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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..891deb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #60389 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/60389) diff --git a/old/60389-0.txt b/old/60389-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 0c4ee96..0000000 --- a/old/60389-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14128 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of History of the Peninsular War Volume IV (of -6), by Robert Southey - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: History of the Peninsular War Volume IV (of 6) - -Author: Robert Southey - -Release Date: September 30, 2019 [EBook #60389] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR, VOL 4 *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - -Transcriber’s Note: - - -Sidenotes are shown in UPPER-CASE and enclosed in ♦DIAMOND SYMBOLS♦; -italic text is enclosed in _underscores_. Other notes will be found at -the end of this eBook. - - - - -HISTORY - -OF THE - -PENINSULAR WAR. - - - - -G. WOODFALL, ANGEL COURT, SKINNER STREET, LONDON. - - - - - HISTORY - OF THE - PENINSULAR WAR. - - - “Unto thee - “Let thine own times as an old story be.” - - DONNE. - - BY ROBERT SOUTHEY, ESQ. LL.D. - POET LAUREATE, - - HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, OF THE - ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY OF HISTORY, OF THE ROYAL - INSTITUTE OF THE NETHERLANDS, OF THE - CYMMRODORION, OF THE MASSACHUSETTS - HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ETC. - - - A NEW EDITION. - - _IN SIX VOLUMES._ - - VOL. IV. - - - LONDON: - JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET. - - MDCCCXXVIII. - - - - -Ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη, -καὶ τὸ πραχθὲν πότερα εὔλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς -ἀγώνισμα μὲν, μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται· καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ -τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν. - - POLYBIUS, lib. iii. sect. 31. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - CHAPTER XXIV. - PAGE - Victor retreats across the Tagus 1 - - Alburquerque proposed for the command in La Mancha 2 - - Plan of detaching a Spanish force toward Segovia 4 - - Jealousy entertained of Cuesta 5 - - Sir Arthur confers with Cuesta 6 - - He requires that the passages toward the north be occupied 7 - - Junction of the British and Spanish armies 8 - - Opportunity of attacking the French lost by Cuesta’s indecision 9 - - Distress of the British army for means of transport 10 - - Sir Arthur halts 12 - - Cuesta advances in pursuit of the French 12 - - Junction of Joseph and Sebastiani with Victor 13 - - Cuesta’s vanguard attacked by the French 14 - - Alburquerque saves Cuesta from defeat 15 - - Cuesta retreats to the Alberche 16 - - Sir Arthur prevails on him to cross that river 16 - - Position of the allies in front of Talavera 17 - - Sir Arthur nearly made prisoner 18 - - Battle of Talavera 19 - - Cuesta decimates some of his troops 29 - - State of Talavera 31 - - Movements of Sir Robert Wilson 32 - - Movements of Soult, Ney, and Mortier 33 - - Cuesta neglects to secure the passes 33 - - Intelligence of Soult’s advance 34 - - Soult occupies Plasencia 35 - - Sir Arthur marches against him 36 - - Cuesta determines to follow Sir Arthur 38 - - Cuesta joins the British 39 - - They retreat across the Tagus 40 - - Colonel Mackinnon removes part of the wounded 41 - - Defeat of the Spaniards at Arzobispo 43 - - Movements of Marshal Ney 45 - - Action with Sir Robert Wilson at the Puerto de Baños 46 - - The French enter Talavera 48 - - Victor behaves well to the English wounded 49 - - Murder of the Bishop of Coria 50 - - Venegas’s army kept inactive before and after the battle of - Talavera 51 - - His useless attempt upon Toledo 53 - - He complains of Cuesta 55 - - The Intruder’s movements after the battle 56 - - Venegas prepares to fight at Aranjuez 57 - - Aranjuez and its gardens 59 - - The French repulsed there 63 - - Deliberations concerning the army of La Mancha 63 - - Venegas resolves to attack the enemy 65 - - The French attack him 66 - - Battle of Almonacid 67 - - - CHAPTER XXV. - - Soult proposes to invade Portugal 71 - - Sir Arthur Wellesley raised to the Peerage 74 - - Marquis Wellesley arrives in Spain 75 - - Distress of the army for provisions 75 - - Disputes with Cuesta concerning supplies 77 - - Mr. Frere requires the removal of Cuesta 80 - - Cuesta resigns the command 82 - - Eguia succeeds _ad interim_ 84 - - Calvo sent to see to the supplies 85 - - Lord Wellington declares his intention of falling back 86 - - Correspondence with Eguia and Calvo 88 - - Marquis Wellesley proposes a plan for supplying the armies 91 - - His ill opinion of the Spanish government 93 - - Lord Wellington objects to taking a position on the Guadiana 95 - - Alburquerque appointed to the command in Extremadura 96 - - Lord Wellington withdraws to Badajoz 98 - - Expedition to Walcheren 100 - - Inquiry into the conduct of the Duke of York 101 - - Changes in the British ministry 102 - - Lords Grey and Grenville refuse to join it 103 - - Disposition of the French and Spanish armies 105 - - Neediness of the intrusive government 106 - - Measures of severity 108 - - Kellermann’s edict 108 - - Measures of Joseph’s ministers 109 - - The Central Junta announces that the Cortes will be assembled 112 - - Declaration which was first proposed 114 - - Objections to it by Mr. Frere 117 - - Unpopularity of the Central Junta 119 - - Their difficulties and errors 120 - - Scheme for overthrowing them 127 - - Commission appointed by the Junta 128 - - Romana’s address 129 - - Reply of the Junta 136 - - Guerillas 144 - - D. Julian Sanchez 145 - - The French repulsed from Astorga 147 - - Battle of Tamames 148 - - The French retire from Salamanca 149 - - Marshal Soult appointed Major-General 150 - - The Junta resolve on risking a general action 150 - - Areizaga appointed to the command 151 - - State of Madrid 152 - - Condition of the British army 154 - - Disposition of the French troops 155 - - Areizaga advances from the Sierra Morena 157 - - The Austrian commissioner remonstrates against his purpose 158 - - Battle of Ocaña 159 - - Treatment of the prisoners 162 - - Battle of Alba de Tormes 164 - - - CHAPTER XXVI. - - Gerona 167 - - Strength of the garrison 170 - - Crusaders enrolled 170 - - Company of S. Barbara 170 - - St. Narcis appointed Generalissimo 171 - - All mention of a capitulation forbidden 172 - - St. Cyr would have reduced the city by blockade 173 - - The bombardment begins 174 - - St. Cyr draws nearer Gerona 176 - - S. Feliu de Guixols and Palamos taken by the French 177 - - Assault of Monjuic 178 - - Succours intercepted 182 - - The ravelin taken 184 - - Monjuic abandoned 185 - - Verdier expects the town to fall 186 - - Battery planted on the cathedral 187 - - Distress of the city 189 - - Attempt to introduce succours 189 - - Garcia Conde enters with reinforcements 191 - - Inadequacy of this relief 192 - - Los Angeles taken and the garrison put to the sword 194 - - Unsuccessful sally 195 - - The French repulsed in a general assault 196 - - St. Cyr resolves to reduce the city by famine 201 - - O’Donnell enters the city 202 - - Failure of the attempt to relieve it 203 - - St. Cyr gives up the command to Augereau 204 - - O’Donnell effects his retreat 205 - - Magazines at Hostalrich taken by the French 207 - - Augereau offers favourable terms 208 - - Destruction of a French convoy by the British ships 209 - - Increased distress in the city 211 - - Report concerning the state of health 212 - - Some of the outworks taken by the French 214 - - Last sally 215 - - Alvarez becomes delirious 216 - - Capitulation 217 - - Death of Alvarez 220 - - Eroles escapes 221 - - - CHAPTER XXVII. - - Buonaparte divorces the Empress Josephine 222 - - Farther requisition for the armies in Spain 224 - - Display of Spanish flags at Paris 225 - - Address of the Central Junta to the nation 227 - - State of public opinion in England 233 - - Lord Wellington’s views with regard to Portugal 235 - - The King’s speech 236 - - Earl St. Vincent 237 - - Lord Grenville 238 - - Honourable Mr. Ward 239 - - Mr. Ponsonby 240 - - Mr. Whitbread 240 - - Mr. Perceval 242 - - Vote of thanks to Lord Wellington opposed by the Earl of Suffolk 244 - - Earl Grosvenor 244 - - Earl Grey 244 - - Marquis Wellesley 244 - - Lord Grenville 247 - - General Tarleton 247 - - Mr. Whitbread 248 - - Pension voted for Lord Wellington 248 - - Opposed by Sir Francis Burdett 249 - - Mr. Whitbread 250 - - Mr. Wilberforce 251 - - Mr. Canning 251 - - The Common Council petition against the pension 252 - - Marquis of Lansdowne 254 - - Lord Holland 255 - - Marquis Wellesley 257 - - - CHAPTER XXVIII. - - Supineness of the Central Junta 264 - - Romana refuses the command 266 - - Montijo and D. Francisco Palafox imprisoned 266 - - Attempts to produce a false confidence 267 - - Scheme of Count Tilly 268 - - The Junta announce their intention to remove 270 - - Murmurs at Seville 272 - - Invasion of Andalusia 273 - - The French pass the Sierra Morena 274 - - False hopes held out to the people by the Central Junta 274 - - Instructions to Alburquerque 275 - - Insurrection at Seville against the Central Junta 277 - - Saavedra takes upon himself the temporary authority 279 - - The French enter Seville 279 - - They overrun Andalusia 280 - - They push for Cadiz 281 - - Alburquerque’s movements 282 - - Cadiz saved by Alburquerque 284 - - He is appointed governor of Cadiz by the people 284 - - A Junta elected at Cadiz 285 - - Resignation of the Central Junta 286 - - A Regency appointed 288 - - Last address of the Central Junta 289 - - The Regents 295 - - Their injustice toward the members of the Central Junta 296 - - Proclamation of the Intruder 299 - - Language of the despondents in England 301 - - The Isle of Leon 303 - - Victor summons the Junta of Cadiz 306 - - Ill will of the Junta towards Alburquerque 307 - - The troops neglected 308 - - Alburquerque applies to the Regency in their behalf 310 - - The Junta publish an attack against Alburquerque 311 - - He resigns the command, and is sent ambassador to England 312 - - - CHAPTER XXIX. - - The Regency 314 - - Schemes for delivering Ferdinand 316 - - Baron de Kolli’s attempt 316 - - Overtures for peace 321 - - Buonaparte’s intention of establishing a Western Empire 323 - - Money voted for the Portugueze army 326 - - Debates upon this subject 326 - - Marquis Wellesley 326 - - Lord Grenville 328 - - Lord Liverpool 332 - - Earl Moira 333 - - Lord Sidmouth 334 - - Marquis of Lansdowne 334 - - Lord Erskine 335 - - Lord Holland 335 - - Mr. Perceval 338 - - Sir John Newport 339 - - Mr. Villiers 339 - - Mr. Curwen 340 - - Mr. Leslie Foster 340 - - General Ferguson 349 - - Mr. Fitzgerald 350 - - Lord Milton 350 - - Mr. Bankes 350 - - Mr. Jacob 351 - - Mr. Whitbread 352 - - Mr. Huskisson 354 - - Mr. Bathurst 354 - - Reform in the Portugueze army 356 - - - CHAPTER XXX. - - O’Donnell appointed to the command in Catalonia 367 - - Garcia Conde made governor of Lerida 367 - - Rapid promotion in the Spanish armies 368 - - Conduct of the people of Villadrau 369 - - Hostalrich 371 - - Commencement of the siege 372 - - First success of O’Donnell 373 - - Desertion from the French army 373 - - Want of concert between the provinces 374 - - Negligence of the Valencian government 376 - - The force on the Valencian frontier dispersed 377 - - Suchet advances against Valencia 378 - - He retreats 380 - - Conspiracy discovered in that city 381 - - The French boast of success 382 - - O’Donnell’s successful operations 383 - - Siege of Hostalrich 387 - - Retreat of the garrison 390 - - Las Medas and Lerida surrendered 394 - - Augereau superseded by Marshal Macdonald 395 - - Fort Matagorda taken by the French 396 - - Storm at Cadiz 398 - - Cruel usage of the French prisoners in the bay 399 - - Escape of the prison ships 400 - - Insurrection and massacre of the prisoners at Majorca 402 - - Prisoners sent to Cabrera 402 - - Their inhuman treatment there 403 - - Marshal Soult’s edict 404 - - Counter edict of the Regency 405 - - - CHAPTER XXXI. - - Inactivity before Cadiz 407 - - The Regents send for Cuesta 407 - - Badajoz secured by Romana 408 - - The British take a position on the frontiers of Beira 408 - - Astorga summoned by the French 410 - - Siege of Astorga 411 - - Its surrender 412 - - Affair at Barba del Puerco 414 - - Massena appointed to the army of Portugal 415 - - Ciudad Rodrigo 416 - - The French besiege it 417 - - D. Julian Sanchez 418 - - Marshal Ney summons the place 418 - - Situation of Lord Wellington 420 - - Spirit of the inhabitants 420 - - Nunnery of S. Cruz attacked 421 - - Convent of S. Domingo recovered 422 - - Julian Sanchez effects his escape from the city 423 - - State of the British army 425 - - A practicable breach made 426 - - The place capitulates 428 - - Conduct of the French 429 - - Speculations upon the campaign 431 - - La Puebla de Sanabria occupied by the French 434 - - The Portugueze retake it 436 - - - CHAPTER XXXII. - - Massena’s proclamation to the Portugueze 440 - - The French invest Almeida 441 - - Almeida 442 - - Fort Conception abandoned 444 - - Affair on the Coa 445 - - Desponding letters from the army 448 - - Apprehensions expressed in England 450 - - Ney summons the governor of Almeida 451 - - Portugueze officers in Massena’s army 452 - - The Portugueze ordered to retire before the enemy 454 - - Siege of Almeida 455 - - Surrender of the place 456 - - The Portugueze prisoners enlist and desert 457 - - Condemnation of their conduct 458 - - Militia forced into the French service 459 - - They escape and rejoin the allies 460 - - Changes in the Portugueze Regency 461 - - Conduct of the Portugueze government 463 - - Arbitrary arrests at Lisbon 465 - - Apprehensions of the British government 467 - - Movements of Regnier’s corps, and of General Hill 470 - - Massena advances into Portugal 471 - - Ney and Regnier join him at Celorico 472 - - The French army collected at Viseu 474 - - Lord Wellington crosses to the Serra de Busaco 474 - - Busaco 476 - - Battle of Busaco 478 - - Behaviour of the Portugueze troops 482 - - Massena marches into the Porto road 484 - - Colonel Trant’s movements 485 - - The allies withdraw from Busaco 487 - - Trant retreats to the Vouga 487 - - The allies cross the Mondego 489 - - Flight of the inhabitants from Coimbra 490 - - The French enter Coimbra 490 - - The Portugueze people fly before the enemy 491 - - Hopes and expectations of the French 493 - - Confusion at Condeixa 494 - - Leiria forsaken 495 - - Alcobaça forsaken by the monks 496 - - Surprise at Alcoentre 497 - - The French discover the lines 498 - - Feelings of the British army 499 - - Lines of Torres Vedras 500 - - Romana joins the allies 504 - - Trant surprises the French in Coimbra 504 - - He escorts his prisoners to Porto 507 - - Difficulties of Massena’s situation 509 - - His demonstrations in front of the lines 511 - - Montbrun sent against Abrantes 512 - - The French army subsists by plunder 513 - - Deserters form themselves into a corps of plunderers 515 - - State of Lisbon 516 - - Opinions of the opposition in England 517 - - General La Croix killed 518 - - Massena retreats from the lines 520 - - Lord Wellington advances to Santarem 521 - - Both armies go into cantonments 522 - - The King’s illness 523 - - Proceedings concerning a Regency 525 - - Mr. Perceval 527 - - Troops sent to Portugal 530 - - Issues of money required 531 - - Conduct of Lord Grenville as Auditor of the Exchequer 532 - - State of the opposition 536 - - Their expectations 538 - - Language of the anarchists 538 - - Mr. Perceval popular at this time 542 - - Schemes for a new ministry 544 - - The King’s opinion during an interval of amendment 545 - - The Prince Regent announces his intention of making no change 546 - - Mr. Perceval’s reply 547 - - - - -HISTORY - -OF THE - -PENINSULAR WAR. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIV. - - SIR A. WELLESLEY ENTERS SPAIN. BATTLE OF TALAVERA. RETREAT OF THE - BRITISH ARMY. DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS AT PUENTE DEL ARZOBISPO - AND ALMONACID. - - -♦1809.♦ - -♦VICTOR RETREATS BEYOND THE TAGUS.♦ - -The head-quarters of Marshal Victor, after he returned from his -movement in favour of Soult to his former position, were at Truxillo: -Cuesta was on his left flank, having his head-quarters at Fuente del -Maestro, and his advance at Calemonte on the Guadiana, a league from -Merida. The British General had formed a plan for cutting off the -enemy’s retreat by a movement through Castello Branco and Plasencia -to the bridge of Almaraz; this he relinquished, because it did not -coincide with Cuesta’s opinion, and because he found it impossible -to prevail upon that general to choose a secure position, or to -concentrate his army, which was distributed with so little judgement -in an open country, that if Victor had attacked it, an easier victory -might have been obtained than that of Medellin. The French have -seldom suffered such opportunities to pass, and Sir Arthur was very -apprehensive that the army, which had been raised with such exertions, -would be dispersed before he could effect a junction with it. But -Victor was content to forego this advantage rather than risk the -danger of being cut off from Madrid by such an operation as Sir Arthur -had meditated; he broke up, therefore, at the beginning of June, -and retreated across the Tagus at Almaraz; Cuesta followed, without -obtaining any advantage over him in his retreat, and sufficiently -fortunate that the French Marshal was in too much fear of a better -army, to profit by the want of discipline in the Spaniards and the want -of skill in their commander. - -♦ALBURQUERQUE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMAND IN LA MANCHA.♦ - -When Sir Arthur had given up his original plan, it was concerted that -he should join Cuesta at Badajoz. Victor’s retreat rendered this -unnecessary; it was then agreed that he should advance, as he had at -first proposed, by way of Plasencia. The army of La Mancha at this -time, consisting of 16,000 foot and 1300 horse, was under Venegas, -subject to Cuesta’s orders. This was the side on which the French -were most exposed; Alburquerque, by one operation, though it had only -partially succeeded, had retarded the plans of the enemy for more than -a month, and, had he not been withheld by the positive orders of men -who were unworthy to control him, there is reason for believing that he -would have prevented many of the disasters which afterwards occurred. -His patriotism was undoubted; no man, indeed, ever more passionately -loved his country: his military talents were of the highest promise; -and when these moral advantages concurred, his rank and illustrious -family ought to have been considered as circumstances to recommend him, -giving him, as they would have done, additional claims to the respect -of the army and of the nation. With both he was exceedingly popular, -especially among the La Manchans; and having been a successful general, -almost the only one who had obtained any success, the soldiers had -an opinion of his good fortune as well as of his talents. Mr. Frere, -who estimated the Duke as he deserved, was exceedingly desirous that -he should have the command in La Mancha, and suggested it to Cuesta. -“An army,” he said, “which had been torn by factions, thrown into -confusion by the successive removal of its officers, and discouraged -by ill fortune, could have no hope of being speedily re-established -and conducted to victory, except by a general who was known to them -for his successes, and who was personally popular among them, and in -the province wherein he was to act. The Duque de Alburquerque was the -only one who united in himself these advantages; and for the situation -which he at present held, Venegas would not be less useful, having -always served under General Cuesta, and not only near his person, -but immediately under his eyes.” Unhappily Cuesta was jealous of the -Duke’s popularity; and the Supreme Junta were jealous of his rank and -influence. Mr. Frere’s advice was rejected, and this may be considered -as one cause of the failure of the campaign. - -♦PLAN OF DETACHING A SPANISH FORCE TOWARD SEGOVIA.♦ - -It had at first been doubted whether the French would make any thing -more than a show of resistance on this side of Madrid; and a plan was -proposed for menacing their retreat and the rear of the metropolis, by -detaching a considerable Spanish corps through the Puerto de Arenas -to Avila, Arevalo, and Segovia. Such a movement, it was thought, -would compel the enemy either to retreat, or to detach a force of -correspondent magnitude; and thus a material advantage would be -afforded to the British army, which, when concentrated, amounted only -to 20,000 men. Cuesta had about 38,000, well armed but ill disciplined, -and ill clothed also, which, in their state of discipline, was an evil -of more consequence than may immediately be obvious. The Intruder, with -9000 of his guards, and the greater part of the garrison of Madrid, -had joined Sebastiani in La Mancha, and attempted to bring Venegas to -action; finding this in vain, they left 2000 men to defend Toledo, and -prepared to bring their whole disposable force, consisting of about -50,000, against the united Spanish and British armies. But the Spanish -army was in such a state, that little could be expected from its -co-operation: a smaller force would, under such circumstances, be of -greater assistance, as being more manageable and more likely to follow -the example and catch the spirit of their better disciplined allies. -If, therefore, a large detachment of these troops, by moving toward -Segovia, could draw off a body of the French to watch them, they would -render more service by such a diversion than could be expected from -them in the field. For this reason such a movement was advised both by -Sir Arthur and Mr. Frere; that minister not being deterred from the -performance of his duty by the clamour raised against him in England, -but delivering his opinion to the British general upon the same -footing, he said, as he should have done had he been holding a private -conversation with Sir Arthur, and as he should equally have ventured -to do had he been residing ♦JEALOUSY ENTERTAINED OF CUESTA.♦ casually -in Spain in a private character. There was another reason which made -the Junta wish to see Cuesta’s army diminished. A suspicion had for -some time prevailed that Cuesta had not forgiven his arrest, and that -the same temper which led him to those violent measures whereby he -had provoked that act of vigour, would tempt him to take some serious -vengeance whenever it was in his power. This, it was thought, was more -to be apprehended now than at any former time, because the army which -his rival, Blake, commanded, had just at this time been shamefully -dispersed, and thus the great obstacle to such a project was removed. -The Junta were afraid to supersede Cuesta, even if they knew whom to -appoint in his place; and they were afraid even to propose this measure -of detaching a part of his army, under a commander of sufficient -popularity to oppose his designs: but it was not doubted that if such a -measure were proposed by the British General as a military plan, they -would joyfully accede to it. - -Cuesta was wronged by these suspicions; ... he was obstinate, -intractable, and unfit for command; but a right honest man, and one -who, from a sense of duty as well as from natural courage, would at any -time have laid down his ♦JULY 10. SIR ARTHUR CONFERS WITH CUESTA.♦ -life for the service of Spain. Sir Arthur, whose head-quarters were now -at Plasencia, went to confer with him at Almaraz. Fourteen thousand of -the Spaniards were at this time stationed at the Puente del Arzobispo; -the remainder were about two miles from the bridge of Almaraz, encamped -under the Pass of Miravete. Victor had taken up a position upon the -Alberche, near Talavera. There, Sir Arthur stated his opinion, the -enemy ought to be attacked by the united force of the allies; but it -would be desirable to detach a corps of 10,000 towards Avila to turn -their right: Cuesta approved the proposal, but desired they might be -British troops. Sir Arthur replied, that the British ♦1809. JULY.♦ -army, to act with advantage, must act in a body; and the Spaniards -could better spare such a detachment, being indeed more numerous than -was either necessary for the operations on the Alberche, or convenient, -considering their state of discipline. These representations were lost -upon Cuesta, who estimated his own importance by the numbers under -his command; he refused to make any large detachment, but offered -to send two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry to join Sir R. -Wilson’s Portugueze brigade, and march upon Arenas, and thence to -Escalona, in communication with the left of the British army. Had Sir -Arthur’s advice been followed, it was his intention to have recommended -Alburquerque to the command; but it was the fate of Spain to be almost -always deprived of the services of this brave and able general by the -jealousy of meaner minds. - -♦HE REQUIRES THAT THE PASSES BE OCCUPIED.♦ - -Sir Arthur proposed also that the Spaniards should occupy the passes at -Perales and Baños, and thus cut off the communication between Victor -and the French forces in the north of Spain. It was neither known what -the amount of that force might be, nor where it was distributed, nor -in what condition it was: but the march of Mortier with some 15,000 -men from Aragon to their assistance had been ascertained, and it was -certain therefore that a movement might be apprehended from that -quarter. The proposal was received with some ill humour on Cuesta’s -part, for he was surrounded by intriguers, some of whom perhaps sought -to serve the enemy by embroiling the allies, and others who, having as -much national pride as professional ignorance, had as much selfishness -as either; these persons had persuaded the hasty old man that Sir -Arthur sought to weaken the Spanish army by dividing it, in order to -obtain for himself the glory of expelling the French from Madrid, which -was now, they represented, within Cuesta’s reach. He was prevailed -upon however, by his Adjutant-General, O’Donoju, to promise that this -should be done; and if the performance fell far short, the detachment -being incompetent in force, and almost wholly unprovided, the failure -must be imputed to his erring judgement and the disorderly state of the -commissariat department, not to any want of faith or perverse purpose -on his part. - -♦JUNCTION OF THE BRITISH AND SPANISH ARMIES.♦ - -In pursuance of the arrangements at this interview, the British army -broke up from Plasencia on the 17th and 18th of July, and formed a -junction with Cuesta on the 20th at Oropesa. Sir R. Wilson marched from -his position on the Tietar on the 15th, and reached Escalona on the -23d, threatening Madrid on that side, from which he was about eight -leagues distant. Venegas had been directed to break up from Madrilejos -at the same time as the British army, march by Tembleque and Ocaña, -cross the Tagus by the ford at Fuente Duenas, and advance to Arganda, -so to threaten Madrid, which would then be within a few hours’ march. -Had this plan been followed, either a considerable body of the French -must have been detached against Venegas, or he would have entered the -capital without resistance. - -♦OPPORTUNITY OF ATTACKING THE FRENCH.♦ - -But Sir Arthur was destined throughout the campaign to have his -plans continually frustrated by the misconduct of those from whom he -looked for cordial co-operation. On the 22d the combined armies moved -from Oropesa, and the advance attacked Victor’s rear-guard, which -was drawn up in order of battle, upon a plain about a league from -Talavera. Their right wing was turned by Brigadier-General Anson, -and Alburquerque attacked them in front, and drove them back. They -retreated to a position upon the Alberche, a league beyond the town, -and the combined armies advanced, and encamped that night in the vine -and olive-yards between the town and the French. Sir Arthur had a -narrow escape that day; while he was reconnoitring, a three-pound shot -was fired at him with so good an aim, that it cut a bough from a tree -close to his head. He determined to attack the enemy the following -morning, and bring Victor to action before he should be joined by -Sebastiani and the Intruder. Nothing could be more favourable to his -views than this unskilful halt of the enemy, an opportunity being thus -presented for beating them, as he had hoped, in detail. The columns -were formed for this purpose at an early hour, and at five in the -morning they received orders to march. But when Cuesta was informed -of the determination which had been taken, no arguments could induce -him to make up his mind, and give the ♦LOST BY CUESTA’S INDECISION.♦ -necessary instructions: at midnight he remained undecided, and the -orders therefore were necessarily countermanded, ... not more to the -disappointment of the army, than to the sore vexation of the General, -who knew the whole importance of the opportunity which had thus been -lost. So unaccountable was this conduct in Cuesta, that it has been -supposed he scrupled at fighting upon a Sunday. Whatever his reasons -were, they have never been explained, and could not have been more -valid than this would have been: but thus the fair occasion was let -pass; for when, on the morning of the 24th, he was ready to offer -battle, it appeared that Victor, profiting by the precious time which -had been given him, had decamped during the night, and retired to St. -Olalla, and from thence towards Torrejos, to effect that meditated -junction which Sir Arthur’s measures would have frustrated. - -♦DISTRESS OF THE BRITISH ARMY FOR WANT OF TRANSPORT.♦ - -This retreat surprised Cuesta as much as if his own procrastination -had not deprived Spain of the victory which prompter measures would -have secured. The British General had foreseen the consequence of so -ill-timed a delay, and the disappointment was the more grievous because -he could not pursue the French. From the hour in which he entered -Spain he had never been able to procure means of transport: ... he -required none for the baggage of individuals, ... only for provisions, -ammunition, money, and military stores, things indispensable for an -army: and these were not to be obtained. The country was in a state of -total disorganization; and what was more extraordinary, the government -seemed to be totally ignorant of this, and to suppose that nothing more -was required of it than to issue edicts, which would be carried into -effect as if things were in their ordinary course. This inconvenience -had been so severely felt, that Sir Arthur, before he left Plasencia, -informed Cuesta it would be impossible for him to undertake any farther -operations after their arrangements against Victor should have been -carried into effect, unless the necessary means of transport were -supplied. Justice to his Majesty, and to the army with which he had -been intrusted, required this determination, he said, and he was -equally bound in justice to communicate it to General Cuesta without -delay. The means which he required were such as every country in which -an army was acting was bound to afford; and if the people of Spain were -either unwilling or unable to supply what the British army required, -they must do without its services. This declaration had been made as -early as the 16th; a week had now elapsed, there had not been the -slightest effort to remedy the evil, and from the same cause the troops -were now in actual want of provisions. For the Spanish commissariat was -in the most deplorable state; and that of the British army, which was -far from being in a good one, could effect nothing in a country where -they exerted no authority themselves, and the government would exert -none for them. The evil was aggravated by the junction of two large -armies, in a country which had scarcely ever been without troops to -exhaust it during the preceding twelve months. When the two combined -armies became competitors for food, the inhabitants naturally preferred -their own countrymen: ... it was afterwards discovered also, that, with -a stupid selfishness, which admits neither of justification or excuse, -they concealed the greater part of their stores from both. - -♦SIR ARTHUR HALTS.♦ - -Thus painfully circumstanced, Sir Arthur could not proceed. He -conceived also that his engagement with Cuesta was fulfilled by the -removal of Victor from the Alberche; for if advantage were duly taken -of that movement, it gave the Spanish General possession of the course -of the Tagus, and opened the communication with La Mancha and Venegas. -He halted from absolute necessity, and he determined even to return -to Portugal, if he were not properly supplied. Cuesta appeared fully -sensible of the propriety of this determination, and trusting that good -fortune would put him in possession of Madrid, which now seemed just -within his reach, he, having means of transport in abundance, ♦CUESTA -ADVANCES IN PURSUIT OF VICTOR.♦ advanced four leagues in pursuit of -Victor, to the village of Bravo; Sir Arthur, meantime, taking up a -position at Talavera, to wait the issue of a movement which was -undertaken against his opinion, moved two divisions of infantry and a -brigade of cavalry, under General Sherbrooke, across the Alberche to -Casalegas, to keep up the communication with Cuesta and with Sir Robert -Wilson. Near that village the body of a Spanish peasant was found, whom -the French soldiers had a little before burnt, or rather scorched to -death. It lay with the arms lifted and the hands clenched, as if in the -act of prayer, the features distorted, and the whole corpse stiffened -in one dreadful expression of agony! - -♦JUNCTION OF JOSEPH AND SEBASTIANI WITH VICTOR.♦ - -Joseph Buonaparte and Marshal Jourdan left Madrid on the 23d, and -halted that night at Navalcarnero, designing to form a junction with -Victor at Casalegas, and to order Sebastiani thither as soon as that -general, in pursuance of his instructions, should have returned from -Consuegra and Madrilejos, where he was watching Venegas, to Toledo. -Another object which Jourdan had in view was to check Sir Robert -Wilson, whose force he supposed to be considerably greater than it was, -and of whose enterprising spirit the French stood in fear. But Victor, -who was well informed of the plans of his enemies, perceived, that if -he fell back upon Navalcarnero to join the Intruder, it would be easy -to interpose between them and Sebastiani, in which case the junction -of their whole force in this quarter would be rendered exceedingly -difficult, if not impossible. Apprising Joseph, therefore, of his -movements, he retreated to the left bank of the Guadarrama, at its -confluence ♦JULY 25.♦ with the Tagus near Toledo. Sebastiani reached -that city the same day, and the Intruder, marching to the same point, -fixed his head-quarters at Vargas, two leagues distant, so that the -whole force which he could bring against the allies was now united. -It consisted of 45,000 men, after 3000 were left to defend Toledo. -They resolved immediately, now that this great object was effected, to -act upon the offensive; and on the next day they began their march to -Torrejos. - -♦CUESTA’S VANGUARD ATTACKED BY THE FRENCH.♦ - -Cuesta had by this time advanced to St. Olalla. He there learnt that -Victor had turned off towards Toledo; and so far was he from divining -the obvious intent of such a movement, that he supposed the French were -in full retreat, and that he had nothing to do but to pursue them. From -some strange misconception, too, he supposed the English were about to -follow him; they were very short of provisions and means of conveyance, -he informed his own government, but he was doing all in his power to -persuade them of the necessity of putting themselves in motion. He -thus deceived himself and his government, instead of making efforts to -supply the wants of the English army, or assisting them with his own -means of transport. These he possessed in sufficient quantity; and it -was discovered when too late, that food in abundance might have been -procured, had proper means been used for obtaining it. In the morning -of the 25th Cuesta dispatched intelligence that he was in pursuit of -the French; in the evening he discovered that he was in some danger -of being attacked by them, and on the following day his outposts were -assailed in Torrejos, and driven in. General Zayas advanced with the -vanguard to meet the French; he was attacked by Latour Maubourg, -with the French advanced guard, and suffered considerable loss; but -Zayas was a good officer, and maintained his ground against superior -numbers while he sent to require support. ♦ALBURQUERQUE SAVES CUESTA -FROM DEFEAT.♦ Alburquerque had requested that his division might be -the first to support the vanguard, either in case of its attacking -the enemy or being attacked. While Cuesta made arrangements for the -retreat of the whole army beyond the Alberche, the Duque advanced time -enough to save Zayas from complete rout, and the army from that utter -defeat which must necessarily have resulted. The vanguard was flying -at the moment when he arrived; he charged the enemy, checked them, and -gave the van time to re-form, and fall back in good order. But for -this timely success the army would have been dispersed, for all the -artillery and baggage were in the streets of St. Olalla, carts of bread -were there also blocking up the way, the commissaries had taken flight, -and the men, catching that panic which want of order in an army never -fails to occasion on the first approach of danger, had begun to throw -away their arms, that they might neither be incumbered with them in -running away, nor supposed to be soldiers if they were overtaken. - -♦CUESTA RETREATS TO THE ALBERCHE.♦ - -Alburquerque would have pursued his success had he not been compelled -to retreat by repeated orders from the commander-in-chief, at the -moment when he was about to attack a disheartened enemy, with troops -confident in their own courage and in the skill of their leader, and -heated by the advantage which they had gained. He had, however, done -much in saving the army, for never were the movements of an army -conducted in a more wretched and disorderly manner; like a rabble upon -a pilgrimage, such was Alburquerque’s description, they proceeded -without any regard to distance, order, or method, and with the whole -park of artillery; they had neither provisions, staff, nor settled -plan; and they stopped upon their marches to repose like flocks of -sheep, without taking up any position, so that, if the French had known -the condition they were in, defeat must have been inevitable whenever -they were unexpectedly attacked. Saved from that total dispersion which -must have ensued, had not Alburquerque thus checked the French in their -career, the Spanish army retreated twenty miles from St. Olalla to the -Alberche unmolested, thus again forming a junction with the British, -and bivouacked on the left bank. At daybreak Sir Arthur crossed, and -having with some difficulty penetrated to the old General’s tent, found -him asleep there, and the army in that state of disorder which is ♦SIR -ARTHUR PREVAILS ON HIM TO CROSS THAT RIVER.♦ usually consequent upon -a forced retreat. He pointed out the necessity of passing the river -without loss of time, and taking up his ground on the right of the -British position. Fortunately Cuesta yielded to this advice, although -he thought it unlikely that the enemy would venture to attack them: -there was a report that they had detached 15,000 men towards Madrid, -and this strengthened his opinion. In fact, had Venegas performed his -part of the concerted operations, either this must have been done by -the French, or Madrid would have fallen. But though this General was -under Cuesta’s orders, and had been instructed how to act in pursuance -of the plan arranged with the British Commander, counter orders were -sent him by the Supreme Junta; and he, in consequence, disconcerted -the whole arrangement by employing himself in a useless cannonade of -Toledo; thus permitting the French to bring their whole force against -the allies. - -♦POSITION OF THE ALLIES IN FRONT OF TALAVERA.♦ - -Sir Arthur, as soon as the Spaniards fell back to the Alberche, -expected a general action, and immediately prepared for it, recalling -Sherbrooke from Casalegas to his station in the line. The position -extended something more than two miles. The British were on the left; -there the ground was open, and commanded by a height upon which a -division of infantry was stationed under Major-General Hill. Still -farther upon the left was a low range of mountains separated from the -height by a valley about 300 fathoms wide, and here a ravine running -from north to south covered the left and centre of the position, and -terminated at the beginning of the olive grounds on the right. The -valley was not occupied, because it was commanded by the height, and -because the mountains were thought too distant to be of any consequence -in the expected battle. The right, consisting of Spaniards, extended -immediately in front of Talavera down to the Tagus: this part of the -ground was covered with olive trees, and much intersected by banks and -ditches. The high road leading from the town to the bridge of Alberche -was defended by a heavy battery in front of the Ermida, or chapel of -Nuestra Señora del Prado, which was occupied by Spanish infantry. All -the avenues to the town were defended in like manner; the town itself -was occupied, and the remainder of the Spanish foot formed in two lines -behind the banks, on the road which led to the position of the British. -In the centre between the allied armies was a commanding spot, on -which the British had begun to construct a redoubt. Brigadier-General -Alexander Campbell was posted here with a division of infantry; and -General Cotton’s brigade of dragoons, with some Spanish cavalry, in the -open ground in his rear. - -♦SIR ARTHUR NEARLY MADE PRISONER.♦ - -When Sherbrooke was recalled from Casalegas, General Mackenzie had -been left with a division of infantry and a brigade of horse as an -advanced post near Casa de Salinas, in a wood on the right of the -Alberche, which covered the left of the British army. About two in -the afternoon of the 27th the enemy appeared in strength on the left -bank; Victor forded the Alberche, and before Mackenzie’s division -could be withdrawn from the wood on the left, it was attacked by very -superior forces under Generals Lapisse and Chaudron Rousseau. Sir -Arthur, from a tower immediately in their rear, which he had ascended -for the purpose of observation, saw the men falter when about to be -attacked by such overpowering numbers, and descending just in time, -with difficulty mounted his horse in the midst of the affray, and -escaped being made prisoner. Had he been taken at that moment, or had -Marlborough, a century before, been recognised and detained when he -fell into the hands of a French partisan on the Meuse, how differently -would the latter days of Buonaparte and of Louis XIV. have closed, and -how different at this hour would have been the condition of England, -of Europe, and of the world! The British suffered considerably, but -they withdrew in perfect order, and took their place in the line. -Meantime the other divisions of the French crossed, and advanced -within cannon-shot of ♦BATTLE OF TALAVERA.♦ the allied army. They -cannonaded the left of the British position, and they attacked the -Spanish infantry with their horse, hoping to break through and win -the town; but they were bravely withstood and finally repulsed. The -action ceased a little before nine at night. A little before eleven the -first line of the Spanish left opened a tremendous fire; Sir Arthur, -who was near the spot, observed that the fire was admirably well kept -up, and hoped they would do as well next day; but as he suspected that -at that moment there was nothing to fire at, he wished to stop it. -While he was speaking, three battalions of Spaniards, alarmed at their -own noise, gave way, and fairly took to their heels. The vacancy was -promptly filled up; and these very men the next day bore their full -share of the battle, and behaved as steadily as the best troops could -have done. Victor had marked the height on which General Hill was -posted; he considered it to be the key of the position, and thought -that, if he could beat the English from thence, it would be impossible -for them to maintain the field afterwards. This might best be done -during the night. He therefore ordered Ruffin to attack the hill with -three regiments, Vilatte to support him, and Lapisse to make a feint -upon the centre of the allied armies, which might serve as a diversion. -The attack was made soon after night had closed; for a moment it -was successful, and they got possession of the height. General Hill -instantly attacked them with the bayonet, and recovered the post. At -midnight the attempt was repeated, and failed again. According to -the French account, one of the regiments destined for this service -lost its way, owing to the darkness, and another was impeded by the -ravine. Both sides suffered considerably at this well-contested point. -The armies lay upon the field, the cavalry with their bridles round -their arms; but there was little rest during the night; both sides -were on the alert and alarm, and in different parts of the field the -videttes of each army were sometimes fired on by their own countrymen, -being mistaken for enemies. Whole battalions of the enemy got into the -English line, some crying that they were Spaniards, some that they were -German deserters: the trick was soon discovered, and, in the reception -which they met with, it is not unlikely that many a poor German, who -really intended to desert, lost his life. These night-engagements -were carried on with the most determined fury; the men, after they -had discharged their muskets, frequently closed, and fought with the -butt-end. - -The French had ascertained, in the course of the evening, that any -attack upon the town, posted as the Spaniards were, was hopeless; -that the centre also was very strong, both from the rugged ground and -the olive-yards which covered it, and the works which had been thrown -up there. The left was the most practicable point of attack, and the -difficulty of carrying that they had severely experienced. There, -however, they made a third attempt at daybreak, with three regiments -under General Ruffin advancing in close columns. They proceeded -triumphantly, as they supposed, nearly to the summit; when they were -again charged and again beaten back, but they fell back in good order. -Sir Arthur, for the better security of this post, now sent two brigades -of horse into the valley on the left. Alburquerque had at this time -been ordered by the Spanish commander to go with his cavalry to a place -near the town, where it was impossible for them to act, and there -was not even room for them, the ground being thickly wooded. On this -occasion he ventured to act from his own judgement; observing that the -English cavalry were charged by very superior numbers, he hastened to -support them, and his opportune arrival enabled them to occupy the -position. Cuesta perceived the advantage of this movement, and suffered -the Duke to choose his own ground, who accordingly took the post of -danger with the English horse. To annoy this body, the French sent -their riflemen to the heights on the left of the valley; thus occupying -the ground which Sir Arthur had supposed beyond the bounds to which the -action would extend. It proved of no advantage to them; for Cuesta, -marking the movement, dispatched Camp-marshal Bassecourt against them -with the fifth division of Spanish infantry, and dislodged them with -great loss. - -About eleven, the enemy having been baffled in all their attempts, -intermitted the attack, rested their troops, and, it is said, cooked -their dinners upon the field. Wine and a little bread were served out -to the British troops. A brook which flows into the Tagus separated the -French and English in one part of the field, and during this pause men -of both armies went there to drink, as if a truce had been established. -Their muskets were laid down and their helmets put off while they -stooped to the stream, and when they had quenched their thirst, they -rested on the brink, looking at each other. The heat and exasperation -of battle were suspended; they felt that mutual respect which proofs -of mutual courage had inspired, and some of them shook hands across -the brook, in token that although they were met to shed each other’s -blood, brave men knew how to value a brave enemy. At such a moment it -was natural for Englishmen to have no other feeling; ... the atrocities -by which Buonaparte’s soldiers in the Peninsula had disgraced their -profession, their country, and their nature, were for the time -forgotten. This interval also was taken for bringing off the wounded -who lay intermingled as they had fallen. And here also a redeeming -sense of humanity was manifested; all hostility being suspended among -those who were thus employed, and each striving who should with most -alacrity assist the other in extricating the common sufferers. About -noon Victor ordered a general attack along the whole line. His own -three divisions were to attack the hill once more. Sebastiani was to -form his first division in two lines on the left of Lapisse; Leval, -with a brigade just then arriving from Aranjuez, to be stationed to -the left of this division, a little in the rear; still further left, -Milhaud, with his dragoons, was to observe Talavera; Latour Maubourg’s -infantry and Merlin’s light-horse formed in the rear of Victor to -support his corps, and advance into the open ground now occupied by -him, as soon as he should have won the hill. The reserve was placed in -a third line behind Sebastiani’s corps. - -From the moment this general attack commenced, the firing of musketry -was heard on all sides like the roll of a drum, with scarcely a -moment’s interruption during the remainder of the day, the deeper sound -of a heavy cannonade rising above it like thunder. The operations -of the French were deranged by a blunder of Leval’s division, which -they attribute to the ruggedness of the ground, and the impossibility -of preserving the line among the olive-trees and vines. Instead of -forming in _echellon_ in the rear, it advanced to the front, and -before it had finished deploying it was attacked. Sebastiani sent a -brigade to its support, and it fell back to the ground which it was -designed to occupy. This occasioned some delay. When the line was -formed, Sebastiani waited till Victor had begun the attack. Lapisse -first crossed the ravine, supported by Latour Maubourg’s cavalry, and -by two batteries, each of eight pieces of cannon. Vilatte threatened -the hills and covered the valley, and Ruffin, skirting the great chain -of mountains to the left, endeavoured to turn the flank of the British -army. The attack upon the hill was exceedingly formidable, but, like -all the former, it failed. Lapisse was mortally wounded, his men were -driven back, and Victor himself rallied them, and brought them once -more to the contested point; their retrograde movement had exposed -Sebastiani’s right, and there also the French suffered considerably. - -While Victor led his troops once more to the foot of that hill which -had so often been fatal to the assailants, Vilatte with the columns in -the valley advanced to his support. General Anson’s brigade, consisting -of the 1st German light dragoons and the 23d dragoons, with General -Fane’s heavy cavalry, were ordered to charge them. The French formed -in two solid squares; they were protected by a deep ravine, which -was not perceived till the horses were close to it; and they kept -up a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry. This was the most -destructive part of the whole action; numbers of men and horse fell -into the ravine, ... numbers were mown down. But the portion which -got over were collected as well as he could by the Honourable Major -Ponsonby, and led upon the bayonets of the enemy. They passed between -two columns of infantry, against which they could effect nothing, then -galloped upon the regiment of chasseurs which supported them. Here -they were charged by some regiments in reserve, surrounded, broken, -dispersed, and almost destroyed, losing two-thirds of their number. The -rest (Lord William Russell was among them) passed through the intervals -of the French columns, and retired within their own lines. Injudicious -and unfortunate as the charge was, the desperate courage with which -officers and men had advanced upon almost certain destruction -astonished the enemy; it put an end to their efforts on that side, and -no further attempt was made upon the hill, which was now covered with -dead, dying, wounded, and exhausted troops. - -The attack upon the centre was made at the same time. General -Campbell was supported by Eguia and Henestrosa, and by a regiment of -Spanish horse; the allies repulsed the enemy, and while the Spaniards -turned their flank, the English took their cannon. A column, chiefly -consisting of Germans, advanced with excellent steadiness through a -heavy fire of artillery, like men who, having obtained the highest -military character, were resolved to keep it. They were received by -Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke’s men with a volley of musketry which -staggered them; the whole British division then rushed forward with -the bayonet, and by that irresistible charge the enemy were driven -back with great slaughter. But the brigade of Guards advanced too -far in pursuit; they were attacked by the French reserve, they were -cut down by a close fire of artillery from a wood; in a few minutes -all their mounted officers were killed, with more than 500 men, and -at that moment the fate of the day appeared worse than doubtful. But -Sir Arthur’s foresight secured the victory which had been so long -contested. Seeing the advance, and apprehending the consequence, he -moved a battalion of the 48th from the heights to their support; and -this timely succour, with the assistance of the second line of General -Cotton’s cavalry, saved the brigade from that total destruction which -must else have been inevitable. The broken Guards passed through the -intervals of the 48th, re-formed behind it, and then in their turn -supported the regiment which had preserved them. Upon their advance, -the enemy, whose heart now failed them, retired: the Guards renewed the -huzzas with which they had advanced, and the cry was taken up along -the whole line. It was the shout of victory on the part of the allies; -for though the light troops continued to fire, and from time to time a -heavy cannonade was renewed, the enemy made no further attempt. - -A circumstance more horrid than unfrequent in war occurred toward the -close of the action; the long dry grass took fire, and many of the -wounded were scorched to death. It was night before the battle ended, -and the allies were far from certain that it would not be renewed on -the morrow. The moon rose dimly, the night was chill and damp because -of the heavy dew; the troops lay in position on the ground, without -covering, and without food; even water was scarce; but the officers -and the generals were faring alike, and neither murmuring was heard -for their privations, nor apprehension felt for what the morrow might -bring forth. The French had made large fires along the whole front of -their line. At daylight the troops were under arms, and in order of -battle, ... but the enemy had disappeared, a rear-guard only being in -sight on the left of the Alberche. The Intruder had been a spectator of -the whole action. During the night contradictory reports were brought -him, some affirming that another attack must ensure the victory, others -that Victor’s right had been turned, and he could not possibly keep his -ground. In this dilemma Joseph sent to ascertain which was the true -report, and retired to rest, in expectation of having the favourable -one confirmed, the reserve bivouacking round him. At daybreak he -was awakened by Sebastiani, who had fallen back with his corps upon -the reserve during the night, and who came with tidings that he had -been compelled to make this retrograde movement, because Victor was -retreating along the foot of the hills to Casalegas. This intelligence -left no time for deliberation. The Intruder began to retreat also, -but in perfect order; Milhaud’s division formed the rear, and Latour -Maubourg brought off many of the wounded. Twenty pieces of cannon were -taken by the conquerors; the prisoners were not many. - -Our loss had been very heavy; 801 killed, 3913 wounded, 653 missing. -The Spaniards had 1250 killed and wounded. Generals Mackenzie and -Langworth fell. Two bullets passed through Sir Arthur’s clothes, and he -received a severe contusion on the shoulder from a spent musket-ball. -During the second action no attack was made upon the main body of -Cuesta’s army; the position was too strong, and the French rightly -judged, that if, by bringing their whole force to bear upon the -English, they could defeat them, Cuesta’s discomfiture must necessarily -follow. On this day, therefore, they were in the proportion of more -than two to one to the troops whom they engaged. The British entered -the field 18,300 effective men; they were opposed to not less than -48,000. The presence of the Spaniards was of vital importance, by the -security which they afforded to the right of our army; and essential -service was afforded by those who came into action on the second day, -especially by Alburquerque and Bassecourt, and by two battalions under -Brigadier-General Whittingham, in their service, who came forward -to support the Guards; but the brunt of the battle was borne by the -British, as the loss which they sustained evinces. From their loss -that of the defeated enemy might fairly be computed, if the numbers -left upon the field had not afforded surer ground. Both Spaniards and -English state it at not less than 10,000 men; the number of their dead -was so great, that Cuesta ordered out his troops by battalions to burn -them. - -♦CUESTA DECIMATES SOME OF HIS TROOPS.♦ - -The Spaniards, where they were well commanded, behaved well; but -melancholy proofs were given of the inefficient state of their armies. -The whole of their commissariat took flight as soon as the action -began, with all the people belonging to them; so that after the battle -the allies found themselves in total want of food and resources. Three -or four corps threw down their muskets without having once discharged -them, and dispersed; some of them plundered the baggage. Cuesta was -so indignant at this, that after the action he ordered the division -to be decimated, and it was only after much entreaty from the British -Commander that he consented to re-decimate those on whom the lot had -fallen, and six officers and some thirty men were actually executed. -Sir Arthur remarked upon this occasion, with equal humanity and wisdom, -that fear of disgrace would affect the Spaniards more than fear of -death, and that for this reason, among others, exertions ought to be -made for clothing them in uniform. Marching to battle as they did, -without any thing to distinguish them for soldiers, in the first panic -they threw away their arms and accoutrements, and pretended to be -peasants. Men dressed as soldiers could not thus at once put off the -marks of their profession, and that being the case, they would feel -that their safety depended upon keeping their arms and standing their -ground; and when the whole army was uniformly clothed, it would be easy -to deprive the soldier who should misbehave of a part of his uniform, -or to fix upon him some mark of disgrace,--a mode of punishment, he -said, the most effectual as well as the most humane. Cuesta had just -experienced the good effect of such measures; the regiments whom he -deprived of one of their pistols for misconduct at the battle of -Medellin, behaved so well from that time, and exerted themselves so -strenuously on all occasions to wipe off their disgrace, that, after -the battle of Talavera, the pistol was restored to them. - -♦STATE OF TALAVERA.♦ - -The wounded of both armies were brought in promiscuously, and many -of them laid in the streets and in the squares till shelter could be -allotted for them: even for this inevitable necessity no order having -been taken by the Spanish authorities. It is worthy of notice, that a -greater proportion recovered of those who were left a night upon the -field, than of such as were earlier housed, and this is explained by -the effect of the free air in preventing fever. Needful accommodations -for these poor creatures were not to be found in a city which the -French had visited. They had destroyed the public buildings, overturned -the altars, and opened the tombs. Furniture of every kind they had -carried off to their camp, and what they had no other use for, they had -consumed as fuel. Frenchmen like, they had a theatre in their camp. The -soldiers’ huts were so remarkable for neatness and regularity, as to be -an object of curiosity to the British officers; but it was remarked as -one proof of the wanton destruction caused by the Intruder’s armies, -that they were all thatched with unthreshed straw. It ought to be -mentioned as a contrast to this, that when the British troops halted by -day or night amid olive-groves, they were not allowed to cut the trees -either for fuel or for shelter. - -♦MOVEMENTS OF SIR R. WILSON.♦ - -The day after the action a light brigade, 3000 strong, and a troop -of horse-artillery, under Brigadier-General Craufurd, arrived from -Lisbon to reinforce the British army, which thus found itself nearly -as strong as before the action. But a battle so well contested, and so -gloriously won, was rendered of no avail, by the complicated misconduct -of the Spanish government and of the Spanish general. The same want -of provisions and of the means of transport, which had compelled Sir -Arthur to halt at Talavera, prevented him from pursuing his victory. -The Intruder, ignorant of this, trembled for Madrid, expecting every -hour to hear that Venegas, Sir R. Wilson, and the combined forces were -marching upon that city, where the people were looking out for their -deliverers. Sir Robert had proceeded with his corps to Navalcarneiro, -notwithstanding the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy’s army. The -detachment reached the Guadarrama: he had established a communication -with Madrid, Belliard was preparing to withdraw from the city into the -Retiro, which had been fortified as a citadel, and Sir Robert had made -arrangements for entering the metropolis on the night of that very -day when he and his corps were recalled, because a general action was -expected. Some insurrectionary movements had already appeared, which -Belliard had been able to suppress; but it was certain that the moment -an army came to the assistance of the citizens, he would no longer be -able to keep them down. Joseph’s hope, therefore, was from an attack -upon the rear of the allies, to be made by the collected forces of -Soult, Ney, and Mortier, under command of the former. - -♦MOVEMENTS OF SOULT, NEY, AND MORTIER.♦ - -Soult, after his retreat from Galicia, occupied Zamora, Salamanca, -and Leon, with the remains of his army, which he had found means -to reequip. Ney’s corps was quartered at Astorga, Benevente, and -Leon; Mortier’s at Medina del Campo, and Valladolid. Apprised of the -movements of the English, Soult gave orders on the 20th for collecting -the whole at Salamanca, and four days afterwards was instructed by -Jourdan, in the Intruder’s name, to advance as speedily as possible -upon the rear of the enemy by way of Plasencia. Sir Arthur, from the -commencement of the campaign, was aware of the existence of this -force in the north, and the manner in which it would attempt to act. -His own army was so small, that it was not possible for him to spare -detachments for securing the passes of the long mountain-ridge which -the French ♦CUESTA NEGLECTS TO SECURE THE PASSES.♦ must cross. But -Cuesta had sent the Marquess de la Reyna, with two battalions from his -own army and two from Bejar, to occupy the Puerto de Baños, and given -orders to the Duque del Parque to secure the Puerto de Perales, by -detachments from Ciudad Rodrigo. The former point Sir Arthur considered -safe; but, doubting the Duque’s power to spare a sufficient force -for the latter, he directed Beresford, with the Portugueze troops, to -defend this pass, as the greatest service which, in their then state of -discipline, they were capable of performing. - -♦INTELLIGENCE OF SOULT’S ADVANCE.♦ - -Two days after the battle, intelligence was brought to Talavera that -12,000 rations had been ordered at Fuente Duenas for the 28th, and -24,000 at Los Santos on the same day, for a French army, which it was -supposed was on its march to the Puerto de Baños. Cuesta upon this -discovered some anxiety respecting that post, and proposed that Sir -R. Wilson with his corps should be sent thither. This could not be -assented to, for his corps was stationed in the mountains towards -Escalona, still keeping up a communication with the people of Madrid, -... an advantage too important to be foregone. Of this Cuesta appeared -sensible; yet he could not be prevailed upon to send a detachment -from his own army; and Sir Arthur, considering that they had no other -grounds for believing this was the point which was threatened than that -the rations were ordered, which might be a feint, and hoping too that -the troops already there might prove sufficient, and even that the -news of his late victory might deter the French from proceeding, did -not press the Spanish general further that day. Night brought with it -the anxious feeling that a point had now become of prime importance, -concerning which he could not be satisfied that proper means had been -♦JULY 31.♦ taken for its defence; and in the morning he again pressed -Cuesta upon the subject, urging him to detach thither a division of -infantry, with its guns, and a commanding officer on whom he could -rely. “Certainly,” he declared, “he never would have advanced so far, -if reason had not been given him to believe that pass was secure. The -division would not be missed at Talavera; if it arrived in time it -would perform a service of the greatest moment; and even if the enemy -should have crossed the mountains before its arrival, it would then be -in a situation to observe him.” But Cuesta was not to be persuaded. -That day and the following elapsed; on the third came tidings that -the French had entered Bejar; and then the Spanish general dispatched -Bassecourt with a force which might have sufficed had it been sent in -time. - -♦SOULT OCCUPIES PLASENCIA.♦ - -Mortier began his march from Salamanca on the 27th, Soult followed -on the 30th, Ney two days afterwards, all taking the same route. -The advance fell in with the Marquess de la Reyna’s out-posts at La -Calzala, and pursued them to Bejar and Col de Baños. The two battalions -on which Cuesta had relied before the appearance of danger, consisted -of only 600 men, supplied with twenty rounds of ammunition! Even this -was more than they employed; they attempted to blow up the bridge -called Cuesper de Hombre, and failing in that, retired without firing -a shot. ♦1809. AUGUST.♦ The battalions of Bejar dispersed as soon as -they saw the enemy. Yet such was the strength of this position, that -the very sight of the Spaniards delayed Mortier’s march, in consequence -of the dispositions which he thought it necessary to make for forcing -it if it had been defended, and he did not enter Plasencia till the -first of August. The occupation of that place was of the greatest -importance; the French had now intercepted sir Arthur’s communication -with Portugal, and were enabled to manœuvre upon his rear if he -advanced toward Madrid, or remained at Talavera. - -♦SIR ARTHUR MARCHES AGAINST HIM.♦ - -Cuesta now proposed that half the British army should march against -Soult, while the other half maintained the post at Talavera. Sir Arthur -said he was ready either to go or stay with the whole British army, but -he would not divide it; the choice was left to him, and he preferred -going, thinking his own troops were most likely to accomplish the -object of the march, perhaps even without a contest. It appears that -he was not aware of the enemy’s force: Cuesta estimated it at twelve -or fourteen thousand, and Sir Arthur did not at that time suppose it -to be larger. He preferred the alternative of going for another reason -also, feeling it of more importance to him that the communication -through Plasencia should be opened than it was to the Spaniards, though -highly important to them also. The movements of Victor in front induced -him to suppose that the enemy, despairing of any better success at -Talavera than they had already experienced, intended to fall upon Sir -R. Wilson, and force a passage by Escalona: thus to act in concert -with Soult between the Alberche and the Tietar. Sir Robert also felt -himself seriously menaced, and some letters which he intercepted gave -him sufficient information to ascertain that these were the plans of -the enemy; he therefore informed the British General that he should -remove his artillery to St. Roman, occupy the Panada with 300 men, a -strong height behind Montillo with 600 more, from whence there was a -good retreat to St. Valuela, and return with the rest to a position, -in readiness either to occupy Valuela, or obey such instructions as -he might receive. In this state of things, Sir Arthur perceived how -possible it was that Cuesta might be forced to quit Talavera before -he could return to it, and this made him uneasy for his hospital. At -all events, he thought it too far advanced. He therefore entreated -Cuesta to make a requisition for carts, and remove the wounded as -expeditiously as was consistent with their safety, by first sending -them to an intermediate station at no great distance, from whence they -might gradually be passed to the place which should ultimately be fixed -upon. He wrote to Bassecourt, requesting that he, with that division -which had been dispatched to secure the passes after they had been -lost, would halt at Centiello, and watch the vale of Plasencia; and -he again recommended to the Spanish commander, that Venegas should be -ordered to threaten Madrid by the road of Arganda, that being the only -means whereby it was possible to alarm the enemy, and make him divide -his forces. - -♦AUG. 3. - -CUESTA DETERMINES TO FOLLOW SIR ARTHUR.♦ - -Having thus taken every precaution, he marched to Oropesa, with the -intention of either compelling Soult to retreat, or giving him battle. -At five in the evening he learned that the enemy were at Naval Moral, -not more than eighteen miles distant; thus having placed themselves -between him and the bridge of Almaraz, as if they meant to cut off -his retreat across the Tagus. An hour afterwards dispatches came from -Talavera, inclosing an intercepted letter from Jourdan to Soult, -wherein the latter was told that the British army was at least 25,000 -strong, and yet he was ordered to bring it to action wherever he could -find it; from this Cuesta inferred that Soult could not have less than -30,000 men, and this was the precise number at which the friar, on -whom the letter had been found, stated his army. But the most grievous -part of the intelligence was, that Victor was again advancing, and -had reached St. Olalla, and that Cuesta, seeing himself threatened -both in front and in flank, and apprehending the British would require -assistance, was determined to march and join them. Painful as it was -thus to abandon the wounded, he considered that he must have abandoned -them if he were driven from the position, and that position being now -open on the left, he did not think himself able to maintain it. Sir -Arthur immediately wrote to represent that the danger was far less -imminent than Cuesta apprehended; the enemy, he thought, were not -likely to attack Talavera, nor to occupy the British long. It would be -time to march when they knew that the French had forced their way at -Escalona, or were breaking up from St. Olalla. Victor was certainly -alone, and Sebastiani and the Intruder occupied by Venegas. At all -events he urged him to delay his march till the next day, send off his -commissariat and baggage before him, and halt in the woods till the -wounded were arrived at the bridge of Arzobispo. Soult’s force, he -said, was certainly overrated. - -Sir Arthur’s mistake upon this subject arose from his being ignorant -that Mortier had formed a junction with this army. He supposed that it -consisted only of the corps of Soult and Ney, who had brought out of -Galicia 18,000 men, the remains of 36,000 with which they entered that -country. Cuesta, however, was better informed; and he himself altered -his opinion of the enemy’s force when he considered the positive orders -which the Intruder had given for attacking the British army, supposing -it to consist ♦CUESTA JOINS THE BRITISH.♦ of 25,000 men. Cuesta had -not asked Sir Arthur’s advice, and did not wait to receive it: he left -Talavera before it reached him, marched all night, and joined the -British at Oropesa soon after daylight on the 4th. His apprehension of -danger to himself was well founded: it was not without great exertions -and heavy loss that the combined armies had repulsed the French at -Talavera; well, therefore, might he despair of withstanding them alone -if they returned to the attack. But the danger which by this hasty -retreat he averted from himself, he brought upon Venegas and Sir -Arthur; and the latter, in addition to the mortification of having -his wounded fall into the hands of the enemy, saw himself exposed -to an attack in front and in rear at the same time by two armies, -each superior ♦THEY RETREAT ACROSS THE TAGUS.♦ to his own. It was -absolutely necessary to retreat, otherwise nothing but two victories -could extricate the troops from their perilous situation, and they were -little capable of extraordinary exertions, not having had their full -allowance of provisions for several days. The bridge of Almaraz had -been destroyed, and when the Marquess de la Reyna abandoned his post -at the pass, he made for this point, with the intention of removing -the bridge of boats that had been placed there; the boats indeed might -be still in the river, but it was thought impossible to reach Almaraz -without a battle. If he moved on to give the enemy battle, the French -from Talavera would break down the bridge of Arzobispo, and thus -intercept the only way by which a retreat was practicable; the same -danger would be incurred if he took a position at Oropesa. Nothing -remained, therefore, but to cross at Arzobispo, while it was yet in -his power, and take up a defensive post upon the Tagus: the sooner a -defensive line should be taken, the more likely were the troops to -be able to defend it. On the day, therefore, that Cuesta formed his -unfortunate junction, Sir Arthur retreated by this route, and crossed. -Cuesta followed on the night of the 5th. - -♦COL. MACKINNON REMOVES SOME OF THE WOUNDED.♦ - -Sir Arthur had left Colonel Mackinnon in command at Talavera with the -charge of the sick and wounded, amounting, with those attached to the -hospital, to about 5000 persons. On the evening of one day the charge -had been given him, and on the next at noon Cuesta informed him that -Soult was at Plasencia with 30,000 men, and that Victor was in his -front, only six leagues distant; the monk who discovered their plans, -being the bearer of a letter from the Intruder to Soult, was in the -room: it was his intention to retire at dusk with the Spanish army and -join Sir Arthur, and the hospital had better be got off before that -time. Colonel Mackinnon had been instructed, in case of such necessity, -to make for Merida by way of the Puente del Arzobispo: but it was with -difficulty he could procure from Cuesta seven waggons to remove a few -of the wounded. There was no alternative but to recommend those whom -there was no possibility of removing to the honour and humanity of the -French commanders; and Colonel Mackinnon, who had lived in France, -and was in every respect one of the most accomplished officers in the -British army, did this in a manner which was believed to have had great -effect in obtaining for them the humane and honourable treatment they -received. All who were able to march were ordered to assemble at three -that afternoon, and proceed to Calera that night, ... a town which the -French had completely destroyed. The next day they were overtaken at -Arzobispo by the British army, and instead of passing the night there, -as had been intended, were ordered to proceed. Forty bullock-cars were -added to their means of transport, but in such ill repair for some -of the worst roads in the world, that only eleven of them reached -Deleitosa. A more difficult six days’ march could hardly be conceived, -and the difficulty was of a kind more trying to a brave and feeling -mind than danger. There was only a commissary’s clerk to provide for -them, and the runaway Spaniards were plundering the small magazines -in all the villages. Reports that the French had crossed the Tagus, -and were in their front, alarmed his men, who were in no condition for -the field, and many of them took to the mountains. Mackinnon mustered -his force in a convent near Deleitosa; it consisted then of 2000 men, -and these he conducted to Elvas, without magazines, with no assistance -from the magistrates, who, on the contrary, sometimes evinced a hostile -disposition; and with such want of humanity on the part of the people -(made callous by selfishness, and selfish by necessity), that he was -often obliged to use violent means, or the men must have been starved. - -♦DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS AT ARZOBISPO.♦ - -The British army was now stationed at Deleitosa, whence they could -defend the point of Almaraz and the lower parts of the Tagus. Cuesta -remained at Arzobispo; but so little in concert with Sir Arthur, that -he moved his head-quarters, and suffered three days to elapse without -sending him any information of his plans or movements. On the night -of the 7th, he removed to Peraleda de Garbin, leaving two divisions -of infantry and Alburquerque’s division of cavalry to defend the -passage of the river. This was an imprudent measure, for the enemy -were in force on the left bank; they had already attempted to win the -bridge, and were now erecting batteries. The bridge was barricaded, and -defended by several batteries with embrasures connected by a covered -way, and upon these works the general relied with such confidence, that -he thought he might safely withdraw the greater part of his army to -more convenient quarters. Cuesta ought to have understood the nature -of this post; he had been blamed for abandoning it in the former part -of the year: satisfied, however, with having fortified the bridge, -he never thought of examining whether ♦AUG. 8.♦ the river might not -be fordable. Mortier, who commanded the corps of the French which -led the pursuit, erected batteries to call off the attention of the -Spaniards, while he ordered the chief of his staff, Dombrowsky, with -two good ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 524.♦ swimmers, to sound the Tagus. -His officer of engineers had observed, that when the Spanish horse -were brought to drink they went some way into the river; trial was -made where this indication promised some hope of success, and a good -ford, passable even for infantry, was found there, not two hundred -yards above the bridge and the Spanish batteries. Soult, who had -now come up, resolved to effect the passage in the heat of the day, -when the Spaniards would be taking their mid-day sleep, and might be -surprised. He calculated upon a carelessness which he was sure to -find. The Spaniards relied upon the river for their defence, never -having deemed it needful to ascertain how far it might be relied on: -the passage was accomplished almost as soon as they were aware of the -attempt; the works of the bridge were taken in the rear, some of the -Spanish artillerymen were cut down ♦NAYLIES, 174.♦ at their guns, -and others, in a manner not to be justified by any laws of war, were -compelled to turn them upon their countrymen; the works were presently -demolished, and the way opened for Girard’s infantry. Alburquerque’s -cavalry were reposing under some trees, a short league from the scene -of action; at the first alarm they ♦NAYLIES, 175.♦ hastened to support -their countrymen; and their charge was made with such resolution and -effect, that Soult is said to have thought of firing grape upon them -through his own men, as the only means of repelling them. But succours -came to the French in time for preventing this atrocious expedient; and -the Spaniards, horse and foot alike, retreated, or rather fled through -a mountainous country, which favoured their escape, leaving their -ammunition, their baggage, and the whole of their artillery. The slain -were estimated by the French at 1600 men, most of whom were cut down -in a pursuit from which the enemy returned with every man his sabre -red with blood. Some of the French were drowned in the passage, their -other loss was trifling. The same frightful circumstance as at Talavera -occurred after the action; the herbage took fire; the wind spread the -flames far and wide, among stubble, dry shrubs, and groves of ♦NAYLIES, -177.♦ ilex and of olives; ... on all sides the cries of the wounded -were heard; and through the night muskets, which the fugitives had -thrown away, went off, cartridges took fire, and cassoons of artillery -exploded. - -♦MOVEMENTS OF MARSHAL NEY.♦ - -The commonest precaution might have saved the Spaniards from this -defeat, in which, though the loss of men was not great, that of -artillery and ammunition was considerable, and the moral effect upon -the troops of more importance than either. It seems, indeed, that Soult -advanced to Arzobispo in the sole hope of profiting by the negligence -of the Spanish commanders to strike some such blow; for the enemy had -no intention at this time of carrying the war into Extremadura, finding -Almaraz too well defended, and the fords, which were said to exist -below the bridge, impassable. Ney had formed the design of crossing -them, and taking possession of the defiles of Deleitosa and Xaraicejo, -thus to cut off the retreat of the English toward Portugal; but those -points were secured by Sir Arthur, as well as the passage of the river, -and the French Marshal was ordered back to Salamanca to secure that -part of the country, in concert with Kellermann, against the Duque del -Parque and the Conde de Noroña, who had been prevented from occupying -the enemy on that side for want of artillery and cavalry; the former, -however, was now beginning to act on the offensive. Ney began his march -on the 9th to the Puerto de Baños, in his way towards Old Castille; and -this brought him in contact with Sir Robert Wilson. - -♦ACTION WITH SIR R. WILSON AT THE PUERTO DE BAÑOS.♦ - -When the British commander left Talavera, Cuesta’s advanced guard was -in communication with Sir Robert, and that officer was informed of the -intended retreat of the Spaniards, that he might in like manner fall -back. But he was advanced too far for this to be practicable; after a -long march through the mountains, he found himself, on the night of the -14th, six leagues from Arzobispo; the high road between Oropesa and -Talavera was to be crossed, and Victor was in possession of Talavera; -thinking it, therefore, too late to reach Arzobispo, he determined -to move by Puerto de San Julien and Centinello, and cross the Tietar -toward the mountains. On the 11th he reached Baños, and had set out -the following morning on the road of Grenadilla, to restore by this -route his communication with the allied armies, when a cloud of dust -was perceived on the road of Plasencia, and a peasant assured him -it proceeded from a body of the enemy. Readily believing what was so -probable, he turned back, and took post in front of Baños, placing 200 -Spanish infantry under Colonel Grant in advance of Aldea Nueva. The -enemy’s chasseurs and voltigeurs advanced in considerable bodies under -General Lorset; and Grant, after a resistance in which the Spaniards -demeaned themselves gallantly, was compelled to fall back. The French -then attempted to cut off Sir Robert’s own legion, which was posted -between Aldea Nueva and Baños: he had strengthened his position by -every means which the time allowed, so that they could only advance -gradually, and with severe loss from the fire of musketry which was -kept up upon them. At length part of the Merida battalion on the right -gave way, and a road was thus left open by which the position might -have been turned. Then Sir Robert ordered a retreat upon the heights -above Baños, and from thence sent to secure the road of Monte Mayor, -which turned the Puerto de Baños, a league in the rear, and by which -the French were directing a column. Don Carlos d’Espagna came up at -this time with his battalion of light infantry, took post along the -heights commanding the road to Baños, and enabled Sir Robert to detach -a party to the mountain on the left, commanding the main road. On the -Extremadura side this Puerto is not a pass of such strength as on the -side of Castille. Sir Robert had no artillery, and the French were not -less than treble the number of his troops; nevertheless he maintained -his ground for nine hours. At six in the evening, three columns of the -enemy succeeded in gaining the height on the left; his post was then no -longer tenable, and he retired along the mountains, leaving open the -main road, along which a considerable column of cavalry immediately -hastened. It came in sight of the battalion of Seville, which had -been left at Bejar with orders to follow on the morrow; but when Sir -Robert was obliged to retire, and the action commenced, he ordered it -to the pass to watch the Monte Mayor road and the heights on the rear -of his left. As soon as the French cavalry came nigh, an officer with -some dragoons rode on, and called out to the Spanish commanders to -surrender. They were answered by a volley that killed the whole party; -the Spaniards then began to mount the heights; they were attacked and -surrounded by two bodies, one of horse, the other of foot; but they -succeeded in cutting their way through, and Ney, having forced the -pass, hastened on to Salamanca. Sir Robert’s loss was not considerable, -and after halting two days at Miranda de Castañas, to rest his men, and -collect those who were dispersed, he proceeded on his way. - -♦THE FRENCH ENTER TALAVERA.♦ - -The retreat of Cuesta from Talavera, however much both the former and -subsequent conduct of that general may deserve censure, was, under his -circumstances, at least an excusable measure. About 1500 of the wounded -were left, whom there was no time to remove; most of whom, indeed, -were not in a state to bear removal. Cuesta had hardly begun his march -before the French were in sight. When Victor entered the town, he found -some of the wounded, French and English alike, lying on the ground in -the Plaza. After complimenting the English, and observing that they -understood the laws and courtesies of war, he told them there was one -thing which they did not understand, and that ♦VICTOR BEHAVES WELL TO -THE ENGLISH WOUNDED.♦ was how to deal with the Spaniards. He then sent -soldiers to every house, with orders to the inhabitants immediately to -receive and accommodate the wounded of the two nations, who were lodged -together, one English and one Frenchman; and he expressly directed that -the Englishman should always be served first. Many had already died -in the square, and the stones were covered with blood; Victor ordered -the townsmen to come with spades and besoms, remove and bury the dead, -and cleanse the Plaza; he was speedily obeyed, and then the French -said the place was fit for them to walk in. This was done a few hours -after they entered the town. The next day the troops were assembled -at noon, and liberty of pillaging for three hours was allowed them. -Every man was provided with a hammer and a small saw for this purpose -in his knapsack, and they filed off by beat of drum in regular parties -to the different quarters of the town upon this work, as a business -with which they were well acquainted. Nothing escaped their search: -they discovered corn enough to supply the French army for three months; -these magazines had been concealed both from the Spanish and English -generals, and the owners were now punished for their treachery to their -countrymen and their allies, by the loss of the whole. Dollars enough -to load eight mules were also found hidden beneath some broken wheels -and rubbish in a yard belonging to one of the convents. - -♦MURDER OF THE BISHOP OF CORIA.♦ - -The behaviour of Victor to the wounded English deserves more especially -to be mentioned, because Soult was carrying on the war with unrelenting -barbarity. From Plasencia he laid waste the fertile vale in which that -city stands with fire and sword. Serradilla, Pasanon, Arroyo-Molinos, -El Barrado, Garganta la Olla, Texada, Riolobos, Malpartida, and La -Oliva, were burnt by his troops, who, when they were not otherwise -employed, went out upon the highways, robbed every person whose ill -fortune compelled them to travel in this miserable country, and usually -killed those whom they robbed. D. Juan Alvarez de Castro, the Bishop of -Coria, in his eighty-sixth year, was murdered by these wretches. When -Lapisse, in the month of June, marched from Salamanca to Alcantara, the -Bishop with great difficulty and fatigue escaped; but the hardships -which he then underwent were too much for one in such extreme old age, -and when Soult quartered himself in this part of the country, he was -confined to his bed in the village of Los Hoyos. Had he been removed -he must have died upon the road; it was, therefore, not a matter of -choice but of necessity that he should remain and take his chance. -Three of his clergy and some of his domestics remained with him; and -a few old men took refuge under the same roof, thinking the presence -of their venerable pastor would render it a safe asylum. The French -entered the village, and took possession of the house where the old -prelate lay in bed. His chaplains met them, and intreated protection -for their spiritual father, and his domestics waited upon them, hoping -to obtain favour, or at least to escape injury. But after these -ruffians had eaten and drunk what was set before them, they plundered -the house of every thing which could be converted to their own use, and -destroyed whatever they could not carry away. Then they fell upon the -unhappy people of the house, one of whom they killed, and wounded six -others; lastly, they dragged the Bishop from his bed, and discharged -two muskets into his body. - -♦VENEGAS’S ARMY KEPT IN INACTION BEFORE AND AFTER THE BATTLE OF -TALAVERA.♦ - -The plans of the enemy on the side of Extremadura were effected; -they who had so lately trembled for Madrid had seen the allied -armies recross the Tagus, and they gave themselves credit for the -fortunate issue of a campaign, in which, if it had not been for the -misconduct of the Spanish General and of the Central Junta, they must -have been driven to the Ebro. On the side of La Mancha they were -not less successful. Venegas, on the 14th of July, had received -orders to occupy the attention of the enemy, and divert them from -the allied armies as much as possible, without endangering himself -In consequence he advanced his army from El Moral, Ynfanles, Puerto -Elano, and Valdepeñas, to Damiel, La Solana, El Corral de Caraquel, -and Manzanares, keeping his head-quarters still at Santa Cruz de -Mudela, and expecting intelligence which would justify him in advancing -to Consuegra and Madrilejos. At this time he supposed it was the -intention of the combined armies to march upon Madrid; and when the -want both of provisions and means of transport rendered it impossible -for the British army to proceed, Cuesta gave him no intelligence of -this, thereby exposing him to be destroyed, if the French, instead -of marching upon Talavera, had directed their attack against him. -Cuesta’s whole conduct respecting the British army was so utterly -unreasonable, that it can only be accounted for by ascribing it to -obstinacy and incapacity. The wants of the British army were palpable; -he had them before his eyes, and could at any moment have satisfied -himself of the truth of every complaint which he received; yet he -concealed the real state of things both from his own government and -from Venegas, to both of whom it was of such essential importance that -they should be accurately informed. The Spanish government received -true intelligence from Mr. Frere, and in consequence they dispatched -a courier to Venegas, directing him to suspend his operations, and -take up a defensive position. Cuesta’s neglect rendered it prudent -to dispatch these orders; but one evil produced another. Two hours -after the arrival of the courier, Venegas received intelligence of -the victory of Talavera, which was the more unexpected, because the -Intruder, true to the French system, had published an Extraordinary -Gazette, stating that he had defeated the allied armies on the 26th. -Venegas ordered Te Deum to be sung in the neighbouring churches, and -celebrated the victory by a general discharge: but he failed to improve -it; and, instead of considering that the circumstances under which -the Junta had dictated his instructions were now entirely changed, he -adhered strictly to them, and lost the opportunity of advancing to -Madrid; thus consummating the series of blunders by which a campaign so -well planned, and a victory so bravely won, were rendered fruitless. -Had he pushed for that city immediately, he might have entered it; Sir -Robert Wilson would have joined him there, the resources of the city -would have been secured for the allies, and the recovery of the capital -would have raised the whole country far and near against the French. If -Alburquerque had commanded this army, the momentous opportunity would -not have been lost. - -♦HIS USELESS ATTEMPT UPON TOLEDO.♦ - -Venegas therefore remained with his vanguard at Aranjuez, and his -head-quarters at Ocaña, while another division of his army under -Lacy was employed in an idle attempt upon Toledo, which, as he did -not choose to destroy the houses from whence the enemy fired at -him, because it was a Spanish town, could not possibly succeed, and -therefore ought not to have been made. On the third day after the -battle Cuesta wrote to Venegas, directing him to advance upon Madrid. -“This operation,” he said, “must oblige Victor to detach a large part -of his force toward the capital, in which case the allies would pursue -him to that city, and if any unforeseen accident should compel Venegas -to retire, he might retreat by Arganda and along the skirts of the -mountains.” This letter was written at eleven at night. Twelve hours -afterwards Cuesta forwarded a second dispatch, stating that Victor’s -army had marched in the direction of Torrijos and Toledo. Venegas, upon -receiving the first, ordered his whole force to unite at Aranjuez, -meaning to lose no time in reaching the capital. The contents of the -second staggered him; if the enemy marched for Toledo, they would -fall on his rear-guard; if they went through Torrijos direct upon -Madrid, they had the start, and would get between him and that city. He -determined, therefore, still to collect his force in the neighbourhood -of Aranjuez, and there wait for fresh orders; and he reminded Cuesta -how indispensably necessary it was that their movements should be -combined. - -♦VENEGAS COMPLAINS OF CUESTA.♦ - -His army was collected on the night of the 3d, leaving only 600 foot -and 200 horse in the neighbourhood of Toledo. The next day he received -another dispatch from Cuesta, telling him of his march from Talavera -to reinforce Sir Arthur. This letter was written with preposterous -confidence; he was going, he said, to secure the victory against Soult, -after which they should return to attack Victor. Meantime he advised -Venegas to bear in mind, that general actions with better disciplined -troops than their own did not suit them. Venegas felt the danger of -his own situation, but his prevailing feelings were indignation and -resentment at the multiplied proofs of incapacity which Cuesta had -given. He wrote to his government, stating “that he was thus left to -himself with an army inferior in number to the enemy, and, by the -acknowledgement of the captain-general, inferior in discipline also: -how much more deeply should he have been committed, if, in obedience -to that general’s orders, he had marched upon Madrid, relying on the -promised support of the allied armies!” The reflection was just as well -as natural; but Venegas ought to have reflected also, that if he had -marched upon Madrid in time, that support would not have failed him. -He added that no choice was left, save of commencing a retreat, which -would dispirit the troops and destroy the national enthusiasm in all -the places which they had occupied and must now abandon. Consequences -like these, which were immediately before his eyes, made him determine -to remain where he was, and fight if he were attacked, preferring to be -cut to pieces rather than submit to a shameful flight. - -♦THE INTRUDER’S MOVEMENTS AFTER THE BATTLE.♦ - -The enemy were well aware of the danger to which they had been -exposed from the army of La Mancha. The Intruder, after his defeat -at Talavera, retreated to Santa Olalla, leaving Victor to take up -a position behind the Alberche, and watch the combined armies. The -next day he moved to Bargas and Olias, near Toledo. On the night of -the 31st, he received advices from Victor, who, being alarmed by Sir -Robert Wilson’s movements, was about to fall back to Maqueda; at the -same time he learnt that Venegas was collecting his force at Aranjuez -and threatening Madrid. Alarmed at this, he ordered Sebastiani and the -corps of reserve to take up a position at Illescas, from whence they -might either advance rapidly to support Victor, or to attack Venegas. -Victor’s next advices expressed further fears from the troops at -Escalona, whose force he supposed to be far greater than it was: “If -the enemy advanced in that direction,” he said, “as seemed probable, he -should retire to Mostoles.” Joseph, trembling for the capital, moved -to that place himself in the night between the 3d and 4th: Mostoles is -only twelve miles from Madrid, ... so near had the scene of action been -brought. From thence, having learnt that Victor’s apprehensions had -subsided, he turned back on the following night to Valdemoro, summoned -Sebastiani thither, and ordered an attack to be made upon Venegas. - -♦VENEGAS PREPARES FOR BATTLE AT ARANJUEZ.♦ - -That general expected such an attack from the moment when he was -apprised of Cuesta’s retreat. At daybreak on the 5th, he went from his -head-quarters at Tembleque to reconnoitre the position at Aranjuez. The -Queen’s Bridge was the only one which had not been broken down; his -first measure was to recall Lacy with the advanced guard from Puente -Largo on the Xarama, that he might secure his retreat over this bridge -in time; then he resolved to occupy the range of heights adjacent to -Ontigola, beginning from Mount Parnaso, and to defend the passage of -the river. Having directed these measures, he returned to his quarters, -leaving Giron in command of the three divisions upon the Tagus. Three -hours had hardly elapsed before Giron sent word that large columns of -horse and foot and artillery were marching upon Puente Largo, and that -some had already crossed the Xarama; this was followed by tidings that -a great dust was seen in the direction of the ford of Añover. It could -not now be doubted that a serious attack was about to be made; the ford -would certainly be attempted, and Venegas was apprehensive that he -should be assailed in the rear at the same time by troops from Toledo. -He therefore ordered Lacy to cross the Queen’s Bridge, and break it -down; and marched his reserve from Ocaña to the height on the left of -the road between that town and Aranjuez, where they might be ready to -resist an attack on the side of Toledo or the ford, and to support the -retreat of the other divisions, who, if they found themselves unable to -guard the river, were instructed to retreat to Ocaña; but their orders -were to defend the passage to the utmost, and maintain every position -inch by inch. - -Lacy could not commence his retreat soon enough to avoid an attack; -a strong body of cavalry from the Cuesta de la Reyna fell upon his -rear, but they resisted the enemy, and, retiring in good order over -the Queen’s Bridge, broke it down, and took post upon some heights -which protected it: the bridge itself was defended by Don Luis Riquelme -with three battalions and four pieces of cannon; another battalion -was stationed in the Plaza de S. Antonio. D. Miguel Antonio Panes, a -captain of artillery, only son of the Marquis of Villa Panes, defended -the broken Puente de Barcas with two eight-pounders and two companies. -Other troops were stationed at the ford of the Infante Don Antonio’s -garden, at the Puente Verde, at the Vado Largo, or broad ford, and in -the Calle de la Reyna. A reserve was placed on each side the road to -Ocaña, and in the walks immediately adjoining the palace, on the left -of which the whole of the cavalry stood ready to charge the enemy in -case they should win the passage of the river, or attack the Spaniards -in the rear by a party which might have crossed at some remoter point. - -♦ARANJUEZ AND ITS GARDENS.♦ - -The ground whereon a battle has been fought is never passed over by -an intelligent traveller without producing a meditative train of -thought, however transient, even if the scene has no other interest; -but when the local circumstances are remarkable, the impressions become -deeper and more durable, especially if the war were one in which, -after any lapse of time, the heart still feels a lively concern. -Aranjuez had been for nearly two centuries the spring residence of -the Spanish court. It stands in a rich and lovely country, where the -Xarama falls into the Tagus, in what was once a peninsula. Charles -V. had built a hunting-seat there, which Philip III. enlarged into a -palace, yet such a palace as was designed for comfort and comparative -retirement, rather than for splendour. In his time a canal was made -between the two rivers, partly with the intent of giving the place -a character of safety, that the King might be secure there with no -larger body of guards than his dignity required. Succeeding monarchs -each added something to the embellishment of the grounds, and Charles -IV., when Prince of Asturias, made a garden which was called by his -name. Aranjuez itself was a poor village till the time of Grimaldi’s -administration, when a town was built there under his directions, and -partly on the Dutch plan; the streets being long, spacious, straight, -and uniform, with rows of trees, for beauty and for shade, ... only -the canals were wanting. The population had increased to some 10,000 -persons, who depended in great measure for their prosperity upon the -annual residence of the court. - -The pride of Aranjuez was in its gardens; they were in the French -style, but with a charm which that style derived from a Spanish -climate. Long and wide avenues were overbowered with elms, which loved -the soil, and which, by the stateliness of their growth, and the deep -umbrage of their ample branches, repaid the care with which water from -the Tagus was regularly conducted to their roots. That river also -supplied numerous fountains, each in the centre of some area, square or -circular, hex- or oct-angular, where, in peaceful times, at all hours -of the day, some idlers or ruminators were seen on the marble benches, -enjoying the shade, and the sight and the sound of the water, which -was thrown up by statues of all kinds, appropriate or preposterous, -beasts, harpies, sea-horses, Tritons, and heathen gods and goddesses, -in jets or curvilinear shoots, intersecting each other, falling in -regular forms, sparkling as they played, cooling the air around, and -diffusing a sense of freshness even in the hottest noon. In some -places the loftiest trees were made to bear a part in these devices of -wanton power, the pipes being conveyed to their summit; in others the -fountains set music in motion when they played. There was one fountain -which served as a monument of one of the proudest victories that had -ever been achieved by Spain, the central part being formed from a block -of marble which had been taken in one of the Turkish ships at Lepanto. - -But this was a place where the strength of vegetation made art -appear subordinate, and the magnificence which all these elaborate -embellishments produced was subservient to delight and comfort. The -elms, which were the largest of their kind, had attained a growth which -nothing but artificial irrigation in a genial soil and hot climate -could have given them. The poplar and the tamarisk flourished in like -manner; the latter grew along the banks of the Tagus with peculiar -luxuriance. Every approach to Aranjuez was shaded with trees, from -which avenues branched off in all directions, opening into glades, -and diversified with bowers. Nor was this royal expenditure directed -only to the purposes of splendid enjoyment. The Spanish Kings, with an -intention better than the success which attended it, endeavoured to -improve the agriculture of the country, by setting their subjects an -example upon the royal domains. The best fruits in the Peninsula were -cultivated for sale in the royal gardens; the finest oil in Spain was -produced there, and wine from vineyards of the choicest grapes was -collected in cellars of unequalled extent. They had attempted also to -naturalize the camel there, and at one time from two to three hundred -of these animals fed in the royal pastures, and were occasionally -employed for burthen. But though they bred, and appeared to thrive -there, the experiment was given up; the native animals, which are -reared with so much less cost and care, being better suited to the -soil, and surface, and climate of Spain. - -The banks of the Tagus at Aranjuez, and the gardens which it had so -long been the pride and pleasure of the Spanish Kings to embellish, -were now to be made the scene of war. About two in the afternoon the -French appeared upon the right bank, and began the attack along the -whole line. They opened a heavy fire on all points, but more especially -upon the ford of Don Antonio’s garden, and the reserve from the walks -were sent to strengthen that post. Panes at the Puente de Barcas was -struck by a ball, which carried away his leg; a glance convinced him -that the wound was mortal: “Comrades,” said he, “stand by these guns -till death ... I am going to heaven:” and, as they bore him from the -field, the only anxiety he expressed was, that another officer should -take his place without delay. Don Gaspar Hermosa succeeded him, after -planting a mortar at the Puente ford in the midst of the enemy’s fire. -The Spanish artillery was excellently served this day, and frequently -silenced that of the French. One mortar placed in the thicket opposite -the islet, made great havoc among the enemy. Lacy, perceiving his own -post secure, and that the main attack was made upon the left, at the -Puente Verde, the gardens of the Prince and of Don Antonio, removed his -division thither without waiting for orders. The firing continued till -the approach of night, when the French, baffled in all their attempts, -retired. The loss of the Spaniards was between two and three hundred; -they computed that of the French at three hundred killed, and about a -thousand wounded. The French force consisted of fourteen or fifteen -thousand, being the whole of Sebastiani’s corps. They themselves -carefully avoided all mention of the action, saying only that they -worsted the advanced guard of Venegas, and drove it beyond the Tagus. -Giron, who commanded, was rewarded with the rank of camp-martial; and -the Junta testified its sense of the heroism of Panes, who died a few -hours after he was wounded, by exempting the title in his family from -the duties called _lanzas_ and _medias anatas_ for ever, appointing -his father a gentleman of the bed-chamber, and ordering a letter to be -written to him, as a document to be preserved in the archives of his -house, expressing, in the most honourable terms, the sense which the -country entertained of the services rendered to it both by father and -son. - -♦DELIBERATIONS CONCERNING THE ARMY OF LA MANCHA.♦ - -The French after this repulse recrossed the Xarama, and, as Venegas -had foreseen, prepared to attack him from the other side. According -to their official statement, they thought it would be a long and -difficult work to rebuild the bridges at Aranjuez, and that it would -be less dangerous to force the passage of the Tagus at Toledo, where -the Spaniards remained masters of the bridge. The Spanish General, -therefore, disposed his troops at Aranjuez, Ocaña, La Guardia, and -Tembleque, ready to march, as circumstances might require, to some -point where he could only be attacked in front, and might be freed -from the apprehension that the enemy would cut off his retreat by way -of Toledo, and, having disabled him, penetrate to the Sierra Morena, -the armies of Cuesta and Sir Arthur being too far off to prevent them. -The necessity of retreating was indeed obvious; and the Junta were of -opinion that he had no other course left than that of abandoning La -Mancha, and taking post at the pass of Despeñaperros. Mr. Frere thought -it would be better, if La Mancha were untenable, to occupy the passes -with a part of his army only (for it was not to be supposed that at -this time the French could make any serious attempt upon Andalusia), -and march with or detach the rest upon the left of the enemy, through -a country which they had never been able to occupy, Cuenca, Molina, -and as far as Arragon; a movement upon the two former points would -threaten the capital, upon the latter it would give the Spaniards a -decided superiority in that quarter, and interrupt the communication -of the French with France. In the present state of things, Mr. Frere -perceived how desirable it was that the Spaniards should have as many -small armies as possible; their system of military subsistence and -discipline being so imperfect, defeats became dangerous, and even -destructive, in proportion to the size of the army; in small bodies -they were comparatively of little importance: in small bodies the -Spaniards had almost uniformly been successful; and such diversions -would harass and distract the French, and waste their force. - -♦VENEGAS RESOLVES TO ATTACK THE ENEMY.♦ - -Mr. Frere spoke upon this plan to one of the leading members of the -war department, and would have delivered in his advice in writing, if -Marquis Wellesley had not at that time been daily expected to arrive -at Seville and supersede him. This circumstance, and the confidence -which Venegas expressed in the spirit of his troops (for he seemed -disposed to risk a battle rather than abandon La Mancha,) induced him -to wait for the Marquis’s arrival; and then it was too late. For on the -same day that Mr. Frere recommended this proposed diversion, Venegas -received advices from the fifth division, under General Zerain, by -Toledo, that the French had received a reinforcement of 8000 ♦AUG. 8.♦ -men, and were about to attack him. Upon this the general ordered the -fourth division from Tembleque to advance to his support. While they -were on their way, Sebastiani, having collected ♦AUG. 9.♦ his whole -corps at Toledo, attacked Zerain, who retreated in good order to -Sonseca, and from thence turned to Almonacid to join the troops which -had been sent to his assistance. At Almonacid Venegas assembled his -whole army on the 10th, and believing that the number of the enemy did -not exceed 14,000, the same reasons which had made him stand his ground -at Aranjuez, after the retreat of the combined armies, induced him once -more to give the French battle. He could not bear to abandon the people -of La Mancha, who had welcomed him with enthusiasm on his advance: he -knew how injurious it was, not merely to the general character of an -army, but to the individual feelings of the soldiery, to be perpetually -giving way before the enemy, losing ground, and losing reputation -and hope also; and his success at Aranjuez made him confident in the -courage and conduct of his troops. Before he delivered his own opinion, -he summoned the different chiefs of division to council, and they -perfectly accorded with his pre-determination. This was on the 10th; he -resolved to let the troops rest the next day, that they might recover -from their march, and it was agreed to attack the enemy at daybreak on -the 12th. Meantime it was supposed more accurate information of their -number might be obtained. - -♦HE IS ATTACKED BY THEM.♦ - -Delay has ever been the bane of the Spanish councils, and Venegas -should have remembered, that in offensive war every thing depends -upon celerity. Victor had now opened a communication with Soult, and -the Intruder being thus delivered from all fear of the allied armies, -joined Sebastiani, with the reserve, on the 9th. While Venegas was -deliberating, his position was reconnoitred; and on the morning of the -day which he had allowed for rest he was attacked by an army of little -less than double the force at which he had computed it. The Spaniards, -however, were not taken by surprise. The right wing, under Vigodet, -extended to some rising ground beyond the village of Almonacid: the -centre, consisting of two divisions, under Camp-marshal Castejon, -were in the plain before the village. Lacy commanded the left, which -was supported by a height, detached from the range of hills that run -north and south, beginning at Toledo. Giron was stationed, with three -battalions, as a reserve, behind the centre; the rest of his division -were posted, part on the heights to the left, part at an advanced -battery, and the remainder upon the Castle hill, behind the village. -The cavalry, under Camp-marshals the Marquis of Gelo, D. Tomas Zerain, -and the Viscount de Zolina, were placed in two bodies, one on each wing. - -♦BATTLE OF ALMONACID.♦ - -The Intruder was in the field; but Sebastiani was the real commander. -That general perceived that the event of the day depended upon the -possession of the hill on the Spaniards’ left, and he ordered Laval -to attack it with his two divisions. Laval formed in close columns, -by divisions and brigades, and attacked the hill both in front and on -the right at once. The French suffered considerably in this attack. -Count Sobolesky and another chief of battalion were killed, several -of equal rank wounded; but they had the advantage of numbers as well -as discipline. The colonel who commanded on the hill was wounded, and -before Giron could reach the spot with the reserve, the battalions -which were posted there gave way. These battalions, instead of rallying -when they found themselves supported, confused the troops who came to -support them. The height, upon which the fate of the day depended, was -lost; and the enemy, having won it, attacked the Spaniards in flank. -Lacy upon this wheeled to face the enemy, and for a while withstood -them; 200 cavalry, led by Don Nicholas Chacon, charged one of their -columns, which, forming itself into a square, withstood the attack; and -Chacon, having his horse shot under him, and some of his best officers -and soldiers killed, was compelled to withdraw. In the centre the enemy -were equally successful, and at length the Spaniards fell back along -the whole of their line. Nevertheless the ground was well contested, -and Venegas took up a second position behind Almonacid, supported by -the Castle hill. Here he was presently attacked at all points; his -cavalry made another charge, which failed for lack of numbers, not -of spirit, and the general then perceived that there was no hope of -recovering the day. He therefore commenced his retreat, and ordered -Vigodet, whose division was at this time the least exposed, to bring up -and cover the rear. Vigodet performed this service with great coolness, -recovered and spiked one of the cannon which had been taken, and -began at length to fall back himself in good order. At this time some -ammunition carts, which were blown up on his right, that they might -not fall into the enemy’s hands, frightened the horses of the little -cavalry which covered his own retreat, and the French, taking advantage -of their confusion, charged him vigorously. The second in command -of the division, D. Francisco de Reyna, checked the pursuers, while -Vigodet rallied the scattered horse, and collected about 1000 men, -under whose protection he left the field. They retreated by different -routes to Herencia, meaning to fall back to Manzanares, Membrilla, and -Solana. As far as Herencia the movement was effected in good order, -only a few soldiers, straggling from their ranks to drink at the few -wells in that arid country; but when the van reached Manzanares, a cry -arose that the French had got before them on the road of Valdepeñas, -to cut off their retreat. This false report, either originating in -treason or in cowardice, spread through the troops: from that moment -subordination was at an end, and they forfeited the credit which had -been gained in the action, by dispersing. - -Sebastiani stated the loss of the Spaniards at 4000 killed, 4000 -prisoners, an immense number wounded, 100 ammunition waggons, -and thirty-five pieces of cannon. The whole of the artillery and -baggage was certainly lost; but the number of prisoners was grossly -exaggerated, because the Spaniards did not disperse till they had -accomplished their retreat; and the French, with that inconsistency -which so often betrayed the falsehood of their official accounts, -admitted that none of their corps could be overtaken. He gave no -account of his own loss; Venegas estimated it at 8000, ... an -exaggeration as great as that of the French general; but that the -French suffered severely was evident, because they were long crippled -for any further operations. Venegas retired to La Carolina, his men -assembled at the passes of the Sierra, and in a few days he was again -at the head of a respectable army. The enemy had now effected every -thing which they proposed; they had driven Cuesta and the British -beyond the Tagus on one side, and on the other had recovered possession -of La Mancha; and the Intruder, rejoicing in the issue of a campaign, -which opened under such inauspicious aspects, returned triumphantly to -Madrid. The disgrace of Talavera sate easy upon the French; ... with -their usual contempt of truth, they affirmed that they had won the -victory; and the situation of the contending armies a few weeks after -the battle gave credit to the impudent assertion. - - - - -CHAPTER XXV. - - PLANS OF THE FRENCH. SIR A. WELLESLEY RAISED TO THE PEERAGE. - MARQUIS WELLESLEY ARRIVES IN SPAIN. ALTERATIONS IN THE BRITISH - MINISTRY. STATE OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. THE BRITISH ARMY - RETREATS TO THE FRONTIERS OF PORTUGAL. BATTLES OF TAMAMES, - OCANA, AND ALBA DE TORMES. - - -♦1809. AUGUST.♦ - -Never during the war had the prospect appeared so hopeful as when Sir -Arthur entered Spain. For the first time Buonaparte had been repulsed -at all points in a great battle; and for the first time also a spirit -of national resistance had broken forth in Germany, ... the only -spirit by which his tyranny could be overthrown. The Spaniards seemed -to acquire strength from their defeats, learning confidence in their -resources, if not experience from misfortunes; while the British army, -by the passage of the Douro and the discomfiture of Soult, had once -more made the enemy feel what they might apprehend from such troops and -such a commander. - -♦SOULT PROPOSES IMMEDIATELY TO INVADE PORTUGAL.♦ - -The Peninsula was but a secondary object in the all-grasping schemes -of Buonaparte’s ambition. At first he had expected to secure it -without a struggle; nor was he yet so undeceived concerning the real -nature of the resistance to be experienced there, as to believe that -any serious effort would be required for completing its conquest. In -Germany it was, he thought, that the fate of Europe must be decided; -and this opinion was proclaimed in England by those who, on every -occasion, sought to persuade the public that resistance to such a -statesman and such a general, wherever it was attempted, could only -end in defeat, and humiliation, and ruin. Under this impression he had -ordered the intrusive government, which was in fact entirely under his -orders, to content itself with protracting the war till the campaign -in Germany should be brought to a close. That campaign was now ended. -The battle of Wagram had re-established his shaken power; an armistice -had immediately been sued for, and in the negotiations which followed, -the house of Austria surrendered more than the French king Francis I. -had lost at Pavia. The news of this great success did not, however, -induce the Intruder to deviate from his instructions. M. Soult, the -most enterprising as well as the ablest of the French officers who -were employed in Spain, proposed at this time a plan for re-entering -Portugal. The line which should have secured the communication of the -British army with Lisbon he occupied, now that that army had found -it necessary to retreat across the Tagus. He proposed, therefore, to -move from Plasencia against Beresford’s inefficient force, while Ney, -advancing from Salamanca, should act upon its left flank. That army, if -not absolutely destroyed, would be prevented from forming a junction by -way of Alcantara with Sir Arthur; and the French, by rapidly pursuing -this advantage, might occupy Abrantes, and once more take possession of -Lisbon, in which case Soult, ♦CAMPAIGN OF 1809, PP. 49–52. IB. APP. -C-K.♦ still deceiving himself with regard to the disposition of the -Portugueze, thought they would submit to an enemy whom they found it -hopeless to resist. The plan was boldly conceived, though M. Soult had -not sufficiently taken into his calculation the character of the troops -with which he would again be brought in contact: but it was rejected -by Joseph, who was at that time guided chiefly by M. Jourdan. That -General, distinguished for his signal successes in the revolutionary -war, held the high situation of Major-General of the army of Spain; and -he preferring what seemed the surer though the slower course, resolved -implicitly to follow the Emperor Napoleon’s instructions, and undertake -no offensive operation for the present. A plan, he said, had been -laid down for invading Portugal, and would be executed in the month -of February. It was their intention to subjugate the south of Spain -before this should be undertaken; and if the British Commander had -possessed as little foresight as appeared in the conduct of the Spanish -government, or if the British army had not derived better support from -the Portugueze than from the Spaniards, the French might have succeeded -in both parts of their intended operations. - -♦SIR A. WELLESLEY RAISED TO THE PEERAGE.♦ - -The Central Junta expressed its sense of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s -services, by nominating him one of the Captain-generals of the army (a -rank nearly equivalent to that of our field-marshal), and presenting -him, in the name of Ferdinand, with some horses selected from the best -breeds of Andalusia. “This tribute,” they said, “was of small value -in comparison with the services which he had rendered to Spain, and -still less in proportion to the wishes of those who offered it: but for -hearts like his, the satisfaction resulting from great achievements -was their best recompense; not was it in the power of man to bestow -any reward which could equal the glory of being one of the principal -deliverers of a great and generous people, of listening to their -blessings, and of deserving their gratitude.” Sir Arthur accepted the -horses, and the appointment also, provided he should receive permission -from his own sovereign; but he declined the pay attached to it, not -thinking it becoming that he should burthen the finances of Spain -during such a contest. In England, also, he was recompensed with new -honours. As soon as the news of his victory arrived, he was raised to -the peerage by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount -Wellington of Talavera, and of Wellington in the county of Somerset. - -♦AUG. 1. MARQUIS WELLESLEY ARRIVES IN SPAIN.♦ - -On the fourth morning after the battle, while the bells of Cadiz were -ringing, the cannon firing, and the people rejoicing with higher hopes -than had been felt since the surrender of Dupont, Marquis Wellesley -landed in that harbour to supersede Mr. Frere. A great concourse -assembled to see him land, and as he set foot on shore, a French flag -was spread before him, that he might tread upon it in honour of his -brother’s victory. The people drew his carriage, which in that country -is an unusual mark of respect. The Marquis gave one of them a purse of -gold to distribute among his comrades: but the man returned it, and, -in the name of the people, assured him they desired no reward, being -happy that they had this opportunity of expressing the sentiments of -the whole nation. Both at Cadiz and at Seville the Marquis was received -with every mark of public honour, and with the most enthusiastic -expressions of attachment and gratitude to the British nation. But -the first dispatches from Sir Arthur opened ♦DISTRESS OF THE ARMY FOR -PROVISIONS.♦ upon him a disheartening prospect. The combined armies, -amounting to not less than 60,000 men, and 16,000 or 18,000 horse, -were depending entirely for their daily supply upon the country, -which did not contain a population in many square miles equal to the -number of the army, and could not of course produce a sufficiency for -its sustenance. Extremadura indeed is the worst peopled and least -cultivated province of the whole Peninsula. It was necessary to -send to a great distance for supplies, which, scanty as they were, -could not be procured regularly, nor without great difficulty. The -troops were ill fed, and frequently received no rations whatever. -Effectual measures, Sir Arthur said, must be taken, and that speedily. -No army could serve to any purpose unless it were properly fed; and -it was absurd to suppose that a Spaniard, or a man or animal of any -country, could make exertions without a due supply of food; in fact -the Spaniards were more clamorous, and more exhausted, if they did not -receive it regularly, than the English. The English, however, were in -a state of great distress; from the 3d till the 7th they had had no -bread; then about 4000 pounds of biscuit were divided among 30,000 -mouths, and the whole supply ♦AUG. 8.♦ was exhausted. “The army,” said -Sir Arthur, “will be entirely lost, if this treatment continues. If -efficient measures had been adopted by the government when the distress -of the British troops was first represented to them, the benefit must -ere this have been experienced. There had been no neglect on the part -of Mr. Frere: the evil was owing to the poverty and exhausted state of -the country; to the inactivity of the magistrates and people; to their -disinclination to taking any trouble, except that of packing up their -property, and removing when they heard of the approach of a French -patrole; to their habits of insubordination and disobedience, and to -the want of power in the government and their officers.” - -♦DISPUTES WITH CUESTA CONCERNING SUPPLIES.♦ - -Cuesta’s unaccommodating temper aggravated the evil. He was applied -to after the battle for ninety mules to draw the British artillery in -place of those lost in the action; there were at that time hundreds -in his army employed in drawing empty carts, and yet he refused to -part with any. Five guns belonging to Alburquerque’s division having -been taken at Arzobispo, the Duke endeavoured to make over to the -British army the mules attached to them; but Cuesta took them for -himself. His own cavalry were plentifully supplied with barley, while -hundreds of the British horses died for want of it. In other respects, -his men suffered as many privations as the English; and vexation at -this and at the untoward issue of the campaign, combined with bodily -infirmity, seems to have bewildered him: he lent ear to every complaint -against the allies; and at a time when they were literally starving, -both men and horses, he wrote to their General, stating that his own -troops were in want of necessary food, because all that he ordered -for their use was intercepted by the British and their commissaries. -The English, he said, actually sold biscuit and meat; and he heard -continual complaints and saw continual traces that they plundered all -the places through which they passed, and even followed the peasantry -to the mountains, for the purpose of stripping them even to the shirt. -Sir Arthur positively denied that any thing going to the Spanish army -had been stopped by the British; as for the tale of his soldiers -selling provisions, he observed, that it was beneath the dignity of his -Excellency’s situation and character to notice such things, and beneath -his own to reply to them. He was concerned that General Cuesta should -conceive there was any reason for complaining of the British troops; -but, continued he, “when troops are starving, which those under my -command have been, as I have repeatedly told your Excellency since I -joined you, and particularly when they had no bread from the 3d to the -7th, it is not astonishing that they should go to the villages and even -to the mountains to look for food where they think they can get it. The -complaints of the inhabitants, however, should not have been confined -to the conduct of the British; here in Deleitosa I have seen Spanish -soldiers, who ought to have been elsewhere, take off the doors of the -houses which were locked up, in order that they might plunder the -houses; and they afterwards burnt the doors.” - -To preserve discipline among starving troops is indeed impossible, and -neither Cuesta nor Sir Arthur could be responsible for their men under -such circumstances; but the letter of the former brought the question -respecting provisions to a point, and Sir Arthur called upon him to -state distinctly whether he understood that the Spanish army was to -have not only all the provisions which the country could afford, but -all those also which were sent from Seville; whether any magazines had -been formed, and from whence the troops were to draw provisions? “I -hope,” said he, “that I shall receive satisfactory answers to these -questions to-morrow morning; if not, I beg that your Excellency will be -prepared to occupy the posts opposite Almaraz, as it will be impossible -for me to remain any longer in a country in which no arrangement is -made for provisioning my troops, and in which it is understood that all -the provisions which are either found in the country, or are sent from -Seville (as I have been informed, for the use of the British army) are -to be applied solely and exclusively to the Spanish troops.” On the day -that this correspondence took place, an English commissary arriving -from Truxillo with bread and barley for the British army, was stopped -on the way, and deprived of all his barley and part of his bread by -a detachment of Spanish horse. Whatever momentary irritation might -be occasioned by circumstances like these, Sir Arthur commiserated -the sufferings of the Spanish army too sincerely to harbour any -resentment; but he perceived the absolute necessity of withdrawing. -“It is useless,” he said to the British ambassador, “to complain; but -we are not treated as friends, much less as the only prop on which the -cause of Spain can depend. But, besides this want of good-will, which -can easily be traced to the temper of the General, there is such a -want of resources in the country, and so little exertion in bringing -forward what is to be found; that if the army were to remain here much -longer, it would become totally useless. The daily and increasing loss -of horses from deficiency of food, and from the badness of what there -is, is really alarming.” Ney’s return to Old Castille strengthened -him in this resolution; it satisfied him that no serious attack upon -Andalusia was intended for the present, and he thought it not unlikely -that this corps of the enemy was about to invade Portugal, for the sake -of drawing him out of Spain. - -♦MR. FRERE REQUIRES THE REMOVAL OF CUESTA.♦ - -The necessity of removing Cuesta from the command appeared so urgent -to Mr. Frere, that he deemed it his duty to present a memorial upon -the subject, though Marquis Wellesley was expected two days afterward -at Seville. ♦AUG. 9.♦ He dwelt upon his abandonment of the wounded -at Talavera, and upon the imminent danger to which he had exposed -Venegas by concealing from him, as well as from his government, the -true state of the combined armies, and the inability of the English to -proceed. The dismissal of Cuesta, he said, could not long be delayed, -and it was important that it should take place instantly, and another -commander appointed: either the choice being left to Sir Arthur, or the -Junta itself appointing the Duke of Alburquerque, who possessed his -confidence and that of the army, and whose abilities had been tried -and approved. This was the only satisfaction which could be given to -the British General and his army, and even this would be little: “the -wound,” said Mr. Frere, “is very deep, and the English nation could -not have received one more difficult to heal than the abandonment of -their wounded at Talavera.” This was the last act of Mr. Frere in his -public capacity; and it was consistent with the whole conduct of that -minister, who, during his mission never shrunk from any responsibility, -nor ever, from the fear of it, omitted any effort which he thought -requisite for the common welfare of his own country and of Spain. In -presenting such a memorial, while his successor was, as it were, at the -door, he was conscious that he might appear to be acting irregularly in -his public character; and in his private one, that it might alter the -feelings with which he could have wished to take leave of his friends -in Spain; but, in addition to the urgency of the case, he considered -also that it would be peculiarly unpleasant for Marquis Wellesley -to begin his mission with an altercation in which his brother was -concerned. Mr. Frere’s situation had been unfavourable to any thing -like a controlling influence; the intelligence which announced the -intended assistance of a British force had been accompanied with an -intimation of his recall, and for some months he had, as he expressed -himself, literally been a minister only from day to day, looking -for the arrival of his successor by the first fair wind. The Junta -expressed their sense of his zealous services by conferring upon -him the Castillian title of Marquez de la Union (which he received -permission from his own government to retain); and, in reply to the -momentary outcry which misrepresentation and party spirit had raised -against him in England, they represented his conduct such as they -conceived it to be, and as it truly was. This had never prevented him -from using the strongest language and taking the highest tone toward -the very persons who had been foremost in this friendly act; but he -felt how unfavourable his situation was, and, knowing that that of -Marquis Wellesley would in all respects be very different, he hoped -the Marquis might be able to remedy the existing evils as far as they -were capable of being remedied. The task, however, was no easy one. -“It might seem,” he said, “that a British minister ought before that -time to have established a regular system for securing the subsistence -of the armies; but the evil lay deep; it arose from an old despotic -government, and from eighteen years of the basest corruption, intrigue, -and public pillage. The effects of all this still continued, the system -itself was not wholly done away, and even a sovereign in ordinary times -would find it difficult to remedy it.” - -♦CUESTA RESIGNS THE COMMAND.♦ - -Marquis Wellesley, on his arrival, did not think it expedient to -insist on Cuesta’s removal. That General, he observed, was said to be -deficient in every quality necessary for an extensive command, except -courage; his temper rendered him peculiarly unfit for acting with an -allied army, and it was scarcely possible that another officer with -equal disqualifications should be found in the Spanish service. But -the government was under some apprehension of his influence, which -was supposed to be extensive and dangerous, though it rested on no -other foundation than the precarious one of undeserved popularity. The -Marquis, therefore, limited his interference to a strong expression -of his sense of the General’s misconduct, being of opinion that his -removal might be effected more willingly and with less danger if it -appeared to be the consequence of his own actions, rather than the -result of a direct application from the British ambassador. The Junta, -however, were desirous that such a direct application should be made; -and Marquis Wellesley then addressed a note to Garay, stating that it -was impossible to hope for any degree of co-operation, or even for any -aid from the troops of Spain to the British army, if the chief command -remained in the hands of General Cuesta. Cuesta had wisely anticipated -such a measure. Two days after the date of that letter to Sir Arthur, -in which he complained so preposterously of the British troops, a -paralytic stroke deprived him of the use of one leg; feeling himself -then completely incapacitated, he delivered over the army to the second -in command, D. Francisco de Eguia, and requested permission to resign, -that he might go to the baths of Alhama. When, therefore, the Marquis -delivered in his note, he was informed that Cuesta’s resignation had -been accepted. - -♦EGUIA SUCCEEDS AD INTERIM TO THE COMMAND.♦ - -Eguia was well acquainted with the military topography of Spain, but -had no other qualification for the command of an army: at the battle -of Medellin he did not venture to depart from his orders without -receiving fresh ones from Cuesta, at a time when it was impossible for -Cuesta to communicate with him, and by this imbecility he completed -the destruction of the army that day. Mr. Frere, knowing that the -military Junta would be most likely to confirm him in the command, -because he was one of the old school, wrote a private note to Garay, -deprecating such an appointment. Alburquerque was the proper person for -the command; but the Junta were jealous of his rank, his popularity, -his talents, and his enlightened views; and Marquis Wellesley soon -discovered that, if he were named to the command, the army under him -would certainly be reduced. Till, however, a successor to Cuesta should -be chosen, the command devolved upon Eguia; and when that General -notified this to the British Commander, he accompanied the intelligence -with the fairest professions, desiring him to depute a confidential -officer, who, with another appointed on the part of the Spaniards, -might regulate the distribution of provisions in such a manner that -the English army should be supplied in preference to the Spaniards. -Lord Wellington expressed, in reply, his perfect confidence in the -intentions of Eguia, and sent some officers to Truxillo, there to meet -any whom Eguia might appoint, and settle some practicable arrangement: -a preference like that which was spoken of he well perceived was -impossible. - -♦CALVO SENT TO SEE TO THE SUPPLIES.♦ - -When first the Junta were informed of the distress of the British army, -nothing appeared to hurt them so much as that their own troops should -have been supplied while their allies were in want, and they ordered -Cuesta, in every instance, to supply the British troops in preference -to his own. They directed the Junta of Badajoz to send two members of -their body into the vale of Plasencia, and secure the persons of those -magistrates who, having engaged to furnish means for the British army, -had failed in their engagement; to supersede them also, and place at -the disposal of the British commissary every thing which he might -require. Before these measures could be executed, Soult entered from -Old Castille, and the whole of the fertile country on that side of the -Tagus fell into the possession of the enemy. When the complaints of -the British General became louder, the Junta, alarmed at his intended -retreat into Portugal, deputed D. Lorenzo Calvo, one of their own body, -to the armies, hoping that his exertions, aided by his authority, would -effectually remedy the evil. Calvo was considered a man of energetic -character and activity, and, having been bred up in commerce, had -acquired those habits of business which were necessary for the service -in which he was now employed. True to that system of dissimulation, -which, by the old school, was esteemed essential in all business of -state, he was charged to invest Cuesta with the order of Charles III. -lest that General should take umbrage at the distinction conferred upon -Lord Wellington, though at this very time the Junta were so offended at -Cuesta’s conduct, that nothing but their fears had prevented them from -immediately displacing him. - -♦LORD WELLINGTON DECLARES HIS INTENTION OF FALLING BACK.♦ - -But neither Eguia’s professions, nor the measures of the government, -nor the presence of one of its members, produced any relief to the -British army. Had it been in a condition for service, and provided -with means of transport, Lord Wellington had it in view to act against -the French at Plasencia, for which purpose he ordered materials to be -collected for repairing the Puente de Cardinal; but his cavalry had -now consumed all the forage within reach; they were obliged to go from -twenty to thirty miles to procure it, and frequently when they had -gone so far, the Spaniards, being themselves in equal want, deprived -them of it on their return. The horses were at length so much reduced -that they were scarcely able to relieve the outposts. More than a -month had now elapsed since the British General informed Cuesta that, -if he were not supplied, he could not remain in Spain. In the course -of that time, if proper measures had been taken, supplies might have -been forwarded from the farthest part of Andalusia; but not a mule or -cart, or article of provision of any kind had been obtained under any -order from, or arrangement made by, the government. Lord Wellington -applied for a remount of only an hundred mares, which could not be -used in the Spanish cavalry, because they used stallions; even these -he could not procure, nor did he receive an answer to his application. -It was now become absolutely necessary to withdraw, and on the 18th of -August, he requested Marquis Wellesley to give notice to the government -that he was about so to do. “Since the 22d of last month,” said he, -“the horses have not received their regular deliveries of barley, and -the infantry not ten days’ bread. I have no doubt the government have -given orders that we should be provided as we ought to be, but orders -are not sufficient. To carry on the contest to any purpose, the labour -and service of every man and of every beast in the country should be -employed in the support of the armies; and these should be so classed -and arranged as not only to secure obedience to the orders of the -government, but regularity and efficiency in the performance of the -service. Magazines might then with ease be formed, and transported -wherever the armies should be stationed. But as we are now situated, -50,000 men are collected upon a spot which cannot afford subsistence -for 10,000, and there are no means of sending to a distance to make -good the deficiency: the Junta have issued orders, which, for want of -arrangement, there are no persons to obey; and the army would perish -here, if I were to remain, before the supplies could arrive.” - -♦CORRESPONDENCE WITH EGUIA AND CALVO.♦ - -Prepared as both the Spanish government and general ought to have been -for such a determination, both manifested the greatest astonishment -when it was announced. Eguia wrote to Lord Wellington, repeating his -protestations, that he should have every thing which he required, and -that the Spaniards should go without any thing, rather than the British -should be in want. “An English commissary,” he said, “should reside -at Truxillo, who should have a key of the magazines, and take the -proportion for the British army, though his own should perish. If,” he -continued, “notwithstanding these conclusive protestations, the British -General persisted in marching into Portugal, it would be apparent -that other causes induced him to take that step, and not the want of -subsistence.” Upon this insulting assertion, Lord Wellington informed -Eguia that any further correspondence between them was unnecessary. He -entered, nevertheless, into a sufficient explanation of the real state -of affairs. The magazines of Truxillo, according to a return sent by -Eguia himself, did not contain a sufficiency to feed the British army -alone for one day. No doubt was entertained of the exertions of the -Spanish General, nor of his sincerity. “The deficiencies,” said Lord -Wellington, “arise not from want of orders of your Excellency, but -from the want of means in the country, from the want of arrangement in -the government, and from the neglect of timely measures to supply the -wants which were complained of long ago.” A letter from Calvo to Lord -Wellington implied the same suspicion concerning the motives of his -retreat as Eguia had done, though in more qualified terms. This member -of the Junta came forward with something more specious than vague -promises and protestations. “He bound himself,” he said, “to provide -the army, within three days, with all the rations which it might -require; and within fifteen days to have magazines formed in places -appointed by the British General, containing all the articles which -the army could consume in one or two months; and to provide also carts -and mules, both of draft and burthen, sufficient for the transport of -these magazines.” He then protested that 7000 rations of bread, 50,000 -pounds of flour, 250 _fanegas_ of barley, 50 of rye, 100 of wheat, and -60 _arrobas_ of rice were ready, with means of transport for them, and -before the morrow noon would reach the British army in their present -position. “My activity,” said Calvo, “shall not rest until continual -remittances of the same articles prove that my promises deserve to -be confided in; and if there were in your Excellency’s intention any -disposition to alter your purpose of retreat, I am certain I should -obtain the satisfaction of hearing your Excellency yourself confess -that I had surpassed your hopes.” At the time when Lord Wellington -received this letter, he had in his possession an order dated only -five days back, and signed by this very member of the Supreme Junta, -ordering to the Spanish head-quarters, for the use of the Spanish army, -all the provisions which the British commissary had provided in the -town of Guadalupe and its neighbourhood. Well, therefore, might he -reply to him, that he could have no confidence in his assurances. “As -for the promise,” said he, “of giving provisions to the British army -to the exclusion of the Spanish troops, such a proposal can only have -been made as an extreme and desperate measure to induce me to remain -in Spain; and were it practicable, I could not give my consent to it. -The Spanish army must be fed as well as the British. I am fully aware,” -he continued, “of the consequences which may follow my departure, -though there is now no enemy in our front; but I am not responsible -for them, whatever they may be. They are responsible who, having been -made acquainted with the wants of this army more than a month ago, have -taken no effectual means to relieve them; who allowed a brave army, -which was rendering gratuitous services to Spain, and which was able -and willing to pay for every thing it received, to starve in the midst -of their country, and be reduced by want to a state of inefficiency; -who refused or neglected to find carriages for removing the officers -and soldiers who had been wounded in their service, and obliged me to -give up the equipment of the army for the performance of this necessary -act ♦AUG. 20.♦ of humanity.” On the following day Lord Wellington began -his retreat in the direction of Badajoz. - -♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY PROPOSES A PLAN FOR SUPPLYING THE ARMIES.♦ - -He halted at Merida, and eight days after his departure, being then -four marches from Xaraicejo, he found none of the supplies on the -road which had so confidently been promised. Having, however, been -able to separate his troops, and being out of reach of Eguia’s army, -he now procured regular supplies. Marquis Wellesley meantime had -been indefatigable in pressing upon the government the necessity -of a regular plan for provisioning the armies; and he found, upon -investigation, that orders enough had been issued, but no means -had been employed either to enforce the execution of those orders, -or to ascertain in what respects they had failed, or what were the -causes either of their total failure or of their partial success. No -magazines or regular depots had been established, no regular means of -transport provided, nor any persons regularly appointed to conduct and -superintend convoys, under the direction of the general commanding the -army; nor had any system been adopted for drawing from the more fertile -provinces, by a connected chain of magazines, resources to supply the -deficiency of those poorer countries in which the army might be acting. -At the solicitation of the Junta, Marquis Wellesley delivered in a plan -for remedying these evils. It was less easy of execution in Spain than -it would have been in England, where the system of our stagecoaches -and waggons has disciplined a great number of persons in the detail of -such arrangements; yet, with due exertions on the part of government, -it might speedily have been established. Two days elapsed, and no -notice was taken of the proposal; he requested a reply, and after two -days more Garay put into his hand a long string of regulations for -the internal management of the magazines when they should have been -formed. Marquis Wellesley again anxiously inquired whether the Junta -were disposed to adopt the plan which he had formed at their request, -and whether any steps had been taken for carrying it into effect? At -length, after it had been nine days in their hands, he was informed -that they assented to it,--but this was all; it was a mere verbal -assent, and no measures whatever were taken for beginning arrangements -of such urgent necessity. The government at the same time expressed -its confidence that the British army would now rejoin the Spaniards, -and make a forward movement against the enemy. Marquis Wellesley -suspected some of the Junta of treason. “This proposition,” said he to -his government, “accords with the general tenor of those professions -of zeal for active war, which have particularly characterized the -declarations of the Junta since the army has been deprived of the -means of movement and supply. Far from affording any just foundation -of confidence in their intentions, such declarations of activity and -enterprise, unaccompanied by any provident or regular attention to -the means and objects of the war, serve only to create additional -suspicions of ignorance, weakness, or insincerity. No person acquainted -with the real condition of the British and Spanish forces at ♦AUG. 30.♦ -this time, could reasonably advise a forward movement against the enemy -with any other view than the certain destruction of the allied armies.” - -♦HIS ILL OPINION OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.♦ - -The conduct of the Junta gave strong grounds for such a suspicion. -The real cause which had checked the progress of a victorious army, -and finally reduced it to a state unfit for service, could not be -concealed; public opinion loudly imputed this evil to the negligence of -government, and the government endeavoured, by ungenerous artifices, to -divert the general indignation. Rumours were set afloat that the real -cause of the retreat of the British army was very different from the -assigned one; they had not fallen back upon Portugal because there had -been any deficiency either in their means of supply or of transport, -but because of certain political considerations, inconsistent with the -security and honour of Spain, and with the good faith of Great Britain. -Demands, it was whispered, had been made in the King of England’s -name, for the cession of Cadiz, of the Havannah, and even of the whole -island of Cuba; changes had been required in the form of the Spanish -government, as preliminary conditions to the further operations of the -British troops in Spain, and Lord Wellington had retreated only because -these demands were refused. These reports, which, if not invented -by the government, certainly were not discountenanced by them, were -absolutely and entirely false; nothing had been asked from Spain except -subsistence for the army employed in her defence. Marquis Wellesley, -however, though he perceived the criminal misconduct of the government, -and though he affirmed that in the last campaign no rational motives -could be imagined for the conduct of some of the generals and officers, -unless it were supposed that they concerted their operations with the -French instead of the British general, did justice to the people of -Spain. “Whatever insincerity or jealousy towards England existed, was -to be found,” he said, “in the government, its officers, and adherents; -no such unworthy sentiment prevailed among the people.” They had done -their duty, and were still ready to do it; and, notwithstanding the -vexations which he experienced, and the alarm and even ill-will which -the retreat of the British excited, he remembered, as became him, -that the cause of Spain and England was the same: while, therefore, -he expressed his opinion that the Cortes ought to be assembled, and -a more efficient government formed than that of so ill-constituted -and anomalous a body as the Junta, he listened willingly to every -suggestion for employing the British troops in any practicable manner. -Might it not be possible, it was said, for them to take up a position -on the left bank of the Guadiana, occupying Merida as an advanced post, -their right at Almendralejo, and their left extending toward Badajoz? -Portugal might be covered by this position; Seville protected at the -same time, and a point of support given to the left of the Spanish -army, which should in that case be cantoned in Medellin, Don Benito, -and Villa Nueva de la Serena. - -♦LORD WELLINGTON OBJECTS TO TAKING A POSITION ON THE GUADIANA.♦ - -This plan the Marquis proposed to his brother; but that able general -was of opinion that the Guadiana was not defensible by a weaker -against a stronger army, being fordable in very many places, and -affording no position. The Spanish army, he thought, was at that time -in the best position in that part of the country, one which they -ought to hold against any force that could be brought against them, -if they could hold any thing; while they held it they covered the -Guadiana effectually, and their retreat from it was always secure. -He, therefore, recommended that they should send away the bridge of -boats which was still opposite Almaraz, and remain where they were -as long as possible. For the British army, Lord Wellington said, he -saw no chance at present of its resuming offensive operations; and he -desired that no hopes might be held out to the Junta of any further -co-operation on his part with the Spanish troops, which in their -present state were by no means to be depended on. He saw the difficulty -to which this determination might reduce the Spanish government; their -army might be seized with a panic, run off, and leave every thing -exposed to instant loss. All he could say to this was, that he was -in no hurry to withdraw from Spain; he wanted to refresh his troops; -he should not enter Portugal till he had heard Marquis Wellesley’s -sentiments; if he did enter it he should go no farther than the -frontier, where he should be so near, that the enemy, unless in very -great force, would not venture across the Guadiana, leaving the British -army upon their flank and rear; in fact, therefore, he should be as -useful to Spain within the Portugueze frontier as upon the Guadiana, -and even more so, because the nearer he went to Portugal, the more -efficient he should become. The best way to cover the Guadiana and -Seville, was by a position on the enemy’s flank. - -♦ALBURQUERQUE APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN EXTREMADURA.♦ - -As an inducement to Lord Wellington to remain, and co-operate with -the Spanish army, the Junta proposed to place the corps which they -designed to leave in Extremadura under his command. This was to consist -of 12,000 men, a number inadequate to the service for which they were -required; but the true reason was perceived by the British General; -he had by this time had ample opportunities of discovering that the -Junta, in the distribution of their force, did not consider military -defence and military operations so much as political intrigues and the -attainment of trifling political objects. The Junta of Extremadura -had insisted that Alburquerque should have the command in their -province; the government was weak enough in authority to be obliged -to yield this, and weak enough in judgement to diminish as far as -possible the army which they unwillingly entrusted to this envied -and most ill-treated nobleman. Lord Wellington, who could not have -accepted the command unconditionally without permission from his own -court, declined it altogether under present circumstances, as being -inconsistent with those operations which he foresaw would soon become -necessary for the British army. He had intelligence that a council of -war held at Salamanca had recommended an attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo: -the loss of that place would cut off the only communication which the -Spanish government had with the northern provinces, and would give the -French secure possession of Old Castille, and probably draw after it -the loss of Almeida. It would, therefore, be incumbent upon him to make -exertions for relieving Ciudad Rodrigo. The cabildo of that city, just -at this time when Lord Wellington was contemplating their approaching -danger, and how best to succour them, gave an example of the spirit -which too many of these provincial authorities displayed toward the -British army. 100,000 pounds of biscuit had been ordered there, and -paid for by a British commissary; and when Marshal Beresford sent for -it, that it might be deposited in the magazines at Almeida, the cabildo -seized 30,000 pounds of this quantity, upon the ground that debts due -to that city by Sir John Moore’s army had not been paid, ... although -part of the business of the commissary who was sent to Ciudad Rodrigo -was to settle these accounts, and discharge the debts in question. - -♦LORD WELLINGTON WITHDRAWS TO BADAJOZ.♦ - -This was a specimen of that ill-will towards England which prevailed in -many places among persons of this rank; and Marquis Wellesley perceived -that such persons, if not favoured by the government, were certainly -not discountenanced. The same spirit was manifested but too plainly by -the persons employed about Cuesta’s army. While they were professing -that the English army should be served in preference to their own -people (even to the exclusion of them, if needful), they never offered -to supply a single cart or mule, or any means of transport from their -own abundance. Lord Wellington, for want of such means, was compelled -to leave his ammunition behind him, and then no difficulty was found -in transporting it to the Spanish stores. No difficulty was found -in transporting the bridge of boats from Almaraz to Badajoz; yet -if these means of transport, with which the Spanish army was always -abundantly provided, had been shared with the British army, many of the -difficulties under which it suffered would have been relieved, and its -separation, says Lord Wellington, certainly would not have taken place -when it did. The distress which his men suffered would not have been -felt in an equal degree by the French, or by any people who understood -how to manage their food. Meat they had always in sufficiency, and -their chief want was of bread, ... they were not ingenious enough to -make a comfortable meal without it, though flour or rice was served out -in its stead. But the want of food for the cavalry, and of means of -transport, which actually rendered the British army inefficient, could -not be remedied by any dexterity of the men, or any foresight of the -general, and is wholly imputable to the conduct of the Spanish generals -and the Spanish government. Spain was grievously injured by this -unpardonable misconduct. The English ministry were at this very time -proposing to increase Lord Wellington’s force to 30,000 men, provided -the supreme command were vested in the British general, and effectual -arrangements made for their supply. But in the present state of things, -both the Marquis and his brother perceived that any co-operation -with the Spanish armies would only draw on a repetition of the same -disasters. The intent was therefore abandoned, ♦1809. SEPTEMBER.♦ and -Lord Wellington at the beginning of September, proceeded to Badajoz, -stationing his army, part within the Portugueze frontier, and part on -the Spanish territory, in a position which would menace the flank and -rear of the French if they advanced toward Andalusia. - -♦EXPEDITION TO WALCHEREN.♦ - -While the allied armies were thus rendered inefficient, not by the -skill or strength of the enemy, but by the inexperience and incapacity -of the Spanish authorities, the mightiest force that had ever left the -British shores was wasted in a miserable expedition to the Scheldt, -and upon objects so insulated, and unimportant at that crisis, that if -they had been completely attained, success would have been nugatory. -Had that force been landed in the north of Germany, as the Austrian -government proposed, it has since been known, that what Schill did -with his single regiment, would have been done by Blucher and the -whole Prussian army. Marquis Wellesley had always disapproved of its -destination, looking upon the plan as at once absurd and ruinous. -Destructive to the last degree it proved, from the unwholesome nature -of the country to which it was sent: a cause which of all others might -with most certainty have been foreseen, and yet by some fatality seems -to have been overlooked by all who were concerned in planning the -expedition or consulted upon it. The only consolation, if consolation -it may be deemed, for the misemployment of such a force, was in the -knowledge that, owing to the state of the Spanish counsels, and the -temper of the Spanish generals, it could not have acted in Spain. - -♦INQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE DUKE OF YORK.♦ - -The British government meantime had to struggle with difficulties at -home as well as abroad, and of the most unexpected kind. During the -former part of the year parliament was occupied with an inquiry into -the conduct of the Duke of York as commander-in-chief, which ended -in his resigning the office. The circumstances which were disclosed -rendered this resignation becoming and necessary; but perhaps there -never was another instance in which the reaction of public opinion was -at once so strongly and so justly manifested. For when the agitation -was subsided which had been raised, not so much by the importance -of the business itself, as by the unremitting efforts of a set of -libellers the vilest and most venomous of their kind, it was then -perceived that the accusation had originated in intrigue and malice; -that the abuses which were brought to light were far less than had been -supposed to exist, and that in proving them it had been proved also -that the greatest improvements had been introduced into that department -by his Royal Highness, and that the general administration was -excellent. From that time, therefore, the Duke acquired a popularity -which he had never before possessed; and the efforts which had been -made with persevering malignity to ruin him in the good opinion of the -nation, served only to establish him there upon the strongest and -surest grounds. - -♦ALTERATIONS IN THE MINISTRY.♦ - -This inquiry had occupied a full third of the whole session, to the -grievous interruption of public business, and the more grievous -excitement of the people, even to the extinction in most minds of -all other public interest whatever. The ministry meantime had other -causes of disquiet, which did not transpire till the session had -closed. Mismanaged arrangements for the removal of Lord Castlereagh -from the war department, induced him to challenge Mr. Canning, with -whom the wish for his removal originated, but who in the course -of the affair had been as ill used as himself. Both parties in -consequence resigned; the Duke of Portland did the same, compelled by -the state of his health, for he died almost immediately afterwards, -and thus the administration was broken up. Lord Liverpool, the only -remaining secretary of state, performed the business of the other two -departments, while the remaining members of the cabinet looked about -in dismay, and almost in despair, for new colleagues and for a new -head. ♦SEPT. 23.♦ Their situation appeared so forlorn that official -letters were addressed to Earl Grey and Lord Grenville, informing them -that his Majesty had authorized Earl Liverpool and Mr. Perceval to -communicate with their lordships for the purpose of forming an extended -and combined administration, and requesting them to come to town, that -as little time as possible might be lost in forwarding so important -an object. Earl Grey replied, that had his Majesty been pleased to -signify he had any commands for him personally, he should not have lost -a moment in showing his duty by prompt obedience to his royal pleasure; -but when it was proposed that he should communicate with the existing -ministers, for the purpose of forming a combined administration with -them, he should be wanting in duty to the King, and in fairness to -them, if he did not at once declare that such a union was, as far as -it regarded him under the then circumstances, impossible: this being -the answer which he was under the necessity of giving, his appearance -in London could be of no advantage; and it might possibly be of -detriment to the country, if, in consequence of a less decisive answer, -any farther delay should take place in the formation of a settled -government. - -Lord Grenville, who was in Cornwall, replied, he should lose no time in -repairing to town, and begged leave to defer all observations upon the -business till his arrival. The day after his arrival he sent an answer -conformable to that of Earl Grey, declining the proposed communication, -because it could not be productive of any public advantage. “I trust,” -he added, “I need not say that this opinion is neither founded in any -sentiment of personal hostility, nor in a desire of unnecessarily -prolonging political differences. To compose, not to inflame, the -divisions of the empire, has always been my anxious wish, and is now -more than ever the duty of every loyal subject; but my accession to -the existing administration could not in any respect contribute to -this object, nor could it be considered in any other light than as a -dereliction of public principle. This answer, which I must have given -to any such proposal, if made while the government was yet entire, -cannot be varied by the retreat of some of its members. My objections -are not personal, they apply to the principle of the government itself, -and to the circumstances which attended its appointment.” - -Nothing but extreme necessity could have induced the remaining -ministers to make these overtures; and when their advances were thus -rejected, great hopes were entertained by the adverse party, that -they would not be able to keep their ground as an administration. It -was even affirmed and believed that some of the highest offices were -offered to different persons, and that none could be found to accept -them. The only hope of the ministry rested upon Marquis Wellesley; -hints were thrown out that he would not join any arrangement in which -Mr. Canning was not included; this opinion, however, proved erroneous, -the Marquis accepted the office which Mr. Canning vacated, the Earl -of Liverpool was transferred from the home to the war department, -and the situation which he had vacated was filled by Mr. Ryder. Lord -Palmerstone was made secretary at war in the room of Sir James -Pulteney, and Mr. Perceval took the place of the Duke of Portland, -... thus uniting in himself, as Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington had done -before him, the offices of first lord of the treasury and chancellor -of the exchequer. The loss of the Duke was only that of a name; that -of Mr. Canning was greatly regretted, as was also the secession of Mr. -Huskisson, who resigned his seat at the treasury at the same time; -but though the ministry was weakened by their departure, it was well -understood that the opposition would derive no aid from them; and, on -the whole, government was thought to have gained by these changes more -than it had lost, in consequence of the high reputation of Marquis -Wellesley, and the almost general desire of the nation to see him in -administration. His brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, was appointed to -succeed him as ambassador to Spain. - -♦DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES.♦ - -The disposable force of the enemy in Spain at this time was estimated -at 125,000 men, well provided with cavalry and artillery, exclusive -of the garrisons in Barcelona and the strong places upon the -Pyrenean frontier. Of these, about 35,000 were employed in Arragon -and Catalonia, the rest were in the two Castilles and Extremadura, -70,000 being in the field under Victor, Soult, Ney, Sebastiani, and -Mortier, ... the remainder employed in garrisons, and in keeping up the -communication between the different places in their possession. Sick -and wounded were not included, and an allowance was made for the loss -of 10,000 men at Talavera. At the lowest estimate, this was the number -of the enemy; the force of the Spaniards was miserably inferior. Blake, -after the rout at Belchite, had reassembled a small army, scarcely -exceeding 6000 men, with which he was endeavouring, from time to time, -to relieve Gerona. Noroña had 15,000 men in Galicia; but a tenth part -of these were without arms, and he had neither cavalry nor artillery. -The Duke del Parque had 9000 men at Ciudad Rodrigo, and Eguia and -Venegas had about 50,000 in their two armies. But the inefficient state -of these troops had been lamentably proved; both cavalry and infantry -were for the most part undisciplined, and the latter neither properly -clothed nor accoutred, notwithstanding large supplies of all things -needful had been sent from England. - -♦NEEDINESS OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦ - -The Intruder meantime, now that immediate danger was averted, had -leisure to feel the wretched state to which his subserviency to a -wicked brother had reduced him. He was, indeed, in possession of -Madrid, and half the kingdom was overrun by his troops; but how were -those troops to be paid, or how was he to support the expenses of his -court and government? Whatever might be the issue of the war in the -Peninsula, the vast colonial empire of Spain could never be his, and -the resources which still continued to arrive from thence were enjoyed -by the legitimate government. Whereever his authority extended, trade -was at an end, the people were impoverished, and the sources of revenue -destroyed. The first-fruits of plunder also had now been consumed. -Andalusia, indeed, offered a harvest as yet untouched, and which would -ere long be at his disposal; but till the opportunity arrived, it was -necessary to glean whatever had been spared in the former pillage. An -edict was issued, denouncing severe punishment against those who should -secrete papers or effects belonging to the suppressed monasteries, and -offering a reward for the discovery of such property, proportionate to -its value. He had previously confiscated the property of all Spaniards -in foreign countries, who should not forthwith return in obedience to -his command; he now called upon those in whose hands property, papers, -or effects had been left by others when forsaking their place of -residence, to deliver them up for the use of the treasury. Any persons -buying or selling gold, silver, or jewels, which had belonged to a -suppressed convent, or to an insurgent, were to be severely punished; -and those who assisted the insurgents in any manner were to be put -to death. Another decree sequestered the revenues of all archbishops -and bishops, and appointed pensions from the state instead. Another -commanded all persons possessing plate to the amount of more than ten -dollars, except in plates, knives, and spoons, to give in an account -thereof within three days; the mint was immediately to pay a fourth -of its value, and the remainder was promised within four months. All -plate which should be concealed after this edict was to be forfeited, -and a fourth of its value given to the informer; and silversmiths were -forbidden to purchase any articles in silver, except such as were -permitted to be in use by the present decree. - -♦MEASURES OF SEVERITY.♦ - -These measures proved the neediness of the intrusive government. Its -atrocious character had already been amply demonstrated; if farther -proof were needed, it was to be found in a decree by which all persons -whose sons were serving in what it called the insurgent armies were -required to furnish a man to the Intruder’s service for every son, or -a proportionate sum of money; the elder brothers, or other nearest -relations or guardians of those who had no father, were subjected -to the same law; and those who had no money either for procuring -the substitute or paying the fine were to be imprisoned, or sent -into France. But it was reserved for this government to introduce a -new species of barbarity, which had never before been heard of in -war. Kellermann, whom the English had rescued with such difficulty -from the vengeance of the Portugueze at Lisbon, was at this time -governor-general of what the French called Upper Spain, ♦OCT. 28.♦ that -is, of the provinces of Salamanca, Zamora, Toro, Leon, Valladolid, -Palencia, Burgos, Soria, Santander, Biscay, Guipuzcoa, and Alava. -♦KELLERMANN’S EDICT.♦ Throughout this whole tract of country he placed -all horses and mares above a certain height in requisition for the -French armies, ordering them to be taken to the respective country -towns, and there delivered for that purpose; and every horse or mare -below the size named, or under thirty months old, with every mare that -should be three months gone with foal, was to have the left eye put -out by the owner, and to be in other ways rendered unfit for military -service. A fine of four times the value of the beast was to be exacted -from any one who disobeyed this edict, and all French officers were -charged to see it carried into execution. Nothing can more strikingly -evince their moral degradation, than that their general should have -ordered them to enforce the execution ♦MEASURES OF JOSEPH’S MINISTERS.♦ -of an edict like this. These were the measures pursued in the name of -a King who was represented as being equally philosophic and humane, -who was to remedy all the evils of long misrule, to relieve the people -from all grievances, restore Spain to its ancient prosperity, and -confer upon it a happiness which it had never before enjoyed! In an -unhappy hour had Joseph’s ministers entered his service, persuading, or -seeking to persuade, themselves that they might benefit their country -by giving their countenance to a perfidious and odious usurpation. The -ablest men who have ever endeavoured to do good by evil means, have -felt their best intentions frustrated in the attempt. These ministers, -worthy, as under other circumstances they might have been of their -station, found themselves now the mere instrument of that very military -power which they had flattered themselves that they should be allowed -to direct. Still, however, seeking some excuse to their own hearts, -and to posterity, they took advantage of the time for attempting -alterations, which would have been most salutary if the nation had been -prepared for them, ... but for which it was so little prepared, that -the premature attempt only attached the Spaniards the more to the very -evils from which it was intended to deliver them. One sweeping decree -abolished all the regular orders in Spain, whether monastic, mendicant, -or clerical; the individuals belonging to them were ordered to quit -their convents within fifteen days, resume their secular habits, and -repair to their native places, where pensions were promised them. It -was certain that the intrusive government had neither the means nor -the intention of paying these pensions; but the whole property of the -suppressed orders was seized for the use of the state. The reason -assigned for this measure in the preamble to the decree was, that these -communities had taken a hostile part against the government, which, -while it thus abolished them, wished to recompense those individuals -who had conducted themselves well. Better reasons, Urquijo and his -colleagues well knew, would only have exasperated a people whose souls -were thoroughly enslaved to the superstitions which debased them; -but the cause which was thus assigned exasperated them as much, and -this feeling was kept up and disseminated every where by the ejected -members, who, wherever they went, excited the compassion of their -countrymen and inflamed their hatred of the intrusive government. Some -prudence as well as humanity was shown, by exempting the nuns from this -decree; they were subjected to the ordinary, and forbidden to receive -pupils. The military orders were abolished also, except that of the -Golden Fleece, and the one which the intrusive government had itself -instituted. This was needlessly offending the national pride, which was -in like manner wounded by the removal of the tax raised under the name -of the _Voto de Santiago_; the relief, even had circumstances allowed -it to be felt, would not have compensated for the outrage upon Spanish -feeling. In taking away the privilege of sanctuary, and suppressing all -ecclesiastical jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, the ministers -acted as they would have wished to do, had they held their offices by -a better tenure; and in making strangulation the mode of death for all -criminals of whatever rank, and decreeing that degradation was implied -in the sentence. But when an edict affected to abolish all dignities -and titles which had not been conferred by the Intruder, and required -the traitorous nobles in his service to receive from him a confirmation -of the peerage which they had disgraced, the futility of the decree -only provoked contempt. - -♦THE CENTRAL JUNTA ANNOUNCE THAT THE CORTES WILL BE ASSEMBLED.♦ - -Joseph’s ministers had leisure for legislative speculations and for -dreams of reformation. The real business of government was not in -their hands; in all essential points they were mere ciphers, and -seemed to feel that they were so. The Central Junta was in a situation -as much more trying as it was more honourable. The difficulties -and embarrassments of every kind with which they were beset might -have confused heads more experienced in affairs of state; and their -exertions under the pressure of immediate danger left them little -time for those measures of effectual reform, which Spain so greatly -needed, but which were looked for more eagerly by the British nation -than by the Spaniards, for as a people the Spaniards were contented -with their old system, and attached to it even with all its evils and -abominations. The general wish in England was that the Cortes should be -convened, and this was desired as sincerely by the British government -as by Jovellanos and those other noble minded Spaniards who hoped -through regular and constitutional means to restore the liberty and the -prosperity of their country. It was long after the installation of the -Junta before the disasters of the day allowed them leisure for thinking -of the morrow. To this their delay in taking measures for assembling -the Cortes must be ascribed, more than to their love of power, which -they were ill able to wield, or of the patronage which they unworthily -bestowed. But to these motives the delay was imputed; and by not -following the advice of Jovellanos when the act would have appeared -spontaneous and graceful, they lost the opportunity of obtaining that -popularity which even the semblance of disinterestedness is sure to -acquire. It was not till eight months after their installation that a -decree came forth for re-establishing the legal representation of the -monarchy in its ancient Cortes. The time was left indefinite, but the -edict said it would be convoked in the course of the ensuing year, or -earlier, if circumstances should permit. - -The language of the Supreme Junta on this, as on every other occasion, -was worthy of the position in which the national government was placed, -and of the principles on which it professed to act. “The Spanish -people,” they said, “must leave to their posterity an inheritance -worthy of the sacrifices which were made for obtaining it. The Supreme -Junta had never lost sight of this object; and the progress of the -enemy, which had hitherto occupied their whole attention, rendered -more bitter the reflection, that all their disasters were solely owing -to the disuse of those institutions which, in happier times, secured -the welfare and the strength of the state. The ambition of some, and -the indolence of others, had reduced those institutions to nothing; -and the Junta, from the moment of its installation, solemnly bound -itself to restore them. The time was now arrived for this great work. -Desirous, therefore, that the nation should appear with the dignity -due to its heroic efforts; that the rights of the people should be -placed beyond the reach of encroachments; and that the sources of -public felicity should run freely as soon as the war ceased, and repair -whatever inveterate arbitrary power had scorched, or the present -devastation had destroyed, the Junta decreed, that the Cortes should -be re-established, and would immediately proceed to consider the -method of convening it; for which end it would nominate a committee of -five of its members. It would also investigate, in order to propose -them to the nation assembled in Cortes, the means of supporting the -holy war in which they were engaged; of insuring the observance of -their fundamental laws; of meliorating the legislation and abolishing -the abuses which had crept into it; of collecting and administering -the revenue, and of reforming the system of public education. And -to combine the information necessary for such discussions, it would -consult the councils, provincial Juntas, tribunals, magistracies, -corporations, bishops, and universities, and the opinion of intelligent -and enlightened persons.” - -♦DECLARATION WHICH WAS FIRST PROPOSED.♦ - -A declaration in stronger terms had been submitted to the Junta, and -rejected by them at the instigation of Mr. Frere. “Spaniards,” it -was there said, “it is three ages since the laws on which the nation -founded its defence against tyranny have been destroyed. Our fathers -did not know how to preserve the liberty which had been bequeathed to -them; and although all the provinces of Spain successively struggled -to defend it, evil stars rendered their efforts useless. The laws, -from that time forward, have been only an expression more or less -tyrannical, or beneficent, of a particular will. Providence, as if -to punish the loss of that prerogative of free men, has paralysed -our valour, arrested the progress of our intellect, and impeded our -civilization, till we have come to that condition, that an insolent -tyrant formed the project of subduing the greatest nation of the globe, -without reckoning upon its will, and even despising its existence. -In vain has the prince sometimes attempted to remedy some of the -evils of the state: buildings cannot be erected on sand, and without -fundamental and constituted laws, it is useless for the philosopher -in his study, or the statesman in the theatre of business, to exert -himself for the good of the people. The best projects are not put in -execution, or not carried through. Good suggestions are followed by -evil ones; economy and order, by prodigality and rapine; a prudent and -mild minister, by an avaricious and foolish favourite; and thus the -ship of the state floats without sails and helm, till, as has happened -to the Spanish monarchy, it is dashed to pieces on a rock. How, but -by the re-establishment of freedom, could that blood be recompensed -which flows in every part of the Peninsula; those sacrifices which -Spanish loyalty is offering every instant; that moral resistance, as -universal as it is sublime, which disconcerts our enemies, and renders -them hopeless even in the midst of their victories? When this dreadful -contest is concluded, the Spaniard shall say proudly to himself, ‘My -fathers left me slavery and wretchedness for my inheritance; I leave -to my descendants liberty and glory.’ Spaniards, this is the feeling -which, by reflection in some, and by instinct in all, animates you now; -and it shall not be defrauded of its expectations. Our detractors say -that we are fighting to defend old abuses, and the inveterate vices of -our corrupted government; let them know that your struggle is for the -happiness, as well as the independence of your country; that you will -not depend henceforward on the uncertain will or the variable temper -of a single man; nor continue to be the plaything of a court without -justice, under the control of an insolent favourite, or a capricious -woman; but that on the edifice of your ancient laws you will rear a -barrier between despotism and your sacred rights. This barrier consists -in a constitution to aid and support the monarch when he is just, and -to restrain him when he follows evil councils. Without a constitution -all reform is precarious, all prosperity uncertain; without it the -people are no more than flocks of slaves, put in motion at the order -of a will, frequently unjust, and always unrestrained; without it -the forces of the whole society, which should procure the greatest -advantages for all its members, are employed exclusively to satisfy the -ambition, or satiate the frenzy of a few, or perhaps of one.” - -♦OBJECTIONS BY MR. FRERE.♦ - -When this paper was communicated to Mr. Frere, he saw serious -objections, which he stated to Garay, and which the Junta, though they -would otherwise have published the proclamation, readily admitted. That -ambassador perceived, more clearly perhaps than any other person at -that time, the danger to be apprehended from convoking a legislative -assembly in a nation altogether unprepared for it by habits, feelings, -education, or general knowledge. He considered it a delicate and -dangerous point in every respect, and said, “that if the decision of -the question were left in his hand, notwithstanding the necessity -for widening the basis of the government, the failure of all the -political experiments which had been made in these latter times, and -the impossibility which had been found (by a fatality peculiar to the -present age) of forming a permanent establishment, even in affairs -less essential than the formation of a free constitution for a great -nation, would make him waver. But taking the decision for granted, he -thought the manner in which it was proposed to announce it likely -to produce bad effects in Spain; and he could venture,” he said, “to -assure D. Martin de Garay, that it would undoubtedly create them in -England. If the Spaniards had indeed passed three centuries under -arbitrary government, they ought not to forget that it was the price -which they paid for having conquered and peopled the fairest portion of -the world, and that the integrity of that immense power rested solely -upon these two words, Religion and the King. If the old constitution -had been lost by the conquest of America, the first object should be -to recover it; but in such a manner as not to lose what had cost so -much in the acquisition: and for this reason, they ought to avoid, -as a political poison, every enunciation of general principles, the -application of which it would be impossible to limit or qualify, even -when the Negroes and Indians should quote it in favour of themselves. -And allowing that a bad exchange had been made in bartering the -ancient national liberty for the glory and extension of the Spanish -name; allowing that the error should at all hazards be done away; even -though it were so,” Mr. Frere said, “it did not appear becoming the -character of a well-educated person to pass censures upon the conduct -of his forefathers, or to complain of what he may have lost by their -negligence or prodigality, still less so if it were done in the face -of the world; and what should be said of a nation who should do this -publicly, and after mature deliberation?” - -This was true foresight,--and yet the English ambassador approached -Charybdis in his fear of Scylla. He spoke to the Spaniards of Religion -and the King; in England the truest and most enlightened lovers of -liberty can have no better rallying words; in Spain those words -had for three hundred years meant the inquisition and an absolute -monarch, whose ministers, so long as they could retain his favour, -governed according to their own will and pleasure, unchecked by any -constitutional control. The government did not obtain by their decree -for ♦UNPOPULARITY OF THE JUNTA.♦ convoking the Cortes the popularity -which they had perhaps expected. The measure had been long delayed, and -therefore was supposed to have been unwillingly resolved on. So much, -indeed, had been expected from the Central Junta, that no possible -wisdom on their part, no possible success, could have answered the -unreasonable demand. The disappointment of the nation was in proportion -to its hopes, and the government became equally the object of suspicion -and contempt. Some of the members had large estates in those provinces -which were occupied by the French, and it was suspected that where -their property was, there their hearts were also. Their subsequent -conduct proved how greatly they were injured by this distrust. They -were not censured for their first disasters, which the ablest men -under like circumstances could not have averted. Had they obtained -accurate intelligence of the strength and movements of the enemy when -Buonaparte entered Spain; had they exerted themselves as much in -disciplining troops as in raising and embodying them, and had they -supplied them with regularity and promptitude; it would not have been -possible to have stopped the progress of such a force. Something was -allowed for the confidence which the battle of Baylen had inspired, and -for the enthusiasm of the people, which the government had partaken. -Neither would the nation have been disposed to condemn, even if it had -perceived, errors which arose from the national character. But when, -after the bitter experience of twelve whole months, no measures had -been adopted for improving the discipline of the armies, or supplying -them in the field, the incapacity of the Junta became glaring, and -outcries against them were heard on all sides. - -♦THEIR DIFFICULTIES AND ERRORS.♦ - -One of the weightiest errors for which they were censured was for not -exerting themselves more effectually to bring the whole strength of the -country against the invaders. They had promised to raise 500,000 men -and 50,000 cavalry. Granada was the only province which supplied its -full proportion, and Granada even exceeded it; its contingent was about -28,000, whereas it furnished nearly forty. But this depended more upon -the provincial Juntas than upon the central government, whose decrees -were of no avail in those parts which the enemy possessed, and were ill -observed in others, where the local administrations, from disgust, or -jealousy, or indolence, or incapacity, seemed to look on as spectators -of the dreadful drama, rather than to perform their parts in it, as -men and as Spaniards. Neither is it to the want of numbers that their -defeats were to be attributed; there were at all times men enough in -the field; arms, equipments, and discipline were wanting. It is unjust -to judge of the exertions of the Spanish Junta by those of the National -Convention in France, who had the whole wealth and strength of a -populous and rich country at their absolute disposal, and who began the -revolutionary war with officers, and tacticians, and statesmen capable -of wielding the mighty means which were put into their hands. The fault -of the Junta was in relying too much upon numbers and bravery, and too -little upon their fortresses. The general under whom the great captain -Gonzalo de Cordova learnt the art of war had left them a lesson which -they might profitably have remembered. He used to say, that fortresses -ought to be opposed to the impatience and fury of the French, and that -the place for stationing raw troops was behind walls and ramparts. - -The most important errors which the Junta had hitherto committed were, -the delay in convoking the Cortes, and their conduct towards Sir -Arthur Wellesley’s army; but the national character contributed in no -slight degree to both. For it was not the known aversion of Florida -Blanca to the name of a representative assembly, nor the fears of some -of the Junta, nor the love of power in others, which protracted the -convocation of the Cortes, so much as their reverential adherence to -established forms. This was evident in Jovellanos himself, who regarded -it as equally profane and dangerous to approach this political ark of -the covenant, without scrupulously observing all the ceremonies and -solemnities which the law prescribed. Precedents on points of this -kind are not to be found in Spain as they are in England. Antiquaries -were to be consulted, archives examined, old regulations adapted to -new circumstances,--and this when the enemy was at the gates. The -defect may well be pardoned, because of the virtues with which it -was connected. Had the Spaniards regarded with less veneration the -deeds and the institutions of their ancestors, they would never have -supported that struggle which will be the wonder of succeeding ages. -Their conduct toward the English army sprang from a worse fault; -from that pride which made them prone to impose upon others and upon -themselves a false opinion of their strength. It is the national -failing, for which they have ever been satirized, by their own writers -as well as by other nations. They will rather promise and disappoint, -than acknowledge their inability; of this, their history for the last -two centuries affords abundant examples; they had yet to learn, that -perfect sincerity is as much due to an ally as to a confessor. In -many cases the government was itself deceived; the same false point of -honour prevailing in every department, from the lowest to the highest, -it received and acted upon exaggerated statements and calculations; but -in others, it cannot be denied, that pride led to the last degree of -meanness, and that promises were held out to the English general, which -those who made them must have known it was impossible to perform. - -Yet it must be admitted that the errors of the Junta were more -attributable to the character of the nation than of the individuals; -and those individuals were placed in circumstances of unexampled -difficulty. Four-and-thirty men, most of them strangers to each other, -and unaccustomed to public business, were brought together to govern a -nation in the most perilous crisis of its history, without any thing to -direct them except their own judgement, and almost without any other -means than what the patriotism of the people could supply. They had -troops indeed, but undisciplined, unofficered, unprovided, half armed, -and half clothed. The old system of government was broken up, the new -one was yet to be formed. They had neither commissariat nor treasury; -the first donations and imposts were exhausted; so also were the -supplies which England had liberally given, and those from America had -not yet arrived. Added to these difficulties, and worse than all, was -that dreadful state of moral and social anarchy into which the nation -had been thrown, and which was such that no man knew in whom he could -confide. To poison food or water in time of war is a practice which -all people, who are not absolute savages, have pronounced infamous by -common consent; but it is a light crime compared to the means which -Buonaparte employed for the subjugation of Spain,--means which poisoned -the well-springs of social order, and loosened the very joints and -fibres of society. Morla, when he betrayed his country, committed an -act of treason against human nature. The evil had been great before, -but when a Judas Iscariot had been found in Morla during the agony of -Spain, in whom could the people confide? “Suspicion,” says Jovellanos, -“and hatred were conceived and spread with frightful facility. How many -generals, nobles, prelates, magistrates, and lawyers, were regarded -with distrust, either because of their old relations with Godoy, or -because they were connected with some of the new partizans of the -tyranny; or for the weakness, or indecision, or ambiguity of their -conduct; or for the calumnies and insinuations which rivalship and envy -excited against them! It was considered as a crime to have gone to -Bayonne, to have remained at Madrid, or resided in other places which -were occupied by the intrusive government; to have submitted to swear -allegiance to it, to have obeyed its orders, or to have suffered even -compulsively its yoke and its contempt. What reputation was secure? -Who was not exposed to the attacks of envy, to the imputations of -calumny, and to the violence of an agitated populace?” - -From this state of things it necessarily arose, that the Junta acted in -constant fear and suspicion of those whom they employed. Their sense -of weakness and their love of power increased the evil. Fearing the -high spirit of Alburquerque, and the influence which rank and talents -conjoined would give to his deserved popularity among the soldiers, -they cramped him in a subordinate command, while they trusted those -armies which were the hope of Spain to Cuesta, because they were afraid -of offending him, and to Venegas, for the opposite reason, that they -were sure of his obsequious submission. Some odium they incurred by -permitting a trade with towns which the enemy occupied. For the sake, -as was alleged, of those Spaniards who were compelled to live under -the yoke, and also for the advantage of the colonies, they had granted -licences for conveying sugar, cacao, and bark, to those parts of the -kingdom. ♦JULY 14.♦ These licences were only to be trusted to persons -of known and approved patriotism, who were likewise to be strictly -watched, and liable to be searched upon any suspicion. The weakness of -such a concession in such a war, as well as the obvious facility which -it afforded to the French and their traitorous partizans, excited just -reprehension; and at the close of the year ♦DEC. 28.♦ the Junta found -it necessary to revoke their edict, acknowledging that, in spite of all -precautions, it was found prejudicial to the public safety. Some of the -members were suspected of enhancing the price of necessaries for the -army, by their own secret monopolies; others were said to be surrounded -by venal instruments, through whom alone they were accessible. These -imputations were probably ill-founded or exaggerated; certain, however, -it is, that never had any government fewer friends. Men of the most -opposite principles were equally disaffected toward it. Its very -defenders had no confidence in its stability, and were ready to forsake -it. They who dreaded any diminution of the regal authority, could not -forgive its popular origin; they who aspired to lay the foundation -of a new and happier order of things, were discontented, because the -measures which were taken towards the reformation of the state were -slowly, and, as they deemed, reluctantly adopted. Those wretches who -were sold to France were the enemies of any government which resisted -the usurpation; and those whose timid natures, or short-sighted -selfishness, disposed them to submission, naturally regarded it with -dislike, because it delayed the subjection of the country. Among the -people, who were actuated by none of these feelings, it was sufficient -to render the Junta unpopular that it was unfortunate. The times -rendered them suspicious; their own conduct and their power made them -obnoxious to many; and their ill-fortune, more than their errors, made -them disliked by all. - -♦SCHEME FOR OVERTHROWING THEM.♦ - -Influenced by some of these motives, and perhaps in no little degree -by jealousy, the Junta of Seville were particularly hostile to the -government, and a plan was formed in that city for overthrowing it: the -members were to be seized, and some of the most obnoxious transported -to Manilla in a ship which was prepared for the purpose. Some regiments -had been gained over, and it is said even the guards of the Junta; -but as the persons who designed this revolution had for their direct -object the good of Spain, they considered it a mark of confidence due -to Great Britain to make the English ambassador acquainted with their -purpose; for in fact, so far were the Spanish people from regarding -the interference of Great Britain with jealousy, that they were -disappointed because their ally did not interfere more frequently, and -with more effect. Marquis Wellesley, of whom it had been said by Mr. -Whitbread that he would, if opportunity should offer, take Spain and -Portugal as Buonaparte had done, had now an opportunity of showing in -what manner he thought himself bound to act by a government which he -knew to be weak, and suspected to be treacherous. At the very time when -this foul imputation was brought against him in parliament, he gave to -that government just so much information of its danger, as, without -compromising the safety of any persons concerned, enabled the Junta to -prevent the intended insurrection. - -The general wish was less for the convocation of the Cortes, than for -the establishment of a regency, from which more unanimity and more -vigour was expected, than from the present divided council. The people -of Cadiz said the fate of Spain was in Marquis Wellesley’s hands, that -he ought to remove the Junta, and establish an energetic government. -Those persons who respected hereditary claims would have had the -Archbishop of Toledo appointed regent, as being the only Bourbon in -the country; but he was young; and what weighed against him more than -the want of either talents or character, was, that he was believed to -be governed by his sister, the wife of Godoy. Others looked to Romana, -knowing his dislike to the Junta, and hoping that he would assume the -government himself, or intrust it to able hands. Another project was -to appoint both these personages regents, with the Duke del Infantado, -and two other colleagues. It was thought that the army would gladly -have seen the supreme authority vested in one of their own body, either -Romana or Infantado. But both these noblemen were free from any such -ambition; and Montijo, who was always intriguing for power, was so well -known, that he was the last person whom any party would have trusted. - -♦COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE JUNTA.♦ - -The warning which had thus been given was not lost upon the Junta, and -they attended to the representations which accompanied it; they knew -their weakness, and perceived their danger; admitted that the existing -government was not suited to the state of affairs, and nominated a -commission for the purpose of inquiring in what manner it might best be -replaced. Romana was included in the commission, and upon this occasion -he delivered in a paper, which, if they had required additional proof -of his hostility, and their own unstable tenure, would amply have -♦ROMANA’S ADDRESS. OCT. 4.♦ afforded it. “There were three cases,” -he said, “either of which ought to produce a change in the system -of a government: When a nation, which ought only to obey, doubts -the legitimacy of the authority to which it is to submit; when such -authority begins to lose its influence; when it is not only prejudicial -to the public weal, but contrary to the principles of the constitution. -The existing government was objectionable upon all these grounds: it -was founded upon a democratic principle of representation, inconsistent -with the pure monarchical system of Spain, and with the heroic loyalty -of the Spaniards, and which, if it continued, would subvert the -monarchy. As often as he meditated upon this subject, he doubted the -lawfulness of the existing government; and this opinion was general in -the provinces through which he had passed. Among the services which he -had endeavoured to perform for his king and country, it was not the -least that he had yielded obedience to the orders of this government, -and made the constituted authorities in Leon, Asturias, and Gallicia -do the same; considering this absolutely necessary to preserve the -nation from anarchy. A government, though illegal, might secure the -happiness of the people, if it deserved their confidence, and they -respected its authority; but the existing government had lost its -authority. The people, who judge of measures by the effects which they -see produced, complain that our armies are weak for want of energy in -the government; that no care has been taken for supplying them; that -they have not seen the promised accounts of the public expenditure, -and how the sums which have arrived from America, those which our -generous allies have given, the rents of the crown, and the voluntary -contributions, have been expended: they look in vain for necessary -reforms; they see that employments are not given to men of true -merit, and true lovers of their country; that some members, instead -of manifesting their desire of the public good, by disinterestedness, -seek to preserve their authority for their own advantage; that others -confer lucrative and honourable employments on their own dependents -and countrymen; that for this sole reason ecclesiastical offices have -been filled up, the rents of which ought to have been applied to the -necessities of the state; that that unity which is necessary in the -government, is not to be found, many of the Junta caring only for the -interests of their particular provinces, as if they were members of -some body different from that of the Spanish monarchy; that they had -not only confirmed the military appointments made by the provincial -Juntas, without examining the merits of the persons appointed, but had -even assigned recompences to many who were destitute of all military -knowledge, having never seen service, nor performed any of those duties -which were confided to them; that the Junta, divided into sections, -dispatched business in matters altogether foreign to their profession, -and in which they were utterly unversed, instead of referring them to -the competent and appropriate ministers; that horses taken from their -owners, instead of being sent to the armies, were dying for hunger on -the dry sea-marshes; finally, that many of the most important branches -of administration were in the hands of men, suspicious, because of -their conduct from the commencement of the public misfortunes, and -because they were the creatures of that infamous favourite, who had -been the author of all the general misery. Such,” said Romana, “are the -complaints of the people: there is but one step to disobedience; the -enemy will profit by the first convulsion, and anarchy or servitude -will then be the alternative.” - -The Marquis then stated, that the time for which some provinces had -appointed their representatives to the Junta was expired; that others -had empowered them not to exercise the sovereign authority, but to -constitute a government which might represent the monarch: in neither -case could these provinces be expected to acknowledge an authority -which they had never conferred. The commission, he proceeded to say, -had proposed that the Junta should reduce itself to five persons, -in whom the executive power should be vested; and that in rotation -each member of the existing body should enter into this supreme -executive council, which should also preside over the Cortes when it -was assembled. This project discovered the love of power in the Junta -more unequivocally than any other part of their conduct. What Romana -proposed in its stead was as prudent in itself as it was inconsistent -with his previous positions. After maintaining that the powers of the -existing government were from the first illegal, and that even such as -they were, they had, for part of the members, expired, he recommended -nevertheless that this government should, as representing legitimately -or illegitimately the Cortes, appoint a regent, or a council of -regency, consisting of three or of five persons, especially advising, -as a proof of generosity and patriotism, that they should nominate -none of their own body. A Junta should be formed, under the title of -the Permanent Deputation of the Realm, to represent the Cortes till -the Cortes should be assembled; it should consist of five members -and a procurador-general, and one of these members should always be -chosen from their American brethren, as forming an integral part of -the nation. But the Cortes should be assembled with as little delay -as circumstances would permit, and then no laws should be passed, or -contributions imposed, without its consent. “If,” said he, “I have in -some cases connected the supreme power with the nation, I have done no -more than revive the constitutional principles of the Spanish monarchy, -which have been stifled by the despotism of its kings and their -ministers.” However hostile to the principles of civil liberty the -first positions of Romana appeared, the most zealous friends of freedom -might have been contented with his conclusions. - -“Ought we,” said he, “to fear that an adventurer, who usurps the -throne of Ferdinand, should appear among us, if we had a government -like this, emanating from the consent of the people, from submission -to the true God, and from the necessity of our mournful and perilous -situation? Would our armies then be defective in numbers, and in -subordination and discipline? would they be so filled with ignorant -and cowardly officers, so unprovided with food, so irregularly paid, -and so destitute of all equipments? would men be appointed generals, -because they would support the persons who appointed them, or because -they knew how to command an army and how to save the country? With -such a government, the nation would have invincible armies, the armies -would have generals, the troops would be officered, and the soldiers -would learn subordination and discipline. When Spain shall see that -auspicious day, I shall think it the first day of her hope, and the -most happy of her glorious revolution. Such,” he continued, “is my -opinion; but I ought not to forget that I have publicly controverted it -by my actions. For who sustained your sovereign authority in the army -and province which I governed? Gallicia, whom didst thou obey? Didst -thou respect in me any power but that of the Central Junta, or did I -consent that thou shouldst separate thyself from a government which I -was sanctioning by my own obedience? Asturias, didst not thou see the -powerful arm upraised which thou hadst implored so earnestly, and the -blow of its power fall upon a Junta, which, after having acknowledged -the sovereignty of the Central, and received from it succours, of -which my soldiers, naked and exhausted, were in want, domineered like -a despot, and had even disobeyed the express will of our King, D. -Ferdinand? Nevertheless,” said he, addressing the Central Junta, “you -rewarded this scandalous disobedience; and removed me covertly from -the command, in order that guilty Spaniards might be honoured with -the greater distinction. My opinions were the same then that they are -now; but circumstances imperiously required a government, and any -government is better than none. Then it was my duty to obey; now I -should not perform what is due to my character, if I did not declare -what I believe to be required for the salvation of my country. How -indeed should I be silent; how should I suffer the fire of patriotism -to be extinguished, seeing the sacrifice of so many victims in our -glorious cause; faithful wives murdered with their daughters, after the -most foul and unutterable outrages; nuns driven from their cloisters, -some wandering about, many more the prey of lustful impiety; ministers -of the altar forced from the sanctuary; temples turned into stables -and dens of uncleanness; towns reduced to servitude; opulence to -squalid beggary; armies composed of the bravest spirits of the nation, -which have disappeared in the hottest struggles of their native land, -consumed by hunger, naked, and destitute; seeing, in fine, that such -revenues and the liberal donations of Spain and America have not even -supplied the first necessities of the soldier? How could I remain a -tranquil spectator of such great and mournful objects, and not think -them superior to the nearest personal interest, to our self-love, and -to our very existence? As a Spaniard,” he concluded, “I am ready to -suffer a thousand deaths in defence of our liberty; and in my rank I -have rendered homage to the descendant of the Pelayos, the Jaymes, and -the Garcias. As a general, I will join myself to the last soldier who -shall have resolution to revenge his country in the last period of her -independence; but as a representative of the nation, I must be excused -from occupying that distinguished place, unless a legitimate government -be immediately established, which foreign powers will not hesitate to -acknowledge, which will represent our sovereign, and which will save a -people who are resolved to die for their God, for their king, and for -the happiness of their posterity.” - -♦REPLY OF THE JUNTA.♦ - -It is proof of full political freedom in the Spanish press at this -juncture, that this paper should have appeared, being little short of -a declaration of hostility against the existing government. But though -the high monarchical principles with which Romana began his manifesto -displeased the democratic party, and the glaring inconsistency of -his proposal weakened the effect which his authority might otherwise -have produced, the government felt the necessity of doing something -to conciliate the nation; they determined to convoke the Cortes, -and announced the resolution in a paper which may be considered as -their official apology. In this paper, without directly referring to -Romana’s ♦OCT. 28.♦ charges, they replied to them. “Spaniards,” said -they, “it has seemed good to Providence that in this terrible crisis -you should not be able to advance one step towards independence, -without advancing one likewise toward liberty. An imbecile and decrepit -despotism prepared the way for French tyranny. Political impostors -then thought to deceive you by promising reforms, and announcing, in -a constitution framed at their pleasure, the empire of the laws, ... -a barbarous contradiction, worthy of their insolence. But the Spanish -people, that people which before any other enjoyed the prerogatives -and advantages of civil liberty, and opposed to arbitrary power the -barrier which justice has appointed, need borrow from no other nation -the maxims of political prudence, and told these impudent legislators, -that the artifices of intriguers and the mandates of tyrants are not -laws for them. You ran to arms; and fortune rendered homage to you, and -bestowed victory in reward for your ardour. The immediate effect was -the reunion of the state, which was at that time divided into as many -factions as provinces. Our enemies thought they had sown among us the -deadly seed of anarchy, and did not remember that Spanish judgement -and circumspection are always superior to French intrigue. A supreme -authority was established without contradiction and without violence; -and the people, after having astonished the world with the spectacle of -their sublime exaltation and their victories, filled it with admiration -and respect by their moderation and discretion. - -“The Central Junta was installed, and its first care was to announce, -that if the expulsion of the enemy was the first object of its -attention in point of time, the permanent welfare of the state was -the principal in importance; for to leave it sunk in the sea of old -abuses, would be a crime as enormous as to deliver you into the hands -of Buonaparte; therefore, as soon as the whirlwind of war permitted, it -resounded in your ears the name of the Cortes, which has ever been the -bulwark of civil freedom; a name heretofore pronounced with mystery -by the learned, with distrust by politicians, and with horror by -tyrants; but which henceforth in Spain will be the indestructible basis -of the monarchy, the most secure support of the rights of Ferdinand -and his family, a right for the people, and an obligation for the -government. That moral resistance, which has reduced our enemies to -confusion and despair in the midst of their victories, must not receive -a less reward. Those battles which are lost, those armies which are -destroyed; those soldiers who, dispersed in one action, return to offer -themselves for another; that populace which, despoiled of almost all -they possessed, returned to their homes to share the wretched remains -of their property with the defenders of their country; that struggle of -barbarity on the one hand, and of invincible constancy on the other, -present a whole as terrible as magnificent, which Europe contemplates -with astonishment, and which history will one day record, for the -admiration and example of posterity. A people so generous ought only to -be governed by laws which bear the great character of public consent -and common utility, ... a character which they can only receive by -emanating from the august assembly which has been announced to you.” - -The Junta now betrayed that undue desire of retaining their power, -which, though not their only error, was the only one which proceeded -from selfish considerations. “It had been recommended,” they said, -“that the existing government should be converted into a regency -of three or of five persons, and this opinion was supported by -the application of an ancient law to our present situation; but a -political position which is entirely new, occasions political forms and -principles absolutely new also. To expel the French, to restore to his -liberty and his throne our adored King, and to establish a solid and -permanent foundation of good government, are the maxims which gave the -impulse to our revolution, are those which support and direct it; and -that government will be the best which shall best promote these wishes -of the Spanish nation. Does a regency promise this security? What -inconveniences, what dangers, how many divisions, how many parties, how -many ambitious pretensions within and without the kingdom; how much, -and how just, discontent in our Americas, now called to have a share in -the present government! What would become of our Cortes, our liberty, -the cheering prospects of future welfare and glory which present -themselves? What would become of the object most valuable and dear to -the Spanish nation ... the rights of Ferdinand? The advocates for this -institution ought to shudder at the danger to which they expose them, -and to bear in mind that they afford to the tyrant a new opportunity -of buying and selling them. Let us bow with reverence to the venerable -antiquity of the law; but let us profit by the experience of ages. Let -us open our annals and trace the history of our regencies. What shall -we find? ... a picture of desolation, of civil war, of rapine, and of -human degradation, in unfortunate Castille.” - -The weakness of this reasoning proved how the love of power had blinded -those from whom it proceeded. The Junta wished to evade the law of the -Partidas, because it did not specify a case which it could not possibly -have contemplated, though the law itself was perfectly and directly -relevant. They assumed it as a certain consequence of a regency, -that the colonies would be disgusted; that the Cortes would not be -convoked; that the rights of Ferdinand would be disregarded; and that -new opportunities of corruption would be afforded to France; and they -forgot to ask themselves what reason there could be for apprehending -all or any of these dangers, more from a council of regency than from -their own body. Romana’s manifesto contained nothing more flagrantly -illogical than this. Having thus endeavoured to set aside this project -by alarming the nation, they admitted that the executive power ought -to be lodged in fewer hands, and said, that with that circumspection, -which neither exposed the state to the oscillations consequent upon -every change of government, nor sensibly altered the unity of the body -which it was intrusted with, they had concentrated their own authority; -and that from this time those measures which required dispatch, -secrecy, and energy, would be directed by a section formed of six -members, holding their office for a time. - -The remainder of the manifesto was in a worthier strain. “Another -opinion,” they said, “which objected to a regency, objected also to -the Cortes as an insufficient representation, if convoked according to -the ancient forms; as ill-timed, and perhaps perilous in the existing -circumstances; and in fine as useless, because the provincial Juntas, -which had been immediately erected by the people, were their true -representatives; but as the government had already publicly declared -that it would adapt the Cortes, in its numbers, forms, and classes, to -the present state of things, any objection drawn from the inadequacy -of the ancient forms was malicious, as well as inapplicable. Yes, -Spaniards,” said they, “you are about to have your Cortes, and the -national representation will be as perfect and full as it can and -ought to be, in an assembly of such importance and eminent dignity. -You are about to have your Cortes; and at what time, gracious God! can -the nation adopt this measure better than at present? When war has -exhausted all the ordinary means, when the selfishness of some, and the -ambition of others, debilitate and paralyse the efforts of government; -when they seek to destroy from its foundations the essential principle -of the monarchy, which is union; when the hydra of federalism, so -happily silenced the preceding year by the creation of the central -power, dares again to raise its heads, and endeavour to precipitate -us into anarchy; when the subtlety of our enemies is watching the -moment of our divisions to destroy the state; this is the time, then, -to collect in one point the national dignity and power, where the -Spanish people may vote and call forth the extraordinary resources -which a powerful nation ever has within it for its salvation. That -alone can put them in motion; that alone can encourage the timidity -of some, and restrain the ambition of others; that alone can suppress -importunate vanity, puerile pretensions, and infuriated passions. -Spain will, in fine, give to Europe a fresh example of its religion, -its circumspection, and its discretion, in the just and moderate use -which it is about to make of the liberty in which it is constituted. -Thus it is that the supreme Junta, which immediately recognized this -national representation as a right, and proclaimed it as a reward, now -invokes and implores it as the most necessary and efficacious remedy; -and has therefore resolved that the general Cortes shall be convoked on -the first day of January in the next year, in order to enter on their -august functions the first of March following. When that happy day has -arrived, the Junta will say to the representatives of the nation, - -“‘Ye are met together, O fathers of your country! and re-established in -all the plenitude of your rights, after a lapse of three centuries. -Called to the exercise of authority by the unanimous voice of the -kingdom, the individuals of the supreme Junta have shewn themselves -worthy of the confidence reposed in them, by employing all their -exertions for the preservation of the state. When the power was placed -in our hands, our armies, half formed, were destitute; our treasury -was empty, and our resources uncertain and distant. We have maintained -in the free provinces unity, order, and justice; and in those occupied -by the enemy, we have exerted our endeavours to preserve patriotism -and loyalty. We have vindicated the national honour and independence -in the most complicated and difficult diplomatic negotiations; and we -have made head against adversity, ever trusting that we should overcome -it by constancy. We have, without doubt, committed errors, and would -willingly, were it possible, redeem them with our blood; but in the -confusion of events, among the difficulties which surrounded us, who -could be certain of always being in the right? Could we be responsible, -because one body of troops wanted valour and another confidence; -because one general had less prudence and another less good fortune? -Much Spaniards, is to be attributed to your inexperience, much to -circumstances, but nothing to our intention; that ever has been to -deliver our King, to preserve to him a throne for which the people has -made such sacrifices, and to maintain it free, independent, and happy. -We have decreed the abolition of arbitrary power from the time we -announced the re-establishment of our Cortes. Such is, O Spaniards! the -use we have made of the unlimited authority confided to us; and when -your wisdom shall have established the basis and form of government -most proper for the independence and good of the state, we will resign -it into the hands you shall point out, contented with the glory of -having given to the Spaniards the dignity of a nation legitimately -constituted.’” - -♦GUERILLAS.♦ - -Had the nation been more alive to such hopes as were thus held out, -the pressure of events and the presence of imminent danger would have -distracted their thoughts from all speculative subjects. Frustrated as -their expectations of immediate deliverance had been, their confidence -was not shaken; the national temper led them to think lightly of every -disaster, but to exaggerate every trifling success; and the defeats -at Arzobispo and Almonacid were less felt or thought of by the body -of the people, than the successful exploits of those predatory bands, -who, under the name of Guerillas, were now in action every where. -The government partook of this disposition; and it must be ascribed -as much to this as to policy, that the official as well as the -provincial journals published every adventure of this kind more fully -and circumstantially than some of those actions wherein their armies -had disappeared. The example which Mina and the Empecinado had set -was followed with alacrity and tempting success, rich opportunities -being offered by the requisition of plate from churches and from -individuals, which the intrusive government was at this time enforcing. -The guerillas were on the watch, and intercepted no trifling share -of the spoils. One party surprised a convoy with eighty _quintals_ -of silver near Segovia. The French, who found themselves sorely -annoyed by this species of warfare, though they were as yet far from -apprehending all they should suffer by it, endeavoured to raise a -counter-force of the same kind in Navarre, under the name of Miquelets. -But that appellation, which was so popular among the Spaniards, had no -attraction for them when it was pressed into the usurper’s service, -and the scheme only evinced the incapacity of those who projected it, -for the guerillas depended for information, shelter, every thing which -could contribute either to their success or their safety, upon the good -will of their countrymen; who then would engage in an opposite service, -with the certainty that every Spaniard would regard him as an enemy and -traitor, and as such endeavour secretly or openly to bring about his -destruction? - -♦D. JULIAN SANCHEZ.♦ - -Among the persons who became most eminent for their exploits in -this desultory warfare, D. Julian Sanchez began at this time to be -distinguished. He raised a company of lancers in ♦1809. OCTOBER.♦ the -district of Ciudad Rodrigo, and acted with such effect against the -enemy in the plains of Castille, that General Marchand, who commanded -the sixth corps at Salamanca, threatened to execute the vengeance which -the guerillas at once eluded and defied, upon those whom he suspected -of favouring them. Specifying, therefore, eight of the principal -sheep-owners in that part of the country, he declared that they should -be kept under a military guard in their own houses, and the severest -measures be enforced against their persons and property, if the bands -of robbers, as he called them, did not totally disappear within eight -days after the date of his proclamation. He declared also that the -priests, _alcaldes_, lawyers, and surgeons of every village, should -be responsible with their lives for any disorders committed by the -guerillas within their respective parishes; adding, that every village -and every house which the inhabitants might abandon on the approach of -the French should be burnt. This served only to call forth an indignant -reply from Sanchez, containing some of those incontrovertible truths -which made the better part of the French themselves detest the service -in which they were employed. - -Ney’s corps was at this time in Salamanca, under General Marchand, -occupying also Ledesma and Alba de Tormes. Soult’s head-quarters were -at Plasencia; he occupied Coria, Galesteo, and the banks of the Tietar -and the Tagus, as far as the Puente del Arzobispo; Mortier’s corps was -at Talavera, Oropesa, La Calzada de Oropesa, and Naval Moral; Victor’s -advanced posts were at Daymiel, his head-quarters at Toledo; Sebastiani -was at Fuenlebrada, and his corps extended from Aranjuez to Alcala. On -the side of La Mancha or Extremadura, they could not hope to open a way -to Seville, unless the government by an act of suicidal madness should -encounter the certain consequences ♦THE FRENCH REPULSED FROM ASTORGA.♦ -of a general action. Remaining, therefore, on the defensive here, they -prepared for offensive operations on the side of Salamanca, with a view -to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and a third invasion of Portugal. Sir -Robert Wilson’s representations respecting the importance of that point -had not been neglected by the government; the force which the Duque del -Parque commanded there was now respectable in numbers, and had acquired -some experience as well as confidence in that desultory warfare -which Sir Robert had begun, and which D. Julian Sanchez had so well -continued. Preparatory to their movements on this quarter, the French -attempted to carry Astorga by a sudden attack, for which purpose, with -a force of 2600 men, they advanced from the Ezla, and endeavoured to -force the Bishop’s Gate. D. Jose Maria de Santocildes, who commanded -there, was neither wanting in principle nor in ♦OCT. 9.♦ conduct. His -measures for defence were well taken and well executed, and after a -four hours’ action, the enemy retreated with the loss of more than 200 -men. - -♦BATTLE OF TAMAMES. OCT. 18.♦ - -A movement of more importance was presently undertaken against the -Duque del Parque, who had taken a strong position on the heights near -Tamames. Marchand commanded the French corps, consisting of 10,000 -foot, 1200 horse, with fourteen pieces of cannon; and nothing but -his contempt of the enemy could have induced him to attack them in -such a post. He came on in full confidence, forming his columns with -ostentatious display, as if to exhibit the perfect facility with which -their evolutions were made. As it was soon apparent that the main -attack would be upon the left, being the weakest part of the position, -the Duke ordered Count de Belveder, with half the reserve, to support -this point. Carrera, who commanded the left wing, stood the attack -well; a small party of cavalry, still further to the left, were posted -in a wood, from whence it was intended that they should issue, and -charge the flank of the enemy; but Carrera’s second brigade making -a movement for the purpose of allowing their artillery to play, the -French horse charged them at full speed before they were well formed, -broke in upon them, and cut down the Spaniards at their guns: ... for a -moment the day seemed lost. The Duke, with his staff, came up in time -to the place of danger. Mendizabal, who was second in command, sprang -from his horse, and rallied those who were falling back; the young -Principe de Anglona distinguished himself in the same manner; and -Carrera, whose horse had received two musket-balls, and one wound with -a sabre, put himself at the head of his men, charged the French with -the bayonet, routed them and recovered the guns. Meantime an attack -was made upon the right and centre; but here the Spaniards were more -strongly posted, and D. Francisco de Losada, who commanded in that -part, repulsed them. They retreated in great disorder, leaving more -than 1100 on the field; their wounded were not less than 2000. - -♦THE FRENCH RETIRE FROM SALAMANCA. OCT. 21.♦ - -On the third day after the battle, the Duke moved forward, hoping to -surprise the enemy in Salamanca. He crossed at Ledesma on the 23d, and -marched all the night of the 24th; at daybreak he reached the heights -which command Salamanca to the northward, but the French had retreated -during the night to Toro, carrying with them the church plate and all -their other plunder. They had remained five days in hope of receiving -a reinforcement from Kellermann, who, with a weak corps, occupied the -country between Segovia and Burgos; but seeing no succour approach, the -loss which they had sustained rendered it necessary for them to retire -with all speed, upon the unexpected intelligence that the Spaniards -were within three leagues of the city. - -♦MARSHAL SOULT APPOINTED MAJOR GENERAL.♦ - -The people of Salamanca did not long enjoy their deliverance. While -Kellermann was reinforced with one brigade, another from Dessoles’ -division was directed toward that city, preparatory to more important -movements; activity having now been given to the French armies, and -union, which had long been wanted, by the appointment of Marshal Soult -to the rank of Major-General in place of Marshal Jourdan, who was -recalled to Paris. This change was highly acceptable to the troops -in general, though there prevailed a feeling of personal ill-will -toward Soult on the part of some of his fellow marshals which had -not existed toward his predecessor; but more confidence was reposed -in him, the reputation which Jourdan had obtained in the days of -the National Convention not having been supported by his subsequent -fortune. The Duque del Parque, perceiving that more serious operations -were likely to be directed against him, urged the government to act -on the offensive in La Mancha, as a means ♦THE JUNTA RESOLVE ON -RISKING A GENERAL ACTION.♦ of averting the danger from himself; and -the Junta needed little encouragement at this time for measures of the -most desperate temerity. The ablest members of that body partook so -strongly of the national temper, that they were wholly incapacitated -for understanding the real state either of their own armies, or of the -allies, or of their enemies. Their infatuation might seem incredible, -if it were not proved both by their conduct and by documents which they -themselves laid before the nation, stating upon what grounds they had -acted. They had persuaded themselves that if Sir Arthur, after Cuesta -rejoined him, had given battle to Soult, according to his original -intention, the destruction of Soult’s army would have been easy and -certain, the annihilation of Victor’s army easy ♦EXPOSICION DE LA -JUNTA CENTRAL. RAMO DIPLOMATICO, P. 27.♦ as a consequent measure, the -recovery of Madrid easy, and the expulsion of the French as far as -the Ebro, or even to the Pyrenees. By some fatality, they said, the -British General had chosen that line of conduct which was precisely the -most prejudicial to the Spanish cause. By some stranger fatality they -themselves persisted in believing that the British army had been at -all times amply supplied with means of subsistence and of transport, -that it was at any time capable of advancing, and (as if themselves -incapable of understanding that the British Commander and the British -Ambassador meant what they said in their repeated representations) -that it would advance if the Spaniards evinced the determination and -the ability to act without them. And with this persuasion they deluded -their General as well as themselves. - -♦AREIZAGA APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND.♦ - -Rash as he was, even Cuesta would hardly have been so deluded. Upon his -resignation Eguia had only held the command while the government could -look about for a successor. Castaños was under a cloud; the inquiry -which he demanded had never been granted, and though public opinion was -beginning to regard him as his past services and real worth deserved, -there was no thought of again employing him. Alburquerque was an -object of jealousy; Romana of dislike and fear. Areizaga therefore, -who had been highly commended by Blake for his conduct in the battle -of Alcañiz, was removed from the command at Lerida to be placed at -the head of 50,000 men. Alburquerque, who had from 9000 to 10,000 -in Extremadura, was ordered to join Parque, and place himself under -his orders; while Areizaga, with the greatest force that they could -collect, was instructed ♦STATE OF MADRID.♦ to advance upon Madrid. -What they knew concerning the state of that city might well excite -their feelings, and raise in them a strong desire of delivering its -inhabitants from their bondage; but there was nothing to encourage -the extravagant hopes which they entertained. The national feeling -existed nowhere in greater strength, though there was no other place -wherein so many traitors were collected; all who in other parts of the -country had made themselves conspicuous as partizans of Joseph, having -fled thither when they could not abide in safety elsewhere. To leave -the capital was an enterprise of the utmost danger for those who were -willing to sacrifice every thing, and take their chance in the field -against the invaders: any one might enter; but in the course of a few -hours it was known who the stranger was, whence he came, where he was -harboured, what was his business, and who were his connexions, ... -every thing which the most vigilant police, and the most active system -of espionage could discover. The tradesmen and those whose means -of subsistence were not destroyed by the revolution were oppressed -by heavy and frequent exactions; the Intruder’s ministers knew the -impolicy of this, but nevertheless were compelled to impose these -burdens; and after the atrocities which they had sanctioned, they -could suffer nothing more either in character or in peace of mind. -Otherwise, even in Madrid, where a strong military force kept every -thing in order, and where none of the immediate evils of war were felt, -there were sights which might have wrung the heart. Men and women, who -had been born and bred in opulence, begged in the streets, as soon as -evening had closed, ... the feelings of better times preventing them -from exposing their misery in the daylight. But what most wounded -the Spanish temper was the condition of their clergy, and monks, and -friars, who, suffering as it were as confessors under the intrusive -government, worked as daily labourers for their support, employing -in hard and coarse labour hands which, the Spaniards said, were -consecrated by the use of holy oil, and by contact with the Body of our -Lord! - -Overlooking all impediments in the way of their desires, the Junta -calculated so surely upon delivering the capital, that they fixed upon -a captain-general, a governor, and a corregidor, who were to enter upon -their functions as soon ♦JOVELLANOS, § 103.♦ as it should be recovered; -and they charged Jovellanos and Riquelme to draw up provisional ♦1809. -NOVEMBER.♦ regulations for securing tranquillity there when the enemy -should withdraw. This confidence arose from a national character which -repeated disasters could neither subdue nor correct. The rashness with -which they determined to bring on a general action, at whatever risk, -appeared to them a prudent resolution. Now that the continental war was -terminated, and Buonaparte had no other employment for his armies, it -was certain that more troops than had been withdrawn from Spain would -be marched into it, for the purpose of effecting its subjugation; they -thought it therefore the best and surest policy to make a great effort -before the numbers of the enemy should be thus formidably increased. -Former failures had neither disheartened nor instructed them; and they -furthered the equipment of the army with a zeal which, if it had been -excited two months before in providing for their allies, might have -realized the hopes wherein they now indulged. - -♦CONDITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY.♦ - -The new commander partook the blind confidence of his government. -In some degree he appears to have been deceived by them; for he was -neither informed of Lord Wellington’s determination not to advance, nor -of the condition of the British army, which was such at that time as -to render an advance impossible. From causes which physiologists have -not yet been able to ascertain, the country where they were quartered, -upon the Guadiana, is peculiarly unhealthy during the dry season, when -that river ceases to be a stream, and, like its feeders, is reduced -to a succession of detached pools in the deeper parts of its course. -The troops suffered so much more than the natives, partly because the -disease laid stronger hold on constitutions which were not accustomed -to it, and partly from the peculiar liableness of men, when congregated -in camps, to receive and communicate endemic maladies, that more than a -third of their whole number were on the sick list; and the inhabitants -of the country, aware as they were that this plague belonged to it, -ascribed its greater prevalence and malignity among the strangers to -their having eaten mushrooms, holding the whole tribe themselves in -abhorrence, and not thinking the ordinary causes of the disease could -account for the effects which they witnessed. Areizaga was ignorant of -all this, and the government allowed him to advance with an expectation -that the British army was to follow and support him. - -♦DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH TROOPS.♦ - -Knowing the condition of that army, it seems almost incredible that -the Junta could have deceived themselves when they thus deceived their -general. But unlikely as it was that they should have given orders for -a forward movement of such importance, without such co-operation, they -hoped perhaps to deceive the enemy, by reports that Lord Wellington -and Alburquerque would advance along the valley of the Tagus. The -French were never able to obtain good intelligence of the English -plans; they could, however, to a certain point, foresee them, as a -skilful chess-player apprehends the scheme of an opponent who is not -less expert than himself at the game; they had learnt to respect the -British army in the field, but they thought the British Commander was -more likely from caution to let pass an opportunity of success, than -to afford the enemy one by rashness. This opinion they had formed from -the events of the late campaign, being fully aware of the danger to -which they had been exposed, and unacquainted with the difficulties -which had frustrated Sir Arthur’s plans, ... difficulties indeed which -they who were accustomed always to take whatever was needful for their -armies either from friend or foe, without any other consideration -than that of supplying their own immediate wants, would have regarded -with astonishment, if not contempt. When Marshal Soult therefore -prepared at this time to act against the Spaniards, the English force -hardly entered into his calculations. He had 70,000 men available for -immediate service in one direction. One corps of these, under Laborde, -watched the Tagus, with an eye to Alburquerque’s movements. Victor -observed the roads from Andalusia to Toledo and Aranjuez, having his -cavalry in advance at Madrilejos and Consuegra; Sebastiani, with the -fourth corps, was in the rear of Victor, securing the capital, from -which neighbourhood a division had been sent to support Marchand after -his defeat at Tamames. The reserve, under Mortier, was at Talavera; -Gazan occupied Toledo with two weak regiments; and Joseph was with his -guards at Aranjuez, relying upon the fortune of Napoleon, and now, when -the Continent was effectually subdued, and reinforcements had already -begun to enter the Peninsula, believing himself in secure possession of -the crown of Spain. - -♦AREIZAGA ADVANCES FROM THE SIERRA MORENA.♦ - -On the 3d of November, Areizaga’s army, consisting of 43,000 foot, 6600 -cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, began their march from the foot -of the Sierra Morena into the plains, taking with them eight days’ -provision. The advanced guard, of 2000 cavalry under Freire, were -one day’s march in front; the infantry followed in seven divisions, -then the rest of the cavalry in reserve, and the head-quarters last, -marching from twenty to thirty miles a day; they had no tents, and took -up their quarters at night in the towns upon the road. They advanced -forces by Daymiel on the left, others along the high road to Madrid, -by Valdepeñas and Manzanares. The French retired before them, and in -several skirmishes of cavalry the Spaniards were successful. Latour -Maubourg escaped with a considerable body of horse from Madrilejos by -the treachery of a deserter, who apprised him of his danger just in -time for him to get out of the town as the Spaniards entered it. They -continued their way through Tembleque to Dos Barrios; then, by a flank -march, reached S. Cruz de la Zarza; threw bridges across the Tagus, -and passed a division over. Here they took a position; the French -pushed their patroles of cavalry near the town, and Areizaga drew out -his army in order of battle. An action upon that ground did not suit -the enemy, and the Spanish general was frantic enough to determine upon -leaving the mountains, and giving them battle in the plain. - -♦THE AUSTRIAN COMMISSIONER REMONSTRATES AGAINST HIS PURPOSE. NOV. 16.♦ - -Baron Crossand, who was employed in Spain on a mission from Austria, -was with the army, and, dreading the unavoidable consequences of such -a determination, presented a memorial to Areizaga, reminding him, that -only the preceding day he had admitted how dangerous it would be thus -to hazard the welfare of his country. None of the motives, he said, -which should induce a prudent general to risk a battle were applicable -in the present case; he had nothing to urge him forward, and the most -fertile provinces of Spain were in his rear: by meeting the enemy upon -their own ground, the advantage of position was voluntarily given them, -and the superiority of numbers which the Spaniards possessed was not -to be considered as an advantage, in their state of discipline; so far -indeed was it otherwise that the French founded part of their hopes -upon the disorder into which the Spaniards would fall in consequence -of their own multitude. A victory might procure the evacuation of -Madrid and of the two Castilles, but these results were light in the -balance when weighed against the consequences of defeat. The wisest -plan of operations was to entrench himself upon the strong ground which -the left bank of the Tagus afforded; from thence he might send out -detachments toward Madrid and in all directions, and act in concert -with the Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque, patience and caution -rendering certain their ultimate success. - -♦BATTLE OF OCAÑA.♦ - -These representations were lost upon Areizaga; he marched back to Dos -Barrios, and then advanced upon Ocaña into the open country. About 800 -French and Polish cavalry were in the town; they were driven out by the -Spanish horse; a skirmish ensued, in which four or five hundred men -fell on both sides. In this affair the French general Paris was borne -out of the saddle by a lancer, and laid dead on the field. He was an -old officer, whom the Spaniards represent as a humane and honourable -man, regretting that he should have perished in such a cause. Areizaga -bivouacqued that night; and the French, who had now collected the corps -of Sebastiani and Mortier, under command of the latter, crossed the -Tagus before morning. At daybreak Areizaga ascended the church tower of -Ocaña, and seeing the array and number of the enemy, it is said that -he perceived, when too late, what would be the result of his blind -temerity. He arrayed his army in two equal parts, one on each side the -town; and his second line was placed so near the first, that, if the -first were thrown into disorder, there was not room for it to rally. -Most of the cavalry were stationed in four lines upon the right flank, -a disposition neither imposing in appearance nor strong in reality. The -artillery was upon the two flanks. - -About seven in the morning, Zayas, who had often distinguished himself, -attacked the French cavalry with the advanced guard, and drove them -back. Between eight and nine the cannonade began. The Spanish artillery -was well served; it dismounted two of the French guns, and blew up some -of their ammunition-carts. Mortier having reconnoitred the ground, -determined to make his chief attack upon the right, and, after having -cannonaded it for a while from a battery in his centre, he ordered -Leval, with the Polish and German troops, to advance, and turn a ravine -which extended from the town nearly to the end of this wing of the -Spanish army. Leval formed his line in compact columns; the Spaniards -met them along the whole of their right wing, and their first line -wavered. It was speedily reinforced; the right wing was broken, and a -charge of cavalry completed the confusion on this side. The left stood -firm, and cheered Areizaga as he passed; an able general might yet -have secured a retreat, but he was confounded, and quitted the field, -ordering this part of the army to follow him. Lord Macduff, who was -with the Spaniards, then requested the second in command to assume -the direction; but while he was exerting himself to the utmost, the -French cavalry broke through the centre, and the rout was complete. -The Spaniards were upon an immense plain, every where open to the -cavalry, by whom they were followed and cut down on all sides. Victor, -who crossed the Tagus at Villa Mensiger, pursued all night. All their -baggage was taken, almost all their artillery; according to the French -account, 4000 were killed, and 26,000 made prisoners: on no occasion -have the French had so little temptation to exaggerate. Their own loss -was about 1700. - -This miserable defeat was the more mournful, because the troops that -day gave proof enough both of capacity and courage to show how surely, -under good discipline and good command, they might have retrieved the -military character of their country. No artillery could have been -better served. The first battalion of guards, which was 900 strong, -left upon the field fourteen officers, and half its men. Four hundred -and fifty of a Seville regiment, which had distinguished itself with -Wilson at Puerto de Baños, entered the action, and only eighty of -them were accounted for when the day was over. Miserably commanded as -the Spaniards were, there was a moment when the French, in attempting -to deploy, were thrown into disorder, by their well-supported fire, -and success was at that moment doubtful. The error of exposing the -army in such a situation must not be ascribed wholly to incapacity -in Areizaga, who had distinguished himself not less for conduct than -courage at Alcañiz; it was another manifestation of the national -character, of that obstinacy which no experience could correct, of that -spirit which no disasters could subdue. - -♦TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS.♦ - -There was none of that butchery in the pursuit by which the French -had disgraced themselves at Medellin. The intrusive government had at -that time acted with the cruelty which fear inspires; feeling itself -secure now, its object was to take prisoners, and force them into its -own service; and for this purpose a different sort of cruelty was -employed. While the Madrid Gazette proclaimed that the French soldiers -behaved with more than humanity to the captured Spaniards, that they -might gratify their Emperor’s brother by treating his misled subjects -with this kindness, the treatment which those prisoners received was -in reality so brutal, that if the people of Madrid had had no other -provocation, it would have sufficed for making them hate and execrate -the Intruder, and those by whom his councils were directed. They were -plundered without shame or mercy by the French troops, and any who -were recognized as having been taken before, or as having belonged to -Joseph’s levies, were hurried before a military tribunal, and shot -in presence of their fellows. Even an attempt to escape was punished -with death by these tribunals, whose sentence was without appeal! -They were imprisoned in the Retiro, and in the buildings attached to -the Museum, where they were ill fed and worse used; and they who had -friends, relations, or even parents, in Madrid, were neither allowed to -communicate with, nor to receive the slightest assistance from them. By -such usage about 8000 were forced into a service, from which they took -the first opportunity ♦RIGEL, 2. 406.♦ to desert, most of them in the -course of a few months having joined the guerillas. - -The defeat of Areizaga drew after it that of the Duke del Parque. Too -confident in his troops, he remained in his advanced situation, amid -the open country of Castille, till the army which he had defeated was -reinforced by Kellermann’s division from Valladolid. The Duke knew -there were 8000 French infantry and 2000 horse in Medina del Campo, -and, thinking that this was all their force, took a position at Carpio, -upon the only rising ground in those extensive plains, and there waited -for their attack. The enemy advanced slowly, as if waiting for other -troops to come up. Seeing this, the Duke gave orders to march against -them, and the French retreated, fighting as they fell back, from about -three in the afternoon till the close of day, when they entered Medina -del Campo. The Duke then discovered that a far greater force than he -had expected was at hand, and fell back to his position at Carpio, -there to give his troops rest, for they had been thirty hours without -any. At midnight the French also retired upon their reinforcements. -During the following day the Duke obtained full intelligence; it now -became too evident that he could no longer continue in his advanced -situation, and he began his retreat from Carpio in the night. In -the evening of the next day he halted a few hours at Vittoria and -Cordovilla, and at ten that night continued his march, being pursued -by Kellermann, who did ♦BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.♦ not yet come near -enough to annoy him. On the morning of the 28th he reached Alba de -Tormes, and there drew up his troops to resist the enemy, who were -now close upon him. He posted them upon the heights which command the -town on both sides of the Tormes, in order to cover his rear-guard, -the bridges, and the fords; the whole cavalry was on the left bank. -General Lorcet began the attack, and was repulsed by the infantry and -artillery: two brigades of French horse then charged the right wing of -the Spaniards; their cavalry were ordered to meet the charge; whether -from some accidental disorder, or sudden panic, they took to flight -without discharging a shot, or exchanging a single sword stroke; -part of them were rallied and brought back, but the same disgraceful -feeling recurred; they fled a second time, and left the right flank -of the army uncovered: the French then charged the exposed wing with -an overpowering force, and, in spite of a brave resistance, succeeded -in breaking through. The victorious cavalry then charged the left of -the Spaniards; but here it was three times repulsed. Mendizabal and -Carrera formed their troops into an oblong square, and every farther -attempt of the enemy was baffled: night now came on; this body, taking -advantage of the darkness, retreated along the heights on the left -bank of the town, and the Duke then gave orders to fall back in the -direction of Tamames. They marched in good order till morning, when, as -they were within eight miles of that town, and of the scene of their -former victory, a small party of the enemy’s horse came in sight, and -a rumour ran through the ranks that the French were about to charge -them in great force. The very men who had fought so nobly only twelve -hours before now threw away firelocks, knapsacks, and whatever else -encumbered them: the enemy were not near enough to avail themselves of -this panic; and the Duke, with the better part of his troops, reached -the Peña de Francia, and in that secure position halted to collect -again the fugitives and stragglers. Kellermann spoke of 3000 men killed -and 2000 prisoners: and all the artillery of the right wing was taken. - -By this victory the French were enabled without farther obstacle to -direct their views against Ciudad Rodrigo, and to threaten Portugal: -and Lord Wellington removed in consequence from his position in the -vicinity of Badajos to the north of the Tagus, there to take measures -against the operations which he had long foreseen. Alburquerque’s -little army was now the only one which remained unbroken; but what -was this against the numerous armies of the French? even if it were -sufficient to cover Extremadura, what was there on the side of La -Mancha to secure Andalusia, and Seville itself? Every effort was made -to collect a new army under Areizaga at the passes of the Sierra, and -to reinforce the Duke del Parque also; ... but the danger was close at -hand. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVI. - -SIEGE OF GERONA. - - -♦1809.♦ - -While the Central Junta directed its whole attention toward Madrid, -and expended all its efforts in operations, so ill concerted and ill -directed, that the disastrous termination was foreseen with equal -certainty both by their friends and foes, Catalonia was left to defend -itself; and a sacrifice of heroic duty, not less memorable than that -which Zaragoza had exhibited, was displayed at Gerona. - -♦GERONA.♦ - -Gerona (the Gerunda of the Romans, a place of such unknown antiquity -that fabulous historians have ascribed its foundation to Geryon) is -situated upon the side and at the foot of a hill, where the little -river Onar, which divides the city from the suburbs, falls into -the Ter. Two centuries ago it was second only to Barcelona in size -and importance; other places in the principality, more favourably -situated for commerce, and less overlaid with monks and friars, had -now outgrown it, for of about 14,000 inhabitants, not less than a -fourth were clergy and religioners. In the thirteenth century it was -distinguished by the defence[1] which Ramon Folch of Cardona made -there against Philip III. of France; a memorable siege, not only for -the resolution with which Ramon held out, and for the ability with -which he obtained honourable terms at last, concealing from Philip the -extremity of famine to which the place was reduced, but also for the -singular destruction which was brought upon the besiegers by a plague -of flies[2]. Their bite is said to have been fatal to the horses, of -which such numbers died, that their carcasses produced pestilence; -two-thirds of the army perished, and the remainder found it necessary -to retreat into their own country, carrying home in their coffins the -chiefs who had led them into Spain. In the succession-war, Gerona was -signalized by the desperate resistance which it made against Philip V. -After it had fallen, the Catalans blockaded it during eight months; -M. Berwick raised the blockade, and the French minister proposed to -him to demolish the works; his plea was, that the expense of keeping -a garrison there might be spared; but his intent, that the Spaniards -might have one strong-hold the less upon their frontier. But Berwick -required an order from Louis XIV. to warrant him in a proceeding which -must necessarily offend the King of Spain; and Louis was then withheld -by a sense of decency from directly ordering what he wished to have had -done. The fortifications after that time had been so neglected, that -when Arthur Young was there in 1787, he thought they were not strong -enough to stop an army for half an hour: the old walls, however, had -now been well repaired; and the city was also protected by four forts -upon the high ground above it. But its principal defence was the -citadel, called here, as at Barcelona, Monjuic, which commanded it from -an eminence about sixty fathoms distant. This was a square fort, 240 -yards in length on each side, with four bastions, and for outworks the -four towers of Saints Luis, Narcis, Daniel, and Juan. - -♦FORCE OF THE GARRISON.♦ - -The garrison amounted only to 3400 men, but they were commanded by -Mariano Alvares, ♦VOL. I. P. 465; VOL. II. P. 322.♦ and the inhabitants -were encouraged by having twice driven the enemy from their walls. -After the battle of Valls it was certain that the French, having no -force to oppose them in the field, would make a third attempt to -obtain possession of this important place, and that they would make it -in sufficient strength and with ample means, lest they should incur -the disgrace of a third repulse. No means, therefore, were neglected -of providing for defence; but while every military preparation which -the circumstances permitted was made, Alvarez felt and understood -that his surest reliance must be placed upon that moral resistance of -which the Zaragozans had set them so illustrious an example. Like the -♦CRUSADERS ENROLLED.♦ crusaders of old, the inhabitants took the cross, -and formed eight companies of an hundred men each; the women also, -maids and matrons alike, enrolled themselves in an association which -they ♦COMPANY OF ST. BARBARA.♦ called the Company of St. Barbara, to -perform whatever duties lay within their power, as their countrywomen -had done at Zaragoza. The French scoffed at these things, as indicating -the fanaticism of a people whom they considered greatly inferior to -themselves. Light-minded, as well as light-hearted, and regardless of -any higher motive than may be found in the sense of mere military duty -(for it was the direct object of Buonaparte’s institutions to eradicate -or preclude every better principle), they were incapable of perceiving -that the state of mind which their nefarious conduct had called forth, -sanctified such measures. - -♦ST. NARCIS APPOINTED GENERALISSIMO.♦ - -These were demonstrations of the religious feeling with which the -Geronans devoted themselves to the cause of their country, and to the -duty of self-defence. With more reason might the French deride the -part which in that city was assigned to the Patron Saint, though such -derision would come with little consistency from those among them who -professed to believe in the Romish church. St. Narcis, as the Saint is -called in the clipt language of that province, had obtained as much -credit for defeating Duhesme in his first attempt upon Gerona, as for -sending the plague of flies against the French King Philip. A meeting -had in consequence been held of the municipality, the chapter, the -heads of the religious houses, and all the chief persons of the city, -Colonel Julien Bolivar presiding as the king’s lieutenant. Resolutions -were passed, that seeing St. Narcis had always vouchsafed his especial -protection to the principality of Catalonia, as had been manifested -during the former invasions of the French, and recently by the -defeat of Duhesme, which was wholly owing to his favour; and seeing -moreover that for the purpose of resisting the tyranny and oppression -of Napoleon Buonaparte it was necessary to appoint a commander who -should be capable of directing their operations and repulsing such an -enemy, ... no one could so worthily fill that office as the invincible -patron and martyr St. Narcis; and therefore, in the name of Ferdinand -the King, they nominated him Generalissimo of all the Spanish forces -by land and sea, and confided to him the defence of Gerona, of its -district, and of the whole principality. On the following Sunday, the -Junta, with all the clergy and other persons of distinction, went in -procession to notify this appointment to the Saint in his shrine in the -church of St. Felix; the shrine was opened, and a general’s staff, a -sword, and a belt, all richly ornamented, were deposited by the relics -of the chosen commander; and the enthusiastic joy which the ceremony -excited was such, that the Spaniards said it seemed as if the glory of -the Lord had descended and filled the church, manifesting that their -devotion was approved and blessed by Heaven! - -♦ALL MENTION OF CAPITULATING FORBIDDEN.♦ - -This display of national character and of Romish superstition had -taken place in the first fervour of their feelings after a signal -deliverance. The spirit of the Geronans did not fail when danger -was again at hand; and the governor, seeing and relying upon this -disposition of the people, thought it advisable, before the time of -trial approached, to restrain by fear the few treacherous subjects -who might be waiting, when opportunity offered, to declare themselves; -♦APRIL 1.♦ he published an edict, therefore, forbidding all persons -from speaking of capitulation on pain of immediate death, without -exception of class, rank, or condition. Both by the garrison and the -people it was received with acclamations. The military Junta of the -city proposed that the streets should be unpaved as a precaution -against bombardment; this was opposed by the board of police, upon the -ground that it would be prejudicial to health; the question, therefore, -was referred to the medical board, who found it convenient to avoid a -physical discussion, and compromised the matter by deciding that the -paving should be taken up in the squares and streets through which the -troops must necessarily pass. - -♦ST. CYR WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE CITY BY BLOCKADE.♦ - -General Reille, who was to have commanded the besieging army, was -at this time superseded by General Verdier. This army consisted of -18,000 men; to make up that number Marshal St. Cyr was compelled to -weaken the corps of observation under his own command, which was thus -reduced to about 12,000; but from such armies as the Catalans could -bring into the field, and such counsels as directed them, he well knew -how little there was to apprehend. ♦ST. CYR, 164.♦ In this confidence -St. Cyr would have preferred blockading the city to besieging it, and -would have waited till it should be reduced by famine, whereby all -the loss which the besiegers sustained might have been spared. But -he was neither consulted nor listened to, holding the command at this -time only till Marshal Augereau ♦1809. MAY.♦ should arrive. On the -6th of May the besiegers first appeared on the heights of Casa Roca -and Costarroja on the other side the Ter, and began to form their -lines without opposition. A battery of eleven mortars was planted -upon Casa Roca, from whence it commanded the city; works were erected -against Monjuic also; the garrison being far too weak to impede these -operations, and no efforts being made for impeding them from without. -When the lines were completed, and every thing ready to commence the -bombardment, they sent a flag of truce requiring Alvarez to spare -himself and the city the evils which must inevitably attend resistance. -D. Mariano admitted the officer to his presence, and bade him tell his -general, that in future the trouble of sending flags of truce might -be spared, for he would hold no other communication with him than at -the mouth of the cannon. The French commander found means of conveying -a letter to him afterwards, with the significant observation that he -might probably repent having thus cut himself off from the only means -of communication which ♦THE BOMBARDMENT BEGINS.♦ were allowed in war. -It was on the 12th of June that the summons was sent, and on the night -of the 13th, about an hour after midnight, the bombardment began. -Then for the first time the _generale_ or alarm was beat, a sound -which afterwards became so frequent in this ♦1809. JUNE.♦ devoted -city: roused from their sleep, the aged and the children repaired to -cellars and other places of imagined security, which they who could -had provided for this emergency, and the female company of St. Barbara -hastened to their posts. An ill-judged sally was made early on the 17th -against some works which were supposed to be the base of a battery -against the Puerto de Francia: it was successful, but the success was -of little importance and dearly purchased; many brave men fell, and 110 -were brought back wounded. The bombardment continued, and among other -buildings the military hospital was destroyed: the people, while it was -in flames, observed that its destruction was deserved, for, instead -of proving a place of help and healing for the sick, covetousness and -peculation had made their profit there upon human misery. The hospitals -of St. Domingo and St. Martin were also rendered uninhabitable; -one other had been made ready, another was to be prepared, and the -difficulty of providing for the sick and wounded increased at the time -when their numbers were daily increasing. About the end of the month an -epidemic affection of the bowels become prevalent, occasioned partly -by the perpetual agitation of mind which the people endured, partly by -sleeping in damp subterranean places, where the air never circulated -freely, and where many had nothing but the ground to lie on. In July, -a bilious fever is usually endemic in Gerona; it seized especially upon -the lower classes now, and upon the refugees from those places which -had been taken or burned by the enemy; and it affected the wounded also. - -♦ST. CYR DRAWS NEARER GERONA.♦ - -During these operations St. Cyr, retaining the command till Augereau, -who was disabled by an attack of gout at Perpignan, should arrive -to supersede him, had remained in his position ♦P. 368.♦ near Vich. -The capture of the French troops near Monzon, and Blake’s success at -Alcañiz, had so alarmed the enemy at Zaragoza and at Madrid, that -orders were dispatched for him to return towards Tarragona, and combine -his movements with Suchet, who, it was deemed, would otherwise be in -danger. But King Joseph’s orders were respected almost as little by the -French commanders as by the Spanish nation. Marshal St. Cyr represented -that his army had always been left to itself, having no relation -with any other corps, and being specially destined for subjugating -Catalonia, which the Emperor Napoleon had thought quite sufficient -employment for it, and which, in fact, would long continue to require -all its efforts. On the other hand, Verdier was entreating him to -approach nearer Gerona, and this he prepared to do, being aware that -Blake’s immediate object, after collecting the runaways from Belchite, -must be to introduce supplies and reinforcements into the besieged -city. His first care was to send the sick and wounded to Barcelona, -the only place where they could be in safety. This done, no time was -lost in breaking up from quarters which he was unwilling to abandon; -for though the want of meat and wine had been severely felt there by -the troops and officers, as well as by the invalids, there had been no -lack of bread; and the country through which they had to pass not being -practicable for carriages of any kind, no more could be taken with them -than the soldiers could carry for ♦JUNE 18.♦ themselves. The movement -was so luckily timed, that they reached S. Coloma de Farnes, just as -a small detachment of Blake’s army arrived there, escorting some 1200 -cattle to Gerona: the whole convoy fell into their hands, ♦ST. CYR, -167–172.♦ with an abundance of wine also, the want of which is felt by -the French soldiers more severely than any other privation. - -♦PALAMOS TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦ - -St. Cyr’s head-quarters were now at Caldas de Malavella, and he -occupied a line extending from Oña in advance of Bruñola to S. Feliu de -Guixols, of which place his troops took possession at this time, after -a brave but ineffectual resistance. It was a point of considerable -importance, being the port most convenient for those Spanish vessels -which cut off the communication between France and Barcelona for all -ships which were not under a strong escort. Palamos was of still more -importance at this juncture, because from thence Gerona communicated -by sea with Tarragona. This place was attacked by Italian troops under -General Fontane; it was carried by assault, and the only persons who -were spared were the few who threw themselves into the sea, and were -received prisoners when the fury of the invaders had spent itself[3]. -On the other hand, the Catalans were not always unsuccessful in -their endeavours to annoy the invaders. Rovira, formerly a canon, -and therefore called Doctor Colonel Rovira (one of the most able and -enterprising partizans who appeared during the contest), intercepted -a convoy and a train of artillery horses, to supply the loss of which -St. Cyr was obliged to part with the horses belonging to his corps. -And a battalion which Augereau had sent to fix up proclamations in -the villages beyond the frontier, was routed by Colonel Porta before -it had disposed of three of ♦ST. CYR, 173, 190.♦ its papers. Augereau -having, in the campaign of 1794, served in that province, and left a -good name there, had counted upon the effect of his proclamations, not -considering that he was now engaged in a cause in which every heart and -every understanding, every principle and every feeling, were against -him. - -♦ASSAULT OF MONJUIC.♦ - -Verdier meantime prosecuted the siege, in full expectation of -bringing it to a speedy conclusion. ♦1809. JULY.♦ The outworks were -soon rendered untenable, and the redoubts which covered the front of -Monjuic were carried with a facility which made him undervalue his -opponents. At ♦ST. CYR, 175.♦ the beginning of July, three batteries -played upon three sides of this little fortress: that which was planted -against the north front consisted of twenty four-and-twenty pounders; -while the French were battering it, the angle upon which the flag was -hoisted fell into the ditch; D. Mariano Montorro descended for it in -the midst of the fire, brought it up in safety, and replanted it upon -the wall. The breach was soon wide enough for forty men abreast. The -fire of the garrison had ceased, for they perceived that the French -were secured by their trenches, and powder was too precious to be -used unless its effects were certain: the enemy, who had not learned -the temper of the men with whom they were contending, judged from -this silence, that their hearts or ammunition had failed, and in the -night between the fourth and fifth they assaulted the breach. But -it was for this that the garrison had reserved their fire, and they -poured it so destructively upon the columns which approached, that -the French retreated with great loss. For three days they continued -their fire upon the breach. Between two and three on the morning of -the 8th, 6000 men again assaulted it; and at the same time the town -was bombarded[4]. D. Blas de Furnas, second in command at Monjuic, was -in the thickest of the fight; he strained his voice till from exertion -it totally failed, but still his presence and his actions encouraged -all who saw him. The enemy came on, filled the fosse, and proceeded -to the breach ... “Woe to him,” says Samaniego, the historian of the -siege, and himself one of the besieged, “woe to him who sets his foot -upon the fosse of Monjuic!” A mortar, which lay masked among the -ruins of the ravelin, and discharged 500 musket-balls at every shot, -was played full upon the enemy by D. Juan Candy, and the havoc which -it made was tremendous. Three times during that day the assault was -repeated, with the utmost resolution on the part of the assailants, -who were never thrown into confusion, though all their efforts were -unavailing, and though they left 1600 of their number slain. The day, -however, was disastrous to the Geronans also, though not from any evil -which it was possible for strength or courage to have averted. The -tower of St. Juan, which stood between the west curtain of the castle, -the city, and the Calle de Pedret, was blown up. In what manner the -magazine took fire was never known. Part of its little garrison were -fortunately employed in active service elsewhere; the rest were buried -in the ruins, from whence twenty-three persons were extricated alive -amid the incessant fire which the enemy kept up upon the spot. Their -preservation was in great measure owing to the exertions of D. Carlos -Beramendi. The company of St. Barbara distinguished themselves that -day: covered with dust and blood, under the burning heat of July, and -through the incessant fire of the batteries and musketry, they carried -water and wine to the soldiers, and bore back the wounded. - -The severe loss which the French sustained in this second attempt -convinced them, that while one stone remained upon another, Monjuic -was not to be taken by assault. From this time, therefore, they -continued to batter it on three sides; and, practising the surest and -most destructive mode of warfare, stationed sharpshooters in their -trenches on every side, so that for one of the garrison to be seen -was almost certain death. So perilous was the service become, that -the centinels were changed every half hour, yet nine were killed in -one day at one post, and scarcely one escaped unwounded. It became at -length impossible to observe the operations of the enemy, so thick -were their marksmen, and with such fatal certainty did they take their -aim: no other means remained than that of sending some one into the -fosse, who, lifting up his head with the most imminent hazard, took a -momentary glance. By the beginning of August the besiegers had pushed -their parallels to the edge of the fosse; their labour was impeded by -the stony soil, which rendered it necessary to bring earth from some -distance; for this, however, they had hands enough, and they had no -apprehension to hurry and disturb them, that any army powerful enough -to raise the siege could be brought against them. - -♦SUCCOURS INTERCEPTED.♦ - -Meantime the Spaniards were preparing for an attempt to introduce -succours. For this purpose they threatened the right of the covering -army, hoping to draw their attention upon that point, while 1500 men -passed through the French line near Llagostera, where General Pino -had his head-quarters. They succeeded perfectly in this difficult -attempt, through their knowledge of the country, ... but a straggler -who lagged behind fell into the enemy’s hand, and upon information -which was obtained from him, it was understood that they would direct -their course to Castellar de la Selva, and endeavour to pass through -the besieging army in the night. There was time to take measures for -intercepting them, and being turned aside from thence at nightfall, -when they were beginning to debouche, they fell in at daybreak with -Pino, who was in pursuit, and scarcely a third escaped: the rest -were made prisoners, and sent into France. It was learnt from the -prisoners ♦JULY 11.♦ that the Spaniards did not intend to make any -serious effort for raising the siege till the besiegers should be -weakened by those diseases which the season would infallibly produce. -Reports, nevertheless, were current that such an effort would be made -on Santiago’s day, when the patron of Spain might be expected once -more to inspire or assist his faithful votaries. The French would have -deemed themselves fortunate if this report had been verified; for -according to the barbarous system of warfare which Buonaparte pursued, -they were left to provide subsistence for themselves as they could; -... the soldiers had to cut the corn, thresh it, and grind it for -themselves; and though St. Cyr had given orders that biscuit for four -days’ consumption should always be kept in readiness, in case it should -be necessary to collect the army for the purpose of giving battle, not -more than half that quantity could ever be provided. More than once -also ammunition became scarce, great part coming from Toulouse, and -even from so remote a point as Strasbourg. ♦ST. CYR, 164.♦ Unhappily -the Spaniards were in no condition to profit by the embarrassments of -the enemy; and nothing was done by England for Catalonia, where, during -the first years of the struggle, so much might have been done ♦VOL. -II. P. 328.♦ with effect. The army which in the preceding autumn had -been ordered thither from Sicily, and detained by its general for the -protection of that island, was employed at this time in an expedition -against Naples, as a diversion in favour of the Austrians; and thus the -means which might have saved Gerona were misdirected. - -♦THE RAVELIN TAKEN.♦ - -Meantime the main attacks of the besiegers were directed against -the ravelin which was now the main defence of Monjuic. While it -was possible to maintain it, the garrison contended who should be -stationed there, as at the post of honour. It was repeatedly attacked -by night, but the defenders were always ready, and always repulsed the -assailants. It was now discovered that the enemy were mining; this was -distinctly ascertained by the sounds which were heard in the direction -of the fosse. The castle was founded upon a rock, and therefore the -officers apprehended no immediate danger from operations of this -nature. The purpose of the French was to destroy a breast-work which -protected that gate of the castle through which was the passage to the -ravelin: the breast-work was almost wholly of earth, and its explosion -did no hurt, but it left the gate exposed. A battery, already prepared, -began to play upon it, and the communication between the castle and -the ravelin was thus rendered exceedingly difficult. A sally was made -against this battery, and the guns were spiked; a priest was one of the -foremost in this adventure: he received a ball in his thigh, and fell; -the enemy pressed on to kill him; one of their officers, at the hazard -of his own life, protected him, and in this act of humane interference -was slain by the Spaniards, ... ♦1809. AUGUST.♦ a circumstance which -their journalists recorded with becoming regret. The success which had -been obtained was of little avail, for the French had artillery in -abundance: in the course of a few hours they mounted other pieces in -place of those which had been rendered useless, and continued their -fire upon the gate and the ravelin. At the same time they formed a -covered way from their own parapet to the breach of the ravelin; by -this, on the night between the 4th and 5th of August they poured a -sufficient body of troops through the breach to overpower the forty -men who were stationed there; but having won the place, they could -not maintain it, exposed as it was to musketry from the castle. It -was, therefore, left for the dead who covered it. About forty hours -afterwards, a few Spaniards determined to go and bring off the arms -which the French had not had time to carry away; they found a lad of -sixteen who had lain thus long among the carcasses; he was the only one -of his comrades who escaped death or captivity, ... they brought him -off, and he was sent to the hospital half dead with exhaustion. - -♦MONJUIC ABANDONED.♦ - -The guns of Monjuic had now been silenced; the enemy were so near, -that sometimes the Spaniards knocked them down with stones: it was -with difficulty that the governor, D. Guillerme Nasch, could restrain -his men: impatient at remaining inactive, they earnestly solicited -permission to sally out upon the most desperate attempts. The garrison -had held out seven-and-thirty days since a practicable breach was made. -A week had elapsed since the ravelin was lost, and three sides of the -castle were now entirely in ruins; there was little water left, and -that little foul and unwholesome; the number of soldiers was every -day diminished by disease as well as by the chances of war. Under -these circumstances, the governor deemed it his duty to preserve the -men who were still left, that they might assist in the defence of the -city. On the evening of the 11th he abandoned the ruins, and retired -into Gerona, every man taking with him two hand-grenades and as many -cartridges as he could carry. Matches were left in the magazine, and -the retreat was effected with only the loss of one man, who was killed -by a shell when he had entered the gates. - -♦VERDIER EXPECTS THE TOWN TO FALL.♦ - -Elated with this success, ... a success dearly purchased, and bringing -no glory to the conqueror, ... Verdier assured his government that -Gerona could not now hold out longer than from eight to fifteen days. -He planted one battery against the bulwark of St. Pedro, and another -upon Monjuic, which commanded all the works in the plain, and the -whole line of the city from St. Pedro to the tower of Gironella. Other -batteries, placed by St. Daniel’s Tower, commanded Fort Calvary, the -Castle of the Constable, and one of its advanced posts. While they were -forming these, and throwing up works nearer the city than they could -approach before the fall of Monjuic, a little respite was necessarily -afforded to the besieged; but, that no rest might be given them, -shells were thrown in from time to time by night and day. From the -commencement of the siege Alvarez had felt the want of men, and had -repeatedly solicited a reinforcement of 2000; even then the garrison -would hardly have amounted to half its complement. Nothing but the want -of men prevented him from making more frequent sallies, ... in all that -were made, the desperate courage and high sense of duty which inspired -the Spaniards gave them a decided advantage. “Never,” said he, in his -report to the government, “never have I seen the precious enthusiasm of -all who are within this city abated even for a moment; and a thousand -times would they have sallied out, if I had not, because of their -scanty numbers, been compelled to forbid them.” Just after the fall -of Monjuic, D. Ramon Foxa, and D. Jose Cantera, brought him 700 men, -a trifling number considering the state of Gerona, and the importance -of defending it; but they were volunteers, and went with willing and -prepared minds to make the sacrifice which was required of them. - -♦A BATTERY PLANTED ON THE CATHEDRAL.♦ - -Alvarez now planted upon the roof of the cathedral a battery of three -cannon. The little opposition which was made to this as an act of -profanation was soon overcome, for the clergy felt that, as when -fighting in the field, they were employed in the service of the altar, -so, in such a war, the temple could not be desecrated by using it as a -fortress. Till now a watch had been kept upon the tower, to observe the -movements of the enemy, and ring the alarm whenever an attack was about -to be made. It was composed of the clergy of the cathedral, with one -of the Canons at their head: now that the battery was planted there, -this guard made their station a place of arms also, and annoyed the -besiegers with musketry. The cathedral had been hitherto the hospital -for wounded officers; it now became necessary to remove them to a safer -quarter, for the enemy directed their fire thither with a perseverance -that discovered how much they were annoyed from thence. In the frequent -removal of the hospitals which the bombardment occasioned, the company -of St. Barbara was of the most essential service; throughout the whole -siege, these heroic women shrunk from no duty, however laborious, -however perilous, or however painful. Three of the leaders are -especially mentioned, Dona Lucia Joana de Fitzgéralt, D. Mariangela -Vivern, and D. Maria Custi, commandants of the three divisions of St. -Narcis, St. Dorothy, and St. Eulalia. - -At the end of August, several breaches had been made by the batteries -of Monjuic, and it was every day apprehended that they would be made -practicable. Alvarez then declared in his general orders, that if -any of the defenders flinched from the breach when it was attacked, -they should immediately be considered as enemies, and fired upon -accordingly. The besiegers continually constructed new works, they -had troops at command, artillery in abundance, and ♦DISTRESS OF THE -CITY.♦ engineers of the greatest skill. The garrison was considerably -reduced; the hospitals were no longer able to contain the numbers -who required admission: the contagion increased, and became more -virulent; the magazines were exhausted of all their provisions except -wheat and a little flour, and famine began to be severely felt. Not a -word of capitulation was permitted within the city, nor a thought of -it entertained; but Blake was well aware that it was now absolutely -necessary to make a great effort for the relief of the place, and throw -in troops and ♦ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE SUCCOURS.♦ supplies. This was -exceedingly difficult; for, although the enemy occupied an extensive -line, it might easily be contracted, and they would certainly employ -their whole force to prevent the entrance of supplies into a place -which they had strictly blockaded for more than three months. The only -means of succeeding would be to divert their attention upon various -points, and make them suppose that the Spaniards intended to give -battle in the quarter directly opposite to that by which the convoy was -to proceed. Blake’s head-quarters were at S. Ilari when he began his -movements; he ordered Don Manuel Llanden, lieutenant of the regiment -of Ultonia, with as many troops as could be allotted for this service, -and as many of the Somatenes as he could collect on the way, to march -to the heights of Los Angeles, which are north of Gerona, dislodge the -enemy from that position, where they had only a small body of infantry, -and protect the convoy which was to be introduced on that side. Blake -then advanced two hours’ march towards the Ermida, or Chapel of Pradro, -with the reserve, that he might be ready to give assistance wherever -it was wanted; from thence he dispatched the colonel of the regiment -of Ultonia, D. Enrique O’Donnell, with 1200 foot and a few cavalry, to -attack the French at Bruñolas, his object being to make them suppose -that the convoy was proceeding in that direction. - -♦SEPT. 1.♦ - -O’Donnell, by the error of his guides, was led more than two hours’ -march out of the direct road, and thus prevented from attacking the -enemy at daybreak, according to his intention. This, however, did not -frustrate the plan. Bruñolas was a strong position, the enemy were -posted in two bodies, and they had a redoubt with entrenchments on the -top of the mountain. Stationing one part of his men at the foot of the -ascent, to defeat the purpose of the enemy, which he perceived was -to attack his principal column in flank, he ordered Sarsfield, with -the greater part of his force, to attack the French in front; it was -done with complete success; they were driven from their entrenchments, -and reinforcements came hastening towards them, this, as Blake had -designed, being supposed to be the point which it was of most -importance to ♦1809. SEPTEMBER.♦ secure. O’Donnell having succeeded in -this diversion, now descended into the plain, lest he should be turned -by superior numbers. There was some difficulty in the descent, owing -to its steepness and the proximity of the enemy, nevertheless it was -effected in perfect order, and having reached the plain, he halted, -and formed in order of battle. Another division of the Spaniards under -General Loygorri joined him, and they continued in that position to -occupy the attention of the French, and draw more of their troops from -the side of the Ter during the whole of the day. - -While O’Donnell thus successfully executed his orders on one side, -D. Juan Claros acted on another in concert with the Doctor Colonel -Rovira. Rovira dislodged the enemy from the castle of Montagut, which -they had fortified. Claros at the same time attacked them on the left -bank of the Ter, dislodged them from the height which they occupied -on that part of the river, killed the Westphalian General Hadelin, -burnt their encampments at Sarria and Montrospe, and won the battery -of Casa Enroca. Llanden meantime obtained possession of the heights -of Los Angeles: this opened a way for ♦GARCIA CONDE ENTERS WITH -REINFORCEMENTS.♦ the convoy, with which Garcia Conde, at the head of -4000 foot and 500 horse, advanced from Amer, crossed the Ter, and -hastened along the right bank toward Gerona. The attention of the enemy -had been so well diverted by the attacks on other points, that the -Spaniards were enabled to break through the force which had been left -there, set fire to the tents, and effect their entrance. Six hundred -men sallied at the same time from the city to the plain of Salt, partly -to assist in confusing the enemy, but more for the purpose of restoring -water to the only two mills within the walls. In this they failed; -for, since the French had broken the water-courses, it was discovered -that the weather had completed their destruction; ... had not this -detachment thus uselessly employed their time, they might have carried -off the besiegers’ magazines from Salt. - -♦INADEQUACY OF THIS RELIEF.♦ - -These operations, so honourable to Blake who planned, and to the -officers who executed them, were performed during a day of heavy and -incessant rain, which concealed their movements from the enemy. Of -the troops who got into Gerona, 3000 remained there. Alvarez did not -conceal from them the desperate nature of the service upon which they -had entered; he addressed both officers and men, telling them, that -if any one among them dreaded the thoughts of death, now was the time -to leave the city, for the Geronans and their defenders had sworn to -perish rather than surrender, and he asked if they were willing, to -swear the like? They readily took the oath. Conde, with the rest of the -army and the beasts of the convoy, accomplished his return as happily -as his entrance. Of all Blake’s actions this was the only one which -was completely successful. But more might have been done, and ought -to have been attempted. If he had given the French battle, a victory -would have delivered Gerona; and a defeat could only have produced -the dispersion of his own troops, in a country which they knew, where -every man was friendly to them, and where they would presently have -re-assembled. He had little to lose, and every thing to gain. Even if, -instead of retreating as soon as his object of introducing supplies -was effected, he had continued to threaten the enemy, without risking -an action, an opportunity of attacking them at advantage must have -been given him; for of the two days’ biscuit which had been reserved -for such an occasion, one had been consumed, and the French army could -not have been kept together for want of supplies. Blake was highly -and deservedly extolled for the skill with which he had conducted his -operations; but the attempt, though it had succeeded in all parts, -was miserably inadequate to the object. The stores, which after so -much preparation and with such skilful movements had been introduced, -contained only a supply for fifteen days. Hopes indeed were held out of -others which were to follow, but it was impossible not to perceive that -the enemy would be more vigilant hereafter, and that the introduction -of a second convoy would be rendered far more difficult than that of -the first. Alvarez was so well convinced of this, that he immediately -reduced the rations one half, preparing at once with invincible -resolution for the extremity which he knew was ♦ST. CYR, 231.♦ now to -be expected; and then, it is said, that for the first time there was -some desertion from the Spanish troops. - -♦LOS ANGELES TAKEN, AND THE GARRISON PUT TO THE SWORD.♦ - -The Spaniards, after the late action, had occupied with 500 men the -convent of N. Señora de los Angeles, which was situated upon the -highest ground in the vicinity, and having been fortified, was now -an important point, as facilitating both ingress and egress for the -besieged, while it remained in their hands. Mazuchelli, therefore, -with the Italian troops, was ordered to take it. According to his -statement the Spanish commandant Llanden fired upon the officer who -summoned him; and therefore when the post was carried, after a brave -resistance, every man was put to the sword except three officers, -whom the Italian commander saved, and Llanden himself, who leapt from -one of the ♦ST. CYR, 243.♦ church-windows, and effected his escape. -The Italian soldiers had become mercilessly ferocious in the course -of this war, exasperated, it is said, by the murder of some of their -sick and wounded ♦IB. 262.♦ who had fallen into the hands of Rovira -and other guerilla chiefs. In these dreadful cases, where cruelty -excites revenge, and revenge provokes fresh cruelty, there is a fearful -accumulation of guilt on all the parties who thus aggravate the evils -of war: but that the inhumanity of the invaders was carried on upon -a wider scale, that it was systematically encouraged and sometimes -enjoined, and that it extended to women and even children, is as -certain ... as that the provocation was given by them, and the example -set, ... an example which neither the Spaniards nor Portugueze were -likely to be slow in following. The enemy were less fortunate in an -attack upon the irregular forces under Claros and Rovira, who with -incessant activity intercepted their communication with Figueras. -Verdier attacked them at S. Gregori, where they were well posted and -well commanded, for these leaders were men well fitted for the sort of -warfare in which they were engaged, and the French were compelled to -retire with the loss of one of their generals. - -♦UNSUCCESSFUL SALLY.♦ - -The besiegers were at this time compelled for want of ammunition to -suspend their efforts till a supply could be received from France. The -time was not lost by the garrison in strengthening their works, works -however which derived their main strength from the unconquerable spirit -of the inhabitants. When the supplies arrived the enemy directed their -fire upon the three points of St. Lucia, St. Cristobal, and the Quartel -de Alemanes, or Quarter of the Germans. This latter building rested -in part of its foundation upon the wall itself, and the object of the -enemy was to beat it down, that they might enter over its ruins as by a -bridge. The fire from the cathedral, from the Sarracinas, and from the -tower of Gironella, was well kept up in return; but the French had so -greatly the advantage both in the number and size of their artillery, -that Alvarez ordered a sally, in the ♦SEPT. 15.♦ hope of spiking their -guns. That it might be the more unexpected, the gate of S. Pedro, which -had been walled up since the loss of Monjuic, was re-opened, and the -Spaniards advanced with such rapidity upon the enemy’s works, that -the attack was made almost as soon as they were seen. In many points -it was successful, in some the Spaniards failed, and when they were -thrown into confusion they were unable to rally. In some few of the -persons chosen for the sally, something worse than want of discipline -discovered itself, ... they lagged behind in the assault, and, without -sharing the danger, fell in with their braver comrades on their return. -So much was done, and so much more must have been effected, if all -had behaved equally well, that Colonel Marshal, an Englishman in the -Spanish service, exclaimed, “We have lost a great victory!” - -♦THE FRENCH REPULSED IN A GENERAL ASSAULT.♦ - -The guns which had been rendered useless were soon replaced, and an -incessant fire was kept up upon the three great breaches; on the 18th, -the French engineers declared that all three were practicable. Monjuic -had taught the enemy not to be too confident of success; the breaches -indeed were of such magnitude that it seemed scarcely possible they -should fail in storming them, but they knew that victory must be dearly -purchased. In the evening, therefore, they sent a white flag; it was -not noticed from the town, and the officers who accompanied it made -signs to the Spaniards; there was no firing at this time, and the -men, both of the besieging army and the town, were looking silently -and intently on, to await the issue. Alvarez at length sent a verbal -order to the French officers to retire, ... they requested to be -heard, and were told from the walls to retire on peril of their lives; -they persisted in offering a letter, and then both the castle of the -Constable and the tower of Gironella fired. As soon as the officers -reached their own lines, the batteries were again opened, some upon -the breaches, others throwing shells into the town. During the night -this was kept up, and the enemy collected troops upon the heights of -Campdura and in Monjuic, for the assault. At daybreak they were seen -in motion in different parts, with the purpose, it was supposed, of -calling off attention from the real points of danger. The whole ♦SEPT. -19.♦ forenoon was employed in preparation. Between three and four, the -watch on the cathedral informed Alvarez that troops were descending -from Monjuic to St. Daniel. At the same time the like intelligence -arrived from the forts of the Constable and of the Capuchines; and -another messenger from the cathedral followed, with tidings that the -enemy were advancing in force both from Monjuic and St. Daniel against -the breaches, and that many of them carried instruments for sapping. - -The alarm was now rung from the cathedral, and beaten through the -streets; there was scarcely any interval between the alarm and the -attack, so near to the walls were the points of which the enemy were -in possession: 2000 men came on straight from Monjuic, an equal number -advanced between Monjuic and St. Daniel, a third body from S. Miguel; -at the same time a movement of troops was seen in the woods of Palau; -they advanced against the three bridges, the Puerto de Francia, and -forts Calvary and Cabildo. It was not without surprise that the enemy -found the Geronans prepared to receive them at all these points. Nasch, -the defender of Monjuic, had his post at the Quartel de Alemanes, -where one of the principal breaches was made. Colonel Marshall was at -the breach of St. Lucia; a company of crusaders, composed entirely of -clergy, were stationed at the breach of St. Cristobal; the rest of the -garrison, and crusaders, and all the other townsmen manned the walls. -The company of St. Barbara were distributed among the different posts, -to perform their important functions, and proclamations were made, -inviting the other women of Gerona to assist them in this awful hour. - -At the Quartel de Alemanes the enemy mounted the breach with the utmost -resolution, and they succeeded in forcing their way into the first -quadrangle of that great building; the French batteries continued to -play upon the walls and the buildings adjoining the breach, and a -huge fragment fell upon those who were foremost in the assault, just -at the moment when part of the Ultonia regiment was about to charge -them: a few of the Spaniards were buried with them in the ruins. The -Geronans then rushed on, drove back the enemy, presented themselves in -the breach, and fought hand to hand with the assailants. Frequently -such was the press of the conflict, and such the passion which inspired -them, that impatient of the time required for reloading their muskets, -the defendants caught up stones from the breach, and brained their -enemies with these readier weapons. Four times the assault was repeated -in the course of two hours, and at every point the enemy were beaten -off. Alvarez, during the whole assault, hastened from post to post, -wherever there was most need of his presence, providing every thing, -directing all and encouraging all; he had prepared cressets to light -up the walls and breaches in case the enemy should persist in their -attempt after darkness closed; but they withdrew long before night -set in, hastily and in disorder, leaving 800 of their best men slain. -Among them was that Colonel Floresti, whom this very Mariano Alvarez -had admitted into Monjuic at Barcelona, when the French took their ♦SEE -VOL. I. P. 201.♦ treacherous possession of that fortress. - -Of the besieged forty-four fell in this glorious day, and 197 were -wounded. Our brave countryman, Colonel Marshall, died of his wounds, -as did D. Ricardo Maccarty, another officer of the same regiment, -who was Irish either by birth or extraction. A glorious success had -been gained, one that filled the conquerors with the highest and most -ennobling pride; this joy it brought with it, but it brought no rest, -no respite, scarcely even a prolongation of hope. There was neither -wine to distribute to the soldiers after their exertions, nor even -bread; a scanty mess of pulse or corn, with a little oil, or a morsel -of bacon in its stead, was all that could be served out, ... and this -not from the public magazines, but given by the inhabitants, who, in -the general extremity, shared their stores with the soldiers, lamenting -that they had nothing better to bestow. “What matters it?” said these -brave Spaniards, “the joy of having saved Gerona to-day will give us -strength to go on!” A party went out to bring in any of the wounded -enemies who might have been left among the dead; one had been stript by -a miquelet, but upon perceiving what was the object of their search, he -discovered himself to be living. “Having been wounded,” he said, “he -feigned death as the only chance of escaping death, for he had been -led to believe that the miquelets and the peasants gave no quarter.” -The man who had stripped him happened to be present when he spoke; he -immediately re-clothed him, ran to bring him water, and took charge -of him till he could be removed to the hospital. While the Spaniards -were employed in this humane office, a fire was opened upon them from -the enemy’s works, occasioned, no doubt, by some error of the French -centinels: it drove them in, and the remainder of the wounded were -consequently left to perish. One wretched German, by the breach of St. -Lucia, lay groaning for twenty hours before death relieved him. - -♦ST. CYR RESOLVES TO REDUCE THE CITY BY FAMINE.♦ - -The loss which they had sustained in this assault thoroughly -discouraged the besiegers; and when St. Cyr, for the sake of proving to -the Spaniards that he was not to be outdone by them in perseverance, -would have made a second effort, the officers whom he consulted were -unanimously of opinion that it ought not again to be attempted. The -Marshal, however unwilling to make an acknowledgement so honourable to -the people against whom he was employed, was compelled then to admit -that Gerona could only be reduced by famine, and to determine upon -pursuing that course, which of all others is the most wearying to the -soldiers, and the most painful to a general who has not extinguished in -himself all sense of humanity. Every day now added to the distress of -the besieged. Their flour was exhausted; wheat they had still in store, -but men are so much the slaves of habit, that it was considered as one -great evil of the siege, that they had no means of grinding it; two -horse-mills, which had been erected, were of such clumsy construction, -that they did not perform half the needful work, and the Geronans, -rather than prepare the unground corn in any way to which they had not -been accustomed, submitted to the labour of grinding it between two -stones, or pounding it in the shell of a bomb with a cannon-ball. For -want of other animal food, mules and horses were slaughtered for the -hospital and for the shambles; a list was made of all within the city, -and they were taken by lot. Fuel was exceedingly scarce, yet the heaps -which were placed in cressets at the corners of the principal streets, -to illuminate them in case of danger, remained untouched, and not a -billet was taken from them during the whole siege. The summer fever -became more prevalent; the bodies of the sufferers were frequently -covered with a minute eruption, which was usually a fatal symptom: -fluxes also began to prevail[5]. - -♦O’DONNELL ENTERS THE CITY.♦ - -The hope of relief was the only thing talked of in Gerona, and day -and night the people, as well as the watchmen, looked eagerly on all -sides for the succours of which they were so greatly in need, and -which they knew Blake was preparing. That general, on the 21st of -September, had assembled a convoy at Hostalrich; on the morning of -the 26th a firing was heard towards Los Angeles, and a strong body -of the garrison sallied out to assist the convoy. Wimpfen had the -command of the advancing army. When they reached the heights of S. -Pelayo, before La Bisbal, O’Donnell was sent forward, with 1000 men, -to open a way through the enemy: this officer, who was generally not -less successful than enterprising in his attempts, broke through the -enemy, set fire to one of their encampments, and made way for 160 laden -beasts, which entered safely through the Puerta del Areny. The joy -of the besieged was but of short endurance; they looked to see more -troops and more supplies hastening on: 10,000 men they knew had been -sent upon this service, 1000 had effected their part, why could not -the nine follow? After gazing for hours in vain, they could no longer -deceive themselves with hope; it was but too certain that the rest of -the convoy had been intercepted. They then began to censure the general -who had attempted to introduce it on that side, where the way was -craggy, and led through such defiles, that a handful of men would be -sufficient to defeat his purpose: their disappointment vented itself in -exclamations against Blake, and they blamed him for remaining at the -head of an army after so many repeated misfortunes as he had sustained. -♦FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE IT.♦ That general was not more -censured by the Catalans than by the enemy for his conduct during the -siege. The French condemned his want of promptitude and enterprise, -being conscious themselves that for want of resources they must have -been seriously endangered, if they had been repeatedly and vigorously -attacked, or even threatened. But Blake, after the panic at Belchite, -could have no confidence in his men: nor was this his only misfortune; -though in other respects a good officer, he wanted that presence of -mind which is the most essential requisite for a commander, and he was -therefore better qualified to plan a campaign than to execute his own -arrangements. When he succeeded in the former attempt for relieving -Gerona, if the fair occasion had been seized the enemy might have then -been compelled to raise the siege; but it was let pass for want of -alacrity and hope. This second effort was miserably unsuccessful; nine -parts of the convoy fell into the enemy’s hand, and there was a loss of -more than 3000 men, for the ♦ST. CYR, 262.♦ Italians gave no quarter. -St. Cyr thought that the men who had got into the city could not -possibly retreat from it, and must therefore accelerate its surrender; -and believing that the ♦ST. CYR GIVES UP THE COMMAND TO AUGEREAU.♦ -business of the siege was done, he went to Perpignan for the purpose -of making arrangements for the better supply of the army, and getting -rid of an irksome command which his successor seemed in no haste to -assume. His situation had long been painful. The service itself was one -to which no casuistry could reconcile an honourable mind; the system -of preying upon the country gave a barbarous character to it, which, -if the cause itself had been less odious, must have been intolerable -to one bred up in those feelings and observances by which the evils -of war were mitigated: and if Marshal St. Cyr had been insensible to -these reflections, he had much personal mortification to endure. There -was reason to suspect that the army was neglected, because he was an -object of displeasure to the government which employed him; and he was -made to feel that the officers under him were, for his sake, debarred -from the honours and advancement which they were entitled to expect. -Finding therefore that Augereau was not incapacitated by ill health -♦ST. CYR, 264, 268.♦ from assuming the command, he communicated to him -his determination of holding it no longer, and was rewarded for his -services by two years of disgrace and exile. - -♦O’DONNELL EFFECTS HIS RETREAT.♦ - -Marshal Augereau had not been many hours before Gerona when O’Donnell -with his thousand men broke through the besieging army, and -accomplished his retreat more daringly and not less successfully than -he had effected his entrance. It was O’Donnell who first formed the -Geronans into companies, and disciplined them: he had not remained -in the city during the siege, because it was rightly thought he -would be better able to assist it from without; and he had displayed -such skill and intrepidity in intercepting a convoy at Mascara, in -concert with Rovira, that the Central Junta promoted him to the rank -of brigadier. When, in the unhappy attempt at relieving the city, he -and his division only had entered, he took up his station between the -fort of the Capuchins and of La Reynana; but Gerona stood in need of -provisions, not men; a thousand troops added nothing to her useful -strength, the Geronans were strong enough without them to resist -an assault if another were made; with them they were not numerous -enough to sally and raise the siege; the continuance of O’Donnell -then could only serve to hasten the fall of the city, by increasing -the consumption of its scanty stores, and to weaken his own men by -the privations in which they shared. It was agreed, therefore, with -Alvarez that he should cut his way through the enemy; and a few -families thought it better to follow him in this perilous attempt, -than remain in a city where it now became apparent that they who -escaped death could not long escape captivity. The place was completely -surrounded, so that to elude the enemy was impossible; the only hope -was to surprise them, ♦OCT. 13.♦ and then force a way. One night, -after the moon was down, they left their position in silence: the -Geronan centinels at St. Francisco de Paula mistook them for an enemy, -and fired: but it is not unlikely that this accident, which might so -easily have frustrated the enterprise, facilitated it, by deceiving -the French, who, when they heard the alarm given from the city, could -never imagine that an attempt was about to be made upon their camp. -To make way by the mountains, O’Donnell knew would be impossible, in -the darkness, without confusion; ♦1809. OCTOBER.♦ therefore, though -the enemy’s posts were more numerous on the plain, he judged it safer -to take that course. The plan was ably carried into effect; his men -surprised the first post, fell upon them with sword and bayonet, not -firing a gun, cut them off without giving the alarm, and sparing two -prisoners, made them their guides through the encampment. They passed -five-and-twenty posts of the enemy, through many of which they forced -their way: Souham was surprised in his quarter, and fled in his shirt, -leaving behind him as much booty as the Spaniards had time to lay hands -on. The alarm spread throughout the whole of the lines, but it was too -late; by daybreak the Spaniards reached S. Colona, where Milans was -posted with part of Blake’s army, and it was not till they were thus -placed in safety that a body of 2000 foot and 200 horse, who had been -sent in pursuit of them, came up. O’Donnell was promoted to the rank of -camp-marshal for this exploit. - -♦MAGAZINES AT HOSTALRICH TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦ - -But an immediate change took place in the condition of the besieging -army under the new commander. Their wants were immediately supplied -from France, they were largely reinforced, and encouragement of every -kind was given them, as if to show that the disfavour which they had -experienced had been wholly intended toward Marshal St. Cyr. Augereau -being thus in strength, sent General Pino against the town of -Hostalrich, where magazines were collected for Blake’s army, and for -the relief of Gerona. The town was occupied by 2000 troops; Blake was -too distant to act in support of this important post; the Spaniards, -after a gallant resistance, were driven into the citadel by superior -numbers; the magazines were lost, and the greater part of the town -burnt. - -♦AUGEREAU OFFERS FAVOURABLE TERMS.♦ - -The French purchased their success dearly; but it cut off the last -possibility of relief from Gerona. The besieged now died in such -numbers, chiefly of dysentery, that the daily deaths were never less -than thirty-five, and sometimes amounted to seventy. The way to the -burial place was never vacant. Augereau straitened the blockade; and, -that the garrison might neither follow the example of O’Donnell, -nor receive any supplies, however small, he drew his lines closer, -stretched cords with bells along the interspaces, and kept watch-dogs -at all the posts. The bombardment was continued, and always with -greater violence during the night than the day, as if to exhaust the -Geronans by depriving them of sleep. He found means also of sending -letters into the city, sparing no attempts to work upon the hopes and -fears of the people; he told them of his victory at Hostalrich, ... of -the hopeless state of Blake’s army, ... of the peace which Austria had -made; ... he threatened the most signal vengeance if they persisted -in holding out, and he offered to grant an armistice for a month, -and suffer supplies immediately to enter, provided Alvarez would -capitulate at the end of that time, if the city were not relieved. -There was a humanity in this offer such as no other French general had -displayed during the course of the Spanish war; but Alvarez and the -Geronans knew their duty too well to accept even such terms as these -after the glorious resistance which they had made. With such an enemy, -and in such a cause, they knew that no compromise ought to be made: -they had devoted themselves for Spain, and it did not become them, for -the sake of shortening their own sufferings, to let loose so large a -part of the besieging army as this armistice would have left at liberty -for other operations. - -♦DESTRUCTION OF A FRENCH CONVOY BY THE BRITISH SHIPS.♦ - -While the people of Gerona opposed this heroic spirit of endurance -to the enemy, an affair took place at sea, which, if it brought no -immediate relief to the Catalans, convinced them at least that they -were not wholly neglected by Great Britain. Lord Collingwood having -obtained intelligence that an attempt would be made from Toulon for -throwing supplies into Barcelona, sailed from Minorca about the middle -of October, and took his station a few leagues off Cape St. Sebastian, -on the coast of Catalonia. On the 23d the enemy’s fleet came in sight, -consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, two armed store -ships, and a convoy of sixteen sail. Rear Admiral Martin was ordered -to give chase; he fell in with the ships of war off ♦OCT. 25.♦ the -entrance of the Rhone, but they escaped him that night, because the -wind blew directly on shore. The next morning he renewed the chase, and -drove two of them, one of eighty guns, the other of seventy-four, on -shore, off Frontignan, where they were set fire to by their own crews; -the other ship of the line and one frigate ran on shore at the entrance -of the port of Cette, where there was little probability that the -former could be saved, but they were under protection of the batteries. -The second frigate had hauled her wind during the night, and got into -Marseilles road. - -Two brigs, two bombards, and a ketch belonging to the convoy, were -burnt by the Pomona while Admiral Martin was in chase. The other -vessels made for the bay of Rosas; a squadron pursued, and found them -moored under the protection of the castle, Fort Trinidad, and several -batteries newly erected by the French. Four of these vessels were -armed; the largest was of 600 tons, carrying sixteen nine-pounders, and -110 men; she was inclosed in boarding nettings, and perfectly prepared -for action. The English boats, however, boarded them all, though they -were bravely defended, and though a constant fire was kept up from the -forts and from the beach. Of the eleven ships, three had landed their -cargoes, but all were taken or burnt; and of the whole convoy there -only escaped the frigate, which put into Marseilles, and one of the -store-ships, which probably succeeded in reaching Barcelona. - -♦INCREASED DISTRESS OF THE CITY.♦ - -It was no unimportant service thus to straiten the French in that -city, ... but it was a success which brought no relief to Gerona, -where the devoted inhabitants seemed now abandoned to their fate. -Hitherto the few mules and horses which remained unslaughtered had -been led out to feed near the walls of St. Francisco de Paula, and -of the burial ground: ... this was now prevented by the batteries -of Palau and Montelivi, and by the French advanced posts; and these -wretched animals, being thus deprived of their only food, gnawed the -hair from each other’s tails and manes before they were led to the -shambles. Famine at length did the enemy’s work; the stores from which -the citizens had supplied the failure of the magazines were exhausted; -it became necessary to set a guard over the ovens, and the food for -the hospitals was sometimes seized upon the way by the famishing -populace. The enemy endeavoured to tempt the garrison to desert, by -calling out to them to come and eat, and holding out provisions. A few -were tempted; they were received with embraces, and fed in sight of -the walls, ... poor wretches, envying the firmer constancy of their -comrades more than those comrades did the food, for lack of which -their own vital spirits were well-nigh spent! None of that individual -animosity was here displayed which characterized the street-fighting -♦1809. NOVEMBER.♦ at Zaragoza, ... the nature of the siege was not such -as to call it forth; and some of those humanities appeared, which in -other instances the French generals systematically outraged in Spain. -The out-sentries frequently made a truce with each other, laid down -their arms, and drew near enough to converse; the French soldier would -then give his half-starved enemy a draught from his leathern bottle, -or brandy flask, and when they had drunk and talked together, they -returned to their posts, scoffed at each other, proceeded from mockery -to insult, and sometimes closed the scene with a skirmish. - -♦REPORT OF THE STATE OF HEALTH.♦ - -The only disgraceful circumstance which occurred during the whole -siege was the desertion of ten officers in a body, two of whom were -men of noble birth; they had been plotting to make the governor -capitulate, and finding their intentions frustrated, went over to the -enemy in open day. Except in this instance, the number of deserters -was very small. Towards the end of November many of the inhabitants, -having become utterly hopeless of relief, preferred the chance of -death to the certainty of being made prisoners, and they ventured to -pass the enemy’s lines, some failing in the attempt, others being -more fortunate. At this time Samaniego, who was first surgeon to the -garrison, delivered in to Alvarez a report upon the state of ♦NOV. 29.♦ -health: as he gave it into his hands, he said something implying the -melancholy nature of its contents; Alvarez replied, “this paper then, -perhaps, will inform posterity of our sufferings, if there should be -none left to recount them!” He then bade Samaniego read it. It was a -dreadful report. There did not remain a single building in Gerona which -had not been injured by the bombardment; not a house was habitable; -the people slept in cellars, and vaults, and holes amid the ruins; and -it had not unfrequently happened that the wounded were killed in the -hospitals. The streets were broken up; so that the rain water and the -sewers stagnated there, and the pestilential vapours which arose were -rendered more noxious by the dead bodies which lay rotting amid the -ruins. The siege had now endured seven months; scarcely a woman had -become pregnant during that time; the very dogs, before hunger consumed -them, had ceased to follow after kind; they did not even fawn upon -their masters; the almost incessant thunder of artillery seemed to make -them sensible of the state of the city, and the unnatural atmosphere -affected them as well as humankind. It even affected vegetation. In -the gardens within the walls the fruits withered, and scarcely any -vegetable could be raised. Within the last three weeks above 500 -of the garrison had died in the hospitals; a dysentery was raging -and spreading; the sick were lying upon the ground, without beds, -almost without food; and there was scarcely fuel to dress the little -wheat that remained, and the few horses which were yet unconsumed. -Samaniego then adverted with bitterness to the accounts which had been -circulated, that abundant supplies had been thrown into the city; and -he concluded by saying, “if by these sacrifices, deserving for ever -to be the admiration of history, and if by consummating them with the -lives of us who, by the will of Providence, have survived our comrades, -the liberty of our country can be secured, happy shall we be in the -bosom of eternity and in the memory of good men, and happy will our -children be among their fellow-countrymen!” - -♦SOME OF THE OUTWORKS TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦ - -The breaches which had been assaulted ten weeks before were still -open; it was easier for the Geronans to defend than to repair them, -and the French had suffered too much in that assault to repeat it. A -fourth had now been made. The enemy, learning from the officers who -had deserted that the ammunition of the place was almost expended, -ventured upon bolder operations. They took possession by night of -the Calle del Carmen; from thence they commanded the bridge of S. -Francisco, which was the only means of communication between the old -city and that part on the opposite side of the Ter; from thence also -they battered Forts Merced and S. Francisco de Paula. During another -night they got possession of Fort Calvary, which they had reduced to -ruins, and of the Cabildo redoubt: this last success seems to have -been owing to some misconduct, for the historian of the siege inveighs -upon this occasion against the pernicious measure of intrusting boys -with command, as a reward for the services of their fathers. The city -redoubts fell next. The bodily strength as well as the ammunition of -the Geronans was almost exhausted, and these advantages over them were -gained with comparative ease. The enemy were now close to the walls, -and thus cut off the forts of the Capuchins and of the Constable, the -only two remaining outworks. The garrisons of both amounted only to 160 -men; they had scarcely any powder, little water, and no food. These -posts were of the last importance; it was resolved to make a sally for -the sake of relieving them, and the garrison of the town gave up for -this purpose their own miserable rations, contributing enough for the -consumption of three days. The ration was at this time a handful of -wheat daily, or sometimes, in its stead, the quarter of a small loaf, -and five ounces of horse’s or mule’s flesh, every alternate day. - -♦LAST SALLY OF THE GARRISON.♦ - -The few men who could be allotted for this service, or indeed who were -equal to it, sallied in broad day through the Puerto del Socorro, -within pistol-shot of the redoubts which the enemy now possessed; they -were in three bodies, two of which hastened up the hill toward the two -forts, while the third remained to protect them from being attacked -in the rear from the Calle del Carmen. The sally was so sudden, so -utterly unlooked for by the besiegers, and so resolutely executed, that -its purpose was accomplished, ♦1809. DECEMBER.♦ though not without -the loss in killed and wounded of about forty men, which was nearly a -third of those who were employed in it. This was the last effort of the -Geronans. The deaths increased in a dreadful and daily accelerating -progression; the burial-places were without the walls; it had long been -a service of danger to bury the dead, for the French, seeing the way -to the cemetery always full, kept up a fire upon it; hands could not -now be found to carry them out to the deposit-house, and from thence to -the grave; and at one time 120 bodies were lying in the deposit-house, -uncoffined, in sight of all who passed the walls. - -♦ALVAREZ BECOMES DELIRIOUS.♦ - -The besiegers were now erecting one battery more in the Calle de la -Rulla; it was close upon one of the breaches, and commanded the whole -space between Forts Merced and S. Francisco de Paula. This was in the -beginning of December; on the 4th Alvarez was seized with a nervous -fever, occasioned undoubtedly by the hopeless state of the city. On -the 8th the disorder had greatly increased, and he became delirious. -The next day the Junta assembled, and one of their body was deputed to -examine Samaniego and his colleague Viader, whether the governor was -in a state to perform the duties of his office. They required a more -specific question; and the Canon who had been deputed then said, it -was feared that, in the access of delirium, the governor might give -orders contrary to his own judgement, if he were in perfect sanity of -mind, and contrary to the public weal, when the dreadful situation of -the city was considered. The purport of such language could not be -mistaken; and they replied, that, without exceeding the bounds of their -profession, they could pronounce his state of health to be incompatible -with the command, and his continuance in command equally incompatible -with the measures necessary for his recovery. - -♦CAPITULATION.♦ - -Samaniego and his colleague went after this consultation to visit the -governor, whom they found in such a state that they judged it proper -for him to receive the _viaticum_, thinking it most probable that, -in the next access of fever, he would lose his senses and die, ... -for this was the manner in which the disorder under which he laboured -usually terminated. Being thus delivered over to the priests, Alvarez, -before the fit came on, resigned the command, which then devolved -upon Brigadier D. Julian de Bolivar: a council was held during the -night, composed of the two Juntas, military and civil; and the result -was, that in the morning, D. Blas de Furnas, an officer who had -greatly distinguished himself during the siege, should treat for a -capitulation. The whole of the 10th was employed in adjusting the -terms. They were in the highest degree honourable. The garrison were to -march out with the honours of war, and be sent prisoners into France, -to be exchanged as soon as possible for an equal number of French -prisoners then detained in Majorca and other places. None were to be -considered prisoners except those who were ranked as soldiers; the -commissariat, intendants, and medical staff were thus left at freedom. -The French were not to be quartered upon the inhabitants; the official -papers were neither to be destroyed nor removed; no person was to be -injured for the part which he had taken during the siege; those who -were not natives of Gerona should be at liberty to leave it, and take -with them all their property; the natives also who chose to depart -might do so, take with them their moveable property, and dispose as -they pleased of the rest. - -While the capitulation was going on, many of the enemy’s soldiers came -to the walls, bringing provisions and wine, to be drawn up by strings, -... an honourable proof of the temper with which they regarded their -brave opponents. During the night the deserters who were in Gerona, -with many other soldiers and peasants, attempted to escape: some -succeeded, others were killed or taken in the attempt, and not a few -dropped with weakness upon the way. To those who remained, the very -silence of night, it is said, was a thing so unusual, that it became -a cause of agitation. At daybreak it was found that the soldiers had -broken the greater part of their arms, and thrown the fragments into -the streets or the river. When the garrison were drawn up in sight of -the French, their shrunken limbs and hollow eyes and pale and meagre -countenances sufficiently manifested by what they had been subdued. -The French observed, not without admiration, that in the city, as well -as at Monjuic, most of the guns had been fired so often that they were -rendered useless; brass itself had given way, says Samaniego, before -the constancy of the Geronans. - -The first act of the French officer who was appointed governor was -to order all the inhabitants to deliver in their arms, on pain of -death, and to establish a military commission. _Te Deum_ was ordered -in the cathedral; it was performed with tears, and a voice which could -difficultly command its utterance. Augereau would fain have had a -sermon like that which had been preached before Lasnes at Zaragoza, -but not a priest could be found who would sin against his soul by -following the impious example. A guard was set upon Alvarez; he amended -slowly, and the physicians applied for leave for him to quit the city, -and go to some place upon the sea-shore; it was replied, that Marshal -Augereau’s orders only permitted him to allow the choice of any place -on the French frontier, or in the direct road to France. He chose -Figueras, and, having recovered sufficiently to bear the removal, was -hurried off at ♦DEC. 24.♦ midnight without any previous notice, and -under a strong escort. The Friars, who had been all confined in the -church of St. Francisco, with a cannon pointed against the door, and -a match lighted, were marched off at the same time, in violation of -the terms. The sick and wounded Spaniards were hastily removed to -St. Daniel; they were laid upon straw, and being left without even -such necessaries as they had possessed in the city, except that they -were better supplied with food, many died in consequence. There was -a grievous want of humanity in this; but no brutal acts of outrage -and cruelty were committed, as at Zaragoza; and, when so many of the -French generals rendered themselves infamous, Augereau, and the few who -observed any of the old humanities of war, deserve to be distinguished -from their execrable colleagues. - -♦DEATH OF ALVAREZ.♦ - -The Central Junta decreed the same honours to Gerona and its heroic -defenders as had been conferred in the case of Zaragoza. The rewards -which Mariano Alvarez had deserved by his admirable conduct were to be -given to his family, if, as there was reason to fear, he himself should -not live to receive them. The sad apprehension which was thus expressed -was soon verified. He died at Figueras. It was said, and believed, in -Catalonia, that Buonaparte had sent orders to execute him in the Plaza -at Gerona, and that the French, fearing the consequences if they should -thus outrage the national feeling, put him out of the way by poison[6]. -His death was so probable, considering what he had endured during the -siege, and the condition in which it left him, that no suspicion of -this kind would have prevailed, if the public execution of Santiago -Sass and of Hofer, and the private catastrophe of Captain Wright and of -Pichegru, had not given dreadful proof that the French government and -its agents were capable of any wickedness. In the present imputation -they were probably wronged, but it was brought on them by the opinion -which their actions had obtained and merited. - -♦EROLES ESCAPES.♦ - -About 600 of the garrison made their escape from Rousillon. Eroles was -one; than whom no Spaniard rendered greater services to his country -during the war, nor has left to posterity a more irreproachable and -honourable name. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVII. - -PROCEEDINGS IN FRANCE AND IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. - - -♦1809.♦ - -♦BUONAPARTE DIVORCES THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.♦ - -The year had thus closed in Spain as triumphantly for the invaders -as it began; and yet the French felt, and could not but feel, that -the subjugation of that kingdom was more distant at this time than -they had supposed it to be when they entered upon the invasion, in -the wantonness of insolent power. Buonaparte, when he recapitulated -the exploits of the year to his senate, intimated an intention of -returning thither to complete the conquest. “When I shall show myself -beyond the Pyrenees,” said he, “the frightened leopard will fly to -the ocean to avoid shame, defeat, and death. The triumph of my arms -will be the triumph of the genius of good over that of evil; of -moderation, order, and morality, over civil war, anarchy, and the -evil passions.” He neither mentioned nor alluded to the battle of -Talavera; the circumstances of that well-fought field had been so -completely concealed from the French nation, that they were fully -persuaded the English had suffered a great defeat; but the lesson -had not been lost upon Buonaparte. That battle, and the repulse at -Esling, made him for the first time feel the insecure foundation of -his power; it taught him that his armies were not invincible. His -hatred for England, implacable as it was, had not prevented him from -regarding with admiration the military genius of Marlborough, though -he was incapable of appreciating the principles and feelings which -induced that excellent commander on every occasion to mitigate by every -means in his power the miseries of war. He despised the counsels, and -egregiously miscalculated the resources of Great Britain; but he was -compelled in his heart to render reluctant justice to the national -spirit, which Vimeiro and Coruña, and the Douro and Talavera, had shewn -him could be displayed by her armies no less than by her fleets; and -he could not but secretly and ominously apprehend, that such victories -as those of Blenheim and Ramillies might be achieved by such soldiers. -It is believed that this feeling determined him to connect himself by -marriage with one of the great continental powers. Secret arrangements -for this having been made with the house of Austria, he divorced -the Empress Josephine at the close of the year by an act of his own -government, and with her full acquiescence, reasons of state being made -the plea, as they were the motives, for this measure. In the manner of -the separation, in the provision which was made, and in the honours -which were reserved for Josephine, due regard was shown her: she was -a gentle and benevolent woman; and had Buonaparte in his moral nature -been half as worthy of the throne, the world might have loved and -revered the memory of both. - -♦FARTHER REQUISITION FOR THE ARMIES IN SPAIN.♦ - -But triumphantly as the war with Austria had been concluded, the -prospect of peace was yet far distant. The war-minister reported, -that the French armies in Spain consisted of 300 battalions and 150 -squadrons, and it would be sufficient, without sending any additional -corps, to keep them at their full establishment: 30,000 men collected -at Bayonne afforded means for accomplishing this, and for repulsing -any force which the English might send to that country. In this state -of things, no other levy was necessary than such as would supply the -contingent indispensably requisite for replacing in the battalions of -the interior the drafts which were daily made from them. There remained -from the conscription of the years 1806, 7, 8, 9, 10, more than 80,000 -men, who, though ballotted, had not been called into actual service; -it was proposed to call out 36,000, and then to declare those classes -free from any future call. “By these means, sire,” said the minister, -“your armies will be maintained at their present strength, and a -considerable number of your subjects will be definitively released -from the conscription.” There were also at the Emperor’s disposal -25,000 men, afforded by the conscription for 1811; but upon these it -was not proposed to call, unless events should disappoint his pacific -intentions. - -Thirty thousand men stationed at Bayonne to supply the constant -consumption of his army in Spain, 36,000 to be raised for replacing -the drafts from the interior, and 25,000 to be taken by anticipation, -before the conscription in its regular course ought to have reached -them, and to be held in readiness for farther demands of blood; this -was the prospect held out at the conclusion of the Austrian war; these -were the sacrifices which the French were called upon to make, not for -defence, not for the interests, not for the honour of France, but to -support a wanton and execrable usurpation, which had no other cause -than the individual ambition of Buonaparte.... ♦DISPLAY OF SPANISH -FLAGS.♦ He felt how needful it was to persuade the French that a war -which they knew to be so destructive was not as inglorious as it was -unjust, and for this purpose a parade was made of the victories which -had been obtained in Spain. The flags taken at Espinosa, Burgos, -Tudela, Somosierra, and Madrid, were presented to the legislative body; -a detachment of the grenadiers of the imperial guard was introduced, -and seated on the right and left of Buonaparte’s statue, that the -stage might be full. Rhetorical speeches were delivered, and the -session concluded like a stage spectacle, with a flourish of trumpets, -and cries of Long live the Emperor! In this exhibition, Buonaparte -addressed himself to the ruling passion of the people over whom he -reigned. “Without glory,” he said, “there could be no happiness for a -Frenchman;” and the moral feeling of the nation had been so debased -that they believed glory might be attained in a war thus flagrantly -and infamously unjust. ♦1810. JANUARY.♦ The prevailing weakness of his -own character also was betrayed in this display; no other successes -were brought forward than those which had been won while he was in -Spain; for though he liberally rewarded his generals in all ways, and -left them also at full liberty to enrich themselves by exaction and -plunder, he was jealous of any celebrity that they might attain, and -desired, more from personal vanity than from political considerations, -that in every success the French should look to him, and to him alone, -as the author of their victories. - -While France was thus rejoicing in the triumphs of its armies, the -Central Junta saw the whole extent of their danger, and rested their -hopes upon the goodness of their cause and the character of the -Spanish nation, with a composure which nothing could shake. Never was -a nation more truly represented in its defects and in its virtues, in -its strength and in its weakness. While in their administration they -committed the same errors, deceiving themselves and others, which in -former wars had rendered the Spaniards[7] the most inefficient and -impracticable of all allies; their language was that of the loftiest -fortitude, and their public papers breathed a spirit worthy of their -station. One of the most splendid of these orations was issued during -the fearful pause after the defeat of their armies at Ocaña and at Alba -de Tormes, when the peace with Austria left Buonaparte at leisure to -♦ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA TO THE NATION.♦ direct his whole force -against Spain. “Our enemies,” said they, “exhort us to submit to the -clemency of the conqueror. Because in their own degraded hearts they -find nothing but baseness when they are weak, and atrocity when they -are strong, they imagine that the Spaniards must abandon all their -lofty hopes. Who has told them that our virtue is of so low a standard? -Does fortune oppose to us greater obstacles? we will redouble our -exertions! Are our dangers augmented? we shall acquire the greater -glory! Slaves of Buonaparte, waste not time in sophistries which can -deceive no one; speak frankly and say, we will be the most wicked of -men, because we believe ourselves the most powerful: ... this language -is consistent and intelligible; but do not attempt to persuade us -that the abandonment of our rights is wisdom, and that cowardice is -prudence! Submit?... Do these sophists know to what they advise the -most high-minded nation upon earth? It would be a stain without example -in our annals, if after such efforts, such incredible events, we were -to fall at the feet of the crowned slave who has been sent to us as -king. And for what? That from the midst of his banquets, his ruffian -parasites, and his prostitutes, he may point out the churches which are -to be burnt; the estates which are to be divided among his satellites; -the virgins and matrons who are to be taken to his seraglio; the youths -who are to be sent as the tribute to the Minotaur of France! - -“Spaniards, think not that the Junta speak thus to excite you by the -arts of language; what need of words, when things speak for themselves? -Your houses are destroyed; your churches demolished; your fields laid -waste; your families dispersed and wandering through the country, or -hurried into the grave. Have we made so many sacrifices, have the -flames of war consumed half Spain, that we should abandon the other -half to the far more deadly peace which the enemy prepares for it? -For no one will beguile himself with the insidious parade of the -improvements which the French hold out. The Tartar who commands them -has decreed, that Spain shall have neither industry, nor commerce, -nor population, nor political representation whatever: ... to be made -a waste and solitary sheep-walk for supplying French manufactures -with our wools; to become a nursery of men who may be hurried away to -slaughter; such is the destiny which he would impose upon the most -highly favoured of all countries! Shall we then, submitting to this, -submit also to the destruction of our religion; abandon the interests -of heaven and the faith of our fathers to the sacrilegious mockery -of these banditti; and forsake the sanctuary which, during seven -centuries, and in a thousand and a thousand battles, our forefathers -maintained against the Saracens? If we should do this, the victims who -perished in that contest would cry to us from their graves, Ungrateful -and perfidious race, shall our sacrifices be in vain, and is our blood -of no estimation in your eyes? No, patriots! rest in peace, ... and let -not that bitter thought disturb the quiet of your sepulchres! - -“There is no peace, there can be none in this state of things! That -Spain may be free, is the universal wish of the nation; and if that -cannot be obtained, at least it may become one immense desert, one -wide grave, where the accumulated remains of French and Spaniards may -exhibit to future ages our glory and their shame. But fortune is not so -inimical to virtue as to leave to its defenders only this melancholy -termination. It is written in heaven, and the history of all ages -attests the truth, that a people who decidedly love their liberty and -independence must ultimately establish them, in despite of all the -artifice and all the violence of tyranny. Victory, which is so often -a gift of fortune, is sooner or later the reward of constancy. What -defended the little republics of Greece from the barbarous invasion of -Xerxes? What reconstructed the Capitol when it was almost destroyed by -the Gauls? What preserved it from the mighty arms of Hannibal? What, in -times nearer our own, protected the Swiss from German tyranny, and gave -independence to Holland in spite of the power of our ancestors? - -“Spaniards, the Junta announces to you frankly what has happened in -the continent, because it would not have you ignorant for a moment -of the new danger which threatens the country: they announce it in -the confidence, that, instead of being dismayed, you will collect -new strength, and show yourselves more worthy of the cause which you -defend, and of the admiration of the universe: they announce it to -you, because they know that the determination of the Spaniards is to -be free at whatever cost; and all means however violent, all resources -however extraordinary, all funds however privileged, must be called -out to repel the enemy. The ship’s treasures must be thrown overboard -to lighten her in the tempest and save her from shipwreck. Our country -is sinking; ... strength, riches, life, wisdom, council, ... whatever -we have is hers. The victory is ours, if we carry on to the end of our -enterprise the sublime enthusiasm with which it began. The mass with -which we must resist the enemy must be composed of the strength of -all, and the sacrifices of all; and then what will it import that he -pours upon us anew the legions which are now superfluous in Germany, -or the swarm of conscripts which he is about to drag from France? We -began the contest with 80,000 men less; he began it with 200,000 more. -Let him replace them if he can; let him send or bring them to this -region of death, as destructive to the oppressors as to the oppressed! -Adding to the experience of two campaigns the strength of despair and -of fury, we will give to their phalanxes of banditti the same fate -which their predecessors have experienced; and the earth, fattened with -their blood, shall return to us with usury the fruits of which they -have deprived us! Let the monarchs of the North, forgetful of what -they are, and of what they are capable, submit to be the slaves of -this new Tamerlane; let them purchase at such a price the tranquillity -of a moment, till it comes to their turn to be devoured! What is this -to us, who are a mighty people, and resolved to perish or to triumph? -Did we ask their consent when, twenty months ago, we raised our arms -against the tyrant? Did we not enter into the contest alone? Did we not -carry it on for a campaign alone?... Nothing which is necessary for our -defence is wanting. Our connexion is daily drawn closer with America, -to whose assistance, as timely as it was generous, the mother country -is deeply indebted, and on whose zeal and loyalty a great part of our -hope is founded. The alliance which we have formed with Great Britain -continues and will continue; that nation has lavished for us its blood -and its treasures, and is entitled to our gratitude and that of future -ages. Let, then, intrigue, or fear, prevail with weak governments and -misled cabinets; let them, if they will, conclude treaties, illusory -on the part of him who grants, and disgraceful on the part of those -who accept them; let them, if they will, relinquish the common cause -of civilized nations, and inhumanly abandon their allies! The Spanish -people will stand alone and erect amid the ruins of the European -continent. Here has been drawn, never to be sheathed, the sword of -hatred against the execrable tyrant; here is raised, never to be beaten -down, the standard of independence and of justice! Hasten to it, all ye -in Europe who will not live under the abominable yoke; ye who will not -enter into a league with iniquity; ye who are indignant at the fatal -and cowardly desertion of these deluded princes, come to us! Here the -valiant shall find opportunities of acquiring true honour; the wise and -the virtuous shall obtain respect; the afflicted shall have an asylum. -Our cause is the same; the same shall be our reward. Come! and, in -despite of all the arts and all the power of this inhuman despot, we -will render his star dim, and form for ourselves our own destiny!” - -Two things are remarkable in this paper; the total change, or rather -restoration of public feeling, which must have been effected, before -a Spanish government would hold up the resistance of the Dutch to -Philip as a glorious example to the Spanish people; and the want of -foresight and information in the Junta, who could not only rely upon -the attachment of the colonies, but even venture to declare, that the -hopes of the country rested in great measure upon them. But though the -Spanish government deceived itself in looking for hope where none was -to be found, and in its exaggerated opinion of its military strength, -it was not mistaken in relying upon the national character, and that -spirit of endurance which constituted ♦STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN -ENGLAND.♦ its moral strength. Upon this it was, and upon the extent and -nature of the Peninsula, that those persons who from the commencement -looked on with unshaken confidence to the final expulsion of the -invaders, founded their judgement. The Continent, notwithstanding its -extent, fell under the yoke of France, because the spirit of the people -was not such as to supply the want of magnanimity and of wisdom in -their rulers: the Tyrolese were subdued notwithstanding their heroism, -because, in so small a territory as the Tyrol, numbers, remorselessly -employed, must necessarily overcome all resistance. But no force can be -sufficient to conquer and keep in subjection a peninsula, containing -about 170,000 square miles, and twelve millions of inhabitants, if the -people carry resistance to the uttermost. Their armies may be defeated, -their towns occupied, their fortresses taken, their villages burnt, -... but the country cannot be conquered while the spirit of the nation -remains unsubdued. In Spain the mountains form a chain of fastnesses -running through the whole Peninsula, and connecting all its provinces -with each other. In such a country, therefore, when the war ceases -to be carried on by army against army, and becomes the struggle of a -nation against its oppressors, pursued incessantly by night and day, -the soldier, no longer acting in large bodies, loses that confidence -which discipline gives him; while the peasant, on the other hand, feels -the whole advantage which the love of his country, and the desire of -vengeance, and the sense of duty, and the approbation of his own heart, -give to the individual in a contest between man and man. The character -of the Spaniards was displayed in their annals. The circumstances of -their country remained the same as when Henri IV. said of it, that -it was a land wherein a weak army must be beaten, and a strong one -starved. They who were neither ignorant of history nor of human nature -considered these things; and therefore, from the commencement of the -struggle, regarded it with unabated hope. - -But never since the commencement of the French revolution had the -affairs of England, of Europe, and of the world, worn so dark an aspect -as at this time. The defeats which the Spaniards had sustained were -far more disheartening than those of the preceding winter, because -they evinced that neither had the armies improved in discipline, nor -the government profited by experience. It was but too plain, that, -notwithstanding the show of resistance made at the Sierra Morena, the -kingdoms of Andalusia were in fact open to the enemy; so supine was the -Central Junta, as to make it even probable that Cadiz itself might be -betrayed or surprised; and if, now that Buonaparte had no other object, -he should march a great force against the English in Portugal, there -were few persons who had sufficient knowledge of the country and of the -character of the people, to look onward without dismay. - -♦LORD WELLINGTON’S VIEWS WITH REGARD TO PORTUGAL.♦ - -Lord Wellington calculated upon both. He knew that man is naturally -brave, that the men of any country therefore may, with good training, -be made good soldiers, and that if the Spanish troops were no longer -what they had been under the Prince of Parma, the fault was not in -the materials, but in the composition of their armies. The Portugueze -were as proud a people as the Spaniards, and had in their history as -much cause for pride; but they were not so impracticable. The removal -of their court removed all those intrigues and jealousies which would -otherwise have been at work; the nation felt itself at this time -dependent upon England; but there was no humiliation in this; any such -sentiment was precluded by old alliance, the confidence of hereditary -attachment, and the consciousness that it was willing and able to -do its own part in its own defence. Whatever measures the British -government advanced were cordially adopted; and Lord Wellington, -during the mortifying inaction to which he was reduced, had the -satisfaction of knowing that the Portugueze troops were every day -improving in military habits and feelings, and that he might reckon -upon them in the next campaign as an efficient force. In all his views -and opinions concerning the course to be pursued, Marquis Wellesley -entirely agreed with him; and the Marquis, when he returned to England -to take his place in administration, proposed that every effort should -be made for placing Portugal in the best state of preparation. He knew -that we might rely upon the Spaniards for perseverance through all -reverses and under every disadvantage; but it was on the Portugueze -that we must place our trust for regular and effectual co-operation. - -♦THE KING’S SPEECH.♦ - -When parliament assembled this was referred to in the king’s speech. -“The efforts,” it was said, “of Great Britain, for the protection of -Portugal, had been powerfully aided by the confidence which the Prince -Regent had reposed in his majesty, and by the co-operation of the local -government, and of the people of that country. The expulsion of the -French from that kingdom, and the glorious victory of Talavera, had -contributed to check the progress of the enemy. The Spanish government -had now, in the name and by the authority of Ferdinand VII., determined -to assemble the general and extraordinary Cortes of the nation. This -measure, his majesty trusted, would give fresh animation and vigour -to the councils and the arms of Spain, and successfully direct the -energies and spirit of the Spanish people to the maintenance of the -legitimate monarchy, and to the ultimate deliverance of their country. -The most important considerations of policy and of good faith required, -that as long as this great cause could be maintained with a prospect -of success, it should be supported, according to the nature and -circumstances of the contest, by the strenuous and continued assistance -of the power and resources of Great Britain.” - -In the debates which ensued it was a melancholy thing to see how -strongly the spirit of opposition manifested itself even in those -persons whose opinions and feelings regarding the justice and necessity -of the war were in entire ♦SPEECH OF EARL ST. VINCENT;♦ sympathy with -the government. Earl St. Vincent inveighed in the strongest terms -against the ministers, to whose ignorance and incapacity, to whose -weakness, infatuation, and stupidity, he said, all our disasters and -disgrace were owing. After panegyrizing Sir John Moore as one of -the ablest men who ever commanded an army, he spoke of the battle -of Talavera as a victory which had been purchased with the useless -expenditure of our best blood, which led to no advantage, and which -had had all the consequences of defeat. “It is high time,” said he, -“that parliament should adopt strong measures, or the voice of the -country will resound like thunder in their ears. Any body may be a -minister now: they pop in, and they pop out, like the man and woman in -a peasant’s barometer; they rise up like tadpoles; they may be compared -to wasps, to hornets, to locusts; they send forth their pestilential -breath over the whole country, and nip and destroy every fair flower -in the land. The conduct of his majesty’s government has led to the -most frightful disasters, which are no where exceeded in the annals of -history. The country is in that state which makes peace inevitable; -it will be compelled to make peace, however disadvantageous, because -it will be unable to maintain a war so shamefully misconducted and so -disastrous in its consequences.” - -♦LORD GRENVILLE;♦ - -Lord Grenville spake in a similar temper. The day must come, he -said, when ministers would have to render an account to parliament -of the treasures which they had wasted, and the lives which they had -sacrificed. Their measures had uniformly failed, and presented nothing -but an unbroken series of disgraceful, irremediable failures. And yet -they had the confidence, the unblushing confidence, to tell us of a -victory! Gilded disasters were called splendid victories, and the -cypress that droops over the tombs of our gallant defenders, whose -lives have been uselessly sacrificed, was to be denominated blooming -laurels! He spake of what might have been done if an army had been -sent either to Trieste or to the north of Germany; condemned the -Walcheren expedition, as the plan and execution of that miserable -enterprise deserved, and pronounced a condemnation not less unqualified -upon the plans which had been pursued in Spain, where, he said, they -had persisted in expecting co-operation from an armed peasantry, -persevering in error after the absurdity of such an expectation had -been proved. Why too had the army in that country been exposed in -unhealthy situations? But the Lords had a duty to perform; having seen -what had taken place before in Spain and Portugal, they could not -exculpate themselves for having continued to repose confidence in such -ministers. They must exert themselves in this most imminent crisis of -their country. “You cannot be ignorant,” said he, “of its tremendous -situation, and where can you look? To the government! See it, my Lords, -broken, distracted, incompetent, incapable of exerting any energy, -or inspiring any confidence! It is not from the government that our -deliverance is to be expected; it must be found, if it be found at all, -in your own energy and in your own patriotism.” And he concluded with -moving as an amendment to the address, that vigorous and effectual -proceedings should be instituted, as the only atonement which could be -made to an injured people! - -♦HONOURABLE MR. WARD;♦ - -The language of the opposition in the House of Commons was not -more temperate. “Lord Wellington’s exploits at Talavera,” said the -Honourable Mr. Ward, “left the cause of Spain as desperate as they -found it, and in their consequences resembled not victories, but -defeats. For by what more disastrous consequences could defeat have -been followed, than by a precipitate retreat, by the loss of 2000 men -left to the mercy of the enemy upon that spot where they had just -fought and conquered, but fought and conquered in vain; that spot -which, as it were in mockery to them, we had endeavoured to perpetuate -in the name of the general? By what worse could it have been followed -than by the loss of all footing in Spain, the ruin of another army, -and the virtual renunciation of all the objects of the war? William -III. used by his skilful generalship to render defeat harmless, ... our -generals made victory itself unavailing.” - -♦MR. PONSONBY;♦ - -Mr. Ponsonby said it was a crisis which called upon the House of -Commons to put forth its penal powers; and that had he a choice between -punishment and pardon, he should prefer punishment, because the -circumstances of the country imperiously required some solemn example. -♦MR. WHITBREAD;♦ Mr. Whitbread directed the force of his invective -against Marquis Wellesley. “To Spain,” he said, “he had gone, after -delays which ought to be accounted for; and what were his services -when he got there? Why, he went through the mummery of dancing on the -French flag! He visited the Junta, went through all the routine of -etiquette and politics, made a speech about reform, took his glass -after dinner, and religiously toasted the Pope. On his return, of -course, when the places were going, he came in for his share, and -made one of the administration which the Chancellor of the Exchequer -had at length compiled; but in what manner had he compiled it? His -first application was to two noble lords, with whose principles he -had been at war all his political life: they rejected the tender in a -manner worthy of their dignity, and the rebuff which they gave would -have daunted any man of less temerity than himself. There was not a -man, from the Orkneys to the Land’s End, who did not pronounce him -and his administration weak, incapable, and insufficient. Even with -the addition of the two colleagues who had deserted them they were -feeble, but they then stood on a principle, or rather in opposition -to a principle; but now, having been rejected by all who were worthy, -the weak, and old, and infirm, were collected from the hedges and high -roads, and consorted with for want of better. - -“Let our relative situation with the enemy,” he pursued, “be well -considered! Austria gone, the French force concentrated, and Spain -their only object. We are told that Portugal may be defended by 30,000 -men; but would not Buonaparte know our force to a drummer? and where -we had 30,000 he would have three score. Who would struggle against -such fearful odds? We held our ground in that country just at the will -of the French Emperor, and at his option he could drive us out of it. -And what could we expect from our present ministry, ... or rather -from a single man, for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in fact, stood -alone? Marquis Wellesley, of whom such account had been made, might -be considered as completely insignificant. Who was he? The governor -of India, ... the man who had scarcely escaped the censure of that -house for his cruel tyranny! the man who had assailed the press, that -sacred palladium of the people! the friend of despotism! the foe to -liberty! Could this man say to Buonaparte, in the noble indignation -of insulted virtue, ‘I have not done as you have!’ Alas! if such a -man had strength, he would indeed be a fearful acquisition to such a -government; but he was known, and therefore weak and harmless. Peace,” -Mr. Whitbread concluded, “should be the cry of the nation. Peace, ... -particularly because the thraldom of millions of our fellow-subjects -was the tenure by which this incapable junto held their offices.” - -♦MR. PERCEVAL.♦ - -Mr. Perceval replied to this speech in all its parts. “As to the -situation,” he said, “which he had the honour to hold in his Majesty’s -council, he must state, in the most explicit manner, that it was not -an object of his own desire; on the contrary, if his wishes had been -realized, another person would then have held the office of first lord -of the treasury. When, by his Majesty’s directions, he had applied -to Lords Grey and Grenville, for the purpose of forming an extended -administration, the first proposition which he should have made to -them, if they had given him an opportunity of stating it, would have -been, that it should be left to themselves to determine who should be -the first lord of the treasury.” This was a confession of weakness: -twelve months before, Mr. Perceval was strong in the opinion of the -people; but now the deplorable Walcheren expedition hung about him like -a mill-stone, and, even in his own feelings, weighed him down. Having -said what he could in defence of that expedition, he rose into a higher -strain, when speaking of the Spaniards, and the unjust and unfeeling -manner in which their conduct had been represented. “Was it liberal,” -he said, “that the defenders of Zaragoza and Gerona should be said -to have displayed no generosity, no enthusiasm, no patriotism? Well, -indeed, might those persons censure what was done to aid the Spanish -cause, who could assert that the cause did not deserve success! But -neither in ancient nor in modern history could an example be found of -a country maintaining a contest like that which this degraded Spain, -and this degraded Spanish government, had so long supported. Never, in -recent times, had 250,000 Frenchmen been so long in a country without -subduing it. Spain was not subdued; but what effect upon the Spaniards -such language as had been used that night might produce, it was -impossible to predict!” - -♦VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD WELLINGTON OPPOSED BY THE EARL OF SUFFOLK.♦ - -When a vote of thanks to Lord Wellington was moved in the House of -Lords, it was opposed by the Earl of Suffolk, who argued that the best -mode of assisting Spain was by a floating force, which might be landed -wherever it could be most useful; by such a mode of warfare, he said, -Gerona, during its long and glorious defence, ♦EARL GROSVENOR;♦ might -have been relieved. Earl Grosvenor also opposed the vote, and made some -judicious remarks upon the practice of raising men to the peerage whose -fortunes were not adequate to support the rank. The ends of military -fame, he said, would be better promoted if different orders of military -merit were established; the same spirit of valour might be excited, and -all inconveniences to the constitution ♦EARL GREY;♦ avoided. Earl Grey -denied that the battle of Talavera was a victory; it had been trumpeted -as such, he said, by ministers, but in so doing they had practised an -unworthy deception. Lord Wellington had betrayed want of capacity and -want of skill: the consequences had been most disastrous, nor did we -yet know the extent of the evil. One army had been compelled to retreat -into Portugal, where he feared it was in a very critical situation, -and where, from the unhealthiness of the position which it occupied, -disease had made such an alarming progress among the troops, that he -believed their numbers did not at that time exceed 9000 effective men. - -♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY;♦ - -Marquis Wellesley replied, that he knew the circumstances which had -influenced his brother in all his movements during the campaign, and -the plain statement of those circumstances triumphantly vindicated -him. “Against strange mismanagement,” he said, “such unlooked for, -such unaccountable casualties as had occurred during that campaign, -and frustrated a plan so wisely contrived, no human prudence on Sir -Arthur’s part could provide. Concerning the necessity of a radical -change in the government of Spain, his opinions,” he continued, “were -not unknown. But it surely was not to be expected that Spain could -reach at once the vigour of a free government, just emerging as she -was from that dreadful oppression which had broken down the faculties -of her people, ... from those inveterate habits and ancient prejudices -which had so long contracted her views and retarded her improvement, -and from the disconnexion and disunion between her different -provinces. The change which was desired could not be the work of a -day. But were we therefore to desert the Spaniards in this crisis of -their fortunes, and abandon them to the mercy of their invaders?... -As for the circumstances which attended and followed the battle of -Talavera, nothing more perhaps, in a military sense, could be said -of the result, than that the British troops had repulsed the attack -of a French army almost double their numbers, the efforts of which -had been chiefly directed against them. But was there no skill, no -bravery, no perseverance displayed in the mode in which that repulse -was effected? Did no glory redound from it to the British arms? Had -it not been acknowledged, even by the enemy, as the severest check -they had yet sustained? That victory had saved the south of Spain from -absolute destruction, had afforded time for Portugal to organize her -army, and had enabled Lord Wellington to take a position where he might -derive supplies from Spain, at the same time that he drew nearer to his -own magazines. He should not attempt to diminish the disasters which -afterwards befel the Spanish armies; both his noble brother and himself -had earnestly advised them to keep on the defensive; but, flushed with -the victory of Talavera, and too sanguine of success, they advanced at -all points, and the result had fatally justified the propriety of the -advice which had been given them. This, however, was not the present -subject. It was enough for him to have shown that Lord Wellington had -arrested the progress of the French armies into the south of Spain, and -procured a breathing time for Portugal; that country was placed in a -greater degree of security than at any time since it had been menaced -by France, and such essential improvements had been introduced into the -Portugueze army, that it would be enabled effectually to co-operate -with the British troops. These advantages were fairly to be ascribed -to Lord Wellington; and he did not hesitate to say, that his brother -was as justly entitled to every distinction which his sovereign had -conferred, and to every honour and reward which it was in the power of -that house to bestow, as any noble lord who for his personal services -had obtained the same distinctions, or who sat there by descent from -his illustrious ancestors.” - -To this temperate and able speech, which showed that means had been -taken with due foresight, and that with due perseverance there ♦LORD -GRENVILLE.♦ was a well-grounded hope of success, Lord Grenville replied -by arguing from the misconduct of the Spanish ministers against our -own. “Let the house,” he said, “consider how much dependence the -administration had placed upon such a government as that of the -Spaniards, and then ask themselves if they could be justified in -supporting them in a continuance of error. We were now told that -reliance was to be placed upon the co-operation of the Portugueze; but -they ought to judge of the future from the past, to recollect that for -want of co-operation it had been found necessary to retreat, and that -the remnant of the army was in a situation not unlike that in which it -was placed by its advance to Talavera.” - -♦FEB. 1.♦ - -The vote of thanks was opposed in like manner ♦GENERAL TARLETON;♦ in -the House of Commons. General Tarleton said, that Lord Wellington’s -dispatches were vain-glorious, partial, and incorrect; that he had -been deficient in information concerning the amount and situation of -Soult’s army; and that he had been compelled to a precipitate retreat, -after abandoning his sick and wounded. ♦MR. WHITBREAD.♦ Mr. Whitbread -affirmed, that the battle had been more a repulse than a victory; nor -could he, he said, withhold a tear, when he thought of the British -blood which had been spilt in sacrifice to incapacity and folly. The -consequence of the battle was, that the army had no other retreat than -that through Deleitosa, and their condition during that retreat was -such, that many hundred perished on the road from famine. The Spanish -cause, he concluded, was now more hopeless than ever. But the motion -received a powerful support from Mr. Windham, who, setting all party -views aside, followed the feelings of his own generous nature. “The -unproductive consequences of this victory,” he said, ... “for a victory -it was, and a glorious victory, ... were not to be put in comparison -with the military renown which we had gained. Ten or fifteen years -ago, it was thought on the continent that we might do something at -sea, ... that an Englishman was a sort of sea-animal; but our army was -considered as nothing. Our achievements in Egypt first entitled us to -the name of a military power; the battle of Maida confirmed it; and -he would not give the battles of Vimeiro, Coruña, and Talavera, for a -whole Archipelago of sugar islands.” - -♦PENSION VOTED FOR LORD WELLINGTON. FEB. 16.♦ - -The vote was carried in both houses without a division. But the -opposition tried their strength in the House of Commons upon the -King’s message, recommending that a pension of 2000_l._ should be -settled upon Lord Wellington, and the two next heirs to his title -in succession. “With the grant of the peerage,” ♦MR. CALCRAFT;♦ Mr. -Calcraft said, “that house had nothing to do; he was sorry it had been -conferred; but though there was no remedy for it, the house ought not -to add to it the pension. Pensions and thanks might be voted, but they -could not permanently blind the country; whatever the public opinion -might be now, it would not be with ministers upon this subject a -month hence, when the whole fruits of Lord Wellington’s victories and -campaigns would develope themselves to public view. It was mournful -and alarming to hear that Lord Wellington had said he could defend -Portugal with 50,000 men, provided 30,000 of them were British; for if -the French were in earnest in their designs upon that country, before -three months Lord Wellington and his army would be in England. Neither -Portugal nor any other country could be defended by victories like that -of Talavera.” - -It was said by General Craufurd, a peerage might be an incumbrance -to Lord Wellington without a pension. General Loftus also remarked, -that he had always been one of the most liberal men in existence, -and the state of his circumstances was therefore, he imagined, far -from sufficient for the support of the dignity ♦OPPOSED BY SIR -FRANCIS BURDETT;♦ to which he was elevated. Sir Francis Burdett took -this occasion for touching a popular note. “If Lord Wellington’s -liberality,” he said, “had brought him into difficulty or debt, who -was it whom they called upon to free him from the incumbrance? ... -the people; ... who already owed debts enough, not in consequence of -any prodigality of their own, but through the impositions of their -representatives. As to the military part of the question, he could only -say, that the result was failure, ... failure as complete as failure -could be. But even if the occasion had been such as to deserve reward, -he should object to making any appeal for that purpose to the people’s -purse. What was become of the patronage of the government? Where were -the sinecures, which were always defended because they afforded a fund -for such purposes as these? Yet application was made to the people, ... -and this by a government who, while they perpetually threw the burden -upon the people, had greater means of rewarding merit at their disposal -than all the combined merit of Europe could possibly exhaust.” - -♦MR. WHITBREAD;♦ - -The same strain of argument was pursued by Mr. Whitbread. “It was -often argued,” he said, “that the expectation of one of those great -places falling in satisfied many a claimant: if so, why should not -Lord Wellington wait for one of them? It was an important part of the -question, whether, supposing the peerage to have been merited, the -circumstances of the new peer were such as to require the pension; for -if they were not, it would be a scandalous waste of the public money. -Nor was it necessarily to follow, that whenever the king was advised to -grant a peerage to any officer, the House of Commons was bound to vote -him a pension.” - -This produced from Mr. Wellesley Pole a ♦MR. WILBERFORCE;♦ statement -of his brother’s fortune. Mr. Wilberforce then appealed to the house, -whether, if Lord Wellington had devoted the great talents which -confessedly belonged to him to the bar, or to any other liberal -pursuit, he would not have rendered them infinitely more productive -than it appeared that he had done by actively employing them in the -service of his country? and he protested against the unjust and -impolitic illiberality of opposing such a grant upon such grounds. -The same opinion ♦MR. CANNING.♦ was delivered by Mr. Canning. “The -victories of Lord Wellington,” he said, “had re-established our -military character, and retrieved the honour of the country, which -was before in abeyance. If the system of bestowing the peerage was to -be entirely changed, and the House of Lords to be peopled only by the -successors to hereditary honours, Lord Wellington certainly would not -be found there. But he would not do that noble body the injustice of -supposing that it was a mere stagnant lake of collected honours: it was -to be occasionally refreshed by fresh streams. It was the prerogative -of the crown to confer the honour of the peerage; it was the duty of -that house to give it honour and independence. The question was, -whether they would enable Lord Wellington to take his seat with the -proudest peer in the other house, or whether they would send him there -with the avowed intention that it was only to the crown he was to look -for support. It was their duty to take care if the crown made a peer, -that it should not make a generation of peers wholly dependent on its -favour for their support.” - -There was a great majority upon this question, 213 voting for the -grant, 106 against it. But the current of popular opinion in the -metropolis set in with the opposition at this time; for the Walcheren -expedition, like a pestilential vapour, clouded the whole political -♦THE COMMON COUNCIL PETITION AGAINST THE PENSION.♦ horizon. The -common council presented a petition against the pension: a measure so -extraordinary, they said, in the present state of the country, and -under all the afflicting circumstances attending our armies in Spain -and Portugal under that officer’s command, could not but prove highly -injurious in its consequences, and no less grievous than irritating -to the nation at large. In the military conduct of Lord Wellington, -the lord mayor and common council added, they did not recognise any -claims to national remuneration; and they conceived it to be a high -aggravation of the misconduct of his majesty’s unprincipled and -incapable advisers, that they had, in contempt and defiance of public -opinion, recommended this grant to parliament. There was neither -reason nor justice in making it, and therefore they prayed that it -might not pass into a law. When the second reading was moved, Mr. -Whitbread said he trusted that as this petition had been presented, -the minister would not press it that day. Mr. Perceval replied he saw -no necessity for any such forbearance, and the bill passed by a great -majority, 106 dividing against 36. - -In these debates ministers were completely triumphant. Some of their -opponents accused them of having done too much, others of having -done too little, and some would fain have persuaded the people of -Great Britain, that our army had obtained no victory at Talavera. The -charge of having taken no measures for conciliating the Spaniards, by -obtaining for them a restoration of those political rights which had -been so long withheld, was abundantly disproved by the papers laid -before parliament. There it appeared that Mr. Stuart, Mr. Frere, and -Marquis Wellesley, had each pressed upon the existing government the -necessity of convoking the Cortes. The great error which the ministry -had committed, was in their neglect of Catalonia. In the commencement -of the struggle this fault was not imputable to them, but to the -general, who disobeyed his instructions to convey his army to that most -important scene of operations: the effects of that fatal error were to -a certain extent irremediable; but no subsequent attempt was made, and -the French were suffered to take fortress after fortress, without an -effort on our part to relieve them. Still the conduct of administration -toward Spain was far more worthy of commendation than of censure; if -not without error, if not always successful, it had uniformly been -brave and generous: we had every motive of policy for assisting the -Spaniards in their struggle, but the assistance was given in a manner -worthy of the nation which gave, and of the noble people who received -it. - -The result of any discussion upon this subject was anticipated by the -public; they, in spite of the efforts of factious news-writers, and -journalists of higher pretensions, whose want of feeling was more -disgraceful even than their want of foresight, continued to feel -concerning Spain like freemen and like Englishmen. Nor was Mr. Windham -the only member of opposition who expressed this sentiment. When in -♦MARQUIS OF LANSDOWN; JUNE 8.♦ the course of the session the Marquis -of Lansdown moved for a vote of censure upon ministers for rashness -and ignorance, the strong bias of party spirit did not prevent him -from rendering justice, in some respects, both to his own countrymen -and to Spain. “Whatever he might think of the policy which led to the -battle of Talavera,” he said, “or of its consequences, he should ever -contemplate the action itself as a proud monument of glory to the -general who commanded, and to the army who won that ever-memorable -day. No success, he affirmed, could be expected in Spain under such a -government, or with armies so constituted and commanded as the Spanish -armies, or where supplies could not be procured; these things ought to -have been known; but these things were no reflection on the Spanish -national character. The Spaniards had displayed acts of the most -splendid heroism which had ever been recorded; they had converted the -walls of Zaragoza and Gerona into fortifications almost impregnable. -Their disasters were imputable, not to the people, but to those who -could suppose that a junta of persons put together in any manner -composed a government, and that a crowd of men collected in any way was -an army. Still he was ready to confide in the Spanish people, and to -believe that much might yet be done by their efforts; and he cherished -the hope, and would cherish it to the last, that if ever Europe was -saved, our own country would be an important agent in that great event. -But it was not by co-operating in rash expeditions with such armies as -that of Cuesta.” - -♦LORD HOLLAND;♦ - -Lord Holland spoke to the same purport, while the intent of his speech -was to fix a censure on the ministers. He condemned them for having -sent out Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere without adequate instructions, -particularly with regard to the most important point, the arrangement -of a system for redressing the grievances of the Spanish people and -restoring their rights. But on that point the British government -was fully justified. He condemned them also for neither having sent -an adequate force, nor given proper instructions, nor made adequate -provision for that force which they did send: but the event had shown, -that a larger force had been sent than could be provided, in the -inexperienced state of our own commissariat, and in the disordered -state of Spain. He said that ministers ought equally to be condemned -by those who disapproved of our interposing at all in the affairs of -Spain, and by those who were most interested in the success of the -Spaniards: if, indeed, there was any difference, the friends of Spain -must condemn them most, because they were peculiarly mortified by the -disappointment of their wishes, a disappointment which the misjudging -policy of these ministers had produced. He was one who had felt this -mortification, for no event had ever excited a livelier interest in -his mind, not even the dawn of the French revolution. But having thus -spoken to justify the vote of censure which he was about to give, -Lord Holland argued in defence of the principle which his own party -vehemently and even virulently opposed. He dwelt upon the importance of -supporting Spain to the utmost, and upon the perilous facilities which -Cadiz and Lisbon would afford for the invasion of Ireland, if those -ports were suffered to fall into the hands of the French. If, after -all efforts, he said, Spain should ultimately be subdued, his advice -was, that we should promote the establishment of such a system of -government in the Spanish colonies as good statesmen could approve, the -only system which ought to be approved in any country, a system founded -upon the opinions and wishes of the people. - -♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY.♦ - -Marquis Wellesley replied to the general attack which was made upon -ministers, in a manner worthy of his reputation as a statesman. He -pointed out the solid advantages which had been gained during the last -campaign, by securing Portugal, and giving time for the Portugueze -to form an army, which was now in a state to co-operate with the -British troops; he showed also what advantages had been gained to the -Spaniards, had the Junta known how to profit by them, or followed the -advice which both he himself and Lord Wellington had pressed upon them -in vain. Then, in a clear and masterly manner, he enforced the duty -and necessity of supporting the cause of Spain. “Justly,” he said, -“had it been stated by the noble Marquis, that if ever Europe was to -be delivered, England must be the great agent in her deliverance; and -justly he might have added, that the fairest opportunity for effecting -that deliverance opened, when Spain magnanimously rose to resist the -most flagrant usurpation of which history records an example. Not -only were we called upon by the splendour, the glory, the majesty of -the Spanish cause, to lend our aid; a principle of self-preservation -called upon us also: these efforts on the part of Spain afforded us -the best chance of providing for our own security, by keeping out of -the hands of France the naval means of Spain, which Buonaparte was so -eager to grasp, knowing they were the most effectual weapons he could -wield against the prosperity and the power of Great Britain. The views -of Buonaparte, in his endeavours to subjugate Spain, were obvious, -even to superficial observers. The old government had placed at his -disposal the resources of that country, but the old government was -feeble and effete; and, however subservient to his will, he knew it -was an instrument which he could not pitch to the tone of his designs. -He therefore resolved to seize upon the whole Peninsula, and to -establish in it a government of his own. He may have been prompted to -this partly by his hatred to the Bourbon race, partly by the cravings -of an insatiable ambition, partly by the vain desire of spreading his -dynasty over Europe, partly by mere vanity: but his main object was, -that he might wield with new vigour the naval and colonial resources -of Spain, to the detriment of Great Britain. This alone could suit the -vastness of his designs; this alone could promise to gratify his mortal -hatred of the British name. By the entire subjugation of the Peninsula, -and the full possession of its resources, he knew that he should -be best enabled to sap the fundamental security of these kingdoms. -Therefore how highly important was it to keep alive there a spirit -of resistance to France! There were no means, however unprincipled, -which Buonaparte would scruple to employ for the attainment of his -ends. To him force and fraud were alike, ... force, that would stoop -to all the base artifices of fraud, ... fraud, that would come armed -with all the fierce violence of force. Every thing which the head of -such a man could contrive, or the arm execute, would be combined and -concentrated into one vast effort, and that effort would be strained -for the humiliation and destruction of this country. Universal dominion -is, and will continue to be, the aim of all French governments; but -it is pre-eminently the object to which such a mind as Buonaparte’s -will aspire. England alone stands in the way of the accomplishment -of that design, and England he has therefore resolved to strike down -and extirpate. How then were these daring projects to be met? How, -but by cherishing, wherever it may be found, but particularly in the -Peninsula, the spirit of resistance to the usurpations of France? If -we have saved the navy of Portugal; if we have saved the Spanish ships -at Ferrol; if we have enabled the Portugueze government to migrate to -their colonies; if we have succeeded in yet securing the naval and -colonial resources both of Portugal and Spain; how have these important -objects been achieved, but by fomenting in both these kingdoms a spirit -of resistance to the overwhelming ambition of Buonaparte? To this end -must all our efforts be now directed. This is the only engine which -now remains for us to work in opposition to Buonaparte’s gigantic -designs. Why then should we depart from that salutary line of policy? -what is there to dissuade or discourage us from adhering to it? I can -discover nothing in the aspect of Spanish affairs that wears any thing -like the hue and complexion of despair. If, indeed, it had appeared -that this spirit began to languish in the breast of the Spaniards, if -miscarriages, disasters, and defeats had been observed to damp the -ardour and break down the energies of the Spanish mind, then might it -be believed that further assistance to the Spanish cause would prove -unavailing. But, fortunately for this country, not only is there life -still in Spain, but her patriotic heart still continues to beat high: -the generous and exalted sentiment, which first prompted us to lend our -aid to the cause of Spain, should therefore be still maintained in full -force, and should still inspirit us to continue that aid to the last -moment of her resistance. The struggle in which Spain is now engaged -is not merely a Spanish struggle. In that struggle are committed the -best, the very vital interests of England. With the fate of Spain the -fate of England is now inseparably blended. Should we not therefore -stand by her to the last? For my part, my lords, as an adviser of the -crown, I shall not cease to recommend to my sovereign to continue to -assist Spain to the latest moment of her resistance. It should not -dishearten us that Spain appears to be in the very crisis of her fate; -we should, on the contrary, extend a more anxious care over her at a -moment so critical. For in nations, and above all in Spain, how often -have the apparent symptoms of dissolution been the presages of new -life, and of renovated vigour? Therefore, I would cling to Spain in -her last struggle; therefore, I would watch her last agonies, I would -wash and heal her wounds, I would receive her parting breath, I would -catch and cherish the last vital spark of her expiring patriotism. Nor -let this be deemed a mere office of pious charity; nor an exaggerated -representation of my feelings; nor an overcharged picture of the -circumstances that call them forth. In the cause of Spain, the cause of -honour and of interest is equally involved and inseparably allied. It -is a cause in favour of which the finest feelings of the heart unite -with the soundest dictates of the understanding.” - -Full use was made of these debates by the French government, which was -at this time employing every artifice for making the people believe -that Great Britain was on the brink of ruin. The King’s speech, as -usual, was falsified, and sent abroad. There it was said, that whatever -temporary and partial inconveniences might have resulted from the -measures which were directed by France against our trade and revenue, -the great source of our prosperity and strength, those measures had -wholly failed of producing any general effect. The official French -paper substituted for these words a sentence, in which the King was -made to tell his parliament, they must be aware that the measures -adopted by France to dry up the great sources of our prosperity had -been to a certain degree efficient. It was said that we were not merely -on the verge of national bankruptcy, but actually suffering under all -the horrors of famine; that our crops of every kind had failed; we were -obliged to feed our cattle with sugar and molasses, and had nothing -but sugar, cocoa, and coffee, and the skin and bones of these cattle -for ourselves. To a certain degree, Buonaparte and his journalists may -have perhaps believed the falsehoods which they circulated; they read -in our factious newspapers of decaying trade, diminished resources, -and starving manufacturers; and the opposition told them, that France -was certain of success in whatever she attempted on the Continent; -that the cause of Spain was hopeless; that it was impossible for us -to carry on the war; that if we did not grant the Roman Catholics all -that they demanded, Ireland would be lost, and the loss of Ireland -would draw after it the downfal of the British empire. Speeches of this -tenour were carefully translated for the use of the Emperor’s subjects, -and circulated throughout the Continent: but when the French saw it -asserted, upon the authority of English members of parliament, that the -Spaniards and Portugueze had nothing worth fighting for; that they were -inimical in their hearts to England; that Buonaparte was reforming the -abuses of their old government, and redressing their grievances; when -they saw it affirmed in the English House of Commons, that the people -of Spain must know Marquis Wellesley would, if opportunity should -offer, take both Spain and Portugal as Buonaparte had done; when they -saw the same persons who represented Sir John Moore as a consummate -general vilify the talents of Lord Wellington, deny his merits, oppose -the rewards which were so justly conferred on him, and maintain, in -the face of their insulted country, that the British army had gained -no victory at Talavera; it appeared to them impossible that language, -at once so false, so absurd, and so co-operative with the designs of -France, could have been uttered by an English tongue; such speeches -were supposed to have been invented in France, and they attributed to -the artifices of their own government what were in reality the genuine -effusions of perverse minds, irritable tempers, and disappointed -faction. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVIII. - -THE FRENCH ENTER ANDALUSIA. DISSOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA AND -APPOINTMENT OF A REGENCY. ALBURQUERQUE’S RETREAT. - - -♦1810.♦ - -♦SUPINENESS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦ - -The Central Junta manifested none of that energy after the rout at -Ocaña which they had so successfully exerted after the battle of -Medellin. The whole extent, not of the loss alone, but of the danger -also, had then been fairly stated, and bravely regarded. The danger was -more immediate now; so imminent indeed, that it was scarcely possible -they should have deceived themselves with any expectation of seeing -it averted; but they did not venture to proclaim the whole truth, and -call forth in the southern provinces a spirit like that which the -Catalans displayed, and which might have made their cities and strong -places emulate Zaragoza and Gerona. Instead of this, they suffered a -fallacious hope to be held out, that if the enemy should enter the -kingdoms of the south, the passes would be occupied behind them; the -Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque would hasten to the scene of action, -and another day like that of Baylen might be expected. Fuller accounts -were given in the official gazette of an affair of guerillas than of -the battle of Ocaña; and details were published of their victory at -Tamames, after the army by which it was gained had been routed at Alba -de Tormes. - -♦GENERAL DISCONTENT.♦ - -They obtained a few addresses thanking them for having convoked the -Cortes, which, it was said, would like an elixir of life revivify the -social body to its very extremities, and congratulating them upon their -triumph over internal divisions, and over those who would hastily and -inopportunely have established a regency. But their enemies were more -active than their friends, or rather than their dependants, for other -friends they had none; and their congratulations were as premature -as their triumph was short-lived. Romana’s declaration against them -was not the only symptom that they had lost the confidence of the -army as well as of the people. The Conde de Noroña being at this time -removed from the command in Galicia, addressed a proclamation to the -Galicians, telling them the country was in danger, and that for his -part he had given up all dependence upon the existing government. -His repeated applications for money and arms had never obtained the -slightest notice, and seemed rather to have given offence. Under -such circumstances it remained for them to act for themselves, and -he advised them to form a separate Junta for their own kingdom, and -be governed by it. A similar disposition prevailed in many of the -provinces, and Spain seemed on the point of relapsing into that state -from which the formation of the Central Junta had delivered it. They -were saved from it only by the progress of the enemy. - -♦ROMANA REFUSES THE COMMAND.♦ - -So effectually were the Junta humbled, that they requested Romana -would repair to Carolina, where the wreck of Areizaga’s army was -collecting, and offered him full powers for whatever measures he might -think necessary. But Romana was too much disgusted with the government -to serve under them, and saw the consequences too clearly to place -himself in a responsible situation where failure was certain. They -then recalled Blake from Catalonia, where ill fortune had made him -unpopular, appointing O’Donnell, in whom the soldiers and the people -had great confidence, to succeed him; but this removal could not be -effected in time; Castaños was not called upon, perhaps from a sense -of the injustice with which he had been treated; and Areizaga was -thus left in the command, neither to the satisfaction of the troops, -the people, or himself, for he had now a full consciousness of his -weakness, his danger, and his incapacity. - -♦MONTIJO AND D. FR. PALAFOX IMPRISONED.♦ - -The government for its own safety had found it necessary to imprison -Montijo and D. Francisco Palafox, and they had removed the most -formidable person for popular talents in the Seville Junta, by sending -Padre Gil on a mission to Sicily. That Junta, however, was busily at -work, though the better members took no part in its intrigues; and the -efforts which should have been made for organizing a civic and national -resistance, the spirit and disposition for which were not wanting, -were employed in exciting resentment against the government. This -temper was not mitigated by some financial measures, which were of a -nature rather to betray its weakness than show its resources. Half the -plate and jewels of every family and individual was called for, as a -forced loan; and a heavy tax, in the form of a license, imposed upon -every one who kept a carriage of any kind, the license being granted to -those only whose profession or whose infirmities rendered it necessary. -All funds which had been bequeathed or appropriated to pious purposes -were for the present to be taken for war expenses, those of hospitals -and public schools alone excepted; vacant _encomiendas_ and vacancies -in the military orders were not to be filled up, that the revenues -might be made available for the same emergency; and a scale was formed -for reducing the pay of all persons in the public service, soldiers -who were actually employed alone excepted. These measures, which -disappointed some in their expectations, and bore heavily upon the -scanty means of others, produced more discontent than relief. - -♦ATTEMPTS TO EXCITE A FALSE CONFIDENCE.♦ - -The Junta could at this time have had no reasonable hope of preventing -the French from entering Andalusia. They could have no reliance upon -the remains of Areizaga’s army, for the most mournful circumstances -attending such battles as that of Ocaña is, that the worst men escape, -and that the best and steadiest are those who fall. Parque’s force was -not so completely broken up; it had lost more in reputation than in -actual strength, but its strength was comparatively small, and it was -at a distance. What reliance they had was upon Alburquerque’s corps, -which consisted of only 12,000 men; ... his head-quarters were at Don -Benito, having 2000 men at Truxillo, and some advanced parties upon the -Tagus. But their immediate danger was not from the side of Extremadura, -and what was such a corps against the armies which the French would now -bring into the field! Fallacious statements were circulated to make -the Andalusians rely upon the strength of the passes, and the measures -which had been taken for defending them. It was affirmed that Areizaga -had been joined by considerable reinforcements, and abundantly supplied -with means of every kind; that his army had been re-organized; that -that general, who had gained the confidence of the nation, would soon -be at the head of its four divisions; and that the works in the passes -were such, that all the force which Napoleon might send against them -would be unable to effect their way. - -♦SCHEMES OF COUNT TILLY.♦ - -Such statements, which could only deceive the people into a false -security, may very possibly have been designed for that effect by some -of those agents of the government, who were now looking to obtain -favour with the Intruder, The members of the Junta themselves stand -clearly acquitted of any such intention. One of them, and only one, -had at this time his own projects in view, and they were not so much -those of a traitor, as of a desperate adventurer, in the delirium of -revolutionary ambition. This was the Conde de Tilly, a man equally -destitute of principle and of character, and who, as sometimes happens -in the crooked paths of political expediency, had been promoted from -the provincial to the Central Junta, because such promotion was the -readiest means of removing him from a situation which he disgraced! -This man, being destitute of any private worth and of all national -feeling, could have no hope for his country; and finding no farther -hope there for himself, he had turned his thoughts toward the colonies. -His plan was to get four or five thousand troops at his disposal, and -when the crisis which he foresaw should arrive, seize what money there -might be in the treasury, hasten to Cadiz, take possession of the ships -there, sail for Mexico, and there establish himself at the head of an -independent government. The difficulties which he might find from the -British squadron at his outset, or the Mexicans on his arrival, were -overlooked in this frantic scheme. A few days before the battle of -Ocaña he opened it to a general officer, whom he wished to engage in -the project; that officer informed Castaños, who was then residing at -Algeziras, and to whom those persons who saw that some change in the -executive government must soon take place, were looking as one in whom -the nation might confide. The adventurer was arrested in consequence, -and died not long afterwards a prisoner in one of the castles at Cadiz. - -♦THE JUNTA ANNOUNCE THEIR INTENTION TO REMOVE.♦ - -At the commencement of Areizaga’s unhappy operations, the Junta and the -general had encouraged each other in a delusion so unreasonable that -it might almost be called insane. But now if it had been possible for -the government, after the experience of Somosierra, to deceive itself -concerning the strength of the passes, and the reliance which might be -placed upon them, their commander would have awakened them from that -dream. Areizaga had lost his presumption at Ocaña, and was prepared for -defeat before he was attacked. He made known his utter hopelessness -to the Junta, and by sending away great part of his stores, for the -purpose of securing them, betrayed it also to the army and to the -people. In their former danger, after the battle of Medellin, the Junta -had declared that they would never change their place of residence till -some peril or public reason rendered their removal necessary; that in -such case of emergency they would make their intention known, would -remove to the situation where they could with most advantage attend -to the defence of the country, and would never abandon the continent -of Spain while there was one spot in it which they could maintain -against the invaders. It was debated now whether they should act in -conformity to this declaration. The intention of such a removal had -been indicated when the Isle of Leon was named as the place where the -Cortes were to assemble; and there were some members who objected to -an earlier removal, on the ground that it would greatly increase the -general alarm. But the majority rightly perceived that the danger was -close at hand, and therefore that no time was to be lost. They did -not, however, venture openly to state the true and obvious motives -for this resolution when they announced it to the public. The Isle -of Leon, they said, was the fittest place for the Cortes to hold its -sittings, because there were buildings there applicable to the purpose; -from thence their decrees could be communicated to every part of -the Peninsula, whatever might be the vicissitudes of war; and there -they might devote themselves to their arduous functions with perfect -tranquillity, which was hardly attainable amid the distractions of a -great city. But this having been determined, the Junta found itself in -the predicament provided for by a decree of the preceding year, wherein -it had been declared, that at whatever place the representatives of the -nation should be convoked, to that place the government must remove its -seat. They gave notice, therefore, that on the first of February they -should meet in the Isle of Leon; and they made immediate preparations -for the removal. - -♦MURMURS AT SEVILLE.♦ - -The people of Seville could not but perceive that their city was to -be abandoned to the enemy; this was obvious. What other designs the -members of the Junta might have formed, every one guessed, according -as he suspected or despised this unfortunate administration. Some -said they were sold to the French, and the Junta were only pretending -to fly, that they might deceive other provinces with a show of -patriotism, and sell them as they had sold Andalusia. Others acquitted -them of treason, to fix upon them the charge of peculation: a few of -the members, they said, were, for their known virtue and talents, -entitled to the love of their countrymen; the rest were a sordid race, -who, having appropriated to themselves the free gifts which had been -contributed for the use of the army, while they left the soldiers to -perish for want of food and clothing, were now about to fly to England -or to the Canaries, and there enjoy in safety the riches of which they -had defrauded their brethren and their country. Those persons who -could command the means of removal hastened to secure themselves in -the sea-ports; others, whose fortunes rooted them to the spot, and who -were thus compelled to share its fate, or whose bolder spirits were -impatient of flight or of submission, joined in imprecations upon the -government by which they believed themselves to have been sacrificed; -... whether the cause had been guilt or imbecility, the effect to them -and to the country was the same. - -♦1810. JANUARY. - -INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.♦ - -The preparations of the French having now been completed, the Intruder -put himself at the head of the French army, and advanced to take -possession of the kingdoms of Andalusia. The actual command was vested -in Marshal Soult, having Victor, Mortier, and Sebastiani under him. -The Intruder was accompanied by Azanza, O’Farrell, and other of his -ministers, who, believing that Spain was now conquered, and that Great -Britain must withdraw from a contest which it was impossible she could -maintain, were confirmed in that opinion[8] by the speeches of the -opposition in the British parliament, and by the authority of certain -English newspapers. The French, to exaggerate their easy triumph, -affirmed that the Spanish general, confiding in the entrenchments which -he had thrown up at the entrance of the defile, in the cuts which had -been made in the roads, and the mines which had been dug at the brink -of the precipices, considered his position impregnable. But Areizaga -had not been more censurable at Ocaña for rashness than he was now for -the total want of that confidence with which he was thus reproached. -Had he known how to have excited in his men either the hope or the -despair of enthusiastic devotion to their country and their cause, the -strength of the position would have afforded him such advantages, that -the enemy must have sought some other entrance into Andalusia. There -was no attempt at this; the remembrance of his former defeat acted -both upon him and his soldiers, and the Sierra Morena was defended no -better than the Somosierra had been. The men gave way at every point, -with scarcely a show of resistance, because they saw, by the conduct -of their general, that it was not expected they should stand their -ground. One division took flight at Navas de Tolosa, where one of the -most celebrated victories in Spanish history had been gained over the -Moors. The operations began on the 20th of January, and the Intruder’s -head-quarters were established the next day at Baylen, a name of which -the French reminded the Spaniards now with bitter exultation. - -♦FALSE HOPES HELD OUT TO THE PEOPLE BY THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦ - -On the same day, the Junta informed the people of Seville that the -pass of Almaden had been forced; but the danger, they said, was not -so great as terror might perhaps represent it. The division stationed -there, having been far too weak for maintaining the post, was gone to -join Alburquerque, who threatened the flank of the enemy; the Duke -del Parque was advancing by rapid marches; their junction would form -an army superior to the French force at Almaden, which would thus be -checked in its career, or driven back; while Areizaga’s army occupied -the other passes, and was ready to hasten to the defence of Seville, -whither also the two dukes would repair in case of necessity. This, -they said, was the true state of things, which the government had -neither exaggerated nor dissembled. They had issued orders for marching -off all the men in arms who could be collected to join the armies, and -for supplying them; and they called upon the people of this capital to -lay aside all terror, to suffer no confusion or tumult, but to display -the same courage and calmness which they had so honourably manifested -in times of greater danger. For the French, they said, depended more -upon the distrust and disunion which they hoped to create than upon -their own strength. - -♦INSTRUCTIONS TO ALBURQUERQUE.♦ - -While the Junta thus admonished the people to be calm, they themselves -were bewildered by the danger which pressed upon them. The series of -their instructions to Alburquerque, from the time when they first -clearly saw that Andalusia was seriously threatened, exhibits their -incapacity and their wavering councils in the most extraordinary -manner. A month before the attack was made, Alburquerque warned them -that the pass of Almaden was threatened, and explaining in what -manner such a movement on the part of the enemy would threaten his -own position, observed how expedient it was to call his troops from -Truxillo and the advanced posts upon the Tagus. Their answer was, -that if the enemy made the movement which he apprehended, he must -endeavour to prevent them, by taking a good position, where he might -fight them to advantage; meantime the force at Truxillo must not be -lessened, and he must not forget to leave a competent garrison in -Badajoz. By another dispatch they enjoined him to act offensively and -with energy, to destroy the plans of the French for penetrating by -the road of La Plata. Another ordered him to hold himself ready for -marching as soon as he should receive instructions; and had he been -a man of less decision, it would thus have suspended his movements -till those instructions arrived. His army was thus upon the Guadiana -when the passes were forced, and the enemy moved a column along the -road of La Plata, to occupy Guadalcanal, and thus prevent him from -entering Andalusia. This purpose Alburquerque understood, and made his -own movements so judiciously, that when they expected to take easy -possession of Guadalcanal, they found him there with the main body of -his infantry, while the horse escorted his artillery to St. Olalla -and Ronquillo; and thus the whole army was ready to move wherever -its services were required. Here he received those instructions for -which he had been too zealous and too good an officer to wait. They -directed him to approach the enemy as near as possible, to oppose them -if they attempted to enter Andalusia, and if they should retreat upon -La Mancha, to harass them as much as possible; for it appears that -the Junta even indulged this hope. Alburquerque informed them, that -an army, consisting of 8000 disposable men and 600 horse, could not -approach very near to watch the movements of a hostile force, more than -three-fold its own number; if he added to his own little division that -which was destined to garrison Badajoz, which had at this time scarcely -400 effective men, it would only increase his own troops to 11,700, -which would still be insufficient either to occupy the line of defence, -which they instructed him to take up, or to observe the enemy with any -hope of impeding them: nevertheless he would do all that was possible. -On the 21st the Junta ordered him to march immediately for Cordoba, in -consequence of the enemy’s having occupied the pass called Puerto del -Rey; the next morning they summoned him to Seville, by the shortest -route, and with the utmost expedition; before night they changed their -purpose, and sent off another express, ordering him ♦MANIFESTO DEL -DUQUE DE ALBURQUERQUE, 45–70.♦ to Cordoba. This vacillation was imputed -to treason, especially as the war-minister, D. Antonio Cornel, had long -been suspected by the people. Certain it is, that if Alburquerque had -obeyed these orders, his own army must have been cut off, and Cadiz -would inevitably have been taken by the enemy, according to their aim -and expectation: but the error of the Junta is sufficiently accounted -for by their incapacity and their alarm. - -♦INSURRECTION AT SEVILLE AGAINST THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦ - -The termination of their power was at hand. When this last order was -expedited to Alburquerque, every hour brought fresh tidings of the -progress of the enemy, the murmurs of the people becoming louder as -their agitation increased, and their danger appeared more imminent. -The Junta were hastening their departure for Cadiz; their equipages -were conveyed to the quays, and the papers from the public offices were -embarked on the Guadalquiver. This alone would have made the populace -apprehend the real state of things, even if it had been possible to -keep them in ignorance of the disasters which so many breathless -couriers announced. During the nights of the 22d and 23d the patroles -were doubled; no disturbance, however, took place; the agents of -Montijo and Francisco Palafox were preparing to strike an effectual -blow, and carefully prevented a premature explosion. On the morning -of the 24th the people assembled in the square of St. Francisco, and -in front of the Alcazar; some demanded that the Central Junta should -be deposed; others, more violent in their rage, cried out, that they -should be put to death; but the universal cry was, that the city should -be defended; and they took arms tumultuously, forbade all persons to -leave the city, and patrolled the streets in numerous small parties to -see that this prohibition was observed. The tumult began at eight in -the morning, and in the course of two hours became general: they who -secretly directed it, cried out that the Junta of Seville should assume -the government, went to the Carthusian convent in which Montijo and -Francisco Palafox were confined, delivered them, and by acclamation -called on Saavedra to take upon himself the direction of public affairs -in this emergency. - -♦SAAVEDRA TAKES UPON HIMSELF THE TEMPORARY AUTHORITY.♦ - -D. Francisco Saavedra, at that time minister of finance and president -of the Junta of Seville, was a man of great ability and high character; -but he was advanced in years, and it was believed that poison had been -administered to him, at the instigation of Godoy, which had in some -degree affected his intellects. Whatever foundation there may have been -for this belief, he betrayed no want either of intellect or of exertion -on this occasion; he calmed the people by consenting to exercise the -authority with which they invested him; assembled the members of the -provincial Junta; issued a proclamation enjoining the Sevillians to -remain tranquil; and by making new appointments, and dispatching new -orders to the armies, satisfied the populace for the time. Montijo -left the city to assist in collecting the scattered troops; and Romana -was re-nominated to that army from which the Central Junta had removed -him. The people, however, called upon Romana to take upon himself the -defence of the city, and stopped his horses at the gate; but Romana -evaded the multitude, and hastened towards Badajoz to secure that -important fortress, as the best service which he could then perform. - -♦THE FRENCH ENTER SEVILLE.♦ - -Every thing was in confusion now. The Central Junta were hastening how -they could to Cadiz. Saavedra with five other members of ♦JOVELLANOS, -P. 13. § 6.♦ the Seville Junta took the same course, separating -themselves from their unworthy colleagues, some of whom, they now -perceived, were corrupted by the enemy, and others betrayed by their -selfishness and their fears. These persons remained to receive their -reward from the intrusive government, or make their terms with it; -and Seville, in spite of the disposition of its inhabitants, received -the yoke like Madrid. This had been foreseen, and the Central Junta -had been urged to break up the cannon foundry, and destroy the stores -which they could not remove; but every thing was left to the French. -The ♦THEY OVERRUN ANDALUSIA.♦ virtue indeed which had been displayed -at Zaragoza and Gerona appeared the more remarkable when it was seen -how ignobly the Andalusian cities submitted to the invaders, who -sent off their detachments in all directions, not so much to conquer -the country, as to take possession of it. Jaen, which had boasted of -its preparations for defence, where six-and-forty pieces of cannon -had been mounted, and military stores laid in to resist a siege, -submitted as tamely as the most defenceless village. Granada, also, -where a crusade had been preached, was entered without resistance by -Sebastiani. The people of Alhama were the first who opposed the enemy; -their town, which had only the ruins of Moorish works to protect it, -was carried by storm; and Sebastiani fought his way from Antequera -to Malaga through armed citizens and peasantry, headed by priests -and monks. The French say that this insurrection, as they called it, -put on an alarming appearance; and it is evident, from the struggle -made in this quarter by a hasty and undisciplined multitude, that if -the provincial authorities had displayed common prudence in preparing -for the invasion, and common spirit in resisting it, Andalusia might -have proved the grave of the invaders. While Sebastiani thus overran -Granada, Mortier was detached on the other hand to occupy Extremadura, -which it was thought was left exposed by the retreat of the English; -but Alburquerque, disobeying the express commands of the government, -had garrisoned Badajoz, Romana had repaired in time to that fortress, -and the designs and expectations of the enemy in that important quarter -were effectually baffled. - -♦THE FRENCH PUSH FOR CADIZ.♦ - -This was not their only disappointment. The possession of the country, -and all the open towns, was of little importance when compared with -that of Cadiz. If it were possible that the fate of Spain could depend -upon any single event, that event would have been the capture of Cadiz -at this time; and the French therefore pushed on for it with even more -than their accustomed rapidity. The city was utterly unprepared for -an attack: there were not a thousand troops in the Isle of Leon, and -not volunteers enough to man the works; the battery of St. Fernando, -one of its main bulwarks of defence, was unfinished. While the scene -of action was at a distance, the people of Cadiz thought the danger -was remote also; and but for the genius and decision of a single man, -Buonaparte might have executed his threat of taking vengeance there for -the loss of his squadron. - -♦ALBURQUERQUE’S MOVEMENTS.♦ - -At four on the morning of the 24th Alburquerque received that dispatch -from the Central Junta, which, countermanding his march to Seville, -ordered him to make for Cordoba. A counter-order of some kind he seems -to have expected; for, in acknowledging this dispatch, he expressed -his satisfaction that he had not commenced his movements according to -the instructions received the preceding night, in which case he must -have had the inconvenience of a counter-march; at the same time he -said, that the troops which he had directed to garrison Badajoz, and -which he was now ordered to recall, could not join him without great -danger, and without leaving that place defenceless, ... a point of -such importance, that though these orders were positive, he would not -obey them unless they were repeated. At this time he was at Pedroso -de la Sierra, whither he had advanced from Guadalcanal, pursuant to -the first instructions, requiring him to move upon Cordoba. There -was the Guadalquivir to cross, and Alburquerque, not being certain -that his artillery could pass the bridge of Triana, determined to -have it ferried over at Cantillana. He was near that ferry when the -last dispatches reached him, written on the 23d, and repeating the -order to march towards Cordoba: but Alburquerque at this time knew -that the Junta were flying from Seville, though they had given him no -intimation of their design, and knew also that Cordoba must then be in -the enemy’s possession. He did not therefore hesitate for a moment to -disobey orders, which must have led to the destruction of his army, -... an army, in the fate of which, inconsiderable as it was, the fate -of Spain was more essentially involved, than in that of any which she -had yet sent into the field. Having crossed at Cantillana, he made the -main body proceed to Carmona, while he himself, with part of his little -cavalry, advanced towards Ecija, where the French had already arrived, -to ascertain their movements, and if possible alarm them by his own, -and make them suppose that his army covered Seville: but the French -general, as well as Alburquerque, was aware that Seville was a point of -far inferior importance to that upon which the invaders had fixed their -attention; and the enemy were now pushing on the chief part of their -force by El Arahal and Moron to Utrera, in order to cut off the Duke -from Cadiz. The least delay or indecision, from the moment he began his -march, would have proved fatal. Instantly perceiving their object, he -ordered his troops to make for Utrera, where his artillery and cavalry -arrived almost at the same time with the French; from thence he -marched with the infantry by Las Cabezas to Lebrija, across the marsh, -at a season when it was deemed impracticable; thus enabling it to reach -Xerez in time, while the cavalry accompanied the artillery along the -high road, skirmishing as it retreated, delaying the pursuers, and -sacrificing itself for the preservation of the rest of the army and of -Cadiz. On the night of the 30th he performed this march from Utrera to -Lebrija; and on the same night the people of Cadiz were relieved by an -express from him, saying, that he was between them and the French, and -should reach ♦CADIZ SAVED BY ALBURQUERQUE.♦ the city in time to save -it. The following morning he arrived at Xerez, having gained a day’s -march upon the enemy: they found themselves outstript in rapidity, and -outmanœuvred; and on the morning of the 2d of February, Alburquerque, -with his 8000 men, entered the Isle of Leon, having accomplished a -march of sixty-five leagues, 260 English miles. Thus Cadiz was saved. - -♦HE IS APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF CADIZ BY THE PEOPLE.♦ - -Yet the means of defence had been so scandalously neglected, that the -Isle of Leon must have been lost if the French had ventured to make a -spirited attack upon it; and Cadiz would then speedily have shared the -same fate. In general, the French calculate with sufficient confidence -upon the errors of their enemies, ... a confidence which has rarely -deceived them in the field, and has almost invariably succeeded in -negotiation. Here, however, they did not think it possible that works -so essential to the salvation of the government should have been -left unfinished; and, knowing that the troops were under a man whom -they trusted and loved, they knew that, naked, and exhausted, and -half-starved as those troops were, behind walls and ramparts, they -would prove desperate opponents. Having saved this all-important place -by his presence, the Duke lost no time in securing it; he exerted -himself night and day: the people, he says, when they are guided by -their first feelings, usually see things as they are; they blessed him -as their preserver, and he was appointed governor by acclamation. - -♦A JUNTA, ELECTED AT CADIZ.♦ - -While Alburquerque was on his march, a change in the government had -been effected. Venegas had been appointed governor of Cadiz by the -Central Junta, apparently in reward for that blind obedience to their -instructions, which, more than any other circumstance, frustrated Sir -Arthur Wellesley’s victory. Both Mr. Frere and the British general -distrusted his military talents. The people of Cadiz, with less -justice, suspected his fidelity, and he was not without fear that he -might become the victim of suspicion in some fit of popular fury. His -danger became greater as soon as it was known that the Central Junta -had been deposed at Seville, and were flying in various directions; -but Venegas, with prudent foresight, went to the Cabildo, and, saying -that the government from which he had received his appointment existed -no longer, resigned his command into their hands, and offered to -perform any duty to which they should appoint him. This well-timed -submission had all the effect which he could wish; the Cabildo were -flattered by it, the more, because such deference of the military to -the civil authority was altogether unprecedented in that country; and -they requested him to continue in his post, and act as their president, -till a Junta could be elected for the government of the town. Measures -were immediately taken for choosing this Junta, and the election was -made in the fairest manner. A balloting-box was carried from house to -house; the head of every family voted for an electoral body; and this -body, consisting of about threescore persons, then elected the Junta, -who were eighteen in number. A mode of election so perfectly free and -unobjectionable gave to the Junta of Cadiz a proportionate influence -over the people; but they themselves, proud of being, as they imagined, -the only legally-constituted body in Spain, became immediately jealous -of their power, and hostile to the establishment of any other. - -♦RESIGNATION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦ - -It was, however, essential to the salvation of the country that some -government should be established, which would be recognized by the -whole of Spain. The members of the Central Junta, who had arrived in -the Isle of Leon, would fain have continued their functions; they found -it vain to attempt this, and then, yielding to necessity, they suffered -themselves to be guided by Jovellanos, who represented to them the -necessity of appointing a regency, not including any individual of -their own body. Mr. Frere, acting as British minister till Marquis -Wellesley’s successor should arrive, exerted that influence which he so -deservedly possessed, first to enforce the advice of Jovellanos upon -his colleagues, and afterwards to make the Junta of Cadiz assent to -the only measure which could preserve their country from anarchy; but -so little were they disposed to acknowledge any authority except their -own, that, unless the whole influence of the British minister had been -zealously exerted, their acquiescence would not have been obtained. The -Archbishop of Laodicea, who was president of the Central Junta, the -Conde de Altamira, Valdes, and Ovalle, had been seized at Xerez, and -were in imminent danger from the blind fury of the populace, if some -resolute men had not come forward and saved them, by persuading the mob -to put them under custody in the Carthusian convent, as prisoners of -state. They were indebted for their liberation to Castaños, who in this -time of danger had hastened to the Isle of Leon, and took measures for -having them safely conducted thither. Their arrival made the number of -members three-and-twenty; and on the 29th of January this government -issued its last decree. Voluntarily they cannot be said to have laid -down their power, but the same presiding mind which pervaded their -former writings made them resign it with dignity. “Having,” they said, -“reassembled in the Isle of Leon, pursuant to their decree of the -13th, the dangers of the state were greatly augmented, although less -by the progress of the enemy than by internal convulsions. The change -of government which they themselves had announced, but had reserved -for the Cortes to effect, could no longer be deferred without mortal -danger to the country. But that change must not be the act of a single -body, a single place, or a single individual; for in such case, that -which ought to be the work of prudence and of the law, would be the -work of agitation and tumult; and a faction would do that, which ought -only to be done by the whole nation, or by a body lawfully representing -it. The fatal consequences which must result from such disorder were -apparent; there was no wise citizen who did not perceive, no Frenchman -who did not wish for them. If the urgency of present calamities, and -the public opinion which was governed by them, required the immediate -establishment of a Council of Regency, the appointment of that council -belonged to none but the supreme authority, established by the national -will, obeyed by it, and acknowledged by the provinces, the armies, the -allies, and the colonies of Spain; ... the sole legitimate authority, -which represented the unity of the power of the monarchy.” - -♦A REGENCY APPOINTED.♦ - -After this preamble they nominated as regents Don Pedro de Quevedo y -Quintana, Bishop of Orense; D. Francisco de Saavedra, late president -of the Junta of Seville; General Castaños; Don Antonio de Escaño, -minister of marine; and D. Esteban Fernandez de Leon, a member of the -council of the Indies, as representative of the colonies. To these -persons the Junta transferred its authority; providing, however, that -they should only retain it till the Cortes were assembled, who were -then to determine what form of government should be adopted; and that -the means which were thus provided for the ultimate welfare of the -nation might not be defeated, they required that the regents, when they -took their oath to the Junta, should swear also that they would verify -the meeting of the Cortes at the time which had been appointed. The -new government was to be installed on the ♦LAST ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL -JUNTA.♦ third day after this decree. The Junta accompanied it with a -farewell address to the people, condemning the tumult at Seville, and -justifying themselves, like men who felt that they had been unjustly -accused, because they had been unfortunate. Neither their incessant -application to the public weal, they said, had been sufficient to -accomplish what they desired, nor the disinterestedness with which -they had served their country, nor their loyalty to their beloved but -unhappy king, nor their hatred to the tyrant and to every kind of -tyranny. Ambition, and intrigue, and ignorance had been too powerful. -“Ought we,” they said, “to have let the public revenues be plundered, -which base interest and selfishness were seeking to drain off by a -thousand ways? Could we satisfy the ambition of those who did not think -themselves sufficiently rewarded with three or four steps of promotion -in as many months? or, could we, notwithstanding the moderation which -has been the character of our government, forbear to correct, with the -authority of the law, the faults occasioned by that spirit of faction, -which was audaciously proceeding to destroy order, introduce anarchy, -and miserably overthrow the state?” - -Then drawing a rapid sketch of the exertions which they had made -since they were driven from Aranjuez, ... “Events,” they said, “have -been unsuccessful, ... but was the fate of battles in our hands? And -when these reverses are remembered, why should it be forgotten that -we have maintained our intimate relations with the friendly powers; -that we have drawn closer the bonds of fraternity with our Americas; -and that we have resisted with dignity the perfidious overtures of -the usurper? But nothing could restrain the hatred which, from the -hour of its installation, was sworn against the Junta. Its orders -were always ill interpreted, and never well obeyed.” Then, touching -upon the insults and dangers to which they had been exposed in the -insurrection at Seville, ... “Spaniards,” they continued, “thus it is -that those men have been persecuted and defamed, whom you chose for -your representatives; they who without guards, without troops, without -punishments, confiding themselves to the public faith, exercised -tranquilly, under its protection, those august functions with which you -had invested them! And who are they, mighty God! who persecute them? -the same who, from its installation, have laboured to destroy the Junta -from its foundations; the same who have introduced disorder into the -cities, division into the armies, insubordination into the constituted -authorities. The individuals of the government are neither perfect nor -impeccable; they are men, and as such liable to human weakness and -error. But as public administrators, as your representatives, they will -reply to the imputations of these agitators, and show them where good -faith and patriotism have been found, and where ambitious passions, -which incessantly have destroyed the bowels of the country. Reduced -from henceforward by our own choice to the rank of simple citizens, -without any other reward than the remembrance of the zeal and of the -labours which we have employed in the public service, we are ready, or, -more truly, we are anxious, to reply to our calumniators before the -Cortes, or the tribunal which it shall appoint. Let them fear, not us; -let them fear, who have seduced the simple, corrupted the vile, and -agitated the furious; let them fear, who, in the moment of the greatest -danger, when the edifice of the state could scarce resist the shock -from without, have applied to it the torch of dissension, to reduce it -to ashes. Remember, Spaniards, the fate of Porto! an internal tumult, -excited by the French themselves, opened its gates to Soult, who did -not advance to occupy it till a popular tumult had rendered its defence -impossible. The Junta warned you against a similar fate after the -battle of Medellin, when symptoms appeared of that discord which has -now with such hazard declared itself. Recover yourselves, and do not -accomplish these mournful presentiments! - -“Strong, however, as we are in the testimony of our own consciences, -and secure in that we have done for the good of the state as much as -circumstances placed within our power, the country and our own honour -demand from us the last proof of our zeal, and require us to lay down -an authority, the continuance of which might draw on new disturbances -and dissensions. Yes, Spaniards, your government, which, from the -hour of its installation, has omitted nothing which it believed could -accomplish the public wish; which, as a faithful steward, has given -to all the resources that have reached its hands no other destination -than the sacred wants of the country; which has frankly published its -proceedings; and which has evinced the greatest proof of its desire for -your welfare, by convoking a Cortes more numerous and free than any -which the monarchy has ever yet witnessed, resigns willingly the power -and authority which you have confided to it, and transfers them to the -Council of Regency, which it has established by the decree of this -day. May your new governors be more fortunate in their proceedings! and -the individuals of the Supreme Junta will envy them nothing but the -glory of having saved their country, and delivered their King.” - -Thus terminated the unfortunate but ever-memorable administration -of the Central Junta, a body which had become as odious before its -dissolution, as it was popular when it was first installed. If in -their conduct there had been much to condemn and much to regret, it -may be admitted, upon a calm retrospect, that there was hardly less -to be applauded and admired. Spain will hereafter render justice to -their intentions, and remember with gratitude that this was the first -government which addressed the Spaniards as a free people, the first -to sanction those constitutional principles of liberty which had for -so many generations been suppressed. It was to be expected, when such -tremendous events were passing, and such momentous interests at stake, -that their errors would be judged of by their consequences without -reference to their causes. An unsuccessful administration is always -unpopular; and in perilous and suspicious times, when the affairs of -state go ill, what is the effect of misjudgement, or weakness, or -inevitable circumstances, is too commonly and too readily imputed -to deliberate treason. Such an opinion had very generally prevailed -against the Central Junta; but when this power was at an end, and -nothing would have gratified the people more than the exposure and -punishment of the guilty, not even the shadow of proof could be found -against them. They were inexperienced in business, they had been -trained up in prejudice, they partook, as was to be expected, of the -defects of the national character; but they partook, and some of -them in the highest degree, of its virtues also: and their generous -feeling, their high-mindedness, and unshaken fortitude, may command an -Englishman’s respect, if it be contrasted not merely with the conduct -of the continental courts, but with the recorded sentiments of that -party in our own state, who, during this arduous contest, represented -the struggle as hopeless, and whose language, though it failed either -to dispirit or to disgust the Spaniards, served most certainly to -encourage the enemy. England has had abundant cause to be grateful to -Providence, but never, in these latter times, has it had greater than -for escaping, more than once, the imminent danger of having this party -for its rulers. They would have deserted the last, the truest, of our -allies; they would have betrayed the last, the only hope of Europe and -of the world; they would have sacrificed our honour first, and when -they had brought home the war to our own doors, which their measures -inevitably must have done, the lasting infamy which they had entailed -upon the nation would have been a worse evil than the dreadful and -perilous trial through which it would have had to pass. - -♦1810. FEBRUARY. - -THE REGENTS.♦ - -In their choice of the regents the Junta seem to have looked for the -fittest persons, without regard to any other considerations. Three -of them were well known. The Bishop of Orense was venerable for his -public conduct, as well as for his age and exemplary virtues; no man -had contributed more signally to rouse and maintain the spirit of -the country. Castaños had received from the Junta a species of ill -treatment which was in the spirit of the old government, but for -which they made amends by this appointment. When he was ordered as a -sort of banishment to his own house at Algeziras, the people of that -place, greatly to their honour, mounted a volunteer guard before the -house, as a mark of respect; and the Junta, in the last days of their -administration, when they turned their eyes about in distress, called -upon him to take the command, and resume the rank of captain-general -of the four kingdoms of Andalusia. The call was too late, but he came -to the Isle of Leon in time to rescue some members of that body from -the populace of Xerez; and in nominating him to the regency, they -seem to have consulted the wishes of the people. Saavedra was in full -popularity, and had given good proof of disinterested zeal during -the tumult at Seville. Instead of securing his private property, he -occupied himself in calming the people, and in preserving the public -treasure and the more valuable public records; and as there was a -want of vessels, he embarked the public property on board the one -which had been hired for his own effects. Escaño had been minister of -marine at Madrid, and was known as a man of business and fidelity. -Leon’s appointment was not agreeable to the Junta of Cadiz, who felt -their power, and were determined to derive from it as much advantage as -possible; he therefore declined accepting the office on the plea of ill -health, and D. Miguel de Lardizabal y Ariba, a native of the province -of Tlaxcalla, in New Spain, and member of the council of the Indies, -was appointed in his stead. - -♦THEIR INJUSTICE TOWARDS THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦ - -A government was thus formed, which, receiving its authority from the -Supreme Junta, derived it ultimately from the same lawful source, ... -the choice of the people and the necessity of the state. In such times, -and in a nation which attaches a sort of religious reverence to forms, -it was of prime importance that the legitimacy of the new government -should be apparent, and its right of succession clear and indisputable. -For this Spain was principally indebted to Jovellanos, the last and not -the least service which that irreproachable and excellent man rendered -to his country. But it was the fate of Jovellanos, notwithstanding -the finest talents, the most diligent discharge of duty, the purest -patriotism, and the most unsullied honour, to be throughout his life -the victim of the unhappy circumstances of Spain. Seven years’ -imprisonment, by the will and pleasure of the despicable Godoy, was a -light evil compared with the injustice which he now endured from that -government which he, more than any other individual, had contributed -to appoint and to legitimate. The council of Castille, which first -acknowledged the Intruder, and then acknowledged the Junta, in the -same time-serving spirit attacked the Junta now that it was fallen, -affirmed that its power had been a violent usurpation, which the -nation had rather tolerated than consented to, and that the members -had exercised this usurped power contrary to law, and with the most -open and notorious selfishness and ambition. The people, not contented -with their compulsory resignation, accused them of having peculated the -public money; and the regency, yielding to the temper of the times, -and perhaps courting popularity, acted as if it believed this charge, -registered their effects, and seized their papers. Even Jovellanos was -ordered to retire to his own province, which happened at that time to -be free from the enemy, and there place himself under the inspection -of the magistrates. This act is inexpiably disgraceful to those from -whom it proceeded; upon Jovellanos it could entail no disgrace. He had -long learnt to bear oppression, and patiently to suffer wrong; but this -injury came with the sting of ingratitude, it struck him to the heart, -and embittered his few remaining days. - -This rigorous treatment of the Central Junta was the work of their -implacable enemy, the council of Castille, a body which they ought -to have dissolved and branded for its submission to the Intruder; -and of the Junta of Cadiz, a corporation equally daring and selfish, -who thought that in proportion as they could blacken the character -of the former government, they should increase their own credit -with the people. The members of that government had given the best -proof of innocence; not one of them had gone over to the enemy, nor -even attempted to conceal himself at a time when the popular hatred -against them had been violently excited. Several of them had embarked -on board a Spanish frigate for the Canaries; when their baggage was -seized, it was, at their own request, examined before the crew, and -the examination proved that they had scarcely the means of performing -the voyage with tolerable comfort. Tilly died in prison without a -trial. This was a thoroughly worthless man, and it might probably have -appeared that he had found means of enriching himself when he was sent, -in the manner of the republican commissioners in France, to superintend -the army which defeated Dupont. But Calvo, who was arrested also and -thrown into a dungeon, without a bed to lie on or a change of linen, -and whose wife also was put in confinement, was irreproachable in his -public character. He had been one of the prime movers of that spirit -which has sanctified the name of Zaragoza, and during the first siege -repeatedly led the inhabitants against the French. All his papers had -been seized; he repeatedly called upon the regency to print every one -of them, to publish his accounts, and bring him to a public trial; but -he was no more attended to than if he had been in the Seven Towers of -Constantinople. After the Cortes assembled he obtained a trial, and was -pronounced innocent. - -♦PROCLAMATION OF THE INTRUDER.♦ - -The Intruder, following his armies, and thinking to obtain possession -of Cadiz, and destroy the legitimate government of Spain, issued a -proclamation at Cordoba, characterized by the impiety and falsehood -which marked the whole proceedings of the French in this atrocious -usurpation. “The moment was arrived,” he said, “when the Spaniards -could listen with advantage to the truths which he was about to utter. -During more than a century the force of circumstances, which masters -all events, had determined that Spain should be the friend and ally of -France. When an extraordinary revolution hurled from the throne the -house which reigned in France, it was the duty of the Spanish branch to -support it, and not lay down its arms until it was re-established. But -it required a spirit of heroism to adopt such a resolution, and the -cabinet of Madrid thought it better to wait for that from the progress -of time, which it wanted courage to obtain by arms.” This truth, for -such the Intruder might well call this part of the proclamation, marks, -as much as the falsehoods which accompanied it, the devilish spirit -by which the French councils had long been possessed; having allured -the Spanish Bourbons by oaths and treaties to their own destruction, -France now reproached them with the very conduct which she had tempted -them to pursue. The paper proceeded to affirm, that, during its whole -alliance with France, Spain had been watching an opportunity of falling -upon her. “The conqueror of Europe,” it continued, “would not allow -himself to be duped. The princes of the house of Spain, not having -the courage to fight, renounced the crown, and were content to make -stipulations for their private interests. The Spanish grandees, the -generals, the chiefs of the nation, recognized those treaties. I,” -said the Intruder, “received their oaths at Madrid, but the occurrence -at Baylen threw every thing into confusion. The timid became alarmed, -but the enlightened and conscientious remained true to me. A new -continental war, and the assistance of England, prolonged an unequal -contest, of which the nation feels all the horrors. The issue was never -doubtful, and the fate of arms has now declared so. If tranquillity -is not immediately restored, who can foresee the consequence? It is -the interest of France to preserve Spain entire and independent, if -she become again her friend and ally; but if she continue her enemy, -it is the duty of France to weaken, to dismember, and to destroy her. -God, who reads the hearts of men, knows with what view I thus address -you. Spaniards! the irrevocable destiny is not yet pronounced. Cease -to suffer yourselves to be duped by the common enemy. Employ your -understanding: it will point out to you in the French troops, friends -who are ready to defend you. It is yet time: rally around me! and may -this open to Spain a new era of glory and happiness.” - -♦LANGUAGE OF THE DESPONDENTS IN ENGLAND.♦ - -If the Spaniards had had as little wisdom, or as little sense of -national honour, as the party who opposed the measures of government -in England, they would have believed the Intruder, and submitted to -him. This party, who, at the time of Sir John Moore’s retreat, told us -that the Spaniards had then yielded, and that their fate was decided, -now declared, with a little more prudence in their predictions, that -the show of resistance must soon be at an end. The king’s message, -declaring that Great Britain would continue its assistance to the -great cause of Spain, as the most important considerations of policy -and of good faith required, excited in them the gloomiest forebodings. -“We were then still,” they said, “to cling to the forlorn hope of -maintaining a footing in Portugal! Our resources were still farther -to be drained in supporting our ally, or rather in supporting a system -which did not arouse its own people to its defence; and for our -efforts, however strenuous, in the support of which we did not receive -either their gratitude or their co-operation. It was reported,” they -said, “that the English army had made a retrograde movement to Lisbon, -and actually embarked in the transports at the mouth of the Tagus. -Having uniformly declared their opinion, that this expedition, under -Lord Wellington, was injurious to the most important interests of the -country, as they affected both its resources and its character, they -should most sincerely and warmly congratulate the public if such were -its termination.” That is, they would have congratulated us if we had -broken our faith, deserted our allies, fled before our enemies, left -Buonaparte to obtain possession of Cadiz and Lisbon, and then waited -tremblingly for him upon our own shores, with our resources carefully -husbanded till it pleased him to come and take them! - -“It has been conjectured,” said these hopeful politicians, “that Cadiz -might be abundantly supplied from the opposite coast of Barbary. But -those who hazarded this opinion were not precisely informed of the -state of things on the African coast. The Emperor of Morocco was -extremely unfriendly to his Christian neighbours. Cadiz, to be sure, -was an interesting point, which it was our interest to maintain as -long as possible; but they had no expectation that Cadiz, when really -attacked, could long hold out. It could not be supplied with fuel with -which to bake bread for the inhabitants for one week.” While this party -thus displayed their presumptuous ignorance, and vented their bitter -mortification in insults against the ministry and against our allies, -they endeavoured to direct attention toward the Spanish colonies, -saying that the great, and indeed only object, of this country, should -be to establish a mercantile connexion with the empire which was to -be erected there, and recommending that we should take immediate -measures for assisting the emigration of the Spanish patriots! Happily -the councils of Great Britain were directed by wiser heads, and the -people of Spain actuated by better principles and by a braver spirit. -“We are supported,” said Romana to his countrymen, “by the illustrious -English nation, who are united with the brave Portugueze, our brethren, -possessing a common interest with ourselves, and who never will abandon -us.” The people and the government had the same confidence in British -honour. English and Portugueze troops were dispatched from Lisbon to -assist in the defence of Cadiz, and Ceuta was delivered in trust to an -English garrison. - -♦THE ISLE OF LEON.♦ - -The Isle of Leon forms an irregular triangle, of which the longest side -is separated from the main land by a channel, called the river of -Santi Petri, ten miles in length, and navigable for the largest ships. -This side is strongly fortified, and the situation also is peculiarly -strong. The bridge of Zuazo, built originally by the Romans, over the -channel, is flanked with batteries, and communicates with the continent -by a causeway over impassable marshes. There are two towns upon the -island; that which bears the same name, and which contains about 40,000 -inhabitants, is nearly in the middle of the isle; the other, called -St. Carlos, which stands a little to the north, was newly erected, and -consisted chiefly of barracks and other public buildings. Cadiz stands -on the end of a tongue of land seven miles in length, extending from -the isle into the bay; this isthmus is from a quarter to half a mile -broad, flanked on one side by the sea, and on the other by the bay of -Cadiz. Along this isthmus, an enemy who had made himself master of -the island must pass; new batteries had been formed, new works thrown -up, and mines dug; and if these obstacles were overcome, his progress -would then be opposed by regular fortifications, upon which the utmost -care and expense had been bestowed for rendering the city impregnable. -Before this unexpected and unexampled aggression on the part of France, -the great object of the Spanish government had been to render Cadiz -secure from the sea: as soon, therefore, as the approach of the enemy -was certain, one of the first operations was to demolish all those -works on the main land from whence the shipping could be annoyed. This -was a precaution which Admiral Purvis had strongly advised after the -battle of Medellin, and again as soon as the more ruinous defeat of -Areizaga was known. Upon the first report that the enemy were hastening -toward Cadiz, in the hope of surprising it, he requested Admiral Alava -to remove the ships, and place them in the lower part of the harbour, -where they might be secure; but it was not till Mr. Frere had strongly -urged the necessity of this precaution that the Spanish Admiral, after -much reasoning on his part, reluctantly complied. The ill spirit which -at this time prevailed among the naval officers arose rather from -the pitiable situation in which they found themselves, than from any -predilection for the French, or the more natural feeling of hostility -toward the English in which they had grown up. Men being wanted for -the land service, and not for the fleet, the navy had been neglected -during this contest: the ships were ill manned and miserably stored, -the pay far in arrears; and the officers had latterly disregarded their -duty as much as they thought themselves disregarded by the government, -... hopelessness producing discontent, and discontent growing into -disaffection. This temper could produce no ill effect when the regency -and the people were so well disposed. The fleet was removed in time; -and the hulks also in which the miserable prisoners were confined were -moved lower down into the bay, and moored under the guns of the English -and Spanish ships. - -The British Admiral had represented in time how important it was that -the batteries on the north side of the harbour should be kept in an -efficient state. The danger now was from the land side, not from the -sea, and by good fortune the land quarter had been strengthened some -fifty years before, at a cost and with a care which had then been -deemed superfluous. But the Spanish government had not forgotten -that it was on that side Essex had made his attack, and England was -the enemy against whom those precautions were taken. At that time -every villa and garden upon the isthmus had been destroyed. During -after-years of security the ground had again been covered, and was now -to be cleared again. The Spaniards, roused by the exertions and example -of Alburquerque, as much as by the immediate danger, laboured at the -works, and carefully removed every building on the isthmus. Night and -day these labours were carried on, and the sound of explosions was -almost perpetual. The wood from the demolished buildings was taken into -the city for fuel. - -♦VICTOR SUMMONS THE JUNTA OF CADIZ.♦ - -Marshal Victor, before he understood how well the isle was secured, -sent a summons to the Junta of Cadiz, telling them he was ready to -receive their submission to King Joseph. Jaen, Cordova, Seville, -and Granada, he said, had received the French with joy; he expected -the same reception from the people of Cadiz; and as the fleets and -arsenals were the property of the nation, he demanded that they -should be preserved for their rightful sovereign. They returned an -answer, signed by every individual of their body, declaring that they -acknowledged no one for King of Spain but Ferdinand VII. Soult, also, -representing the English as the enemies of Spain, insinuated, in a -summons to Alburquerque, that it was their intention to seize Cadiz -for themselves. Alburquerque replied, no such design was entertained -by the British nation, who were not less generous than they were great -and brave; their only object was to assist in the defence of Cadiz with -all the means in which they abounded, an assistance which the Spaniards -solicited and gratefully received. Cadiz, he added, had nothing to -fear from a force of 100,000 men; the Spaniards knew that the French -commanded no more than the ground which they covered, and they would -never lay down their arms till they had effected the deliverance of -their country. - -♦ILL-WILL OF THE JUNTA TOWARDS ALBURQUERQUE.♦ - -The service which Alburquerque had rendered was so signal, and its -importance so perfectly understood by all the people of Cadiz, that -he was deservedly looked upon as the saviour of the place. Having -been appointed governor in obedience to the general wish, he became -in consequence president of the Junta, as Venegas had been before -him, whose obedient policy was now rewarded by the highest station -to which a subject could be appointed, that of viceroy of Mexico. -Alburquerque had not solicited these appointments; on the contrary, he -remonstrated against them, pointing out how impossible it was, that, -having the command of the army, he could attend to other duties at the -same time; and in consequence of his representations, D. Andres Lopez -de Sagastizabel was nominated to act as his deputy in both capacities. -The Junta of Cadiz had obtained their power unexceptionably, but no -men ever made a more unworthy use of it; they had reluctantly assented -to the formation of the regency, and when it was formed, endeavoured -to restrain and overrule it, and engross as much authority as possible -to themselves, in which, unhappily for Spain, and more unhappily for -Spanish America, they were but too successful. Alburquerque became the -marked object of their dislike, because he had recognised the regency -at a moment when, if he had hesitated, they would have struggled to -get the whole power of government into their own hands. That spirit, -which had never condescended to conceal its indignant contempt for -Godoy, could not stoop to court the favour of a Junta of mercantile -monopolists. Not that he despised them as such; his mind was too full -of noble enterprises to bestow a thought upon them, otherwise than as -men who were called upon to do their duty while he did his. - -♦THE TROOPS NEGLECTED.♦ - -His first business had been to complete the unfinished works of -defence, especially the _cortadura_, or cut across the isthmus, where -the battery of St. Fernando was erected; and lest any attempt should -be made to pass beside it at low water, the iron gratings from the -windows of the public buildings were removed, and placed on the beach -as a chevaux-de-frise. While these things were going on, the people -of Cadiz manifested a disgraceful indolence; they assembled in crowds -on the ramparts, wrapt in their long cloaks, and there stood gazing -silently for hours, while the English were employed in blowing up -the forts round the bay; appearing, says an eye-witness, indifferent -spectators of the events around them, rather than the persons for whose -security these exertions were made. Meantime the troops, whose rapid -march had placed these idlers out of fear, were neglected in a manner -not less cruel to the individuals than it was detrimental to the public -service. The points to be protected were so many, that the numbers of -this little army did not suffice to guard them, without exhausting the -men by double duty. Alburquerque requested that the regiments might be -filled from the numberless idle inhabitants of the isle and of Cadiz, -who, while they were idle, were at such a time worse than useless. -Unless this were done, he said, it was not only impossible for his men -to undertake any offensive operations, or even to improve themselves in -discipline, but they must be wasted away with fatigue and consequent -infirmities. These representations were in vain; neither was he more -successful in requiring their pay, a supply of clothing, of which they -stood evidently in need, and those common comforts in their quarters, -which were as requisite for health as for decency. The Junta of Cadiz -had seven hundred pieces of cloth in their possession, yet more than -a month elapsed, and nothing was done toward clothing the almost -naked troops. Alburquerque asserts, as a fact within his own positive -knowledge, that the reason was, because the Junta were at that time -contending with the Regency, to get the management of the public money -into their own hands, and meant, if they had failed, to sell this cloth -to the government, and make a profit upon it, as merchants, of eight -reales _per vara_! - -♦ALBURQUERQUE APPLIES TO THE REGENCY IN THEIR BEHALF.♦ - -It is not to be supposed that the Junta were idle at this time; they -had many and urgent duties to attend to; but no duty could be more -urgent than that of supplying the wants and increasing the force of -the army. The Duke applied to them in vain for six weeks, during which -time he discovered that the Junta looked as much to their private -interest as to the public weal; for from the beginning, he says, their -aim was to get the management of the public expenditure, not merely for -the sake of the influence which accompanies it, but that they might -repay themselves the sums which they had lent, and make their own -advantage by trading with the public money. At length he applied to -the Regency. The regents, feeling how little influence they possessed -over the Junta, advised the Duke to publish the memorial which he -had presented to them, thinking that it would excite the feelings -of the people. In this they were not deceived; ... the people, now -for the first time called upon to relieve the wants of the soldiers, -exerted themselves liberally, and there was not a family in which some -contribution was not made for the defenders of the country. But the -Junta were exasperated to the last degree by this measure, which their -own culpable neglect had rendered necessary. Alburquerque’s memorial -contained no complaint against them; it only stated the wants of the -soldiers, and requested that, unless those wants were supplied, he -might be relieved from a command, the duties of which, under such -circumstances, it was not possible for him to perform. Though he was -persuaded of their selfish views, he had no design of exposing an -evil which there was no means of remedying; and when he understood -how violently they were offended, he addressed a letter to them, -disclaiming any intention of inculpating them, in terms which nothing -but his earnest desire of avoiding all dissensions that might prove -injurious to the country could ♦THE JUNTA ATTACK ALBURQUERQUE.♦ either -dictate or justify. This did not prevent the Junta from publishing an -attack upon him, in reply, of the most virulent nature. They reproached -him with having exposed the wants and weakness of the army; entered -into details as frivolous in themselves as they were false in their -application, to show that they had done every thing for the soldiers; -declared, with an impudence of ingratitude which it is not possible -to reprobate in severer terms than it deserves, that his cavalry had -retreated too precipitately, and ought to have brought in grain with -them; and concluded by a menacing intimation, that the people of Cadiz -were ready to support them against any persons who should attempt to -impeach their proceedings. If the Junta of Cadiz had no other sins -to answer for, this paper alone would be sufficient to render their -name odious in history; so unprovoked was it in its temper, so false -in its details, so detestable for its ingratitude. Had Alburquerque -been capable of consulting his own safety by a precipitate retreat, -Portugal, as he said, and the English army were at hand, ... and he -needed not to have undertaken an arduous march of 260 miles in the -face of a superior enemy, and in direct disobedience of the orders -of his government. If the cavalry which saved Cadiz, and which they -thus wantonly accused of retreating too precipitately, had been even a -quarter of an hour later, it could not have entered the Isle of Leon. -“This,” said the indignant Duke, “is the patriotism of the Junta of -Cadiz; the enemy is at the gates, and they throw out a defiance to the -general and the army who protect them!” - -♦HE RESIGNS THE COMMAND.♦ - -But Alburquerque was too sincere a lover of his country to expose it to -the slightest danger, even for the sake of his own honour. He could -not resent this infamous attack without exciting a perilous struggle; -and without resenting it he felt it impossible to remain at the head of -the army. Having thus been publicly insulted, a reparation as public -was necessary to his honour, and that reparation, for the sake of -Spain, he delayed to demand. The Regency would have had him continue -in the command; he however persisted in resigning. No injustice which -could be done him, he said, would ever have made him cease to present -himself in the front of danger, had he not been compelled to withdraw -for fear of the fatal consequences of internal discord. Accordingly, he -who should have been leading, and who would have led, the men who loved -him to victory, came over to England as ambassador, with a wounded -spirit and a broken heart. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIX. - - ATTEMPTS TO DELIVER FERDINAND. OVERTURES FOR A NEGOTIATION MADE - THROUGH HOLLAND. PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT CONCERNING PORTUGAL. - REFORM OF THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY. - - -♦1810.♦ - -♦THE REGENCY.♦ - -The regency was acknowledged without hesitation in those provinces -which were not yet overrun by the enemy, and every where by those -Spaniards who resisted the usurpation; yet with the authority which -they derived from the Supreme Junta a portion of its unpopularity had -descended upon them. The necessity of their appointment was perceived, -and the selection of the members was not disapproved: in fact, public -opinion had in a great degree directed the choice; nevertheless, when -they were chosen, a feeling seemed to prevail that the men upon whom -that unfortunate body had devolved their power could not be worthy of -the national confidence. Like their predecessors, they were in fact -surrounded by the same system of sycophancy and intrigue which had -subsisted under the monarchy. The same swarm was about them: it was -a state plague with which Spain had been afflicted from the age of -the Philips. Hence it came to pass that the national force, instead -of being invigorated by the concentration of legitimate power, was -sometimes paralysed by it. For if a fairer prospect appeared to open -in the provinces where the people had been left to themselves and to -chiefs of their own choosing, too often when a communication was opened -with the seat of government, this unwholesome influence was felt in the -appointment of some inefficient general, who was perhaps a stranger to -the province which he was sent to command. - -A central government was, however, indispensable, as a means of -communication first with England, and eventually with other states, -but more especially as keeping together the whole body of the monarchy -both in Europe and in America. The Spanish nation was not more sensible -of this than the British ministry. The French, and they who, like the -French, reasoning upon the principles of a philosophy as false as it -is degrading, believe that neither states nor individuals are ever -directed in their conduct by the disinterested sense of honour and of -duty, supposed that the continuance of these temporary administrations -must be conformable to the wishes of the British cabinet, whose -influence would be in proportion to the weakness and precarious tenure -of those who held the government in Spain. But that cabinet had no -covert designs; they acted upon the principle of a plain, upright, -open policy, which deserves, and will obtain, the approbation of just -posterity; and so far were they from pursuing any system of selfish -and low-minded cunning, that at this time, when the regency was formed, -they were taking measures for effecting the deliverance of Ferdinand -from captivity. - -♦SCHEMES FOR DELIVERING FERDINAND.♦ - -Montijo, before his hostility to the Junta was openly declared, had -proposed a scheme to them for this purpose; but he was too well known -to be trusted, and when he required as a preliminary measure that -50,000 dollars should be given him, Calvo, who was the member appointed -to hear what he might propose, plainly told him that his object was -to employ that sum in raising a sedition against the government; upon -which Montijo told him that he had a good scent, and thus the matter -ended. A similar proposal was made by some adventurer in Catalonia; the -provincial government was disposed to listen to it, but they referred -it to General Doyle, and he soon ascertained that the projector only -wanted to get money and ♦BARON DE KOLLI’S ATTEMPT.♦ decamp with it. -Meantime the British ministers had formed a well-concerted plan, -but dependent upon some fearful contingencies, ... the fidelity of -every one to whom in its course of performance it must necessarily be -communicated, and the disposition of Ferdinand to put his life upon the -hazard in the hope of recovering his liberty and his throne. The Baron -de Kolli, who was the person chosen for this perilous service, was one -who in other secret missions had proved himself worthy of confidence. -He took with him for credentials the letter in which Ferdinand’s -marriage in the year 1802 had been announced by Charles IV. to the King -of England, and also letters in Latin and in French from the King, -communicating to the prisoner the state of affairs in Spain, and saying -how important it was that he should escape from captivity, and show -himself in the midst of his faithful people. A squadron, commanded by -Sir George Cockburn, landed Kolli in Quiberon Bay, and to that part of -the coast Ferdinand was to have directed his flight, for which every -needful and possible provision had been made, measures having also been -devised for sending the pursuers upon a wrong scent. The scheme had -been well laid, and with such apparent probability of success, that it -is said the Duke of Kent requested permission to take ♦KOLLI’S MEMOIRS, -39.♦ upon himself the danger of the attempt. The squadron was provided -with every thing which could conduce to the convenience and comfort of -Ferdinand and his brother; with this view a Roman Catholic priest had -been embarked, with a regular set of ornaments and consecrated plate -for the Romish service. - -Kolli made his way to Paris, completed his arrangements, and was -arrested at Vincennes within a fortnight from the day whereon he -landed. He had been betrayed by a pretended royalist in the pay of -the British government, and by the Sieur Richard, whom he had trusted -because he had served bravely under the unfortunate ♦1810. MARCH.♦ -Prince de Talmont in La Vendée. His credentials and his other papers -were seized; and when he was examined by Fouché, who was then minister -of police, he had the mortification of being told that the character -of the person for whose service he had thus exposed himself had been -entirely mistaken, for that no credentials would induce Ferdinand to -hazard such an attempt. It was afterwards proposed to him, that as his -life and the fortune of his children were at stake, he should proceed -to Valençay, and execute his commission, to the end that he might hear -from Ferdinand’s own lips his disavowal of any connexion with England, -... or that if that prince really entertained a wish to escape, an -opportunity might be given him of which the French government might -make such use as it deemed best. Kolli rejected this with becoming -spirit; and the purpose of the police was just as well answered by -sending Richard to personate him. But Ferdinand no sooner understood -the ostensible object of his visitor, than he informed the governor of -Valençay that an English emissary was in the castle. - -It is very possible that Ferdinand may have perceived something -in Richard’s manner more likely to excite suspicion than to win -confidence; for the man was not a proficient in villany, and not -having engaged in it voluntarily, may have felt some compunction -concerning the business whereon he was sent. His instructions were, if -he should succeed in entrapping Ferdinand, to bring him straight to -Vincennes, there probably to have been placed in close confinement: the -supposition that a tragedy like that of the Duc D’Enghein was intended -cannot be admitted without supposing in Buonaparte far greater respect -for the personal character of his victim than he could possibly have -entertained. An official report was published, containing a letter -in Ferdinand’s name, wherein the project for his escape was called -scandalous and infernal, and a hope expressed that the authors and -accomplices of it might be punished as they deserved. Other papers were -published at the same time, with the same obvious design of exposing -Ferdinand to the indignation or contempt of his countrymen and of his -allies. There was a letter of congratulation to the Emperor Napoleon -upon his victories in Austria; an expression of gratitude for his -protection, and of implicit obedience to his wishes and commands; -details of a fête which he had given just before this occurrence in -honour of the Emperor’s marriage with the Archduchess Maria Louisa; and -a letter requesting an interview with the governor of Valençay upon a -subject of the greatest moment to himself, being his wish to become -the adopted son of the Emperor, an adoption which, the writer said, -would constitute the happiness of his life, and of which he conceived -himself worthy by his perfect love and attachment to the sacred person -of his majesty, and entire submission to his intentions ♦1810. APRIL.♦ -and desires. But it was so notoriously the system of Buonaparte’s -government to publish any falsehoods which might serve a present -purpose, that these letters, whether genuine or fabricated, obtained no -credit[9]. - -As soon as the official report appeared in the English newspapers, Mr. -Whitbread asked in the House of Commons whether the letter purporting -to be written by his Majesty to Ferdinand VII. was to be looked upon as -a document which had any pretensions to the character of authenticity? -a question which Mr. Perceval declined answering. Of course this -afforded a topic for exultation and insult to the opponents of the -government. The Spaniards felt very differently upon the occasion. -Whether those who were desirous of forming a new constitution for -Spain, or even of correcting the inveterate abuses of the old system, -thought it desirable to see Ferdinand in possession of the throne, -before their object was effected, may well be doubted; but whatever -their opinions might be upon that point, the attempt at delivering -him excited no other feelings than those of gratitude and admiration -towards Great Britain. ♦ESPAÑOL, T. I. 120.♦ “With what pleasure,” said -the best and wisest of their writers, “does the good man who observes -the mazes of political events, behold one transaction of which humanity -alone was the end and aim! With what interest does he contemplate an -expedition intended, not for speculations of commerce, nor for objects -of ambition, but for the deliverance of a captive King, in the hope of -restoring him to his throne and to his people!” - -♦OVERTURES FOR PEACE.♦ - -The British cabinet was sounded to see whether it would offer such -compensations and exchange of prisoners as might extricate Kolli from -his perilous situation. This curious proposal was connected with some -insidious overtures for peace made then, partly for the purpose of -deceiving the French people into a belief that the continuance of the -war was owing alone to the inveterate feeling of hostility in England; -but more with the design of preparing the Dutch for the annexation of -their country to the French empire, an intention which was first avowed -in these overtures. Louis Buonaparte was drawn into this transaction -by a solemn assurance that no such intention was really entertained; -but that it was held forth merely as a feint, in the hope of alarming -the British government, and inducing it to make peace, for the sake -of averting a political union, which of all measures must be most -dangerous to England. The overture was properly rejected upon the -ground, that it would be useless, or worse than useless, to open a -negotiation when it was certain that insurmountable difficulties must -occur in its first stage. A few weeks only elapsed before the purpose -which had been solemnly disavowed by Buonaparte’s ministers to Louis -was carried into effect, by a compulsory treaty, in which that poor -king ceded to France the provinces of Zealand and Dutch Brabant, the -territory between the Maas and the Waal, including Nimeguen, together -with the Bommelwaard and the territory of Altena, inasmuch as it -had been adopted for a constitutional principle in France that the -_thalweg_ or stream of the Rhine formed the boundary of the French -empire. About two months after this act of insolent and wanton power an -army was ordered into Holland to complete the usurpation, and Louis, -giving the only proof of integrity and courage which was possible in -his unhappy circumstances, abdicated the throne, and retired into -the Austrian dominions, leaving behind him a letter to the Dutch -legislature, which contained a full vindication of his own conduct, -and an exposure of Napoleon’s traitorous policy, which, given as it was -in the most cautious language, and with a remainder of respect and even -brotherly affection, might alone suffice to stamp the character[10] of -that brother with lasting infamy. During his short and miserable reign -Louis had done what, considering in what manner he had been placed -upon the throne, it might have seemed almost impossible that he should -do, he had gained the affections of the Dutch people; not by any good -which he did, for his tyrannical brother neither allowed him time nor -means for effecting the benevolent measures which he designed, but -by the interest which he took in their sufferings, and by his honest -endeavours to prevent or mitigate those acts of tyranny which were -intended to increase the distress of a ruined country, and prepare it -for this catastrophe. - -♦BUONAPARTE’S INTENTION OF ESTABLISHING A WESTERN EMPIRE.♦ - -The conquest of Holland had been an old object of French ambition; -but wider views than Louis XIV. entertained during the springtide of -his prosperity were at this time disclosed ♦FEB. 17.♦ by Buonaparte. -A _senatus consultum_ appeared early in the year, decreeing that the -Papal States should be united to, and form an integral part of the -French empire. The city of Rome was declared to be the second in the -empire (Amsterdam was named the third); the Prince Imperial was to take -the title of King of Rome, and the Emperors, after having been crowned -in the church of Notre Dame at Paris, were before the tenth year of -their reign to be crowned in St. Peter’s also. The measures that were -designed to follow upon this decree were unequivocally intimated, in -that semi-official manner by which Buonaparte’s schemes of ambition -were always first announced. “The Roman and German imperial dignity,” -it was said, “which, with regard to Rome, had long been an empty name, -had ceased to exist upon the abdication of the Emperor Francis; from -that time, therefore, the great Emperor of the French had a right to -assume the title. Napoleon, who revoked the gifts which Charlemagne -made to the bishops of Rome, might now, as legitimate lord paramount -of Rome, like his illustrious predecessor, style himself Roman and -French Emperor. He restores to the Romans the eagle which Charlemagne -brought from them, and placed upon his palace at Aix la Chapelle; he -makes them sharers in his empire and his glory; and a thousand years -after the reign of Charlemagne, a new medal will be struck with the -inscription _Renovatio Imperii_. After ages of oblivion, the Empire -of the West reappears with renovated vigour; for Napoleon the Great -must be looked on as the founder of a revived Western Empire, and in -this character he will prove a blessing to civilized Europe. The peace -of Europe will thus be completely re-established. The great number of -well-meaning people, to whom Napoleon’s power seemed oppressive, while -they considered themselves as exempt from any engagement towards him, -will fulfil their new duties with inviolable fidelity. Considered in -this point of view, the re-establishment of the Western Empire is a -duty which Napoleon owes not less to the law of self-preservation, than -to the repose of Europe.” - -No opposition to this project could have been offered by the -continental princes; the yoke was upon their necks: it only remained -for him to complete the subjugation of the Peninsula, and this appeared -to him and his admirers an easy task, to be accomplished in one short -campaign. There was no longer any Spanish force in the field capable -of even momentarily diverting the French from their great object of -destroying the English army, and obtaining possession of Portugal, and -to that object Buonaparte might now direct his whole attention and his -whole power. - -Lord Wellington had foreseen this, and clearly perceiving also what -would be the business of the ensuing campaign, had prepared for the -defence of Portugal in time. It was necessary that we should carry on -the war in that country as principals rather than as allies, and for -this full power had been given by the Prince of Brazil. As yet little -had been done toward the improvement of the Portugueze army; like the -government, it was in the worst possible condition; both were in the -lowest state of degradation to which ignorance, and imbecility, and -inveterate abuses ♦MONEY VOTED FOR THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY.♦ could reduce -them. Early in the session, parliament was informed that the King had -authorized pecuniary advances to be made to Portugal, in support of its -military exertions, and had made an arrangement for the maintenance of -a body of troops not exceeding 30,000 men. Twenty thousand we already -had in our pay, the sum for whom was estimated at 600,000_l._; for -the additional ten, it was stated at 250,000_l._ to which was to be -added 130,000_l._ for the maintenance of officers to be employed in -training these levies, and preparing them to act with the British -troops. This led to a very interesting ♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY;♦ debate in -the House of Lords. Marquis Wellesley affirmed, “that Portugal was -the most material military position that could be occupied for the -purpose of assisting Spain: great disasters, he admitted, had befallen -the Spanish cause, still they were far from sinking his mind into -despair, and still he would contend, it was neither politic nor just -to manifest any intention ♦1810. FEBRUARY.♦ of abandoning Portugal. -What advantage could be derived from casting over our own councils, -and over the hopes of Portugal and Spain, the hue and complexion of -despair? To tell them that the hour of their fate was arrived, ... -that all attempts to assist, or even to inspirit their exertions in -their own defence, were of no avail, ... that they must bow the neck -and submit to the yoke of a merciless invader, ... this indeed would -be to strew the conqueror’s path with flowers, to prepare the way for -his triumphal march to the throne of the two kingdoms! Was it then -for this that so much treasure had been expended, ... that so much of -the blood had been shed of those gallant and loyal nations? Whatever -disasters had befallen them, they were not imputable to the people of -Spain. The spirit of the people was excellent, and he still ventured to -hope that it would prove unconquerable. All their defeats and disasters -were solely to be ascribed to the vices of their government. It was the -imbecility, or treachery, of that vile and wretched government which -first opened the breach through which the enemy entered into the heart -of Spain; that delivered into hostile hands the fortresses of that -country; and betrayed her people defenceless and unarmed into the power -of a perfidious foe. Let us not contribute to accomplish what they have -so inauspiciously begun! Let not their lordships come to any resolution -that can justify Portugal in relaxing her exertions, or Spain in -considering her cause as hopeless. Yet what other consequence would -result from prematurely withdrawing the British troops from Portugal, -or retracting the grounds upon which we had hitherto assisted her?” - -♦LORD GRENVILLE;♦ - -Lord Grenville replied. “He felt it,” he said, “an ungrateful task, ... -a painful duty, ... to recal the attention of their lordships to his -former predictions, which they had despised and rejected, but which -were now, all of them, too fatally fulfilled. His object, however, -was not a mere barren censure of past errors, but rather, from a -consideration of those errors, to conjure them to rescue the country -from a continuance of the same disasters, and to pay some regard to the -lives of their fellow-citizens. Were they disposed to sit in that house -day after day, and year after year, spectators of wasteful expenditure, -and the useless effusion of so much of the best blood of the country, -in hopeless, calamitous, and disgraceful efforts? It was a sacred duty -imposed upon them to see that not one more life was wasted, not one -more drop of blood shed unprofitably, where no thinking man could say -that, by any human possibility, such dreadful sacrifices could be made -with any prospect of advantage. Was there any man that heard him, who -in his conscience believed that even the sacrifice of the whole of that -brave British army would secure the kingdom of Portugal? If,” said -he, “I receive from any person an answer in the affirmative, I shall -be able to judge by that answer of the capacity of such a person for -the government of this country, or even for the transaction of public -business in a deliberative assembly. By whatever circumstances, ... -by whatever kind of fate it was, I must say, that I always thought -the object of the enterprise impossible; but now I believe it is -known to all the people of this country, that it has become certainly -impossible. Was it then too much to ask of their lordships that another -million should not be wasted, when nothing short of a divine miracle -could render it effectual to its proposed object?” In these strong and -explicit terms did Lord Grenville declare his opinion, that it was -impossible for a British army to secure Portugal; and thus distinctly -did he affirm, that the opinion of a statesman upon this single point -was a sufficient test of his capacity for government. - -After touching upon the convention of Cintra and Sir John Moore’s -retreat, he spoke of the impolicy of our conduct in Portugal. “If -those,” he said, “who had the management of public affairs had -possessed any wisdom, any capacity for enlightened policy in the -regulation of a nation’s interests and constitution, any right or -sound feelings with regard to the happiness of their fellow-creatures, -here had been a wide field opening to them. They had got possession of -the kingdom of our ally, with its government dissolved, and no means -existing within it for the establishment of any regular authority -or civil administration, but such as the British government alone -should suggest. Here had been a glorious opportunity for raising the -Portugueze nation from that wretched and degraded condition to which -a lengthened succession of mental ignorance, civil oppression, and -political tyranny and prostitution had reduced it. Was not that an -opportunity, which any men capable of enlarged and liberal views of -policy, and influenced by any just feelings for the interests of their -fellow-creatures, would have eagerly availed themselves of? Would not -such men have seized with avidity the favourable occasion to rescue the -country from that ignorance and political debasement, which rendered -the inhabitants incapable of any public spirit or national feeling? -Here was a task worthy of the greatest statesmen; here was an object, -in the accomplishment of which there were no talents so transcendant, -no capacity so enlarged, no ability so comprehensive, that might -not have been well, and beneficially, and gloriously employed. It -was a work well suited to a wise and liberal policy, to an enlarged -and generous spirit, to every just feeling and sound principle of -national interest, ... to impart the blessings of a free government to -the inhabitants of a country so long oppressed and disgraced by the -greatest tyranny that had ever existed in any nation of Europe.” - -Then after arguing that time had been lost in arming and disciplining -the Portugueze, he relapsed into his strain of unhappy prophecy. “He -did not,” he said, “mean to undervalue the services or the character -of the Portugueze soldiery, whom he considered as possessing qualities -capable of being made useful, but he would never admit that they -could form a force competent to the defence of the kingdom; they -might be useful in desultory warfare, but must be wholly unfit for -co-operation with a regular army. He was not afraid, therefore, of -any responsibility that might be incurred by his stating, that if the -safety of the British army was to be committed on the expectation of -such co-operation, it would be exposed to most imminent and perhaps -inevitable hazard. But if these 30,000 men were not composed of -undisciplined peasants and raw recruits, but consisted of British -troops, in addition to the British army already in Portugal, he should -consider it nothing but infatuation to think of defending Portugal, -even with such a force. Against a power possessing the whole means of -Spain, as he must suppose the French to do at this moment, Portugal -was the least defensible of any country in Europe. It had the longest -line of frontier, compared with its actual extent, of any other nation; -besides, from its narrowness, its line of defence would be more likely -to be turned; and an invading enemy would derive great advantages -from its local circumstances. As to the means of practical defence -afforded by its mountains, he should only ask, whether the experience -of the last seventeen years had taught the world nothing; whether its -instructive lessons were wholly thrown away? Could it be supposed that -a country so circumstanced, with a population without spirit, and a -foreign general exercising little short of arbitrary power within it, -was capable of any effectual defence?” Lord Grenville concluded this -memorable speech, by moving, as an amendment to the usual address, -“that the house would without delay enter upon the consideration of -these most important subjects, in the present difficult and alarming -state of these realms.” - -♦EARL OF LIVERPOOL;♦ - -“It was not the fault of ministers,” Lord Liverpool replied, -“nor of the person whom they had sent thither as his majesty’s -representative, if the exertions of the Portugueze government were not -correspondent to the dangers of the crisis. The state of the country -must be recollected, which might truly be said to have been without -a government; all the ancient and established authorities having -disappeared with the Prince Regent. But, under these unpromising -circumstances, every thing was done which could be done. There was -no time lost; there was no exertion untried; there was no measure -neglected. Never were greater exertions made to provide a sufficient -force, and never were they more successful. The noble baron had -triumphantly asked, what have we gained in the Peninsula? We have -gained the hearts and affections of the whole population of Spain and -Portugal; we have gained that of which no triumphs, no successes of -the enemy could deprive us. In Portugal, such is the affection of the -inhabitants, that there is no want of a British soldier that is not -instantly and cheerfully supplied. Look to Spain! What is the feeling -of the people, even in this awful moment of national convulsion and -existing revolution? It is that of the most complete deference to the -British minister and government; and so perfect is their confidence -in both, that they have placed their fleet under the orders of the -British admiral. Would a cold, cautious, and phlegmatic system of -policy have ever produced such proofs of confidence? Would indifference -have produced those strong and signal proofs of affection? Whatever -might be the issue of the contest, to this country would always remain -the proud satisfaction of having done its duty. He trusted we should -never abandon Spain, so long as any hope remained of the possibility -of ultimate success. We were bound by every sentiment of honour and -good faith to support a people who had given proofs of honour, of good -faith, and of bravery, which have never been exceeded by any nation.” - -♦EARL MOIRA;♦ - -Earl Moira replied to this, by delivering opinions which, as a -soldier, he would never have conceived, if he had not been possessed -by party spirit. “Every thing which the ministers attempted,” he -said, “betrayed, as the universal opinion of the public pronounced, a -total want of judgement, foresight, and vigour; and, as the climax of -error, they now seemed resolved to defend Portugal, ... according to -a plan of defence, too, which was perfectly impracticable. For it was -utterly ridiculous to suppose, that the ideas of Count La Lippe, as to -the practicability of defending Portugal from invasion, could now be -relied upon. We should be allowed to retain Portugal, under our present -system, just so long as Buonaparte thought proper. The administration -of these men had been marked by the annihilation of every foreign -hope, and the reduction of every domestic resource; they who vaunted -of their resolution and power to protect and liberate the Continent, -had only succeeded in bringing danger close to our own shores? And -why? because they sacrificed the interests of the nation, and violated -every principle of public duty, to gratify their personal ambition and -personal cupidity. He was speaking the language of ninety men out of a -hundred of the whole population of the country, when he asserted, that -they deserved marked reprobation, and exemplary punishment.” - -♦LORD SIDMOUTH;♦ - -Viscount Sidmouth regretted the opportunities which had been lost, but, -with his English feeling and his usual fairness, insisted that it was -incumbent upon us to stand by our allies to the uttermost. The Marquis -of Lansdown objected to the measures of ministry more temperately than -his colleagues in opposition, maintaining that it was bad policy to -become a principal ♦LORD, ERSKINE;♦ in a continental war. Lord Erskine -spoke in a strain of acrimonious contempt, mingled with irrelevant -accusations and unbecoming levity. “There really,” said he, “seems to -be a sort of predestination, which I will leave the reverend bench to -explain, that whenever the French take any country, or any prisoners, -they shall have some of our money also. I can hardly account for the -infatuation which possesses those men, who suppose they can defend -Portugal by sending a supply of British money there. It might as well -be expected to accomplish that by sending over the woolsack, with my -noble and learned friend upon it.” - -The ministers must have been well pleased with the conduct of their -opponents; they could not have desired any thing more favourable to -themselves than the intemperance which had been displayed, and the -rash assertions and more rash predictions, which had been so ♦LORD -HOLLAND.♦ boldly hazarded against them. Lord Holland upon this occasion -made a remarkable speech, observing, in allusion to Lords Sidmouth -and Buckinghamshire, that “he could not understand how these lords -could give their confidence to ministers without being assured that -their confidence was deserved. We were obliged in honour,” he said, -“to do what we could for Portugal, without injury to ourselves, ... in -honour, ... for that was the only motive that ought to interest the -feelings, or excite the hearts of this or any other nation. But if we -were to embark in the cause of that sinking people, we were not to -load them with our imbecility, in addition to their own weakness. A -great plan was necessary; nothing neutral or narrow, nothing minute, -nothing temporary, could enter into it; but for this qualities were -requisite which no man could hope for in the present ministry. Where -was the address, the ability, the knowledge, the public spirit, that -were the soul of success in such a cause? He found them shifting from -object to object, and hanging their hope on every weak and bending -support, that failed them in the first moment of pressure. He thought, -that for defence no government could be too free; by that he meant -too democratic; the words might not be synonymous, but it was in such -governments that men felt of what they were capable. There was then -the full stretch of all the powers. There was a great struggle, a -great allay of the baser passions; but there rose from them a spirit -vigorous, subtilized, and pure; there was the triumph of all the -vehement principles of the nation; the rapid intelligence, the bold -decision, the daring courage, the stern love of country. It was in the -hour of struggle that men started up among the ranks of the people; -those bright shapes of valour and virtue that gave a new life to the -people; those surpassing forms of dignity and splendour that suddenly -rose up, as if by miracle, among the host, rushed to the front of the -battle, and, as in the days of old, by their sole appearance turned -the victory. But where was the symptom of a love for free government -in the conduct of the ministry? The government of Portugal had been -absolutely in their hands; had they disburdened it of its obstructions -to freedom? Had they pointed its aspect towards democracy? Then as if -the cause had been rendered desperate because the British ministry had -not introduced democratic principles into the governments of Spain and -Portugal, he supported the opinion of his party, and maintained that -it would be criminal to force a nation to a defence which might draw -down ruin on them. But if we were to withdraw from the contest, it was -possible for us to do so without degrading the country by any base -avidity for little gains, by seizing upon any of those little pieces of -plunder, which were so tempting, and apt to overpower our resistance to -the temptation. We might leave the country of our ally with the spirit -of friendship and the purity of honour. It was of great moment to us, -in even that meanest and lowest view of policy, to leave the people -of the Peninsula our friends; but we must be actuated by a higher -principle, and be regretted and revered by those whom we were forced -to abandon. He could not expect this from his majesty’s ministers, and -therefore could not think their hands fit to wield the resources, or -sustain the character of the British empire.” Lord Holland therefore -voted for the amendment, the object of which was, that the cause of the -Peninsula should be given up as hopeless. - -♦MARCH 9. - -MR. PERCEVAL;♦ - -The debate was not less interesting in the Lower House, when Mr. -Perceval moved for a sum not exceeding 980,000_l._ for the defence of -Portugal; “a vote,” he said “so consistent with the feelings which -the house had professed on former occasions, that he should not have -expected any opposition to it. He reminded the house how those who -opposed it had been always of opinion that it was impossible for Spain -to hold out so long; that if she succeeded at all, she must succeed at -once; but that she could never maintain a protracted contest against -the disciplined armies and enormous resources of France. This was -their declared and recorded opinion; but what was the fact? Spain had -continued the struggle. France might occupy the country with an army, -but her power would be confined within the limits of her military -posts, and it would require nearly as large an army to keep possession -of it as to make the conquest. There never had existed a military power -capable of subduing a population possessing the mind, and heart, and -soul of the Spaniards. The very victories of their enemies would teach -them discipline, and infuse into them a spirit which would ultimately -be the ruin of their oppressors. Under these circumstances, would it -be wise to abandon Portugal? The last Austrian war had arisen in great -measure out of the contest in the Peninsula; and during the progress of -that war, however calamitous the result had proved, it would be in the -recollection of the house, that one other day’s successful resistance -of the French by the Austrians might have overthrown the accumulated -power of the enemy. Such events might again take place, for no man -could anticipate, in the present state of the world, what might arise -in the course of a short time; but be that as it might, as long as the -contest was, or could be, maintained in the Peninsula, the best policy -of this country was to support it.” - -♦SIR J. NEWPORT;♦ - -To this Sir John Newport replied, “if any question could provoke -opposition, it must be that which would make them continue efforts in -a cause which every one but the ministers considered hopeless. As for -the recorded opinion of parliament, parliament was pledged to support -the Spaniards while they were true to themselves; but that they had -been true to themselves he denied.” Then assuming that the French must -necessarily drive us out of Portugal, he asked what was to be done -with the 30,000 Portugueze soldiers? “Were they to be brought to this -country, and added to the already enormous foreign army in its service? -Or were they to be sent to Brazil? Or to be left fully equipped, and -ready to add to the military force of Buonaparte?” In the course of his -speech Sir John Newport endeavoured to show that the Portugueze levies -had not been ♦MR. VILLIERS;♦ expedited as they ought to have been. Mr. -Villiers, who had been our minister in Portugal, made answer, “that the -government there was administered with great vigour; large supplies of -money had been raised to meet the public exigencies; the old military -constitution of the country had been restored: the finances were ably -administered and well collected; and the war department conducted with -energy and ability. If Spain,” he said, “had done its duty equally with -Portugal, in supporting the efforts of Great Britain, its cause would -already have triumphed, and there would not now have been a Frenchman -upon the Spanish territory.” - -♦MR. CURWEN;♦ - -Mr. Curwen said, “that as the Portugueze people had suffered a French -army to overrun their country without any resistance, he was not for -placing much reliance upon the Portugueze troops. If the enemy could -point out what he would wish that we should undertake, his first wish -would be, that we should attempt to defend Portugal. Buonaparte,” he -said, “could not receive more cheering hopes of ultimate success, -than he would derive from learning that the present ministers were to -continue in office, and that the House of Commons still persisted in -placing a blind confidence in them, and enabling them to enter upon -measures which, in their inevitable result, could not fail to answer -all his purposes. The vote of the house this night, if it should decide -against attempting the defence of Portugal, would be more important -than if we were to take half the French army prisoners.” - -♦MR. LESLIE FOSTER;♦ - -Mr. Leslie Foster then rose, and his speech, in the spirit which it -breathed, and the knowledge which it displayed, formed a singular -contrast to the harangues of the opposition. “The present proposition -of his majesty,” said he, “is partly connected with his past conduct -towards the Peninsula; it is but a continuance and extension of the -same spirit of British resistance. It is now, however, open to the -reprehension of two classes of politicians; those who think we never -ought to have committed ourselves for the salvation of Portugal and -Spain; and those who, having approved of that committal while the -event appeared doubtful, think that the overwhelming power of France -has at length brought this tragedy so nearly to a close, that nothing -is left for us, but to escape if possible from being sharers in its -catastrophe. Hope, they contend, has vanished; there is no longer room -for prediction; history has already recorded, in letters of blood, the -fate that awaits our perseverance. To me the aspect of the Peninsula -appears an enigma, which it is no reflection on any ministers not -perfectly to have understood; a revolution bursting out at a period the -least expected, exhibiting events in its progress the most singularly -contradictory, and pregnant with results which I still think no man -living can foresee. If, on the one hand, we are referred to the apathy -of Gallicia during the retreat of Sir John Moore, ... if we are desired -to remember Ocaña and Tudela, and all the other defeats which the -Spaniards have endured, and endured without despondency, ... must we -not in candour remember that there was a battle of Baylen? Are we to -shut our eyes to the extraordinary phenomenon, that in Catalonia, the -very next province to France, the French, at this hour, appear to be -as often the besieged as the besiegers? and can we forget Zaragoza -and Gerona? But above all, shall we not do justice to that singular -obstinacy, to give it no more glorious a character, which has sustained -their spirit under two hundred defeats, and which, in every period of -the history of Spain, has formed its distinguishing characteristic? The -expulsion of the Moors was the fruit of seven centuries of fighting -uninterrupted, and of 3600 battles, in many of which the Spaniards had -been defeated. In the beaten but persevering Spaniards of these days we -may trace the descendants of those warriors, as easily as we recognize -the sons of the conquerors of Cressy and of Agincourt in the English -who fought at Talavera. We may trace the same fortitude and patience, -the same enthusiastic superstition, the same persevering insensibility -of failure, and, I will add, the same absolute indifference as to -liberty, constitution, or cortes, that distinguished the expellers of -the Moors. Because we feel that freedom is the first of blessings, -it is too much to say that other nations are to be raised in arms by -no other motives than its influence. History should have taught us, -that there is another spirit prompting men to war, and which once -poured all Europe forth in the Crusades; and however we may pronounce -on the motives of our ancestors, the fact we cannot deny, that the -greatest spectacle of embattled nations ever exhibited on the theatre -of war was under governments and systems which indeed were not worth -the defending. I believe we may consider the inhabitants of the -Peninsula, first, as a multitude of hardy and patient peasantry, buried -in ignorance and superstition, and accustomed from their cradles, -by the traditions and the songs of their ancestors, to consider the -sword as the natural companion of the cross; and almost inseparably -to connect in idea the defence of their religion with the slaughter -of their enemies; and with these predispositions goaded into madness -by ecclesiastics, as ignorant almost as their flocks; but without an -idea or a wish for freedom; with _Fernando Settimo_ in their mouths, -as a watch-word, and fighting, if you will, for the continuance of -the Inquisition. And with these qualifications it is my most firm -conviction, that they would have overwhelmed all the armies of France, -but that it was their misfortune to be cursed with a nobility in all -respects the opposite of the peasantry, differing from them, not merely -in their moral qualities, but even in their physical appearance; a -nobility of various degrees of worthlessness, but with a few brilliant -exceptions, generally proportioned to the rank of their nobility; and -further cursed by a government (I speak not of their kings but of the -Junta) both in its form and in its substance the most abominable that -ever repressed or betrayed the energies of a nation; hence desperate -from repeated treason, destitute of confidence, not in themselves but -in their commanders, unable to stand before the French in battle, but -still more unable to abstain from fighting. One rare and unquestionable -feature they presented, ... a nation that would fight with France; and -certain I am, that if we had not tried the experiment of fighting by -their side, these very men, who now most loudly condemn the course we -have pursued, would be calling for the impeachment of these ministers, -who had neglected such glorious opportunities; who, in the crisis of -the fate of France, had shrunk from the only field where there was a -prospect of contending with success; who had coldly refused our aid -to the only allies who were ever worthy of British co-operation. It -is too much a habit to call for the fruits of our battles, tacitly -assuming that nothing but the absolute and complete attainment of our -object can justify having fought them. I never can agree to measure -the justification of a battle by the mere fruits of victory! yet even -on this ground I must contend, that never were there laurels the -more opposite of barren, than those which have been reaped by our -countrymen in Spain. We, indeed, wanted not to be convinced that our -army, like our navy, equalled in science, and exceeded in courage, -that of any other nation in the world: but if we have any anxiety for -our character with other armies, if reputation is strength, and if the -reputation of a nation, as well as of an individual, consists not in -the estimation in which it holds itself, but in the estimation in which -it is held by others, it is a false vanity that causes us to shut our -eyes and ears to the opinions of other nations. Spain at least had -been convinced by the exertions of her government, misrepresenting our -failure at Buenos Ayres, and other scenes of our misfortunes, that -Great Britain, omnipotent by sea, was even ridiculous on land. So much -so, that when the army of General Spencer was landed near Cadiz, than -which a finer army never left the English shore, it was the wonder as -well as the pity of the Spaniards, that such noble-looking soldiers -should be so absolutely incapable of fighting. The ‘beautiful’ army -was even the emphatic denomination by which the British forces were -distinguished; and when Sir John Moore was known to be at length on his -march, that the beautiful army, the ‘_hermoso exercito_,’ was actually -advancing, was a subject of Spanish surprise, at least as much as of -Spanish exultation; but when that army had commenced its retreat, old -impressions were revived with tenfold force, ‘_hermoso_’ was no longer -the epithet bestowed on it, but one which it is impossible for me to -repeat. Nor let it be said that Coruña was a full vindication of its -fame! We indeed know that British heroism never shone more conspicuous -than on that day; but the ray of glory which illuminated that last -scene of our retreat, was but feebly reflected through the rest of -Spain from that distant part of the Peninsula. The French returned in -triumph to Madrid, and boasted that they had driven us into the sea; -... it was certain we were no longer on the land; ... and under such -circumstances it is not surprising that Spain should have declined -to have given to us all the credit which we really deserved. Some -gentlemen, I see, are of opinion that it is no great matter what the -Spaniards thought about us; but are we equally indifferent to the -opinions of the French? Let us not too hastily conclude that they did -full justice to our merits. We are told, indeed, that at Maida and in -Egypt we had set that point at rest. Of Maida, I shall only say, that -within the last month it has been, for the first time, mentioned in -any newspaper of France, and that I believe nine-tenths of the French -soldiers have never heard either of the battle, or of the existence -of such a place; and as to Egypt, their opinion is universally that -which General Regnier, in his most able, but untrue representation, of -those events, has laboured to impress, namely, that the treachery of -Menou, and the detestation in which the army held the service in Egypt, -and their anxiety to return to France, were the real causes of their -expulsion; and that an overwhelming force of ninety thousand men, of -English, Turks, and Indians, which he says, and which they believe, we -brought against them, furnished a decent excuse for their surrender. -Let us remember too, that it was after these proofs of British military -excellence, that Buonaparte, on the heights of Boulogne, parcelled out -in promise to his soldiers the estates of the ‘_nation boutiquiere_:’ -let us remember also our own opinions in those days, how general -engagements were to be avoided; ... how a system of bush-fighting was -to be adopted in Kent; ... and our hopes that England might be saved -after London might be lost, ... or what inundations we should make to -protect it. Such language was then termed ‘caution:’ but on the proud -eminence on which we are now placed, we may afford to acknowledge -there was in it some mixture of distrust in the good old bayonet of -Britain. Where are the promises of Buonaparte now? The very ridicule -of such assertions would render it impossible for him to repeat them. -It is these guilty ministers who have taught to him, and what I think -of much more consequence, have taught to England, another style of -conversation. They have fairly tried that point, so carefully avoided -by their predecessors; they have brought our armies to a meeting with -the finest armies of France; and have added more to our strength, as -well as to our glory, by fighting in Spain, than their predecessors -by abstaining from it in Poland.... Such is the view which I take of -what is past: With respect to the second point, whether the time is -indeed come, when our further assistance can only be destruction to -ourselves, without being serviceable to our allies, a very little time -must show us that; and if there are indeed good grounds of hope, any -premature expression of our despondency will certainly extinguish them. -The Junta is at length demolished. The French are again dispersed over -every part of the Peninsula: the people are still every where in arms. -Let us not damp that spirit which may effect much, and which must -effect something, ... which must at least give long employment to the -forces of our enemy. If, indeed, it depended solely upon us, whether -our allies should continue that sacrifice of blood which they have so -profusely shed, I should not think us justifiable in purchasing our -quiet at such a price: but convinced as I am, that whether we stand -by them, or forsake them, those gallant nations will still continue -to bleed at every pore, our assistance assumes a new character; -and independent of the advantages to be derived to ourselves, ... -independent of 200,000 Frenchmen already fallen, ... independent of -not less than 300,000 more required even to preserve existence in -the Peninsula, ... independent of Brazil and South America, for ever -severed from our enemies, ... and independent of the fleets of the -Peninsula, I trust, rescued from their grasp, ... independent of these -gains to ourselves, there is another feeling binding upon a nation, -as well as upon an individual, not to forsake our friend because he -is in his greatest danger!... Still, however, I acknowledge a limit -there must be, beyond which we cannot go, and whenever we can agree in -declaring that - - Funditus occidimus, neque habet Fortuna regressum, - -then, indeed, the first laws of self-preservation will call on us to -discontinue the contest. But surely Great Britain will not utter such -a sentiment until her allies shall be disposed to join in it. They do -not despair, and I will never despair of them so long as they do not -despair of themselves, ... so long as I should leave it in their power -to say to us at a future day, ‘Whence these chains?... If you had stood -firm a little longer, ... if you had not so soon fainted, ... we should -not at this day be in the power of our enemies!’” - -♦GENERAL FERGUSON;♦ - -General Ferguson was the first person who rose after Mr. Leslie Foster -had concluded this able and manly speech. “He had been in Portugal,” -he said, and “he did not think there were 30,000 soldiers in that -country; those that were there had certainly, through the exertions of -General Beresford and other British officers, attained an appearance -of discipline: but he feared that an army adequate to the task of -defending Portugal must be able to make a stand in the first instance; -and if obliged to retreat, must still, as opportunity offered, return -to the charge; and thus make resistance after resistance. Now he was -decidedly of opinion, from what he had seen and heard of them, that -on the very first defeat the little discipline of the Portugueze army -would vanish, and a dispersion be the consequence.” - -♦MR. FITZGERALD;♦ - -Mr. Fitzgerald asked whether ministers had employed transports to bring -away our cavalry from Portugal? in this service, he said, our money -would be best employed. He had never heard of any achievement performed -by the Portugueze, except, indeed, that 2000 of them, with the Bishop -of Porto at their head, had entered Porto, and taken twenty-four -Frenchmen ♦LORD MILTON;♦ prisoners. Lord Milton repeated the erroneous -proposition of the Marquis of Lansdowne, that it was highly improper to -act as principals in a foreign country, instead of as auxiliaries. “No -reasonable man,” he affirmed, “could vote a million of the public money -for such a purpose, when the French were under the walls of Cadiz. -It had often been the practice to subsidize foreign troops, but he -believed it had never before entered the head of any English statesman -to grant subsidies to the Portugueze, ... to those, in fact, among whom -the materials for ♦MR. BANKES;♦ an army could not be found.” Mr. Bankes -talked of the money: “We had it not to spare, and if we had, even then -we ought not to spare it. Too much had already been furnished to the -Spaniards. Where were we to find more? specie we had not, and paper -would not answer. The enemy were now perhaps in possession of Cadiz, -which had escaped immediate capture only through an accident. The -Cortes had not even a town in Spain to meet in. It was quite romantic -to expect that a British army, of 20,000 or 25,000 men, even with -whatever co-operation Portugal could give, would be able to maintain -the war there as a principal against France. He must oppose the motion, -and recommend that the resources of the country should be husbanded for -our defence.” - -♦MR. JACOB;♦ - -Upon this, Mr. Jacob, who had recently returned from Spain, denied that -France had any complete occupation of that country, either civil or -military. In Catalonia, he said, it would be difficult to say, whether -there were at that moment more Spanish towns besieged by the French, -or towns occupied by French troops besieged by the Spaniards; and the -communications were so completely cut off, that the French could not -send a letter from Barcelona to Gerona, without an escort of at least -500 cavalry to protect it. Generally speaking, throughout the whole of -Spain, those towns only were surrendered which were under the influence -of the nobility and gentry of large estates; but the mass of the people -were patriotic, and the villages were defended after the towns had -been betrayed. And not only the villages, but the mountains, were -still obstinately defended. He believed, that among the nobility and -gentry, where there were two brothers, the man of great possessions -was always for submitting to the enemy, while the other joined the -patriotic standard. We had been accustomed to consider civil wars as -the most horrible of all kinds of hostilities, but never was any civil -war so horrible as that which was now raging in Spain. The massacre, -the pillage, and the violence offered to women, were unparalleled. -He had lately been witness to some of these atrocities. The town of -Puerto Real had surrendered upon terms, and Victor, upon entering it, -published a proclamation, promising the most perfect security to all -the inhabitants. Nevertheless, he had hardly taken possession before he -ordered the men, who were mostly artificers at the docks in Cadiz, to -be imprisoned, and the females were marched down to St. Mary’s, to be -violated by his army. - -It might have been thought that such a statement as this could have -produced but one effect, or at least that no man could have been -found who would attempt to weaken its effect, by ♦MR. WHITBREAD;♦ -recriminating upon his own country. Mr. Whitbread, however, after -observing that he believed Mr. Jacob had gone to Spain upon a mission, -half commercial, half diplomatic, demanded of him whether he had been -an eye-witness of these atrocities; and if he were, or if he were -not, why he had detailed them, unless it was to inflame the house -upon a question where their judgement only ought to decide? “Abuses, -no doubt,” he said, “must have prevailed; but were gentlemen aware of -none committed under circumstances of less provocation, when the clergy -received the mandates of power to ascend their pulpits, and issue from -them falsehoods not more rank than they were notorious?” Such is the -language which Mr. Whitbread is reported to have uttered upon this -occasion. He proceeded to ask, “Where was the spirit of the Spaniards? -where were its effects? were they seen in suffering the French to pass -over the face of their country, like light through an unresisting -medium? We were gravely told that the post could not pass unmolested; -no doubt this was a most serious calamity, and a conclusive proof of -the energy of the popular spirit, ... only, unfortunately, we had the -same proof in Ireland! Spain,” he averred, “had not done its duty ... -no matter from what cause; the people had, however, some excuse, they -had been under the selfish sway of an aristocracy, that only wanted -to use them as an instrument for effecting their own narrow purposes; -their implicit confidence had been abused by the blind bigotry of an -intolerant priesthood, ... a priesthood that, whatever it preached, -practised not the gospel; they had had the sword in their hands as -often as the crosier, and they had had, he feared, in their hearts -any thing but the meekness, humility, charity, and peace, that their -blessed Master had inculcated by his pure precepts, enforced by the -example of his spotless life, and sealed by the last sufferings of his -all-atoning death. While,” said Mr. Whitbread, “I value those precepts -and that example, I never can take pleasure in setting man against his -fellow-man in a hopeless struggle. I think the present cause hopeless, -and as such I never will consent to its being uselessly and cruelly -protracted.” - -Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Bathurst spoke like men in whom the principle -of opposition was not the pole star of their political course. The -♦MR. HUSKISSON;♦ question, Mr. Huskisson said, was, whether we were to -withhold from his majesty’s ministers the means by which the contest -might be rendered ♦MR. BATHURST.♦ more likely to be successful. Mr. -Bathurst said, it was enough for him to know that an alliance with -Portugal had been concluded, and that Portugal, in virtue of that -alliance, demanded our assistance. An amendment was moved by Mr. -Tierney, tending to refuse the grant, and 142 members voted for it, -over whom ministers had a majority of sixty-two. In the Lords, the -numbers had been 94, and 124. - -To comment upon the language of the opposition in these debates would -be superfluous. The ignorance which they displayed of the national -character of the Spaniards and Portugueze, and of the nature of the -seat of war, the contemptuous superiority which they assumed, and -the tone in which they ridiculed and reviled our allies, were of -little moment; but the debate was of main importance, because the -party committed themselves completely upon the defence of Portugal, -declaring, in the most confident and positive terms, that it was -hopeless, and ought not to be attempted. Their journalists took up -the subject in the same strain, and followed the unhappy pattern of -prediction which had been set them. One of two things, they said, -must necessarily happen to these 30,000 Portugueze troops; either -they must fall into the hands of the French, or we must bring them -out of Portugal. The possibility that, with a British army, they -might be able successfully to defend their country, these men had -neither wisdom, nor knowledge, nor virtue to contemplate. Could it be -doubted for a moment, they said, that Spain would be subdued, from one -extremity to the other, before the end of six months? They copied, -too, as faithfully, the false and slanderous representations which -were made of the Portugueze. A thousand Portugueze, they said, would -fly before a single French company, just as so many gipsies would run -away from a constable. We might raise a better legion in Norwood. Was -there an English colonel who would give five shillings a dozen for -such recruits, or a serjeant who would be at the expense of a bowl of -punch for fourscore of them? The French and their partizans did not -fail to make due use of what was thus advanced in their favour; but -the Portugueze were too well acquainted with the real character and -feelings of this nation to have their faith in British friendship -shaken by the gross misrepresentations of a virulent party: and they -knew, perhaps, that statesmen who take part against the government and -against the allies of their country, and writers who pervert to the -most wicked and perilous purposes the freedom of the press, are the -concomitant evils of a free constitution like ours, under which both -public and private libellers breed like vermin in a genial climate. - -♦REFORM OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY.♦ - -Meantime the Portugueze army, which, under a system of complicated -abuses, had been reduced to the lowest possible state of degradation, -was reformed in all its branches by the indefatigable exertions of -Marshal Beresford. He had to contend not only with the inveterate -evils which had grown up during the long perversion of government, but -with that spirit of insubordination which, at the outbreak of these -troubles, the general anarchy had produced. The soldiers had begun -to claim and exert the power of choosing their own officers; an end -was immediately put to this ruinous license, and at the same time -means were taken for removing the cause of complaint wherever it had -originated, by recalling the officers as well as the men to a sense of -their duty, and by introducing British officers in sufficient number -to give the army consistence and effect till they might gradually be -replaced by native Portugueze. Equal justice, which in that country -had been as little known as liberty of conscience, was promised and -administered; the troops were told that the Marshal was at all times -ready to hear their complaints, through the proper channel; and that if -any officer excused himself from forwarding the complaint of a soldier, -the soldier might address it directly to the commander-in-chief. But -the Marshal said it was his duty to be impartial, and the officers had -as much right to justice as the soldiers. Severe penalties had been -denounced against desertion, but with so little effect, that nearly -seven hundred cases occurred during the month of April in this year; -the punishment of death was then inflicted on one offender, and two -others were degraded to Angola. At the same time the officers were not -allowed to absent themselves from their duty under pretext of illness; -certificates to this effect had been so greatly abused, that they were -no longer to be regarded without such actual inspection as the Marshal -might appoint; and one person of high family was dismissed the service -for a subterfuge of this kind. Courts-martial were made to understand -their proper functions by being reprimanded in general orders; and -the _Misericordia_ which had interfered to suspend the execution of -an officer who had received money from the French, and entered their -service, was informed that its privileges did not extend to these -cases, and that the sentence must be carried into effect. - -It was necessary to raise the military character in the opinion -of the soldiers themselves, as well as of the nation. But before -this could be done, the sense of cleanliness and decency was to be -restored: for the troops, in that sullen state of self-neglect which -discomfort and hopelessness produce, had well-nigh lost all sense of -either. The Commander-in-chief told them that many of the evils which -the army suffered were occasioned by the want of cleanliness; that -health could not be preserved without it, that the soldiers must wash -themselves frequently, and that it grieved him to say, he must require -the officers to set them an example; that fatigue was no excuse for -neglecting this essential duty, for after a long march nothing was so -refreshing; that every officer must be responsible for the cleanliness -of the men under his command, and that he himself would never excuse -any officer whom he should see dirty. He gave orders that the men -should be provided with soap, brushes, and combs; that they should -brush their clothes and clean their shoes every day, and be punished -if they neglected this; and as the summer approached, he required the -officers, whenever an opportunity occurred, to make the men bathe by -companies. The Portugueze soldiers, it was said, like those of every -other country, desired to appear with a military air, and with that -propriety which belongs to the military character, and the men who most -affected this appearance were always the best soldiers; it was the -business of the officers, therefore, to see that they were provided -with every thing necessary for maintaining it. While this indispensable -attention to cleanliness was exacted, every possible provision was -made both for their health[11] and comfort. A dispensation was -obtained from the Pope’s Legate, allowing the troops the use of meat -while on service, every day in the year, except on Ash-Wednesday and -Good-Friday. The huge regimental kettles, which, after the Mahommedan -custom, were still used in the Portugueze army, and which, from the -inconvenience of carrying them, frequently did not come up with the -troops till long after they were wanted, were laid aside, and light tin -vessels substituted, which might be always at hand. An injurious custom -of marching in their cloaks when it rained, and even using the blanket -at such times as an additional covering, was prohibited; the men, they -were told, knew by experience, that no clothing could protect them -against the rain during a wet march, and therefore they were ordered -to keep cloak and blanket dry for their own comfort when they reached -the journey’s end. The officers and non-commissioned officers were -in the habit of kicking and striking the soldiers; wherever British -officers commanded this was immediately forbidden, and their example, -with the decided opinion of Marshal Beresford, nearly, or altogether, -put a stop to the unmanly practice. The ordinary punishment, though -less disgraceful and severe than the abominable system of flogging, -proved more frequently fatal; it consisted in striking the soldier on -the back, across the shoulders, with the broad side of a sword. The -number of strokes, or _pancadas_, never exceeded fifty; but men have -not unfrequently been known to drop down dead after receiving thirty, -from a rupture of the aorta. Marshal Beresford ordered a small cane to -be used instead of the sword; and thus, without altering the national -manner of punishment, rendered it no longer dangerous. - -There were other evils which were beyond his power. When the troops of -the line were recruited, it was neither done by ballot nor by bounty: -a certain number were demanded from each district; the captain of -that district picked whom he chose, sent them to prison till he had -collected the whole number, then marched them to join their regiment. -The Marshal introduced the easy improvement of sending them to a -recruiting depôt, to be drilled before they joined; but he fixed -upon the peninsula of Peniche, a swampy and unwholesome spot, which -proved fatal to many, acting with double effect upon the depressed, -half-starved, and ill-treated peasants, who were sent thither. The -sick, the lame, and the lazy, were crowded into the same dungeon when -recruited by the Capitam Mor; contagion was thus generated, and very -often those, and those especially, who were fit for the service, were -carried off by disease. The depôt was afterwards removed to Mafra, -which is a healthy situation. - -Over the method of levying troops Marshal Beresford had no control. But -the hospitals, which were infinitely more destructive to the army than -the sword of the enemy, and would have destroyed it much faster than -it could have been recruited, were greatly improved under a British -inspector, though the government would not permit his regulations to be -carried into effect to their full extent. Still a great and material -improvement was accomplished. The commissariat had been so conducted, -as to be at once inefficient for the army, and oppressive for the -people. A board of administration at Lisbon had its intendants in -every province, and its factors in every town. Government contracted -for provisions and forage, at fixed prices, with the board, and the -board directed its agents to purchase what might be required for the -troops on the spot. Payment was made by bills upon the board, which -in the best times were seldom taken up till twelve months after they -became due, and in the present state of things were considered to be -worth nothing. The farmer, therefore, naturally concealed his grain; -it was seldom that magazines were formed, or any provision made -against scarcity; and what the farmer could not or would not sell at -the disadvantageous rate which the factors offered, was usually taken, -when it could be found, by force. Marshal Beresford got commissaries -appointed to the different brigades, but he could not get money for -them, and therefore they were of little use. To reform the civil -establishments of the army was almost as difficult as it would have -been to reform the government; the utmost exertions of the Marshal, -aided as they were by Lord Wellington’s interference, availed nothing, -... being opposed by every species of low cunning and court intrigue. -For the old corruptions existed in full vigour, notwithstanding the -removal of the court to Brazil; and the body politic continued to -suffer under its inveterate disease, a _morbus pediculosus_, from -which nothing but a system of reform, wisely, temperately, firmly, and -constitutionally pursued, could purify it, and restore it to health and -strength. - -Much, however, was done for Portugal, ... enough to be ever remembered -by that country with gratitude, and by Great Britain with a generous -and ennobling pride. An English commissariat, scrupulously exact in -all its dealings, relieved the farmers in great measure from the -oppression of their own government. The soldiers learnt to respect -their officers and themselves; they rapidly improved in discipline; -they acquired confidence, and became proud of their profession. The -government itself found it necessary to alter its old system of secrecy -and delusion; the dispatches of Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford -were published in the Lisbon Gazette, and the people of Portugal were -officially informed of the real circumstances of the war, as fairly and -as fully as they had been in the War of the Acclamation. - - - - -CHAPTER XXX. - -SIEGE OF HOSTALRICH. ATTEMPT UPON VALENCIA. CAPTURE OF LERIDA. -OPERATIONS BEFORE CADIZ. - - -♦1810.♦ - -If proof had been wanting that men of any country may be made good -soldiers under good discipline, it might have been seen at this time in -Buonaparte’s armies, where the Italians, who in their own country ran -like sheep before the French, were now embodied with them, and approved -themselves in every respect equal to their former conquerors. These -men, who were taken by the conscription to bear part in a war wherein -they had no concern, who had no national character to support, nothing -but the spirit of their profession to animate them, were nevertheless -equal to any service required from them, and needed no other excitement -than that they were fighting for pay, and plunder, and life. Was it -then to be doubted, that if the same care were bestowed in training, -the same results would be seen in the Spaniards and Portugueze, -who were under the influence of every passion and every principle -which can strengthen and elevate the heart of man, ... both people -too being alike remarkable for national feeling, and for patience -under difficulties and privations, docility to their superiors, and -faithful attachment to those in whom they trust? It was not indeed to -be expected that the Spaniards would so far acknowledge their military -degradation as to put themselves under the tuition of an ally; Spain -had not abated sufficiently of its old pretensions, thus to humiliate -itself. Neither indeed was that degradation so complete as it had been -in Portugal. The Spanish artillery was most respectable; and there -were officers in the army who had studied their profession, and whose -talents might have raised them to distinction in the proudest age of -Spanish history. But the Portugueze were conscious of their weakness, -and in this knowledge they found their strength: for when that brave -and generous people, in the extremity of their fortune, submitted -implicitly to the direction of their old hereditary ally, ... when they -offered hands and hearts for the common cause, and asked for assistance -and instruction, the ultimate success of that cause became as certain -as any thing can possibly be deemed by human foresight. With Portugal -for the scene of action, and her population ready for every sacrifice -that duty might require, it remained only for Great Britain to feel and -understand its own strength, and employ its inexhaustible resources in -exertions adequate to the occasion. - -But Great Britain as yet hardly understood its strength. The cold -poison which was continually instilled by party writers into the public -ear had produced some effect even upon the sound part of the nation. -From the commencement of the war it had been proclaimed as a truth too -certain to be disputed, that England could no longer as a military -power compete with France, consequently that we must rely upon our -insular situation, and husband our resources. These opinions had been -so long repeated, that they had acquired something like the authority -of prescription; the government itself seemed to distrust the national -power, and in the fear of hazarding too much, apportioned always for -every service the smallest possible force that could be supposed -adequate to the object, instead of placing at the general’s disposal -such ample means as might ensure success. The first departure from this -over-cautious system was in the expedition to Walcheren, where a great -armament was worse than wasted. That miserable enterprise weakened the -government, and in some degree disheartened it; and Lord Wellington, -in addition to the other difficulties of his situation, had long to -struggle with insufficient means. But the exertions and the experience -of the last year had not been lost: the British army had acquired a -reputation which, however successfully Buonaparte concealed it from -the French people, was felt by his soldiers and his generals: time had -been gained for training the Portugueze troops, and preparing for the -defence of Portugal; and the British Commander having proved both his -enemies and his allies, had clearly foreseen the course which the war -would take, and determined upon his own measures with the calmness of -a mind that knew how to make the best advantage of the events it could -not control. - -♦O’DONNELL APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN CATALONIA.♦ - -While both parties were preparing for a campaign in Portugal, in which -the enemy expected to complete the conquest of the Peninsula, and -Lord Wellington felt assured that the tide of their fortune would be -turned; while the war before Cadiz was pursued with little exertion -or enterprise on either side, and the cities of Andalusia were -occupied without a struggle by the invaders; in Catalonia the contest -was carried on with renewed vigour. The fall of Gerona enabled the -besieging army to undertake farther operations; but the Catalans, as -well as the French, had changed their commander. Upon Blake’s recall -to the south, D. Juan de Henestrosa had succeeded to the command; -the provincial Junta however, in accord with the general wish of the -people and of the troops, appointed O’Donnell in his stead, and this -nomination was ♦GARCIA CONDE MADE GOVERNOR OF LERIDA.♦ confirmed by the -Regency. It gave offence to Garcia Conde, who was an older officer, and -had also distinguished himself during the siege of ♦VON STAFF, 246.♦ -Gerona. He resigned the command of the first division in disgust: this -act of intemperance, however, was overlooked, and he was made governor -of Lerida, a post of great importance at that time, but to which his -services and his character seemed fairly to entitle him. The Duque del -Parque had more reason for displeasure at O’Donnell’s promotion; in -the belief that he was to have the command in Catalonia by the express -desire of the Catalan people, he had taken leave of his own army, and -Romana had been appointed to succeed him. - -♦RAPID PROMOTION IN THE SPANISH ARMIES.♦ - -If heroes who carry victory with their single presence were to be -produced as if by miracle, according to Lord Holland’s supposition, -by democratic institutions, during such struggles as that in which -the Spaniards were engaged, fairer opportunities for their appearance -could not have been afforded under the most democratic forms than -were given both by the Central Junta and by the Regency. There had -been a flagrant exception in the case of Alburquerque; the union of -high rank, deserved popularity, and great military talents in his -person, had excited unworthy jealousies in some, and worse passions in -others: but in every other instance, promotion had rapidly followed -upon desert; a rash and even ruinous confidence had been shown where -any promise of ability appeared; and men were raised so rapidly, that -they became giddy with their sudden elevation. But Henrique O’Donnell -justified the expectations which had been formed of him. While the -French proclaimed in their official accounts, that now Gerona had -been taken, little more was required for the complete subjugation of -Catalonia; that the Ampurdam was already reduced; that the peasants, -as they were taken in arms, were hung up in great numbers upon the -trees along the road side, and that the French communications had at -length been rendered secure, the fall of Gerona, like that of Zaragoza, -had animated the Spaniards, not discouraged them: they looked to the -spirit which the garrison and the inhabitants had displayed, not to the -surrender which famine had rendered inevitable, and in the religious -and heroic endurance which had there been manifested, found cause for -more ennobling pride and surer hope than a victory in the field would -have given them. Eroles was charged by the superior Junta to enforce -the decree for embodying every fifth man. He called upon the Catalans -in language suited to the times, reminding them of their forefathers -who spread terror through the Greek empire; and referring to those -regiments of the Gerona garrison, which but a little while before the -siege had been filled up with men thus levied, as having exemplified -not less illustriously the powerful effects of discipline. By this -means the army was recruited, and the men hoping for change of fortune -with every change of commander, entered cheerfully upon the service -under O’Donnell, who had hitherto only been known by his adventurous -exploits and his success. - -♦CONDUCT OF THE PEOPLE OF VILLADRAU.♦ - -In the other parts of Spain, grievously as all had suffered, the -scene of action had frequently been shifted; but in Catalonia there -had been no intermission. From the commencement till the termination -of the war, the struggle was carried on there without an interval -of rest. A memorable instance of the provincial spirit was given at -this time by the people of Villadrau, an open town, in the plain of -Vich; on the approach of an enemy’s detachment, which they had no -means of resisting, the whole of its inhabitants, in the middle of -February, retired to the mountains. The French Commandant, finding -the place utterly deserted, wrote to the Regidor, telling him that if -the inhabitants were not brought back by the following day, he should -be obliged to report their conduct to Marshal Augereau, and take the -necessary measures for reducing them to obedience: at the same time he -assured him that the most effectual means should be used for preserving -order. This answer was returned by the Regidor: “All these people, -that the French nation may know the love they bear to their religion, -their King, and their country, are contented to remain buried among the -snows of Montsen, rather than submit to the hateful dominion of the -French troops.” So many families, in the same spirit, forsook their -homes, rather than remain subject to the invaders, that the superior -Junta, at O’Donnell’s suggestion, issued an order for providing them -with quarters in the same manner as the soldiers. The exceptions to -this spirit were found, where they were to be expected, in the rich -commercial towns, as at Reus. If the people of Barcelona, like those of -Villadrau, and of so many smaller places, had abandoned their houses, -that city could not long have been held by the enemy; in that case the -blockade might have been as rigorous, and almost as effectual by land -as by sea: but provisions for the use of the inhabitants were allowed -by the Spanish generals to enter; and therefore, though the French -might be sometimes inconvenienced, it was certain that they would never -be exposed to any serious danger of famine. - -♦HOSTALRICH.♦ - -The communication between Gerona and that city was impeded by -Hostalrich, a modern fortress, overlooking a small and decayed town, -which had once been fortified. It is situated on high and broken -ground, seven leagues from Gerona. The intermediate country is of the -wildest character, consisting of mountains covered with pines; the -road winds through sundry defiles, so narrow, that in most places the -river nearly fills up the way; the pass is so difficult, that in one -part it has obtained the name of El Purgatorio; and the outlet is -commanded by this fortress. Part of the town had been burnt during the -siege of Gerona, when the magazines which had been collected there were -taken by the enemy. An enemy’s division, under the Italian General -Mazzuchelli, occupied it now, preparatory to the siege of the castle; -the inhabitants, upon their approach, took refuge in the church, and -there defended themselves till a detachment of the garrison sallied, -and relieved them; and before the blockade of the fortress was -pressed, they had time to remove and seek shelter where they could. The -garrison meantime prepared for a Spanish defence. This fortress, said -the governor Julian de Estrada, is the daughter of Gerona, and ought to -imitate the example of its mother! - -♦COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE.♦ - -The siege began on the 13th of January: a week afterwards one of the -outworks, called the Friars’ Tower, was attacked; the officer in -command, D. Francisco Oliver, was killed by a hand-grenade, which -exploded as he was in the act of throwing it; and the man who succeeded -him, immediately, either through cowardice, or from a worse motive, -surrendered his post. Augereau, who was at this time come to inspect -the siege and accelerate the operations, thought it a good opportunity -to intimidate the governor. He therefore summoned him to surrender, -saying, that the garrison should in that case be allowed the honours -of war, and marched as prisoners into France; giving them two hours -to reply, and warning them that if they refused to submit upon this -summons, they must not expect to be treated like soldiers, but should -suffer capital punishment, as men taken in rebellion against their -lawful king. Estrada replied, that the Spaniards had no other king -than Ferdinand VII. The siege was carried on with little vigour till -the 20th of February, when the French began to bombard the fort; but -the men who defended it showed themselves worthy of the cause in which -they were engaged, and of their commander; and here, as at Gerona, the -French, with all their skill, and all their numbers, found that the -strength of a fortress depends less upon its walls and bulwarks, than -upon the virtue of those who defend it. - -♦FIRST SUCCESS OF O’DONNELL.♦ - -The force under Augereau’s command was sufficiently large for carrying -on the siege of Hostalrich, commencing operations against Lerida, -and acting at the same time against O’Donnell, whose troops the -French Marshal despised, as consisting merely of raw levies. He was -soon taught to respect them and their General; for when he himself -went to Barcelona with a considerable convoy of stores, and 1500 of -the garrison were sent to occupy O’Donnell’s attention, not a fifth -part of the number effected their retreat into the city. More than -500 of the French were slain, and nearly as many taken ♦DESERTION -FROM THE FRENCH ARMY.♦ prisoners. They suffered a greater loss from -desertion. Buonaparte had pursued the wicked policy of forcing into -his own service the Austrian prisoners taken in the late war; 800 of -these men went over to the Spaniards in a body, stipulating only that -they might keep their arms, and remain together, till they should -be distributed among the regiments of the line. General Doyle had -addressed proclamations to the soldiers in the French service, not only -in the French and Spanish languages, but in Italian, Dutch, German, and -Polish also, setting before them the real cause of a war, the nature of -which they saw and felt. The Catalans too had learnt the good policy -of distinguishing between the French and the foreigners in the French -army, treating the latter, when they were taken, with kindness, as men -who had been brought against them by compulsion. The effect of this -system, and of the proclamations, was such as greatly to alarm the -enemy. They lost in this manner more than 6000 men, wretched as the -service was to which the men went over. It was not possible for them -to take any effectual means for checking this evil, when such constant -opportunities were offered in the desultory warfare which they were -compelled to carry on. - -♦WANT OF CONCERT BETWEEN THE PROVINCES.♦ - -Had the Spanish army been even in a tolerable condition, this -cause must have produced the ruin of the French in Catalonia; but -the deserters found that they were exchanging a bad service for a -worse. The French troops, though by a policy not less ruinous than -detestable, left to supply themselves as they could, were, even at the -worst, better provided than the Spaniards in their best state. They -had always the benefit of system, regularity, and order; while the -Spaniards suffered as much from the confusion which insubordination -and the total want of method occasioned, as from neglect on the part -of the local authorities and the provincial government. Owing to these -combined causes their armies were often in a state of destitution. -Unanimous as Spain was in its feeling of indignant abhorrence at the -insolent usurpation which Buonaparte had attempted, it was divided -against itself whenever provincial interests appeared to clash. Neither -Catalonia nor Valencia would at this time make common cause with -Arragon, although they were engaged with the same passionate feeling, -for the same object, against the same enemy, and although their own -safety was immediately involved in the fate of that kingdom. The -Arragonese army consisted of about 13,000 men in three divisions, one -of which was near Teruel, another near Tortosa, and the third on the -line of the Cinca; the men were without pay, without arms, without -clothing; the officers on a fourth part of their appointments. Twenty -thousand men would eagerly have joined that army, if they could have -been armed and fed; the people had given abundant proof of their zeal, -and spirit, and devotion, and the army had done its duty: yet Valencia -would spare them none of its own ample resources, and the Catalan -government even stopped the supplies which were intended for Arragon. -The Arragonese felt this the more indignantly, because, while Lazan -was at their head, his rank and influence ensured some attention to -his representations on their behalf; but Lazan, whether or not justly, -had been arrested, as being implicated in the intrigues of Montijo and -D. Francisco Palafox, and was kept a close prisoner in Peñiscola. The -judge who officially inquired into his conduct declared that there was -not the slightest proof ♦1810. FEBRUARY.♦ against him; and upon the -overthrow of the Central Junta, Saavedra dispatched an order for his -liberation; but the Junta of Valencia, with that order in their hands, -detained him in strict confinement. - -♦NEGLECT OF THE VALENCIAN GOVERNMENT.♦ - -No province had as yet suffered so little as Valencia; the people were -proud of the spirit and signal success with which they had repelled -Marshal Moncey from the walls of their capital; their country was the -most fertile and most populous part of Spain; men were in abundance, -wealth was not wanting, and there were more appearances of activity -and preparation than were any where else to be seen. In every town and -village militia and guerilla bands were formed; about 50,000 were thus -embodied, the greater part armed with fire-arms; and besides these -there were 11,000 troops of the line; but with this force nothing -was undertaken. Good service might have been rendered on one side by -harassing the enemy’s communications in La Mancha; and scenes of more -important action were open both in Arragon and Catalonia, ... even on -their own borders; but the will, courage, and means were inefficient, -for want of capacity in their leaders. They waited for the enemy upon -their own ground, in hope and in confidence, but without foresight -or system. General Doyle endeavoured to convince the provincial -government that no time should be lost in fortifying the important -points of Morella, Oropesa, and Murviedro. He inferred from some of -Suchet’s movements an intention to establish himself in the latter -place, which would have cut off the communication between Catalonia -and the rest of Spain, and have given him command of the Huerta de -Valencia, and of the whole country to the very gates of Tortosa. But -in the confidence and confusion which prevailed alike in the people -and in the officers and the rulers, nothing was done; and so far were -they from storing Tarragona, and forming a depôt at Peñiscola, as the -importance of the crisis required, that Tortosa itself had not at this -time provisions for a week’s consumption. They relied upon the defence -of their frontier, upon their own numbers and resources, upon fortune -and Providence; for themselves, they were ready to meet the danger -manfully whenever it should come, ... but as for any system of defence, -to fortune and Providence that seemed to be left. - -♦THE FORCE ON THE VALENCIAN FRONTIER DISPERSED.♦ - -The Valencians were in this state when the half-armed, half-clothed, -half-hungered Arragonese, with whom their abundant means ought to have -been shared, were dispersed, and the frontier in consequence was left -open. General Caro determined to march upon Teruel, which the French -had entered, but the movements of an active enemy soon compelled him -to change this determination. One division of Suchet’s army advanced -from Alcañiz upon Morella; no means had been taken for strengthening -that important point, the Valencians therefore fell back from thence, -and from San Mateo also, and the enemy, without experiencing any -opposition, proceeded by Burriol with all speed toward Murviedro. -Meantime Suchet with the other division advanced upon the same point -by way of Alventosa; there he encountered a brave resistance from the -vanguard of Caro’s army, and after a contest, which lasted nearly the -whole day, was repulsed. The Spanish commander, expecting a renewal of -the attack, requested a reinforcement from Segorbe; he was informed in -reply, that General Caro had ordered the troops to fall back upon the -capital. This disheartened men who were too prone to interpret an order -for retreating as a signal for flight; they dispersed upon the next -attack, leaving the artillery upon the ground; Segorbe was entered in -pursuit, and Suchet, having sacked that place, effected a junction with -the other division of his army at Murviedro. - -His corps consisted of about 12,000 men, with thirty field-pieces; a -force manifestly insufficient for its object, if he had not counted -upon the success of his machinations in the capital. ♦SUCHET ADVANCES -AGAINST VALENCIA.♦ From thence he advanced to the Puig, and having -fixed his head-quarters on the spot ♦MARCH 6.♦ where King Jayme el -Conquistador had encamped when he undertook the conquest of Valencia, -he addressed a letter to the Captain General Caro, saying, that he -came not to make war upon the happy capital of the finest kingdom -in Spain, nor to lay waste the delicious country which surrounded -it, but to offer protection and peace, such as Jaen, and Granada, -♦1810. MARCH.♦ and Cordoba, and Seville were enjoying. Andalusia had -submitted; the army, having discharged its duty, had entered into the -service of King Joseph Napoleon; and the militia, consisting of men -enlisted by force, and under the penalty of death if they refused, -had been dismissed. Religion was respected, justice observed, private -property untouched; and General Caro was now invited to open the gates -of Valencia, that the French might enter, and he might deserve the -blessings of his country. Wherefore should he prolong a contest, the -issue of which the Spaniards themselves could now no longer consider -doubtful? They had done enough to prove their courage, and it was time -that their sufferings should have an end. The Captain General’s answer -contained some stinging truths, and some remarkable falsehoods. It -contrasted the professions of General Suchet with his actual conduct; -and it assured him that the French had been completely defeated between -Puerto Real and the Isle of Leon, that they had evacuated Seville -in consequence, and were in full retreat toward the Sierra Morena. -Authentic intelligence was so irregularly communicated, and the most -extravagant reports so eagerly propagated and so readily believed, -that it is very possible the Captain General of Valencia believed the -incredible statement which he advanced. Suchet addressed a summons -also to the inhabitants of Valencia, calling upon them as proprietors -and parents to consult their own interest and their duty, by preserving -their beautiful and flourishing city from the calamities of war. They -returned for answer, that they were prepared to sacrifice every thing -in the defence of their just cause; that having defeated Moncey in a -similar attempt, they had good reason now to hope for the same success; -and that it was for his Excellency, who so humanely deprecated the -effusion of blood, to consider whether the best method of avoiding that -evil was not to abstain from an attack? - -♦HE RETREATS FROM VALENCIA.♦ - -Suchet, in fact, had no intention of making one. It was, however, -expected by the Valencians; and in that expectation the superior Junta, -by Caro’s advice, had removed to St. Felipe, a city to which it seems -strange that its old name of Xativa should not have been at this time -restored. There they were to exert themselves for supplying the capital -and annoying the invaders, a military Junta being appointed meantime -within the city, to dispose of the peasantry who had flocked thither, -and to direct the labours of a willing people. A former Junta had been -assembled after the dispersion at Alventosa, and in the course of the -ensuing night every member had been arrested upon a charge of treason. -An edict also was passed, confiscating the property of all who had fled -from the city at this time, their absence being interpreted as proof -either of cowardice or of treachery. Such severity was not without -cause. Relying upon their intelligence in the city, the van of the -French army entered the suburb of Murviedro, and occupied the College -of Pius V. the Royal Palace, and the Zaidia, all which are without the -walls on the farther bank of the Turia. From the palace they fired upon -the bridge; and they exasperated, if it were possible to exasperate, -the hatred of the Spaniards, by exposing the images which they had -taken from the churches on their march and in the suburbs to the fire -of the city, having stript some of their taudry attire, and dressed up -others in regimentals. But finding their hopes fail, and not being in -sufficient force to venture upon an attack, they decamped during the -night of the 11th, retreating with such celerity, that they abandoned -great part of their plunder. - -♦A CONSPIRACY DISCOVERED IN THAT CITY.♦ - -The Valencians imputed their deliverance on this occasion to their -Patroness and Generalissima, the Virgin, under her invocation of Maria -Santissima de los Desamparados, and to the Saints who were natives of -Valencia. A deliverance it was; for a plan had actually been formed to -assassinate the Captain General, and proclamations in favour of King -Joseph and his French allies were found upon the chief mover of this -treason, Colonel Baron de Pozoblanco. This person, who appears to have -been a revolutionary fanatic, suffered under the hangman; his head -was exposed upon a stake in the market-place, with an inscription -under it, announcing his crime, and charging him also with belonging -to the sect of the illuminated Egyptian freemasons, which was said to -be extending itself from Madrid into La Mancha, Murcia, and Valencia, -and to have converted the different appellations of the Virgin into -distinctive names for its own organization. - -♦THE FRENCH BOAST OF SUCCESS.♦ - -Suchet’s expedition was not made without loss; some of his garrisons -and smaller parties were cut off by the Arragonese troops in his rear, -under D. Pedro Villacampa. The Castle of Benasque had been taken before -he marched against Valencia, and that capture completed his military -possession of the north of Arragon; but the people, when deprived of -their fortresses, found fastnesses in their mountains, and waged from -thence a wearying and wasting war against their oppressors; and Mina’s -prisoners were escorted from the frontier of Navarre to Lerida, through -a country of which the French called and fancied themselves masters. -This desultory warfare was carried on in Catalonia also with no less -skill than success. Augereau had supposed, that after the reduction -of Gerona little more was necessary for the complete subjugation of -the province; he boasted of a victory in the plain of Vich, the most -glorious, it was said, which the French had yet obtained, wherein -O’Donnell had lost 7000 men, with the whole of his baggage, and after -which he could find no place of safety till he had taken refuge under -the walls of Tarragona. Souham in like manner proclaimed that the -famous Rovira had fled before him, notwithstanding his vaunts of the -incursions, robberies, and assassinations upon which he prided himself. -It was presently seen with what little foundation the invaders boasted -of these triumphs. - -♦O’DONNELL’S SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS.♦ - -O’Donnell’s movements were not in consequence of a defeat. Having -experienced the superiority which the enemy’s discipline gave them -in the management of large bodies, he had immediate recourse to that -system of warfare, in which enterprise, celerity, and the ardour of -the soldiers, are of more avail than tactics. Therefore he retreated -rapidly from Moya to Terrasa, leaving Manresa uncovered: the -inhabitants of that city forsook it on the approach of the French; and -O’Donnell continuing ♦MARCH 16.♦ to lead the invaders on, fell back, -first to Villa-franca del Panades, then to Torre-dembarra, finally -under the walls of Tarragona, executing these movements in good order, -and without loss. The enemy, in pursuit, as they believed, of a flying -army, occupied Manresa with 1500 men, left 900 in Villa-franca, and -proceeded till they also came in sight of Tarragona. One division -occupied Vendrell, and extended to Arco de Barra, upon the high road -to Barcelona; but in a few days this division joined the main body, -which was at Coll de Santa Cristina, and they immediately advanced -♦MARCH 28.♦ towards Valls. O’Donnell, profiting by this movement, -sent Camp Marshal D. Juan Caro against Villa-franca; Caro proceeded by -forced marches, and surprised the enemy on the following ♦MARCH 30.♦ -morning; between 200 and 300 were killed, and 640 made prisoners, not a -man escaping. Caro himself was wounded; the command of his detachment -devolved upon Brigadier D. Gervasio Gasca, and they proceeded toward -Manresa, to attack the enemy, who occupied that town. - -A body of 500 or 600 had already been sent to reinforce the French -in Manresa, and had effected their junction, though not without the -loss of two carts of ammunition, and forty killed, in an action with a -party of somatenes and of expatriates, as those Spaniards were called -whose homes were occupied by the enemy. Augereau no sooner heard of -the loss in Villa-franca, than, apprehending a similar attack upon -Manresa, he ordered a further reinforcement of 1200 men from Barcelona, -to proceed thither with the utmost celerity. Gasca, receiving timely -intelligence of their movement, instead ♦APRIL 3.♦ of proceeding -upon Manresa, marched to intercept this column, and fell in with it -between Esparraguera and Abrera; 400 were left upon the field, 500 made -prisoners, and the remainder fled toward Barcelona, not more than 200 -reaching that city. The Spaniards, after this second success, prepared -to execute their projected attack upon the enemy in Manresa, and the -Marquis de Campoverde took the command for this purpose: but the men -had exerted themselves too much in forced marches and in action to -perform a third enterprise with the same celerity as the two former; -and on the night before the attack should have been made, Schwartz, -who headed the French detachment, evacuated the town, and took the -road to Barcelona by Santa Clara, Barata, and Marieta. He began his -retreat at eleven on the night of the 4th. Brigadier D. Francisco -Milans, who was stationed at St. Fructuos, passing the night under -arms, to be ready for the attack at seven on the following morning, was -apprised of the enemy’s retreat between four and five, and dispatched -the corps of expatriates, under Rovira, in pursuit, while the rest of -the division followed as fast as possible. Rovira, whom the French had -lately reviled as a wretch who was flying before them, passing in two -hours over a distance which was the ordinary journey of four, in their -pursuit, overtook them at Hostalet, and attacked them with his usual -intrepidity. Schwartz, whose force consisted of 1500 men, formed them -into a column, and continued to retreat, fighting as he went. Rovira, -however, so impeded his movements, that he gave time for Milans to come -up with him near Sabadell; the Spaniards then charged with the bayonet; -500 of the French fell, 300 were made prisoners; Schwartz himself was -wounded, and owed his life to the swiftness of his horse. Some of the -French, after having surrendered, were said to have fired upon the -Spaniards, and this was assigned as the cause why the number of the -slain exceeded that of the prisoners. - -The amount of the killed and taken in these actions falls far short of -the sum of the French loss; for the desertion was very great, every -defeat giving the Germans, who were forced into their wicked service, -an opportunity of escaping from it. The whole loss which they sustained -from these well-planned enterprises was not less than 5000. O’Donnell -hoped that he should now be enabled to relieve Hostalrich; but the -main body of the French returning toward Barcelona from Reus, which -they had taken possession of a few days before, compelled Campoverde’s -division to fall back, and thus prevented the attempt. In Catalonia, -indeed, though more military talent and far more energy were displayed -than in the other provinces, it was less a war of armies than of the -people against a great military force. Wherever the French moved in -large bodies, the Catalans could not resist them, or resisted in vain; -in general actions and in sieges, the enemy were sure to be successful; -the French, therefore, and they in this country who would have had -us abandon the Peninsula to their mercy, concluded that the party -which won battles, and captured fortresses, must necessarily soon -become masters of the country; and they reasoned thus, because they -never took into their calculation the national character, the natural -strength of Spain, and the moral strength of man. - -♦1810. FEBRUARY. - -SIEGE OF HOSTALRICH.♦ - -The effect of that moral power was shown not less admirably at -Hostalrich than it had been at Zaragoza and Gerona, though the three -sieges differed from each other in all their circumstances. The little -town of Hostalrich was not included within the works, and the fortress -contained no other inhabitants than its garrison. The bombardment -began on the 20th of February. The adjutant, D. Jose Antonio Roca, was -writing a dispatch for the governor to the commander-in-chief, when a -shell burst so near them, that one of the fragments entered the room -and swept away every thing from off the table: Roca picked up his -paper, and, remarking that the sand which it carried with it might save -him the trouble of telling the general they were bombarded, continued -his dispatch. A private soldier, who went out of the works for water, -received a musket-ball in his groin as he was returning; he laid one -hand upon the wound, and carrying in the pitcher steadily with the -other, met his serjeant, to whom he delivered it; then groping in the -wound for the ball, which probably had not gone deep, he pulled it out -with his fingers, and gave it to the serjeant, saying, “I deposit this -ball in your hands; keep it for me, and as soon as I am cured, this -very bullet shall revenge me upon the first Frenchman at whom I can -get a shot.” And as he went to the hospital he charged his comrades, -in case he should not live to take vengeance for himself, that they -would take it for him. Such was the spirit with which Hostalrich was -defended. “Let every circumstance of the siege be made known!” said -this brave garrison; “if we are successful, the detail will give hope, -and confidence, and joy to every true patriot; if we are unfortunate, -it will excite a different feeling, but it will never produce shame or -dismay.” - -♦1810. MARCH.♦ - -Verdier, who now commanded the besieging force, addressed a new summons -to the governor at the time of O’Donnell’s retreat to Tarragona, -representing that movement as the consequence of a total defeat. “The -wreck of the Spanish army,” he said, “was seeking a moment’s shelter -in Tarragona and Tortosa, vigorously pursued by Augereau in person, -who would immediately commence the siege of both places. The siege of -Lerida was already far advanced, and its fall inevitable. Hostalrich -was a fort of no other use than as it interrupted the communication -between Gerona and Barcelona; and this purpose it no longer effected, -the French having made a new road, and communicating freely between -those cities. The object, therefore, for defending it, no longer -existed; and longer resistance, instead of adding to the governor’s -glory, would be called a vain obstinacy, draw upon him the reproaches -of posterity, and make him responsible for the blood which should be -shed.” Considering these circumstances, the French general summoned -him to surrender, and offered him the honours of war. The Marshal Duke -of Castiglione, Augereau, he added, revoking his former declaration, -had authorized him to propose these terms. “You will do well, sir,” -he continued, “to accept them with glory; if you delay, they will -without doubt be refused to you; and you will then be obliged to suffer -conditions, which, however rigorous they may appear, are dictated by -justice, seeing that a protracted resistance is neither justified by -honour nor by reason.” Estrada replied, by simply referring him to his -former determination, and to the conduct of the garrison. - -The situation of the fortress, upon a craggy height, secured it against -an assault, while there were any resolute men to defend it. The -bombardment continued till every building within the walls had been -destroyed, except a casemate, which served as an hospital, and was only -large enough to hold one-and-twenty beds; the remainder of the sick -and wounded were secured in a mine, and the garrison also had their -quarters under ground. Supplies had been introduced about the middle of -the siege; all other attempts had been defeated, and would have been -of no avail at length had they succeeded, because the cisterns were -destroyed. Estrada had the example of O’Donnell’s retreat from Gerona -before him, and determined to make his way through the enemy’s lines, -rather than capitulate. This he concerted with O’Donnell, ♦1810. MAY.♦ -who, for the purpose of deceiving the besiegers, ordered some vessels -to approach Arenys de Mar, the nearest part of the coast, sent one -detachment to call off their attention on the side of Orsaviña and -Monnegre, and another on the southern skirts of Monseny, toward Breda. -Augereau, who had come to witness the capture of a fortress which had -resisted him for four months, sent in a last summons on the evening -of the 11th of May, offering the same terms which had been granted -to Gerona; he allowed the governor two hours for consideration, and -declared, that if the fort was not then delivered up, the whole of -the garrison should be put to the sword. Estrada laid this before his -officers, and with one consent they returned for answer, that they -thanked the Marshal for thinking them worthy of being thus named with -Gerona, but that they were not yet in a condition which should make -them yield. On the following morning, the men, to their great joy, were -informed of the resolution which had been taken. - -♦RETREAT OF THE GARRISON.♦ - -The French expected such an attempt, and judged, from the stir which -they beheld in the fort, that it would be made in the ensuing night. -That evening, therefore, they strengthened their post at Tordera on the -right, thinking, as the men themselves did, that the governor would -make for Arenys de Mar, where the ships were awaiting him. At ten, -the garrison descended the glacis on the side of the high road of St. -Celoni, and crossed the road and the space between the fort and the -heights of Masanas. It was broad moonlight. Two advanced parties, to -the right and left, fell upon the enemy’s picquets with the bayonet; -those, however, who escaped gave the alarm; but the garrison had gained -the start, ascended to St. Jacinto, and hastened toward St. Feliu -de Buxaleu. A league from Hostalrich they fell in with an enemy’s -encampment, and routed them; this gave the alarm to another body of -2000 French, whose station was near, on the road to Arbucias; but they -were received so resolutely, that they soon gave over the pursuit. -Thus all was effected which could be done by skill and courage; one -division lost its way, and many of the men dropt on the road, their -strength failing them on this great exertion, from the want of rest and -food, which they had long endured. Among them was the noble Julian de -Estrada, who thus fell into the hands of the enemy: this was a heavier -loss to his country than that of the fortress which he had defended so -well; for in the course of the war, Catalonia had but too much cause -bitterly to regret the loss of such men as Estrada and Alvarez. Five -hundred men reached Vich in safety on the following day, 132 joined -them on the next, being part of the battalion of Gerona, who had lost -their way and fallen in with the enemy; stragglers continually came in, -and on the evening of that day, the number who had accomplished their -retreat amounted to 800, though the French asserted, that every man -was either killed or taken. - -In such an enterprise, it was impossible to bring off the sick and -wounded; the comptroller of the hospital, D. Manuel Miguel Mellado, -remained with them to go through the form of delivering up the ruins, -and provide for their safety. Such of the invalids as were best able -mounted guard, the gates were closed, and the drawbridges raised; and -in this state Mellado anxiously waited for what might happen. Half an -hour before midnight, a brisk fire of musketry was poured in upon the -flanks of the ravelin, and of St. Francisco. Mellado called out to -the enemy to cease firing, for the fort was theirs; and he requested -them to wait till the morning, that he might deliver a letter from -the governor to the French general. They replied, they would suffer -no delay, the gates must instantly be opened; otherwise, they had -ladders, and would enter and put every man to the sword. He, however, -told them he would not open the gates till he had seen their general; -upon this they renewed their fire, setting up a loud shout like men -who were about to obtain possession of their prey. Mellado hastened -to the bulwark of St. Barbara, where he apprehended the escalade -would be made, and there he perceived that the enemy, who had found -a rope-ladder in the covered way, were endeavouring to grapple the -drawbridge with it; but, either from the weight of the rope, which -rendered it difficult to be thrown, or because the irons were not -sufficiently sharp to lay hold, their attempts were frustrated. This -Mellado could not foresee; and knowing that no time was to be lost, he -hastened out through a covered way to the nearest work of the enemy, -and called out to the commandant, requesting him to stop the assault, -and send him to the general, that he might deliver the governor’s -letter; the party who were flanking the ravelin, no sooner heard his -voice than they fired a volley towards it; upon which, without waiting -for an answer, he hastened to the nearest centinel of the French, and -the captain of the guard conducted him to the French commandant in the -town; whom he entreated to have compassion upon the wounded in the -fort, and call off the assailants. This officer was a man of humanity, -and instantly sent off to suspend the assault, while Mellado, who was -now delivered from his fears for his poor defenceless countrymen, -was escorted to the general. In the morning the gates were opened -to the enemy. The French soldiers gave sufficient proof how little -mercy the wounded would have found at their hands, had they been -under no control, for they stript the clothes and blankets from the -beds of these helpless men. Mazzachelli gave orders that they should -be conveyed to Gerona; and Mellado, having seen this performed, and -perceiving that it was intended to detain him and his assistants as -prisoners, took the first opportunity of making his escape. - -♦LAS MEDAS AND LERIDA SURRENDERED.♦ - -At the very time when the garrison of Hostalrich, after a four months’ -defence, and a bombardment, during which between three and four -thousand shells were thrown into the place, ♦MAY 13.♦ thus gallantly -effected their retreat, the Catalans suffered another loss. The islands -and fortress of Las Medas, which were of material importance from -their position on the coast, were surprised by a party of Neapolitan -infantry, and given up in a manner which the French imputed to -cowardice, though, by their own account, treason, on the part of the -commander, was the only intelligible cause of the surrender. Lerida -also was rather betrayed than yielded by Garcia Conde. The town was -entered by assault: and the castle, where the works were uninjured, -and which, under Alvarez or Estrada, might have rivalled Gerona, was -surrendered the next day. For this there was no excuse; O’Donnell’s -last orders to the governor had been, that if the city should be -taken, he was to defend the fortresses; and if no such orders had -been given, his duty required him to hold out to the last extremity. -The commander-in-chief, who rewarded the defenders of Hostalrich with -a medal, stigmatized this conduct as it deserved; but he reminded -the Catalans, that Tarragona, Tortosa, Cardona, Berga, Seu de Urgel, -Coll de Ballaguer, and Mequinenza, still remained as bulwarks of the -principality; that if all these were lost, there would be their -inaccessible mountains; and that when they began the war, they had -neither army nor fortresses, for all their fortified places had been -dismantled. A wound which he had received during the siege of Gerona, -and which had never been healed, because he never allowed himself rest -enough from the incessant and anxious activity of his situation, became -now so threatening, that he was constrained for a while to withdraw -from ♦AUGEREAU SUPERSEDED BY MARSHAL MACDONALD.♦ the command. Augereau -also, about the same time, was recalled. His success in sieges did not -expiate, in Buonaparte’s eyes, for the loss in men and reputation which -he had sustained from an enemy who were now become as wary as they were -active and enterprising. Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Tarento, succeeded -him. The plunder of Barcelona was sent into France under Augereau’s -escort; and a number of commercial adventurers from that country, who, -being deceived by the French official accounts, had supposed that Spain -was actually subdued, and gone thither with the intent of forming -establishments, gladly seized the first opportunity of returning in -safety. - -If the war was carried on by the Catalans with an unwearied and -unremitting energy which was not displayed in other parts of Spain, -it was not wholly owing to that enterprising and unconquerable spirit -by which they have always been characterized, but in some degree to -the natural strength of the province, and still more to the advantage -which they derived from having many places in their possession which -could not be reduced without a regular siege. Throughout Spain there -existed the same feeling of indignation against the invaders, ... -but where the country, the villages, and the towns were alike open, -there was not the same possibility of resistance; plains could not be -defended by peasantry; nor could the contest be maintained by large -bodies against a superior enemy, when there were neither fortified -towns nor natural fastnesses on which they could retire. In such -parts the war was carried on by guerilla parties, who made incursions -from the mountainous districts into the plains, and whenever it was -necessary to disperse, found friends every where. Wherever the French -were nominally masters of the country, the guerillas harassed their -communication, cut off their small parties, and diminished their -numbers by a mode of warfare as disheartening to the enemy as it was -consuming and inglorious; while in the stronger parts of the kingdom, -such as Asturias, and the province of Cuenca, and the mountains of -Ronda, the inhabitants perseveringly defended their native soil. - -♦FORT MATAGORDA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦ - -Cadiz, however, was the point whereon all eyes were at this time -turned, in expectation of great events. Victor had been left to command -the siege, if siege it may be called. The French occupied the shore of -the bay, fortified their own position, and endeavoured to annoy the -shipping and the town; a regular attack upon the isle was too perilous -for them to attempt. Fort Matagorda was the only point from which it -was thought possible that they could injure the town: it had been built -for the defence of the arsenal, opposite to the broadest part of that -tongue of land which connects Cadiz with the Isle of Leon. From thence -it was apprehended they might with the largest land mortars throw -shells to the gates of the city; Ormond indeed had planted his cannon -there, in the fruitless attempt upon Cadiz in Queen Anne’s reign. -The fort, like the other land-works, had been dismantled upon their -approach; but when it was seen that they were beginning to reconstruct -it, it was deemed advisable that they should be dispossessed, and -that the post should be maintained as long as possible against them. -Accordingly they were compelled to abandon it, and the hasty works -which could be re-erected were garrisoned by a party of British -soldiers and seamen under Captain Maclean. They defended it for nearly -two months, till it was reduced to a heap of ruins; and having lost -in the last two days sixteen killed and fifty-seven wounded, were -brought off by the boats of the British squadron, under the fire of -the enemy’s batteries, with little loss. The manner in which this weak -fort was defended taught the French what they might expect if they -should attempt the Isle of Leon, for the defence of which a formidable -line of works behind the Santi Pietri had now been executed under the -direction of General Sir Thomas Graham, who had arrived from England to -command the auxiliary forces there. These works extended to the ocean -on the right, and on the left occupied the Caraccas as an advanced -post. The French also were more intent upon securing themselves in -their cantonments than upon annoying the Spaniards. They fortified -Puerto Real, Puerto Santa Maria, and Chiclana, formed entrenched camps -between these places, and strengthened the Trocadero, where they -established batteries from whence to bombard the town. Having presently -found the inefficiency of the field artillery, which was all that -they had brought with them, they fished up the guns from the French -and Spanish ships which had been wrecked upon that coast after the -battle of Trafalgar. Most of the heavy pieces with which two-and-twenty -batteries were now mounted were recovered in this manner from the sea. - -♦STORM AT CADIZ.♦ - -The French, though disappointed in their main object here by -Alburquerque’s sagacity, and the prompt assistance of the British -forces, were in high spirits. They were in a fine country; their -quarters were at once commodious and secure; and a few weeks after -their arrival the winds and waves threw into their possession no -inconsiderable booty. For during a tremendous gale, which continued -four days with unabated violence, three line of battle ships, one -frigate, and about forty merchantmen were driven[12] to the side -of the bay which they occupied, and went on shore at the height of -the spring side. The men were taken out by the boats of the British -squadron, and the ships were set on fire by the enemy’s red-hot shot; -but no small part of the lading fell into their ♦CRUEL USAGE OF THE -FRENCH PRISONERS IN THE BAY.♦ hands. During the tempest the French on -board the prison ships could not receive their supplies of provisions -and water from the shore; their signals of distress were disregarded -by the Spaniards; and if the British Admiral had not sent his boats -to their relief as soon as the gale abated, very many more of these -miserable men than actually perished must have fallen victims, the -Spaniards being in no haste to encounter the swell for the sake of -enemies whom they seem to have considered as out of the pale of -humanity. In the case of these prisoners, indeed, they had cast off -all compassion, and the obduracy of the national character was fully -manifested towards them, the negligence of the government being in -this instance hardly less criminal than the avarice ♦1810. MAY.♦ -and brutality of those whom it employed. Admiral Pickmore perceiving -with how little care the pontoons were secured, proposed to the -Spanish Admiral that chains should be used as bridles to their cables; -application was made to the Admiral in command at the Caraccas; they -were promised from time to time, but never sent; and, as the British -Commander had foreseen, ♦MAY 15.♦ the prisoners in the Castilla, nearly -700 in number, and mostly officers, cut the cable one night, when -wind and tide were in their favour, ♦ESCAPE OF TWO PRISON SHIPS.♦ and -hoisting a sail which they had made from their hammocks, ran for the -opposite coast. English boats were presently sent after them, while -it was doubted whether the vessel had not by accident parted from her -anchor; but when they reached her it was impossible to board, the -pontoon being light, her ports all down, no steps on the side, nor -ropes over it, and the French prepared, not only with musketry, but -with cannon-ball of twenty-four and thirty-six pounders, which had -been used for ballast in the vessel: two hundred men were stationed to -throw these by hand, and the boats were presently disabled when such -missiles were showered upon them. Fort Puntales and the gun and mortar -boats opened their fire upon the pontoon, the vessel was burnt, but the -fugitives, with little loss, effected their escape[13]. - -A week later the French had nearly obtained possession of a rich -prize. The S. Elmo, line of battle ship, with 250,000_l._ on board, -in attempting to work out of the bay, got under their battery of S. -Catalina. She was saved by the exertions of the officers and men in -all the boats of the British squadron. Having turned her head round, -the greater part of them went on board, and fought her guns with good -effect till out of the enemy’s reach. The French had better fortune -with the Argonauta pontoon; the prisoners on board that vessel, about -six hundred in number, followed the example of their comrades in the -Castilla; a third of these were killed by the fire which was kept up -upon them; the remainder escaped from the burning hulk. But though -the Spaniards had taken no precautions for rendering such attempts -impracticable, they felt how dangerous it was to keep so large a body -of prisoners in the bay while a French army was in possession of -the shores. Two ships of the line were at this time under orders to -carry part of them to the Canaries; and more would have been sent to -Majorca and Minorca, whither 5000 had been transported in the preceding -year, if the inhabitants had not at this crisis been in a state of -excitement, which would have rendered a farther importation dangerous -both to the prisoners themselves and to the government. Serious -disturbances had broken out in both islands, not from any spirit of -disaffection, but from distress, and indignation that so many of -these unhappy persons should be cast among them, and no adequate means -provided for their subsistence. The Minorcans were less likely to be -patient under such misgovernment than any other Spaniards, remembering -the prosperity and good order which they had enjoyed while their island -was in possession of the English: with them, however, the ebullition of -♦INSURRECTION AGAINST THE PRISONERS AT MAJORCA.♦ popular feeling past -harmlessly off, while Majorca became the scene of a disgraceful and -dreadful tragedy. Some fugitives landed at Palma from those parts of -the south which had lately fallen under the French yoke; they brought -horrible tales concerning the invasion of Andalusia and the conduct -of the invaders; and the people, excited by these horrors, cried out -for vengeance upon the prisoners. Troops were called out to protect -these unfortunate men, but the soldiers would not act against their -countrymen; and when the commander, General Reding, as the only means -of saving the prisoners, consented that they should be sent to the -desert island of Cabrera, many were butchered in his presence, in spite -of his entreaties and exertions, and many thrown into the sea, before -the embarkation could be effected; nor could it have been effected, if -the soldiers had not at length been provoked to fire upon the mob. - -♦PRISONERS SENT TO CABRERA.♦ - -Five thousand at first, and afterwards half as many more, were landed -upon Cabrera, a rocky island about fifteen miles in circumference, -with no other inhabitants than a handful of soldiers, who were -stationed there to prevent the Barbary corsairs from making it a place -of rendezvous. A few tents were provided for the superior officers, -the remainder were left to shelter themselves as they could. There -was but one spring on the island, and in summer this was dry: they -discovered some old wells, which had been filled up, and which, when -cleared, yielded bad water, and very little of it. The supplies from -Palma were sent so irregularly, sometimes owing to the weather, but -far more frequently to inhuman negligence, that scores and hundreds -of these miserable creatures ♦THEIR INHUMAN TREATMENT THERE.♦ died of -hunger and thirst; many were in a state of complete nakedness, when -in mere humanity clothing was sent them by the British commander in -the Mediterranean: and at other times they were kept alive by barrels -of biscuit and of meat which the English ships threw overboard for -them, to be cast on shore. But in the third year of their abode, the -captain of a Spanish frigate, whose name ought to have been recorded, -remonstrated so effectually upon the manner of their treatment, -that from that time they were regularly supplied with food. He gave -them potatoes and cabbage and tobacco seed, from which they raised -sufficient for their consumption; and having by persevering labour, -♦MÉMOIRES D’UN OFFICIER FRANÇAIS, PRISONNIER EN ESPAGNE, 255, 287.♦ -without any other tools than a single knife, broken six feet into a -rock, on the surface of which there was appearance enough of moisture -to excite their hopes, they obtained a supply of water. Some of -them used the skulls of their own dead, for want of other vessels, -to contain it; ... and others, with no such excuse of necessity, -manufactured buttons from their bones! About 1500 entered the Spanish -service rather than endure a banishment to which no end could be -foreseen; and some 500, chiefly officers, were in compassion removed to -England. At the end of the war not more than 2000 remained in Cabrera, -nearly half of those who had been landed there having sunk under their -sufferings. The Spaniards departed from the straight path of probity -when they broke the terms of capitulation which had been granted ♦SEE -VOL. I. P. 501.♦ at Baylen. They committed that breach of faith in -deference to popular outcry, and to the sophistry of one who soon -proved himself a traitor, ... the most odious of all those men whom -the Revolution either found wicked or made so: and in the subsequent -treatment of the prisoners humanity was as little regarded, as honour -had been in detaining them. Many and grievous were the errors which the -Spaniards committed in the course of the war; but this is the only part -of its history which will be remembered for them as a national reproach. - -♦M. SOULT’S EDICT.♦ - -On the other hand, the French had as yet abated nothing of that -insolent cruelty with which they began the contest, supposing that -they could intimidate the Spanish nation. Soult, ♦MAY 9.♦ who had -recommended that all the commanding ♦SEE VOL. III. P. 446.♦ officers -employed in Spain should be _impassible_, ... incapable of any feeling -by which they might even possibly be moved to compunction, ... issued -at this time an edict not less extraordinary than Kellermann’s. After -various enactments, some of which were as impracticable as they were -rigorous, imposing penalties upon the inhabitants of those districts -in which the patriotic parties should commit any crimes, as this -Frenchman was pleased to denominate their hostilities against the -invaders of their country; he pronounced, “that there was no Spanish -army, except that of his Catholic Majesty, King Joseph Napoleon; all -parties, therefore, which existed in the provinces, whatever might be -their number, and whoever might be their commander, should be treated -as banditti, who had no other object than robbery and murder; and all -the individuals of such parties who might be taken in arms should be -immediately condemned and shot, and their bodies exposed along ♦COUNTER -EDICT OF THE REGENCY.♦ the highways.” When the Regency found that this -decree was actually carried into effect, they ♦AUG. 15.♦ reprinted it, -with a counter decree by its side, in French and Spanish, declaring -anew, “that every Spaniard capable of bearing arms was in these times -a soldier; that for every one who should be murdered by the French, in -consequence of the edict of the ferocious Soult, who called himself -Duke of Dalmatia, the three first Frenchmen taken in arms should -infallibly be hanged; three for every house which the enemy burnt in -their devastating system, and three for every person who should perish -in the fire.” Soult himself they declared unworthy of the protection -of the law of nations, while his decree remained unrepealed. They gave -orders, that if he were taken, he should be punished as a robber; and -they took measures for circulating both decrees throughout Europe, to -the end that all persons might be informed of the atrocious conduct -of these enemies of the human race; and that those inhabitants of the -countries which were in alliance with France, or, more truly, which -were enslaved by her, who were unhappy enough to have children, or -kinsmen, or friends serving in the French armies in Spain, might see -the fate prepared for them by the barbarity of a monster, who thought -by such means to subdue a free and noble nation. - - - - -CHAPTER XXXI. - -ASTORGA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH. SIEGE AND FALL OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. - - -♦1810.♦ - -♦INACTIVITY BEFORE CADIZ.♦ - -Hostilities were carried on before Cadiz with equal languor on both -sides, the French making no attempt on the Isle of Leon, and the -Spaniards none for breaking up the land-blockade. On the enemy’s part -this inaction was occasioned by their knowledge of the strength of the -works; on that of the Spaniards by want of energy in the government, -and want of spirit ♦THE REGENCY SEND FOR CUESTA.♦ in the people of -Cadiz. The Regency, immediately upon their appointment, had sent for -Cuesta to reside either in the city or the isle, that they might profit -by his advice, regarding him, they said, as the main pillar of the -country: they expressed their deep sorrow for some outrages which had -been committed against his venerable age, and their determination to -inflict exemplary punishment upon the offenders: they ordered that part -of his appointments should forthwith be paid, and promised the whole -arrears as soon as it should be possible to discharge them. The time, -however, for Cuesta’s services, either in the field or the council, -was past; and the old General employed his latter days in composing a -vindictive attack upon the fallen Junta, which called forth on their -part a complete justification of their conduct towards him. On that -score they had nothing wherewith to reproach themselves; but they must -have felt some self-condemnation in reflecting that the two generals, -who in the hour of extreme danger had acted with promptitude and -success, were the men in whom they had least confided. Alburquerque -they had regarded with jealousy, and Romana they had deprived of his -command in deference to the deputies of Asturias. - -♦BADAJOZ SECURED BY ROMANA.♦ - -The service which Romana had rendered at that crisis was only of less -importance than the preservation of the Isle of Leon. He had secured -Badajoz when a corps of 12,000 men from Seville thought to have -obtained possession of it by a coup-de-main: some Portugueze had come -to his assistance, and their artillerymen distinguished themselves when -the enemy ventured to approach the walls. Baffled in this attempt, the -French retired to Merida, Zafra, and S. Marta, where they were annoyed -by the division of his army under D. Carlos O’Donnell, brother to the -commander in Catalonia. - -♦THE BRITISH TAKE A POSITION ON THE FRONTIERS OF BEIRA.♦ - -Lord Wellington had nearly 9000 sick when his head-quarters were -removed from Badajoz; but when, in clear anticipation of the enemy’s -intentions, he took a position on the frontiers of Beira, they rapidly -recovered strength in that salubrious country. On the side of Alentejo -he knew that the invasion would not be attempted; attempts in that -quarter had always proved unsuccessful: if Badajoz and Elvas had been -reduced, Lisbon was secured by the Tagus, and there is no other part -of Portugal in which an army would suffer so much from disease, and -from want of water; this indeed Loison ♦SEE VOL. II. P. 181.♦ had -experienced. On the side of Gallicia the French had so lately felt -how difficult it was to retreat, that it was altogether unlikely they -would risk the same danger again, even if it had not been necessary -again to obtain possession of that province as a preliminary measure. -It appeared certain, therefore, that the attempt would be made by way -of Beira, the only remaining and most practicable route for an invading -army. Their first step must be to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. This, he -knew, had been recommended by a council of war held in September at -Salamanca; and its success, he then observed, would do more evil than -the French could effect in any other way; for it would cut off the only -communication of the Spanish government with the northern provinces, -give the enemy the command of Castille, and probably draw after it the -loss of Almeida. Looking, therefore, to Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida as -the points of which the enemy must obtain possession before they could -march either upon Lisbon or Porto, he chose a position in the segment -of a circle, of which the convex part was opposed to the quarter from -whence the invasion was expected. Guarda, Celorico, Pinhel, and the -west bank of the Coa, were its four main points; the Coa, with its -tributary streams, flowing in front of his line along the greater part -of its extent. That river rises in the Sierra de Xalma, which is a -part of the Serra da Gata, and enters Portugal by Folgosinho; another -stream, which is also regarded as its source, rises near Sabugal; it -receives many smaller rivers, and falls into the Douro near Villa Nova -de Foscoa. Its waters are supposed to be excellent for dying wool and -tempering steel, but unwholesome. - -♦ASTORGA SUMMONED BY THE FRENCH.♦ - -Before the French entered upon their operations in this quarter, they -thought it necessary to obtain complete possession of Leon, that their -communication might be open with Valladolid. They had been repulsed in -an attempt upon Astorga, in the preceding September, by Santocildes, -who remained as governor there. That city was surrounded with walls, -which gave it an appearance of antiquity, not of strength. They had -been erected many centuries ago, and were so massive, and at the same -time considered as of so little consequence for purposes of defence, -that the poor were permitted to dig holes in them which served for -habitations. The garrison consisted of about 3000 men, of whom from -500 to 600 were on the hospital list. Some attempts had been made to -render the city defensible, according to the system of modern warfare, -by the enemy, after Buonaparte entered it in pursuit of Sir J. Moore; -and when the Spaniards recovered it, they added to these works. Still -the fortifications were such, that though the French might deem them -sufficient against an armed peasantry, or a guerilla party, it was -never expected that any resistance would be made there against a -regular force. After the French had overrun Andalusia, and when they -were proclaiming, that the brigands had been put to the sword, and the -Napoleonic throne established in Cadiz, ... for this falsehood was -in such phrase asserted in their Spanish gazettes, ... Loison, whose -head-quarters were at Bañeza, the nearest town, wrote to the governor, -telling him, that King Joseph had entered Seville amid the acclamations -of the inhabitants; that Andalusia had submitted; the ♦FEB. 16.♦ Junta -was dissolved; and almost all the people of Spain, awakened now to a -sense of their true interest, had had recourse to the clemency of their -sovereign, who received them like a father. He urged Santocildes to -imitate so good an example, and appoint a place where they might meet -and confer upon such terms as must needs persuade him to this wise and -honourable course. Santocildes replied to this overture, that he knew -his duty, and would do it. - -♦SIEGE OF ASTORGA.♦ - -On the 21st of March, Junot invested Astorga with 12,000 men, of whom -about a tenth part were cavalry, by means of which he became master -of the open country. The vigorous measures of Santocildes obstructed -his operations so much, that a month elapsed before he opened his -batteries. They began on three sides ♦1810. MARCH.♦ at once, at -daybreak on the 20th of April, and soon effected a breach on the -north, by the Puerta de Hierro; but immediately behind the breach the -Spaniards pulled down a house, the foundations of which served as a -formidable trench; they kept up their fire during the night, and at -eleven the following morning Junot once more summoned the governor to -surrender, declaring that, if he held out two hours longer, the city -should be stormed, and the garrison put to the sword. The governor -having returned a becoming answer, the batteries renewed their fire; -the bombardment was recommenced; the cathedral was set on fire, with -many other houses, and a whole street in the suburbs; and the French, -thinking to profit by the confusion, assaulted the breach: 2000 men -were appointed for this service: great part perished before they could -reach the wall; the remainder mounted the breach; the works within -impeded them, a destructive fire was poured upon them, and after an -hour and a half they were repulsed. At the same time the suburb was -assaulted, and with the same success; the enemy being three times -baffled in their attempts. Their loss this day amounted to 1500 men. - -♦ITS SURRENDER.♦ - -Had the city been well stored, it would have cost the besiegers still -dearer; but after this signal success, Santocildes found himself with -only thirty round of cartridges remaining for the men, and eight only -for the artillery. Junot passed the night in making a covered way from -the trenches to the foot of the breach, where he lodged a large body -of picked men. Meantime a council of war was held; the impossibility -of resisting with advantage for want of ammunition was admitted; some -officers proposed that they should cut their way through the besiegers; -... the strength of the enemy’s cavalry was one impediment to this, -but it was rejected on account of the inhabitants; for Astorga was not -like Hostalrich, where the garrison had only themselves to provide -for; and unless terms were made for the town’s-people, what they might -expect from such conquerors as Junot and Loison was but too well -known. Fresh works of defence were thrown up within the breach while -this deliberation was going on, that nothing might be omitted, and -at daybreak a capitulation was proposed. They demanded and obtained -the honours of war for themselves; security for the inhabitants, both -in person and property; that the men should keep their knapsacks, -and the officers their horses, swords, and baggage. This part of the -capitulation was broken, and the officers were plundered as they left -the town. Even Junot, however, returned Santocildes his sword, saying, -that so brave a man ought not to be without one. In the course of -the siege the enemy lost 2500 in killed alone; so dearly was Astorga -purchased. But the more gallant its resistance, the more was that -misconduct to be regretted which had infected the provincial Juntas as -strongly as the Central Government. Since July last Gallicia had been -entirely delivered from the enemy; the population of that province, -when the census of 1797 was taken, amounted to nearly a million and -a half; the people had shown their spirit, and if due exertions had -been made on the part of the civil and military authorities, an army -might have been formed there, capable not only of preserving Astorga, -but of essentially co-operating with the British and Portugueze in the -subsequent operations. - -♦AFFAIR AT BARBA DEL PUERCO.♦ - -After this conquest, Junot, leaving a small garrison in Astorga, -marched into Old Castille, where Ney had previously been joined by the -corps of Loison, Regnier, and Kellermann. The campaign had already -begun here. In the beginning of March the French army were upon the -Tormes, with their advanced posts upon the Agueda. Lord Wellington was -at Viseu, and his advanced posts, under General Craufurd, were upon -the Agueda also, and between ♦MARCH 19.♦ that river and the Coa. The -first time that the British and French troops met after the battle -of Talavera was in an affair of outposts, at Barba del Puerco: four -companies of the 95th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith, were posted -at that place; the French had a strong party immediately opposite, on -the other side the Agueda, in the village of St. Felices. The only -bridge below Ciudad Rodrigo is between these villages, and as the -river at this season was swollen with rain, this was the only passage. -The country is rocky and mountainous, and though the advanced sentries -of both parties were within a few yards of the bridge, it was not -expected that either would attempt to annoy the other; so great were -the obstacles which the nature of the ground presented. The French, -however, collected a brigade in St. Felices, and after night had -closed marched 600 men toward the bridge. About midnight they were all -assembled there, and made the advanced sentries prisoners; a picquet of -eighty men, posted behind the rocks, immediately fired upon them and -retreated in excellent order; they pushed on up the mountain, hoping -to surprise the remainder of the men, but were presently repulsed. The -loss was trifling on either side. Marshal Ney, however, ventured to -assert, that the English had been routed at the point of the bayonet, -and that their transports were ready at Porto and Lisbon. - -♦MASSENA APPOINTED TO THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.♦ - -The French had learnt at Vimeiro, and Coruña, and Talavera, to respect -British valour, but they had not yet been taught to respect English -policy; and they fully expected that if they brought a superior force -against him, Lord Wellington would fly through Portugal, and seek -shelter in his ships. Preparations, therefore, were made for this third -invasion, with an army far exceeding in number those which Junot and -Soult had commanded, even if they had been united, and under Massena, -a general ♦1810. APRIL.♦ of higher rank than either. No general in -the French service had enjoyed so high a reputation since Hoche, -and Pichegru, and Moreau had disappeared. Buonaparte, in his first -campaigns, called him, in his own inflated style, the favourite Child -of Victory; and after the late Austrian war, created him Prince of -Essling, because his skill and exertions had contributed mainly to the -escape of the French from utter destruction at the battle of Aspern. -He was appointed commander-in-chief of the provinces of the north of -Spain, including the kingdoms of Old Castille, Leon, and Asturias; the -provinces of St. Andero, Soria, Valladolid and Palencia, Toro, Zamora, -Salamanca and Avila; the army under him was named the army of Portugal; -and, as Soult had done before him, it is believed that he went to make -the conquest of Portugal, expecting to be rewarded with its crown for -his success. - -♦CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦ - -In the later wars between Spain and Portugal, the three cities where -the Spaniards used to collect their armies before they invaded the -enemy’s country were Tuy, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz. Of these -fortresses, Tuy, like Valença on the opposite frontier, is now of -little strength or importance, Badajoz a strong place, Ciudad Rodrigo -hardly to be ranked in the third order of fortresses. It was built -some centuries ago, when the site was sufficiently convenient for a -fortified town; but the situation is bad; the works were old and -imperfect, and it had other local disadvantages. It is commanded from -many points; and one height, within 500 toises of the city, exceeds -by about fifty yards the highest of its buildings. There were no -bomb-proofs; and the suburbs, in which there were four convents, and -the number of gardens without the walls, materially assisted the -operations of a besieging army. The population of the city had been -estimated at about 10,000; but it appears not much to have exceeded -half that number. The garrison amounted to 4950, including 600 -townsmen; the greater part of the others being volunteers, or men newly -raised. Camp Marshal D. Andres Perez de Herrasti was governor, an old -man, who had been the friend and comrade of Mariano Alvarez. - -♦THE FRENCH BESIEGE IT.♦ - -On the 25th of April 6000 French appeared before the place, and -encamped in the _Termino_ of Pedro Toro, a league to the eastward. -On the 30th, the second division, consisting of from 4000 to 5000, -arrived and encamped in the _Termino_ of Valde Carros, a league to the -north. Five days afterwards another encampment was formed between the -two. On May 15th, another division, of about 7000 men, encamped to -the westward, upon Monte de Ibanrey. So large a force was necessary, -because the English were near at hand. By the 4th of June the city -was completely invested. This was not effected without repeated -skirmishes, in which the enemy suffered considerable loss. In these -♦1810. MAY.♦ affairs, D. Antonio Camargo, commandant of the volunteers -of Avila, greatly distinguished himself; but the individual who, above -all others, annoyed the enemy by his incessant enterprise, ♦D. JULIAN -SANCHEZ.♦ was D. Julian Sanchez, the son of a farmer, near the banks -of the Guebra. Till the invasion of his country, he had cultivated -his father’s lands; but when his father, mother, and sister had been -murdered by the French, he made a vow of vengeance, and, at the head -of one of those bands which the Spaniards call _guerrillas_, well -performed it. On one occasion he surprised, in his father’s house, a -French colonel, infamous for his atrocities, and put him to death, -first telling him who it was that inflicted his merited punishment in -this world, and sent him to render account for his crimes in the next. - -♦MARSHAL NEY SUMMONS THE TOWN.♦ - -This enterprising leader made repeated assaults upon the enemy, -not hesitating, at the head of sixty, eighty, or an hundred of his -lancers, to attack three or four times his own number. Camargo, and -D. Jose Puente, commandant of the cavalry regiment of Ciudad Rodrigo, -co-operated ably with him, and the French suffered daily and hourly -losses from their indefatigable activity. They suffered also greatly -from the artillery of the town, which was excellently served. Ney -carried on his operations in a manner which the Spaniards thought -prodigal of the lives of his men, beginning his approaches where, in -their judgement, a general more sparing of his army would ♦1810. JUNE.♦ -have terminated them. To protect these works, he ordered a great number -of holes to be dug, where he posted sharpshooters, by whom the garrison -were greatly annoyed. On the 24th of June, Massena arrived and took the -command, and at three on the following morning the batteries opened, -and a constant fire from six-and-forty pieces of heavy artillery was -kept up day and night till the evening of the 28th, when, having made -a breach of about five-and-twenty yards in length, Ney required the -governor to surrender, “sending him,” he said, “this last summons by -order of the Prince of Essling, commander-in-chief of the army of -Portugal, then present, whose honour and humanity were well known, but -who, if the defence were uselessly prolonged, would be compelled to -treat him with all the rigour authorized by the laws of war. If he had -any hope of being succoured by the English, he was doubtless by that -time undeceived; for if such had been their intention, they would not -have waited till the city was reduced to its present deplorable state. -He had, therefore, to choose between an honourable capitulation, and -the terrible vengeance of a victorious army; and a positive answer was -requested.” Herrasti replied, “that after forty-nine years’ service, -he could not but know the laws of war and his military duties; the -fortress was not in a state to capitulate; and whenever circumstances -made it his duty, he would then apply for terms, after securing his -honour, which was dearer to him than life.” - -♦SITUATION OF LORD WELLINGTON.♦ - -How galling it must have been for Lord Wellington to witness the -progress of the siege, knowing his inability to relieve the town, may -well be conceived. His outposts were near enough to hear even the -musketry; but with so large a proportion of his troops half-disciplined -and untried, he could not act upon the offensive against an enemy -greatly superior in numbers, without incurring the most imminent -danger. The only possible plan by which Portugal could be saved he had -laid down for himself, and from that plan no circumstances, however -painful to his own feelings, or however derogatory in appearance to his -reputation, could induce him to swerve. He was in communication with -Romana at Badajoz; but in the state of the Spanish armies, any plan -of co-operation for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo was impossible. It -was, however, of great importance that the place should be resolutely -defended to the last extremity, and in this hope Romana and the English -general were not disappointed. ♦SPIRIT OF THE INHABITANTS.♦ The minds -of the people had been prepared for this extremity; they had their -patriotic writers and their poets; the exploits of Julian Sanchez -excited the emulation of the youth, and the conduct of the old governor -gave confidence to all. The examples of Zaragoza, and Gerona, and -Hostalrich, and Astorga, animated the women and children, as well as -those who bore arms; for in a cause like theirs they had seen their -countrymen acquire a glory when unsuccessful, which could not have been -greater had they been victorious. The women and children, when they saw -their houses burning, gave way neither to fear nor lamentation, but -exerted themselves to quench the flames, and carried refreshment and -ammunition to the troops amid the hottest fire. There were two blind -beggars in the city: no one supposed that these unfortunate men could -render any service during the siege, but zeal taught them how to be -serviceable; they carried water to the walls by day, and ammunition by -night, with such unwearied activity, that it was the intention of the -governor and the Junta, if the town had been saved, to have rewarded -them with pensions for life. - -♦THE NUNNERY OF S. CRUZ ATTACKED.♦ - -It was of great consequence to the Spaniards to keep possession of -those buildings without the walls, which would otherwise afford -protection to the besiegers, but which also afforded such means for -annoying them while they could be defended, that it had not been -thought advisable to demolish them before the siege. The nunnery -of Santa Cruz was the most important of these buildings. D. Ramon -Castellanos was posted there with a company of sixty men, when three -hundred of the enemy’s grenadiers, with a party of sappers, assailed -it in the night, half the party attacking it in the rear, the other -in ♦1810. JULY.♦ the front. They blew up the first and second gates; -hand grenades were thrown on both sides; the Spaniards, having the -advantage of the building, kept up a most destructive discharge of -musketry; the commander of the one party was killed, the captain of -engineers, who commanded the other, wounded, but he did not retire till -he had set fire to the convent. Seeing the flames, the governor made -signal for Castellanos to abandon the post, who accordingly let down -his men from a window into one of the inner courts of the convent, and -descending himself the last, they forced their way with the bayonet. It -was a little after midnight when they reached the gate of La Colada: -but seeing, while they took food and rested after the action, that the -enemy had extinguished the flames, Castellanos went to the governor, -and represented to him that his honour was concerned in recovering the -post. He led his men at three in the morning, after only two hours’ -respite, to the assault, and surprising the French, drove them from -their dearly purchased conquest, where they left 158 dead, and 45 -wounded behind them, the remainder of the wounded having been removed -during the short time that they retained possession. - -♦CONVENT OF ST. DOMINGO RECOVERED. JULY 2.♦ - -They were driven from the convent of St. Domingo in a manner not less -worthy of remembrance. After they had won the building, Herrasti was -very desirous of recovering it, and yet hesitated at giving orders for -the attempt, knowing the exhausted state of the garrison, and how ill -any loss of men could be afforded. A serjeant, by name Manuel Martin, -happened to hear what was the state of the governor’s feelings upon -this subject. This man, who was a native of Zamora, had made himself -well known to the French: they called him _agua y vino_, water and -wine, the words which he always used when engaged in action with them; -wine being his signal for attack, and water that for retreat. He had -distinguished himself greatly during the siege, and had at this time a -wound in his arm, which however did not prevent him from going to the -governor, and soliciting permission to make an attack upon the enemy -in this convent, saying, that if he could not drive them out, at least -he could annoy them there. Accordingly, choosing out five-and-twenty -comrades, he attacked the convent with such well-directed vigour, that -the enemy, though greatly superior in numbers, were terrified and took -to flight, many of them leaving their knapsacks and muskets behind -them. This was so signal an exploit, that Manuel Martin was deservedly -promoted for it, and a badge of distinction was given to each of the -soldiers. - -♦JULIAN SANCHEZ EFFECTS HIS ESCAPE FROM THE CITY.♦ - -But against such a force as surrounded them, all that the Spaniards -could do was to hold out to the uttermost, and sell the fortress as -dearly as possible. Massena boasted of having 100,000 men in the field; -he had 66,000 infantry and 6000 horse, of whom as many as could be -advantageously employed carried on the siege, while the others kept -the British army in check, Lord Wellington having only 51,000 under -his command, including 3000 cavalry, and half this force composed of -Portugueze, who were as yet untried, and consequently in whom little -reliance could then be placed. They were, however, brigaded with the -British in the proportion of one battalion to two, and were every -day acquiring confidence and character. The siege was less murderous -than that of Zaragoza, because the city was much smaller and less -populous, and, having the advantage of regular works, did not require -the same kind of defence. When Herrasti and the Junta saw that it was -not possible to hold out much longer, they ordered Julian Sanchez -and his lancers to make their escape while it was yet practicable, -reminding Sanchez how important it was that his services should still -be continued, and telling him he would be of more assistance to Ciudad -Rodrigo in the field than he could now be within the walls. A little -before midnight Sanchez collected his troops in the plaza; the two of -his company who were married men took their wives behind them; they -sallied out, and their leader, in the spirit of Scanderbeg, instead -of contenting himself with merely effecting his own retreat, charged -a post of cavalry, routed them, and carried away eight prisoners with -their horses. The two women were armed with pistols, and one of them, -by name Marta Fraile, saved her husband, by shooting a dragoon who was -about to attack him on one side. - -♦STATE OF THE BRITISH ARMY.♦ - -The British army meantime, though it could render no assistance, was -far from being idly or ill employed. There had been a prevailing -feeling of despondency before the siege began, and an expectation -that the town would surrender as soon as the enemy should have opened -their fire. The progress of the siege produced more respect for -the Spaniards, and the active service in which the men soon found -themselves engaged produced cheerfulness and hope. The picquets -occupied the line of the Azava from Carpio on the right to its junction -with the Agueda; the enemy had 8000 men on the left bank of the Agueda, -behind that river and the Azava, which was fordable in many places. The -head-quarters of the light division, under Major-General Craufurd, were -at Gallegos, a short league distant, in an open country; the greatest -alertness, therefore, was necessary, and the men slept at their horses’ -heads, the horses bridled and the reins in hand. The Germans were -selected for the outpost duty, being at that time the only troops in -the army who were acquainted with it: the 16th light dragoons requested -to be intermixed with them on duty, men and officers; a compliment -which gratified the brave men to whom it was paid, and the greatest -harmony was always preserved. The picquets were brought to the greatest -perfection, and the division soon attained that alertness which could -only be learnt in such service. The Portugueze behaved well on the -first opportunity which was afforded, and obtained the good opinion of -their allies; so that every thing went on satisfactorily in the allied -army, except that in a trifling and ill-executed affair Colonel Talbot -fell, a gallant officer, who had distinguished himself at Talavera, and -was deservedly and greatly lamented. - -♦A PRACTICABLE BREACH MADE.♦ - -The French general, to whom time was of more consequence than any cost -of lives, pressed the siege with the utmost vigour, but with heavy -loss, owing to the repeated sallies of the garrison, and the excellent -manner in which the artillery of the Spaniards was served. In hope of -forcing the governor to surrender by the cries of the inhabitants, -he bombarded the town, and almost destroyed it; but the people were -not to be shaken in their purpose, the names of Numantia and Zaragoza -were in every mouth, and they were resolved in their turn to transmit -a memorable example to posterity. Meantime the regular advances of -the besiegers were carried on without intermission, and by the 2d of -July a practicable breach had been opened in the Baluarte del Rey. -The Spaniards made every exertion to defend it with sacks of earth, -estacades, and whatever other obstacles they could oppose to the enemy; -but the French did not yet venture an assault; they had so severely -experienced the valour of their opponents, that they had determined -not to storm the town till the works should be reduced to such a -state, that they might avail themselves of the whole advantage of their -numbers. They made three mines, one under the counterscarp, the other -two under the curtain of the wall and part of the Calle del Seminario, -or College-street, near the Cathedral. The besieged were aware of their -progress, but all efforts at impeding it were useless, and at three in -the morning of the 10th, the counterscarp was blown up, forming not -only an open breach, but such a way to it that carts might ascend from -the glacis. - -Immediately afterwards the French renewed the fire from all their -batteries, and kept it up without intermission for twelve hours. During -this time the cry of the soldiers and the inhabitants, women and boys, -as well as their husbands and fathers, was, that they would beat off -the enemy or die; but the officers and the Junta were well aware, that -any farther resistance would only afford the French a pretext for -carrying their threats into execution, and putting all to the sword. -Thirty thousand men were ready to storm the city that evening. It was -not without much difficulty that the people could be induced to hear -of a council of war, nor would they have suffered one to be held, had -they not seen such undoubted proofs of the patriotism and courage -of those who now told them that a surrender was become inevitable. -There were some in the council who proposed to follow the example of -Julian Estrada at Hostalrich, and force their way with the bayonet -through their enemies; but here, as at Astorga, it was urged that they -were in different circumstances, and had therefore different duties; -their business now was to preserve 5000 inhabitants, who would else -be exposed to the unrestrained vengeance and brutality of the enemy. -Finally, it was resolved to capitulate, but not till the latest moment, -when there was no longer the slightest hope or possibility of relief. - -♦THE TOWN CAPITULATES. JULY 10.♦ - -Massena’s orders to Ney were to assault the town that evening; the -French advanced for this purpose, and were at the foot of the breach, -in the act of mounting, when the white flag was hoisted: the officer -who planted it in the breach descended with the terms of capitulation, -and presented them to Ney, who sternly told him it was now too late -for any thing. The Spaniard, however, had recourse to Massena, who was -at that time supposed to be more humane than Ney. The first article -was, that the garrison should march out with the honours of war; the -rest were in like manner such as are usual in the like circumstances. -Massena having cast his eye over them, said, “Tell your governor, this -is no time to ratify the terms in writing; but I grant all which he -requires, and am going to give orders accordingly.” He then sent his -adjutant-general to bid Ney suspend the assault. Loison immediately -marched through the breach, and took possession of the town; and -General Simon, notwithstanding Massena’s pledged word, made the -garrison deposit their arms in the arsenal. - -♦CONDUCT OF THE FRENCH.♦ - -The other terms were at the moment fulfilled; and when Herrasti, the -next day, requested that the capitulation might be signed, in order -that he might transmit it to his own government, Massena replied, -that as he saw the articles observed, he neither could nor ought to -require more. The people had escaped the horrors of an assault; but in -other respects they soon found they were at the mercy of a conqueror -who acknowledged no other law than his own pleasure. Herrasti had -stipulated for the liberty of the civil officers; they, however, were -declared prisoners of war. The members of the Junta were thrown into -the vilest dungeon of the public gaol, from whence, after having -endured for eight-and-forty hours every kind of insult and ill -treatment, they were marched on foot to Salamanca, in company with the -governor, who alone was permitted to retain his horse. The clergy were -arrested and shut up for two days in the church of St. Juan; the old -and infirm were then suffered to go to their houses, but forbidden the -exercise of their functions; the lay brethren were ordered to serve in -the hospitals, and all the others sent prisoners to Salamanca. The next -measures were, to impose a contribution of 1,800,000 reales, and to set -from six to eight hundred men at work to destroy the batteries, fill -up the trenches, and repair the works, compelling them to labour like -slaves, giving them no provisions, and allowing them little rest. - -The account which the French published of their conquest was, according -to their system, full of falsehoods. They asserted that the garrison -had surrendered at discretion, which could only be contradicted, not -disproved, because Massena had broken his word. This falsehood is -worthy of remark, because it shows so strikingly the characteristic -baseness of Buonaparte’s generals. Ciudad Rodrigo was evidently at -their mercy; a generous enemy would have rejoiced to show his sense of -the merits of those who had opposed him, and would have known that in -refusing them the honours of war, he deprived them only of a barren -form; for the merit of their gallant and heroic defence it was not -in his power to efface. Massena, not satisfied with thus injuring -Herrasti’s honour, cast upon him a fouler aspersion, making him say, -that he and the garrison would have surrendered sooner, if they had -not been intimidated by the inhabitants. In reality, such had been -the noble spirit of the soldiers, that it was only by the entreaties, -as well as the arguments of the superior Junta of Castille, whose -residence was in that city, that they were prevailed upon to give up -their intention of attempting to cut their way through the besiegers. -The French general did not forget to insult the English, and endeavour -by his falsehoods to exasperate the Spaniards against them. “Ciudad -Rodrigo,” he said, “fell in their presence; they promised to succour -it; made the inhabitants prolong their defence by this deceitful hope; -and suffered the place to fall without making the slightest effort -for its relief. Thus they had excited against them the universal -indignation of the garrison and the people, who united in exclaiming -against their perfidy.” - -This justice, however, Massena did to Ciudad Rodrigo, that he admitted -the defence had been most obstinate. It was impossible, he said, -to form an idea of the state to which it was reduced. Every thing -had been battered down; not a single house remained uninjured. The -killed he estimated at more than 2000. The Spaniards stated it at -only sixty-three of the inhabitants, and 237 of the garrison. Seven -thousand soldiers, he said, laid down their arms: ... the number at the -commencement of the siege was 4950. Six hundred made their escape on -the night of the capitulation, and more than 1500 before they reached -Salamanca. Above two-and-forty thousand shells were thrown into the -city, and nearly five-and-twenty thousand from it. The quantity of -powder consumed by the garrison during the last sixteen days was 893 -quintales, ... the quintal being 132 lbs. The French gave no statement -of their own loss; it was probably very considerable; ♦SPECULATIONS -UPON THE CAMPAIGN.♦ the Spaniards estimated it at 3400. The capture, -however, occasioned the greatest exultation in Paris, and the Moniteur -mingled with its own insults the echoes of our factious journalists. -“The good sense of the English people,” it said, “enabling them to -foresee the dishonour and destruction of their army in Portugal, they -are convinced that the most fortunate event which could befal it would -be a catastrophe like that of Moore’s. They are too much accustomed to -calculate chances and events not to know, that alone against France -they can, in such a contest, meet nothing but disaster, and obtain -nothing but disgrace.” “Men of sound judgement, like Grenville or -Grey, are numerous in England,” said the Moniteur, “but they are at -present without any influence there.” Then, returning to its natural -tone of insult, it ridiculed the strength of Lord Wellington’s army, -amounting to the dreadful number of 24,000 English. “The cries of the -inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo,” it said, “were heard in his camp, which -was only six leagues distant: but all ears were shut against them; -the English made no attempt to succour that city: ... they were the -laughing-stock of Europe; every coffee-house waiter knew their weakness -on land, as well as their influence at sea. Ciudad Rodrigo was one of -the last bulwarks of the insurrection; its capture made the catastrophe -more imminent for England, who would now find it necessary to call to -the helm more prudent men, better acquainted with the nature of the -resources and of the strength of their country, and therefore more -moderate.” - -In England, too, we were told, that if Ciudad Rodrigo were taken, the -efforts of the English might be considered to be at an end; the French -would then be able to advance without fear of a check; the harvest -also being now begun, whatever grain there was in the country they -would be able to secure for themselves, and so form magazines, the -want of which had hitherto chiefly retarded their advance. At one time -these politicians cried out, “that Lord Wellington could not permit -the enemy quietly to prosecute the siege of so important a fortress.” -At another, “they would not suppose him capable of fighting a useless -battle: for they trusted he was not so prodigal of the blood of his -followers. They trusted that his operations would be justified by -the event.” Then again “they were not competent to speak from their -own knowledge, yet certainly it did appear a doubtful policy to be -patiently waiting till Massena had time to concentrate his troops, -and make all his arrangements for an attack on the British position.” -“The plan of overwhelming Lord Wellington, by bringing an immense -superiority to bear upon him, was one which obviously presented itself; -there seemed no insurmountable difficulty in the execution; obstacles -there might be, from want of provisions and other circumstances, but -the skill and perseverance of the French in combating them forbade -us to place much reliance upon such grounds.” In this manner, always -presaging evil, and consistent in nothing but despondency, sometimes -borrowing the tone of the Moniteur, and sometimes setting it, did these -journalists of a disappointed party labour to deaden the hearts and -hopes of their countrymen; while their more daring, but hardly more -mischievous coadjutors addressed their weekly invectives to the readers -and auditors in pot-houses and tap-rooms, abusing their ignorance, -appealing to, and inflaming their worst passions, and crying out -against the measures of their own government, while upon the crimes -of Buonaparte they observed a silence which sufficiently indicated -their sympathy with his system, their wishes for the extension of his -tyranny, and their hopes of his eventual success. - -♦LA PUEBLA DE SANABRIA OCCUPIED BY THE FRENCH.♦ - -The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo enabled Massena to detach a force for the -relief of Astorga, where General Mahy, who commanded in Galicia, was -blockading the French garrison. This object was easily effected. -General Taboada at this time occupied Puebla de Sanabria, where he -was exerting himself to organize a body of troops for the field: -General Echavarria was engaged in like manner at Alcañizas. In such -feeble, uncombined efforts the spirit of the country was spent, and -its resources frittered away; for as soon as men enough were brought -together to attract the enemy’s attention, they were either dispersed -or destroyed. This was the fate of Echavarria’s corps; it was surprised -by a French detachment under General La Croix, and nearly annihilated. -The alarm spread to Silveira’s head-quarters at Braganza, and Colonel -Wilson (his second in command) hastened with the advanced guard to -Echavarria’s support; but he arrived only to find the ground covered -with dead and wounded Spaniards, the enemy having retired to Carvales, -after completely accomplishing the purpose of their expedition. Massena -boasted soon afterwards of a like success at Sanabria; but the results -were very different. The French magnified the importance of this post, -saying that it commanded the entrance into Portugal, and shut up the -communication with Galicia. They said also, that Lord Wellington had -enjoined the Spanish governor to make an obstinate defence; but that -the governor reproached him in reply for having deceived the commandant -of Ciudad Rodrigo, and broken his word with him; told him it was -evident he intended to do nothing for Spain, but only, for the sake -of fomenting divisions, held out hopes of assistance which were never -realized; yet nevertheless offered to shut himself up in the fortress, -and bury himself in its ruins, if the English general would send him -one Englishman for two Spaniards, to assist in its defence. The answer -of Lord Wellington, the French papers said, might easily be conceived; -and the Spanish general therefore abandoned the town, where General -Serras found twenty pieces of artillery, and provisions for 3000 men -for six months. After this the French made no farther mention of the -Puebla de Sanabria. - -♦THE PORTUGUEZE RETAKE IT.♦ - -D. Francisco Taboada Gil, the officer who was thus falsely represented -as insulting the English general, had communicated not with him but -with the Portugueze commander, Silveira, at Braganza, with whom it -was agreed that he should evacuate the place if it were attacked by -a superior force. Taboada accordingly ♦JULY 29.♦ fell back upon the -Portillas de Galicia; Silveira, having ascertained that Serras had -returned with the greater part of his troops to Mombuey, concerted -measures with the Spanish general for surprising the garrison which -the French had left in Sanabria, and on the fourth day after they had -taken possession of their boasted conquest, the enemy found themselves -♦AUG. 3.♦ invested in the fort. They were summoned; but the commander -replied, that he had men and ammunition to defend himself with, and -that he expected speedily to be succoured by Marshal Massena. On the -following morning a detachment of about seventy French cavalry came on -to attack the advanced guard of the Portugueze, under Captain Francisco -Texeira Lobo, whose force was about equal; but while he charged them in -front, another small party of Portugueze, by his instructions, wheeled -round and attacked them in the rear: they were instantly broken, and -twenty-eight were left upon the field, thirty prisoners, and ♦1810. -AUGUST.♦ forty horses taken. The remainder of that day was spent in -vain endeavours to force an entrance into the fort: the assailants -burnt the gates, but the enemy blocked them up effectually with stones; -the Portugueze and Spaniards then got possession of a house adjoining, -from whence they attempted to make a way through, but the enemy soon -battered it down. On the morrow, one mortar and one three-pounder were -planted against them; the first became useless after a few discharges, -and Silveira, the next morning, sent for a six-pounder from Braganza. -He was now apprized that Serras was advancing in force to relieve the -garrison. Silveira left the Spaniards to maintain the blockade, and -drew up in order of battle upon the river Tera; but Serras, having -reconnoitred his force, thought proper to retire upon Mombuey. The -six-pounder, from Braganza, was an iron gun, in such a state, that when -it arrived it was of no avail; and a twelve-pounder, which on the 8th -was brought from the same place, proved in the same condition: this was -a serious disappointment, for Silveira was now apprized that Serras -was collecting reinforcements. Six hundred horse had entered Zamora, -on their way to him, and two battalions of Italian troops were joining -him from Benevente, ♦AUG. 9.♦ Leon, and Astorga. Unable to batter the -place, because of the wretched state of his artillery, which had been -long left to rust in a dilapidated fortress, he tried the effect of -mining; here experience and skill were wanting, and only the face of -the curtain was thrown down. The garrison, however, who were Swiss, -dreaded that a second attempt might prove more successful; and their -commandant, pleading that he and his men were not French, proposed -and obtained good terms, delivering up the place on condition that -they should be allowed to embark from Coruña, and return to their own -country, on their parole, not to bear arms against the allied powers. -The artillery of the place, and the stores, were restored to the -Spaniards; but Silveira retained for the Portugueze an eagle, the first -which they had taken from their enemy. Sixty of the Swiss entered into -the service of the allies. - -Serras was in sight of Silveira’s advanced posts when this capitulation -was concluded; he had with him from 4000 to 5000 foot, and about 800 -cavalry. The allied Portugueze and Spaniards were inferior in number, -and still more in discipline, and with this unequal force pressing hard -upon them they broke up from Sanabria, at a time when the prisoners -were come three hours march on the way to Coruña. Colonel Wilson, -who had been ordered on an important duty to head-quarters, returned -in time to assume the command of the rear-guard, and with it cover -their retrograde movement. He checked the French in a sharp affair -of cavalry, after which he took the open road to Braganza, Silveira -retreating with the foot upon the heights of Calabor, where the enemy, -if they should continue the pursuit, could derive no advantage from -their horse. But having arrived too late for saving the garrison, -they advanced no farther than Pedralva, and from thence returned to -Sanabria, then to Mombuey. This was the termination of General Serras’s -success at the Puebla de Sanabria; the whole of the garrison which he -left there were taken prisoners, and the eagle which was taken with -them was deposited with proper triumph in the cathedral at Lisbon, as -the first trophy of the regenerated Portugueze. - - - - -CHAPTER XXXII. - - CAPTURE OF ALMEIDA. CONDUCT OF THE PORTUGUEZE GOVERNMENT. BATTLE OF - BUSACO. RETREAT OF THE BRITISH AND PORTUGUEZE TO THE LINES OF - TORRES VEDRAS. THE KING’S ILLNESS. - - -♦1810. JULY.♦ - -♦MASSENA’S PROCLAMATION TO THE PORTUGUEZE.♦ - -From Ciudad Rodrigo Massena addressed a proclamation to the Portugueze. -“Inhabitants of Portugal,” he said, “the Emperor of the French has put -under my orders an army of 110,000 men, to take possession of this -kingdom, and to expel the English, your pretended friends. Against you -he has no enmity: on the contrary, it is his highest wish to promote -your happiness, and the first step for securing it is to dismiss -from the country those locusts who consume your property, blast your -harvests, and palsy your efforts. In opposing the Emperor, you oppose -your true friend; a friend who has it in his power to render you the -happiest people in the world. Were it not for the insidious counsels of -England, you might now have enjoyed peace and tranquillity, and have -been put in possession of that happiness. You have blindly rejected -offers calculated only to promote your benefit, and have accepted -proposals which will long be the curse of Portugal. His majesty has -commissioned me to conjure you that you would awake to your true -interests; that you would awake to those prospects which, with your -consent, may be quickly realized; awake so as to distinguish between -friends and enemies. The King of England is actuated by selfish and -narrow purposes; the Emperor of the French is governed by principles -of universal philanthropy. The English have put arms into your hands, -arms which you know not how to use: I will instruct you. They are to be -the instruments of annihilation to your foes: ... and who those foes -are I have already shown. Use them as you ought, and they will become -your salvation! Use them as you ought not, and they will prove your -destruction! Resistance is vain. Can the feeble army of the British -general expect to oppose the victorious legions of the Emperor? Already -a force is collected, sufficient to overwhelm your country. Snatch the -moment that mercy and generosity offer! As friends you may respect -us, and be respected in return; as foes you must dread us, and in the -conflict must be subdued. The choice is your own, either to meet the -horrors of a bloody war, and see your country desolated, your villages -in flames, your cities plundered; or to accept an honourable and happy -peace, which will obtain for you every blessing that by resistance you -would resign for ever.” - -On the same day that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, the enemy’s cavalry -appeared on the ♦THE FRENCH INVEST ALMEIDA.♦ plains of Almeida. Lord -Wellington’s head-quarters at this time were at Alverca: his position -was a defensive line, about thirty miles in extent, along the frontier -mountains of Beira; but as the line formed a segment of a circle, the -points were not distant from each other in proportion to its length. -The infantry extended from Celorico to Guarda on the one side, and to -Fort Conception, one of the outworks of Almeida, on the other. The -cavalry were in advance near Fort Conception, and at Sabugal, and on -the Coa. The enemy’s superiority in horse was very great, but the -nature of the ground deprived them of the advantage which this must -otherwise have given them. They now proceeded to invest Almeida. The -operations of the siege were conducted by the second corps, under -Marshal Ney. Junot, with the 8th, had his head-quarters at S. Felices, -and his cavalry at Villar de Porco, Fuente Guinaldo, and Fuentes -d’Onoro, ground which had not then been rendered memorable in military -history. While this portion of the army covered the siege, Serras with -a division of 7000 men at Benevente threatened Tras os Montes, and -Bonnet with 8000 at Astorga was ready to enter Galicia and the province -of Entre Douro e Minho. - -♦ALMEIDA.♦ - -Dumouriez, forgetting Elvas at the time, has called Almeida the -strongest place in Portugal. It is perhaps more important from its -situation, but very far inferior to it in strength. This town was -founded by the Moors, and is said to have been one of those which -Ferrando the Great won from them while the Cid served under him, in -his first wars. When the tide of success was for a while turned by -the entrance of the Almoravides into Spain, Talmayda, as it was then -called, fell again into the hands of the misbelievers, from whom it -was finally reconquered, in 1190, by King Sancho I. of Portugal. -Payo Guterres distinguishing himself in the conquest, obtained from -it the appellative of _O Almeydam_, the Almeydan, and transmitted to -his descendants the surname of Almeyda, conspicuous in Portugueze and -Indian history, but disgraced at this time by the representative of -the family, who was then engaged in Massena’s army as a traitor. King -Diniz, the ruins of whose magnificent works are to be seen in every -part of Portugal, rebuilt the city, and is supposed to have removed it -from a valley, a little way north of its present site. The castle was -built by him, and repaired by King Emanuel. In the later wars between -Spain and Portugal, Almeida has always been considered a place of -great importance, being the bulwark of the latter country on its most -accessible side; but, like other things of more essential consequence -to the strength of a kingdom, it had long been neglected. In 1809 there -were not a dozen gun-carriages fit for service, nor any wood in store -for the construction of others; the embrazures were falling to decay, -and the palisades of the covert-way had been mostly broken, or carried -away for fire-wood. The works were originally ill constructed, and the -place had the great disadvantage of being commanded on one side by a -hill. Its population in 1747 was 2463; and Almeida is not one of the -few places in Portugal which have been progressive since that time. - -♦FORT CONCEPTION ABANDONED.♦ - -The same causes which rendered it impossible for Lord Wellington to -relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, made it necessary for him to leave Almeida to -its own means of defence; but the works had been repaired, the garrison -was strong, and Brigadier Cox, an English officer in the Portugueze -service, was appointed to the command. With the example of Ciudad -Rodrigo before it, there was no reason to doubt that Almeida would make -a vigorous resistance, and probably hold out so long as materially -to derange the plans of the enemy. Fort Conception was abandoned -and blown up at the enemy’s approach. General Craufurd, however, -continued to occupy a position near Almeida with 3200 British and 1100 -Portugueze troops, eight squadrons of cavalry included. The chain of -his cavalry outposts formed a semicircle in front of the town, their -right flank resting on the Coa, near As Naves, about three miles above -this fortress, and their left, in like manner, resting upon the same -river, about three miles below it, near Cinco Villas. The centre was -covered by a small stream, and on the right and centre, where it was -expected that the enemy would advance, the cavalry posts were supported -by piquets of infantry. There was but one road by which the artillery -and cavalry could retreat, that leading from Almeida to the bridge, -which is about a mile west of the town. The nature of the ground made -it difficult for the enemy to approach this road on the left of the -allies, and on the south the infantry were placed to cover it, having -their right flank resting on the Coa above the bridge, their front -covered by a deep rocky ravine, and their left in some enclosures near -a windmill[14], on the plain, about 800 yards south of the town. - -♦AFFAIR ON THE COA.♦ - -On the morning of July 24th, the centre of the British line of piquets -was attacked; they were supported by the 14th light dragoons and two -guns, but were withdrawn when a considerable column of the enemy -appeared with artillery, and began to form on the other side of the -rivulet. The force which Marshal Ney, who directed these movements, -brought into the field, consisted of 20,000 foot and between 3000 and -4000 horse, being in fact his whole corps. Fifteen squadrons of cavalry -crossed the rivulet as soon as the piquets retired, and formed with -artillery in front, and about 7000 infantry on their right; other -troops meantime were advancing upon the right of the British position, -the side on which they might best expect to cut off the retreat of -the allies to the bridge. General Craufurd now perceived that it was -impossible for him to prevent the investment of Almeida, and that -he was on the wrong side of the Coa. The artillery and cavalry were -therefore ordered to retreat along the only road which was practicable -for them; the infantry from the left to move off in _echelon_; the -right it was necessary to hold till the last, to prevent the enemy from -approaching the bridge by a road coming from Junca, which runs in the -bottom of the valley by the river side. - -On the left, the men had to retreat through thick vineyards, -intersected with deep trenches, and with walls six or seven feet high; -they could not take advantage of this ground, for the enemy were in -such force, that there was imminent danger of being overpowered, and -cut off before they could reach the bridge. One of these walls General -Craufurd had considered as a complete defence against cavalry; it -enclosed a vineyard, in which some companies had been stationed, but -there had been a heavy rain during the whole of the preceding night, -and the troops had pulled down this wall in many places to make use of -the stones for forming a shelter; through these openings the enemy’s -horse entered, and here they made most of the prisoners who were taken -in the action. To retire in order over such ground was impossible, -but the retreat was made with characteristic coolness. On the other -side the bridge, the ground was equally unfavourable for re-forming; -the 43d and part of the 95th regiments were ordered to form in front -of the bridge, and defend it as long as they could, while the rest of -the troops should pass over and take a new position. They obeyed these -orders so literally, that they defended it all day; three times the -enemy attempted to force the passage, and each time they were repulsed -at the point of the bayonet; at length, when night closed, and every -thing had passed over, and the enemy had ceased to assail them, these -brave men retreated from the post where so many of their comrades -had fallen: the heaviest loss necessarily fell upon these gallant -regiments; the total, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to -330[15]. Colonel Hall of the 43d, who was among the slain, had only -joined from England the preceding day. The loss was to be regretted -because there was no object to be gained by engaging the French at -such disadvantage; but never did men behave more gallantly than those -who were engaged that day, British and Portugueze alike. They effected -their retreat under the most unfavourable circumstances, without -losing a gun, a trophy, or a single article of field equipment; and -they inflicted upon the enemy a loss, which, by his own account, was -nearly equal to the sum of ours, and which in reality doubled its -amount. After this the infantry were withdrawn to the neighbourhood of -Celorico, leaving the outpost duty to be performed by cavalry alone. - -♦DESPONDING LETTERS FROM THE ARMY.♦ - -Massena asserted that one of our couriers had been taken with -dispatches, which represented that the English had never been engaged -in so brisk an affair; that they were in full rout; and that it was -impossible to form an idea of their deplorable condition. Of the -condition of that army, and the full rout to which he had driven -them, it was not long before Massena obtained some correct personal -knowledge; but it is probable that some desponding letters had fallen -into his hands, and it is likely also that he expected to drive the -British army before him full speed to Lisbon. Letters had been written -from that army to Porto, in which the writers had delivered it as -their opinion that our forces must inevitably retreat, Massena having -such an overpowering superiority, that Portugal could not possibly -be defended against him. These letters excited such alarm among the -British merchants in that city, that the vice-consul applied to our -admiral at Lisbon, requesting he would take into consideration the -necessity of having a sufficient force off the Douro to protect the -British subjects, who might be compelled to embark without the least -delay. They were in the utmost consternation, he said. Admiral Berkeley -thought it proper to send this requisition to Lord Wellington, who in -consequence issued general orders upon the subject. “He would not make -any inquiry,” he said, “to ascertain the authors of these letters, -which had excited so much consternation in a place where it was most -to be wished that none should exist. He had frequently lamented the -ignorance displayed in letters from the army, and the indiscretion -with which those letters were published. It was impossible that many -officers could possess a sufficient knowledge of facts to be able to -form a correct opinion of the probable events of the campaign, yet when -their erroneous opinions were published, they could not but produce -mischievous effects. He requested, therefore, that the officers, on -account of their own reputation, would refrain from giving opinions -upon matters, with regard to which they could not possibly possess -the necessary knowledge for giving it with correctness; and if they -communicated to their correspondents facts relating to the position of -the army, its strength, the formation of its magazines, preparations -for cutting down or blowing up bridges, &c., they would at least tell -their correspondents not to publish these letters in newspapers, unless -it was certain that the publication could not prove injurious to the -army and to the public service.” - -♦APPREHENSIONS EXPRESSED IN ENGLAND.♦ - -There was cause for this reproof. The effect of such agueish -predictions in Portugal could only be to make the Portugueze believe -we should forsake them, and thus dispose them for submission to the -enemy; while, in England, they assisted the party of the despondents, -whose journalists were labouring to strike their country with a dead -palsy. “We had been lulled,” they said, “into the most dangerous -confidence. Massena was only waiting for the advance of his flanks, -that he might, with his whole combined army, either force our handful -of men to a battle, or surround them: all that could be expected was, -that the survivors might be enabled to retire to their ships with -eclat.” By the next dispatches it appeared, that it was more easy -for a journalist to imagine such a manœuvre, than for Massena to -execute it; but this had no other effect than to make them change the -note of alarm. “If Massena,” they then said, “did not destroy Lord -Wellington’s army by fighting, it could only be because he meant -to destroy it by not fighting; for Massena was the most consummate -captain of all Buonaparte’s generals. And did ministers anticipate with -complacency the continuance of our army in Portugal through the winter? -The rainy season was approaching; might it not be the deep policy of -this arch-statesman and conqueror to keep our army there? He would be -content to devote Massena and his troops to destruction, if it would -facilitate some ulterior plan; he might mean to ruin us by the expense -of our forces there; and what should we say, if it were really a part -of his policy to keep them there, while he, having possession of the -Dutch, the Danish, and the Swedish fleets and ports, made a descent -upon England or Ireland? They trusted ministers were upon their guard, -and that they destined their troops at home for a service more imminent -than the reinforcement of Lord Wellington.” - -♦NEY SUMMONS THE GOVERNOR OF ALMEIDA.♦ - -While these writers, in the pure spirit of faction, were thus advising -a diversion in favour of the enemy, Ney, who conducted the siege of -Almeida, directed Loison to summon the governor. This general, who -was peculiarly odious in that country for his cruelty and rapacity, -addressed ♦JULY 24.♦ the governor as a Portugueze, admonishing him -not to hazard the interests of his nation for a vain point of honour. -“None,” said he, “knows better than you do, that the French come to -deliver you from the yoke of the English. There is not a Portugueze -who is ignorant of the little consideration which his country enjoys -among that people. Have they not given abundant proofs of the little -attention which they pay to a nation worthy of esteem, and for a -long time the ally of France? Their occupation of all the civil and -military posts proves to demonstration, that the intention of the -English government is to consider Portugal as one of her colonies. -The conduct which the English have held with regard to the Spaniards, -whom they promised to defend, but abandoned, should open your eyes, -and convince you that they will do the same with regard to Portugal. -Sir Governor, his excellency has charged me to offer you the most -honourable capitulation, by which you may retain the government of -your fortress, and your garrison be admitted into the number of those -Portugueze troops that have remained faithful to the interests of their -country. In your hands therefore, is placed the fate of Almeida, and of -your companions in arms. If you refuse to accede to this proposal, you -will become responsible for all the blood shed unavailingly, in a cause -which is foreign to the Portugueze nation.” Brigadier Cox happened to -be in the covered-way, close to the barrier gate, when the flag of -truce arrived with this summons. Without permitting the French officer -to enter, he returned a verbal answer, that the fortress would be -defended to the last extremity. - -♦PORTUGUEZE IN MASSENA’S ARMY.♦ - -The Portugueze troops, of whom Loison spake as being engaged in the -service of France, were the remainder of those whom Junot had hurried -away from their own country. The men, Buonaparte was too wary to send -back; but Massena brought with him a few nobles, who, having long -preyed upon the country which they disgraced, completed their infamy by -betraying it. To these traitors Loison appealed in his summons, saying, -they could assure the governor of the honourable manner in which -they had been treated. The Marquis of Alorna, D. Pedro de Almeida, -was the most conspicuous among them; he and his accomplices used all -their influence to persuade their countrymen to submission; but the -Portugueze had already experienced the effects of non-resistance, and -the inhabitants of Castello Mendo, and a few other villages on the -borders of Beira, were the only persons who were unfortunate enough to -be deceived. These poor people, instead of abandoning their habitations -on the approach of the enemy, in obedience to the orders which had been -issued, remained in them, fearing to encounter the evils of wandering -in search of shelter, and hoping, that, as they submitted to the enemy -without resistance, their property would be safe, their women preserved -from violation, and their lives secured. But the French, conscious of -the wickedness of the cause in which they were engaged, seemed, like -the pirates of the last century, to have considered themselves in a -state of reprobation, and to have committed crimes which make humanity -shudder, as if for the purpose of manifesting their desperate defiance -of God and man. “The inhabitants of these submissive villages suffered -all the evils which a cruel enemy could inflict; their property was -plundered; their houses burnt; their women atrociously violated; and -those, whose age and sex did not provoke the brutal violence of the -soldiers, fell victims to the confidence which they placed in promises -made only to be broken.” In these words the enormities which the French -committed were proclaimed by the Portugueze government, and by the -British general. - -♦THE PORTUGUEZE ORDERED TO RETIRE BEFORE THE ENEMY. AUG. 4.♦ - -That general addressed a proclamation to the Portugueze upon the -occasion, telling them they now saw what they had to expect from the -French. They now saw that no means remained for avoiding the evils with -which they were threatened, but a determined and vigorous resistance, -and a firm resolution to obstruct as much as possible the advance -of the enemy, by removing out of his reach all such things as might -contribute to his subsistence, or facilitate his progress. “The army -under my command,” said he, “will protect as large a portion of the -country as is possible; but it is obvious that the people alone can -deliver themselves by a vigorous resistance, and preserve their goods -by removing them out of the reach of the enemy. The duties, therefore, -that bind me to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and -to the Portugueze nation, oblige me to make use of the power and -authority with which I am furnished, for compelling the careless and -indolent to make the necessary efforts to preserve themselves from the -dangers which threaten them, and to save their country. In conformity -with this, I make known and declare, that all magistrates and persons -in authority who shall remain in the villages or towns, after -having received orders from the military officer to remove, and all -persons, of whatever class they may be, who shall maintain the least -communication with, or aid and assist in any manner the enemy, shall be -considered as traitors to the state, and tried, and punished as such an -enormous crime requires.” The manner in which Lord Wellington assumed -this power, in the name of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and of the -Portugueze nation, was as wise as the assumption itself was necessary -in such circumstances. The Portugueze people also were fully sensible -that their duty and their interest were the same, and never did any -people act with more determined zeal in defence of their country. - -♦SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.♦ - -Massena opened his trenches on the night of August 15. While a false -attack was made against the north of the town, 2000 men dug the first -parallel to a depth of three feet; and on Sunday the 26th, at five -in the morning, eleven batteries, mounted with sixty-five pieces of -cannon, opened their fire. The garrison consisted of 5000 men, of whose -spirit no doubt was entertained; the fortress was well provided, -and its works had been placed in so respectable a state, that Lord -Wellington had reason to think it might delay the enemy till late in -the season, even if he should be unable to find an opportunity of -relieving it. These well-founded expectations were frustrated by one -of those chances which sometimes disconcert the wisest plans, and -disappoint the surest hopes of man. On the night after the batteries -opened, the large powder magazine in the citadel, with two smaller ones -contiguous to it, blew up. More than half the artillerymen, a great -number of the garrison, and many of the inhabitants, perished in this -dreadful explosion; many of the guns were dismounted, and the works -were rendered no longer defensible, even if means of defence had been -left; but, except a few cartridges for immediate use, and thirty-nine -barrels of powder in the laboratory, the whole of the ammunition was -destroyed. - -♦SURRENDER OF THE PLACE.♦ - -Great as the calamity was, the evil would have been far more alarming -had it proceeded, as was at first supposed, from treason; but, -according to the best information which could be collected, it was -altogether accidental: the magazine was bomb-proof; and they were -taking ammunition from it, when a shell fell upon one of the carts. The -lieutenant-governor had behaved well till the batteries opened; he was -then so terrified, that he shut himself up in the bomb-proofs. Having -thus proved himself a coward, mere shame made him a traitor: and after -the explosion he took advantage of the confusion to counteract the -governor’s attempt at holding out longer. Another traitor was found -in the major of artillery. He had behaved well during the siege; but -when he was sent out to propose terms of capitulation, for the purpose -of gaining favour with the enemy he communicated to him the whole -extent of the disaster; so that Massena, knowing the place was at his -mercy, was enabled to dictate what terms he pleased. The garrison -were made prisoners of war, with this exception, that the militia, -having deposited their arms, should return to their homes, and not -serve during the war. It was ten at night when the capitulation was -concluded; in the course of half an hour the French recommenced their -fire upon the town, and kept it up till morning, when the Portugueze -were assured in reply to their remonstrances, that it had been owing -to a mistake on the part of the artillery officers: undoubtedly it -had been so; but the commander is chargeable with something worse -♦COMPILAÇAM DAS ORDENS DO DIA, 1810, P. 168.♦ than error, for having -suffered it to continue through the night without thinking it worth -while to send an order which would instantly have stopped it. - -♦THE PORTUGUEZE PRISONERS ENLIST AND DESERT.♦ - -The terms were broken by the French with their wonted perfidy. They -tried persuasions first, and employed Alorna and the other traitors -who were with him to seduce their countrymen. Accordingly, when the -Portugueze laid down their arms upon the esplanade, they were invited -to volunteer into the French service; but not a man was found base -enough to come forward and accept the invitation. On the following -day, when the troops of the line and the militia had been separated, -they were tried separately. The troops were told, that unless they -accepted the alternative which was offered them, they must immediately -be marched into France; the hardships which they would suffer on their -march, and the treatment to which they would be exposed afterwards, -were represented to them in strong terms; and officers and men, with an -unanimity which might well have been suspected, agreed then to enlist -in the enemy’s service. They found means of informing Marshal Beresford -that they did this only for the sake of remaining within reach of their -own country, and making their escape as soon as possible; and the truth -of this declaration was proved by the numbers who soon rejoined the -allied army. Upon this occasion Marshal Beresford acted in a manner -becoming the British ♦CONDEMNATION OF THEIR CONDUCT.♦ character. He -expressed in general orders his strong disapprobation of such conduct; -for the soldiers, he said, some allowance was to be made; they were -excusable on the score of their want of education, their undoubted good -intention, and their feeling that the enemy with whom they had to deal -scrupled at no means, however unworthy, for the attainment of his ends. -Yet even in them it was to be discommended, and he doubted not that -henceforth those whom the fortune of war might throw into the enemy’s -♦1810. SEPTEMBER.♦ hands would take their lot patiently, and suffer any -thing rather than bring a stain upon the national honour. Nothing could -excuse the officers for conduct so base, so abominable, and so unworthy -of the Portugueze name. They had sinned against knowledge, and thereby -rendered themselves false and infamous; they had contracted a voluntary -engagement with the determination of not keeping it, placing themselves -in a miserable predicament, which rendered it only less infamous to -break their faith than to observe it. He should therefore report them -to their prince, that they might be dismissed with ignominy from the -service, and answer for their conduct according to the laws. At the -same time he published the names of five officers who, under a proper -sense of duty, had withstood the contagion of ill example. - -♦MILITIA FORCED INTO THE FRENCH SERVICE.♦ - -There were three militia regiments in Almeida, those of Trancoso, -Guarda, and Arganil. Neither man nor officer of these could be induced -to serve against his country, nor self-seduced to tamper with his own -conscience. But instead of dismissing them according to the terms, -Massena said, that if they would not serve by fair means, they should -by force; and gave orders for forming a corps of pioneers, by detaining -200 men and seven officers from each regiment. Marshal Beresford -observed upon this, after honourably contrasting the conduct of the -militia with that of the regular troops, that the Portugueze, to -their misfortune, were too well acquainted with French morality for -this iniquity to surprise them: it was but one injury the more which -that outraged nation had to revenge, ... and his army would revenge -it. “Never,” said he, “even though Almeida is lost, never since the -beginning of the war has this kingdom been in so good a state for -resisting the enemy. Soldiers of the Portugueze army, if you remember -that we have the English army to co-operate with us, which has beaten -the enemy whenever it encountered them, ... if you call to mind who is -the commander of that army, and that he is yours also, ... if you have -confidence in him and in yourselves, the invaders never can conquer -Portugal. Your general has full confidence in the result, because he -confides in the inherent loyalty and valour of the nation, and in its -determination of sacrificing every thing to its fidelity, its liberty, -and its independence!” - -♦THEY ESCAPE AND REJOIN THE ALLIES.♦ - -Massena asserted that the Porto regiment hated the English, and -therefore he should retain it in his service; but he belied his own -assertion by adding that he should keep a watchful eye on the men, -and not place them in important posts. If he judged in any degree of -the Portugueze people by the few traitorous nobles and fidalgos with -whom he was conversant, he was speedily undeceived. A night had not -elapsed before great part both of the officers and men were missing, -and in less than a fortnight nearly the whole escaped. The men, instead -of taking the opportunity of deserting, rejoined their countrymen in -arms; and the officers, unconscious of having done any thing unworthy, -presented themselves to the commander of the first detachment they -could reach, in a condition which pleaded for them, exhausted with -fatigue and hunger. They protested, when they found it necessary to -excuse themselves, that they had taken no oath of fidelity to the -French, and that to avoid it when it was to be tendered, they had fled -at all hazards, not waiting for safer opportunities. A representation -in their favour was made by Silveira; and Marshal Beresford in -consequence mitigated his former censure. It would, he said, be the -greatest satisfaction to him if he should find it confirmed that these -officers had not pledged themselves to the enemy; but what he wished to -enforce upon them was, that an officer ought to consider not merely the -end at which he aims, but the means also by which to bring it about, -that both may be alike honourable. He referred their conduct therefore -to a council of inquiry, under Silveira. - -♦CHANGES IN THE PORTUGUEZE REGENCY.♦ - -The Portugueze regency now declared Alorna a traitor, and offered -a reward of a thousand moidores for bringing him in alive or dead. -The Marquis of Ponte de Lima, the Marquis of Loule, the Count of St. -Miguel, the Count of Ega, Gomes Friere de Andrade, and D. José Carcome -Lobo, were also declared traitors, and their property declared to be -confiscated: but they had powerful friends in the state; and it is said -that, notwithstanding the decree, their property remained untouched, in -the hands of persons in whom they could confide. A change had lately -taken place in the Portugueze regency. The Marquez das Minas resigned, -in consequence of an illness which soon proved fatal. The other two -members were, the Bishop of Porto, who was Patriarch elect, and the -Marquis Monteiro Mor. Four new members were now added; the Principal -Sousa, brother to the Conde de Linhares, who was minister in Brazil, -and to the Portugueze ambassador in England; the Conde de Redondo; -Ricardo Raymundo Nogueira, who had been law professor at Coimbra; and -the English ambassador, Mr. Stuart. Admiral Berkeley was at the same -time appointed by the Prince of Brazil commander-in-chief of the naval, -as Lord Wellington had been of the military force of Portugal. There -are few things in the annals of Great Britain more honourable to the -national character than the perfect confidence reposed in the English -nation by its old ally, and the manner in which that confidence was -requited. While the enemies of both countries were endeavouring to -incense the Portugueze against the English, by telling them that the -British government designed to usurp Portugal; and while the enemies -of administration were traducing and insulting the Portugueze people, -crying out that they would not defend themselves and could not be -defended by us, and therefore that we ought not to attempt to defend -them, the English army and the Portugueze people were acting with the -most perfect unanimity, for the common interests and common safety of -Great Britain and Portugal. - -♦CONDUCT OF THE PORTUGUEZE GOVERNMENT.♦ - -The spirit of the people, without which all other means of defence must -have been ineffectual, was what England could neither give nor take -away; but for the measures by which that spirit was so directed as to -secure its end, Portugal was indebted to British councils. Military -and financial resources, of which the nation had not supposed itself -capable, were called forth; and the Portugueze were addressed by their -rulers in language to which they had long been unaccustomed, ... the -language of hope and confidence, and of conscious rectitude as well -as conscious strength. Like the Supreme Junta, the regents reminded -the Portugueze of their heroic ancestors; they spake of the wickedness -of the enemy, the inexpressible miseries which would accompany their -yoke, and the certainty of glorious success, if those exertions and -sacrifices were made which the emergency required; but the Portugueze -regency did not, like the Spaniards, speak to the people of the causes -which had rendered this invasion possible, and produced the decay of -Portugal; nor did they hold out the promise of the restoration of their -rights, the redress of their grievances, and the due execution of -their laws. Such promises were not necessary as excitement; a people -who were literally defending their hearths and altars, and fighting -to save their wives and daughters from violation and butchery, or to -revenge them, needed no additional feeling to goad them on: ... as -pledges they were not held out; because the government had not the -prudence to think of reforming itself. In providing for the defence -of the country, it acted providently and bravely, with wisdom and -with vigour; but in other things, the old leaven discovered itself, -and made it apparent that the pleasure of the minister was still the -law of Portugal. A decree was published, assigning to the widows, -children, or dependent brethren of those who had fallen at Almeida, -the full pay of the deceased, and half pay to the families of those -who were made prisoners. “The Prince,” it said, “would not believe -that any of his faithful vassals could have entered the service of the -enemy; and if any had been compelled to do so, he trusted they had only -yielded to compulsion, with the purpose of effecting their escape. He -suspended, therefore, his justice; but if a month elapsed before such -persons acquitted themselves by appearing, they would be considered as -traitors.” Now, the treason of the lieutenant-governor and the major -of artillery was open and undoubted: Lord Wellington had stated it in -his dispatches to the minister at war; their names were given in those -dispatches here in England, but suppressed in Portugal, out of favour -to their connexions. - -♦ARBITRARY ARRESTS AT LISBON.♦ - -In another respect the conduct of the Portugueze regency was more -inexcusable. Eight-and-forty persons, of all ranks and professions, and -many of them unacquainted with each other, were seized in the night; -ten of them were sent to the tower of St. Julian, and the rest to the -Limoeiro, the common prison of the city. The most alarming rumours -were scattered abroad. A formidable and extensive conspiracy, it was -said, had been discovered, which had nothing less for its object than -a general massacre of the British, for the purpose of delivering up -the country to the French. These reports reached England, and received -their first contradiction from the Portugueze government themselves, -who found it expedient to declare, that neither Lord Wellington nor -Mr. Stuart had any part in their proceedings upon this occasion; -that the stories of the conspiracy, and of the arms which had been -discovered, were false; and that the individuals who had been arrested -had been sent out of the kingdom, only because it was the opinion of -the police that their residence in it might be prejudicial to the -public tranquillity. Some of these individuals were permitted to come -to England, others were sent to the Azores, after they had suffered -every kind of inconvenience, privation, and indignity, to the alarm and -distress of the families of all, and the ruin of some; ... there was -neither proof nor accusation against them; the whole, as a public act, -was one of those acts which mark the unheeding and unfeeling folly of -an ignorant and obstinate despotism, but of which the secret springs -are to be found in private malice or cupidity. - -The manner in which the Portugueze government declared, that neither -Marshal General Lord Wellington, nor the minister plenipotentiary -of his Britannic Majesty, nor any individual of the British nation, -had any part in these proceedings, nor any previous knowledge of -them, make it apparent that the British general and the British -minister disapproved of an act of tyranny which was thus in reality -disclaimed on their part. They could not prevent that of which they -were not apprised before it was done, nor after it was done could -they express their disapprobation better than by requiring to have it -thus distinctly stated, that the regency had neither acted upon their -advice, nor received their sanction. It was the more to be regretted, -because the other measures of the government entitled them to respect -and gratitude. They had restored order in the country, and brought -its resources into action, and their public acts and declarations -corresponded to the spirit of the people. The ringleaders of the -mutiny, which, in its consequences, had given Soult possession of -Porto, were brought to trial and condign punishment; and after the most -impartial examination of his conduct, General Bernardim Freire de -Andrada, who had been murdered at Braga, was declared to have served -his country faithfully and well, and the memory of those unfortunate -men who perished in the same tumult was cleared of all imputation. An -army more numerous than Portugal had ever before possessed was formed, -equipped, and disciplined; and the government, when it reminded the -people of their strength, did not fear to tell them of their danger. -It announced the loss of Almeida, ... “a loss,” said the regents, -“greatly to be lamented for the death of part of its defenders, and -the unhappiness of others, who have thus fallen into captivity, but of -little importance to the great cause of the salvation of the country. -Wellington at the head of the allied armies; Beresford directing our -troops, who are indebted to him for their organization and their -discipline; brave soldiers, and a faithful people, who have sworn to -defend their prince and their native land to the last extremity; these -are the bulwarks which defend us; and these an army of slaves, who are -continually wasting away by want and desertion, will never be able to -beat down.” - -♦APPREHENSIONS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.♦ - -The Portugueze, and those especially who were intrusted with the -government of their country, cannot be extolled above their merits, for -the spirit which they displayed at this crisis, the most momentous, and -to ordinary minds the most appalling of the whole war. Their merit is -the greater because there was not that vigour in the British cabinet -which the emergency required; and because with all their confidence in -British fidelity, they could not have been without some apprehension -of seeing the defence of Portugal abandoned by Great Britain. The -enemy had exultingly proclaimed that the English would fly to their -ships, and some colour for the boast was afforded by the fact that a -fleet large enough to receive the troops was lying in the Tagus, and -evidently detained there for such a service. The heavy baggage of the -army was actually kept on board; and Lord Wellington was at that time -acting under instructions of a character to excite in him any thing -rather than confidence or hope. They were to this effect, that his -majesty would be better pleased if the army were withdrawn too soon, -than that its embarkation should be endangered by the least delay. -Such instructions must inevitably have drawn on the disgrace and -ruin which they anticipated, if they had been addressed to a man of -inferior capacity, or meaner mind. A want of courage and of generosity -was implied in them which is but too characteristic of British -ministries. Instead of assuring the commander of support, whatever -might be the issue, if nothing on his part were left undone, he was -made to understand that any risk which he incurred must be upon his own -responsibility, and that any disaster which he might sustain would be -imputed to his decision. But Providence was with us, and directed the -course of events to a glorious and happy issue, notwithstanding our -repeated errors. - -Lord Wellington had the farther mortification of knowing that the -army, satisfied as he was with its conduct in all respects, partook -that despondency which the pestilent activity of a faction at home was -continually labouring to produce, and which the events of the campaign -had hitherto tended to confirm. His plans had been long meditated and -wisely formed; but the reasonable expectations which he founded upon -them were disappointed by the accident that drew after it the fall -of Almeida. That place might easily have held out till the autumnal -rains should have rendered it impossible for the French to advance, -and scarcely practicable for them to have subsisted their army upon -that frontier. To gain time at this juncture was for him to gain every -thing: here he thought to have wintered in the sure expectation that -every day would render the Portugueze troops more efficient, and with -the reasonable hope that, through Marquis Wellesley’s influence in -the cabinet, he should receive such reinforcements as would enable -him to act upon the offensive. Accident had frustrated this intent; -the enemy were enabled to advance, elated with their fortune, and -relying upon it as the only divinity in which they were encouraged -to trust; and Massena, whose plans had hitherto succeeded beyond his -calculations, and even to the extent of his hopes, had the advantage of -relying upon the disposition as well as the efficiency of his army, -and the full support of a government which placed ample means at his -command, crippled him with no restrictions, and threatened him with no -responsibility. - -♦MOVEMENTS OF REGNIER’S CORPS, AND OF GENERAL HILL.♦ - -Upon the fall of Almeida Lord Wellington’s head-quarters were removed -to Gouvea, and the whole of his infantry retired to the rear of -Celorico, the outposts continuing in advance of that town. Massena -waited till he had been joined by Regnier’s corps, consisting of -17,000 men, which, having acted with little success against Romana -in Extremadura, had crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete, early in -July. According to the plan which Buonaparte had laid down for the -conquest of Portugal, this corps was to have moved by the right bank -of the Tagus upon Abrantes; but this design having been altered when -the allied army was found more numerous and efficient than the French -cabinet had supposed, Regnier had moved upon Zarzamayor, Penamacor, and -Monsanto, in the hope of striking a blow against Lieutenant-General -Hill, who had advanced with 13,000 men from Abrantes to Portalegre, -for the purpose of supporting Romana. The French hoped either that -he would expose himself to an attack, or that Lord Wellington might -be tempted to make a movement against Regnier, of which Massena was -prepared to take advantage; but the British generals were not thus to -be circumvented: and Massena as well as Lord Wellington, directing his -attention to a single object, Regnier joined the invading force, while -Hill was stationed at Sarzedas, to cover the road upon Abrantes to -Lisbon, or move to Ponte de Murcella, and unite with the main body on -the line of its retreat: in either case Major-General Leith’s division, -which was kept at Thomar in reserve to support him, was to take the -same direction. - -♦MASSENA ADVANCES INTO PORTUGAL.♦ - -Had Massena despised the allied army in truth as he affected to -do, he would now have marched by Castello Branco, Abrantes, and -Santarem, direct upon Lisbon, leaving Lord Wellington behind him; but -he remembered the fate of Junot, and had too much respect for the -enemy with whom he had to contend. Relying, however, upon numbers and -fortune, and taking into account the indecision and timidity which -seemed to characterize the British counsels, he expected that Lord -Wellington, being too weak to risk a battle, would retreat, if not fly -before him, with no other hope than that of reaching the ships and -securing his embarkation. Under this imagination he ordered the French -army to provide itself for seventeen days, by which time he expected -to finish the campaign triumphantly. The only impediment which he -apprehended on the way was from the difficulty of transport. For this -reason very few women were allowed to accompany the army; they were -left at Ciudad Rodrigo, where so many had assembled to share in the -spoils and pleasures of Lisbon with their friends and husbands, that -the place, because of the round of gaieties which was there kept up, -was called Little Paris. From thence they were to follow when the easy -conquest should be completed; and this was thought so certain, that -engagements were made for parties to be given in the capital. With this -confidence, and this levity of mind, the French entered upon their -third invasion of Portugal. They began their march in three bodies, -Junot’s corps with the artillery and cavalry proceeding by Pinhel -and Trancoso, Ney’s by Alverca, and Regnier’s by Guarda. At the same -time, Lord Wellington, aware of the enemy’s intent, began to retreat -towards Coimbra deliberately, and with such evident forethought and -determination, that this retrograde movement did not in the slightest -degree abate the spirits of the army. No stores were abandoned, no men -and horses foundered; the operations were all performed with regularity -and ease; the soldiers suffered no privations, and underwent no -unnecessary fatigue; the inhabitants retired under their protection, -and assisted them in breaking up the bridges, destroying the mills, -and laying waste the country; so that Massena found a desert as he -advanced. In the town of Celorico there were only two inhabitants, -and nothing but bare walls. At that ♦NEY AND REGNIER’S CORPS JOIN -HIM AT CELORICO.♦ place the corps of Regnier and Ney effected their -junction. The appearance of the former made it evident that there was -no intention of acting upon the Tagus; and it appeared also, upon -their taking the road by Fornos, that it was Massena’s intention to -proceed upon the right side of the Mondego, not upon the left by way of -Penalva and Ponte de Murcella, where he thought Lord Wellington would -be prepared to resist him in a strong position: he calculated upon -turning this position, and so making himself master of Coimbra and the -resources which the fertile country about that city would supply. But -he did not calculate upon the foresight and decision of the British -General, nor upon the spirit of the Portugueze people: he hoped to -delude them by promises, and to find them as he advanced remaining -patiently in their towns and villages, in expectation of the conquest -which awaited them. With ♦SEPT. 20.♦ this intent he gave orders that -the troops should halt before they entered Viseu, till the inhabitants -might be assured of protection for themselves and their property. No -persons were found abroad there; the soldiers were still forbidden to -enter any house forcibly on pain of severe punishment, and Massena -himself remained a while in the streets, expecting the effect of his -condescending patience. Night was setting in, and the word was at -length given that the soldiers might quarter themselves. The doors were -presently broken open, ... but neither inhabitants nor provisions were -there; every thing had been carried away, all had fled; even no lights -were to be found, except those which were burning in the churches. The -only living souls remaining there were a few poor wretches in the -hospital, who were in too pitiable a state for removal: one medical -attendant had been left with them; he also had fled upon the entrance -of the French, but upon the information of his patients he was pursued -and overtaken, and ordered to continue at his post, and assure the -town’s-people when they ventured back that no ill treatment was to be -apprehended from the French conquerors. - -♦THE FRENCH ARMY COLLECTED AT VISEU.♦ - -Here Junot, with the artillery and cavalry, joined the army; but this -junction, which completed the concentration of the French force, was -impeded by Colonel Trant with some Portugueze militia and dragoons, -who attacked the convoy near Tojal. Had this enterprise been executed -as well as it was planned and timed, a blow might have been inflicted -which the enemy would have felt severely; but the French, by their -prompt discipline and judicious boldness, deterred the militia from -pursuing their success, ♦JONES’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR, I. 297.♦ and -the park fell back on Trancoso. This delay, however, was no light -advantage for the allies: it compelled Massena to remain two days at -Viseu waiting for his artillery, and the time thus gained enabled Lord -Wellington to collect his force upon the ground whereon, now that -Massena’s movements were foreseen, he had determined to withstand him. - -♦LORD WELLINGTON CROSSES TO THE SERRA DE BUSACO. SEPT. 21.♦ - -On the day after the French commander arrived at Viseu, General -Hill joined the British army at Ponte de Murcella; the bridge was -destroyed, and he was left there with his division, while the rest of -the army crossed the Mondego, and Lord Wellington himself proceeded -to the Serra de Busaco, a mountainous ridge eight miles in length, -and terminating precipitously on the Mondego; the Serra de Murcella, -in like manner, terminating on the opposite bank. By daylight on the -following morning the light division and the cavalry, with General -Pack’s Portugueze brigade, assembled in the plain of Mortagoa, having -their picquets upon the Criz; the bridge over that little river was -destroyed. That day the enemy appeared in sight, and on the morrow, -about three in the afternoon, drove in the picquets; some skirmishing -ensued, the allies retreated to the rear of the plain, and at night -began their march over the Serra. The place appointed for their bivouac -was on the other side, two leagues distant, but the acclivity was so -steep, that owing to this cause, and to the impediment occasioned by -the breaking down of some artillery waggons, they did not reach it -till it was daylight. It was generally supposed in the army at this -time that no stand would be made, but Lord Wellington’s determination -soon became apparent. Had his army indeed been numerous enough to have -occupied the whole ridge, no enemy could have ventured to attack him -there, the ascent being too steep for cavalry, and the height of the -position above the ground in its front such as to render the use of -artillery on the part of the assailants almost unavailing: occupied -as it was, it was impregnable. The general elevation of the ridge is -from nine to twelve hundred feet, and it is crossed by two roads, both -leading from the north to Coimbra, the one passing near the convent, -the other about a league to the southward. - -♦BUSACO.♦ - -Busaco, which was now to become famous in British and Portugueze -history, had long been a venerable name in Portugal. It is the only -place in that kingdom where the barefooted Carmelites possessed what in -monastic language is called a desert; by which term an establishment is -designated where those brethren whose piety flies the highest pitch may -at once enjoy the advantages of the eremite and the discipline of the -cœnobite life, and thus indulge the ♦GENERAL MACKINNON’S JOURNAL, P. -74.♦ heroism of ascetic devotion in security. The convent, surrounded -by an extensive and almost impervious wood, stands in what may be -called the crater of the loftiest part of the ridge: its precincts, -which included a circumference of about four miles, were walled in. -Within that circuit were various chapels and religious stations; and -on the summit of the mountain, which is within the inclosure, a stone -cross was erected of enormous size, upon so huge a foundation, that -three thousand cart-loads of stone were employed in constructing its -base. The cells of the brethren were round the church[16], not in a -regular building, but accommodated to the irregularities of the ground, -and lined with cork, which was every where used instead of wood because -of the dampness of the situation. Every cell had its garden and its -water-course for irrigating it, the cultivation of these little spots -being the only recreation which the inhabitants allowed themselves -as lawful. In one of these gardens the first cedars which grew in -Portugal were raised. It was indeed one of those places where man has -converted an earthly Paradise into a Purgatory for himself, but where -superstition almost seems sanctified by every thing around it. Lord -Wellington’s head-quarters were in the convent; and the solitude and -silence of Busaco were now broken by events, in which its hermits, -dead as they were to the world, might be permitted to partake all the -agitations of earthly hope and fear. - -On the 26th Generals Hill and Leith joined the army. This corps had -made so rapid and arduous a march, that Massena regarded its junction -as impossible, and reckoned therefore that the force which he wished -to attack must necessarily be weak in front, if indeed Lord Wellington -should venture to give him battle. That general arrived on the same -day at Mortagoa, and the bridge over the Criz was re-established for -his artillery, the army having crossed at a ford a little way above. -Some skirmishing took place, and at S. Antonio do Cantaro the French -were resisted in a manner which made them first apprehend that a -determined stand was to be made against them. Massena himself upon this -reconnoitred the position, after which he asked one of the unworthy -Portugueze who accompanied him, if he thought the allies would give him -battle? He ♦RELAÇAM DA CAMPANHA DE MASSENA. INVESTIGADOR PORTUGUEZ, -VOL. VI. 59.♦ was answered, that undoubtedly they would, seeing they -showed themselves in such strength. The French Marshal replied, I -cannot persuade myself that Lord Wellington will risk the loss of his -reputation; but if he does, ... I have him! To-morrow we shall effect -the conquest of Portugal; and in a few days I shall drown the leopard! - -♦BATTLE OF BUSACO. SEPT. 27.♦ - -About two on the following morning the French army was in motion. -Ney’s corps formed in close column on the right, at the foot of the -hill, and on the road which leads to the convent; Regnier’s on the -left, upon the southern road which passes by S. Antonio do Cantaro; -Junot’s was in the centre, and in reserve; the cavalry was in the -rear, the ground not permitting it to act. The allied British and -Portugueze army was posted along the ridge of the Serra, forming the -segment of a circle, the extreme points of which embraced every part -of the enemy’s position, and from whence every movement on their part -could be immediately observed. The troops had bivouacked that night in -position, as they stood: Lord Wellington in the wood near the centre, -the general officers at the heads of their divisions and brigades. The -orders were that all should stand to their arms before daylight; and -the whole army were in high spirits, deeming themselves sure of an -action, and of success. Before daybreak the rattling of the enemy’s -carriages was heard, and a few of their guns were brought to fire upon -a smaller number of British ones which had been placed to command the -road. At dawn the action began on the right, and after some firing -by the light troops in advance of the position, the enemy attacked a -village which was in front of the light division, and which, though -its possession was of advantage to the French, Lord Wellington chose -rather to let them occupy, than suffer an action to be brought on upon -less favourable ground than that which he had chosen, and where he was -sure of success. The nature of the ground, upon which this assurance -was founded, facilitated the enemy’s movements to a certain degree, -but no farther; its steepness and its inequalities covered their -ascent, and they gained the summit with little loss. Regnier’s corps -was the first that was seriously engaged: it ascended at a part where -there were only a few light troops; and being thus enabled to deploy -without opposition, the French possessed themselves for a moment, -in considerable strength, of a point within the line. Their first -column was received by the 88th regiment alone, part of Major-General -Mackinnon’s brigade, which was presently reinforced by half the 45th, -and soon afterwards by the 8th Portugueze: their second found the 74th, -with the 9th and 21st Portugueze, ready to receive them on the right. -Being repulsed there, they tried the centre with no better fortune; -the remainder of Major-General Picton’s division coming up, he charged -them with the bayonet, and dislodged them, greatly superior in numbers -as they were, from the strong ground which they had gained; at the -same time, Major-General Leith arriving with a brigade on their flank, -joined in the charge, and they were driven down the hill with great -slaughter, leaving 700 dead upon the ground. Few prisoners were taken. - -Marshal Ney meantime was not more fortunate with his division. Part -of it he formed in column of mass, and ordered it to ascend upon -the right of the village which he had occupied. They came up in the -best possible order, though not without suffering considerably from -the light infantry; the ground, however, covered them in part by -its steepness. Major-General Craufurd, who commanded on that side, -judiciously made his troops withdraw just behind the crest of the ridge -whereon they were formed: he himself remained in front, on horseback, -observing the enemy. No sooner had they reached the summit than the -guns of his division opened a destructive fire upon them; and the men -appearing suddenly at a distance only of some twenty paces, advanced -and charged. Instantly the French were broken: the foremost regiments -of the column were almost destroyed, and those who escaped fled down -the steep declivity, running, sliding, or rolling, as they could. -General Simon, who commanded the column, was wounded and taken. Massena -was now convinced that the attack could not succeed, and therefore -halted the support at the foot of the hill. He endeavoured to decoy -Lord Wellington out of a position which had been proved impregnable; -but the British commander persisted in the sure system on which he had -resolved, and the remainder of the day was employed in skirmishing -between the light troops. They were directed to retire when pressed, -and give the enemy an opportunity of repeating the attack. But the -enemy had received too severe a lesson to venture upon a repetition, -and as night approached they were drawn off to some distance, near the -ground where Junot and the reserve were stationed. The village which -they had been allowed to occupy in the morning still remained in their -possession. Major-General Craufurd sent to the officer who commanded -there, saying it was necessary for his corps, and requiring him to -abandon it. The reply was, that he would die in defence of the post -with which he was intrusted. This tone ♦MEMOIRS OF THE EARLY CAMPAIGNS, -171.♦ was neither called for by the occasion nor justified by the -event. Six guns were immediately opened upon him; some companies of the -43d and of the Rifle Corps were ordered to charge the village; the -French were instantly driven out, and the advanced post of the light -division resumed possession. - -♦BEHAVIOUR OF THE PORTUGUEZE TROOPS.♦ - -Victories of greater result at the time have been gained in Portugal, -but never was a battle fought there of more eventual importance to the -Portugueze nation; for the Portugueze troops, whom the French despised, -whom the enemies of the ministry in England reviled, and whom perhaps -many of the British army till then mistrusted, established that day -their character both for courage[17] and for discipline, and proved, -that however the government and the institutions of that kingdom had -been perverted and debased, the people had not degenerated. Lord -Wellington bore testimony to their deserts: he declared that he had -never seen a more gallant attack than that which they made upon the -enemy who had reached the ridge of the Serra; they were worthy, he -said, of contending in the same ranks with the British troops in that -good cause, which they afforded the best hopes of saving. Marshal -Beresford bestowed high and deserved praise upon them in general -orders; and the opportunity was taken of granting a free pardon to all -who were under arrest for military offences, that they might rejoin -their regiments, and emulate their comrades, to whose good conduct -they were indebted for this forgiveness; but persons who had been -apprehended for robbery or murder were excepted from the amnesty, for -these, it was properly observed, were not to be considered merely as -military crimes. After this battle, the knighthood of the Bath was -conferred on Marshal Beresford, in consideration of those exertions by -which the Portugueze troops had been qualified to bear their part in it -so honourably[18]. - -The loss of the British in this memorable action amounted to 107 -killed, 493 wounded, and thirty-one taken; that of the Portugueze to -90 killed, 512 wounded, and twenty taken. One French general, three -colonels, thirty-three officers, and 250 men were made prisoners; -2000 were left dead on the field; the number was ascertained, because -Massena sent a flag of truce requesting permission to bury them; it was -not thought proper to comply with the request, and they were buried by -the conquerors. Most of their wounded, who were very numerous[19], were -left to the mercy of the peasants; General Craufurd, whose division was -the last that withdrew from the Serra, saved as many as he could from -their hands, and lodged them in the convent. Unground maize was found -in the knapsacks of the French. - -♦MASSENA MARCHES INTO THE PORTO ROAD.♦ - -Massena having in person directed the operations of the day, had -purchased at some cost the conviction that his boast was not here to -be realized. He consulted with Ney, Regnier, Junot, and Freirion; and -they called in the Portugueze traitors to inquire of them by what -course a position might be turned, which they found themselves unable -to force. None of these unworthy men happened to be acquainted with -that part of the country; the French commander turned from them in -evident displeasure, as if they ought to have possessed the information -of which he stood in need, and he ordered General Montbrun out with a -strong detachment to explore the ways, telling him to send Generals -St. Croix and Lamotte in different directions on the same service. On -the following day two peasants were brought in; promises could draw -nothing from them, but they yielded to threats of torture and death, -and informed the enemy that there was a pass[20] over the Serra de -Caramula, communicating with the great road between Porto and Coimbra, -and coming into it near Sardam. By this course Massena immediately -determined to proceed. There had been skirmishing throughout the -morning between the light troops; the better to conceal their -movements, the French set fire to the woods; but the summit of Busaco -commands a most extensive prospect over the whole country[21]: early -in the afternoon a large body of their horse and foot was observed in -motion from the left of their centre to the rear, and from thence their -cavalry were seen in march along the road leading from Mortagoa, over -the mountain, toward Porto. Lord Wellington at once apprehended their -purpose, and perceived that it was now too late to prevent or to impede -it. - -♦COLONEL TRANT’S MOVEMENTS.♦ - -Orders had been dispatched from the Ponte de Murcella on the 19th to -Colonel Trant, who was then acting as Brigadier with some Portugueze -militia, that he should occupy the villages of Sardam and Aguada. The -division which he commanded formed part of the force under General -Bacellar, who was then at Moimenta da Beira, and whose instructions -were to consider the defence of the Douro, and more especially of -Porto as his principal object. The orders were that Trant should march -by S. Pedro do Sul, which was the nearest line, but the worst road, -and through a country exhausted of provisions, in consequence of the -passage of the enemy by Viseu, and the abandonment of the intermediate -district by its inhabitants. Partly for these considerations General -Bacellar directed him to make a circuit by Porto, but chiefly because -he had ascertained that a French detachment of 1500 men had entered S. -Pedro; and because he considered it his main business to provide for -the protection of Porto, which he also supposed to be Lord Wellington’s -object in ordering this movement. Trant proposed to attack the enemy -at S. Pedro, and force his way, if possible; Bacellar would not permit -him to make the attempt, because he thought it too hazardous for -troops like his; and Trant in consequence took the circuitous route. -He left his men near the points which he had been instructed ♦SEPT. -28.♦ to occupy, early on the morning after the battle, and proceeded -to the head-quarters at Busaco, where he arrived before eleven in -the forenoon, and was then first apprized that it had been intended -he should occupy the village of Boyalva, and defend the pass over -the Serra de Caramula. He offered instantly to return and occupy the -intended ground; and there was time for doing it, but the offer was -declined. Lord Wellington had not detached any part of his own army to -these passes, because in case of failure, the troops must have been cut -off from the main body; whereas the Portugueze, if compelled to retire, -might fall back upon Porto, according to their destination. Had the -ground been stronger than it was, it was not to be supposed that 1500 -militia could maintain it against Massena’s army; for to that number -Trant’s force was reduced, the men having marched 190 miles in nine -successive days, and many, while traversing the district in which they -were raised, had absented themselves, without leave, to revisit their -families. They might possibly have held it long enough to bring on a -general action, if Lord Wellington had thought it advisable again to -venture one; but the same motives which withheld him from giving battle -for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, or Almeida, influenced him still: -he had indeed more confidence in the Portugueze troops, but the other -reasons existed in their full strength: adhering to his long concerted -plans, which were laid for sure though slow success, he determined upon -committing nothing to the mere fortune of war; Trant therefore returned -to Sardam, to act as ♦THE ALLIES WITHDRAW FROM BUSACO.♦ opportunity -might offer, and Lord Wellington during the night withdrew his army -from Busaco. General Hill recrossed the Mondego, retiring toward -Santarem by way of Thomar, and Lord Wellington marched on Coimbra, -leaving Craufurd with a few piquets on the Serra, where he performed -the humane office of providing for the wounded French, who had been -abandoned by their countrymen, for want of means to remove them. - -♦TRANT RETREATS TO THE VOUGA.♦ - -On the evening of the 28th the enemy’s cavalry entered Boyalva, -driving in a piquet of the Light Dragoons. It is an open village, on -the western slope of the hill, where there is no defile, and where -the ground is not broken. Trant was then at Sardam, where, during the -following day and night, he occupied one half the united villages, -the enemy’s cavalry occupying the other. As he could no longer be of -service here, and was aware that he should be attacked in the course of -the day if he remained longer, early on the 30th he resolved to retire -behind the Vouga. La Croix, who, with a column of horse, was scouring -the country upon the right flank of the invading army, fell in with -his outposts, attacked them, and drove them in with the loss of one -officer and five-and-twenty men[22]. The infantry, by good fortune, -had effected their passage; they formed in defence of the bridge, and -La Croix having no infantry, did not attempt to force it. The Vouga -was at this time fordable, and therefore Trant marched in the night to -Oliveira, on the Porto road, from whence, if it should be necessary, he -could in one day reach the Douro, and cross it for the defence of that -city. There were then no other troops to defend it, and if the enemy -had pursued, Porto might have been a second time in their power. That -this was not done is not surprising, because it did not consist with -the scheme of Massena’s operations; but that the French should have -neglected so fair an opportunity of dispersing Trant’s force, which -if not dispersed might be expected presently to harass their rear, -must be accounted among those errors with which the whole course of -human events is marked, and in which the religious mind perceives the -superintendence of a higher power than man. - -♦THE ALLIES CROSS THE MONDEGO.♦ - -The allies being on the shorter line to Coimbra, were sufficiently in -advance of the enemy for all their movements to be conducted with the -same coolness and order which had characterized the whole retreat. On -the 30th the infantry crossed from Coimbra into the great Lisbon road. -The rear-guard of cavalry bivouacked in front of Fornos, and remained -bridled up all night, in a very dangerous situation, the enemy having -pushed a strong force close to ♦OCT. 1.♦ them. In the morning they were -driven in some confusion through Fornos by a large body of horse and -foot: they formed on the great plain of Coimbra, and the French seeing -the three brigades of cavalry with six guns of the horse artillery -ready to receive them, did not venture to leave the inclosures. Before -noon the rear-guard received orders to retire, and crossed the Mondego -accordingly at the fords near S. Martinho do Bispo. The enemy pushed -on their horse, came up just as the passage had been effected, and -attempted to cross, as if in pursuit: they were charged, and driven -back by a squadron of the 16th, after which they dismounted, and fired -with their carbines ineffectually across the river. The passage might -have been defended with good prospect of success, but this was not -consistent with Lord Wellington’s plans, which were to draw the French -to a point where they should be at the greatest distance from their -resources, and where his own would be at hand. - -♦1810. OCTOBER. - -FLIGHT OF THE INHABITANTS FROM COIMBRA.♦ - -When it was known in Coimbra that the enemy were approaching, and the -retreat of the British made it evident that the city would be at their -mercy, a cry soon arose that the French had actually entered, and the -whole of the inhabitants who had not yet provided for their safety ran -shrieking toward the bridge. On all other sides they were cut off from -flight. The bridge, which is long and narrow, was presently choked -by the crowd of fugitives; and multitudes in the hurry of their fear -rushed into the Mondego, and made their way through the water, which -was in many parts three or four feet deep. The gateway, which was the -city prison, is near the bridge, and the screams of the prisoners, who -beheld this scene of terror from their grates, and expected something -far more dreadful from the cruelty of the French than they had reason -to apprehend from the laws of their own country, were heard amid all -the uproar and confusion. Lord Wellington heard them, and in compassion -sent his aide-de-camp, Lord March, to set them at liberty. - -♦THE FRENCH ENTER COIMBRA.♦ - -Massena expected to find great resources in Coimbra, a large and -flourishing city situated in the finest part of a beautiful and -fertile country. He found it utterly deserted, like every place which -the French had hitherto entered on their march. With the intent of -securing the stores, he forbade all pillage, and gave orders that -only the brigade which was to be left in garrison there should enter. -In defiance of these orders Junot commanded his men to make their -way in, and break open the houses, as the owners had thought proper -to abandon them. Such directions were eagerly obeyed; the men forced -the guard, which, in pursuance of Massena’s instructions, had been -stationed at the gate of S. Sophia; the other troops immediately joined -them in their occupation, and Massena neither attempted to enforce his -own orders, nor manifested any displeasure during the scene of wanton -waste and havoc which ensued. The magazines of the allied army had been -removed, and Montbrun, who was dispatched to Figueira for the chance -of overtaking them there, arrived too late: but provision enough, it -is said, was found in Coimbra to have served the enemy for a month’s -consumption, if proper measures had been adopted for its preservation. -The people who so unanimously forsook their homes had had neither time -nor means for removing their property. So long as it was uncertain -in which direction the invaders would move, and while a possibility -remained that they might be successfully resisted upon the way, the -people of Coimbra had lived in hope that this dire necessity might be -averted; and when it came upon them, so many cars were required for the -sick and wounded, and other services of the enemy, that few or none -were left for them. - -♦THE PORTUGUEZE PEOPLE FLY BEFORE THE ENEMY.♦ - -It is the custom throughout the south of India, that when a hostile -army approaches, the natives bury their treasure, forsake their -houses, take with them as much food as they can carry, and seek the -protection of some strong place, or conceal themselves among the woods -and mountains. People in these deplorable circumstances are called the -Wulsa of the district. The Wulsa has never been known to depart on -the approach of a British force, if unaccompanied by Indian allies. -This, however, is no peculiar honour of the British name; it belongs -rather to the European character, for no such spectacle had ever been -exhibited in European warfare till the present campaign. The orders of -the Regency and of the commander-in-chief might have been issued in -vain, if the Portugueze people had not from cruel experience felt the -necessity of this measure for their individual safety. The alternative -was dreadful, and yet better than that of remaining at the mercy of -such invaders. It was a miserable sight to see them accompanying the -columns of the retreating army, well-ordered as the movements of -that army were, and resolutely, as on the few occasions which were -offered, it met and checked the pursuers. All ranks and conditions were -confounded in the general calamity: families accustomed to the comforts -of a delightful climate and fruitful country followed the troops on -foot; there was no security for age, or sex, or childhood, but in -flight[23]. Every thing was left behind them except what the women -could carry; for even in this extremity the men very generally observed -the national prejudice, which deems it disgraceful for man to bear a -burthen. - -♦HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE FRENCH.♦ - -Boastful as the French commander was, and confident in his own fortune, -and in the hitherto unchecked prosperity of the Emperor Napoleon, the -battle of Busaco made him apprehend that the enterprise in which he had -engaged was not so easy as he had imagined, nor so free from all risk -of disasters. There were not fewer than 5000 sick and wounded whom it -was necessary to leave at Coimbra; as many more had been left at Busaco -dead on the field, or abandoned there because their condition was -hopeless, or for want of means to remove them. But a loss of 10,000 men -upon his march, without any commensurate diminution of the allies, had -not been allowed for in his calculations; and he found himself unable -to leave a guard of sufficient strength at Coimbra, without weakening -his army too much. He thought therefore that the surest course by which -he could secure his sick and wounded was to pursue the English with all -his force, and drive them out of the country, for he still persuaded -himself that they were flying to their ships. This opinion he expressed -in dispatches which were intercepted. The other generals partook the -same delusion; they no longer despised the British troops, but they had -not yet been taught to respect the councils of the British government, -and the nature of its policy they could neither believe nor comprehend; -for it appeared to them incredible that any government should act upon -principles of integrity and honour. They supposed that Lord Wellington -would embark as soon as he reached Lisbon, and that it was his -intention to carry off as many of the Portugueze youth as he could get -on board, by way of securing some compensation for the expenses of the -war! - -♦CONFUSION AT CONDEIXA.♦ - -With these expectations they followed the retreating army, not with the -ardour of pursuit, but ready to avail themselves of any opportunity -that might present itself, and cautious how they offered any to an -enemy whom they no longer affected to despise. The single occasion -which occurred in their favour they were not near enough to seize. It -was at Condeixa (the Conimbrica of the Romans); the town is built on -the ridge of the hill, and the road passes through it along a narrow -street; the people of the vicinity crowded in simultaneously with -the troops, and the inhabitants at the same time hurried to join in -a retreat which they had delayed till the last minute. They were in -great alarm, the way was blocked up by some of the country carts, and -had it not been for the good discipline which the troops observed in -this scene of confusion, and the exertions of the officers, the enemy -might have obtained no inconsiderable advantage. But they were not near -enough to profit by the favourable opportunity: order was restored -in time; and this was the only moment of serious danger during the -whole retreat. Massena pushed forward to this town, without halting at -Coimbra; but he found it necessary to remain here three days, for the -purpose of resting his troops and collecting such provisions as the -inhabitants had not been able to remove, and the retreating army had -left untouched. As the enemy advanced, the allies retired a march or -two before them; the infantry proceeded with as little molestation as -if they had been marching through a country which was in peace; the -cavalry covered the retreat, and no stragglers were to be seen. - -♦LEIRIA FORSAKEN.♦ - -Some skirmishing took place near Pombal, with trifling loss on the -part of the allies, and more on that of the enemy. Ney and Junot -took this line of march, while Regnier advanced ♦OCT. 5.♦ upon the -road to Thomar. Leiria was forsaken by its whole population: a city -thus deserted offered such temptation, that discipline could not be -maintained in the retreating army without some examples of severity, -and one British and one native soldier were punished with death for -breaking into a chapel and plundering it. Here the allied army divided, -one part taking the road to Alcobaça, the other to Rio Mayor. ♦ALCOBAÇA -FORSAKEN BY THE MONKS.♦ The monks of Alcobaça performed on this -occasion toward the British officers their last act of hospitality. -Most of them had already departed from the magnificent and ancient -abode, where the greater part of their lives had been spent peacefully -and inoffensively, to seek an asylum where they could; the few who -remained prepared dinner for their guests in the great hall and in -the apartments reserved for strangers, after which they brought them -the keys, and desired them to take whatever they liked, ... for they -expected that every thing would be destroyed by the French. Means were -afforded them, through General Mackinnon’s kindness, for saving some -things which they could not otherwise have removed; and then the most -venerable edifice in Portugal for its antiquity, its history, its -literary treasures, and the tombs which it contained, was abandoned to -an invader who delighted in defiling whatever was held sacred, and in -destroying whatever a generous enemy, from the impulse of feeling and -the sense of honour, would carefully have preserved. - -♦SURPRISE AT ALCOENTRE.♦ - -The rains now commenced, and set in with their accustomed severity in -that country. By this time the infantry had reached their positions; -but the cavalry who covered the rear were exposed to the whole severity -of the weather, bivouacking every night, because the enemy were so -close that it would have been imprudent for them to occupy a village. -Sir Stapleton Cotton, however, having reached the little town of -Alcoentre, took up his quarters there; the French, expecting that in -this heavy and incessant rain the English would apprehend no enterprise -on their part, took advantage of the weather, and endeavoured to -surprise him there; his piquets were driven in; and almost as soon as -the alarm could be given, they were in the town, and in possession of -six guns. A squadron from the 16th came down in time, charged them -in the street, recovered the guns, and drove them to the other end -of the town. Some severe skirmishing occurred on the following day, -in which the 3d regiment of French hussars behaved most gallantly. -At daybreak on the 10th the enemy had lost sight of the allies, and -when they reached Moinho do Cubo, where the roads to Alenquer and -Lisbon divide, they knew not which course to take. Two peasants were -brought in by their detachments, and were asked which way the English -had retreated, and where their lines were, ... for by this time -Massena had found cause to doubt whether a general who retreated so -deliberately had no other intention than to embark and fly as soon as -he reached Lisbon. The men answered that they could give no information -on either point, because they knew nothing; military punishment was -immediately inflicted upon them, to extort what they were determined -not to disclose, and they both endured it till they fainted, thus -giving the French another proof of national resolution, and of the -feeling of the Portugueze towards them. Being thus disappointed of the -intelligence which they expected, the French vanguard, which consisted -of 10,000 men, divided. The division which took the Alenquer road came -in sight of a column of the allies on ♦THE FRENCH DISCOVER THE LINES OF -THE ALLIES.♦ the heights beyond that town; on the following day this -column retreated in good order to Sobral, and was driven out of it: the -French were pursuing their advantage when a peasant fell into their -hands, who, unlike his countrymen, answered without hesitation all the -interrogatories which were put to him; he told the commander that they -were close upon the British lines, and pointed out to him where the -batteries were, in constructing which he had himself laboured. Had it -not been for his warning, this ♦INVESTIGADOR PORTUGUEZ, T. VI. 64.♦ -body of the enemy would presently have been in a situation from which -it could hardly have escaped. They halted instantly, and fell back; -Massena was informed of the discovery which had been made; and three -days elapsed before the invaders again approached the works of the -allies so nearly. - -♦FEELINGS OF THE ARMY.♦ - -The army had commenced their retrograde movement from the frontiers -with an impression that the cause wherein they were engaged had become -hopeless, and that when they reached Lisbon they should be embarked, -and abandon Portugal. This opinion had been altered by the course of -events during the retreat, and by the manner in which that retreat had -been conducted. There had been no alarm, no confusion, no precipitance -upon the march. Nothing could have been conducted with greater ease to -the troops; not a straggler had been taken, not a gun abandoned, not -an article of baggage lost; the infantry had never even been seen by -the enemy, except at Busaco, where they gave them battle, and signally -defeated them: and the cavalry had taken on the way more prisoners from -the enemy than the allies lost, a circumstance which probably never -occurred in any former retreat. The troops, therefore, became confident -that their commander had no thought of abandoning the contest; and that -an embarkation was not his object, but that he was acting upon some -settled plan, which he was well able to carry to the end. But when they -entered the lines which they were to occupy, their surprise was hardly -less than that of Massena and his army, at the foresight which they -there saw displayed, and the skill with which a strong position had -been rendered impregnable. - -♦THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.♦ - -At the close of the last century Sir Charles Stuart had perceived -that, if the French should ever seriously attempt the conquest of -Portugal, here was the vantage ground of defence; and Lord Wellington, -in his campaign against Junot, had observed this part of the country -at leisure, and came to the same conclusion. Portugal, he said in -the House of Commons, could be defended, but not on the frontier; -the defence must be on the strong ground about Lisbon; and that -consideration, he added, was in his mind when the Convention of Cintra -was made. As soon, therefore, as the impossibility of co-operating with -the Spaniards to any good effect had been fully proved, and it became -apparent that the decisive struggle must be made in Portugal, upon this -ground he resolved to make it. Early in the year it was stated in the -English newspapers that men were employed in fortifying this position, -but no mention of it had subsequently appeared, and it is truly -remarkable that works of such magnitude and importance should have -been commenced and perfected without exciting the slightest attention -during their progress. They extended from Alhandra on the Tagus to the -mouth of the little river Sizandro: the direct line across the country -between these points is about six-and-twenty miles; the line of defence -was about forty. All roads which could have afforded any advantage to -the enemy were destroyed, and others opened by which the allies might -effect their communications with most facility. In some places, streams -were dammed and inundations formed; in others the sides of the ravines -and hills were scarped perpendicularly; intrenchments were thrown up -wherever they could be serviceable; every approach was commanded by -cannon, placed in posts which had been rendered inaccessible; and -at all the most important points redoubts were erected capable of -resisting even if the enemy should establish themselves in their rear, -and well provided with stores and ammunition for defence. - -These works, the most celebrated of their kind, were constructed -under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, of the engineers, -assisted by Captain Chapman. Lieutenant-General Hill commanded on the -right, having his head-quarters at Alhandra; ... the great approach to -Lisbon is on this side, but the ground is strong; no means had been -neglected for strengthening it, and gun-boats from the Tagus could -assist in the defence. That river covered the right, the left was -closed by the heights above Sobral, and communicated there with the -corps of the centre. Major-General Picton commanded on the left; his -head-quarters were at Torres Vedras, a town which, being better known -than any other included within the works, became for ever memorable -in military history, by giving name to these formidable lines. The -weakest part of the whole position was between Torres Vedras and the -sea; but the artificial defences were proportionately strong, ... and -where it would otherwise have been most accessible, it was rendered -most secure by inundations extending some six miles along the Sizandro -to the sea. The centre extended from the heights of Sobral de Monte -Agraço to Torres Vedras: in the former little town Marshal Beresford -had his head-quarters; Lord Wellington’s were about two leagues from -the latter, at the Quinta de Pero Negro, near Enxara dos Cavalleiros. -The heights above Sobral formed the principal point of defence on -this part of the line; and the villages of Ordasqueyra and Runa, -which are upon the road between Sobral and Torres Vedras, were also -strongly fortified, because they commanded the only pass to the latter -town within Monte Junto. That mountain, which runs due north from -Runa for some fourteen miles, contributed mainly to the strength of -the position. It prevented all military communication between Sobral -and Torres Vedras, except by the line which the allies occupied in -strength. Lord Wellington might be attacked either from the east by -Sobral, or by Torres Vedras from the west; but he could bring his -troops from the one point to the other in a few hours, along a safe and -easy communication; whereas for the enemy to have communicated between -the same points would have required at least two days, for they must -have rounded the Serra at its northern point. - -In the rear of this line, and nearly parallel to it, at a distance -of from six to eight miles, was a second fortified position, -extending from behind Alverca to Bucellas, thence along the Serras to -Montachique, by the park wall of Mafra to Gradil, and so along the -heights to the mouth of a little stream called S. Lorenzo. Strong works -covered the communication between these lines. And lest, contrary to -all probabilities and human foresight, a position so fortified and -occupied should be found untenable against the invaders, works were -constructed at the mouth of the Tagus, at St. Julian’s, which would -have secured the embarkation of the troops. The heights at Almada, on -the south of the Tagus, which command Lisbon and its anchorage, were -also fortified, in case Mortier should carry into effect a co-operation -on the side of Alentejo, which it was not doubted was part of the -French ♦WORKS AT ALMEIDA.♦ plan. Ten thousand men, consisting in part -of marines, were destined to serve in this quarter. The redoubts in the -position were manned by Portugueze militia, who, with a certain number -of regular troops, were quite equal to the duties which might be there -required. The troops of the line, British and Portugueze, were thus -disposable to act in moveable columns, and oppose the enemy wherever -they might attempt to penetrate. The allies were joined here by Romana -with 6000 Spaniards, from Extremadura; here they might be efficiently -employed, but in that quarter they could be of little service. ♦ROMANA -JOINS THE ALLIES AT LISBON.♦ Badajoz, which Romana had secured at -the critical time, had now by his exertions been well provided and -garrisoned, ... and this junction had been arranged as soon as it -became certain that the decisive stand must be made in the lines of -Torres Vedras. - -The French had suffered severely from the weather during the latter -days of their march, so that both horses and men were greatly exhausted -when they arrived at the point where their advance was stopped. It was -no easy task to reconnoitre these lines, many of the most important -points being concealed behind the hills; but Massena, after a careful -inspection, saw enough to convince him, that if he attacked them a -repulse might be expected, more fatal in its results than that which -he had received at Busaco. And his hopes were not raised by the -intelligence which now reached him of the consequences which that -defeat had drawn after it. It was then perceived how great an error -had been committed in not pursuing Colonel Trant beyond the Vouga, and -dispersing the Portugueze militia under his command. - -♦COLONEL TRANT SURPRISES THE FRENCH IN COIMBRA.♦ - -That officer, who well understood the weakness both of his forces and -of his position, ... for the Vouga was at that time fordable, ... had -retreated by a night march to Oliveira, not without apprehension that -the enemy would send a detachment against Porto, where they would have -found no other troops to defend it than the small and ill disciplined -body which he could have carried thither. When he had ascertained that -this was not their purpose, but that the whole army was advancing in -pursuit of Lord Wellington, and had left their wounded in Coimbra, -he lost no time, but immediately concerted means for surprising -them in that city. The Army of the North, as it was called, under -Lieutenant-General Bacellar, consisted of three divisions of militia, -... that of Tras os Montes, under Silveira, that of the Minho, under -Brigadier-General Miller, and that of Porto, under Trant. It had -also two regiments of Portugueze cavalry and three brigades of field -artillery, ... this constituted its whole force. When Trant was sent -round by Porto to Sardam, the other divisions were disposed so as to -close upon the enemy’s rear; and the advanced guard, under Colonel -John Wilson, followed them through Vizeu, and along the lower falls -of the Caramula, intercepting their communications and taking their -stragglers. This body was near enough to see from a distance the action -at Busaco; and when Massena, withdrawing from thence, concentrated -his army at Mortagoa, Colonel Wilson fell in with a detachment of his -rear-guard, and in an affair of nearly equal numbers captured thirty -mounted dragoons, and several infantry. As he proceeded he found -the villages laid waste, and filled with the enemy’s dead and dying; -and many of their wounded, falling into his hands, were committed to -the surgeon’s care, and saved from the death to which the invading -army in its haste had abandoned them. With this officer, and with -Brigadier-General Miller, Trant intended to combine his movements; and -having written to them, advanced from Oliveira to Mealhada, expecting -to join them there, ... but the country through which they came had -been completely wasted, so that the want of supplies, and the exhausted -state of the horses, rendered it impossible for them to advance so -rapidly as he had hoped. Delay would give the enemy leisure to prepare -for defence, whereas it was probable that at this time they had no -apprehension of an attack, and were ignorant that any troops were so -near them: Mealhada is scarcely twelve miles from Coimbra, and by a -rapid movement Trant thought he might be able with his own division -to effect what, if time were lost and the French on their guard, the -united bodies might find it difficult to accomplish. He determined, -therefore, to proceed. At a little distance from Os Fornos he fell in -with an enemy’s detachment, pushed on his cavalry so as to cut them -off from Coimbra, and made them all prisoners, except a few who fell -before the others surrendered. Then he ordered his horse to advance at -a gallop along the principal road, cross the bridge over the Mondego, -and take post on the Lisbon road, thus cutting off the communication -between Massena’s army and the garrison. While the cavalry were -crossing, an irregular fire was kept up upon them from St. Clara’s, a -nunnery on the south of the river which the enemy occupied: as soon -as the passage was effected, the French here proposed to capitulate; -but Trant would hear of no capitulation, ... they must surrender at -discretion, he said, and he would exert all his means to protect them -from the people. The infantry meantime entered the city; and after a -contest which continued about an hour, the French were made prisoners. -Six or seven hundred convalescents thought themselves strong enough to -defend the convent in which they were quartered, imprudently therefore -they refused to surrender: the building was presently stormed, and most -of them fell victims to Portugueze vengeance. - -♦HE ESCORTS HIS PRISONERS TO PORTO.♦ - -Colonel Trant found more difficulty in protecting the French than -in taking them prisoners. The militia and armed peasantry under his -command were exasperated almost to madness by the conduct of an enemy -whose route from Pinhel might be traced by the smoke of burning -villages. Coimbra itself presented a spectacle sufficient to excite -the bitterest feelings of indignation. The French had ransacked every -house, and church, and public building; they had for pure wantonness -set fire to some of the houses, and they had heaped up promiscuously -in the streets all the provisions which the army could not carry -with it. Enough had been found in shops, and private houses, and in -the convents of that populous and flourishing city, to have supplied -the army for no inconsiderable time, if it had been collected in -magazines: but Massena relied upon having the resources of Lisbon at -his disposal; and the commissary-general, whom he had left as governor -in Coimbra, however well he understood the importance of preserving the -stores which had here fallen into his hands, was unable to restrain -a soldiery, who from the commencement of the war had been permitted -to indulge in licenses of every kind. About 800 of Trant’s men were -natives of Coimbra or its district; not a few of the inhabitants, upon -the recovery of the city, appeared from their hiding-places: the enemy -had been surprised and taken in the very act of havoc; and nothing but -the greatest exertions on the part of Trant, and the respect with which -he was regarded, could have saved the prisoners from the vengeance of -those who, in addition to their strong national feeling, were under the -sense of private and present injuries, and those of the deepest kind. -For though the greater part of the population had taken flight, in so -populous a city there had been many for whom flight was impossible, ... -age and sickness had detained some: others were bound by duty to the -sick and aged; and others again, under the fear of casting themselves -upon the world as wanderers, and the hope that by remaining with their -property they might preserve a part at least, had waited for the evil -under their own roofs, or hesitated whither to fly, till it had been -too late; and these unhappy persons had found no protection from the -established laws of war, or the common usages of humanity. Under these -circumstances there was no other means of preserving the prisoners -but by marching them to Porto. Brigadier Miller and Colonel Wilson, -who had formed a junction on the day that Trant’s dispatches reached -them, having pushed on with all speed to support him in his attempt, -arrived at Coimbra a few hours after him. Leaving them therefore in the -city with part of his brigade, with the other he convoyed 4000 of the -French, going himself to protect them, as well knowing that, unless he -were present, they would never reach Porto alive, ... for his men had -been raised in that country, which was the scene of Soult’s cruelties, -and some of them were from that village of Arrifana, where horrors had -been perpetrated of which ♦SEE VOL. III. P. 269.♦ the military murders -committed under General Thomieres’ orders were the least part. - -♦DIFFICULTIES OF MASSENA’S SITUATION.♦ - -Above 150 officers and 5000 men were made prisoners by this well-timed -enterprise; 3500 muskets were taken, nearly the whole of which were -charged; and hence the number of effective men may be estimated. -A great number of kine and sheep were found, which the enemy had -collected; had they crossed the Vouga they might have carried off from -2000 to 3000 head of cattle in one or two days’ sweep of the country -between that river and the Douro. In the commissariat, as well as -in the hospital department, Massena suffered a loss here which was -severely felt; the capture of his wounded under such circumstances -was not more mortifying to him than the disappointment was painful -of those hopes which he had founded upon the possession of Coimbra. -Instead of having a garrison in that important quarter, occupied in -collecting for him the resources of a fertile country, and facilitating -his intercourse with Spain, his communications were now impeded; he -was cut off from Beira and the northern provinces; the Portugueze, -encouraged by success, were acting in his rear, and in front there was -a formidable force in a position, which he soon perceived it would be -hopeless to attack. He had no other means of subsistence for his army -than what might be procured by force, and any reinforcement must be -strong enough to fight its way from the very frontier of France, for a -small party could nowhere pass in safety. But the sea was open to the -allies; ... every day witnessed the arrival of supplies and stores in -the Tagus, and it was reasonably to be expected that Lord Wellington -would soon receive reinforcements enough for enabling him to act upon -the offensive. Massena felt now the difficulties of the situation in -which his own confidence and that of Buonaparte had placed him. But -he manifested no sense of weakness; and having well reconnoitred the -right of the lines, he placed his three corps separately in bivouac in -front of it, and determined, but with due caution, to make at least a -trial of that fortune which had never failed him till he was opposed to -British enemies. - -♦HIS DEMONSTRATIONS IN FRONT OF THE LINES.♦ - -There was a redoubt in an important point of the position, at the foot -of the heights above Sobral; opposite to this, at a little distance, -the French established one, and Massena having strictly observed the -ground, gave orders for attacking the British redoubt, and took his -station on a hill to see the issue of this his first ♦EARLY CAMPAIGNS, -191.♦ operation. The Honourable Colonel Cadogan of the 73d commanded -there, and not only were the enemy repulsed, but their own redoubt was -attacked, carried, and maintained. Convinced by the trial how little -was to be hoped from any bolder measures, Massena ventured no farther. -To cover his own plans, he still however maintained his position, -and made such demonstrations, that the allies were daily under arms -before daylight, with their general-in-chief ready to direct their -operations, expecting and hoping that a general attack might be made, -and in full assurance that it could only end in the defeat ♦COLONEL -JONES’S ACCOUNT, I. 308.♦ and destruction of the enemy. But the French -commander was not now so confident in his own troops, nor so ignorant -of those to whom he was opposed, as to incur the danger of a defeat -which must have been irreparable. The demonstration was made for the -purpose of covering certain movements in his rear, and after a week of -anxious and eager hope, the allies were convinced that no attempt would -be made to force their inexpugnable position. - -♦MONTBRUN SENT AGAINST ABRANTES.♦ - -Having consulted with Marshal Ney, Regnier, Junot, and Montbrun, -Massena determined upon sending to Buonaparte to request -reinforcements, and taking a position in the interior of Portugal -till they should arrive. As a preparatory measure, Montbrun was -sent with the advanced guard, and with Loison’s division to occupy -Abrantes. Meantime he established his head-quarters at Alenquer, -those of Regnier’s corps were at Villa Franca, of Junot’s opposite -to Sobral, and of Ney’s in front of Torres Vedras. Montbrun was -detained two days at Santarem by an inundation of the Tagus, which -covered the Campos de Golegam; as soon as the waters had retired, he -advanced to Barquinha; that place, like Santarem, was deserted, but -the inhabitants, relying too much upon protection from Abrantes, and -from the river, had collected large magazines there, which they had now -no time for removing. When he reached the Zezere, thinking to cross -at Punhete, he found that the bridge of boats had been destroyed, and -that a detachment from the garrison of Abrantes was entrenched in the -town, which stands on the left bank. The Zezere is at all times a -rapid and formidable stream; at that season it was nowhere fordable; -the banks are high and difficult, and after consulting with the other -generals, Montbrun determined to set the town on fire, that, under -cover of the conflagration, he might throw a bridge across, and effect -his passage: this resolution was taken at night; in the morning it was -found that the allies had withdrawn; the river was then bridged without -opposition, and the enemy advanced upon Abrantes. But that city was -well provided against any sudden attack; and the French, perceiving -that nothing was to be done there, retired to Punhete, and Barquinha, -and Golegam. Montbrun’s next orders were to take possession of Torres -Novas and Thomar. Colonel Wilson had been instructed to proceed with -his corps of militia towards these towns, for the purpose of confining -the enemy’s detachments on that side; but he, and Trant, and Miller, -were charged always to keep in view the necessity of preserving their -communication with the Lower Douro. Wilson, after the recapture of -Coimbra, had followed the enemy through Leiria, and afterwards occupied -the road from Ponte de Murcella to Thomar. But this town had been taken -possession of by Montbrun, and there and at Torres Novas stores were -found which relieved for a while the distress of the invaders, who -depended for their subsistence entirely upon what they could find. - -♦THE FRENCH ARMY SUBSISTS BY PLUNDER.♦ - -It was because Massena was too strong in numbers to be beaten without -a greater expense of lives than Lord Wellington could then afford, -that the British commander trusted to famine, and to that worrying -system of national warfare which no army can withstand. Famine would -soon and surely have compelled the invaders to retreat if the orders -of the Regency had been duly observed, and the country completely -cleared of all stores before the enemy approached. But the local -magistrates had not taken effectual measures for enforcing these -orders; while the danger was at a distance, they had continued to -hope it might be averted, or at least that it would not reach their -particular districts; and in very many places the farmers had secreted -their stores, that they might not be constrained to sell them to the -commissioners at a low price and at long credit. The precautionary -measures of the government were so far carried into effect, that the -enemy were severely distressed, and finally found it necessary to -abandon their enterprise; but they were able to subsist some months -upon what they found, for nothing escaped their search. The French -soldiers had been so long accustomed to plunder, that they proceeded -in their researches for booty of every kind upon a regular system. -They were provided with tools for the work of pillage, and every piece -of furniture in which places of concealment could be constructed they -broke open from behind, so that no valuables could be hidden from -them by any contrivance of that kind. Having satisfied themselves -that nothing was secreted above ground, they proceeded to examine -whether there was any new masonry, or if any part of the cellar or -ground-floor had been disturbed: if it appeared uneven, they dug there: -where there was no such indication, they poured water, and if it were -absorbed in one place faster than another, there they broke the earth. -There were men who at the first glance could pronounce whether any -thing had been buried beneath the soil, and when they probed with an -iron rod, or, in default of it, with sword or bayonet, it was found -that they were seldom mistaken in their judgement. The habit of living -by prey called forth, as in beasts, a faculty of discovering it: there -was one soldier whose scent became so acute, that if he approached the -place where wine had been concealed, he would go unerringly to the spot. - -♦DESERTERS FORM THEMSELVES INTO A CORPS OF PLUNDERERS.♦ - -But before supplies could be brought in by this marauding system, the -distress which was felt in the invading army occasioned a considerable -desertion. The more desperate deserters, instead of going over to -the British lines, collected in strong parties in the country about -Alcobaça, Nazaré, and As Caldas da Rainha, and at length formed -themselves into a regular army of robbers, calling themselves the -11th corps, under their officers and general. When they fell in with -a detachment of their countrymen, they compelled them to join with -them, and in a short time their numbers amounted to more than 1600. -The annoyance became at length more serious to Massena than to the -Portugueze; he sent two strong detachments against them, and it was -not till after an obstinate action that they surrendered to a superior -force, ... their leaders were then shot, and the men returned to a -course of duty which differed very little from their predatory life. - -♦STATE OF LISBON.♦ - -There was necessarily great distress meantime at Lisbon, because so -many families had taken refuge there in a state of destitution; but -that distress was alleviated by the care of the government, and by a -religion in which alms-giving ranks high in the scale of religious -works, and is enjoined as a regular compensation for sin. Thousands of -these poor fugitives were hutted in the open country; many were sent -across the river, and they who came from those parts of the country -which, by the recovery of Coimbra, were delivered from the French, -returned home. Provisions were dear, but there was neither danger nor -dread of famine. That country from which the capital receives all its -garden produce was within the British lines; on the other side the -river Alentejo and Algarve were free from the enemy; and the latter -fertile province, with that part of the former which is considered -as the granary of the south of Portugal, perfectly secure from them, -unless the subjugation of the kingdom were effected. The Barbary coast -was close at hand; ships from America and England were daily arriving, -and the supply of wheat was soon fully equal to the consumption of the -army and of the increased population. - -But the opposition writers in England endeavoured to raise an -alarm, “that Lisbon, not Massena, was in danger of famine; he,” they -said, “could drive in upon our lines the population ♦OPINIONS OF THE -OPPOSITION IN ENGLAND.♦ of the surrounding country to increase our -difficulties, and to relieve his own could send his foraging parties -into an immense track of country as yet untouched. England, meantime, -must send out not merely regiment after regiment, but cargo after cargo -of grain throughout the winter; and what if the bar of the Tagus should -be locked up by adverse winds? Massena, we might be sure, with the -talents and prudence universally ascribed to him, did not act without -a confident prospect of success. It had been said in the Gazette, that -he possessed only the ground on which his army stood; this was an -_erratum_, where for Massena we ought to read Wellington. Our situation -in Portugal would become infinitely more disagreeable than his, even -if he did not, bringing his whole force to bear on one, two, or three -points, by his superior numbers thus concentrated, break the lines in -which Lord Wellington’s army was so much drawn out. He would have the -most productive part of the kingdom open to him; we should have only -Lisbon and its vicinity, with the whole Portugueze army to maintain, -as well as the British; nay, with the whole population of Lisbon, -increased by the fugitives who had taken asylum there, deprived of -their usual resources, and thrown upon us even for daily bread! What a -delicate and irksome part then would our troops have to support, if -they were to pass the winter upon those mountains, possessing no part -of Portugal but that in which they were posted, incessantly harassed -by the French in their front, with a Portugueze army double their own -number within their lines, and a starving metropolis in the rear? The -French had obviously the advantage; they could remain in their post as -long or as short a time as they pleased: they could retire and return -at their discretion. They might wait for the reinforcements which the -despot their master would draw to their aid from every quarter of -subjected Europe: they were likely to accumulate, while the British -must in the nature of things decrease. Massena was in truth master of -the game he had to play. The most disastrous thing that could happen -to us, next to positive defeat, would be the necessity of keeping our -position on these heights for the winter; and we trust,” said these -hopeful directors of public opinion, “we trust that we shall not have -to incur that calamity! Lord Wellington may reembark his troops without -much molestation; and rather than he should be driven to the necessity -of continuing in these positions for the winter, we confess, we wish -that he were re-embarked.” - -♦GENERAL LA CROIX KILLED.♦ - -The people of Lisbon had not been without some apprehension that the -British government would withdraw, rather in hopelessness than in -weakness, from the contest. The merchants, therefore, had prepared to -take flight, some for Brazil, others for England. But when they saw -with what determination the lines were manned, this apprehension was -laid aside; the fullest confidence succeeded, and all persons relied -upon the skill of Lord Wellington, the strength of his position, and -the discipline and courage of the allied armies. Such was the security -which they felt behind his impregnable lines, that parties resorted to -Alhandra for the sake of seeing them, as idlers flock from London to -behold a review. A battalion of British seamen had been formed to serve -in defending that part of the position. Land service was a jubilee to -these men; they had the town of Alhandra to themselves, the inhabitants -having forsaken it, and there those who were off guard sat in large -armed chairs of embossed leather, two centuries old, smoking and -drinking in the open streets. In reconnoitring this part of the line -from the side of Villa Franca, General La Croix was killed by a shot -from the water. Frequent skirmishes took place on the right flank and -in the rear of the French encampment; but the piquets, by one of those -agreements which mutual convenience will sometimes produce between -enemies, did not fire upon each other, and this gave occasion for some -of the old humanities of war. Some of our men even went and drank -wine with the French, till an order was issued prohibiting a sort of -intercourse which could neither with propriety nor safety be permitted. - -♦1810. NOVEMBER. - -MASSENA RETREATS FROM THE LINES.♦ - -Certain movements of the enemy seemed at this time to indicate an -intention of crossing the Tagus. Laborde was sent to garrison Santarem. -He threatened to destroy the little town of Chamusca on the Alentejo -side (noted for its sweet wine), if the boats there were not sent -over for his use: upon which the inhabitants burnt them. A detachment -advanced toward Villa Velha, in hopes of winning the bridge there, but -it had been removed in time. Abrantes secured the passage against them -at one practicable point; and Major-General Fane was sent into Alentejo -to observe the enemy at Santarem, with a sufficient force to defeat any -attempt that might be made in that quarter. Meantime Massena’s apparent -inactivity was regarded with some wonder, and made the subject of -pasquinades in his own army. Sickness and desertion were daily reducing -his numbers; his only possibility of success depended upon effecting -a plan of co-operation with Soult; but time must elapse before that -could be attempted, and without reinforcements he could not maintain -his ground in Portugal the while. For these he had applied pressingly, -and having determined where to await them, and prepared accordingly, -after remaining a month in front of the British lines, he broke up from -his bivouac on the night of the 14th of November, for the purpose of -retiring into cantonments. The allies were immediately put in motion -to follow him, but the movement was so ably conducted, on the enemy’s -part, that not above 400 prisoners were taken during the retreat. - -♦LORD WELLINGTON ADVANCES TO SANTAREM.♦ - -Lord Wellington, not knowing what might be Massena’s intention, could -not pursue him with his whole force; Picton’s division was retained -in its station, in case the enemy should move round Monte Junto for -the purpose of making an attack on that side; and Hill was sent across -the Tagus with his corps, to protect Alentejo, and communicate with -Abrantes, if that place should be attacked. With the remainder of -the army Lord Wellington followed the French, and came up with them -near Santarem, where they occupied a position strong in itself, and -rendered formidable by retrenchments and abbattis. It was where the -high road, which is in that place a raised causeway walled on either -side, crosses a wide morass, through which the Rio Mayor makes its -way to the Tagus. The approach was defended by breastworks and trees -cut down, and the causeway was commanded from a hill, close to its -termination on the Santarem side, by artillery, which would have swept -its whole length. Demonstrations for attacking them were made, rather -to ascertain whether a retreat from the country were intended, than -with any intent of assailing a position so well chosen and secured. -Had this indeed been seriously designed, the heavy rain which fell -during the night, and rendered the fords of the Rio Mayor impassable, -must have frustrated it. Perceiving that the enemy were in considerable -force there, instead of being, as had been at first supposed, only the -rear-guard, and having ascertained that Massena’s ♦BOTH ARMIES GO INTO -CANTONMENTS.♦ purpose was to canton his troops in the finest part of -that country, Lord Wellington retained only his light division in front -of Santarem, and cantoned the army at Cartaxo (where his head-quarters -were fixed), Azambuja, Alcoentre, Alenquer, and Villa Franca, from -whence they might at any time fall back within their lines, if -the enemy should receive such reinforcements as might render this -expedient. Massena’s head-quarters were first at Santarem, but he soon -removed them to Torres Novas: Regnier was left at Santarem with his -corps; Junot’s was cantoned at Pernes; Ney’s at Thomar, Torres Novas, -and Punhete; the companies of artificers at Barquinha, and a reserve -of cavalry at Ourem. In this state both armies prepared to pass the -winter, both expecting reinforcements, and each ready to take advantage -of any favourable opportunity that circumstances might present. - -“If this,” said the despondents in England, “be termed the defence -of a country, the Portugueze or any other people may well exclaim, -God preserve us from such defenders!” “The campaign,” they predicted, -“would be renewed in February, with such an accumulation of force -on the part of the enemy, as must make the protection even of Lisbon -hopeless, much less the deliverance of the Peninsula.” “They knew how -galling it must be to the pride of the nation thus to be foiled, and -thus, in expedition after expedition, to see the treasures and the -blood of their countrymen squandered in vain; but if the public would -give confidence to men of shallow intellects, ... to men who, having no -real stake in the country, submitted to execute the projects, however -extravagant, of the Junta who had so long misguided us, ... they must -bear the calamity and disgrace of constant miscarriage. It was a most -erroneous view of British policy, to conceive that we could ever, with -our limited population and commercial habits, become a military people; -and it would be just as rational for the French to strive to cope with -us by sea, as for us to enter the lists with them by land. All that -they now prayed for was, that our eyes might be at length opened to the -true policy which we ought to pursue, that of retrieving our finances, -and employing our resources upon objects truly British.” This was the -language of the opposition, and it excited now for the first time the -fears of the English public, because circumstances as melancholy as -they were unforeseen seemed to render it probable that they would soon -have it in their power to act upon the principles which they professed. - -♦THE KING’S ILLNESS.♦ - -Toward the latter end of October the Princess Amelia died, after a -protracted and painful illness, which she had endured with exemplary -meekness and resignation. Aware of what must be its termination, -she had some of her hair set in a ring, and one day when her blind -father, making his daily visit, came to her bed-side, and held out his -hand to her, she put this sad memorial upon his finger silently. Her -dissolution occurred so soon afterwards, that she never knew the fatal -consequences. The King had suffered intense anxiety during her illness, -and when he felt this last indication of his daughter’s love, feeling -at the same time but too surely all that it implied, it affected him so -strongly as to bring on the recurrence of a malady which had rendered -the appointment of a regent necessary two-and-twenty years before. -There was, however, good reason for hope, because the disease of mind -was not constitutional and hereditary; they who had the best grounds -for forming an opinion believed that its foundation was laid by extreme -anxiety and consequent insomnolence during the latter years of the -American war. The physicians confidently expected that it would prove -of short continuance, and therefore parliament having met according -to summons, adjourned for a fortnight without a dissentient voice. -At the expiration of that term a second adjournment for a similar -time was proposed, upon the same grounds, and carried against a small -minority: that time also having elapsed, a report of the privy council -was laid before parliament, containing the examination of the King’s -physicians, all of whom declared it highly ♦1810. DECEMBER.♦ probable -that he would recover. Upon this report the house adjourned for a -third fortnight, but not without warm debate and a great increase -of numbers to the minority. At the end of this third adjournment -ministers informed parliament that although a considerable degree of -progressive amendment had taken place, and the same confident hopes of -ultimate recovery were still entertained, yet the immediate state of -his Majesty’s health was not such as could warrant them to propose a -farther adjournment. It became necessary, therefore, to deliberate in -what manner a regency should be formed. - -♦PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING A REGENCY.♦ - -During the subsequent proceedings, ministers were accused in the most -vehement language of flagrant usurpation, and of grossly violating the -constitution. They were called a parcel of second-rate lawyers and -needy adventurers, who in their desperate ambition cared not for the -fate of the nation, so they could only contrive to keep their places -and retain the command of the public purse. Their proceedings, it was -said, were miserable shams and pretences, tending to inflict a mortal -stab upon the constitution of the country, and to vest the government -in an oligarchical House of Commons. Mr. Perceval would fain persuade -that house to make him governor of the country, and let him put the -crown in his pocket. Parliament, therefore, was exhorted to withdraw -from ministers as speedily as possible the power which they enjoyed, -for the day of their dismissal, it was said, would be the best day -England had ever seen. Among the evils which might be expected from -the suspension of the executive power, it was urged that no assistance -could be sent to Lord Wellington, no money drawn from the exchequer, -however indispensable a supply might be at this time. Lord Holland -dwelt upon this argument; to which Lord Liverpool replied, he was not -aware of any injury to the public service from any such delay, nor -that ministers had abstained from any acts, from which, under other -circumstances, they would not have advised his Majesty to abstain. -At whatever risk to themselves, he said, they would do that which -they deemed most conducive to the safety, honour, and interest of the -country, leaving it for the justice of parliament to consider of, and -decide upon, the grounds of their justification. This reply was not -received as it ought to have been. Lord Holland made answer, it was -highly proper that indemnity should follow statesman-like measures, -called for by necessity; but those who had assumed the functions of -the executive power could not be entitled to indemnity for measures -rendered necessary by a delay which they themselves had caused. And the -Duke of Norfolk observed in the same tone, that if no inconvenience had -resulted from the suspension of the executive power, then had ministers -in effect taken the sovereignty into their own hands. - -♦MR. PERCEVAL.♦ - -Upon this subject Mr. Perceval spoke with characteristic manliness. “We -have not,” said he, “been blind to these things. If ministers should -find it necessary to take such steps, they would be justified under the -particular circumstances of the case; but they would act under a heavy -responsibility, and parliament would be bound in duty to examine their -conduct afterwards. I am deeply convinced, that I stand in a situation -of as deep responsibility as ever a minister stood in; a double -responsibility, a responsibility to the public, and a responsibility -to the King my master. I feel this to be our situation; and parliament -must have felt it so too, in suffering the delays that have already -taken place. Gentlemen opposite may put what construction they please -upon what I am about to say; but I do contend boldly before parliament, -and before my country, that if, under these circumstances, any measure, -in any of the public departments, required the sign manual, the officer -at the head of that department would act most culpably if he did not -issue the necessary orders to his inferior upon his responsibility. -This is the view I have of the situation and of the duties of his -Majesty’s ministers; and although gentlemen on the other side have -thought proper to insinuate that our measures have been influenced by -a desire of retaining our offices, I am sure the house will not be of -opinion that our situation is particularly enviable, or one that could -by any possibility be an object of choice. We feel ... we admit ... -all the inconvenience of the present state of things; but, considering -the duration to be but short, are they in any degree equal to the -inconvenience of appointing another person to execute the functions of -the sovereign; or, in other words, of appointing a regent, unless the -necessity of the case absolutely requires it? It is not from feelings -of delicacy only that his Majesty’s ministers have acted, but from the -conviction that the preserving to his Majesty the power of exercising -his authority immediately upon his recovery, without the interruption -of a regent, would be a great national advantage. The regent, when -appointed, would of course act as he thought best for the interests -of the state; and even admitting that the plans which he would adopt -would be better than those now pursued, yet I contend, that this -change from a bad to a better system, with the probability of again -shortly recurring to the old system, would be much more injurious to -the welfare of the public, than the inconveniences which have been so -strongly urged by the gentlemen on the other side of the house. - -“The delay which has taken place has been no covert delay: it has been -perfectly open, and the reason why it was asked was fairly stated. We -have had no disguise, no subterfuge; our object was broadly and fairly -stated to parliament. Sir, I say again, that ministers feel deeply the -heavy responsibility of their situation: they know that their conduct -will necessarily be examined and scrutinized by parliament; they -know that they may have to request justice from parliament for their -conduct, at a time when those who are now censuring their conduct with -so much acrimony may possess a greater sway than they do at present. Is -such a situation, then, a desirable one? Is it an object of ambition? -Is it possible that any man, or set of men, can covet such a situation, -or wish to retain it, except from the imperious sense of the duty which -they owe to their sovereign and to their country? That duty I will -perform to the best of my humble abilities, and cheerfully submit my -conduct to the justice of parliament and of my country. - -“It has been asked, whether, if under the present circumstances the -evacuation of Portugal were deemed necessary, any order could be sent -out to Lord Wellington for that purpose? And do gentlemen really -believe that any difficulty exists upon such a subject? Do they really -believe that Lord Wellington would refuse to obey an order transmitted -to him, by his Majesty’s secretary of state, for that purpose, merely -because he had heard of the King’s indisposition? Undoubtedly they do -not: the case they have put is then an imaginary one.... Sir, in the -office which I have the honour to hold, money must be taken out of the -Exchequer for the public service; it is the bounden duty of ministers -to see that service performed; and do the honourable gentlemen opposite -think that I would hesitate to draw the money for that purpose?”... -At this a loud cry of Hear! hear! was raised from the opposition -benches.... “Sir,” pursued Mr. Perceval, “I am unable to account for -the distinction which the gentlemen opposite appear to me to make -between the two cases which I have put. When I said that ministers -would not hesitate to give orders for the evacuation of Portugal, if -it were deemed necessary, they seemed, by their silence at least, -to acquiesce in what I said; but when I spoke of applying the money -voted for the public service to the public service, they affect great -astonishment, as if the principle of the two cases was not the same. -But do they think that where money has been voted by parliament, and -ordered by parliament to be applied to a particular service, that I -would hesitate to have that public service performed, for fear of the -responsibility that would attach to me? Do they think that I would -endanger the best interests of the country, from any consideration of -personal danger to myself? Do they think that I would risk a mutiny -in the army or the navy, rather than take upon me the responsibility -of issuing their pay? No, sir, if I could be guilty of such conduct, -I should be unfit indeed for the situation which I hold! I should be -guilty of a base dereliction of my duty to my sovereign and my country!” - -♦TROOPS SENT TO PORTUGAL.♦ - -This was no empty language; and however the manly appeal might be -lost upon those persons to whom it was immediately addressed, it was -not lost upon the people of England. The ministers, with a spirit -which alone might be sufficient to atone for all their errors, and -entitle them to the lasting gratitude of these kingdoms, had ordered -off reinforcements to Lord Wellington, on their own responsibility, -at a crisis when they held their power by so precarious a tenure, -that it was not unlikely their successors’ orders for the evacuation -of Portugal might be upon the seas at the same time. For that this -was the policy which the opposition intended to pursue, if, as they -now fully expected, they were to be invested with power, ♦ISSUES OF -MONEY REQUIRED.♦ was what they themselves avowed. Issues of money also -became necessary for the army and navy: money had been appropriated -by parliament for these services; but the exchequer act requires that -the issue should be under the great seal, or under the privy seal, or -by authority of an act of parliament. Mr. Perceval thought that under -the existing circumstances it would be proper to use the privy seal: -the keeper of the privy seal was willing to take upon himself this -responsibility; but the signature of Mr. Larpent, clerk of the privy -seal, was likewise necessary, and that gentleman refused to affix it, -pleading scruples on account of his oath of office. Mr. Perceval upon -this issued an order from the Treasury to the Exchequer, deeming this -sufficient, and thinking also that it was better for the responsible -servants ♦1811. JANUARY.♦ of the crown to risk the censure, or wait -the indemnity of parliament, than to procrastinate public business, by -bringing such topics into discussion in the house from time to time. -♦JAN. 1. CONDUCT OF LORD GRENVILLE AS AUDITOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.♦ But -when these warrants were brought to Lord Grenville, in his capacity -of Auditor of the Exchequer, he returned an answer to Mr. Perceval, -requiring time “to consider the nature and extent of the duties which -this new and unexpected course of proceeding imposed upon him;” and -therefore requesting to know when it was necessary that the money -should be issued. He was informed, “that, according to the usual -course of supplying the weekly issues to the navy and army, it would -be necessary that sums should be issued for both services, beyond -the amount of the existing credit at the exchequer, either on the -morrow, or the next day at farthest; but if an actual issue could -be made within six days, no serious inconvenience was apprehended.” -Lord Grenville then desired that the opinions of the Attorney and -Solicitor General should be taken. These law officers pronounced, -that they “did not think the warrant of the Lords Commissioners of -the Treasury was in law a sufficient authority imperative upon the -Auditor, nor, consequently, a legal sanction for his proceeding to obey -the same; nor that any discretion was left to him by the law on this -occasion, for the exercise of which he would not be responsible.” The -Lords Commissioners of the Treasury transmitted this opinion to Lord -Grenville, informing him at the same time “that their sense of the -mischief to the public service, which would arise if any delay should -take place, appeared to render it indispensable that the warrants -should be forthwith complied with, and that they were consequently -ready to take upon themselves the responsibility of any act which -might be essential for that purpose.” Lord Grenville replied, that it -was matter of the deepest concern to him to be made the involuntary -cause of any, even the shortest delay, in an issue of his Majesty’s -treasury, stated to him from such high authority to be important to the -public service. “If,” said he, “I could be satisfied of the propriety -of my doing what is required, there is no personal responsibility -which I would not readily incur for the public interests; but I cannot -persuade myself, that I could obey those warrants, without a breach of -my official duty in that point, which is above all others peculiarly -obligatory on the person placed in the situation of Auditor of the -Exchequer; nor without a high and criminal violation both of a positive -statute, and also of the essential principles of our monarchical and -parliamentary constitution. - -“I am told,” he continued, “that I must act on my own discretion, for -the exercise of which I must alone be responsible. This responsibility, -if it legally attaches upon me, I certainly cannot transfer to any -other persons, and least of all to your lordships, whatever willingness -you have expressed to take it on yourselves. My attempting to do so -would itself be criminal; tending to confound the official relations in -which I have the honour to stand towards your lordships, and to annul -those checks which the law has established for ensuring the faithful -discharge of our respective duties, and thereby the security of the -public treasure. But I beg leave humbly to submit to your lordships, -that the law has in truth invested me with no discretion on this -subject. The exigencies of the public service, which your lordships -have condescended to detail to me in these your warrants, are matters -of state, of which, as Auditor of the Exchequer, I have no knowledge, -and can take no cognizance; my official duty is strictly limited to -an observance of the accustomed forms of the exchequer, and of the -laws which have from time to time been passed for its regulation. To -these I am bound to adhere; and it is on the fullest consideration -which this pressure of time has permitted me to give them, that I am -compelled to decline, but with all due respect to your lordships, a -compliance with the requisition contained in those warrants, to which -this letter refers.” His lordship concluded, by recommending that the -difficulty should be submitted to the consideration of the two houses -of parliament, with whom rested the right and duty to provide the -means of removing it, and to whose pleasure he would defer with entire -submission. - -♦JAN. 3.♦ - -Mr. Perceval immediately laid this correspondence before parliament, -saying, “that, though, if it had not been for the difficulty thus -unexpectedly started, he should not have thought it expedient to bring -the subject under their immediate notice, yet he had always anticipated -it as his duty to submit it to their consideration, not for the purpose -of obtaining a previous vote of indemnity, but, having incurred the -responsibility of action, with the view of calling on the house to -determine whether or not ministers had acted justifiably.” He now -moved a resolution, that the Lords of the Treasury should issue their -warrants for the payment of such sums as were necessary, and that the -Auditors and officers of the Exchequer should obey those warrants. -In the course of the debate he noticed the argument, that public -inconvenience was now proved to have arisen from the delay occasioned -by adjournments. “We have,” said he, “this marked, monstrous, -abominable, and aggravated case before us, ... and what is it? what -is this great public inconvenience? Why, that ministers have found it -necessary to come to parliament to authorize the issue of money, for -services for which that very money has been appointed!” - -The resolution passed without a division; but, in the Upper House, -twenty Peers, among whom were all the Royal Dukes, protested against -it; because, they said, the principle on which it was founded would -justify the assumption of all the executive power of the crown by -the two houses of parliament, during any suspension of the personal -exercise of the royal authority. This business attracted more notice -than it otherwise would have done, because, upon Lord Grenville’s -accession to the first place in the ministry after the death of Mr. -Pitt, a bill had been passed, empowering him to hold at the same time -the offices of First Lord of the Treasury and Auditor of the Exchequer; -offices which, it was argued in support of the bill, might without -inconvenience be held by the same person. The imprudence of bringing -thus to recollection a measure, which at the time had called forth -strong animadversions, did not tend to lessen the unpopularity of Lord -Grenville and the coalition with which he acted. - -♦STATE OF THE OPPOSITION.♦ - -That party fully expected their return to power. They were strong in -borough influence, while Mr. Perceval, owing to the course which he -pursued concerning the regency, lost the support of those members -of the royal family who had been most closely connected with their -father’s government. Their journalists were numerous and active, and -they depended upon the Prince’s favour. But though all the various -sects and subdivisions of opposition had united in one cry against -the king’s ministers, there were too many points of difference -between them to be easily accommodated. On the question of what is -insidiously termed catholic emancipation they were agreed; but only on -that question: the Grenvilles were at variance with all their allies -upon the subject of parliamentary reform, and the reformists were -at variance among themselves as to the nature and extent of their -purposed reformation. The war also was another ground of dissension. -One party would have sacrificed our allies, our interest, and our -honour, for the sake of obtaining vile popularity, by concluding a -nominal and deceitful peace. They saw no difficulty in accommodating -our differences with all our enemies; according to them, their country -was in the wrong upon every disputed point; we had therefore only to -concede every thing to America, and suffer Buonaparte, without farther -opposition, to govern Spain and Portugal in his own way: then we might -have illuminations for a definitive treaty, transparencies of Peace -and Plenty, and quartern loaves and pewter pots carried in jubilant -procession, in honour of the reduced prices of bread and porter. This -would have been the foreign policy of the radical reformers; that of -Lord Grenville and the despondents would have been equally ruinous; -believing it impossible that we could resist the military power -of France, and yet knowing that peace would be only a snare, they -would have carried on a timid defensive war, without the hope or the -possibility of bringing it to a glorious termination. Lord Holland, on -the contrary, would have acted with additional vigour in aid of Spain; -in this he would have been supported by Earl Moira and Mr. Sheridan, -and perhaps by the Marquis of Lansdowne and Mr. Ponsonby. - -♦THEIR EXPECTATIONS.♦ - -The hopes, however, of the opposition were raised to the highest pitch, -and their partizans scarcely even attempted to conceal their joy at -an event, which, as they fully expected, was to restore them to their -places. The disposition of the Prince was well known to be favourable -to these hopes: he had a personal regard for some of the leaders of -the party, and it was believed that many of his political opinions had -been imbibed from Mr. Fox. It was therefore probable that a change of -ministry would take place; and all the opponents of government, however -greatly they differed among themselves as to their ultimate objects, -from the regular opposition, under Lords Grey and Grenville, down to -the very dregs of the revolutionary faction, vied with each other in -exulting over a falling enemy. - -♦LANGUAGE OF THE ANARCHISTS.♦ - -Two years before the King’s illness, one of their journalists had said, -that “of all monarchs, since the revolution, the successor of George -III. would have the finest opportunity of becoming nobly popular.” -This sentence, connected as it was with the anticipation of “a crowd -of blessings that might be bestowed upon the country, in the event of -a total change of system,” had unwisely been selected for prosecution -by Sir Vicary Gibbs, and the defendants were of course acquitted. Such -language was perfectly consistent in the Foxites; but in the mouths -of the anarchists, the flattery which was now used toward the Prince -appeared not a little extraordinary. “Never,” they said, “was there so -fair an opportunity for producing a great and salutary effect, as the -Prince now had. We want a change of the whole system, a radical and a -sweeping change of it; and it is because we hope that such a change -would be the consequence of giving full powers to the Prince, that we -wish to see full powers given to him. Is not the Prince of Wales as -likely to be able to judge of political systems as his father, ... -afflicted as the latter unhappily has been in more ways than one, and -bent down with age as he now is? Is not the Prince as likely to be -able to choose proper advisers as his father was, or ever can be? Why -then should powers, of any sort, belonging to the kingly office, be -withheld from him? I know it has been said, that we are _bidding_ for -the Prince; and who can bid above us? We have to offer him _hearts_, -and _sinews_, and _lives_, if he needs them, and we ask for nothing -but our well-known rights in return. We want to strip him of nothing. -We grudge him and his family nothing that the constitution awards -them, or that they could ever wish for, in the way of splendour. All -we have to beseech of him is, that he will resolve to be the ruler of -a free people, and not the leader of a faction.” ... “His succession -to power,” we were told by another of these journalists, “with such -opportunities before him, and at so momentous a time, appeared a lot so -enviable, that it might turn philosophy itself into ambition. Hitherto -he had been seated in that domestic privacy, which he had learnt how to -value and dignify. And so wonderfully had past circumstances held back -the cause of radical reform, and so favourable for it were the present, -that Fate seemed purposely to have reserved the amiable task for his -royal highness, that with one restoring breath he might melt away the -accumulated oppressions of half a century.” - -The wishes of this party concerning the King’s resumption of authority -were sufficiently expressed. They told us, it was exposing the -government to the contempt of foreign powers, to have a person at the -head of affairs who had long been incapable of signing his name to a -document, without some one to guide his hand; a person long incapable -of receiving petitions, of even holding a levee, or discharging -the most ordinary functions of his office; and now, too, afflicted -with this mental malady! They cited cases to show how doubtful and -precarious were the appearances of recovery from mental derangement; -observed that persons having been so afflicted were easily hurried, -and inferred that a man subject to hurries was not fit to wield the -executive power. When they were charged by their opponents with thus -disclosing a determination, that if they acceded to power the King -should never resume his functions, the manner in which the charge was -repelled was such as confirmed it. “Every one,” they said, “expresses -regret that the King, or that any other human being, should be -afflicted with blindness. But old age is old age, and blindness is -blindness, in a King as well as in other men; and when blindness is -unhappily added to old age, and to both are added _mental derangement_, -is it unreasonable that people whose happiness or misery must, in a -great degree, depend upon their government, should be solicitous that -_great caution_ should be used in the resumption of the royal authority -by a person thus afflicted?”... “Throw him into a corner!” exclaimed a -ministerial writer, when he exposed with indignation the wishes of this -party; “tell him, this is the lot reserved for a king who has reigned -so long!” The reply to this was any thing rather than a confutation or -denial of the charge. “We have had nothing to do with the _lot_,” said -a mouthpiece of the anarchists; “we have had no hand in making the King -either old, or blind, or mentally deranged. The _lot_ has fallen upon -him. The first is the lot of every man, and is generally esteemed a -very fortunate lot; the second is nothing very rare, and it is by no -means an unfrequent companion of old age; and the third, and all three, -are the work of nature, and not of any of us. And as to the King’s -having reigned so long, there is neither merit nor demerit in that, -either in him or his people.” - -♦MR. PERCEVAL POPULAR AT THIS TIME.♦ - -Whether the agitators and anarchists really believed that the Prince -could be so infatuated as to countenance their plans for a radical -and sweeping change, ... or whether they held out this hope to their -dupes and disciples, in order that their certain disappointment might -engender a deadlier disaffection, is best known to themselves; but if, -abstaining from their indecent attempts to show that the King ought -never to be permitted to resume his authority, they had talked of no -other reform than that of curtailing the power of what they called -the borough-mongering faction, there never was a time when the better -part of the people would have been so well inclined to listen to their -arguments. Mr. Perceval had never stood so high in public estimation as -at this moment. When first he came into power, the tide of popularity -was in favour of him and his colleagues: because any men would have -been popular who succeeded to the administration which was then -displaced; but a series of untoward events had for a time lessened his -hold upon the country, without in any degree diminishing the general -dislike with which his opponents were regarded. The unhappy expedition -to Walcheren drew after it a cry of grief and disappointment, against -which, perhaps, he could scarcely have borne up, if Sir Francis -Burdett, by a factious dispute with the House of Commons, had not, -most unintentionally, but most effectually, drawn off the public -attention at the very moment when the decision upon the inquiry came -on. It was always asserted by his enemies, that he held his situation, -not through any weight of influence in the country, nor of talents -in parliament, but through the confidence and especial favour of the -King; and that nothing could be more unfit than that the British prime -minister should be thus dependent upon, and literally, as it were, -the servant of the crown. They who argued thus against Mr. Perceval’s -administration did not perceive how strong an argument they supplied -against that system, to which they themselves owed their only power; -certain, however, it is, that Mr. Perceval was thought a weak minister, -because he wanted that influence; and a sense of this weakness seems -sometimes to have made him assent to measures which he would gladly -have prevented, if he had held his situation by a stronger tenure. But -when the prop upon which he really had leaned, and by which it was -believed that he was entirely supported, was suddenly taken away, then -it was that he felt his own resources, and the people saw him confident -in his motives and measures, and with the strength of integrity hold -on his steady course; not to be deterred from what he knew to be his -duty, either by the clamours and threats of the faction within doors, -and the demagogues without; nor by the expressed displeasure of the -Prince, in whose power it would presently be to dismiss him from -office. Then, perhaps, for the first time, he became conscious of his -own powers, and the dignity of his nature shone forth; it was seen that -the man, whose individual character was without a spot, carried the -pure principles of his privacy into public action, and possessed the -steadiness and intrepidity of a statesman in as eminent a degree as the -milder and most endearing virtues of domestic life. Mr. Perceval never -held so high a place in public opinion as the favoured minister of the -King, in full and secure possession of power, as now, when he was only -the faithful servant of a master who was no longer sensible of his -services, and no longer capable of supporting him. - -♦SCHEMES FOR A NEW MINISTRY.♦ - -Accustomed as the various members of opposition were to coalitions, and -compromises, and concessions, it was no easy task to form a coherent -ministry out of such heterogeneous elements. At the very commencement -of the arrangements, Lords Grey and Grenville could not accord, and -the Earl left town in disgust; they found it, however, expedient to -agree, and he returned in time to give counsel when the Prince had -to answer the proposed restrictions sent to him by parliament. It is -said that the answer which these lords had advised was shown by the -Prince to Mr. Sheridan, and that Mr. Sheridan declared it would prove -of the most pernicious consequences, inasmuch as it could hardly -fail to involve the Prince in a dispute ♦1811. FEBRUARY.♦ with the -House of Commons. This opinion was followed, and the answer which -was delivered was composed according to Mr. Sheridan’s counsel. The -two leading opposition lords were offended at this, and intimated, -that as his Royal Highness had not deemed it proper to adopt their -advice, they could not be of any service to him in the intended -arrangement. The Prince upon this requested Lord Holland to form an -administration; but Lord Holland had no influence, and was utterly -unable to ensure majorities. The Prince, therefore, who now began to -feel the difficulties of government, was driven back to Lords Grey and -Grenville, and a temporary conciliation took place. The triumph of -the opposition seemed now to be complete; they thought the field was -their own, and that nothing remained but to distribute the spoils. This -distribution, however, excited claims and contentions, of which the -Prince heard more than he liked. - -♦THE KING’S OPINION DURING AN INTERVAL OF AMENDMENT.♦ - -When the time of the regency drew near, Mr. Perceval waited on the King -at Windsor, and found him well enough to converse upon public affairs, -though not sufficiently recovered to bear the weight of business. He -inquired anxiously concerning the Prince’s conduct, and expressed -great joy at finding that he had not thrown himself entirely into the -hands of a party who were directly hostile to all the measures of his -father’s government; and he desired that the Queen would write to the -Prince, to signify this approbation, and to request that he might -not be harassed on his return to society by having to ♦THE PRINCE -REGENT ANNOUNCES HIS INTENTION OF MAKING NO CHANGE. FEB. 4.♦ change -an ephemeral administration. The Prince, it is said, was well pleased -to be thus relieved from the difficulties in which he found himself -involved by jarring opinions and contending claims. He made known his -determination of making no change to the opposition; and on the day -before the regency bill passed, he officially acquainted Mr. Perceval -that it was his intention not to remove from their stations those whom -he found there as the King’s official servants. “At the same time,” -said he, “the Prince owes it to the truth and sincerity of character, -which, he trusts, will appear in every action of his life, explicitly -to declare, that the impulse of filial duty and affection to his -beloved and afflicted father leads him to dread that any act of the -Regent might, in the smallest degree, have the effect of interfering -with the progress of his Sovereign’s recovery. This consideration -alone dictates the decision now communicated to Mr. Perceval. Having -thus performed an act of indispensable duty, from a just sense of -what is due to his own consistency and honour, the Prince has only to -add, that, among the many blessings to be derived from his Majesty’s -restoration to health, and to the personal exercise of his royal -functions, it will not, in the Prince’s estimation, be the least, that -that most fortunate event will at once rescue him from a situation of -unexampled embarrassment, and put an end to a state of affairs ill -calculated, he fears, to sustain the interests of the united kingdom in -this awful and perilous crisis, and most difficult to be reconciled to -the genuine principles of the British constitution.” - -♦MR. PERCEVAL’S REPLY.♦ - -Mr. Perceval replied, that, in the expression of the Prince’s anxiety -for the speedy restoration of his father’s health, he and his -colleagues could see nothing but additional motives for their most -anxious exertions to give satisfaction to his Royal Highness, in the -only manner in which it could be given, by endeavouring to promote his -views for the security and happiness of the country. “Mr. Perceval,” -he continued, “has never failed to regret the impression of your Royal -Highness with regard to the provisions of the regency bill, which his -Majesty’s servants felt it to be their duty to recommend to parliament. -But he ventures to submit to your Royal Highness, that, whatever -difficulties the present awful crisis of the country and the world may -create in the administration of the executive government, your Royal -Highness will not find them in any degree increased by the temporary -suspension of the exercise of those branches of the royal prerogative -which has been introduced by parliament, in conformity to what was -intended on a former similar occasion; and that whatever ministers -your Royal Highness might think proper to employ, would find in that -full support and countenance, which, as long as they were honoured -with your Royal Highness’s commands, they would feel confident they -would continue to enjoy, ample and sufficient means for enabling -your Royal Highness effectually to maintain the great and important -interests of the united kingdom. And Mr. Perceval humbly trusts, that, -whatever doubts your Royal Highness may entertain with respect to the -constitutional propriety of the measures which have been adopted, -your Royal Highness will feel assured, that they could not have been -recommended by his Majesty’s servants, nor sanctioned by parliament, -but upon the sincere, though possibly erroneous, conviction, that -they in no degree trenched upon the true principles and spirit of the -constitution.” - -The opposition had made so sure of coming into power, that they let -the list of their intended arrangement get abroad; “an arrangement,” -they told us, “of one united, compact body of men, all holding -the same principles, and all animated by the same views; and an -administration,” they added, “of more internal strength, by the ties of -mutual friendship, ... of more public influence, by talents, integrity, -and stake in the country, never had been submitted to any Prince.” A -meeting of the common council was called by their city partizans, to -prepare an address of congratulation to the Regent upon the change -of men and measures which he was about to make. Their disappointment -was in proportion to their hopes; they affirmed, however, that the -Prince’s determination would be received with real satisfaction by the -friends of Lords Grey and Grenville, who must all feel that nothing -but a sense of imperious duty could have induced them to undertake the -irksome and arduous task of office in such times. “Three months,” they -said, “had already elapsed under a total suspension of the functions -of government, ... three months the most important, perhaps, that -had ever occurred in our history; another month must have been added -to the delay, if the Prince had yielded to his patriotic sentiments, -and recurred all at once to the principles upon which he thought the -administration would be most beneficially conducted. Thus much time -must have been required for the re-election of those who would have -vacated their seats, and for the re-establishment of the routine of -office; but this delay might certainly, in a moment of such emergency, -be productive of the most serious evil.” But while the Whigs thus -affected the language of resignation, the radical journalists declared, -“that a ministry formed by the two joint opposition lords would have -excluded almost all the Prince’s friends; that from those lords the -people could have expected nothing; but that they would have hoped for -something from an arrangement that should have placed Lord Holland -at the head of affairs, to the great mortification of those less -popular and less liberal leaders. It was as well to retain Perceval -and Liverpool, as to supersede them by Grey and Grenville.” Whigs and -anarchists, however, both agreed in asserting, that the Prince had -no confidence whatever in his ministers. “He signs papers,” said one -of these journalists, “receives addresses, expresses his opinions -respecting courts marshal and criminal, and has ten or a dozen people -to walk before him; but with regard to the nation, he can only wish its -prosperity, and has no more to do with its government than a keeper of -geese.” - -But the great and quiet majority of the nation regarded the Prince -Regent’s determination with grateful joy: they anticipated, from the -wisdom and feeling which dictated it, a perseverance in the true -course of policy and honour, and in that anticipation looked on to -a triumphant issue of the war, with a hope which from thenceforward -suffered no abatement. - - -END OF VOL IV. - - -G. Woodfall, Printer, Angel Court, Skinner Street, London. - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] _Non est memoriæ ... quod in castro vel civitate aliquâ tales -fuerint defensores._ Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium, Marca Hispanica, 568. - -[2] This would naturally be deemed miraculous, and the miracle was -ascribed to St. Narcissus and other saints, whose graves the French had -disturbed, and scattered their remains about. One statement is, that -the flies proceeded from St. Narcissus’s tomb. _Muscæ istæ partim erant -lividæ, partim virides, in quâdam sui parte colorem rubeum denotantes._ -(Gesta Com. Barcin. 569, ut supra.) _Ceterum, qui locorum periti sunt -quæ circum Gerundam visuntur_, says the Archbishop Pierre de Marca, _ii -testantur haud procul eâ urbe videri rupes ex quibus vulgò oriuntur -etiamnum muscæ quales e scpulchro Sancti Narcissi prodiisse fabulantur. -Quod si ita est, non ultra inquirendum est in earum originem quæ -Gallico tum exercitui insultârunt, quas manifestum est ortas esse ex -rupibus illis._ Marca Hispanica, 468. - -The flies are described differently in the _Acta Sanctorum_ (Mart. t. -ii. 624), where the miracles of St. Narcissus are given _ex hispanico -Ant. Vincentii Domenecci. Ex ipso sancti præsulis sepulchro exierunt -innumera examina muscarum, cœruleo partim, partim viridi colore -tinctarum, rubrisque striis dispunctarum; quæ virorum equorumque -subingressæ nares, non priùs deserebant occupatos, quàm spiritum -vitamque abstulissent, concidentibus humi mortuis. Tanti enim erat -veneni efficacia, ut seu virum seu equum momordissent, morsum continuò -mors sequeretur._ These authorities are given because they relate to -a curious fact in natural history, ... if there be any truth in the -story; and that there was a plague of insects can hardly be doubted. -That their bite was so deadly, and that they proceeded from the tomb, -I should have hesitated as little as the reader to disbelieve, if -some other accounts had not seemed to show that both these apparent -improbabilities may be possible. It is said that one part of Louisiana -is infested by a fly whose bite is fatal to horses. And about twenty -years ago, at Lewes, when a leaden coffin, which had been interred -about threescore years, was opened, the legs and thighbones of the -skeleton were found to be “covered with myriads of flies, of a species, -perhaps, totally unknown to the naturalist. The wings were white, -and the spectators gave it the name of the coffin-fly. The lead was -perfectly sound, and presented not the least chink or crevice for the -admission of air”: and the flies which were thus released are described -as being active and strong on the wing. - -If, however, some long lost species had reappeared from the tomb, and -multiplied so as to become a plague, it would have continued in the -country. But if Pierre de Marca was rightly informed that a fly which -corresponds in appearance to the description is still found there, it -certainly possesses none of the tremendous powers which the legend -ascribes to it. - -[3] Marshal St. Cyr has the following remark upon this carnage, after -observing that it proved useful as an example to other towns: _La -gloire de defendre ses foyers domestiques, menacés par l’étranger, est -grande, la plus grande de toutes, peut-être: mais la vertu qui y fait -prétendre, ne serait point la première des vertus, si elle pouvait -être pratiquée sans peril._ It must cost the heart something to reason -thus even in a just war. Marshal St. Cyr tells us, indeed, that _le -soldat devient naturellement cruel à la longue_: ... the more careful, -therefore, should he be not to sear his feelings and his conscience by -such reflections as this. - -[4] An instance of heroism worthy of record was displayed by Luciano -Aucio, a drummer belonging to the artillery, who was stationed to give -the alarm whenever a shell was thrown: a ball struck off his leg at the -knee; but when the women came to remove him, he cried out, “No, no; -my arms are left, and I can still beat the drum to give my comrades -warning in time for them to save themselves!” This brave lad was the -only person during the siege who recovered after an amputation of the -thigh. - -[5] Two singular cases of contusion of the brain were observed at this -time in the hospitals: one man did nothing but count with a loud and -deliberate voice from forty to seventy, always beginning at one number -and ending at the other, and this incessantly through the whole night. -Another continually uttered the most extraordinary blasphemies and -curses, exhausting the whole vocabulary of malediction, without any -apparent emotion of anger: this case did not prove fatal, but the man -was left in a state of helpless idiocy. - -[6] A man deposed that he had seen the body when it was buried hastily, -by night; the face, he said, was swollen, and the eyes forced out of -their sockets. Supposing this testimony were true, the appearance would -denote strangulation rather than poison; but that Alvarez should have -been privately murdered is altogether improbable. - -[7] Burnet says of the wars in the reign of William III. “The late king -told me that in these campaigns the Spaniards were both so ignorant and -so backward, so proud and yet so weak, that they would never own their -feebleness or their wants to him. They pretended they had stores when -they had none; and thousands when they scarce had hundreds. He had in -their councils often desired that they would give him only a true state -of their garrisons and magazines; but they always gave it false; so -that for some campaigns all was lost, merely because they deceived him -in the strength they pretended they had. At last he believed nothing -they said, but sent his own officers to examine every thing.” Vol. ii. -p. 7. - -[8] Memoria de Azanza y O’Farrell, § 193, pp. 169, 170. They plead this -in justification or excuse for themselves. - -[9] The account of Kolli’s examination had in one part been palpably -falsified. He was represented as saying that it was the Duke of Kent’s -wish to send Ferdinand to Gibraltar; but that he would not have -assisted in this plan, because it would have been in fact sending -him to prison! The whole of these documents are printed in Louis -Goldsmith’s Recueil de Decrets, Ordonnances, &c. t. iv. pp. 302–14; and -by Llorente, in his Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de la Revolution -d’Espagne, t. ii. pp. 306–342. This unworthy Spaniard expresses there a -decided opinion that Kolli himself was the person who went to Valençay, -as the official report stated. The Baron, however, has published his -own story, and it is confirmed by the declarations of Richard and -Fouché, authentically made after the restoration of the Bourbons. - -One curious fact appears in the Baron de Kolli’s Memoirs. Diamonds to -the amount of 200,000 francs were taken from him by the police when he -was seized. After the restoration he reclaimed them. The result of his -application was a royal ordonnance, in which the King decided, that -the other effects belonging to the claimant should be restored to him, -but that the diamonds seized at Paris are, and remain, confiscated, as -having been given to the Sieur de Kolli by a government then at war -with France. And his renewed applications were answered by a repetition -of this ordonnance! - -[10] Notwithstanding the facility with which, in many instances, Louis -was deluded by his brother, and the curious simplicity of character -which he exhibits, it is impossible to peruse his _Documens Historiques -et Reflexions sur le Gouvernement de la Hollande_, without feeling -great respect for him. His conduct was irreproachable, his views -benevolent even when erroneous, his intentions uniformly good; and -excellent indeed must that disposition have been, which in such trying -circumstances always preserved its natural rectitude. - -It appears by these documents that the throne of Spain was offered to -him before Joseph was thought of, and that he rejected the proposal -as at once impolitic and iniquitous. But it is curious to see how -completely he had been deceived concerning the course of events in the -Peninsula, and still more extraordinary that in the year 1820 (when his -book was published) he appears to have obtained no better information -upon that subject than was communicated in the Moniteur during his -brother’s reign. - -[11] The prejudice against mercury prevailed so strongly among the -native practitioners, that the commander-in-chief, at a time when -syphilitic diseases were thinning the ranks, found it necessary to -enforce its use in the army and in all the military hospitals. - -[12] Some days after the storm the boats of the Triumph picked up -about thirty tons of quicksilver, in leathern bags of fifty pounds -each, which were cast on shore from the wreck. They were stowed below -in the storerooms and after-hold, and the bags having been thoroughly -soaked in the sea, decayed and burst before the danger was perceived. -As much of the quicksilver as possible was collected, but it insinuated -itself every where, and not less than ten tons weight was supposed to -have got between the timbers, which could only be cleared by docking -the ship and removing a plank at the lowest part near the keel. The -provisions were spoilt; two or three hundred of the crew were so -severely affected, that it was necessary to remove them immediately, -many of them being in a state which left little chance of recovery; and -the ship was sent to Gibraltar to have all her stores taken out, and -undergo a thorough clearance. - -[13] A minute and interesting account of this escape was published at -Lausanne, 1817, with this title, _Relation du Séjour des Prisonniers de -Guerre Français et Suisses sur le Ponton la Castille, dans la Baie de -Cadix, et de leur Evasion le 15 May, 1810. Par L. Chapuis, de Lausanne, -Chirurgien major_. - -[14] Upon this windmill the governor intended to mount a gun, and the -gun was lying in it, but not as yet mounted, and consequently useless; -another dismounted gun was lying near the mill. These guns of course -could be of no use in the action which ensued, but they figured in -Marshal Massena’s account of it. - -[15] Massena’s official statement of this action was a masterpiece of -impudent falsehood. He asserted that General Craufurd’s force consisted -of 2000 horse and 8000 foot, and that they were all posted under the -guns of the fortress; that they gave way before the French, our cavalry -not daring to meet them with the sabre, and the infantry pursued at a -running step; that we lost sixty officers, of whom twenty-four were -buried in the field of battle; 400 killed, 700 wounded, 400 prisoners, -one stand of colours, and two pieces of cannon, while the loss of -the conquerors did not amount to 300. He took no colours, and the -two pieces of cannon were the dismounted guns at the windmill. In a -subsequent dispatch Massena assured the war-minister that all his -troops were burning with impatience to teach the English army what they -had already taught Craufurd’s division. Our own gazette had already -shown the veracity of this boaster’s account; but this new insult -called forth a counter-statement from General Craufurd, from which this -detail has chiefly been drawn, and to the truth of which the whole -British army were witnesses. - -[16] The author of _Der Feldzug von Portugal in den Jahren 1811 und -1812_ (_Stutgard und Tubingen_, 1816) is mistaken in calling it the -burial-place of the kings of Portugal. - -[17] Some of the Portugueze charging a superior force got so wedged in -among the French, that they had not room to use their bayonets; they -turned up the butt ends of their muskets, and plied them with such -vigour, that they presently cleared the way. - -[18] Ten ensigns’ commissions were sent out after this action by the -commander-in-chief to Lord Wellington, as rewards for the same number -of non-commissioned officers who had distinguished themselves. - -[19] The Portugueze officer who was with Massena, and whose journal is -printed in the _Investigador Portuguez_, states the number of killed -and wounded whom the French left on the ground at 4600. - -[20] There are in fact three passes over this Serra, all of them -practicable for cavalry. - -[21] Cardoso says, that to the east the Serra de Castello Rodrigo may -be distinguished, which is thirty leagues off, the Serra de Minde to -the south, and that of Grijo to the north, fifteen leagues distant. -Westward is the mouth of the Mondego and the coast. - -[22] A loss which was magnified to 500 in Massena’s dispatches. - -[23] The under-gardener of the Botanical Garden at Coimbra, with -his family, consisting of his wife (a young woman of eighteen, with -an infant at the breast) and her mother, having tarried too long to -accompany the army, was overtaken in the little town of Soure by some -stragglers from the enemy’s advanced guard, who were in search of -plunder. These miscreants secured the husband by fastening his hands -behind him: they tied the mother in the same manner; the villain then, -to whom the wife was allotted, either by agreement among them, or by -virtue of his authority, endeavoured to tear the infant from her arms, -that he might proceed to violate her in presence of her mother and -her husband. Failing in this, and enraged at a resistance which he -had not expected, he drew back a few yards, presented his musket, and -swore he would fire at her if she did not yield. “Fire, devil!” was -her immediate reply, and at the word she and her infant fell by the -same shot. The ruffians stripped her body, and compelled the husband -to carry the clothes on his back to Thomar, whither they carried him -prisoner. During his detention there he pointed out the murderer to -a Portugueze nobleman then serving with Massena; but whatever this -traitor may have felt at the crime, he did not venture to report it -to the French commander, and demand justice upon the criminal: the -hopes of co-operation on the part of the Portugueze people which he -had held out had been proved so utterly false, that Massena treated -him with contemptuous dislike, and moreover every thing was permitted -to their soldiers by the French generals in that atrocious campaign. -The gardener effected his escape to Coimbra, where a subscription was -raised for him, but he soon died, broken-hearted. The man himself -related this tragedy to the British officer, from whom I received it. -It is recorded here as an example of the spirit which the invaders -frequently found in those Portugueze women who were unfortunate enough -to fall into their hands. - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this book. Simple typographical errors were -corrected and some unbalanced quotation marks were remedied. Other -errors of these types were not changed because the corrections were not -obvious to the Transcriber. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences -of inconsistent hyphenation have been changed only when there was a -predominant preference throughout the book. - -The source book used many Sidenotes, printed in italics. Most match -entries in the Table of Contents, but some are either dates or -citations. To preserve proximity with the original text, if they were -printed mid-paragraph, that is where they appear here. Depending on -the format in which you are reading this eBook, Sidenotes may be -distinguished from regular text by being shown in some combination -of italics, boldface, UPPER-CASE, enclosed in ♦DIAMOND SYMBOLS♦, -being offset into the left-margin, or in a rectangular area within -the regular text. Due to limitations of some eReaders, some sidenotes -may appear next to or below each other, depending on the width of the -screen. - -The original Table of Contents used “ib.” when the page number was the -same as the one in the previous entry. This eBook uses the actual page -numbers. - -Page 201: “not to be outdone” was missing the “to”; restored by -Transcriber. - -All six volumes of this work are available at no cost at Project -Gutenberg. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: History of the Peninsular War Volume IV (of 6) - -Author: Robert Southey - -Release Date: September 30, 2019 [EBook #60389] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR, VOL 4 *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - -</pre> - -<div class="all"> - -<div class="sec"> -<div class="transnote"> -<p class="center">Transcriber’s Note:</p> -<p class="covernote">Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.</p> -<p class="center"><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Notes at the end</a> of this eBook explain special -notation used to highlight Sidenotes.</p> -</div> - -<h1>HISTORY<br /> -<span class="xxsmall wspace">OF THE</span><br /> -<span class="larger">PENINSULAR WAR.</span></h1> - -<p class="newpage p4 center"><span class="small">G. WOODFALL, <span class="smcap">ANGEL COURT, SKINNER STREET, LONDON</span>.</span></p> - -<hr /> - -<p class="newpage p4 center vspace2 large bold"> -HISTORY<br /> -<span class="xxsmall wspace">OF THE</span><br /> -<span class="larger">PENINSULAR WAR.</span></p> - -<div class="p2 poem-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="i18">“Unto thee<br /></span> -<span class="i0">“Let thine own times as an old story be.”<br /></span> -</div> - -<div class="attrib"><span class="smcap">Donne.</span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p class="p2 center large vspace"> -BY ROBERT SOUTHEY, ESQ. LL.D.<br /> -<span class="smaller">POET LAUREATE,</span></p> - -<p class="center smaller vspace">HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, OF THE<br /> -ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY OF HISTORY, OF THE ROYAL<br /> -INSTITUTE OF THE NETHERLANDS, OF THE<br /> -CYMMRODORION, OF THE MASSACHUSETTS<br /> -HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ETC.</p> - -<p class="p2 center larger">A NEW EDITION.</p> - -<p class="p2 center"><i>IN SIX VOLUMES.</i></p> - -<p class="p1 center larger">VOL. IV.</p> - -<p class="p2 center vspace large">LONDON:<br /> -<span class="smaller">JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.<br /> -<span class="smaller">MDCCCXXVIII.</span></span></p> - -<hr /> - -<p class="newpage p4 b0">Ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν -ἐπράχθη, καὶ τὸ πραχθὲν πότερα εὔλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον -αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν, μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται· καὶ -παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.</p> - -<p class="p0 sigright"> -<span class="smcap">Polybius</span>, lib. iii. sect. 31. -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">v</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS.</h2> -</div> - -<table id="toc" summary="Contents"> - <tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXIV">CHAPTER XXIV.</a></td></tr> - <tr class="small"> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">PAGE</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Victor retreats across the Tagus</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Alburquerque proposed for the command in La Mancha</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_2">2</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Plan of detaching a Spanish force toward Segovia</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_4">4</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Jealousy entertained of Cuesta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_5">5</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sir Arthur confers with Cuesta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_6">6</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">He requires that the passages toward the north be occupied</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_7">7</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Junction of the British and Spanish armies</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_8">8</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Opportunity of attacking the French lost by Cuesta’s indecision</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_9">9</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Distress of the British army for means of transport</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_10">10</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sir Arthur halts</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_12">12</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cuesta advances in pursuit of the French</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_12">12</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Junction of Joseph and Sebastiani with Victor</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_13">13</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cuesta’s vanguard attacked by the French</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_14">14</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Alburquerque saves Cuesta from defeat</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cuesta retreats to the Alberche</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_16">16</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sir Arthur prevails on him to cross that river</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_16">16</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Position of the allies in front of Talavera</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_17">17</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sir Arthur nearly made prisoner</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_18">18</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Battle of Talavera</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_19">19</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cuesta decimates some of his troops</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_29">29</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">State of Talavera</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_31">31</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Movements of Sir Robert Wilson</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_32">32</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Movements of Soult, Ney, and Mortier</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_33">33</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cuesta neglects to secure the passes</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_33">33</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Intelligence of Soult’s advance</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_34">34</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Soult occupies Plasencia</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_35">35</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">vi</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sir Arthur marches against him</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cuesta determines to follow Sir Arthur</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_38">38</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cuesta joins the British</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_39">39</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">They retreat across the Tagus</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_40">40</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Colonel Mackinnon removes part of the wounded</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_41">41</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Defeat of the Spaniards at Arzobispo</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_43">43</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Movements of Marshal Ney</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_45">45</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Action with Sir Robert Wilson at the Puerto de Baños</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_46">46</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French enter Talavera</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_48">48</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Victor behaves well to the English wounded</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_49">49</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Murder of the Bishop of Coria</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_50">50</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Venegas’s army kept inactive before and after the battle of Talavera</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_51">51</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">His useless attempt upon Toledo</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_53">53</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">He complains of Cuesta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_55">55</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Intruder’s movements after the battle</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_56">56</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Venegas prepares to fight at Aranjuez</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_57">57</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Aranjuez and its gardens</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_59">59</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French repulsed there</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_63">63</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Deliberations concerning the army of La Mancha</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_63">63</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Venegas resolves to attack the enemy</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_65">65</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French attack him</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_66">66</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Battle of Almonacid</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_67">67</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXV">CHAPTER XXV.</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Soult proposes to invade Portugal</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_71">71</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sir Arthur Wellesley raised to the Peerage</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_74">74</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Marquis Wellesley arrives in Spain</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_75">75</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Distress of the army for provisions</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_75">75</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Disputes with Cuesta concerning supplies</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_77">77</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Frere requires the removal of Cuesta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_80">80</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cuesta resigns the command</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_82">82</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Eguia succeeds <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ad interim</i></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_84">84</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Calvo sent to see to the supplies</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_85">85</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Wellington declares his intention of falling back</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_86">86</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Correspondence with Eguia and Calvo</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_88">88</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Marquis Wellesley proposes a plan for supplying the armies</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_91">91</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">vii</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">His ill opinion of the Spanish government</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_93">93</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Wellington objects to taking a position on the Guadiana</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_95">95</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Alburquerque appointed to the command in Extremadura</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_96">96</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Wellington withdraws to Badajoz</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_98">98</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Expedition to Walcheren</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_100">100</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Inquiry into the conduct of the Duke of York</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_101">101</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Changes in the British ministry</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_102">102</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lords Grey and Grenville refuse to join it</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_103">103</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Disposition of the French and Spanish armies</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_105">105</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Neediness of the intrusive government</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_106">106</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Measures of severity</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_108">108</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Kellermann’s edict</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_108">108</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Measures of Joseph’s ministers</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_109">109</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Central Junta announces that the Cortes will be assembled</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_112">112</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Declaration which was first proposed</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_114">114</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Objections to it by Mr. Frere</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_117">117</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Unpopularity of the Central Junta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_119">119</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Their difficulties and errors</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_120">120</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Scheme for overthrowing them</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_127">127</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commission appointed by the Junta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Romana’s address</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_129">129</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Reply of the Junta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_136">136</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Guerillas</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_144">144</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">D. Julian Sanchez</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_145">145</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French repulsed from Astorga</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_147">147</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Battle of Tamames</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_148">148</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French retire from Salamanca</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_149">149</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Marshal Soult appointed Major-General</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_150">150</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Junta resolve on risking a general action</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_150">150</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Areizaga appointed to the command</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_151">151</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">State of Madrid</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_152">152</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Condition of the British army</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_154">154</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Disposition of the French troops</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_155">155</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Areizaga advances from the Sierra Morena</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_157">157</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">viii</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Austrian commissioner remonstrates against his purpose</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_158">158</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Battle of Ocaña</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_159">159</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Treatment of the prisoners</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_162">162</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Battle of Alba de Tormes</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_164">164</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXVI">CHAPTER XXVI.</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Gerona</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_167">167</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Strength of the garrison</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_170">170</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Crusaders enrolled</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_170">170</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Company of S. Barbara</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_170">170</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">St. Narcis appointed Generalissimo</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_171">171</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">All mention of a capitulation forbidden</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_172">172</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">St. Cyr would have reduced the city by blockade</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_173">173</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The bombardment begins</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_174">174</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">St. Cyr draws nearer Gerona</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_176">176</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">S. Feliu de Guixols and Palamos taken by the French</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_177">177</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Assault of Monjuic</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_178">178</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Succours intercepted</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_182">182</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The ravelin taken</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_184">184</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Monjuic abandoned</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_185">185</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Verdier expects the town to fall</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_186">186</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Battery planted on the cathedral</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_187">187</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Distress of the city</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_189">189</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Attempt to introduce succours</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_189">189</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Garcia Conde enters with reinforcements</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_191">191</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Inadequacy of this relief</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_192">192</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Los Angeles taken and the garrison put to the sword</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_194">194</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Unsuccessful sally</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_195">195</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French repulsed in a general assault</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_196">196</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">St. Cyr resolves to reduce the city by famine</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_201">201</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">O’Donnell enters the city</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_202">202</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Failure of the attempt to relieve it</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_203">203</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">St. Cyr gives up the command to Augereau</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_204">204</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">O’Donnell effects his retreat</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_205">205</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Magazines at Hostalrich taken by the French</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_207">207</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Augereau offers favourable terms</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_208">208</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">ix</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Destruction of a French convoy by the British ships</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_209">209</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Increased distress in the city</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_211">211</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Report concerning the state of health</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_212">212</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Some of the outworks taken by the French</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_214">214</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Last sally</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_215">215</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Alvarez becomes delirious</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_216">216</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Capitulation</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_217">217</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Death of Alvarez</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_220">220</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Eroles escapes</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_221">221</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXVII">CHAPTER XXVII.</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Buonaparte divorces the Empress Josephine</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_222">222</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Farther requisition for the armies in Spain</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_224">224</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Display of Spanish flags at Paris</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_225">225</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Address of the Central Junta to the nation</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_227">227</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">State of public opinion in England</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_233">233</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Wellington’s views with regard to Portugal</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_235">235</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The King’s speech</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_236">236</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Earl St. Vincent</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_237">237</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Grenville</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_238">238</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Honourable Mr. Ward</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_239">239</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Ponsonby</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_240">240</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Whitbread</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_240">240</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Perceval</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_242">242</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Vote of thanks to Lord Wellington opposed by the Earl of Suffolk</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_244">244</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Earl Grosvenor</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_244">244</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Earl Grey</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_244">244</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Marquis Wellesley</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_244">244</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Grenville</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_247">247</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">General Tarleton</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_247">247</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Whitbread</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_248">248</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Pension voted for Lord Wellington</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_248">248</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Opposed by Sir Francis Burdett</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_249">249</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Whitbread</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_250">250</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Wilberforce</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_251">251</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Canning</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_251">251</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">x</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Common Council petition against the pension</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_252">252</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Marquis of Lansdowne</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_254">254</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Holland</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_255">255</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Marquis Wellesley</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_257">257</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXVIII">CHAPTER XXVIII.</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Supineness of the Central Junta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_264">264</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Romana refuses the command</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_266">266</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Montijo and D. Francisco Palafox imprisoned</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_266">266</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Attempts to produce a false confidence</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_267">267</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Scheme of Count Tilly</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_268">268</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Junta announce their intention to remove</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_270">270</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Murmurs at Seville</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_272">272</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Invasion of Andalusia</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_273">273</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French pass the Sierra Morena</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_274">274</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">False hopes held out to the people by the Central Junta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_274">274</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Instructions to Alburquerque</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_275">275</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Insurrection at Seville against the Central Junta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_277">277</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Saavedra takes upon himself the temporary authority</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_279">279</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French enter Seville</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_279">279</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">They overrun Andalusia</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_280">280</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">They push for Cadiz</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_281">281</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Alburquerque’s movements</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_282">282</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cadiz saved by Alburquerque</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_284">284</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">He is appointed governor of Cadiz by the people</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_284">284</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">A Junta elected at Cadiz</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_285">285</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Resignation of the Central Junta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_286">286</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">A Regency appointed</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_288">288</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Last address of the Central Junta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_289">289</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Regents</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_295">295</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Their injustice toward the members of the Central Junta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_296">296</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Proclamation of the Intruder</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_299">299</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Language of the despondents in England</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_301">301</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Isle of Leon</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_303">303</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Victor summons the Junta of Cadiz</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_306">306</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Ill will of the Junta towards Alburquerque</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_307">307</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">xi</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The troops neglected</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_308">308</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Alburquerque applies to the Regency in their behalf</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_310">310</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Junta publish an attack against Alburquerque</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_311">311</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">He resigns the command, and is sent ambassador to England</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_312">312</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXIX">CHAPTER XXIX.</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Regency</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_314">314</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Schemes for delivering Ferdinand</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_316">316</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Baron de Kolli’s attempt</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_316">316</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Overtures for peace</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_321">321</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Buonaparte’s intention of establishing a Western Empire</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_323">323</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Money voted for the Portugueze army</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_326">326</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Debates upon this subject</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_326">326</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Marquis Wellesley</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_326">326</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Grenville</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_328">328</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Liverpool</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_332">332</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Earl Moira</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_333">333</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Sidmouth</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_334">334</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Marquis of Lansdowne</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_334">334</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Erskine</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_335">335</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Holland</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_335">335</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Perceval</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_338">338</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Sir John Newport</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_339">339</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Villiers</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_339">339</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Curwen</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_340">340</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Leslie Foster</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_340">340</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">General Ferguson</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_349">349</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Fitzgerald</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_350">350</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Milton</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_350">350</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Bankes</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_350">350</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Jacob</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_351">351</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Whitbread</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_352">352</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Huskisson</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_354">354</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Bathurst</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_354">354</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Reform in the Portugueze army</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_356">356</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXX">CHAPTER XXX.</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xii">xii</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">O’Donnell appointed to the command in Catalonia</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_367">367</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Garcia Conde made governor of Lerida</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_367">367</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Rapid promotion in the Spanish armies</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_368">368</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Conduct of the people of Villadrau</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_369">369</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Hostalrich</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_371">371</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Commencement of the siege</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_372">372</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">First success of O’Donnell</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_373">373</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Desertion from the French army</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_373">373</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Want of concert between the provinces</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_374">374</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Negligence of the Valencian government</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_376">376</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The force on the Valencian frontier dispersed</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_377">377</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Suchet advances against Valencia</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_378">378</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">He retreats</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_380">380</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Conspiracy discovered in that city</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_381">381</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French boast of success</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_382">382</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">O’Donnell’s successful operations</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_383">383</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Siege of Hostalrich</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_387">387</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Retreat of the garrison</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_390">390</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Las Medas and Lerida surrendered</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_394">394</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Augereau superseded by Marshal Macdonald</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_395">395</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Fort Matagorda taken by the French</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_396">396</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Storm at Cadiz</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_398">398</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cruel usage of the French prisoners in the bay</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_399">399</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Escape of the prison ships</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_400">400</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Insurrection and massacre of the prisoners at Majorca</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_402">402</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Prisoners sent to Cabrera</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_402">402</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Their inhuman treatment there</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_403">403</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Marshal Soult’s edict</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_404">404</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Counter edict of the Regency</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_405">405</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXXI">CHAPTER XXXI.</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Inactivity before Cadiz</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_407">407</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Regents send for Cuesta</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_407">407</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Badajoz secured by Romana</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_408">408</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The British take a position on the frontiers of Beira</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_408">408</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Astorga summoned by the French</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_410">410</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiii">xiii</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Siege of Astorga</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_411">411</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Its surrender</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_412">412</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Affair at Barba del Puerco</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_414">414</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Massena appointed to the army of Portugal</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_415">415</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Ciudad Rodrigo</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_416">416</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French besiege it</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_417">417</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">D. Julian Sanchez</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_418">418</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Marshal Ney summons the place</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_418">418</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Situation of Lord Wellington</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_420">420</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Spirit of the inhabitants</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_420">420</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Nunnery of S. Cruz attacked</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_421">421</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Convent of S. Domingo recovered</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_422">422</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Julian Sanchez effects his escape from the city</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_423">423</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">State of the British army</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_425">425</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">A practicable breach made</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_426">426</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The place capitulates</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_428">428</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Conduct of the French</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_429">429</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Speculations upon the campaign</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_431">431</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">La Puebla de Sanabria occupied by the French</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_434">434</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Portugueze retake it</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_436">436</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXXII">CHAPTER XXXII.</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Massena’s proclamation to the Portugueze</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_440">440</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French invest Almeida</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_441">441</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Almeida</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_442">442</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Fort Conception abandoned</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_444">444</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Affair on the Coa</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_445">445</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Desponding letters from the army</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_448">448</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Apprehensions expressed in England</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_450">450</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Ney summons the governor of Almeida</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_451">451</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Portugueze officers in Massena’s army</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_452">452</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Portugueze ordered to retire before the enemy</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_454">454</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Siege of Almeida</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_455">455</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Surrender of the place</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_456">456</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Portugueze prisoners enlist and desert</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_457">457</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Condemnation of their conduct</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_458">458</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Militia forced into the French service</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_459">459</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiv">xiv</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">They escape and rejoin the allies</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_460">460</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Changes in the Portugueze Regency</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_461">461</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Conduct of the Portugueze government</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_463">463</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Arbitrary arrests at Lisbon</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_465">465</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Apprehensions of the British government</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_467">467</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Movements of Regnier’s corps, and of General Hill</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_470">470</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Massena advances into Portugal</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_471">471</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Ney and Regnier join him at Celorico</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_472">472</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French army collected at Viseu</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_474">474</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Wellington crosses to the Serra de Busaco</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_474">474</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Busaco</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_476">476</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Battle of Busaco</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_478">478</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Behaviour of the Portugueze troops</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_482">482</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Massena marches into the Porto road</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_484">484</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Colonel Trant’s movements</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_485">485</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The allies withdraw from Busaco</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_487">487</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Trant retreats to the Vouga</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_487">487</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The allies cross the Mondego</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_489">489</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Flight of the inhabitants from Coimbra</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_490">490</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French enter Coimbra</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_490">490</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Portugueze people fly before the enemy</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_491">491</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Hopes and expectations of the French</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_493">493</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Confusion at Condeixa</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_494">494</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Leiria forsaken</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_495">495</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Alcobaça forsaken by the monks</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_496">496</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Surprise at Alcoentre</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_497">497</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French discover the lines</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_498">498</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Feelings of the British army</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_499">499</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lines of Torres Vedras</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_500">500</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Romana joins the allies</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_504">504</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Trant surprises the French in Coimbra</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_504">504</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">He escorts his prisoners to Porto</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_507">507</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Difficulties of Massena’s situation</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_509">509</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">His demonstrations in front of the lines</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_511">511</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Montbrun sent against Abrantes</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_512">512</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The French army subsists by plunder</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_513">513</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Deserters form themselves into a corps of plunderers</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_515">515</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">State of Lisbon</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_516">516</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xv">xv</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Opinions of the opposition in England</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_517">517</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">General La Croix killed</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_518">518</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Massena retreats from the lines</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_520">520</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Lord Wellington advances to Santarem</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_521">521</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Both armies go into cantonments</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_522">522</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The King’s illness</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_523">523</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Proceedings concerning a Regency</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_525">525</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Perceval</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_527">527</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Troops sent to Portugal</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_530">530</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Issues of money required</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_531">531</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Conduct of Lord Grenville as Auditor of the Exchequer</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_532">532</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">State of the opposition</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_536">536</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Their expectations</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_538">538</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Language of the anarchists</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_538">538</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Perceval popular at this time</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_542">542</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Schemes for a new ministry</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_544">544</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The King’s opinion during an interval of amendment</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_545">545</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Prince Regent announces his intention of making no change</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_546">546</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Mr. Perceval’s reply</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_547">547</a></td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<div class="main"> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">1</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="HISTORY" class="vspace"><span class="smaller">HISTORY</span><br /> -<span class="xxsmall">OF THE</span><br /> -PENINSULAR WAR.</h2> -</div> - -<hr /> -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XXIV" class="nobreak p2">CHAPTER XXIV.</h2> -</div> - -<blockquote class="inhead"> - -<p class="hang">SIR A. WELLESLEY ENTERS SPAIN. BATTLE OF -TALAVERA. RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY. -DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS AT PUENTE DEL -ARZOBISPO AND ALMONACID.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Victor retreats beyond the Tagus.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> head-quarters of Marshal Victor, after -he returned from his movement in favour of -Soult to his former position, were at Truxillo: -Cuesta was on his left flank, having his head-quarters -at Fuente del Maestro, and his advance -at Calemonte on the Guadiana, a league from -Merida. The British General had formed a -plan for cutting off the enemy’s retreat by a -movement through Castello Branco and Plasencia -to the bridge of Almaraz; this he relinquished, -because it did not coincide with Cuesta’s -opinion, and because he found it impossible to -prevail upon that general to choose a secure<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">2</span> -position, or to concentrate his army, which was -distributed with so little judgement in an open -country, that if Victor had attacked it, an easier -victory might have been obtained than that of -Medellin. The French have seldom suffered -such opportunities to pass, and Sir Arthur was -very apprehensive that the army, which had -been raised with such exertions, would be dispersed -before he could effect a junction with it. -But Victor was content to forego this advantage -rather than risk the danger of being cut off -from Madrid by such an operation as Sir Arthur -had meditated; he broke up, therefore, at the -beginning of June, and retreated across the -Tagus at Almaraz; Cuesta followed, without -obtaining any advantage over him in his retreat, -and sufficiently fortunate that the French Marshal -was in too much fear of a better army, -to profit by the want of discipline in the Spaniards -and the want of skill in their commander.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Alburquerque proposed for the command in La Mancha.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>When Sir Arthur had given up his original -plan, it was concerted that he should join Cuesta -at Badajoz. Victor’s retreat rendered this unnecessary; -it was then agreed that he should -advance, as he had at first proposed, by way of -Plasencia. The army of La Mancha at this -time, consisting of 16,000 foot and 1300 horse, -was under Venegas, subject to Cuesta’s orders. -This was the side on which the French were -most exposed; Alburquerque, by one operation, -though it had only partially succeeded, had retarded -the plans of the enemy for more than a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">3</span> -month, and, had he not been withheld by the -positive orders of men who were unworthy to -control him, there is reason for believing that -he would have prevented many of the disasters -which afterwards occurred. His patriotism was -undoubted; no man, indeed, ever more passionately -loved his country: his military talents -were of the highest promise; and when these -moral advantages concurred, his rank and illustrious -family ought to have been considered -as circumstances to recommend him, giving -him, as they would have done, additional claims -to the respect of the army and of the nation. -With both he was exceedingly popular, especially -among the La Manchans; and having been a -successful general, almost the only one who had -obtained any success, the soldiers had an opinion -of his good fortune as well as of his talents. Mr. -Frere, who estimated the Duke as he deserved, -was exceedingly desirous that he should have -the command in La Mancha, and suggested it -to Cuesta. “An army,” he said, “which had -been torn by factions, thrown into confusion by -the successive removal of its officers, and discouraged -by ill fortune, could have no hope of -being speedily re-established and conducted to -victory, except by a general who was known to -them for his successes, and who was personally -popular among them, and in the province -wherein he was to act. The Duque de Alburquerque -was the only one who united in himself -these advantages; and for the situation which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">4</span> -he at present held, Venegas would not be less -useful, having always served under General -Cuesta, and not only near his person, but immediately -under his eyes.” Unhappily Cuesta was -jealous of the Duke’s popularity; and the Supreme -Junta were jealous of his rank and influence. -Mr. Frere’s advice was rejected, and -this may be considered as one cause of the -failure of the campaign.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Plan of detaching a Spanish force toward Segovia.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>It had at first been doubted whether the -French would make any thing more than a show -of resistance on this side of Madrid; and a plan -was proposed for menacing their retreat and the -rear of the metropolis, by detaching a considerable -Spanish corps through the Puerto de Arenas -to Avila, Arevalo, and Segovia. Such a movement, -it was thought, would compel the enemy -either to retreat, or to detach a force of correspondent -magnitude; and thus a material advantage -would be afforded to the British army, -which, when concentrated, amounted only to -20,000 men. Cuesta had about 38,000, well -armed but ill disciplined, and ill clothed also, -which, in their state of discipline, was an evil of -more consequence than may immediately be -obvious. The Intruder, with 9000 of his guards, -and the greater part of the garrison of Madrid, -had joined Sebastiani in La Mancha, and attempted -to bring Venegas to action; finding -this in vain, they left 2000 men to defend -Toledo, and prepared to bring their whole disposable -force, consisting of about 50,000, against<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">5</span> -the united Spanish and British armies. But the -Spanish army was in such a state, that little -could be expected from its co-operation: a -smaller force would, under such circumstances, -be of greater assistance, as being more manageable -and more likely to follow the example -and catch the spirit of their better disciplined -allies. If, therefore, a large detachment of these -troops, by moving toward Segovia, could draw -off a body of the French to watch them, they -would render more service by such a diversion -than could be expected from them in the field. -For this reason such a movement was advised -both by Sir Arthur and Mr. Frere; that minister -not being deterred from the performance of his -duty by the clamour raised against him in England, -but delivering his opinion to the British -general upon the same footing, he said, as he -should have done had he been holding a private -conversation with Sir Arthur, and as he should -equally have ventured to do had he been residing - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Jealousy entertained of Cuesta.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -casually in Spain in a private character. There -was another reason which made the Junta wish -to see Cuesta’s army diminished. A suspicion -had for some time prevailed that Cuesta had not -forgiven his arrest, and that the same temper -which led him to those violent measures whereby -he had provoked that act of vigour, would -tempt him to take some serious vengeance -whenever it was in his power. This, it was -thought, was more to be apprehended now than -at any former time, because the army which his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">6</span> -rival, Blake, commanded, had just at this time -been shamefully dispersed, and thus the great -obstacle to such a project was removed. The -Junta were afraid to supersede Cuesta, even if -they knew whom to appoint in his place; and -they were afraid even to propose this measure -of detaching a part of his army, under a commander -of sufficient popularity to oppose his -designs: but it was not doubted that if such a -measure were proposed by the British General -as a military plan, they would joyfully accede -to it.</p> - -<p>Cuesta was wronged by these suspicions; ... -he was obstinate, intractable, and unfit for command; -but a right honest man, and one who, -from a sense of duty as well as from natural -courage, would at any time have laid down his - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">July 10.</span> <br />Sir Arthur confers with Cuesta.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -life for the service of Spain. Sir Arthur, whose -head-quarters were now at Plasencia, went to -confer with him at Almaraz. Fourteen thousand -of the Spaniards were at this time stationed at -the Puente del Arzobispo; the remainder were -about two miles from the bridge of Almaraz, -encamped under the Pass of Miravete. Victor -had taken up a position upon the Alberche, -near Talavera. There, Sir Arthur stated his -opinion, the enemy ought to be attacked by the -united force of the allies; but it would be desirable -to detach a corps of 10,000 towards -Avila to turn their right: Cuesta approved -the proposal, but desired they might be British -troops. Sir Arthur replied, that the British<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">7</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809. July.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -army, to act with advantage, must act in a -body; and the Spaniards could better spare -such a detachment, being indeed more numerous -than was either necessary for the operations on -the Alberche, or convenient, considering their -state of discipline. These representations were -lost upon Cuesta, who estimated his own importance -by the numbers under his command; -he refused to make any large detachment, but -offered to send two battalions of infantry and a -few cavalry to join Sir R. Wilson’s Portugueze -brigade, and march upon Arenas, and thence -to Escalona, in communication with the left of -the British army. Had Sir Arthur’s advice -been followed, it was his intention to have recommended -Alburquerque to the command; -but it was the fate of Spain to be almost always -deprived of the services of this brave and able -general by the jealousy of meaner minds.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>He requires that the passes be occupied.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Sir Arthur proposed also that the Spaniards -should occupy the passes at Perales and Baños, -and thus cut off the communication between -Victor and the French forces in the north of -Spain. It was neither known what the amount -of that force might be, nor where it was distributed, -nor in what condition it was: but the -march of Mortier with some 15,000 men from -Aragon to their assistance had been ascertained, -and it was certain therefore that a movement -might be apprehended from that quarter. The -proposal was received with some ill humour -on Cuesta’s part, for he was surrounded by intriguers,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">8</span> -some of whom perhaps sought to serve -the enemy by embroiling the allies, and others -who, having as much national pride as professional -ignorance, had as much selfishness as -either; these persons had persuaded the hasty -old man that Sir Arthur sought to weaken the -Spanish army by dividing it, in order to obtain -for himself the glory of expelling the French -from Madrid, which was now, they represented, -within Cuesta’s reach. He was prevailed upon -however, by his Adjutant-General, O’Donoju, -to promise that this should be done; and if the -performance fell far short, the detachment being -incompetent in force, and almost wholly unprovided, -the failure must be imputed to his erring -judgement and the disorderly state of the commissariat -department, not to any want of faith -or perverse purpose on his part.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Junction of the British and Spanish armies.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>In pursuance of the arrangements at this -interview, the British army broke up from Plasencia -on the 17th and 18th of July, and formed -a junction with Cuesta on the 20th at Oropesa. -Sir R. Wilson marched from his position on the -Tietar on the 15th, and reached Escalona on -the 23d, threatening Madrid on that side, from -which he was about eight leagues distant. Venegas -had been directed to break up from Madrilejos -at the same time as the British army, -march by Tembleque and Ocaña, cross the Tagus -by the ford at Fuente Duenas, and advance to -Arganda, so to threaten Madrid, which would -then be within a few hours’ march. Had this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">9</span> -plan been followed, either a considerable body -of the French must have been detached against -Venegas, or he would have entered the capital -without resistance.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Opportunity of attacking the French.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>But Sir Arthur was destined throughout the -campaign to have his plans continually frustrated -by the misconduct of those from whom -he looked for cordial co-operation. On the 22d -the combined armies moved from Oropesa, and -the advance attacked Victor’s rear-guard, which -was drawn up in order of battle, upon a plain -about a league from Talavera. Their right -wing was turned by Brigadier-General Anson, -and Alburquerque attacked them in front, and -drove them back. They retreated to a position -upon the Alberche, a league beyond the town, -and the combined armies advanced, and encamped -that night in the vine and olive-yards -between the town and the French. Sir Arthur -had a narrow escape that day; while he was reconnoitring, -a three-pound shot was fired at him -with so good an aim, that it cut a bough from -a tree close to his head. He determined to -attack the enemy the following morning, and -bring Victor to action before he should be joined -by Sebastiani and the Intruder. Nothing could -be more favourable to his views than this unskilful -halt of the enemy, an opportunity being -thus presented for beating them, as he had -hoped, in detail. The columns were formed for -this purpose at an early hour, and at five in the -morning they received orders to march. But<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">10</span> -when Cuesta was informed of the determination -which had been taken, no arguments could induce -him to make up his mind, and give the - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>lost by Cuesta’s indecision.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -necessary instructions: at midnight he remained -undecided, and the orders therefore were necessarily -countermanded, ... not more to the disappointment -of the army, than to the sore vexation -of the General, who knew the whole importance -of the opportunity which had thus been -lost. So unaccountable was this conduct in -Cuesta, that it has been supposed he scrupled -at fighting upon a Sunday. Whatever his reasons -were, they have never been explained, and -could not have been more valid than this would -have been: but thus the fair occasion was let -pass; for when, on the morning of the 24th, he -was ready to offer battle, it appeared that Victor, -profiting by the precious time which had been -given him, had decamped during the night, and -retired to St. Olalla, and from thence towards -Torrejos, to effect that meditated junction which -Sir Arthur’s measures would have frustrated.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Distress of the British army for want of transport.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>This retreat surprised Cuesta as much as if -his own procrastination had not deprived Spain -of the victory which prompter measures would -have secured. The British General had foreseen -the consequence of so ill-timed a delay, and -the disappointment was the more grievous because -he could not pursue the French. From -the hour in which he entered Spain he had never -been able to procure means of transport: ... he -required none for the baggage of individuals,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">11</span> -... only for provisions, ammunition, money, and -military stores, things indispensable for an army: -and these were not to be obtained. The country -was in a state of total disorganization; and what -was more extraordinary, the government seemed -to be totally ignorant of this, and to suppose that -nothing more was required of it than to issue -edicts, which would be carried into effect as if -things were in their ordinary course. This inconvenience -had been so severely felt, that Sir -Arthur, before he left Plasencia, informed Cuesta -it would be impossible for him to undertake -any farther operations after their arrangements -against Victor should have been carried into -effect, unless the necessary means of transport -were supplied. Justice to his Majesty, and to -the army with which he had been intrusted, -required this determination, he said, and he -was equally bound in justice to communicate it -to General Cuesta without delay. The means -which he required were such as every country -in which an army was acting was bound to -afford; and if the people of Spain were either -unwilling or unable to supply what the British -army required, they must do without its services. -This declaration had been made as early as the -16th; a week had now elapsed, there had not -been the slightest effort to remedy the evil, -and from the same cause the troops were now -in actual want of provisions. For the Spanish -commissariat was in the most deplorable state; -and that of the British army, which was far from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">12</span> -being in a good one, could effect nothing in a -country where they exerted no authority themselves, -and the government would exert none -for them. The evil was aggravated by the -junction of two large armies, in a country which -had scarcely ever been without troops to exhaust -it during the preceding twelve months. When -the two combined armies became competitors -for food, the inhabitants naturally preferred -their own countrymen: ... it was afterwards discovered -also, that, with a stupid selfishness, -which admits neither of justification or excuse, -they concealed the greater part of their stores -from both.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Sir Arthur halts.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Thus painfully circumstanced, Sir Arthur -could not proceed. He conceived also that his -engagement with Cuesta was fulfilled by the removal -of Victor from the Alberche; for if advantage -were duly taken of that movement, it -gave the Spanish General possession of the course -of the Tagus, and opened the communication -with La Mancha and Venegas. He halted from -absolute necessity, and he determined even to -return to Portugal, if he were not properly supplied. -Cuesta appeared fully sensible of the -propriety of this determination, and trusting -that good fortune would put him in possession -of Madrid, which now seemed just within his -reach, he, having means of transport in abundance, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Cuesta advances in pursuit of Victor.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -advanced four leagues in pursuit of Victor, -to the village of Bravo; Sir Arthur, meantime, -taking up a position at Talavera, to wait<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">13</span> -the issue of a movement which was undertaken -against his opinion, moved two divisions of infantry -and a brigade of cavalry, under General -Sherbrooke, across the Alberche to Casalegas, -to keep up the communication with Cuesta and -with Sir Robert Wilson. Near that village the -body of a Spanish peasant was found, whom the -French soldiers had a little before burnt, or rather -scorched to death. It lay with the arms lifted -and the hands clenched, as if in the act of prayer, -the features distorted, and the whole corpse -stiffened in one dreadful expression of agony!</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Junction of Joseph and Sebastiani with Victor.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Joseph Buonaparte and Marshal Jourdan left -Madrid on the 23d, and halted that night at -Navalcarnero, designing to form a junction with -Victor at Casalegas, and to order Sebastiani -thither as soon as that general, in pursuance of -his instructions, should have returned from -Consuegra and Madrilejos, where he was watching -Venegas, to Toledo. Another object which -Jourdan had in view was to check Sir Robert -Wilson, whose force he supposed to be considerably -greater than it was, and of whose enterprising -spirit the French stood in fear. But -Victor, who was well informed of the plans of -his enemies, perceived, that if he fell back upon -Navalcarnero to join the Intruder, it would be -easy to interpose between them and Sebastiani, -in which case the junction of their whole force -in this quarter would be rendered exceedingly -difficult, if not impossible. Apprising Joseph, -therefore, of his movements, he retreated to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">14</span> -left bank of the Guadarrama, at its confluence - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">July 25.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -with the Tagus near Toledo. Sebastiani reached -that city the same day, and the Intruder, marching -to the same point, fixed his head-quarters at -Vargas, two leagues distant, so that the whole -force which he could bring against the allies -was now united. It consisted of 45,000 men, -after 3000 were left to defend Toledo. They -resolved immediately, now that this great object -was effected, to act upon the offensive; and on -the next day they began their march to Torrejos.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Cuesta’s vanguard attacked by the French.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Cuesta had by this time advanced to St. Olalla. -He there learnt that Victor had turned off towards -Toledo; and so far was he from divining -the obvious intent of such a movement, that he -supposed the French were in full retreat, and -that he had nothing to do but to pursue them. -From some strange misconception, too, he supposed -the English were about to follow him; -they were very short of provisions and means -of conveyance, he informed his own government, -but he was doing all in his power to persuade -them of the necessity of putting themselves -in motion. He thus deceived himself and his -government, instead of making efforts to supply -the wants of the English army, or assisting them -with his own means of transport. These he -possessed in sufficient quantity; and it was discovered -when too late, that food in abundance -might have been procured, had proper means -been used for obtaining it. In the morning of -the 25th Cuesta dispatched intelligence that he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">15</span> -was in pursuit of the French; in the evening he -discovered that he was in some danger of being -attacked by them, and on the following day his -outposts were assailed in Torrejos, and driven -in. General Zayas advanced with the vanguard -to meet the French; he was attacked by Latour -Maubourg, with the French advanced guard, -and suffered considerable loss; but Zayas was a -good officer, and maintained his ground against -superior numbers while he sent to require support. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Alburquerque saves Cuesta from defeat.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Alburquerque had requested that his -division might be the first to support the vanguard, -either in case of its attacking the enemy -or being attacked. While Cuesta made arrangements -for the retreat of the whole army beyond -the Alberche, the Duque advanced time enough -to save Zayas from complete rout, and the army -from that utter defeat which must necessarily -have resulted. The vanguard was flying at the -moment when he arrived; he charged the enemy, -checked them, and gave the van time to re-form, -and fall back in good order. But for this timely -success the army would have been dispersed, for -all the artillery and baggage were in the streets -of St. Olalla, carts of bread were there also -blocking up the way, the commissaries had -taken flight, and the men, catching that panic -which want of order in an army never fails to -occasion on the first approach of danger, had -begun to throw away their arms, that they might -neither be incumbered with them in running -away, nor supposed to be soldiers if they were -overtaken.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">16</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Cuesta retreats to the Alberche.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Alburquerque would have pursued his success -had he not been compelled to retreat by repeated -orders from the commander-in-chief, at -the moment when he was about to attack a disheartened -enemy, with troops confident in their -own courage and in the skill of their leader, and -heated by the advantage which they had gained. -He had, however, done much in saving the army, -for never were the movements of an army conducted -in a more wretched and disorderly manner; -like a rabble upon a pilgrimage, such was -Alburquerque’s description, they proceeded -without any regard to distance, order, or method, -and with the whole park of artillery; they -had neither provisions, staff, nor settled plan; -and they stopped upon their marches to repose -like flocks of sheep, without taking up any position, -so that, if the French had known the condition -they were in, defeat must have been inevitable -whenever they were unexpectedly attacked. -Saved from that total dispersion which -must have ensued, had not Alburquerque thus -checked the French in their career, the Spanish -army retreated twenty miles from St. Olalla to -the Alberche unmolested, thus again forming a -junction with the British, and bivouacked on -the left bank. At daybreak Sir Arthur crossed, -and having with some difficulty penetrated to -the old General’s tent, found him asleep there, -and the army in that state of disorder which is - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Sir Arthur prevails on him to cross that river.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -usually consequent upon a forced retreat. He -pointed out the necessity of passing the river -without loss of time, and taking up his ground<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">17</span> -on the right of the British position. Fortunately -Cuesta yielded to this advice, although -he thought it unlikely that the enemy would -venture to attack them: there was a report that -they had detached 15,000 men towards Madrid, -and this strengthened his opinion. In fact, had -Venegas performed his part of the concerted -operations, either this must have been done by -the French, or Madrid would have fallen. But -though this General was under Cuesta’s orders, -and had been instructed how to act in pursuance -of the plan arranged with the British Commander, -counter orders were sent him by the -Supreme Junta; and he, in consequence, disconcerted -the whole arrangement by employing -himself in a useless cannonade of Toledo; thus -permitting the French to bring their whole force -against the allies.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Position of the allies in front of Talavera.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Sir Arthur, as soon as the Spaniards fell back -to the Alberche, expected a general action, and -immediately prepared for it, recalling Sherbrooke -from Casalegas to his station in the line. The -position extended something more than two -miles. The British were on the left; there the -ground was open, and commanded by a height -upon which a division of infantry was stationed -under Major-General Hill. Still farther upon -the left was a low range of mountains separated -from the height by a valley about 300 fathoms -wide, and here a ravine running from north to -south covered the left and centre of the position, -and terminated at the beginning of the olive<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">18</span> -grounds on the right. The valley was not -occupied, because it was commanded by the -height, and because the mountains were thought -too distant to be of any consequence in the expected -battle. The right, consisting of Spaniards, -extended immediately in front of Talavera down -to the Tagus: this part of the ground was -covered with olive trees, and much intersected -by banks and ditches. The high road leading -from the town to the bridge of Alberche was -defended by a heavy battery in front of the -Ermida, or chapel of Nuestra Señora del Prado, -which was occupied by Spanish infantry. All -the avenues to the town were defended in like -manner; the town itself was occupied, and the -remainder of the Spanish foot formed in two -lines behind the banks, on the road which led -to the position of the British. In the centre -between the allied armies was a commanding -spot, on which the British had begun to construct -a redoubt. Brigadier-General Alexander -Campbell was posted here with a division of -infantry; and General Cotton’s brigade of dragoons, -with some Spanish cavalry, in the open -ground in his rear.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Sir Arthur nearly made prisoner.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>When Sherbrooke was recalled from Casalegas, -General Mackenzie had been left with a division -of infantry and a brigade of horse as an advanced -post near Casa de Salinas, in a wood on the right -of the Alberche, which covered the left of the -British army. About two in the afternoon of -the 27th the enemy appeared in strength on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">19</span> -the left bank; Victor forded the Alberche, and -before Mackenzie’s division could be withdrawn -from the wood on the left, it was attacked by -very superior forces under Generals Lapisse -and Chaudron Rousseau. Sir Arthur, from a -tower immediately in their rear, which he had -ascended for the purpose of observation, saw the -men falter when about to be attacked by such -overpowering numbers, and descending just in -time, with difficulty mounted his horse in the -midst of the affray, and escaped being made -prisoner. Had he been taken at that moment, -or had Marlborough, a century before, been -recognised and detained when he fell into the -hands of a French partisan on the Meuse, how -differently would the latter days of Buonaparte -and of Louis XIV. have closed, and how different -at this hour would have been the condition -of England, of Europe, and of the world! The -British suffered considerably, but they withdrew -in perfect order, and took their place in the line. -Meantime the other divisions of the French -crossed, and advanced within cannon-shot of - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Battle of Talavera.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the allied army. They cannonaded the left of -the British position, and they attacked the -Spanish infantry with their horse, hoping to -break through and win the town; but they -were bravely withstood and finally repulsed. -The action ceased a little before nine at night. -A little before eleven the first line of the Spanish -left opened a tremendous fire; Sir Arthur, who -was near the spot, observed that the fire was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">20</span> -admirably well kept up, and hoped they would -do as well next day; but as he suspected that -at that moment there was nothing to fire at, he -wished to stop it. While he was speaking, three -battalions of Spaniards, alarmed at their own -noise, gave way, and fairly took to their heels. -The vacancy was promptly filled up; and these -very men the next day bore their full share of -the battle, and behaved as steadily as the best -troops could have done. Victor had marked -the height on which General Hill was posted; -he considered it to be the key of the position, -and thought that, if he could beat the English -from thence, it would be impossible for them to -maintain the field afterwards. This might best -be done during the night. He therefore ordered -Ruffin to attack the hill with three regiments, -Vilatte to support him, and Lapisse to -make a feint upon the centre of the allied -armies, which might serve as a diversion. The -attack was made soon after night had closed; -for a moment it was successful, and they got -possession of the height. General Hill instantly -attacked them with the bayonet, and recovered -the post. At midnight the attempt was repeated, -and failed again. According to the French -account, one of the regiments destined for this -service lost its way, owing to the darkness, and -another was impeded by the ravine. Both sides -suffered considerably at this well-contested point. -The armies lay upon the field, the cavalry with -their bridles round their arms; but there was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">21</span> -little rest during the night; both sides were on -the alert and alarm, and in different parts of the -field the videttes of each army were sometimes -fired on by their own countrymen, being mistaken -for enemies. Whole battalions of the -enemy got into the English line, some crying -that they were Spaniards, some that they were -German deserters: the trick was soon discovered, -and, in the reception which they met -with, it is not unlikely that many a poor German, -who really intended to desert, lost his -life. These night-engagements were carried on -with the most determined fury; the men, after -they had discharged their muskets, frequently -closed, and fought with the butt-end.</p> - -<p>The French had ascertained, in the course of -the evening, that any attack upon the town, -posted as the Spaniards were, was hopeless; -that the centre also was very strong, both from -the rugged ground and the olive-yards which -covered it, and the works which had been thrown -up there. The left was the most practicable -point of attack, and the difficulty of carrying -that they had severely experienced. There, -however, they made a third attempt at daybreak, -with three regiments under General Ruffin advancing -in close columns. They proceeded -triumphantly, as they supposed, nearly to the -summit; when they were again charged and -again beaten back, but they fell back in good -order. Sir Arthur, for the better security of -this post, now sent two brigades of horse into<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">22</span> -the valley on the left. Alburquerque had at -this time been ordered by the Spanish commander -to go with his cavalry to a place near -the town, where it was impossible for them to -act, and there was not even room for them, the -ground being thickly wooded. On this occasion -he ventured to act from his own judgement; -observing that the English cavalry were charged -by very superior numbers, he hastened to support -them, and his opportune arrival enabled -them to occupy the position. Cuesta perceived -the advantage of this movement, and suffered the -Duke to choose his own ground, who accordingly -took the post of danger with the English horse. -To annoy this body, the French sent their riflemen -to the heights on the left of the valley; -thus occupying the ground which Sir Arthur -had supposed beyond the bounds to which the -action would extend. It proved of no advantage -to them; for Cuesta, marking the movement, -dispatched Camp-marshal Bassecourt against -them with the fifth division of Spanish infantry, -and dislodged them with great loss.</p> - -<p>About eleven, the enemy having been baffled -in all their attempts, intermitted the attack, -rested their troops, and, it is said, cooked their -dinners upon the field. Wine and a little bread -were served out to the British troops. A brook -which flows into the Tagus separated the French -and English in one part of the field, and during -this pause men of both armies went there to -drink, as if a truce had been established. Their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">23</span> -muskets were laid down and their helmets put -off while they stooped to the stream, and when -they had quenched their thirst, they rested on -the brink, looking at each other. The heat -and exasperation of battle were suspended; they -felt that mutual respect which proofs of mutual -courage had inspired, and some of them shook -hands across the brook, in token that although -they were met to shed each other’s blood, brave -men knew how to value a brave enemy. At -such a moment it was natural for Englishmen -to have no other feeling; ... the atrocities by -which Buonaparte’s soldiers in the Peninsula -had disgraced their profession, their country, -and their nature, were for the time forgotten. -This interval also was taken for bringing off the -wounded who lay intermingled as they had fallen. -And here also a redeeming sense of humanity -was manifested; all hostility being suspended -among those who were thus employed, and each -striving who should with most alacrity assist -the other in extricating the common sufferers. -About noon Victor ordered a general attack -along the whole line. His own three divisions -were to attack the hill once more. Sebastiani -was to form his first division in two lines on the -left of Lapisse; Leval, with a brigade just then -arriving from Aranjuez, to be stationed to the -left of this division, a little in the rear; still -further left, Milhaud, with his dragoons, was to -observe Talavera; Latour Maubourg’s infantry -and Merlin’s light-horse formed in the rear of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">24</span> -Victor to support his corps, and advance into -the open ground now occupied by him, as soon -as he should have won the hill. The reserve -was placed in a third line behind Sebastiani’s -corps.</p> - -<p>From the moment this general attack commenced, -the firing of musketry was heard on all -sides like the roll of a drum, with scarcely a -moment’s interruption during the remainder of -the day, the deeper sound of a heavy cannonade -rising above it like thunder. The operations of -the French were deranged by a blunder of Leval’s -division, which they attribute to the ruggedness -of the ground, and the impossibility of preserving -the line among the olive-trees and vines. -Instead of forming in <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">echellon</i> in the rear, it advanced -to the front, and before it had finished -deploying it was attacked. Sebastiani sent a -brigade to its support, and it fell back to the -ground which it was designed to occupy. This -occasioned some delay. When the line was -formed, Sebastiani waited till Victor had begun -the attack. Lapisse first crossed the ravine, -supported by Latour Maubourg’s cavalry, and -by two batteries, each of eight pieces of cannon. -Vilatte threatened the hills and covered the -valley, and Ruffin, skirting the great chain of -mountains to the left, endeavoured to turn the -flank of the British army. The attack upon the -hill was exceedingly formidable, but, like all the -former, it failed. Lapisse was mortally wounded, -his men were driven back, and Victor himself<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">25</span> -rallied them, and brought them once more to -the contested point; their retrograde movement -had exposed Sebastiani’s right, and there also -the French suffered considerably.</p> - -<p>While Victor led his troops once more to the -foot of that hill which had so often been fatal to -the assailants, Vilatte with the columns in the -valley advanced to his support. General Anson’s -brigade, consisting of the 1st German light -dragoons and the 23d dragoons, with General -Fane’s heavy cavalry, were ordered to charge -them. The French formed in two solid squares; -they were protected by a deep ravine, which was -not perceived till the horses were close to it; and -they kept up a tremendous fire of artillery and -musketry. This was the most destructive part -of the whole action; numbers of men and horse -fell into the ravine, ... numbers were mown down. -But the portion which got over were collected -as well as he could by the Honourable Major -Ponsonby, and led upon the bayonets of the enemy. -They passed between two columns of infantry, -against which they could effect nothing, then -galloped upon the regiment of chasseurs which -supported them. Here they were charged by -some regiments in reserve, surrounded, broken, -dispersed, and almost destroyed, losing two-thirds -of their number. The rest (Lord William Russell -was among them) passed through the intervals -of the French columns, and retired within -their own lines. Injudicious and unfortunate as -the charge was, the desperate courage with which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">26</span> -officers and men had advanced upon almost certain -destruction astonished the enemy; it put -an end to their efforts on that side, and no further -attempt was made upon the hill, which was now -covered with dead, dying, wounded, and exhausted -troops.</p> - -<p>The attack upon the centre was made at the -same time. General Campbell was supported -by Eguia and Henestrosa, and by a regiment of -Spanish horse; the allies repulsed the enemy, -and while the Spaniards turned their flank, the -English took their cannon. A column, chiefly -consisting of Germans, advanced with excellent -steadiness through a heavy fire of artillery, like -men who, having obtained the highest military -character, were resolved to keep it. They were -received by Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke’s -men with a volley of musketry which staggered -them; the whole British division then rushed -forward with the bayonet, and by that irresistible -charge the enemy were driven back with -great slaughter. But the brigade of Guards advanced -too far in pursuit; they were attacked -by the French reserve, they were cut down by -a close fire of artillery from a wood; in a few -minutes all their mounted officers were killed, -with more than 500 men, and at that moment -the fate of the day appeared worse than doubtful. -But Sir Arthur’s foresight secured the victory -which had been so long contested. Seeing the -advance, and apprehending the consequence, he -moved a battalion of the 48th from the heights<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">27</span> -to their support; and this timely succour, with -the assistance of the second line of General -Cotton’s cavalry, saved the brigade from that -total destruction which must else have been inevitable. -The broken Guards passed through -the intervals of the 48th, re-formed behind it, -and then in their turn supported the regiment -which had preserved them. Upon their advance, -the enemy, whose heart now failed them, -retired: the Guards renewed the huzzas with -which they had advanced, and the cry was taken -up along the whole line. It was the shout of -victory on the part of the allies; for though the -light troops continued to fire, and from time to -time a heavy cannonade was renewed, the enemy -made no further attempt.</p> - -<p>A circumstance more horrid than unfrequent -in war occurred toward the close of the action; -the long dry grass took fire, and many of the -wounded were scorched to death. It was night -before the battle ended, and the allies were far -from certain that it would not be renewed on the -morrow. The moon rose dimly, the night was -chill and damp because of the heavy dew; the -troops lay in position on the ground, without -covering, and without food; even water was -scarce; but the officers and the generals were -faring alike, and neither murmuring was heard for -their privations, nor apprehension felt for what -the morrow might bring forth. The French had -made large fires along the whole front of their -line. At daylight the troops were under arms,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">28</span> -and in order of battle, ... but the enemy had disappeared, -a rear-guard only being in sight on -the left of the Alberche. The Intruder had -been a spectator of the whole action. During -the night contradictory reports were brought -him, some affirming that another attack must -ensure the victory, others that Victor’s right had -been turned, and he could not possibly keep his -ground. In this dilemma Joseph sent to ascertain -which was the true report, and retired to -rest, in expectation of having the favourable one -confirmed, the reserve bivouacking round him. -At daybreak he was awakened by Sebastiani, -who had fallen back with his corps upon the -reserve during the night, and who came with -tidings that he had been compelled to make this -retrograde movement, because Victor was retreating -along the foot of the hills to Casalegas. -This intelligence left no time for deliberation. -The Intruder began to retreat also, but in perfect -order; Milhaud’s division formed the rear, -and Latour Maubourg brought off many of the -wounded. Twenty pieces of cannon were taken -by the conquerors; the prisoners were not many.</p> - -<p>Our loss had been very heavy; 801 killed, -3913 wounded, 653 missing. The Spaniards -had 1250 killed and wounded. Generals Mackenzie -and Langworth fell. Two bullets passed -through Sir Arthur’s clothes, and he received a -severe contusion on the shoulder from a spent -musket-ball. During the second action no attack -was made upon the main body of Cuesta’s army;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">29</span> -the position was too strong, and the French -rightly judged, that if, by bringing their whole -force to bear upon the English, they could defeat -them, Cuesta’s discomfiture must necessarily -follow. On this day, therefore, they were in the -proportion of more than two to one to the troops -whom they engaged. The British entered the -field 18,300 effective men; they were opposed -to not less than 48,000. The presence of the -Spaniards was of vital importance, by the security -which they afforded to the right of our army; -and essential service was afforded by those who -came into action on the second day, especially -by Alburquerque and Bassecourt, and by two -battalions under Brigadier-General Whittingham, -in their service, who came forward to -support the Guards; but the brunt of the battle -was borne by the British, as the loss which they -sustained evinces. From their loss that of the -defeated enemy might fairly be computed, if the -numbers left upon the field had not afforded -surer ground. Both Spaniards and English state -it at not less than 10,000 men; the number of -their dead was so great, that Cuesta ordered out -his troops by battalions to burn them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Cuesta decimates some of his troops.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Spaniards, where they were well commanded, -behaved well; but melancholy proofs -were given of the inefficient state of their armies. -The whole of their commissariat took flight as -soon as the action began, with all the people -belonging to them; so that after the battle the -allies found themselves in total want of food<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">30</span> -and resources. Three or four corps threw -down their muskets without having once discharged -them, and dispersed; some of them -plundered the baggage. Cuesta was so indignant -at this, that after the action he ordered -the division to be decimated, and it was only -after much entreaty from the British Commander -that he consented to re-decimate those -on whom the lot had fallen, and six officers and -some thirty men were actually executed. Sir -Arthur remarked upon this occasion, with equal -humanity and wisdom, that fear of disgrace -would affect the Spaniards more than fear of -death, and that for this reason, among others, -exertions ought to be made for clothing them -in uniform. Marching to battle as they did, -without any thing to distinguish them for soldiers, -in the first panic they threw away their -arms and accoutrements, and pretended to be -peasants. Men dressed as soldiers could not -thus at once put off the marks of their profession, -and that being the case, they would feel -that their safety depended upon keeping their -arms and standing their ground; and when the -whole army was uniformly clothed, it would be -easy to deprive the soldier who should misbehave -of a part of his uniform, or to fix upon him -some mark of disgrace,—a mode of punishment, -he said, the most effectual as well as the most -humane. Cuesta had just experienced the good -effect of such measures; the regiments whom -he deprived of one of their pistols for misconduct<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">31</span> -at the battle of Medellin, behaved so well -from that time, and exerted themselves so strenuously -on all occasions to wipe off their disgrace, -that, after the battle of Talavera, the -pistol was restored to them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>State of Talavera.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The wounded of both armies were brought -in promiscuously, and many of them laid in the -streets and in the squares till shelter could be -allotted for them: even for this inevitable necessity -no order having been taken by the -Spanish authorities. It is worthy of notice, -that a greater proportion recovered of those -who were left a night upon the field, than of such -as were earlier housed, and this is explained by -the effect of the free air in preventing fever. -Needful accommodations for these poor creatures -were not to be found in a city which the -French had visited. They had destroyed the -public buildings, overturned the altars, and -opened the tombs. Furniture of every kind -they had carried off to their camp, and what -they had no other use for, they had consumed -as fuel. Frenchmen like, they had a theatre in -their camp. The soldiers’ huts were so remarkable -for neatness and regularity, as to be an object -of curiosity to the British officers; but it -was remarked as one proof of the wanton destruction -caused by the Intruder’s armies, that -they were all thatched with unthreshed straw. -It ought to be mentioned as a contrast to this, -that when the British troops halted by day or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">32</span> -night amid olive-groves, they were not allowed -to cut the trees either for fuel or for shelter.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Movements of Sir R. Wilson.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The day after the action a light brigade, 3000 -strong, and a troop of horse-artillery, under Brigadier-General -Craufurd, arrived from Lisbon to -reinforce the British army, which thus found itself -nearly as strong as before the action. But -a battle so well contested, and so gloriously won, -was rendered of no avail, by the complicated -misconduct of the Spanish government and of -the Spanish general. The same want of provisions -and of the means of transport, which -had compelled Sir Arthur to halt at Talavera, -prevented him from pursuing his victory. The -Intruder, ignorant of this, trembled for Madrid, -expecting every hour to hear that Venegas, Sir -R. Wilson, and the combined forces were marching -upon that city, where the people were looking -out for their deliverers. Sir Robert had -proceeded with his corps to Navalcarneiro, notwithstanding -the immediate neighbourhood of -the enemy’s army. The detachment reached -the Guadarrama: he had established a communication -with Madrid, Belliard was preparing to -withdraw from the city into the Retiro, which -had been fortified as a citadel, and Sir Robert -had made arrangements for entering the metropolis -on the night of that very day when he -and his corps were recalled, because a general -action was expected. Some insurrectionary -movements had already appeared, which Belliard<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">33</span> -had been able to suppress; but it was certain -that the moment an army came to the assistance -of the citizens, he would no longer be able to -keep them down. Joseph’s hope, therefore, was -from an attack upon the rear of the allies, to be -made by the collected forces of Soult, Ney, and -Mortier, under command of the former.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Movements of Soult, Ney, and Mortier.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Soult, after his retreat from Galicia, occupied -Zamora, Salamanca, and Leon, with the remains -of his army, which he had found means to reequip. -Ney’s corps was quartered at Astorga, -Benevente, and Leon; Mortier’s at Medina del -Campo, and Valladolid. Apprised of the movements -of the English, Soult gave orders on the -20th for collecting the whole at Salamanca, and -four days afterwards was instructed by Jourdan, -in the Intruder’s name, to advance as speedily -as possible upon the rear of the enemy by way -of Plasencia. Sir Arthur, from the commencement -of the campaign, was aware of the existence -of this force in the north, and the manner -in which it would attempt to act. His own -army was so small, that it was not possible for -him to spare detachments for securing the passes -of the long mountain-ridge which the French - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Cuesta neglects to secure the passes.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -must cross. But Cuesta had sent the Marquess -de la Reyna, with two battalions from his own -army and two from Bejar, to occupy the Puerto -de Baños, and given orders to the Duque del -Parque to secure the Puerto de Perales, by detachments -from Ciudad Rodrigo. The former -point Sir Arthur considered safe; but, doubting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">34</span> -the Duque’s power to spare a sufficient force -for the latter, he directed Beresford, with the -Portugueze troops, to defend this pass, as the -greatest service which, in their then state of discipline, -they were capable of performing.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Intelligence of Soult’s advance.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Two days after the battle, intelligence was -brought to Talavera that 12,000 rations had -been ordered at Fuente Duenas for the 28th, -and 24,000 at Los Santos on the same day, for -a French army, which it was supposed was on -its march to the Puerto de Baños. Cuesta upon -this discovered some anxiety respecting that -post, and proposed that Sir R. Wilson with his -corps should be sent thither. This could not -be assented to, for his corps was stationed in -the mountains towards Escalona, still keeping up -a communication with the people of Madrid, ... -an advantage too important to be foregone. Of -this Cuesta appeared sensible; yet he could not -be prevailed upon to send a detachment from -his own army; and Sir Arthur, considering that -they had no other grounds for believing this was -the point which was threatened than that the -rations were ordered, which might be a feint, -and hoping too that the troops already there -might prove sufficient, and even that the news -of his late victory might deter the French from -proceeding, did not press the Spanish general -further that day. Night brought with it the -anxious feeling that a point had now become of -prime importance, concerning which he could -not be satisfied that proper means had been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">35</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">July 31.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -taken for its defence; and in the morning he -again pressed Cuesta upon the subject, urging -him to detach thither a division of infantry, -with its guns, and a commanding officer on -whom he could rely. “Certainly,” he declared, -“he never would have advanced so far, if reason -had not been given him to believe that pass -was secure. The division would not be missed -at Talavera; if it arrived in time it would perform -a service of the greatest moment; and -even if the enemy should have crossed the -mountains before its arrival, it would then be in -a situation to observe him.” But Cuesta was -not to be persuaded. That day and the following -elapsed; on the third came tidings that -the French had entered Bejar; and then the -Spanish general dispatched Bassecourt with a -force which might have sufficed had it been -sent in time.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Soult occupies Plasencia.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Mortier began his march from Salamanca on -the 27th, Soult followed on the 30th, Ney two -days afterwards, all taking the same route. The -advance fell in with the Marquess de la Reyna’s -out-posts at La Calzala, and pursued them to -Bejar and Col de Baños. The two battalions -on which Cuesta had relied before the appearance -of danger, consisted of only 600 men, -supplied with twenty rounds of ammunition! -Even this was more than they employed; they -attempted to blow up the bridge called Cuesper -de Hombre, and failing in that, retired without -firing a shot. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809. August.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -The battalions of Bejar dispersed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">36</span> -as soon as they saw the enemy. Yet such was -the strength of this position, that the very sight -of the Spaniards delayed Mortier’s march, in -consequence of the dispositions which he thought -it necessary to make for forcing it if it had been -defended, and he did not enter Plasencia till the -first of August. The occupation of that place -was of the greatest importance; the French had -now intercepted sir Arthur’s communication with -Portugal, and were enabled to manœuvre upon -his rear if he advanced toward Madrid, or remained -at Talavera.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Sir Arthur marches against him.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Cuesta now proposed that half the British army -should march against Soult, while the other half -maintained the post at Talavera. Sir Arthur -said he was ready either to go or stay with the -whole British army, but he would not divide it; -the choice was left to him, and he preferred -going, thinking his own troops were most likely -to accomplish the object of the march, perhaps -even without a contest. It appears that he was -not aware of the enemy’s force: Cuesta estimated -it at twelve or fourteen thousand, and Sir -Arthur did not at that time suppose it to be -larger. He preferred the alternative of going -for another reason also, feeling it of more importance -to him that the communication through -Plasencia should be opened than it was to the -Spaniards, though highly important to them also. -The movements of Victor in front induced him -to suppose that the enemy, despairing of any -better success at Talavera than they had already<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">37</span> -experienced, intended to fall upon Sir R. Wilson, -and force a passage by Escalona: thus to act in -concert with Soult between the Alberche and -the Tietar. Sir Robert also felt himself seriously -menaced, and some letters which he intercepted -gave him sufficient information to ascertain that -these were the plans of the enemy; he therefore -informed the British General that he should -remove his artillery to St. Roman, occupy the -Panada with 300 men, a strong height behind -Montillo with 600 more, from whence there was -a good retreat to St. Valuela, and return with -the rest to a position, in readiness either to -occupy Valuela, or obey such instructions as he -might receive. In this state of things, Sir Arthur -perceived how possible it was that Cuesta might -be forced to quit Talavera before he could return -to it, and this made him uneasy for his hospital. -At all events, he thought it too far advanced. -He therefore entreated Cuesta to make a requisition -for carts, and remove the wounded as -expeditiously as was consistent with their safety, -by first sending them to an intermediate station -at no great distance, from whence they might -gradually be passed to the place which should -ultimately be fixed upon. He wrote to Bassecourt, -requesting that he, with that division -which had been dispatched to secure the passes -after they had been lost, would halt at Centiello, -and watch the vale of Plasencia; and he again -recommended to the Spanish commander, that -Venegas should be ordered to threaten Madrid<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">38</span> -by the road of Arganda, that being the only -means whereby it was possible to alarm the -enemy, and make him divide his forces.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 3.</span> <br />Cuesta determines to follow Sir Arthur.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Having thus taken every precaution, he marched -to Oropesa, with the intention of either compelling -Soult to retreat, or giving him battle. -At five in the evening he learned that the enemy -were at Naval Moral, not more than eighteen -miles distant; thus having placed themselves -between him and the bridge of Almaraz, as if -they meant to cut off his retreat across the -Tagus. An hour afterwards dispatches came -from Talavera, inclosing an intercepted letter -from Jourdan to Soult, wherein the latter was -told that the British army was at least 25,000 -strong, and yet he was ordered to bring it to -action wherever he could find it; from this -Cuesta inferred that Soult could not have less -than 30,000 men, and this was the precise number -at which the friar, on whom the letter had -been found, stated his army. But the most -grievous part of the intelligence was, that Victor -was again advancing, and had reached St. Olalla, -and that Cuesta, seeing himself threatened both -in front and in flank, and apprehending the -British would require assistance, was determined -to march and join them. Painful as it was thus -to abandon the wounded, he considered that he -must have abandoned them if he were driven -from the position, and that position being now -open on the left, he did not think himself able -to maintain it. Sir Arthur immediately wrote<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">39</span> -to represent that the danger was far less imminent -than Cuesta apprehended; the enemy, he -thought, were not likely to attack Talavera, nor -to occupy the British long. It would be time -to march when they knew that the French had -forced their way at Escalona, or were breaking -up from St. Olalla. Victor was certainly alone, -and Sebastiani and the Intruder occupied by -Venegas. At all events he urged him to delay -his march till the next day, send off his commissariat -and baggage before him, and halt in -the woods till the wounded were arrived at the -bridge of Arzobispo. Soult’s force, he said, was -certainly overrated.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur’s mistake upon this subject arose -from his being ignorant that Mortier had formed -a junction with this army. He supposed that it -consisted only of the corps of Soult and Ney, -who had brought out of Galicia 18,000 men, -the remains of 36,000 with which they entered -that country. Cuesta, however, was better informed; -and he himself altered his opinion of -the enemy’s force when he considered the positive -orders which the Intruder had given for -attacking the British army, supposing it to consist - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Cuesta joins the British.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -of 25,000 men. Cuesta had not asked Sir -Arthur’s advice, and did not wait to receive it: -he left Talavera before it reached him, marched -all night, and joined the British at Oropesa soon -after daylight on the 4th. His apprehension of -danger to himself was well founded: it was not -without great exertions and heavy loss that the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">40</span> -combined armies had repulsed the French at -Talavera; well, therefore, might he despair of -withstanding them alone if they returned to the -attack. But the danger which by this hasty -retreat he averted from himself, he brought -upon Venegas and Sir Arthur; and the latter, -in addition to the mortification of having his -wounded fall into the hands of the enemy, saw -himself exposed to an attack in front and in rear -at the same time by two armies, each superior - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>They retreat across the Tagus.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -to his own. It was absolutely necessary to -retreat, otherwise nothing but two victories -could extricate the troops from their perilous -situation, and they were little capable of extraordinary -exertions, not having had their full -allowance of provisions for several days. The -bridge of Almaraz had been destroyed, and when -the Marquess de la Reyna abandoned his post -at the pass, he made for this point, with the -intention of removing the bridge of boats that -had been placed there; the boats indeed might -be still in the river, but it was thought impossible -to reach Almaraz without a battle. If he moved -on to give the enemy battle, the French from -Talavera would break down the bridge of Arzobispo, -and thus intercept the only way by which -a retreat was practicable; the same danger would -be incurred if he took a position at Oropesa. -Nothing remained, therefore, but to cross at -Arzobispo, while it was yet in his power, and -take up a defensive post upon the Tagus: the -sooner a defensive line should be taken, the more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">41</span> -likely were the troops to be able to defend it. -On the day, therefore, that Cuesta formed his -unfortunate junction, Sir Arthur retreated by -this route, and crossed. Cuesta followed on -the night of the 5th.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Col. Mackinnon removes some of the wounded.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Sir Arthur had left Colonel Mackinnon in -command at Talavera with the charge of the -sick and wounded, amounting, with those attached -to the hospital, to about 5000 persons. -On the evening of one day the charge had been -given him, and on the next at noon Cuesta -informed him that Soult was at Plasencia with -30,000 men, and that Victor was in his front, -only six leagues distant; the monk who discovered -their plans, being the bearer of a letter -from the Intruder to Soult, was in the room: it -was his intention to retire at dusk with the -Spanish army and join Sir Arthur, and the -hospital had better be got off before that time. -Colonel Mackinnon had been instructed, in case -of such necessity, to make for Merida by way -of the Puente del Arzobispo: but it was with -difficulty he could procure from Cuesta seven -waggons to remove a few of the wounded. There -was no alternative but to recommend those whom -there was no possibility of removing to the honour -and humanity of the French commanders; and -Colonel Mackinnon, who had lived in France, -and was in every respect one of the most accomplished -officers in the British army, did this in -a manner which was believed to have had great -effect in obtaining for them the humane and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">42</span> -honourable treatment they received. All who -were able to march were ordered to assemble at -three that afternoon, and proceed to Calera that -night, ... a town which the French had completely -destroyed. The next day they were -overtaken at Arzobispo by the British army, -and instead of passing the night there, as had -been intended, were ordered to proceed. Forty -bullock-cars were added to their means of transport, -but in such ill repair for some of the worst -roads in the world, that only eleven of them -reached Deleitosa. A more difficult six days’ -march could hardly be conceived, and the difficulty -was of a kind more trying to a brave and -feeling mind than danger. There was only a -commissary’s clerk to provide for them, and the -runaway Spaniards were plundering the small -magazines in all the villages. Reports that the -French had crossed the Tagus, and were in their -front, alarmed his men, who were in no condition -for the field, and many of them took to the -mountains. Mackinnon mustered his force in -a convent near Deleitosa; it consisted then of -2000 men, and these he conducted to Elvas, -without magazines, with no assistance from the -magistrates, who, on the contrary, sometimes -evinced a hostile disposition; and with such -want of humanity on the part of the people -(made callous by selfishness, and selfish by -necessity), that he was often obliged to use -violent means, or the men must have been -starved.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">43</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Defeat of the Spaniards at Arzobispo.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The British army was now stationed at Deleitosa, -whence they could defend the point of -Almaraz and the lower parts of the Tagus. -Cuesta remained at Arzobispo; but so little in -concert with Sir Arthur, that he moved his head-quarters, -and suffered three days to elapse without -sending him any information of his plans or -movements. On the night of the 7th, he removed -to Peraleda de Garbin, leaving two divisions -of infantry and Alburquerque’s division of -cavalry to defend the passage of the river. This -was an imprudent measure, for the enemy were -in force on the left bank; they had already attempted -to win the bridge, and were now erecting -batteries. The bridge was barricaded, and -defended by several batteries with embrasures -connected by a covered way, and upon these -works the general relied with such confidence, -that he thought he might safely withdraw the -greater part of his army to more convenient -quarters. Cuesta ought to have understood the -nature of this post; he had been blamed for -abandoning it in the former part of the year: -satisfied, however, with having fortified the -bridge, he never thought of examining whether - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 8.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the river might not be fordable. Mortier, who -commanded the corps of the French which led -the pursuit, erected batteries to call off the attention -of the Spaniards, while he ordered the -chief of his staff, Dombrowsky, with two good - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Operations de M. Soult, 524.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -swimmers, to sound the Tagus. His officer of -engineers had observed, that when the Spanish<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">44</span> -horse were brought to drink they went some way -into the river; trial was made where this indication -promised some hope of success, and a -good ford, passable even for infantry, was found -there, not two hundred yards above the bridge -and the Spanish batteries. Soult, who had now -come up, resolved to effect the passage in the -heat of the day, when the Spaniards would be -taking their mid-day sleep, and might be surprised. -He calculated upon a carelessness which -he was sure to find. The Spaniards relied upon -the river for their defence, never having deemed -it needful to ascertain how far it might be relied -on: the passage was accomplished almost -as soon as they were aware of the attempt; the -works of the bridge were taken in the rear, -some of the Spanish artillerymen were cut down - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Naylies, 174.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -at their guns, and others, in a manner not to be -justified by any laws of war, were compelled to -turn them upon their countrymen; the works -were presently demolished, and the way opened -for Girard’s infantry. Alburquerque’s cavalry -were reposing under some trees, a short league -from the scene of action; at the first alarm they - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Naylies, 175.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -hastened to support their countrymen; and their -charge was made with such resolution and effect, -that Soult is said to have thought of firing grape -upon them through his own men, as the only -means of repelling them. But succours came to -the French in time for preventing this atrocious -expedient; and the Spaniards, horse and foot -alike, retreated, or rather fled through a mountainous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">45</span> -country, which favoured their escape, -leaving their ammunition, their baggage, and -the whole of their artillery. The slain were estimated -by the French at 1600 men, most of -whom were cut down in a pursuit from which -the enemy returned with every man his sabre -red with blood. Some of the French were -drowned in the passage, their other loss was -trifling. The same frightful circumstance as at -Talavera occurred after the action; the herbage -took fire; the wind spread the flames far and -wide, among stubble, dry shrubs, and groves of - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Naylies, 177.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -ilex and of olives; ... on all sides the cries of the -wounded were heard; and through the night -muskets, which the fugitives had thrown away, -went off, cartridges took fire, and cassoons of -artillery exploded.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Movements of Marshal Ney.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The commonest precaution might have saved -the Spaniards from this defeat, in which, though -the loss of men was not great, that of artillery -and ammunition was considerable, and the moral -effect upon the troops of more importance than -either. It seems, indeed, that Soult advanced -to Arzobispo in the sole hope of profiting by the -negligence of the Spanish commanders to strike -some such blow; for the enemy had no intention -at this time of carrying the war into Extremadura, -finding Almaraz too well defended, and -the fords, which were said to exist below the -bridge, impassable. Ney had formed the design -of crossing them, and taking possession of the -defiles of Deleitosa and Xaraicejo, thus to cut<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">46</span> -off the retreat of the English toward Portugal; -but those points were secured by Sir Arthur, as -well as the passage of the river, and the French -Marshal was ordered back to Salamanca to secure -that part of the country, in concert with -Kellermann, against the Duque del Parque and -the Conde de Noroña, who had been prevented -from occupying the enemy on that side for want -of artillery and cavalry; the former, however, -was now beginning to act on the offensive. Ney -began his march on the 9th to the Puerto de -Baños, in his way towards Old Castille; and this -brought him in contact with Sir Robert Wilson.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Action with Sir R. Wilson at the Puerto de Baños.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>When the British commander left Talavera, -Cuesta’s advanced guard was in communication -with Sir Robert, and that officer was informed -of the intended retreat of the Spaniards, that he -might in like manner fall back. But he was advanced -too far for this to be practicable; after -a long march through the mountains, he found -himself, on the night of the 14th, six leagues -from Arzobispo; the high road between Oropesa -and Talavera was to be crossed, and Victor -was in possession of Talavera; thinking it, -therefore, too late to reach Arzobispo, he determined -to move by Puerto de San Julien and -Centinello, and cross the Tietar toward the -mountains. On the 11th he reached Baños, and -had set out the following morning on the road -of Grenadilla, to restore by this route his communication -with the allied armies, when a cloud -of dust was perceived on the road of Plasencia,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">47</span> -and a peasant assured him it proceeded from a -body of the enemy. Readily believing what -was so probable, he turned back, and took post -in front of Baños, placing 200 Spanish infantry -under Colonel Grant in advance of Aldea Nueva. -The enemy’s chasseurs and voltigeurs advanced -in considerable bodies under General Lorset; -and Grant, after a resistance in which the Spaniards -demeaned themselves gallantly, was compelled -to fall back. The French then attempted -to cut off Sir Robert’s own legion, which was -posted between Aldea Nueva and Baños: he had -strengthened his position by every means which -the time allowed, so that they could only advance -gradually, and with severe loss from the -fire of musketry which was kept up upon them. -At length part of the Merida battalion on the -right gave way, and a road was thus left open -by which the position might have been turned. -Then Sir Robert ordered a retreat upon the -heights above Baños, and from thence sent to -secure the road of Monte Mayor, which turned -the Puerto de Baños, a league in the rear, and -by which the French were directing a column. -Don Carlos d’Espagna came up at this time with -his battalion of light infantry, took post along -the heights commanding the road to Baños, and -enabled Sir Robert to detach a party to the -mountain on the left, commanding the main -road. On the Extremadura side this Puerto is -not a pass of such strength as on the side of Castille. -Sir Robert had no artillery, and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">48</span> -French were not less than treble the number of -his troops; nevertheless he maintained his ground -for nine hours. At six in the evening, three -columns of the enemy succeeded in gaining the -height on the left; his post was then no longer -tenable, and he retired along the mountains, -leaving open the main road, along which a considerable -column of cavalry immediately hastened. -It came in sight of the battalion of Seville, which -had been left at Bejar with orders to follow on -the morrow; but when Sir Robert was obliged -to retire, and the action commenced, he ordered -it to the pass to watch the Monte Mayor road -and the heights on the rear of his left. As soon -as the French cavalry came nigh, an officer with -some dragoons rode on, and called out to the -Spanish commanders to surrender. They were -answered by a volley that killed the whole party; -the Spaniards then began to mount the heights; -they were attacked and surrounded by two -bodies, one of horse, the other of foot; but they -succeeded in cutting their way through, and -Ney, having forced the pass, hastened on to -Salamanca. Sir Robert’s loss was not considerable, -and after halting two days at Miranda de -Castañas, to rest his men, and collect those who -were dispersed, he proceeded on his way.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French enter Talavera.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The retreat of Cuesta from Talavera, however -much both the former and subsequent conduct -of that general may deserve censure, was, under -his circumstances, at least an excusable measure. -About 1500 of the wounded were left, whom<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">49</span> -there was no time to remove; most of whom, -indeed, were not in a state to bear removal. -Cuesta had hardly begun his march before the -French were in sight. When Victor entered the -town, he found some of the wounded, French -and English alike, lying on the ground in the -Plaza. After complimenting the English, and -observing that they understood the laws and -courtesies of war, he told them there was one -thing which they did not understand, and that - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Victor behaves well to the English wounded.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -was how to deal with the Spaniards. He then -sent soldiers to every house, with orders to the -inhabitants immediately to receive and accommodate -the wounded of the two nations, who -were lodged together, one English and one -Frenchman; and he expressly directed that the -Englishman should always be served first. Many -had already died in the square, and the stones -were covered with blood; Victor ordered the -townsmen to come with spades and besoms, remove -and bury the dead, and cleanse the Plaza; -he was speedily obeyed, and then the French -said the place was fit for them to walk in. This -was done a few hours after they entered the -town. The next day the troops were assembled -at noon, and liberty of pillaging for three -hours was allowed them. Every man was provided -with a hammer and a small saw for this -purpose in his knapsack, and they filed off by -beat of drum in regular parties to the different -quarters of the town upon this work, as a business -with which they were well acquainted.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">50</span> -Nothing escaped their search: they discovered -corn enough to supply the French army for -three months; these magazines had been concealed -both from the Spanish and English generals, -and the owners were now punished for -their treachery to their countrymen and their -allies, by the loss of the whole. Dollars enough -to load eight mules were also found hidden -beneath some broken wheels and rubbish in a -yard belonging to one of the convents.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Murder of the Bishop of Coria.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The behaviour of Victor to the wounded -English deserves more especially to be mentioned, -because Soult was carrying on the war -with unrelenting barbarity. From Plasencia he -laid waste the fertile vale in which that city -stands with fire and sword. Serradilla, Pasanon, -Arroyo-Molinos, El Barrado, Garganta la Olla, -Texada, Riolobos, Malpartida, and La Oliva, -were burnt by his troops, who, when they were -not otherwise employed, went out upon the -highways, robbed every person whose ill fortune -compelled them to travel in this miserable -country, and usually killed those whom they -robbed. D. Juan Alvarez de Castro, the Bishop -of Coria, in his eighty-sixth year, was murdered -by these wretches. When Lapisse, in the month -of June, marched from Salamanca to Alcantara, -the Bishop with great difficulty and fatigue -escaped; but the hardships which he then underwent -were too much for one in such extreme -old age, and when Soult quartered himself in -this part of the country, he was confined to his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">51</span> -bed in the village of Los Hoyos. Had he -been removed he must have died upon the -road; it was, therefore, not a matter of choice -but of necessity that he should remain and take -his chance. Three of his clergy and some of -his domestics remained with him; and a few -old men took refuge under the same roof, thinking -the presence of their venerable pastor would -render it a safe asylum. The French entered -the village, and took possession of the house -where the old prelate lay in bed. His chaplains -met them, and intreated protection for their -spiritual father, and his domestics waited upon -them, hoping to obtain favour, or at least to escape -injury. But after these ruffians had eaten and -drunk what was set before them, they plundered -the house of every thing which could be converted -to their own use, and destroyed whatever -they could not carry away. Then they -fell upon the unhappy people of the house, one -of whom they killed, and wounded six others; -lastly, they dragged the Bishop from his bed, -and discharged two muskets into his body.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Venegas’s army kept in inaction before and after the battle of Talavera.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The plans of the enemy on the side of Extremadura -were effected; they who had so lately -trembled for Madrid had seen the allied armies -recross the Tagus, and they gave themselves -credit for the fortunate issue of a campaign, in -which, if it had not been for the misconduct of -the Spanish General and of the Central Junta, -they must have been driven to the Ebro. On -the side of La Mancha they were not less successful.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">52</span> -Venegas, on the 14th of July, had -received orders to occupy the attention of the -enemy, and divert them from the allied armies -as much as possible, without endangering himself -In consequence he advanced his army -from El Moral, Ynfanles, Puerto Elano, and -Valdepeñas, to Damiel, La Solana, El Corral de -Caraquel, and Manzanares, keeping his head-quarters -still at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and expecting -intelligence which would justify him in -advancing to Consuegra and Madrilejos. At -this time he supposed it was the intention of -the combined armies to march upon Madrid; -and when the want both of provisions and -means of transport rendered it impossible for -the British army to proceed, Cuesta gave him -no intelligence of this, thereby exposing him to -be destroyed, if the French, instead of marching -upon Talavera, had directed their attack against -him. Cuesta’s whole conduct respecting the -British army was so utterly unreasonable, that -it can only be accounted for by ascribing it to -obstinacy and incapacity. The wants of the -British army were palpable; he had them before -his eyes, and could at any moment have -satisfied himself of the truth of every complaint -which he received; yet he concealed the real -state of things both from his own government -and from Venegas, to both of whom it was of -such essential importance that they should be -accurately informed. The Spanish government -received true intelligence from Mr. Frere, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">53</span> -in consequence they dispatched a courier to -Venegas, directing him to suspend his operations, -and take up a defensive position. Cuesta’s -neglect rendered it prudent to dispatch these -orders; but one evil produced another. Two -hours after the arrival of the courier, Venegas -received intelligence of the victory of Talavera, -which was the more unexpected, because the -Intruder, true to the French system, had published -an Extraordinary Gazette, stating that he -had defeated the allied armies on the 26th. -Venegas ordered Te Deum to be sung in the -neighbouring churches, and celebrated the victory -by a general discharge: but he failed to -improve it; and, instead of considering that the -circumstances under which the Junta had dictated -his instructions were now entirely changed, -he adhered strictly to them, and lost the opportunity -of advancing to Madrid; thus consummating -the series of blunders by which a campaign -so well planned, and a victory so bravely -won, were rendered fruitless. Had he pushed -for that city immediately, he might have entered -it; Sir Robert Wilson would have joined him -there, the resources of the city would have -been secured for the allies, and the recovery of -the capital would have raised the whole country -far and near against the French. If Alburquerque -had commanded this army, the momentous -opportunity would not have been lost.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>His useless attempt upon Toledo.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Venegas therefore remained with his vanguard -at Aranjuez, and his head-quarters at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">54</span> -Ocaña, while another division of his army under -Lacy was employed in an idle attempt upon -Toledo, which, as he did not choose to destroy -the houses from whence the enemy fired at him, -because it was a Spanish town, could not possibly -succeed, and therefore ought not to have -been made. On the third day after the battle -Cuesta wrote to Venegas, directing him to advance -upon Madrid. “This operation,” he -said, “must oblige Victor to detach a large -part of his force toward the capital, in which -case the allies would pursue him to that city, -and if any unforeseen accident should compel -Venegas to retire, he might retreat by Arganda -and along the skirts of the mountains.” This -letter was written at eleven at night. Twelve -hours afterwards Cuesta forwarded a second -dispatch, stating that Victor’s army had marched -in the direction of Torrijos and Toledo. Venegas, -upon receiving the first, ordered his whole -force to unite at Aranjuez, meaning to lose no -time in reaching the capital. The contents of -the second staggered him; if the enemy marched -for Toledo, they would fall on his rear-guard; if -they went through Torrijos direct upon Madrid, -they had the start, and would get between him -and that city. He determined, therefore, still -to collect his force in the neighbourhood of -Aranjuez, and there wait for fresh orders; and -he reminded Cuesta how indispensably necessary -it was that their movements should be combined.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">55</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Venegas complains of Cuesta.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>His army was collected on the night of the -3d, leaving only 600 foot and 200 horse in the -neighbourhood of Toledo. The next day he -received another dispatch from Cuesta, telling -him of his march from Talavera to reinforce -Sir Arthur. This letter was written with preposterous -confidence; he was going, he said, to -secure the victory against Soult, after which -they should return to attack Victor. Meantime -he advised Venegas to bear in mind, that general -actions with better disciplined troops than -their own did not suit them. Venegas felt the -danger of his own situation, but his prevailing -feelings were indignation and resentment at the -multiplied proofs of incapacity which Cuesta -had given. He wrote to his government, stating -“that he was thus left to himself with an -army inferior in number to the enemy, and, by -the acknowledgement of the captain-general, -inferior in discipline also: how much more -deeply should he have been committed, if, in -obedience to that general’s orders, he had -marched upon Madrid, relying on the promised -support of the allied armies!” The reflection -was just as well as natural; but Venegas ought -to have reflected also, that if he had marched -upon Madrid in time, that support would not -have failed him. He added that no choice was -left, save of commencing a retreat, which would -dispirit the troops and destroy the national enthusiasm -in all the places which they had occupied -and must now abandon. Consequences<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">56</span> -like these, which were immediately before his -eyes, made him determine to remain where he -was, and fight if he were attacked, preferring -to be cut to pieces rather than submit to a -shameful flight.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Intruder’s movements after the battle.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The enemy were well aware of the danger to -which they had been exposed from the army of -La Mancha. The Intruder, after his defeat at -Talavera, retreated to Santa Olalla, leaving Victor -to take up a position behind the Alberche, -and watch the combined armies. The next day -he moved to Bargas and Olias, near Toledo. On -the night of the 31st, he received advices from -Victor, who, being alarmed by Sir Robert Wilson’s -movements, was about to fall back to Maqueda; -at the same time he learnt that Venegas -was collecting his force at Aranjuez and threatening -Madrid. Alarmed at this, he ordered Sebastiani -and the corps of reserve to take up a position -at Illescas, from whence they might either -advance rapidly to support Victor, or to attack -Venegas. Victor’s next advices expressed further -fears from the troops at Escalona, whose -force he supposed to be far greater than it was: -“If the enemy advanced in that direction,” he -said, “as seemed probable, he should retire to -Mostoles.” Joseph, trembling for the capital, -moved to that place himself in the night between -the 3d and 4th: Mostoles is only twelve miles -from Madrid, ... so near had the scene of action -been brought. From thence, having learnt that -Victor’s apprehensions had subsided, he turned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">57</span> -back on the following night to Valdemoro, summoned -Sebastiani thither, and ordered an attack -to be made upon Venegas.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Venegas prepares for battle at Aranjuez.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>That general expected such an attack from -the moment when he was apprised of Cuesta’s -retreat. At daybreak on the 5th, he went from -his head-quarters at Tembleque to reconnoitre -the position at Aranjuez. The Queen’s Bridge -was the only one which had not been broken -down; his first measure was to recall Lacy with -the advanced guard from Puente Largo on the -Xarama, that he might secure his retreat over -this bridge in time; then he resolved to occupy -the range of heights adjacent to Ontigola, beginning -from Mount Parnaso, and to defend the -passage of the river. Having directed these -measures, he returned to his quarters, leaving -Giron in command of the three divisions upon -the Tagus. Three hours had hardly elapsed -before Giron sent word that large columns of -horse and foot and artillery were marching upon -Puente Largo, and that some had already crossed -the Xarama; this was followed by tidings that -a great dust was seen in the direction of the -ford of Añover. It could not now be doubted -that a serious attack was about to be made; the -ford would certainly be attempted, and Venegas -was apprehensive that he should be assailed in -the rear at the same time by troops from Toledo. -He therefore ordered Lacy to cross the Queen’s -Bridge, and break it down; and marched his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">58</span> -reserve from Ocaña to the height on the left of -the road between that town and Aranjuez, where -they might be ready to resist an attack on the -side of Toledo or the ford, and to support the -retreat of the other divisions, who, if they found -themselves unable to guard the river, were instructed -to retreat to Ocaña; but their orders -were to defend the passage to the utmost, and -maintain every position inch by inch.</p> - -<p>Lacy could not commence his retreat soon -enough to avoid an attack; a strong body of -cavalry from the Cuesta de la Reyna fell upon -his rear, but they resisted the enemy, and, retiring -in good order over the Queen’s Bridge, -broke it down, and took post upon some heights -which protected it: the bridge itself was defended -by Don Luis Riquelme with three battalions -and four pieces of cannon; another battalion -was stationed in the Plaza de S. Antonio. -D. Miguel Antonio Panes, a captain of artillery, -only son of the Marquis of Villa Panes, defended -the broken Puente de Barcas with two -eight-pounders and two companies. Other -troops were stationed at the ford of the Infante -Don Antonio’s garden, at the Puente Verde, at -the Vado Largo, or broad ford, and in the Calle -de la Reyna. A reserve was placed on each -side the road to Ocaña, and in the walks immediately -adjoining the palace, on the left of which -the whole of the cavalry stood ready to charge -the enemy in case they should win the passage<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">59</span> -of the river, or attack the Spaniards in the rear -by a party which might have crossed at some -remoter point.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Aranjuez and its gardens.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The ground whereon a battle has been fought -is never passed over by an intelligent traveller -without producing a meditative train of thought, -however transient, even if the scene has no -other interest; but when the local circumstances -are remarkable, the impressions become -deeper and more durable, especially if the war -were one in which, after any lapse of time, the -heart still feels a lively concern. Aranjuez had -been for nearly two centuries the spring residence -of the Spanish court. It stands in a rich -and lovely country, where the Xarama falls into -the Tagus, in what was once a peninsula. -Charles V. had built a hunting-seat there, which -Philip III. enlarged into a palace, yet such a -palace as was designed for comfort and comparative -retirement, rather than for splendour. -In his time a canal was made between the two -rivers, partly with the intent of giving the place -a character of safety, that the King might be -secure there with no larger body of guards than -his dignity required. Succeeding monarchs -each added something to the embellishment of -the grounds, and Charles IV., when Prince of -Asturias, made a garden which was called by -his name. Aranjuez itself was a poor village -till the time of Grimaldi’s administration, when -a town was built there under his directions, and -partly on the Dutch plan; the streets being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">60</span> -long, spacious, straight, and uniform, with rows -of trees, for beauty and for shade, ... only the -canals were wanting. The population had increased -to some 10,000 persons, who depended -in great measure for their prosperity upon the -annual residence of the court.</p> - -<p>The pride of Aranjuez was in its gardens; -they were in the French style, but with a charm -which that style derived from a Spanish climate. -Long and wide avenues were overbowered with -elms, which loved the soil, and which, by the -stateliness of their growth, and the deep umbrage -of their ample branches, repaid the care -with which water from the Tagus was regularly -conducted to their roots. That river also supplied -numerous fountains, each in the centre of -some area, square or circular, hex- or oct-angular, -where, in peaceful times, at all hours of the -day, some idlers or ruminators were seen on the -marble benches, enjoying the shade, and the -sight and the sound of the water, which was -thrown up by statues of all kinds, appropriate -or preposterous, beasts, harpies, sea-horses, Tritons, -and heathen gods and goddesses, in jets or -curvilinear shoots, intersecting each other, falling -in regular forms, sparkling as they played, -cooling the air around, and diffusing a sense of -freshness even in the hottest noon. In some -places the loftiest trees were made to bear a part -in these devices of wanton power, the pipes -being conveyed to their summit; in others the -fountains set music in motion when they played.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">61</span> -There was one fountain which served as a monument -of one of the proudest victories that had -ever been achieved by Spain, the central part -being formed from a block of marble which had -been taken in one of the Turkish ships at Lepanto.</p> - -<p>But this was a place where the strength of -vegetation made art appear subordinate, and -the magnificence which all these elaborate embellishments -produced was subservient to delight -and comfort. The elms, which were the -largest of their kind, had attained a growth -which nothing but artificial irrigation in a genial -soil and hot climate could have given them. -The poplar and the tamarisk flourished in like -manner; the latter grew along the banks of the -Tagus with peculiar luxuriance. Every approach -to Aranjuez was shaded with trees, from -which avenues branched off in all directions, -opening into glades, and diversified with bowers. -Nor was this royal expenditure directed only to -the purposes of splendid enjoyment. The Spanish -Kings, with an intention better than the -success which attended it, endeavoured to improve -the agriculture of the country, by setting -their subjects an example upon the royal domains. -The best fruits in the Peninsula were -cultivated for sale in the royal gardens; the -finest oil in Spain was produced there, and wine -from vineyards of the choicest grapes was collected -in cellars of unequalled extent. They -had attempted also to naturalize the camel there,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">62</span> -and at one time from two to three hundred of -these animals fed in the royal pastures, and were -occasionally employed for burthen. But though -they bred, and appeared to thrive there, the experiment -was given up; the native animals, -which are reared with so much less cost and -care, being better suited to the soil, and surface, -and climate of Spain.</p> - -<p>The banks of the Tagus at Aranjuez, and the -gardens which it had so long been the pride -and pleasure of the Spanish Kings to embellish, -were now to be made the scene of war. About -two in the afternoon the French appeared upon -the right bank, and began the attack along the -whole line. They opened a heavy fire on all -points, but more especially upon the ford of -Don Antonio’s garden, and the reserve from -the walks were sent to strengthen that post. -Panes at the Puente de Barcas was struck by -a ball, which carried away his leg; a glance -convinced him that the wound was mortal: -“Comrades,” said he, “stand by these guns -till death ... I am going to heaven:” and, as -they bore him from the field, the only anxiety -he expressed was, that another officer should -take his place without delay. Don Gaspar Hermosa -succeeded him, after planting a mortar at -the Puente ford in the midst of the enemy’s fire. -The Spanish artillery was excellently served -this day, and frequently silenced that of the -French. One mortar placed in the thicket opposite -the islet, made great havoc among the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">63</span> -enemy. Lacy, perceiving his own post secure, -and that the main attack was made upon the -left, at the Puente Verde, the gardens of the -Prince and of Don Antonio, removed his division -thither without waiting for orders. The -firing continued till the approach of night, when -the French, baffled in all their attempts, retired. -The loss of the Spaniards was between -two and three hundred; they computed that of -the French at three hundred killed, and about -a thousand wounded. The French force consisted -of fourteen or fifteen thousand, being the -whole of Sebastiani’s corps. They themselves -carefully avoided all mention of the action, saying -only that they worsted the advanced guard -of Venegas, and drove it beyond the Tagus. -Giron, who commanded, was rewarded with the -rank of camp-martial; and the Junta testified -its sense of the heroism of Panes, who died a -few hours after he was wounded, by exempting -the title in his family from the duties called -<i>lanzas</i> and <i>medias anatas</i> for ever, appointing his -father a gentleman of the bed-chamber, and -ordering a letter to be written to him, as a -document to be preserved in the archives of -his house, expressing, in the most honourable -terms, the sense which the country entertained of -the services rendered to it both by father and -son.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Deliberations concerning the army of La Mancha.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The French after this repulse recrossed the -Xarama, and, as Venegas had foreseen, prepared -to attack him from the other side. According<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">64</span> -to their official statement, they thought -it would be a long and difficult work to rebuild -the bridges at Aranjuez, and that it would be -less dangerous to force the passage of the Tagus -at Toledo, where the Spaniards remained masters -of the bridge. The Spanish General, therefore, -disposed his troops at Aranjuez, Ocaña, -La Guardia, and Tembleque, ready to march, -as circumstances might require, to some point -where he could only be attacked in front, and -might be freed from the apprehension that the -enemy would cut off his retreat by way of Toledo, -and, having disabled him, penetrate to the -Sierra Morena, the armies of Cuesta and Sir -Arthur being too far off to prevent them. The -necessity of retreating was indeed obvious; and -the Junta were of opinion that he had no other -course left than that of abandoning La Mancha, -and taking post at the pass of Despeñaperros. -Mr. Frere thought it would be better, if La -Mancha were untenable, to occupy the passes -with a part of his army only (for it was not to -be supposed that at this time the French could -make any serious attempt upon Andalusia), and -march with or detach the rest upon the left of -the enemy, through a country which they had -never been able to occupy, Cuenca, Molina, -and as far as Arragon; a movement upon the -two former points would threaten the capital, -upon the latter it would give the Spaniards a -decided superiority in that quarter, and interrupt -the communication of the French with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">65</span> -France. In the present state of things, Mr. -Frere perceived how desirable it was that the -Spaniards should have as many small armies as -possible; their system of military subsistence -and discipline being so imperfect, defeats became -dangerous, and even destructive, in proportion -to the size of the army; in small bodies -they were comparatively of little importance: -in small bodies the Spaniards had almost uniformly -been successful; and such diversions -would harass and distract the French, and waste -their force.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Venegas resolves to attack the enemy.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Mr. Frere spoke upon this plan to one of the -leading members of the war department, and -would have delivered in his advice in writing, -if Marquis Wellesley had not at that time been -daily expected to arrive at Seville and supersede -him. This circumstance, and the confidence -which Venegas expressed in the spirit of his -troops (for he seemed disposed to risk a battle -rather than abandon La Mancha,) induced him -to wait for the Marquis’s arrival; and then it -was too late. For on the same day that Mr. -Frere recommended this proposed diversion, -Venegas received advices from the fifth division, -under General Zerain, by Toledo, that the -French had received a reinforcement of 8000 - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 8.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -men, and were about to attack him. Upon this -the general ordered the fourth division from -Tembleque to advance to his support. While -they were on their way, Sebastiani, having collected - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 9.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -his whole corps at Toledo, attacked Zerain,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">66</span> -who retreated in good order to Sonseca, -and from thence turned to Almonacid to join -the troops which had been sent to his assistance. -At Almonacid Venegas assembled his -whole army on the 10th, and believing that the -number of the enemy did not exceed 14,000, -the same reasons which had made him stand -his ground at Aranjuez, after the retreat of the -combined armies, induced him once more to -give the French battle. He could not bear to -abandon the people of La Mancha, who had -welcomed him with enthusiasm on his advance: -he knew how injurious it was, not merely to the -general character of an army, but to the individual -feelings of the soldiery, to be perpetually -giving way before the enemy, losing ground, and -losing reputation and hope also; and his success -at Aranjuez made him confident in the courage -and conduct of his troops. Before he delivered -his own opinion, he summoned the different -chiefs of division to council, and they perfectly -accorded with his pre-determination. This was -on the 10th; he resolved to let the troops rest -the next day, that they might recover from their -march, and it was agreed to attack the enemy -at daybreak on the 12th. Meantime it was -supposed more accurate information of their -number might be obtained.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>He is attacked by them.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Delay has ever been the bane of the Spanish -councils, and Venegas should have remembered, -that in offensive war every thing depends upon -celerity. Victor had now opened a communication<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">67</span> -with Soult, and the Intruder being thus -delivered from all fear of the allied armies, -joined Sebastiani, with the reserve, on the 9th. -While Venegas was deliberating, his position -was reconnoitred; and on the morning of the -day which he had allowed for rest he was attacked -by an army of little less than double -the force at which he had computed it. The -Spaniards, however, were not taken by surprise. -The right wing, under Vigodet, extended to -some rising ground beyond the village of Almonacid: -the centre, consisting of two divisions, -under Camp-marshal Castejon, were in -the plain before the village. Lacy commanded -the left, which was supported by a height, detached -from the range of hills that run north -and south, beginning at Toledo. Giron was -stationed, with three battalions, as a reserve, -behind the centre; the rest of his division were -posted, part on the heights to the left, part at -an advanced battery, and the remainder upon -the Castle hill, behind the village. The cavalry, -under Camp-marshals the Marquis of -Gelo, D. Tomas Zerain, and the Viscount de -Zolina, were placed in two bodies, one on each -wing.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Battle of Almonacid.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Intruder was in the field; but Sebastiani -was the real commander. That general perceived -that the event of the day depended upon -the possession of the hill on the Spaniards’ left, -and he ordered Laval to attack it with his two -divisions. Laval formed in close columns, by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">68</span> -divisions and brigades, and attacked the hill -both in front and on the right at once. The -French suffered considerably in this attack. -Count Sobolesky and another chief of battalion -were killed, several of equal rank wounded; -but they had the advantage of numbers as well -as discipline. The colonel who commanded on -the hill was wounded, and before Giron could -reach the spot with the reserve, the battalions -which were posted there gave way. These -battalions, instead of rallying when they found -themselves supported, confused the troops who -came to support them. The height, upon which -the fate of the day depended, was lost; and the -enemy, having won it, attacked the Spaniards -in flank. Lacy upon this wheeled to face the -enemy, and for a while withstood them; 200 -cavalry, led by Don Nicholas Chacon, charged -one of their columns, which, forming itself into -a square, withstood the attack; and Chacon, -having his horse shot under him, and some of -his best officers and soldiers killed, was compelled -to withdraw. In the centre the enemy -were equally successful, and at length the -Spaniards fell back along the whole of their line. -Nevertheless the ground was well contested, and -Venegas took up a second position behind Almonacid, -supported by the Castle hill. Here -he was presently attacked at all points; his cavalry -made another charge, which failed for -lack of numbers, not of spirit, and the general -then perceived that there was no hope of recovering<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">69</span> -the day. He therefore commenced his -retreat, and ordered Vigodet, whose division -was at this time the least exposed, to bring up -and cover the rear. Vigodet performed this service -with great coolness, recovered and spiked -one of the cannon which had been taken, and -began at length to fall back himself in good -order. At this time some ammunition carts, -which were blown up on his right, that they -might not fall into the enemy’s hands, frightened -the horses of the little cavalry which covered -his own retreat, and the French, taking -advantage of their confusion, charged him vigorously. -The second in command of the division, -D. Francisco de Reyna, checked the pursuers, -while Vigodet rallied the scattered horse, and -collected about 1000 men, under whose protection -he left the field. They retreated by different -routes to Herencia, meaning to fall back -to Manzanares, Membrilla, and Solana. As far -as Herencia the movement was effected in good -order, only a few soldiers, straggling from their -ranks to drink at the few wells in that arid -country; but when the van reached Manzanares, -a cry arose that the French had got before -them on the road of Valdepeñas, to cut off -their retreat. This false report, either originating -in treason or in cowardice, spread through -the troops: from that moment subordination -was at an end, and they forfeited the credit -which had been gained in the action, by dispersing.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">70</span> -Sebastiani stated the loss of the Spaniards at -4000 killed, 4000 prisoners, an immense number -wounded, 100 ammunition waggons, and -thirty-five pieces of cannon. The whole of the -artillery and baggage was certainly lost; but -the number of prisoners was grossly exaggerated, -because the Spaniards did not disperse -till they had accomplished their retreat; and -the French, with that inconsistency which so -often betrayed the falsehood of their official accounts, -admitted that none of their corps could -be overtaken. He gave no account of his own -loss; Venegas estimated it at 8000, ... an exaggeration -as great as that of the French general; -but that the French suffered severely was evident, -because they were long crippled for any -further operations. Venegas retired to La Carolina, -his men assembled at the passes of the -Sierra, and in a few days he was again at the -head of a respectable army. The enemy had -now effected every thing which they proposed; -they had driven Cuesta and the British beyond -the Tagus on one side, and on the other had -recovered possession of La Mancha; and the -Intruder, rejoicing in the issue of a campaign, -which opened under such inauspicious aspects, -returned triumphantly to Madrid. The disgrace -of Talavera sate easy upon the French; ... with -their usual contempt of truth, they affirmed that -they had won the victory; and the situation of -the contending armies a few weeks after the -battle gave credit to the impudent assertion.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">71</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XXV">CHAPTER XXV.</h2> -</div> - -<blockquote class="inhead"> - -<p class="hang">PLANS OF THE FRENCH. SIR A. WELLESLEY -RAISED TO THE PEERAGE. MARQUIS WELLESLEY -ARRIVES IN SPAIN. ALTERATIONS IN THE -BRITISH MINISTRY. STATE OF THE SPANISH -GOVERNMENT. THE BRITISH ARMY RETREATS -TO THE FRONTIERS OF PORTUGAL. BATTLES -OF TAMAMES, OCANA, AND ALBA DE TORMES.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.<br />August.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p><span class="firstword">Never</span> during the war had the prospect appeared -so hopeful as when Sir Arthur entered -Spain. For the first time Buonaparte had been -repulsed at all points in a great battle; and for -the first time also a spirit of national resistance -had broken forth in Germany, ... the only spirit -by which his tyranny could be overthrown. -The Spaniards seemed to acquire strength from -their defeats, learning confidence in their resources, -if not experience from misfortunes; -while the British army, by the passage of the -Douro and the discomfiture of Soult, had once -more made the enemy feel what they might apprehend -from such troops and such a commander.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Soult proposes immediately to invade Portugal.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Peninsula was but a secondary object in -the all-grasping schemes of Buonaparte’s ambition. -At first he had expected to secure it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">72</span> -without a struggle; nor was he yet so undeceived -concerning the real nature of the resistance to -be experienced there, as to believe that any -serious effort would be required for completing -its conquest. In Germany it was, he thought, -that the fate of Europe must be decided; and -this opinion was proclaimed in England by those -who, on every occasion, sought to persuade the -public that resistance to such a statesman and -such a general, wherever it was attempted, could -only end in defeat, and humiliation, and ruin. -Under this impression he had ordered the intrusive -government, which was in fact entirely -under his orders, to content itself with protracting -the war till the campaign in Germany should -be brought to a close. That campaign was now -ended. The battle of Wagram had re-established -his shaken power; an armistice had immediately -been sued for, and in the negotiations -which followed, the house of Austria surrendered -more than the French king Francis I. -had lost at Pavia. The news of this great success -did not, however, induce the Intruder to -deviate from his instructions. M. Soult, the -most enterprising as well as the ablest of the -French officers who were employed in Spain, -proposed at this time a plan for re-entering -Portugal. The line which should have secured -the communication of the British army with -Lisbon he occupied, now that that army had -found it necessary to retreat across the Tagus. -He proposed, therefore, to move from Plasencia<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">73</span> -against Beresford’s inefficient force, while Ney, -advancing from Salamanca, should act upon its -left flank. That army, if not absolutely destroyed, -would be prevented from forming a -junction by way of Alcantara with Sir Arthur; -and the French, by rapidly pursuing this advantage, -might occupy Abrantes, and once more -take possession of Lisbon, in which case Soult, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Campaign of 1809, pp. 49–52. <br />Ib. App. C-K.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -still deceiving himself with regard to the disposition -of the Portugueze, thought they would submit -to an enemy whom they found it hopeless -to resist. The plan was boldly conceived, -though M. Soult had not sufficiently taken into -his calculation the character of the troops with -which he would again be brought in contact: -but it was rejected by Joseph, who was at that -time guided chiefly by M. Jourdan. That -General, distinguished for his signal successes -in the revolutionary war, held the high situation -of Major-General of the army of Spain; and he -preferring what seemed the surer though the -slower course, resolved implicitly to follow the -Emperor Napoleon’s instructions, and undertake -no offensive operation for the present. A -plan, he said, had been laid down for invading -Portugal, and would be executed in the month -of February. It was their intention to subjugate -the south of Spain before this should be -undertaken; and if the British Commander had -possessed as little foresight as appeared in the -conduct of the Spanish government, or if the -British army had not derived better support<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">74</span> -from the Portugueze than from the Spaniards, -the French might have succeeded in both parts -of their intended operations.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Sir A. Wellesley raised to the peerage.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Central Junta expressed its sense of Sir -Arthur Wellesley’s services, by nominating him -one of the Captain-generals of the army (a rank -nearly equivalent to that of our field-marshal), -and presenting him, in the name of Ferdinand, -with some horses selected from the best breeds -of Andalusia. “This tribute,” they said, “was -of small value in comparison with the services -which he had rendered to Spain, and still less -in proportion to the wishes of those who offered -it: but for hearts like his, the satisfaction resulting -from great achievements was their best -recompense; not was it in the power of man to -bestow any reward which could equal the glory -of being one of the principal deliverers of a great -and generous people, of listening to their blessings, -and of deserving their gratitude.” Sir -Arthur accepted the horses, and the appointment -also, provided he should receive permission -from his own sovereign; but he declined -the pay attached to it, not thinking it becoming -that he should burthen the finances of Spain -during such a contest. In England, also, he -was recompensed with new honours. As soon -as the news of his victory arrived, he was raised -to the peerage by the titles of Baron Douro of -Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera, -and of Wellington in the county of Somerset.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">75</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 1.</span> <br />Marquis Wellesley arrives in Spain.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>On the fourth morning after the battle, while -the bells of Cadiz were ringing, the cannon -firing, and the people rejoicing with higher -hopes than had been felt since the surrender of -Dupont, Marquis Wellesley landed in that harbour -to supersede Mr. Frere. A great concourse -assembled to see him land, and as he set -foot on shore, a French flag was spread before -him, that he might tread upon it in honour of -his brother’s victory. The people drew his carriage, -which in that country is an unusual mark -of respect. The Marquis gave one of them a -purse of gold to distribute among his comrades: -but the man returned it, and, in the name of -the people, assured him they desired no reward, -being happy that they had this opportunity -of expressing the sentiments of the whole -nation. Both at Cadiz and at Seville the Marquis -was received with every mark of public honour, -and with the most enthusiastic expressions of -attachment and gratitude to the British nation. -But the first dispatches from Sir Arthur opened - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Distress of the army for provisions.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -upon him a disheartening prospect. The combined -armies, amounting to not less than 60,000 -men, and 16,000 or 18,000 horse, were depending -entirely for their daily supply upon the -country, which did not contain a population in -many square miles equal to the number of the -army, and could not of course produce a sufficiency -for its sustenance. Extremadura indeed -is the worst peopled and least cultivated province<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">76</span> -of the whole Peninsula. It was necessary -to send to a great distance for supplies, which, -scanty as they were, could not be procured regularly, -nor without great difficulty. The troops -were ill fed, and frequently received no rations -whatever. Effectual measures, Sir Arthur said, -must be taken, and that speedily. No army -could serve to any purpose unless it were properly -fed; and it was absurd to suppose that a -Spaniard, or a man or animal of any country, -could make exertions without a due supply of -food; in fact the Spaniards were more clamorous, -and more exhausted, if they did not receive -it regularly, than the English. The English, -however, were in a state of great distress; from -the 3d till the 7th they had had no bread; then -about 4000 pounds of biscuit were divided -among 30,000 mouths, and the whole supply - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 8.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -was exhausted. “The army,” said Sir Arthur, -“will be entirely lost, if this treatment continues. -If efficient measures had been adopted -by the government when the distress of the -British troops was first represented to them, the -benefit must ere this have been experienced. -There had been no neglect on the part of Mr. -Frere: the evil was owing to the poverty and -exhausted state of the country; to the inactivity -of the magistrates and people; to their disinclination -to taking any trouble, except that of -packing up their property, and removing when -they heard of the approach of a French patrole;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">77</span> -to their habits of insubordination and disobedience, -and to the want of power in the government -and their officers.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Disputes with Cuesta concerning supplies.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Cuesta’s unaccommodating temper aggravated -the evil. He was applied to after the battle for -ninety mules to draw the British artillery in place -of those lost in the action; there were at that -time hundreds in his army employed in drawing -empty carts, and yet he refused to part with any. -Five guns belonging to Alburquerque’s division -having been taken at Arzobispo, the Duke endeavoured -to make over to the British army the -mules attached to them; but Cuesta took them -for himself. His own cavalry were plentifully -supplied with barley, while hundreds of the -British horses died for want of it. In other -respects, his men suffered as many privations -as the English; and vexation at this and at the -untoward issue of the campaign, combined with -bodily infirmity, seems to have bewildered him: -he lent ear to every complaint against the allies; -and at a time when they were literally starving, -both men and horses, he wrote to their General, -stating that his own troops were in want of -necessary food, because all that he ordered for -their use was intercepted by the British and their -commissaries. The English, he said, actually -sold biscuit and meat; and he heard continual -complaints and saw continual traces that they -plundered all the places through which they -passed, and even followed the peasantry to the -mountains, for the purpose of stripping them<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">78</span> -even to the shirt. Sir Arthur positively denied -that any thing going to the Spanish army had -been stopped by the British; as for the tale of -his soldiers selling provisions, he observed, that -it was beneath the dignity of his Excellency’s -situation and character to notice such things, -and beneath his own to reply to them. He was -concerned that General Cuesta should conceive -there was any reason for complaining of the British -troops; but, continued he, “when troops -are starving, which those under my command -have been, as I have repeatedly told your Excellency -since I joined you, and particularly when -they had no bread from the 3d to the 7th, it -is not astonishing that they should go to the -villages and even to the mountains to look for -food where they think they can get it. The -complaints of the inhabitants, however, should -not have been confined to the conduct of the -British; here in Deleitosa I have seen Spanish -soldiers, who ought to have been elsewhere, -take off the doors of the houses which were -locked up, in order that they might plunder the -houses; and they afterwards burnt the doors.”</p> - -<p>To preserve discipline among starving troops -is indeed impossible, and neither Cuesta nor Sir -Arthur could be responsible for their men under -such circumstances; but the letter of the former -brought the question respecting provisions to a -point, and Sir Arthur called upon him to state -distinctly whether he understood that the Spanish -army was to have not only all the provisions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">79</span> -which the country could afford, but all those -also which were sent from Seville; whether any -magazines had been formed, and from whence -the troops were to draw provisions? “I hope,” -said he, “that I shall receive satisfactory answers -to these questions to-morrow morning; if not, -I beg that your Excellency will be prepared to -occupy the posts opposite Almaraz, as it will be -impossible for me to remain any longer in a -country in which no arrangement is made for -provisioning my troops, and in which it is understood -that all the provisions which are either -found in the country, or are sent from Seville -(as I have been informed, for the use of the -British army) are to be applied solely and exclusively -to the Spanish troops.” On the day -that this correspondence took place, an English -commissary arriving from Truxillo with bread -and barley for the British army, was stopped on -the way, and deprived of all his barley and part -of his bread by a detachment of Spanish horse. -Whatever momentary irritation might be occasioned -by circumstances like these, Sir Arthur -commiserated the sufferings of the Spanish army -too sincerely to harbour any resentment; but -he perceived the absolute necessity of withdrawing. -“It is useless,” he said to the British -ambassador, “to complain; but we are not -treated as friends, much less as the only prop -on which the cause of Spain can depend. But, -besides this want of good-will, which can easily -be traced to the temper of the General, there<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">80</span> -is such a want of resources in the country, and -so little exertion in bringing forward what is to -be found; that if the army were to remain here -much longer, it would become totally useless. -The daily and increasing loss of horses from -deficiency of food, and from the badness of what -there is, is really alarming.” Ney’s return to -Old Castille strengthened him in this resolution; -it satisfied him that no serious attack upon Andalusia -was intended for the present, and he -thought it not unlikely that this corps of the -enemy was about to invade Portugal, for the -sake of drawing him out of Spain.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Frere requires the removal of Cuesta.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The necessity of removing Cuesta from the -command appeared so urgent to Mr. Frere, -that he deemed it his duty to present a memorial -upon the subject, though Marquis Wellesley -was expected two days afterward at Seville. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 9.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -He dwelt upon his abandonment of the wounded -at Talavera, and upon the imminent danger to -which he had exposed Venegas by concealing -from him, as well as from his government, the -true state of the combined armies, and the -inability of the English to proceed. The dismissal -of Cuesta, he said, could not long be -delayed, and it was important that it should -take place instantly, and another commander -appointed: either the choice being left to Sir -Arthur, or the Junta itself appointing the Duke -of Alburquerque, who possessed his confidence -and that of the army, and whose abilities had -been tried and approved. This was the only<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">81</span> -satisfaction which could be given to the British -General and his army, and even this would be -little: “the wound,” said Mr. Frere, “is very -deep, and the English nation could not have received -one more difficult to heal than the abandonment -of their wounded at Talavera.” This -was the last act of Mr. Frere in his public capacity; -and it was consistent with the whole conduct -of that minister, who, during his mission never -shrunk from any responsibility, nor ever, from -the fear of it, omitted any effort which he -thought requisite for the common welfare of his -own country and of Spain. In presenting such a -memorial, while his successor was, as it were, -at the door, he was conscious that he might -appear to be acting irregularly in his public -character; and in his private one, that it might -alter the feelings with which he could have -wished to take leave of his friends in Spain; -but, in addition to the urgency of the case, he -considered also that it would be peculiarly unpleasant -for Marquis Wellesley to begin his -mission with an altercation in which his brother -was concerned. Mr. Frere’s situation had been -unfavourable to any thing like a controlling -influence; the intelligence which announced -the intended assistance of a British force had -been accompanied with an intimation of his -recall, and for some months he had, as he expressed -himself, literally been a minister only -from day to day, looking for the arrival of his -successor by the first fair wind. The Junta<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">82</span> -expressed their sense of his zealous services by -conferring upon him the Castillian title of Marquez -de la Union (which he received permission -from his own government to retain); and, in -reply to the momentary outcry which misrepresentation -and party spirit had raised against him -in England, they represented his conduct such -as they conceived it to be, and as it truly was. -This had never prevented him from using the -strongest language and taking the highest tone -toward the very persons who had been foremost -in this friendly act; but he felt how unfavourable -his situation was, and, knowing that that -of Marquis Wellesley would in all respects be -very different, he hoped the Marquis might -be able to remedy the existing evils as far -as they were capable of being remedied. The -task, however, was no easy one. “It might -seem,” he said, “that a British minister ought -before that time to have established a regular -system for securing the subsistence of the armies; -but the evil lay deep; it arose from an old despotic -government, and from eighteen years of -the basest corruption, intrigue, and public -pillage. The effects of all this still continued, -the system itself was not wholly done away, -and even a sovereign in ordinary times would -find it difficult to remedy it.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Cuesta resigns the command.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Marquis Wellesley, on his arrival, did not -think it expedient to insist on Cuesta’s removal. -That General, he observed, was said to be deficient -in every quality necessary for an extensive<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">83</span> -command, except courage; his temper rendered -him peculiarly unfit for acting with an allied -army, and it was scarcely possible that another -officer with equal disqualifications should be -found in the Spanish service. But the government -was under some apprehension of his influence, -which was supposed to be extensive and -dangerous, though it rested on no other foundation -than the precarious one of undeserved -popularity. The Marquis, therefore, limited -his interference to a strong expression of his -sense of the General’s misconduct, being of -opinion that his removal might be effected more -willingly and with less danger if it appeared to -be the consequence of his own actions, rather -than the result of a direct application from the -British ambassador. The Junta, however, were -desirous that such a direct application should -be made; and Marquis Wellesley then addressed -a note to Garay, stating that it was impossible -to hope for any degree of co-operation, or even -for any aid from the troops of Spain to the -British army, if the chief command remained in -the hands of General Cuesta. Cuesta had wisely -anticipated such a measure. Two days after -the date of that letter to Sir Arthur, in which -he complained so preposterously of the British -troops, a paralytic stroke deprived him of the -use of one leg; feeling himself then completely -incapacitated, he delivered over the army to the -second in command, D. Francisco de Eguia, -and requested permission to resign, that he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">84</span> -might go to the baths of Alhama. When, therefore, -the Marquis delivered in his note, he -was informed that Cuesta’s resignation had -been accepted.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Eguia succeeds ad interim to the command.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Eguia was well acquainted with the military -topography of Spain, but had no other qualification -for the command of an army: at the -battle of Medellin he did not venture to depart -from his orders without receiving fresh ones -from Cuesta, at a time when it was impossible -for Cuesta to communicate with him, and by -this imbecility he completed the destruction of -the army that day. Mr. Frere, knowing that -the military Junta would be most likely to confirm -him in the command, because he was one -of the old school, wrote a private note to -Garay, deprecating such an appointment. Alburquerque -was the proper person for the command; -but the Junta were jealous of his rank, -his popularity, his talents, and his enlightened -views; and Marquis Wellesley soon discovered -that, if he were named to the command, the -army under him would certainly be reduced. -Till, however, a successor to Cuesta should be -chosen, the command devolved upon Eguia; -and when that General notified this to the -British Commander, he accompanied the intelligence -with the fairest professions, desiring -him to depute a confidential officer, who, with -another appointed on the part of the Spaniards, -might regulate the distribution of provisions in -such a manner that the English army should<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">85</span> -be supplied in preference to the Spaniards. -Lord Wellington expressed, in reply, his perfect -confidence in the intentions of Eguia, and -sent some officers to Truxillo, there to meet any -whom Eguia might appoint, and settle some practicable -arrangement: a preference like that which -was spoken of he well perceived was impossible.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Calvo sent to see to the supplies.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>When first the Junta were informed of the -distress of the British army, nothing appeared -to hurt them so much as that their own troops -should have been supplied while their allies -were in want, and they ordered Cuesta, in every -instance, to supply the British troops in preference -to his own. They directed the Junta of -Badajoz to send two members of their body -into the vale of Plasencia, and secure the persons -of those magistrates who, having engaged -to furnish means for the British army, had -failed in their engagement; to supersede them -also, and place at the disposal of the British -commissary every thing which he might require. -Before these measures could be executed, -Soult entered from Old Castille, and -the whole of the fertile country on that side -of the Tagus fell into the possession of the -enemy. When the complaints of the British -General became louder, the Junta, alarmed at -his intended retreat into Portugal, deputed D. -Lorenzo Calvo, one of their own body, to the -armies, hoping that his exertions, aided by his -authority, would effectually remedy the evil. -Calvo was considered a man of energetic -character and activity, and, having been bred<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">86</span> -up in commerce, had acquired those habits of -business which were necessary for the service -in which he was now employed. True to that -system of dissimulation, which, by the old -school, was esteemed essential in all business of -state, he was charged to invest Cuesta with the -order of Charles III. lest that General should -take umbrage at the distinction conferred upon -Lord Wellington, though at this very time the -Junta were so offended at Cuesta’s conduct, -that nothing but their fears had prevented them -from immediately displacing him.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Wellington declares his intention of falling back.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>But neither Eguia’s professions, nor the -measures of the government, nor the presence -of one of its members, produced any relief to -the British army. Had it been in a condition -for service, and provided with means of transport, -Lord Wellington had it in view to act -against the French at Plasencia, for which -purpose he ordered materials to be collected -for repairing the Puente de Cardinal; but his -cavalry had now consumed all the forage within -reach; they were obliged to go from twenty to -thirty miles to procure it, and frequently when -they had gone so far, the Spaniards, being -themselves in equal want, deprived them of it -on their return. The horses were at length so -much reduced that they were scarcely able to -relieve the outposts. More than a month had -now elapsed since the British General informed -Cuesta that, if he were not supplied, he could -not remain in Spain. In the course of that -time, if proper measures had been taken, supplies<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">87</span> -might have been forwarded from the -farthest part of Andalusia; but not a mule or -cart, or article of provision of any kind had -been obtained under any order from, or arrangement -made by, the government. Lord -Wellington applied for a remount of only -an hundred mares, which could not be used -in the Spanish cavalry, because they used -stallions; even these he could not procure, -nor did he receive an answer to his application. -It was now become absolutely necessary -to withdraw, and on the 18th of August, he -requested Marquis Wellesley to give notice to -the government that he was about so to do. -“Since the 22d of last month,” said he, “the -horses have not received their regular deliveries -of barley, and the infantry not ten days’ bread. -I have no doubt the government have given -orders that we should be provided as we ought -to be, but orders are not sufficient. To carry -on the contest to any purpose, the labour and -service of every man and of every beast in the -country should be employed in the support of -the armies; and these should be so classed and -arranged as not only to secure obedience to the -orders of the government, but regularity and -efficiency in the performance of the service. -Magazines might then with ease be formed, and -transported wherever the armies should be -stationed. But as we are now situated, 50,000 -men are collected upon a spot which cannot -afford subsistence for 10,000, and there are no<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">88</span> -means of sending to a distance to make good -the deficiency: the Junta have issued orders, -which, for want of arrangement, there are no -persons to obey; and the army would perish -here, if I were to remain, before the supplies -could arrive.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Correspondence with Eguia and Calvo.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Prepared as both the Spanish government -and general ought to have been for such a determination, -both manifested the greatest astonishment -when it was announced. Eguia wrote -to Lord Wellington, repeating his protestations, -that he should have every thing which he required, -and that the Spaniards should go without -any thing, rather than the British should be -in want. “An English commissary,” he said, -“should reside at Truxillo, who should have a -key of the magazines, and take the proportion -for the British army, though his own should -perish. If,” he continued, “notwithstanding -these conclusive protestations, the British General -persisted in marching into Portugal, it -would be apparent that other causes induced -him to take that step, and not the want of subsistence.” -Upon this insulting assertion, Lord -Wellington informed Eguia that any further -correspondence between them was unnecessary. -He entered, nevertheless, into a sufficient explanation -of the real state of affairs. The magazines -of Truxillo, according to a return sent -by Eguia himself, did not contain a sufficiency -to feed the British army alone for one day. No -doubt was entertained of the exertions of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">89</span> -Spanish General, nor of his sincerity. “The -deficiencies,” said Lord Wellington, “arise not -from want of orders of your Excellency, but -from the want of means in the country, from -the want of arrangement in the government, -and from the neglect of timely measures to -supply the wants which were complained of -long ago.” A letter from Calvo to Lord Wellington -implied the same suspicion concerning -the motives of his retreat as Eguia had done, -though in more qualified terms. This member -of the Junta came forward with something more -specious than vague promises and protestations. -“He bound himself,” he said, “to provide the -army, within three days, with all the rations -which it might require; and within fifteen days -to have magazines formed in places appointed -by the British General, containing all the articles -which the army could consume in one or two -months; and to provide also carts and mules, -both of draft and burthen, sufficient for the -transport of these magazines.” He then protested -that 7000 rations of bread, 50,000 pounds -of flour, 250 <i>fanegas</i> of barley, 50 of rye, 100 -of wheat, and 60 <i>arrobas</i> of rice were ready, -with means of transport for them, and before -the morrow noon would reach the British army -in their present position. “My activity,” said -Calvo, “shall not rest until continual remittances -of the same articles prove that my promises -deserve to be confided in; and if there -were in your Excellency’s intention any disposition<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">90</span> -to alter your purpose of retreat, I am -certain I should obtain the satisfaction of hearing -your Excellency yourself confess that I had -surpassed your hopes.” At the time when -Lord Wellington received this letter, he had in -his possession an order dated only five days -back, and signed by this very member of the -Supreme Junta, ordering to the Spanish head-quarters, -for the use of the Spanish army, all -the provisions which the British commissary -had provided in the town of Guadalupe and its -neighbourhood. Well, therefore, might he reply -to him, that he could have no confidence in -his assurances. “As for the promise,” said he, -“of giving provisions to the British army to the -exclusion of the Spanish troops, such a proposal -can only have been made as an extreme and -desperate measure to induce me to remain in -Spain; and were it practicable, I could not -give my consent to it. The Spanish army must -be fed as well as the British. I am fully aware,” -he continued, “of the consequences which may -follow my departure, though there is now no -enemy in our front; but I am not responsible -for them, whatever they may be. They are responsible -who, having been made acquainted -with the wants of this army more than a month -ago, have taken no effectual means to relieve -them; who allowed a brave army, which was -rendering gratuitous services to Spain, and -which was able and willing to pay for every -thing it received, to starve in the midst of their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">91</span> -country, and be reduced by want to a state of -inefficiency; who refused or neglected to find -carriages for removing the officers and soldiers -who had been wounded in their service, and -obliged me to give up the equipment of the -army for the performance of this necessary act - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 20.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -of humanity.” On the following day Lord -Wellington began his retreat in the direction of -Badajoz.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Marquis Wellesley proposes a plan for supplying the armies.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>He halted at Merida, and eight days after -his departure, being then four marches from Xaraicejo, -he found none of the supplies on the -road which had so confidently been promised. -Having, however, been able to separate his -troops, and being out of reach of Eguia’s army, -he now procured regular supplies. Marquis -Wellesley meantime had been indefatigable in -pressing upon the government the necessity of -a regular plan for provisioning the armies; and -he found, upon investigation, that orders enough -had been issued, but no means had been employed -either to enforce the execution of those -orders, or to ascertain in what respects they had -failed, or what were the causes either of their -total failure or of their partial success. No -magazines or regular depots had been established, -no regular means of transport provided, -nor any persons regularly appointed to -conduct and superintend convoys, under the -direction of the general commanding the army; -nor had any system been adopted for drawing -from the more fertile provinces, by a connected<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">92</span> -chain of magazines, resources to supply the deficiency -of those poorer countries in which the -army might be acting. At the solicitation of -the Junta, Marquis Wellesley delivered in a -plan for remedying these evils. It was less easy -of execution in Spain than it would have been -in England, where the system of our stagecoaches -and waggons has disciplined a great -number of persons in the detail of such arrangements; -yet, with due exertions on the part of -government, it might speedily have been established. -Two days elapsed, and no notice was -taken of the proposal; he requested a reply, -and after two days more Garay put into his -hand a long string of regulations for the internal -management of the magazines when they should -have been formed. Marquis Wellesley again -anxiously inquired whether the Junta were disposed -to adopt the plan which he had formed at -their request, and whether any steps had been -taken for carrying it into effect? At length, -after it had been nine days in their hands, he -was informed that they assented to it,—but this -was all; it was a mere verbal assent, and no -measures whatever were taken for beginning -arrangements of such urgent necessity. The -government at the same time expressed its confidence -that the British army would now rejoin -the Spaniards, and make a forward movement -against the enemy. Marquis Wellesley suspected -some of the Junta of treason. “This -proposition,” said he to his government, “accords<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">93</span> -with the general tenor of those professions -of zeal for active war, which have particularly -characterized the declarations of the -Junta since the army has been deprived of the -means of movement and supply. Far from -affording any just foundation of confidence in -their intentions, such declarations of activity -and enterprise, unaccompanied by any provident -or regular attention to the means and -objects of the war, serve only to create additional -suspicions of ignorance, weakness, or insincerity. -No person acquainted with the real -condition of the British and Spanish forces at - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 30.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -this time, could reasonably advise a forward -movement against the enemy with any other -view than the certain destruction of the allied -armies.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>His ill opinion of the Spanish government.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The conduct of the Junta gave strong grounds -for such a suspicion. The real cause which had -checked the progress of a victorious army, and -finally reduced it to a state unfit for service, -could not be concealed; public opinion loudly -imputed this evil to the negligence of government, -and the government endeavoured, by ungenerous -artifices, to divert the general indignation. -Rumours were set afloat that the real -cause of the retreat of the British army was -very different from the assigned one; they had -not fallen back upon Portugal because there -had been any deficiency either in their means -of supply or of transport, but because of certain -political considerations, inconsistent with the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">94</span> -security and honour of Spain, and with the -good faith of Great Britain. Demands, it was -whispered, had been made in the King of England’s -name, for the cession of Cadiz, of the -Havannah, and even of the whole island of -Cuba; changes had been required in the form -of the Spanish government, as preliminary conditions -to the further operations of the British -troops in Spain, and Lord Wellington had retreated -only because these demands were refused. -These reports, which, if not invented -by the government, certainly were not discountenanced -by them, were absolutely and entirely -false; nothing had been asked from Spain except -subsistence for the army employed in her -defence. Marquis Wellesley, however, though -he perceived the criminal misconduct of the -government, and though he affirmed that in -the last campaign no rational motives could be -imagined for the conduct of some of the generals -and officers, unless it were supposed that -they concerted their operations with the French -instead of the British general, did justice to the -people of Spain. “Whatever insincerity or -jealousy towards England existed, was to be -found,” he said, “in the government, its officers, -and adherents; no such unworthy sentiment prevailed -among the people.” They had done -their duty, and were still ready to do it; and, -notwithstanding the vexations which he experienced, -and the alarm and even ill-will which -the retreat of the British excited, he remembered,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">95</span> -as became him, that the cause of Spain -and England was the same: while, therefore, -he expressed his opinion that the Cortes ought -to be assembled, and a more efficient government -formed than that of so ill-constituted and -anomalous a body as the Junta, he listened -willingly to every suggestion for employing the -British troops in any practicable manner. Might -it not be possible, it was said, for them to take -up a position on the left bank of the Guadiana, -occupying Merida as an advanced post, their -right at Almendralejo, and their left extending -toward Badajoz? Portugal might be covered -by this position; Seville protected at the same -time, and a point of support given to the left -of the Spanish army, which should in that case -be cantoned in Medellin, Don Benito, and Villa -Nueva de la Serena.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Wellington objects to taking a position on the Guadiana.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>This plan the Marquis proposed to his brother; -but that able general was of opinion that -the Guadiana was not defensible by a weaker -against a stronger army, being fordable in very -many places, and affording no position. The -Spanish army, he thought, was at that time in -the best position in that part of the country, one -which they ought to hold against any force that -could be brought against them, if they could -hold any thing; while they held it they covered -the Guadiana effectually, and their retreat from -it was always secure. He, therefore, recommended -that they should send away the bridge -of boats which was still opposite Almaraz, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">96</span> -remain where they were as long as possible. For -the British army, Lord Wellington said, he saw -no chance at present of its resuming offensive -operations; and he desired that no hopes might -be held out to the Junta of any further co-operation -on his part with the Spanish troops, which -in their present state were by no means to be -depended on. He saw the difficulty to which -this determination might reduce the Spanish -government; their army might be seized with -a panic, run off, and leave every thing exposed -to instant loss. All he could say to this was, -that he was in no hurry to withdraw from Spain; -he wanted to refresh his troops; he should not -enter Portugal till he had heard Marquis Wellesley’s -sentiments; if he did enter it he should -go no farther than the frontier, where he should -be so near, that the enemy, unless in very great -force, would not venture across the Guadiana, -leaving the British army upon their flank and -rear; in fact, therefore, he should be as useful to -Spain within the Portugueze frontier as upon the -Guadiana, and even more so, because the nearer -he went to Portugal, the more efficient he should -become. The best way to cover the Guadiana -and Seville, was by a position on the enemy’s -flank.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Alburquerque appointed to the command in Extremadura.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>As an inducement to Lord Wellington to -remain, and co-operate with the Spanish army, -the Junta proposed to place the corps which -they designed to leave in Extremadura under -his command. This was to consist of 12,000<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">97</span> -men, a number inadequate to the service for -which they were required; but the true reason -was perceived by the British General; he had -by this time had ample opportunities of discovering -that the Junta, in the distribution of -their force, did not consider military defence -and military operations so much as political -intrigues and the attainment of trifling political -objects. The Junta of Extremadura had insisted -that Alburquerque should have the command -in their province; the government was weak -enough in authority to be obliged to yield this, -and weak enough in judgement to diminish as -far as possible the army which they unwillingly -entrusted to this envied and most ill-treated -nobleman. Lord Wellington, who could not -have accepted the command unconditionally -without permission from his own court, declined -it altogether under present circumstances, as -being inconsistent with those operations which -he foresaw would soon become necessary for the -British army. He had intelligence that a council -of war held at Salamanca had recommended -an attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo: the loss of -that place would cut off the only communication -which the Spanish government had with the -northern provinces, and would give the French -secure possession of Old Castille, and probably -draw after it the loss of Almeida. It would, -therefore, be incumbent upon him to make -exertions for relieving Ciudad Rodrigo. The -cabildo of that city, just at this time when Lord<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">98</span> -Wellington was contemplating their approaching -danger, and how best to succour them, gave an -example of the spirit which too many of these -provincial authorities displayed toward the British -army. 100,000 pounds of biscuit had been -ordered there, and paid for by a British commissary; -and when Marshal Beresford sent for it, -that it might be deposited in the magazines at -Almeida, the cabildo seized 30,000 pounds of -this quantity, upon the ground that debts due -to that city by Sir John Moore’s army had not -been paid, ... although part of the business of -the commissary who was sent to Ciudad Rodrigo -was to settle these accounts, and discharge the -debts in question.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Wellington withdraws to Badajoz.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>This was a specimen of that ill-will towards -England which prevailed in many places among -persons of this rank; and Marquis Wellesley -perceived that such persons, if not favoured by -the government, were certainly not discountenanced. -The same spirit was manifested but -too plainly by the persons employed about Cuesta’s -army. While they were professing that -the English army should be served in preference -to their own people (even to the exclusion of -them, if needful), they never offered to supply -a single cart or mule, or any means of transport -from their own abundance. Lord Wellington, -for want of such means, was compelled to leave -his ammunition behind him, and then no difficulty -was found in transporting it to the Spanish -stores. No difficulty was found in transporting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">99</span> -the bridge of boats from Almaraz to Badajoz; -yet if these means of transport, with which the -Spanish army was always abundantly provided, -had been shared with the British army, many -of the difficulties under which it suffered would -have been relieved, and its separation, says Lord -Wellington, certainly would not have taken place -when it did. The distress which his men suffered -would not have been felt in an equal degree -by the French, or by any people who understood -how to manage their food. Meat they -had always in sufficiency, and their chief want -was of bread, ... they were not ingenious enough -to make a comfortable meal without it, though -flour or rice was served out in its stead. But -the want of food for the cavalry, and of means -of transport, which actually rendered the British -army inefficient, could not be remedied by any -dexterity of the men, or any foresight of the -general, and is wholly imputable to the conduct -of the Spanish generals and the Spanish government. -Spain was grievously injured by this -unpardonable misconduct. The English ministry -were at this very time proposing to increase -Lord Wellington’s force to 30,000 men, provided -the supreme command were vested in the British -general, and effectual arrangements made for -their supply. But in the present state of things, -both the Marquis and his brother perceived -that any co-operation with the Spanish armies -would only draw on a repetition of the same -disasters. The intent was therefore abandoned, - -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">100</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.<br />September.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -and Lord Wellington at the beginning of September, -proceeded to Badajoz, stationing his -army, part within the Portugueze frontier, and -part on the Spanish territory, in a position which -would menace the flank and rear of the French -if they advanced toward Andalusia.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Expedition to Walcheren.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>While the allied armies were thus rendered -inefficient, not by the skill or strength of the -enemy, but by the inexperience and incapacity -of the Spanish authorities, the mightiest force -that had ever left the British shores was wasted -in a miserable expedition to the Scheldt, and -upon objects so insulated, and unimportant at -that crisis, that if they had been completely attained, -success would have been nugatory. Had -that force been landed in the north of Germany, -as the Austrian government proposed, it has -since been known, that what Schill did with his -single regiment, would have been done by Blucher -and the whole Prussian army. Marquis -Wellesley had always disapproved of its destination, -looking upon the plan as at once absurd -and ruinous. Destructive to the last degree it -proved, from the unwholesome nature of the -country to which it was sent: a cause which of -all others might with most certainty have been -foreseen, and yet by some fatality seems to have -been overlooked by all who were concerned in -planning the expedition or consulted upon it. -The only consolation, if consolation it may be -deemed, for the misemployment of such a force, -was in the knowledge that, owing to the state of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">101</span> -the Spanish counsels, and the temper of the -Spanish generals, it could not have acted in -Spain.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Inquiry into the conduct of the Duke of York.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The British government meantime had to -struggle with difficulties at home as well as -abroad, and of the most unexpected kind. -During the former part of the year parliament -was occupied with an inquiry into the conduct -of the Duke of York as commander-in-chief, -which ended in his resigning the office. The -circumstances which were disclosed rendered -this resignation becoming and necessary; but -perhaps there never was another instance in -which the reaction of public opinion was at -once so strongly and so justly manifested. For -when the agitation was subsided which had been -raised, not so much by the importance of the -business itself, as by the unremitting efforts of -a set of libellers the vilest and most venomous -of their kind, it was then perceived that the accusation -had originated in intrigue and malice; -that the abuses which were brought to light -were far less than had been supposed to exist, -and that in proving them it had been proved -also that the greatest improvements had been -introduced into that department by his Royal -Highness, and that the general administration -was excellent. From that time, therefore, the -Duke acquired a popularity which he had never -before possessed; and the efforts which had -been made with persevering malignity to ruin -him in the good opinion of the nation, served<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">102</span> -only to establish him there upon the strongest -and surest grounds.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Alterations in the ministry.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>This inquiry had occupied a full third of the -whole session, to the grievous interruption of -public business, and the more grievous excitement -of the people, even to the extinction in -most minds of all other public interest whatever. -The ministry meantime had other causes -of disquiet, which did not transpire till the session -had closed. Mismanaged arrangements for -the removal of Lord Castlereagh from the war department, -induced him to challenge Mr. Canning, -with whom the wish for his removal originated, -but who in the course of the affair had -been as ill used as himself. Both parties in consequence -resigned; the Duke of Portland did -the same, compelled by the state of his health, -for he died almost immediately afterwards, and -thus the administration was broken up. Lord -Liverpool, the only remaining secretary of state, -performed the business of the other two departments, -while the remaining members of the cabinet -looked about in dismay, and almost in -despair, for new colleagues and for a new head. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Sept. 23.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Their situation appeared so forlorn that official -letters were addressed to Earl Grey and Lord -Grenville, informing them that his Majesty had -authorized Earl Liverpool and Mr. Perceval to -communicate with their lordships for the purpose -of forming an extended and combined administration, -and requesting them to come to -town, that as little time as possible might be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">103</span> -lost in forwarding so important an object. Earl -Grey replied, that had his Majesty been pleased -to signify he had any commands for him personally, -he should not have lost a moment in -showing his duty by prompt obedience to his -royal pleasure; but when it was proposed that -he should communicate with the existing ministers, -for the purpose of forming a combined administration -with them, he should be wanting in -duty to the King, and in fairness to them, if he -did not at once declare that such a union was, as -far as it regarded him under the then circumstances, -impossible: this being the answer which -he was under the necessity of giving, his appearance -in London could be of no advantage; -and it might possibly be of detriment to the -country, if, in consequence of a less decisive -answer, any farther delay should take place in -the formation of a settled government.</p> - -<p>Lord Grenville, who was in Cornwall, replied, -he should lose no time in repairing to town, and -begged leave to defer all observations upon the -business till his arrival. The day after his arrival -he sent an answer conformable to that of -Earl Grey, declining the proposed communication, -because it could not be productive of any -public advantage. “I trust,” he added, “I -need not say that this opinion is neither founded -in any sentiment of personal hostility, nor in a -desire of unnecessarily prolonging political differences. -To compose, not to inflame, the divisions -of the empire, has always been my<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">104</span> -anxious wish, and is now more than ever the -duty of every loyal subject; but my accession -to the existing administration could not in any -respect contribute to this object, nor could it be -considered in any other light than as a dereliction -of public principle. This answer, which I -must have given to any such proposal, if made -while the government was yet entire, cannot be -varied by the retreat of some of its members. -My objections are not personal, they apply to -the principle of the government itself, and to -the circumstances which attended its appointment.”</p> - -<p>Nothing but extreme necessity could have -induced the remaining ministers to make these -overtures; and when their advances were thus -rejected, great hopes were entertained by the -adverse party, that they would not be able to -keep their ground as an administration. It was -even affirmed and believed that some of the -highest offices were offered to different persons, -and that none could be found to accept them. -The only hope of the ministry rested upon Marquis -Wellesley; hints were thrown out that he -would not join any arrangement in which Mr. -Canning was not included; this opinion, however, -proved erroneous, the Marquis accepted -the office which Mr. Canning vacated, the Earl -of Liverpool was transferred from the home to -the war department, and the situation which he -had vacated was filled by Mr. Ryder. Lord -Palmerstone was made secretary at war in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">105</span> -room of Sir James Pulteney, and Mr. Perceval -took the place of the Duke of Portland, ... thus -uniting in himself, as Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington -had done before him, the offices of first lord -of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer. -The loss of the Duke was only that of a name; -that of Mr. Canning was greatly regretted, as -was also the secession of Mr. Huskisson, who -resigned his seat at the treasury at the same -time; but though the ministry was weakened -by their departure, it was well understood that -the opposition would derive no aid from them; -and, on the whole, government was thought to -have gained by these changes more than it had -lost, in consequence of the high reputation of -Marquis Wellesley, and the almost general desire -of the nation to see him in administration. -His brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, was appointed -to succeed him as ambassador to Spain.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Disposition of the French and Spanish armies.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The disposable force of the enemy in Spain -at this time was estimated at 125,000 men, well -provided with cavalry and artillery, exclusive of -the garrisons in Barcelona and the strong places -upon the Pyrenean frontier. Of these, about -35,000 were employed in Arragon and Catalonia, -the rest were in the two Castilles and Extremadura, -70,000 being in the field under Victor, -Soult, Ney, Sebastiani, and Mortier, ... the remainder -employed in garrisons, and in keeping -up the communication between the different -places in their possession. Sick and wounded -were not included, and an allowance was made<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">106</span> -for the loss of 10,000 men at Talavera. At -the lowest estimate, this was the number of -the enemy; the force of the Spaniards was miserably -inferior. Blake, after the rout at Belchite, -had reassembled a small army, scarcely -exceeding 6000 men, with which he was endeavouring, -from time to time, to relieve Gerona. -Noroña had 15,000 men in Galicia; but -a tenth part of these were without arms, and he -had neither cavalry nor artillery. The Duke -del Parque had 9000 men at Ciudad Rodrigo, -and Eguia and Venegas had about 50,000 in -their two armies. But the inefficient state of -these troops had been lamentably proved; both -cavalry and infantry were for the most part -undisciplined, and the latter neither properly -clothed nor accoutred, notwithstanding large -supplies of all things needful had been sent -from England.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Neediness of the intrusive government.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Intruder meantime, now that immediate -danger was averted, had leisure to feel the -wretched state to which his subserviency to a -wicked brother had reduced him. He was, -indeed, in possession of Madrid, and half the -kingdom was overrun by his troops; but how -were those troops to be paid, or how was he to -support the expenses of his court and government? -Whatever might be the issue of the war -in the Peninsula, the vast colonial empire of -Spain could never be his, and the resources -which still continued to arrive from thence were -enjoyed by the legitimate government. Whereever<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">107</span> -his authority extended, trade was at an end, -the people were impoverished, and the sources -of revenue destroyed. The first-fruits of plunder -also had now been consumed. Andalusia, indeed, -offered a harvest as yet untouched, and -which would ere long be at his disposal; but -till the opportunity arrived, it was necessary to -glean whatever had been spared in the former -pillage. An edict was issued, denouncing severe -punishment against those who should secrete -papers or effects belonging to the suppressed -monasteries, and offering a reward for the discovery -of such property, proportionate to its -value. He had previously confiscated the property -of all Spaniards in foreign countries, who -should not forthwith return in obedience to his -command; he now called upon those in whose -hands property, papers, or effects had been left -by others when forsaking their place of residence, -to deliver them up for the use of the treasury. -Any persons buying or selling gold, silver, or -jewels, which had belonged to a suppressed -convent, or to an insurgent, were to be severely -punished; and those who assisted the insurgents -in any manner were to be put to death. Another -decree sequestered the revenues of all archbishops -and bishops, and appointed pensions -from the state instead. Another commanded -all persons possessing plate to the amount of -more than ten dollars, except in plates, knives, -and spoons, to give in an account thereof within -three days; the mint was immediately to pay a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">108</span> -fourth of its value, and the remainder was promised -within four months. All plate which -should be concealed after this edict was to be -forfeited, and a fourth of its value given to the -informer; and silversmiths were forbidden to -purchase any articles in silver, except such as -were permitted to be in use by the present -decree.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Measures of severity.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>These measures proved the neediness of the -intrusive government. Its atrocious character -had already been amply demonstrated; if farther -proof were needed, it was to be found in a -decree by which all persons whose sons were -serving in what it called the insurgent armies -were required to furnish a man to the Intruder’s -service for every son, or a proportionate sum -of money; the elder brothers, or other nearest -relations or guardians of those who had no father, -were subjected to the same law; and those who -had no money either for procuring the substitute -or paying the fine were to be imprisoned, or sent -into France. But it was reserved for this government -to introduce a new species of barbarity, -which had never before been heard of in war. -Kellermann, whom the English had rescued -with such difficulty from the vengeance of the -Portugueze at Lisbon, was at this time governor-general -of what the French called Upper Spain, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Oct. 28.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -that is, of the provinces of Salamanca, Zamora, -Toro, Leon, Valladolid, Palencia, Burgos, Soria, -Santander, Biscay, Guipuzcoa, and Alava. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Kellermann’s edict.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Throughout this whole tract of country he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">109</span> -placed all horses and mares above a certain -height in requisition for the French armies, -ordering them to be taken to the respective -country towns, and there delivered for that -purpose; and every horse or mare below the -size named, or under thirty months old, with -every mare that should be three months gone -with foal, was to have the left eye put out by -the owner, and to be in other ways rendered -unfit for military service. A fine of four times -the value of the beast was to be exacted from -any one who disobeyed this edict, and all French -officers were charged to see it carried into execution. -Nothing can more strikingly evince -their moral degradation, than that their general -should have ordered them to enforce the execution - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Measures of Joseph’s ministers.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -of an edict like this. These were the -measures pursued in the name of a King who -was represented as being equally philosophic and -humane, who was to remedy all the evils of long -misrule, to relieve the people from all grievances, -restore Spain to its ancient prosperity, and confer -upon it a happiness which it had never before -enjoyed! In an unhappy hour had Joseph’s -ministers entered his service, persuading, or -seeking to persuade, themselves that they might -benefit their country by giving their countenance -to a perfidious and odious usurpation. The -ablest men who have ever endeavoured to do -good by evil means, have felt their best intentions -frustrated in the attempt. These ministers, -worthy, as under other circumstances they might<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">110</span> -have been of their station, found themselves now -the mere instrument of that very military power -which they had flattered themselves that they -should be allowed to direct. Still, however, -seeking some excuse to their own hearts, and to -posterity, they took advantage of the time for -attempting alterations, which would have been -most salutary if the nation had been prepared -for them, ... but for which it was so little prepared, -that the premature attempt only attached -the Spaniards the more to the very evils from -which it was intended to deliver them. One -sweeping decree abolished all the regular orders -in Spain, whether monastic, mendicant, or clerical; -the individuals belonging to them were -ordered to quit their convents within fifteen -days, resume their secular habits, and repair to -their native places, where pensions were promised -them. It was certain that the intrusive -government had neither the means nor the -intention of paying these pensions; but the -whole property of the suppressed orders was -seized for the use of the state. The reason -assigned for this measure in the preamble to the -decree was, that these communities had taken -a hostile part against the government, which, -while it thus abolished them, wished to recompense -those individuals who had conducted -themselves well. Better reasons, Urquijo and -his colleagues well knew, would only have exasperated -a people whose souls were thoroughly -enslaved to the superstitions which debased<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">111</span> -them; but the cause which was thus assigned -exasperated them as much, and this feeling was -kept up and disseminated every where by the -ejected members, who, wherever they went, -excited the compassion of their countrymen and -inflamed their hatred of the intrusive government. -Some prudence as well as humanity was -shown, by exempting the nuns from this decree; -they were subjected to the ordinary, and forbidden -to receive pupils. The military orders -were abolished also, except that of the Golden -Fleece, and the one which the intrusive government -had itself instituted. This was needlessly -offending the national pride, which was in like -manner wounded by the removal of the tax -raised under the name of the <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">Voto de Santiago</i>; -the relief, even had circumstances allowed it to -be felt, would not have compensated for the -outrage upon Spanish feeling. In taking away -the privilege of sanctuary, and suppressing all -ecclesiastical jurisdiction in civil and criminal -cases, the ministers acted as they would have -wished to do, had they held their offices by a -better tenure; and in making strangulation the -mode of death for all criminals of whatever rank, -and decreeing that degradation was implied in -the sentence. But when an edict affected to -abolish all dignities and titles which had not -been conferred by the Intruder, and required -the traitorous nobles in his service to receive -from him a confirmation of the peerage which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">112</span> -they had disgraced, the futility of the decree only -provoked contempt.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Central Junta announce that the Cortes will be assembled.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Joseph’s ministers had leisure for legislative -speculations and for dreams of reformation. -The real business of government was not in -their hands; in all essential points they were -mere ciphers, and seemed to feel that they were -so. The Central Junta was in a situation as -much more trying as it was more honourable. -The difficulties and embarrassments of every -kind with which they were beset might have -confused heads more experienced in affairs of -state; and their exertions under the pressure -of immediate danger left them little time for -those measures of effectual reform, which Spain -so greatly needed, but which were looked for -more eagerly by the British nation than by the -Spaniards, for as a people the Spaniards were -contented with their old system, and attached -to it even with all its evils and abominations. -The general wish in England was that the -Cortes should be convened, and this was desired -as sincerely by the British government as by -Jovellanos and those other noble minded Spaniards -who hoped through regular and constitutional -means to restore the liberty and the -prosperity of their country. It was long after -the installation of the Junta before the disasters -of the day allowed them leisure for thinking of -the morrow. To this their delay in taking -measures for assembling the Cortes must be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">113</span> -ascribed, more than to their love of power, -which they were ill able to wield, or of the -patronage which they unworthily bestowed. -But to these motives the delay was imputed; -and by not following the advice of Jovellanos -when the act would have appeared spontaneous -and graceful, they lost the opportunity of obtaining -that popularity which even the semblance -of disinterestedness is sure to acquire. It was -not till eight months after their installation that -a decree came forth for re-establishing the legal -representation of the monarchy in its ancient -Cortes. The time was left indefinite, but the -edict said it would be convoked in the course -of the ensuing year, or earlier, if circumstances -should permit.</p> - -<p>The language of the Supreme Junta on this, -as on every other occasion, was worthy of the -position in which the national government was -placed, and of the principles on which it professed -to act. “The Spanish people,” they -said, “must leave to their posterity an inheritance -worthy of the sacrifices which were made -for obtaining it. The Supreme Junta had never -lost sight of this object; and the progress of -the enemy, which had hitherto occupied their -whole attention, rendered more bitter the reflection, -that all their disasters were solely owing to -the disuse of those institutions which, in happier -times, secured the welfare and the strength of -the state. The ambition of some, and the -indolence of others, had reduced those institutions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">114</span> -to nothing; and the Junta, from the -moment of its installation, solemnly bound itself -to restore them. The time was now arrived for -this great work. Desirous, therefore, that the -nation should appear with the dignity due to its -heroic efforts; that the rights of the people -should be placed beyond the reach of encroachments; -and that the sources of public felicity -should run freely as soon as the war ceased, -and repair whatever inveterate arbitrary power -had scorched, or the present devastation had -destroyed, the Junta decreed, that the Cortes -should be re-established, and would immediately -proceed to consider the method of convening -it; for which end it would nominate a committee -of five of its members. It would also -investigate, in order to propose them to the -nation assembled in Cortes, the means of supporting -the holy war in which they were engaged; -of insuring the observance of their fundamental -laws; of meliorating the legislation and -abolishing the abuses which had crept into it; -of collecting and administering the revenue, -and of reforming the system of public education. -And to combine the information necessary for -such discussions, it would consult the councils, -provincial Juntas, tribunals, magistracies, corporations, -bishops, and universities, and the -opinion of intelligent and enlightened persons.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Declaration which was first proposed.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>A declaration in stronger terms had been -submitted to the Junta, and rejected by them -at the instigation of Mr. Frere. “Spaniards,”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">115</span> -it was there said, “it is three ages since the laws -on which the nation founded its defence against -tyranny have been destroyed. Our fathers did -not know how to preserve the liberty which had -been bequeathed to them; and although all -the provinces of Spain successively struggled -to defend it, evil stars rendered their efforts -useless. The laws, from that time forward, -have been only an expression more or less tyrannical, -or beneficent, of a particular will. -Providence, as if to punish the loss of that -prerogative of free men, has paralysed our valour, -arrested the progress of our intellect, and impeded -our civilization, till we have come to -that condition, that an insolent tyrant formed -the project of subduing the greatest nation of -the globe, without reckoning upon its will, and -even despising its existence. In vain has the -prince sometimes attempted to remedy some of -the evils of the state: buildings cannot be -erected on sand, and without fundamental and -constituted laws, it is useless for the philosopher -in his study, or the statesman in the theatre of -business, to exert himself for the good of the -people. The best projects are not put in execution, -or not carried through. Good suggestions -are followed by evil ones; economy and -order, by prodigality and rapine; a prudent -and mild minister, by an avaricious and foolish -favourite; and thus the ship of the state floats -without sails and helm, till, as has happened to -the Spanish monarchy, it is dashed to pieces on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">116</span> -a rock. How, but by the re-establishment of freedom, -could that blood be recompensed which -flows in every part of the Peninsula; those -sacrifices which Spanish loyalty is offering every -instant; that moral resistance, as universal -as it is sublime, which disconcerts our enemies, -and renders them hopeless even in the midst -of their victories? When this dreadful contest -is concluded, the Spaniard shall say proudly to -himself, ‘My fathers left me slavery and -wretchedness for my inheritance; I leave to -my descendants liberty and glory.’ Spaniards, -this is the feeling which, by reflection in some, -and by instinct in all, animates you now; and -it shall not be defrauded of its expectations. -Our detractors say that we are fighting to defend -old abuses, and the inveterate vices of our -corrupted government; let them know that -your struggle is for the happiness, as well -as the independence of your country; that -you will not depend henceforward on the uncertain -will or the variable temper of a single -man; nor continue to be the plaything of a -court without justice, under the control of an -insolent favourite, or a capricious woman; but -that on the edifice of your ancient laws you -will rear a barrier between despotism and your -sacred rights. This barrier consists in a constitution -to aid and support the monarch when -he is just, and to restrain him when he follows -evil councils. Without a constitution all reform -is precarious, all prosperity uncertain; without<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">117</span> -it the people are no more than flocks of slaves, -put in motion at the order of a will, frequently -unjust, and always unrestrained; without it -the forces of the whole society, which should -procure the greatest advantages for all its members, -are employed exclusively to satisfy the -ambition, or satiate the frenzy of a few, or perhaps -of one.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Objections by Mr. Frere.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>When this paper was communicated to Mr. -Frere, he saw serious objections, which he -stated to Garay, and which the Junta, though -they would otherwise have published the proclamation, -readily admitted. That ambassador -perceived, more clearly perhaps than any other -person at that time, the danger to be apprehended -from convoking a legislative assembly -in a nation altogether unprepared for it by -habits, feelings, education, or general knowledge. -He considered it a delicate and dangerous -point in every respect, and said, “that -if the decision of the question were left in his -hand, notwithstanding the necessity for widening -the basis of the government, the failure of -all the political experiments which had been -made in these latter times, and the impossibility -which had been found (by a fatality peculiar -to the present age) of forming a permanent -establishment, even in affairs less essential than -the formation of a free constitution for a great -nation, would make him waver. But taking -the decision for granted, he thought the manner<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">118</span> -in which it was proposed to announce it -likely to produce bad effects in Spain; and he -could venture,” he said, “to assure D. Martin -de Garay, that it would undoubtedly create -them in England. If the Spaniards had indeed -passed three centuries under arbitrary government, -they ought not to forget that it was the -price which they paid for having conquered -and peopled the fairest portion of the world, -and that the integrity of that immense power -rested solely upon these two words, Religion -and the King. If the old constitution had been -lost by the conquest of America, the first object -should be to recover it; but in such a -manner as not to lose what had cost so much -in the acquisition: and for this reason, they -ought to avoid, as a political poison, every -enunciation of general principles, the application -of which it would be impossible to limit or -qualify, even when the Negroes and Indians -should quote it in favour of themselves. And -allowing that a bad exchange had been made -in bartering the ancient national liberty for -the glory and extension of the Spanish name; -allowing that the error should at all hazards be -done away; even though it were so,” Mr. -Frere said, “it did not appear becoming the -character of a well-educated person to pass -censures upon the conduct of his forefathers, -or to complain of what he may have lost by -their negligence or prodigality, still less so if it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">119</span> -were done in the face of the world; and what -should be said of a nation who should do this -publicly, and after mature deliberation?”</p> - -<p>This was true foresight,—and yet the English -ambassador approached Charybdis in his -fear of Scylla. He spoke to the Spaniards of -Religion and the King; in England the truest -and most enlightened lovers of liberty can have -no better rallying words; in Spain those words -had for three hundred years meant the inquisition -and an absolute monarch, whose ministers, -so long as they could retain his favour, governed -according to their own will and pleasure, unchecked -by any constitutional control. The -government did not obtain by their decree for - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Unpopularity of the Junta.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -convoking the Cortes the popularity which they -had perhaps expected. The measure had been -long delayed, and therefore was supposed to -have been unwillingly resolved on. So much, -indeed, had been expected from the Central -Junta, that no possible wisdom on their part, -no possible success, could have answered the -unreasonable demand. The disappointment of -the nation was in proportion to its hopes, and -the government became equally the object of -suspicion and contempt. Some of the members -had large estates in those provinces which were -occupied by the French, and it was suspected -that where their property was, there their hearts -were also. Their subsequent conduct proved -how greatly they were injured by this distrust. -They were not censured for their first disasters, -which the ablest men under like circumstances<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">120</span> -could not have averted. Had they obtained -accurate intelligence of the strength and movements -of the enemy when Buonaparte entered -Spain; had they exerted themselves as much in -disciplining troops as in raising and embodying -them, and had they supplied them with regularity -and promptitude; it would not have been -possible to have stopped the progress of such a -force. Something was allowed for the confidence -which the battle of Baylen had inspired, -and for the enthusiasm of the people, which -the government had partaken. Neither would -the nation have been disposed to condemn, even -if it had perceived, errors which arose from the -national character. But when, after the bitter -experience of twelve whole months, no measures -had been adopted for improving the discipline -of the armies, or supplying them in the field, -the incapacity of the Junta became glaring, and -outcries against them were heard on all sides.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Their difficulties and errors.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>One of the weightiest errors for which they -were censured was for not exerting themselves -more effectually to bring the whole strength of -the country against the invaders. They had -promised to raise 500,000 men and 50,000 -cavalry. Granada was the only province which -supplied its full proportion, and Granada even -exceeded it; its contingent was about 28,000, -whereas it furnished nearly forty. But this depended -more upon the provincial Juntas than -upon the central government, whose decrees -were of no avail in those parts which the enemy -possessed, and were ill observed in others, where<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">121</span> -the local administrations, from disgust, or jealousy, -or indolence, or incapacity, seemed to look -on as spectators of the dreadful drama, rather -than to perform their parts in it, as men and as -Spaniards. Neither is it to the want of numbers -that their defeats were to be attributed; -there were at all times men enough in the field; -arms, equipments, and discipline were wanting. -It is unjust to judge of the exertions of the -Spanish Junta by those of the National Convention -in France, who had the whole wealth -and strength of a populous and rich country at -their absolute disposal, and who began the revolutionary -war with officers, and tacticians, -and statesmen capable of wielding the mighty -means which were put into their hands. The -fault of the Junta was in relying too much upon -numbers and bravery, and too little upon their -fortresses. The general under whom the great -captain Gonzalo de Cordova learnt the art of -war had left them a lesson which they might -profitably have remembered. He used to say, -that fortresses ought to be opposed to the impatience -and fury of the French, and that the -place for stationing raw troops was behind walls -and ramparts.</p> - -<p>The most important errors which the Junta -had hitherto committed were, the delay in convoking -the Cortes, and their conduct towards -Sir Arthur Wellesley’s army; but the national -character contributed in no slight degree to -both. For it was not the known aversion of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">122</span> -Florida Blanca to the name of a representative -assembly, nor the fears of some of the Junta, -nor the love of power in others, which protracted -the convocation of the Cortes, so much -as their reverential adherence to established -forms. This was evident in Jovellanos himself, -who regarded it as equally profane and dangerous -to approach this political ark of the -covenant, without scrupulously observing all -the ceremonies and solemnities which the law -prescribed. Precedents on points of this kind -are not to be found in Spain as they are in -England. Antiquaries were to be consulted, -archives examined, old regulations adapted to -new circumstances,—and this when the enemy -was at the gates. The defect may well be pardoned, -because of the virtues with which it was -connected. Had the Spaniards regarded with -less veneration the deeds and the institutions of -their ancestors, they would never have supported -that struggle which will be the wonder -of succeeding ages. Their conduct toward the -English army sprang from a worse fault; from -that pride which made them prone to impose -upon others and upon themselves a false opinion -of their strength. It is the national failing, for -which they have ever been satirized, by their -own writers as well as by other nations. They -will rather promise and disappoint, than acknowledge -their inability; of this, their history -for the last two centuries affords abundant examples; -they had yet to learn, that perfect sincerity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">123</span> -is as much due to an ally as to a confessor. -In many cases the government was -itself deceived; the same false point of honour -prevailing in every department, from the lowest -to the highest, it received and acted upon exaggerated -statements and calculations; but in -others, it cannot be denied, that pride led to -the last degree of meanness, and that promises -were held out to the English general, which -those who made them must have known it was -impossible to perform.</p> - -<p>Yet it must be admitted that the errors of the -Junta were more attributable to the character of -the nation than of the individuals; and those -individuals were placed in circumstances of unexampled -difficulty. Four-and-thirty men, most -of them strangers to each other, and unaccustomed -to public business, were brought together -to govern a nation in the most perilous crisis of -its history, without any thing to direct them -except their own judgement, and almost without -any other means than what the patriotism of the -people could supply. They had troops indeed, -but undisciplined, unofficered, unprovided, half -armed, and half clothed. The old system of -government was broken up, the new one was -yet to be formed. They had neither commissariat -nor treasury; the first donations and imposts -were exhausted; so also were the supplies -which England had liberally given, and those -from America had not yet arrived. Added to -these difficulties, and worse than all, was that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">124</span> -dreadful state of moral and social anarchy into -which the nation had been thrown, and which -was such that no man knew in whom he could -confide. To poison food or water in time of -war is a practice which all people, who are not -absolute savages, have pronounced infamous by -common consent; but it is a light crime compared -to the means which Buonaparte employed -for the subjugation of Spain,—means which poisoned -the well-springs of social order, and loosened -the very joints and fibres of society. Morla, -when he betrayed his country, committed an -act of treason against human nature. The evil -had been great before, but when a Judas Iscariot -had been found in Morla during the agony -of Spain, in whom could the people confide? -“Suspicion,” says Jovellanos, “and hatred -were conceived and spread with frightful facility. -How many generals, nobles, prelates, -magistrates, and lawyers, were regarded with -distrust, either because of their old relations -with Godoy, or because they were connected -with some of the new partizans of the tyranny; -or for the weakness, or indecision, or ambiguity -of their conduct; or for the calumnies and insinuations -which rivalship and envy excited -against them! It was considered as a crime -to have gone to Bayonne, to have remained at -Madrid, or resided in other places which were -occupied by the intrusive government; to have -submitted to swear allegiance to it, to have -obeyed its orders, or to have suffered even compulsively<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">125</span> -its yoke and its contempt. What reputation -was secure? Who was not exposed to -the attacks of envy, to the imputations of calumny, -and to the violence of an agitated populace?”</p> - -<p>From this state of things it necessarily arose, -that the Junta acted in constant fear and suspicion -of those whom they employed. Their -sense of weakness and their love of power increased -the evil. Fearing the high spirit of -Alburquerque, and the influence which rank -and talents conjoined would give to his deserved -popularity among the soldiers, they cramped -him in a subordinate command, while they -trusted those armies which were the hope of -Spain to Cuesta, because they were afraid of -offending him, and to Venegas, for the opposite -reason, that they were sure of his obsequious -submission. Some odium they incurred by -permitting a trade with towns which the enemy -occupied. For the sake, as was alleged, of those -Spaniards who were compelled to live under the -yoke, and also for the advantage of the colonies, -they had granted licences for conveying sugar, -cacao, and bark, to those parts of the kingdom. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">July 14.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -These licences were only to be trusted to persons -of known and approved patriotism, who -were likewise to be strictly watched, and liable -to be searched upon any suspicion. The weakness -of such a concession in such a war, as well -as the obvious facility which it afforded to the -French and their traitorous partizans, excited<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">126</span> -just reprehension; and at the close of the year - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Dec. 28.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the Junta found it necessary to revoke their edict, -acknowledging that, in spite of all precautions, -it was found prejudicial to the public safety. -Some of the members were suspected of enhancing -the price of necessaries for the army, -by their own secret monopolies; others were said -to be surrounded by venal instruments, through -whom alone they were accessible. These imputations -were probably ill-founded or exaggerated; -certain, however, it is, that never had -any government fewer friends. Men of the -most opposite principles were equally disaffected -toward it. Its very defenders had no confidence -in its stability, and were ready to forsake it. -They who dreaded any diminution of the regal -authority, could not forgive its popular origin; -they who aspired to lay the foundation of a new -and happier order of things, were discontented, -because the measures which were taken towards -the reformation of the state were slowly, and, -as they deemed, reluctantly adopted. Those -wretches who were sold to France were the -enemies of any government which resisted the -usurpation; and those whose timid natures, or -short-sighted selfishness, disposed them to submission, -naturally regarded it with dislike, because -it delayed the subjection of the country. -Among the people, who were actuated by none -of these feelings, it was sufficient to render the -Junta unpopular that it was unfortunate. The -times rendered them suspicious; their own conduct<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">127</span> -and their power made them obnoxious to -many; and their ill-fortune, more than their -errors, made them disliked by all.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Scheme for overthrowing them.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Influenced by some of these motives, and perhaps -in no little degree by jealousy, the Junta -of Seville were particularly hostile to the government, -and a plan was formed in that city for -overthrowing it: the members were to be seized, -and some of the most obnoxious transported to -Manilla in a ship which was prepared for the -purpose. Some regiments had been gained over, -and it is said even the guards of the Junta; but -as the persons who designed this revolution had -for their direct object the good of Spain, they -considered it a mark of confidence due to Great -Britain to make the English ambassador acquainted -with their purpose; for in fact, so far -were the Spanish people from regarding the interference -of Great Britain with jealousy, that -they were disappointed because their ally did -not interfere more frequently, and with more -effect. Marquis Wellesley, of whom it had been -said by Mr. Whitbread that he would, if opportunity -should offer, take Spain and Portugal as -Buonaparte had done, had now an opportunity -of showing in what manner he thought himself -bound to act by a government which he knew -to be weak, and suspected to be treacherous. -At the very time when this foul imputation was -brought against him in parliament, he gave to -that government just so much information of its -danger, as, without compromising the safety of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">128</span> -any persons concerned, enabled the Junta to -prevent the intended insurrection.</p> - -<p>The general wish was less for the convocation -of the Cortes, than for the establishment of a -regency, from which more unanimity and more -vigour was expected, than from the present -divided council. The people of Cadiz said the -fate of Spain was in Marquis Wellesley’s hands, -that he ought to remove the Junta, and establish -an energetic government. Those persons who -respected hereditary claims would have had the -Archbishop of Toledo appointed regent, as being -the only Bourbon in the country; but he was -young; and what weighed against him more -than the want of either talents or character, was, -that he was believed to be governed by his sister, -the wife of Godoy. Others looked to Romana, -knowing his dislike to the Junta, and hoping -that he would assume the government himself, -or intrust it to able hands. Another project was -to appoint both these personages regents, with -the Duke del Infantado, and two other colleagues. -It was thought that the army would -gladly have seen the supreme authority vested -in one of their own body, either Romana or Infantado. -But both these noblemen were free -from any such ambition; and Montijo, who was -always intriguing for power, was so well known, -that he was the last person whom any party -would have trusted.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Commission appointed by the Junta.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The warning which had thus been given was -not lost upon the Junta, and they attended to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">129</span> -the representations which accompanied it; they -knew their weakness, and perceived their danger; -admitted that the existing government was -not suited to the state of affairs, and nominated -a commission for the purpose of inquiring in what -manner it might best be replaced. Romana was -included in the commission, and upon this occasion -he delivered in a paper, which, if they had -required additional proof of his hostility, and -their own unstable tenure, would amply have - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Romana’s address. <br /><span class="date">Oct. 4.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -afforded it. “There were three cases,” he said, -“either of which ought to produce a change in -the system of a government: When a nation, -which ought only to obey, doubts the legitimacy -of the authority to which it is to submit; when -such authority begins to lose its influence; when -it is not only prejudicial to the public weal, but -contrary to the principles of the constitution. -The existing government was objectionable upon -all these grounds: it was founded upon a democratic -principle of representation, inconsistent -with the pure monarchical system of Spain, and -with the heroic loyalty of the Spaniards, and -which, if it continued, would subvert the monarchy. -As often as he meditated upon this subject, -he doubted the lawfulness of the existing -government; and this opinion was general in the -provinces through which he had passed. Among -the services which he had endeavoured to perform -for his king and country, it was not the -least that he had yielded obedience to the orders -of this government, and made the constituted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">130</span> -authorities in Leon, Asturias, and Gallicia do -the same; considering this absolutely necessary -to preserve the nation from anarchy. A government, -though illegal, might secure the happiness -of the people, if it deserved their confidence, and -they respected its authority; but the existing -government had lost its authority. The people, -who judge of measures by the effects which they -see produced, complain that our armies are weak -for want of energy in the government; that no -care has been taken for supplying them; that -they have not seen the promised accounts of the -public expenditure, and how the sums which -have arrived from America, those which our -generous allies have given, the rents of the -crown, and the voluntary contributions, have -been expended: they look in vain for necessary -reforms; they see that employments are not -given to men of true merit, and true lovers of -their country; that some members, instead of -manifesting their desire of the public good, by -disinterestedness, seek to preserve their authority -for their own advantage; that others confer -lucrative and honourable employments on their -own dependents and countrymen; that for this -sole reason ecclesiastical offices have been filled -up, the rents of which ought to have been applied -to the necessities of the state; that that unity -which is necessary in the government, is not to -be found, many of the Junta caring only for the -interests of their particular provinces, as if they -were members of some body different from that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">131</span> -of the Spanish monarchy; that they had not only -confirmed the military appointments made by -the provincial Juntas, without examining the -merits of the persons appointed, but had even -assigned recompences to many who were destitute -of all military knowledge, having never seen -service, nor performed any of those duties which -were confided to them; that the Junta, divided -into sections, dispatched business in matters altogether -foreign to their profession, and in which -they were utterly unversed, instead of referring -them to the competent and appropriate ministers; -that horses taken from their owners, instead -of being sent to the armies, were dying -for hunger on the dry sea-marshes; finally, -that many of the most important branches of -administration were in the hands of men, suspicious, -because of their conduct from the commencement -of the public misfortunes, and because -they were the creatures of that infamous -favourite, who had been the author of all the -general misery. Such,” said Romana, “are the -complaints of the people: there is but one step -to disobedience; the enemy will profit by the -first convulsion, and anarchy or servitude will -then be the alternative.”</p> - -<p>The Marquis then stated, that the time for -which some provinces had appointed their representatives -to the Junta was expired; that -others had empowered them not to exercise the -sovereign authority, but to constitute a government -which might represent the monarch: in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">132</span> -neither case could these provinces be expected -to acknowledge an authority which they had -never conferred. The commission, he proceeded -to say, had proposed that the Junta should reduce -itself to five persons, in whom the executive -power should be vested; and that in rotation -each member of the existing body should enter -into this supreme executive council, which should -also preside over the Cortes when it was assembled. -This project discovered the love of power -in the Junta more unequivocally than any other -part of their conduct. What Romana proposed -in its stead was as prudent in itself as it was inconsistent -with his previous positions. After -maintaining that the powers of the existing -government were from the first illegal, and that -even such as they were, they had, for part of the -members, expired, he recommended nevertheless -that this government should, as representing -legitimately or illegitimately the Cortes, appoint -a regent, or a council of regency, consisting of -three or of five persons, especially advising, as -a proof of generosity and patriotism, that they -should nominate none of their own body. A -Junta should be formed, under the title of the -Permanent Deputation of the Realm, to represent -the Cortes till the Cortes should be assembled; -it should consist of five members and a -procurador-general, and one of these members -should always be chosen from their American -brethren, as forming an integral part of the nation. -But the Cortes should be assembled with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">133</span> -as little delay as circumstances would permit, -and then no laws should be passed, or contributions -imposed, without its consent. “If,” said -he, “I have in some cases connected the supreme -power with the nation, I have done no -more than revive the constitutional principles of -the Spanish monarchy, which have been stifled -by the despotism of its kings and their ministers.” -However hostile to the principles of -civil liberty the first positions of Romana appeared, -the most zealous friends of freedom -might have been contented with his conclusions.</p> - -<p>“Ought we,” said he, “to fear that an adventurer, -who usurps the throne of Ferdinand, -should appear among us, if we had a government -like this, emanating from the consent of -the people, from submission to the true God, -and from the necessity of our mournful and -perilous situation? Would our armies then be -defective in numbers, and in subordination and -discipline? would they be so filled with ignorant -and cowardly officers, so unprovided with food, -so irregularly paid, and so destitute of all -equipments? would men be appointed generals, -because they would support the persons who -appointed them, or because they knew how -to command an army and how to save the -country? With such a government, the nation -would have invincible armies, the armies -would have generals, the troops would be -officered, and the soldiers would learn subordination -and discipline. When Spain shall see<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">134</span> -that auspicious day, I shall think it the first day -of her hope, and the most happy of her glorious -revolution. Such,” he continued, “is my -opinion; but I ought not to forget that I have -publicly controverted it by my actions. For -who sustained your sovereign authority in the -army and province which I governed? Gallicia, -whom didst thou obey? Didst thou respect -in me any power but that of the Central Junta, -or did I consent that thou shouldst separate -thyself from a government which I was sanctioning -by my own obedience? Asturias, didst -not thou see the powerful arm upraised which -thou hadst implored so earnestly, and the blow -of its power fall upon a Junta, which, after -having acknowledged the sovereignty of the -Central, and received from it succours, of which -my soldiers, naked and exhausted, were in want, -domineered like a despot, and had even disobeyed -the express will of our King, D. Ferdinand? -Nevertheless,” said he, addressing the -Central Junta, “you rewarded this scandalous -disobedience; and removed me covertly from -the command, in order that guilty Spaniards -might be honoured with the greater distinction. -My opinions were the same then that they are -now; but circumstances imperiously required a -government, and any government is better than -none. Then it was my duty to obey; now I -should not perform what is due to my character, -if I did not declare what I believe to be required -for the salvation of my country. How -indeed should I be silent; how should I suffer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">135</span> -the fire of patriotism to be extinguished, seeing -the sacrifice of so many victims in our glorious -cause; faithful wives murdered with their -daughters, after the most foul and unutterable -outrages; nuns driven from their cloisters, some -wandering about, many more the prey of lustful -impiety; ministers of the altar forced from the -sanctuary; temples turned into stables and dens -of uncleanness; towns reduced to servitude; -opulence to squalid beggary; armies composed -of the bravest spirits of the nation, which have -disappeared in the hottest struggles of their native -land, consumed by hunger, naked, and -destitute; seeing, in fine, that such revenues and -the liberal donations of Spain and America have -not even supplied the first necessities of the -soldier? How could I remain a tranquil spectator -of such great and mournful objects, and -not think them superior to the nearest personal -interest, to our self-love, and to our very existence? -As a Spaniard,” he concluded, “I am -ready to suffer a thousand deaths in defence of -our liberty; and in my rank I have rendered -homage to the descendant of the Pelayos, the -Jaymes, and the Garcias. As a general, I will -join myself to the last soldier who shall have -resolution to revenge his country in the last -period of her independence; but as a representative -of the nation, I must be excused from -occupying that distinguished place, unless a legitimate -government be immediately established, -which foreign powers will not hesitate to acknowledge,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">136</span> -which will represent our sovereign, -and which will save a people who are resolved -to die for their God, for their king, and for the -happiness of their posterity.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Reply of the Junta.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>It is proof of full political freedom in the -Spanish press at this juncture, that this paper -should have appeared, being little short of a -declaration of hostility against the existing government. -But though the high monarchical -principles with which Romana began his manifesto -displeased the democratic party, and the -glaring inconsistency of his proposal weakened -the effect which his authority might otherwise -have produced, the government felt the necessity -of doing something to conciliate the nation; -they determined to convoke the Cortes, and -announced the resolution in a paper which may -be considered as their official apology. In this -paper, without directly referring to Romana’s - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Oct. 28.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -charges, they replied to them. “Spaniards,” -said they, “it has seemed good to Providence -that in this terrible crisis you should not be -able to advance one step towards independence, -without advancing one likewise toward -liberty. An imbecile and decrepit despotism -prepared the way for French tyranny. Political -impostors then thought to deceive you by promising -reforms, and announcing, in a constitution -framed at their pleasure, the empire of the -laws, ... a barbarous contradiction, worthy of -their insolence. But the Spanish people, that -people which before any other enjoyed the prerogatives<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">137</span> -and advantages of civil liberty, and -opposed to arbitrary power the barrier which -justice has appointed, need borrow from no -other nation the maxims of political prudence, -and told these impudent legislators, that the artifices -of intriguers and the mandates of tyrants -are not laws for them. You ran to arms; and -fortune rendered homage to you, and bestowed -victory in reward for your ardour. The immediate -effect was the reunion of the state, which -was at that time divided into as many factions -as provinces. Our enemies thought they had -sown among us the deadly seed of anarchy, and -did not remember that Spanish judgement and -circumspection are always superior to French -intrigue. A supreme authority was established -without contradiction and without violence; -and the people, after having astonished the world -with the spectacle of their sublime exaltation -and their victories, filled it with admiration and -respect by their moderation and discretion.</p> - -<p>“The Central Junta was installed, and its -first care was to announce, that if the expulsion -of the enemy was the first object of its attention -in point of time, the permanent welfare of -the state was the principal in importance; for -to leave it sunk in the sea of old abuses, would -be a crime as enormous as to deliver you into -the hands of Buonaparte; therefore, as soon as -the whirlwind of war permitted, it resounded -in your ears the name of the Cortes, which has -ever been the bulwark of civil freedom; a name<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">138</span> -heretofore pronounced with mystery by the -learned, with distrust by politicians, and with horror -by tyrants; but which henceforth in Spain will -be the indestructible basis of the monarchy, the -most secure support of the rights of Ferdinand -and his family, a right for the people, and an -obligation for the government. That moral resistance, -which has reduced our enemies to confusion -and despair in the midst of their victories, -must not receive a less reward. Those -battles which are lost, those armies which are -destroyed; those soldiers who, dispersed in one -action, return to offer themselves for another; -that populace which, despoiled of almost all -they possessed, returned to their homes to share -the wretched remains of their property with the -defenders of their country; that struggle of barbarity -on the one hand, and of invincible constancy -on the other, present a whole as terrible -as magnificent, which Europe contemplates -with astonishment, and which history will one -day record, for the admiration and example of -posterity. A people so generous ought only to -be governed by laws which bear the great character -of public consent and common utility, ... -a character which they can only receive by -emanating from the august assembly which has -been announced to you.”</p> - -<p>The Junta now betrayed that undue desire -of retaining their power, which, though not -their only error, was the only one which proceeded -from selfish considerations. “It had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">139</span> -been recommended,” they said, “that the -existing government should be converted into -a regency of three or of five persons, and this -opinion was supported by the application of an -ancient law to our present situation; but a -political position which is entirely new, occasions -political forms and principles absolutely -new also. To expel the French, to restore to -his liberty and his throne our adored King, and -to establish a solid and permanent foundation -of good government, are the maxims which -gave the impulse to our revolution, are those -which support and direct it; and that government -will be the best which shall best promote -these wishes of the Spanish nation. Does a -regency promise this security? What inconveniences, -what dangers, how many divisions, how -many parties, how many ambitious pretensions -within and without the kingdom; how much, -and how just, discontent in our Americas, now -called to have a share in the present government! -What would become of our Cortes, -our liberty, the cheering prospects of future -welfare and glory which present themselves? -What would become of the object most valuable -and dear to the Spanish nation ... the rights of -Ferdinand? The advocates for this institution -ought to shudder at the danger to which they -expose them, and to bear in mind that they -afford to the tyrant a new opportunity of buying -and selling them. Let us bow with reverence -to the venerable antiquity of the law; but let<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">140</span> -us profit by the experience of ages. Let us -open our annals and trace the history of our -regencies. What shall we find? ... a picture of -desolation, of civil war, of rapine, and of human -degradation, in unfortunate Castille.”</p> - -<p>The weakness of this reasoning proved how -the love of power had blinded those from whom -it proceeded. The Junta wished to evade the -law of the Partidas, because it did not specify -a case which it could not possibly have contemplated, -though the law itself was perfectly and -directly relevant. They assumed it as a certain -consequence of a regency, that the colonies -would be disgusted; that the Cortes would not -be convoked; that the rights of Ferdinand -would be disregarded; and that new opportunities -of corruption would be afforded to France; -and they forgot to ask themselves what reason -there could be for apprehending all or any of -these dangers, more from a council of regency -than from their own body. Romana’s manifesto -contained nothing more flagrantly illogical than -this. Having thus endeavoured to set aside -this project by alarming the nation, they admitted -that the executive power ought to be lodged -in fewer hands, and said, that with that circumspection, -which neither exposed the state to the -oscillations consequent upon every change of -government, nor sensibly altered the unity of -the body which it was intrusted with, they -had concentrated their own authority; and -that from this time those measures which required<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">141</span> -dispatch, secrecy, and energy, would be -directed by a section formed of six members, -holding their office for a time.</p> - -<p>The remainder of the manifesto was in a -worthier strain. “Another opinion,” they said, -“which objected to a regency, objected also -to the Cortes as an insufficient representation, -if convoked according to the ancient forms; as -ill-timed, and perhaps perilous in the existing -circumstances; and in fine as useless, because -the provincial Juntas, which had been immediately -erected by the people, were their true -representatives; but as the government had -already publicly declared that it would adapt -the Cortes, in its numbers, forms, and classes, -to the present state of things, any objection -drawn from the inadequacy of the ancient forms -was malicious, as well as inapplicable. Yes, -Spaniards,” said they, “you are about to have -your Cortes, and the national representation -will be as perfect and full as it can and ought -to be, in an assembly of such importance and -eminent dignity. You are about to have your -Cortes; and at what time, gracious God! -can the nation adopt this measure better than -at present? When war has exhausted all the -ordinary means, when the selfishness of some, -and the ambition of others, debilitate and paralyse -the efforts of government; when they seek -to destroy from its foundations the essential -principle of the monarchy, which is union; -when the hydra of federalism, so happily silenced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">142</span> -the preceding year by the creation of the -central power, dares again to raise its heads, -and endeavour to precipitate us into anarchy; -when the subtlety of our enemies is watching -the moment of our divisions to destroy the -state; this is the time, then, to collect in one -point the national dignity and power, where -the Spanish people may vote and call forth the -extraordinary resources which a powerful nation -ever has within it for its salvation. That alone -can put them in motion; that alone can encourage -the timidity of some, and restrain the -ambition of others; that alone can suppress -importunate vanity, puerile pretensions, and -infuriated passions. Spain will, in fine, give to -Europe a fresh example of its religion, its circumspection, -and its discretion, in the just and -moderate use which it is about to make of the -liberty in which it is constituted. Thus it is -that the supreme Junta, which immediately -recognized this national representation as a -right, and proclaimed it as a reward, now invokes -and implores it as the most necessary and -efficacious remedy; and has therefore resolved -that the general Cortes shall be convoked on -the first day of January in the next year, in -order to enter on their august functions the -first of March following. When that happy -day has arrived, the Junta will say to the representatives -of the nation,</p> - -<p>“‘Ye are met together, O fathers of your -country! and re-established in all the plenitude<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">143</span> -of your rights, after a lapse of three centuries. -Called to the exercise of authority by the unanimous -voice of the kingdom, the individuals -of the supreme Junta have shewn themselves -worthy of the confidence reposed in them, by -employing all their exertions for the preservation -of the state. When the power was -placed in our hands, our armies, half formed, -were destitute; our treasury was empty, and -our resources uncertain and distant. We have -maintained in the free provinces unity, order, -and justice; and in those occupied by the -enemy, we have exerted our endeavours to -preserve patriotism and loyalty. We have -vindicated the national honour and independence -in the most complicated and difficult -diplomatic negotiations; and we have made -head against adversity, ever trusting that we -should overcome it by constancy. We have, -without doubt, committed errors, and would -willingly, were it possible, redeem them with -our blood; but in the confusion of events, -among the difficulties which surrounded us, -who could be certain of always being in the -right? Could we be responsible, because one -body of troops wanted valour and another confidence; -because one general had less prudence -and another less good fortune? Much Spaniards, -is to be attributed to your inexperience, much -to circumstances, but nothing to our intention; -that ever has been to deliver our King, to preserve -to him a throne for which the people<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">144</span> -has made such sacrifices, and to maintain it -free, independent, and happy. We have decreed -the abolition of arbitrary power from the -time we announced the re-establishment of our -Cortes. Such is, O Spaniards! the use we -have made of the unlimited authority confided -to us; and when your wisdom shall have established -the basis and form of government most -proper for the independence and good of the -state, we will resign it into the hands you shall -point out, contented with the glory of having -given to the Spaniards the dignity of a nation -legitimately constituted.’”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Guerillas.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Had the nation been more alive to such hopes -as were thus held out, the pressure of events and -the presence of imminent danger would have -distracted their thoughts from all speculative -subjects. Frustrated as their expectations of -immediate deliverance had been, their confidence -was not shaken; the national temper led -them to think lightly of every disaster, but to -exaggerate every trifling success; and the defeats -at Arzobispo and Almonacid were less felt -or thought of by the body of the people, than -the successful exploits of those predatory bands, -who, under the name of Guerillas, were now -in action every where. The government partook -of this disposition; and it must be ascribed -as much to this as to policy, that the official as -well as the provincial journals published every -adventure of this kind more fully and circumstantially -than some of those actions wherein<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">145</span> -their armies had disappeared. The example -which Mina and the Empecinado had set was -followed with alacrity and tempting success, -rich opportunities being offered by the requisition -of plate from churches and from individuals, -which the intrusive government was at this time -enforcing. The guerillas were on the watch, -and intercepted no trifling share of the spoils. -One party surprised a convoy with eighty <em>quintals</em> -of silver near Segovia. The French, who -found themselves sorely annoyed by this species -of warfare, though they were as yet far from -apprehending all they should suffer by it, endeavoured -to raise a counter-force of the same -kind in Navarre, under the name of Miquelets. -But that appellation, which was so popular -among the Spaniards, had no attraction for -them when it was pressed into the usurper’s -service, and the scheme only evinced the incapacity -of those who projected it, for the guerillas -depended for information, shelter, every thing -which could contribute either to their success -or their safety, upon the good will of their countrymen; -who then would engage in an opposite -service, with the certainty that every Spaniard -would regard him as an enemy and traitor, and -as such endeavour secretly or openly to bring -about his destruction?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>D. Julian Sanchez.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Among the persons who became most eminent -for their exploits in this desultory warfare, D. -Julian Sanchez began at this time to be distinguished. -He raised a company of lancers in - -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">146</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.<br />October.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the district of Ciudad Rodrigo, and acted with -such effect against the enemy in the plains of -Castille, that General Marchand, who commanded -the sixth corps at Salamanca, threatened -to execute the vengeance which the guerillas -at once eluded and defied, upon those -whom he suspected of favouring them. Specifying, -therefore, eight of the principal sheep-owners -in that part of the country, he declared -that they should be kept under a military guard -in their own houses, and the severest measures -be enforced against their persons and property, -if the bands of robbers, as he called them, did -not totally disappear within eight days after the -date of his proclamation. He declared also -that the priests, <i>alcaldes</i>, lawyers, and surgeons -of every village, should be responsible with their -lives for any disorders committed by the guerillas -within their respective parishes; adding, -that every village and every house which the -inhabitants might abandon on the approach of -the French should be burnt. This served only -to call forth an indignant reply from Sanchez, -containing some of those incontrovertible truths -which made the better part of the French themselves -detest the service in which they were employed.</p> - -<p>Ney’s corps was at this time in Salamanca, -under General Marchand, occupying also Ledesma -and Alba de Tormes. Soult’s head-quarters -were at Plasencia; he occupied Coria, -Galesteo, and the banks of the Tietar and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">147</span> -Tagus, as far as the Puente del Arzobispo; -Mortier’s corps was at Talavera, Oropesa, La -Calzada de Oropesa, and Naval Moral; Victor’s -advanced posts were at Daymiel, his head-quarters -at Toledo; Sebastiani was at Fuenlebrada, -and his corps extended from Aranjuez to Alcala. -On the side of La Mancha or Extremadura, -they could not hope to open a way to Seville, -unless the government by an act of suicidal -madness should encounter the certain consequences - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French repulsed from Astorga.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -of a general action. Remaining, therefore, -on the defensive here, they prepared for -offensive operations on the side of Salamanca, -with a view to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, -and a third invasion of Portugal. Sir Robert -Wilson’s representations respecting the importance -of that point had not been neglected by -the government; the force which the Duque -del Parque commanded there was now respectable -in numbers, and had acquired some experience -as well as confidence in that desultory -warfare which Sir Robert had begun, and which -D. Julian Sanchez had so well continued. Preparatory -to their movements on this quarter, -the French attempted to carry Astorga by a -sudden attack, for which purpose, with a force -of 2600 men, they advanced from the Ezla, and -endeavoured to force the Bishop’s Gate. D. -Jose Maria de Santocildes, who commanded -there, was neither wanting in principle nor in - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Oct. 9.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -conduct. His measures for defence were well -taken and well executed, and after a four hours’<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">148</span> -action, the enemy retreated with the loss of -more than 200 men.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Battle of Tamames. <br /><span class="date">Oct. 18.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>A movement of more importance was presently -undertaken against the Duque del Parque, -who had taken a strong position on the heights -near Tamames. Marchand commanded the -French corps, consisting of 10,000 foot, 1200 -horse, with fourteen pieces of cannon; and nothing -but his contempt of the enemy could have -induced him to attack them in such a post. He -came on in full confidence, forming his columns -with ostentatious display, as if to exhibit the -perfect facility with which their evolutions were -made. As it was soon apparent that the main -attack would be upon the left, being the weakest -part of the position, the Duke ordered Count -de Belveder, with half the reserve, to support -this point. Carrera, who commanded the left -wing, stood the attack well; a small party of -cavalry, still further to the left, were posted in -a wood, from whence it was intended that they -should issue, and charge the flank of the enemy; -but Carrera’s second brigade making a movement -for the purpose of allowing their artillery -to play, the French horse charged them at full -speed before they were well formed, broke in -upon them, and cut down the Spaniards at their -guns: ... for a moment the day seemed lost. -The Duke, with his staff, came up in time to -the place of danger. Mendizabal, who was second -in command, sprang from his horse, and -rallied those who were falling back; the young<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">149</span> -Principe de Anglona distinguished himself in -the same manner; and Carrera, whose horse -had received two musket-balls, and one wound -with a sabre, put himself at the head of his men, -charged the French with the bayonet, routed -them and recovered the guns. Meantime an -attack was made upon the right and centre; -but here the Spaniards were more strongly -posted, and D. Francisco de Losada, who commanded -in that part, repulsed them. They retreated -in great disorder, leaving more than -1100 on the field; their wounded were not less -than 2000.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French retire from Salamanca. <span class="date">Oct. 21.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>On the third day after the battle, the Duke -moved forward, hoping to surprise the enemy -in Salamanca. He crossed at Ledesma on the -23d, and marched all the night of the 24th; at -daybreak he reached the heights which command -Salamanca to the northward, but the -French had retreated during the night to Toro, -carrying with them the church plate and all -their other plunder. They had remained five -days in hope of receiving a reinforcement from -Kellermann, who, with a weak corps, occupied -the country between Segovia and Burgos; but -seeing no succour approach, the loss which they -had sustained rendered it necessary for them to -retire with all speed, upon the unexpected intelligence -that the Spaniards were within three -leagues of the city.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Marshal Soult appointed Major general.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The people of Salamanca did not long enjoy -their deliverance. While Kellermann was reinforced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">150</span> -with one brigade, another from Dessoles’ -division was directed toward that city, -preparatory to more important movements; -activity having now been given to the French -armies, and union, which had long been wanted, -by the appointment of Marshal Soult to the -rank of Major-General in place of Marshal -Jourdan, who was recalled to Paris. This change -was highly acceptable to the troops in general, -though there prevailed a feeling of personal ill-will -toward Soult on the part of some of his fellow -marshals which had not existed toward his -predecessor; but more confidence was reposed -in him, the reputation which Jourdan had obtained -in the days of the National Convention -not having been supported by his subsequent -fortune. The Duque del Parque, perceiving -that more serious operations were likely to be -directed against him, urged the government to -act on the offensive in La Mancha, as a means - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Junta resolve on risking a general action.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -of averting the danger from himself; and the -Junta needed little encouragement at this time -for measures of the most desperate temerity. -The ablest members of that body partook so -strongly of the national temper, that they were -wholly incapacitated for understanding the real -state either of their own armies, or of the allies, -or of their enemies. Their infatuation might -seem incredible, if it were not proved both by -their conduct and by documents which they -themselves laid before the nation, stating upon -what grounds they had acted. They had persuaded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">151</span> -themselves that if Sir Arthur, after -Cuesta rejoined him, had given battle to Soult, -according to his original intention, the destruction -of Soult’s army would have been easy and -certain, the annihilation of Victor’s army easy - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Exposicion de la Junta Central. Ramo Diplomatico, P. 27.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -as a consequent measure, the recovery of Madrid -easy, and the expulsion of the French as far as -the Ebro, or even to the Pyrenees. By some -fatality, they said, the British General had -chosen that line of conduct which was precisely -the most prejudicial to the Spanish cause. By -some stranger fatality they themselves persisted -in believing that the British army had been at all -times amply supplied with means of subsistence -and of transport, that it was at any time capable -of advancing, and (as if themselves incapable -of understanding that the British Commander -and the British Ambassador meant what -they said in their repeated representations) that -it would advance if the Spaniards evinced the -determination and the ability to act without -them. And with this persuasion they deluded -their General as well as themselves.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Areizaga appointed to the command.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Rash as he was, even Cuesta would hardly -have been so deluded. Upon his resignation -Eguia had only held the command while the -government could look about for a successor. -Castaños was under a cloud; the inquiry which -he demanded had never been granted, and -though public opinion was beginning to regard -him as his past services and real worth deserved, -there was no thought of again employing him.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">152</span> -Alburquerque was an object of jealousy; Romana -of dislike and fear. Areizaga therefore, -who had been highly commended by Blake for -his conduct in the battle of Alcañiz, was removed -from the command at Lerida to be placed -at the head of 50,000 men. Alburquerque, -who had from 9000 to 10,000 in Extremadura, -was ordered to join Parque, and place himself -under his orders; while Areizaga, with the -greatest force that they could collect, was instructed - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>State of Madrid.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -to advance upon Madrid. What they -knew concerning the state of that city might -well excite their feelings, and raise in them a -strong desire of delivering its inhabitants from -their bondage; but there was nothing to encourage -the extravagant hopes which they entertained. -The national feeling existed nowhere -in greater strength, though there was no other -place wherein so many traitors were collected; -all who in other parts of the country had made -themselves conspicuous as partizans of Joseph, -having fled thither when they could not abide -in safety elsewhere. To leave the capital was -an enterprise of the utmost danger for those -who were willing to sacrifice every thing, and -take their chance in the field against the invaders: -any one might enter; but in the course -of a few hours it was known who the stranger -was, whence he came, where he was harboured, -what was his business, and who were his connexions, -... every thing which the most vigilant -police, and the most active system of espionage<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">153</span> -could discover. The tradesmen and those whose -means of subsistence were not destroyed by the -revolution were oppressed by heavy and frequent -exactions; the Intruder’s ministers knew -the impolicy of this, but nevertheless were compelled -to impose these burdens; and after the -atrocities which they had sanctioned, they could -suffer nothing more either in character or in -peace of mind. Otherwise, even in Madrid, -where a strong military force kept every thing -in order, and where none of the immediate evils -of war were felt, there were sights which might -have wrung the heart. Men and women, who -had been born and bred in opulence, begged in -the streets, as soon as evening had closed, ... the -feelings of better times preventing them from -exposing their misery in the daylight. But -what most wounded the Spanish temper was the -condition of their clergy, and monks, and friars, -who, suffering as it were as confessors under the -intrusive government, worked as daily labourers -for their support, employing in hard and coarse -labour hands which, the Spaniards said, were -consecrated by the use of holy oil, and by contact -with the Body of our Lord!</p> - -<p>Overlooking all impediments in the way of -their desires, the Junta calculated so surely -upon delivering the capital, that they fixed upon -a captain-general, a governor, and a corregidor, -who were to enter upon their functions as soon - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Jovellanos, § 103.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -as it should be recovered; and they charged -Jovellanos and Riquelme to draw up provisional - -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">154</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.<br />November.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -regulations for securing tranquillity there when -the enemy should withdraw. This confidence -arose from a national character which repeated -disasters could neither subdue nor correct. The -rashness with which they determined to bring -on a general action, at whatever risk, appeared -to them a prudent resolution. Now that the -continental war was terminated, and Buonaparte -had no other employment for his armies, it was -certain that more troops than had been withdrawn -from Spain would be marched into it, for -the purpose of effecting its subjugation; they -thought it therefore the best and surest policy -to make a great effort before the numbers of the -enemy should be thus formidably increased. -Former failures had neither disheartened nor -instructed them; and they furthered the equipment -of the army with a zeal which, if it had -been excited two months before in providing -for their allies, might have realized the hopes -wherein they now indulged.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Condition of the British army.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The new commander partook the blind confidence -of his government. In some degree he -appears to have been deceived by them; for he -was neither informed of Lord Wellington’s determination -not to advance, nor of the condition -of the British army, which was such at that time -as to render an advance impossible. From -causes which physiologists have not yet been -able to ascertain, the country where they were -quartered, upon the Guadiana, is peculiarly unhealthy -during the dry season, when that river<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">155</span> -ceases to be a stream, and, like its feeders, is reduced -to a succession of detached pools in the -deeper parts of its course. The troops suffered -so much more than the natives, partly because -the disease laid stronger hold on constitutions -which were not accustomed to it, and partly -from the peculiar liableness of men, when congregated -in camps, to receive and communicate -endemic maladies, that more than a third of -their whole number were on the sick list; and -the inhabitants of the country, aware as they -were that this plague belonged to it, ascribed -its greater prevalence and malignity among the -strangers to their having eaten mushrooms, holding -the whole tribe themselves in abhorrence, -and not thinking the ordinary causes of the -disease could account for the effects which they -witnessed. Areizaga was ignorant of all this, -and the government allowed him to advance -with an expectation that the British army was to -follow and support him.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Disposition of the French troops.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Knowing the condition of that army, it seems -almost incredible that the Junta could have -deceived themselves when they thus deceived -their general. But unlikely as it was that they -should have given orders for a forward movement -of such importance, without such co-operation, -they hoped perhaps to deceive the enemy, by -reports that Lord Wellington and Alburquerque -would advance along the valley of the Tagus. -The French were never able to obtain good -intelligence of the English plans; they could,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">156</span> -however, to a certain point, foresee them, as a -skilful chess-player apprehends the scheme of -an opponent who is not less expert than himself -at the game; they had learnt to respect the -British army in the field, but they thought the -British Commander was more likely from caution -to let pass an opportunity of success, than -to afford the enemy one by rashness. This -opinion they had formed from the events of the -late campaign, being fully aware of the danger -to which they had been exposed, and unacquainted -with the difficulties which had frustrated -Sir Arthur’s plans, ... difficulties indeed -which they who were accustomed always to take -whatever was needful for their armies either from -friend or foe, without any other consideration -than that of supplying their own immediate -wants, would have regarded with astonishment, -if not contempt. When Marshal Soult therefore -prepared at this time to act against the Spaniards, -the English force hardly entered into -his calculations. He had 70,000 men available -for immediate service in one direction. One -corps of these, under Laborde, watched the -Tagus, with an eye to Alburquerque’s movements. -Victor observed the roads from Andalusia -to Toledo and Aranjuez, having his -cavalry in advance at Madrilejos and Consuegra; -Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, was in -the rear of Victor, securing the capital, from -which neighbourhood a division had been sent -to support Marchand after his defeat at Tamames.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">157</span> -The reserve, under Mortier, was at -Talavera; Gazan occupied Toledo with two -weak regiments; and Joseph was with his -guards at Aranjuez, relying upon the fortune -of Napoleon, and now, when the Continent -was effectually subdued, and reinforcements had -already begun to enter the Peninsula, believing -himself in secure possession of the crown of -Spain.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Areizaga advances from the Sierra Morena.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>On the 3d of November, Areizaga’s army, -consisting of 43,000 foot, 6600 cavalry, and -sixty pieces of cannon, began their march from -the foot of the Sierra Morena into the plains, -taking with them eight days’ provision. The -advanced guard, of 2000 cavalry under Freire, -were one day’s march in front; the infantry -followed in seven divisions, then the rest of the -cavalry in reserve, and the head-quarters last, -marching from twenty to thirty miles a day; -they had no tents, and took up their quarters at -night in the towns upon the road. They advanced -forces by Daymiel on the left, others -along the high road to Madrid, by Valdepeñas -and Manzanares. The French retired before -them, and in several skirmishes of cavalry the -Spaniards were successful. Latour Maubourg -escaped with a considerable body of horse from -Madrilejos by the treachery of a deserter, who -apprised him of his danger just in time for him -to get out of the town as the Spaniards entered -it. They continued their way through Tembleque -to Dos Barrios; then, by a flank march,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">158</span> -reached S. Cruz de la Zarza; threw bridges -across the Tagus, and passed a division over. -Here they took a position; the French pushed -their patroles of cavalry near the town, and -Areizaga drew out his army in order of battle. -An action upon that ground did not suit the -enemy, and the Spanish general was frantic -enough to determine upon leaving the mountains, -and giving them battle in the plain.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Austrian commissioner remonstrates against his purpose. <span class="date">Nov. 16.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Baron Crossand, who was employed in Spain -on a mission from Austria, was with the army, -and, dreading the unavoidable consequences of -such a determination, presented a memorial to -Areizaga, reminding him, that only the preceding -day he had admitted how dangerous it would -be thus to hazard the welfare of his country. -None of the motives, he said, which should -induce a prudent general to risk a battle were -applicable in the present case; he had nothing -to urge him forward, and the most fertile provinces -of Spain were in his rear: by meeting -the enemy upon their own ground, the advantage -of position was voluntarily given them, and -the superiority of numbers which the Spaniards -possessed was not to be considered as an advantage, -in their state of discipline; so far indeed -was it otherwise that the French founded part -of their hopes upon the disorder into which the -Spaniards would fall in consequence of their -own multitude. A victory might procure the -evacuation of Madrid and of the two Castilles, -but these results were light in the balance when<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">159</span> -weighed against the consequences of defeat. -The wisest plan of operations was to entrench -himself upon the strong ground which the left -bank of the Tagus afforded; from thence he -might send out detachments toward Madrid and -in all directions, and act in concert with the -Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque, patience -and caution rendering certain their ultimate -success.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Battle of Ocaña.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>These representations were lost upon Areizaga; -he marched back to Dos Barrios, and then advanced -upon Ocaña into the open country. -About 800 French and Polish cavalry were in -the town; they were driven out by the Spanish -horse; a skirmish ensued, in which four or five -hundred men fell on both sides. In this affair -the French general Paris was borne out of the -saddle by a lancer, and laid dead on the field. -He was an old officer, whom the Spaniards -represent as a humane and honourable man, -regretting that he should have perished in such -a cause. Areizaga bivouacqued that night; -and the French, who had now collected the -corps of Sebastiani and Mortier, under command -of the latter, crossed the Tagus before -morning. At daybreak Areizaga ascended the -church tower of Ocaña, and seeing the array -and number of the enemy, it is said that he -perceived, when too late, what would be the -result of his blind temerity. He arrayed his -army in two equal parts, one on each side the -town; and his second line was placed so near<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">160</span> -the first, that, if the first were thrown into -disorder, there was not room for it to rally. -Most of the cavalry were stationed in four lines -upon the right flank, a disposition neither imposing -in appearance nor strong in reality. The -artillery was upon the two flanks.</p> - -<p>About seven in the morning, Zayas, who had -often distinguished himself, attacked the French -cavalry with the advanced guard, and drove them -back. Between eight and nine the cannonade -began. The Spanish artillery was well served; -it dismounted two of the French guns, and blew -up some of their ammunition-carts. Mortier -having reconnoitred the ground, determined to -make his chief attack upon the right, and, after -having cannonaded it for a while from a battery -in his centre, he ordered Leval, with the Polish -and German troops, to advance, and turn a -ravine which extended from the town nearly to -the end of this wing of the Spanish army. Leval -formed his line in compact columns; the Spaniards -met them along the whole of their right -wing, and their first line wavered. It was -speedily reinforced; the right wing was broken, -and a charge of cavalry completed the confusion -on this side. The left stood firm, and cheered -Areizaga as he passed; an able general might -yet have secured a retreat, but he was confounded, -and quitted the field, ordering this -part of the army to follow him. Lord Macduff, -who was with the Spaniards, then requested the -second in command to assume the direction;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">161</span> -but while he was exerting himself to the utmost, -the French cavalry broke through the centre, -and the rout was complete. The Spaniards -were upon an immense plain, every where open -to the cavalry, by whom they were followed and -cut down on all sides. Victor, who crossed the -Tagus at Villa Mensiger, pursued all night. -All their baggage was taken, almost all their -artillery; according to the French account, -4000 were killed, and 26,000 made prisoners: -on no occasion have the French had so little -temptation to exaggerate. Their own loss was -about 1700.</p> - -<p>This miserable defeat was the more mournful, -because the troops that day gave proof -enough both of capacity and courage to show -how surely, under good discipline and good -command, they might have retrieved the military -character of their country. No artillery -could have been better served. The first battalion -of guards, which was 900 strong, left -upon the field fourteen officers, and half its -men. Four hundred and fifty of a Seville -regiment, which had distinguished itself with -Wilson at Puerto de Baños, entered the action, -and only eighty of them were accounted for -when the day was over. Miserably commanded -as the Spaniards were, there was a moment -when the French, in attempting to deploy, were -thrown into disorder, by their well-supported -fire, and success was at that moment doubtful. -The error of exposing the army in such a situation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">162</span> -must not be ascribed wholly to incapacity -in Areizaga, who had distinguished himself -not less for conduct than courage at Alcañiz; -it was another manifestation of the national -character, of that obstinacy which no experience -could correct, of that spirit which no -disasters could subdue.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Treatment of the prisoners.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>There was none of that butchery in the pursuit -by which the French had disgraced themselves -at Medellin. The intrusive government -had at that time acted with the cruelty which -fear inspires; feeling itself secure now, its object -was to take prisoners, and force them into -its own service; and for this purpose a different -sort of cruelty was employed. While -the Madrid Gazette proclaimed that the French -soldiers behaved with more than humanity to -the captured Spaniards, that they might gratify -their Emperor’s brother by treating his misled -subjects with this kindness, the treatment which -those prisoners received was in reality so brutal, -that if the people of Madrid had had no other -provocation, it would have sufficed for making -them hate and execrate the Intruder, and those -by whom his councils were directed. They -were plundered without shame or mercy by the -French troops, and any who were recognized -as having been taken before, or as having belonged -to Joseph’s levies, were hurried before -a military tribunal, and shot in presence of their -fellows. Even an attempt to escape was punished -with death by these tribunals, whose<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">163</span> -sentence was without appeal! They were imprisoned -in the Retiro, and in the buildings -attached to the Museum, where they were ill -fed and worse used; and they who had friends, -relations, or even parents, in Madrid, were -neither allowed to communicate with, nor to -receive the slightest assistance from them. By -such usage about 8000 were forced into a -service, from which they took the first opportunity - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Rigel, 2. 406.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -to desert, most of them in the course -of a few months having joined the guerillas.</p> - -<p>The defeat of Areizaga drew after it that of -the Duke del Parque. Too confident in his -troops, he remained in his advanced situation, -amid the open country of Castille, till the -army which he had defeated was reinforced by -Kellermann’s division from Valladolid. The -Duke knew there were 8000 French infantry -and 2000 horse in Medina del Campo, and, -thinking that this was all their force, took a -position at Carpio, upon the only rising ground -in those extensive plains, and there waited for -their attack. The enemy advanced slowly, as -if waiting for other troops to come up. Seeing -this, the Duke gave orders to march against -them, and the French retreated, fighting as they -fell back, from about three in the afternoon till -the close of day, when they entered Medina -del Campo. The Duke then discovered that a -far greater force than he had expected was at -hand, and fell back to his position at Carpio, -there to give his troops rest, for they had been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">164</span> -thirty hours without any. At midnight the -French also retired upon their reinforcements. -During the following day the Duke obtained -full intelligence; it now became too evident -that he could no longer continue in his advanced -situation, and he began his retreat from -Carpio in the night. In the evening of the -next day he halted a few hours at Vittoria and -Cordovilla, and at ten that night continued his -march, being pursued by Kellermann, who did - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Battle of Alba de Tormes.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -not yet come near enough to annoy him. On -the morning of the 28th he reached Alba de -Tormes, and there drew up his troops to resist -the enemy, who were now close upon him. He -posted them upon the heights which command -the town on both sides of the Tormes, in order -to cover his rear-guard, the bridges, and the -fords; the whole cavalry was on the left bank. -General Lorcet began the attack, and was repulsed -by the infantry and artillery: two -brigades of French horse then charged the -right wing of the Spaniards; their cavalry were -ordered to meet the charge; whether from -some accidental disorder, or sudden panic, they -took to flight without discharging a shot, or -exchanging a single sword stroke; part of them -were rallied and brought back, but the same -disgraceful feeling recurred; they fled a second -time, and left the right flank of the army uncovered: -the French then charged the exposed -wing with an overpowering force, and, in spite -of a brave resistance, succeeded in breaking<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">165</span> -through. The victorious cavalry then charged -the left of the Spaniards; but here it was three -times repulsed. Mendizabal and Carrera formed -their troops into an oblong square, and every -farther attempt of the enemy was baffled: night -now came on; this body, taking advantage of -the darkness, retreated along the heights on the -left bank of the town, and the Duke then gave -orders to fall back in the direction of Tamames. -They marched in good order till morning, when, -as they were within eight miles of that town, and -of the scene of their former victory, a small -party of the enemy’s horse came in sight, and -a rumour ran through the ranks that the French -were about to charge them in great force. The -very men who had fought so nobly only twelve -hours before now threw away firelocks, knapsacks, -and whatever else encumbered them: the -enemy were not near enough to avail themselves -of this panic; and the Duke, with the -better part of his troops, reached the Peña de -Francia, and in that secure position halted to -collect again the fugitives and stragglers. Kellermann -spoke of 3000 men killed and 2000 -prisoners: and all the artillery of the right -wing was taken.</p> - -<p>By this victory the French were enabled -without farther obstacle to direct their views -against Ciudad Rodrigo, and to threaten Portugal: -and Lord Wellington removed in consequence -from his position in the vicinity of -Badajos to the north of the Tagus, there to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">166</span> -take measures against the operations which he -had long foreseen. Alburquerque’s little army -was now the only one which remained unbroken; -but what was this against the numerous -armies of the French? even if it were sufficient -to cover Extremadura, what was there -on the side of La Mancha to secure Andalusia, -and Seville itself? Every effort was made to -collect a new army under Areizaga at the passes -of the Sierra, and to reinforce the Duke del -Parque also; ... but the danger was close at -hand.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">167</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XXVI" class="vspace">CHAPTER XXVI.<br /> - -<span class="subhead">SIEGE OF GERONA.</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p><span class="firstword">While</span> the Central Junta directed its whole -attention toward Madrid, and expended all its -efforts in operations, so ill concerted and ill directed, -that the disastrous termination was foreseen -with equal certainty both by their friends -and foes, Catalonia was left to defend itself; and -a sacrifice of heroic duty, not less memorable -than that which Zaragoza had exhibited, was -displayed at Gerona.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Gerona.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Gerona (the Gerunda of the Romans, a place -of such unknown antiquity that fabulous historians -have ascribed its foundation to Geryon) -is situated upon the side and at the foot of a hill, -where the little river Onar, which divides the -city from the suburbs, falls into the Ter. Two -centuries ago it was second only to Barcelona -in size and importance; other places in the -principality, more favourably situated for commerce, -and less overlaid with monks and friars, -had now outgrown it, for of about 14,000 inhabitants, -not less than a fourth were clergy and -religioners. In the thirteenth century it was -distinguished by the defence<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> which Ramon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">168</span> -Folch of Cardona made there against Philip III. -of France; a memorable siege, not only for the -resolution with which Ramon held out, and for the -ability with which he obtained honourable terms -at last, concealing from Philip the extremity of -famine to which the place was reduced, but also -for the singular destruction which was brought -upon the besiegers by a plague of flies<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a>. Their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">169</span> -bite is said to have been fatal to the horses, of -which such numbers died, that their carcasses -produced pestilence; two-thirds of the army -perished, and the remainder found it necessary -to retreat into their own country, carrying home -in their coffins the chiefs who had led them into -Spain. In the succession-war, Gerona was signalized -by the desperate resistance which it made -against Philip V. After it had fallen, the Catalans -blockaded it during eight months; M. -Berwick raised the blockade, and the French -minister proposed to him to demolish the works; -his plea was, that the expense of keeping a garrison -there might be spared; but his intent, that -the Spaniards might have one strong-hold the -less upon their frontier. But Berwick required -an order from Louis XIV. to warrant him in a -proceeding which must necessarily offend the -King of Spain; and Louis was then withheld -by a sense of decency from directly ordering -what he wished to have had done. The fortifications -after that time had been so neglected, -that when Arthur Young was there in 1787, he -thought they were not strong enough to stop an -army for half an hour: the old walls, however, -had now been well repaired; and the city was -also protected by four forts upon the high ground -above it. But its principal defence was the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">170</span> -citadel, called here, as at Barcelona, Monjuic, -which commanded it from an eminence about -sixty fathoms distant. This was a square fort, -240 yards in length on each side, with four bastions, -and for outworks the four towers of Saints -Luis, Narcis, Daniel, and Juan.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Force of the garrison.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The garrison amounted only to 3400 men, -but they were commanded by Mariano Alvares, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Vol. i. p. 465; Vol. ii. p. 322.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -and the inhabitants were encouraged by having -twice driven the enemy from their walls. After -the battle of Valls it was certain that the French, -having no force to oppose them in the field, -would make a third attempt to obtain possession -of this important place, and that they would -make it in sufficient strength and with ample -means, lest they should incur the disgrace of a -third repulse. No means, therefore, were neglected -of providing for defence; but while every -military preparation which the circumstances -permitted was made, Alvarez felt and understood -that his surest reliance must be placed upon that -moral resistance of which the Zaragozans had -set them so illustrious an example. Like the - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Crusaders enrolled.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -crusaders of old, the inhabitants took the cross, -and formed eight companies of an hundred men -each; the women also, maids and matrons alike, -enrolled themselves in an association which they - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Company of St. Barbara.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -called the Company of St. Barbara, to perform -whatever duties lay within their power, as their -countrywomen had done at Zaragoza. The -French scoffed at these things, as indicating the -fanaticism of a people whom they considered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">171</span> -greatly inferior to themselves. Light-minded, -as well as light-hearted, and regardless of any -higher motive than may be found in the sense of -mere military duty (for it was the direct object -of Buonaparte’s institutions to eradicate or preclude -every better principle), they were incapable -of perceiving that the state of mind which -their nefarious conduct had called forth, sanctified -such measures.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Narcis appointed generalissimo.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>These were demonstrations of the religious -feeling with which the Geronans devoted themselves -to the cause of their country, and to the -duty of self-defence. With more reason might the -French deride the part which in that city was -assigned to the Patron Saint, though such derision -would come with little consistency from -those among them who professed to believe in -the Romish church. St. Narcis, as the Saint is -called in the clipt language of that province, -had obtained as much credit for defeating Duhesme -in his first attempt upon Gerona, as for -sending the plague of flies against the French -King Philip. A meeting had in consequence -been held of the municipality, the chapter, the -heads of the religious houses, and all the chief -persons of the city, Colonel Julien Bolivar presiding -as the king’s lieutenant. Resolutions were -passed, that seeing St. Narcis had always vouchsafed -his especial protection to the principality -of Catalonia, as had been manifested during the -former invasions of the French, and recently by -the defeat of Duhesme, which was wholly owing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">172</span> -to his favour; and seeing moreover that for the -purpose of resisting the tyranny and oppression -of Napoleon Buonaparte it was necessary to appoint -a commander who should be capable of -directing their operations and repulsing such an -enemy, ... no one could so worthily fill that office -as the invincible patron and martyr St. Narcis; -and therefore, in the name of Ferdinand the -King, they nominated him Generalissimo of all -the Spanish forces by land and sea, and confided -to him the defence of Gerona, of its district, -and of the whole principality. On the following -Sunday, the Junta, with all the clergy and other -persons of distinction, went in procession to -notify this appointment to the Saint in his shrine -in the church of St. Felix; the shrine was -opened, and a general’s staff, a sword, and a -belt, all richly ornamented, were deposited by -the relics of the chosen commander; and the -enthusiastic joy which the ceremony excited -was such, that the Spaniards said it seemed as if -the glory of the Lord had descended and filled -the church, manifesting that their devotion was -approved and blessed by Heaven!</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>All mention of capitulating forbidden.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>This display of national character and of -Romish superstition had taken place in the first -fervour of their feelings after a signal deliverance. -The spirit of the Geronans did not fail -when danger was again at hand; and the governor, -seeing and relying upon this disposition -of the people, thought it advisable, before the -time of trial approached, to restrain by fear the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">173</span> -few treacherous subjects who might be waiting, -when opportunity offered, to declare themselves; - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">April 1.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -he published an edict, therefore, forbidding all -persons from speaking of capitulation on pain of -immediate death, without exception of class, -rank, or condition. Both by the garrison and -the people it was received with acclamations. -The military Junta of the city proposed that the -streets should be unpaved as a precaution against -bombardment; this was opposed by the board -of police, upon the ground that it would be prejudicial -to health; the question, therefore, was -referred to the medical board, who found it -convenient to avoid a physical discussion, and -compromised the matter by deciding that the -paving should be taken up in the squares and -streets through which the troops must necessarily -pass.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr would have reduced the city by blockade.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>General Reille, who was to have commanded -the besieging army, was at this time superseded -by General Verdier. This army consisted of -18,000 men; to make up that number Marshal -St. Cyr was compelled to weaken the corps of -observation under his own command, which -was thus reduced to about 12,000; but from -such armies as the Catalans could bring into -the field, and such counsels as directed them, -he well knew how little there was to apprehend. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr, 164.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -In this confidence St. Cyr would have preferred -blockading the city to besieging it, and would -have waited till it should be reduced by famine, -whereby all the loss which the besiegers sustained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">174</span> -might have been spared. But he was -neither consulted nor listened to, holding the -command at this time only till Marshal Augereau - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809. May.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -should arrive. On the 6th of May the -besiegers first appeared on the heights of Casa -Roca and Costarroja on the other side the Ter, -and began to form their lines without opposition. -A battery of eleven mortars was planted -upon Casa Roca, from whence it commanded -the city; works were erected against Monjuic -also; the garrison being far too weak to impede -these operations, and no efforts being made for -impeding them from without. When the lines -were completed, and every thing ready to commence -the bombardment, they sent a flag of -truce requiring Alvarez to spare himself and -the city the evils which must inevitably attend -resistance. D. Mariano admitted the officer to -his presence, and bade him tell his general, that -in future the trouble of sending flags of truce -might be spared, for he would hold no other -communication with him than at the mouth of -the cannon. The French commander found -means of conveying a letter to him afterwards, -with the significant observation that he might -probably repent having thus cut himself off -from the only means of communication which - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>The bombardment begins.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -were allowed in war. It was on the 12th of -June that the summons was sent, and on the -night of the 13th, about an hour after midnight, -the bombardment began. Then for the first -time the <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">generale</i> or alarm was beat, a sound<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">175</span> -which afterwards became so frequent in this - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809. June.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -devoted city: roused from their sleep, the aged -and the children repaired to cellars and other -places of imagined security, which they who -could had provided for this emergency, and the -female company of St. Barbara hastened to their -posts. An ill-judged sally was made early on -the 17th against some works which were supposed -to be the base of a battery against the -Puerto de Francia: it was successful, but the -success was of little importance and dearly -purchased; many brave men fell, and 110 were -brought back wounded. The bombardment -continued, and among other buildings the military -hospital was destroyed: the people, while -it was in flames, observed that its destruction -was deserved, for, instead of proving a place of -help and healing for the sick, covetousness and -peculation had made their profit there upon -human misery. The hospitals of St. Domingo -and St. Martin were also rendered uninhabitable; -one other had been made ready, another -was to be prepared, and the difficulty of providing -for the sick and wounded increased at -the time when their numbers were daily increasing. -About the end of the month an -epidemic affection of the bowels become prevalent, -occasioned partly by the perpetual agitation -of mind which the people endured, partly -by sleeping in damp subterranean places, where -the air never circulated freely, and where many -had nothing but the ground to lie on. In July,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">176</span> -a bilious fever is usually endemic in Gerona; it -seized especially upon the lower classes now, -and upon the refugees from those places which -had been taken or burned by the enemy; and it -affected the wounded also.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr draws nearer Gerona.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>During these operations St. Cyr, retaining -the command till Augereau, who was disabled -by an attack of gout at Perpignan, should arrive -to supersede him, had remained in his position - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>P. 368.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -near Vich. The capture of the French -troops near Monzon, and Blake’s success at -Alcañiz, had so alarmed the enemy at Zaragoza -and at Madrid, that orders were dispatched for -him to return towards Tarragona, and combine -his movements with Suchet, who, it was deemed, -would otherwise be in danger. But King Joseph’s -orders were respected almost as little by -the French commanders as by the Spanish nation. -Marshal St. Cyr represented that his -army had always been left to itself, having no -relation with any other corps, and being specially -destined for subjugating Catalonia, which -the Emperor Napoleon had thought quite sufficient -employment for it, and which, in fact, -would long continue to require all its efforts. -On the other hand, Verdier was entreating him -to approach nearer Gerona, and this he prepared -to do, being aware that Blake’s immediate object, -after collecting the runaways from Belchite, -must be to introduce supplies and reinforcements -into the besieged city. His first care -was to send the sick and wounded to Barcelona,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">177</span> -the only place where they could be in safety. -This done, no time was lost in breaking up -from quarters which he was unwilling to abandon; -for though the want of meat and wine -had been severely felt there by the troops and -officers, as well as by the invalids, there had -been no lack of bread; and the country through -which they had to pass not being practicable for -carriages of any kind, no more could be taken -with them than the soldiers could carry for - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">June 18.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -themselves. The movement was so luckily -timed, that they reached S. Coloma de Farnes, -just as a small detachment of Blake’s army arrived -there, escorting some 1200 cattle to Gerona: -the whole convoy fell into their hands, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr, 167–172.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -with an abundance of wine also, the want of -which is felt by the French soldiers more severely -than any other privation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Palamos taken by the French.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>St. Cyr’s head-quarters were now at Caldas -de Malavella, and he occupied a line extending -from Oña in advance of Bruñola to S. Feliu de -Guixols, of which place his troops took possession -at this time, after a brave but ineffectual -resistance. It was a point of considerable importance, -being the port most convenient for -those Spanish vessels which cut off the communication -between France and Barcelona for all -ships which were not under a strong escort. -Palamos was of still more importance at this -juncture, because from thence Gerona communicated -by sea with Tarragona. This place -was attacked by Italian troops under General<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">178</span> -Fontane; it was carried by assault, and the -only persons who were spared were the few -who threw themselves into the sea, and were -received prisoners when the fury of the invaders -had spent itself<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a>. On the other hand, the Catalans -were not always unsuccessful in their endeavours -to annoy the invaders. Rovira, formerly -a canon, and therefore called Doctor -Colonel Rovira (one of the most able and enterprising -partizans who appeared during the -contest), intercepted a convoy and a train of -artillery horses, to supply the loss of which St. -Cyr was obliged to part with the horses belonging -to his corps. And a battalion which Augereau -had sent to fix up proclamations in the -villages beyond the frontier, was routed by Colonel -Porta before it had disposed of three of - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr, 173, 190.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -its papers. Augereau having, in the campaign -of 1794, served in that province, and left a -good name there, had counted upon the effect -of his proclamations, not considering that he -was now engaged in a cause in which every -heart and every understanding, every principle -and every feeling, were against him.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Assault of Monjuic.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Verdier meantime prosecuted the siege, in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">179</span> -full expectation of bringing it to a speedy conclusion. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.<br />July.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -The outworks were soon rendered -untenable, and the redoubts which covered the -front of Monjuic were carried with a facility -which made him undervalue his opponents. At - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr, 175.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the beginning of July, three batteries played -upon three sides of this little fortress: that -which was planted against the north front consisted -of twenty four-and-twenty pounders; -while the French were battering it, the angle -upon which the flag was hoisted fell into the -ditch; D. Mariano Montorro descended for it -in the midst of the fire, brought it up in safety, -and replanted it upon the wall. The breach -was soon wide enough for forty men abreast. -The fire of the garrison had ceased, for they -perceived that the French were secured by their -trenches, and powder was too precious to be -used unless its effects were certain: the enemy, -who had not learned the temper of the men -with whom they were contending, judged from -this silence, that their hearts or ammunition -had failed, and in the night between the fourth -and fifth they assaulted the breach. But it was -for this that the garrison had reserved their fire, -and they poured it so destructively upon the -columns which approached, that the French -retreated with great loss. For three days they -continued their fire upon the breach. Between -two and three on the morning of the 8th, 6000 -men again assaulted it; and at the same time<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">180</span> -the town was bombarded<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a>. D. Blas de Furnas, -second in command at Monjuic, was in the -thickest of the fight; he strained his voice till -from exertion it totally failed, but still his presence -and his actions encouraged all who saw -him. The enemy came on, filled the fosse, and -proceeded to the breach ... “Woe to him,” says -Samaniego, the historian of the siege, and himself -one of the besieged, “woe to him who sets -his foot upon the fosse of Monjuic!” A mortar, -which lay masked among the ruins of the -ravelin, and discharged 500 musket-balls at -every shot, was played full upon the enemy by -D. Juan Candy, and the havoc which it made -was tremendous. Three times during that day -the assault was repeated, with the utmost resolution -on the part of the assailants, who were -never thrown into confusion, though all their -efforts were unavailing, and though they left -1600 of their number slain. The day, however, -was disastrous to the Geronans also, -though not from any evil which it was possible -for strength or courage to have averted. The -tower of St. Juan, which stood between the -west curtain of the castle, the city, and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">181</span> -Calle de Pedret, was blown up. In what manner -the magazine took fire was never known. -Part of its little garrison were fortunately employed -in active service elsewhere; the rest -were buried in the ruins, from whence twenty-three -persons were extricated alive amid the -incessant fire which the enemy kept up upon -the spot. Their preservation was in great measure -owing to the exertions of D. Carlos Beramendi. -The company of St. Barbara distinguished -themselves that day: covered with dust -and blood, under the burning heat of July, and -through the incessant fire of the batteries and -musketry, they carried water and wine to the -soldiers, and bore back the wounded.</p> - -<p>The severe loss which the French sustained -in this second attempt convinced them, that -while one stone remained upon another, Monjuic -was not to be taken by assault. From this -time, therefore, they continued to batter it on -three sides; and, practising the surest and most -destructive mode of warfare, stationed sharpshooters -in their trenches on every side, so that -for one of the garrison to be seen was almost -certain death. So perilous was the service -become, that the centinels were changed every -half hour, yet nine were killed in one day at -one post, and scarcely one escaped unwounded. -It became at length impossible to observe the -operations of the enemy, so thick were their -marksmen, and with such fatal certainty did -they take their aim: no other means remained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">182</span> -than that of sending some one into the fosse, -who, lifting up his head with the most imminent -hazard, took a momentary glance. By the beginning -of August the besiegers had pushed -their parallels to the edge of the fosse; their -labour was impeded by the stony soil, which -rendered it necessary to bring earth from some -distance; for this, however, they had hands -enough, and they had no apprehension to hurry -and disturb them, that any army powerful -enough to raise the siege could be brought -against them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Succours intercepted.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Meantime the Spaniards were preparing for -an attempt to introduce succours. For this -purpose they threatened the right of the covering -army, hoping to draw their attention upon -that point, while 1500 men passed through the -French line near Llagostera, where General -Pino had his head-quarters. They succeeded -perfectly in this difficult attempt, through their -knowledge of the country, ... but a straggler -who lagged behind fell into the enemy’s hand, -and upon information which was obtained from -him, it was understood that they would direct -their course to Castellar de la Selva, and endeavour -to pass through the besieging army in -the night. There was time to take measures -for intercepting them, and being turned aside -from thence at nightfall, when they were beginning -to debouche, they fell in at daybreak with -Pino, who was in pursuit, and scarcely a third -escaped: the rest were made prisoners, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">183</span> -sent into France. It was learnt from the prisoners - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">July 11.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -that the Spaniards did not intend to make -any serious effort for raising the siege till the -besiegers should be weakened by those diseases -which the season would infallibly produce. -Reports, nevertheless, were current that such -an effort would be made on Santiago’s day, -when the patron of Spain might be expected -once more to inspire or assist his faithful votaries. -The French would have deemed themselves -fortunate if this report had been verified; -for according to the barbarous system of warfare -which Buonaparte pursued, they were left to -provide subsistence for themselves as they -could; ... the soldiers had to cut the corn, thresh -it, and grind it for themselves; and though St. -Cyr had given orders that biscuit for four days’ -consumption should always be kept in readiness, -in case it should be necessary to collect -the army for the purpose of giving battle, not -more than half that quantity could ever be -provided. More than once also ammunition -became scarce, great part coming from Toulouse, -and even from so remote a point as Strasbourg. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr, 164.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Unhappily the Spaniards were in no -condition to profit by the embarrassments of -the enemy; and nothing was done by England -for Catalonia, where, during the first years of -the struggle, so much might have been done - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Vol. ii. p. 328.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -with effect. The army which in the preceding -autumn had been ordered thither from Sicily, -and detained by its general for the protection<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">184</span> -of that island, was employed at this time in an -expedition against Naples, as a diversion in favour -of the Austrians; and thus the means -which might have saved Gerona were misdirected.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The ravelin taken.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Meantime the main attacks of the besiegers -were directed against the ravelin which was now -the main defence of Monjuic. While it was -possible to maintain it, the garrison contended -who should be stationed there, as at the post of -honour. It was repeatedly attacked by night, -but the defenders were always ready, and always -repulsed the assailants. It was now discovered -that the enemy were mining; this was distinctly -ascertained by the sounds which were heard in -the direction of the fosse. The castle was -founded upon a rock, and therefore the officers -apprehended no immediate danger from operations -of this nature. The purpose of the French -was to destroy a breast-work which protected -that gate of the castle through which was the passage -to the ravelin: the breast-work was almost -wholly of earth, and its explosion did no hurt, -but it left the gate exposed. A battery, already -prepared, began to play upon it, and the communication -between the castle and the ravelin -was thus rendered exceedingly difficult. A -sally was made against this battery, and the -guns were spiked; a priest was one of the foremost -in this adventure: he received a ball in his -thigh, and fell; the enemy pressed on to kill -him; one of their officers, at the hazard of his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">185</span> -own life, protected him, and in this act of humane -interference was slain by the Spaniards, ... - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.<br />August.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -a circumstance which their journalists recorded -with becoming regret. The success which had -been obtained was of little avail, for the French -had artillery in abundance: in the course of a -few hours they mounted other pieces in place -of those which had been rendered useless, and -continued their fire upon the gate and the ravelin. -At the same time they formed a covered -way from their own parapet to the breach of the -ravelin; by this, on the night between the 4th -and 5th of August they poured a sufficient body -of troops through the breach to overpower the -forty men who were stationed there; but having -won the place, they could not maintain it, exposed -as it was to musketry from the castle. It -was, therefore, left for the dead who covered it. -About forty hours afterwards, a few Spaniards -determined to go and bring off the arms which -the French had not had time to carry away; -they found a lad of sixteen who had lain thus -long among the carcasses; he was the only one -of his comrades who escaped death or captivity, -... they brought him off, and he was sent to the -hospital half dead with exhaustion.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Monjuic abandoned.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The guns of Monjuic had now been silenced; -the enemy were so near, that sometimes the -Spaniards knocked them down with stones: it -was with difficulty that the governor, D. Guillerme -Nasch, could restrain his men: impatient -at remaining inactive, they earnestly solicited<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">186</span> -permission to sally out upon the most desperate -attempts. The garrison had held out seven-and-thirty -days since a practicable breach was -made. A week had elapsed since the ravelin -was lost, and three sides of the castle were now -entirely in ruins; there was little water left, and -that little foul and unwholesome; the number -of soldiers was every day diminished by disease -as well as by the chances of war. Under these -circumstances, the governor deemed it his duty -to preserve the men who were still left, that -they might assist in the defence of the city. On -the evening of the 11th he abandoned the ruins, -and retired into Gerona, every man taking with -him two hand-grenades and as many cartridges -as he could carry. Matches were left in the -magazine, and the retreat was effected with only -the loss of one man, who was killed by a shell -when he had entered the gates.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Verdier expects the town to fall.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Elated with this success, ... a success dearly -purchased, and bringing no glory to the conqueror, -... Verdier assured his government that -Gerona could not now hold out longer than from -eight to fifteen days. He planted one battery -against the bulwark of St. Pedro, and another -upon Monjuic, which commanded all the works -in the plain, and the whole line of the city from -St. Pedro to the tower of Gironella. Other -batteries, placed by St. Daniel’s Tower, commanded -Fort Calvary, the Castle of the Constable, -and one of its advanced posts. While -they were forming these, and throwing up works<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">187</span> -nearer the city than they could approach before -the fall of Monjuic, a little respite was necessarily -afforded to the besieged; but, that no rest -might be given them, shells were thrown in from -time to time by night and day. From the commencement -of the siege Alvarez had felt the -want of men, and had repeatedly solicited a -reinforcement of 2000; even then the garrison -would hardly have amounted to half its complement. -Nothing but the want of men prevented -him from making more frequent sallies, ... in all -that were made, the desperate courage and high -sense of duty which inspired the Spaniards gave -them a decided advantage. “Never,” said he, -in his report to the government, “never have I -seen the precious enthusiasm of all who are -within this city abated even for a moment; and -a thousand times would they have sallied out, -if I had not, because of their scanty numbers, -been compelled to forbid them.” Just after the -fall of Monjuic, D. Ramon Foxa, and D. Jose -Cantera, brought him 700 men, a trifling number -considering the state of Gerona, and the -importance of defending it; but they were volunteers, -and went with willing and prepared minds -to make the sacrifice which was required of -them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>A battery planted on the cathedral.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Alvarez now planted upon the roof of the -cathedral a battery of three cannon. The little -opposition which was made to this as an act of -profanation was soon overcome, for the clergy -felt that, as when fighting in the field, they were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">188</span> -employed in the service of the altar, so, in such -a war, the temple could not be desecrated by -using it as a fortress. Till now a watch had been -kept upon the tower, to observe the movements -of the enemy, and ring the alarm whenever an -attack was about to be made. It was composed -of the clergy of the cathedral, with one of the -Canons at their head: now that the battery was -planted there, this guard made their station a -place of arms also, and annoyed the besiegers -with musketry. The cathedral had been hitherto -the hospital for wounded officers; it now -became necessary to remove them to a safer -quarter, for the enemy directed their fire thither -with a perseverance that discovered how much -they were annoyed from thence. In the frequent -removal of the hospitals which the bombardment -occasioned, the company of St. Barbara -was of the most essential service; throughout -the whole siege, these heroic women shrunk -from no duty, however laborious, however perilous, -or however painful. Three of the leaders -are especially mentioned, Dona Lucia Joana de -Fitzgéralt, D. Mariangela Vivern, and D. Maria -Custi, commandants of the three divisions of St. -Narcis, St. Dorothy, and St. Eulalia.</p> - -<p>At the end of August, several breaches had -been made by the batteries of Monjuic, and it -was every day apprehended that they would be -made practicable. Alvarez then declared in his -general orders, that if any of the defenders -flinched from the breach when it was attacked,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">189</span> -they should immediately be considered as enemies, -and fired upon accordingly. The besiegers -continually constructed new works, they had -troops at command, artillery in abundance, and - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Distress of the city.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -engineers of the greatest skill. The garrison -was considerably reduced; the hospitals were -no longer able to contain the numbers who required -admission: the contagion increased, and -became more virulent; the magazines were exhausted -of all their provisions except wheat and -a little flour, and famine began to be severely -felt. Not a word of capitulation was permitted -within the city, nor a thought of it entertained; -but Blake was well aware that it was now absolutely -necessary to make a great effort for the -relief of the place, and throw in troops and - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Attempt to introduce succours.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -supplies. This was exceedingly difficult; for, -although the enemy occupied an extensive line, -it might easily be contracted, and they would -certainly employ their whole force to prevent the -entrance of supplies into a place which they had -strictly blockaded for more than three months. -The only means of succeeding would be to -divert their attention upon various points, and -make them suppose that the Spaniards intended -to give battle in the quarter directly opposite -to that by which the convoy was to proceed. -Blake’s head-quarters were at S. Ilari when he -began his movements; he ordered Don Manuel -Llanden, lieutenant of the regiment of Ultonia, -with as many troops as could be allotted for this -service, and as many of the Somatenes as he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">190</span> -could collect on the way, to march to the heights -of Los Angeles, which are north of Gerona, dislodge -the enemy from that position, where they -had only a small body of infantry, and protect -the convoy which was to be introduced on that -side. Blake then advanced two hours’ march -towards the Ermida, or Chapel of Pradro, with -the reserve, that he might be ready to give -assistance wherever it was wanted; from thence -he dispatched the colonel of the regiment of -Ultonia, D. Enrique O’Donnell, with 1200 foot -and a few cavalry, to attack the French at Bruñolas, -his object being to make them suppose -that the convoy was proceeding in that direction.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Sept. 1.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>O’Donnell, by the error of his guides, was -led more than two hours’ march out of the direct -road, and thus prevented from attacking -the enemy at daybreak, according to his intention. -This, however, did not frustrate the plan. -Bruñolas was a strong position, the enemy were -posted in two bodies, and they had a redoubt -with entrenchments on the top of the mountain. -Stationing one part of his men at the foot of -the ascent, to defeat the purpose of the enemy, -which he perceived was to attack his principal -column in flank, he ordered Sarsfield, with the -greater part of his force, to attack the French -in front; it was done with complete success; -they were driven from their entrenchments, and -reinforcements came hastening towards them, -this, as Blake had designed, being supposed to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">191</span> -be the point which it was of most importance to - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.<br />September.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -secure. O’Donnell having succeeded in this -diversion, now descended into the plain, lest he -should be turned by superior numbers. There -was some difficulty in the descent, owing to its -steepness and the proximity of the enemy, nevertheless -it was effected in perfect order, and -having reached the plain, he halted, and formed -in order of battle. Another division of the -Spaniards under General Loygorri joined him, -and they continued in that position to occupy -the attention of the French, and draw more of -their troops from the side of the Ter during the -whole of the day.</p> - -<p>While O’Donnell thus successfully executed -his orders on one side, D. Juan Claros acted on -another in concert with the Doctor Colonel -Rovira. Rovira dislodged the enemy from the -castle of Montagut, which they had fortified. -Claros at the same time attacked them on the -left bank of the Ter, dislodged them from the -height which they occupied on that part of the -river, killed the Westphalian General Hadelin, -burnt their encampments at Sarria and Montrospe, -and won the battery of Casa Enroca. -Llanden meantime obtained possession of the -heights of Los Angeles: this opened a way for - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Garcia Conde enters with reinforcements.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the convoy, with which Garcia Conde, at the -head of 4000 foot and 500 horse, advanced from -Amer, crossed the Ter, and hastened along the -right bank toward Gerona. The attention of -the enemy had been so well diverted by the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">192</span> -attacks on other points, that the Spaniards were -enabled to break through the force which had -been left there, set fire to the tents, and effect -their entrance. Six hundred men sallied at the -same time from the city to the plain of Salt, -partly to assist in confusing the enemy, but -more for the purpose of restoring water to the -only two mills within the walls. In this they -failed; for, since the French had broken the -water-courses, it was discovered that the weather -had completed their destruction; ... had not -this detachment thus uselessly employed their -time, they might have carried off the besiegers’ -magazines from Salt.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Inadequacy of this relief.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>These operations, so honourable to Blake who -planned, and to the officers who executed them, -were performed during a day of heavy and incessant -rain, which concealed their movements -from the enemy. Of the troops who got into -Gerona, 3000 remained there. Alvarez did not -conceal from them the desperate nature of the -service upon which they had entered; he addressed -both officers and men, telling them, that -if any one among them dreaded the thoughts of -death, now was the time to leave the city, for -the Geronans and their defenders had sworn to -perish rather than surrender, and he asked if -they were willing, to swear the like? They -readily took the oath. Conde, with the rest of -the army and the beasts of the convoy, accomplished -his return as happily as his entrance. -Of all Blake’s actions this was the only one which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">193</span> -was completely successful. But more might -have been done, and ought to have been attempted. -If he had given the French battle, -a victory would have delivered Gerona; and a -defeat could only have produced the dispersion -of his own troops, in a country which they knew, -where every man was friendly to them, and where -they would presently have re-assembled. He -had little to lose, and every thing to gain. Even -if, instead of retreating as soon as his object of -introducing supplies was effected, he had continued -to threaten the enemy, without risking -an action, an opportunity of attacking them at -advantage must have been given him; for of -the two days’ biscuit which had been reserved -for such an occasion, one had been consumed, -and the French army could not have been kept -together for want of supplies. Blake was highly -and deservedly extolled for the skill with which -he had conducted his operations; but the attempt, -though it had succeeded in all parts, was -miserably inadequate to the object. The stores, -which after so much preparation and with such -skilful movements had been introduced, contained -only a supply for fifteen days. Hopes -indeed were held out of others which were to -follow, but it was impossible not to perceive -that the enemy would be more vigilant hereafter, -and that the introduction of a second convoy -would be rendered far more difficult than -that of the first. Alvarez was so well convinced -of this, that he immediately reduced the rations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">194</span> -one half, preparing at once with invincible resolution -for the extremity which he knew was - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr, 231.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -now to be expected; and then, it is said, that -for the first time there was some desertion from -the Spanish troops.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Los Angeles taken, and the garrison put to the sword.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Spaniards, after the late action, had occupied -with 500 men the convent of N. Señora -de los Angeles, which was situated upon the -highest ground in the vicinity, and having been -fortified, was now an important point, as facilitating -both ingress and egress for the besieged, -while it remained in their hands. Mazuchelli, -therefore, with the Italian troops, was ordered -to take it. According to his statement the -Spanish commandant Llanden fired upon the -officer who summoned him; and therefore when -the post was carried, after a brave resistance, -every man was put to the sword except three -officers, whom the Italian commander saved, and -Llanden himself, who leapt from one of the - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr, 243.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -church-windows, and effected his escape. The -Italian soldiers had become mercilessly ferocious -in the course of this war, exasperated, it is said, -by the murder of some of their sick and wounded - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Ib. 262.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -who had fallen into the hands of Rovira and -other guerilla chiefs. In these dreadful cases, -where cruelty excites revenge, and revenge provokes -fresh cruelty, there is a fearful accumulation -of guilt on all the parties who thus aggravate -the evils of war: but that the inhumanity -of the invaders was carried on upon a wider scale, -that it was systematically encouraged and sometimes<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">195</span> -enjoined, and that it extended to women -and even children, is as certain ... as that the -provocation was given by them, and the example -set, ... an example which neither the Spaniards -nor Portugueze were likely to be slow in -following. The enemy were less fortunate in -an attack upon the irregular forces under Claros -and Rovira, who with incessant activity intercepted -their communication with Figueras. -Verdier attacked them at S. Gregori, where -they were well posted and well commanded, for -these leaders were men well fitted for the sort -of warfare in which they were engaged, and the -French were compelled to retire with the loss of -one of their generals.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Unsuccessful sally.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The besiegers were at this time compelled for -want of ammunition to suspend their efforts till -a supply could be received from France. The -time was not lost by the garrison in strengthening -their works, works however which derived -their main strength from the unconquerable -spirit of the inhabitants. When the supplies -arrived the enemy directed their fire upon the -three points of St. Lucia, St. Cristobal, and the -Quartel de Alemanes, or Quarter of the Germans. -This latter building rested in part of its -foundation upon the wall itself, and the object -of the enemy was to beat it down, that they -might enter over its ruins as by a bridge. The -fire from the cathedral, from the Sarracinas, and -from the tower of Gironella, was well kept up -in return; but the French had so greatly the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">196</span> -advantage both in the number and size of their -artillery, that Alvarez ordered a sally, in the - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Sept. 15.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -hope of spiking their guns. That it might be -the more unexpected, the gate of S. Pedro, -which had been walled up since the loss of -Monjuic, was re-opened, and the Spaniards advanced -with such rapidity upon the enemy’s -works, that the attack was made almost as soon -as they were seen. In many points it was successful, -in some the Spaniards failed, and when -they were thrown into confusion they were unable -to rally. In some few of the persons chosen -for the sally, something worse than want of discipline -discovered itself, ... they lagged behind -in the assault, and, without sharing the danger, -fell in with their braver comrades on their return. -So much was done, and so much more -must have been effected, if all had behaved -equally well, that Colonel Marshal, an Englishman -in the Spanish service, exclaimed, “We -have lost a great victory!”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French repulsed in a general assault.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The guns which had been rendered useless -were soon replaced, and an incessant fire was -kept up upon the three great breaches; on the -18th, the French engineers declared that all -three were practicable. Monjuic had taught the -enemy not to be too confident of success; the -breaches indeed were of such magnitude that -it seemed scarcely possible they should fail in -storming them, but they knew that victory must -be dearly purchased. In the evening, therefore, -they sent a white flag; it was not noticed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">197</span> -from the town, and the officers who accompanied -it made signs to the Spaniards; there -was no firing at this time, and the men, both of -the besieging army and the town, were looking -silently and intently on, to await the issue. -Alvarez at length sent a verbal order to the -French officers to retire, ... they requested to be -heard, and were told from the walls to retire on -peril of their lives; they persisted in offering a -letter, and then both the castle of the Constable -and the tower of Gironella fired. As soon as -the officers reached their own lines, the batteries -were again opened, some upon the breaches, -others throwing shells into the town. During -the night this was kept up, and the enemy collected -troops upon the heights of Campdura and -in Monjuic, for the assault. At daybreak they -were seen in motion in different parts, with the -purpose, it was supposed, of calling off attention -from the real points of danger. The whole - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Sept. 19.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -forenoon was employed in preparation. Between -three and four, the watch on the cathedral -informed Alvarez that troops were descending -from Monjuic to St. Daniel. At the -same time the like intelligence arrived from the -forts of the Constable and of the Capuchines; -and another messenger from the cathedral followed, -with tidings that the enemy were advancing -in force both from Monjuic and St. -Daniel against the breaches, and that many of -them carried instruments for sapping.</p> - -<p>The alarm was now rung from the cathedral,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">198</span> -and beaten through the streets; there was -scarcely any interval between the alarm and -the attack, so near to the walls were the points -of which the enemy were in possession: 2000 -men came on straight from Monjuic, an equal -number advanced between Monjuic and St. -Daniel, a third body from S. Miguel; at the -same time a movement of troops was seen in -the woods of Palau; they advanced against the -three bridges, the Puerto de Francia, and forts -Calvary and Cabildo. It was not without surprise -that the enemy found the Geronans prepared -to receive them at all these points. -Nasch, the defender of Monjuic, had his post -at the Quartel de Alemanes, where one of the -principal breaches was made. Colonel Marshall -was at the breach of St. Lucia; a company of -crusaders, composed entirely of clergy, were -stationed at the breach of St. Cristobal; the -rest of the garrison, and crusaders, and all the -other townsmen manned the walls. The company -of St. Barbara were distributed among the -different posts, to perform their important functions, -and proclamations were made, inviting -the other women of Gerona to assist them in -this awful hour.</p> - -<p>At the Quartel de Alemanes the enemy -mounted the breach with the utmost resolution, -and they succeeded in forcing their way -into the first quadrangle of that great building; -the French batteries continued to play upon -the walls and the buildings adjoining the breach,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">199</span> -and a huge fragment fell upon those who were -foremost in the assault, just at the moment -when part of the Ultonia regiment was about -to charge them: a few of the Spaniards were -buried with them in the ruins. The Geronans -then rushed on, drove back the enemy, presented -themselves in the breach, and fought -hand to hand with the assailants. Frequently -such was the press of the conflict, and such the -passion which inspired them, that impatient of -the time required for reloading their muskets, -the defendants caught up stones from the -breach, and brained their enemies with these -readier weapons. Four times the assault was -repeated in the course of two hours, and at -every point the enemy were beaten off. Alvarez, -during the whole assault, hastened from post to -post, wherever there was most need of his presence, -providing every thing, directing all and -encouraging all; he had prepared cressets to -light up the walls and breaches in case the -enemy should persist in their attempt after -darkness closed; but they withdrew long before -night set in, hastily and in disorder, leaving -800 of their best men slain. Among them -was that Colonel Floresti, whom this very -Mariano Alvarez had admitted into Monjuic -at Barcelona, when the French took their - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>See vol. i. p. 201.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -treacherous possession of that fortress.</p> - -<p>Of the besieged forty-four fell in this glorious -day, and 197 were wounded. Our brave -countryman, Colonel Marshall, died of his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">200</span> -wounds, as did D. Ricardo Maccarty, another -officer of the same regiment, who was Irish -either by birth or extraction. A glorious success -had been gained, one that filled the conquerors -with the highest and most ennobling -pride; this joy it brought with it, but it brought -no rest, no respite, scarcely even a prolongation -of hope. There was neither wine to distribute -to the soldiers after their exertions, nor even -bread; a scanty mess of pulse or corn, with a -little oil, or a morsel of bacon in its stead, was -all that could be served out, ... and this not -from the public magazines, but given by the -inhabitants, who, in the general extremity, -shared their stores with the soldiers, lamenting -that they had nothing better to bestow. -“What matters it?” said these brave Spaniards, -“the joy of having saved Gerona to-day will -give us strength to go on!” A party went out -to bring in any of the wounded enemies who -might have been left among the dead; one -had been stript by a miquelet, but upon perceiving -what was the object of their search, he -discovered himself to be living. “Having -been wounded,” he said, “he feigned death as -the only chance of escaping death, for he had -been led to believe that the miquelets and the -peasants gave no quarter.” The man who had -stripped him happened to be present when he -spoke; he immediately re-clothed him, ran to -bring him water, and took charge of him till he -could be removed to the hospital. While the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">201</span> -Spaniards were employed in this humane office, -a fire was opened upon them from the enemy’s -works, occasioned, no doubt, by some error of -the French centinels: it drove them in, and the -remainder of the wounded were consequently -left to perish. One wretched German, by the -breach of St. Lucia, lay groaning for twenty -hours before death relieved him.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr resolves to reduce the city by famine.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The loss which they had sustained in this -assault thoroughly discouraged the besiegers; -and when St. Cyr, for the sake of proving to -the Spaniards that he was not to be outdone by -them in perseverance, would have made a -second effort, the officers whom he consulted -were unanimously of opinion that it ought not -again to be attempted. The Marshal, however -unwilling to make an acknowledgement so honourable -to the people against whom he was -employed, was compelled then to admit that -Gerona could only be reduced by famine, and -to determine upon pursuing that course, which -of all others is the most wearying to the soldiers, -and the most painful to a general who has not -extinguished in himself all sense of humanity. -Every day now added to the distress of the -besieged. Their flour was exhausted; wheat -they had still in store, but men are so much -the slaves of habit, that it was considered as -one great evil of the siege, that they had no -means of grinding it; two horse-mills, which -had been erected, were of such clumsy construction, -that they did not perform half the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">202</span> -needful work, and the Geronans, rather than -prepare the unground corn in any way to which -they had not been accustomed, submitted to the -labour of grinding it between two stones, or -pounding it in the shell of a bomb with a -cannon-ball. For want of other animal food, -mules and horses were slaughtered for the -hospital and for the shambles; a list was made -of all within the city, and they were taken by -lot. Fuel was exceedingly scarce, yet the heaps -which were placed in cressets at the corners of -the principal streets, to illuminate them in case -of danger, remained untouched, and not a billet -was taken from them during the whole siege. -The summer fever became more prevalent; the -bodies of the sufferers were frequently covered -with a minute eruption, which was usually a -fatal symptom: fluxes also began to prevail<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a>.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>O’Donnell enters the city.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The hope of relief was the only thing talked -of in Gerona, and day and night the people, as -well as the watchmen, looked eagerly on all sides -for the succours of which they were so greatly -in need, and which they knew Blake was preparing. -That general, on the 21st of September, -had assembled a convoy at Hostalrich; on the -morning of the 26th a firing was heard towards<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">203</span> -Los Angeles, and a strong body of the garrison -sallied out to assist the convoy. Wimpfen had -the command of the advancing army. When -they reached the heights of S. Pelayo, before -La Bisbal, O’Donnell was sent forward, with -1000 men, to open a way through the enemy: -this officer, who was generally not less successful -than enterprising in his attempts, broke -through the enemy, set fire to one of their -encampments, and made way for 160 laden -beasts, which entered safely through the Puerta -del Areny. The joy of the besieged was but -of short endurance; they looked to see more -troops and more supplies hastening on: 10,000 -men they knew had been sent upon this service, -1000 had effected their part, why could not the -nine follow? After gazing for hours in vain, -they could no longer deceive themselves with -hope; it was but too certain that the rest of the -convoy had been intercepted. They then began -to censure the general who had attempted to -introduce it on that side, where the way was -craggy, and led through such defiles, that a -handful of men would be sufficient to defeat his -purpose: their disappointment vented itself in -exclamations against Blake, and they blamed -him for remaining at the head of an army after -so many repeated misfortunes as he had sustained. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Failure of the attempt to relieve it.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -That general was not more censured -by the Catalans than by the enemy for his -conduct during the siege. The French condemned -his want of promptitude and enterprise,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">204</span> -being conscious themselves that for want of -resources they must have been seriously endangered, -if they had been repeatedly and -vigorously attacked, or even threatened. But -Blake, after the panic at Belchite, could have -no confidence in his men: nor was this his only -misfortune; though in other respects a good -officer, he wanted that presence of mind which -is the most essential requisite for a commander, -and he was therefore better qualified to plan a -campaign than to execute his own arrangements. -When he succeeded in the former attempt for -relieving Gerona, if the fair occasion had been -seized the enemy might have then been compelled -to raise the siege; but it was let pass for -want of alacrity and hope. This second effort -was miserably unsuccessful; nine parts of the -convoy fell into the enemy’s hand, and there -was a loss of more than 3000 men, for the - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr, 262.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Italians gave no quarter. St. Cyr thought that -the men who had got into the city could not -possibly retreat from it, and must therefore -accelerate its surrender; and believing that the - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr gives up the command to Augereau.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -business of the siege was done, he went to Perpignan -for the purpose of making arrangements -for the better supply of the army, and getting -rid of an irksome command which his successor -seemed in no haste to assume. His situation -had long been painful. The service itself was -one to which no casuistry could reconcile an -honourable mind; the system of preying upon -the country gave a barbarous character to it,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">205</span> -which, if the cause itself had been less odious, -must have been intolerable to one bred up in -those feelings and observances by which the -evils of war were mitigated: and if Marshal St. -Cyr had been insensible to these reflections, he -had much personal mortification to endure. -There was reason to suspect that the army was -neglected, because he was an object of displeasure -to the government which employed him; -and he was made to feel that the officers under -him were, for his sake, debarred from the -honours and advancement which they were -entitled to expect. Finding therefore that -Augereau was not incapacitated by ill health - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>St. Cyr, 264, 268.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -from assuming the command, he communicated -to him his determination of holding it no longer, -and was rewarded for his services by two years -of disgrace and exile.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>O’Donnell effects his retreat.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Marshal Augereau had not been many hours -before Gerona when O’Donnell with his thousand -men broke through the besieging army, -and accomplished his retreat more daringly and -not less successfully than he had effected his -entrance. It was O’Donnell who first formed -the Geronans into companies, and disciplined -them: he had not remained in the city during -the siege, because it was rightly thought he -would be better able to assist it from without; -and he had displayed such skill and intrepidity -in intercepting a convoy at Mascara, in concert -with Rovira, that the Central Junta promoted -him to the rank of brigadier. When, in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">206</span> -unhappy attempt at relieving the city, he and -his division only had entered, he took up his -station between the fort of the Capuchins and -of La Reynana; but Gerona stood in need of -provisions, not men; a thousand troops added -nothing to her useful strength, the Geronans -were strong enough without them to resist an -assault if another were made; with them they -were not numerous enough to sally and raise the -siege; the continuance of O’Donnell then could -only serve to hasten the fall of the city, by -increasing the consumption of its scanty stores, -and to weaken his own men by the privations -in which they shared. It was agreed, therefore, -with Alvarez that he should cut his way through -the enemy; and a few families thought it better -to follow him in this perilous attempt, than remain -in a city where it now became apparent -that they who escaped death could not long -escape captivity. The place was completely -surrounded, so that to elude the enemy was -impossible; the only hope was to surprise them, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Oct. 13.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -and then force a way. One night, after the -moon was down, they left their position in -silence: the Geronan centinels at St. Francisco -de Paula mistook them for an enemy, and fired: -but it is not unlikely that this accident, which -might so easily have frustrated the enterprise, -facilitated it, by deceiving the French, who, -when they heard the alarm given from the city, -could never imagine that an attempt was about -to be made upon their camp. To make way by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">207</span> -the mountains, O’Donnell knew would be impossible, -in the darkness, without confusion; - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.<br />October.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -therefore, though the enemy’s posts were more -numerous on the plain, he judged it safer to take -that course. The plan was ably carried into -effect; his men surprised the first post, fell upon -them with sword and bayonet, not firing a gun, -cut them off without giving the alarm, and -sparing two prisoners, made them their guides -through the encampment. They passed five-and-twenty -posts of the enemy, through many -of which they forced their way: Souham was -surprised in his quarter, and fled in his shirt, -leaving behind him as much booty as the Spaniards -had time to lay hands on. The alarm -spread throughout the whole of the lines, but it -was too late; by daybreak the Spaniards reached -S. Colona, where Milans was posted with part -of Blake’s army, and it was not till they were -thus placed in safety that a body of 2000 foot -and 200 horse, who had been sent in pursuit of -them, came up. O’Donnell was promoted to -the rank of camp-marshal for this exploit.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Magazines at Hostalrich taken by the French.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>But an immediate change took place in the -condition of the besieging army under the new -commander. Their wants were immediately -supplied from France, they were largely reinforced, -and encouragement of every kind was -given them, as if to show that the disfavour -which they had experienced had been wholly -intended toward Marshal St. Cyr. Augereau -being thus in strength, sent General Pino against<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">208</span> -the town of Hostalrich, where magazines were -collected for Blake’s army, and for the relief -of Gerona. The town was occupied by 2000 -troops; Blake was too distant to act in support -of this important post; the Spaniards, after a -gallant resistance, were driven into the citadel -by superior numbers; the magazines were lost, -and the greater part of the town burnt.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Augereau offers favourable terms.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The French purchased their success dearly; -but it cut off the last possibility of relief from -Gerona. The besieged now died in such numbers, -chiefly of dysentery, that the daily deaths -were never less than thirty-five, and sometimes -amounted to seventy. The way to the burial -place was never vacant. Augereau straitened -the blockade; and, that the garrison might -neither follow the example of O’Donnell, nor -receive any supplies, however small, he drew -his lines closer, stretched cords with bells along -the interspaces, and kept watch-dogs at all the -posts. The bombardment was continued, and -always with greater violence during the night -than the day, as if to exhaust the Geronans by -depriving them of sleep. He found means also -of sending letters into the city, sparing no attempts -to work upon the hopes and fears of the -people; he told them of his victory at Hostalrich, -... of the hopeless state of Blake’s army, -... of the peace which Austria had made; ... he -threatened the most signal vengeance if they -persisted in holding out, and he offered to grant -an armistice for a month, and suffer supplies<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">209</span> -immediately to enter, provided Alvarez would -capitulate at the end of that time, if the city -were not relieved. There was a humanity in -this offer such as no other French general had -displayed during the course of the Spanish war; -but Alvarez and the Geronans knew their duty -too well to accept even such terms as these -after the glorious resistance which they had -made. With such an enemy, and in such a -cause, they knew that no compromise ought to -be made: they had devoted themselves for -Spain, and it did not become them, for the -sake of shortening their own sufferings, to let -loose so large a part of the besieging army as -this armistice would have left at liberty for -other operations.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Destruction of a French convoy by the British ships.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>While the people of Gerona opposed this -heroic spirit of endurance to the enemy, an -affair took place at sea, which, if it brought -no immediate relief to the Catalans, convinced -them at least that they were not wholly neglected -by Great Britain. Lord Collingwood having -obtained intelligence that an attempt would be -made from Toulon for throwing supplies into -Barcelona, sailed from Minorca about the middle -of October, and took his station a few leagues -off Cape St. Sebastian, on the coast of Catalonia. -On the 23d the enemy’s fleet came in sight, -consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, -two armed store ships, and a convoy of sixteen -sail. Rear Admiral Martin was ordered to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">210</span> -give chase; he fell in with the ships of war off - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Oct. 25.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the entrance of the Rhone, but they escaped -him that night, because the wind blew directly -on shore. The next morning he renewed the -chase, and drove two of them, one of eighty -guns, the other of seventy-four, on shore, off -Frontignan, where they were set fire to by -their own crews; the other ship of the line and -one frigate ran on shore at the entrance of the -port of Cette, where there was little probability -that the former could be saved, but they were -under protection of the batteries. The second -frigate had hauled her wind during the night, -and got into Marseilles road.</p> - -<p>Two brigs, two bombards, and a ketch -belonging to the convoy, were burnt by the -Pomona while Admiral Martin was in chase. -The other vessels made for the bay of Rosas; -a squadron pursued, and found them moored -under the protection of the castle, Fort Trinidad, -and several batteries newly erected by the -French. Four of these vessels were armed; -the largest was of 600 tons, carrying sixteen -nine-pounders, and 110 men; she was inclosed -in boarding nettings, and perfectly prepared -for action. The English boats, however, boarded -them all, though they were bravely defended, -and though a constant fire was kept up from -the forts and from the beach. Of the eleven -ships, three had landed their cargoes, but all -were taken or burnt; and of the whole convoy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">211</span> -there only escaped the frigate, which put into -Marseilles, and one of the store-ships, which -probably succeeded in reaching Barcelona.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Increased distress of the city.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>It was no unimportant service thus to -straiten the French in that city, ... but it was a -success which brought no relief to Gerona, -where the devoted inhabitants seemed now -abandoned to their fate. Hitherto the few -mules and horses which remained unslaughtered -had been led out to feed near the walls of St. -Francisco de Paula, and of the burial ground: -... this was now prevented by the batteries of -Palau and Montelivi, and by the French advanced -posts; and these wretched animals, being -thus deprived of their only food, gnawed the -hair from each other’s tails and manes before -they were led to the shambles. Famine at -length did the enemy’s work; the stores from -which the citizens had supplied the failure of -the magazines were exhausted; it became -necessary to set a guard over the ovens, and -the food for the hospitals was sometimes seized -upon the way by the famishing populace. The -enemy endeavoured to tempt the garrison to -desert, by calling out to them to come and -eat, and holding out provisions. A few were -tempted; they were received with embraces, -and fed in sight of the walls, ... poor wretches, -envying the firmer constancy of their comrades -more than those comrades did the food, for lack -of which their own vital spirits were well-nigh -spent! None of that individual animosity was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">212</span> -here displayed which characterized the street-fighting - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.<br />November.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -at Zaragoza, ... the nature of the siege -was not such as to call it forth; and some of -those humanities appeared, which in other -instances the French generals systematically -outraged in Spain. The out-sentries frequently -made a truce with each other, laid down their -arms, and drew near enough to converse; the -French soldier would then give his half-starved -enemy a draught from his leathern bottle, or -brandy flask, and when they had drunk and -talked together, they returned to their posts, -scoffed at each other, proceeded from mockery -to insult, and sometimes closed the scene with -a skirmish.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Report of the state of health.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The only disgraceful circumstance which -occurred during the whole siege was the desertion -of ten officers in a body, two of whom -were men of noble birth; they had been plotting -to make the governor capitulate, and -finding their intentions frustrated, went over to -the enemy in open day. Except in this instance, -the number of deserters was very small. Towards -the end of November many of the inhabitants, -having become utterly hopeless of relief, -preferred the chance of death to the certainty of -being made prisoners, and they ventured to pass -the enemy’s lines, some failing in the attempt, -others being more fortunate. At this time Samaniego, -who was first surgeon to the garrison, -delivered in to Alvarez a report upon the state of - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Nov. 29.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -health: as he gave it into his hands, he said<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">213</span> -something implying the melancholy nature of its -contents; Alvarez replied, “this paper then, -perhaps, will inform posterity of our sufferings, if -there should be none left to recount them!” -He then bade Samaniego read it. It was a -dreadful report. There did not remain a single -building in Gerona which had not been injured by -the bombardment; not a house was habitable; -the people slept in cellars, and vaults, and holes -amid the ruins; and it had not unfrequently -happened that the wounded were killed in -the hospitals. The streets were broken up; -so that the rain water and the sewers stagnated -there, and the pestilential vapours which arose -were rendered more noxious by the dead bodies -which lay rotting amid the ruins. The siege -had now endured seven months; scarcely a -woman had become pregnant during that time; -the very dogs, before hunger consumed them, -had ceased to follow after kind; they did not -even fawn upon their masters; the almost -incessant thunder of artillery seemed to make -them sensible of the state of the city, and the -unnatural atmosphere affected them as well as -humankind. It even affected vegetation. In -the gardens within the walls the fruits withered, -and scarcely any vegetable could be raised. -Within the last three weeks above 500 of the -garrison had died in the hospitals; a dysentery -was raging and spreading; the sick were lying -upon the ground, without beds, almost without -food; and there was scarcely fuel to dress the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">214</span> -little wheat that remained, and the few horses -which were yet unconsumed. Samaniego then -adverted with bitterness to the accounts which -had been circulated, that abundant supplies -had been thrown into the city; and he concluded -by saying, “if by these sacrifices, deserving -for ever to be the admiration of history, and -if by consummating them with the lives of us -who, by the will of Providence, have survived -our comrades, the liberty of our country can -be secured, happy shall we be in the bosom of -eternity and in the memory of good men, and -happy will our children be among their fellow-countrymen!”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Some of the outworks taken by the French.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The breaches which had been assaulted ten -weeks before were still open; it was easier for -the Geronans to defend than to repair them, and -the French had suffered too much in that assault -to repeat it. A fourth had now been made. -The enemy, learning from the officers who had -deserted that the ammunition of the place was -almost expended, ventured upon bolder operations. -They took possession by night of the -Calle del Carmen; from thence they commanded -the bridge of S. Francisco, which was -the only means of communication between the -old city and that part on the opposite side of -the Ter; from thence also they battered Forts -Merced and S. Francisco de Paula. During -another night they got possession of Fort Calvary, -which they had reduced to ruins, and of -the Cabildo redoubt: this last success seems to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">215</span> -have been owing to some misconduct, for the -historian of the siege inveighs upon this occasion -against the pernicious measure of intrusting -boys with command, as a reward for the services -of their fathers. The city redoubts fell -next. The bodily strength as well as the ammunition -of the Geronans was almost exhausted, -and these advantages over them were gained -with comparative ease. The enemy were now -close to the walls, and thus cut off the forts of -the Capuchins and of the Constable, the only -two remaining outworks. The garrisons of -both amounted only to 160 men; they had -scarcely any powder, little water, and no food. -These posts were of the last importance; it was -resolved to make a sally for the sake of relieving -them, and the garrison of the town gave up for -this purpose their own miserable rations, contributing -enough for the consumption of three -days. The ration was at this time a handful of -wheat daily, or sometimes, in its stead, the quarter -of a small loaf, and five ounces of horse’s or -mule’s flesh, every alternate day.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Last sally of the garrison.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The few men who could be allotted for this -service, or indeed who were equal to it, sallied -in broad day through the Puerto del Socorro, -within pistol-shot of the redoubts which the -enemy now possessed; they were in three bodies, -two of which hastened up the hill toward the -two forts, while the third remained to protect -them from being attacked in the rear from the -Calle del Carmen. The sally was so sudden,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">216</span> -so utterly unlooked for by the besiegers, and so -resolutely executed, that its purpose was accomplished, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.<br />December.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -though not without the loss in killed -and wounded of about forty men, which was -nearly a third of those who were employed in -it. This was the last effort of the Geronans. -The deaths increased in a dreadful and daily -accelerating progression; the burial-places were -without the walls; it had long been a service of -danger to bury the dead, for the French, seeing -the way to the cemetery always full, kept up a -fire upon it; hands could not now be found to -carry them out to the deposit-house, and from -thence to the grave; and at one time 120 bodies -were lying in the deposit-house, uncoffined, in -sight of all who passed the walls.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Alvarez becomes delirious.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The besiegers were now erecting one battery -more in the Calle de la Rulla; it was close upon -one of the breaches, and commanded the whole -space between Forts Merced and S. Francisco -de Paula. This was in the beginning of December; -on the 4th Alvarez was seized with a -nervous fever, occasioned undoubtedly by the -hopeless state of the city. On the 8th the disorder -had greatly increased, and he became delirious. -The next day the Junta assembled, and -one of their body was deputed to examine Samaniego -and his colleague Viader, whether the -governor was in a state to perform the duties of -his office. They required a more specific question; -and the Canon who had been deputed -then said, it was feared that, in the access of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">217</span> -delirium, the governor might give orders contrary -to his own judgement, if he were in perfect -sanity of mind, and contrary to the public -weal, when the dreadful situation of the city -was considered. The purport of such language -could not be mistaken; and they replied, that, -without exceeding the bounds of their profession, -they could pronounce his state of health -to be incompatible with the command, and his -continuance in command equally incompatible -with the measures necessary for his recovery.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Capitulation.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Samaniego and his colleague went after this -consultation to visit the governor, whom they -found in such a state that they judged it proper -for him to receive the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">viaticum</i>, thinking it most -probable that, in the next access of fever, he -would lose his senses and die, ... for this was the -manner in which the disorder under which he -laboured usually terminated. Being thus delivered -over to the priests, Alvarez, before the -fit came on, resigned the command, which then -devolved upon Brigadier D. Julian de Bolivar: -a council was held during the night, composed -of the two Juntas, military and civil; and the -result was, that in the morning, D. Blas de -Furnas, an officer who had greatly distinguished -himself during the siege, should treat for a capitulation. -The whole of the 10th was employed -in adjusting the terms. They were in the highest -degree honourable. The garrison were to -march out with the honours of war, and be sent -prisoners into France, to be exchanged as soon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">218</span> -as possible for an equal number of French prisoners -then detained in Majorca and other -places. None were to be considered prisoners -except those who were ranked as soldiers; the -commissariat, intendants, and medical staff were -thus left at freedom. The French were not to -be quartered upon the inhabitants; the official -papers were neither to be destroyed nor removed; -no person was to be injured for the -part which he had taken during the siege; those -who were not natives of Gerona should be at -liberty to leave it, and take with them all their -property; the natives also who chose to depart -might do so, take with them their moveable property, -and dispose as they pleased of the rest.</p> - -<p>While the capitulation was going on, many -of the enemy’s soldiers came to the walls, -bringing provisions and wine, to be drawn up -by strings, ... an honourable proof of the temper -with which they regarded their brave opponents. -During the night the deserters who -were in Gerona, with many other soldiers and -peasants, attempted to escape: some succeeded, -others were killed or taken in the attempt, and -not a few dropped with weakness upon the way. -To those who remained, the very silence of -night, it is said, was a thing so unusual, that it -became a cause of agitation. At daybreak it -was found that the soldiers had broken the -greater part of their arms, and thrown the fragments -into the streets or the river. When the -garrison were drawn up in sight of the French,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">219</span> -their shrunken limbs and hollow eyes and pale -and meagre countenances sufficiently manifested -by what they had been subdued. The French -observed, not without admiration, that in the -city, as well as at Monjuic, most of the guns -had been fired so often that they were rendered -useless; brass itself had given way, says Samaniego, -before the constancy of the Geronans.</p> - -<p>The first act of the French officer who was -appointed governor was to order all the inhabitants -to deliver in their arms, on pain of -death, and to establish a military commission. -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Te Deum</i> was ordered in the cathedral; it was -performed with tears, and a voice which could -difficultly command its utterance. Augereau -would fain have had a sermon like that which -had been preached before Lasnes at Zaragoza, -but not a priest could be found who would sin -against his soul by following the impious example. -A guard was set upon Alvarez; he -amended slowly, and the physicians applied for -leave for him to quit the city, and go to some -place upon the sea-shore; it was replied, that -Marshal Augereau’s orders only permitted him -to allow the choice of any place on the French -frontier, or in the direct road to France. He -chose Figueras, and, having recovered sufficiently -to bear the removal, was hurried off at - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Dec. 24.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -midnight without any previous notice, and under -a strong escort. The Friars, who had been -all confined in the church of St. Francisco, with -a cannon pointed against the door, and a match<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">220</span> -lighted, were marched off at the same time, in -violation of the terms. The sick and wounded -Spaniards were hastily removed to St. Daniel; -they were laid upon straw, and being left without -even such necessaries as they had possessed -in the city, except that they were better supplied -with food, many died in consequence. -There was a grievous want of humanity in this; -but no brutal acts of outrage and cruelty were -committed, as at Zaragoza; and, when so many -of the French generals rendered themselves infamous, -Augereau, and the few who observed -any of the old humanities of war, deserve to be -distinguished from their execrable colleagues.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Death of Alvarez.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Central Junta decreed the same honours -to Gerona and its heroic defenders as had been -conferred in the case of Zaragoza. The rewards -which Mariano Alvarez had deserved by his admirable -conduct were to be given to his family, -if, as there was reason to fear, he himself should -not live to receive them. The sad apprehension -which was thus expressed was soon verified. -He died at Figueras. It was said, and -believed, in Catalonia, that Buonaparte had sent -orders to execute him in the Plaza at Gerona, -and that the French, fearing the consequences -if they should thus outrage the national feeling, -put him out of the way by poison<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a>. His death<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">221</span> -was so probable, considering what he had endured -during the siege, and the condition in -which it left him, that no suspicion of this kind -would have prevailed, if the public execution -of Santiago Sass and of Hofer, and the private -catastrophe of Captain Wright and of Pichegru, -had not given dreadful proof that the French -government and its agents were capable of any -wickedness. In the present imputation they -were probably wronged, but it was brought on -them by the opinion which their actions had obtained -and merited.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Eroles escapes.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>About 600 of the garrison made their escape -from Rousillon. Eroles was one; than whom -no Spaniard rendered greater services to his -country during the war, nor has left to posterity -a more irreproachable and honourable name.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">222</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XXVII" class="vspace">CHAPTER XXVII.<br /> - -<span class="subhead">PROCEEDINGS IN FRANCE AND IN THE BRITISH -PARLIAMENT.</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1809.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Buonaparte divorces the Empress Josephine.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> year had thus closed in Spain as triumphantly -for the invaders as it began; and yet -the French felt, and could not but feel, that the -subjugation of that kingdom was more distant -at this time than they had supposed it to be -when they entered upon the invasion, in the -wantonness of insolent power. Buonaparte, -when he recapitulated the exploits of the year -to his senate, intimated an intention of returning -thither to complete the conquest. “When -I shall show myself beyond the Pyrenees,” said -he, “the frightened leopard will fly to the ocean -to avoid shame, defeat, and death. The triumph -of my arms will be the triumph of the genius of -good over that of evil; of moderation, order, -and morality, over civil war, anarchy, and the -evil passions.” He neither mentioned nor alluded -to the battle of Talavera; the circumstances -of that well-fought field had been so -completely concealed from the French nation, -that they were fully persuaded the English had -suffered a great defeat; but the lesson had not -been lost upon Buonaparte. That battle, and -the repulse at Esling, made him for the first time<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">223</span> -feel the insecure foundation of his power; it -taught him that his armies were not invincible. -His hatred for England, implacable as it was, -had not prevented him from regarding with admiration -the military genius of Marlborough, -though he was incapable of appreciating the -principles and feelings which induced that excellent -commander on every occasion to mitigate -by every means in his power the miseries of war. -He despised the counsels, and egregiously miscalculated -the resources of Great Britain; but -he was compelled in his heart to render reluctant -justice to the national spirit, which Vimeiro and -Coruña, and the Douro and Talavera, had shewn -him could be displayed by her armies no less than -by her fleets; and he could not but secretly and -ominously apprehend, that such victories as those -of Blenheim and Ramillies might be achieved -by such soldiers. It is believed that this feeling -determined him to connect himself by marriage -with one of the great continental powers. Secret -arrangements for this having been made -with the house of Austria, he divorced the Empress -Josephine at the close of the year by an -act of his own government, and with her full -acquiescence, reasons of state being made the -plea, as they were the motives, for this measure. -In the manner of the separation, in the provision -which was made, and in the honours which were -reserved for Josephine, due regard was shown -her: she was a gentle and benevolent woman; -and had Buonaparte in his moral nature been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">224</span> -half as worthy of the throne, the world might -have loved and revered the memory of both.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Farther requisition for the armies in Spain.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>But triumphantly as the war with Austria had -been concluded, the prospect of peace was yet -far distant. The war-minister reported, that the -French armies in Spain consisted of 300 battalions -and 150 squadrons, and it would be sufficient, -without sending any additional corps, to -keep them at their full establishment: 30,000 -men collected at Bayonne afforded means for -accomplishing this, and for repulsing any force -which the English might send to that country. -In this state of things, no other levy was necessary -than such as would supply the contingent -indispensably requisite for replacing in the battalions -of the interior the drafts which were daily -made from them. There remained from the -conscription of the years 1806, 7, 8, 9, 10, more -than 80,000 men, who, though ballotted, had not -been called into actual service; it was proposed -to call out 36,000, and then to declare those -classes free from any future call. “By these -means, sire,” said the minister, “your armies -will be maintained at their present strength, -and a considerable number of your subjects will -be definitively released from the conscription.” -There were also at the Emperor’s disposal 25,000 -men, afforded by the conscription for 1811; but -upon these it was not proposed to call, unless -events should disappoint his pacific intentions.</p> - -<p>Thirty thousand men stationed at Bayonne to -supply the constant consumption of his army in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">225</span> -Spain, 36,000 to be raised for replacing the drafts -from the interior, and 25,000 to be taken by -anticipation, before the conscription in its regular -course ought to have reached them, and to be -held in readiness for farther demands of blood; -this was the prospect held out at the conclusion -of the Austrian war; these were the sacrifices -which the French were called upon to make, not -for defence, not for the interests, not for the -honour of France, but to support a wanton and -execrable usurpation, which had no other cause -than the individual ambition of Buonaparte.... - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Display of Spanish flags.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -He felt how needful it was to persuade the -French that a war which they knew to be so destructive -was not as inglorious as it was unjust, -and for this purpose a parade was made of the -victories which had been obtained in Spain. -The flags taken at Espinosa, Burgos, Tudela, -Somosierra, and Madrid, were presented to the -legislative body; a detachment of the grenadiers -of the imperial guard was introduced, and seated -on the right and left of Buonaparte’s statue, that -the stage might be full. Rhetorical speeches -were delivered, and the session concluded like -a stage spectacle, with a flourish of trumpets, -and cries of Long live the Emperor! In this -exhibition, Buonaparte addressed himself to the -ruling passion of the people over whom he -reigned. “Without glory,” he said, “there -could be no happiness for a Frenchman;” and -the moral feeling of the nation had been so debased -that they believed glory might be attained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">226</span> -in a war thus flagrantly and infamously unjust. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />January.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -The prevailing weakness of his own character -also was betrayed in this display; no other successes -were brought forward than those which -had been won while he was in Spain; for though -he liberally rewarded his generals in all ways, -and left them also at full liberty to enrich themselves -by exaction and plunder, he was jealous -of any celebrity that they might attain, and desired, -more from personal vanity than from -political considerations, that in every success -the French should look to him, and to him alone, -as the author of their victories.</p> - -<p>While France was thus rejoicing in the triumphs -of its armies, the Central Junta saw the whole -extent of their danger, and rested their hopes -upon the goodness of their cause and the character -of the Spanish nation, with a composure -which nothing could shake. Never was a nation -more truly represented in its defects and in its -virtues, in its strength and in its weakness. -While in their administration they committed -the same errors, deceiving themselves and others, -which in former wars had rendered the Spaniards<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> -the most inefficient and impracticable -of all allies; their language was that of the loftiest<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">227</span> -fortitude, and their public papers breathed -a spirit worthy of their station. One of the -most splendid of these orations was issued during -the fearful pause after the defeat of their armies -at Ocaña and at Alba de Tormes, when the -peace with Austria left Buonaparte at leisure to - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Address of the Central Junta to the nation.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -direct his whole force against Spain. “Our -enemies,” said they, “exhort us to submit to -the clemency of the conqueror. Because in -their own degraded hearts they find nothing but -baseness when they are weak, and atrocity when -they are strong, they imagine that the Spaniards -must abandon all their lofty hopes. Who has -told them that our virtue is of so low a standard? -Does fortune oppose to us greater obstacles? -we will redouble our exertions! Are our dangers -augmented? we shall acquire the greater -glory! Slaves of Buonaparte, waste not time -in sophistries which can deceive no one; speak -frankly and say, we will be the most wicked of -men, because we believe ourselves the most -powerful: ... this language is consistent and intelligible; -but do not attempt to persuade us -that the abandonment of our rights is wisdom, -and that cowardice is prudence! Submit?... -Do these sophists know to what they advise the -most high-minded nation upon earth? It would -be a stain without example in our annals, if after -such efforts, such incredible events, we were to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">228</span> -fall at the feet of the crowned slave who has been -sent to us as king. And for what? That from -the midst of his banquets, his ruffian parasites, -and his prostitutes, he may point out the churches -which are to be burnt; the estates which are to -be divided among his satellites; the virgins and -matrons who are to be taken to his seraglio; the -youths who are to be sent as the tribute to the -Minotaur of France!</p> - -<p>“Spaniards, think not that the Junta speak -thus to excite you by the arts of language; -what need of words, when things speak for themselves? -Your houses are destroyed; your -churches demolished; your fields laid waste; -your families dispersed and wandering through -the country, or hurried into the grave. Have -we made so many sacrifices, have the flames of -war consumed half Spain, that we should abandon -the other half to the far more deadly peace -which the enemy prepares for it? For no one -will beguile himself with the insidious parade of -the improvements which the French hold out. -The Tartar who commands them has decreed, -that Spain shall have neither industry, nor commerce, -nor population, nor political representation -whatever: ... to be made a waste and solitary -sheep-walk for supplying French manufactures -with our wools; to become a nursery of -men who may be hurried away to slaughter; -such is the destiny which he would impose upon -the most highly favoured of all countries! Shall -we then, submitting to this, submit also to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">229</span> -destruction of our religion; abandon the interests -of heaven and the faith of our fathers to the -sacrilegious mockery of these banditti; and forsake -the sanctuary which, during seven centuries, -and in a thousand and a thousand battles, -our forefathers maintained against the Saracens? -If we should do this, the victims who perished -in that contest would cry to us from their graves, -Ungrateful and perfidious race, shall our sacrifices -be in vain, and is our blood of no estimation -in your eyes? No, patriots! rest in peace, -... and let not that bitter thought disturb the -quiet of your sepulchres!</p> - -<p>“There is no peace, there can be none in -this state of things! That Spain may be free, -is the universal wish of the nation; and if that -cannot be obtained, at least it may become one -immense desert, one wide grave, where the -accumulated remains of French and Spaniards -may exhibit to future ages our glory and their -shame. But fortune is not so inimical to virtue -as to leave to its defenders only this melancholy -termination. It is written in heaven, and the -history of all ages attests the truth, that a people -who decidedly love their liberty and independence -must ultimately establish them, in despite -of all the artifice and all the violence of -tyranny. Victory, which is so often a gift of -fortune, is sooner or later the reward of constancy. -What defended the little republics of -Greece from the barbarous invasion of Xerxes? -What reconstructed the Capitol when it was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">230</span> -almost destroyed by the Gauls? What preserved -it from the mighty arms of Hannibal? -What, in times nearer our own, protected the -Swiss from German tyranny, and gave independence -to Holland in spite of the power of -our ancestors?</p> - -<p>“Spaniards, the Junta announces to you -frankly what has happened in the continent, -because it would not have you ignorant for a -moment of the new danger which threatens the -country: they announce it in the confidence, -that, instead of being dismayed, you will collect -new strength, and show yourselves more -worthy of the cause which you defend, and of -the admiration of the universe: they announce -it to you, because they know that the determination -of the Spaniards is to be free at whatever -cost; and all means however violent, all resources -however extraordinary, all funds however -privileged, must be called out to repel the -enemy. The ship’s treasures must be thrown -overboard to lighten her in the tempest and -save her from shipwreck. Our country is sinking; -... strength, riches, life, wisdom, council, -... whatever we have is hers. The victory is -ours, if we carry on to the end of our enterprise -the sublime enthusiasm with which it began. -The mass with which we must resist the enemy -must be composed of the strength of all, and -the sacrifices of all; and then what will it import -that he pours upon us anew the legions which -are now superfluous in Germany, or the swarm<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">231</span> -of conscripts which he is about to drag from -France? We began the contest with 80,000 -men less; he began it with 200,000 more. Let -him replace them if he can; let him send or -bring them to this region of death, as destructive -to the oppressors as to the oppressed! -Adding to the experience of two campaigns the -strength of despair and of fury, we will give to -their phalanxes of banditti the same fate which -their predecessors have experienced; and the -earth, fattened with their blood, shall return to -us with usury the fruits of which they have deprived -us! Let the monarchs of the North, -forgetful of what they are, and of what they are -capable, submit to be the slaves of this new Tamerlane; -let them purchase at such a price the -tranquillity of a moment, till it comes to their -turn to be devoured! What is this to us, who -are a mighty people, and resolved to perish or -to triumph? Did we ask their consent when, -twenty months ago, we raised our arms against -the tyrant? Did we not enter into the contest -alone? Did we not carry it on for a campaign -alone?... Nothing which is necessary for our -defence is wanting. Our connexion is daily -drawn closer with America, to whose assistance, -as timely as it was generous, the mother country -is deeply indebted, and on whose zeal and loyalty -a great part of our hope is founded. The -alliance which we have formed with Great Britain -continues and will continue; that nation has -lavished for us its blood and its treasures, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">232</span> -is entitled to our gratitude and that of future -ages. Let, then, intrigue, or fear, prevail with -weak governments and misled cabinets; let -them, if they will, conclude treaties, illusory on -the part of him who grants, and disgraceful on -the part of those who accept them; let them, -if they will, relinquish the common cause of -civilized nations, and inhumanly abandon their -allies! The Spanish people will stand alone and -erect amid the ruins of the European continent. -Here has been drawn, never to be sheathed, the -sword of hatred against the execrable tyrant; -here is raised, never to be beaten down, the -standard of independence and of justice! Hasten -to it, all ye in Europe who will not live under -the abominable yoke; ye who will not enter into -a league with iniquity; ye who are indignant -at the fatal and cowardly desertion of these deluded -princes, come to us! Here the valiant -shall find opportunities of acquiring true honour; -the wise and the virtuous shall obtain respect; -the afflicted shall have an asylum. Our cause is -the same; the same shall be our reward. Come! -and, in despite of all the arts and all the power -of this inhuman despot, we will render his star -dim, and form for ourselves our own destiny!”</p> - -<p>Two things are remarkable in this paper; the -total change, or rather restoration of public -feeling, which must have been effected, before -a Spanish government would hold up the resistance -of the Dutch to Philip as a glorious example -to the Spanish people; and the want of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">233</span> -foresight and information in the Junta, who -could not only rely upon the attachment of the -colonies, but even venture to declare, that the -hopes of the country rested in great measure -upon them. But though the Spanish government -deceived itself in looking for hope where -none was to be found, and in its exaggerated -opinion of its military strength, it was not mistaken -in relying upon the national character, -and that spirit of endurance which constituted - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>State of public opinion in England.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -its moral strength. Upon this it was, and upon -the extent and nature of the Peninsula, that -those persons who from the commencement -looked on with unshaken confidence to the -final expulsion of the invaders, founded their -judgement. The Continent, notwithstanding -its extent, fell under the yoke of France, because -the spirit of the people was not such as -to supply the want of magnanimity and of wisdom -in their rulers: the Tyrolese were subdued -notwithstanding their heroism, because, in so -small a territory as the Tyrol, numbers, remorselessly -employed, must necessarily overcome all -resistance. But no force can be sufficient to -conquer and keep in subjection a peninsula, -containing about 170,000 square miles, and -twelve millions of inhabitants, if the people -carry resistance to the uttermost. Their armies -may be defeated, their towns occupied, their -fortresses taken, their villages burnt, ... but the -country cannot be conquered while the spirit of -the nation remains unsubdued. In Spain the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">234</span> -mountains form a chain of fastnesses running -through the whole Peninsula, and connecting -all its provinces with each other. In such a -country, therefore, when the war ceases to be -carried on by army against army, and becomes -the struggle of a nation against its oppressors, -pursued incessantly by night and day, the soldier, -no longer acting in large bodies, loses that -confidence which discipline gives him; while -the peasant, on the other hand, feels the whole -advantage which the love of his country, and -the desire of vengeance, and the sense of duty, -and the approbation of his own heart, give to -the individual in a contest between man and -man. The character of the Spaniards was displayed -in their annals. The circumstances of -their country remained the same as when Henri -IV. said of it, that it was a land wherein a weak -army must be beaten, and a strong one starved. -They who were neither ignorant of history nor -of human nature considered these things; and -therefore, from the commencement of the struggle, -regarded it with unabated hope.</p> - -<p>But never since the commencement of the -French revolution had the affairs of England, -of Europe, and of the world, worn so dark an -aspect as at this time. The defeats which -the Spaniards had sustained were far more disheartening -than those of the preceding winter, -because they evinced that neither had the armies -improved in discipline, nor the government profited -by experience. It was but too plain, that,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">235</span> -notwithstanding the show of resistance made at -the Sierra Morena, the kingdoms of Andalusia -were in fact open to the enemy; so supine was -the Central Junta, as to make it even probable -that Cadiz itself might be betrayed or surprised; -and if, now that Buonaparte had no other object, -he should march a great force against the English -in Portugal, there were few persons who -had sufficient knowledge of the country and of -the character of the people, to look onward -without dismay.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Wellington’s views with regard to Portugal.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Lord Wellington calculated upon both. He -knew that man is naturally brave, that the men -of any country therefore may, with good training, -be made good soldiers, and that if the -Spanish troops were no longer what they had -been under the Prince of Parma, the fault was -not in the materials, but in the composition of -their armies. The Portugueze were as proud a -people as the Spaniards, and had in their history -as much cause for pride; but they were not -so impracticable. The removal of their court -removed all those intrigues and jealousies which -would otherwise have been at work; the nation -felt itself at this time dependent upon England; -but there was no humiliation in this; any such -sentiment was precluded by old alliance, the -confidence of hereditary attachment, and the -consciousness that it was willing and able to do -its own part in its own defence. Whatever -measures the British government advanced were -cordially adopted; and Lord Wellington, during<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">236</span> -the mortifying inaction to which he was reduced, -had the satisfaction of knowing that the Portugueze -troops were every day improving in -military habits and feelings, and that he might -reckon upon them in the next campaign as an -efficient force. In all his views and opinions -concerning the course to be pursued, Marquis -Wellesley entirely agreed with him; and the -Marquis, when he returned to England to take -his place in administration, proposed that every -effort should be made for placing Portugal in -the best state of preparation. He knew that -we might rely upon the Spaniards for perseverance -through all reverses and under every -disadvantage; but it was on the Portugueze that -we must place our trust for regular and effectual -co-operation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The King’s speech.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>When parliament assembled this was referred -to in the king’s speech. “The efforts,” it was -said, “of Great Britain, for the protection of -Portugal, had been powerfully aided by the confidence -which the Prince Regent had reposed -in his majesty, and by the co-operation of the -local government, and of the people of that -country. The expulsion of the French from -that kingdom, and the glorious victory of Talavera, -had contributed to check the progress of -the enemy. The Spanish government had now, -in the name and by the authority of Ferdinand -VII., determined to assemble the general and -extraordinary Cortes of the nation. This measure, -his majesty trusted, would give fresh<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">237</span> -animation and vigour to the councils and the -arms of Spain, and successfully direct the energies -and spirit of the Spanish people to the -maintenance of the legitimate monarchy, and -to the ultimate deliverance of their country. -The most important considerations of policy -and of good faith required, that as long as this -great cause could be maintained with a prospect -of success, it should be supported, according to -the nature and circumstances of the contest, by -the strenuous and continued assistance of the -power and resources of Great Britain.”</p> - -<p>In the debates which ensued it was a melancholy -thing to see how strongly the spirit of -opposition manifested itself even in those persons -whose opinions and feelings regarding the justice -and necessity of the war were in entire - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Speech of Earl St. Vincent;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -sympathy with the government. Earl St. Vincent -inveighed in the strongest terms against -the ministers, to whose ignorance and incapacity, -to whose weakness, infatuation, and stupidity, -he said, all our disasters and disgrace were -owing. After panegyrizing Sir John Moore as -one of the ablest men who ever commanded an -army, he spoke of the battle of Talavera as a -victory which had been purchased with the -useless expenditure of our best blood, which led -to no advantage, and which had had all the consequences -of defeat. “It is high time,” said he, -“that parliament should adopt strong measures, -or the voice of the country will resound like -thunder in their ears. Any body may be a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">238</span> -minister now: they pop in, and they pop out, -like the man and woman in a peasant’s barometer; -they rise up like tadpoles; they may be -compared to wasps, to hornets, to locusts; they -send forth their pestilential breath over the whole -country, and nip and destroy every fair flower -in the land. The conduct of his majesty’s -government has led to the most frightful disasters, -which are no where exceeded in the annals -of history. The country is in that state which -makes peace inevitable; it will be compelled to -make peace, however disadvantageous, because -it will be unable to maintain a war so shamefully -misconducted and so disastrous in its -consequences.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Grenville;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Lord Grenville spake in a similar temper. -The day must come, he said, when ministers -would have to render an account to parliament -of the treasures which they had wasted, and the -lives which they had sacrificed. Their measures -had uniformly failed, and presented nothing but -an unbroken series of disgraceful, irremediable -failures. And yet they had the confidence, the -unblushing confidence, to tell us of a victory! -Gilded disasters were called splendid victories, -and the cypress that droops over the tombs of -our gallant defenders, whose lives have been -uselessly sacrificed, was to be denominated -blooming laurels! He spake of what might -have been done if an army had been sent either -to Trieste or to the north of Germany; condemned -the Walcheren expedition, as the plan<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">239</span> -and execution of that miserable enterprise -deserved, and pronounced a condemnation not -less unqualified upon the plans which had been -pursued in Spain, where, he said, they had -persisted in expecting co-operation from an -armed peasantry, persevering in error after the -absurdity of such an expectation had been -proved. Why too had the army in that country -been exposed in unhealthy situations? But the -Lords had a duty to perform; having seen what -had taken place before in Spain and Portugal, -they could not exculpate themselves for having -continued to repose confidence in such ministers. -They must exert themselves in this most imminent -crisis of their country. “You cannot be -ignorant,” said he, “of its tremendous situation, -and where can you look? To the government! -See it, my Lords, broken, distracted, incompetent, -incapable of exerting any energy, or -inspiring any confidence! It is not from the -government that our deliverance is to be expected; -it must be found, if it be found at all, -in your own energy and in your own patriotism.” -And he concluded with moving as an amendment -to the address, that vigorous and effectual proceedings -should be instituted, as the only atonement -which could be made to an injured people!</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Honourable Mr. Ward;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The language of the opposition in the House -of Commons was not more temperate. “Lord -Wellington’s exploits at Talavera,” said the -Honourable Mr. Ward, “left the cause of -Spain as desperate as they found it, and in their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">240</span> -consequences resembled not victories, but defeats. -For by what more disastrous consequences -could defeat have been followed, than -by a precipitate retreat, by the loss of 2000 -men left to the mercy of the enemy upon that -spot where they had just fought and conquered, -but fought and conquered in vain; that spot -which, as it were in mockery to them, we had -endeavoured to perpetuate in the name of the -general? By what worse could it have been -followed than by the loss of all footing in Spain, -the ruin of another army, and the virtual renunciation -of all the objects of the war? William -III. used by his skilful generalship to render -defeat harmless, ... our generals made victory -itself unavailing.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Ponsonby;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Mr. Ponsonby said it was a crisis which called -upon the House of Commons to put forth its -penal powers; and that had he a choice between -punishment and pardon, he should prefer punishment, -because the circumstances of the -country imperiously required some solemn example. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Whitbread;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Mr. Whitbread directed the force of -his invective against Marquis Wellesley. “To -Spain,” he said, “he had gone, after delays -which ought to be accounted for; and what -were his services when he got there? Why, he -went through the mummery of dancing on the -French flag! He visited the Junta, went through -all the routine of etiquette and politics, made a -speech about reform, took his glass after dinner, -and religiously toasted the Pope. On his return,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">241</span> -of course, when the places were going, he -came in for his share, and made one of the administration -which the Chancellor of the Exchequer -had at length compiled; but in what -manner had he compiled it? His first application -was to two noble lords, with whose principles -he had been at war all his political life: -they rejected the tender in a manner worthy of -their dignity, and the rebuff which they gave -would have daunted any man of less temerity than -himself. There was not a man, from the Orkneys -to the Land’s End, who did not pronounce -him and his administration weak, incapable, and -insufficient. Even with the addition of the two -colleagues who had deserted them they were -feeble, but they then stood on a principle, or -rather in opposition to a principle; but now, -having been rejected by all who were worthy, -the weak, and old, and infirm, were collected -from the hedges and high roads, and consorted -with for want of better.</p> - -<p>“Let our relative situation with the enemy,” -he pursued, “be well considered! Austria -gone, the French force concentrated, and Spain -their only object. We are told that Portugal -may be defended by 30,000 men; but would -not Buonaparte know our force to a drummer? -and where we had 30,000 he would have three -score. Who would struggle against such fearful -odds? We held our ground in that country -just at the will of the French Emperor, and at -his option he could drive us out of it. And<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">242</span> -what could we expect from our present ministry, -... or rather from a single man, for the -Chancellor of the Exchequer, in fact, stood -alone? Marquis Wellesley, of whom such account -had been made, might be considered as -completely insignificant. Who was he? The -governor of India, ... the man who had scarcely -escaped the censure of that house for his cruel -tyranny! the man who had assailed the press, -that sacred palladium of the people! the friend -of despotism! the foe to liberty! Could this -man say to Buonaparte, in the noble indignation -of insulted virtue, ‘I have not done as you -have!’ Alas! if such a man had strength, he -would indeed be a fearful acquisition to such a -government; but he was known, and therefore -weak and harmless. Peace,” Mr. Whitbread -concluded, “should be the cry of the nation. -Peace, ... particularly because the thraldom -of millions of our fellow-subjects was the tenure -by which this incapable junto held their -offices.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Perceval.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Mr. Perceval replied to this speech in all its -parts. “As to the situation,” he said, “which -he had the honour to hold in his Majesty’s -council, he must state, in the most explicit -manner, that it was not an object of his own -desire; on the contrary, if his wishes had been -realized, another person would then have held -the office of first lord of the treasury. When, -by his Majesty’s directions, he had applied to -Lords Grey and Grenville, for the purpose of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">243</span> -forming an extended administration, the first -proposition which he should have made to them, -if they had given him an opportunity of stating -it, would have been, that it should be left to -themselves to determine who should be the first -lord of the treasury.” This was a confession -of weakness: twelve months before, Mr. Perceval -was strong in the opinion of the people; -but now the deplorable Walcheren expedition -hung about him like a mill-stone, and, even in -his own feelings, weighed him down. Having -said what he could in defence of that expedition, -he rose into a higher strain, when speaking -of the Spaniards, and the unjust and unfeeling -manner in which their conduct had been -represented. “Was it liberal,” he said, “that -the defenders of Zaragoza and Gerona should -be said to have displayed no generosity, no -enthusiasm, no patriotism? Well, indeed, might -those persons censure what was done to aid the -Spanish cause, who could assert that the cause -did not deserve success! But neither in ancient -nor in modern history could an example be -found of a country maintaining a contest like -that which this degraded Spain, and this degraded -Spanish government, had so long supported. -Never, in recent times, had 250,000 -Frenchmen been so long in a country without -subduing it. Spain was not subdued; but what -effect upon the Spaniards such language as had -been used that night might produce, it was impossible -to predict!”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">244</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Vote of thanks to Lord Wellington opposed by the Earl of Suffolk.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>When a vote of thanks to Lord Wellington -was moved in the House of Lords, it was opposed -by the Earl of Suffolk, who argued that -the best mode of assisting Spain was by a floating -force, which might be landed wherever it could -be most useful; by such a mode of warfare, he -said, Gerona, during its long and glorious defence, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Earl Grosvenor;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -might have been relieved. Earl Grosvenor -also opposed the vote, and made some -judicious remarks upon the practice of raising -men to the peerage whose fortunes were not -adequate to support the rank. The ends of -military fame, he said, would be better promoted -if different orders of military merit were -established; the same spirit of valour might be -excited, and all inconveniences to the constitution - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Earl Grey;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -avoided. Earl Grey denied that the -battle of Talavera was a victory; it had been -trumpeted as such, he said, by ministers, but in -so doing they had practised an unworthy deception. -Lord Wellington had betrayed want of -capacity and want of skill: the consequences -had been most disastrous, nor did we yet know -the extent of the evil. One army had been -compelled to retreat into Portugal, where he -feared it was in a very critical situation, and -where, from the unhealthiness of the position -which it occupied, disease had made such an -alarming progress among the troops, that he -believed their numbers did not at that time -exceed 9000 effective men.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Marquis Wellesley;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Marquis Wellesley replied, that he knew the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">245</span> -circumstances which had influenced his brother -in all his movements during the campaign, and -the plain statement of those circumstances -triumphantly vindicated him. “Against strange -mismanagement,” he said, “such unlooked for, -such unaccountable casualties as had occurred -during that campaign, and frustrated a plan so -wisely contrived, no human prudence on Sir -Arthur’s part could provide. Concerning the -necessity of a radical change in the government -of Spain, his opinions,” he continued, “were -not unknown. But it surely was not to be -expected that Spain could reach at once the -vigour of a free government, just emerging as -she was from that dreadful oppression which -had broken down the faculties of her people, ... -from those inveterate habits and ancient prejudices -which had so long contracted her views -and retarded her improvement, and from the -disconnexion and disunion between her different -provinces. The change which was desired -could not be the work of a day. But -were we therefore to desert the Spaniards in -this crisis of their fortunes, and abandon them -to the mercy of their invaders?... As for the -circumstances which attended and followed the -battle of Talavera, nothing more perhaps, in a -military sense, could be said of the result, than -that the British troops had repulsed the attack -of a French army almost double their numbers, -the efforts of which had been chiefly directed -against them. But was there no skill, no<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">246</span> -bravery, no perseverance displayed in the mode -in which that repulse was effected? Did no -glory redound from it to the British arms? -Had it not been acknowledged, even by the -enemy, as the severest check they had yet sustained? -That victory had saved the south of -Spain from absolute destruction, had afforded -time for Portugal to organize her army, and -had enabled Lord Wellington to take a position -where he might derive supplies from Spain, at -the same time that he drew nearer to his own -magazines. He should not attempt to diminish -the disasters which afterwards befel the Spanish -armies; both his noble brother and himself had -earnestly advised them to keep on the defensive; -but, flushed with the victory of Talavera, and -too sanguine of success, they advanced at all -points, and the result had fatally justified the -propriety of the advice which had been given -them. This, however, was not the present subject. -It was enough for him to have shown -that Lord Wellington had arrested the progress -of the French armies into the south of Spain, -and procured a breathing time for Portugal; -that country was placed in a greater degree of -security than at any time since it had been -menaced by France, and such essential improvements -had been introduced into the Portugueze -army, that it would be enabled effectually to -co-operate with the British troops. These advantages -were fairly to be ascribed to Lord -Wellington; and he did not hesitate to say,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">247</span> -that his brother was as justly entitled to every -distinction which his sovereign had conferred, -and to every honour and reward which it was -in the power of that house to bestow, as any -noble lord who for his personal services had -obtained the same distinctions, or who sat there -by descent from his illustrious ancestors.”</p> - -<p>To this temperate and able speech, which -showed that means had been taken with due -foresight, and that with due perseverance there - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Grenville.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -was a well-grounded hope of success, Lord -Grenville replied by arguing from the misconduct -of the Spanish ministers against our own. -“Let the house,” he said, “consider how much -dependence the administration had placed upon -such a government as that of the Spaniards, and -then ask themselves if they could be justified -in supporting them in a continuance of error. -We were now told that reliance was to be -placed upon the co-operation of the Portugueze; -but they ought to judge of the future from the -past, to recollect that for want of co-operation -it had been found necessary to retreat, and that -the remnant of the army was in a situation not -unlike that in which it was placed by its advance -to Talavera.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Feb. 1.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The vote of thanks was opposed in like manner - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>General Tarleton;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -in the House of Commons. General Tarleton -said, that Lord Wellington’s dispatches -were vain-glorious, partial, and incorrect; that -he had been deficient in information concerning -the amount and situation of Soult’s army; and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">248</span> -that he had been compelled to a precipitate -retreat, after abandoning his sick and wounded. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Whitbread.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Mr. Whitbread affirmed, that the battle had -been more a repulse than a victory; nor could -he, he said, withhold a tear, when he thought -of the British blood which had been spilt in -sacrifice to incapacity and folly. The consequence -of the battle was, that the army had no -other retreat than that through Deleitosa, and -their condition during that retreat was such, -that many hundred perished on the road from -famine. The Spanish cause, he concluded, was -now more hopeless than ever. But the motion -received a powerful support from Mr. Windham, -who, setting all party views aside, followed -the feelings of his own generous nature. “The -unproductive consequences of this victory,” he -said, ... “for a victory it was, and a glorious -victory, ... were not to be put in comparison -with the military renown which we had gained. -Ten or fifteen years ago, it was thought on the -continent that we might do something at sea, ... -that an Englishman was a sort of sea-animal; -but our army was considered as nothing. Our -achievements in Egypt first entitled us to the -name of a military power; the battle of Maida -confirmed it; and he would not give the battles -of Vimeiro, Coruña, and Talavera, for a whole -Archipelago of sugar islands.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Pension voted for Lord Wellington. <span class="date">Feb. 16.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The vote was carried in both houses without -a division. But the opposition tried their -strength in the House of Commons upon the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">249</span> -King’s message, recommending that a pension -of 2000<i>l.</i> should be settled upon Lord Wellington, -and the two next heirs to his title in succession. -“With the grant of the peerage,” - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Calcraft;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Mr. Calcraft said, “that house had nothing to -do; he was sorry it had been conferred; but -though there was no remedy for it, the house -ought not to add to it the pension. Pensions -and thanks might be voted, but they could not -permanently blind the country; whatever the -public opinion might be now, it would not be -with ministers upon this subject a month hence, -when the whole fruits of Lord Wellington’s -victories and campaigns would develope themselves -to public view. It was mournful and -alarming to hear that Lord Wellington had said -he could defend Portugal with 50,000 men, -provided 30,000 of them were British; for if -the French were in earnest in their designs upon -that country, before three months Lord Wellington -and his army would be in England. Neither -Portugal nor any other country could be defended -by victories like that of Talavera.”</p> - -<p>It was said by General Craufurd, a peerage -might be an incumbrance to Lord Wellington -without a pension. General Loftus also remarked, -that he had always been one of the -most liberal men in existence, and the state of -his circumstances was therefore, he imagined, -far from sufficient for the support of the dignity - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Opposed by Sir Francis Burdett;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -to which he was elevated. Sir Francis Burdett -took this occasion for touching a popular note.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">250</span> -“If Lord Wellington’s liberality,” he said, -“had brought him into difficulty or debt, who -was it whom they called upon to free him from -the incumbrance? ... the people; ... who already -owed debts enough, not in consequence of any -prodigality of their own, but through the impositions -of their representatives. As to the -military part of the question, he could only say, -that the result was failure, ... failure as complete -as failure could be. But even if the occasion -had been such as to deserve reward, he should -object to making any appeal for that purpose to -the people’s purse. What was become of the -patronage of the government? Where were -the sinecures, which were always defended because -they afforded a fund for such purposes as -these? Yet application was made to the people, -... and this by a government who, while they -perpetually threw the burden upon the people, -had greater means of rewarding merit at their -disposal than all the combined merit of Europe -could possibly exhaust.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Whitbread;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The same strain of argument was pursued by -Mr. Whitbread. “It was often argued,” he -said, “that the expectation of one of those -great places falling in satisfied many a claimant: -if so, why should not Lord Wellington wait for -one of them? It was an important part of the -question, whether, supposing the peerage to -have been merited, the circumstances of the -new peer were such as to require the pension; -for if they were not, it would be a scandalous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">251</span> -waste of the public money. Nor was it necessarily -to follow, that whenever the king was -advised to grant a peerage to any officer, the -House of Commons was bound to vote him a -pension.”</p> - -<p>This produced from Mr. Wellesley Pole a - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Wilberforce;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -statement of his brother’s fortune. Mr. Wilberforce -then appealed to the house, whether, -if Lord Wellington had devoted the great -talents which confessedly belonged to him to -the bar, or to any other liberal pursuit, he would -not have rendered them infinitely more productive -than it appeared that he had done by actively -employing them in the service of his -country? and he protested against the unjust -and impolitic illiberality of opposing such a -grant upon such grounds. The same opinion - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Canning.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -was delivered by Mr. Canning. “The victories -of Lord Wellington,” he said, “had re-established -our military character, and retrieved -the honour of the country, which was before in -abeyance. If the system of bestowing the peerage -was to be entirely changed, and the House -of Lords to be peopled only by the successors -to hereditary honours, Lord Wellington certainly -would not be found there. But he would -not do that noble body the injustice of supposing -that it was a mere stagnant lake of collected -honours: it was to be occasionally refreshed by -fresh streams. It was the prerogative of the -crown to confer the honour of the peerage; it -was the duty of that house to give it honour<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">252</span> -and independence. The question was, whether -they would enable Lord Wellington to take his -seat with the proudest peer in the other house, -or whether they would send him there with the -avowed intention that it was only to the crown -he was to look for support. It was their duty -to take care if the crown made a peer, that it -should not make a generation of peers wholly -dependent on its favour for their support.”</p> - -<p>There was a great majority upon this question, -213 voting for the grant, 106 against it. -But the current of popular opinion in the -metropolis set in with the opposition at this -time; for the Walcheren expedition, like a -pestilential vapour, clouded the whole political - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>The common council petition against the pension.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -horizon. The common council presented a petition -against the pension: a measure so extraordinary, -they said, in the present state of the -country, and under all the afflicting circumstances -attending our armies in Spain and -Portugal under that officer’s command, could -not but prove highly injurious in its consequences, -and no less grievous than irritating -to the nation at large. In the military conduct -of Lord Wellington, the lord mayor and common -council added, they did not recognise -any claims to national remuneration; and they -conceived it to be a high aggravation of the -misconduct of his majesty’s unprincipled and -incapable advisers, that they had, in contempt -and defiance of public opinion, recommended -this grant to parliament. There was neither<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">253</span> -reason nor justice in making it, and therefore -they prayed that it might not pass into a law. -When the second reading was moved, Mr. -Whitbread said he trusted that as this petition -had been presented, the minister would not -press it that day. Mr. Perceval replied he saw -no necessity for any such forbearance, and the -bill passed by a great majority, 106 dividing -against 36.</p> - -<p>In these debates ministers were completely -triumphant. Some of their opponents accused -them of having done too much, others of having -done too little, and some would fain have persuaded -the people of Great Britain, that our -army had obtained no victory at Talavera. -The charge of having taken no measures for -conciliating the Spaniards, by obtaining for -them a restoration of those political rights -which had been so long withheld, was abundantly -disproved by the papers laid before parliament. -There it appeared that Mr. Stuart, -Mr. Frere, and Marquis Wellesley, had each -pressed upon the existing government the necessity -of convoking the Cortes. The great -error which the ministry had committed, was in -their neglect of Catalonia. In the commencement -of the struggle this fault was not imputable -to them, but to the general, who disobeyed -his instructions to convey his army to that most -important scene of operations: the effects of -that fatal error were to a certain extent irremediable; -but no subsequent attempt was made,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">254</span> -and the French were suffered to take fortress -after fortress, without an effort on our part to -relieve them. Still the conduct of administration -toward Spain was far more worthy of commendation -than of censure; if not without error, -if not always successful, it had uniformly been -brave and generous: we had every motive of policy -for assisting the Spaniards in their struggle, -but the assistance was given in a manner worthy -of the nation which gave, and of the noble people -who received it.</p> - -<p>The result of any discussion upon this subject -was anticipated by the public; they, in spite of -the efforts of factious news-writers, and journalists -of higher pretensions, whose want of -feeling was more disgraceful even than their -want of foresight, continued to feel concerning -Spain like freemen and like Englishmen. Nor -was Mr. Windham the only member of opposition -who expressed this sentiment. When in - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Marquis of Lansdown; <br /><span class="date">June 8.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the course of the session the Marquis of Lansdown -moved for a vote of censure upon ministers -for rashness and ignorance, the strong bias -of party spirit did not prevent him from rendering -justice, in some respects, both to his own -countrymen and to Spain. “Whatever he might -think of the policy which led to the battle of -Talavera,” he said, “or of its consequences, he -should ever contemplate the action itself as a -proud monument of glory to the general who -commanded, and to the army who won that -ever-memorable day. No success, he affirmed,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">255</span> -could be expected in Spain under such a government, -or with armies so constituted and -commanded as the Spanish armies, or where -supplies could not be procured; these things -ought to have been known; but these things -were no reflection on the Spanish national character. -The Spaniards had displayed acts of -the most splendid heroism which had ever been -recorded; they had converted the walls of Zaragoza -and Gerona into fortifications almost impregnable. -Their disasters were imputable, not -to the people, but to those who could suppose -that a junta of persons put together in any manner -composed a government, and that a crowd of -men collected in any way was an army. Still he -was ready to confide in the Spanish people, and -to believe that much might yet be done by their -efforts; and he cherished the hope, and would -cherish it to the last, that if ever Europe was -saved, our own country would be an important -agent in that great event. But it was not by -co-operating in rash expeditions with such armies -as that of Cuesta.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Holland;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Lord Holland spoke to the same purport, -while the intent of his speech was to fix a censure -on the ministers. He condemned them -for having sent out Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere -without adequate instructions, particularly with -regard to the most important point, the arrangement -of a system for redressing the grievances -of the Spanish people and restoring their rights. -But on that point the British government was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">256</span> -fully justified. He condemned them also for -neither having sent an adequate force, nor given -proper instructions, nor made adequate provision -for that force which they did send: but the -event had shown, that a larger force had been -sent than could be provided, in the inexperienced -state of our own commissariat, and in the -disordered state of Spain. He said that ministers -ought equally to be condemned by those -who disapproved of our interposing at all in the -affairs of Spain, and by those who were most -interested in the success of the Spaniards: if, -indeed, there was any difference, the friends of -Spain must condemn them most, because they -were peculiarly mortified by the disappointment -of their wishes, a disappointment which the misjudging -policy of these ministers had produced. -He was one who had felt this mortification, for -no event had ever excited a livelier interest in -his mind, not even the dawn of the French -revolution. But having thus spoken to justify -the vote of censure which he was about to give, -Lord Holland argued in defence of the principle -which his own party vehemently and even virulently -opposed. He dwelt upon the importance -of supporting Spain to the utmost, and upon the -perilous facilities which Cadiz and Lisbon would -afford for the invasion of Ireland, if those ports -were suffered to fall into the hands of the French. -If, after all efforts, he said, Spain should ultimately -be subdued, his advice was, that we -should promote the establishment of such a system<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">257</span> -of government in the Spanish colonies as -good statesmen could approve, the only system -which ought to be approved in any country, a -system founded upon the opinions and wishes -of the people.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Marquis Wellesley.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Marquis Wellesley replied to the general attack -which was made upon ministers, in a manner -worthy of his reputation as a statesman. -He pointed out the solid advantages which had -been gained during the last campaign, by securing -Portugal, and giving time for the Portugueze -to form an army, which was now in a -state to co-operate with the British troops; he -showed also what advantages had been gained -to the Spaniards, had the Junta known how to -profit by them, or followed the advice which -both he himself and Lord Wellington had pressed -upon them in vain. Then, in a clear and masterly -manner, he enforced the duty and necessity -of supporting the cause of Spain. “Justly,” -he said, “had it been stated by the noble Marquis, -that if ever Europe was to be delivered, -England must be the great agent in her deliverance; -and justly he might have added, that -the fairest opportunity for effecting that deliverance -opened, when Spain magnanimously rose -to resist the most flagrant usurpation of which -history records an example. Not only were we -called upon by the splendour, the glory, the -majesty of the Spanish cause, to lend our aid; -a principle of self-preservation called upon us -also: these efforts on the part of Spain afforded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">258</span> -us the best chance of providing for our own security, -by keeping out of the hands of France -the naval means of Spain, which Buonaparte was -so eager to grasp, knowing they were the most -effectual weapons he could wield against the -prosperity and the power of Great Britain. The -views of Buonaparte, in his endeavours to subjugate -Spain, were obvious, even to superficial -observers. The old government had placed at -his disposal the resources of that country, but -the old government was feeble and effete; and, -however subservient to his will, he knew it was -an instrument which he could not pitch to the -tone of his designs. He therefore resolved to -seize upon the whole Peninsula, and to establish -in it a government of his own. He may have -been prompted to this partly by his hatred to -the Bourbon race, partly by the cravings of an -insatiable ambition, partly by the vain desire of -spreading his dynasty over Europe, partly by -mere vanity: but his main object was, that he -might wield with new vigour the naval and colonial -resources of Spain, to the detriment of -Great Britain. This alone could suit the vastness -of his designs; this alone could promise to -gratify his mortal hatred of the British name. By -the entire subjugation of the Peninsula, and the -full possession of its resources, he knew that he -should be best enabled to sap the fundamental -security of these kingdoms. Therefore how -highly important was it to keep alive there a -spirit of resistance to France! There were no<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">259</span> -means, however unprincipled, which Buonaparte -would scruple to employ for the attainment of -his ends. To him force and fraud were alike, ... -force, that would stoop to all the base artifices -of fraud, ... fraud, that would come armed with -all the fierce violence of force. Every thing -which the head of such a man could contrive, -or the arm execute, would be combined and -concentrated into one vast effort, and that effort -would be strained for the humiliation and destruction -of this country. Universal dominion -is, and will continue to be, the aim of all French -governments; but it is pre-eminently the object -to which such a mind as Buonaparte’s -will aspire. England alone stands in the way -of the accomplishment of that design, and England -he has therefore resolved to strike down -and extirpate. How then were these daring -projects to be met? How, but by cherishing, -wherever it may be found, but particularly in -the Peninsula, the spirit of resistance to the -usurpations of France? If we have saved the -navy of Portugal; if we have saved the Spanish -ships at Ferrol; if we have enabled the Portugueze -government to migrate to their colonies; -if we have succeeded in yet securing the naval -and colonial resources both of Portugal and -Spain; how have these important objects been -achieved, but by fomenting in both these kingdoms -a spirit of resistance to the overwhelming -ambition of Buonaparte? To this end must all -our efforts be now directed. This is the only<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">260</span> -engine which now remains for us to work in -opposition to Buonaparte’s gigantic designs. -Why then should we depart from that salutary -line of policy? what is there to dissuade or discourage -us from adhering to it? I can discover -nothing in the aspect of Spanish affairs that -wears any thing like the hue and complexion of -despair. If, indeed, it had appeared that this -spirit began to languish in the breast of the -Spaniards, if miscarriages, disasters, and defeats -had been observed to damp the ardour and break -down the energies of the Spanish mind, then -might it be believed that further assistance to -the Spanish cause would prove unavailing. But, -fortunately for this country, not only is there -life still in Spain, but her patriotic heart still -continues to beat high: the generous and exalted -sentiment, which first prompted us to lend -our aid to the cause of Spain, should therefore -be still maintained in full force, and should still -inspirit us to continue that aid to the last moment -of her resistance. The struggle in which -Spain is now engaged is not merely a Spanish -struggle. In that struggle are committed the -best, the very vital interests of England. With -the fate of Spain the fate of England is now -inseparably blended. Should we not therefore -stand by her to the last? For my part, my -lords, as an adviser of the crown, I shall not -cease to recommend to my sovereign to continue -to assist Spain to the latest moment of her resistance. -It should not dishearten us that Spain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">261</span> -appears to be in the very crisis of her fate; we -should, on the contrary, extend a more anxious -care over her at a moment so critical. For in -nations, and above all in Spain, how often have -the apparent symptoms of dissolution been the -presages of new life, and of renovated vigour? -Therefore, I would cling to Spain in her last -struggle; therefore, I would watch her last -agonies, I would wash and heal her wounds, I -would receive her parting breath, I would catch -and cherish the last vital spark of her expiring -patriotism. Nor let this be deemed a mere -office of pious charity; nor an exaggerated representation -of my feelings; nor an overcharged -picture of the circumstances that call them forth. -In the cause of Spain, the cause of honour and -of interest is equally involved and inseparably -allied. It is a cause in favour of which the finest -feelings of the heart unite with the soundest dictates -of the understanding.”</p> - -<p>Full use was made of these debates by the -French government, which was at this time -employing every artifice for making the people -believe that Great Britain was on the brink of -ruin. The King’s speech, as usual, was falsified, -and sent abroad. There it was said, that whatever -temporary and partial inconveniences might -have resulted from the measures which were -directed by France against our trade and revenue, -the great source of our prosperity and strength, -those measures had wholly failed of producing -any general effect. The official French paper<span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">262</span> -substituted for these words a sentence, in which -the King was made to tell his parliament, they -must be aware that the measures adopted by -France to dry up the great sources of our prosperity -had been to a certain degree efficient. -It was said that we were not merely on the verge -of national bankruptcy, but actually suffering -under all the horrors of famine; that our crops -of every kind had failed; we were obliged to -feed our cattle with sugar and molasses, and had -nothing but sugar, cocoa, and coffee, and the -skin and bones of these cattle for ourselves. To -a certain degree, Buonaparte and his journalists -may have perhaps believed the falsehoods which -they circulated; they read in our factious newspapers -of decaying trade, diminished resources, -and starving manufacturers; and the opposition -told them, that France was certain of success in -whatever she attempted on the Continent; that -the cause of Spain was hopeless; that it was -impossible for us to carry on the war; that if -we did not grant the Roman Catholics all that -they demanded, Ireland would be lost, and the -loss of Ireland would draw after it the downfal -of the British empire. Speeches of this tenour -were carefully translated for the use of the Emperor’s -subjects, and circulated throughout the -Continent: but when the French saw it asserted, -upon the authority of English members of parliament, -that the Spaniards and Portugueze had -nothing worth fighting for; that they were -inimical in their hearts to England; that Buonaparte<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">263</span> -was reforming the abuses of their old -government, and redressing their grievances; -when they saw it affirmed in the English House -of Commons, that the people of Spain must know -Marquis Wellesley would, if opportunity should -offer, take both Spain and Portugal as Buonaparte -had done; when they saw the same persons who -represented Sir John Moore as a consummate -general vilify the talents of Lord Wellington, -deny his merits, oppose the rewards which were -so justly conferred on him, and maintain, in the -face of their insulted country, that the British -army had gained no victory at Talavera; it -appeared to them impossible that language, at -once so false, so absurd, and so co-operative with -the designs of France, could have been uttered -by an English tongue; such speeches were supposed -to have been invented in France, and -they attributed to the artifices of their own -government what were in reality the genuine -effusions of perverse minds, irritable tempers, -and disappointed faction.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">264</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XXVIII">CHAPTER XXVIII.<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE FRENCH ENTER ANDALUSIA. DISSOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA AND -APPOINTMENT OF A REGENCY. ALBURQUERQUE’S RETREAT.</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Supineness of the Central Junta.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> Central Junta manifested none of that -energy after the rout at Ocaña which they had -so successfully exerted after the battle of -Medellin. The whole extent, not of the loss -alone, but of the danger also, had then been -fairly stated, and bravely regarded. The danger -was more immediate now; so imminent indeed, -that it was scarcely possible they should have -deceived themselves with any expectation of -seeing it averted; but they did not venture to -proclaim the whole truth, and call forth in the -southern provinces a spirit like that which the -Catalans displayed, and which might have made -their cities and strong places emulate Zaragoza -and Gerona. Instead of this, they suffered a -fallacious hope to be held out, that if the enemy -should enter the kingdoms of the south, the -passes would be occupied behind them; the -Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque would -hasten to the scene of action, and another day -like that of Baylen might be expected. Fuller -accounts were given in the official gazette of an -affair of guerillas than of the battle of Ocaña;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">265</span> -and details were published of their victory at -Tamames, after the army by which it was gained -had been routed at Alba de Tormes.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>General discontent.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>They obtained a few addresses thanking them -for having convoked the Cortes, which, it was -said, would like an elixir of life revivify the -social body to its very extremities, and congratulating -them upon their triumph over internal -divisions, and over those who would hastily and -inopportunely have established a regency. But -their enemies were more active than their friends, -or rather than their dependants, for other friends -they had none; and their congratulations were -as premature as their triumph was short-lived. -Romana’s declaration against them was not the -only symptom that they had lost the confidence -of the army as well as of the people. The Conde -de Noroña being at this time removed from the -command in Galicia, addressed a proclamation -to the Galicians, telling them the country was -in danger, and that for his part he had given up -all dependence upon the existing government. -His repeated applications for money and arms -had never obtained the slightest notice, and -seemed rather to have given offence. Under -such circumstances it remained for them to act -for themselves, and he advised them to form a -separate Junta for their own kingdom, and be -governed by it. A similar disposition prevailed -in many of the provinces, and Spain seemed on -the point of relapsing into that state from which -the formation of the Central Junta had delivered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">266</span> -it. They were saved from it only by the progress -of the enemy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Romana refuses the command.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>So effectually were the Junta humbled, that -they requested Romana would repair to Carolina, -where the wreck of Areizaga’s army was -collecting, and offered him full powers for whatever -measures he might think necessary. But -Romana was too much disgusted with the -government to serve under them, and saw the -consequences too clearly to place himself in a -responsible situation where failure was certain. -They then recalled Blake from Catalonia, where -ill fortune had made him unpopular, appointing -O’Donnell, in whom the soldiers and the people -had great confidence, to succeed him; but this -removal could not be effected in time; Castaños -was not called upon, perhaps from a sense of the -injustice with which he had been treated; and -Areizaga was thus left in the command, neither -to the satisfaction of the troops, the people, or -himself, for he had now a full consciousness of -his weakness, his danger, and his incapacity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Montijo and D. Fr. Palafox imprisoned.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The government for its own safety had found -it necessary to imprison Montijo and D. Francisco -Palafox, and they had removed the most -formidable person for popular talents in the -Seville Junta, by sending Padre Gil on a mission -to Sicily. That Junta, however, was busily at -work, though the better members took no part -in its intrigues; and the efforts which should -have been made for organizing a civic and national -resistance, the spirit and disposition for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">267</span> -which were not wanting, were employed in -exciting resentment against the government. -This temper was not mitigated by some financial -measures, which were of a nature rather to -betray its weakness than show its resources. -Half the plate and jewels of every family and -individual was called for, as a forced loan; and -a heavy tax, in the form of a license, imposed -upon every one who kept a carriage of any kind, -the license being granted to those only whose -profession or whose infirmities rendered it necessary. -All funds which had been bequeathed or -appropriated to pious purposes were for the -present to be taken for war expenses, those of -hospitals and public schools alone excepted; -vacant <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">encomiendas</i> and vacancies in the military -orders were not to be filled up, that the revenues -might be made available for the same emergency; -and a scale was formed for reducing the pay of -all persons in the public service, soldiers who -were actually employed alone excepted. These -measures, which disappointed some in their expectations, -and bore heavily upon the scanty -means of others, produced more discontent than -relief.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Attempts to excite a false confidence.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Junta could at this time have had no -reasonable hope of preventing the French from -entering Andalusia. They could have no -reliance upon the remains of Areizaga’s army, -for the most mournful circumstances attending -such battles as that of Ocaña is, that the worst -men escape, and that the best and steadiest are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">268</span> -those who fall. Parque’s force was not so -completely broken up; it had lost more in -reputation than in actual strength, but its -strength was comparatively small, and it was -at a distance. What reliance they had was -upon Alburquerque’s corps, which consisted of -only 12,000 men; ... his head-quarters were at -Don Benito, having 2000 men at Truxillo, -and some advanced parties upon the Tagus. -But their immediate danger was not from the -side of Extremadura, and what was such a -corps against the armies which the French -would now bring into the field! Fallacious -statements were circulated to make the Andalusians -rely upon the strength of the passes, -and the measures which had been taken for -defending them. It was affirmed that Areizaga -had been joined by considerable reinforcements, -and abundantly supplied with means of -every kind; that his army had been re-organized; -that that general, who had gained the confidence -of the nation, would soon be at the head of its -four divisions; and that the works in the -passes were such, that all the force which Napoleon -might send against them would be unable -to effect their way.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Schemes of Count Tilly.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Such statements, which could only deceive -the people into a false security, may very -possibly have been designed for that effect by -some of those agents of the government, who -were now looking to obtain favour with the -Intruder, The members of the Junta themselves<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">269</span> -stand clearly acquitted of any such intention. -One of them, and only one, had at this time -his own projects in view, and they were not so -much those of a traitor, as of a desperate adventurer, -in the delirium of revolutionary ambition. -This was the Conde de Tilly, a man equally -destitute of principle and of character, and who, -as sometimes happens in the crooked paths of -political expediency, had been promoted from -the provincial to the Central Junta, because -such promotion was the readiest means of -removing him from a situation which he disgraced! -This man, being destitute of any -private worth and of all national feeling, could -have no hope for his country; and finding -no farther hope there for himself, he had turned -his thoughts toward the colonies. His plan -was to get four or five thousand troops at his -disposal, and when the crisis which he foresaw -should arrive, seize what money there might -be in the treasury, hasten to Cadiz, take possession -of the ships there, sail for Mexico, and -there establish himself at the head of an independent -government. The difficulties which -he might find from the British squadron at his -outset, or the Mexicans on his arrival, were -overlooked in this frantic scheme. A few days -before the battle of Ocaña he opened it to a -general officer, whom he wished to engage in -the project; that officer informed Castaños, -who was then residing at Algeziras, and to -whom those persons who saw that some change<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">270</span> -in the executive government must soon take -place, were looking as one in whom the nation -might confide. The adventurer was arrested -in consequence, and died not long afterwards -a prisoner in one of the castles at Cadiz.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Junta announce their intention to remove.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>At the commencement of Areizaga’s unhappy -operations, the Junta and the general had -encouraged each other in a delusion so unreasonable -that it might almost be called insane. -But now if it had been possible for the government, -after the experience of Somosierra, to -deceive itself concerning the strength of the -passes, and the reliance which might be placed -upon them, their commander would have -awakened them from that dream. Areizaga -had lost his presumption at Ocaña, and was -prepared for defeat before he was attacked. -He made known his utter hopelessness to the -Junta, and by sending away great part of his -stores, for the purpose of securing them, betrayed -it also to the army and to the people. -In their former danger, after the battle of -Medellin, the Junta had declared that they -would never change their place of residence -till some peril or public reason rendered their -removal necessary; that in such case of emergency -they would make their intention known, -would remove to the situation where they could -with most advantage attend to the defence of -the country, and would never abandon the -continent of Spain while there was one spot -in it which they could maintain against the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">271</span> -invaders. It was debated now whether they -should act in conformity to this declaration. -The intention of such a removal had been -indicated when the Isle of Leon was named -as the place where the Cortes were to assemble; -and there were some members who objected -to an earlier removal, on the ground that it -would greatly increase the general alarm. But -the majority rightly perceived that the danger -was close at hand, and therefore that no time -was to be lost. They did not, however, venture -openly to state the true and obvious motives for -this resolution when they announced it to the -public. The Isle of Leon, they said, was the -fittest place for the Cortes to hold its sittings, -because there were buildings there applicable -to the purpose; from thence their decrees could -be communicated to every part of the Peninsula, -whatever might be the vicissitudes of war; -and there they might devote themselves to -their arduous functions with perfect tranquillity, -which was hardly attainable amid the -distractions of a great city. But this having -been determined, the Junta found itself in the -predicament provided for by a decree of the -preceding year, wherein it had been declared, -that at whatever place the representatives of -the nation should be convoked, to that place -the government must remove its seat. They -gave notice, therefore, that on the first of -February they should meet in the Isle of Leon;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">272</span> -and they made immediate preparations for the -removal.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Murmurs at Seville.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The people of Seville could not but perceive -that their city was to be abandoned to the -enemy; this was obvious. What other designs -the members of the Junta might have formed, -every one guessed, according as he suspected -or despised this unfortunate administration. -Some said they were sold to the French, and -the Junta were only pretending to fly, that they -might deceive other provinces with a show of -patriotism, and sell them as they had sold -Andalusia. Others acquitted them of treason, -to fix upon them the charge of peculation: -a few of the members, they said, were, for their -known virtue and talents, entitled to the love -of their countrymen; the rest were a sordid -race, who, having appropriated to themselves -the free gifts which had been contributed for -the use of the army, while they left the soldiers -to perish for want of food and clothing, were -now about to fly to England or to the Canaries, -and there enjoy in safety the riches of which -they had defrauded their brethren and their -country. Those persons who could command -the means of removal hastened to secure themselves -in the sea-ports; others, whose fortunes -rooted them to the spot, and who were thus -compelled to share its fate, or whose bolder -spirits were impatient of flight or of submission, -joined in imprecations upon the government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">273</span> -by which they believed themselves to have -been sacrificed; ... whether the cause had been -guilt or imbecility, the effect to them and to -the country was the same.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />January.</span><br />Invasion of Andalusia.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The preparations of the French having now -been completed, the Intruder put himself at -the head of the French army, and advanced to -take possession of the kingdoms of Andalusia. -The actual command was vested in Marshal -Soult, having Victor, Mortier, and Sebastiani -under him. The Intruder was accompanied by -Azanza, O’Farrell, and other of his ministers, -who, believing that Spain was now conquered, -and that Great Britain must withdraw from a -contest which it was impossible she could maintain, -were confirmed in that opinion<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> by the -speeches of the opposition in the British parliament, -and by the authority of certain English -newspapers. The French, to exaggerate their -easy triumph, affirmed that the Spanish general, -confiding in the entrenchments which he had -thrown up at the entrance of the defile, in the -cuts which had been made in the roads, and the -mines which had been dug at the brink of the -precipices, considered his position impregnable. -But Areizaga had not been more censurable at -Ocaña for rashness than he was now for the total -want of that confidence with which he was thus -reproached. Had he known how to have excited -in his men either the hope or the despair<span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">274</span> -of enthusiastic devotion to their country and -their cause, the strength of the position would -have afforded him such advantages, that the -enemy must have sought some other entrance -into Andalusia. There was no attempt at this; -the remembrance of his former defeat acted both -upon him and his soldiers, and the Sierra Morena -was defended no better than the Somosierra had -been. The men gave way at every point, with -scarcely a show of resistance, because they saw, -by the conduct of their general, that it was not -expected they should stand their ground. One -division took flight at Navas de Tolosa, where -one of the most celebrated victories in Spanish -history had been gained over the Moors. The -operations began on the 20th of January, and -the Intruder’s head-quarters were established -the next day at Baylen, a name of which the -French reminded the Spaniards now with bitter -exultation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>False hopes held out to the people by the Central Junta.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>On the same day, the Junta informed the -people of Seville that the pass of Almaden had -been forced; but the danger, they said, was not -so great as terror might perhaps represent it. -The division stationed there, having been far too -weak for maintaining the post, was gone to join -Alburquerque, who threatened the flank of the -enemy; the Duke del Parque was advancing -by rapid marches; their junction would form an -army superior to the French force at Almaden, -which would thus be checked in its career, or -driven back; while Areizaga’s army occupied<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">275</span> -the other passes, and was ready to hasten to the -defence of Seville, whither also the two dukes -would repair in case of necessity. This, they -said, was the true state of things, which the -government had neither exaggerated nor dissembled. -They had issued orders for marching -off all the men in arms who could be collected -to join the armies, and for supplying them; and -they called upon the people of this capital to lay -aside all terror, to suffer no confusion or tumult, -but to display the same courage and calmness -which they had so honourably manifested in -times of greater danger. For the French, they -said, depended more upon the distrust and disunion -which they hoped to create than upon -their own strength.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Instructions to Alburquerque.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>While the Junta thus admonished the people -to be calm, they themselves were bewildered by -the danger which pressed upon them. The series -of their instructions to Alburquerque, from the -time when they first clearly saw that Andalusia -was seriously threatened, exhibits their incapacity -and their wavering councils in the most extraordinary -manner. A month before the attack -was made, Alburquerque warned them that the -pass of Almaden was threatened, and explaining -in what manner such a movement on the part of -the enemy would threaten his own position, observed -how expedient it was to call his troops -from Truxillo and the advanced posts upon the -Tagus. Their answer was, that if the enemy -made the movement which he apprehended,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">276</span> -he must endeavour to prevent them, by taking -a good position, where he might fight them to -advantage; meantime the force at Truxillo must -not be lessened, and he must not forget to leave -a competent garrison in Badajoz. By another -dispatch they enjoined him to act offensively -and with energy, to destroy the plans of the -French for penetrating by the road of La Plata. -Another ordered him to hold himself ready for -marching as soon as he should receive instructions; -and had he been a man of less decision, -it would thus have suspended his movements till -those instructions arrived. His army was thus -upon the Guadiana when the passes were forced, -and the enemy moved a column along the road -of La Plata, to occupy Guadalcanal, and thus -prevent him from entering Andalusia. This -purpose Alburquerque understood, and made his -own movements so judiciously, that when they -expected to take easy possession of Guadalcanal, -they found him there with the main body of his -infantry, while the horse escorted his artillery -to St. Olalla and Ronquillo; and thus the whole -army was ready to move wherever its services -were required. Here he received those instructions -for which he had been too zealous and too -good an officer to wait. They directed him to -approach the enemy as near as possible, to oppose -them if they attempted to enter Andalusia, -and if they should retreat upon La Mancha, to -harass them as much as possible; for it appears -that the Junta even indulged this hope. Alburquerque<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">277</span> -informed them, that an army, consisting -of 8000 disposable men and 600 horse, could -not approach very near to watch the movements -of a hostile force, more than three-fold its own -number; if he added to his own little division -that which was destined to garrison Badajoz, -which had at this time scarcely 400 effective -men, it would only increase his own troops to -11,700, which would still be insufficient either -to occupy the line of defence, which they instructed -him to take up, or to observe the enemy -with any hope of impeding them: nevertheless -he would do all that was possible. On the 21st -the Junta ordered him to march immediately -for Cordoba, in consequence of the enemy’s -having occupied the pass called Puerto del Rey; -the next morning they summoned him to Seville, -by the shortest route, and with the utmost expedition; -before night they changed their purpose, -and sent off another express, ordering him - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Manifesto del Duque de Alburquerque, 45–70.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -to Cordoba. This vacillation was imputed to -treason, especially as the war-minister, D. Antonio -Cornel, had long been suspected by the -people. Certain it is, that if Alburquerque had -obeyed these orders, his own army must have -been cut off, and Cadiz would inevitably have -been taken by the enemy, according to their aim -and expectation: but the error of the Junta is -sufficiently accounted for by their incapacity and -their alarm.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Insurrection at Seville against the Central Junta.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The termination of their power was at hand. -When this last order was expedited to Alburquerque,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">278</span> -every hour brought fresh tidings of the -progress of the enemy, the murmurs of the -people becoming louder as their agitation increased, -and their danger appeared more imminent. -The Junta were hastening their departure -for Cadiz; their equipages were conveyed -to the quays, and the papers from the public -offices were embarked on the Guadalquiver. -This alone would have made the populace apprehend -the real state of things, even if it had -been possible to keep them in ignorance of the -disasters which so many breathless couriers announced. -During the nights of the 22d and -23d the patroles were doubled; no disturbance, -however, took place; the agents of Montijo and -Francisco Palafox were preparing to strike an -effectual blow, and carefully prevented a premature -explosion. On the morning of the 24th the -people assembled in the square of St. Francisco, -and in front of the Alcazar; some demanded -that the Central Junta should be deposed; -others, more violent in their rage, cried out, that -they should be put to death; but the universal -cry was, that the city should be defended; and -they took arms tumultuously, forbade all persons -to leave the city, and patrolled the streets in -numerous small parties to see that this prohibition -was observed. The tumult began at eight -in the morning, and in the course of two hours -became general: they who secretly directed it, -cried out that the Junta of Seville should assume -the government, went to the Carthusian convent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">279</span> -in which Montijo and Francisco Palafox -were confined, delivered them, and by acclamation -called on Saavedra to take upon himself -the direction of public affairs in this emergency.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Saavedra takes upon himself the temporary authority.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>D. Francisco Saavedra, at that time minister -of finance and president of the Junta of Seville, -was a man of great ability and high character; -but he was advanced in years, and it was believed -that poison had been administered to him, -at the instigation of Godoy, which had in some -degree affected his intellects. Whatever foundation -there may have been for this belief, he -betrayed no want either of intellect or of exertion -on this occasion; he calmed the people by -consenting to exercise the authority with which -they invested him; assembled the members of -the provincial Junta; issued a proclamation -enjoining the Sevillians to remain tranquil; and -by making new appointments, and dispatching -new orders to the armies, satisfied the populace -for the time. Montijo left the city to assist in -collecting the scattered troops; and Romana -was re-nominated to that army from which the -Central Junta had removed him. The people, -however, called upon Romana to take upon -himself the defence of the city, and stopped his -horses at the gate; but Romana evaded the -multitude, and hastened towards Badajoz to secure -that important fortress, as the best service -which he could then perform.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French enter Seville.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Every thing was in confusion now. The -Central Junta were hastening how they could<span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">280</span> -to Cadiz. Saavedra with five other members of - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Jovellanos, p. 13. § 6.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the Seville Junta took the same course, separating -themselves from their unworthy colleagues, -some of whom, they now perceived, were corrupted -by the enemy, and others betrayed by -their selfishness and their fears. These persons -remained to receive their reward from the intrusive -government, or make their terms with -it; and Seville, in spite of the disposition of its -inhabitants, received the yoke like Madrid. This -had been foreseen, and the Central Junta had -been urged to break up the cannon foundry, and -destroy the stores which they could not remove; -but every thing was left to the French. The - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>They overrun Andalusia.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -virtue indeed which had been displayed at Zaragoza -and Gerona appeared the more remarkable -when it was seen how ignobly the Andalusian -cities submitted to the invaders, who sent -off their detachments in all directions, not so -much to conquer the country, as to take possession -of it. Jaen, which had boasted of its -preparations for defence, where six-and-forty -pieces of cannon had been mounted, and military -stores laid in to resist a siege, submitted as -tamely as the most defenceless village. Granada, -also, where a crusade had been preached, -was entered without resistance by Sebastiani. -The people of Alhama were the first who opposed -the enemy; their town, which had only -the ruins of Moorish works to protect it, was -carried by storm; and Sebastiani fought his -way from Antequera to Malaga through armed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">281</span> -citizens and peasantry, headed by priests and -monks. The French say that this insurrection, -as they called it, put on an alarming appearance; -and it is evident, from the struggle made in -this quarter by a hasty and undisciplined multitude, -that if the provincial authorities had displayed -common prudence in preparing for the -invasion, and common spirit in resisting it, Andalusia -might have proved the grave of the -invaders. While Sebastiani thus overran Granada, -Mortier was detached on the other hand -to occupy Extremadura, which it was thought -was left exposed by the retreat of the English; -but Alburquerque, disobeying the express commands -of the government, had garrisoned Badajoz, -Romana had repaired in time to that -fortress, and the designs and expectations of -the enemy in that important quarter were effectually -baffled.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French push for Cadiz.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>This was not their only disappointment. The -possession of the country, and all the open -towns, was of little importance when compared -with that of Cadiz. If it were possible that the -fate of Spain could depend upon any single -event, that event would have been the capture -of Cadiz at this time; and the French therefore -pushed on for it with even more than their accustomed -rapidity. The city was utterly unprepared -for an attack: there were not a thousand -troops in the Isle of Leon, and not volunteers -enough to man the works; the battery of -St. Fernando, one of its main bulwarks of defence,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">282</span> -was unfinished. While the scene of -action was at a distance, the people of Cadiz -thought the danger was remote also; and but -for the genius and decision of a single man, -Buonaparte might have executed his threat of -taking vengeance there for the loss of his squadron.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Alburquerque’s movements.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>At four on the morning of the 24th Alburquerque -received that dispatch from the Central -Junta, which, countermanding his march to -Seville, ordered him to make for Cordoba. A -counter-order of some kind he seems to have -expected; for, in acknowledging this dispatch, -he expressed his satisfaction that he had not -commenced his movements according to the -instructions received the preceding night, in -which case he must have had the inconvenience -of a counter-march; at the same time he said, -that the troops which he had directed to garrison -Badajoz, and which he was now ordered -to recall, could not join him without great -danger, and without leaving that place defenceless, -... a point of such importance, that though -these orders were positive, he would not obey -them unless they were repeated. At this time -he was at Pedroso de la Sierra, whither he had -advanced from Guadalcanal, pursuant to the -first instructions, requiring him to move upon -Cordoba. There was the Guadalquivir to cross, -and Alburquerque, not being certain that his -artillery could pass the bridge of Triana, determined -to have it ferried over at Cantillana. He<span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">283</span> -was near that ferry when the last dispatches -reached him, written on the 23d, and repeating -the order to march towards Cordoba: but Alburquerque -at this time knew that the Junta -were flying from Seville, though they had given -him no intimation of their design, and knew -also that Cordoba must then be in the enemy’s -possession. He did not therefore hesitate for -a moment to disobey orders, which must have -led to the destruction of his army, ... an army, -in the fate of which, inconsiderable as it was, -the fate of Spain was more essentially involved, -than in that of any which she had yet sent into -the field. Having crossed at Cantillana, he -made the main body proceed to Carmona, while -he himself, with part of his little cavalry, advanced -towards Ecija, where the French had -already arrived, to ascertain their movements, -and if possible alarm them by his own, and -make them suppose that his army covered Seville: -but the French general, as well as Alburquerque, -was aware that Seville was a point of -far inferior importance to that upon which the -invaders had fixed their attention; and the -enemy were now pushing on the chief part of -their force by El Arahal and Moron to Utrera, -in order to cut off the Duke from Cadiz. The -least delay or indecision, from the moment he -began his march, would have proved fatal. Instantly -perceiving their object, he ordered his -troops to make for Utrera, where his artillery -and cavalry arrived almost at the same time<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">284</span> -with the French; from thence he marched with -the infantry by Las Cabezas to Lebrija, across -the marsh, at a season when it was deemed impracticable; -thus enabling it to reach Xerez in -time, while the cavalry accompanied the artillery -along the high road, skirmishing as it retreated, -delaying the pursuers, and sacrificing itself for -the preservation of the rest of the army and of -Cadiz. On the night of the 30th he performed -this march from Utrera to Lebrija; and on the -same night the people of Cadiz were relieved by -an express from him, saying, that he was between -them and the French, and should reach - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Cadiz saved by Alburquerque.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the city in time to save it. The following morning -he arrived at Xerez, having gained a day’s -march upon the enemy: they found themselves -outstript in rapidity, and outmanœuvred; and -on the morning of the 2d of February, Alburquerque, -with his 8000 men, entered the Isle of -Leon, having accomplished a march of sixty-five -leagues, 260 English miles. Thus Cadiz -was saved.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>He is appointed governor of Cadiz by the people.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Yet the means of defence had been so scandalously -neglected, that the Isle of Leon must -have been lost if the French had ventured to -make a spirited attack upon it; and Cadiz would -then speedily have shared the same fate. In -general, the French calculate with sufficient -confidence upon the errors of their enemies, ... -a confidence which has rarely deceived them in -the field, and has almost invariably succeeded -in negotiation. Here, however, they did not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">285</span> -think it possible that works so essential to the -salvation of the government should have been -left unfinished; and, knowing that the troops -were under a man whom they trusted and loved, -they knew that, naked, and exhausted, and -half-starved as those troops were, behind walls -and ramparts, they would prove desperate opponents. -Having saved this all-important place -by his presence, the Duke lost no time in -securing it; he exerted himself night and day: -the people, he says, when they are guided by -their first feelings, usually see things as they -are; they blessed him as their preserver, and he -was appointed governor by acclamation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>A Junta, elected at Cadiz.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>While Alburquerque was on his march, a -change in the government had been effected. -Venegas had been appointed governor of Cadiz -by the Central Junta, apparently in reward for -that blind obedience to their instructions, which, -more than any other circumstance, frustrated -Sir Arthur Wellesley’s victory. Both Mr. Frere -and the British general distrusted his military -talents. The people of Cadiz, with less justice, -suspected his fidelity, and he was not without -fear that he might become the victim of suspicion -in some fit of popular fury. His danger -became greater as soon as it was known that -the Central Junta had been deposed at Seville, -and were flying in various directions; but Venegas, -with prudent foresight, went to the Cabildo, -and, saying that the government from which he -had received his appointment existed no longer,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">286</span> -resigned his command into their hands, and -offered to perform any duty to which they should -appoint him. This well-timed submission had -all the effect which he could wish; the Cabildo -were flattered by it, the more, because such -deference of the military to the civil authority -was altogether unprecedented in that country; -and they requested him to continue in his post, -and act as their president, till a Junta could be -elected for the government of the town. Measures -were immediately taken for choosing this -Junta, and the election was made in the fairest -manner. A balloting-box was carried from house -to house; the head of every family voted for an -electoral body; and this body, consisting of -about threescore persons, then elected the Junta, -who were eighteen in number. A mode of -election so perfectly free and unobjectionable -gave to the Junta of Cadiz a proportionate -influence over the people; but they themselves, -proud of being, as they imagined, the only -legally-constituted body in Spain, became immediately -jealous of their power, and hostile to -the establishment of any other.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Resignation of the Central Junta.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>It was, however, essential to the salvation of -the country that some government should be -established, which would be recognized by the -whole of Spain. The members of the Central -Junta, who had arrived in the Isle of Leon, -would fain have continued their functions; they -found it vain to attempt this, and then, yielding -to necessity, they suffered themselves to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">287</span> -guided by Jovellanos, who represented to them -the necessity of appointing a regency, not including -any individual of their own body. Mr. -Frere, acting as British minister till Marquis -Wellesley’s successor should arrive, exerted that -influence which he so deservedly possessed, first -to enforce the advice of Jovellanos upon his -colleagues, and afterwards to make the Junta of -Cadiz assent to the only measure which could -preserve their country from anarchy; but so -little were they disposed to acknowledge any -authority except their own, that, unless the -whole influence of the British minister had been -zealously exerted, their acquiescence would not -have been obtained. The Archbishop of Laodicea, -who was president of the Central Junta, -the Conde de Altamira, Valdes, and Ovalle, had -been seized at Xerez, and were in imminent -danger from the blind fury of the populace, if -some resolute men had not come forward and -saved them, by persuading the mob to put them -under custody in the Carthusian convent, as -prisoners of state. They were indebted for their -liberation to Castaños, who in this time of danger -had hastened to the Isle of Leon, and took measures -for having them safely conducted thither. -Their arrival made the number of members -three-and-twenty; and on the 29th of January -this government issued its last decree. Voluntarily -they cannot be said to have laid down -their power, but the same presiding mind which -pervaded their former writings made them resign<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">288</span> -it with dignity. “Having,” they said, “reassembled -in the Isle of Leon, pursuant to their -decree of the 13th, the dangers of the state were -greatly augmented, although less by the progress -of the enemy than by internal convulsions. The -change of government which they themselves -had announced, but had reserved for the Cortes -to effect, could no longer be deferred without -mortal danger to the country. But that change -must not be the act of a single body, a single -place, or a single individual; for in such case, -that which ought to be the work of prudence -and of the law, would be the work of agitation -and tumult; and a faction would do that, which -ought only to be done by the whole nation, or -by a body lawfully representing it. The fatal -consequences which must result from such disorder -were apparent; there was no wise citizen -who did not perceive, no Frenchman who did -not wish for them. If the urgency of present -calamities, and the public opinion which was -governed by them, required the immediate -establishment of a Council of Regency, the -appointment of that council belonged to none -but the supreme authority, established by the -national will, obeyed by it, and acknowledged -by the provinces, the armies, the allies, and the -colonies of Spain; ... the sole legitimate authority, -which represented the unity of the power -of the monarchy.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>A regency appointed.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>After this preamble they nominated as regents -Don Pedro de Quevedo y Quintana, Bishop of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_289">289</span> -Orense; D. Francisco de Saavedra, late president -of the Junta of Seville; General Castaños; -Don Antonio de Escaño, minister of marine; -and D. Esteban Fernandez de Leon, a member -of the council of the Indies, as representative -of the colonies. To these persons the Junta -transferred its authority; providing, however, -that they should only retain it till the Cortes -were assembled, who were then to determine -what form of government should be adopted; -and that the means which were thus provided -for the ultimate welfare of the nation might not -be defeated, they required that the regents, when -they took their oath to the Junta, should swear -also that they would verify the meeting of the -Cortes at the time which had been appointed. -The new government was to be installed on the - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Last address of the Central Junta.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -third day after this decree. The Junta accompanied -it with a farewell address to the people, -condemning the tumult at Seville, and justifying -themselves, like men who felt that they had been -unjustly accused, because they had been unfortunate. -Neither their incessant application to -the public weal, they said, had been sufficient -to accomplish what they desired, nor the disinterestedness -with which they had served their -country, nor their loyalty to their beloved but -unhappy king, nor their hatred to the tyrant -and to every kind of tyranny. Ambition, and -intrigue, and ignorance had been too powerful. -“Ought we,” they said, “to have let the public -revenues be plundered, which base interest and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_290">290</span> -selfishness were seeking to drain off by a thousand -ways? Could we satisfy the ambition of -those who did not think themselves sufficiently -rewarded with three or four steps of promotion -in as many months? or, could we, notwithstanding -the moderation which has been the character -of our government, forbear to correct, with the -authority of the law, the faults occasioned by -that spirit of faction, which was audaciously -proceeding to destroy order, introduce anarchy, -and miserably overthrow the state?”</p> - -<p>Then drawing a rapid sketch of the exertions -which they had made since they were driven -from Aranjuez, ... “Events,” they said, “have -been unsuccessful, ... but was the fate of battles -in our hands? And when these reverses are -remembered, why should it be forgotten that -we have maintained our intimate relations with -the friendly powers; that we have drawn closer -the bonds of fraternity with our Americas; and -that we have resisted with dignity the perfidious -overtures of the usurper? But nothing could -restrain the hatred which, from the hour of its -installation, was sworn against the Junta. Its -orders were always ill interpreted, and never -well obeyed.” Then, touching upon the insults -and dangers to which they had been -exposed in the insurrection at Seville, ... “Spaniards,” -they continued, “thus it is that those -men have been persecuted and defamed, -whom you chose for your representatives; they -who without guards, without troops, without<span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">291</span> -punishments, confiding themselves to the public -faith, exercised tranquilly, under its protection, -those august functions with which you had invested -them! And who are they, mighty God! -who persecute them? the same who, from its -installation, have laboured to destroy the Junta -from its foundations; the same who have introduced -disorder into the cities, division into the -armies, insubordination into the constituted authorities. -The individuals of the government -are neither perfect nor impeccable; they are -men, and as such liable to human weakness and -error. But as public administrators, as your -representatives, they will reply to the imputations -of these agitators, and show them where -good faith and patriotism have been found, and -where ambitious passions, which incessantly -have destroyed the bowels of the country. Reduced -from henceforward by our own choice to -the rank of simple citizens, without any other -reward than the remembrance of the zeal and -of the labours which we have employed in the -public service, we are ready, or, more truly, we -are anxious, to reply to our calumniators before -the Cortes, or the tribunal which it shall appoint. -Let them fear, not us; let them fear, -who have seduced the simple, corrupted the -vile, and agitated the furious; let them fear, -who, in the moment of the greatest danger, -when the edifice of the state could scarce resist -the shock from without, have applied to it the -torch of dissension, to reduce it to ashes. Remember,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">292</span> -Spaniards, the fate of Porto! an internal -tumult, excited by the French themselves, -opened its gates to Soult, who did not -advance to occupy it till a popular tumult had -rendered its defence impossible. The Junta -warned you against a similar fate after the battle -of Medellin, when symptoms appeared of that -discord which has now with such hazard declared -itself. Recover yourselves, and do not -accomplish these mournful presentiments!</p> - -<p>“Strong, however, as we are in the testimony -of our own consciences, and secure in that we -have done for the good of the state as much as -circumstances placed within our power, the -country and our own honour demand from us -the last proof of our zeal, and require us to lay -down an authority, the continuance of which -might draw on new disturbances and dissensions. -Yes, Spaniards, your government, which, -from the hour of its installation, has omitted -nothing which it believed could accomplish the -public wish; which, as a faithful steward, has -given to all the resources that have reached its -hands no other destination than the sacred wants -of the country; which has frankly published its -proceedings; and which has evinced the greatest -proof of its desire for your welfare, by -convoking a Cortes more numerous and free -than any which the monarchy has ever yet witnessed, -resigns willingly the power and authority -which you have confided to it, and transfers -them to the Council of Regency, which it has<span class="pagenum" id="Page_293">293</span> -established by the decree of this day. May -your new governors be more fortunate in their -proceedings! and the individuals of the Supreme -Junta will envy them nothing but the glory of -having saved their country, and delivered their -King.”</p> - -<p>Thus terminated the unfortunate but ever-memorable -administration of the Central Junta, -a body which had become as odious before its -dissolution, as it was popular when it was first -installed. If in their conduct there had been -much to condemn and much to regret, it may -be admitted, upon a calm retrospect, that there -was hardly less to be applauded and admired. -Spain will hereafter render justice to their intentions, -and remember with gratitude that this -was the first government which addressed the -Spaniards as a free people, the first to sanction -those constitutional principles of liberty which -had for so many generations been suppressed. -It was to be expected, when such tremendous -events were passing, and such momentous interests -at stake, that their errors would be judged -of by their consequences without reference to -their causes. An unsuccessful administration -is always unpopular; and in perilous and suspicious -times, when the affairs of state go ill, -what is the effect of misjudgement, or weakness, -or inevitable circumstances, is too commonly -and too readily imputed to deliberate treason. -Such an opinion had very generally prevailed -against the Central Junta; but when this power<span class="pagenum" id="Page_294">294</span> -was at an end, and nothing would have gratified -the people more than the exposure and punishment -of the guilty, not even the shadow of -proof could be found against them. They -were inexperienced in business, they had -been trained up in prejudice, they partook, as -was to be expected, of the defects of the national -character; but they partook, and some -of them in the highest degree, of its virtues -also: and their generous feeling, their high-mindedness, -and unshaken fortitude, may command -an Englishman’s respect, if it be contrasted -not merely with the conduct of the -continental courts, but with the recorded sentiments -of that party in our own state, who, -during this arduous contest, represented the -struggle as hopeless, and whose language, -though it failed either to dispirit or to disgust -the Spaniards, served most certainly to encourage -the enemy. England has had abundant -cause to be grateful to Providence, but never, -in these latter times, has it had greater than for -escaping, more than once, the imminent danger -of having this party for its rulers. They would -have deserted the last, the truest, of our allies; -they would have betrayed the last, the only -hope of Europe and of the world; they would -have sacrificed our honour first, and when they -had brought home the war to our own doors, -which their measures inevitably must have done, -the lasting infamy which they had entailed upon -the nation would have been a worse evil than<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">295</span> -the dreadful and perilous trial through which -it would have had to pass.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />February.</span> <br />The Regents.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>In their choice of the regents the Junta -seem to have looked for the fittest persons, -without regard to any other considerations. -Three of them were well known. The Bishop -of Orense was venerable for his public conduct, -as well as for his age and exemplary virtues; no -man had contributed more signally to rouse -and maintain the spirit of the country. Castaños -had received from the Junta a species of ill -treatment which was in the spirit of the old -government, but for which they made amends -by this appointment. When he was ordered as -a sort of banishment to his own house at Algeziras, -the people of that place, greatly to their -honour, mounted a volunteer guard before the -house, as a mark of respect; and the Junta, in -the last days of their administration, when they -turned their eyes about in distress, called upon -him to take the command, and resume the rank -of captain-general of the four kingdoms of -Andalusia. The call was too late, but he came -to the Isle of Leon in time to rescue some members -of that body from the populace of Xerez; -and in nominating him to the regency, they -seem to have consulted the wishes of the people. -Saavedra was in full popularity, and had given -good proof of disinterested zeal during the tumult -at Seville. Instead of securing his private -property, he occupied himself in calming the -people, and in preserving the public treasure<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">296</span> -and the more valuable public records; and as -there was a want of vessels, he embarked the -public property on board the one which had -been hired for his own effects. Escaño had -been minister of marine at Madrid, and was -known as a man of business and fidelity. Leon’s -appointment was not agreeable to the Junta of -Cadiz, who felt their power, and were determined -to derive from it as much advantage as -possible; he therefore declined accepting the -office on the plea of ill health, and D. Miguel -de Lardizabal y Ariba, a native of the province -of Tlaxcalla, in New Spain, and member of -the council of the Indies, was appointed in his -stead.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Their injustice towards the members of the Central Junta.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>A government was thus formed, which, receiving -its authority from the Supreme Junta, -derived it ultimately from the same lawful -source, ... the choice of the people and the necessity -of the state. In such times, and in a -nation which attaches a sort of religious reverence -to forms, it was of prime importance that -the legitimacy of the new government should -be apparent, and its right of succession clear -and indisputable. For this Spain was principally -indebted to Jovellanos, the last and not -the least service which that irreproachable and -excellent man rendered to his country. But it -was the fate of Jovellanos, notwithstanding the -finest talents, the most diligent discharge of -duty, the purest patriotism, and the most unsullied -honour, to be throughout his life the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">297</span> -victim of the unhappy circumstances of Spain. -Seven years’ imprisonment, by the will and -pleasure of the despicable Godoy, was a light -evil compared with the injustice which he now -endured from that government which he, more -than any other individual, had contributed to -appoint and to legitimate. The council of -Castille, which first acknowledged the Intruder, -and then acknowledged the Junta, in the same -time-serving spirit attacked the Junta now that -it was fallen, affirmed that its power had been a -violent usurpation, which the nation had rather -tolerated than consented to, and that the members -had exercised this usurped power contrary -to law, and with the most open and notorious -selfishness and ambition. The people, not contented -with their compulsory resignation, accused -them of having peculated the public -money; and the regency, yielding to the temper -of the times, and perhaps courting popularity, -acted as if it believed this charge, registered -their effects, and seized their papers. Even -Jovellanos was ordered to retire to his own province, -which happened at that time to be free -from the enemy, and there place himself under -the inspection of the magistrates. This act is -inexpiably disgraceful to those from whom it -proceeded; upon Jovellanos it could entail no -disgrace. He had long learnt to bear oppression, -and patiently to suffer wrong; but this -injury came with the sting of ingratitude, it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">298</span> -struck him to the heart, and embittered his few -remaining days.</p> - -<p>This rigorous treatment of the Central Junta -was the work of their implacable enemy, the -council of Castille, a body which they ought -to have dissolved and branded for its submission -to the Intruder; and of the Junta of Cadiz, -a corporation equally daring and selfish, who -thought that in proportion as they could blacken -the character of the former government, they -should increase their own credit with the -people. The members of that government -had given the best proof of innocence; not -one of them had gone over to the enemy, nor -even attempted to conceal himself at a time -when the popular hatred against them had -been violently excited. Several of them had -embarked on board a Spanish frigate for the -Canaries; when their baggage was seized, it -was, at their own request, examined before -the crew, and the examination proved that they -had scarcely the means of performing the -voyage with tolerable comfort. Tilly died in -prison without a trial. This was a thoroughly -worthless man, and it might probably have -appeared that he had found means of enriching -himself when he was sent, in the manner of -the republican commissioners in France, to -superintend the army which defeated Dupont. -But Calvo, who was arrested also and thrown -into a dungeon, without a bed to lie on or a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_299">299</span> -change of linen, and whose wife also was put -in confinement, was irreproachable in his public -character. He had been one of the prime -movers of that spirit which has sanctified the -name of Zaragoza, and during the first siege -repeatedly led the inhabitants against the -French. All his papers had been seized; he -repeatedly called upon the regency to print -every one of them, to publish his accounts, and -bring him to a public trial; but he was no -more attended to than if he had been in the -Seven Towers of Constantinople. After the -Cortes assembled he obtained a trial, and was -pronounced innocent.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Proclamation of the Intruder.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Intruder, following his armies, and -thinking to obtain possession of Cadiz, and -destroy the legitimate government of Spain, -issued a proclamation at Cordoba, characterized -by the impiety and falsehood which marked -the whole proceedings of the French in this -atrocious usurpation. “The moment was arrived,” -he said, “when the Spaniards could -listen with advantage to the truths which he -was about to utter. During more than a century -the force of circumstances, which masters -all events, had determined that Spain should -be the friend and ally of France. When an extraordinary -revolution hurled from the throne the -house which reigned in France, it was the duty -of the Spanish branch to support it, and not -lay down its arms until it was re-established. -But it required a spirit of heroism to adopt such<span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">300</span> -a resolution, and the cabinet of Madrid thought -it better to wait for that from the progress of -time, which it wanted courage to obtain by -arms.” This truth, for such the Intruder -might well call this part of the proclamation, -marks, as much as the falsehoods which accompanied -it, the devilish spirit by which the French -councils had long been possessed; having -allured the Spanish Bourbons by oaths and -treaties to their own destruction, France now -reproached them with the very conduct which -she had tempted them to pursue. The paper -proceeded to affirm, that, during its whole -alliance with France, Spain had been watching -an opportunity of falling upon her. “The -conqueror of Europe,” it continued, “would -not allow himself to be duped. The princes -of the house of Spain, not having the courage -to fight, renounced the crown, and were content -to make stipulations for their private interests. -The Spanish grandees, the generals, -the chiefs of the nation, recognized those -treaties. I,” said the Intruder, “received their -oaths at Madrid, but the occurrence at Baylen -threw every thing into confusion. The timid -became alarmed, but the enlightened and conscientious -remained true to me. A new continental -war, and the assistance of England, -prolonged an unequal contest, of which the -nation feels all the horrors. The issue was -never doubtful, and the fate of arms has now -declared so. If tranquillity is not immediately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_301">301</span> -restored, who can foresee the consequence? -It is the interest of France to preserve Spain -entire and independent, if she become again -her friend and ally; but if she continue her -enemy, it is the duty of France to weaken, to -dismember, and to destroy her. God, who -reads the hearts of men, knows with what view -I thus address you. Spaniards! the irrevocable -destiny is not yet pronounced. Cease to suffer -yourselves to be duped by the common enemy. -Employ your understanding: it will point out -to you in the French troops, friends who are -ready to defend you. It is yet time: rally -around me! and may this open to Spain a new -era of glory and happiness.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Language of the despondents in England.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>If the Spaniards had had as little wisdom, -or as little sense of national honour, as the party -who opposed the measures of government in -England, they would have believed the Intruder, -and submitted to him. This party, who, at the -time of Sir John Moore’s retreat, told us that -the Spaniards had then yielded, and that their -fate was decided, now declared, with a little -more prudence in their predictions, that the -show of resistance must soon be at an end. -The king’s message, declaring that Great -Britain would continue its assistance to the -great cause of Spain, as the most important -considerations of policy and of good faith required, -excited in them the gloomiest forebodings. -“We were then still,” they said, -“to cling to the forlorn hope of maintaining<span class="pagenum" id="Page_302">302</span> -a footing in Portugal! Our resources were -still farther to be drained in supporting our -ally, or rather in supporting a system which -did not arouse its own people to its defence; -and for our efforts, however strenuous, in the -support of which we did not receive either -their gratitude or their co-operation. It was reported,” -they said, “that the English army -had made a retrograde movement to Lisbon, -and actually embarked in the transports at the -mouth of the Tagus. Having uniformly declared -their opinion, that this expedition, under -Lord Wellington, was injurious to the most -important interests of the country, as they -affected both its resources and its character, -they should most sincerely and warmly congratulate -the public if such were its termination.” -That is, they would have congratulated us if -we had broken our faith, deserted our allies, -fled before our enemies, left Buonaparte to -obtain possession of Cadiz and Lisbon, and -then waited tremblingly for him upon our own -shores, with our resources carefully husbanded -till it pleased him to come and take them!</p> - -<p>“It has been conjectured,” said these -hopeful politicians, “that Cadiz might be -abundantly supplied from the opposite coast -of Barbary. But those who hazarded this -opinion were not precisely informed of the -state of things on the African coast. The -Emperor of Morocco was extremely unfriendly -to his Christian neighbours. Cadiz, to be sure,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">303</span> -was an interesting point, which it was our -interest to maintain as long as possible; but -they had no expectation that Cadiz, when really -attacked, could long hold out. It could not -be supplied with fuel with which to bake bread -for the inhabitants for one week.” While this -party thus displayed their presumptuous ignorance, -and vented their bitter mortification -in insults against the ministry and against our -allies, they endeavoured to direct attention -toward the Spanish colonies, saying that the -great, and indeed only object, of this country, -should be to establish a mercantile connexion -with the empire which was to be erected there, -and recommending that we should take immediate -measures for assisting the emigration of -the Spanish patriots! Happily the councils -of Great Britain were directed by wiser heads, -and the people of Spain actuated by better -principles and by a braver spirit. “We are -supported,” said Romana to his countrymen, -“by the illustrious English nation, who are -united with the brave Portugueze, our brethren, -possessing a common interest with ourselves, -and who never will abandon us.” The -people and the government had the same confidence -in British honour. English and Portugueze -troops were dispatched from Lisbon -to assist in the defence of Cadiz, and Ceuta was -delivered in trust to an English garrison.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Isle of Leon.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Isle of Leon forms an irregular triangle, -of which the longest side is separated from the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_304">304</span> -main land by a channel, called the river of Santi -Petri, ten miles in length, and navigable for the -largest ships. This side is strongly fortified, -and the situation also is peculiarly strong. The -bridge of Zuazo, built originally by the Romans, -over the channel, is flanked with batteries, and -communicates with the continent by a causeway -over impassable marshes. There are two towns -upon the island; that which bears the same -name, and which contains about 40,000 inhabitants, -is nearly in the middle of the isle; the -other, called St. Carlos, which stands a little to -the north, was newly erected, and consisted -chiefly of barracks and other public buildings. -Cadiz stands on the end of a tongue of land -seven miles in length, extending from the isle -into the bay; this isthmus is from a quarter to -half a mile broad, flanked on one side by the -sea, and on the other by the bay of Cadiz. -Along this isthmus, an enemy who had made -himself master of the island must pass; new -batteries had been formed, new works thrown -up, and mines dug; and if these obstacles were -overcome, his progress would then be opposed -by regular fortifications, upon which the utmost -care and expense had been bestowed for rendering -the city impregnable. Before this unexpected -and unexampled aggression on the -part of France, the great object of the Spanish -government had been to render Cadiz secure -from the sea: as soon, therefore, as the approach -of the enemy was certain, one of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">305</span> -first operations was to demolish all those works -on the main land from whence the shipping -could be annoyed. This was a precaution which -Admiral Purvis had strongly advised after the -battle of Medellin, and again as soon as the -more ruinous defeat of Areizaga was known. -Upon the first report that the enemy were hastening -toward Cadiz, in the hope of surprising -it, he requested Admiral Alava to remove the -ships, and place them in the lower part of the -harbour, where they might be secure; but it -was not till Mr. Frere had strongly urged the -necessity of this precaution that the Spanish -Admiral, after much reasoning on his part, reluctantly -complied. The ill spirit which at this -time prevailed among the naval officers arose -rather from the pitiable situation in which they -found themselves, than from any predilection -for the French, or the more natural feeling of -hostility toward the English in which they had -grown up. Men being wanted for the land service, -and not for the fleet, the navy had been -neglected during this contest: the ships were -ill manned and miserably stored, the pay far in -arrears; and the officers had latterly disregarded -their duty as much as they thought themselves -disregarded by the government, ... hopelessness -producing discontent, and discontent growing -into disaffection. This temper could produce -no ill effect when the regency and the people -were so well disposed. The fleet was removed -in time; and the hulks also in which the miserable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_306">306</span> -prisoners were confined were moved lower -down into the bay, and moored under the guns -of the English and Spanish ships.</p> - -<p>The British Admiral had represented in time -how important it was that the batteries on the -north side of the harbour should be kept in an -efficient state. The danger now was from the -land side, not from the sea, and by good fortune -the land quarter had been strengthened some -fifty years before, at a cost and with a care -which had then been deemed superfluous. But -the Spanish government had not forgotten that -it was on that side Essex had made his attack, -and England was the enemy against whom those -precautions were taken. At that time every -villa and garden upon the isthmus had been -destroyed. During after-years of security the -ground had again been covered, and was now to -be cleared again. The Spaniards, roused by the -exertions and example of Alburquerque, as much -as by the immediate danger, laboured at the -works, and carefully removed every building on -the isthmus. Night and day these labours were -carried on, and the sound of explosions was almost -perpetual. The wood from the demolished -buildings was taken into the city for fuel.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Victor summons the Junta of Cadiz.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Marshal Victor, before he understood how -well the isle was secured, sent a summons to the -Junta of Cadiz, telling them he was ready to receive -their submission to King Joseph. Jaen, -Cordova, Seville, and Granada, he said, had received -the French with joy; he expected the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">307</span> -same reception from the people of Cadiz; and -as the fleets and arsenals were the property of -the nation, he demanded that they should be -preserved for their rightful sovereign. They -returned an answer, signed by every individual -of their body, declaring that they acknowledged -no one for King of Spain but Ferdinand VII. -Soult, also, representing the English as the enemies -of Spain, insinuated, in a summons to Alburquerque, -that it was their intention to seize -Cadiz for themselves. Alburquerque replied, -no such design was entertained by the British -nation, who were not less generous than they -were great and brave; their only object was to -assist in the defence of Cadiz with all the means -in which they abounded, an assistance which -the Spaniards solicited and gratefully received. -Cadiz, he added, had nothing to fear from a -force of 100,000 men; the Spaniards knew that -the French commanded no more than the ground -which they covered, and they would never lay -down their arms till they had effected the deliverance -of their country.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Ill-will of the Junta towards Alburquerque.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The service which Alburquerque had rendered -was so signal, and its importance so perfectly -understood by all the people of Cadiz, -that he was deservedly looked upon as the saviour -of the place. Having been appointed governor -in obedience to the general wish, he became -in consequence president of the Junta, as -Venegas had been before him, whose obedient -policy was now rewarded by the highest station<span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">308</span> -to which a subject could be appointed, that of -viceroy of Mexico. Alburquerque had not solicited -these appointments; on the contrary, he -remonstrated against them, pointing out how -impossible it was, that, having the command of -the army, he could attend to other duties at the -same time; and in consequence of his representations, -D. Andres Lopez de Sagastizabel -was nominated to act as his deputy in both capacities. -The Junta of Cadiz had obtained -their power unexceptionably, but no men ever -made a more unworthy use of it; they had reluctantly -assented to the formation of the regency, -and when it was formed, endeavoured to -restrain and overrule it, and engross as much authority -as possible to themselves, in which, unhappily -for Spain, and more unhappily for Spanish -America, they were but too successful. Alburquerque -became the marked object of their dislike, -because he had recognised the regency at -a moment when, if he had hesitated, they would -have struggled to get the whole power of government -into their own hands. That spirit, -which had never condescended to conceal its -indignant contempt for Godoy, could not stoop -to court the favour of a Junta of mercantile monopolists. -Not that he despised them as such; -his mind was too full of noble enterprises to bestow -a thought upon them, otherwise than as -men who were called upon to do their duty -while he did his.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The troops neglected.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>His first business had been to complete the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_309">309</span> -unfinished works of defence, especially the <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">cortadura</i>, -or cut across the isthmus, where the -battery of St. Fernando was erected; and lest -any attempt should be made to pass beside it at -low water, the iron gratings from the windows -of the public buildings were removed, and placed -on the beach as a chevaux-de-frise. While these -things were going on, the people of Cadiz manifested -a disgraceful indolence; they assembled -in crowds on the ramparts, wrapt in their long -cloaks, and there stood gazing silently for hours, -while the English were employed in blowing up -the forts round the bay; appearing, says an -eye-witness, indifferent spectators of the events -around them, rather than the persons for whose -security these exertions were made. Meantime -the troops, whose rapid march had placed these -idlers out of fear, were neglected in a manner -not less cruel to the individuals than it was detrimental -to the public service. The points to be -protected were so many, that the numbers of this -little army did not suffice to guard them, without -exhausting the men by double duty. Alburquerque -requested that the regiments might -be filled from the numberless idle inhabitants of -the isle and of Cadiz, who, while they were idle, -were at such a time worse than useless. Unless -this were done, he said, it was not only impossible -for his men to undertake any offensive -operations, or even to improve themselves in -discipline, but they must be wasted away with -fatigue and consequent infirmities. These representations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_310">310</span> -were in vain; neither was he more -successful in requiring their pay, a supply of -clothing, of which they stood evidently in need, -and those common comforts in their quarters, -which were as requisite for health as for decency. -The Junta of Cadiz had seven hundred pieces -of cloth in their possession, yet more than a -month elapsed, and nothing was done toward -clothing the almost naked troops. Alburquerque -asserts, as a fact within his own positive knowledge, -that the reason was, because the Junta were -at that time contending with the Regency, to get -the management of the public money into their -own hands, and meant, if they had failed, to sell -this cloth to the government, and make a profit -upon it, as merchants, of eight reales <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">per vara</i>!</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Alburquerque applies to the Regency in their behalf.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>It is not to be supposed that the Junta were -idle at this time; they had many and urgent -duties to attend to; but no duty could be more -urgent than that of supplying the wants and increasing -the force of the army. The Duke -applied to them in vain for six weeks, during -which time he discovered that the Junta looked -as much to their private interest as to the public -weal; for from the beginning, he says, their -aim was to get the management of the public -expenditure, not merely for the sake of the influence -which accompanies it, but that they -might repay themselves the sums which they had -lent, and make their own advantage by trading -with the public money. At length he applied -to the Regency. The regents, feeling how little<span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">311</span> -influence they possessed over the Junta, advised -the Duke to publish the memorial which he had -presented to them, thinking that it would excite -the feelings of the people. In this they were not -deceived; ... the people, now for the first time -called upon to relieve the wants of the soldiers, -exerted themselves liberally, and there was not -a family in which some contribution was not -made for the defenders of the country. But -the Junta were exasperated to the last degree -by this measure, which their own culpable neglect -had rendered necessary. Alburquerque’s -memorial contained no complaint against them; -it only stated the wants of the soldiers, and -requested that, unless those wants were supplied, -he might be relieved from a command, -the duties of which, under such circumstances, -it was not possible for him to perform. Though -he was persuaded of their selfish views, he had -no design of exposing an evil which there was -no means of remedying; and when he understood -how violently they were offended, he addressed -a letter to them, disclaiming any intention -of inculpating them, in terms which nothing -but his earnest desire of avoiding all dissensions -that might prove injurious to the country could - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Junta attack Alburquerque.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -either dictate or justify. This did not prevent -the Junta from publishing an attack upon him, -in reply, of the most virulent nature. They -reproached him with having exposed the wants -and weakness of the army; entered into details -as frivolous in themselves as they were false in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">312</span> -their application, to show that they had done -every thing for the soldiers; declared, with an -impudence of ingratitude which it is not possible -to reprobate in severer terms than it deserves, -that his cavalry had retreated too precipitately, -and ought to have brought in grain with them; -and concluded by a menacing intimation, that -the people of Cadiz were ready to support them -against any persons who should attempt to impeach -their proceedings. If the Junta of Cadiz -had no other sins to answer for, this paper alone -would be sufficient to render their name odious -in history; so unprovoked was it in its temper, -so false in its details, so detestable for its ingratitude. -Had Alburquerque been capable of -consulting his own safety by a precipitate retreat, -Portugal, as he said, and the English army -were at hand, ... and he needed not to have undertaken -an arduous march of 260 miles in the -face of a superior enemy, and in direct disobedience -of the orders of his government. If -the cavalry which saved Cadiz, and which they -thus wantonly accused of retreating too precipitately, -had been even a quarter of an hour later, -it could not have entered the Isle of Leon. -“This,” said the indignant Duke, “is the patriotism -of the Junta of Cadiz; the enemy is at -the gates, and they throw out a defiance to the -general and the army who protect them!”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>He resigns the command.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>But Alburquerque was too sincere a lover of -his country to expose it to the slightest danger, -even for the sake of his own honour. He could<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">313</span> -not resent this infamous attack without exciting -a perilous struggle; and without resenting it -he felt it impossible to remain at the head of the -army. Having thus been publicly insulted, a -reparation as public was necessary to his honour, -and that reparation, for the sake of Spain, he -delayed to demand. The Regency would have -had him continue in the command; he however -persisted in resigning. No injustice which could -be done him, he said, would ever have made -him cease to present himself in the front of -danger, had he not been compelled to withdraw -for fear of the fatal consequences of internal -discord. Accordingly, he who should have been -leading, and who would have led, the men who -loved him to victory, came over to England as -ambassador, with a wounded spirit and a broken -heart.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_314">314</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XXIX">CHAPTER XXIX.</h2> -</div> - -<blockquote class="inhead"> - -<p class="hang">ATTEMPTS TO DELIVER FERDINAND. OVERTURES -FOR A NEGOTIATION MADE THROUGH HOLLAND. -PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT CONCERNING PORTUGAL. -REFORM OF THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Regency.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> regency was acknowledged without hesitation -in those provinces which were not yet -overrun by the enemy, and every where by -those Spaniards who resisted the usurpation; -yet with the authority which they derived from -the Supreme Junta a portion of its unpopularity -had descended upon them. The necessity of -their appointment was perceived, and the selection -of the members was not disapproved: in -fact, public opinion had in a great degree directed -the choice; nevertheless, when they were -chosen, a feeling seemed to prevail that the -men upon whom that unfortunate body had -devolved their power could not be worthy of -the national confidence. Like their predecessors, -they were in fact surrounded by the -same system of sycophancy and intrigue which -had subsisted under the monarchy. The same -swarm was about them: it was a state plague -with which Spain had been afflicted from the -age of the Philips. Hence it came to pass that -the national force, instead of being invigorated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">315</span> -by the concentration of legitimate power, was -sometimes paralysed by it. For if a fairer prospect -appeared to open in the provinces where -the people had been left to themselves and to -chiefs of their own choosing, too often when a -communication was opened with the seat of -government, this unwholesome influence was -felt in the appointment of some inefficient general, -who was perhaps a stranger to the province -which he was sent to command.</p> - -<p>A central government was, however, indispensable, -as a means of communication first -with England, and eventually with other states, -but more especially as keeping together the -whole body of the monarchy both in Europe -and in America. The Spanish nation was not -more sensible of this than the British ministry. -The French, and they who, like the French, -reasoning upon the principles of a philosophy -as false as it is degrading, believe that neither -states nor individuals are ever directed in their -conduct by the disinterested sense of honour -and of duty, supposed that the continuance of -these temporary administrations must be conformable -to the wishes of the British cabinet, -whose influence would be in proportion to the -weakness and precarious tenure of those who -held the government in Spain. But that cabinet -had no covert designs; they acted upon the -principle of a plain, upright, open policy, which -deserves, and will obtain, the approbation of -just posterity; and so far were they from pursuing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">316</span> -any system of selfish and low-minded cunning, -that at this time, when the regency was -formed, they were taking measures for -effecting the deliverance of Ferdinand from -captivity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Schemes for delivering Ferdinand.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Montijo, before his hostility to the Junta was -openly declared, had proposed a scheme to -them for this purpose; but he was too well -known to be trusted, and when he required as -a preliminary measure that 50,000 dollars should -be given him, Calvo, who was the member appointed -to hear what he might propose, plainly -told him that his object was to employ that -sum in raising a sedition against the government; -upon which Montijo told him that he had a -good scent, and thus the matter ended. A -similar proposal was made by some adventurer -in Catalonia; the provincial government was -disposed to listen to it, but they referred it to -General Doyle, and he soon ascertained that -the projector only wanted to get money and - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Baron de Kolli’s attempt.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -decamp with it. Meantime the British ministers -had formed a well-concerted plan, but dependent -upon some fearful contingencies, ... the -fidelity of every one to whom in its course of -performance it must necessarily be communicated, -and the disposition of Ferdinand to put -his life upon the hazard in the hope of recovering -his liberty and his throne. The Baron de -Kolli, who was the person chosen for this perilous -service, was one who in other secret -missions had proved himself worthy of confidence.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">317</span> -He took with him for credentials the -letter in which Ferdinand’s marriage in the -year 1802 had been announced by Charles IV. -to the King of England, and also letters in Latin -and in French from the King, communicating -to the prisoner the state of affairs in Spain, and -saying how important it was that he should escape -from captivity, and show himself in the -midst of his faithful people. A squadron, commanded -by Sir George Cockburn, landed Kolli -in Quiberon Bay, and to that part of the coast -Ferdinand was to have directed his flight, for -which every needful and possible provision had -been made, measures having also been devised -for sending the pursuers upon a wrong scent. -The scheme had been well laid, and with such -apparent probability of success, that it is said -the Duke of Kent requested permission to take - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Kolli’s Memoirs, 39.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -upon himself the danger of the attempt. The -squadron was provided with every thing which -could conduce to the convenience and comfort -of Ferdinand and his brother; with this view a -Roman Catholic priest had been embarked, with -a regular set of ornaments and consecrated plate -for the Romish service.</p> - -<p>Kolli made his way to Paris, completed his -arrangements, and was arrested at Vincennes -within a fortnight from the day whereon he -landed. He had been betrayed by a pretended -royalist in the pay of the British government, -and by the Sieur Richard, whom he had trusted -because he had served bravely under the unfortunate - -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">318</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />March.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Prince de Talmont in La Vendée. His -credentials and his other papers were seized; -and when he was examined by Fouché, who -was then minister of police, he had the mortification -of being told that the character of the -person for whose service he had thus exposed -himself had been entirely mistaken, for that no -credentials would induce Ferdinand to hazard -such an attempt. It was afterwards proposed -to him, that as his life and the fortune of his -children were at stake, he should proceed to -Valençay, and execute his commission, to the -end that he might hear from Ferdinand’s own -lips his disavowal of any connexion with England, -... or that if that prince really entertained -a wish to escape, an opportunity might be given -him of which the French government might -make such use as it deemed best. Kolli rejected -this with becoming spirit; and the purpose -of the police was just as well answered by -sending Richard to personate him. But Ferdinand -no sooner understood the ostensible object -of his visitor, than he informed the governor -of Valençay that an English emissary was in the -castle.</p> - -<p>It is very possible that Ferdinand may have -perceived something in Richard’s manner more -likely to excite suspicion than to win confidence; -for the man was not a proficient in villany, and -not having engaged in it voluntarily, may have -felt some compunction concerning the business -whereon he was sent. His instructions were, if<span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">319</span> -he should succeed in entrapping Ferdinand, to -bring him straight to Vincennes, there probably -to have been placed in close confinement: the -supposition that a tragedy like that of the Duc -D’Enghein was intended cannot be admitted -without supposing in Buonaparte far greater -respect for the personal character of his victim -than he could possibly have entertained. An -official report was published, containing a letter -in Ferdinand’s name, wherein the project for -his escape was called scandalous and infernal, -and a hope expressed that the authors and accomplices -of it might be punished as they deserved. -Other papers were published at the same -time, with the same obvious design of exposing -Ferdinand to the indignation or contempt of -his countrymen and of his allies. There was -a letter of congratulation to the Emperor Napoleon -upon his victories in Austria; an expression -of gratitude for his protection, and of -implicit obedience to his wishes and commands; -details of a fête which he had given just before -this occurrence in honour of the Emperor’s -marriage with the Archduchess Maria Louisa; -and a letter requesting an interview with the -governor of Valençay upon a subject of the -greatest moment to himself, being his wish to -become the adopted son of the Emperor, an -adoption which, the writer said, would constitute -the happiness of his life, and of which -he conceived himself worthy by his perfect love -and attachment to the sacred person of his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">320</span> -majesty, and entire submission to his intentions - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />April.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -and desires. But it was so notoriously the system -of Buonaparte’s government to publish any -falsehoods which might serve a present purpose, -that these letters, whether genuine or fabricated, -obtained no credit<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a>.</p> - -<p>As soon as the official report appeared in the -English newspapers, Mr. Whitbread asked in -the House of Commons whether the letter purporting -to be written by his Majesty to Ferdinand -VII. was to be looked upon as a document -which had any pretensions to the character of -authenticity? a question which Mr. Perceval -declined answering. Of course this afforded a -topic for exultation and insult to the opponents -of the government. The Spaniards felt very -differently upon the occasion. Whether those<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">321</span> -who were desirous of forming a new constitution -for Spain, or even of correcting the inveterate -abuses of the old system, thought it desirable -to see Ferdinand in possession of the throne, -before their object was effected, may well be -doubted; but whatever their opinions might -be upon that point, the attempt at delivering -him excited no other feelings than those of gratitude -and admiration towards Great Britain. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Español, t. i. 120.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -“With what pleasure,” said the best and wisest -of their writers, “does the good man who observes -the mazes of political events, behold one -transaction of which humanity alone was the -end and aim! With what interest does he contemplate -an expedition intended, not for speculations -of commerce, nor for objects of ambition, -but for the deliverance of a captive King, in -the hope of restoring him to his throne and to -his people!”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Overtures for peace.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The British cabinet was sounded to see whether -it would offer such compensations and -exchange of prisoners as might extricate Kolli -from his perilous situation. This curious proposal -was connected with some insidious overtures -for peace made then, partly for the purpose -of deceiving the French people into a -belief that the continuance of the war was -owing alone to the inveterate feeling of hostility -in England; but more with the design of preparing -the Dutch for the annexation of their -country to the French empire, an intention -which was first avowed in these overtures. Louis<span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">322</span> -Buonaparte was drawn into this transaction by -a solemn assurance that no such intention was -really entertained; but that it was held forth -merely as a feint, in the hope of alarming the -British government, and inducing it to make -peace, for the sake of averting a political union, -which of all measures must be most dangerous -to England. The overture was properly rejected -upon the ground, that it would be useless, or -worse than useless, to open a negotiation when -it was certain that insurmountable difficulties -must occur in its first stage. A few weeks only -elapsed before the purpose which had been solemnly -disavowed by Buonaparte’s ministers to -Louis was carried into effect, by a compulsory -treaty, in which that poor king ceded to France -the provinces of Zealand and Dutch Brabant, -the territory between the Maas and the Waal, -including Nimeguen, together with the Bommelwaard -and the territory of Altena, inasmuch as -it had been adopted for a constitutional principle -in France that the <i>thalweg</i> or stream of the -Rhine formed the boundary of the French -empire. About two months after this act of -insolent and wanton power an army was ordered -into Holland to complete the usurpation, and -Louis, giving the only proof of integrity and -courage which was possible in his unhappy -circumstances, abdicated the throne, and retired -into the Austrian dominions, leaving behind -him a letter to the Dutch legislature, which -contained a full vindication of his own conduct,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">323</span> -and an exposure of Napoleon’s traitorous policy, -which, given as it was in the most cautious -language, and with a remainder of respect and -even brotherly affection, might alone suffice to -stamp the character<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> of that brother with lasting -infamy. During his short and miserable -reign Louis had done what, considering in what -manner he had been placed upon the throne, it -might have seemed almost impossible that he -should do, he had gained the affections of the -Dutch people; not by any good which he did, -for his tyrannical brother neither allowed him -time nor means for effecting the benevolent -measures which he designed, but by the interest -which he took in their sufferings, and -by his honest endeavours to prevent or mitigate -those acts of tyranny which were intended to -increase the distress of a ruined country, and -prepare it for this catastrophe.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Buonaparte’s intention of establishing a Western Empire.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The conquest of Holland had been an old -object of French ambition; but wider views<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">324</span> -than Louis XIV. entertained during the springtide -of his prosperity were at this time disclosed - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Feb. 17.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -by Buonaparte. A <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">senatus consultum</i> appeared -early in the year, decreeing that the Papal -States should be united to, and form an integral -part of the French empire. The city of Rome -was declared to be the second in the empire -(Amsterdam was named the third); the Prince -Imperial was to take the title of King of Rome, -and the Emperors, after having been crowned -in the church of Notre Dame at Paris, were -before the tenth year of their reign to be -crowned in St. Peter’s also. The measures -that were designed to follow upon this decree -were unequivocally intimated, in that semi-official -manner by which Buonaparte’s schemes of -ambition were always first announced. “The -Roman and German imperial dignity,” it was -said, “which, with regard to Rome, had long -been an empty name, had ceased to exist upon -the abdication of the Emperor Francis; from -that time, therefore, the great Emperor of the -French had a right to assume the title. Napoleon, -who revoked the gifts which Charlemagne -made to the bishops of Rome, might -now, as legitimate lord paramount of Rome, -like his illustrious predecessor, style himself -Roman and French Emperor. He restores to -the Romans the eagle which Charlemagne -brought from them, and placed upon his palace -at Aix la Chapelle; he makes them sharers in -his empire and his glory; and a thousand years<span class="pagenum" id="Page_325">325</span> -after the reign of Charlemagne, a new medal -will be struck with the inscription <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Renovatio -Imperii</i>. After ages of oblivion, the Empire -of the West reappears with renovated vigour; -for Napoleon the Great must be looked on as -the founder of a revived Western Empire, and -in this character he will prove a blessing to -civilized Europe. The peace of Europe will -thus be completely re-established. The great -number of well-meaning people, to whom -Napoleon’s power seemed oppressive, while -they considered themselves as exempt from -any engagement towards him, will fulfil their -new duties with inviolable fidelity. Considered -in this point of view, the re-establishment of -the Western Empire is a duty which Napoleon -owes not less to the law of self-preservation, -than to the repose of Europe.”</p> - -<p>No opposition to this project could have been -offered by the continental princes; the yoke -was upon their necks: it only remained for -him to complete the subjugation of the Peninsula, -and this appeared to him and his admirers -an easy task, to be accomplished in one short -campaign. There was no longer any Spanish -force in the field capable of even momentarily -diverting the French from their great object of -destroying the English army, and obtaining -possession of Portugal, and to that object Buonaparte -might now direct his whole attention and -his whole power.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington had foreseen this, and clearly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">326</span> -perceiving also what would be the business of the -ensuing campaign, had prepared for the defence -of Portugal in time. It was necessary that we -should carry on the war in that country as principals -rather than as allies, and for this full power -had been given by the Prince of Brazil. As yet -little had been done toward the improvement of -the Portugueze army; like the government, it -was in the worst possible condition; both were -in the lowest state of degradation to which ignorance, -and imbecility, and inveterate abuses - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Money voted for the Portugueze army.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -could reduce them. Early in the session, parliament -was informed that the King had authorized -pecuniary advances to be made to Portugal, -in support of its military exertions, and -had made an arrangement for the maintenance -of a body of troops not exceeding 30,000 men. -Twenty thousand we already had in our pay, -the sum for whom was estimated at 600,000<i>l.</i>; -for the additional ten, it was stated at 250,000<i>l.</i> -to which was to be added 130,000<i>l.</i> for the -maintenance of officers to be employed in training -these levies, and preparing them to act with -the British troops. This led to a very interesting - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Marquis Wellesley;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -debate in the House of Lords. Marquis -Wellesley affirmed, “that Portugal was the most -material military position that could be occupied -for the purpose of assisting Spain: great -disasters, he admitted, had befallen the Spanish -cause, still they were far from sinking his mind -into despair, and still he would contend, it was -neither politic nor just to manifest any intention - -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">327</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />February.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -of abandoning Portugal. What advantage could -be derived from casting over our own councils, -and over the hopes of Portugal and Spain, the -hue and complexion of despair? To tell them -that the hour of their fate was arrived, ... that -all attempts to assist, or even to inspirit their -exertions in their own defence, were of no -avail, ... that they must bow the neck and submit -to the yoke of a merciless invader, ... this -indeed would be to strew the conqueror’s path -with flowers, to prepare the way for his triumphal -march to the throne of the two kingdoms! -Was it then for this that so much treasure -had been expended, ... that so much of the -blood had been shed of those gallant and loyal -nations? Whatever disasters had befallen them, -they were not imputable to the people of Spain. -The spirit of the people was excellent, and he -still ventured to hope that it would prove unconquerable. -All their defeats and disasters were -solely to be ascribed to the vices of their government. -It was the imbecility, or treachery, -of that vile and wretched government which -first opened the breach through which the enemy -entered into the heart of Spain; that delivered -into hostile hands the fortresses of that -country; and betrayed her people defenceless -and unarmed into the power of a perfidious foe. -Let us not contribute to accomplish what they -have so inauspiciously begun! Let not their -lordships come to any resolution that can justify -Portugal in relaxing her exertions, or Spain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">328</span> -in considering her cause as hopeless. Yet what -other consequence would result from prematurely -withdrawing the British troops from Portugal, -or retracting the grounds upon which we -had hitherto assisted her?”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Grenville;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Lord Grenville replied. “He felt it,” he -said, “an ungrateful task, ... a painful duty, ... -to recal the attention of their lordships to his -former predictions, which they had despised and -rejected, but which were now, all of them, too -fatally fulfilled. His object, however, was not -a mere barren censure of past errors, but rather, -from a consideration of those errors, to conjure -them to rescue the country from a continuance -of the same disasters, and to pay some regard -to the lives of their fellow-citizens. Were they -disposed to sit in that house day after day, and -year after year, spectators of wasteful expenditure, -and the useless effusion of so much of -the best blood of the country, in hopeless, calamitous, -and disgraceful efforts? It was a sacred -duty imposed upon them to see that not one -more life was wasted, not one more drop of -blood shed unprofitably, where no thinking man -could say that, by any human possibility, such -dreadful sacrifices could be made with any prospect -of advantage. Was there any man that -heard him, who in his conscience believed that -even the sacrifice of the whole of that brave -British army would secure the kingdom of -Portugal? If,” said he, “I receive from any -person an answer in the affirmative, I shall be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_329">329</span> -able to judge by that answer of the capacity of -such a person for the government of this country, -or even for the transaction of public business -in a deliberative assembly. By whatever -circumstances, ... by whatever kind of fate it was, -I must say, that I always thought the object of -the enterprise impossible; but now I believe it -is known to all the people of this country, that -it has become certainly impossible. Was it then -too much to ask of their lordships that another -million should not be wasted, when nothing short -of a divine miracle could render it effectual to -its proposed object?” In these strong and explicit -terms did Lord Grenville declare his opinion, -that it was impossible for a British army -to secure Portugal; and thus distinctly did he -affirm, that the opinion of a statesman upon this -single point was a sufficient test of his capacity -for government.</p> - -<p>After touching upon the convention of Cintra -and Sir John Moore’s retreat, he spoke of the -impolicy of our conduct in Portugal. “If -those,” he said, “who had the management of -public affairs had possessed any wisdom, any capacity -for enlightened policy in the regulation -of a nation’s interests and constitution, any right -or sound feelings with regard to the happiness -of their fellow-creatures, here had been a wide -field opening to them. They had got possession -of the kingdom of our ally, with its government -dissolved, and no means existing within it for -the establishment of any regular authority or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">330</span> -civil administration, but such as the British government -alone should suggest. Here had been -a glorious opportunity for raising the Portugueze -nation from that wretched and degraded condition -to which a lengthened succession of mental -ignorance, civil oppression, and political tyranny -and prostitution had reduced it. Was -not that an opportunity, which any men capable -of enlarged and liberal views of policy, and influenced -by any just feelings for the interests -of their fellow-creatures, would have eagerly -availed themselves of? Would not such men -have seized with avidity the favourable occasion -to rescue the country from that ignorance and -political debasement, which rendered the inhabitants -incapable of any public spirit or national -feeling? Here was a task worthy of the greatest -statesmen; here was an object, in the accomplishment -of which there were no talents so -transcendant, no capacity so enlarged, no ability -so comprehensive, that might not have been -well, and beneficially, and gloriously employed. -It was a work well suited to a wise and liberal -policy, to an enlarged and generous spirit, to -every just feeling and sound principle of national -interest, ... to impart the blessings of a -free government to the inhabitants of a country -so long oppressed and disgraced by the greatest -tyranny that had ever existed in any nation of -Europe.”</p> - -<p>Then after arguing that time had been lost -in arming and disciplining the Portugueze, he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">331</span> -relapsed into his strain of unhappy prophecy. -“He did not,” he said, “mean to undervalue -the services or the character of the Portugueze -soldiery, whom he considered as possessing qualities -capable of being made useful, but he would -never admit that they could form a force competent -to the defence of the kingdom; they -might be useful in desultory warfare, but must -be wholly unfit for co-operation with a regular -army. He was not afraid, therefore, of any responsibility -that might be incurred by his stating, -that if the safety of the British army was -to be committed on the expectation of such co-operation, -it would be exposed to most imminent -and perhaps inevitable hazard. But if -these 30,000 men were not composed of undisciplined -peasants and raw recruits, but consisted -of British troops, in addition to the British army -already in Portugal, he should consider it nothing -but infatuation to think of defending Portugal, -even with such a force. Against a power -possessing the whole means of Spain, as he must -suppose the French to do at this moment, Portugal -was the least defensible of any country in -Europe. It had the longest line of frontier, -compared with its actual extent, of any other -nation; besides, from its narrowness, its line of -defence would be more likely to be turned; and -an invading enemy would derive great advantages -from its local circumstances. As to the -means of practical defence afforded by its mountains, -he should only ask, whether the experience<span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">332</span> -of the last seventeen years had taught the -world nothing; whether its instructive lessons -were wholly thrown away? Could it be supposed -that a country so circumstanced, with a -population without spirit, and a foreign general -exercising little short of arbitrary power within -it, was capable of any effectual defence?” Lord -Grenville concluded this memorable speech, by -moving, as an amendment to the usual address, -“that the house would without delay enter upon -the consideration of these most important subjects, -in the present difficult and alarming state -of these realms.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Earl of Liverpool;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>“It was not the fault of ministers,” Lord -Liverpool replied, “nor of the person whom -they had sent thither as his majesty’s representative, -if the exertions of the Portugueze -government were not correspondent to the dangers -of the crisis. The state of the country -must be recollected, which might truly be said -to have been without a government; all the -ancient and established authorities having disappeared -with the Prince Regent. But, under -these unpromising circumstances, every thing -was done which could be done. There was no -time lost; there was no exertion untried; there -was no measure neglected. Never were greater -exertions made to provide a sufficient force, and -never were they more successful. The noble -baron had triumphantly asked, what have we -gained in the Peninsula? We have gained the -hearts and affections of the whole population of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">333</span> -Spain and Portugal; we have gained that of -which no triumphs, no successes of the enemy -could deprive us. In Portugal, such is the -affection of the inhabitants, that there is no want -of a British soldier that is not instantly and -cheerfully supplied. Look to Spain! What is -the feeling of the people, even in this awful -moment of national convulsion and existing revolution? -It is that of the most complete deference -to the British minister and government; -and so perfect is their confidence in both, that -they have placed their fleet under the orders of -the British admiral. Would a cold, cautious, -and phlegmatic system of policy have ever produced -such proofs of confidence? Would indifference -have produced those strong and signal -proofs of affection? Whatever might be the -issue of the contest, to this country would always -remain the proud satisfaction of having -done its duty. He trusted we should never -abandon Spain, so long as any hope remained -of the possibility of ultimate success. We were -bound by every sentiment of honour and good -faith to support a people who had given proofs -of honour, of good faith, and of bravery, which -have never been exceeded by any nation.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Earl Moira;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Earl Moira replied to this, by delivering opinions -which, as a soldier, he would never have -conceived, if he had not been possessed by -party spirit. “Every thing which the ministers -attempted,” he said, “betrayed, as the universal -opinion of the public pronounced, a total<span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">334</span> -want of judgement, foresight, and vigour; and, -as the climax of error, they now seemed resolved -to defend Portugal, ... according to a plan of -defence, too, which was perfectly impracticable. -For it was utterly ridiculous to suppose, that -the ideas of Count La Lippe, as to the practicability -of defending Portugal from invasion, -could now be relied upon. We should be allowed -to retain Portugal, under our present -system, just so long as Buonaparte thought proper. -The administration of these men had been -marked by the annihilation of every foreign hope, -and the reduction of every domestic resource; -they who vaunted of their resolution and power -to protect and liberate the Continent, had only -succeeded in bringing danger close to our own -shores? And why? because they sacrificed the -interests of the nation, and violated every principle -of public duty, to gratify their personal -ambition and personal cupidity. He was speaking -the language of ninety men out of a hundred -of the whole population of the country, when he -asserted, that they deserved marked reprobation, -and exemplary punishment.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Sidmouth;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Viscount Sidmouth regretted the opportunities -which had been lost, but, with his English -feeling and his usual fairness, insisted that it -was incumbent upon us to stand by our allies to -the uttermost. The Marquis of Lansdown objected -to the measures of ministry more temperately -than his colleagues in opposition, maintaining -that it was bad policy to become a principal - -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">335</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord, Erskine;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -in a continental war. Lord Erskine spoke -in a strain of acrimonious contempt, mingled -with irrelevant accusations and unbecoming levity. -“There really,” said he, “seems to be a -sort of predestination, which I will leave the -reverend bench to explain, that whenever the -French take any country, or any prisoners, they -shall have some of our money also. I can hardly -account for the infatuation which possesses those -men, who suppose they can defend Portugal by -sending a supply of British money there. It -might as well be expected to accomplish that -by sending over the woolsack, with my noble -and learned friend upon it.”</p> - -<p>The ministers must have been well pleased -with the conduct of their opponents; they could -not have desired any thing more favourable to -themselves than the intemperance which had -been displayed, and the rash assertions and -more rash predictions, which had been so - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Holland.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -boldly hazarded against them. Lord Holland -upon this occasion made a remarkable speech, -observing, in allusion to Lords Sidmouth and -Buckinghamshire, that “he could not understand -how these lords could give their confidence -to ministers without being assured that -their confidence was deserved. We were obliged -in honour,” he said, “to do what we could -for Portugal, without injury to ourselves, ... in -honour, ... for that was the only motive that -ought to interest the feelings, or excite the -hearts of this or any other nation. But if we -were to embark in the cause of that sinking<span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">336</span> -people, we were not to load them with our imbecility, -in addition to their own weakness. A -great plan was necessary; nothing neutral or -narrow, nothing minute, nothing temporary, -could enter into it; but for this qualities were -requisite which no man could hope for in the -present ministry. Where was the address, the -ability, the knowledge, the public spirit, that -were the soul of success in such a cause? He -found them shifting from object to object, and -hanging their hope on every weak and bending -support, that failed them in the first moment of -pressure. He thought, that for defence no -government could be too free; by that he meant -too democratic; the words might not be synonymous, -but it was in such governments that -men felt of what they were capable. There -was then the full stretch of all the powers. -There was a great struggle, a great allay of the -baser passions; but there rose from them a -spirit vigorous, subtilized, and pure; there was -the triumph of all the vehement principles of the -nation; the rapid intelligence, the bold decision, -the daring courage, the stern love of country. -It was in the hour of struggle that men started up -among the ranks of the people; those bright -shapes of valour and virtue that gave a new life -to the people; those surpassing forms of dignity -and splendour that suddenly rose up, as if by -miracle, among the host, rushed to the front of -the battle, and, as in the days of old, by their -sole appearance turned the victory. But where -was the symptom of a love for free government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">337</span> -in the conduct of the ministry? The government -of Portugal had been absolutely in their -hands; had they disburdened it of its obstructions -to freedom? Had they pointed its aspect -towards democracy? Then as if the cause had -been rendered desperate because the British -ministry had not introduced democratic principles -into the governments of Spain and Portugal, -he supported the opinion of his party, and maintained -that it would be criminal to force a nation -to a defence which might draw down ruin on -them. But if we were to withdraw from the -contest, it was possible for us to do so without -degrading the country by any base avidity for -little gains, by seizing upon any of those little -pieces of plunder, which were so tempting, and -apt to overpower our resistance to the temptation. -We might leave the country of our ally -with the spirit of friendship and the purity of -honour. It was of great moment to us, in even -that meanest and lowest view of policy, to leave -the people of the Peninsula our friends; but we -must be actuated by a higher principle, and be -regretted and revered by those whom we were -forced to abandon. He could not expect this -from his majesty’s ministers, and therefore could -not think their hands fit to wield the resources, -or sustain the character of the British empire.” -Lord Holland therefore voted for the amendment, -the object of which was, that the cause of -the Peninsula should be given up as hopeless.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">March 9. </span><br />Mr. Perceval;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The debate was not less interesting in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">338</span> -Lower House, when Mr. Perceval moved for a -sum not exceeding 980,000<i>l.</i> for the defence of -Portugal; “a vote,” he said “so consistent -with the feelings which the house had professed -on former occasions, that he should not have -expected any opposition to it. He reminded -the house how those who opposed it had been -always of opinion that it was impossible for -Spain to hold out so long; that if she succeeded -at all, she must succeed at once; but that she -could never maintain a protracted contest against -the disciplined armies and enormous resources -of France. This was their declared and recorded -opinion; but what was the fact? Spain had -continued the struggle. France might occupy -the country with an army, but her power would -be confined within the limits of her military -posts, and it would require nearly as large an -army to keep possession of it as to make the -conquest. There never had existed a military -power capable of subduing a population possessing -the mind, and heart, and soul of the -Spaniards. The very victories of their enemies -would teach them discipline, and infuse into -them a spirit which would ultimately be the ruin -of their oppressors. Under these circumstances, -would it be wise to abandon Portugal? The -last Austrian war had arisen in great measure -out of the contest in the Peninsula; and during -the progress of that war, however calamitous the -result had proved, it would be in the recollection -of the house, that one other day’s successful resistance<span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">339</span> -of the French by the Austrians might -have overthrown the accumulated power of the -enemy. Such events might again take place, -for no man could anticipate, in the present -state of the world, what might arise in the course -of a short time; but be that as it might, as long -as the contest was, or could be, maintained in -the Peninsula, the best policy of this country -was to support it.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Sir J. Newport;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>To this Sir John Newport replied, “if any -question could provoke opposition, it must be -that which would make them continue efforts -in a cause which every one but the ministers -considered hopeless. As for the recorded opinion -of parliament, parliament was pledged to -support the Spaniards while they were true to -themselves; but that they had been true to -themselves he denied.” Then assuming that -the French must necessarily drive us out of -Portugal, he asked what was to be done with -the 30,000 Portugueze soldiers? “Were they -to be brought to this country, and added to the -already enormous foreign army in its service? -Or were they to be sent to Brazil? Or to be -left fully equipped, and ready to add to the military -force of Buonaparte?” In the course of -his speech Sir John Newport endeavoured to -show that the Portugueze levies had not been - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Villiers;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -expedited as they ought to have been. Mr. -Villiers, who had been our minister in Portugal, -made answer, “that the government there was -administered with great vigour; large supplies of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">340</span> -money had been raised to meet the public exigencies; -the old military constitution of the country -had been restored: the finances were ably administered -and well collected; and the war department -conducted with energy and ability. If -Spain,” he said, “had done its duty equally -with Portugal, in supporting the efforts of Great -Britain, its cause would already have triumphed, -and there would not now have been a Frenchman -upon the Spanish territory.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Curwen;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Mr. Curwen said, “that as the Portugueze -people had suffered a French army to overrun -their country without any resistance, he was -not for placing much reliance upon the Portugueze -troops. If the enemy could point out -what he would wish that we should undertake, -his first wish would be, that we should attempt -to defend Portugal. Buonaparte,” he said, -“could not receive more cheering hopes of -ultimate success, than he would derive from -learning that the present ministers were to continue -in office, and that the House of Commons -still persisted in placing a blind confidence in -them, and enabling them to enter upon measures -which, in their inevitable result, could not fail -to answer all his purposes. The vote of the -house this night, if it should decide against -attempting the defence of Portugal, would be -more important than if we were to take half the -French army prisoners.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Leslie Foster;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Mr. Leslie Foster then rose, and his speech, -in the spirit which it breathed, and the knowledge<span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">341</span> -which it displayed, formed a singular -contrast to the harangues of the opposition. -“The present proposition of his majesty,” -said he, “is partly connected with his past -conduct towards the Peninsula; it is but a -continuance and extension of the same spirit of -British resistance. It is now, however, open -to the reprehension of two classes of politicians; -those who think we never ought to have committed -ourselves for the salvation of Portugal -and Spain; and those who, having approved -of that committal while the event appeared -doubtful, think that the overwhelming power -of France has at length brought this tragedy -so nearly to a close, that nothing is left for us, -but to escape if possible from being sharers in -its catastrophe. Hope, they contend, has -vanished; there is no longer room for prediction; -history has already recorded, in letters -of blood, the fate that awaits our perseverance. -To me the aspect of the Peninsula appears an -enigma, which it is no reflection on any ministers -not perfectly to have understood; a -revolution bursting out at a period the least -expected, exhibiting events in its progress the -most singularly contradictory, and pregnant -with results which I still think no man living -can foresee. If, on the one hand, we are referred -to the apathy of Gallicia during the -retreat of Sir John Moore, ... if we are desired to -remember Ocaña and Tudela, and all the other -defeats which the Spaniards have endured, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">342</span> -endured without despondency, ... must we not in -candour remember that there was a battle of -Baylen? Are we to shut our eyes to the extraordinary -phenomenon, that in Catalonia, the -very next province to France, the French, -at this hour, appear to be as often the besieged -as the besiegers? and can we forget Zaragoza -and Gerona? But above all, shall we not do -justice to that singular obstinacy, to give it -no more glorious a character, which has sustained -their spirit under two hundred defeats, -and which, in every period of the history of -Spain, has formed its distinguishing characteristic? -The expulsion of the Moors was the -fruit of seven centuries of fighting uninterrupted, -and of 3600 battles, in many of which the -Spaniards had been defeated. In the beaten -but persevering Spaniards of these days we may -trace the descendants of those warriors, as easily -as we recognize the sons of the conquerors of -Cressy and of Agincourt in the English who -fought at Talavera. We may trace the same -fortitude and patience, the same enthusiastic -superstition, the same persevering insensibility -of failure, and, I will add, the same absolute -indifference as to liberty, constitution, or cortes, -that distinguished the expellers of the Moors. -Because we feel that freedom is the first of -blessings, it is too much to say that other nations -are to be raised in arms by no other motives -than its influence. History should have taught -us, that there is another spirit prompting men<span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">343</span> -to war, and which once poured all Europe forth -in the Crusades; and however we may pronounce -on the motives of our ancestors, the -fact we cannot deny, that the greatest spectacle -of embattled nations ever exhibited on -the theatre of war was under governments and -systems which indeed were not worth the defending. -I believe we may consider the inhabitants -of the Peninsula, first, as a multitude -of hardy and patient peasantry, buried in ignorance -and superstition, and accustomed from -their cradles, by the traditions and the songs of -their ancestors, to consider the sword as the -natural companion of the cross; and almost -inseparably to connect in idea the defence of -their religion with the slaughter of their enemies; -and with these predispositions goaded into -madness by ecclesiastics, as ignorant almost -as their flocks; but without an idea or a wish -for freedom; with <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">Fernando Settimo</i> in their -mouths, as a watch-word, and fighting, if you -will, for the continuance of the Inquisition. -And with these qualifications it is my most firm -conviction, that they would have overwhelmed -all the armies of France, but that it was their -misfortune to be cursed with a nobility in all -respects the opposite of the peasantry, differing -from them, not merely in their moral qualities, -but even in their physical appearance; a nobility -of various degrees of worthlessness, but -with a few brilliant exceptions, generally proportioned -to the rank of their nobility; and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">344</span> -further cursed by a government (I speak not -of their kings but of the Junta) both in its form -and in its substance the most abominable that -ever repressed or betrayed the energies of a -nation; hence desperate from repeated treason, -destitute of confidence, not in themselves but -in their commanders, unable to stand before -the French in battle, but still more unable to -abstain from fighting. One rare and unquestionable -feature they presented, ... a nation that -would fight with France; and certain I am, -that if we had not tried the experiment of -fighting by their side, these very men, who -now most loudly condemn the course we have -pursued, would be calling for the impeachment -of these ministers, who had neglected such -glorious opportunities; who, in the crisis of -the fate of France, had shrunk from the only -field where there was a prospect of contending -with success; who had coldly refused our aid -to the only allies who were ever worthy of -British co-operation. It is too much a habit -to call for the fruits of our battles, tacitly assuming -that nothing but the absolute and -complete attainment of our object can justify -having fought them. I never can agree to -measure the justification of a battle by the -mere fruits of victory! yet even on this ground -I must contend, that never were there laurels -the more opposite of barren, than those which -have been reaped by our countrymen in Spain. -We, indeed, wanted not to be convinced that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_345">345</span> -our army, like our navy, equalled in science, -and exceeded in courage, that of any other -nation in the world: but if we have any anxiety -for our character with other armies, if reputation -is strength, and if the reputation of a -nation, as well as of an individual, consists not -in the estimation in which it holds itself, but -in the estimation in which it is held by others, -it is a false vanity that causes us to shut our eyes -and ears to the opinions of other nations. Spain -at least had been convinced by the exertions -of her government, misrepresenting our failure -at Buenos Ayres, and other scenes of our misfortunes, -that Great Britain, omnipotent by -sea, was even ridiculous on land. So much so, -that when the army of General Spencer was -landed near Cadiz, than which a finer army -never left the English shore, it was the wonder -as well as the pity of the Spaniards, that such -noble-looking soldiers should be so absolutely -incapable of fighting. The ‘beautiful’ army -was even the emphatic denomination by which -the British forces were distinguished; and -when Sir John Moore was known to be at length -on his march, that the beautiful army, the ‘<i xml:lang="es" lang="es">hermoso -exercito</i>,’ was actually advancing, was a -subject of Spanish surprise, at least as much -as of Spanish exultation; but when that army -had commenced its retreat, old impressions -were revived with tenfold force, ‘<i xml:lang="es" lang="es">hermoso</i>’ -was no longer the epithet bestowed on it, but -one which it is impossible for me to repeat.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_346">346</span> -Nor let it be said that Coruña was a full vindication -of its fame! We indeed know that -British heroism never shone more conspicuous -than on that day; but the ray of glory which -illuminated that last scene of our retreat, -was but feebly reflected through the rest of -Spain from that distant part of the Peninsula. -The French returned in triumph to Madrid, -and boasted that they had driven us into the -sea; ... it was certain we were no longer on the -land; ... and under such circumstances it is not -surprising that Spain should have declined to -have given to us all the credit which we really -deserved. Some gentlemen, I see, are of opinion -that it is no great matter what the Spaniards -thought about us; but are we equally -indifferent to the opinions of the French? Let -us not too hastily conclude that they did full -justice to our merits. We are told, indeed, -that at Maida and in Egypt we had set that -point at rest. Of Maida, I shall only say, -that within the last month it has been, for the -first time, mentioned in any newspaper of -France, and that I believe nine-tenths of the -French soldiers have never heard either of the -battle, or of the existence of such a place; and -as to Egypt, their opinion is universally that -which General Regnier, in his most able, but -untrue representation, of those events, has laboured -to impress, namely, that the treachery -of Menou, and the detestation in which the -army held the service in Egypt, and their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">347</span> -anxiety to return to France, were the real -causes of their expulsion; and that an overwhelming -force of ninety thousand men, of -English, Turks, and Indians, which he says, -and which they believe, we brought against -them, furnished a decent excuse for their surrender. -Let us remember too, that it was -after these proofs of British military excellence, -that Buonaparte, on the heights of Boulogne, -parcelled out in promise to his soldiers the -estates of the ‘<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">nation boutiquiere</i>:’ let us remember -also our own opinions in those days, how -general engagements were to be avoided; ... how -a system of bush-fighting was to be adopted in -Kent; ... and our hopes that England might be -saved after London might be lost, ... or what -inundations we should make to protect it. Such -language was then termed ‘caution:’ but on -the proud eminence on which we are now placed, -we may afford to acknowledge there was in it -some mixture of distrust in the good old bayonet -of Britain. Where are the promises of Buonaparte -now? The very ridicule of such assertions -would render it impossible for him to repeat -them. It is these guilty ministers who have -taught to him, and what I think of much more -consequence, have taught to England, another -style of conversation. They have fairly tried -that point, so carefully avoided by their predecessors; -they have brought our armies to a -meeting with the finest armies of France; and -have added more to our strength, as well as to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">348</span> -our glory, by fighting in Spain, than their predecessors -by abstaining from it in Poland.... -Such is the view which I take of what is past: -With respect to the second point, whether the -time is indeed come, when our further assistance -can only be destruction to ourselves, without -being serviceable to our allies, a very little time -must show us that; and if there are indeed good -grounds of hope, any premature expression of -our despondency will certainly extinguish them. -The Junta is at length demolished. The French -are again dispersed over every part of the Peninsula: -the people are still every where in arms. -Let us not damp that spirit which may effect -much, and which must effect something, ... which -must at least give long employment to the forces -of our enemy. If, indeed, it depended solely -upon us, whether our allies should continue that -sacrifice of blood which they have so profusely -shed, I should not think us justifiable in purchasing -our quiet at such a price: but convinced -as I am, that whether we stand by them, or -forsake them, those gallant nations will still -continue to bleed at every pore, our assistance -assumes a new character; and independent of -the advantages to be derived to ourselves, ... independent -of 200,000 Frenchmen already fallen, -... independent of not less than 300,000 more -required even to preserve existence in the Peninsula, -... independent of Brazil and South -America, for ever severed from our enemies, ... -and independent of the fleets of the Peninsula,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">349</span> -I trust, rescued from their grasp, ... independent -of these gains to ourselves, there is another feeling -binding upon a nation, as well as upon an -individual, not to forsake our friend because he is -in his greatest danger!... Still, however, I acknowledge -a limit there must be, beyond which -we cannot go, and whenever we can agree in -declaring that</p> - -<p class="p1 b1 center"> -Funditus occidimus, neque habet Fortuna regressum, -</p> - -<p class="in0">then, indeed, the first laws of self-preservation -will call on us to discontinue the contest. But -surely Great Britain will not utter such a sentiment -until her allies shall be disposed to join -in it. They do not despair, and I will never -despair of them so long as they do not despair -of themselves, ... so long as I should leave it -in their power to say to us at a future day, -‘Whence these chains?... If you had stood firm -a little longer, ... if you had not so soon fainted, -... we should not at this day be in the power of -our enemies!’”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>General Ferguson;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>General Ferguson was the first person who -rose after Mr. Leslie Foster had concluded this -able and manly speech. “He had been in Portugal,” -he said, and “he did not think there -were 30,000 soldiers in that country; those that -were there had certainly, through the exertions -of General Beresford and other British officers, -attained an appearance of discipline: but he -feared that an army adequate to the task of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_350">350</span> -defending Portugal must be able to make a stand -in the first instance; and if obliged to retreat, -must still, as opportunity offered, return to the -charge; and thus make resistance after resistance. -Now he was decidedly of opinion, from -what he had seen and heard of them, that on -the very first defeat the little discipline of the -Portugueze army would vanish, and a dispersion -be the consequence.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Fitzgerald;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Mr. Fitzgerald asked whether ministers had -employed transports to bring away our cavalry -from Portugal? in this service, he said, our -money would be best employed. He had never -heard of any achievement performed by the -Portugueze, except, indeed, that 2000 of them, -with the Bishop of Porto at their head, had -entered Porto, and taken twenty-four Frenchmen - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Milton;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -prisoners. Lord Milton repeated the erroneous -proposition of the Marquis of Lansdowne, that -it was highly improper to act as principals in a -foreign country, instead of as auxiliaries. “No -reasonable man,” he affirmed, “could vote a -million of the public money for such a purpose, -when the French were under the walls of Cadiz. -It had often been the practice to subsidize -foreign troops, but he believed it had never -before entered the head of any English statesman -to grant subsidies to the Portugueze, ... to -those, in fact, among whom the materials for - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Bankes;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -an army could not be found.” Mr. Bankes -talked of the money: “We had it not to spare, -and if we had, even then we ought not to spare<span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">351</span> -it. Too much had already been furnished to -the Spaniards. Where were we to find more? -specie we had not, and paper would not answer. -The enemy were now perhaps in possession of -Cadiz, which had escaped immediate capture -only through an accident. The Cortes had not -even a town in Spain to meet in. It was quite -romantic to expect that a British army, of 20,000 -or 25,000 men, even with whatever co-operation -Portugal could give, would be able to maintain -the war there as a principal against France. He -must oppose the motion, and recommend that -the resources of the country should be husbanded -for our defence.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Jacob;<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Upon this, Mr. Jacob, who had recently returned -from Spain, denied that France had any -complete occupation of that country, either civil -or military. In Catalonia, he said, it would be -difficult to say, whether there were at that -moment more Spanish towns besieged by the -French, or towns occupied by French troops -besieged by the Spaniards; and the communications -were so completely cut off, that the -French could not send a letter from Barcelona -to Gerona, without an escort of at least 500 -cavalry to protect it. Generally speaking, -throughout the whole of Spain, those towns -only were surrendered which were under the -influence of the nobility and gentry of large -estates; but the mass of the people were patriotic, -and the villages were defended after the -towns had been betrayed. And not only the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">352</span> -villages, but the mountains, were still obstinately -defended. He believed, that among the nobility -and gentry, where there were two brothers, the -man of great possessions was always for submitting -to the enemy, while the other joined the -patriotic standard. We had been accustomed -to consider civil wars as the most horrible of all -kinds of hostilities, but never was any civil war -so horrible as that which was now raging in -Spain. The massacre, the pillage, and the violence -offered to women, were unparalleled. He -had lately been witness to some of these atrocities. -The town of Puerto Real had surrendered -upon terms, and Victor, upon entering it, published -a proclamation, promising the most perfect -security to all the inhabitants. Nevertheless, -he had hardly taken possession before he ordered -the men, who were mostly artificers at the docks -in Cadiz, to be imprisoned, and the females were -marched down to St. Mary’s, to be violated by -his army.</p> - -<p>It might have been thought that such a statement -as this could have produced but one effect, -or at least that no man could have been found -who would attempt to weaken its effect, by - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Whitbread;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -recriminating upon his own country. Mr. Whitbread, -however, after observing that he believed -Mr. Jacob had gone to Spain upon a mission, -half commercial, half diplomatic, demanded of -him whether he had been an eye-witness of these -atrocities; and if he were, or if he were not, why -he had detailed them, unless it was to inflame<span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">353</span> -the house upon a question where their judgement -only ought to decide? “Abuses, no doubt,” -he said, “must have prevailed; but were gentlemen -aware of none committed under circumstances -of less provocation, when the clergy -received the mandates of power to ascend their -pulpits, and issue from them falsehoods not more -rank than they were notorious?” Such is the -language which Mr. Whitbread is reported to -have uttered upon this occasion. He proceeded -to ask, “Where was the spirit of the Spaniards? -where were its effects? were they seen in suffering -the French to pass over the face of -their country, like light through an unresisting -medium? We were gravely told that the post -could not pass unmolested; no doubt this was -a most serious calamity, and a conclusive proof -of the energy of the popular spirit, ... only, unfortunately, -we had the same proof in Ireland! -Spain,” he averred, “had not done its duty ... no -matter from what cause; the people had, however, -some excuse, they had been under the -selfish sway of an aristocracy, that only wanted -to use them as an instrument for effecting their -own narrow purposes; their implicit confidence -had been abused by the blind bigotry of an intolerant -priesthood, ... a priesthood that, whatever -it preached, practised not the gospel; they had -had the sword in their hands as often as the -crosier, and they had had, he feared, in their -hearts any thing but the meekness, humility, -charity, and peace, that their blessed Master had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">354</span> -inculcated by his pure precepts, enforced by the -example of his spotless life, and sealed by the -last sufferings of his all-atoning death. While,” -said Mr. Whitbread, “I value those precepts -and that example, I never can take pleasure in -setting man against his fellow-man in a hopeless -struggle. I think the present cause hopeless, -and as such I never will consent to its being -uselessly and cruelly protracted.”</p> - -<p>Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Bathurst spoke like -men in whom the principle of opposition was -not the pole star of their political course. The - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Huskisson;<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -question, Mr. Huskisson said, was, whether we -were to withhold from his majesty’s ministers the -means by which the contest might be rendered - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Bathurst.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -more likely to be successful. Mr. Bathurst said, -it was enough for him to know that an alliance -with Portugal had been concluded, and that -Portugal, in virtue of that alliance, demanded -our assistance. An amendment was moved by -Mr. Tierney, tending to refuse the grant, and -142 members voted for it, over whom ministers -had a majority of sixty-two. In the Lords, the -numbers had been 94, and 124.</p> - -<p>To comment upon the language of the opposition -in these debates would be superfluous. The -ignorance which they displayed of the national -character of the Spaniards and Portugueze, and -of the nature of the seat of war, the contemptuous -superiority which they assumed, and the -tone in which they ridiculed and reviled our -allies, were of little moment; but the debate<span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">355</span> -was of main importance, because the party committed -themselves completely upon the defence -of Portugal, declaring, in the most confident -and positive terms, that it was hopeless, and -ought not to be attempted. Their journalists -took up the subject in the same strain, and followed -the unhappy pattern of prediction which -had been set them. One of two things, they -said, must necessarily happen to these 30,000 -Portugueze troops; either they must fall into -the hands of the French, or we must bring them -out of Portugal. The possibility that, with a -British army, they might be able successfully to -defend their country, these men had neither -wisdom, nor knowledge, nor virtue to contemplate. -Could it be doubted for a moment, they -said, that Spain would be subdued, from one -extremity to the other, before the end of six -months? They copied, too, as faithfully, the -false and slanderous representations which were -made of the Portugueze. A thousand Portugueze, -they said, would fly before a single French -company, just as so many gipsies would run away -from a constable. We might raise a better legion -in Norwood. Was there an English colonel -who would give five shillings a dozen for such -recruits, or a serjeant who would be at the expense -of a bowl of punch for fourscore of them? -The French and their partizans did not fail to -make due use of what was thus advanced in -their favour; but the Portugueze were too well -acquainted with the real character and feelings<span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">356</span> -of this nation to have their faith in British friendship -shaken by the gross misrepresentations of a -virulent party: and they knew, perhaps, that -statesmen who take part against the government -and against the allies of their country, and -writers who pervert to the most wicked and -perilous purposes the freedom of the press, are -the concomitant evils of a free constitution like -ours, under which both public and private -libellers breed like vermin in a genial climate.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Reform of the Portuguese army.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Meantime the Portugueze army, which, under -a system of complicated abuses, had been -reduced to the lowest possible state of degradation, -was reformed in all its branches by the indefatigable -exertions of Marshal Beresford. He -had to contend not only with the inveterate -evils which had grown up during the long perversion -of government, but with that spirit of -insubordination which, at the outbreak of these -troubles, the general anarchy had produced. -The soldiers had begun to claim and exert the -power of choosing their own officers; an end -was immediately put to this ruinous license, and -at the same time means were taken for removing -the cause of complaint wherever it had originated, -by recalling the officers as well as the -men to a sense of their duty, and by introducing -British officers in sufficient number to -give the army consistence and effect till they -might gradually be replaced by native Portugueze. -Equal justice, which in that country -had been as little known as liberty of conscience,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">357</span> -was promised and administered; the -troops were told that the Marshal was at all -times ready to hear their complaints, through -the proper channel; and that if any officer excused -himself from forwarding the complaint of -a soldier, the soldier might address it directly -to the commander-in-chief. But the Marshal -said it was his duty to be impartial, and the -officers had as much right to justice as the -soldiers. Severe penalties had been denounced -against desertion, but with so little effect, that -nearly seven hundred cases occurred during the -month of April in this year; the punishment of -death was then inflicted on one offender, and -two others were degraded to Angola. At the -same time the officers were not allowed to absent -themselves from their duty under pretext -of illness; certificates to this effect had been -so greatly abused, that they were no longer to -be regarded without such actual inspection as -the Marshal might appoint; and one person of -high family was dismissed the service for a subterfuge -of this kind. Courts-martial were -made to understand their proper functions by -being reprimanded in general orders; and the -<i>Misericordia</i> which had interfered to suspend -the execution of an officer who had received -money from the French, and entered their service, -was informed that its privileges did not -extend to these cases, and that the sentence -must be carried into effect.</p> - -<p>It was necessary to raise the military character<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">358</span> -in the opinion of the soldiers themselves, -as well as of the nation. But before this could -be done, the sense of cleanliness and decency -was to be restored: for the troops, in that -sullen state of self-neglect which discomfort and -hopelessness produce, had well-nigh lost all -sense of either. The Commander-in-chief told -them that many of the evils which the army -suffered were occasioned by the want of cleanliness; -that health could not be preserved without -it, that the soldiers must wash themselves -frequently, and that it grieved him to say, he -must require the officers to set them an example; -that fatigue was no excuse for neglecting -this essential duty, for after a long march -nothing was so refreshing; that every officer -must be responsible for the cleanliness of the -men under his command, and that he himself -would never excuse any officer whom he should -see dirty. He gave orders that the men should -be provided with soap, brushes, and combs; -that they should brush their clothes and clean -their shoes every day, and be punished if they -neglected this; and as the summer approached, -he required the officers, whenever an opportunity -occurred, to make the men bathe by companies. -The Portugueze soldiers, it was said, like -those of every other country, desired to appear -with a military air, and with that propriety -which belongs to the military character, and -the men who most affected this appearance -were always the best soldiers; it was the business<span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">359</span> -of the officers, therefore, to see that they -were provided with every thing necessary for -maintaining it. While this indispensable attention -to cleanliness was exacted, every possible -provision was made both for their health<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> and -comfort. A dispensation was obtained from -the Pope’s Legate, allowing the troops the use -of meat while on service, every day in the year, -except on Ash-Wednesday and Good-Friday. -The huge regimental kettles, which, after the -Mahommedan custom, were still used in the -Portugueze army, and which, from the inconvenience -of carrying them, frequently did not -come up with the troops till long after they -were wanted, were laid aside, and light tin vessels -substituted, which might be always at hand. -An injurious custom of marching in their cloaks -when it rained, and even using the blanket at -such times as an additional covering, was prohibited; -the men, they were told, knew by experience, -that no clothing could protect them -against the rain during a wet march, and therefore -they were ordered to keep cloak and -blanket dry for their own comfort when they -reached the journey’s end. The officers and -non-commissioned officers were in the habit of -kicking and striking the soldiers; wherever -British officers commanded this was immediately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">360</span> -forbidden, and their example, with the decided -opinion of Marshal Beresford, nearly, or altogether, -put a stop to the unmanly practice. -The ordinary punishment, though less disgraceful -and severe than the abominable system of -flogging, proved more frequently fatal; it consisted -in striking the soldier on the back, across -the shoulders, with the broad side of a sword. -The number of strokes, or <i>pancadas</i>, never exceeded -fifty; but men have not unfrequently been -known to drop down dead after receiving thirty, -from a rupture of the aorta. Marshal Beresford -ordered a small cane to be used instead of -the sword; and thus, without altering the national -manner of punishment, rendered it no -longer dangerous.</p> - -<p>There were other evils which were beyond -his power. When the troops of the line were -recruited, it was neither done by ballot nor by -bounty: a certain number were demanded from -each district; the captain of that district picked -whom he chose, sent them to prison till he had -collected the whole number, then marched -them to join their regiment. The Marshal introduced -the easy improvement of sending -them to a recruiting depôt, to be drilled before -they joined; but he fixed upon the peninsula of -Peniche, a swampy and unwholesome spot, -which proved fatal to many, acting with double -effect upon the depressed, half-starved, and ill-treated -peasants, who were sent thither. The -sick, the lame, and the lazy, were crowded into<span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">361</span> -the same dungeon when recruited by the Capitam -Mor; contagion was thus generated, and -very often those, and those especially, who were -fit for the service, were carried off by disease. -The depôt was afterwards removed to Mafra, -which is a healthy situation.</p> - -<p>Over the method of levying troops Marshal -Beresford had no control. But the hospitals, -which were infinitely more destructive to the -army than the sword of the enemy, and would -have destroyed it much faster than it could -have been recruited, were greatly improved -under a British inspector, though the government -would not permit his regulations to be -carried into effect to their full extent. Still a -great and material improvement was accomplished. -The commissariat had been so conducted, -as to be at once inefficient for the army, -and oppressive for the people. A board of administration -at Lisbon had its intendants in -every province, and its factors in every town. -Government contracted for provisions and forage, -at fixed prices, with the board, and the -board directed its agents to purchase what -might be required for the troops on the spot. -Payment was made by bills upon the board, -which in the best times were seldom taken up -till twelve months after they became due, and -in the present state of things were considered -to be worth nothing. The farmer, therefore, -naturally concealed his grain; it was seldom -that magazines were formed, or any provision<span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">362</span> -made against scarcity; and what the farmer -could not or would not sell at the disadvantageous -rate which the factors offered, was usually -taken, when it could be found, by force. Marshal -Beresford got commissaries appointed to -the different brigades, but he could not get -money for them, and therefore they were of -little use. To reform the civil establishments -of the army was almost as difficult as it would -have been to reform the government; the utmost -exertions of the Marshal, aided as they -were by Lord Wellington’s interference, availed -nothing, ... being opposed by every species of -low cunning and court intrigue. For the old -corruptions existed in full vigour, notwithstanding -the removal of the court to Brazil; and the -body politic continued to suffer under its inveterate -disease, a <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">morbus pediculosus</i>, from which -nothing but a system of reform, wisely, temperately, -firmly, and constitutionally pursued, -could purify it, and restore it to health and -strength.</p> - -<p>Much, however, was done for Portugal, ... -enough to be ever remembered by that country -with gratitude, and by Great Britain with a generous -and ennobling pride. An English commissariat, -scrupulously exact in all its dealings, -relieved the farmers in great measure from the -oppression of their own government. The soldiers -learnt to respect their officers and themselves; -they rapidly improved in discipline; -they acquired confidence, and became proud of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">363</span> -their profession. The government itself found -it necessary to alter its old system of secrecy -and delusion; the dispatches of Lord Wellington -and Marshal Beresford were published in -the Lisbon Gazette, and the people of Portugal -were officially informed of the real circumstances -of the war, as fairly and as fully as they -had been in the War of the Acclamation.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">364</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XXX">CHAPTER XXX.<br /> - -<span class="subhead">SIEGE OF HOSTALRICH. ATTEMPT UPON VALENCIA. -CAPTURE OF LERIDA. OPERATIONS BEFORE CADIZ.</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p><span class="firstword">If</span> proof had been wanting that men of any -country may be made good soldiers under good -discipline, it might have been seen at this time -in Buonaparte’s armies, where the Italians, who -in their own country ran like sheep before the -French, were now embodied with them, and -approved themselves in every respect equal to -their former conquerors. These men, who were -taken by the conscription to bear part in a war -wherein they had no concern, who had no -national character to support, nothing but the -spirit of their profession to animate them, were -nevertheless equal to any service required from -them, and needed no other excitement than that -they were fighting for pay, and plunder, and -life. Was it then to be doubted, that if the -same care were bestowed in training, the same -results would be seen in the Spaniards and Portugueze, -who were under the influence of every -passion and every principle which can strengthen -and elevate the heart of man, ... both people too -being alike remarkable for national feeling, and -for patience under difficulties and privations, docility<span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">365</span> -to their superiors, and faithful attachment -to those in whom they trust? It was not indeed -to be expected that the Spaniards would -so far acknowledge their military degradation -as to put themselves under the tuition of an -ally; Spain had not abated sufficiently of its old -pretensions, thus to humiliate itself. Neither -indeed was that degradation so complete as it -had been in Portugal. The Spanish artillery -was most respectable; and there were officers -in the army who had studied their profession, -and whose talents might have raised them to -distinction in the proudest age of Spanish history. -But the Portugueze were conscious of -their weakness, and in this knowledge they found -their strength: for when that brave and generous -people, in the extremity of their fortune, -submitted implicitly to the direction of their -old hereditary ally, ... when they offered hands -and hearts for the common cause, and asked for -assistance and instruction, the ultimate success -of that cause became as certain as any thing can -possibly be deemed by human foresight. With -Portugal for the scene of action, and her population -ready for every sacrifice that duty might -require, it remained only for Great Britain to -feel and understand its own strength, and employ -its inexhaustible resources in exertions adequate -to the occasion.</p> - -<p>But Great Britain as yet hardly understood -its strength. The cold poison which was continually -instilled by party writers into the public ear<span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">366</span> -had produced some effect even upon the sound -part of the nation. From the commencement -of the war it had been proclaimed as a truth too -certain to be disputed, that England could no -longer as a military power compete with France, -consequently that we must rely upon our insular -situation, and husband our resources. These -opinions had been so long repeated, that they -had acquired something like the authority of -prescription; the government itself seemed to -distrust the national power, and in the fear of -hazarding too much, apportioned always for -every service the smallest possible force that -could be supposed adequate to the object, instead -of placing at the general’s disposal such -ample means as might ensure success. The first -departure from this over-cautious system was in -the expedition to Walcheren, where a great -armament was worse than wasted. That miserable -enterprise weakened the government, and -in some degree disheartened it; and Lord Wellington, -in addition to the other difficulties of -his situation, had long to struggle with insufficient -means. But the exertions and the experience -of the last year had not been lost: the -British army had acquired a reputation which, -however successfully Buonaparte concealed it -from the French people, was felt by his soldiers -and his generals: time had been gained for -training the Portugueze troops, and preparing -for the defence of Portugal; and the British -Commander having proved both his enemies and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">367</span> -his allies, had clearly foreseen the course which -the war would take, and determined upon his -own measures with the calmness of a mind that -knew how to make the best advantage of the -events it could not control.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>O’Donnell appointed to the command in Catalonia.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>While both parties were preparing for a campaign -in Portugal, in which the enemy expected -to complete the conquest of the Peninsula, and -Lord Wellington felt assured that the tide of -their fortune would be turned; while the war -before Cadiz was pursued with little exertion or -enterprise on either side, and the cities of Andalusia -were occupied without a struggle by the -invaders; in Catalonia the contest was carried -on with renewed vigour. The fall of Gerona -enabled the besieging army to undertake farther -operations; but the Catalans, as well as the -French, had changed their commander. Upon -Blake’s recall to the south, D. Juan de Henestrosa -had succeeded to the command; the provincial -Junta however, in accord with the general -wish of the people and of the troops, appointed -O’Donnell in his stead, and this nomination was - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Garcia Conde made governor of Lerida.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -confirmed by the Regency. It gave offence to -Garcia Conde, who was an older officer, and had -also distinguished himself during the siege of - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Von Staff, 246.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Gerona. He resigned the command of the first -division in disgust: this act of intemperance, -however, was overlooked, and he was made -governor of Lerida, a post of great importance -at that time, but to which his services and -his character seemed fairly to entitle him. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_368">368</span> -Duque del Parque had more reason for displeasure -at O’Donnell’s promotion; in the belief -that he was to have the command in Catalonia -by the express desire of the Catalan people, -he had taken leave of his own army, and -Romana had been appointed to succeed him.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Rapid promotion in the Spanish armies.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>If heroes who carry victory with their single -presence were to be produced as if by miracle, -according to Lord Holland’s supposition, by -democratic institutions, during such struggles -as that in which the Spaniards were engaged, -fairer opportunities for their appearance could -not have been afforded under the most democratic -forms than were given both by the Central -Junta and by the Regency. There had been a -flagrant exception in the case of Alburquerque; -the union of high rank, deserved popularity, and -great military talents in his person, had excited -unworthy jealousies in some, and worse passions -in others: but in every other instance, promotion -had rapidly followed upon desert; a rash -and even ruinous confidence had been shown -where any promise of ability appeared; and men -were raised so rapidly, that they became giddy -with their sudden elevation. But Henrique -O’Donnell justified the expectations which had -been formed of him. While the French proclaimed -in their official accounts, that now Gerona -had been taken, little more was required -for the complete subjugation of Catalonia; that -the Ampurdam was already reduced; that the -peasants, as they were taken in arms, were hung<span class="pagenum" id="Page_369">369</span> -up in great numbers upon the trees along the -road side, and that the French communications -had at length been rendered secure, the fall of -Gerona, like that of Zaragoza, had animated the -Spaniards, not discouraged them: they looked -to the spirit which the garrison and the inhabitants -had displayed, not to the surrender which -famine had rendered inevitable, and in the religious -and heroic endurance which had there -been manifested, found cause for more ennobling -pride and surer hope than a victory in the -field would have given them. Eroles was charged -by the superior Junta to enforce the decree for -embodying every fifth man. He called upon -the Catalans in language suited to the times, -reminding them of their forefathers who spread -terror through the Greek empire; and referring -to those regiments of the Gerona garrison, which -but a little while before the siege had been filled -up with men thus levied, as having exemplified -not less illustriously the powerful effects of discipline. -By this means the army was recruited, -and the men hoping for change of fortune with -every change of commander, entered cheerfully -upon the service under O’Donnell, who had -hitherto only been known by his adventurous -exploits and his success.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Conduct of the people of Villadrau.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>In the other parts of Spain, grievously as all -had suffered, the scene of action had frequently -been shifted; but in Catalonia there had been -no intermission. From the commencement till -the termination of the war, the struggle was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">370</span> -carried on there without an interval of rest. A -memorable instance of the provincial spirit was -given at this time by the people of Villadrau, -an open town, in the plain of Vich; on the approach -of an enemy’s detachment, which they -had no means of resisting, the whole of its inhabitants, -in the middle of February, retired to -the mountains. The French Commandant, -finding the place utterly deserted, wrote to the -Regidor, telling him that if the inhabitants were -not brought back by the following day, he should -be obliged to report their conduct to Marshal -Augereau, and take the necessary measures for -reducing them to obedience: at the same time -he assured him that the most effectual means -should be used for preserving order. This answer -was returned by the Regidor: “All these -people, that the French nation may know the -love they bear to their religion, their King, and -their country, are contented to remain buried -among the snows of Montsen, rather than submit -to the hateful dominion of the French -troops.” So many families, in the same spirit, -forsook their homes, rather than remain subject -to the invaders, that the superior Junta, at -O’Donnell’s suggestion, issued an order for -providing them with quarters in the same manner -as the soldiers. The exceptions to this -spirit were found, where they were to be expected, -in the rich commercial towns, as at -Reus. If the people of Barcelona, like those -of Villadrau, and of so many smaller places,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_371">371</span> -had abandoned their houses, that city could not -long have been held by the enemy; in that case -the blockade might have been as rigorous, and -almost as effectual by land as by sea: but provisions -for the use of the inhabitants were allowed -by the Spanish generals to enter; and -therefore, though the French might be sometimes -inconvenienced, it was certain that they -would never be exposed to any serious danger -of famine.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Hostalrich.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The communication between Gerona and that -city was impeded by Hostalrich, a modern fortress, -overlooking a small and decayed town, -which had once been fortified. It is situated -on high and broken ground, seven leagues from -Gerona. The intermediate country is of the -wildest character, consisting of mountains covered -with pines; the road winds through sundry -defiles, so narrow, that in most places the river -nearly fills up the way; the pass is so difficult, -that in one part it has obtained the name of El -Purgatorio; and the outlet is commanded by -this fortress. Part of the town had been burnt -during the siege of Gerona, when the magazines -which had been collected there were taken by -the enemy. An enemy’s division, under the -Italian General Mazzuchelli, occupied it now, -preparatory to the siege of the castle; the inhabitants, -upon their approach, took refuge in -the church, and there defended themselves till -a detachment of the garrison sallied, and relieved -them; and before the blockade of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_372">372</span> -fortress was pressed, they had time to remove -and seek shelter where they could. The garrison -meantime prepared for a Spanish defence. -This fortress, said the governor Julian de Estrada, -is the daughter of Gerona, and ought to -imitate the example of its mother!</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Commencement of the siege.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The siege began on the 13th of January: a -week afterwards one of the outworks, called the -Friars’ Tower, was attacked; the officer in command, -D. Francisco Oliver, was killed by a hand-grenade, -which exploded as he was in the act -of throwing it; and the man who succeeded -him, immediately, either through cowardice, or -from a worse motive, surrendered his post. Augereau, -who was at this time come to inspect -the siege and accelerate the operations, thought -it a good opportunity to intimidate the governor. -He therefore summoned him to surrender, saying, -that the garrison should in that case be -allowed the honours of war, and marched as -prisoners into France; giving them two hours -to reply, and warning them that if they refused -to submit upon this summons, they must not -expect to be treated like soldiers, but should -suffer capital punishment, as men taken in rebellion -against their lawful king. Estrada replied, -that the Spaniards had no other king than -Ferdinand VII. The siege was carried on with -little vigour till the 20th of February, when -the French began to bombard the fort; but the -men who defended it showed themselves worthy -of the cause in which they were engaged, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">373</span> -of their commander; and here, as at Gerona, -the French, with all their skill, and all their -numbers, found that the strength of a fortress -depends less upon its walls and bulwarks, than -upon the virtue of those who defend it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>First success of O’Donnell.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The force under Augereau’s command was -sufficiently large for carrying on the siege of -Hostalrich, commencing operations against Lerida, -and acting at the same time against O’Donnell, -whose troops the French Marshal despised, -as consisting merely of raw levies. He was soon -taught to respect them and their General; for -when he himself went to Barcelona with a considerable -convoy of stores, and 1500 of the garrison -were sent to occupy O’Donnell’s attention, -not a fifth part of the number effected their retreat -into the city. More than 500 of the -French were slain, and nearly as many taken - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Desertion from the French army.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -prisoners. They suffered a greater loss from -desertion. Buonaparte had pursued the wicked -policy of forcing into his own service the Austrian -prisoners taken in the late war; 800 of -these men went over to the Spaniards in a body, -stipulating only that they might keep their arms, -and remain together, till they should be distributed -among the regiments of the line. General -Doyle had addressed proclamations to -the soldiers in the French service, not only in -the French and Spanish languages, but in Italian, -Dutch, German, and Polish also, setting -before them the real cause of a war, the nature -of which they saw and felt. The Catalans too<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">374</span> -had learnt the good policy of distinguishing between -the French and the foreigners in the -French army, treating the latter, when they -were taken, with kindness, as men who had been -brought against them by compulsion. The -effect of this system, and of the proclamations, -was such as greatly to alarm the enemy. They -lost in this manner more than 6000 men, wretched -as the service was to which the men went over. -It was not possible for them to take any effectual -means for checking this evil, when such -constant opportunities were offered in the desultory -warfare which they were compelled to -carry on.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Want of concert between the provinces.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Had the Spanish army been even in a tolerable -condition, this cause must have produced -the ruin of the French in Catalonia; but the -deserters found that they were exchanging a -bad service for a worse. The French troops, -though by a policy not less ruinous than detestable, -left to supply themselves as they could, -were, even at the worst, better provided than -the Spaniards in their best state. They had -always the benefit of system, regularity, and -order; while the Spaniards suffered as much -from the confusion which insubordination and -the total want of method occasioned, as from -neglect on the part of the local authorities and -the provincial government. Owing to these -combined causes their armies were often in a -state of destitution. Unanimous as Spain was -in its feeling of indignant abhorrence at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_375">375</span> -insolent usurpation which Buonaparte had attempted, -it was divided against itself whenever -provincial interests appeared to clash. Neither -Catalonia nor Valencia would at this time make -common cause with Arragon, although they -were engaged with the same passionate feeling, -for the same object, against the same enemy, -and although their own safety was immediately -involved in the fate of that kingdom. The -Arragonese army consisted of about 13,000 men -in three divisions, one of which was near Teruel, -another near Tortosa, and the third on the line -of the Cinca; the men were without pay, without -arms, without clothing; the officers on a fourth -part of their appointments. Twenty thousand -men would eagerly have joined that army, if -they could have been armed and fed; the people -had given abundant proof of their zeal, and -spirit, and devotion, and the army had done its -duty: yet Valencia would spare them none of -its own ample resources, and the Catalan government -even stopped the supplies which were intended -for Arragon. The Arragonese felt this -the more indignantly, because, while Lazan was -at their head, his rank and influence ensured -some attention to his representations on their -behalf; but Lazan, whether or not justly, had -been arrested, as being implicated in the intrigues -of Montijo and D. Francisco Palafox, -and was kept a close prisoner in Peñiscola. The -judge who officially inquired into his conduct -declared that there was not the slightest proof - -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">376</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />February.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -against him; and upon the overthrow of the -Central Junta, Saavedra dispatched an order for -his liberation; but the Junta of Valencia, with -that order in their hands, detained him in strict -confinement.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Neglect of the Valencian government.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>No province had as yet suffered so little as -Valencia; the people were proud of the spirit -and signal success with which they had repelled -Marshal Moncey from the walls of their capital; -their country was the most fertile and most populous -part of Spain; men were in abundance, -wealth was not wanting, and there were more -appearances of activity and preparation than -were any where else to be seen. In every town -and village militia and guerilla bands were -formed; about 50,000 were thus embodied, the -greater part armed with fire-arms; and besides -these there were 11,000 troops of the line; but -with this force nothing was undertaken. Good -service might have been rendered on one side -by harassing the enemy’s communications in -La Mancha; and scenes of more important -action were open both in Arragon and Catalonia, -... even on their own borders; but the will, -courage, and means were inefficient, for want of -capacity in their leaders. They waited for the -enemy upon their own ground, in hope and in -confidence, but without foresight or system. -General Doyle endeavoured to convince the -provincial government that no time should be -lost in fortifying the important points of Morella, -Oropesa, and Murviedro. He inferred<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">377</span> -from some of Suchet’s movements an intention -to establish himself in the latter place, which -would have cut off the communication between -Catalonia and the rest of Spain, and have given -him command of the Huerta de Valencia, and -of the whole country to the very gates of Tortosa. -But in the confidence and confusion -which prevailed alike in the people and in the -officers and the rulers, nothing was done; and -so far were they from storing Tarragona, and -forming a depôt at Peñiscola, as the importance -of the crisis required, that Tortosa itself had -not at this time provisions for a week’s consumption. -They relied upon the defence of -their frontier, upon their own numbers and resources, -upon fortune and Providence; for themselves, -they were ready to meet the danger manfully -whenever it should come, ... but as for any -system of defence, to fortune and Providence -that seemed to be left.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The force on the Valencian frontier dispersed.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Valencians were in this state when the -half-armed, half-clothed, half-hungered Arragonese, -with whom their abundant means ought -to have been shared, were dispersed, and the -frontier in consequence was left open. General -Caro determined to march upon Teruel, which -the French had entered, but the movements of -an active enemy soon compelled him to change -this determination. One division of Suchet’s -army advanced from Alcañiz upon Morella; no -means had been taken for strengthening that -important point, the Valencians therefore fell<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">378</span> -back from thence, and from San Mateo also, -and the enemy, without experiencing any opposition, -proceeded by Burriol with all speed -toward Murviedro. Meantime Suchet with the -other division advanced upon the same point -by way of Alventosa; there he encountered a -brave resistance from the vanguard of Caro’s -army, and after a contest, which lasted nearly -the whole day, was repulsed. The Spanish -commander, expecting a renewal of the attack, -requested a reinforcement from Segorbe; he -was informed in reply, that General Caro had -ordered the troops to fall back upon the capital. -This disheartened men who were too prone to -interpret an order for retreating as a signal for -flight; they dispersed upon the next attack, -leaving the artillery upon the ground; Segorbe -was entered in pursuit, and Suchet, having -sacked that place, effected a junction with the -other division of his army at Murviedro.</p> - -<p>His corps consisted of about 12,000 men, -with thirty field-pieces; a force manifestly insufficient -for its object, if he had not counted -upon the success of his machinations in the capital. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Suchet advances against Valencia.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -From thence he advanced to the Puig, -and having fixed his head-quarters on the spot - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">March 6.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -where King Jayme el Conquistador had encamped -when he undertook the conquest of -Valencia, he addressed a letter to the Captain -General Caro, saying, that he came not to -make war upon the happy capital of the finest -kingdom in Spain, nor to lay waste the delicious<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">379</span> -country which surrounded it, but to offer protection -and peace, such as Jaen, and Granada, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />March.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -and Cordoba, and Seville were enjoying. Andalusia -had submitted; the army, having discharged -its duty, had entered into the service -of King Joseph Napoleon; and the militia, -consisting of men enlisted by force, and under -the penalty of death if they refused, had been -dismissed. Religion was respected, justice observed, -private property untouched; and General -Caro was now invited to open the gates of -Valencia, that the French might enter, and he -might deserve the blessings of his country. -Wherefore should he prolong a contest, the -issue of which the Spaniards themselves could -now no longer consider doubtful? They had -done enough to prove their courage, and it was -time that their sufferings should have an end. -The Captain General’s answer contained some -stinging truths, and some remarkable falsehoods. -It contrasted the professions of General Suchet -with his actual conduct; and it assured him that -the French had been completely defeated between -Puerto Real and the Isle of Leon, that they had -evacuated Seville in consequence, and were in -full retreat toward the Sierra Morena. Authentic -intelligence was so irregularly communicated, -and the most extravagant reports so -eagerly propagated and so readily believed, that -it is very possible the Captain General of Valencia -believed the incredible statement which -he advanced. Suchet addressed a summons<span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">380</span> -also to the inhabitants of Valencia, calling upon -them as proprietors and parents to consult their -own interest and their duty, by preserving their -beautiful and flourishing city from the calamities -of war. They returned for answer, that -they were prepared to sacrifice every thing in -the defence of their just cause; that having -defeated Moncey in a similar attempt, they had -good reason now to hope for the same success; -and that it was for his Excellency, who so humanely -deprecated the effusion of blood, to -consider whether the best method of avoiding -that evil was not to abstain from an attack?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>He retreats from Valencia.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Suchet, in fact, had no intention of making -one. It was, however, expected by the Valencians; -and in that expectation the superior -Junta, by Caro’s advice, had removed to St. -Felipe, a city to which it seems strange that its -old name of Xativa should not have been at -this time restored. There they were to exert -themselves for supplying the capital and annoying -the invaders, a military Junta being appointed -meantime within the city, to dispose of -the peasantry who had flocked thither, and to -direct the labours of a willing people. A former -Junta had been assembled after the dispersion -at Alventosa, and in the course of the -ensuing night every member had been arrested -upon a charge of treason. An edict also was -passed, confiscating the property of all who had -fled from the city at this time, their absence -being interpreted as proof either of cowardice<span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">381</span> -or of treachery. Such severity was not without -cause. Relying upon their intelligence in -the city, the van of the French army entered -the suburb of Murviedro, and occupied the -College of Pius V. the Royal Palace, and the -Zaidia, all which are without the walls on the -farther bank of the Turia. From the palace -they fired upon the bridge; and they exasperated, -if it were possible to exasperate, the -hatred of the Spaniards, by exposing the images -which they had taken from the churches on -their march and in the suburbs to the fire of the -city, having stript some of their taudry attire, -and dressed up others in regimentals. But -finding their hopes fail, and not being in sufficient -force to venture upon an attack, they -decamped during the night of the 11th, retreating -with such celerity, that they abandoned -great part of their plunder.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>A conspiracy discovered in that city.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Valencians imputed their deliverance on -this occasion to their Patroness and Generalissima, -the Virgin, under her invocation of Maria -Santissima de los Desamparados, and to the -Saints who were natives of Valencia. A deliverance -it was; for a plan had actually been -formed to assassinate the Captain General, and -proclamations in favour of King Joseph and -his French allies were found upon the chief -mover of this treason, Colonel Baron de Pozoblanco. -This person, who appears to have -been a revolutionary fanatic, suffered under the -hangman; his head was exposed upon a stake<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">382</span> -in the market-place, with an inscription under -it, announcing his crime, and charging him also -with belonging to the sect of the illuminated -Egyptian freemasons, which was said to be extending -itself from Madrid into La Mancha, -Murcia, and Valencia, and to have converted -the different appellations of the Virgin into -distinctive names for its own organization.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French boast of success.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Suchet’s expedition was not made without -loss; some of his garrisons and smaller parties -were cut off by the Arragonese troops in his -rear, under D. Pedro Villacampa. The Castle -of Benasque had been taken before he marched -against Valencia, and that capture completed -his military possession of the north of Arragon; -but the people, when deprived of their fortresses, -found fastnesses in their mountains, and -waged from thence a wearying and wasting war -against their oppressors; and Mina’s prisoners -were escorted from the frontier of Navarre to -Lerida, through a country of which the French -called and fancied themselves masters. This -desultory warfare was carried on in Catalonia -also with no less skill than success. Augereau -had supposed, that after the reduction of Gerona -little more was necessary for the complete subjugation -of the province; he boasted of a victory -in the plain of Vich, the most glorious, it -was said, which the French had yet obtained, -wherein O’Donnell had lost 7000 men, with the -whole of his baggage, and after which he could -find no place of safety till he had taken refuge<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">383</span> -under the walls of Tarragona. Souham in like -manner proclaimed that the famous Rovira had -fled before him, notwithstanding his vaunts of -the incursions, robberies, and assassinations -upon which he prided himself. It was presently -seen with what little foundation the invaders -boasted of these triumphs.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>O’Donnell’s successful operations.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>O’Donnell’s movements were not in consequence -of a defeat. Having experienced the -superiority which the enemy’s discipline gave -them in the management of large bodies, he -had immediate recourse to that system of warfare, -in which enterprise, celerity, and the -ardour of the soldiers, are of more avail than -tactics. Therefore he retreated rapidly from -Moya to Terrasa, leaving Manresa uncovered: -the inhabitants of that city forsook it on the -approach of the French; and O’Donnell continuing - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">March 16.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -to lead the invaders on, fell back, first to -Villa-franca del Panades, then to Torre-dembarra, -finally under the walls of Tarragona, -executing these movements in good order, and -without loss. The enemy, in pursuit, as they -believed, of a flying army, occupied Manresa -with 1500 men, left 900 in Villa-franca, and -proceeded till they also came in sight of Tarragona. -One division occupied Vendrell, and -extended to Arco de Barra, upon the high road -to Barcelona; but in a few days this division -joined the main body, which was at Coll de -Santa Cristina, and they immediately advanced - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">March 28.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -towards Valls. O’Donnell, profiting by this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_384">384</span> -movement, sent Camp Marshal D. Juan Caro -against Villa-franca; Caro proceeded by forced -marches, and surprised the enemy on the following - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">March 30.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -morning; between 200 and 300 were -killed, and 640 made prisoners, not a man -escaping. Caro himself was wounded; the -command of his detachment devolved upon -Brigadier D. Gervasio Gasca, and they proceeded -toward Manresa, to attack the enemy, -who occupied that town.</p> - -<p>A body of 500 or 600 had already been sent -to reinforce the French in Manresa, and had -effected their junction, though not without the -loss of two carts of ammunition, and forty -killed, in an action with a party of somatenes -and of expatriates, as those Spaniards were -called whose homes were occupied by the enemy. -Augereau no sooner heard of the loss in -Villa-franca, than, apprehending a similar attack -upon Manresa, he ordered a further reinforcement -of 1200 men from Barcelona, to proceed thither -with the utmost celerity. Gasca, receiving -timely intelligence of their movement, instead - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">April 3.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -of proceeding upon Manresa, marched to intercept -this column, and fell in with it between -Esparraguera and Abrera; 400 were left upon -the field, 500 made prisoners, and the remainder -fled toward Barcelona, not more than 200 -reaching that city. The Spaniards, after this -second success, prepared to execute their projected -attack upon the enemy in Manresa, and -the Marquis de Campoverde took the command<span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">385</span> -for this purpose: but the men had exerted -themselves too much in forced marches and in -action to perform a third enterprise with the -same celerity as the two former; and on the -night before the attack should have been made, -Schwartz, who headed the French detachment, -evacuated the town, and took the road to Barcelona -by Santa Clara, Barata, and Marieta. -He began his retreat at eleven on the night of -the 4th. Brigadier D. Francisco Milans, who -was stationed at St. Fructuos, passing the night -under arms, to be ready for the attack at seven -on the following morning, was apprised of the -enemy’s retreat between four and five, and dispatched -the corps of expatriates, under Rovira, -in pursuit, while the rest of the division followed -as fast as possible. Rovira, whom the -French had lately reviled as a wretch who was -flying before them, passing in two hours over a -distance which was the ordinary journey of four, -in their pursuit, overtook them at Hostalet, and -attacked them with his usual intrepidity. -Schwartz, whose force consisted of 1500 men, -formed them into a column, and continued to -retreat, fighting as he went. Rovira, however, -so impeded his movements, that he gave time -for Milans to come up with him near Sabadell; -the Spaniards then charged with the bayonet; -500 of the French fell, 300 were made prisoners; -Schwartz himself was wounded, and -owed his life to the swiftness of his horse.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">386</span> -Some of the French, after having surrendered, -were said to have fired upon the Spaniards, and -this was assigned as the cause why the number -of the slain exceeded that of the prisoners.</p> - -<p>The amount of the killed and taken in these -actions falls far short of the sum of the French -loss; for the desertion was very great, every -defeat giving the Germans, who were forced -into their wicked service, an opportunity of -escaping from it. The whole loss which they -sustained from these well-planned enterprises -was not less than 5000. O’Donnell hoped that -he should now be enabled to relieve Hostalrich; -but the main body of the French returning -toward Barcelona from Reus, which they had -taken possession of a few days before, compelled -Campoverde’s division to fall back, and thus -prevented the attempt. In Catalonia, indeed, -though more military talent and far more energy -were displayed than in the other provinces, it -was less a war of armies than of the people -against a great military force. Wherever the -French moved in large bodies, the Catalans -could not resist them, or resisted in vain; in -general actions and in sieges, the enemy were -sure to be successful; the French, therefore, -and they in this country who would have had -us abandon the Peninsula to their mercy, concluded -that the party which won battles, and -captured fortresses, must necessarily soon become -masters of the country; and they reasoned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">387</span> -thus, because they never took into their calculation -the national character, the natural strength -of Spain, and the moral strength of man.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />February.</span> <br />Siege of Hostalrich.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The effect of that moral power was shown -not less admirably at Hostalrich than it had been -at Zaragoza and Gerona, though the three sieges -differed from each other in all their circumstances. -The little town of Hostalrich was not -included within the works, and the fortress -contained no other inhabitants than its garrison. -The bombardment began on the 20th of February. -The adjutant, D. Jose Antonio Roca, -was writing a dispatch for the governor to the -commander-in-chief, when a shell burst so near -them, that one of the fragments entered the -room and swept away every thing from off the -table: Roca picked up his paper, and, remarking -that the sand which it carried with it might save -him the trouble of telling the general they were -bombarded, continued his dispatch. A private -soldier, who went out of the works for water, -received a musket-ball in his groin as he was -returning; he laid one hand upon the wound, -and carrying in the pitcher steadily with the -other, met his serjeant, to whom he delivered -it; then groping in the wound for the ball, which -probably had not gone deep, he pulled it out -with his fingers, and gave it to the serjeant, -saying, “I deposit this ball in your hands; keep -it for me, and as soon as I am cured, this very -bullet shall revenge me upon the first Frenchman -at whom I can get a shot.” And as he went<span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">388</span> -to the hospital he charged his comrades, in case -he should not live to take vengeance for himself, -that they would take it for him. Such was the -spirit with which Hostalrich was defended. -“Let every circumstance of the siege be made -known!” said this brave garrison; “if we are -successful, the detail will give hope, and confidence, -and joy to every true patriot; if we are -unfortunate, it will excite a different feeling, -but it will never produce shame or dismay.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />March.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Verdier, who now commanded the besieging -force, addressed a new summons to the governor -at the time of O’Donnell’s retreat to Tarragona, -representing that movement as the consequence -of a total defeat. “The wreck of the Spanish -army,” he said, “was seeking a moment’s shelter -in Tarragona and Tortosa, vigorously pursued -by Augereau in person, who would immediately -commence the siege of both places. The siege -of Lerida was already far advanced, and its fall -inevitable. Hostalrich was a fort of no other -use than as it interrupted the communication -between Gerona and Barcelona; and this purpose -it no longer effected, the French having -made a new road, and communicating freely -between those cities. The object, therefore, -for defending it, no longer existed; and longer -resistance, instead of adding to the governor’s -glory, would be called a vain obstinacy, draw -upon him the reproaches of posterity, and make -him responsible for the blood which should be -shed.” Considering these circumstances, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">389</span> -French general summoned him to surrender, -and offered him the honours of war. The Marshal -Duke of Castiglione, Augereau, he added, -revoking his former declaration, had authorized -him to propose these terms. “You will do well, -sir,” he continued, “to accept them with glory; -if you delay, they will without doubt be refused -to you; and you will then be obliged to suffer -conditions, which, however rigorous they may -appear, are dictated by justice, seeing that a -protracted resistance is neither justified by honour -nor by reason.” Estrada replied, by simply -referring him to his former determination, and -to the conduct of the garrison.</p> - -<p>The situation of the fortress, upon a craggy -height, secured it against an assault, while there -were any resolute men to defend it. The bombardment -continued till every building within -the walls had been destroyed, except a casemate, -which served as an hospital, and was only large -enough to hold one-and-twenty beds; the remainder -of the sick and wounded were secured -in a mine, and the garrison also had their quarters -under ground. Supplies had been introduced -about the middle of the siege; all other -attempts had been defeated, and would have -been of no avail at length had they succeeded, -because the cisterns were destroyed. Estrada -had the example of O’Donnell’s retreat from -Gerona before him, and determined to make -his way through the enemy’s lines, rather than -capitulate. This he concerted with O’Donnell, - -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">390</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />May.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -who, for the purpose of deceiving the besiegers, -ordered some vessels to approach Arenys de -Mar, the nearest part of the coast, sent one detachment -to call off their attention on the side -of Orsaviña and Monnegre, and another on the -southern skirts of Monseny, toward Breda. Augereau, -who had come to witness the capture of -a fortress which had resisted him for four months, -sent in a last summons on the evening of the -11th of May, offering the same terms which had -been granted to Gerona; he allowed the governor -two hours for consideration, and declared, -that if the fort was not then delivered -up, the whole of the garrison should be put to -the sword. Estrada laid this before his officers, -and with one consent they returned for answer, -that they thanked the Marshal for thinking -them worthy of being thus named with Gerona, -but that they were not yet in a condition which -should make them yield. On the following -morning, the men, to their great joy, were informed -of the resolution which had been taken.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Retreat of the garrison.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The French expected such an attempt, and -judged, from the stir which they beheld in the -fort, that it would be made in the ensuing night. -That evening, therefore, they strengthened their -post at Tordera on the right, thinking, as the -men themselves did, that the governor would -make for Arenys de Mar, where the ships were -awaiting him. At ten, the garrison descended -the glacis on the side of the high road of St. -Celoni, and crossed the road and the space between<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">391</span> -the fort and the heights of Masanas. It -was broad moonlight. Two advanced parties, -to the right and left, fell upon the enemy’s picquets -with the bayonet; those, however, who -escaped gave the alarm; but the garrison had -gained the start, ascended to St. Jacinto, and -hastened toward St. Feliu de Buxaleu. A league -from Hostalrich they fell in with an enemy’s -encampment, and routed them; this gave the -alarm to another body of 2000 French, whose -station was near, on the road to Arbucias; but -they were received so resolutely, that they soon -gave over the pursuit. Thus all was effected -which could be done by skill and courage; one -division lost its way, and many of the men dropt -on the road, their strength failing them on this -great exertion, from the want of rest and food, -which they had long endured. Among them -was the noble Julian de Estrada, who thus fell -into the hands of the enemy: this was a heavier -loss to his country than that of the fortress -which he had defended so well; for in the -course of the war, Catalonia had but too much -cause bitterly to regret the loss of such men -as Estrada and Alvarez. Five hundred men -reached Vich in safety on the following day, -132 joined them on the next, being part of the -battalion of Gerona, who had lost their way and -fallen in with the enemy; stragglers continually -came in, and on the evening of that day, the -number who had accomplished their retreat<span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">392</span> -amounted to 800, though the French asserted, -that every man was either killed or taken.</p> - -<p>In such an enterprise, it was impossible to -bring off the sick and wounded; the comptroller -of the hospital, D. Manuel Miguel Mellado, -remained with them to go through the form of -delivering up the ruins, and provide for their -safety. Such of the invalids as were best able -mounted guard, the gates were closed, and the -drawbridges raised; and in this state Mellado -anxiously waited for what might happen. Half -an hour before midnight, a brisk fire of musketry -was poured in upon the flanks of the ravelin, -and of St. Francisco. Mellado called out -to the enemy to cease firing, for the fort was -theirs; and he requested them to wait till the -morning, that he might deliver a letter from the -governor to the French general. They replied, -they would suffer no delay, the gates must instantly -be opened; otherwise, they had ladders, -and would enter and put every man to the sword. -He, however, told them he would not open the -gates till he had seen their general; upon this -they renewed their fire, setting up a loud shout -like men who were about to obtain possession -of their prey. Mellado hastened to the -bulwark of St. Barbara, where he apprehended -the escalade would be made, and there he perceived -that the enemy, who had found a rope-ladder -in the covered way, were endeavouring -to grapple the drawbridge with it; but, either<span class="pagenum" id="Page_393">393</span> -from the weight of the rope, which rendered -it difficult to be thrown, or because the irons -were not sufficiently sharp to lay hold, their attempts -were frustrated. This Mellado could -not foresee; and knowing that no time was to -be lost, he hastened out through a covered way -to the nearest work of the enemy, and called -out to the commandant, requesting him to stop -the assault, and send him to the general, that he -might deliver the governor’s letter; the party who -were flanking the ravelin, no sooner heard his -voice than they fired a volley towards it; upon -which, without waiting for an answer, he hastened -to the nearest centinel of the French, and -the captain of the guard conducted him to the -French commandant in the town; whom he entreated -to have compassion upon the wounded -in the fort, and call off the assailants. This -officer was a man of humanity, and instantly -sent off to suspend the assault, while Mellado, -who was now delivered from his fears for his -poor defenceless countrymen, was escorted to -the general. In the morning the gates were -opened to the enemy. The French soldiers gave -sufficient proof how little mercy the wounded -would have found at their hands, had they -been under no control, for they stript the -clothes and blankets from the beds of these -helpless men. Mazzachelli gave orders that -they should be conveyed to Gerona; and Mellado, -having seen this performed, and perceiving -that it was intended to detain him and his assistants<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">394</span> -as prisoners, took the first opportunity -of making his escape.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Las Medas and Lerida surrendered.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>At the very time when the garrison of Hostalrich, -after a four months’ defence, and a -bombardment, during which between three and -four thousand shells were thrown into the place, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">May 13.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -thus gallantly effected their retreat, the Catalans -suffered another loss. The islands and fortress -of Las Medas, which were of material importance -from their position on the coast, were surprised -by a party of Neapolitan infantry, and -given up in a manner which the French imputed -to cowardice, though, by their own account, -treason, on the part of the commander, -was the only intelligible cause of the surrender. -Lerida also was rather betrayed than yielded -by Garcia Conde. The town was entered by -assault: and the castle, where the works were -uninjured, and which, under Alvarez or Estrada, -might have rivalled Gerona, was surrendered -the next day. For this there was no excuse; -O’Donnell’s last orders to the governor had -been, that if the city should be taken, he was -to defend the fortresses; and if no such orders -had been given, his duty required him to hold -out to the last extremity. The commander-in-chief, -who rewarded the defenders of Hostalrich -with a medal, stigmatized this conduct as it -deserved; but he reminded the Catalans, that -Tarragona, Tortosa, Cardona, Berga, Seu de -Urgel, Coll de Ballaguer, and Mequinenza, still -remained as bulwarks of the principality; that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_395">395</span> -if all these were lost, there would be their inaccessible -mountains; and that when they began -the war, they had neither army nor fortresses, -for all their fortified places had been dismantled. -A wound which he had received during the -siege of Gerona, and which had never been -healed, because he never allowed himself rest -enough from the incessant and anxious activity -of his situation, became now so threatening, that -he was constrained for a while to withdraw from - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Augereau superseded by Marshal Macdonald.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the command. Augereau also, about the same -time, was recalled. His success in sieges did -not expiate, in Buonaparte’s eyes, for the loss -in men and reputation which he had sustained -from an enemy who were now become as wary -as they were active and enterprising. Marshal -Macdonald, Duke of Tarento, succeeded him. -The plunder of Barcelona was sent into France -under Augereau’s escort; and a number of -commercial adventurers from that country, who, -being deceived by the French official accounts, -had supposed that Spain was actually subdued, -and gone thither with the intent of forming -establishments, gladly seized the first opportunity -of returning in safety.</p> - -<p>If the war was carried on by the Catalans -with an unwearied and unremitting energy which -was not displayed in other parts of Spain, it was -not wholly owing to that enterprising and unconquerable -spirit by which they have always -been characterized, but in some degree to the -natural strength of the province, and still more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">396</span> -to the advantage which they derived from having -many places in their possession which -could not be reduced without a regular siege. -Throughout Spain there existed the same feeling -of indignation against the invaders, ... but -where the country, the villages, and the towns -were alike open, there was not the same possibility -of resistance; plains could not be defended -by peasantry; nor could the contest be -maintained by large bodies against a superior -enemy, when there were neither fortified towns -nor natural fastnesses on which they could retire. -In such parts the war was carried on by -guerilla parties, who made incursions from the -mountainous districts into the plains, and whenever -it was necessary to disperse, found friends -every where. Wherever the French were nominally -masters of the country, the guerillas harassed -their communication, cut off their small -parties, and diminished their numbers by a mode -of warfare as disheartening to the enemy as it -was consuming and inglorious; while in the -stronger parts of the kingdom, such as Asturias, -and the province of Cuenca, and the mountains -of Ronda, the inhabitants perseveringly defended -their native soil.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Fort Matagorda taken by the French.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Cadiz, however, was the point whereon all -eyes were at this time turned, in expectation of -great events. Victor had been left to command -the siege, if siege it may be called. The French -occupied the shore of the bay, fortified their -own position, and endeavoured to annoy the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">397</span> -shipping and the town; a regular attack upon -the isle was too perilous for them to attempt. -Fort Matagorda was the only point from which -it was thought possible that they could injure -the town: it had been built for the defence of -the arsenal, opposite to the broadest part of that -tongue of land which connects Cadiz with the -Isle of Leon. From thence it was apprehended -they might with the largest land mortars throw -shells to the gates of the city; Ormond indeed -had planted his cannon there, in the fruitless -attempt upon Cadiz in Queen Anne’s reign. -The fort, like the other land-works, had been -dismantled upon their approach; but when it -was seen that they were beginning to reconstruct -it, it was deemed advisable that they -should be dispossessed, and that the post should -be maintained as long as possible against them. -Accordingly they were compelled to abandon it, -and the hasty works which could be re-erected -were garrisoned by a party of British soldiers -and seamen under Captain Maclean. They defended -it for nearly two months, till it was reduced -to a heap of ruins; and having lost in -the last two days sixteen killed and fifty-seven -wounded, were brought off by the boats of the -British squadron, under the fire of the enemy’s -batteries, with little loss. The manner in which -this weak fort was defended taught the French -what they might expect if they should attempt -the Isle of Leon, for the defence of which a -formidable line of works behind the Santi Pietri<span class="pagenum" id="Page_398">398</span> -had now been executed under the direction of -General Sir Thomas Graham, who had arrived -from England to command the auxiliary forces -there. These works extended to the ocean on -the right, and on the left occupied the Caraccas -as an advanced post. The French also were -more intent upon securing themselves in their -cantonments than upon annoying the Spaniards. -They fortified Puerto Real, Puerto Santa Maria, -and Chiclana, formed entrenched camps between -these places, and strengthened the Trocadero, -where they established batteries from -whence to bombard the town. Having presently -found the inefficiency of the field artillery, -which was all that they had brought with -them, they fished up the guns from the French -and Spanish ships which had been wrecked upon -that coast after the battle of Trafalgar. Most -of the heavy pieces with which two-and-twenty -batteries were now mounted were recovered in -this manner from the sea.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Storm at Cadiz.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The French, though disappointed in their -main object here by Alburquerque’s sagacity, -and the prompt assistance of the British forces, -were in high spirits. They were in a fine country; -their quarters were at once commodious -and secure; and a few weeks after their arrival -the winds and waves threw into their possession -no inconsiderable booty. For during a tremendous -gale, which continued four days with -unabated violence, three line of battle ships, -one frigate, and about forty merchantmen were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">399</span> -driven<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> to the side of the bay which they occupied, -and went on shore at the height of the -spring side. The men were taken out by the -boats of the British squadron, and the ships -were set on fire by the enemy’s red-hot shot; -but no small part of the lading fell into their - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Cruel usage of the French prisoners in the bay.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -hands. During the tempest the French on board -the prison ships could not receive their supplies -of provisions and water from the shore; their signals -of distress were disregarded by the Spaniards; -and if the British Admiral had not sent his boats -to their relief as soon as the gale abated, very -many more of these miserable men than actually -perished must have fallen victims, the Spaniards -being in no haste to encounter the swell for the -sake of enemies whom they seem to have considered -as out of the pale of humanity. In the -case of these prisoners, indeed, they had cast off -all compassion, and the obduracy of the national -character was fully manifested towards them, -the negligence of the government being in this -instance hardly less criminal than the avarice - -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_400">400</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />May.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -and brutality of those whom it employed. Admiral -Pickmore perceiving with how little care -the pontoons were secured, proposed to the -Spanish Admiral that chains should be used as -bridles to their cables; application was made to -the Admiral in command at the Caraccas; they -were promised from time to time, but never -sent; and, as the British Commander had foreseen, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">May 15.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the prisoners in the Castilla, nearly 700 in -number, and mostly officers, cut the cable one -night, when wind and tide were in their favour, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Escape of two prison ships.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -and hoisting a sail which they had made from -their hammocks, ran for the opposite coast. -English boats were presently sent after them, -while it was doubted whether the vessel had not -by accident parted from her anchor; but when -they reached her it was impossible to board, the -pontoon being light, her ports all down, no steps -on the side, nor ropes over it, and the French -prepared, not only with musketry, but with cannon-ball -of twenty-four and thirty-six pounders, -which had been used for ballast in the vessel: -two hundred men were stationed to throw these -by hand, and the boats were presently disabled -when such missiles were showered upon them. -Fort Puntales and the gun and mortar boats -opened their fire upon the pontoon, the vessel -was burnt, but the fugitives, with little loss, -effected their escape<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">401</span> -A week later the French had nearly obtained -possession of a rich prize. The S. Elmo, line of -battle ship, with 250,000<i>l.</i> on board, in attempting -to work out of the bay, got under their battery -of S. Catalina. She was saved by the exertions -of the officers and men in all the boats of -the British squadron. Having turned her head -round, the greater part of them went on board, -and fought her guns with good effect till out of -the enemy’s reach. The French had better -fortune with the Argonauta pontoon; the prisoners -on board that vessel, about six hundred -in number, followed the example of their comrades -in the Castilla; a third of these were -killed by the fire which was kept up upon them; -the remainder escaped from the burning hulk. -But though the Spaniards had taken no precautions -for rendering such attempts impracticable, -they felt how dangerous it was to keep so large -a body of prisoners in the bay while a French -army was in possession of the shores. Two -ships of the line were at this time under orders -to carry part of them to the Canaries; and more -would have been sent to Majorca and Minorca, -whither 5000 had been transported in the preceding -year, if the inhabitants had not at this -crisis been in a state of excitement, which would -have rendered a farther importation dangerous -both to the prisoners themselves and to the government. -Serious disturbances had broken out -in both islands, not from any spirit of disaffection, -but from distress, and indignation that so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_402">402</span> -many of these unhappy persons should be cast -among them, and no adequate means provided -for their subsistence. The Minorcans were less -likely to be patient under such misgovernment -than any other Spaniards, remembering the -prosperity and good order which they had enjoyed -while their island was in possession of the -English: with them, however, the ebullition of - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Insurrection against the prisoners at Majorca.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -popular feeling past harmlessly off, while Majorca -became the scene of a disgraceful and -dreadful tragedy. Some fugitives landed at -Palma from those parts of the south which had -lately fallen under the French yoke; they -brought horrible tales concerning the invasion -of Andalusia and the conduct of the invaders; -and the people, excited by these horrors, cried -out for vengeance upon the prisoners. Troops -were called out to protect these unfortunate -men, but the soldiers would not act against their -countrymen; and when the commander, General -Reding, as the only means of saving the prisoners, -consented that they should be sent to the -desert island of Cabrera, many were butchered -in his presence, in spite of his entreaties and -exertions, and many thrown into the sea, before -the embarkation could be effected; nor could -it have been effected, if the soldiers had not at -length been provoked to fire upon the mob.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Prisoners sent to Cabrera.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Five thousand at first, and afterwards half as -many more, were landed upon Cabrera, a rocky -island about fifteen miles in circumference, with -no other inhabitants than a handful of soldiers,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">403</span> -who were stationed there to prevent the Barbary -corsairs from making it a place of rendezvous. -A few tents were provided for the -superior officers, the remainder were left to -shelter themselves as they could. There was -but one spring on the island, and in summer -this was dry: they discovered some old wells, -which had been filled up, and which, when -cleared, yielded bad water, and very little of -it. The supplies from Palma were sent so irregularly, -sometimes owing to the weather, but -far more frequently to inhuman negligence, that -scores and hundreds of these miserable creatures - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Their inhuman treatment there.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -died of hunger and thirst; many were -in a state of complete nakedness, when in mere -humanity clothing was sent them by the British -commander in the Mediterranean: and at other -times they were kept alive by barrels of biscuit -and of meat which the English ships threw overboard -for them, to be cast on shore. But in -the third year of their abode, the captain of a -Spanish frigate, whose name ought to have been -recorded, remonstrated so effectually upon the -manner of their treatment, that from that time -they were regularly supplied with food. He -gave them potatoes and cabbage and tobacco -seed, from which they raised sufficient for their -consumption; and having by persevering labour, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mémoires d’un Officier Français, Prisonnier en Espagne, 255, 287.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -without any other tools than a single knife, -broken six feet into a rock, on the surface of -which there was appearance enough of moisture -to excite their hopes, they obtained a supply<span class="pagenum" id="Page_404">404</span> -of water. Some of them used the skulls of -their own dead, for want of other vessels, to -contain it; ... and others, with no such excuse -of necessity, manufactured buttons from their -bones! About 1500 entered the Spanish service -rather than endure a banishment to which -no end could be foreseen; and some 500, chiefly -officers, were in compassion removed to England. -At the end of the war not more than 2000 remained -in Cabrera, nearly half of those who had -been landed there having sunk under their sufferings. -The Spaniards departed from the -straight path of probity when they broke the -terms of capitulation which had been granted - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>See vol. i. p. 501.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -at Baylen. They committed that breach of -faith in deference to popular outcry, and to the -sophistry of one who soon proved himself a -traitor, ... the most odious of all those men -whom the Revolution either found wicked or -made so: and in the subsequent treatment of -the prisoners humanity was as little regarded, -as honour had been in detaining them. Many -and grievous were the errors which the Spaniards -committed in the course of the war; but -this is the only part of its history which will be -remembered for them as a national reproach.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>M. Soult’s edict.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>On the other hand, the French had as yet -abated nothing of that insolent cruelty with -which they began the contest, supposing that -they could intimidate the Spanish nation. Soult, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">May 9.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -who had recommended that all the commanding - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>See vol. iii. p. 446.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -officers employed in Spain should be <em>impassible</em>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_405">405</span> -... incapable of any feeling by which they might -even possibly be moved to compunction, ... issued -at this time an edict not less extraordinary -than Kellermann’s. After various enactments, -some of which were as impracticable as they -were rigorous, imposing penalties upon the inhabitants -of those districts in which the patriotic -parties should commit any crimes, as this Frenchman -was pleased to denominate their hostilities -against the invaders of their country; he pronounced, -“that there was no Spanish army, -except that of his Catholic Majesty, King Joseph -Napoleon; all parties, therefore, which -existed in the provinces, whatever might be -their number, and whoever might be their commander, -should be treated as banditti, who had -no other object than robbery and murder; and -all the individuals of such parties who might -be taken in arms should be immediately condemned -and shot, and their bodies exposed along - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Counter edict of the Regency.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the highways.” When the Regency found that -this decree was actually carried into effect, they - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 15.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -reprinted it, with a counter decree by its side, -in French and Spanish, declaring anew, “that -every Spaniard capable of bearing arms was in -these times a soldier; that for every one who -should be murdered by the French, in consequence -of the edict of the ferocious Soult, who -called himself Duke of Dalmatia, the three first -Frenchmen taken in arms should infallibly be -hanged; three for every house which the enemy -burnt in their devastating system, and three for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">406</span> -every person who should perish in the fire.” -Soult himself they declared unworthy of the -protection of the law of nations, while his decree -remained unrepealed. They gave orders, -that if he were taken, he should be punished as -a robber; and they took measures for circulating -both decrees throughout Europe, to the -end that all persons might be informed of the -atrocious conduct of these enemies of the human -race; and that those inhabitants of the -countries which were in alliance with France, -or, more truly, which were enslaved by her, who -were unhappy enough to have children, or kinsmen, -or friends serving in the French armies -in Spain, might see the fate prepared for them -by the barbarity of a monster, who thought by -such means to subdue a free and noble nation.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_407">407</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XXXI">CHAPTER XXXI.<br /> - -<span class="subhead">ASTORGA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH. SIEGE AND -FALL OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Inactivity before Cadiz.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p><span class="firstword">Hostilities</span> were carried on before Cadiz -with equal languor on both sides, the French -making no attempt on the Isle of Leon, and the -Spaniards none for breaking up the land-blockade. -On the enemy’s part this inaction was -occasioned by their knowledge of the strength -of the works; on that of the Spaniards by want -of energy in the government, and want of spirit - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Regency send for Cuesta.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -in the people of Cadiz. The Regency, immediately -upon their appointment, had sent for -Cuesta to reside either in the city or the isle, -that they might profit by his advice, regarding -him, they said, as the main pillar of the country: -they expressed their deep sorrow for some outrages -which had been committed against his -venerable age, and their determination to inflict -exemplary punishment upon the offenders: they -ordered that part of his appointments should -forthwith be paid, and promised the whole arrears -as soon as it should be possible to discharge -them. The time, however, for Cuesta’s -services, either in the field or the council, -was past; and the old General employed his -latter days in composing a vindictive attack<span class="pagenum" id="Page_408">408</span> -upon the fallen Junta, which called forth on -their part a complete justification of their conduct -towards him. On that score they had -nothing wherewith to reproach themselves; but -they must have felt some self-condemnation in -reflecting that the two generals, who in the -hour of extreme danger had acted with promptitude -and success, were the men in whom they -had least confided. Alburquerque they had -regarded with jealousy, and Romana they had -deprived of his command in deference to the -deputies of Asturias.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Badajoz secured by Romana.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The service which Romana had rendered at -that crisis was only of less importance than the -preservation of the Isle of Leon. He had secured -Badajoz when a corps of 12,000 men -from Seville thought to have obtained possession -of it by a coup-de-main: some Portugueze had -come to his assistance, and their artillerymen -distinguished themselves when the enemy ventured -to approach the walls. Baffled in this -attempt, the French retired to Merida, Zafra, -and S. Marta, where they were annoyed by the -division of his army under D. Carlos O’Donnell, -brother to the commander in Catalonia.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The British take a position on the frontiers of Beira.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Lord Wellington had nearly 9000 sick when -his head-quarters were removed from Badajoz; -but when, in clear anticipation of the enemy’s -intentions, he took a position on the frontiers of -Beira, they rapidly recovered strength in that -salubrious country. On the side of Alentejo -he knew that the invasion would not be attempted;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_409">409</span> -attempts in that quarter had always -proved unsuccessful: if Badajoz and Elvas had -been reduced, Lisbon was secured by the Tagus, -and there is no other part of Portugal in -which an army would suffer so much from disease, -and from want of water; this indeed Loison - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>See vol. ii. p. 181.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -had experienced. On the side of Gallicia -the French had so lately felt how difficult it -was to retreat, that it was altogether unlikely -they would risk the same danger again, even -if it had not been necessary again to obtain -possession of that province as a preliminary -measure. It appeared certain, therefore, that -the attempt would be made by way of Beira, the -only remaining and most practicable route for -an invading army. Their first step must be to -besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. This, he knew, had -been recommended by a council of war held in -September at Salamanca; and its success, he -then observed, would do more evil than the -French could effect in any other way; for it -would cut off the only communication of the -Spanish government with the northern provinces, -give the enemy the command of Castille, -and probably draw after it the loss of Almeida. -Looking, therefore, to Ciudad Rodrigo and -Almeida as the points of which the enemy must -obtain possession before they could march either -upon Lisbon or Porto, he chose a position in the -segment of a circle, of which the convex part -was opposed to the quarter from whence the -invasion was expected. Guarda, Celorico, Pinhel,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">410</span> -and the west bank of the Coa, were its four -main points; the Coa, with its tributary streams, -flowing in front of his line along the greater -part of its extent. That river rises in the Sierra -de Xalma, which is a part of the Serra da Gata, -and enters Portugal by Folgosinho; another -stream, which is also regarded as its source, -rises near Sabugal; it receives many smaller -rivers, and falls into the Douro near Villa Nova -de Foscoa. Its waters are supposed to be excellent -for dying wool and tempering steel, but -unwholesome.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Astorga summoned by the French.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Before the French entered upon their operations -in this quarter, they thought it necessary -to obtain complete possession of Leon, that -their communication might be open with Valladolid. -They had been repulsed in an attempt -upon Astorga, in the preceding September, by -Santocildes, who remained as governor there. -That city was surrounded with walls, which -gave it an appearance of antiquity, not of -strength. They had been erected many centuries -ago, and were so massive, and at the same -time considered as of so little consequence for -purposes of defence, that the poor were permitted -to dig holes in them which served for -habitations. The garrison consisted of about -3000 men, of whom from 500 to 600 were on -the hospital list. Some attempts had been made -to render the city defensible, according to the -system of modern warfare, by the enemy, after -Buonaparte entered it in pursuit of Sir J. Moore;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_411">411</span> -and when the Spaniards recovered it, they added -to these works. Still the fortifications were -such, that though the French might deem them -sufficient against an armed peasantry, or a -guerilla party, it was never expected that any -resistance would be made there against a regular -force. After the French had overrun Andalusia, -and when they were proclaiming, that -the brigands had been put to the sword, and the -Napoleonic throne established in Cadiz, ... for -this falsehood was in such phrase asserted in their -Spanish gazettes, ... Loison, whose head-quarters -were at Bañeza, the nearest town, wrote to -the governor, telling him, that King Joseph had -entered Seville amid the acclamations of the inhabitants; -that Andalusia had submitted; the - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Feb. 16.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Junta was dissolved; and almost all the people -of Spain, awakened now to a sense of their true -interest, had had recourse to the clemency of -their sovereign, who received them like a father. -He urged Santocildes to imitate so good an example, -and appoint a place where they might -meet and confer upon such terms as must needs -persuade him to this wise and honourable course. -Santocildes replied to this overture, that he knew -his duty, and would do it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Siege of Astorga.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>On the 21st of March, Junot invested Astorga -with 12,000 men, of whom about a tenth -part were cavalry, by means of which he became -master of the open country. The vigorous -measures of Santocildes obstructed his operations -so much, that a month elapsed before he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">412</span> -opened his batteries. They began on three sides - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />March.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -at once, at daybreak on the 20th of April, and -soon effected a breach on the north, by the Puerta -de Hierro; but immediately behind the -breach the Spaniards pulled down a house, the -foundations of which served as a formidable -trench; they kept up their fire during the night, -and at eleven the following morning Junot once -more summoned the governor to surrender, declaring -that, if he held out two hours longer, -the city should be stormed, and the garrison -put to the sword. The governor having returned -a becoming answer, the batteries renewed -their fire; the bombardment was recommenced; -the cathedral was set on fire, with -many other houses, and a whole street in the -suburbs; and the French, thinking to profit by -the confusion, assaulted the breach: 2000 men -were appointed for this service: great part perished -before they could reach the wall; the remainder -mounted the breach; the works within -impeded them, a destructive fire was poured -upon them, and after an hour and a half they -were repulsed. At the same time the suburb -was assaulted, and with the same success; the -enemy being three times baffled in their attempts. -Their loss this day amounted to 1500 -men.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Its surrender.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Had the city been well stored, it would have -cost the besiegers still dearer; but after this -signal success, Santocildes found himself with -only thirty round of cartridges remaining for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_413">413</span> -the men, and eight only for the artillery. Junot -passed the night in making a covered way from -the trenches to the foot of the breach, where he -lodged a large body of picked men. Meantime -a council of war was held; the impossibility of -resisting with advantage for want of ammunition -was admitted; some officers proposed that they -should cut their way through the besiegers; ... -the strength of the enemy’s cavalry was one impediment -to this, but it was rejected on account -of the inhabitants; for Astorga was not like -Hostalrich, where the garrison had only themselves -to provide for; and unless terms were -made for the town’s-people, what they might expect -from such conquerors as Junot and Loison -was but too well known. Fresh works of defence -were thrown up within the breach while -this deliberation was going on, that nothing -might be omitted, and at daybreak a capitulation -was proposed. They demanded and obtained -the honours of war for themselves; security for -the inhabitants, both in person and property; -that the men should keep their knapsacks, and -the officers their horses, swords, and baggage. -This part of the capitulation was broken, and -the officers were plundered as they left the town. -Even Junot, however, returned Santocildes his -sword, saying, that so brave a man ought not to -be without one. In the course of the siege the -enemy lost 2500 in killed alone; so dearly was -Astorga purchased. But the more gallant its -resistance, the more was that misconduct to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">414</span> -regretted which had infected the provincial -Juntas as strongly as the Central Government. -Since July last Gallicia had been entirely delivered -from the enemy; the population of that -province, when the census of 1797 was taken, -amounted to nearly a million and a half; the -people had shown their spirit, and if due exertions -had been made on the part of the civil -and military authorities, an army might have -been formed there, capable not only of preserving -Astorga, but of essentially co-operating with -the British and Portugueze in the subsequent -operations.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Affair at Barba del Puerco.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>After this conquest, Junot, leaving a small -garrison in Astorga, marched into Old Castille, -where Ney had previously been joined by the -corps of Loison, Regnier, and Kellermann. -The campaign had already begun here. In the -beginning of March the French army were upon -the Tormes, with their advanced posts upon -the Agueda. Lord Wellington was at Viseu, -and his advanced posts, under General Craufurd, -were upon the Agueda also, and between - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">March 19.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -that river and the Coa. The first time that the -British and French troops met after the battle -of Talavera was in an affair of outposts, at Barba -del Puerco: four companies of the 95th, under -Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith, were posted -at that place; the French had a strong party -immediately opposite, on the other side the -Agueda, in the village of St. Felices. The only -bridge below Ciudad Rodrigo is between these<span class="pagenum" id="Page_415">415</span> -villages, and as the river at this season was -swollen with rain, this was the only passage. -The country is rocky and mountainous, and -though the advanced sentries of both parties -were within a few yards of the bridge, it was -not expected that either would attempt to annoy -the other; so great were the obstacles -which the nature of the ground presented. The -French, however, collected a brigade in St. Felices, -and after night had closed marched 600 -men toward the bridge. About midnight they -were all assembled there, and made the advanced -sentries prisoners; a picquet of eighty men, -posted behind the rocks, immediately fired upon -them and retreated in excellent order; they -pushed on up the mountain, hoping to surprise -the remainder of the men, but were presently -repulsed. The loss was trifling on either side. -Marshal Ney, however, ventured to assert, that -the English had been routed at the point of the -bayonet, and that their transports were ready at -Porto and Lisbon.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Massena appointed to the army of Portugal.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The French had learnt at Vimeiro, and Coruña, -and Talavera, to respect British valour, -but they had not yet been taught to respect -English policy; and they fully expected that if -they brought a superior force against him, Lord -Wellington would fly through Portugal, and -seek shelter in his ships. Preparations, therefore, -were made for this third invasion, with an -army far exceeding in number those which -Junot and Soult had commanded, even if they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">416</span> -had been united, and under Massena, a general - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />April.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -of higher rank than either. No general in the -French service had enjoyed so high a reputation -since Hoche, and Pichegru, and Moreau -had disappeared. Buonaparte, in his first campaigns, -called him, in his own inflated style, -the favourite Child of Victory; and after the -late Austrian war, created him Prince of Essling, -because his skill and exertions had contributed -mainly to the escape of the French from -utter destruction at the battle of Aspern. He -was appointed commander-in-chief of the provinces -of the north of Spain, including the -kingdoms of Old Castille, Leon, and Asturias; -the provinces of St. Andero, Soria, Valladolid -and Palencia, Toro, Zamora, Salamanca and -Avila; the army under him was named the -army of Portugal; and, as Soult had done before -him, it is believed that he went to make -the conquest of Portugal, expecting to be rewarded -with its crown for his success.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Ciudad Rodrigo.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>In the later wars between Spain and Portugal, -the three cities where the Spaniards used -to collect their armies before they invaded the -enemy’s country were Tuy, Ciudad Rodrigo, -and Badajoz. Of these fortresses, Tuy, like -Valença on the opposite frontier, is now of -little strength or importance, Badajoz a strong -place, Ciudad Rodrigo hardly to be ranked in -the third order of fortresses. It was built some -centuries ago, when the site was sufficiently -convenient for a fortified town; but the situation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_417">417</span> -is bad; the works were old and imperfect, and -it had other local disadvantages. It is commanded -from many points; and one height, -within 500 toises of the city, exceeds by about -fifty yards the highest of its buildings. There -were no bomb-proofs; and the suburbs, in -which there were four convents, and the number -of gardens without the walls, materially assisted -the operations of a besieging army. The population -of the city had been estimated at about -10,000; but it appears not much to have -exceeded half that number. The garrison -amounted to 4950, including 600 townsmen; -the greater part of the others being volunteers, -or men newly raised. Camp Marshal D. Andres -Perez de Herrasti was governor, an old -man, who had been the friend and comrade of -Mariano Alvarez.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French besiege it.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>On the 25th of April 6000 French appeared -before the place, and encamped in the <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">Termino</i> -of Pedro Toro, a league to the eastward. On -the 30th, the second division, consisting of from -4000 to 5000, arrived and encamped in the -<i xml:lang="es" lang="es">Termino</i> of Valde Carros, a league to the north. -Five days afterwards another encampment was -formed between the two. On May 15th, -another division, of about 7000 men, encamped -to the westward, upon Monte de Ibanrey. So -large a force was necessary, because the English -were near at hand. By the 4th of June the -city was completely invested. This was not -effected without repeated skirmishes, in which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">418</span> -the enemy suffered considerable loss. In these - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />May.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -affairs, D. Antonio Camargo, commandant of -the volunteers of Avila, greatly distinguished -himself; but the individual who, above all -others, annoyed the enemy by his incessant enterprise, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>D. Julian Sanchez.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -was D. Julian Sanchez, the son of a -farmer, near the banks of the Guebra. Till the -invasion of his country, he had cultivated his -father’s lands; but when his father, mother, and -sister had been murdered by the French, he -made a vow of vengeance, and, at the head of -one of those bands which the Spaniards call -<i xml:lang="es" lang="es">guerrillas</i>, well performed it. On one occasion -he surprised, in his father’s house, a French -colonel, infamous for his atrocities, and put him -to death, first telling him who it was that inflicted -his merited punishment in this world, -and sent him to render account for his crimes -in the next.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Marshal Ney summons the town.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>This enterprising leader made repeated assaults -upon the enemy, not hesitating, at the -head of sixty, eighty, or an hundred of his lancers, -to attack three or four times his own -number. Camargo, and D. Jose Puente, commandant -of the cavalry regiment of Ciudad -Rodrigo, co-operated ably with him, and the -French suffered daily and hourly losses from -their indefatigable activity. They suffered also -greatly from the artillery of the town, which -was excellently served. Ney carried on his -operations in a manner which the Spaniards -thought prodigal of the lives of his men, beginning<span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">419</span> -his approaches where, in their judgement, -a general more sparing of his army would - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />June.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -have terminated them. To protect these works, -he ordered a great number of holes to be dug, -where he posted sharpshooters, by whom the -garrison were greatly annoyed. On the 24th -of June, Massena arrived and took the command, -and at three on the following morning -the batteries opened, and a constant fire from -six-and-forty pieces of heavy artillery was kept -up day and night till the evening of the 28th, -when, having made a breach of about five-and-twenty -yards in length, Ney required the governor -to surrender, “sending him,” he said, -“this last summons by order of the Prince of -Essling, commander-in-chief of the army of -Portugal, then present, whose honour and humanity -were well known, but who, if the defence -were uselessly prolonged, would be compelled -to treat him with all the rigour authorized -by the laws of war. If he had any hope -of being succoured by the English, he was -doubtless by that time undeceived; for if such -had been their intention, they would not have -waited till the city was reduced to its present -deplorable state. He had, therefore, to choose -between an honourable capitulation, and the -terrible vengeance of a victorious army; and a -positive answer was requested.” Herrasti replied, -“that after forty-nine years’ service, he -could not but know the laws of war and his -military duties; the fortress was not in a state<span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">420</span> -to capitulate; and whenever circumstances made -it his duty, he would then apply for terms, after -securing his honour, which was dearer to him -than life.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Situation of Lord Wellington.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>How galling it must have been for Lord -Wellington to witness the progress of the siege, -knowing his inability to relieve the town, may -well be conceived. His outposts were near -enough to hear even the musketry; but with -so large a proportion of his troops half-disciplined -and untried, he could not act upon the -offensive against an enemy greatly superior in -numbers, without incurring the most imminent -danger. The only possible plan by which Portugal -could be saved he had laid down for -himself, and from that plan no circumstances, -however painful to his own feelings, or however -derogatory in appearance to his reputation, -could induce him to swerve. He was in communication -with Romana at Badajoz; but in -the state of the Spanish armies, any plan of co-operation -for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo was -impossible. It was, however, of great importance -that the place should be resolutely defended -to the last extremity, and in this hope -Romana and the English general were not disappointed. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Spirit of the inhabitants.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -The minds of the people had been -prepared for this extremity; they had their -patriotic writers and their poets; the exploits -of Julian Sanchez excited the emulation of the -youth, and the conduct of the old governor -gave confidence to all. The examples of Zaragoza,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_421">421</span> -and Gerona, and Hostalrich, and -Astorga, animated the women and children, as -well as those who bore arms; for in a cause -like theirs they had seen their countrymen acquire -a glory when unsuccessful, which could -not have been greater had they been victorious. -The women and children, when they saw their -houses burning, gave way neither to fear nor -lamentation, but exerted themselves to quench -the flames, and carried refreshment and ammunition -to the troops amid the hottest fire. There -were two blind beggars in the city: no one -supposed that these unfortunate men could -render any service during the siege, but zeal -taught them how to be serviceable; they carried -water to the walls by day, and ammunition -by night, with such unwearied activity, that it -was the intention of the governor and the Junta, -if the town had been saved, to have rewarded -them with pensions for life.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The nunnery of S. Cruz attacked.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>It was of great consequence to the Spaniards -to keep possession of those buildings without -the walls, which would otherwise afford protection -to the besiegers, but which also afforded -such means for annoying them while they could -be defended, that it had not been thought advisable -to demolish them before the siege. The -nunnery of Santa Cruz was the most important -of these buildings. D. Ramon Castellanos was -posted there with a company of sixty men, when -three hundred of the enemy’s grenadiers, with -a party of sappers, assailed it in the night, half<span class="pagenum" id="Page_422">422</span> -the party attacking it in the rear, the other in - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />July.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the front. They blew up the first and second -gates; hand grenades were thrown on both -sides; the Spaniards, having the advantage of -the building, kept up a most destructive discharge -of musketry; the commander of the one -party was killed, the captain of engineers, who -commanded the other, wounded, but he did not -retire till he had set fire to the convent. Seeing -the flames, the governor made signal for Castellanos -to abandon the post, who accordingly -let down his men from a window into one of the -inner courts of the convent, and descending himself -the last, they forced their way with the -bayonet. It was a little after midnight when -they reached the gate of La Colada: but seeing, -while they took food and rested after the action, -that the enemy had extinguished the flames, -Castellanos went to the governor, and represented -to him that his honour was concerned in -recovering the post. He led his men at three -in the morning, after only two hours’ respite, -to the assault, and surprising the French, drove -them from their dearly purchased conquest, -where they left 158 dead, and 45 wounded behind -them, the remainder of the wounded having -been removed during the short time that they -retained possession.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Convent of St. Domingo recovered. <br /><span class="date">July 2.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>They were driven from the convent of St. -Domingo in a manner not less worthy of remembrance. -After they had won the building, Herrasti -was very desirous of recovering it, and yet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_423">423</span> -hesitated at giving orders for the attempt, knowing -the exhausted state of the garrison, and how -ill any loss of men could be afforded. A serjeant, -by name Manuel Martin, happened to hear what -was the state of the governor’s feelings upon -this subject. This man, who was a native of -Zamora, had made himself well known to the -French: they called him <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">agua y vino</i>, water -and wine, the words which he always used when -engaged in action with them; wine being his -signal for attack, and water that for retreat. -He had distinguished himself greatly during the -siege, and had at this time a wound in his arm, -which however did not prevent him from going -to the governor, and soliciting permission to -make an attack upon the enemy in this convent, -saying, that if he could not drive them out, at -least he could annoy them there. Accordingly, -choosing out five-and-twenty comrades, he -attacked the convent with such well-directed -vigour, that the enemy, though greatly superior -in numbers, were terrified and took to flight, -many of them leaving their knapsacks and muskets -behind them. This was so signal an exploit, -that Manuel Martin was deservedly promoted -for it, and a badge of distinction was -given to each of the soldiers.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Julian Sanchez effects his escape from the city.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>But against such a force as surrounded them, -all that the Spaniards could do was to hold out -to the uttermost, and sell the fortress as dearly -as possible. Massena boasted of having 100,000 -men in the field; he had 66,000 infantry and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_424">424</span> -6000 horse, of whom as many as could be advantageously -employed carried on the siege, -while the others kept the British army in check, -Lord Wellington having only 51,000 under his -command, including 3000 cavalry, and half this -force composed of Portugueze, who were as -yet untried, and consequently in whom little -reliance could then be placed. They were, -however, brigaded with the British in the proportion -of one battalion to two, and were every day -acquiring confidence and character. The siege -was less murderous than that of Zaragoza, because -the city was much smaller and less populous, -and, having the advantage of regular works, -did not require the same kind of defence. When -Herrasti and the Junta saw that it was not possible -to hold out much longer, they ordered -Julian Sanchez and his lancers to make their -escape while it was yet practicable, reminding -Sanchez how important it was that his services -should still be continued, and telling him he -would be of more assistance to Ciudad Rodrigo -in the field than he could now be within the -walls. A little before midnight Sanchez collected -his troops in the plaza; the two of his -company who were married men took their -wives behind them; they sallied out, and their -leader, in the spirit of Scanderbeg, instead of -contenting himself with merely effecting his own -retreat, charged a post of cavalry, routed them, -and carried away eight prisoners with their -horses. The two women were armed with pistols,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_425">425</span> -and one of them, by name Marta Fraile, -saved her husband, by shooting a dragoon who -was about to attack him on one side.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>State of the British army.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The British army meantime, though it could -render no assistance, was far from being idly or -ill employed. There had been a prevailing -feeling of despondency before the siege began, -and an expectation that the town would surrender -as soon as the enemy should have opened -their fire. The progress of the siege produced -more respect for the Spaniards, and the active -service in which the men soon found themselves -engaged produced cheerfulness and hope. The -picquets occupied the line of the Azava from -Carpio on the right to its junction with the -Agueda; the enemy had 8000 men on the left -bank of the Agueda, behind that river and the -Azava, which was fordable in many places. The -head-quarters of the light division, under Major-General -Craufurd, were at Gallegos, a short -league distant, in an open country; the greatest -alertness, therefore, was necessary, and the men -slept at their horses’ heads, the horses bridled -and the reins in hand. The Germans were -selected for the outpost duty, being at that time -the only troops in the army who were acquainted -with it: the 16th light dragoons requested to be -intermixed with them on duty, men and officers; -a compliment which gratified the brave -men to whom it was paid, and the greatest harmony -was always preserved. The picquets were -brought to the greatest perfection, and the division<span class="pagenum" id="Page_426">426</span> -soon attained that alertness which could -only be learnt in such service. The Portugueze -behaved well on the first opportunity which was -afforded, and obtained the good opinion of their -allies; so that every thing went on satisfactorily -in the allied army, except that in a trifling and -ill-executed affair Colonel Talbot fell, a gallant -officer, who had distinguished himself at Talavera, -and was deservedly and greatly lamented.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>A practicable breach made.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The French general, to whom time was of -more consequence than any cost of lives, pressed -the siege with the utmost vigour, but with heavy -loss, owing to the repeated sallies of the garrison, -and the excellent manner in which the artillery -of the Spaniards was served. In hope of forcing -the governor to surrender by the cries of the -inhabitants, he bombarded the town, and almost -destroyed it; but the people were not to be -shaken in their purpose, the names of Numantia -and Zaragoza were in every mouth, and they -were resolved in their turn to transmit a memorable -example to posterity. Meantime the regular -advances of the besiegers were carried on -without intermission, and by the 2d of July a -practicable breach had been opened in the Baluarte -del Rey. The Spaniards made every exertion -to defend it with sacks of earth, estacades, -and whatever other obstacles they could oppose -to the enemy; but the French did not yet -venture an assault; they had so severely experienced -the valour of their opponents, that they -had determined not to storm the town till the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_427">427</span> -works should be reduced to such a state, that -they might avail themselves of the whole advantage -of their numbers. They made three -mines, one under the counterscarp, the other -two under the curtain of the wall and part of -the Calle del Seminario, or College-street, near -the Cathedral. The besieged were aware of -their progress, but all efforts at impeding it were -useless, and at three in the morning of the 10th, -the counterscarp was blown up, forming not -only an open breach, but such a way to it that -carts might ascend from the glacis.</p> - -<p>Immediately afterwards the French renewed -the fire from all their batteries, and kept it up -without intermission for twelve hours. During -this time the cry of the soldiers and the inhabitants, -women and boys, as well as their husbands -and fathers, was, that they would beat off -the enemy or die; but the officers and the Junta -were well aware, that any farther resistance -would only afford the French a pretext for carrying -their threats into execution, and putting all -to the sword. Thirty thousand men were ready -to storm the city that evening. It was not without -much difficulty that the people could be induced -to hear of a council of war, nor would -they have suffered one to be held, had they not -seen such undoubted proofs of the patriotism -and courage of those who now told them that a -surrender was become inevitable. There were -some in the council who proposed to follow the -example of Julian Estrada at Hostalrich, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_428">428</span> -force their way with the bayonet through their -enemies; but here, as at Astorga, it was urged -that they were in different circumstances, and -had therefore different duties; their business -now was to preserve 5000 inhabitants, who would -else be exposed to the unrestrained vengeance -and brutality of the enemy. Finally, it was resolved -to capitulate, but not till the latest moment, -when there was no longer the slightest -hope or possibility of relief.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The town capitulates. <br /><span class="date">July 10.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Massena’s orders to Ney were to assault the -town that evening; the French advanced for -this purpose, and were at the foot of the breach, -in the act of mounting, when the white flag was -hoisted: the officer who planted it in the breach -descended with the terms of capitulation, and -presented them to Ney, who sternly told him it -was now too late for any thing. The Spaniard, -however, had recourse to Massena, who was at -that time supposed to be more humane than -Ney. The first article was, that the garrison -should march out with the honours of war; the -rest were in like manner such as are usual in -the like circumstances. Massena having cast -his eye over them, said, “Tell your governor, -this is no time to ratify the terms in writing; -but I grant all which he requires, and am going -to give orders accordingly.” He then sent his -adjutant-general to bid Ney suspend the assault. -Loison immediately marched through the breach, -and took possession of the town; and General -Simon, notwithstanding Massena’s pledged word,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_429">429</span> -made the garrison deposit their arms in the -arsenal.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Conduct of the French.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The other terms were at the moment fulfilled; -and when Herrasti, the next day, requested -that the capitulation might be signed, -in order that he might transmit it to his own -government, Massena replied, that as he saw -the articles observed, he neither could nor ought -to require more. The people had escaped the -horrors of an assault; but in other respects -they soon found they were at the mercy of a -conqueror who acknowledged no other law than -his own pleasure. Herrasti had stipulated for -the liberty of the civil officers; they, however, -were declared prisoners of war. The members -of the Junta were thrown into the vilest dungeon -of the public gaol, from whence, after having -endured for eight-and-forty hours every kind of -insult and ill treatment, they were marched on -foot to Salamanca, in company with the governor, -who alone was permitted to retain his -horse. The clergy were arrested and shut up -for two days in the church of St. Juan; the old -and infirm were then suffered to go to their -houses, but forbidden the exercise of their -functions; the lay brethren were ordered to -serve in the hospitals, and all the others sent -prisoners to Salamanca. The next measures -were, to impose a contribution of 1,800,000 -reales, and to set from six to eight hundred men -at work to destroy the batteries, fill up the -trenches, and repair the works, compelling them<span class="pagenum" id="Page_430">430</span> -to labour like slaves, giving them no provisions, -and allowing them little rest.</p> - -<p>The account which the French published of -their conquest was, according to their system, -full of falsehoods. They asserted that the garrison -had surrendered at discretion, which could -only be contradicted, not disproved, because -Massena had broken his word. This falsehood -is worthy of remark, because it shows so strikingly -the characteristic baseness of Buonaparte’s -generals. Ciudad Rodrigo was evidently at -their mercy; a generous enemy would have rejoiced -to show his sense of the merits of those -who had opposed him, and would have known -that in refusing them the honours of war, he -deprived them only of a barren form; for the -merit of their gallant and heroic defence it was -not in his power to efface. Massena, not satisfied -with thus injuring Herrasti’s honour, cast -upon him a fouler aspersion, making him say, -that he and the garrison would have surrendered -sooner, if they had not been intimidated by the -inhabitants. In reality, such had been the noble -spirit of the soldiers, that it was only by the entreaties, -as well as the arguments of the superior -Junta of Castille, whose residence was in that -city, that they were prevailed upon to give up -their intention of attempting to cut their way -through the besiegers. The French general did -not forget to insult the English, and endeavour -by his falsehoods to exasperate the Spaniards -against them. “Ciudad Rodrigo,” he said,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_431">431</span> -“fell in their presence; they promised to succour -it; made the inhabitants prolong their defence -by this deceitful hope; and suffered the -place to fall without making the slightest effort -for its relief. Thus they had excited against -them the universal indignation of the garrison -and the people, who united in exclaiming against -their perfidy.”</p> - -<p>This justice, however, Massena did to Ciudad -Rodrigo, that he admitted the defence had -been most obstinate. It was impossible, he said, -to form an idea of the state to which it was reduced. -Every thing had been battered down; -not a single house remained uninjured. The -killed he estimated at more than 2000. The -Spaniards stated it at only sixty-three of the inhabitants, -and 237 of the garrison. Seven -thousand soldiers, he said, laid down their arms: -... the number at the commencement of the -siege was 4950. Six hundred made their escape -on the night of the capitulation, and more -than 1500 before they reached Salamanca. -Above two-and-forty thousand shells were -thrown into the city, and nearly five-and-twenty -thousand from it. The quantity of powder -consumed by the garrison during the last sixteen -days was 893 quintales, ... the quintal being -132 lbs. The French gave no statement of -their own loss; it was probably very considerable; - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Speculations upon the campaign.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the Spaniards estimated it at 3400. The -capture, however, occasioned the greatest exultation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_432">432</span> -in Paris, and the Moniteur mingled with -its own insults the echoes of our factious journalists. -“The good sense of the English people,” -it said, “enabling them to foresee the dishonour -and destruction of their army in Portugal, -they are convinced that the most fortunate -event which could befal it would be a catastrophe -like that of Moore’s. They are too -much accustomed to calculate chances and -events not to know, that alone against France -they can, in such a contest, meet nothing but -disaster, and obtain nothing but disgrace.” -“Men of sound judgement, like Grenville or -Grey, are numerous in England,” said the Moniteur, -“but they are at present without any -influence there.” Then, returning to its natural -tone of insult, it ridiculed the strength of -Lord Wellington’s army, amounting to the -dreadful number of 24,000 English. “The -cries of the inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo,” -it said, “were heard in his camp, which was -only six leagues distant: but all ears were shut -against them; the English made no attempt to -succour that city: ... they were the laughing-stock -of Europe; every coffee-house waiter -knew their weakness on land, as well as their -influence at sea. Ciudad Rodrigo was one of -the last bulwarks of the insurrection; its capture -made the catastrophe more imminent for -England, who would now find it necessary to -call to the helm more prudent men, better acquainted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_433">433</span> -with the nature of the resources and -of the strength of their country, and therefore -more moderate.”</p> - -<p>In England, too, we were told, that if Ciudad -Rodrigo were taken, the efforts of the English -might be considered to be at an end; the -French would then be able to advance without -fear of a check; the harvest also being now -begun, whatever grain there was in the country -they would be able to secure for themselves, -and so form magazines, the want of which had -hitherto chiefly retarded their advance. At one -time these politicians cried out, “that Lord -Wellington could not permit the enemy quietly -to prosecute the siege of so important a fortress.” -At another, “they would not suppose -him capable of fighting a useless battle: for -they trusted he was not so prodigal of the blood -of his followers. They trusted that his operations -would be justified by the event.” Then -again “they were not competent to speak from -their own knowledge, yet certainly it did appear -a doubtful policy to be patiently waiting till -Massena had time to concentrate his troops, -and make all his arrangements for an attack on -the British position.” “The plan of overwhelming -Lord Wellington, by bringing an immense -superiority to bear upon him, was one -which obviously presented itself; there seemed -no insurmountable difficulty in the execution; -obstacles there might be, from want of provisions -and other circumstances, but the skill<span class="pagenum" id="Page_434">434</span> -and perseverance of the French in combating -them forbade us to place much reliance upon -such grounds.” In this manner, always presaging -evil, and consistent in nothing but despondency, -sometimes borrowing the tone of the -Moniteur, and sometimes setting it, did these -journalists of a disappointed party labour to -deaden the hearts and hopes of their countrymen; -while their more daring, but hardly more -mischievous coadjutors addressed their weekly -invectives to the readers and auditors in pot-houses -and tap-rooms, abusing their ignorance, -appealing to, and inflaming their worst passions, -and crying out against the measures of their own -government, while upon the crimes of Buonaparte -they observed a silence which sufficiently -indicated their sympathy with his system, their -wishes for the extension of his tyranny, and -their hopes of his eventual success.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>La Puebla de Sanabria occupied by the French.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo enabled Massena -to detach a force for the relief of Astorga, -where General Mahy, who commanded in Galicia, -was blockading the French garrison. This -object was easily effected. General Taboada -at this time occupied Puebla de Sanabria, where -he was exerting himself to organize a body of -troops for the field: General Echavarria was engaged -in like manner at Alcañizas. In such -feeble, uncombined efforts the spirit of the -country was spent, and its resources frittered -away; for as soon as men enough were brought -together to attract the enemy’s attention, they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_435">435</span> -were either dispersed or destroyed. This was the -fate of Echavarria’s corps; it was surprised by -a French detachment under General La Croix, -and nearly annihilated. The alarm spread to -Silveira’s head-quarters at Braganza, and Colonel -Wilson (his second in command) hastened -with the advanced guard to Echavarria’s support; -but he arrived only to find the ground covered -with dead and wounded Spaniards, the -enemy having retired to Carvales, after completely -accomplishing the purpose of their expedition. -Massena boasted soon afterwards of -a like success at Sanabria; but the results were -very different. The French magnified the importance -of this post, saying that it commanded -the entrance into Portugal, and shut up the -communication with Galicia. They said also, -that Lord Wellington had enjoined the Spanish -governor to make an obstinate defence; but -that the governor reproached him in reply for -having deceived the commandant of Ciudad -Rodrigo, and broken his word with him; told -him it was evident he intended to do nothing -for Spain, but only, for the sake of fomenting -divisions, held out hopes of assistance which -were never realized; yet nevertheless offered -to shut himself up in the fortress, and bury -himself in its ruins, if the English general would -send him one Englishman for two Spaniards, to -assist in its defence. The answer of Lord Wellington, -the French papers said, might easily be -conceived; and the Spanish general therefore<span class="pagenum" id="Page_436">436</span> -abandoned the town, where General Serras -found twenty pieces of artillery, and provisions -for 3000 men for six months. After this the -French made no farther mention of the Puebla -de Sanabria.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Portugueze retake it.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>D. Francisco Taboada Gil, the officer who -was thus falsely represented as insulting the -English general, had communicated not with -him but with the Portugueze commander, Silveira, -at Braganza, with whom it was agreed -that he should evacuate the place if it were attacked -by a superior force. Taboada accordingly - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">July 29.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -fell back upon the Portillas de Galicia; -Silveira, having ascertained that Serras had returned -with the greater part of his troops to -Mombuey, concerted measures with the Spanish -general for surprising the garrison which -the French had left in Sanabria, and on the -fourth day after they had taken possession of -their boasted conquest, the enemy found themselves - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 3.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -invested in the fort. They were summoned; -but the commander replied, that he -had men and ammunition to defend himself -with, and that he expected speedily to be succoured -by Marshal Massena. On the following -morning a detachment of about seventy French -cavalry came on to attack the advanced guard -of the Portugueze, under Captain Francisco -Texeira Lobo, whose force was about equal; -but while he charged them in front, another -small party of Portugueze, by his instructions, -wheeled round and attacked them in the rear:<span class="pagenum" id="Page_437">437</span> -they were instantly broken, and twenty-eight -were left upon the field, thirty prisoners, and - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />August.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -forty horses taken. The remainder of that day -was spent in vain endeavours to force an entrance -into the fort: the assailants burnt the -gates, but the enemy blocked them up effectually -with stones; the Portugueze and Spaniards -then got possession of a house adjoining, -from whence they attempted to make a way -through, but the enemy soon battered it down. -On the morrow, one mortar and one three-pounder -were planted against them; the first -became useless after a few discharges, and Silveira, -the next morning, sent for a six-pounder -from Braganza. He was now apprized that -Serras was advancing in force to relieve the -garrison. Silveira left the Spaniards to maintain -the blockade, and drew up in order of battle -upon the river Tera; but Serras, having reconnoitred -his force, thought proper to retire -upon Mombuey. The six-pounder, from Braganza, -was an iron gun, in such a state, that -when it arrived it was of no avail; and a twelve-pounder, -which on the 8th was brought from -the same place, proved in the same condition: -this was a serious disappointment, for Silveira -was now apprized that Serras was collecting reinforcements. -Six hundred horse had entered -Zamora, on their way to him, and two battalions -of Italian troops were joining him from Benevente, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Aug. 9.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Leon, and Astorga. Unable to batter -the place, because of the wretched state of his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_438">438</span> -artillery, which had been long left to rust in a -dilapidated fortress, he tried the effect of mining; -here experience and skill were wanting, -and only the face of the curtain was thrown -down. The garrison, however, who were Swiss, -dreaded that a second attempt might prove -more successful; and their commandant, pleading -that he and his men were not French, proposed -and obtained good terms, delivering up -the place on condition that they should be allowed -to embark from Coruña, and return to -their own country, on their parole, not to bear -arms against the allied powers. The artillery -of the place, and the stores, were restored to -the Spaniards; but Silveira retained for the Portugueze -an eagle, the first which they had taken -from their enemy. Sixty of the Swiss entered -into the service of the allies.</p> - -<p>Serras was in sight of Silveira’s advanced -posts when this capitulation was concluded; he -had with him from 4000 to 5000 foot, and about -800 cavalry. The allied Portugueze and Spaniards -were inferior in number, and still more -in discipline, and with this unequal force pressing -hard upon them they broke up from Sanabria, -at a time when the prisoners were come -three hours march on the way to Coruña. Colonel -Wilson, who had been ordered on an important -duty to head-quarters, returned in time -to assume the command of the rear-guard, and -with it cover their retrograde movement. He -checked the French in a sharp affair of cavalry,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_439">439</span> -after which he took the open road to Braganza, -Silveira retreating with the foot upon the -heights of Calabor, where the enemy, if they -should continue the pursuit, could derive no -advantage from their horse. But having arrived -too late for saving the garrison, they advanced -no farther than Pedralva, and from -thence returned to Sanabria, then to Mombuey. -This was the termination of General Serras’s -success at the Puebla de Sanabria; the whole -of the garrison which he left there were taken -prisoners, and the eagle which was taken with -them was deposited with proper triumph in the -cathedral at Lisbon, as the first trophy of the -regenerated Portugueze.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_440">440</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CHAPTER_XXXII">CHAPTER XXXII.</h2> -</div> - -<blockquote class="inhead"> - -<p class="hang">CAPTURE OF ALMEIDA. CONDUCT OF THE PORTUGUEZE -GOVERNMENT. BATTLE OF BUSACO. -RETREAT OF THE BRITISH AND PORTUGUEZE -TO THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. THE KING’S -ILLNESS.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />July.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Massena’s proclamation to the Portugueze.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p><span class="firstword">From</span> Ciudad Rodrigo Massena addressed a -proclamation to the Portugueze. “Inhabitants -of Portugal,” he said, “the Emperor of -the French has put under my orders an army -of 110,000 men, to take possession of this -kingdom, and to expel the English, your pretended -friends. Against you he has no enmity: -on the contrary, it is his highest wish to promote -your happiness, and the first step for -securing it is to dismiss from the country those -locusts who consume your property, blast your -harvests, and palsy your efforts. In opposing -the Emperor, you oppose your true friend; a -friend who has it in his power to render you -the happiest people in the world. Were it not -for the insidious counsels of England, you might -now have enjoyed peace and tranquillity, and -have been put in possession of that happiness. -You have blindly rejected offers calculated only -to promote your benefit, and have accepted -proposals which will long be the curse of Portugal.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_441">441</span> -His majesty has commissioned me to -conjure you that you would awake to your true -interests; that you would awake to those prospects -which, with your consent, may be quickly -realized; awake so as to distinguish between -friends and enemies. The King of England is -actuated by selfish and narrow purposes; the -Emperor of the French is governed by principles -of universal philanthropy. The English -have put arms into your hands, arms which you -know not how to use: I will instruct you. They -are to be the instruments of annihilation to -your foes: ... and who those foes are I have -already shown. Use them as you ought, and -they will become your salvation! Use them as -you ought not, and they will prove your destruction! -Resistance is vain. Can the feeble -army of the British general expect to oppose -the victorious legions of the Emperor? Already -a force is collected, sufficient to overwhelm your -country. Snatch the moment that mercy and -generosity offer! As friends you may respect -us, and be respected in return; as foes you -must dread us, and in the conflict must be subdued. -The choice is your own, either to meet -the horrors of a bloody war, and see your country -desolated, your villages in flames, your -cities plundered; or to accept an honourable -and happy peace, which will obtain for you -every blessing that by resistance you would resign -for ever.”</p> - -<p>On the same day that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_442">442</span> -the enemy’s cavalry appeared on the - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French invest Almeida.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -plains of Almeida. Lord Wellington’s head-quarters -at this time were at Alverca: his position -was a defensive line, about thirty miles in -extent, along the frontier mountains of Beira; -but as the line formed a segment of a circle, -the points were not distant from each other in -proportion to its length. The infantry extended -from Celorico to Guarda on the one side, and -to Fort Conception, one of the outworks of Almeida, -on the other. The cavalry were in advance -near Fort Conception, and at Sabugal, -and on the Coa. The enemy’s superiority in -horse was very great, but the nature of the -ground deprived them of the advantage which -this must otherwise have given them. They -now proceeded to invest Almeida. The operations -of the siege were conducted by the second -corps, under Marshal Ney. Junot, with the -8th, had his head-quarters at S. Felices, and his -cavalry at Villar de Porco, Fuente Guinaldo, -and Fuentes d’Onoro, ground which had not -then been rendered memorable in military history. -While this portion of the army covered -the siege, Serras with a division of 7000 men -at Benevente threatened Tras os Montes, and -Bonnet with 8000 at Astorga was ready to enter -Galicia and the province of Entre Douro e -Minho.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Almeida.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Dumouriez, forgetting Elvas at the time, has -called Almeida the strongest place in Portugal. -It is perhaps more important from its situation,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_443">443</span> -but very far inferior to it in strength. This -town was founded by the Moors, and is said -to have been one of those which Ferrando the -Great won from them while the Cid served -under him, in his first wars. When the tide of -success was for a while turned by the entrance -of the Almoravides into Spain, Talmayda, as it -was then called, fell again into the hands of the -misbelievers, from whom it was finally reconquered, -in 1190, by King Sancho I. of Portugal. -Payo Guterres distinguishing himself in the -conquest, obtained from it the appellative of <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">O -Almeydam</i>, the Almeydan, and transmitted to -his descendants the surname of Almeyda, conspicuous -in Portugueze and Indian history, but -disgraced at this time by the representative of -the family, who was then engaged in Massena’s -army as a traitor. King Diniz, the ruins of -whose magnificent works are to be seen in every -part of Portugal, rebuilt the city, and is supposed -to have removed it from a valley, a little -way north of its present site. The castle was -built by him, and repaired by King Emanuel. -In the later wars between Spain and Portugal, -Almeida has always been considered a place of -great importance, being the bulwark of the -latter country on its most accessible side; but, -like other things of more essential consequence -to the strength of a kingdom, it had long been -neglected. In 1809 there were not a dozen -gun-carriages fit for service, nor any wood in -store for the construction of others; the embrazures<span class="pagenum" id="Page_444">444</span> -were falling to decay, and the palisades -of the covert-way had been mostly broken, -or carried away for fire-wood. The works were -originally ill constructed, and the place had the -great disadvantage of being commanded on -one side by a hill. Its population in 1747 was -2463; and Almeida is not one of the few -places in Portugal which have been progressive -since that time.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Fort Conception abandoned.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The same causes which rendered it impossible -for Lord Wellington to relieve Ciudad -Rodrigo, made it necessary for him to leave Almeida -to its own means of defence; but the -works had been repaired, the garrison was -strong, and Brigadier Cox, an English officer in -the Portugueze service, was appointed to the -command. With the example of Ciudad Rodrigo -before it, there was no reason to doubt -that Almeida would make a vigorous resistance, -and probably hold out so long as materially -to derange the plans of the enemy. Fort -Conception was abandoned and blown up at the -enemy’s approach. General Craufurd, however, -continued to occupy a position near Almeida -with 3200 British and 1100 Portugueze -troops, eight squadrons of cavalry included. -The chain of his cavalry outposts formed a semicircle -in front of the town, their right flank -resting on the Coa, near As Naves, about three -miles above this fortress, and their left, in like -manner, resting upon the same river, about -three miles below it, near Cinco Villas. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_445">445</span> -centre was covered by a small stream, and on -the right and centre, where it was expected -that the enemy would advance, the cavalry -posts were supported by piquets of infantry. -There was but one road by which the artillery -and cavalry could retreat, that leading from Almeida -to the bridge, which is about a mile west -of the town. The nature of the ground made -it difficult for the enemy to approach this road -on the left of the allies, and on the south the -infantry were placed to cover it, having their -right flank resting on the Coa above the bridge, -their front covered by a deep rocky ravine, and -their left in some enclosures near a windmill<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a>, -on the plain, about 800 yards south of the -town.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Affair on the Coa.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>On the morning of July 24th, the centre of -the British line of piquets was attacked; they -were supported by the 14th light dragoons and -two guns, but were withdrawn when a considerable -column of the enemy appeared with artillery, -and began to form on the other side of the -rivulet. The force which Marshal Ney, who -directed these movements, brought into the -field, consisted of 20,000 foot and between 3000 -and 4000 horse, being in fact his whole corps. -Fifteen squadrons of cavalry crossed the rivulet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_446">446</span> -as soon as the piquets retired, and formed with -artillery in front, and about 7000 infantry on -their right; other troops meantime were advancing -upon the right of the British position, -the side on which they might best expect to -cut off the retreat of the allies to the bridge. -General Craufurd now perceived that it was -impossible for him to prevent the investment of -Almeida, and that he was on the wrong side of -the Coa. The artillery and cavalry were therefore -ordered to retreat along the only road which -was practicable for them; the infantry from the -left to move off in <em>echelon</em>; the right it was necessary -to hold till the last, to prevent the enemy -from approaching the bridge by a road coming -from Junca, which runs in the bottom of the -valley by the river side.</p> - -<p>On the left, the men had to retreat through -thick vineyards, intersected with deep trenches, -and with walls six or seven feet high; they -could not take advantage of this ground, for -the enemy were in such force, that there was -imminent danger of being overpowered, and -cut off before they could reach the bridge. One -of these walls General Craufurd had considered -as a complete defence against cavalry; it enclosed -a vineyard, in which some companies had -been stationed, but there had been a heavy rain -during the whole of the preceding night, and -the troops had pulled down this wall in many -places to make use of the stones for forming a -shelter; through these openings the enemy’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_447">447</span> -horse entered, and here they made most of the -prisoners who were taken in the action. To retire -in order over such ground was impossible, -but the retreat was made with characteristic -coolness. On the other side the bridge, the -ground was equally unfavourable for re-forming; -the 43d and part of the 95th regiments -were ordered to form in front of the bridge, and -defend it as long as they could, while the rest -of the troops should pass over and take a new -position. They obeyed these orders so literally, -that they defended it all day; three times the -enemy attempted to force the passage, and each -time they were repulsed at the point of the -bayonet; at length, when night closed, and -every thing had passed over, and the enemy had -ceased to assail them, these brave men retreated -from the post where so many of their comrades -had fallen: the heaviest loss necessarily fell -upon these gallant regiments; the total, in -killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to -330<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a>. Colonel Hall of the 43d, who was among<span class="pagenum" id="Page_448">448</span> -the slain, had only joined from England the preceding -day. The loss was to be regretted because -there was no object to be gained by engaging -the French at such disadvantage; but -never did men behave more gallantly than those -who were engaged that day, British and Portugueze -alike. They effected their retreat under -the most unfavourable circumstances, without -losing a gun, a trophy, or a single article of field -equipment; and they inflicted upon the enemy -a loss, which, by his own account, was nearly -equal to the sum of ours, and which in reality -doubled its amount. After this the infantry -were withdrawn to the neighbourhood of Celorico, -leaving the outpost duty to be performed -by cavalry alone.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Desponding letters from the army.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Massena asserted that one of our couriers had -been taken with dispatches, which represented -that the English had never been engaged in so -brisk an affair; that they were in full rout; and -that it was impossible to form an idea of their -deplorable condition. Of the condition of that -army, and the full rout to which he had driven -them, it was not long before Massena obtained -some correct personal knowledge; but it is probable -that some desponding letters had fallen -into his hands, and it is likely also that he expected -to drive the British army before him full -speed to Lisbon. Letters had been written<span class="pagenum" id="Page_449">449</span> -from that army to Porto, in which the writers -had delivered it as their opinion that our forces -must inevitably retreat, Massena having such -an overpowering superiority, that Portugal -could not possibly be defended against him. -These letters excited such alarm among the -British merchants in that city, that the vice-consul -applied to our admiral at Lisbon, requesting -he would take into consideration the -necessity of having a sufficient force off the -Douro to protect the British subjects, who -might be compelled to embark without the least -delay. They were in the utmost consternation, -he said. Admiral Berkeley thought it proper to -send this requisition to Lord Wellington, who -in consequence issued general orders upon the -subject. “He would not make any inquiry,” -he said, “to ascertain the authors of these -letters, which had excited so much consternation -in a place where it was most to be wished -that none should exist. He had frequently -lamented the ignorance displayed in letters from -the army, and the indiscretion with which those -letters were published. It was impossible that -many officers could possess a sufficient knowledge -of facts to be able to form a correct opinion -of the probable events of the campaign, yet -when their erroneous opinions were published, -they could not but produce mischievous effects. -He requested, therefore, that the officers, on -account of their own reputation, would refrain -from giving opinions upon matters, with regard<span class="pagenum" id="Page_450">450</span> -to which they could not possibly possess the -necessary knowledge for giving it with correctness; -and if they communicated to their correspondents -facts relating to the position of the -army, its strength, the formation of its magazines, -preparations for cutting down or blowing -up bridges, &c., they would at least tell their -correspondents not to publish these letters in -newspapers, unless it was certain that the publication -could not prove injurious to the army -and to the public service.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Apprehensions expressed in England.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>There was cause for this reproof. The effect -of such agueish predictions in Portugal could -only be to make the Portugueze believe we -should forsake them, and thus dispose them for -submission to the enemy; while, in England, -they assisted the party of the despondents, -whose journalists were labouring to strike their -country with a dead palsy. “We had been -lulled,” they said, “into the most dangerous -confidence. Massena was only waiting for the -advance of his flanks, that he might, with his -whole combined army, either force our handful -of men to a battle, or surround them: all that -could be expected was, that the survivors might -be enabled to retire to their ships with eclat.” -By the next dispatches it appeared, that it was -more easy for a journalist to imagine such a manœuvre, -than for Massena to execute it; but -this had no other effect than to make them -change the note of alarm. “If Massena,” they -then said, “did not destroy Lord Wellington’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_451">451</span> -army by fighting, it could only be because he -meant to destroy it by not fighting; for Massena -was the most consummate captain of all -Buonaparte’s generals. And did ministers anticipate -with complacency the continuance of -our army in Portugal through the winter? The -rainy season was approaching; might it not be -the deep policy of this arch-statesman and conqueror -to keep our army there? He would be -content to devote Massena and his troops to -destruction, if it would facilitate some ulterior -plan; he might mean to ruin us by the expense -of our forces there; and what should we say, if -it were really a part of his policy to keep them -there, while he, having possession of the Dutch, -the Danish, and the Swedish fleets and ports, -made a descent upon England or Ireland? They -trusted ministers were upon their guard, and -that they destined their troops at home for a -service more imminent than the reinforcement -of Lord Wellington.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Ney summons the governor of Almeida.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>While these writers, in the pure spirit of faction, -were thus advising a diversion in favour -of the enemy, Ney, who conducted the siege of -Almeida, directed Loison to summon the governor. -This general, who was peculiarly odious -in that country for his cruelty and rapacity, addressed - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">July 24.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the governor as a Portugueze, admonishing -him not to hazard the interests of his nation -for a vain point of honour. “None,” said he, -“knows better than you do, that the French -come to deliver you from the yoke of the English.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_452">452</span> -There is not a Portugueze who is ignorant -of the little consideration which his country -enjoys among that people. Have they not given -abundant proofs of the little attention which -they pay to a nation worthy of esteem, and for -a long time the ally of France? Their occupation -of all the civil and military posts proves to -demonstration, that the intention of the English -government is to consider Portugal as one of -her colonies. The conduct which the English -have held with regard to the Spaniards, whom -they promised to defend, but abandoned, should -open your eyes, and convince you that they will -do the same with regard to Portugal. Sir Governor, -his excellency has charged me to offer -you the most honourable capitulation, by which -you may retain the government of your fortress, -and your garrison be admitted into the number -of those Portugueze troops that have remained -faithful to the interests of their country. In -your hands therefore, is placed the fate of Almeida, -and of your companions in arms. If you -refuse to accede to this proposal, you will become -responsible for all the blood shed unavailingly, -in a cause which is foreign to the Portugueze -nation.” Brigadier Cox happened to be -in the covered-way, close to the barrier gate, -when the flag of truce arrived with this summons. -Without permitting the French officer -to enter, he returned a verbal answer, that the -fortress would be defended to the last extremity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Portugueze in Massena’s army.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Portugueze troops, of whom Loison spake<span class="pagenum" id="Page_453">453</span> -as being engaged in the service of France, were -the remainder of those whom Junot had hurried -away from their own country. The men, Buonaparte -was too wary to send back; but Massena -brought with him a few nobles, who, having -long preyed upon the country which they -disgraced, completed their infamy by betraying -it. To these traitors Loison appealed in his -summons, saying, they could assure the governor -of the honourable manner in which they -had been treated. The Marquis of Alorna, D. -Pedro de Almeida, was the most conspicuous -among them; he and his accomplices used all -their influence to persuade their countrymen to -submission; but the Portugueze had already experienced -the effects of non-resistance, and the -inhabitants of Castello Mendo, and a few other -villages on the borders of Beira, were the only -persons who were unfortunate enough to be -deceived. These poor people, instead of abandoning -their habitations on the approach of the -enemy, in obedience to the orders which had -been issued, remained in them, fearing to encounter -the evils of wandering in search of shelter, -and hoping, that, as they submitted to the -enemy without resistance, their property would -be safe, their women preserved from violation, -and their lives secured. But the French, conscious -of the wickedness of the cause in which -they were engaged, seemed, like the pirates of -the last century, to have considered themselves -in a state of reprobation, and to have committed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_454">454</span> -crimes which make humanity shudder, as if for -the purpose of manifesting their desperate defiance -of God and man. “The inhabitants of -these submissive villages suffered all the evils -which a cruel enemy could inflict; their property -was plundered; their houses burnt; their -women atrociously violated; and those, whose -age and sex did not provoke the brutal violence -of the soldiers, fell victims to the confidence -which they placed in promises made only to be -broken.” In these words the enormities which -the French committed were proclaimed by the -Portugueze government, and by the British general.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Portugueze ordered to retire before the enemy. <br /><span class="date">Aug. 4.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>That general addressed a proclamation to the -Portugueze upon the occasion, telling them -they now saw what they had to expect from the -French. They now saw that no means remained -for avoiding the evils with which they -were threatened, but a determined and vigorous -resistance, and a firm resolution to obstruct as -much as possible the advance of the enemy, by -removing out of his reach all such things as -might contribute to his subsistence, or facilitate -his progress. “The army under my command,” -said he, “will protect as large a portion of the -country as is possible; but it is obvious that the -people alone can deliver themselves by a vigorous -resistance, and preserve their goods by removing -them out of the reach of the enemy. -The duties, therefore, that bind me to his Royal -Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_455">455</span> -the Portugueze nation, oblige me to make use -of the power and authority with which I am -furnished, for compelling the careless and indolent -to make the necessary efforts to preserve -themselves from the dangers which threaten -them, and to save their country. In conformity -with this, I make known and declare, that all -magistrates and persons in authority who shall -remain in the villages or towns, after having received -orders from the military officer to remove, -and all persons, of whatever class they may be, -who shall maintain the least communication -with, or aid and assist in any manner the enemy, -shall be considered as traitors to the state, and -tried, and punished as such an enormous crime -requires.” The manner in which Lord Wellington -assumed this power, in the name of the -Prince Regent of Portugal, and of the Portugueze -nation, was as wise as the assumption -itself was necessary in such circumstances. The -Portugueze people also were fully sensible that -their duty and their interest were the same, and -never did any people act with more determined -zeal in defence of their country.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Siege of Almeida.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Massena opened his trenches on the night of -August 15. While a false attack was made -against the north of the town, 2000 men dug -the first parallel to a depth of three feet; and -on Sunday the 26th, at five in the morning, -eleven batteries, mounted with sixty-five pieces -of cannon, opened their fire. The garrison consisted -of 5000 men, of whose spirit no doubt was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_456">456</span> -entertained; the fortress was well provided, and -its works had been placed in so respectable a -state, that Lord Wellington had reason to think -it might delay the enemy till late in the season, -even if he should be unable to find an opportunity -of relieving it. These well-founded expectations -were frustrated by one of those chances -which sometimes disconcert the wisest plans, -and disappoint the surest hopes of man. On the -night after the batteries opened, the large powder -magazine in the citadel, with two smaller -ones contiguous to it, blew up. More than half -the artillerymen, a great number of the garrison, -and many of the inhabitants, perished in this -dreadful explosion; many of the guns were dismounted, -and the works were rendered no longer -defensible, even if means of defence had been -left; but, except a few cartridges for immediate -use, and thirty-nine barrels of powder in -the laboratory, the whole of the ammunition -was destroyed.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Surrender of the place.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Great as the calamity was, the evil would have -been far more alarming had it proceeded, as was -at first supposed, from treason; but, according -to the best information which could be collected, -it was altogether accidental: the magazine was -bomb-proof; and they were taking ammunition -from it, when a shell fell upon one of the carts. -The lieutenant-governor had behaved well till -the batteries opened; he was then so terrified, -that he shut himself up in the bomb-proofs. -Having thus proved himself a coward, mere<span class="pagenum" id="Page_457">457</span> -shame made him a traitor: and after the explosion -he took advantage of the confusion to -counteract the governor’s attempt at holding -out longer. Another traitor was found in the -major of artillery. He had behaved well during -the siege; but when he was sent out to propose -terms of capitulation, for the purpose of gaining -favour with the enemy he communicated to him -the whole extent of the disaster; so that Massena, -knowing the place was at his mercy, was -enabled to dictate what terms he pleased. The -garrison were made prisoners of war, with this -exception, that the militia, having deposited -their arms, should return to their homes, and -not serve during the war. It was ten at night -when the capitulation was concluded; in the -course of half an hour the French recommenced -their fire upon the town, and kept it up till -morning, when the Portugueze were assured in -reply to their remonstrances, that it had been -owing to a mistake on the part of the artillery -officers: undoubtedly it had been so; but the -commander is chargeable with something worse - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Compilaçam das Ordens do Dia, 1810, p. 168.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -than error, for having suffered it to continue -through the night without thinking it worth -while to send an order which would instantly -have stopped it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Portugueze prisoners enlist and desert.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The terms were broken by the French with -their wonted perfidy. They tried persuasions -first, and employed Alorna and the other traitors -who were with him to seduce their countrymen. -Accordingly, when the Portugueze laid down<span class="pagenum" id="Page_458">458</span> -their arms upon the esplanade, they were invited -to volunteer into the French service; but not a -man was found base enough to come forward -and accept the invitation. On the following -day, when the troops of the line and the militia -had been separated, they were tried separately. -The troops were told, that unless they accepted -the alternative which was offered them, they -must immediately be marched into France; the -hardships which they would suffer on their march, -and the treatment to which they would be exposed -afterwards, were represented to them in -strong terms; and officers and men, with an -unanimity which might well have been suspected, -agreed then to enlist in the enemy’s service. -They found means of informing Marshal -Beresford that they did this only for the -sake of remaining within reach of their own -country, and making their escape as soon as -possible; and the truth of this declaration was -proved by the numbers who soon rejoined the -allied army. Upon this occasion Marshal Beresford -acted in a manner becoming the British - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Condemnation of their conduct.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -character. He expressed in general orders his -strong disapprobation of such conduct; for the -soldiers, he said, some allowance was to be made; -they were excusable on the score of their want -of education, their undoubted good intention, -and their feeling that the enemy with whom they -had to deal scrupled at no means, however unworthy, -for the attainment of his ends. Yet -even in them it was to be discommended, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_459">459</span> -he doubted not that henceforth those whom -the fortune of war might throw into the enemy’s - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />September.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -hands would take their lot patiently, and suffer -any thing rather than bring a stain upon the -national honour. Nothing could excuse the -officers for conduct so base, so abominable, and -so unworthy of the Portugueze name. They -had sinned against knowledge, and thereby rendered -themselves false and infamous; they had -contracted a voluntary engagement with the determination -of not keeping it, placing themselves -in a miserable predicament, which rendered it -only less infamous to break their faith than to -observe it. He should therefore report them to -their prince, that they might be dismissed with -ignominy from the service, and answer for their -conduct according to the laws. At the same -time he published the names of five officers who, -under a proper sense of duty, had withstood the -contagion of ill example.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Militia forced into the French service.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>There were three militia regiments in Almeida, -those of Trancoso, Guarda, and Arganil. -Neither man nor officer of these could be induced -to serve against his country, nor self-seduced -to tamper with his own conscience. But -instead of dismissing them according to the -terms, Massena said, that if they would not -serve by fair means, they should by force; and -gave orders for forming a corps of pioneers, by -detaining 200 men and seven officers from each -regiment. Marshal Beresford observed upon -this, after honourably contrasting the conduct<span class="pagenum" id="Page_460">460</span> -of the militia with that of the regular troops, -that the Portugueze, to their misfortune, were -too well acquainted with French morality for -this iniquity to surprise them: it was but one -injury the more which that outraged nation had -to revenge, ... and his army would revenge it. -“Never,” said he, “even though Almeida is -lost, never since the beginning of the war has -this kingdom been in so good a state for resisting -the enemy. Soldiers of the Portugueze -army, if you remember that we have the English -army to co-operate with us, which has beaten -the enemy whenever it encountered them, ... if -you call to mind who is the commander of that -army, and that he is yours also, ... if you have -confidence in him and in yourselves, the invaders -never can conquer Portugal. Your general -has full confidence in the result, because -he confides in the inherent loyalty and valour of -the nation, and in its determination of sacrificing -every thing to its fidelity, its liberty, and its independence!”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>They escape and rejoin the allies.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Massena asserted that the Porto regiment -hated the English, and therefore he should retain -it in his service; but he belied his own assertion -by adding that he should keep a watchful -eye on the men, and not place them in important -posts. If he judged in any degree of -the Portugueze people by the few traitorous -nobles and fidalgos with whom he was conversant, -he was speedily undeceived. A night -had not elapsed before great part both of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_461">461</span> -officers and men were missing, and in less than -a fortnight nearly the whole escaped. The -men, instead of taking the opportunity of deserting, -rejoined their countrymen in arms; -and the officers, unconscious of having done -any thing unworthy, presented themselves to -the commander of the first detachment they -could reach, in a condition which pleaded for -them, exhausted with fatigue and hunger. They -protested, when they found it necessary to excuse -themselves, that they had taken no oath of -fidelity to the French, and that to avoid it when -it was to be tendered, they had fled at all hazards, -not waiting for safer opportunities. A -representation in their favour was made by Silveira; -and Marshal Beresford in consequence -mitigated his former censure. It would, he -said, be the greatest satisfaction to him if he -should find it confirmed that these officers had -not pledged themselves to the enemy; but what -he wished to enforce upon them was, that an -officer ought to consider not merely the end at -which he aims, but the means also by which to -bring it about, that both may be alike honourable. -He referred their conduct therefore to -a council of inquiry, under Silveira.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Changes in the Portugueze regency.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Portugueze regency now declared Alorna -a traitor, and offered a reward of a thousand -moidores for bringing him in alive or dead. The -Marquis of Ponte de Lima, the Marquis of -Loule, the Count of St. Miguel, the Count of -Ega, Gomes Friere de Andrade, and D. José<span class="pagenum" id="Page_462">462</span> -Carcome Lobo, were also declared traitors, and -their property declared to be confiscated: but -they had powerful friends in the state; and it is -said that, notwithstanding the decree, their property -remained untouched, in the hands of persons -in whom they could confide. A change -had lately taken place in the Portugueze regency. -The Marquez das Minas resigned, in consequence -of an illness which soon proved fatal. -The other two members were, the Bishop of -Porto, who was Patriarch elect, and the Marquis -Monteiro Mor. Four new members were now -added; the Principal Sousa, brother to the -Conde de Linhares, who was minister in Brazil, -and to the Portugueze ambassador in England; -the Conde de Redondo; Ricardo Raymundo -Nogueira, who had been law professor at Coimbra; -and the English ambassador, Mr. Stuart. -Admiral Berkeley was at the same time appointed -by the Prince of Brazil commander-in-chief -of the naval, as Lord Wellington had been of -the military force of Portugal. There are few -things in the annals of Great Britain more honourable -to the national character than the perfect -confidence reposed in the English nation by -its old ally, and the manner in which that confidence -was requited. While the enemies of -both countries were endeavouring to incense the -Portugueze against the English, by telling them -that the British government designed to usurp -Portugal; and while the enemies of administration -were traducing and insulting the Portugueze<span class="pagenum" id="Page_463">463</span> -people, crying out that they would not -defend themselves and could not be defended -by us, and therefore that we ought not to attempt -to defend them, the English army and the -Portugueze people were acting with the most -perfect unanimity, for the common interests and -common safety of Great Britain and Portugal.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Conduct of the Portugueze government.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The spirit of the people, without which all -other means of defence must have been ineffectual, -was what England could neither give nor -take away; but for the measures by which that -spirit was so directed as to secure its end, Portugal -was indebted to British councils. Military -and financial resources, of which the nation had -not supposed itself capable, were called forth; -and the Portugueze were addressed by their rulers -in language to which they had long been -unaccustomed, ... the language of hope and -confidence, and of conscious rectitude as well as -conscious strength. Like the Supreme Junta, -the regents reminded the Portugueze of their -heroic ancestors; they spake of the wickedness -of the enemy, the inexpressible miseries which -would accompany their yoke, and the certainty -of glorious success, if those exertions and sacrifices -were made which the emergency required; -but the Portugueze regency did not, like the -Spaniards, speak to the people of the causes -which had rendered this invasion possible, and -produced the decay of Portugal; nor did they -hold out the promise of the restoration of their -rights, the redress of their grievances, and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_464">464</span> -due execution of their laws. Such promises -were not necessary as excitement; a people who -were literally defending their hearths and altars, -and fighting to save their wives and daughters -from violation and butchery, or to revenge them, -needed no additional feeling to goad them on: -... as pledges they were not held out; because -the government had not the prudence to think -of reforming itself. In providing for the defence -of the country, it acted providently and bravely, -with wisdom and with vigour; but in other -things, the old leaven discovered itself, and -made it apparent that the pleasure of the minister -was still the law of Portugal. A decree was -published, assigning to the widows, children, or -dependent brethren of those who had fallen at -Almeida, the full pay of the deceased, and half -pay to the families of those who were made prisoners. -“The Prince,” it said, “would not believe -that any of his faithful vassals could have -entered the service of the enemy; and if any -had been compelled to do so, he trusted they -had only yielded to compulsion, with the purpose -of effecting their escape. He suspended, -therefore, his justice; but if a month elapsed -before such persons acquitted themselves by appearing, -they would be considered as traitors.” -Now, the treason of the lieutenant-governor and -the major of artillery was open and undoubted: -Lord Wellington had stated it in his dispatches -to the minister at war; their names were given -in those dispatches here in England, but suppressed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_465">465</span> -in Portugal, out of favour to their connexions.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Arbitrary arrests at Lisbon.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>In another respect the conduct of the Portugueze -regency was more inexcusable. Eight-and-forty -persons, of all ranks and professions, -and many of them unacquainted with each other, -were seized in the night; ten of them were sent -to the tower of St. Julian, and the rest to the -Limoeiro, the common prison of the city. The -most alarming rumours were scattered abroad. -A formidable and extensive conspiracy, it was -said, had been discovered, which had nothing -less for its object than a general massacre of the -British, for the purpose of delivering up the -country to the French. These reports reached -England, and received their first contradiction -from the Portugueze government themselves, -who found it expedient to declare, that neither -Lord Wellington nor Mr. Stuart had any part -in their proceedings upon this occasion; that -the stories of the conspiracy, and of the arms -which had been discovered, were false; and that -the individuals who had been arrested had been -sent out of the kingdom, only because it was the -opinion of the police that their residence in it -might be prejudicial to the public tranquillity. -Some of these individuals were permitted to -come to England, others were sent to the -Azores, after they had suffered every kind of -inconvenience, privation, and indignity, to the -alarm and distress of the families of all, and the -ruin of some; ... there was neither proof nor<span class="pagenum" id="Page_466">466</span> -accusation against them; the whole, as a public -act, was one of those acts which mark the unheeding -and unfeeling folly of an ignorant and -obstinate despotism, but of which the secret -springs are to be found in private malice or cupidity.</p> - -<p>The manner in which the Portugueze government -declared, that neither Marshal General -Lord Wellington, nor the minister plenipotentiary -of his Britannic Majesty, nor any individual -of the British nation, had any part in -these proceedings, nor any previous knowledge -of them, make it apparent that the British general -and the British minister disapproved of an -act of tyranny which was thus in reality disclaimed -on their part. They could not prevent -that of which they were not apprised before it -was done, nor after it was done could they express -their disapprobation better than by requiring -to have it thus distinctly stated, that the -regency had neither acted upon their advice, -nor received their sanction. It was the more -to be regretted, because the other measures of -the government entitled them to respect and -gratitude. They had restored order in the -country, and brought its resources into action, -and their public acts and declarations corresponded -to the spirit of the people. The ringleaders -of the mutiny, which, in its consequences, -had given Soult possession of Porto, -were brought to trial and condign punishment; -and after the most impartial examination of his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_467">467</span> -conduct, General Bernardim Freire de Andrada, -who had been murdered at Braga, was declared -to have served his country faithfully and well, -and the memory of those unfortunate men who -perished in the same tumult was cleared of all -imputation. An army more numerous than -Portugal had ever before possessed was formed, -equipped, and disciplined; and the government, -when it reminded the people of their strength, -did not fear to tell them of their danger. It announced -the loss of Almeida, ... “a loss,” said -the regents, “greatly to be lamented for the -death of part of its defenders, and the unhappiness -of others, who have thus fallen into captivity, -but of little importance to the great cause -of the salvation of the country. Wellington at -the head of the allied armies; Beresford directing -our troops, who are indebted to him for their -organization and their discipline; brave soldiers, -and a faithful people, who have sworn to defend -their prince and their native land to the last extremity; -these are the bulwarks which defend -us; and these an army of slaves, who are continually -wasting away by want and desertion, -will never be able to beat down.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Apprehensions of the British government.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The Portugueze, and those especially who -were intrusted with the government of their -country, cannot be extolled above their merits, -for the spirit which they displayed at this crisis, -the most momentous, and to ordinary minds the -most appalling of the whole war. Their merit -is the greater because there was not that vigour<span class="pagenum" id="Page_468">468</span> -in the British cabinet which the emergency required; -and because with all their confidence -in British fidelity, they could not have been -without some apprehension of seeing the defence -of Portugal abandoned by Great Britain. -The enemy had exultingly proclaimed that the -English would fly to their ships, and some colour -for the boast was afforded by the fact that a -fleet large enough to receive the troops was -lying in the Tagus, and evidently detained there -for such a service. The heavy baggage of the -army was actually kept on board; and Lord -Wellington was at that time acting under instructions -of a character to excite in him any -thing rather than confidence or hope. They -were to this effect, that his majesty would be -better pleased if the army were withdrawn too -soon, than that its embarkation should be endangered -by the least delay. Such instructions -must inevitably have drawn on the disgrace and -ruin which they anticipated, if they had been -addressed to a man of inferior capacity, or -meaner mind. A want of courage and of generosity -was implied in them which is but too characteristic -of British ministries. Instead of assuring -the commander of support, whatever -might be the issue, if nothing on his part were -left undone, he was made to understand that -any risk which he incurred must be upon his -own responsibility, and that any disaster which -he might sustain would be imputed to his decision. -But Providence was with us, and directed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_469">469</span> -the course of events to a glorious and -happy issue, notwithstanding our repeated errors.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington had the farther mortification -of knowing that the army, satisfied as he was -with its conduct in all respects, partook that despondency -which the pestilent activity of a faction -at home was continually labouring to produce, -and which the events of the campaign had -hitherto tended to confirm. His plans had been -long meditated and wisely formed; but the reasonable -expectations which he founded upon -them were disappointed by the accident that -drew after it the fall of Almeida. That place -might easily have held out till the autumnal -rains should have rendered it impossible for the -French to advance, and scarcely practicable for -them to have subsisted their army upon that -frontier. To gain time at this juncture was for -him to gain every thing: here he thought to -have wintered in the sure expectation that every -day would render the Portugueze troops more -efficient, and with the reasonable hope that, -through Marquis Wellesley’s influence in the -cabinet, he should receive such reinforcements -as would enable him to act upon the offensive. -Accident had frustrated this intent; the enemy -were enabled to advance, elated with their fortune, -and relying upon it as the only divinity in -which they were encouraged to trust; and -Massena, whose plans had hitherto succeeded -beyond his calculations, and even to the extent -of his hopes, had the advantage of relying upon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_470">470</span> -the disposition as well as the efficiency of his -army, and the full support of a government -which placed ample means at his command, -crippled him with no restrictions, and threatened -him with no responsibility.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Movements of Regnier’s corps, and of General Hill.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Upon the fall of Almeida Lord Wellington’s -head-quarters were removed to Gouvea, and the -whole of his infantry retired to the rear of Celorico, -the outposts continuing in advance of that -town. Massena waited till he had been joined -by Regnier’s corps, consisting of 17,000 men, -which, having acted with little success against -Romana in Extremadura, had crossed the Tagus -at Barca de Alconete, early in July. According -to the plan which Buonaparte had laid down -for the conquest of Portugal, this corps was to -have moved by the right bank of the Tagus -upon Abrantes; but this design having been -altered when the allied army was found more -numerous and efficient than the French cabinet -had supposed, Regnier had moved upon Zarzamayor, -Penamacor, and Monsanto, in the hope -of striking a blow against Lieutenant-General -Hill, who had advanced with 13,000 men from -Abrantes to Portalegre, for the purpose of supporting -Romana. The French hoped either -that he would expose himself to an attack, or -that Lord Wellington might be tempted to make -a movement against Regnier, of which Massena -was prepared to take advantage; but the British -generals were not thus to be circumvented: and -Massena as well as Lord Wellington, directing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_471">471</span> -his attention to a single object, Regnier joined -the invading force, while Hill was stationed at -Sarzedas, to cover the road upon Abrantes to -Lisbon, or move to Ponte de Murcella, and -unite with the main body on the line of its retreat: -in either case Major-General Leith’s -division, which was kept at Thomar in reserve -to support him, was to take the same direction.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Massena advances into Portugal.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Had Massena despised the allied army in -truth as he affected to do, he would now have -marched by Castello Branco, Abrantes, and -Santarem, direct upon Lisbon, leaving Lord -Wellington behind him; but he remembered -the fate of Junot, and had too much respect for -the enemy with whom he had to contend. Relying, -however, upon numbers and fortune, and -taking into account the indecision and timidity -which seemed to characterize the British counsels, -he expected that Lord Wellington, being -too weak to risk a battle, would retreat, if not -fly before him, with no other hope than that of -reaching the ships and securing his embarkation. -Under this imagination he ordered the French -army to provide itself for seventeen days, by -which time he expected to finish the campaign -triumphantly. The only impediment which he -apprehended on the way was from the difficulty -of transport. For this reason very few women -were allowed to accompany the army; they -were left at Ciudad Rodrigo, where so many had -assembled to share in the spoils and pleasures of -Lisbon with their friends and husbands, that the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_472">472</span> -place, because of the round of gaieties which -was there kept up, was called Little Paris. -From thence they were to follow when the -easy conquest should be completed; and this -was thought so certain, that engagements were -made for parties to be given in the capital. -With this confidence, and this levity of mind, -the French entered upon their third invasion of -Portugal. They began their march in three -bodies, Junot’s corps with the artillery and cavalry -proceeding by Pinhel and Trancoso, Ney’s -by Alverca, and Regnier’s by Guarda. At the -same time, Lord Wellington, aware of the enemy’s -intent, began to retreat towards Coimbra -deliberately, and with such evident forethought -and determination, that this retrograde movement -did not in the slightest degree abate the -spirits of the army. No stores were abandoned, -no men and horses foundered; the operations -were all performed with regularity and -ease; the soldiers suffered no privations, and -underwent no unnecessary fatigue; the inhabitants -retired under their protection, and assisted -them in breaking up the bridges, destroying the -mills, and laying waste the country; so that -Massena found a desert as he advanced. In -the town of Celorico there were only two inhabitants, -and nothing but bare walls. At that - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Ney and Regnier’s corps join him at Celorico.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -place the corps of Regnier and Ney effected -their junction. The appearance of the former -made it evident that there was no intention of -acting upon the Tagus; and it appeared also,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_473">473</span> -upon their taking the road by Fornos, that it -was Massena’s intention to proceed upon the -right side of the Mondego, not upon the left -by way of Penalva and Ponte de Murcella, -where he thought Lord Wellington would be -prepared to resist him in a strong position: he -calculated upon turning this position, and so -making himself master of Coimbra and the resources -which the fertile country about that -city would supply. But he did not calculate -upon the foresight and decision of the British -General, nor upon the spirit of the Portugueze -people: he hoped to delude them by promises, -and to find them as he advanced remaining patiently -in their towns and villages, in expectation -of the conquest which awaited them. With - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Sept. 20.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -this intent he gave orders that the troops should -halt before they entered Viseu, till the inhabitants -might be assured of protection for themselves -and their property. No persons were -found abroad there; the soldiers were still forbidden -to enter any house forcibly on pain of -severe punishment, and Massena himself remained -a while in the streets, expecting the effect -of his condescending patience. Night was -setting in, and the word was at length given -that the soldiers might quarter themselves. The -doors were presently broken open, ... but neither -inhabitants nor provisions were there; every -thing had been carried away, all had fled; even -no lights were to be found, except those which -were burning in the churches. The only living<span class="pagenum" id="Page_474">474</span> -souls remaining there were a few poor wretches -in the hospital, who were in too pitiable a state -for removal: one medical attendant had been -left with them; he also had fled upon the entrance -of the French, but upon the information -of his patients he was pursued and overtaken, -and ordered to continue at his post, and assure -the town’s-people when they ventured back that -no ill treatment was to be apprehended from the -French conquerors.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French army collected at Viseu.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Here Junot, with the artillery and cavalry, -joined the army; but this junction, which completed -the concentration of the French force, -was impeded by Colonel Trant with some Portugueze -militia and dragoons, who attacked the -convoy near Tojal. Had this enterprise been -executed as well as it was planned and timed, a -blow might have been inflicted which the enemy -would have felt severely; but the French, by -their prompt discipline and judicious boldness, -deterred the militia from pursuing their success, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Jones’s Account of the War, i. 297.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -and the park fell back on Trancoso. This delay, -however, was no light advantage for the -allies: it compelled Massena to remain two -days at Viseu waiting for his artillery, and the -time thus gained enabled Lord Wellington to -collect his force upon the ground whereon, now -that Massena’s movements were foreseen, he -had determined to withstand him.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Wellington crosses to the Serra de Busaco. <br /><span class="date">Sept. 21.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>On the day after the French commander arrived -at Viseu, General Hill joined the British -army at Ponte de Murcella; the bridge was destroyed,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_475">475</span> -and he was left there with his division, -while the rest of the army crossed the Mondego, -and Lord Wellington himself proceeded -to the Serra de Busaco, a mountainous ridge -eight miles in length, and terminating precipitously -on the Mondego; the Serra de Murcella, -in like manner, terminating on the -opposite bank. By daylight on the following -morning the light division and the cavalry, with -General Pack’s Portugueze brigade, assembled -in the plain of Mortagoa, having their picquets -upon the Criz; the bridge over that little river -was destroyed. That day the enemy appeared -in sight, and on the morrow, about three in the -afternoon, drove in the picquets; some skirmishing -ensued, the allies retreated to the rear -of the plain, and at night began their march -over the Serra. The place appointed for their -bivouac was on the other side, two leagues distant, -but the acclivity was so steep, that owing -to this cause, and to the impediment occasioned -by the breaking down of some artillery waggons, -they did not reach it till it was daylight. -It was generally supposed in the army at this -time that no stand would be made, but Lord -Wellington’s determination soon became apparent. -Had his army indeed been numerous -enough to have occupied the whole ridge, no -enemy could have ventured to attack him there, -the ascent being too steep for cavalry, and the -height of the position above the ground in its -front such as to render the use of artillery<span class="pagenum" id="Page_476">476</span> -on the part of the assailants almost unavailing: -occupied as it was, it was impregnable. The -general elevation of the ridge is from nine to -twelve hundred feet, and it is crossed by two -roads, both leading from the north to Coimbra, -the one passing near the convent, the other -about a league to the southward.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Busaco.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Busaco, which was now to become famous in -British and Portugueze history, had long been -a venerable name in Portugal. It is the only -place in that kingdom where the barefooted -Carmelites possessed what in monastic language -is called a desert; by which term an establishment -is designated where those brethren whose -piety flies the highest pitch may at once enjoy -the advantages of the eremite and the discipline -of the cœnobite life, and thus indulge the - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>General Mackinnon’s Journal, p. 74.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -heroism of ascetic devotion in security. The -convent, surrounded by an extensive and almost -impervious wood, stands in what may be called -the crater of the loftiest part of the ridge: its -precincts, which included a circumference of -about four miles, were walled in. Within that -circuit were various chapels and religious stations; -and on the summit of the mountain, -which is within the inclosure, a stone cross was -erected of enormous size, upon so huge a foundation, -that three thousand cart-loads of stone -were employed in constructing its base. The -cells of the brethren were round the church<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_477">477</span> -not in a regular building, but accommodated to -the irregularities of the ground, and lined with -cork, which was every where used instead of -wood because of the dampness of the situation. -Every cell had its garden and its water-course -for irrigating it, the cultivation of these little -spots being the only recreation which the inhabitants -allowed themselves as lawful. In one -of these gardens the first cedars which grew in -Portugal were raised. It was indeed one of those -places where man has converted an earthly Paradise -into a Purgatory for himself, but where -superstition almost seems sanctified by every -thing around it. Lord Wellington’s head-quarters -were in the convent; and the solitude -and silence of Busaco were now broken by -events, in which its hermits, dead as they were -to the world, might be permitted to partake all -the agitations of earthly hope and fear.</p> - -<p>On the 26th Generals Hill and Leith joined -the army. This corps had made so rapid and -arduous a march, that Massena regarded its -junction as impossible, and reckoned therefore -that the force which he wished to attack must -necessarily be weak in front, if indeed Lord -Wellington should venture to give him battle. -That general arrived on the same day at Mortagoa, -and the bridge over the Criz was re-established -for his artillery, the army having -crossed at a ford a little way above. Some<span class="pagenum" id="Page_478">478</span> -skirmishing took place, and at S. Antonio do -Cantaro the French were resisted in a manner -which made them first apprehend that a determined -stand was to be made against them. -Massena himself upon this reconnoitred the -position, after which he asked one of the unworthy -Portugueze who accompanied him, if he -thought the allies would give him battle? He - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Relaçam da Campanha de Massena. Investigador Portuguez, vol. vi. 59.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -was answered, that undoubtedly they would, -seeing they showed themselves in such strength. -The French Marshal replied, I cannot persuade -myself that Lord Wellington will risk the loss -of his reputation; but if he does, ... I have -him! To-morrow we shall effect the conquest -of Portugal; and in a few days I shall drown -the leopard!</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Battle of Busaco. Sept. <br />27.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>About two on the following morning the -French army was in motion. Ney’s corps -formed in close column on the right, at the foot -of the hill, and on the road which leads to the -convent; Regnier’s on the left, upon the southern -road which passes by S. Antonio do Cantaro; -Junot’s was in the centre, and in reserve; -the cavalry was in the rear, the ground not permitting -it to act. The allied British and Portugueze -army was posted along the ridge of the -Serra, forming the segment of a circle, the extreme -points of which embraced every part of -the enemy’s position, and from whence every -movement on their part could be immediately -observed. The troops had bivouacked that -night in position, as they stood: Lord Wellington<span class="pagenum" id="Page_479">479</span> -in the wood near the centre, the general -officers at the heads of their divisions and brigades. -The orders were that all should stand -to their arms before daylight; and the whole -army were in high spirits, deeming themselves -sure of an action, and of success. Before daybreak -the rattling of the enemy’s carriages was -heard, and a few of their guns were brought to -fire upon a smaller number of British ones -which had been placed to command the road. -At dawn the action began on the right, and -after some firing by the light troops in advance -of the position, the enemy attacked a village -which was in front of the light division, and -which, though its possession was of advantage -to the French, Lord Wellington chose rather to -let them occupy, than suffer an action to be -brought on upon less favourable ground than -that which he had chosen, and where he was -sure of success. The nature of the ground, -upon which this assurance was founded, facilitated -the enemy’s movements to a certain -degree, but no farther; its steepness and its inequalities -covered their ascent, and they gained -the summit with little loss. Regnier’s corps -was the first that was seriously engaged: it -ascended at a part where there were only a few -light troops; and being thus enabled to deploy -without opposition, the French possessed themselves -for a moment, in considerable strength, -of a point within the line. Their first column -was received by the 88th regiment alone, part<span class="pagenum" id="Page_480">480</span> -of Major-General Mackinnon’s brigade, which -was presently reinforced by half the 45th, and -soon afterwards by the 8th Portugueze: their -second found the 74th, with the 9th and 21st -Portugueze, ready to receive them on the right. -Being repulsed there, they tried the centre with -no better fortune; the remainder of Major-General -Picton’s division coming up, he charged -them with the bayonet, and dislodged them, -greatly superior in numbers as they were, from -the strong ground which they had gained; at -the same time, Major-General Leith arriving -with a brigade on their flank, joined in the -charge, and they were driven down the hill -with great slaughter, leaving 700 dead upon the -ground. Few prisoners were taken.</p> - -<p>Marshal Ney meantime was not more fortunate -with his division. Part of it he formed -in column of mass, and ordered it to ascend upon -the right of the village which he had occupied. -They came up in the best possible order, though -not without suffering considerably from the light -infantry; the ground, however, covered them -in part by its steepness. Major-General Craufurd, -who commanded on that side, judiciously -made his troops withdraw just behind the crest -of the ridge whereon they were formed: he -himself remained in front, on horseback, observing -the enemy. No sooner had they reached -the summit than the guns of his division opened -a destructive fire upon them; and the men -appearing suddenly at a distance only of some<span class="pagenum" id="Page_481">481</span> -twenty paces, advanced and charged. Instantly -the French were broken: the foremost regiments -of the column were almost destroyed, and -those who escaped fled down the steep declivity, -running, sliding, or rolling, as they could. General -Simon, who commanded the column, was -wounded and taken. Massena was now convinced -that the attack could not succeed, and -therefore halted the support at the foot of -the hill. He endeavoured to decoy Lord Wellington -out of a position which had been proved -impregnable; but the British commander persisted -in the sure system on which he had resolved, -and the remainder of the day was employed -in skirmishing between the light troops. -They were directed to retire when pressed, and -give the enemy an opportunity of repeating the -attack. But the enemy had received too severe -a lesson to venture upon a repetition, and as -night approached they were drawn off to some -distance, near the ground where Junot and the -reserve were stationed. The village which -they had been allowed to occupy in the morning -still remained in their possession. Major-General -Craufurd sent to the officer who commanded -there, saying it was necessary for his -corps, and requiring him to abandon it. The -reply was, that he would die in defence of the -post with which he was intrusted. This tone - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Memoirs of the Early Campaigns, 171.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -was neither called for by the occasion nor justified -by the event. Six guns were immediately -opened upon him; some companies of the 43d<span class="pagenum" id="Page_482">482</span> -and of the Rifle Corps were ordered to charge -the village; the French were instantly driven -out, and the advanced post of the light division -resumed possession.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Behaviour of the Portugueze troops.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Victories of greater result at the time have -been gained in Portugal, but never was a battle -fought there of more eventual importance to the -Portugueze nation; for the Portugueze troops, -whom the French despised, whom the enemies -of the ministry in England reviled, and whom -perhaps many of the British army till then mistrusted, -established that day their character both -for courage<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> and for discipline, and proved, that -however the government and the institutions of -that kingdom had been perverted and debased, -the people had not degenerated. Lord Wellington -bore testimony to their deserts: he declared -that he had never seen a more gallant -attack than that which they made upon the -enemy who had reached the ridge of the Serra; -they were worthy, he said, of contending in the -same ranks with the British troops in that good -cause, which they afforded the best hopes of -saving. Marshal Beresford bestowed high and -deserved praise upon them in general orders; -and the opportunity was taken of granting a -free pardon to all who were under arrest for -military offences, that they might rejoin their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_483">483</span> -regiments, and emulate their comrades, to whose -good conduct they were indebted for this forgiveness; -but persons who had been apprehended -for robbery or murder were excepted -from the amnesty, for these, it was properly -observed, were not to be considered merely as -military crimes. After this battle, the knighthood -of the Bath was conferred on Marshal -Beresford, in consideration of those exertions -by which the Portugueze troops had been qualified -to bear their part in it so honourably<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a>.</p> - -<p>The loss of the British in this memorable action -amounted to 107 killed, 493 wounded, and -thirty-one taken; that of the Portugueze to 90 -killed, 512 wounded, and twenty taken. One -French general, three colonels, thirty-three officers, -and 250 men were made prisoners; 2000 -were left dead on the field; the number was ascertained, -because Massena sent a flag of truce requesting -permission to bury them; it was not -thought proper to comply with the request, and -they were buried by the conquerors. Most of their -wounded, who were very numerous<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a>, were left -to the mercy of the peasants; General Craufurd, -whose division was the last that withdrew from -the Serra, saved as many as he could from their -hands, and lodged them in the convent. Unground<span class="pagenum" id="Page_484">484</span> -maize was found in the knapsacks of -the French.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Massena marches into the Porto road.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Massena having in person directed the operations -of the day, had purchased at some cost -the conviction that his boast was not here to -be realized. He consulted with Ney, Regnier, -Junot, and Freirion; and they called in the -Portugueze traitors to inquire of them by what -course a position might be turned, which they -found themselves unable to force. None of -these unworthy men happened to be acquainted -with that part of the country; the French commander -turned from them in evident displeasure, -as if they ought to have possessed the information -of which he stood in need, and he ordered -General Montbrun out with a strong detachment -to explore the ways, telling him to send -Generals St. Croix and Lamotte in different -directions on the same service. On the following -day two peasants were brought in; promises -could draw nothing from them, but they yielded -to threats of torture and death, and informed the -enemy that there was a pass<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> over the Serra -de Caramula, communicating with the great -road between Porto and Coimbra, and coming -into it near Sardam. By this course Massena -immediately determined to proceed. There -had been skirmishing throughout the morning -between the light troops; the better to conceal -their movements, the French set fire to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_485">485</span> -woods; but the summit of Busaco commands a -most extensive prospect over the whole country<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a>: -early in the afternoon a large body of their -horse and foot was observed in motion from the -left of their centre to the rear, and from thence -their cavalry were seen in march along the road -leading from Mortagoa, over the mountain, toward -Porto. Lord Wellington at once apprehended -their purpose, and perceived that it -was now too late to prevent or to impede it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Colonel Trant’s movements.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Orders had been dispatched from the Ponte -de Murcella on the 19th to Colonel Trant, who -was then acting as Brigadier with some Portugueze -militia, that he should occupy the villages -of Sardam and Aguada. The division which -he commanded formed part of the force under -General Bacellar, who was then at Moimenta -da Beira, and whose instructions were to consider -the defence of the Douro, and more especially -of Porto as his principal object. The -orders were that Trant should march by S. Pedro -do Sul, which was the nearest line, but the -worst road, and through a country exhausted of -provisions, in consequence of the passage of the -enemy by Viseu, and the abandonment of the -intermediate district by its inhabitants. Partly -for these considerations General Bacellar directed -him to make a circuit by Porto, but -chiefly because he had ascertained that a French<span class="pagenum" id="Page_486">486</span> -detachment of 1500 men had entered S. Pedro; -and because he considered it his main business -to provide for the protection of Porto, which -he also supposed to be Lord Wellington’s object -in ordering this movement. Trant proposed to -attack the enemy at S. Pedro, and force his -way, if possible; Bacellar would not permit -him to make the attempt, because he thought it -too hazardous for troops like his; and Trant in -consequence took the circuitous route. He left -his men near the points which he had been instructed - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Sept. 28.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -to occupy, early on the morning after -the battle, and proceeded to the head-quarters -at Busaco, where he arrived before eleven in the -forenoon, and was then first apprized that it had -been intended he should occupy the village of -Boyalva, and defend the pass over the Serra de -Caramula. He offered instantly to return and -occupy the intended ground; and there was -time for doing it, but the offer was declined. -Lord Wellington had not detached any part of -his own army to these passes, because in case of -failure, the troops must have been cut off from -the main body; whereas the Portugueze, if -compelled to retire, might fall back upon Porto, -according to their destination. Had the ground -been stronger than it was, it was not to be supposed -that 1500 militia could maintain it against -Massena’s army; for to that number Trant’s -force was reduced, the men having marched -190 miles in nine successive days, and many, -while traversing the district in which they were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_487">487</span> -raised, had absented themselves, without leave, -to revisit their families. They might possibly -have held it long enough to bring on a general -action, if Lord Wellington had thought it advisable -again to venture one; but the same motives -which withheld him from giving battle for -the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, or Almeida, influenced -him still: he had indeed more confidence -in the Portugueze troops, but the other -reasons existed in their full strength: adhering -to his long concerted plans, which were laid for -sure though slow success, he determined upon -committing nothing to the mere fortune of war; -Trant therefore returned to Sardam, to act as - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>The allies withdraw from Busaco.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -opportunity might offer, and Lord Wellington -during the night withdrew his army from Busaco. -General Hill recrossed the Mondego, retiring -toward Santarem by way of Thomar, and Lord -Wellington marched on Coimbra, leaving Craufurd -with a few piquets on the Serra, where he -performed the humane office of providing for -the wounded French, who had been abandoned -by their countrymen, for want of means to remove -them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Trant retreats to the Vouga.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>On the evening of the 28th the enemy’s -cavalry entered Boyalva, driving in a piquet of -the Light Dragoons. It is an open village, on -the western slope of the hill, where there is no -defile, and where the ground is not broken. -Trant was then at Sardam, where, during the -following day and night, he occupied one half -the united villages, the enemy’s cavalry occupying<span class="pagenum" id="Page_488">488</span> -the other. As he could no longer be of -service here, and was aware that he should be -attacked in the course of the day if he remained -longer, early on the 30th he resolved to retire -behind the Vouga. La Croix, who, with a -column of horse, was scouring the country upon -the right flank of the invading army, fell in with -his outposts, attacked them, and drove them in -with the loss of one officer and five-and-twenty -men<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a>. The infantry, by good fortune, had effected -their passage; they formed in defence of -the bridge, and La Croix having no infantry, -did not attempt to force it. The Vouga was at -this time fordable, and therefore Trant marched -in the night to Oliveira, on the Porto road, from -whence, if it should be necessary, he could in -one day reach the Douro, and cross it for the -defence of that city. There were then no other -troops to defend it, and if the enemy had pursued, -Porto might have been a second time in -their power. That this was not done is not -surprising, because it did not consist with the -scheme of Massena’s operations; but that the -French should have neglected so fair an opportunity -of dispersing Trant’s force, which if not -dispersed might be expected presently to harass -their rear, must be accounted among those -errors with which the whole course of human -events is marked, and in which the religious -mind perceives the superintendence of a higher -power than man.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_489">489</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The allies cross the Mondego.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The allies being on the shorter line to Coimbra, -were sufficiently in advance of the enemy -for all their movements to be conducted with -the same coolness and order which had characterized -the whole retreat. On the 30th the -infantry crossed from Coimbra into the great -Lisbon road. The rear-guard of cavalry bivouacked -in front of Fornos, and remained bridled up -all night, in a very dangerous situation, the -enemy having pushed a strong force close to - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Oct. 1.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -them. In the morning they were driven in -some confusion through Fornos by a large body -of horse and foot: they formed on the great -plain of Coimbra, and the French seeing the -three brigades of cavalry with six guns of the -horse artillery ready to receive them, did not -venture to leave the inclosures. Before noon -the rear-guard received orders to retire, and -crossed the Mondego accordingly at the fords -near S. Martinho do Bispo. The enemy pushed -on their horse, came up just as the passage had -been effected, and attempted to cross, as if in -pursuit: they were charged, and driven back -by a squadron of the 16th, after which they dismounted, -and fired with their carbines ineffectually -across the river. The passage might have -been defended with good prospect of success, -but this was not consistent with Lord Wellington’s -plans, which were to draw the French to -a point where they should be at the greatest -distance from their resources, and where his -own would be at hand.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_490">490</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />October.</span> <br />Flight of the inhabitants from Coimbra.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>When it was known in Coimbra that the -enemy were approaching, and the retreat of the -British made it evident that the city would be -at their mercy, a cry soon arose that the French -had actually entered, and the whole of the inhabitants -who had not yet provided for their -safety ran shrieking toward the bridge. On all -other sides they were cut off from flight. The -bridge, which is long and narrow, was presently -choked by the crowd of fugitives; and multitudes -in the hurry of their fear rushed into the -Mondego, and made their way through the -water, which was in many parts three or four -feet deep. The gateway, which was the city -prison, is near the bridge, and the screams of -the prisoners, who beheld this scene of terror -from their grates, and expected something far -more dreadful from the cruelty of the French -than they had reason to apprehend from the -laws of their own country, were heard amid all -the uproar and confusion. Lord Wellington -heard them, and in compassion sent his aide-de-camp, -Lord March, to set them at liberty.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French enter Coimbra.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Massena expected to find great resources in -Coimbra, a large and flourishing city situated in -the finest part of a beautiful and fertile country. -He found it utterly deserted, like every place -which the French had hitherto entered on their -march. With the intent of securing the stores, -he forbade all pillage, and gave orders that only -the brigade which was to be left in garrison -there should enter. In defiance of these orders<span class="pagenum" id="Page_491">491</span> -Junot commanded his men to make their way in, -and break open the houses, as the owners had -thought proper to abandon them. Such directions -were eagerly obeyed; the men forced the guard, -which, in pursuance of Massena’s instructions, -had been stationed at the gate of S. Sophia; the -other troops immediately joined them in their -occupation, and Massena neither attempted to -enforce his own orders, nor manifested any displeasure -during the scene of wanton waste and -havoc which ensued. The magazines of the -allied army had been removed, and Montbrun, -who was dispatched to Figueira for the chance -of overtaking them there, arrived too late: but -provision enough, it is said, was found in Coimbra -to have served the enemy for a month’s -consumption, if proper measures had been -adopted for its preservation. The people who -so unanimously forsook their homes had had -neither time nor means for removing their property. -So long as it was uncertain in which -direction the invaders would move, and while a -possibility remained that they might be successfully -resisted upon the way, the people of Coimbra -had lived in hope that this dire necessity -might be averted; and when it came upon them, -so many cars were required for the sick and -wounded, and other services of the enemy, that -few or none were left for them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Portugueze people fly before the enemy.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>It is the custom throughout the south of -India, that when a hostile army approaches, -the natives bury their treasure, forsake their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_492">492</span> -houses, take with them as much food as they -can carry, and seek the protection of some -strong place, or conceal themselves among the -woods and mountains. People in these deplorable -circumstances are called the Wulsa of the -district. The Wulsa has never been known to -depart on the approach of a British force, if unaccompanied -by Indian allies. This, however, -is no peculiar honour of the British name; it -belongs rather to the European character, for -no such spectacle had ever been exhibited in -European warfare till the present campaign. -The orders of the Regency and of the commander-in-chief -might have been issued in vain, -if the Portugueze people had not from cruel -experience felt the necessity of this measure for -their individual safety. The alternative was -dreadful, and yet better than that of remaining -at the mercy of such invaders. It was a miserable -sight to see them accompanying the columns -of the retreating army, well-ordered as the movements -of that army were, and resolutely, as on -the few occasions which were offered, it met and -checked the pursuers. All ranks and conditions -were confounded in the general calamity: families -accustomed to the comforts of a delightful -climate and fruitful country followed the troops -on foot; there was no security for age, or sex, -or childhood, but in flight<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a>. Every thing was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_493">493</span> -left behind them except what the women could -carry; for even in this extremity the men very -generally observed the national prejudice, which -deems it disgraceful for man to bear a burthen.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Hopes and expectations of the French.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Boastful as the French commander was, and -confident in his own fortune, and in the hitherto -unchecked prosperity of the Emperor Napoleon, -the battle of Busaco made him apprehend that -the enterprise in which he had engaged was not -so easy as he had imagined, nor so free from all -risk of disasters. There were not fewer than -5000 sick and wounded whom it was necessary -to leave at Coimbra; as many more had been -left at Busaco dead on the field, or abandoned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_494">494</span> -there because their condition was hopeless, or -for want of means to remove them. But a loss -of 10,000 men upon his march, without any -commensurate diminution of the allies, had not -been allowed for in his calculations; and he -found himself unable to leave a guard of sufficient -strength at Coimbra, without weakening -his army too much. He thought therefore that -the surest course by which he could secure his -sick and wounded was to pursue the English -with all his force, and drive them out of the -country, for he still persuaded himself that they -were flying to their ships. This opinion he expressed -in dispatches which were intercepted. -The other generals partook the same delusion; -they no longer despised the British troops, but -they had not yet been taught to respect the -councils of the British government, and the nature -of its policy they could neither believe nor -comprehend; for it appeared to them incredible -that any government should act upon principles -of integrity and honour. They supposed that -Lord Wellington would embark as soon as he -reached Lisbon, and that it was his intention to -carry off as many of the Portugueze youth as he -could get on board, by way of securing some -compensation for the expenses of the war!</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Confusion at Condeixa.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>With these expectations they followed the -retreating army, not with the ardour of pursuit, -but ready to avail themselves of any opportunity -that might present itself, and cautious how they -offered any to an enemy whom they no longer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_495">495</span> -affected to despise. The single occasion which -occurred in their favour they were not near -enough to seize. It was at Condeixa (the Conimbrica -of the Romans); the town is built on -the ridge of the hill, and the road passes through -it along a narrow street; the people of the vicinity -crowded in simultaneously with the troops, -and the inhabitants at the same time hurried to -join in a retreat which they had delayed till the -last minute. They were in great alarm, the way -was blocked up by some of the country carts, -and had it not been for the good discipline which -the troops observed in this scene of confusion, -and the exertions of the officers, the enemy might -have obtained no inconsiderable advantage. But -they were not near enough to profit by the -favourable opportunity: order was restored in -time; and this was the only moment of serious -danger during the whole retreat. Massena -pushed forward to this town, without halting at -Coimbra; but he found it necessary to remain -here three days, for the purpose of resting his -troops and collecting such provisions as the inhabitants -had not been able to remove, and the -retreating army had left untouched. As the -enemy advanced, the allies retired a march or -two before them; the infantry proceeded with -as little molestation as if they had been marching -through a country which was in peace; the -cavalry covered the retreat, and no stragglers -were to be seen.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Leiria forsaken.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Some skirmishing took place near Pombal,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_496">496</span> -with trifling loss on the part of the allies, and -more on that of the enemy. Ney and Junot -took this line of march, while Regnier advanced - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Oct. 5.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -upon the road to Thomar. Leiria was forsaken -by its whole population: a city thus deserted -offered such temptation, that discipline could -not be maintained in the retreating army without -some examples of severity, and one British -and one native soldier were punished with death -for breaking into a chapel and plundering it. -Here the allied army divided, one part taking -the road to Alcobaça, the other to Rio Mayor. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Alcobaça forsaken by the monks.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -The monks of Alcobaça performed on this occasion -toward the British officers their last act of -hospitality. Most of them had already departed -from the magnificent and ancient abode, where -the greater part of their lives had been spent -peacefully and inoffensively, to seek an asylum -where they could; the few who remained prepared -dinner for their guests in the great hall -and in the apartments reserved for strangers, -after which they brought them the keys, and -desired them to take whatever they liked, ... for -they expected that every thing would be destroyed -by the French. Means were afforded -them, through General Mackinnon’s kindness, -for saving some things which they could not -otherwise have removed; and then the most -venerable edifice in Portugal for its antiquity, -its history, its literary treasures, and the tombs -which it contained, was abandoned to an invader -who delighted in defiling whatever was held sacred,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_497">497</span> -and in destroying whatever a generous -enemy, from the impulse of feeling and the sense -of honour, would carefully have preserved.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Surprise at Alcoentre.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The rains now commenced, and set in with -their accustomed severity in that country. By -this time the infantry had reached their positions; -but the cavalry who covered the rear were exposed -to the whole severity of the weather, -bivouacking every night, because the enemy -were so close that it would have been imprudent -for them to occupy a village. Sir Stapleton -Cotton, however, having reached the little town -of Alcoentre, took up his quarters there; the -French, expecting that in this heavy and incessant -rain the English would apprehend no enterprise -on their part, took advantage of the -weather, and endeavoured to surprise him there; -his piquets were driven in; and almost as soon -as the alarm could be given, they were in the -town, and in possession of six guns. A squadron -from the 16th came down in time, charged them -in the street, recovered the guns, and drove them -to the other end of the town. Some severe -skirmishing occurred on the following day, in -which the 3d regiment of French hussars -behaved most gallantly. At daybreak on the -10th the enemy had lost sight of the allies, and -when they reached Moinho do Cubo, where the -roads to Alenquer and Lisbon divide, they knew -not which course to take. Two peasants were -brought in by their detachments, and were asked -which way the English had retreated, and where<span class="pagenum" id="Page_498">498</span> -their lines were, ... for by this time Massena -had found cause to doubt whether a general -who retreated so deliberately had no other intention -than to embark and fly as soon as he -reached Lisbon. The men answered that they -could give no information on either point, because -they knew nothing; military punishment -was immediately inflicted upon them, to extort -what they were determined not to disclose, and -they both endured it till they fainted, thus -giving the French another proof of national -resolution, and of the feeling of the Portugueze -towards them. Being thus disappointed of the -intelligence which they expected, the French -vanguard, which consisted of 10,000 men, divided. -The division which took the Alenquer -road came in sight of a column of the allies on - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French discover the lines of the allies.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the heights beyond that town; on the following -day this column retreated in good order to Sobral, -and was driven out of it: the French were -pursuing their advantage when a peasant fell -into their hands, who, unlike his countrymen, -answered without hesitation all the interrogatories -which were put to him; he told the commander -that they were close upon the British -lines, and pointed out to him where the batteries -were, in constructing which he had himself laboured. -Had it not been for his warning, this - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Investigador Portuguez, t. vi. 64.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -body of the enemy would presently have been -in a situation from which it could hardly have -escaped. They halted instantly, and fell back; -Massena was informed of the discovery which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_499">499</span> -had been made; and three days elapsed before -the invaders again approached the works of the -allies so nearly.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Feelings of the army.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The army had commenced their retrograde -movement from the frontiers with an impression -that the cause wherein they were engaged had -become hopeless, and that when they reached -Lisbon they should be embarked, and abandon -Portugal. This opinion had been altered by the -course of events during the retreat, and by the -manner in which that retreat had been conducted. -There had been no alarm, no confusion, no precipitance -upon the march. Nothing could have -been conducted with greater ease to the troops; -not a straggler had been taken, not a gun abandoned, -not an article of baggage lost; the infantry -had never even been seen by the enemy, -except at Busaco, where they gave them battle, -and signally defeated them: and the cavalry had -taken on the way more prisoners from the enemy -than the allies lost, a circumstance which probably -never occurred in any former retreat. The -troops, therefore, became confident that their -commander had no thought of abandoning the -contest; and that an embarkation was not his -object, but that he was acting upon some settled -plan, which he was well able to carry to the end. -But when they entered the lines which they were -to occupy, their surprise was hardly less than -that of Massena and his army, at the foresight -which they there saw displayed, and the skill<span class="pagenum" id="Page_500">500</span> -with which a strong position had been rendered -impregnable.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The lines of Torres Vedras.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>At the close of the last century Sir Charles -Stuart had perceived that, if the French should -ever seriously attempt the conquest of Portugal, -here was the vantage ground of defence; and -Lord Wellington, in his campaign against Junot, -had observed this part of the country at leisure, -and came to the same conclusion. Portugal, -he said in the House of Commons, could be defended, -but not on the frontier; the defence -must be on the strong ground about Lisbon; -and that consideration, he added, was in his -mind when the Convention of Cintra was made. -As soon, therefore, as the impossibility of co-operating -with the Spaniards to any good effect -had been fully proved, and it became apparent -that the decisive struggle must be made in Portugal, -upon this ground he resolved to make it. -Early in the year it was stated in the English -newspapers that men were employed in fortifying -this position, but no mention of it had -subsequently appeared, and it is truly remarkable -that works of such magnitude and importance -should have been commenced and perfected -without exciting the slightest attention during -their progress. They extended from Alhandra -on the Tagus to the mouth of the little river -Sizandro: the direct line across the country -between these points is about six-and-twenty -miles; the line of defence was about forty. All<span class="pagenum" id="Page_501">501</span> -roads which could have afforded any advantage -to the enemy were destroyed, and others opened -by which the allies might effect their communications -with most facility. In some places, -streams were dammed and inundations formed; -in others the sides of the ravines and hills were -scarped perpendicularly; intrenchments were -thrown up wherever they could be serviceable; -every approach was commanded by cannon, -placed in posts which had been rendered inaccessible; -and at all the most important points -redoubts were erected capable of resisting even -if the enemy should establish themselves in their -rear, and well provided with stores and ammunition -for defence.</p> - -<p>These works, the most celebrated of their -kind, were constructed under the direction of -Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, of the engineers, -assisted by Captain Chapman. Lieutenant-General -Hill commanded on the right, having his -head-quarters at Alhandra; ... the great approach -to Lisbon is on this side, but the ground -is strong; no means had been neglected for -strengthening it, and gun-boats from the Tagus -could assist in the defence. That river covered -the right, the left was closed by the heights -above Sobral, and communicated there with the -corps of the centre. Major-General Picton -commanded on the left; his head-quarters were -at Torres Vedras, a town which, being better -known than any other included within the works, -became for ever memorable in military history,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_502">502</span> -by giving name to these formidable lines. The -weakest part of the whole position was between -Torres Vedras and the sea; but the artificial -defences were proportionately strong, ... and -where it would otherwise have been most accessible, -it was rendered most secure by inundations -extending some six miles along the Sizandro -to the sea. The centre extended from the -heights of Sobral de Monte Agraço to Torres -Vedras: in the former little town Marshal Beresford -had his head-quarters; Lord Wellington’s -were about two leagues from the latter, at -the Quinta de Pero Negro, near Enxara dos Cavalleiros. -The heights above Sobral formed the -principal point of defence on this part of the -line; and the villages of Ordasqueyra and Runa, -which are upon the road between Sobral and -Torres Vedras, were also strongly fortified, because -they commanded the only pass to the latter -town within Monte Junto. That mountain, -which runs due north from Runa for some fourteen -miles, contributed mainly to the strength -of the position. It prevented all military communication -between Sobral and Torres Vedras, -except by the line which the allies occupied in -strength. Lord Wellington might be attacked -either from the east by Sobral, or by Torres Vedras -from the west; but he could bring his -troops from the one point to the other in a few -hours, along a safe and easy communication; -whereas for the enemy to have communicated -between the same points would have required at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_503">503</span> -least two days, for they must have rounded the -Serra at its northern point.</p> - -<p>In the rear of this line, and nearly parallel to -it, at a distance of from six to eight miles, was -a second fortified position, extending from behind -Alverca to Bucellas, thence along the Serras -to Montachique, by the park wall of Mafra -to Gradil, and so along the heights to the mouth -of a little stream called S. Lorenzo. Strong -works covered the communication between these -lines. And lest, contrary to all probabilities -and human foresight, a position so fortified and -occupied should be found untenable against the -invaders, works were constructed at the mouth -of the Tagus, at St. Julian’s, which would have -secured the embarkation of the troops. The -heights at Almada, on the south of the Tagus, -which command Lisbon and its anchorage, were -also fortified, in case Mortier should carry into -effect a co-operation on the side of Alentejo, -which it was not doubted was part of the French - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Works at Almeida.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -plan. Ten thousand men, consisting in part of -marines, were destined to serve in this quarter. -The redoubts in the position were manned by -Portugueze militia, who, with a certain number -of regular troops, were quite equal to the duties -which might be there required. The troops -of the line, British and Portugueze, were thus -disposable to act in moveable columns, and oppose -the enemy wherever they might attempt -to penetrate. The allies were joined here by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_504">504</span> -Romana with 6000 Spaniards, from Extremadura; -here they might be efficiently employed, -but in that quarter they could be of little service. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Romana joins the allies at Lisbon.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -Badajoz, which Romana had secured at -the critical time, had now by his exertions been -well provided and garrisoned, ... and this junction -had been arranged as soon as it became -certain that the decisive stand must be made in -the lines of Torres Vedras.</p> - -<p>The French had suffered severely from the -weather during the latter days of their march, -so that both horses and men were greatly exhausted -when they arrived at the point where -their advance was stopped. It was no easy -task to reconnoitre these lines, many of the -most important points being concealed behind -the hills; but Massena, after a careful inspection, -saw enough to convince him, that if he -attacked them a repulse might be expected, -more fatal in its results than that which he had -received at Busaco. And his hopes were not -raised by the intelligence which now reached -him of the consequences which that defeat had -drawn after it. It was then perceived how great -an error had been committed in not pursuing Colonel -Trant beyond the Vouga, and dispersing -the Portugueze militia under his command.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Colonel Trant surprises the French in Coimbra.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>That officer, who well understood the weakness -both of his forces and of his position, ... -for the Vouga was at that time fordable, ... had -retreated by a night march to Oliveira, not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_505">505</span> -without apprehension that the enemy would -send a detachment against Porto, where they -would have found no other troops to defend it -than the small and ill disciplined body which -he could have carried thither. When he had -ascertained that this was not their purpose, but -that the whole army was advancing in pursuit of -Lord Wellington, and had left their wounded in -Coimbra, he lost no time, but immediately concerted -means for surprising them in that city. -The Army of the North, as it was called, under -Lieutenant-General Bacellar, consisted of -three divisions of militia, ... that of Tras os -Montes, under Silveira, that of the Minho, under -Brigadier-General Miller, and that of Porto, -under Trant. It had also two regiments of -Portugueze cavalry and three brigades of field -artillery, ... this constituted its whole force. -When Trant was sent round by Porto to Sardam, -the other divisions were disposed so as to -close upon the enemy’s rear; and the advanced -guard, under Colonel John Wilson, followed -them through Vizeu, and along the lower falls -of the Caramula, intercepting their communications -and taking their stragglers. This body -was near enough to see from a distance the action -at Busaco; and when Massena, withdrawing -from thence, concentrated his army at Mortagoa, -Colonel Wilson fell in with a detachment -of his rear-guard, and in an affair of nearly -equal numbers captured thirty mounted dragoons, -and several infantry. As he proceeded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_506">506</span> -he found the villages laid waste, and filled with -the enemy’s dead and dying; and many of their -wounded, falling into his hands, were committed -to the surgeon’s care, and saved from the death -to which the invading army in its haste had -abandoned them. With this officer, and with -Brigadier-General Miller, Trant intended to -combine his movements; and having written to -them, advanced from Oliveira to Mealhada, expecting -to join them there, ... but the country -through which they came had been completely -wasted, so that the want of supplies, and the -exhausted state of the horses, rendered it impossible -for them to advance so rapidly as he -had hoped. Delay would give the enemy leisure -to prepare for defence, whereas it was probable -that at this time they had no apprehension -of an attack, and were ignorant that any troops -were so near them: Mealhada is scarcely twelve -miles from Coimbra, and by a rapid movement -Trant thought he might be able with his own -division to effect what, if time were lost and -the French on their guard, the united bodies -might find it difficult to accomplish. He determined, -therefore, to proceed. At a little distance -from Os Fornos he fell in with an enemy’s -detachment, pushed on his cavalry so as to cut -them off from Coimbra, and made them all prisoners, -except a few who fell before the others -surrendered. Then he ordered his horse to -advance at a gallop along the principal road, -cross the bridge over the Mondego, and take<span class="pagenum" id="Page_507">507</span> -post on the Lisbon road, thus cutting off the -communication between Massena’s army and -the garrison. While the cavalry were crossing, -an irregular fire was kept up upon them from -St. Clara’s, a nunnery on the south of the river -which the enemy occupied: as soon as the passage -was effected, the French here proposed to -capitulate; but Trant would hear of no capitulation, ... they -must surrender at discretion, he -said, and he would exert all his means to protect -them from the people. The infantry meantime -entered the city; and after a contest which -continued about an hour, the French were made -prisoners. Six or seven hundred convalescents -thought themselves strong enough to defend the -convent in which they were quartered, imprudently -therefore they refused to surrender: the -building was presently stormed, and most of -them fell victims to Portugueze vengeance.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>He escorts his prisoners to Porto.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Colonel Trant found more difficulty in protecting -the French than in taking them prisoners. -The militia and armed peasantry under -his command were exasperated almost to madness -by the conduct of an enemy whose route -from Pinhel might be traced by the smoke of -burning villages. Coimbra itself presented a -spectacle sufficient to excite the bitterest feelings -of indignation. The French had ransacked -every house, and church, and public building; -they had for pure wantonness set fire to some -of the houses, and they had heaped up promiscuously -in the streets all the provisions which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_508">508</span> -the army could not carry with it. Enough had -been found in shops, and private houses, and in -the convents of that populous and flourishing -city, to have supplied the army for no inconsiderable -time, if it had been collected in -magazines: but Massena relied upon having -the resources of Lisbon at his disposal; and -the commissary-general, whom he had left as -governor in Coimbra, however well he understood -the importance of preserving the stores -which had here fallen into his hands, was unable -to restrain a soldiery, who from the commencement -of the war had been permitted to indulge -in licenses of every kind. About 800 of Trant’s -men were natives of Coimbra or its district; -not a few of the inhabitants, upon the recovery -of the city, appeared from their hiding-places: -the enemy had been surprised and taken in the -very act of havoc; and nothing but the greatest -exertions on the part of Trant, and the respect -with which he was regarded, could have saved -the prisoners from the vengeance of those who, -in addition to their strong national feeling, were -under the sense of private and present injuries, -and those of the deepest kind. For though the -greater part of the population had taken flight, -in so populous a city there had been many for -whom flight was impossible, ... age and sickness -had detained some: others were bound by duty -to the sick and aged; and others again, under -the fear of casting themselves upon the world -as wanderers, and the hope that by remaining<span class="pagenum" id="Page_509">509</span> -with their property they might preserve a part -at least, had waited for the evil under their own -roofs, or hesitated whither to fly, till it had been -too late; and these unhappy persons had found -no protection from the established laws of war, -or the common usages of humanity. Under -these circumstances there was no other means -of preserving the prisoners but by marching -them to Porto. Brigadier Miller and Colonel -Wilson, who had formed a junction on the day -that Trant’s dispatches reached them, having -pushed on with all speed to support him in his -attempt, arrived at Coimbra a few hours after -him. Leaving them therefore in the city with -part of his brigade, with the other he convoyed -4000 of the French, going himself to protect -them, as well knowing that, unless he were -present, they would never reach Porto alive, ... for -his men had been raised in that country, -which was the scene of Soult’s cruelties, and -some of them were from that village of Arrifana, -where horrors had been perpetrated of which - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>See vol. iii. p. 269.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -the military murders committed under General -Thomieres’ orders were the least part.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Difficulties of Massena’s situation.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Above 150 officers and 5000 men were made -prisoners by this well-timed enterprise; 3500 -muskets were taken, nearly the whole of which -were charged; and hence the number of effective -men may be estimated. A great number of kine -and sheep were found, which the enemy had -collected; had they crossed the Vouga they -might have carried off from 2000 to 3000 head<span class="pagenum" id="Page_510">510</span> -of cattle in one or two days’ sweep of the -country between that river and the Douro. In -the commissariat, as well as in the hospital -department, Massena suffered a loss here which -was severely felt; the capture of his wounded -under such circumstances was not more mortifying -to him than the disappointment was painful -of those hopes which he had founded upon the -possession of Coimbra. Instead of having a -garrison in that important quarter, occupied in -collecting for him the resources of a fertile -country, and facilitating his intercourse with -Spain, his communications were now impeded; -he was cut off from Beira and the northern -provinces; the Portugueze, encouraged by success, -were acting in his rear, and in front there -was a formidable force in a position, which he -soon perceived it would be hopeless to attack. -He had no other means of subsistence for his -army than what might be procured by force, and -any reinforcement must be strong enough to -fight its way from the very frontier of France, -for a small party could nowhere pass in safety. -But the sea was open to the allies; ... every day -witnessed the arrival of supplies and stores in -the Tagus, and it was reasonably to be expected -that Lord Wellington would soon receive reinforcements -enough for enabling him to act upon -the offensive. Massena felt now the difficulties -of the situation in which his own confidence and -that of Buonaparte had placed him. But he -manifested no sense of weakness; and having<span class="pagenum" id="Page_511">511</span> -well reconnoitred the right of the lines, he -placed his three corps separately in bivouac in -front of it, and determined, but with due caution, -to make at least a trial of that fortune -which had never failed him till he was opposed -to British enemies.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>His demonstrations in front of the lines.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>There was a redoubt in an important point -of the position, at the foot of the heights above -Sobral; opposite to this, at a little distance, the -French established one, and Massena having -strictly observed the ground, gave orders for -attacking the British redoubt, and took his station -on a hill to see the issue of this his first - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Early Campaigns, 191.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -operation. The Honourable Colonel Cadogan -of the 73d commanded there, and not only were -the enemy repulsed, but their own redoubt was -attacked, carried, and maintained. Convinced -by the trial how little was to be hoped from any -bolder measures, Massena ventured no farther. -To cover his own plans, he still however maintained -his position, and made such demonstrations, -that the allies were daily under arms before -daylight, with their general-in-chief ready to -direct their operations, expecting and hoping -that a general attack might be made, and in full -assurance that it could only end in the defeat - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Colonel Jones’s Account, i. 308.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -and destruction of the enemy. But the French -commander was not now so confident in his own -troops, nor so ignorant of those to whom he was -opposed, as to incur the danger of a defeat which -must have been irreparable. The demonstration -was made for the purpose of covering certain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_512">512</span> -movements in his rear, and after a week -of anxious and eager hope, the allies were -convinced that no attempt would be made to -force their inexpugnable position.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Montbrun sent against Abrantes.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Having consulted with Marshal Ney, Regnier, -Junot, and Montbrun, Massena determined -upon sending to Buonaparte to request reinforcements, -and taking a position in the interior -of Portugal till they should arrive. As a preparatory -measure, Montbrun was sent with the -advanced guard, and with Loison’s division to -occupy Abrantes. Meantime he established -his head-quarters at Alenquer, those of Regnier’s -corps were at Villa Franca, of Junot’s opposite -to Sobral, and of Ney’s in front of Torres Vedras. -Montbrun was detained two days at -Santarem by an inundation of the Tagus, which -covered the Campos de Golegam; as soon as -the waters had retired, he advanced to Barquinha; -that place, like Santarem, was deserted, -but the inhabitants, relying too much upon protection -from Abrantes, and from the river, had -collected large magazines there, which they had -now no time for removing. When he reached -the Zezere, thinking to cross at Punhete, he -found that the bridge of boats had been destroyed, -and that a detachment from the garrison -of Abrantes was entrenched in the town, -which stands on the left bank. The Zezere is -at all times a rapid and formidable stream; at -that season it was nowhere fordable; the banks -are high and difficult, and after consulting with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_513">513</span> -the other generals, Montbrun determined to set -the town on fire, that, under cover of the conflagration, -he might throw a bridge across, and -effect his passage: this resolution was taken at -night; in the morning it was found that the -allies had withdrawn; the river was then bridged -without opposition, and the enemy advanced -upon Abrantes. But that city was well provided -against any sudden attack; and the -French, perceiving that nothing was to be done -there, retired to Punhete, and Barquinha, and -Golegam. Montbrun’s next orders were to take -possession of Torres Novas and Thomar. Colonel -Wilson had been instructed to proceed -with his corps of militia towards these towns, -for the purpose of confining the enemy’s detachments -on that side; but he, and Trant, and -Miller, were charged always to keep in view the -necessity of preserving their communication -with the Lower Douro. Wilson, after the recapture -of Coimbra, had followed the enemy -through Leiria, and afterwards occupied the -road from Ponte de Murcella to Thomar. But -this town had been taken possession of by Montbrun, -and there and at Torres Novas stores were -found which relieved for a while the distress of -the invaders, who depended for their subsistence -entirely upon what they could find.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The French army subsists by plunder.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>It was because Massena was too strong in -numbers to be beaten without a greater expense -of lives than Lord Wellington could then -afford, that the British commander trusted to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_514">514</span> -famine, and to that worrying system of national -warfare which no army can withstand. Famine -would soon and surely have compelled the invaders -to retreat if the orders of the Regency -had been duly observed, and the country completely -cleared of all stores before the enemy -approached. But the local magistrates had not -taken effectual measures for enforcing these -orders; while the danger was at a distance, -they had continued to hope it might be averted, -or at least that it would not reach their particular -districts; and in very many places the farmers -had secreted their stores, that they might not -be constrained to sell them to the commissioners -at a low price and at long credit. The precautionary -measures of the government were so far -carried into effect, that the enemy were severely -distressed, and finally found it necessary to -abandon their enterprise; but they were able to -subsist some months upon what they found, for -nothing escaped their search. The French -soldiers had been so long accustomed to plunder, -that they proceeded in their researches for -booty of every kind upon a regular system. -They were provided with tools for the work of -pillage, and every piece of furniture in which -places of concealment could be constructed they -broke open from behind, so that no valuables -could be hidden from them by any contrivance -of that kind. Having satisfied themselves that -nothing was secreted above ground, they proceeded -to examine whether there was any new<span class="pagenum" id="Page_515">515</span> -masonry, or if any part of the cellar or ground-floor -had been disturbed: if it appeared uneven, -they dug there: where there was no such indication, -they poured water, and if it were absorbed -in one place faster than another, there they broke -the earth. There were men who at the first -glance could pronounce whether any thing had -been buried beneath the soil, and when they -probed with an iron rod, or, in default of it, with -sword or bayonet, it was found that they were -seldom mistaken in their judgement. The habit -of living by prey called forth, as in beasts, a -faculty of discovering it: there was one soldier -whose scent became so acute, that if he approached -the place where wine had been concealed, -he would go unerringly to the spot.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Deserters form themselves into a corps of plunderers.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>But before supplies could be brought in by -this marauding system, the distress which was -felt in the invading army occasioned a considerable -desertion. The more desperate deserters, -instead of going over to the British lines, collected -in strong parties in the country about -Alcobaça, Nazaré, and As Caldas da Rainha, -and at length formed themselves into a regular -army of robbers, calling themselves the 11th -corps, under their officers and general. When -they fell in with a detachment of their countrymen, -they compelled them to join with them, -and in a short time their numbers amounted to -more than 1600. The annoyance became at -length more serious to Massena than to the -Portugueze; he sent two strong detachments<span class="pagenum" id="Page_516">516</span> -against them, and it was not till after an obstinate -action that they surrendered to a superior -force, ... their leaders were then shot, and the -men returned to a course of duty which differed -very little from their predatory life.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>State of Lisbon.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>There was necessarily great distress meantime -at Lisbon, because so many families had taken -refuge there in a state of destitution; but that -distress was alleviated by the care of the government, -and by a religion in which alms-giving -ranks high in the scale of religious works, and -is enjoined as a regular compensation for sin. -Thousands of these poor fugitives were hutted -in the open country; many were sent across the -river, and they who came from those parts of -the country which, by the recovery of Coimbra, -were delivered from the French, returned home. -Provisions were dear, but there was neither -danger nor dread of famine. That country from -which the capital receives all its garden produce -was within the British lines; on the other side -the river Alentejo and Algarve were free from -the enemy; and the latter fertile province, with -that part of the former which is considered as -the granary of the south of Portugal, perfectly -secure from them, unless the subjugation of the -kingdom were effected. The Barbary coast was -close at hand; ships from America and England -were daily arriving, and the supply of wheat -was soon fully equal to the consumption of the -army and of the increased population.</p> - -<p>But the opposition writers in England endeavoured<span class="pagenum" id="Page_517">517</span> -to raise an alarm, “that Lisbon, not -Massena, was in danger of famine; he,” they -said, “could drive in upon our lines the population - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Opinions of the opposition in England.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -of the surrounding country to increase -our difficulties, and to relieve his own could -send his foraging parties into an immense track -of country as yet untouched. England, meantime, -must send out not merely regiment after -regiment, but cargo after cargo of grain throughout -the winter; and what if the bar of the -Tagus should be locked up by adverse winds? -Massena, we might be sure, with the talents and -prudence universally ascribed to him, did not -act without a confident prospect of success. It -had been said in the Gazette, that he possessed -only the ground on which his army stood; this -was an <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">erratum</i>, where for Massena we ought -to read Wellington. Our situation in Portugal -would become infinitely more disagreeable than -his, even if he did not, bringing his whole force -to bear on one, two, or three points, by his -superior numbers thus concentrated, break the -lines in which Lord Wellington’s army was so -much drawn out. He would have the most -productive part of the kingdom open to him; -we should have only Lisbon and its vicinity, -with the whole Portugueze army to maintain, -as well as the British; nay, with the whole -population of Lisbon, increased by the fugitives -who had taken asylum there, deprived of their -usual resources, and thrown upon us even for -daily bread! What a delicate and irksome part<span class="pagenum" id="Page_518">518</span> -then would our troops have to support, if they -were to pass the winter upon those mountains, -possessing no part of Portugal but that in which -they were posted, incessantly harassed by the -French in their front, with a Portugueze army -double their own number within their lines, and -a starving metropolis in the rear? The French -had obviously the advantage; they could remain -in their post as long or as short a time as -they pleased: they could retire and return at -their discretion. They might wait for the reinforcements -which the despot their master would -draw to their aid from every quarter of subjected -Europe: they were likely to accumulate, -while the British must in the nature of things -decrease. Massena was in truth master of the -game he had to play. The most disastrous -thing that could happen to us, next to positive -defeat, would be the necessity of keeping our -position on these heights for the winter; and -we trust,” said these hopeful directors of public -opinion, “we trust that we shall not have to -incur that calamity! Lord Wellington may reembark -his troops without much molestation; -and rather than he should be driven to the necessity -of continuing in these positions for the -winter, we confess, we wish that he were re-embarked.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>General La Croix killed.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The people of Lisbon had not been without -some apprehension that the British government -would withdraw, rather in hopelessness than in -weakness, from the contest. The merchants,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_519">519</span> -therefore, had prepared to take flight, some for -Brazil, others for England. But when they saw -with what determination the lines were manned, -this apprehension was laid aside; the fullest -confidence succeeded, and all persons relied -upon the skill of Lord Wellington, the strength -of his position, and the discipline and courage -of the allied armies. Such was the security -which they felt behind his impregnable lines, -that parties resorted to Alhandra for the sake -of seeing them, as idlers flock from London to -behold a review. A battalion of British seamen -had been formed to serve in defending -that part of the position. Land service was a -jubilee to these men; they had the town of Alhandra -to themselves, the inhabitants having -forsaken it, and there those who were off guard -sat in large armed chairs of embossed leather, -two centuries old, smoking and drinking in the -open streets. In reconnoitring this part of the -line from the side of Villa Franca, General La -Croix was killed by a shot from the water. -Frequent skirmishes took place on the right -flank and in the rear of the French encampment; -but the piquets, by one of those agreements -which mutual convenience will sometimes -produce between enemies, did not fire -upon each other, and this gave occasion for -some of the old humanities of war. Some of -our men even went and drank wine with the -French, till an order was issued prohibiting a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_520">520</span> -sort of intercourse which could neither with -propriety nor safety be permitted.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />November.</span> <br />Massena retreats from the lines.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Certain movements of the enemy seemed at -this time to indicate an intention of crossing the -Tagus. Laborde was sent to garrison Santarem. -He threatened to destroy the little town -of Chamusca on the Alentejo side (noted for -its sweet wine), if the boats there were not sent -over for his use: upon which the inhabitants -burnt them. A detachment advanced toward -Villa Velha, in hopes of winning the bridge -there, but it had been removed in time. Abrantes -secured the passage against them at one -practicable point; and Major-General Fane was -sent into Alentejo to observe the enemy at Santarem, -with a sufficient force to defeat any attempt -that might be made in that quarter. -Meantime Massena’s apparent inactivity was -regarded with some wonder, and made the subject -of pasquinades in his own army. Sickness -and desertion were daily reducing his numbers; -his only possibility of success depended upon -effecting a plan of co-operation with Soult; but -time must elapse before that could be attempted, -and without reinforcements he could not maintain -his ground in Portugal the while. For -these he had applied pressingly, and having -determined where to await them, and prepared -accordingly, after remaining a month in front of -the British lines, he broke up from his bivouac -on the night of the 14th of November, for the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_521">521</span> -purpose of retiring into cantonments. The -allies were immediately put in motion to follow -him, but the movement was so ably conducted, -on the enemy’s part, that not above 400 prisoners -were taken during the retreat.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Lord Wellington advances to Santarem.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Lord Wellington, not knowing what might -be Massena’s intention, could not pursue him -with his whole force; Picton’s division was retained -in its station, in case the enemy should -move round Monte Junto for the purpose of -making an attack on that side; and Hill was -sent across the Tagus with his corps, to protect -Alentejo, and communicate with Abrantes, if -that place should be attacked. With the remainder -of the army Lord Wellington followed -the French, and came up with them near Santarem, -where they occupied a position strong -in itself, and rendered formidable by retrenchments -and abbattis. It was where the high -road, which is in that place a raised causeway -walled on either side, crosses a wide morass, -through which the Rio Mayor makes its way to -the Tagus. The approach was defended by -breastworks and trees cut down, and the causeway -was commanded from a hill, close to its -termination on the Santarem side, by artillery, -which would have swept its whole length. Demonstrations -for attacking them were made, -rather to ascertain whether a retreat from the -country were intended, than with any intent of -assailing a position so well chosen and secured. -Had this indeed been seriously designed, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_522">522</span> -heavy rain which fell during the night, and rendered -the fords of the Rio Mayor impassable, -must have frustrated it. Perceiving that the -enemy were in considerable force there, instead -of being, as had been at first supposed, only the -rear-guard, and having ascertained that Massena’s - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Both armies go into cantonments.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -purpose was to canton his troops in the -finest part of that country, Lord Wellington retained -only his light division in front of Santarem, -and cantoned the army at Cartaxo (where his -head-quarters were fixed), Azambuja, Alcoentre, -Alenquer, and Villa Franca, from whence they -might at any time fall back within their lines, -if the enemy should receive such reinforcements -as might render this expedient. Massena’s -head-quarters were first at Santarem, but he -soon removed them to Torres Novas: Regnier -was left at Santarem with his corps; Junot’s -was cantoned at Pernes; Ney’s at Thomar, -Torres Novas, and Punhete; the companies of -artificers at Barquinha, and a reserve of cavalry -at Ourem. In this state both armies prepared -to pass the winter, both expecting reinforcements, -and each ready to take advantage of any -favourable opportunity that circumstances might -present.</p> - -<p>“If this,” said the despondents in England, -“be termed the defence of a country, the Portugueze -or any other people may well exclaim, -God preserve us from such defenders!” “The -campaign,” they predicted, “would be renewed -in February, with such an accumulation of force<span class="pagenum" id="Page_523">523</span> -on the part of the enemy, as must make the -protection even of Lisbon hopeless, much less -the deliverance of the Peninsula.” “They knew -how galling it must be to the pride of the nation -thus to be foiled, and thus, in expedition after -expedition, to see the treasures and the blood of -their countrymen squandered in vain; but if the -public would give confidence to men of shallow -intellects, ... to men who, having no real stake -in the country, submitted to execute the projects, -however extravagant, of the Junta who -had so long misguided us, ... they must bear the -calamity and disgrace of constant miscarriage. -It was a most erroneous view of British policy, -to conceive that we could ever, with our limited -population and commercial habits, become a military -people; and it would be just as rational -for the French to strive to cope with us by sea, -as for us to enter the lists with them by land. -All that they now prayed for was, that our eyes -might be at length opened to the true policy -which we ought to pursue, that of retrieving -our finances, and employing our resources upon -objects truly British.” This was the language -of the opposition, and it excited now for the -first time the fears of the English public, because -circumstances as melancholy as they were -unforeseen seemed to render it probable that -they would soon have it in their power to act -upon the principles which they professed.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The King’s illness.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Toward the latter end of October the Princess -Amelia died, after a protracted and painful illness,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_524">524</span> -which she had endured with exemplary -meekness and resignation. Aware of what must -be its termination, she had some of her hair set -in a ring, and one day when her blind father, -making his daily visit, came to her bed-side, and -held out his hand to her, she put this sad memorial -upon his finger silently. Her dissolution -occurred so soon afterwards, that she never -knew the fatal consequences. The King had -suffered intense anxiety during her illness, and -when he felt this last indication of his daughter’s -love, feeling at the same time but too surely all -that it implied, it affected him so strongly as to -bring on the recurrence of a malady which had -rendered the appointment of a regent necessary -two-and-twenty years before. There was, however, -good reason for hope, because the disease -of mind was not constitutional and hereditary; -they who had the best grounds for forming an -opinion believed that its foundation was laid by -extreme anxiety and consequent insomnolence -during the latter years of the American war. -The physicians confidently expected that it -would prove of short continuance, and therefore -parliament having met according to summons, -adjourned for a fortnight without a dissentient -voice. At the expiration of that term a second -adjournment for a similar time was proposed, -upon the same grounds, and carried against a -small minority: that time also having elapsed, -a report of the privy council was laid before -parliament, containing the examination of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_525">525</span> -King’s physicians, all of whom declared it highly - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1810.<br />December.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -probable that he would recover. Upon this report -the house adjourned for a third fortnight, -but not without warm debate and a great increase -of numbers to the minority. At the end -of this third adjournment ministers informed -parliament that although a considerable degree -of progressive amendment had taken place, and -the same confident hopes of ultimate recovery -were still entertained, yet the immediate state of -his Majesty’s health was not such as could warrant -them to propose a farther adjournment. It -became necessary, therefore, to deliberate in -what manner a regency should be formed.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Proceedings concerning a regency.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>During the subsequent proceedings, ministers -were accused in the most vehement language of -flagrant usurpation, and of grossly violating the -constitution. They were called a parcel of -second-rate lawyers and needy adventurers, who -in their desperate ambition cared not for the -fate of the nation, so they could only contrive -to keep their places and retain the command of -the public purse. Their proceedings, it was -said, were miserable shams and pretences, tending -to inflict a mortal stab upon the constitution -of the country, and to vest the government -in an oligarchical House of Commons. Mr. -Perceval would fain persuade that house to make -him governor of the country, and let him put the -crown in his pocket. Parliament, therefore, was -exhorted to withdraw from ministers as speedily -as possible the power which they enjoyed, for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_526">526</span> -the day of their dismissal, it was said, would be -the best day England had ever seen. Among -the evils which might be expected from the -suspension of the executive power, it was urged -that no assistance could be sent to Lord Wellington, -no money drawn from the exchequer, -however indispensable a supply might be at this -time. Lord Holland dwelt upon this argument; -to which Lord Liverpool replied, he was -not aware of any injury to the public service -from any such delay, nor that ministers had abstained -from any acts, from which, under other -circumstances, they would not have advised his -Majesty to abstain. At whatever risk to themselves, -he said, they would do that which they -deemed most conducive to the safety, honour, -and interest of the country, leaving it for the -justice of parliament to consider of, and decide -upon, the grounds of their justification. This -reply was not received as it ought to have been. -Lord Holland made answer, it was highly proper -that indemnity should follow statesman-like -measures, called for by necessity; but those -who had assumed the functions of the executive -power could not be entitled to indemnity for -measures rendered necessary by a delay which -they themselves had caused. And the Duke of -Norfolk observed in the same tone, that if no -inconvenience had resulted from the suspension -of the executive power, then had ministers in -effect taken the sovereignty into their own -hands.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_527">527</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Perceval.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Upon this subject Mr. Perceval spoke with -characteristic manliness. “We have not,” said -he, “been blind to these things. If ministers -should find it necessary to take such steps, they -would be justified under the particular circumstances -of the case; but they would act under -a heavy responsibility, and parliament would be -bound in duty to examine their conduct afterwards. -I am deeply convinced, that I stand in -a situation of as deep responsibility as ever a -minister stood in; a double responsibility, a responsibility -to the public, and a responsibility -to the King my master. I feel this to be our -situation; and parliament must have felt it so -too, in suffering the delays that have already -taken place. Gentlemen opposite may put what -construction they please upon what I am about -to say; but I do contend boldly before parliament, -and before my country, that if, under -these circumstances, any measure, in any of the -public departments, required the sign manual, -the officer at the head of that department would -act most culpably if he did not issue the necessary -orders to his inferior upon his responsibility. -This is the view I have of the situation and of the -duties of his Majesty’s ministers; and although -gentlemen on the other side have thought proper -to insinuate that our measures have been influenced -by a desire of retaining our offices, I -am sure the house will not be of opinion that -our situation is particularly enviable, or one that -could by any possibility be an object of choice.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_528">528</span> -We feel ... we admit ... all the inconvenience of -the present state of things; but, considering the -duration to be but short, are they in any degree -equal to the inconvenience of appointing another -person to execute the functions of the sovereign; -or, in other words, of appointing a regent, -unless the necessity of the case absolutely -requires it? It is not from feelings of delicacy -only that his Majesty’s ministers have acted, -but from the conviction that the preserving to -his Majesty the power of exercising his authority -immediately upon his recovery, without the -interruption of a regent, would be a great national -advantage. The regent, when appointed, -would of course act as he thought best for the -interests of the state; and even admitting that -the plans which he would adopt would be better -than those now pursued, yet I contend, that this -change from a bad to a better system, with the -probability of again shortly recurring to the old -system, would be much more injurious to the -welfare of the public, than the inconveniences -which have been so strongly urged by the gentlemen -on the other side of the house.</p> - -<p>“The delay which has taken place has been -no covert delay: it has been perfectly open, -and the reason why it was asked was fairly stated. -We have had no disguise, no subterfuge; our -object was broadly and fairly stated to parliament. -Sir, I say again, that ministers feel -deeply the heavy responsibility of their situation: -they know that their conduct will necessarily<span class="pagenum" id="Page_529">529</span> -be examined and scrutinized by parliament; -they know that they may have to request -justice from parliament for their conduct, at a -time when those who are now censuring their -conduct with so much acrimony may possess -a greater sway than they do at present. Is -such a situation, then, a desirable one? Is it -an object of ambition? Is it possible that any -man, or set of men, can covet such a situation, -or wish to retain it, except from the imperious -sense of the duty which they owe to their sovereign -and to their country? That duty I -will perform to the best of my humble abilities, -and cheerfully submit my conduct to the justice -of parliament and of my country.</p> - -<p>“It has been asked, whether, if under the -present circumstances the evacuation of Portugal -were deemed necessary, any order could -be sent out to Lord Wellington for that purpose? -And do gentlemen really believe that any difficulty -exists upon such a subject? Do they -really believe that Lord Wellington would refuse -to obey an order transmitted to him, by his Majesty’s -secretary of state, for that purpose, merely -because he had heard of the King’s indisposition? -Undoubtedly they do not: the case they -have put is then an imaginary one.... Sir, in the -office which I have the honour to hold, money -must be taken out of the Exchequer for the -public service; it is the bounden duty of ministers -to see that service performed; and do the -honourable gentlemen opposite think that I<span class="pagenum" id="Page_530">530</span> -would hesitate to draw the money for that purpose?”... -At this a loud cry of Hear! hear! was -raised from the opposition benches.... “Sir,” -pursued Mr. Perceval, “I am unable to account -for the distinction which the gentlemen opposite -appear to me to make between the two -cases which I have put. When I said that -ministers would not hesitate to give orders for -the evacuation of Portugal, if it were deemed -necessary, they seemed, by their silence at least, -to acquiesce in what I said; but when I spoke -of applying the money voted for the public -service to the public service, they affect great -astonishment, as if the principle of the two -cases was not the same. But do they think that -where money has been voted by parliament, and -ordered by parliament to be applied to a particular -service, that I would hesitate to have that -public service performed, for fear of the responsibility -that would attach to me? Do they -think that I would endanger the best interests of -the country, from any consideration of personal -danger to myself? Do they think that I would -risk a mutiny in the army or the navy, rather -than take upon me the responsibility of issuing -their pay? No, sir, if I could be guilty of such -conduct, I should be unfit indeed for the situation -which I hold! I should be guilty of a base -dereliction of my duty to my sovereign and my -country!”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Troops sent to Portugal.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>This was no empty language; and however -the manly appeal might be lost upon those persons<span class="pagenum" id="Page_531">531</span> -to whom it was immediately addressed, it -was not lost upon the people of England. The -ministers, with a spirit which alone might be -sufficient to atone for all their errors, and entitle -them to the lasting gratitude of these kingdoms, -had ordered off reinforcements to Lord -Wellington, on their own responsibility, at a -crisis when they held their power by so precarious -a tenure, that it was not unlikely their -successors’ orders for the evacuation of Portugal -might be upon the seas at the same time. -For that this was the policy which the opposition -intended to pursue, if, as they now fully -expected, they were to be invested with power, - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>Issues of money required.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -was what they themselves avowed. Issues of -money also became necessary for the army and -navy: money had been appropriated by parliament -for these services; but the exchequer -act requires that the issue should be under the -great seal, or under the privy seal, or by authority -of an act of parliament. Mr. Perceval -thought that under the existing circumstances -it would be proper to use the privy seal: the -keeper of the privy seal was willing to take -upon himself this responsibility; but the signature -of Mr. Larpent, clerk of the privy seal, -was likewise necessary, and that gentleman refused -to affix it, pleading scruples on account -of his oath of office. Mr. Perceval upon this -issued an order from the Treasury to the Exchequer, -deeming this sufficient, and thinking -also that it was better for the responsible servants - -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_532">532</span> - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1811.<br />January.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -of the crown to risk the censure, or wait -the indemnity of parliament, than to procrastinate -public business, by bringing such topics -into discussion in the house from time to time. - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Jan. 1.</span> <br />Conduct of Lord Grenville as Auditor of the Exchequer.<span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -But when these warrants were brought to Lord -Grenville, in his capacity of Auditor of the Exchequer, -he returned an answer to Mr. Perceval, -requiring time “to consider the nature and -extent of the duties which this new and unexpected -course of proceeding imposed upon -him;” and therefore requesting to know when -it was necessary that the money should be issued. -He was informed, “that, according to -the usual course of supplying the weekly issues -to the navy and army, it would be necessary -that sums should be issued for both services, -beyond the amount of the existing credit at the -exchequer, either on the morrow, or the next -day at farthest; but if an actual issue could be -made within six days, no serious inconvenience -was apprehended.” Lord Grenville then desired -that the opinions of the Attorney and Solicitor -General should be taken. These law -officers pronounced, that they “did not think -the warrant of the Lords Commissioners of the -Treasury was in law a sufficient authority imperative -upon the Auditor, nor, consequently, -a legal sanction for his proceeding to obey the -same; nor that any discretion was left to him -by the law on this occasion, for the exercise of -which he would not be responsible.” The -Lords Commissioners of the Treasury transmitted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_533">533</span> -this opinion to Lord Grenville, informing -him at the same time “that their sense of -the mischief to the public service, which would -arise if any delay should take place, appeared -to render it indispensable that the warrants -should be forthwith complied with, and that -they were consequently ready to take upon -themselves the responsibility of any act which -might be essential for that purpose.” Lord -Grenville replied, that it was matter of the -deepest concern to him to be made the involuntary -cause of any, even the shortest delay, -in an issue of his Majesty’s treasury, stated to -him from such high authority to be important -to the public service. “If,” said he, “I could -be satisfied of the propriety of my doing what -is required, there is no personal responsibility -which I would not readily incur for the public -interests; but I cannot persuade myself, that -I could obey those warrants, without a breach -of my official duty in that point, which is above -all others peculiarly obligatory on the person -placed in the situation of Auditor of the Exchequer; -nor without a high and criminal violation -both of a positive statute, and also of the -essential principles of our monarchical and parliamentary -constitution.</p> - -<p>“I am told,” he continued, “that I must -act on my own discretion, for the exercise of -which I must alone be responsible. This responsibility, -if it legally attaches upon me, I<span class="pagenum" id="Page_534">534</span> -certainly cannot transfer to any other persons, -and least of all to your lordships, whatever willingness -you have expressed to take it on yourselves. -My attempting to do so would itself be -criminal; tending to confound the official relations -in which I have the honour to stand towards -your lordships, and to annul those checks -which the law has established for ensuring the -faithful discharge of our respective duties, and -thereby the security of the public treasure. But -I beg leave humbly to submit to your lordships, -that the law has in truth invested me with no -discretion on this subject. The exigencies of -the public service, which your lordships have -condescended to detail to me in these your warrants, -are matters of state, of which, as Auditor -of the Exchequer, I have no knowledge, and -can take no cognizance; my official duty is -strictly limited to an observance of the accustomed -forms of the exchequer, and of the laws -which have from time to time been passed for -its regulation. To these I am bound to adhere; -and it is on the fullest consideration -which this pressure of time has permitted me -to give them, that I am compelled to decline, -but with all due respect to your lordships, a -compliance with the requisition contained in -those warrants, to which this letter refers.” His -lordship concluded, by recommending that the -difficulty should be submitted to the consideration -of the two houses of parliament, with whom<span class="pagenum" id="Page_535">535</span> -rested the right and duty to provide the means -of removing it, and to whose pleasure he would -defer with entire submission.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">Jan. 3.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Mr. Perceval immediately laid this correspondence -before parliament, saying, “that, -though, if it had not been for the difficulty thus -unexpectedly started, he should not have thought -it expedient to bring the subject under their -immediate notice, yet he had always anticipated -it as his duty to submit it to their consideration, -not for the purpose of obtaining a previous vote -of indemnity, but, having incurred the responsibility -of action, with the view of calling on the -house to determine whether or not ministers -had acted justifiably.” He now moved a resolution, -that the Lords of the Treasury should -issue their warrants for the payment of such -sums as were necessary, and that the Auditors -and officers of the Exchequer should obey those -warrants. In the course of the debate he noticed -the argument, that public inconvenience was -now proved to have arisen from the delay occasioned -by adjournments. “We have,” said -he, “this marked, monstrous, abominable, and -aggravated case before us, ... and what is it? -what is this great public inconvenience? Why, -that ministers have found it necessary to come -to parliament to authorize the issue of money, -for services for which that very money has been -appointed!”</p> - -<p>The resolution passed without a division; but, -in the Upper House, twenty Peers, among whom<span class="pagenum" id="Page_536">536</span> -were all the Royal Dukes, protested against it; -because, they said, the principle on which it was -founded would justify the assumption of all the -executive power of the crown by the two houses -of parliament, during any suspension of the personal -exercise of the royal authority. This -business attracted more notice than it otherwise -would have done, because, upon Lord Grenville’s -accession to the first place in the ministry -after the death of Mr. Pitt, a bill had been -passed, empowering him to hold at the same time -the offices of First Lord of the Treasury and -Auditor of the Exchequer; offices which, it -was argued in support of the bill, might without -inconvenience be held by the same person. The -imprudence of bringing thus to recollection a -measure, which at the time had called forth -strong animadversions, did not tend to lessen -the unpopularity of Lord Grenville and the coalition -with which he acted.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>State of the opposition.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>That party fully expected their return to -power. They were strong in borough influence, -while Mr. Perceval, owing to the course which he -pursued concerning the regency, lost the support -of those members of the royal family who had -been most closely connected with their father’s -government. Their journalists were numerous -and active, and they depended upon the Prince’s -favour. But though all the various sects and -subdivisions of opposition had united in one -cry against the king’s ministers, there were too -many points of difference between them to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_537">537</span> -easily accommodated. On the question of what -is insidiously termed catholic emancipation they -were agreed; but only on that question: the -Grenvilles were at variance with all their allies -upon the subject of parliamentary reform, and -the reformists were at variance among themselves -as to the nature and extent of their purposed -reformation. The war also was another -ground of dissension. One party would have -sacrificed our allies, our interest, and our honour, -for the sake of obtaining vile popularity, by concluding -a nominal and deceitful peace. They -saw no difficulty in accommodating our differences -with all our enemies; according to them, -their country was in the wrong upon every disputed -point; we had therefore only to concede -every thing to America, and suffer Buonaparte, -without farther opposition, to govern Spain and -Portugal in his own way: then we might have -illuminations for a definitive treaty, transparencies -of Peace and Plenty, and quartern loaves -and pewter pots carried in jubilant procession, -in honour of the reduced prices of bread and -porter. This would have been the foreign -policy of the radical reformers; that of Lord -Grenville and the despondents would have been -equally ruinous; believing it impossible that we -could resist the military power of France, and -yet knowing that peace would be only a snare, -they would have carried on a timid defensive -war, without the hope or the possibility of -bringing it to a glorious termination. Lord<span class="pagenum" id="Page_538">538</span> -Holland, on the contrary, would have acted with -additional vigour in aid of Spain; in this he -would have been supported by Earl Moira and -Mr. Sheridan, and perhaps by the Marquis of -Lansdowne and Mr. Ponsonby.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Their expectations.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>The hopes, however, of the opposition were -raised to the highest pitch, and their partizans -scarcely even attempted to conceal their joy at -an event, which, as they fully expected, was to -restore them to their places. The disposition -of the Prince was well known to be favourable -to these hopes: he had a personal regard for -some of the leaders of the party, and it was believed -that many of his political opinions had -been imbibed from Mr. Fox. It was therefore -probable that a change of ministry would take -place; and all the opponents of government, -however greatly they differed among themselves -as to their ultimate objects, from the regular -opposition, under Lords Grey and Grenville, -down to the very dregs of the revolutionary -faction, vied with each other in exulting over a -falling enemy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Language of the anarchists.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Two years before the King’s illness, one of -their journalists had said, that “of all monarchs, -since the revolution, the successor of George III. -would have the finest opportunity of becoming -nobly popular.” This sentence, connected as -it was with the anticipation of “a crowd of -blessings that might be bestowed upon the -country, in the event of a total change of -system,” had unwisely been selected for prosecution<span class="pagenum" id="Page_539">539</span> -by Sir Vicary Gibbs, and the defendants -were of course acquitted. Such language -was perfectly consistent in the Foxites; but in -the mouths of the anarchists, the flattery which -was now used toward the Prince appeared not a -little extraordinary. “Never,” they said, “was -there so fair an opportunity for producing a -great and salutary effect, as the Prince now had. -We want a change of the whole system, a radical -and a sweeping change of it; and it is because -we hope that such a change would be the consequence -of giving full powers to the Prince, -that we wish to see full powers given to him. -Is not the Prince of Wales as likely to be able -to judge of political systems as his father, ... -afflicted as the latter unhappily has been in more -ways than one, and bent down with age as he -now is? Is not the Prince as likely to be able -to choose proper advisers as his father was, or -ever can be? Why then should powers, of any -sort, belonging to the kingly office, be withheld -from him? I know it has been said, that -we are <em>bidding</em> for the Prince; and who can bid -above us? We have to offer him <em>hearts</em>, and -<em>sinews</em>, and <em>lives</em>, if he needs them, and we ask -for nothing but our well-known rights in return. -We want to strip him of nothing. We grudge -him and his family nothing that the constitution -awards them, or that they could ever wish for, -in the way of splendour. All we have to beseech -of him is, that he will resolve to be the -ruler of a free people, and not the leader of a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_540">540</span> -faction.” ... “His succession to power,” we -were told by another of these journalists, “with -such opportunities before him, and at so momentous -a time, appeared a lot so enviable, that -it might turn philosophy itself into ambition. -Hitherto he had been seated in that domestic -privacy, which he had learnt how to value and -dignify. And so wonderfully had past circumstances -held back the cause of radical reform, -and so favourable for it were the present, that -Fate seemed purposely to have reserved the -amiable task for his royal highness, that with -one restoring breath he might melt away the -accumulated oppressions of half a century.”</p> - -<p>The wishes of this party concerning the King’s -resumption of authority were sufficiently expressed. -They told us, it was exposing the -government to the contempt of foreign powers, -to have a person at the head of affairs who had -long been incapable of signing his name to a -document, without some one to guide his hand; -a person long incapable of receiving petitions, -of even holding a levee, or discharging the most -ordinary functions of his office; and now, too, -afflicted with this mental malady! They cited -cases to show how doubtful and precarious were -the appearances of recovery from mental derangement; -observed that persons having been -so afflicted were easily hurried, and inferred -that a man subject to hurries was not fit to wield -the executive power. When they were charged -by their opponents with thus disclosing a determination,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_541">541</span> -that if they acceded to power the -King should never resume his functions, the -manner in which the charge was repelled was -such as confirmed it. “Every one,” they said, -“expresses regret that the King, or that any -other human being, should be afflicted with -blindness. But old age is old age, and blindness -is blindness, in a King as well as in other -men; and when blindness is unhappily added to -old age, and to both are added <em>mental derangement</em>, -is it unreasonable that people whose happiness -or misery must, in a great degree, depend -upon their government, should be solicitous that -<em>great caution</em> should be used in the resumption -of the royal authority by a person thus afflicted?”... -“Throw him into a corner!” exclaimed -a ministerial writer, when he exposed with indignation -the wishes of this party; “tell him, this -is the lot reserved for a king who has reigned -so long!” The reply to this was any thing -rather than a confutation or denial of the charge. -“We have had nothing to do with the <em>lot</em>,” -said a mouthpiece of the anarchists; “we have -had no hand in making the King either old, or -blind, or mentally deranged. The <em>lot</em> has fallen -upon him. The first is the lot of every man, -and is generally esteemed a very fortunate lot; -the second is nothing very rare, and it is by no -means an unfrequent companion of old age; -and the third, and all three, are the work of -nature, and not of any of us. And as to the -King’s having reigned so long, there is neither<span class="pagenum" id="Page_542">542</span> -merit nor demerit in that, either in him or his -people.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Perceval popular at this time.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Whether the agitators and anarchists really -believed that the Prince could be so infatuated -as to countenance their plans for a radical and -sweeping change, ... or whether they held out -this hope to their dupes and disciples, in order -that their certain disappointment might engender -a deadlier disaffection, is best known to -themselves; but if, abstaining from their indecent -attempts to show that the King ought -never to be permitted to resume his authority, -they had talked of no other reform than that of -curtailing the power of what they called the -borough-mongering faction, there never was a -time when the better part of the people would -have been so well inclined to listen to their arguments. -Mr. Perceval had never stood so -high in public estimation as at this moment. -When first he came into power, the tide of popularity -was in favour of him and his colleagues: -because any men would have been popular who -succeeded to the administration which was then -displaced; but a series of untoward events had -for a time lessened his hold upon the country, -without in any degree diminishing the general -dislike with which his opponents were regarded. -The unhappy expedition to Walcheren drew -after it a cry of grief and disappointment, -against which, perhaps, he could scarcely have -borne up, if Sir Francis Burdett, by a factious -dispute with the House of Commons, had not,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_543">543</span> -most unintentionally, but most effectually, drawn -off the public attention at the very moment -when the decision upon the inquiry came on. -It was always asserted by his enemies, that he -held his situation, not through any weight of -influence in the country, nor of talents in parliament, -but through the confidence and especial -favour of the King; and that nothing could -be more unfit than that the British prime minister -should be thus dependent upon, and literally, -as it were, the servant of the crown. They -who argued thus against Mr. Perceval’s administration -did not perceive how strong an argument -they supplied against that system, to -which they themselves owed their only power; -certain, however, it is, that Mr. Perceval was -thought a weak minister, because he wanted -that influence; and a sense of this weakness -seems sometimes to have made him assent to -measures which he would gladly have prevented, -if he had held his situation by a stronger tenure. -But when the prop upon which he really had -leaned, and by which it was believed that he -was entirely supported, was suddenly taken -away, then it was that he felt his own resources, -and the people saw him confident in his motives -and measures, and with the strength of integrity -hold on his steady course; not to be deterred -from what he knew to be his duty, either -by the clamours and threats of the faction -within doors, and the demagogues without; nor -by the expressed displeasure of the Prince, in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_544">544</span> -whose power it would presently be to dismiss -him from office. Then, perhaps, for the first -time, he became conscious of his own powers, -and the dignity of his nature shone forth; it -was seen that the man, whose individual character -was without a spot, carried the pure principles -of his privacy into public action, and -possessed the steadiness and intrepidity of a -statesman in as eminent a degree as the milder -and most endearing virtues of domestic life. -Mr. Perceval never held so high a place in public -opinion as the favoured minister of the King, -in full and secure possession of power, as now, -when he was only the faithful servant of a master -who was no longer sensible of his services, -and no longer capable of supporting him.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Schemes for a new ministry.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Accustomed as the various members of opposition -were to coalitions, and compromises, and -concessions, it was no easy task to form a coherent -ministry out of such heterogeneous elements. -At the very commencement of the arrangements, -Lords Grey and Grenville could -not accord, and the Earl left town in disgust; -they found it, however, expedient to agree, and -he returned in time to give counsel when the -Prince had to answer the proposed restrictions -sent to him by parliament. It is said that the -answer which these lords had advised was shown -by the Prince to Mr. Sheridan, and that Mr. -Sheridan declared it would prove of the most -pernicious consequences, inasmuch as it could<span class="pagenum" id="Page_545">545</span> -hardly fail to involve the Prince in a dispute - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span><span class="date">1811.<br />February.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -with the House of Commons. This opinion was -followed, and the answer which was delivered -was composed according to Mr. Sheridan’s -counsel. The two leading opposition lords were -offended at this, and intimated, that as his Royal -Highness had not deemed it proper to adopt -their advice, they could not be of any service to -him in the intended arrangement. The Prince -upon this requested Lord Holland to form an -administration; but Lord Holland had no influence, -and was utterly unable to ensure majorities. -The Prince, therefore, who now began -to feel the difficulties of government, was driven -back to Lords Grey and Grenville, and a temporary -conciliation took place. The triumph -of the opposition seemed now to be complete; -they thought the field was their own, and that -nothing remained but to distribute the spoils. -This distribution, however, excited claims and -contentions, of which the Prince heard more -than he liked.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>The King’s opinion during an interval of amendment.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>When the time of the regency drew near, Mr. -Perceval waited on the King at Windsor, and -found him well enough to converse upon public -affairs, though not sufficiently recovered to bear -the weight of business. He inquired anxiously -concerning the Prince’s conduct, and expressed -great joy at finding that he had not thrown himself -entirely into the hands of a party who were -directly hostile to all the measures of his father’s -government; and he desired that the Queen -would write to the Prince, to signify this approbation,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_546">546</span> -and to request that he might not be harassed -on his return to society by having to - -<span class="sni"><span class="sne">♦</span>The Prince Regent announces his intention of making no change. <br /><span class="date">Feb. 4.</span><span class="sne">♦</span></span> - -change an ephemeral administration. The -Prince, it is said, was well pleased to be thus relieved -from the difficulties in which he found -himself involved by jarring opinions and contending -claims. He made known his determination -of making no change to the opposition; -and on the day before the regency bill passed, -he officially acquainted Mr. Perceval that it was -his intention not to remove from their stations -those whom he found there as the King’s official -servants. “At the same time,” said he, “the -Prince owes it to the truth and sincerity of character, -which, he trusts, will appear in every action -of his life, explicitly to declare, that the -impulse of filial duty and affection to his beloved -and afflicted father leads him to dread that any -act of the Regent might, in the smallest degree, -have the effect of interfering with the progress -of his Sovereign’s recovery. This consideration -alone dictates the decision now communicated -to Mr. Perceval. Having thus performed an -act of indispensable duty, from a just sense of -what is due to his own consistency and honour, -the Prince has only to add, that, among the -many blessings to be derived from his Majesty’s -restoration to health, and to the personal exercise -of his royal functions, it will not, in the -Prince’s estimation, be the least, that that most -fortunate event will at once rescue him from a -situation of unexampled embarrassment, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_547">547</span> -put an end to a state of affairs ill calculated, he -fears, to sustain the interests of the united kingdom -in this awful and perilous crisis, and most -difficult to be reconciled to the genuine principles -of the British constitution.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><span class="sne">♦</span>Mr. Perceval’s reply.<span class="sne">♦</span></div> - -<p>Mr. Perceval replied, that, in the expression -of the Prince’s anxiety for the speedy restoration -of his father’s health, he and his colleagues -could see nothing but additional motives for their -most anxious exertions to give satisfaction to his -Royal Highness, in the only manner in which -it could be given, by endeavouring to promote -his views for the security and happiness of the -country. “Mr. Perceval,” he continued, “has -never failed to regret the impression of your -Royal Highness with regard to the provisions of -the regency bill, which his Majesty’s servants -felt it to be their duty to recommend to parliament. -But he ventures to submit to your Royal -Highness, that, whatever difficulties the present -awful crisis of the country and the world may -create in the administration of the executive -government, your Royal Highness will not find -them in any degree increased by the temporary -suspension of the exercise of those branches of -the royal prerogative which has been introduced -by parliament, in conformity to what was intended -on a former similar occasion; and that -whatever ministers your Royal Highness might -think proper to employ, would find in that full -support and countenance, which, as long as they -were honoured with your Royal Highness’s commands,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_548">548</span> -they would feel confident they would -continue to enjoy, ample and sufficient means -for enabling your Royal Highness effectually to -maintain the great and important interests of -the united kingdom. And Mr. Perceval humbly -trusts, that, whatever doubts your Royal Highness -may entertain with respect to the constitutional -propriety of the measures which have been -adopted, your Royal Highness will feel assured, -that they could not have been recommended by -his Majesty’s servants, nor sanctioned by parliament, -but upon the sincere, though possibly -erroneous, conviction, that they in no degree -trenched upon the true principles and spirit of -the constitution.”</p> - -<p>The opposition had made so sure of coming -into power, that they let the list of their intended -arrangement get abroad; “an arrangement,” -they told us, “of one united, compact body of -men, all holding the same principles, and all -animated by the same views; and an administration,” -they added, “of more internal strength, -by the ties of mutual friendship, ... of more -public influence, by talents, integrity, and stake -in the country, never had been submitted to any -Prince.” A meeting of the common council -was called by their city partizans, to prepare an -address of congratulation to the Regent upon -the change of men and measures which he was -about to make. Their disappointment was in -proportion to their hopes; they affirmed, however, -that the Prince’s determination would be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_549">549</span> -received with real satisfaction by the friends of -Lords Grey and Grenville, who must all feel -that nothing but a sense of imperious duty could -have induced them to undertake the irksome -and arduous task of office in such times. “Three -months,” they said, “had already elapsed under -a total suspension of the functions of government, -... three months the most important, perhaps, -that had ever occurred in our history; another -month must have been added to the delay, if -the Prince had yielded to his patriotic sentiments, -and recurred all at once to the principles -upon which he thought the administration would -be most beneficially conducted. Thus much -time must have been required for the re-election -of those who would have vacated their seats, and -for the re-establishment of the routine of office; -but this delay might certainly, in a moment of -such emergency, be productive of the most -serious evil.” But while the Whigs thus affected -the language of resignation, the radical journalists -declared, “that a ministry formed by the -two joint opposition lords would have excluded -almost all the Prince’s friends; that from those -lords the people could have expected nothing; -but that they would have hoped for something -from an arrangement that should have placed -Lord Holland at the head of affairs, to the -great mortification of those less popular and less -liberal leaders. It was as well to retain Perceval -and Liverpool, as to supersede them by Grey -and Grenville.” Whigs and anarchists, however,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_550">550</span> -both agreed in asserting, that the Prince -had no confidence whatever in his ministers. -“He signs papers,” said one of these journalists, -“receives addresses, expresses his opinions respecting -courts marshal and criminal, and has -ten or a dozen people to walk before him; but -with regard to the nation, he can only wish -its prosperity, and has no more to do with its -government than a keeper of geese.”</p> - -<p>But the great and quiet majority of the nation -regarded the Prince Regent’s determination with -grateful joy: they anticipated, from the wisdom -and feeling which dictated it, a perseverance in -the true course of policy and honour, and in that -anticipation looked on to a triumphant issue of -the war, with a hope which from thenceforward -suffered no abatement.</p> - -<p class="p2 center">END OF VOL IV.</p> - -<p class="p4 center small"><span class="bt">G. Woodfall, Printer, Angel Court, Skinner Street, London.</span></p> -</div> - -<div class="sec"> -<div class="chapter"><div class="footnotes"> -<h2 id="FOOTNOTES" class="nobreak p1">FOOTNOTES</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Non est memoriæ ... quod in -castro vel civitate aliquâ tales fuerint -defensores.</i> Gesta Comitum -Barcinonensium, Marca Hispanica, -568.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> This would naturally be -deemed miraculous, and the miracle -was ascribed to St. Narcissus -and other saints, whose graves -the French had disturbed, and -scattered their remains about. -One statement is, that the flies -proceeded from St. Narcissus’s -tomb. <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Muscæ istæ partim erant -lividæ, partim virides, in quâdam -sui parte colorem rubeum denotantes.</i> -(Gesta Com. Barcin. 569, -ut supra.) <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Ceterum, qui locorum -periti sunt quæ circum Gerundam -visuntur</i>, says the Archbishop -Pierre de Marca, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ii testantur haud -procul eâ urbe videri rupes ex -quibus vulgò oriuntur etiamnum -muscæ quales e scpulchro Sancti -Narcissi prodiisse fabulantur. -Quod si ita est, non ultra inquirendum -est in earum originem quæ -Gallico tum exercitui insultârunt, -quas manifestum est ortas esse ex -rupibus illis.</i> Marca Hispanica, -468. -</p> -<p> -The flies are described differently -in the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Acta Sanctorum</i> -(Mart. t. ii. 624), where the miracles -of St. Narcissus are given -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ex hispanico Ant. Vincentii Domenecci. -Ex ipso sancti præsulis -sepulchro exierunt innumera examina -muscarum, cœruleo partim, -partim viridi colore tinctarum, rubrisque -striis dispunctarum; quæ -virorum equorumque subingressæ -nares, non priùs deserebant occupatos, -quàm spiritum vitamque -abstulissent, concidentibus humi -mortuis. Tanti enim erat veneni -efficacia, ut seu virum seu equum -momordissent, morsum continuò -mors sequeretur.</i> These authorities -are given because they relate -to a curious fact in natural -history, ... if there be any truth -in the story; and that there was -a plague of insects can hardly be -doubted. That their bite was so -deadly, and that they proceeded -from the tomb, I should have hesitated -as little as the reader to -disbelieve, if some other accounts -had not seemed to show that -both these apparent improbabilities -may be possible. It is said -that one part of Louisiana is infested -by a fly whose bite is fatal -to horses. And about twenty -years ago, at Lewes, when a -leaden coffin, which had been interred -about threescore years, -was opened, the legs and thighbones -of the skeleton were found -to be “covered with myriads of -flies, of a species, perhaps, totally -unknown to the naturalist. The -wings were white, and the spectators -gave it the name of the -coffin-fly. The lead was perfectly -sound, and presented not the -least chink or crevice for the admission -of air”: and the flies -which were thus released are described -as being active and strong -on the wing. -</p> -<p> -If, however, some long lost -species had reappeared from the -tomb, and multiplied so as to become -a plague, it would have -continued in the country. But -if Pierre de Marca was rightly informed -that a fly which corresponds -in appearance to the description -is still found there, it -certainly possesses none of the -tremendous powers which the legend -ascribes to it.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> Marshal St. Cyr has the following -remark upon this carnage, -after observing that it proved -useful as an example to other -towns: <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">La gloire de defendre ses -foyers domestiques, menacés par -l’étranger, est grande, la plus -grande de toutes, peut-être: mais -la vertu qui y fait prétendre, ne -serait point la première des vertus, -si elle pouvait être pratiquée sans -peril.</i> It must cost the heart -something to reason thus even in -a just war. Marshal St. Cyr tells -us, indeed, that <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">le soldat devient -naturellement cruel à la longue</i>: -... the more careful, therefore, -should he be not to sear his feelings -and his conscience by such -reflections as this.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> An instance of heroism worthy -of record was displayed by -Luciano Aucio, a drummer belonging -to the artillery, who was -stationed to give the alarm whenever -a shell was thrown: a ball -struck off his leg at the knee; but -when the women came to remove -him, he cried out, “No, no; my -arms are left, and I can still beat -the drum to give my comrades -warning in time for them to save -themselves!” This brave lad was -the only person during the siege -who recovered after an amputation -of the thigh.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Two singular cases of contusion -of the brain were observed -at this time in the hospitals: one -man did nothing but count with -a loud and deliberate voice from -forty to seventy, always beginning -at one number and ending -at the other, and this incessantly -through the whole night. Another -continually uttered the -most extraordinary blasphemies -and curses, exhausting the whole -vocabulary of malediction, without -any apparent emotion of -anger: this case did not prove -fatal, but the man was left in a -state of helpless idiocy.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> A man deposed that he had -seen the body when it was buried -hastily, by night; the face, he -said, was swollen, and the eyes -forced out of their sockets. Supposing -this testimony were true, -the appearance would denote -strangulation rather than poison; -but that Alvarez should -have been privately murdered is -altogether improbable.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> Burnet says of the wars in the -reign of William III. “The late -king told me that in these campaigns -the Spaniards were both -so ignorant and so backward, so -proud and yet so weak, that they -would never own their feebleness -or their wants to him. They -pretended they had stores when -they had none; and thousands -when they scarce had hundreds. -He had in their councils often desired -that they would give him only -a true state of their garrisons -and magazines; but they always -gave it false; so that for some -campaigns all was lost, merely because -they deceived him in the -strength they pretended they had. -At last he believed nothing they -said, but sent his own officers to -examine every thing.” Vol. ii. p. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> Memoria de Azanza y O’Farrell, -§ 193, pp. 169, 170. They -plead this in justification or excuse -for themselves.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> The account of Kolli’s examination -had in one part been -palpably falsified. He was represented -as saying that it was -the Duke of Kent’s wish to send -Ferdinand to Gibraltar; but that -he would not have assisted in -this plan, because it would have -been in fact sending him to prison! -The whole of these documents -are printed in Louis Goldsmith’s -Recueil de Decrets, Ordonnances, -&c. t. iv. pp. 302–14; -and by Llorente, in his Mémoires -pour servir à l’Histoire de la Revolution -d’Espagne, t. ii. pp. 306–342. -This unworthy Spaniard -expresses there a decided opinion -that Kolli himself was the person -who went to Valençay, as the official -report stated. The Baron, -however, has published his own -story, and it is confirmed by the -declarations of Richard and -Fouché, authentically made after -the restoration of the Bourbons. -</p> -<p> -One curious fact appears in -the Baron de Kolli’s Memoirs. -Diamonds to the amount of -200,000 francs were taken from -him by the police when he was -seized. After the restoration he -reclaimed them. The result of -his application was a royal ordonnance, -in which the King decided, -that the other effects belonging -to the claimant should -be restored to him, but that the -diamonds seized at Paris are, and -remain, confiscated, as having -been given to the Sieur de Kolli -by a government then at war -with France. And his renewed -applications were answered by a -repetition of this ordonnance!</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> Notwithstanding the facility -with which, in many instances, -Louis was deluded by his brother, -and the curious simplicity of character -which he exhibits, it is impossible -to peruse his <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Documens -Historiques et Reflexions sur le -Gouvernement de la Hollande</i>, -without feeling great respect for -him. His conduct was irreproachable, -his views benevolent -even when erroneous, his intentions -uniformly good; and excellent -indeed must that disposition -have been, which in such -trying circumstances always preserved -its natural rectitude. -</p> -<p> -It appears by these documents -that the throne of Spain was offered -to him before Joseph was -thought of, and that he rejected -the proposal as at once impolitic -and iniquitous. But it is curious -to see how completely he had -been deceived concerning the -course of events in the Peninsula, -and still more extraordinary that -in the year 1820 (when his book -was published) he appears to -have obtained no better information -upon that subject than was -communicated in the Moniteur -during his brother’s reign.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> The prejudice against mercury -prevailed so strongly among -the native practitioners, that the -commander-in-chief, at a time -when syphilitic diseases were -thinning the ranks, found it necessary -to enforce its use in the -army and in all the military hospitals.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> Some days after the storm -the boats of the Triumph picked -up about thirty tons of quicksilver, -in leathern bags of fifty -pounds each, which were cast on -shore from the wreck. They -were stowed below in the storerooms -and after-hold, and the -bags having been thoroughly -soaked in the sea, decayed and -burst before the danger was perceived. -As much of the quicksilver -as possible was collected, -but it insinuated itself every -where, and not less than ten tons -weight was supposed to have got -between the timbers, which could -only be cleared by docking the -ship and removing a plank at the -lowest part near the keel. The -provisions were spoilt; two or -three hundred of the crew were -so severely affected, that it was -necessary to remove them immediately, -many of them being in a -state which left little chance of -recovery; and the ship was sent -to Gibraltar to have all her stores -taken out, and undergo a thorough -clearance.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> A minute and interesting account -of this escape was published -at Lausanne, 1817, with this -title, <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Relation du Séjour des Prisonniers -de Guerre Français et -Suisses sur le Ponton la Castille, -dans la Baie de Cadix, et de leur -Evasion le 15 May, 1810. Par -L. Chapuis, de Lausanne, Chirurgien -major</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> Upon this windmill the governor -intended to mount a gun, -and the gun was lying in it, but -not as yet mounted, and consequently -useless; another dismounted -gun was lying near -the mill. These guns of course -could be of no use in the action -which ensued, but they figured -in Marshal Massena’s account of -it.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> Massena’s official statement -of this action was a masterpiece -of impudent falsehood. He asserted -that General Craufurd’s -force consisted of 2000 horse and -8000 foot, and that they were all -posted under the guns of the -fortress; that they gave way before -the French, our cavalry not -daring to meet them with the -sabre, and the infantry pursued -at a running step; that we lost -sixty officers, of whom twenty-four -were buried in the field of -battle; 400 killed, 700 wounded, -400 prisoners, one stand of colours, -and two pieces of cannon, -while the loss of the conquerors -did not amount to 300. He -took no colours, and the two -pieces of cannon were the dismounted -guns at the windmill. -In a subsequent dispatch Massena -assured the war-minister -that all his troops were burning -with impatience to teach the -English army what they had already -taught Craufurd’s division. -Our own gazette had already -shown the veracity of this boaster’s -account; but this new insult -called forth a counter-statement -from General Craufurd, from -which this detail has chiefly been -drawn, and to the truth of which -the whole British army were witnesses.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> The author of <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Der Feldzug von Portugal in den Jahren 1811 -und 1812</i> (<cite>Stutgard und Tubingen</cite>, -1816) is mistaken in calling it the -burial-place of the kings of Portugal.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> Some of the Portugueze -charging a superior force got so -wedged in among the French, -that they had not room to use -their bayonets; they turned up -the butt ends of their muskets, -and plied them with such vigour, -that they presently cleared the -way.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> Ten ensigns’ commissions -were sent out after this action by -the commander-in-chief to Lord -Wellington, as rewards for the -same number of non-commissioned -officers who had distinguished -themselves.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> The Portugueze officer who -was with Massena, and whose -journal is printed in the <cite>Investigador -Portuguez</cite>, states the number -of killed and wounded whom -the French left on the ground at -4600.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> There are in fact three passes over this Serra, all of them practicable -for cavalry.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> Cardoso says, that to the -east the Serra de Castello Rodrigo -may be distinguished, which -is thirty leagues off, the Serra de -Minde to the south, and that of -Grijo to the north, fifteen leagues -distant. Westward is the mouth -of the Mondego and the coast.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> A loss which was magnified to 500 in Massena’s dispatches.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> The under-gardener of the -Botanical Garden at Coimbra, -with his family, consisting of his -wife (a young woman of eighteen, -with an infant at the breast) and -her mother, having tarried too -long to accompany the army, was -overtaken in the little town of -Soure by some stragglers from -the enemy’s advanced guard, who -were in search of plunder. These -miscreants secured the husband -by fastening his hands behind him: -they tied the mother in the same -manner; the villain then, to whom -the wife was allotted, either by -agreement among them, or by -virtue of his authority, endeavoured -to tear the infant from -her arms, that he might proceed -to violate her in presence of her -mother and her husband. Failing -in this, and enraged at a resistance -which he had not expected, -he drew back a few yards, presented -his musket, and swore he -would fire at her if she did not -yield. “Fire, devil!” was her -immediate reply, and at the word -she and her infant fell by the same -shot. The ruffians stripped her -body, and compelled the husband -to carry the clothes on his back -to Thomar, whither they carried -him prisoner. During his detention -there he pointed out the murderer -to a Portugueze nobleman -then serving with Massena; but -whatever this traitor may have -felt at the crime, he did not venture -to report it to the French -commander, and demand justice -upon the criminal: the hopes of -co-operation on the part of the -Portugueze people which he had -held out had been proved so utterly -false, that Massena treated -him with contemptuous dislike, -and moreover every thing was -permitted to their soldiers by the -French generals in that atrocious -campaign. The gardener effected -his escape to Coimbra, where a -subscription was raised for him, -but he soon died, broken-hearted. -The man himself related this tragedy -to the British officer, from -whom I received it. It is recorded -here as an example of the spirit -which the invaders frequently -found in those Portugueze women -who were unfortunate enough to -fall into their hands.</p></div> -</div></div> - -<div class="chapter"><div class="transnote"> -<h2 id="Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</h2> - -<p>Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this book. Simple typographical errors were -corrected and some unbalanced quotation marks were remedied. Other -errors of these types were not changed because the corrections were not -obvious to the Transcriber.</p> - -<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences -of inconsistent hyphenation have been changed only when there was a -predominant preference throughout the book.</p> - -<p>The source book used many Sidenotes, printed in italics. Most match -entries in the Table of Contents, but some are either dates or -citations. To preserve proximity with the original text, if they were -printed mid-paragraph, that is where they appear here. Depending on -the format in which you are reading this eBook, Sidenotes may be -distinguished from regular text by being shown in some combination -of italics, boldface, UPPER-CASE, enclosed in ♦DIAMOND SYMBOLS♦, -being offset into the left-margin, or in a rectangular area within -the regular text. Due to limitations of some eReaders, some sidenotes -may appear next to or below each other, depending on the width of the -screen.</p> - -<p>In the original book, Sidenote dates at the tops of pages were -enclosed in top- and bottom-borders. In some versions of this eBook, -all Sidenote dates are marked that way, even if they originally were -mid-page.</p> - -<p>The original Table of Contents used “ib.” when the page number was the -same as the one in the previous entry. This eBook uses the actual page -numbers.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_201">201</a>: “not to be outdone” was missing the “to”; restored by -Transcriber.</p> - -<p>All six volumes of this work are available at no cost at -<a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">Project Gutenberg</a>. -Some of these volumes reference each other, but some of the -references do not seem to match the text.</p> - -<p class="in0 in4"> -Volume I: Project Gutenberg eBook number <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/60386/60386-h/60386-h.htm">60386</a><br /> -Volume II: Project Gutenberg eBook number <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/60387/60387-h/60387-h.htm">60387</a><br /> -Volume III: Project Gutenberg eBook number <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/60388/60388-h/60388-h.htm">60388</a><br /> -Volume IV: Project Gutenberg eBook number <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/60389/60389-h/60389-h.htm">60389</a><br /> -Volume V: Project Gutenberg eBook number <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/60390/60390-h/60390-h.htm">60390</a><br /> -Volume VI: Project Gutenberg eBook number <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/60391/60391-h/60391-h.htm">60391</a></p> - -</div></div> -</div> -</div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of the Peninsular War Volume -IV (of 6), by Robert Southey - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR, VOL 4 *** - -***** This file should be named 60389-h.htm or 60389-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/0/3/8/60389/ - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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