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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e46e901 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #60262 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/60262) diff --git a/old/60262-8.txt b/old/60262-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 7789cfc..0000000 --- a/old/60262-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7876 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, Where Are We Going?, by David Lloyd George - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: Where Are We Going? - - -Author: David Lloyd George - - - -Release Date: September 8, 2019 [eBook #60262] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHERE ARE WE GOING?*** - - -E-text prepared by Tim Lindell, Martin Pettit, and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made -available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org) - - - -Note: Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive. See - https://archive.org/details/wherearewegoing00lloy - - - - - -WHERE ARE WE GOING? - -by - -The Right Honourable - -DAVID LLOYD GEORGE - -O.M., P.C., M.P. - -BRITISH PRIME MINISTER 1916-1922 - - - - - - -[Illustration: Logo] - - -New York -George H. Doran Company - -Copyright, 1923, -by George H. Doran Company - - -[Illustration: Logo] - - -WHERE ARE WE GOING? II - -Printed in the United States of America - - - - -PREFACE - - -The chapters collected in this book represent a running comment on the -European situation during the past ten months. Although in the haze -that covers the Continent it is difficult always to see clearly what -is happening, and still more difficult to forecast what is likely to -occur, I have not deemed it necessary to revise any of the estimates -I made from time to time in these periodic reviews on the position. -In the period covered by them peace has gone back perceptibly and -unmistakably. Of the years immediately after the end of the Great War -it may be said that up to the present year each showed a distinct -improvement over its predecessor. The temper of the warring nations -showed a gradual healing and improvement, and East and West there was a -return to reason and calm in their attitude towards each other. In the -Cannes discussions of January 1922 the atmosphere of hostility which -poisoned the Spa discussions in 1920 had largely disappeared, and the -applause which greeted Herr Rathenau's fine speech at Genoa in April -1922 was cordial and general. The electric messages from Paris failed -to provoke a thunderstorm, and one of the speakers, at the last meeting -of the Assembly, drawing an illustration from the weather outside, said -the Conference had broken up under blue skies and a serene firmament. - -That was in May 1922. Those words, when used, met with cheering -approval: if used to-day they would be greeted with scoffing laughter. -The present year has been one of growing gloom and menace. The -international temper is distinctly worse all round. A peace has been -patched up with the Turkish Empire. No one believes it can endure -long. The only question is, How long? There may be other patched-up -treaties between struggling nations before the year is out. There is -only one prediction concerning them which can at this stage be safely -made--they will leave European peace in a more precarious plight than -ever. A peace wrung by triumphant force out of helplessness is never a -good peace. That is why I view with apprehension the character of the -settlement which may soon be wrung out of German despair in the Ruhr -and imposed on Greek impotence in the Adriatic. The Fiume settlement -may turn out to be more satisfactory in spite of threatening omens. -The Jugo-Slavs are a formidable military proposition to be tackled by -any Power. The War proved them to be about the best fighting material -in Europe. They are also fairly well equipped with modern weapons, and -if unhappily the need arose their deficiencies in this respect would -soon be supplied from the workshops of Czecho-Slovakia and elsewhere. I -am, therefore, still hopeful that Fiume may be remitted for settlement -to diplomatists and not to gunmen. International right in these -turbulent days seems to depend, not on justice, but on a reckoning of -chances. The Slavs are ready to defend their rights and can do so. -There is, therefore, some talk of conferences and even arbitration in -their case. Germany and Greece cannot put up a fight. Unconditional -surrender is, therefore, their lot. All the same, this is not only a -wrong but a miscalculation. Unjust concessions, extracted by violence, -are not settlements; they are only postponements. Unfortunately, the -decisions at the next great hearing of the cause are just as likely to -be provisional--and so the quarrel will go on to the final catastrophe -unless humanity one day sees the light and has the courage to follow -it. But that day must not be too distant, otherwise it will come too -late to save civilisation. The last conflict between great nations has -exposed the devastating possibilities of modern science. Henceforth -progress in the destructiveness of the apparatus of war has been, and -will continue to be, so rapid that a conflict to-morrow would spread -ten times the desolation caused by the Great War of 1914-18. There is a -concentration of much scientific and mechanical skill on strengthening -the machinery of devastation. Incredible progress--if progress be the -word--has been made within the last three or four years in perfecting -and increasing the shattering power of this kind of devilry. What will -it be like five, ten, twenty years hence! - -Whilst nations are piling up, perfecting and intensifying their -explosives, they are also saturating the ground with the inflammable -passions which one day will precipitate the explosion. Injustice, -insult, insolence, distilled into the spirit of revenge, is everywhere -soaking into the earth. - -I have never doubted that France could impose terms on Germany. It was -clear that she could starve Germany into submission to any conditions -dictated to her. It is astonishing that the Germans should have held -out so long. What I have steadily predicted in these articles is that -those terms will not produce as much reparation as a more conciliatory -course would have brought--that to operate them will be a source of -constant friction, and that the methods employed to impose and execute -them will rouse a spirit of patriotic wrath which will in the end bring -disaster to the victor of to-day. - -When the invasion of the Ruhr was decided upon, the shortage in the -promised coal deliveries upon which default was declared was barely -10 per cent. A little better organisation of the wagon service on the -French side would have made up that deficiency in a very short time. -During the months of the occupation the French and Belgians have not -succeeded in collecting one-sixth the tonnage delivered during the -corresponding months last year. It will take weeks after passive -resistance has collapsed to restore railways and collieries to working -order. The new _régime_ will have to liquidate arrears of at least -15,000,000 tons before it begins its regular monthly deliveries. What -about cash payments? It is not too much to say that Germany is much -less able to meet her obligations in this respect than she was before -the invasion. Her credit has been blown out of sight into infinite -space. It will take a long time to pull it back from its wanderings and -set its feet once more firmly on European earth. There are only four -ways in which the huge sum due from Germany can be liquidated:-- - - - (1) By handing over to the Allies the gold reserves of Germany - and of Germans either at home or on deposit abroad. The former - is negligible; the amount of the latter is disputable. Much of - it is essential to enable Germany to purchase abroad the raw - material and food necessary to her existence. The worse German - credit becomes the larger must this deposit be. As for the foreign - securities and deposits which are not strictly necessary for - trading, they cannot all be made available, for nothing will - induce some of the depositors to part with the whole of these - securities. The sum, therefore, derivable from this source would - amount to but a small percentage of the total figure payable for - reparations. - - (2) Deliveries of coal, timber, potash, dyes and other raw - material. With the exception of timber, these deliveries have - been, on the whole, satisfactory--since the Spa Agreement. It - did not require the pressure of armed invasion to improve these - deliveries, including the timber demands of the Allies. - - (3) A percentage levied on German exports. These are paid for in - gold or its equivalent, and the levy would therefore be remitted - in gold. A levy of 20 per cent. on German exports would have - produced between £40,000,000 and £50,000,000 a year on the basis - of last year's exports. When German trade returned to normal it - would yield £100,000,000. This sum, added to the value of the - material delivered, would cover interest and sinking fund on - the £2,500,000,000 which is now the accepted maximum of German - capacity. - - (4) The restoration of German credit with a view to the immediate - raising of a loan on reparation account. This would help the - Allies over their urgent financial difficulties. - - -These four methods of payment are the only known and knowable means of -obtaining reparations. They would have been more immediately fruitful -if so much time, money and resource had not been wasted over this -ill-judged invasion. - -The apologists of French action in the Ruhr contend that France was -driven to these extremes by the refusal of Britain to co-operate -with her in bringing legitimate pressure to bear on Germany to carry -out the Treaty. Those who put forward this contention argue in -ignorance of the proposals submitted by the British Government to the -Allied Conference in August 1922. These would have exploited all the -methods above set forth to the limit of their productiveness. These -proposals were substantially accepted by all the Allies except France. -Repeated efforts have been made this year in Parliament to induce the -Government to publish this scheme. Both the present and the late Prime -Minister gave favourable if not definite answers to the request for -publication. But so far the August proceedings have not made their -public appearance. Why this reluctance to give the whole facts to the -public? The discussions at the November and January Conferences have -been published in full. These meetings were only adjournments from the -August Conference. The story of the fateful Conference is, therefore, -incomplete if August is suppressed. Ought not the world to know the -proposals which France rejected in August 1922? In the absence of -official publication I will take the responsibility now of giving a -Summary. - -It was proposed:-- - - - (1) That Germany should be called upon to take such measures as - the Reparations Commission should stipulate, in order to balance - her Budget and restore her financial stability. - - (2) That the Reichsbank should be made independent of Government - control. - - (3) That 26 per cent. of the total value of German exports - should be collected in gold or foreign currencies and paid - into a separate account in the Reichsbank in the name of the - Sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission known as the Committee - of Guarantees. - - (4) That the produce of all German import and export duties other - than the levy should be paid monthly to a special account at the - Reichsbank, which should be under the scrutiny of the Committee - of Guarantees. The German Government should have the disposal - of the sums standing to the credit of this account so long as - the Reparations Commission was satisfied that it fulfilled the - obligations imposed upon it. If at any time the Commission was - not satisfied that this was the case the Committee of Guarantees - should have the right to take over the sums standing to the credit - of this account and to secure the payment to it of the produce of - these duties thereafter. - - (5) There were stern provisions for supervision of German finance - by the Committee of Guarantees and for preventing the export of - German capital. - - (6) There were provisions for supervision over State mines and - forests in the event of their being a failure in delivery of coal - or timber as the case might be. - - -A Moratorium up to December 1922 was to be given conditionally on -the acceptance of the above terms by the German Government, and the -Reparations Commission were then to proceed to fix the further annual -payments. - -Had these drastic proposals been adopted and enforced by the Allies, -what would have been the result? Deliveries of coal and timber would -have been ensured up to the full quota arranged. By means of the levy -on exports, £50,000,000 would have been already collected in gold and -paid into Allied account. The mark would have been stabilised, and -could have been made the basis of a considerable loan. As German trade -gradually recovered the export levy would bring in larger amounts. This -year would certainly have produced a yield of between £60,000,000 and -£70,000,000. This is what would have been effected for Reparations if -the plan put forward by the British Government had been accepted and -put into execution in August. By the settlement of this most troublous -question, the great cost and the still greater irritation of the -Ruhr episode would have been avoided, trade would have continued its -convalescence, and the peace of Europe would have been established. - -What would have happened if Germany had refused these terms? We should -certainly have heard what objections or counter-proposals Germany had -to offer. But we were resolved to have a settlement that would put an -end to the fiscal chaos inside Germany, and having thus put her in a -position to pay we were equally resolved that she should pay up to the -limit of her capacity. We, therefore, undertook, if Germany rejected -the terms finally agreed upon, to join France and the other Allies -in any coercive measures deemed advisable to compel acceptance. M. -Poincaré refused to agree. His refusal alone rendered that Conference -fruitless. Over a year has elapsed since then. He has pursued a -different policy. So far it has brought him nothing. I am bold enough -to predict that in future it will bring France considerably less than -the August 1922 plan would have yielded. - -If he is out for reparations his policy will inevitably fail in -comparison with that he so rashly threw over. But if he is out for -trouble it has been a great success, and in future it will be an even -greater triumph for his statesmanship. A permanent garrison in the Ruhr -has possibilities of mischief which it does not require any special -vision to foresee. - -Enduring peace can only rest on a foundation of justice. It is just -that Germany should exert herself to the limit of her strength to -repair the damage wrought by her armies. She was the aggressor; she was -the invader. Her aggression inflicted serious hurt on her neighbours. -By the established precepts of every civilised law in the world she -ought to pay up. A peace which did not recognise that obligation -would be unjust and provoke a righteous resentment in the breasts of -the wronged. That sentiment would have been inimical to the good -understanding that is one of the essentials of peace. Moreover, it -is not conducive to good behaviour amongst nations that they should -be allowed to ravage and destroy without paying the penalty of their -misdeeds. That is why I do not agree with those who would wipe out -the claim for reparations entirely. On the other hand, civilised -jurisprudence has also advanced to the stage where it forbids the -creditor to attach his debtor's freedom and independence as security -for the payment of the debt. The law that permitted a debtor to be sold -into bondage for an unliquidated liability has now been voted barbarous -by the more humane usage and wont of the day. That is why I protest -against using armed force to occupy and control a country whilst the -scourge of starvation is being used to whip its workmen into toiling -for payment of a foreign debt. As Mr. Gladstone once said: "Justice -means justice to all." The main difficulty of a just settlement of -reparations comes from the growing disposition to take sides blindly -in this dispute. One party sees nothing but the outrage of 1914-18, -the costly vindication of right, and the just claim of the victims to -compensation for their losses. The other party sees nothing but the -harsh fury with which the victors in the cause press their verdict -to execution. Peace can only be restored by a full recognition of the -equities as well as the humanities--of the humanities as well as the -equities. I have sought in these pages to deal fairly with both. - -D. LLOYD GEORGE. - -_September 13th, 1923._ - - - - -CONTENTS - -CHAPTER PAGE - I: THE GREAT PERIL 25 - - POST-WAR EUROPE REVISITED--IMPOVERISHMENT - AND TAXATION--RACE HATREDS UNCHANGED--HOW - WAR IS BEGUN--VENGEANCE IS THE - LORD'S--THE CHURCHES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. - - - II: EUROPE STILL ARMING 51 - - MARSHAL FOCH AND THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT - WAR--NAVIES FOR DEFENCE--STRENGTH OF EUROPE'S - ARMIES--EUROPE MORE MILITANT THAN EVER. - - - III: THE ERUPTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 59 - - DROPPING HOT CINDERS IN THE BALKANS--SEEING - WAR IN PICTURES--FORCE THE ARBITER OF RIGHT - AND WRONG--LIMITING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE - LEAGUE--BOTTLING UP THE ADRIATIC. - - - IV: IS THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS A SUCCESS? 68 - - TRIUMPHS OF THE LEAGUE--ALL GREAT - POWERS SHOULD BE IN IT--AMERICA AND - THE LEAGUE--TREATY AND THE LEAGUE--ENDING - THE ARBITRAMENT OF THE SWORD. - - - V: THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND ITS CRITICS 81 - - TREATY CRITICISED BUT NOT READ--AMERICA - AND THE TREATY--LABOUR AND THE TREATY--TREATY - AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS INTERWOVEN. - - - VI: 1922 95 - - WAR DANCE STILL IN THE WORLD--ULTIMATUM - INSTEAD OF CONFERENCE--CANNES - AND GENOA--ENEMIES AT COUNCIL TABLE--TALK - OF AN AMERICAN LOAN. - - - VII: WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? 104 - - CLEMENCEAU AND THE RHINE--ANNEXATION - AND REVENGE--ANGLO-AMERICAN GUARANTEE - TO FRANCE--POINCARÉ AND THE RHINE. - - - VIII: WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? 116 - - VERSAILLES TREATY AND THE RHINE FRONTIER--FOCH - AND THE POLITICAL FRONTIER--AMERICAN AND - BRITISH PRESSURE--SHAM REPUBLIC OF THE RHINE. - - - IX: WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? 130 - - BONAR LAW AND POINCARÉ--PRODUCTIVE - SANCTIONS AND REPARATIONS--MORATORIUM - FOR GERMANY FAILS--BRITAIN STANDS ASIDE. - - - X: REPARATIONS 136 - - REPARATIONS AND THE TREATY--CAPACITY TO - PAY--REPARATIONS COMMISSION CHANGED--AMERICA'S - VACANT CHAIR--WORTHLESS "C" BONDS FOR BRITAIN. - - - XI: MR. HUGHES'S NEW HAVEN SPEECH 147 - - SECRETARY HUGHES'S NEW HAVEN SPEECH, - A TIMID DELIVERANCE--IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL - OF EXPERTS--OFFER OF AMERICAN HELP. - - - XII: THE FRENCH INVASION OF THE RUHR 156 - - WHAT GERMANY HAS PAID--"IN TECHNICAL - DEFAULT"--WRONG WAY TO MAKE GERMANY - PAY--RUINING GERMAN INDUSTRY--FRANCE'S - SECRET AIM. - - - XIII: LOST OPPORTUNITIES 167 - - FRENCH FAILURE IN THE RUHR--WILD OATS - OF REPARATION--THE RUHR AND THE LEAGUE - OF NATIONS--THE BANKERS' CONFERENCE. - - - XIV: FRENCH SCHEMES 175 - - ITALY AND THE RUHR--IRON ORE OF LORRAINE - AND GERMAN COAL DEPOSITS--LOUCHEUR - AND HUGO STINNES--GERMAN WORKMEN IN BONDAGE. - - - XV: THE QUICKSAND 183 - - LOUCHEUR AND THE RUHR--LACK OF LEADER - IN FRANCE--DISREGARD OF ALLIES--AGGRESSION - AND SECURITY--FAILURE OF BONAR LAW. - - - XVI: THE FIRST GERMAN OFFER 191 - - DOES FRANCE SEEK A SETTLEMENT?--DEMAND - FOR SUBMISSION IN THE RUHR--GERMAN - OFFER INADEQUATE--KEEPING AMERICA - OUT--TREATY IDEA NOT FOLLOWED. - - - XVII: THE SECOND GERMAN NOTE 202 - - GERMAN OFFER AND THE LOAN TO GERMANY--CAN - BERLIN ASSENT TO INVASION?--REINTRODUCING - AMERICA--WEAKENING DEBTORS ABILITY TO PAY. - - - XVIII: THE NAPOLEONIC DREAM 213 - - EUROPEAN MIND UNHINGED--WHAT EVERY - FRENCHMAN KNOWS--PICKWICK FOLLOWS - SNODGRASS--GERMANY MAY COLLAPSE--UNDOING - THE WORK OF BISMARCK. - - - XIX: IS IT PEACE? 225 - - STRESEMANN MAN OF ENERGY--CHAOS AHEAD - FOR GERMANY--BRITISH UNEMPLOYMENT--FRANCE - A SELF-CONTAINED COUNTRY--BALFOUR'S - NOTE A GENEROUS OFFER. - - - XX: WHAT NEXT? 234 - - PEN-AND-INK JOUSTING--TORY "DIEHARDS" - AND FRANCE--POINCARÉ AND THE DOVE OF - PEACE--WHAT "PAY AND STAY" MEANS--FRANCE'S - MINIMUM AND BRITAIN'S SURRENDER. - - - XXI: THE BRITISH DEBT TO AMERICA 244 - - BORROWING FOR ALLIES--BRITISH TAXPAYER'S - BURDEN--CREDITOR NATION NOW DEBTOR--BRITAIN - MUST PAY HER WAY--HER CURRENCY - NOT DISCREDITED--INTER-ALLIED DEBTS. - - - XXII: INTER-ALLIED DEBTS 252 - - DISCOVERY OF THE MIDDLE WEST--LEGEND - OF BRITISH WEALTH--1,400,000 UNEMPLOYED--THE - BALFOUR NOTE--CAN BRITAIN AFFORD - TO BE MORE GENEROUS THAN AMERICA? - - - XXIII: THE BRITISH ELECTIONS 264 - - MINORITY RULE AND MORAL AUTHORITY--NATIONAL - LIBERALS AT THE POLLS--DANGER - OF ENGLAND'S ELECTORAL SYSTEM--LABOUR'S - PROSPECTS--WARRING LIBERAL FACTIONS. - - - XXIV: HOW DEMOCRACY WORKS 282 - - GROWTH OF BRITAIN'S ELECTORATE--WOMEN - SUFFRAGE--NEW VOTERS WITHOUT A PARTY--ABSENTEES - FROM THE POLLS--FREAKS OF THE GROUP SYSTEM. - - - XXV: POLITICAL REALITIES 291 - - POST-WAR LEGISLATION--THE IRISH CAULDRON--LABOUR - AND CAPITAL--AGRICULTURE AND - INDUSTRY--SOCIALISM COURTING FASCISM. - - - XXVI: SHOULD WE MAKE PEACE WITH RUSSIA? 301 - - PRE-REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA--CORRUPTION AND - BETRAYAL--"SHAKING HANDS WITH MURDER"--IF - TURKEY, WHY NOT RUSSIA?--NEED FOR - RUSSIA'S EXPORTS. - - - XXVII: PALESTINE AND THE JEWS 312 - - STUPIDITY OF ANTI-SEMITISM--BLIGHTING RULE - OF THE TURK--THE JEW AS A CULTIVATOR--RACE - EQUALITY IN PALESTINE--ZIONIST DECLARATION. - - -XXVIII: THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE 322 - - TURKISH FEZZES IN THE AIR--BLOW OF PRESTIGE - OF THE WEST--MASSACRES AND MISGOVERNMENT--FERTILE - COUNTRY A WILDERNESS--HAD WILSON - SUCCEEDED--LAUSANNE A MILESTONE, NOT A TERMINUS. - - - XXIX: THE SIGNING OF THE IRISH TREATY 339 - - GLADSTONE'S HOME-RULE FIGHT--SCENE IN - NO. 10 DOWNING STREET--GRIFFITH AND COLLINS--TO - SIGN OR NOT TO SIGN--CHILDERS, - SULLEN AND DISAPPOINTED--TREATY A PILLAR - OF HOPE FOR FUTURE. - - - XXX: PROHIBITION 350 - - THE LESSON FROM RUSSIA--BRITAIN NOT - CONVINCED--EXPERIMENTS DIFFICULT--PUBLIC - UNEDUCATED--OUTLOOK NOT ENCOURAGING. - - - XXXI: UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF "OFFICIAL" INFORMATION 361 - - JULIUS CÆSAR BEGAN IT--SELF DEFENCE AND - SECRET INFORMATION--THE VERSAILLES - DECISION--GENERAL RULES AND SPECIAL CASES. - - - - -WHERE ARE WE GOING? - - - - -I - -THE GREAT PERIL - - -If a man on a bright July morning in 1914 had sailed abroad and had the -misfortune to be wrecked on a desert island, returning to civilisation -a week ago, the change which Europe presented to him would be -sufficient to induce him to believe that his long solitude had unhinged -his mind. To him it would have appeared as the stuff of which dreams -are made. He would have remembered a German empire with an august -head, ruling with autocratic sway a population striding with giant -steps into prosperity and wealth, possessing a matchless army, whose -tread terrified Europe; with a fleet that provoked articles and novels -and agitations about the invasion of England; with vast possessions -across the seas. In its place he would see Germany, instead of being a -confident, powerful, arrogant empire, a timid, nervous, and apologetic -republic presided over by a respectable and intelligent workman, her -minister issuing notes to propitiate Belgium, and having them sent -back like the stupid exercises of a backward schoolboy to be rewritten -in accordance with the pleasure of the taskmaster; the great army -reduced to a force one-half the size of that of Serbia; the menacing -fleet at the bottom of the sea; the watch on the Rhine kept by French, -British, and Belgian soldiers. He would see the Krupp works in French -occupation; not a German colony left. - -Russia he would have recollected as a powerful autocracy rooted in a -superstitious belief by the peasantry in the divinity of its head. -He would find it now a revolutionary area ruled by the exiles of -yesterday, shunned by the rest of the world because of the violence -of its communistic doctrines; tsardom, with its gilded retinue of -splendour, flung into a hideous doom, and the sceptre of Peter the -Great enforcing the doctrines of Karl Marx. He would see the Austrian -empire as much a thing of the past as the empire of Nebuchadnezzar, a -poor province lifted out of beggary by the charity of her foes: new -states, which had been dead and buried for centuries, risen from the -dead, casting off their shrouds, marching in full panoply; Trieste -an Italian port; the Dolomites an Italian bastion. The Turk alone -quite unchanged, a few more amputating operations performed upon -him, but still preserving sufficient vitality to massacre Christians -irrespective of denomination or race, and to become a sore trial and -perplexity to the rest of the world. - -If our returned voyager travelled through Europe he would find -even more fundamental changes in the world of finance, trade and -commerce. He would find impoverishment, dislocation; the elaborate -and finely-spun web of commerce rent to pieces, and its torn threads -floating in the wind. With a few sovereigns in his pocket, he would -expect in return 25 francs, 20 marks, and about 26 lire. Instead of -that, with a paper sovereign he would find that he could buy 70 francs, -nearly 100 lire, 250,000 German marks, 300,000 Austrian kronen, and -millions of Russian roubles. The money-changers who once prospered on -decimal fractions now earning a precarious livelihood in the flights -of the multiplication table. That would give him a better indication -perhaps of the reality of the change than even the fall of empires. On -his journeys he would travel through prosperous provinces rutted and -overturned as by a gigantic earthquake; he would pass vast cemeteries -where 10,000,000 young men fallen in the Great War were having their -last sleep; he would see on all hands signs of mutilation of men who -had been engaged in the great struggle. Taxation everywhere quintupled -with nothing but debt to show for it; industry with its back bent under -a burden of taxation which when he left existed only in the nightmares -of the dyspeptic rich. He would then be able to realise something of -the tremendous upheaval that had taken place in the world. - -But what would surprise him more than all these amazing and bewildering -transformations would be the one thing in which there was no change. -He would naturally expect that after such terrifying experiences, the -world would have learnt its lesson, turned its back finally on war, -its crimes and its follies, and set its face resolutely toward peace. -It is the one thing he discovers has not changed--the world has not -learned one single syllable. Suspicions amongst nations exist just -as ever, only more intense; hatreds between races and peoples, only -fiercer; combinations forming everywhere for the next war; great -armies drilling; conventions and compacts for joint action when the -tocsin sounds; general staffs meeting to arrange whether they should -march, where they should march, how they should march, and where they -should strike; little nations only just hatched, just out of the -shell, staggering under the burden of great armaments, and marching -along towards unknown battlefields; new machinery of destruction and -slaughter being devised and manufactured with feverish anxiety; every -day science being brought under contribution to discover new methods to -destroy human life--in fact, a deep laid and powerfully concerted plot -against civilisation, openly organised in the light of the sun. And -that after his experience of four or five years ago! Man the builder, -and man the breaker, working side by side in the same workshop, and -apparently on the best of terms with each other, playing their part -in the eternal round of creation and dissolution, with characteristic -human energy. What a complex creature is man! It is little wonder that -God gave him up repeatedly in despair. He is unteachable. - -I wonder whether it is realised that if war were to break out again, -the calamity would be a hundredfold greater than that of the last -experience. Next time, cities will be laid waste. Possible, and I am -sorry to say, probable enemy nations are more closely intertwined, -and the engines of havoc are becoming more and more terrible. I have -called attention repeatedly to the developments which took place during -the late War, in the variety, the range, and the power of destructive -weapons. Compare the aëroplane at the beginning of the war, and its -small bomb which could easily be manhandled, with the same machine at -the end. By the end of the war machines had been built, and but for -the armistice would have been used, the devastating power of which -was terrific. Since then the power of the machine, the weight of the -explosive, and the incendiary material it drops, have grown, and are -still growing. Science is perfecting old methods of destruction, and -searching out new methods. One day, in its exploration, it may hit on -something that may make the fabric of civilisation rock. - -Can anything be done to avert this approaching catastrophe? That is -the problem of all problems for those who love their fellowmen. I warn -you that it is madness to trust to the hope that mankind, after such -an experience, will not be so rash as to court another disaster of the -same kind. The memory of the terrors, the losses, the sufferings of the -war, will not restrain men from precipitating the world into something -which is infinitely worse, and those who think so, and, therefore, urge -that it is not necessary to engage in a new crusade for peace, have -not studied the perverse, the stubborn, and the reckless nature of -man. There is the danger that the last war may even make some nations -believe in war. - -I have talked to many young soldiers who were fortunate enough to have -passed unscathed through some of the worst experiences of the war, to -many who suffered mutilation in some of these experiences; they have -given me one common impression that the memory of fear is evanescent, -and that they cannot now re-create in their own minds the sensations -of terror through which they passed. If that is true of those who -went through the furnace, what of the multitudes who simply looked -on?--the multitudes of those who were too young to take part, and can -only recall the excitement produced by the conflict and the glory of -victory? The recollection of the headaches of an orgy never lasts as -long as that of its pleasures. It is useless to recall memories of the -terror and torture of the war, and expect them to crusade for peace. -Memory is a treacherous crusader. It starts with a right purpose fresh -and hot on its path, but its zeal gets fainter as the days roll past, -and it ends by handing over its banner to the foe. - -You can only redeem mankind by appealing to its nobler instincts. -Fear is base, and you cannot lift mankind by using it as a lever. The -churches alone can effectively rouse the higher impulses of our nature. -That is where their task comes in. - -There is another reason why we cannot regard the danger as having -passed away. You have all the elements which made for the Great War of -1914 more potent than ever to-day. The atmosphere of Europe is charged -with them. - -What made the last war? Armed international dislikes, rivalries, and -suspicions. The dislikes were based on age-long racial feuds stimulated -by memories of recent wrongs. Celt and Teuton disliking each other; -Slav and Teuton suspicious of each other; the hatred of the Slav for -the Teuton intensified by the arrogance with which Germany humiliated -Russia at the moment of her weakness immediately after the Japanese -War, when she was peculiarly sensitive to insult. You will recollect -the peremptoriness and the insolence of her gesture over the Bosnian -annexation, and insolences are always more painful than wrongs and -rankle longer. They corrode the flesh, and burn into the soul of a -nation, keeping its anger aflame. I wish nations always remembered -that. There was the hatred of the Celt for the Teuton deepened by the -annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and by the incidents inseparable from -the invasion of a foreign soil. There was Germany suspecting that -every railway constructed by Russia was aimed at her heart. There -was France convinced that Germany was only waiting her opportunity -to pick a quarrel which would enable her to deprive France of her -much-coveted colonies. There was England watching with vigilant insight -and increasing anger the growth of Germany's great fleet, which she -was convinced was aimed at her shores. There were great armies in -every continental country ready to march at a moment's notice, fully -equipped, each commander firmly persuaded that his own legions were -irresistible. You had there all the conditions that made for war. Had -it come of set purpose? I have read most of the literature concerning -the events that led up to that war, and it is full of warning as to -how wars happen. They do not come because the majority of those who -are concerned are bent upon bloodshed, not even the majority who have -the decisive voice if they exercised it in time. Had a plebiscite been -taken in every country in Europe a week before war was declared as to -whether they wished to engage in a European conflict, the proposal -would have been turned down by a majority so overwhelming as to show -that the proposition was one that no nation had the slightest idea of -entertaining. That is not the reason why it came. But you have always -in control of the affairs of nations some men who hesitate; many who -are apathetic, many who are merely inefficient and stupid; and then -most men, even in a government, have their minds concentrated on their -own immediate tasks. - -I will give you an illustration of how war is begun, once you have the -predisposition to quarrel, without anybody wanting it and with the -vast majority of the people who are to be engaged in it opposed to it. -Austria issued an ultimatum to Serbia. There is nothing a big bully -likes better than to hector a little man who is near the point of his -toe. Serbia was so near the boot that Austria was constantly tempted -to give it a kick, and it did. It issued an ultimatum, which was a -very insolent one. The Serbian reply was a practical acceptance of the -Austrian demands. This is the note the kaiser wrote on it: "A brilliant -performance this. But with it disappears"--listen to this written by -the Kaiser of Germany just a few days before war was declared--"but -with it disappears every reason for war, and the Austrian minister -ought to have remained quietly in Belgrade. After that I would never -have given orders for mobilisation." In three days there was war. - -Let me give another illustration. Admiral Tirpitz said he saw Von -Jagow two days after the Austrian reply. Von Jagow, the German foreign -minister, was so little interested in the Austro-Serbian conflict that -he confessed to the German ambassador to Austria on July 27th, two days -after the reply had been received, that he had not yet found time to -read the Serbian reply to Austria. Here is the document on which ten -million young men who had no responsibility for it have been slain, -homes have been desolated, and a debt of taxation, confusion and -sorrow incurred which will not be wiped out as long as this generation -lasts. - -It is inconceivable, if one had not some knowledge of the carelessness -and the procrastination which are bred in official circles by long -practice. That was only three days before war was declared. This high -official in the Wilhelmstrasse, who subsequently agreed to the fateful -decision to declare war against Russia, had not even read the critical -document which ought to have averted the struggle. But there are -always the vigilant few, the very few resolute men whose whole mind -and energy and skill is engaged ceaselessly in driving forward the -chariots of war. Whilst others are asleep, they are craftily dodging -the traffic, and stealing along unawares, slowly getting their chariots -into position for the next push forward. Whilst others are asleep, they -lash the fiery steeds along their destructive course. In the press, -on the platform, in the council chambers, in the chancelleries, in -society of all kinds, high and low, they are always pressing along. -When the precipice is reached, they dash through the feeble resistance -of the panic-stricken mob of counsellors and officials, and nations are -plunged into the abyss before they know it. - -This is the way most wars come. - -Read the history of the war of 1870. It came about in the same -confused, clumsy, purposeless way. In all these cases there is always -in the background the sinister figure of that force for mischief which -used to be known by our Puritan fathers as the devil. Have these -hatreds and suspicions abated? Are there no rivalries to-day? Are -there no men whose one joy is in war? Was the devil numbered amongst -the slain in the last war? I have never seen his name in any casualty -list. Look around. His agents are more numerous, more active, more -pressing and efficient than ever. Europe to-day is a cauldron of -suspicions and hatreds. It is well to speak frankly. Celt and Teuton -are now interlocked in a conflict which is none the less desperate -because one of the parties is disarmed. There is a suppressed savagery -which is but ill concealed, and there are new hatreds which, if they -have not been brought into existence during the war, have at any -rate come to the surface. Mankind has learnt no lesson from the four -or five years of war, although it has been scourged with scorpions. -There was nothing that contributed more to the last catastrophe than -the annexation by Germany of Alsace-Lorraine. As long as that act -of folly remained uncorrected there was no real peace possible in -Europe. The nations concerned were just abiding their opportunity, -and the opportunity came. Now you have two Alsace-Lorraines at least. -There is the annexation of Vilna by force; there is the annexation -of Galicia by force, by violence, by the use of arms against the -will of the population. Elsewhere you have the German and the Pole -quarrelling over Silesia; the Russian and the Pole over doubtful -boundaries; the Czech and the Magyar; the Serbian and the Bulgarian; -the Russian and the Rumanian; the Rumanian and the Magyar. There is -the age-long feud between Greek and Turk. All have an air of biding -opportunity, all are armed ready for slaughter. Europe is a seething -cauldron of international hates, with powerful men in command of the -fuel stores feeding the flames and stoking the fires. It is no use -blaming the treaty of Versailles. This state of things has nothing -to do with treaties. Here it is the spirit that killeth and not the -letter. Sometimes wrongs are imaginary. Where the wrongs are imaginary -time will heal the sense of hurt, but sometimes they are real, and -time will fester the wound, but everywhere and always the hatreds are -real enough. Can nothing be done? If it can, let it be done in time. -Let it be done at once. Yet, once more I remind you that if the gun -is loaded--and it is loaded in every land--when the quarrel begins it -is apt to go off, not because the trigger is deliberately pulled, but -because some clumsy fellow in his excitement stumbles against it. - -In a continent which is nominally Christian, the churches surely are -not impotent. When the West was all Catholic, and it had the good -fortune to have a high-minded and capable occupant of the throne -of St. Peter, many a struggle was averted by his intervention. Can -the churches not once more display their power? They can only do -so by moving together, not merely every denomination in Britain, -but every Christian community throughout Europe--Catholic and -Protestant--Catholics even more than Protestants, for the countries -where the peril is most imminent are more under the domination of the -Catholic churches than of the Protestant faiths. If all the heroism -of millions, their sacrifice and their sufferings, are to be thrown -away, it will be the most colossal, criminal and infamous waste ever -perpetrated in human history. Millions of men endangered their lives -willingly. Millions lost their lives for the sake of establishing peace -on earth on the basis of international right. A temple to human right -was built with material quarried out of all that is choicest in the -soul of man. But its timbers are being drenched with the kerosene of -hatred, and one day a match will be lit by some careless or malignant -hand which will set fire to this magnificent edifice; its splendour -will be reduced to black embers, and the hope of mankind will be once -more laid in ashes. The task of the churches is to put forth the whole -of their united strength to avert that catastrophe. - -Peace is only possible when you introduce into the attitude of nations -towards each other principles which govern the demeanour of decent -people in a community towards their neighbours. If international -methods were introduced into the dealings of neighbours with each other -life would become intolerable--the unconcealed suspicions, distrusts -and ill-will which rule everywhere, the eternal expectancy of and -preparation for blows, the readiness of the strong to use violence, -either to enforce his will on his weaker neighbour or to deprive him of -his liberty or his possessions, or even his life, to satisfy anger, -revenge, or greed. Had this been the rule in private affairs, we should -all have to live in caves, or in castles, according to our means. As a -matter of fact, man is only half civilised. In international matters he -is still a savage, in his heart he recognises no law but that of force. -The savage has his restraints. His instinct warns him not to pounce -save when he thinks he can do so effectively and with impunity, and -for some purpose which he thinks worth his while. Whether he hates or -covets, he has no other restraint. I wish I could say that in essence -nations to-day obey any other impulse. Man must be civilised in his -international relations, otherwise wars will go on as long as mankind -remains on this earth. - -I have seen a city wrenched from its people. I have seen a whole -province appropriated against the protests of its people, and -all within the last four years, since the Great War to establish -international right. There was no conceivable justification for either -of these depredations except that both the city and the province were -desirable, were at hand, were very tempting, and that the owners were -too feeble to resist their pillagers. - -The lesson must be taught that larceny does not diminish in turpitude -as it increases in the scale of its operations. A nation that -feloniously steals, takes, and carries away a city or province is just -as criminal as the thief sentenced to imprisonment for robbery by -violence on the high-road. And these national felonies will assuredly -bring trouble one day. They invariably do so, and unfortunately -international trouble is never confined to the felon. Human -retribution, once it begins, is as indiscriminating and uncontrollable -as a prairie fire. The flames consume the wheat as well as the tares. -Hell fire administered by the hand of man scorches the innocent -equally with the guilty. The doom of Germany involved millions in its -tortures who were outside her gates, abominated her crimes, and did all -they could to prevent their perpetration. That is why it is written: -"'Vengeance is mine, I will repay,' saith the Lord." It is the supreme -duty of the churches to teach nations to understand that the moral law -is just as applicable to them in their corporate capacity as it is to -the individuals who compose them; to teach them that hatred is just as -unseemly between nations as it is between individuals, and far more -dangerous. Goodwill must be assiduously cultivated between nations. -It must be ingeminated in every way--in schools, in the press, in -sermons, in classes. The men who are always sowing distrust and dislike -of men of other races and lands should be picked out, condemned, -shown up, hunted by the scorn, the contempt and the wrath of their -fellowmen. They are more dangerous than the incendiary who burns down -an occasional hay-rick or habitation. - -Let the best side of every nation be better known. Each nation has made -its contribution to the sum of human greatness. Dwell on that, and not -on the failings and the deficiencies, the errors, and the crimes which -are unhappily common to all nations. Name me the land that has no stain -on its record. There is no end to the resourcefulness of hate. Its -variety is infinite. I recollect, not so long ago, a time when you were -not a patriot if you were pro-French; the fact that you were pro-French -stamped you as a Little Englander. France was supposed to be a busy -and malignant foe of Britain all the world over, scheming everywhere -against British interests. She stood for all that was unpleasant and -repugnant to the British mind--in her thought, her literature, her -politics, and her manners. France heartily reciprocated our dislike. -There were at least two occasions when war between the two countries -was apprehended, was openly talked of, and was even likely. The -atmosphere of the press in both capitals was charged with brimstone. - -Now it is to Germany you must not utter one word of toleration or even -fair play. I am not counselling the abandonment of the just measure of -our national rights as against either of these two countries, but they -are both great nations. They are both nations that have contributed -richly of the things that make for the elevation, for the happiness, -for the splendour of mankind. If Germany is the land of Bismarck with -its blood and iron, all Protestants will remember that she is also the -land of Luther and the Reformation. If she fought in the late war for -four years to establish a military domination in Europe, she fought -for thirty years with enduring valour and much suffering to establish -the freedom of conscience in Europe. She has given to the world great -literature, great painters, great philosophers, great explorers in -all the continents of thought. She is the land of unrivalled song. -Even in the middle of the bloody conflict with Germany, every Sunday -we praised God in our churches to the notes of German music. Let us -give credit for these things in our efforts to reconstitute the reign -of goodwill. And if we feel angry with France, let us remember her -dazzling array of great writers, her gigantic struggles for liberty, -the penetrating imagination devoted to scientific research, which has -brought incalculable blessings to humanity. Let us not judge France -by the fussy little men that give expression to her petulance in the -fits of temper that overtake every nation, but by the great men who -have given noble expression to her immortal soul. France is the land -of Victor Hugo, of Pascal, of Renan, and many another teacher who has -taken humanity by the hand along the upward road. - -Everything depends on a consistent, determined, continuous inculcation -of the principles and the ideal of goodfellowship, between nations. -Goodwill on earth means to think well of and dwell on the best side -of others, and goodwill on earth and peace have been linked together. -Without the one you will not have the other. Let us, therefore, -cultivate the spirit of brotherhood amongst men. The church must -appeal to the noblest sentiments of the human heart. Mankind can -only be redeemed by an appeal to those higher instincts. Not by an -appeal to ignoble fear. War means terror, war means death, war means -anguish. That will not prevent war, and never has. Man is the most -fearless of God's creatures, and when his passions are roused there -is no fear that will restrain him. The fire of his passion burns the -restraints of self-preservation like bands of tow, so that fear will -not restrain the nations and make peace among them. War destroys trade, -it brings unemployment. Look at all the losses, reckoning them up in -cash. That will not prevent war: it never has. Selfish interests have -a means of deluding themselves. Greed has a blind side. Do not trust -to selfishness and selfish interest to ensure peace. Selfishness will -ensure nothing which is worth keeping in the world. Selfishness pays -good dividends, but it wastes capital. The nation or the individual -that makes self-love the managing-director of the soul will end in -bankruptcy--bankruptcy of respect, bankruptcy of ideals--bankruptcy of -honour--bankruptcy of friendships. What is it that Germany is suffering -from now? Her great tragedy is not her indemnity, not even her gigantic -casualties, not even the destruction of her trade. The one great -tragedy of Germany is that she has lost the respect of mankind. It -affects her trade, it affects her business, it makes it difficult for -her to climb to the pitch whence she fell. The rope is gone. She has -done things of which she herself is now ashamed. Her people--I can -see it when I meet them--are ashamed. That is the tragedy. They are a -gallant people, they are a brave people, they fought bravely, but they -are broken-spirited. Why? They have lost their self-respect because -they have done something that they know in their hearts was wrong. -These are the things that have to be taught to nations. - -A public opinion must be worked up that will be strong enough to -sustain international right. No law is possible without an active -public opinion for its enforcement, least of all international law. -Without it the League of Nations is a farce. You might as well have a -wooden cannon; however splendidly mounted it may be, however imposing -its appearance, every one knows that the moment it is fired it will -burst. Unless the world is taught to respect its authority, it will -become a butt of derision. It is no use keeping up pretences. Pretences -never delude events. The League of Nations may gather together -representatives of all the great powers of the earth, and yet it may -be a futile, barren, costly nothing unless it has behind it the spirit -of the people who constitute those nations. The real danger of the -moment is lest the League of Nations should become a mere make-believe, -whilst the same old intrigues, the same old schemes, the same old -international greed and hatred, should be working their will freely -outside. The decision of the League of Nations has been, within the -last two or three years, openly flouted by a member of that league, -a member which owes its national independence to the treaty which -founded that league. Another nation, one of the principal authors of -the league, refuses to refer a question in which is it concerned, and -in which Europe is concerned, to the arbitrament of the league. Both -these nations prefer to resort to force. The rest of the world looks -on feebly with indifference, accepting the rebuff to their league in -each case. Why? Because there is no public opinion in the recalcitrant -countries to bring pressure to bear on the respective governments, -and there is no public opinion strong enough outside to exercise the -necessary insistence. - -The churches alone can remedy this. There ought to be an international -movement of all the churches, Catholic and Protestant, Protestant -and Catholic. I know it is difficult to compass. The divisions in -Christendom are too often fatal to common action for the attainment of -common aims. They ought to be overcome. They must be overcome. There -was a time in the Middles Ages when religion exercised a direct as -well as an indirect influence in the domain of government and social -relations. It helped to win for Englishmen their great charter. It -gradually emancipated the serfs. It preserved the peace of Europe many -a time when it was gravely imperilled by the quarrels of kings. In -the days of Puritanism, and the days of the Covenant, the partnership -between religion and politics won for us the two great boons of -parliamentary liberty and liberty of conscience. When Methodism spurred -the conscience of England, its influence was felt in the political -movement that emancipated the slaves throughout the British Empire. - -That was one of the greatest feats of disinterested righteousness ever -exhibited by a nation. The tasks awaiting religion to-day in the sphere -of government are even greater--emancipation of the worker from the -tyrannies of economic greed, the saving of the nation from the curse of -alcohol, and the spreading of the angels' message heard on the hills -of Bethlehem until the obdurate heart of man shall at last re-echo it: -"Peace on earth and goodwill amongst men." - - - - -II - -EUROPE STILL ARMING - - -Marshal Foch once told me that he considered the German army of 1914 -the finest army the world ever saw, in numbers, organisation, training, -and equipment. - -What set that army in motion? - -Much has been written and spoken as to the origin of the Great War, and -as to who and what was responsible for so overwhelming a cataclysm. No -one ever believed that it was the assassination of a royal archduke. -Some said it was the working out of the pan-German scheme to rule the -earth; some contended it was the German fear of the growing power of -Russia, the nervous apprehension of what looked like an encircling -movement by Russia, France and Britain. - -The great French marshal's dictum is the real explanation. Unless due -weight is given to this outstanding fact the diplomatic muddle of July, -1914, becomes unintelligible. - -Were it not that the German army was more perfect and more potent than -either the French or the Russian army--were it not that every German -officer was convinced that the German military machine was superior -to all its rivals--there would have been no war, whatever emperors, -diplomatists, or statesmen said, thought, or intended. - -All nations have their ambitions, but they are not tempted to impose -them upon their neighbours if the hazard is too obviously great. But -a sense of overpowering force behind national aims is a constant -incitement to recklessness, to greed, and to ambitious patriotism. - -The more one examines, in the growing calm, the events of July, 1914, -the more one is impressed with the shrinking of the nominal rulers -of the attacking empires as they approached the abyss, and with the -relentless driving onward of the military organisation behind these -terror-stricken dummies. - -Navies are essentially defensive weapons. No capital in the world -can be captured by navies alone, and no country can be annexed or -invaded by a fleet. But armies are grabbing machines. A transcendent -army has always led to aggression. No country can resist the lure of -an easy military triumph paraded before its eyes for two successive -generations. - -The inference is an obvious one. To ensure peace on earth nations must -disarm their striking forces. Without disarmament, pacts, treaties, and -covenants are of no avail. They are the paper currency of diplomacy. -That is the reason why all the friends of peace are filled with despair -when they see nations still arming and competing in armies whilst -trusting to mere words and signatures to restrain the irresistible -impetus of organised force. - -A statistical survey of European armies to-day is calculated to cause -alarm. Europe has not learnt the lesson of the war. It has rather -drawn a wrong inference from that calamity. There are more men under -arms in Europe to-day than there were in 1913-14, with none of the -justification or excuse which could be pleaded in those days. - -In pre-war times the statesmen of each country could make a -parliamentary case for their military budgets by calling attention to -the menace of prodigious armies across their frontiers. Germany and -Austria built up great armaments because their frontiers were open -to the attack of two great military powers who had engaged to pool -their resources in the event of war. France and Russia raised huge -armies because Germany possessed the most redoubtable army in the -world, and could rely in the case of war upon the assistance of the -not inconsiderable forces of the Austrian empire. And both Austria -and France had always the uncertain factor of Italy, with her army of -3,000,000, to reckon with. - -But since the war these mutual excuses no longer exist. The two great -military empires of Central Europe have disappeared. Germany, which -before the war had a peace establishment of 800,000 men and reserves -running into millions, has to-day a total army of 100,000 men--about -one-third the size of the Polish army. The formidable German equipment -which for four years pounded the cities and villages of northern France -to dust is either destroyed or scattered for display amongst the towns -and villages of the victors. The Austrian army, which had in 1913-14 -a peace establishment of 420,000 men and a reserve of two or three -millions of trained men, has to-day been reduced to a tiny force of -30,000 men. - -In spite of these facts France has still an army of 736,000 men now -under arms, with a trained reserve of two or three millions more. She -is strengthening and developing her air force as if she feared--or -contemplated--an immediate invasion. In 1914 France had an air force of -400 aëroplanes; to-day she has 1,152.[1] But numbers signify little. -The size, the power, and the purpose of the machines signify much. -Amongst the 1,152 air machines of to-day will be found bombers of a -destructiveness such as was not dreamt of in 1914. - -Should human folly drift once more into war these preparations are -full of evil omen as to the character of that conflict. A single bomb -dropped from one of the new bombers contains more explosive material -than one hundred of those carried by the old type. And the size of the -machine and of its bombs is growing year by year. Where is it to stop? -And what is it all for? Where is the enemy? Where is the menace which -demands such gigantic military developments? Not one of the neighbours -of France has to-day a force which reaches one-fourth the figures -of her formidable army. Germany no longer affords a decent pretext. -The population of Germany is equal to the aggregate population of -Poland, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Czecho-Slovakia, but her army barely -numbers one-seventh of the aggregate peace establishment of these four -countries. Rumania alone, with a population of 15,000,000, has an army -twice the size of that allowed by the Treaty of Versailles to Germany -with her population of 60,000,000. These countries have in addition -to their standing armies reserve forces of millions of trained men, -whilst the young men of Germany are no longer permitted to train in -the use of arms. Her military equipment is destroyed, and her arsenals -and workshops are closely inspected by Allied officers lest a fresh -equipment should be clandestinely produced. An army of 700,000 is, -therefore, not necessary in order to keep Germany within bounds. - -The only other powerful army in Europe is the Russian army. It is -difficult to gather any reliable facts about Russia. The mists that -arise from that unhealthy political and economic swamp obscure and -distort all vision. The statistics concerning her army vary according -to the point of view of the person who cites them. The latest figure -given by the Russians themselves is 800,000. On paper that indicates -as formidable a force as that possessed by the French. But the events -of the past few years show clearly that the Russian army is powerful -only for defence, and that it is valueless for purposes of invasion. It -has neither the transport that gives mobility nor the artillery that -makes an army redoubtable in attack. The Polish invasion of 1923 was a -comedy, and as soon as the Poles offered the slightest resistance the -Bolsheviks ran back to their fastnesses without striking a Parthian -blow at their pursuers. The state of Russian arsenals and factories -under Bolshevism is such that any attempt to re-equip these armies must -fail. The Russian army, therefore, affords no justification for keeping -up armaments in Europe on the present inflated scale. The fact is that -Europe is thoroughly frightened by its recent experience, and, like all -frightened things, does not readily listen to reason, and is apt to -resort to expedients which aggravate the evils which have terrified it. - -Militarism has reduced it to its present plight, and to save itself -from a similar disaster in future it has become more militarist than -ever. Every little state bristles with guns to scare off invaders. -Meanwhile no country in Europe pays its way, except Britain, with her -reduced army and navy. But by means of loans and inflated currencies -they all, even the smallest of them, contrive to maintain larger armies -than Frederick the Great or the Grand Monarque ever commanded in their -most triumphant years. And the cost of armaments to-day has grown -vastly out of proportion to the numbers of the units that compose them. -France--in many ways the richest country in Europe--displays a gaping -and a growing rent in her national finance which has to be patched up -by paper. The deficit grows in spite of the fact that a large part of -her army is quartered on Germany to the detriment of reparations, and -that the German contribution conceals much of the cost of that large -army. - -A good deal of the borrowing is attributable to the cost of repairing -her devastated area, but the burden of maintaining so huge an army is -responsible for a considerable share of the deficiency. The economic -recovery of Europe is seriously retarded by the cost of the new -militarism. The old continent is throwing to the dogs of war with both -hands the bread that should feed her children. One day those dogs will, -in their arrogant savagery, turn upon the children and rend them. - -_Algeciras, December 26th, 1922._ - -FOOTNOTE: - -[1] 1,152 refers to when this chapter was written, _i. e._, January -6th, 1923. The figure has increased since then. - - - - -III - -THE ERUPTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - - -The shores of the Mediterranean have from time immemorial been the -scene of eruptions and earthquakes. They generally break out without -warning. Sometimes they are devastating in their effects, destroying -life and property over wide areas and on a vast scale. Sometimes they -provide a brilliant spectacular display, terrifying in appearance, but -not causing much destruction. To which of these two categories does the -last eruption of Mussolini belong? To drop hot cinders in the Balkans -is a dangerous experiment. The soil is everywhere soaked with naphtha -and it floats about in uncharted pools and runlets which easily catch -fire. A cinder flung from Vienna started a conflagration which spread -over continents. That was only nine years ago. The ground is still -hot--the smoke blinds and stifles. You cannot see clearly or breathe -freely. Now and again there is a suspicious ruddiness in the banks of -smoke which proves that the fire is not yet out. And yet there are -statesmen flinging burning faggots about with reckless swagger. - -The temper of Europe may be gauged from the reception accorded to these -heedless pyrotechnics on the part of national leaders by their own -countrymen. Every time it occurs, whether in France, Italy or Turkey, -and whether it be Poincaré, Mussolini, or Mustapha Kemal who directs -the show, applause greets the exhibition. I remember the first days -of the Great War. There was not a belligerent capital where great and -enthusiastic crowds did not parade the streets to cheer for war. In -those days men did not know what war meant. Their conception of it -was formed from the pictures of heroic--and always victorious--feats, -hung in national galleries and reproduced in the form of the cheap -chromos, engravings, and prints, which adorn the walls in every cottage -throughout most lands. The triumphant warriors on horseback with the -gleaming eye and the flourishing sabre are their own countrymen; the -poor vanquished under the crashing hoofs are the foe. Hurrah for -more pictures! The Crown Prince denies that he ever used the phrase -"This jolly war." His denial ought to be accepted in the absence of -better proof than is yet forthcoming as to the statement ever having -been made. But the phrase represented the temper of millions in those -fateful days. It used to be said that in wars one lot cheered and -the other fought. But the cheering mobs who filled the streets in -August were filling the trenches in September, and multitudes were -filling graves ere the year was out. But when they cheered they had no -realisation of the actualities of war. They idealised it. They only saw -it in pictures. - -But the cheerers of to-day know what war means. France lost well over a -million lives in the last fight. Italy lost 600,000, and there are men -in every workshop in both countries who know something of the miseries -as well as the horrors of war and can tell those who do not. What, -then, accounts for the readiness, at the slightest provocation, to rush -into all the same wretchedness over again? The infinite capacity of -mankind for deluding itself. Last time, it is true, it was a ghastly -affair. This time it will be an easy victory. Then you had to fight -a perfectly armed Germany, or Austria; now it is a very small affair -indeed--in one case a disarmed Germany which cannot fight, or, in the -other case, a miserable little country like Greece with no Army or -Navy to talk of. So hurrah for the guns! A bloodless victory, except, -of course, to the vanquished. More pictures for the walls to show our -children what terrible people we are when provoked! - -This episode may end peaceably, but it was a risk to take, and quite -an unnecessary risk under the circumstances of the case. Italy was -indignant, and naturally indignant, at the murder of her emissaries -in cold blood on Greek territory and, although it took place in a -well-known murder area--on the Albanian border where comitadjis and -other forms of banditti reign--still, Greece was responsible for -giving adequate protection to all the Boundary Commissioners who were -operating within her frontiers. Italy is, therefore, entitled to demand -stern reparation for this outrage. This Greece promptly concedes. Not -merely has Greece shown her readiness to pay a full indemnity, but -she has offered to salute the Italian flag by way of making amends -for the offence involved to the Italian nation in this failure to -protect Italian officers transacting legitimate business on Greek -soil. Mussolini's answer to the Greek acknowledgment of liability -is to bombard a defenceless town, kill a few unarmed citizens, and -enter into occupation of a Greek island. Does any one imagine, if the -incident had occurred on French soil, and the French Government had -displayed the same willingness to express regret and offer reparation, -that, without further parley, he would have bombarded Ajaccio? Or, -had it been Britain, would he have shelled Cowes and occupied the -Isle of Wight? But Greece has no Navy. That, I suppose, alters the -merits of the case! Force is still the supreme arbiter of right and -wrong in international affairs in Europe. It is worth noting how a new -code of international law is coming into existence since the War. The -French armies invade a neighbour's territory, occupy it, establish -martial law, seize and run the railways, regulate its Press, deport -tens of thousands of its inhabitants, imprison or shoot down all who -resist, and then proclaim that this is not an act of war. It is only -a peaceful occupation to enforce rights under a peace treaty. Signor -Mussolini shells a town belonging to a country with whom he is at -peace, and forcibly occupies part of its territory, and then solemnly -declares that it is not an act of war, but just a reasonable measure -of diplomatic precaution. Once force decides the issue it also -settles the rules. There was a time when English and Spaniards fought -each other in the West Indies whilst their Governments at home were -ostensibly at peace. And French and English fought in India without any -diplomatic rupture between Versailles and St. James's. But in those -days these lands were very remote and the control of the centre over -events at these distances was intermittent and occasionally feeble. -And sometimes it suited Governments to ignore what was taking place on -the fringe of Empire. But even in those days an attack on the homeland -meant war, and it would mean war to-day were the attacked countries not -powerless. I have heard it said that there is one law for the rich and -another for the poor. There is no doubt one international law for the -strong and another for the weak. - -What about the League of Nations? This is pre-eminently a case for -action under the Covenant. Italy and Greece are both parties. How -can they, consistently with the terms of the Treaty they so recently -signed, refuse to leave this dispute to be dealt with by the League? -Italy had a special part in drafting the Treaty and in imposing it -upon Germany and Austria. She cannot now in decency repudiate its -clauses. It is suggested in some quarters that, the dignity of Italy -being involved in the dispute, she cannot possibly consent to leave -it in the hands of the League. That surely is a fatal limitation on -the activities of the League of Nations. Every dispute involving right -implicates the national honour and as every nation is the judge of -its own honour, ultimately all differences would be ruled out of the -Covenant which it did not suit one country or the other to refer. The -League is not allowed to touch Reparations. If this quarrel also is -excluded from the consideration of the League, it is no exaggeration -to say that this valuable part of the Treaty of Versailles becomes a -dead letter. It is one of the gross ironies of the European situation -that the Treaty of Versailles is being gradually torn to pieces by the -countries which are not only the authors but have most to gain by its -provisions. France has already repudiated the first and most important -part of the Treaty by declaring that it will refer no question arising -between herself and her neighbours under the Treaty itself to the -League of Nations. She has further invaded and occupied her neighbour's -territory in defiance of the provisions of the Treaty. If Italy also -declines to respect the first part of that Treaty, then nothing is -left of it except what it suits nations to enforce or obey. And if the -framers do not owe allegiance to the Treaty they drafted, why should -those who only accepted it under duress bow to its behests? The victors -are busily engaged in discrediting their own charter. It would have -been a more honourable course for the nations to pursue if they had -followed the example of America by refusing to ratify the whole Treaty. -To sign a contract and then to pick and choose for execution the parts -of it that suit you is unworthy of the honour of great nations which -profess to lead the world towards a higher civilisation. - -There are ugly rumours of possible complications arising out of this -unfortunate incident. It does not need a vivid imagination to foretell -one or two possible results of a disastrous character. In this country -they would be deplored, not only for their effect on European peace, -but for the damage they must inevitably inflict on the best interests -of Italy. She has had enough of victory. What she needs now--what we -all need--is peace. There is no country which has more genuine goodwill -for Italy's prosperity and greatness than Great Britain. It is an old -and tried friendship. The two nations have many common interests: they -have no rivalries. Hence, the deep anxiety of Britain that Italy should -not commit a mistake which will mortgage her future even if it does not -imperil her present. - -There are no doubt strategic advantages for Italy in holding Corfu. -It enables them to "bottle up" the Adriatic. But it is Greek and it -menaces Slavonia, and this introduction of foreign elements into the -body of a State for strategic reasons always provokes inflammatory -symptoms injurious to the general health of a community. They tend -to become malignant and sooner or later they bring disaster. Bosnia -ultimately proved to be the death of the Austrian Empire. When the -Bosnian cancer became active the evil of Italia Irredenta broke out -once more, and between them they laid the Empire of the Hapsburgs in -the dust. Italy has played a great part in the work of civilisation, -and so has Greece. They have still greater tasks awaiting them--one on -a great and the other necessarily on a smaller scale. It would be a -misfortune to humanity if they spent their fine enthusiasm on hating -and thwarting each other. - -_London, September 3rd, 1923._ - - - - -IV - -IS THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS A SUCCESS? - - -Is the League of Nations a success? It is impossible to answer the -question candidly without giving offence to rival partisans. If you -indicate successes already placed to the account of the League, -opponents deny or minimise these triumphs, and suggest that you are -blinded by attachment to a chimera. If you point to shortcomings, the -extreme zealots of the League get angry and hint that you are a secret -enemy. - -I mean nevertheless to attempt an answer, for much depends on a -fearless examination of progress made or missed. - -My first answer would be that it is scarcely fair to pose this question -just yet. The League was founded only three years ago--much too short -a period to afford a test of the working of a gigantic, complex, but -very delicate and sensitive human machine. There has been hardly time -enough even to catalogue and chart the myriads of nerves that thread -its system. You cannot move a finger at the councils of Geneva without -touching some hidden nerve and setting it in a condition of quivering -protest. The League has, however, been long enough in existence to -reveal its strength and its weaknesses, its power, its potentialities -and its perils. - -It has already achieved triumphs of which its founders may well be -proud. The restoration of Austria to life when it seemed to have been -hopelessly submerged in the deluge of economic, financial and political -disaster which had overwhelmed it, is a notable feat of artificial -respiration. The successful effort organised by the League to stamp out -typhus in Eastern Europe and prevent its spread to the West is also a -success worthy of record. But for this intelligently conducted campaign -that terrible disease would have ravaged Russia and Central Europe -and laid low millions out of populations so enfeebled by hunger and -privation as to become easy victims to its devastating assaults. - -The Labour branch of the League has also been specially active and -energetic, and its persistent endeavours to raise and co-ordinate the -standards of toil in all countries are producing marked and important -results. In addition great credit is due to the League for the splendid -work it has accomplished in alleviating the distress which prevailed -amongst the famine-stricken areas of Eastern Europe and amongst the -refugees who fled from the horrors of victorious Bolshevism in Russia, -and the still greater horrors of Turkish savagery in Asia Minor. - -But these humanitarian tasks, praiseworthy though they be, were not the -primary objects of the foundation of the League. Its main purpose was -the averting of future wars by the setting up of some tribunal to which -nations would be bound by their own covenant and the pressure of other -nations to resort in order to settle their differences. Its failure or -success as an experiment will be judged by this test alone. How does it -stand in this respect? - -It succeeded in effecting a settlement of a dangerous dispute between -Sweden and Finland over the possession of the Aaland Islands. That -success was on the line of its main purpose. Here the methods of the -League gave confidence in its complete impartiality. - -So much can, unfortunately, not be said of another question where it -was called in and gave its decision. Its Silesian award has been acted -upon but hardly accepted by both parties as a fair settlement. That is -due to the manner adopted in reaching judgment. Instead of following -the Aaland precedent in the choice of a tribunal, it pursued a course -which engendered suspicion of its motives. It created a regrettable -impression of anxiety to retain a certain measure of control over -the decision. There was a suspicion of intrigue in the choice of the -tribunal and the conduct of the proceedings. In the Aaland case no -great power was particularly interested in influencing the conclusions -arrived at either way. But here two powers of great authority in the -League--France and Poland--were passionately engaged in securing a -result adverse to Germany. The other party to the dispute had no -friends, and was moreover not a member of the League. - -Britain stood for fair play, but she was not a protagonist of the -claims of Germany. Poland had a powerful advocate on the League--a -country with a vital interest in securing a pro-Polish decision. In -these circumstances the League ought to have exercised the most -scrupulous care to avoid any shadow of doubt as to its freedom from -all bias. Had it chosen distinguished jurists outside its own body to -undertake at least a preliminary investigation as it did in the Aaland -case, all would have been well. It preferred, however, to retain the -matter in its own hands. Hence the doubts and misgivings with which -the judgment of the League has been received not only by the whole of -Germany, but by many outside Germany. - -This decision, and the way Poland has flouted the League over Vilna -served to confirm the idea which prevails in Russia and Germany that -France and Poland dominate the League. The Silesian award may be just, -but the fact remains that it will take a long series of decisions -beyond cavil to restore or rather to establish German and Russian -confidence in the League. - -It is unfortunate that countries which cover more than half Europe -should feel thus about a body whose success depends entirely on the -confidence reposed in its impartiality by all the nations which may be -called upon to carry out its decrees, even though these may be adverse -to their views or supposed interests. The Vilna fiasco, the Armenian -failure, the suspicions that surround the Silesian award, the timidity -which prevents the tackling of reparations, which is the one question -disturbing the peace of Europe to-day, the futile conversations and -committees on disarmament which everyone knows, will not succeed in -scrapping one flight of aëroplanes or one company of infantry. All -these disappointments arise from one predominating cause. What is it? - -Undoubtedly the great weakness of the League comes from the fact that -it only represents one half the great powers of the world. Until the -others join you might as well call the Holy Alliance a League of -Nations. - -The ostensible purpose of that combination was also to prevent a -recurrence of the wars that had for years scorched Europe, and to -establish European peace on the firm basis of a joint guarantee of -delimited frontiers. But certain powers with selfish ambitions dictated -its policy. They terrorised Europe into submission and called that -peace. - -No historical parallel is quite complete, but there is enough material -in the occurrences of to-day to justify the reference. The League to be -a reality must represent the whole civilised world. That is necessary -to give it balance as well as authority. That was the original -conception. To ask why that failed is to provoke a bitter and a barren -controversy. - -I do not propose to express any opinion as to the merits of the -manoeuvres which led to the defeat of the treaty in America. Whether -the Senate should have honoured the signature of an American President -given in the name of his country at an international conference, or -whether the commitment was too fundamentally at variance with American -ideas to justify sanction--whether the amendments demanded as the -condition of approval would have crippled the League and ought to have -been rejected, or whether they were harmless and ought to have been -accepted--these are issues which it would serve no helpful purpose for -me to discuss. - -But as to the effect of the American refusal to adhere to the League, -there can be no doubt. It robbed that body of all chance of dominating -success in the immediate future. It is true that three great powers -remained in the League, but Russia was excluded, Germany was not -included, and when America decided not to go in, of the great powers, -Britain, France and Italy alone remained. - -The effect has been paralysing. Where these three powers disagree on -important issues upon which action is required, nothing is done. The -smaller powers cannot, on questions where one or more of the great -powers have deep and acute feeling, impose their will; and no two great -powers will take the responsibility of overruling the third. - -Hence questions like reparations which constitute a standing menace to -European peace are not dealt with by the League. Had America been in, -even with an amended and expurgated constitution, the situation would -have been transformed. America and Britain, acting in concert with an -openly sympathetic Italy and a secretly assenting Belgium, would have -brought such pressure to bear on France as to make it inevitable that -the League should act. - -The success of the League depends upon the readiness of nations great -and small to discuss all their differences at the council table. But no -great power has so far permitted any international question in which -it has a direct and vital interest to be submitted to the League for -decision. - -It has been allowed to adjudicate upon the destiny of the Aaland -Islands, over the fate of which Sweden and Finland had a controversy. -It has taken cognisance of disputes between Poland and Lithuania -about Vilna, although even here its decision has been ignored by the -parties. But the acute and threatening quarrel which has broken out -between France and Germany over the question of reparations the former -resolutely declines to submit to consideration by the League. - -The Treaty of Versailles is so wide in its application and so -comprehensive and far-reaching in its character that it touches -international interests almost at every point. So that the French -refusal to agree to a reference of any problems in which they are -directly concerned which may arise out of this treaty has had the -effect of hobbling the League. As long as that attitude is maintained, -the League is impotent to discharge its main function of restoring and -keeping peace. - -The dispute over reparations clouds the sky to-day, and until it is -finally settled it will cause grave atmospheric disturbances for -a whole generation. It is not an impossibility that it may end in -the most destructive conflict that ever broke over the earth. It is -churning up deadly passions. If ever there was an occasion which called -for the intervention of an organisation set up for the express purpose -of finding peaceable solutions for trouble-charged international feuds, -surely this is pre-eminently such a case. Not only do the French -government decline to entertain the idea of putting the covenant which -constitutes the first and foremost part of the Treaty of Versailles -into operation: they have gone so far as to intimate that they will -treat any proposal of the kind as an unfriendly act. The constitution -of the League stipulates that it will be the friendly duty of any power -to move that any international dispute which threatens peace shall -be referred to the League. Nevertheless, one leading signatory rules -out of the covenant all the questions which vitally affect its own -interests. This is the power which has invaded the territory of another -because the latter has failed to carry out one of the provisions of the -same treaty! - -This emphatic repudiation of a solemn contract by one of its promoters -has been acquiesced in by all the other signatories. Repudiation and -acquiescence complete the electrocuting circuit. This limitation of -the activities of the League is the gravest check which it has yet -sustained in its career. I do not believe it would have occurred had -America, with or without Article 10, been an active member of this -body. Its great authority, added to that of Britain and Italy, would -have made the pressure irresistible, and its presence on the council -would have helped materially to give such confidence in the stability -and impartiality of the League that Germany would have accepted the -conclusions arrived at without demur and acted upon them without -chicane. A rational settlement of the reparations problem by the League -would have established its authority throughout the world. Germany, -Russia and Turkey, who now treat its deliberations with distrust and -dislike tinctured with contempt, would be forced to respect its power, -and would soon be pleading for incorporation in its councils. The -covenant would thus become a charter--respected, feared, honoured and -obeyed by all. There would still be injustice, but redress would be -sought and fought for in the halls of the League. There would still -be oppression, but freedom would be wrung from the clauses of the -covenant. Argument, debate and intercession would be the recognised -substitutes for shot, shell and sword. Wars would cease unto the ends -of the earth, and the reign of law would be supreme. - -Wherein lies the real power of the League, or to be more accurate, its -possibility of power? It brings together leading citizens of most of -the civilised states of the world to discuss all questions affecting or -likely to affect peace and concord amongst nations. The men assembled -at Geneva do not come there of their own initiative, nor do they merely -represent propagandist societies engaged in preaching the gospel of -peace. They are the chosen emissaries of their respective governments. -They are the authorised spokesmen of these governments. When in doubt -they refer to their governments and receive their instructions, and the -proceedings are reported direct to the governments. They meet often and -regularly, and they debate their problems with complete candour as well -as courtesy. - -It is in itself a good thing to accustom nations to discuss their -difficulties face to face in a public assembly where reasons have -to be sought and given for their attitude which will persuade and -satisfy neutral minds of its justice and fairness. It is a practice -to be cultivated. It is the practice that ended in eliminating the -arbitrament of the sword in the internal affairs of nations. It is -only thus that international disputes will gradually drift into the -debating chamber instead of on to the battlefield for settlement. Wars -are precipitated by motives which the statesmen responsible for them -dare not publicly avow. A public discussion would drag these emotives -in their nudity into the open where they would die of exposure to the -withering contempt of humanity. The League by developing the habit -amongst nations of debating their differences in the presence of the -world, and of courting the judgment of the world upon the merits of -their case, is gradually edging out war as a settler of quarrels. That -is the greatest service it can render mankind. Will it be allowed to -render that service? If not, then it will perish like many another -laudable experiment attempted by mankind in the effort to save itself. - -But if it dies, the hope of establishing peace on earth will be buried -in the same tomb. - -_London, April 2nd, 1923._ - - - - -V - -THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND ITS CRITICS - - -I have had recently special opportunities for appreciating the extent -to which the Treaty of Versailles has not been read by those who -have formed very definite opinions concerning its qualities. There -is no justification for a failure to peruse this great international -instrument. It is the most important document of modern times. It has -reshaped for better or for worse much of the geography of Europe. It -has resurrected dead and buried nationalities. It constitutes the deed -of manumission of tens of millions of Europeans who, up to the year of -victory, 1918, were the bondsmen of other races. It affects profoundly -the economics, the finance, the industrial and trade conditions of the -world; it contains clauses upon the efficacy of which may depend the -very existence of our civilisation. Nevertheless there are few who can -tell you what is in the Treaty of Versailles. You might have thought -that although men differed widely as to its merits, there would -have been no difficulty in securing some measure of agreement as to -its actual contents. Every endeavour was made to give full publicity -to the draft when it was first presented to the Germans, and to the -final document when signed. Even before the form of the draft was ever -settled, the actual decisions were reported from day to day. Never -was a treaty so reported and so discussed in every article and every -particle of its constitution, and to-day you can procure an official -copy of it from any bookseller for the moderate price of 2_s._ 6_d._ In -spite of that no two men who happen to profess diverse opinions as to -its justice or injustice can agree as to its contents. - -A visitor to England in the year 1713 probably experienced the same -perplexity in seeking information from a Whig and a Tory respectively -as to the Treaty of Utrecht. So this treaty has become one of those -fiercely debated subjects, as to which the contestants deliberately -refuse to regard any testimony, or recognise the existence of any fact, -which is in the least inconsistent with their particular point of view. -It has come to pass that the real Treaty of Versailles has already -disappeared, and several imaginary versions have emerged. It is around -these that the conflict rages. - -In France there exist at least two or three schools of thought -concerning the Versailles Treaty. There is one powerful section -which has always regarded it as a treasonable pact, in which M. -Clemenceau gave away solid French rights and interests in a moment of -weakness under pressure from President Wilson and myself. That is the -Poincaré-Barthou-Pertinax school. That is why they are now, whilst in -form engaged in enforcing the treaty, in fact carrying out a gigantic -operation for amending it without consulting the other signatories. -This has come out very clearly in the remarkable report from a French -official in the Rhineland which was disclosed in the London _Observer_. -It is obvious from this paper that whilst the French government have -worked their public into a frenzied state of indignation over the -failure of Germany to carry out the Treaty of Versailles, they were -the whole time deliberately organising a plot to overthrow that treaty -themselves. Their representative on the Rhine was spending French money -with the consent of the French government to promote a conspiracy for -setting up an independent republic on the Rhine under the protection -of France. It was a deliberate attempt by those who disapproved of -the moderation of the Treaty of Versailles to rewrite its clauses in -the terms of the militarist demands put forward by Marshal Foch at -the Peace conference. Marshal Foch, the soul of honour, wanted to see -this done openly and straightforwardly. What he would have done like -the gentleman he is, these conspirators would have accomplished by -deceit--by deceiving their Allies and by being faithless to the treaty -to which their country had appended its signature. That is one French -school of thought on the Treaty of Versailles. It is the one which has -brought Europe to its present state of confusion and despair. - -There is the second school which reads into the treaty powers -and provisions which it does not contain, and never contemplated -containing. These critics maintain stoutly that M. Briand, and all -other French prime ministers, with the exception of M. Poincaré, -betrayed their trust by failing to enforce these imaginary -stipulations. They still honestly believe that M. Poincaré is the first -French minister to have made a genuine attempt to enforce French rights -under the treaty. - -In the background there is a third school which knows exactly what -the treaty means, but dares not say so in the present state of French -opinion. Perhaps they think it is better to bide their time. That time -will come, and when it does arrive, let us hope it will not be too late -to save Europe from the welter. - -In America there are also two or three divergent trends of opinion -about this treaty. One regards it as an insidious attempt to trap -America into the European cockpit, so as to pluck its feathers to line -French and English bolsters. If anything could justify so insular -an estimate it would be the entirely selfish interpretation which -is put upon the treaty by one or two of the Allied governments. The -other American party, I understand, defends it with vigour as a great -human instrument second only in importance to the Declaration of -Independence. There may be a third which thinks that on the whole it -is not a bad settlement, and that the pity is a little more tact was -not displayed in passing it through the various stages of approval and -ratification. This party is not as vocal as the others. - -In England we find at least three schools. There are the critics who -denounce it as a brutal outrage upon international justice. It is to -them a device for extorting incalculable sums out of an impoverished -Germany as reparation for damages artificially worked up. Then there -is the other extreme--the "die-hard" section--more influential since -it became less numerous, who think the treaty let Germany off much -too lightly. In fact they are in complete agreement with the French -Chauvinists as to the reprehensible moderation of its terms. In -Britain also there is a third party which regards its provisions as -constituting the best settlement, when you take into account the -conflicting aims, interests, and traditions of the parties who had to -negotiate and come to an agreement. - -But take all these variegated schools together, or separately, and -you will find not one in a thousand of their pupils could give you -an intelligent and comprehensive summary of the main principles of -the treaty. I doubt whether I should be far wrong in saying there -would not be one in ten thousand. Controversialists generally are -satisfied to concentrate on the articles in the treaty which are -obnoxious or pleasing to them as the case may be, and ignore the rest -completely, however essential they may be to a true judgment of the -whole. Most of the disputants are content to take their views from -press comments and denunciatory speeches. Unhappily the explanatory -speeches have been few. Some there are who have in their possession -the full text--nominally for reference; but you will find parts of -the reparations clauses in their copies black with the thumb-marks -which note the perspiring dialectician searching for projectiles to -hurl at the object of his fury. The clauses which ease and modify the -full demand are treated with stern neglect, and the remainder of the -pages are pure as the untrodden snow. You can trace no footprints of -politicians, publicists, or journalists, in whole provinces of this -unexplored treaty. The covenant of the League of Nations is lifted -bodily out of the text, and is delivered to the public as a separate -testament for the faithful so that the saints may not defile their -hands with the polluted print which exacts justice. They have now come -to believe that it never was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles, -and that it has nothing to do with that vile and sanguinary instrument. - -And yet the first words of this treaty are the following: - - - "The High Contracting Parties, - - "In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve - international peace and security, - - "By the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, - - "By the prescription of open, just and honourable relations - between nations, - - "By the firm establishment of the understandings of international - law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and - - "By the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all - treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one - another, - - "Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations." - - -Then follow the articles of the debated covenant. - -A speaker who took part recently in a university debate on the subject -told me that the undergraduates exhibited the greatest surprise -when he informed them that the League of Nations was founded by the -Versailles Treaty. A few days ago I had a similar experience at the -Oxford Union. I was speaking against a motion framed to condemn the -principles of the treaty as unwise and unjust. In its defence I -recalled some of its outstanding features. But as most of my narrative -had no bearing on reparations it was greeted with impatience and -cries of "Question" from a group of anti-Versaillists. They honestly -thought I was travelling outside the motion in giving a short summary -of the other sections of the treaty. To them it is all condensed in -Mr. Keynes's book, and other hostile commentaries. Anything which -is inconsistent with these, or supplements the scanty or misleading -statements they make, is deemed to be tainted and biassed. To refer to -the text itself they regard as unfair, and as playing into the hands -of the defenders of a wicked and oppressive pact. The actual treaty -has been already put by them out of bounds, and you wander into its -forbidden clauses on pain of being put into the guardroom by one or -other of the intolerant factions who patrol the highways and byways of -international politics. - -In all the debates on the subject in the House of Commons I have only -once heard the treaty itself quoted by a critic, and strangely enough -that was by way of approval. - -I have indicated one important section of the treaty to which is -accorded something of the reverence due to Holy Writ by an influential -section of the public. This group would be shocked were they reminded -that their devotion is given to a chapter in the hateful treaty. -There is yet another large and important section which is completely -ignored by the critics--that which reconstructs Central Europe on the -basis of nationality and the free choice of the people instead of on -the basis of strategy and military convenience. This is the section -that liberated Poland from the claws of the three carnivorous empires -that were preying on its vitals, and restored it to life, liberty and -independence. It is the section that frees the Danes of Schleswig -and the Frenchmen of Alsace-Lorraine. For these oppressed provinces -the Treaty of Versailles is the title-deed of freedom. Why are these -clauses all suppressed in controversial literature? Here is another -of the ignored provisions--that which sets up permanent machinery for -dealing with labour problems throughout the world, and for raising the -standard of life amongst the industrial workers by means of a great -international effort. No more beneficent or more fruitful provision -was ever made in any treaty. It is so momentous and so completely -overlooked in general discussion, that I think it worth while to quote -at length the general principles laid down by a provision which will -one day be claimed as the first great international charter of the -worker. - -"The High Contracting Parties recognise that differences of climate, -habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, -make strict uniformity in the conditions of labour difficult of -immediate attainment. But, holding as they do, that labour should not -be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there -are methods and principles for regulating labour conditions which -all industrial communities should endeavour to apply so far as their -special circumstances will permit. - - - "Among these methods and principles, the following seem to the - High Contracting Parties to be of special and urgent importance:-- - - "_First._--The guiding principle above enunciated that labour - should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of - commerce. - - "_Second._--The right of association for all lawful purposes by - the employed as well as by the employers. - - "_Third._--The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to - maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in - their time and country. - - "_Fourth._--The adoption of an eight-hour day or forty-eight hour - week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been - attained. - - "_Fifth._--The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four - hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable. - - "_Sixth._--The abolition of child labour and the imposition of - such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit - the continuation of their education and assure their proper - physical development. - - "_Seventh._--The principle that men and women should receive equal - remuneration for work of equal value. - - "_Eighth._--The standard set by law in each country with respect - to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the - equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident - therein. - - "_Ninth_.--Each State should make provision for a system of - inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the - enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the - employed." - - -It will take long before the principles propounded in the covenant of -the league under the labour articles are fully and faithfully carried -out, but in both a good deal of quiet and steady progress have already -been attained. M. Albert Thomas is an admirable chief for the labour -bureau. He has zeal, sympathy, tact, energy and great organising -talent. He is pressing along with patience, as well as persistence. But -that is another question. It raises grave issues as to the execution of -the treaty. What I have to deal with to-day is the misunderstandings -which exist as to the character of the treaty itself. The British -public are certainly being deliberately misled on this point. Why are -those sections which emancipate oppressed races, which seek to lift -the worker to a condition above destitution and degradation, and -which build up a breakwater against the raging passions which make -for war, never placed to the credit of the Treaty of Versailles? The -type of controversialist who is always advertising his idealism has -made a point of withholding these salient facts from the public which -he professes to enlighten and instruct. There is no more unscrupulous -debater in the ring than the one who affects to be particularly -high-minded. I do not mean the man who is possessed of a really high -mind, but the man who is always posing as having been exalted by grace -above his fellows. He is the Pharisee of controversy. Beware of him, -for he garbles and misquotes and suppresses to suit his arguments or -prejudices in a way that would make a child of this world blush. - -That is why I venture to put in a humble, although I fear belated, plea -for the reading of the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text, -of the Treaty of Versailles. Herein lies the only fair way of arriving -at a just conclusion on the merits of a treaty which holds in its hands -the destiny of Europe for many a generation. - - - - -VI - -1922 - - -The year nineteen hundred and twenty-two witnessed a genuine struggle -on the part of the nations to re-establish peace conditions in the -world. - -During 1919-20 and 1921 "the tarantella was still in their blood." The -mad war dance was still quivering in their limbs and they could not -rest. The crackle of musketry was incessant and made needful repose -impossible. There was not a country in Europe or Asia whose troops were -not firing shots in anger at some external or internal foe. - -America rang down the fire curtain until this hysterical frenzy had -burnt itself out. Was she right? It is too early yet to give the -answer. The case is but yet "part heard"--many witnessing years whose -evidence is relevant have not yet entered the box: it will, therefore, -be some time before the verdict of history as to her attitude can be -delivered. - -But 1922 testifies to many striking symptoms of recovering sanity on -the part of the tortured continents. Before 1922 you had everywhere -the querulity of the overstrained nerve. The slightest offence or -misunderstanding, however unintentional, provoked a quarrel, and almost -every quarrel was followed by a blow. It was a mad world to live in. -The shrieks of clawing nations rent the European night and made it -hideous. A distinguished general declared that at one period--I think -it was the year of grace 1920--there were thirty wars, great and small, -proceeding simultaneously. Who was to blame? Everybody and nobody. -Mankind had just passed through the most nerve-shattering experience in -all its racking history, and it was not responsible for its actions. -Millions of young men had for years marched through such a pitiless -rain of terror as had not been conceived except in Milton's description -of the battle scenes when the fallen angels were driven headlong to the -deep. And when the Angel of Peace led the nations out from the gates -of hell, no wonder it took them years to recover sight and sanity. -Nineteen twenty-two was a year of restored composure. - -The outward visible sign was seen in the changed character of the -international conferences held during the year. The ultimatum kind of -conference gave way to the genuine peace conference. The old method -insisted upon by French statesmen was to hammer out demands on the -conference anvil and send them in the form of an ultimatum to nations -who, in spite of peace treaties, were still treated as enemies; the new -method was to discuss on equal terms the conditions of appeasement. - -Germany, having no fleet in the Pacific, was not invited to the -Washington conference, and Russia was excluded for other reasons. But -at Cannes Germany was represented, and at Genoa both Germany and Russia -had their delegates. - -The Washington conference was, in some respects, the most remarkable -international conference ever held. It was the first time great -nations commanding powerful armaments had ever sat down deliberately -to discuss a voluntary limitation of their offensive and defensive -forces. Restrictions and reductions have often been imposed in peace -treaties by triumphant nations upon their beaten foes. The Versailles -treaty is an example of that operation. But at Washington the victors -negotiated a mutual cutting-down of navies built for national safety -and strengthened by national pride. The friends of peace therefore -have solid ground for their rejoicing in a contemplation of substantial -reductions already effected in the naval programmes of the most -powerful maritime countries in the world--Britain, the United States of -America, and Japan--as a direct result of the Washington negotiations. - -American statesmanship has given a lead of which it is entitled -to boast, and 1922 is entitled to claim that this triumph of good -understanding has brought a measure of glory which will give it a -peculiar splendour amongst the years of earth's history. - -The gatherings at Cannes and Genoa can also claim outstanding merit -in the large and growing family of international conferences. At -Washington the Allies alone foregathered. At Cannes and Genoa nations -came together which had only recently emerged out of deadly conflict -with each other. At each conference I met on both sides men who had -but just recovered from severe wounds sustained in this struggle. -At Cannes French, Belgian, Italian, Japanese, as well as British -ministers and experts, sat down in council with German ministers and -experts to discuss the vexed question of reparations without taunt or -recrimination. There was a calm recognition not only of the needs of -the injured countries, but also of the difficulties of the offending -state. Outside and beyond the German problem there was a resolve to -eliminate all the various elements of disturbance, political and -economic, that kept Europe in a ferment and made its restoration -impossible. - -Here it was decided to summon all the late belligerent nations to a -great conference at Genoa to discuss reconstruction. To these were -added the neutral nations of Europe. It was a great decision. There -were three obstacles in the way of realising the programme. The first -was the stipulation of France that the specific problems raised by the -treaty of Versailles should be excluded altogether from the purview -of the conference. This was a grave limitation of its functions and -chances. Still, if the Cannes sittings had continued, an arrangement -might have been arrived at with the Germans which would have helped the -deliberations of Genoa. The second obstacle was the refusal of America -to participate in the discussions. Why did the American government -refuse? There were probably good reasons for that refusal, but the -recording angel alone knows them all fully and accurately. The third -obstacle was the fall of the Briand ministry, and the substitution -of a less sympathetic administration. In spite of all these serious -drawbacks Genoa accomplished great things. It brought together into the -same rooms enemies who had not met for years except on the battlefield. -They conferred and conversed around the same table for weeks--at -conferences, committees, and sub-committees. They broke bread and drank -wine together at the same festive boards. Before the conference came -to an end there was an atmosphere of friendliness which was in itself -a guarantee of peaceable relations, for the delegates who represented -the nations at Genoa were all men of real influence in their respective -countries. - -But however important the intangible result, there was much more -achieved. The thirty nations represented in the assembly entered -into a solemn pact not to commit any act of aggression against their -neighbours. When they entered the conference there were few of them -who were not oppressed with suspicions that these neighbours meditated -violence against their frontiers. When they arrived at Genoa they -were all anxious for peace, but apprehensive of impending war. Genoa -dispelled those anxieties. - -One of the most promising results of the pact and the improved -atmospheric conditions out of which it arose is the substantial -reduction in the Bolshevik army. It has already been reduced to -the dimensions of the French army, and we are now promised a -further reduction. That removes a real menace to European peace. -If the reduction of armies in the East of Europe is followed by a -corresponding reduction in the West the reign of peace is not far -distant. - -This is not the time to dwell upon the important agreements effected -at Genoa on questions of exchange, credit, and transport. All the -recommendations made depend for their successful carrying out on the -establishment of a real peace and a friendly understanding between -nations. Peace and goodwill on earth is still the only healing evangel -for idealists to preach and statesmen to practise. Without it plans and -protocols must inevitably fail. - -Where does peace stand? The weary angel is still on the wing, for the -waters have not yet subsided. She may perhaps find a foothold in the -Great West, and Britain is fairly safe--not yet Ireland. - -But the continent of Europe is still swampy and insecure. The debate -in the French Chamber on reparations is not encouraging. The only -difference of opinion in the discussion was that displayed between -those who advocated an advance into the Ruhr, and the seizure of -pledges further into German territory, and those who preferred -"developing" the left bank of the Rhine. Occupying, controlling, -developing, annexing--they all mean the same thing; that the province -to the left bank of the Rhine is to be torn from Germany and grafted -into France. - -There is no peace in this talk. It is a sinister note on which to -end the pacific music of 1922. You must interpret it in connection -with another event of 1922--the Russo-German agreement. Since then -Chicherin--a spirit of mischief incarnate--has almost made Berlin -his abode. The men who are devoting their ingenuity to devising new -torments for Germany are preparing new terrors for their own and their -neighbours' children. - -The year ends with rumours of great American projects for advancing -large sums of money to all and sundry in the hope of settling the -vexed question of German reparation. The loan, it is surmised, will be -accompanied by guarantees on the part of France not to invade further -German territory. Some go so far as to conjecture that it is to be an -essential condition of participation in this Christmas bounty of Madame -Rumour that France is to reduce her armies and to undertake not to -exceed Washington limits for her navies. - -Nobody seems to know, and I am only repeating the gossip of the press. -But if the £350,000,000 loan is likely to materialise, its projectors -are wise in imposing conditions that would afford them some chance -of receiving payment of a moderate interest in the lifetime of this -generation. - -No prudent banker would lend money on the security of a flaming volcano. - -_London, December 20th, 1922._ - - - - -VII - -WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? - -_1. The Rhine_ - - -M. Clemenceau, in the remarkable series of speeches delivered in -the United States of America, implies a breach of faith on the part -of Britain in reference to the pact to guarantee France against the -possibility of German aggression. England has no better friend in -the whole of France than M. Clemenceau. Throughout a strenuous but -consistent career he has never varied in his friendship for England. -Many a time has he been bitterly assailed for that friendship. French -journalists are not sparing of innuendo against those they hate. -They hate fiercely and they hit recklessly, and M. Clemenceau, a man -of scrupulous integrity, at one period in his stormy political life -was charged by certain organs of the Paris press with being in the -pay of England. If, therefore, he now does an injustice to Britain I -am convinced it is not from blind hatred of our country, but from -temporary forgetfulness of the facts. - -He states the facts with reference to the original pact quite fairly. -It was proffered as an answer to those who claimed that the left bank -of the Rhine should be annexed to France. - -There was a strong party in France which urged M. Clemenceau to demand -that the Rhine should be treated as the natural frontier of their -country, and that advantage should be taken of the overwhelming defeat -of Germany to extend the boundaries of France to that fateful river. -For unknown centuries it has been fought over and across--a veritable -river of blood. If French Chauvinism had achieved its purpose at the -Paris conference the Rhine would within a generation once more overflow -its banks and devastate Europe. The most moderate and insidious form -this demand took was a proposal that the German provinces on the left -bank of the Rhine should remain in French occupation until the treaty -had been fulfilled. That meant for ever. Reparations alone--skilfully -handled by the Quai d'Orsay--would preclude the possibility of ever -witnessing fulfilment. The argument by which they supported their claim -was the defencelessness of the French frontier without some natural -barrier. France had been twice invaded and overrun within living memory -by her formidable neighbour. The German military power was now crushed, -and rich and populous provinces of the German Empire had been restored -to France and Poland, but the population of Germany was still fifty per -cent. greater than that of France and it was growing at an alarming -rate, whilst the French population was at a standstill. German towns -and villages were clamant with sturdy children. - -You cannot talk long to a Frenchman without realising how this spectre -of German children haunts France and intimidates her judgment. These -children, it is said, are nourished on vengeance: one day the struggle -will be resumed, and France has no natural defence against the avenging -hordes that are now playing on German streets and with the hum of whose -voices German kindergartens resound. - -We were told the Rhine is the only possible line of resistance. -Providence meant it to play that part, and it is only the sinister -interference of statesmen who love not France that deprives Frenchmen -of this security for peace which a far-seeing Nature has provided. - -The fact that this involved the subjection to a foreign yoke of -millions of men of German blood, history, and sympathies, and that the -incorporation of so large an alien element, hostile in every fibre to -French rule, would be a constant source of trouble and anxiety to the -French Government, whilst it would not merely provide an incentive -to Germany to renew war but would justify and dignify the attack by -converting it into a war of liberation--all that had no effect on the -Rhenian school of French politics. - -This school is as powerful as ever. In one respect it is more powerful, -for in 1919 there was a statesman at the head of affairs who had the -strength as well as the sagacity to resist their ill-judged claims. - -But what about 1922? Where is the foresight and where is the strength? -There is a real danger that the fifteen years' occupation may on one -pretext or another be indefinitely prolonged. When it comes to an -end will there be a ministry in France strong enough to withdraw the -troops? Before the fifteen years' occupation is terminated will there -be a ministry or a series of ministries strong enough to resist -the demand put forward without ceasing in the French press that the -occupation should be made effective? - -Upon the answer to these questions the peace of Europe--the peace of -the world, perhaps the life of our civilisation--depends. The pressure -to do the evil thing that will once more spill rivers of human blood -is insistent. The temptation is growing, the resistance is getting -feebler. America and Britain standing together can alone avert the -catastrophe. But they can do so only by making it clear that the -aggressor--whoever it be--will have the invincible might of these two -commonwealths arrayed against any nation that threatens to embroil the -world in another conflict. - -There are men in Germany who preach vengeance. They must be told that -a war of revenge will find the same allies side by side inflicting -punishment on the peace-breakers. There are men in France who counsel -annexation of territories populated by another race. They must be -warned that such a step will alienate the sympathies of Britain and -America, and that when the inevitable war of liberation comes the -sympathies of America and Britain will be openly ranged on the side of -those who are fighting for national freedom. - -The time has come for saying these things, and if they are not said in -high places humanity will one day call those who occupy those places to -a reckoning. - -The pact was designed to strengthen the hands of M. Clemenceau against -the aggressive party which was then and still is anxious to commit -France to the colossal error of annexing territory which has always -been purely German. - -M. Clemenceau knows full well that Britain has been ready any time -during the last three years up to a few months ago to take upon herself -the burden of that pact with or without the United States of America. -At Cannes early this year I made a definite proposal to that effect. It -was a written offer made by me on behalf of the British government to -M. Briand, who was then prime minister of France. - -I was anxious to secure the co-operation of France in a general -endeavour to clear up the European situation and establish a real -peace from the Urals to the Atlantic seaboard. French suspicions and -French apprehensions constituted a serious difficulty in the way of -settlement, and I thought that if it were made clear to France that the -whole strength of the British Empire could be depended upon to come to -her aid in the event of threatened invasion French opinion would be in -a better mood to discuss the outstanding questions which agitate Europe. - -International goodwill is essential to the re-establishment of the -shattered machinery of international commerce. With a great country -like France, to which the issue of the war had given a towering -position on the continent of Europe, in a condition of fretfulness, it -was impossible to settle Europe. - -Hence the offer which was made by the British government. M. Briand was -prepared to welcome this offer and to proceed to a calm consideration -of the perplexities of the European situation. It was agreed to summon -a conference at Genoa to discuss the condition of European exchange, -credit and trade. It was also resolved that an effort should be made -to establish peace with Russia and to bring that great country once -more inside the community of nations. A great start was made on the -path of genuine appeasement. The German Government were invited to -send their chief Minister to the Cannes conference in order to arrive -at a workable settlement of the vexed question of reparations. The -invitation received a prompt response, and Dr. Rathenau, accompanied -by two or three leading ministers and a retinue of financial experts, -reached Cannes in time to take part in the discussions. - -The negotiations were proceeding helpfully, and another week might have -produced results which would have pacified the tumult of suspicious -nations and inaugurated the promise of fraternity. But, alas, Satan is -not done with Europe. A ministerial crisis in France brought our hopes -tumbling to the ground. The conference was broken up on the threshold -of fulfilment. - -Suspicion once more seized the tiller, and Europe, just as she seemed -to be entering the harbour of goodwill, was swung back violently into -the broken seas of international distrust. The offer made by Britain -to stand alone on the pact of guarantee to France was rejected with -disdain. We were told quite brutally that it was no use without a -military convention. This we declined to enter into. Europe has -suffered too much from military conventions to warrant the repetition -of such a disastrous experiment. - -The pact with Britain lies for the moment in the waste-paper basket. -But we never flung it there. M. Clemenceau ought to have made his -complaint in Paris against men of his own race and not in New York -against Englishmen. With the pact went the effort to make peace in -Europe. - -The history of Genoa is too recent to require any recapitulation of its -features. The new French ministry did not play the part of an inviting -government responsible for pressing to a successful end the objects of -Cannes, but rather that of the captious critic who had to be persuaded -along every inch of the road and who threatened at every obstacle to -turn back and leave the rest of Europe to struggle along with its -burden, amid the mocking laughter of France. - -I am not complaining of M. Barthou. He did his best under most -humiliating conditions to remain loyal to the conference which his -government had joined in summoning. But his task was an impossible one. -He was hampered, embarrassed and tangled at every turn. Whenever he -took any step forward he was lassoed by a despatch from Paris. I have -good authority for stating that he received over eight hundred of these -communications in the course of the conference! - -What could the poor man do under such bewildering conditions? The other -European countries were perplexed and distracted. They were anxious -that Genoa should end in a stable peace. There was no doubt about the -sincerity, the passionate sincerity, of the desire for peace throughout -Europe, but European nations could not help seeing that one of the -great powers was working for a failure. They had a natural anxiety not -to appear to take sides. - -It is a marvel that in spite of this unfortunate attitude adopted -by the French Government a pact was signed which has, at any rate, -preserved the peace in Eastern Europe for several months. - -Before the conference we heard of armies being strengthened along -frontiers and of movements of troops with a menacing intent from the -Baltic to the Black Sea. Genoa at least dispelled that cloud. But a -permanent peace has not yet been established and the pact with Russia -will soon expire. I am, however, hopeful that the spirit of Genoa will -stand between contending armies and prevent the clash of swords. - -All this, however, is leading me away from an examination of M. -Clemenceau's suggestion that Britain did not keep faith in the matter -of guaranteeing France against German aggression. - -The offer was definitely renewed at Cannes, and M. Poincaré has not -accepted it. - -I have my own opinion as to why he has not done so. It is not -merely that he does not wish to set the seal of his approval upon a -predecessor's achievement. I am afraid the reason is of a more sinister -kind. If France accepts Britain's guarantee of defence of her frontier -every excuse for annexing the left bank of the Rhine disappears. - -If this is the explanation, if French ministers have made up their -minds that under no conditions will they, even at the end of the period -of occupation, withdraw from the Rhine, then a new chapter opens in -the history of Europe and the world, with a climax of horror such as -mankind has never yet witnessed. - -The German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine are intensely -German--in race, language, tradition and sympathies. There are seventy -millions of Germans in Europe. A generation hence there may be a -hundred millions. They will never rest content so long as millions of -their fellow-countrymen are under a foreign yoke on the other side of -the Rhine, and it will only be a question of time and opportunity for -the inevitable war of liberation to begin. - -We know what the last war was like. No one can foretell the terrors of -the next. The march of science is inexorable, and wherever it goes it -is at the bidding of men, whether to build or to destroy. Is it too -much to ask that America should, in time, take an effective interest in -the development along the Rhine? To that extent I am in complete accord -with M. Clemenceau. Neither Britain nor America can afford to ignore -the manoeuvres going on along its banks. It is a far cry from the -Rhine to the Mississippi, but not so far as it used to be. - -There are now graves not far from the Rhine wherein lies the dust -of men who, less than six years ago, came from the banks of the -Mississippi, with their faces towards the Rhine. - -_London, December 2nd, 1922._ - - - - -VIII - -WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? - -_2. The Rhine_ (Continued) - - -The breakdown of the London conference, and especially the reason for -that breakdown, proves the warning I uttered in my last chapter was -necessary and timely. - -M. Poincaré demanded the occupation of the only rich coalfield left to -Germany as a guarantee for the carrying out of impossible terms. - -It is because I am profoundly convinced that the policy represented by -this project will lead to trouble of the gravest kind for Europe and -the world that I felt moved to sound a note of warning. I knew it would -provoke much angry misrepresentation. I am accustomed to that. I deemed -it to be my duty to face it. - -The statement I made in my last chapter about the existence of a -strong party in France which regarded the Rhine as the natural barrier -of that country has provoked a storm of denial, repudiation and -indignation. It is denounced as a wicked invention. Some are amazed at -the impudence of the calumny. Where is the party? France knows nothing -of it. Is it not a monster which has emanated from the brain of the -enemy of France? - -Repudiations have their value, especially if they come from men of -authority, and I shall bear invective with the fortitude to which all -men who wish to be happy though politicians should be hardened provided -I elicit denials which may render future international mischief -difficult. - -But a further perusal of the evidence on which I based my statement has -served to deepen my apprehensions. What was the statement? Let me quote -the actual words I used:-- - - - "There was a strong party in France which urged M. Clemenceau to - demand that the Rhine should be treated as the natural frontier - of their country, and that advantage should be taken of the - overwhelming defeat of Germany to extend the boundaries of France - to that fateful river. - - "The most moderate and insidious form this demand took was a - proposal that the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine - should remain in French occupation until the treaty had been - fulfilled. That meant for ever. Reparations alone--skilfully - handled by the Quai d'Orsay--would preclude the possibility of - ever witnessing fulfilment. - - "The pact was designed to strengthen the hands of M. Clemenceau - against the aggressive party which was then, and still is, anxious - to commit France to the colossal error of annexing territory which - has always been purely German." - - -What was the basis on which I made this assertion? It was thoroughly -well known to all those who were engaged in the operations of the Peace -conference. The Rhine was the background of all manoeuvre for weeks -and months. Whether the subject matter was the League of Nations, the -German fleet, or the status of Fiume, we knew that the real struggle -would come over the Rhine. - -On one hand, How much would France demand? on the other, How much would -the Allies concede? There was a subconscious conflict about the Rhine -throughout the whole discussion, however irrelevant the topic under -actual consideration happened to be. - -But unrecorded memories are of little use as testimony unless -corroborated by more tangible proofs. Do such proofs exist? I will -recall a few. - -There was a party which considered the Rhine to be the only natural -frontier of France. It was a strong party, with a strong man as its -spokesman--in many ways the strongest in France--Marshal Foch. His -splendid services in the war gave him a position such as no soldier in -France or in any other country could command. The soldier who, by his -genius, leads a nation to victory, possesses a measure of influence on -the public opinion of the people he has saved from destruction such as -no other individual can aspire to--as long as his services are fresh in -the memory of his fellow-countrymen. That, I admit, is not very long. -Gratitude is like manna--it must be gathered and enjoyed quickly, for -its freshness soon disappears. But in the early months of 1919 Marshal -Foch was still sitting at the banquet table of popular favour enjoying -the full flavour of grateful recognition. His word on all questions -affecting the security and destiny of France was heard with a deference -which no other man in France could succeed in securing. He has also -a quality which is not usually an attribute of generalship: he is a -lucid, forceful and picturesque speaker. He was, therefore, listened -to for what he was, for what he said, and for the way he said it. - -What did he say? He said a good deal on the subject of the Rhine -frontier and I cannot quote it all. I will take a few germane sentences -out of his numerous utterances on the subject. On the 19th day of -April, 1919, there appeared in the London _Times_ an interview with -Marshal Foch. From that interview I take these salient passages:-- - - - "'And now, having reached the Rhine, _we must stay there_,' - went on the Marshal very emphatically. 'Impress that upon your - fellow-countrymen. It is our only safety, their only safety. We - must have a barrier. We must double-lock the door. Democracies - like ours, which are never aggressive, must have strong _natural - military frontiers_. Remember that those seventy millions - of Germans will always be a menace to us. Do not trust the - appearances of the moment. Their natural characteristics have not - changed in four years. _Fifty years hence_ they will be what they - are to-day.' - - * * * * * * * - - "From the table at the other end of the room Marshal Foch brought - a great map, six or eight feet square, on which the natural - features of this part of western Europe were marked. The Rhine - was a thick line of blue. To the west of the river the Marshal - had drawn in pencil a concave arc representing the new frontier - that France will receive under the Peace treaty. It was clearly an - arbitrary political boundary conforming to no natural feature of - the land. - - "'Look at that,' said Marshal Foch. 'There is no natural obstacle - along that frontier. Is it there that we can hold the Germans if - they attack us again? No. Here! here! here!' and he tapped the - blue Rhine with his pencil. - - "'Here we must be ready to face our enemies. This is a barrier - which will take some crossing. If the Germans try to force a - passage over the Rhine--ho! ho! But here'--touching the black - pencilled line running north-west from Lorraine past the Saar - valley to the Belgian frontier--'here there is nothing.' - - * * * * * * * - - "'No; if you are wise you insist on having your locks and your - wall, and we must have our armies on the Rhine. Some people object - that it will take many troops to hold the Rhine. Not so many as - it would take to hold a political frontier. For the Rhine can be - crossed only at certain places, whereas the new political frontier - of France can be broken anywhere and would have to be held in - force along its entire length.'" - - -He expounded his doctrine in greater detail in an official memorandum -which, as commander-in-chief of the Allied armies, he submitted to M. -Clemenceau:-- - - - "To stop the enterprises towards the west of this nation, - everlastingly warlike, and covetous of the good things belonging - to other people, only recently formed and pushed on to conquest - by force regardless of all rights and by ways the most contrary - to all law, seeking always the mastery of the world, _Nature has - only made one barrier--the Rhine. This barrier must be forced on - Germany. Henceforward the Rhine will be the western frontier of - the Germanic peoples...._" - - -He repeated this demand in a subsequent memorandum. Many of us recall -his dramatic irruption into the placid arena of the Peace conference -in May, 1919, still brandishing the same theme. - -It may be said that Marshal Foch is not and does not pretend to be a -statesman. He is only a great soldier. Nevertheless, his political -influence was so great that even in 1920 he overthrew the most powerful -statesman in France within a month of his triumphant return at the -polls with a huge supporting majority in the French Parliament. It -was Marshal Foch who, by his antagonism, was responsible for M. -Clemenceau's defeat at the presidential election of 1920. But for -Marshal Foch's intervention M. Clemenceau would have been to-day -president of the French republic. - -Why was he beaten, at the height of his fame, by a candidate of -infinitely less prestige and power? The wrath of Marshal Foch and his -formidable following was excited against M. Clemenceau because the -latter had, under pressure from the Allies, gone back on the agreed -French policy about the Rhine. M. Tardieu, as is well known, was one of -the two most prominent ministers in M. Clemenceau's administration, and -closely associated with his chief in the framing of the Peace treaty. -He has written a book, and in that book he gives at length a document -which he handed to the Allies on March 12th, 1919, containing the -following proposal:-- - - - "In the general interest of peace and to assure the effective - working of the constituent clause of the League of Nations, the - western frontier of Germany is fixed at the Rhine. Consequently - Germany renounces all sovereignty over, as well as any customs - union with, the territories of the former German empire on the - left bank of the Rhine." - - -There is a sardonic humour about the words "in the general interest of -peace and to assure the effective working of the constituent clause of -the League of Nations." - -But it demonstrates that at that date M. Clemenceau and his minister -had become converts to the doctrine of the Rhine as the natural -boundary of Germany. American and British pressure subsequently induced -him to abandon this position and, as I said in a previous chapter, the -pact was part of the argument addressed to him. But the party of the -Rhine never forgave. Hence his failure to reach the presidential chair. -It was an honourable failure and will ever do him credit. - -The reasons assigned for that defeat by the _Annual Register_, -1919-20--certainly not a partisan authority--prove that even an -unexcitable chronicler laboured then under the delusion--if it be -a delusion--which possessed me when I wrote the offending article. -Explaining the remarkable defeat the _Annual Register_ says:-- - - - " ... Clemenceau's supporters contended that the terms of the - Treaty of Versailles were satisfactory from the French point - of view; his opponents declared that he had given way too much - to the American and British standpoints and that the peace was - unsatisfactory, particularly in respect of the guarantees for the - reparations due to France _and in the matter of the French eastern - frontier. It will be remembered that a large body of French - opinion had desired that France should secure the line of the - Rhine as her eastern frontier._" - - -I can if necessary quote endless leading articles in French journals -and writings and speeches of French politicians. Men of such divergent -temperaments and accomplishments as M. Franklin Bouillon and M. Tardieu -gave countenance to this claim that Germany should be amputated at the -Rhine. One carried the theme along on the torrent of his clattering -lava and the other on the dome of an iceberg. Later on at the reception -of Marshal Foch when he was elected a member of the French Academy, -M. Poincaré, turning at one moment in his discourse to the Marshal, -said in reference to the veteran General's well-known attitude on the -Peace treaty, "Ah, Monsieur le Maréchal, if only your advice had been -listened to." Has he also gone back on an opinion so histrionically -expressed? Let us hope for the best. - -I know it will be said that although the boundaries of Germany were to -end at the Rhine, the province on the left bank was not to be annexed, -but to be reconstituted into an "independent" republic. What manner of -independence and what kind of republic? All German officers were to be -expelled; it was to be detached by special provision from the economic -life of Germany upon which it is almost entirely dependent for its -existence. It was not to be allowed to associate with the fatherland. - -The Rhine which divided the new territory from Germany was to be -occupied in the main by French troops: the territories of the -independent republic were to be occupied by foreign soldiers. Its young -men were to be conscripted and trained with a view to absorbing them -into French and Belgian armies to fight against their own countrymen on -the other side of the Rhine. The whole conditions of life in the "free -and independent republic" were to be dictated by an "accord" between -France, Luxemburg and Belgium, and, in the words of Marshal Foch, -"Britain would be ultimately brought in." - -But I am told that these proposals did not mean annexation. Then what -else did they mean? You do not swallow the oyster. You only first give -it an independent existence by detaching it from its hard surroundings. -You then surround it on all sides and absorb it into your own system -to equip you with added strength to prey on other oysters! What -independence! And what a republic! It would have been and was intended -to be a sham republic. Had the plan been adopted it would have been a -blunder and a crime, for which not France alone but the world would -later on have paid the penalty. - -In the face of these quotations and of these undoubted facts, can any -one say that I calumniated France when I said there was a powerful -party in that country which claimed that the Rhine should be treated -as the natural barrier of Germany, and that the Peace treaty should be -based upon that assumption? - -Let it be observed that I never stated that this claim had the -support of the French democracy. The fact that the treaty, which did -not realise that objective, secured ratification by an overwhelming -majority in the French parliament and subsequently by an emphatic -verdict in the country, demonstrates clearly that the French people as -a whole shrank with their invincible good sense from following even -a lead they admired on to this path of future disaster. But the mere -fact that there are potent influences in France that still press this -demand, and take advantage of every disappointment to urge it forward, -calls for unremitting vigilance amongst all peoples who have the -welfare of humanity at heart. - -In conclusion I should like to add that to denounce me as an enemy of -France because I disagree with the international policy of its present -rulers is a petulant absurdity. - -During the whole of my public career I have been a consistent advocate -of co-operation between the French and British democracies. I took -that line when it was fashionable in this country to fawn on German -imperialism. - -During the war I twice risked my premiership in the effort to place the -British army under the supreme command of a French general. To preserve -French friendship I have repeatedly given way to French demands, and -thus have often antagonised opinion in this country. But I cannot go to -the extent of approving a policy which is endangering the peace of the -world, even to please one section of a people for whose country I have -always entertained the most genuine affection. - -_London, December 9th, 1922._ - - - - -IX - -WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? - -_3. The Paris Conference_ - - -The third conference with M. Poincaré over reparations has ended, like -its two predecessors, in a complete breakdown. - -The first was held in August, the second in December, and the third -fiasco has just been witnessed. - -I congratulate Mr. Bonar Law on having the courage to face a double -failure rather than agree to a course of policy which would in the end -prove disappointing, and probably disastrous. - -Agreement amongst allies is in itself a desirable objective for -statesmen to aim at, but an accord to commit their respective countries -to foolishness is worse than disagreement. - -France and Britain must not quarrel, even if they cannot agree; but if -French ministers persist in the Poincaré policy, the companionship of -France and Britain over this question will be that of parallel lines -which never meet, even if they never conflict. - -What is the object of this headstrong policy? Reparations? - -There is no financier of repute, in any quarter of the globe, who -will agree that these methods will bring the Allies any contributions -towards their impoverished resources. - -At the August conference all the experts were in accord on this -subject, but whilst these methods will produce no cash, they will -produce an unmistakable crash. - -My recollections of the August discussions enable me to follow with -some understanding the rather confused reports which have so far -reached me here.[2] - -It is common ground amongst all the Allies that Germany cannot under -present conditions pay her instalments. - -It is common ground that she must be pressed to put her finances in -order, and by balancing her budget restore the efficiency of her -currency, so as to meet her obligations. - -But M. Poincaré insisted that, as a condition of granting the -moratorium, pledges inside German territory should be seized by the -Allies. - -These pledges consisted of customs already established, and of new -customs to be set up on the Rhine and around the Ruhr, so that no goods -should be permitted to pass from these German provinces into the rest -of Germany without the payment of heavy customs dues. - -The other proposed pledges were the seizure of German forests, of -German mines, and of 60 per cent. of the shares in certain German -factories. - -Mr. Bonar Law, judging by his official _communiqué_ after the breakdown -of the conference, seems to have raised the same objections to these -pledges as I put forward at the August conference. - - - They would bring in nothing comparable to the cost of collection; - - They would provoke much disturbance and irritation and might lead - to consequences of a very grave character. - - -In fact, these pledges are nothing but paper and provocation. - -The customs barrier on the Rhine was tried once before, and was a -complete failure. - -It was tried then as a sanction and not as a means of raising money. -For the former purpose it may have achieved some measure of success, -but from the point of view of collecting money it was a ludicrous -fiasco. - -There are at the present moment hundreds of millions of paper marks -collected at these new tollhouses still locked up in the safe of the -Reparations Commission. They are admittedly worthless. - -As long as these tolls lasted, they were vexatious; they interfered -with business; they dealt lightly with French luxuries working their -way into Germany, but laid a heavy hand on all useful commodities -necessary to the industry and life of the people. - -They were ultimately withdrawn by consent. M. Poincaré now seeks to -revive them. - -The seizure of German forests and mines will inevitably lead to even -more serious consequences. The allied control established in the far -interior of Germany would require protection. - -Protection means military occupation in some shape or other. - -Military occupation of these remote areas means incidents, and -incidents quickly ripen into more serious complications. - -Hence the reluctance of the British government of which I was the head -to concur in this dangerous policy. Hence the refusal of Mr. Bonar -Law's government to accept the responsibility for sanctioning such a -policy. Even logically it is indefensible. - -There are only two alternative points of view. One is that Germany -cannot pay under present conditions until her finances are restored, -and that a moratorium ought to be granted for a period which will -enable that financial restoration to mature. The second is that -Germany can pay, that she is only shamming insolvency, and that all -that you have to do is to apply the thumbscrew firmly and cash will be -forthcoming. - -Logically I can understand either of these two alternatives, but I fail -to comprehend the reason for a proposal that will grant a moratorium -on the ground that Germany cannot pay, and at the same time apply the -thumbscrew until she pays. - -I am glad the British Prime Minister has had the wisdom not to -associate himself with a policy which will bring inevitable discredit -upon those who share the responsibility of enforcing it. - -Meanwhile, the prospects of Europe's recovery are once more to be -retarded by the vain stubbornness of some of her rulers. - -_Ronda (Spain), January 6th, 1923._ - -FOOTNOTE: - -[2] This chapter was written at Ronda (Spain). - - - - -X - -REPARATIONS - - -What is the reparations problem? Why does it appear to be further from -solution than ever? - -The great public in all lands are perplexed and worried by its -disturbing insolubility. It keeps them wondering what may happen next, -and that is never good for a nerve-ridden subject like postwar Europe. - -The real trouble is not in solving the problem itself, but in -satisfying the public opinion which surrounds it. I do not mean to -suggest that it is an easy matter to ascertain what payments Germany -can make, or for Germany to pay and keep paying these sums once they -have been ascertained. But if the difficulty were purely financial it -could be overcome. The heart of the problem lies in the impossibility -at present of convincing the expectant, indignant, hard-hit and heavily -burdened people of France that the sums so fixed represent all that -Germany is capable of paying. - -The question of compelling a country to pay across its frontiers huge -sums convertible into the currency of other countries is a new one. -At first it was too readily taken for granted that a wealth which -could bear a war debt of £8,000,000,000 could surely afford to bear an -indemnity of £6,000,000,000 provided that this smaller sum were made a -first charge on the national revenues; and it took time for the average -mind to appreciate the fundamental difference between payment inside -and transmission outside a country. - -When I think of the estimates framed in 1919 by experts of high -intelligence and trained experience as to Germany's capacity to pay -cash over the border I am not disposed to complain of the impatience -displayed by French taxpayers at the efforts made at successive -conferences to hew down those sanguine estimates to feasible -dimensions. I am content to point with pride to the fact that the -common sense of the more heavily burdened British taxpayer has long ago -taught him to cut his loss and keep his temper. When his example is -followed all round, the reparations question is already solved. - -When public opinion in all the Allied countries has subsided into -sanity on German reparations, as it already has in Britain, financiers -can soon find a way out, and trade and commerce will no longer be -scared periodically from their desks by the seismic shocks given to -credit every time a French minister ascends the tribune to make a -statement on reparations. - -Regarding the payment of reparations solely from the point of view of -finance, the issues can be stated simply, and I think solved readily. - -It is always assumed by those who have never read the Treaty of -Versailles, and the letter that accompanied it, that this much-abused -and little-perused document fixed a fabulous indemnity for payment by -Germany. The treaty may have its defects; that is not one of them, for -it fixed no sum for payment, either great or small. - -It stipulated that a reparations commission should be set up in order, -_inter alia_, to assess the damage inflicted by Germany on Allied -property and the compensation for injury to life and limb in Allied -countries. - -In the second place--and this is also overlooked--it was to ascertain -how much of that claim Germany was capable of paying. On both these -questions Germany is entitled to be heard before adjudication. - -It is in accordance with all jurisprudence that as Germany was the -aggressor and the loser she should pay the costs. But it would be not -only oppressive but foolish to urge payment beyond her capacity. - -The amount of damage was to be ascertained and assessed by May, 1921. -Capacity was to be then determined and revised from time to time, -according to the varying conditions. Even so fair a controversialist -as the eminent Italian statesman Signor Nitti has ignored the latter -provision in the Versailles treaty. No wonder that he should, for there -are multitudes who treat every alteration in the annuities fixed in -May, 1921, as if it were a departure from the Treaty of Versailles -to the detriment of the victors; whereas every modification made was -effected under the provisions and by the machinery incorporated in the -treaty for that express purpose. - -But there has undoubtedly been a departure from the treaty--a -fundamental departure. It has, however, been entirely to the detriment -of the vanquished. In what respect? I propose to explain, for the -whole trouble has arisen from this change in the treaty. The treaty -provided that the body to be set up for deciding the amount to be paid -in respect of reparations should consist of a representative each of -the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and -Belgium. - -With the exception of the United States of America, all these powers -are pecuniarily interested in the verdict. At best it was therefore -on the face of it not a very impartial tribunal. Still, Britain, as a -great trading community, was more interested in a settlement than in a -few millions more or less of indemnity wrung out of Germany; and Italy -also was a country which had large business dealings with Germany and -would not therefore be tempted to take a violently anti-German view on -the commission. The presence therefore of the United States of America, -Britain and Italy together on the commission constituted a guarantee -for moderation of view. - -Now the only disinterested party has retired from the tribunal. The -most interested party is in the chair, with a casting vote on certain -questions. That is not the treaty signed by Germany. - -If you sign an agreement to pay a sum to be awarded by A, B, C, D, and -E, trusting for a fair hearing largely to the influence of A, who is -not only very powerful but who is the only completely disinterested -referee and A then retires from the board of arbitrators, you are -entitled to claim that the character of the agreement is changed. The -representatives of France and Belgium on the Reparations Commission are -honourable men who are most anxious to do justice, but they are watched -by a jealous, vigilant and exacting opinion constantly ready to find -fault with concession and to overpower moderating judgment. - -The balance of the treaty has therefore been entirely upset. What is -really needed is to restore that balance so as to secure a fair verdict -on the only question in issue--how much Germany can pay. - -When you come to consider that issue you must view the claim for -reparations as you would any ordinary debt. You must make up your mind -whether you wish to ruin the debtor or to recover the cash. If there -are no sufficient realisable assets, then, if you want your money, you -must keep your debtor alive. If you want beef from your cow you must -forgo the milk. If your object is to destroy your debtor, you press -for payment of more than he can be reasonably expected to pay, and -then seize his house, his lands, and his chattels, whether they can be -disposed of or not. - -On the other hand, if you want your money, you will find out what he -can pay, and then proceed judiciously, patiently, and firmly to recover -that amount. By that I do not mean what he can pay by condemning -himself to a life of servitude and poverty. No brave nation will -stand that long. That is not a method of recovering an old debt, but -of creating a new one. I mean, what a nation can be expected to pay -steadily without revolt for a whole generation. - -If you scrape the butter from the bread of every German child for -thirty years you may add to the sum of your indemnity a milliard or -two of gold marks. That is not what was intended by the Treaty of -Versailles. Hungry faces make angry hearts, and the anger spreads -further than the hunger. I mean, what Germany can pay without -condemning a generation of workers to Egyptian bondage, and their -children to semi-starvation. Every oppression, if persisted in, -ultimately ends in the ruin of the Red Sea for the oppressors. Europe -has only just escaped with great loss from its waters. We do not want -to be overwhelmed in another. - -How are you to arrive at the exact figure of the annuities Germany -can reasonably be expected to pay without creating these intolerable -conditions for her people? That is the question. The answer was given -in the treaty as signed: by setting up a commission to inquire and -determine. That commission has been weakened, and its character almost -destroyed by the defection of the United States of America. - -Is it possible to find a substitute? I am afraid a reference of that -question to a new committee of experts would not advance matters, for -each country would demand a representative on that committee, and that -would only mean the Reparations Commission over again under another -name. - -The only hope of a fair and final decision is to secure the presence of -a representative of the United States of America on the adjudicating -body, whatever it may be. Is that impossible? - -I need hardly say that I am not venturing to express any opinion as to -the American refusal to ratify the treaty as a whole. I am only stating -quite frankly my view that, unless America takes a hand in reparations, -real settlement will be postponed until the hour of irreparable -mischief strikes. If for reasons of which I am not competent to judge -America cannot occupy her vacant chair on the tribunal which may decide -fateful issues for humanity, I despair of any real progress being made. - -Allied ministers can accept from a body representing the leading -powers who won the war decisions they dare not take on their own -responsibility. That is the essence of the matter. It is no use blaming -politicians. If they of their own initiative attempt to ride down -public sentiment, which alone confers authority upon them, they will -inevitably fail. In every country there are plenty of itching partisans -ready to take advantage of tactical blunders committed by political -opponents or personal rivals. But the judgment of an international -tribunal is another matter, and statesmen can accept it and act upon it -without being taxed with responsibility for its conclusions. - -British opinion cannot and will not accept a settlement based on the -assumption that abatements in the sum claimed for reparations, if and -when made, must be discounted by the British taxpayer alone. - -France undoubtedly suffered more severely from the ravages of war -than any other belligerent. But that is recognised in the proportion -allocated to her of the reparations payments. She is to be paid 52 per -cent. of the total, _i. e._, more than all the other Allied countries -put together. - -Britain comes next in the damage sustained by her people, and she is -given 22 per cent. In many respects she has suffered more heavily than -any other Allied country, especially in taxation and in trade. She is -willing to stand in with the Allies for loss as well as for profit, but -she will resent bitterly the suggestion that the loss must necessarily -be her share, whilst such profit as there is belongs to others. - -The American people, who receive no part of the compensation awarded -and collected, will _a fortiori_ take the same view of their -obligations in the matter. They certainly will not see the force of a -settlement to be made at their expense, as if they had been condemned -to pay an indemnity. - -The question is not what remission or indulgence shall be granted to -Germany, but what payment she is capable of making. If Germany can pay -a large indemnity France gets 52 per cent. of that, and Britain only -22 per cent. If Germany can only make a disappointing payment, France -still gets 52 per cent. and Britain 22 per cent. There is, therefore, -no ground for debiting Britain and America with the cost of reduced -expectations. - -The offer to hand over the worthless "C" bonds to the British Empire in -return for her claims is an insult to the intelligence of the British -public. Let us get away from these shifts on to the straight road. Back -to the treaty--that is the real remedy. There is no need to revise -it--all that is required is to restore it. - -If America reappears on the arbitrating tribunal she need not accept -the rest of the treaty. Then a fair and enduring settlement would soon -ensue, this irritating sore would rapidly heal, and the condition of -the world would steadily improve. - -_Algeciras, January 1st, 1923._ - - - - -XI - -MR. HUGHES'S NEW HAVEN SPEECH - - -The preceding chapter was written at Algeciras on January 2nd, 1923. -On January 3rd there appeared in the Spanish papers a compressed -report of the speech delivered by the American Secretary of State, Mr. -Hughes, at New Haven. It made suggestions on the subject of reparations -which were obviously intended for consideration at the forthcoming -Paris conference. I knew the chairman of that conference, M. Poincaré, -would not be too anxious to bring these proposals to the notice of his -colleagues, but I had some hope that the British, Italian, and Belgian -premiers might do so. I therefore cabled the following message to the -British and American press:-- - - - "I have read with gladness Secretary Hughes's important speech. - As far as I can judge from compressed report appearing in the - local paper of this remote corner of Spain his suggestions and - mine travel in same direction. Earnestly hope Paris conference - will give American proposals priority of consideration. All other - expedients will but postpone mischief which will in the end have - to be redeemed with compound interest at usurious rates by an - embarrassed Europe." - - -I constantly refer to this speech in subsequent articles, and as it has -been suggested that the interpretation I placed on it is not borne out -by the text, I append the full report which appeared in _The Times_ of -December 30th, 1922:-- - - - "Mr. Hughes, the Secretary of State, in a speech which he - delivered before the American Historical Association at New Haven, - Connecticut, to-night lifted yet another corner of the veil which - has shrouded the immediate plans of the United States government. - Much of his address concerned the Washington conference of 1921, - but it ended with a discussion of economic conditions in Europe - which are of prime importance. - - "Mr. Hughes began with the admission that 'we cannot dispose - of these problems by calling them European, for they are world - problems, and we cannot escape the injurious consequences of - failure to settle them.' They were, however, European problems in - the sense that they cannot be solved without the consent of the - European governments, and the _crux_ of the situation lay in the - settlement of reparations. 'There will be no adjustment of other - needs, however pressing, until a definite and accepted basis for - the discharge of reparations claims has been fixed. It is futile - to attempt to erect any economic structure in Europe until the - foundation is laid.' - - "Then followed a passage referring to the attempts to link up the - debts owed to the United States with the question of reparations - or with projects of cancellation, attempts which had been steadily - resisted. It led up to a discussion of the attitude of the United - States towards reparations, 'standing, as it does, a distinct - question, and as one which cannot be settled unless the European - governments concerned are able to agree.' First came a denial that - America desired to see Germany relieved of her responsibility - for the war, or of her just obligations, or that America wished - that France should lose 'any part of her just claims.' On the - other hand, America did not wish to see a prostrate Germany. Some - Americans had suggested that the United States should assume the - _rôle_ of arbitrator, but Mr. Hughes did not think 'we should - assume such a burden of responsibility.' - - "From this point the speech deserves quotation in full: - - "'But the situation,' said Mr. Hughes, 'does call for a settlement - upon its merits. The first condition of a satisfactory settlement - is that the question should be taken out of politics. Statesmen, - have their difficulties, their public opinion, the exigencies they - must face. It is devoutly to be hoped that they will effect a - settlement among themselves, and that the coming meeting in Paris - will find a solution. But if it does not, what should be done? - - "'The alternative of forcible measures to obtain reparations is - not an attractive one. No one can foretell the extent of the - serious consequences which might ensue from such a course. Apart - from political results, I believe that the opinion of experts - is that such measures will not produce reparation payments, but - might tend to destroy the basis of those payments, which must be - found in economic recuperation. If, however, statesmen cannot - agree, and such an alternative is faced, what can be done? Is - there not another way out? The fundamental condition is that in - this critical moment the merits of the question as an economic - one must alone be regarded. Sentiment, however natural, must be - disregarded; mutual recriminations are of no avail; reviews of the - past, whether accurate or inaccurate, promise nothing; assertions - of blame on the one hand and excuses on the other come to naught. - - "'There ought to be a way for statesmen to agree upon what Germany - can pay, for no matter what claims may be made against her that is - the limit of satisfaction. There ought to be a way to determine - that limit and to provide a financial plan by which immediate - results can be obtained and European nations can feel that the - foundations have been laid for their mutual and earnest endeavours - to bring about the utmost prosperity to which the industry of - their people entitles them. - - "'If statesmen cannot agree and the exigencies of public opinion - make their course difficult, then there should be called to their - aid those who can point the way to a solution. - - "'Why should they not invite men of the highest authority in - finance in their respective countries--men of such prestige, - experience, and honour that their agreement upon the amount to - be paid and upon the financial plan for working out payments - would be accepted throughout the world as the most authoritative - expression obtainable? The governments need not bind themselves - in advance to accept the recommendations, but they can at least - make possible such an inquiry with their approval and free the - men who may represent their country in such a commission from - any responsibility to foreign offices and from any duty to obey - political instructions. - - "'In other words, they may invite an answer to this difficult - question from men of such standing and in such circumstances of - freedom as will ensure a reply prompted only by knowledge and - conscience. I have no doubt that distinguished Americans would - be willing to serve on such a commission. If the governments saw - fit to reject the recommendation upon which such a body agreed - they would be free to do so, but they would have the advantage - of impartial advice and of an enlightened public opinion. The - peoples would be informed that the question would be rescued from - assertion and counter-assertion and the problem put upon its way - to solution. - - "'I do not believe that any general conference would answer the - purpose better, much less that any political conference would - accomplish a result which prime ministers find it impossible to - reach. But I do believe that a small group, given proper freedom - of action, would be able soon to devise a proper plan. It would be - time enough to consider forcible measures after such opportunity - had been exhausted.' - - "Mr. Hughes's closing words were: - - "'There lies the open broad avenue of opportunity, if those whose - voluntary action is indispensable are willing to take advantage - of it. And once this is done, the avenues of American helpfulness - cannot fail to open hopefully.'" - - -The argument developed by Mr. Hughes in this speech is identical with -that upon which I based my appeal in the previous chapter for an -impartial investigation into Germany's capacity, and he concludes with -a proposal which is in effect identical with mine. He does not state -categorically that the American government would be prepared to be -officially represented on the commission. But when he says, "I have -no doubt that distinguished Americans would be willing to serve on -such a commission," it means that the government would be indirectly -represented. The Allied governments would certainly have consulted the -government of the U.S.A. as to the American representative nominated -to sit on the commission, and no American expert would be appointed -without full assurance that he was acceptable to the government of his -country. - -It is a misfortune that such important proposals should have been put -forward so timorously that those who wished to ignore them could easily -pretend they had never heard them made. Speeches delivered even by -Secretaries of State at an academic function in a small provincial town -might very well be overlooked in foreign chancelleries, whose postbags -bulge with weighty despatches from many lands, without any suggestion -of studied neglect. It was clear from Mr. Bonar Law's subsequent -attitude in the course of the debate in the House of Commons on the -Ruhr invasion that he at any rate had not seen Mr. Hughes's New Haven -deliverance. Timid diplomatic flutterings make no impression in a great -situation, and so lead to nothing. This is an excellent example of how -not to speak if you wish to be heard, and of how to speak if you have -no desire to be heeded. - -_London, July 4th, 1923._ - - - - -XII - -THE FRENCH INVASION OF THE RUHR - - -France has once more jumped on the prostrate form of Germany, and -the sabots have come down with a thud that will sicken the hearts of -multitudes on both sides of the Atlantic whose friendship for France -stood the losses and griefs of a four years' war. - -Germany having been overthrown and disarmed after a prodigious effort, -involving a strain upon the combined strength of America, Italy, and -the whole British Empire, as well as France, and her arms bound with -the thongs of a stern treaty, the process of dancing upon her while she -is down can at any time now be performed with complete impunity by any -one of these powers alone. - -The spectacle every time it is repeated, provides much satisfaction to -those who indulge in the barren delights of revenging the memory of -past wrongs. There is no doubt some joy for the unsportsmanlike mind -in kicking a helpless giant who once maltreated you and who, but for -the assistance of powerful neighbours, would have done so a second time. - -But what good will it bring devastated France or her overtaxed Allies? -The additional coal and timber that will be wrung out of Germany will -barely cover the direct cost of collection. Although Germany bears the -extra cost, the expense of these punitive measures must all in the end -diminish the means of reparation, and therefore fall on the victor. - -How many students of the problem of reparations have ever taken the -trouble to ascertain the extent to which the maintenance of Allied -armies of occupation has already drained the resources of Germany? -Between direct cash payments, the cost of supplies, and outlay in -labour and material for building huge barracks, these armies have -already cost Germany 6,000,000,000 gold marks--roughly 1,200,000,000 -dollars, or over £300,000,000. - -How much better it would have been if most of this money had gone -towards rebuilding the devastated area! - -It is not without significance, now that war is being waged against -Germany for what the American representative in Paris termed her -technical default, to recollect that, between the expense of the army -of occupation and contributions already made towards reparations, -Germany has already paid to the Allies over three times the amount of -the total indemnity exacted by Bismarck in 1871. - -This is without making any allowance for the vast and highly developed -colonies which she surrendered. Let, therefore, no one approach this -problem as if he were dealing with a recalcitrant country that is -deliberately refusing to acknowledge any of her obligations under a -treaty which she has signed. - -The costs of the last war are acknowledged to be irrecoverable. It is -difficult enough to find the means for payment of damages. Who will pay -the growing cost of this new war? - -So far I have referred only to the direct outlay upon these aggressive -measures. The indirect cost to victor and vanquished alike will be -crushing. - -It is already accumulating. The mere threat has depreciated the value -of the franc, and thus reduced its purchasing capacity abroad. This -loss must be borne by the French consumer. There may be a rally; but I -shall be surprised if the improvement is more than temporary. - -All that is obvious for the moment to the untrained eye is the way in -which the mark is dragging the French and Belgian franc slowly along -its own downward course. - -As the distance between them lengthens and the invisible cord which -ties them together becomes more and more attenuated, it may ultimately -snap and the franc be released from this dangerous association. That I -doubt, for a bankrupt Germany means a country to which even the most -hopeful cannot look as a means of redeeming French deficits. - -Once that is clear to the French peasant he will not so readily part -with his savings, and the real difficulties of French finance will -begin at that stage. A policy, therefore, which demoralises the German -currency is one which is also fatal to the solvency of French finance. - -Let us follow the probable sequence of events. The terrified German -mark is rushing headlong to the bottom of the pit where the Austrian -krone is already lost beyond rescue. - -As long as reparation coal is dug out by bayonets, and reparation -timber is cut down by swords, it is idle to talk of restoring the mark -by putting German finance in order. - -No tariff, however nimble, can keep pace with the runaway mark. It -would baffle the most resourceful finance minister to adapt his budget -to a currency which disappears beyond the horizon while he is sitting -at his desk to pen his proposals. - -If the mere threat of force has produced such a panic, what will be the -effect of the actual measures? It is safe to predict that the advance -of French troops into Germany will not restore the composure of the -frightened mark and arrest its flight. - -What, then, becomes of the hope of renewed payments of the annuity? At -best Germany could only be expected to pay when her foreign trade was -so improved that she could provide a margin out of her exports with -which to pay her annuities. Her foreign trade is largely dependent -upon her foreign exchanges. These are now destroyed beyond prospect of -recovery for years. - -Britain proposed a voluntary moratorium for a short term of years in -order to place Germany in a position where she could at the end of that -term pay a reasonable annuity. The French government have in effect -substituted a compulsory moratorium for an indefinite period with no -prospect of payment in sight. - -The only chance of securing an early instalment of reparation payments -was by pressing Germany to put her finances in order and giving her -fair time in which to do so. The only chance of negotiating a loan -on German security to assist France to pay for the repair of her -devastated provinces, and to enable her to put her own finances in -order, was by restoring the stability of German currency. - -French statesmen have deliberately thrown both these chances away. The -effect on the value of their own currency must be grave, and Frenchmen -will have to pay in increased cost of living for a venture dictated by -short-sighted and short-tempered statesmanship. - -When one thinks of the consequences one is driven to ask whether French -politicians are really seeking reparations or are pursuing another -purpose quite incompatible with the recovery of money payments under -the treaty. - -This is the wrong road to reparations. It leads in exactly the opposite -direction. - -Whither, then, does it lead? There is no doubt that its effect will -be ruinous as far as German industry is concerned. I have already -dealt with its disastrous influence upon German currency, and with the -indirect effect of a rapidly depreciating currency upon German foreign -trade. The seizure of the Ruhr mines will have another serious effect. - -Even now the result of the compulsory alienation of so much of -Germany's coal supply in the Ruhr, in Silesia, and the Saar, from -German industry, has diminished German productiveness. The fuel -deficiency thereby created inside Germany has been partially supplied -by purchases of coal from outside sources. The necessity for providing -gold to pay for foreign coal has added considerably to Germany's -financial difficulties. - -A still larger foreign purchase will be the inevitable result of the -forcible diversion of large quantities of Ruhr coal to France and -Italy, with further financial embarrassments as a consequence. - -That is bad enough. But I fear worse. Will the German miner work with -the same regularity and efficiency for a foreign master as he does for -a German employer? Is there the least possibility of the production -being maintained at its present level? - -The influence of this added muddle on world trade is incalculable. -Nobody gains; everybody is a loser by the move. How is a Germany whose -embarrassed finances are made still more involved--how is a Germany -whose industry becomes more and more difficult--how is a Germany -reduced to despair to be of the slightest use to France, Belgium, -Italy, or anybody else? - -The feather-headed scribes who have advocated this rash policy assume -that France will be helped because Germany will thus be reduced to -impotence. For how long? - -The disintegration of Germany is not an unlikely consequence of this -move. I know that is the expectation. Frenchmen still hanker after -the days when Saxons and Bavarians and Wurtembergers were allies, and -almost vassals, of France against Prussia. It was the lure that led the -Third Napoleon to his ruin. It is the attraction which is now drawing -France once more to a sure doom. The policy will bring no security to -France in the future. It deprives her of all hope of reparations in the -immediate present. There will no longer be a Germany to pay. It would -be too hopeless a task to attempt recovery from each of the severed -states. - -But what of increased security? Nothing can keep Germans permanently -apart. They will, at the suitable moment reunite under more favourable -conditions, freed from external as well as internal debt. France will -have lost her reparations and only retained the hatred of an implacable -foe become more redoubtable than ever. - -How would Europe have fared in the interval whilst France was learning -from events what every other country can see now? There is no knowing -what will happen when a brave people of 60,000,000 find themselves -faced with utter ruin. Whether they turn to the left or to the right -will depend on questions of personal leadership, which are not yet -determined. All we can be sure of is that they can hardly go on as they -are, maintaining an honest struggle for ordered freedom and democratic -self-government. The French proclamation, with its threat of "severest -measures in case of recalcitrancy," is ominous of much that may happen. -No people accustomed to national independence have ever been able long -to tolerate a foreign yoke. - -Chancellor Cuno's action is the first manifestation of the spirit of -revolt. It will certainly grow in intensity. The lash will then fall, -sooner or later, and Germany will be inevitably driven to desperate -courses. A Communist Germany would infect Europe. European vitality -is so lowered by exhaustion that it is in no condition to resist the -plague. Would a reactionary Germany be much better--brooding and -scheming vengeance? - -Russia, with her incalculable resources of men and material, is at -hand, needing all that Germany can best give and best spare. The -Bolshevik leaders only require what Germany is so well fitted to supply -in order to reorganise their country and convert it into the most -formidable state in Europe or Asia. - -Nations hard pressed on the East have in the past moved forward -irresistibly to the West. In obedience to the same law a people hard -pressed on the West will look to the East. - -When the French troops marched on Essen they began a movement the most -far-reaching, and probably the most sinister in its consequences, that -has been witnessed for many centuries in Europe. And these are the -people who, after fifty years of patient and laborious waiting, have -demonstrated to the world in 1918 the stupidity of abusing victory in -1871. - -If the teacher so soon forgets his own special lesson the pupil is not -likely to remember when fury overcomes terror. - -_Algeciras, January 15th, 1923._ - - - - -XIII - -LOST OPPORTUNITIES - - -The French government, having conspicuously failed to win its -anticipated coup, is doubling the stakes each time it loses. When will -it end? And where will it end? It is ill gambling with human passions. -They are all engaged in this wild venture--on both sides of the -table. Pride, greed, vanity, obstinacy, temper, combativeness, racial -antagonisms, but also patriotism, love of justice, hatred of wrong and -high courage. Each side draws from the same arsenal of fiery human -emotions. Unless some one steps in to induce a halt I fear the result -will be devastating. - -France has now abandoned all hope of being able to run the mines, -railways, and workshops of the Ruhr by military agencies. In these -days you cannot shoot every worker who fails to excavate so many -hundredweights of coal per diem, or who refuses to fill a wagon or -drive a locomotive when and by whomsoever he is told to do so. France -cannot provide the necessary complement of miners and railwaymen from -outside to fill vacancies created by sulky workers. And even if she -could it would take many months ere they become sufficiently accustomed -to their new conditions to work without peril to themselves. So a -new policy has been improvised. It is nothing less than the siege of -Germany. Sixty millions of Germans are to be starved into surrender. -That is a long business, as every one knows who has been engaged on -the difficult operations of strike breaking. We have often witnessed -workers with little support or sympathy from the rest of the community -hold out for weeks after their funds have been exhausted. In Germany -all classes are united in resistance. The national pride fortifies -endurance and incites to sacrifice. And the ports are still open. -Meanwhile incidents may happen, developments may occur which will -create a situation that will baffle all the resources the invaders can -command. - -It is very little use looking backward. But there are many who are -disposed to say that the invasion of the Ruhr was bound to come and -the sooner the safer. The Ruhr coal mines were the wild oats of -reparation. Get it over quickly. The headache will bring repentance -and France will then settle down to a quiet life. That is the argument. -I must enter an emphatic protest against this view. If this ill-judged -enterprise had been put off for a few more months I do not believe -any French government would have embarked upon it. There is no French -statesman of any standing who, in his heart, believes in its wisdom. -Now that the credit of France is involved in its success they will all -support it. But French opinion, as a whole, was moving with startling -rapidity from this policy. The Parisian pulse was still feverish, -but the provinces had completely calmed down. Vacancies occurring in -the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies and the provincial assemblies -during several months have afforded an opportunity of testing real -French opinion and the results have been sensational. At election -after election, fought in typical constituencies all over France, the -champions of Ruhrism have been beaten by emphatic majorities. Masses of -French workmen have always opposed this policy. The peasant in every -land always moves slowly. But there can be no doubt that the French -peasant has had enough of military adventures. His sons were never -numbered amongst the "exempts," and the losses in the peasant homes -of France were appalling. Driving through the villages in agricultural -France you find yourself asking, "Where are the young men?" The answer -invariably comes, "This village suffered severely in the war." You -will receive the same answer in the next village, and the next. We -cannot wonder, therefore, that by-elections in rural as well as in -urban France display an unmistakable weariness of plans which involve -the marching of armed Frenchmen into hostile territory. The sorrowing -people of France have good reason to shrink from any course of action -that leads to further shedding of blood. - -For these reasons I have steadily favoured every scheme that had the -effect of postponing decision as to the Ruhr. Delay meant ultimate -defeat for the Chauvinists. That is why they strove so hard to rush -their government into this precipitate action. The abrupt termination -of the Paris conference was their opportunity and they seized it with -tingling fingers. Until then there had never been a clean break on -which violence could be founded. The friends of moderation both here -and on the continent had seen to that. There had been reference of -questions for the scrutiny of experts and calming adjournments to -await their report. When it arrived there were endless suggestions and -counter-suggestions to meet difficulties. In the end Europe was saved -from the catastrophe of once more handing over its destinies to the -guidance of blind force. Unhappily, weariness or impatience induced -the Paris negotiators in a few hours to drop the reins which had for -at least four years held the furies from dashing along their career of -destruction. There were many alternative plans that might have been -discussed. There was the proposal to refer the whole question to the -League of Nations. It is true that when I suggested it in August last -M. Poincaré summarily rejected it. But the Allies also rejected M. -Poincaré's proposals by a majority of four to one at that conference. -That did not prevent his repeating them in January--and this time he -succeeded in winning over the majority to his view. A little more -persistence and less pessimism might have persuaded Belgium, Italy and -Japan to aid our appeals to France to trust rather to the League of -Nations than to the uncertainties of war. - -What is still more inexplicable is the failure of the conference to -take any note of Mr. Secretary Hughes's New Haven speech. Neglected -opportunities litter the path of this troublesome question. There -were the Cannes conversations, broken off just as they were reaching -fruition. Had they been continued another week they would have ended in -a helpful settlement which would have brought reparations to France, -confidence to Germany, and peace to Europe. They struck on one of the -many sunken reefs which bestrew the French political seas, and it will -not surprise me to find that the whole cargo of reparations disappeared -then beyond salvage into the deep with these shipwrecked negotiations. - -Again, Germany threw away a great opportunity at Genoa when all -the nations of Europe came together for the first time to discuss -their troubles in the spirit of equality and amity. It is true that -reparations were excluded at the instance of France from the programme -of the conference. But the spirit engendered by a friendly settlement -of all other outstanding questions would have rendered a reasonable -and temperate consideration of reparations inevitable. Germany, by its -foolish staging of its Russian agreement, made all that impossible. -Resentment and suspicion were once more equipped with a scourge and -they used it relentlessly to drive out all goodwill for Germany from -the purlieus of that great congress. Another lost opportunity. - -Then there was the bankers' committee, appointed to consider the -question of raising an international loan to help France to finance -the repair of her devastated area and also to assist Germany to -restore her demoralised currency. I remember how eager poor Rathenau -was to float that loan and how sanguine he was that it would succeed. -He was confident that the German nationals who have invested their -gold in other lands could be induced to subscribe heavily to the -loan. The bankers concerned--all were of the highest reputation in -the financial world--were confident that if German reparations were -fixed at a reasonable sum investors throughout the world would gladly -put their money into a great international loan which would help to -restore Europe. The French government testily declined to consider -the essential conditions indicated by the bankers. Another lost -opportunity, and Europe once more lumbered along its dreary way to seek -another. - -It came with Mr. Hughes's famous speech. It was clearly the result -of prolonged consideration. For weeks there had been rumours of -much consultation in Washington on the state of Europe, and we were -encouraged to hope that America meant business. The result was Mr. -Secretary Hughes's offer. It was made four days before the Paris -conference and was obviously intended to be discussed by the Allies -there. An endeavour has been made to minimise the importance of this -American approach to Europe, but it is incomprehensible to me how so -momentous a pronouncement has been treated as if it were merely the -casual utterance of a politician who had to find some topic of more or -less interest with which to illuminate a discourse. Another opportunity -lost--perhaps the greatest--perhaps the last. Never has luck striven so -hard to save stupidity. But luck loses its temper easily and then it is -apt to hit hard. - -_London, February 15th, 1923._ - - - - -XIV - -FRENCH SCHEMES - - -"French troops occupying fresh German territory." "Further advance into -Germany." "Reinforcements." "French cut off the British bridgehead on -the Rhine." "Proposals for new coinage in the Ruhr." What is it all -leading to? Is it really reparations? Signor Nitti, who has made a -thorough study of all the documents bearing on French designs against -Germany, has come definitely to the conclusion that these measures -have no reference to the recovery of damages for the devastated area, -but that they are all taken in the execution of a vast project for -securing French control over all the coal and iron of continental -Europe. He supplies chapter and verse for his theory. Something has -undoubtedly roused the suspicions of Signor Mussolini. They come rather -late in the day to be effective. He naturally does not relish the idea -of an Italy whose coal and steel supplies are placed at the mercy of -a gigantic trust directed from Paris. Italy has no coal and iron of -her own. Her interest is, therefore, in a free market. Hence Signor -Mussolini's alarm. Is there any ground for it? Let those who imagine -that Italian statesmen are unnecessarily disturbed read the discussions -in the French press leading up to the speeches recently delivered by M. -Millerand, M. Barthou, and M. Poincaré. - -With regard to M. Barthou's intervention, I feel I must, as one of -the founders of the Reparations Commission, say a word. There were -important questions of amount, method, and time which could not be -determined before the signature of the peace treaty and could not be -settled at all without giving Germany a full opportunity of being -heard. Hence the appointment of the Reparations Commission. It was -called into existence to settle these questions after hearing evidence -and deliberating on its effect. Of this commission M. Barthou is now -chairman. He, therefore, presides over a body which has committed -to its charge judicial functions of a momentous character. He has -to adjudicate from time to time on the case presented by Germany -under a multitude of different heads. Inflammatory speeches on the -very subjects upon which he has to preserve judicial calm are quite -incompatible with his position. When he occupied the same post M. -Poincaré ultimately recognised that he could not continue to write -controversial articles on questions which might come before him -for decision as a judge. He, therefore, very properly resigned his -commissionership. - -But to revert to the speeches delivered by these eminent statesmen. -If they mean what the actual words convey, then France means to stick -to the Ruhr. Not by way of annexation. Oh, no. That, according to M. -Barthou, is a "foolish, mendacious and stupid" lie. But France means -to hang on to the _gages_ until reparation is paid. What are the -_gages_? The industries of the Ruhr. If the French government is to -control the industries which represent the life of this prosperous -area for thirty years it assumes greater authority over the district -than it exercises over the mining area of the Pas de Calais. In its -own mining districts no government takes upon itself--except during a -war--to give directions as to the destination and distribution of the -coal produced. But there are indications that the control over the Ruhr -industries is to be of a much more far-reaching character than this. -And this is where the hints--broad hints--thrown out by the French -press come in. France, in order to secure the payment of the reparation -instalments in future, is to be given shares in these great mines and -industries. What proportion of shares? Amongst the _gages_ demanded by -M. Poincaré in August of last year were sixty per cent. of the shares -in certain pivotal German industries in the Rhine area. Now the Ruhr -industries are clearly to be included within the scope of the demand. -France has the iron ore of Lorraine and the coal of the Saar valley. -Her financiers have been engaged in buying up coal mines in Silesia. If -she can secure the controlling interest in the Ruhr mines and Belgium -and Poland can be persuaded to join in the deal, then the continent of -Europe will be at the mercy of this immense coal and iron combine. - -I said in the previous chapter that the ports were still open. As long -as they are, Central Europe can protect itself to a certain extent -against this gigantic trust, for the products of Britain and America -will be available. But that possibility is to be provided against. -Nothing is to be left to chance. One of the _gages_ is to be control -over German customs. How can Germany balance her budget without a -revenue? How can she raise a revenue without a tariff? What more -productive tariff than a duty on foreign coal and metal manufactures? -And thus all competitive products will be excluded from the German -markets. The combine will be supreme. - -It is true that if this cynical scheme comes off there is an end of -reparations--for the independence of German industry is strangled and -its life will soon languish. But there are signs that French enterprise -has abandoned all idea of recovering reparations and that it is now -brooding upon loot--on an immense scale. For the discussions in the -French press contemplate even wider and more far-reaching developments -than those involved in the control of German industries. Italy, Poland, -and even Russia are to be brought in. The high line taken for years -by the Parisian papers about "no traffic with murder" is being given -up. Instead we have much sentimental twaddle about restoring the -old friendly relations between France and Russia--of course, for a -consideration. Russia is to buy; Germany is to manufacture; France is -to profit. - -These proposals, which have for some time been in the air, are now -actually in type. Now the type is ordinary black--later on it may be -red. Twenty lives have already been lost over the preliminaries of -execution. I fear there will be many more as the difficulties become -more apparent. - -It is not without significance that the terms which Germany is to be -called upon to accept in the event of her submission have never been -formulated. No ultimatum was issued before invasion. If Germany were -to-morrow to throw up her hands what conditions would she have to -comply with? Who can tell? Germany clearly does not know. The British -government does not know. They were never discussed at the Paris -conference. M. Poincaré has only asserted with emphasis that he "will -not accept promises." If the Ruhr is to be evacuated promises must be -accepted at some stage, for Germany cannot deliver ten years' coal -instalments in advance, and she cannot pay fifty milliards of gold -marks over the counter. So, if M. Poincaré's statement means anything, -then the control of Ruhr industries must be vested in France until the -whole of the mortgage has been redeemed. Hence the vast plan for the -exploitation of Germany, and through Germany of Europe. - -A pretty scheme, but--like most plans which make no allowance for -human nature--bound to fail. How long would Italy and Russia consent -to be exploited for the enrichment of French capitalists? Italy has -already made it clear that she has no intention of walking into the -trap. Russia may or may not have been approached. It is not improbable -that there have been informal soundings. It is not easy to reckon what -the Bolshevists may or may not do in any circumstances. But one can be -fairly assured that they will not place their heads in the jaws of a -rapacious capitalistic crocodile of this character. Brigands are not -made of that simple stuff. - -Will German statesmen consent to sell their country into political -and economic bondage for an indefinite period? It is incredible. No -doubt there had been feelers between French and German capitalists for -some time before the Ruhr invasion. M. Loucheur and Herr Stinnes are -credited with having had conversations on the subject of amalgamating -the interests of Lorraine iron ore and Ruhr coal. But the Ruhr invasion -has awakened the patriotism of Germany from its stupor. A potent -new element has therefore been introduced into the calculation. -This element does not mix well with international finance. It may be -depended upon to resist to the last any effort to put German industry -under foreign control, and without control the _gage_ is worthless. - -Then there is the German workman who must be taken into account. The -miner and the engineer in all countries are proverbially independent. -They take no orders even from their own governments. During the war -they had to be reasoned with before they could be persuaded to take a -course urged upon them by the government of the day in the interests -of their own country. They will view the commands of a syndicate -controlled by foreign governments with suspicion and repugnance. Should -disputes arise--and they are more likely than ever to arise constantly -under these conditions--who will be responsible for the protection of -life, liberty, and property? Will foreign troops operate? Or will the -German army and police act practically under orders given from Paris? -The popular sympathy will be with the strikers. - -It is a fantastic idea born of failure and, therefore, bound itself to -be a failure. - -_London, March 1st, 1923._ - - - - -XV - -THE QUICKSAND - - -When you have walked some distance into a quicksand, and are sinking -deeper and deeper with every step you take, it is always difficult to -decide whether you are more likely to reach firm ground by pressing -forward or by going backward. You must do one or other. You cannot just -stand fast, for that is inevitable destruction. The French government -clearly are of opinion that safety lies in marching further into -the quagmire. So three more German cities have been occupied, more -burgomasters and officials expelled, more men and boys shot in the -streets, more black troops imported, more regulations and more decrees -issued; there are more depressions of French, Belgian and Italian -exchanges, more confusion in everybody's business in Central Europe--in -a sentence, everywhere there is more quaking sand and less solid -coal. The total shortage in deliveries as compared with the promises -of Spa was only eight per cent. Had it not been for this fatuous -invasion, France during the past six or seven weeks would have already -received from the Ruhr nearly 3,000,000 tons in coal and in coke. -France has actually received 50,000 tons during this period. A swarm -of engineers, railwaymen, bargemen, officials of all kinds, and hotel -waiters, supported by a formidable army have in six weeks produced this -ridiculous output. No doubt the amount will later on be increased by -further pressure and by pouring in more railwaymen, but it will be a -long time ere France receives her Spa quota minus eight per cent., and -then there will be some months' arrears to make up. - -No wonder that M. Loucheur stated flatly in the French Chamber that he -did not approve of the Ruhr enterprise. He has one distinct advantage -over the Ruhr plungers--he does know something about business. He can -boast also of another gift, the possession of which is not without -significance when you consider his present attitude. He is an admirable -judge of to-morrow's weather. That is a rare endowment amongst -politicians. Any simpleton can tell you which way the wind is blowing -to-day, but it requires a man of special insight and experience in -these matters to forecast the direction of the wind to-morrow. M. -Loucheur is one of those exceptionally well-equipped weather prophets. -So he satisfies the opinion of to-day by giving his support to M. -Poincaré, and he safeguards his position against the morrow's change -by stating clearly that he does not approve the policy he supports. I -have read no declaration from any French statesman of eminence--with -the doubtful exception of M. Barthou--indicating a belief in the wisdom -of the venture. And yet French courage, French pride, French loyalty, -French patriotism--and maybe French blood and treasure--are committed -irretrievably to a reckless gamble which most of the responsible -statesmen who led France by their wisdom through her great troubles -regard with doubt, anxiety and apprehension. - -Will the French government try to extricate themselves from the -difficulties into which they have precipitated their country and -Europe? I fear not. Heedlessness rushes a man into danger; it needs -courage to get out. And when getting out involves an admission of -blame there are few men who possess that exalted type of courage. -There are other reasons why the present government of France will -flounder further into the quicksand. When governments make mistakes in -England, the threat of a Parliamentary defeat or a couple of adverse -by-elections pulls them out roughly but safely, and the governments -start on a new course amid the general satisfaction of friend and foe. -The Willesden, Mitcham, and Liverpool elections rescued the government -from one of the most hopeless muddles into which any administration has -ever contrived to get its affairs. In similar circumstances in France a -change of government is negotiated with amazing dexterity and celerity. -But you cannot arrange the preliminary overthrow of an existing -government unless there is some one in the background ready and willing -to form the next. There are generally two or three outstanding men -of high repute prepared to serve their country in any emergency. The -trouble to-day in France is that every alternative leader disapproves -of this enterprise and believes it must ultimately fail. On the other -hand, there is no prominent figure in French politics prepared to take -upon himself the odium of sounding the retreat. It would always be -said that success was in sight, and that had it not been for the new -minister's cowardice and perfidy France would have emerged triumphantly -out of all her financial worries. The _drapeau_ would have been -lowered and betrayed. No French statesmen dare face that deadly -accusation. So the present French government is tied to the saddle of -its charger and is forced to go on. - -Another explanation of the difficulty of withdrawing is to be found -in the increasing fury of the original fomenters of this rashness. -The more fruitless the enterprise the greater the energy they display -in spurring the government further into its follies. In the previous -article I gave a summary of the ambitious plans they had conceived for -syndicating European resources under French control. The industries -of Europe controlled from Paris--that is their magnificent dream. -Now they propound a new treaty which is to supersede the treaty of -Versailles. Boundaries are to be revised, rich provinces and towns -practically annexed, the Ruhr coal is to be harnessed to Lorraine -coal, and Germany, having been further mutilated and bound, is to be -reduced to a state of complete economic subjection. There has been -nothing comparable to these ideas since the Norman conquest, when -the Saxons, having first of all been disarmed, were reduced to a -condition of economic thraldom for the enrichment and glorification -of their new masters. Needless to say Britain and America are not -to be invited to attend this new peace conference. They are to be -graciously informed of the conditions of the new peace when finally -established by French arms. The British Empire, which raised millions -of men to liberate French soil from the German invaders and which lost -hundreds of thousands of its best young lives in the effort, is not -even to be consulted as to the settlement which its losses alone make -possible. America, who came to the rescue with millions of its bravest, -is barely worth a sentence in these ravings of brains intoxicated -with an unwholesome mixture of hatred, greed and military arrogance. -The French government are not committed by any overt declarations -to these schemes; but it is ominous that they issue from the pens -whose insistent prodding has driven this government on to its present -action. Up to the present no repudiation has come from the head of the -government or from any of his subordinates. The very vagueness of his -published aims would leave him free to adopt any plans. Pledges for -reparation and security will cover a multitude of aggressions. - -The British government have just issued as a Parliamentary paper -a full report of the proceedings of the Paris conference. It is an -amazing document. As far as I can see no real endeavour was made by any -of its members to prevent a break-up. At the first failure to secure -agreement the delegates threw up their hands in despair and sought -no alternatives. They agreed about nothing except that it was not -worth while spending another day in trying to agree. Even M. Theunis, -the resourceful Belgian premier, had nothing to suggest. A blight of -sterility seems to have swept over the conference. On this aspect of -the fateful and fatal conference of Paris I do not now propose to -dwell. I wish to call attention to it for another purpose. I have -perused the Blue Book with great care. I was anxious to find out -exactly what M. Poincaré proposed to demand of Germany as a condition -of submission to the French will. What was Germany to do if she was -anxious to avert the fall of the axe? I have read his speeches and -annexes in vain for any exposition of these terms. It is true he was -never asked the question. That sounds incomprehensible. But every one -engaged was in such a hurry to break up the conference and thus put an -end to disagreeable disagreements that it never seems to have occurred -to them to ask this essential question. And the party principally -concerned was not represented. The result is that no one knows the -terms upon which the French army is prepared to evacuate the Ruhr. Mr. -Bonar Law could not explain when questioned in the House of Commons. I -am not surprised, for no one has ever told him and he never asked. I am -sure that by this time M. Poincaré has quite forgotten why he ever went -into the Ruhr. For that, amongst other reasons, he will remain there -until something happens that will provide us with an answer. - -Most human tragedy is fortuitous. - -_London, March 10th, 1923._ - - - - -XVI - -THE FIRST GERMAN OFFER - - -The French and Belgian governments have slapped another opportunity -in the face. To make that slap resound as well as sting, they have -accompanied their rejection of the German offer by a savage sentence -of fifteen years' imprisonment on the head of the greatest industrial -concern in the Ruhr, if not in Europe. What for? Because he ordered the -works' syren to sound "cease work" for one day when the French troops -occupied the place. There is a swagger of brutality about that sentence -which betokens recklessness. It came at a moment when the German -government had just made an offer of peace, and when that ally of -France who had made the deepest sacrifices in the war to save her and -Belgium from ruin was urging the French government to regard that offer -at least as a starting-point for discussion. The answer was to treat -the German note as an offence, to promulgate that penal sentence which -outrages every sense of decency throughout the world, and to refuse -to permit an ally, who had been so faithful in the time of trouble for -France and Belgium, even the courtesy of a discussion on the tenor -of the reply to be given to a note that so vitally concerned the -interest of all the Allies without exception. Prussian arrogance in its -crudest days can furnish no such example of clumsy and short-sighted -ineptitude. It gives point to Lord Robert Cecil's observation in the -House of Commons that it is very difficult to reconcile the French -attitude with a conception that the French government, with the opinion -behind it, desires a settlement. - -What is the German offer? It proposes to limit the total obligations -of Germany in cash and in kind to thirty milliards of gold marks -(£1,500,000,000) to be raised by loans on the international money -markets at normal conditions in instalments of:-- - - - 20 milliards up to July 1, 1927. - 5 milliards up to July 1, 1929. - 5 milliards up to July 1, 1931. - - -There are provisions for payment of interest from July, 1923, onward, -and the agreements entered into for delivery of payments in kind on -account of reparations are to be carried out in accordance with the -arrangements already made. Then comes this important provision. After a -paragraph in which it is argued that the above figures would strain the -resources of Germany to the utmost it adds:-- - - - "Should others not share this opinion, the German government - propose to submit the whole reparations problem to an - international commission uninfluenced by political considerations, - as suggested by State Secretary Hughes." - - -They further state that the German government are prepared to devise -suitable measures in order that the whole German national resources -should participate "in guaranteeing the service of the loan." -Guarantees are also offered for deliveries in kind. In order to -ensure a permanent peace between France and Germany they propose an -agreement that all contentious questions arising between them in future -should be referred to arbitration. The note finally stipulates that -the evacuation of the Ruhr "within the shortest space of time" and -the restoration of treaty conditions in the Rhineland constitute "an -essential leading up to negotiations on basis of above ideas." The -above represents the substance of the German proposals. - -The French and Belgian governments in their reply stand by the May, -1921, schedule of payments and decline to forego even the very -problematical "C" bonds of £4,250,000,000. Hitherto it has been -common ground that £2,500,000,000 is the figure which Germany can be -expected to pay. The French and Belgian governments are now insisting -on the full measure of the £6,600,000,000 award. The Hughes proposal -they scoff at and treat its putting forward by Germany as part of "an -expression of a systematic revolt against the Treaty of Versailles." -The real temper and purpose of this intransigeant attitude is to be -found in two sentences. Here is the first. Alluding to the resistance -offered in the Ruhr to the French attempt to exploit its resources -the note says: "The Belgian and French governments cannot take into -consideration any German proposal whilst the resistance continues." -That is, however complete and satisfactory a proposal may be in itself, -it would be rejected unless preceded by abject surrender to French -designs in the Ruhr. Then later on comes this significant sentence -emphasising the moral of the first:-- - - - "The Belgian government and the French government have decided - that they will only evacuate the newly occupied territories - according to the measure and in proportion to the payments - effected. They have nothing to alter in this resolution." - - -An impossible payment is to be insisted upon--costs of occupation are -to be added to that, and until both are liquidated French armies are -to remain in possession of the richest areas in Germany. Meanwhile the -British Empire and the United States of America, who, at a prodigious -cost in life and treasure, saved France from a similar humiliation -to that which she is now inflicting on Germany, are practically told -when they venture to offer suggestions to mind their own business. No -interference will be tolerated from meddlers of any sort. - -The sum offered by Germany in settlement of reparations is no doubt -inadequate. It cannot be accepted by any of the Allies in discharge of -the German obligations under the treaty. The German government must -make a very substantial advance on that offer before they can hope to -come to terms with the Allied governments. I have no doubt the German -government fully realise that fact, and I am sure they did not put -forward these figures as their final tender. They meant them to be -taken as a beginning and a basis for negotiation. In fact they say so. -When you enter into negotiations your lawyer, if he knows his business, -never starts with the figure he is authorised ultimately to propose. -Nor does the client always communicate to his advocate the last figure -he would be prepared to pay if he had to decide between that and a -continuation of the struggle, with its costs and its complications. -Once pourparlers begin the original figure disappears, and disappears -quickly. That is the history of all negotiation, private and public. A -refusal to meet in conference until the figure proposed is acceptable -rules out discussion between parties as a means of coming to terms on -the main question in a dispute. - -I have taken part in the settlement of probably more industrial -differences than most politicians. In every case I have started with -an _impasse_. The first meeting of the parties always revealed an -apparently unbridgeable chasm between their respective positions; but -perseverance and an honest endeavour on both sides to find a solution -usually ends in agreement. Goodwill can bridge any abyss. Unconditional -surrender if insisted upon between independent bodies is a sure prelude -to fresh disputes. The mere fact, therefore, that Germany put forward -a proposal which falls short of the needs and equities of the case is -not a sufficient reason for declining to meet her representatives at -a conference to determine what the right sum should be, and the best -method of liquidating it. - -But there is another and a stronger reason why the German offer -should not have been so peremptorily rejected. It did not end with a -submission of an inadequate amount in discharge of reparations claims. -Had it done so the French government might perhaps contend that Germany -must make up her mind, before she is allowed to confer, to raise that -figure to something which at least approximates to the region of -acceptability. But even if the French contention in that respect were -reasonable, it is ruled out by the circumstance that in this note the -German government have proposed an alternative if the figure they -offer is considered unacceptable. That alternative changes the whole -character of the note, when you come to judge of the question of its -_bona fides_. This proposition consists in the complete and categorical -acceptance by the German government of Mr. Secretary Hughes's famous -New Haven suggestions. It will be recollected that, as a way out of -the reparations entanglement, he proposed that an international expert -commission should be set up to inquire into the question of the amount -which Germany is capable of paying, and the best method of discharging -her obligations once they were fixed. Mr. Hughes made it clear that the -United States of America were prepared to assist in such an inquiry. -It is this that lent such significance and importance to his speech. -When I first read that speech I thought it of such moment that I cabled -from Spain to the British and American papers my earnest hope that the -Allies, about to sit in conference in Paris, would immediately consider -its terms, and act upon it. It seemed to me the supreme opportunity -for placing the vexed question which is fretting Europe almost into -nervous paralysis on a pathway which must inevitably lead to a real -settlement. The more I think of that proposal, the more am I convinced -that it was right, and the more am I perplexed by the rude indifference -with which it was treated by the Allied governments. To this hour I am -baffled to explain why those who are anxious for a conclusion never -brought this momentous declaration of American readiness to take a hand -to the notice of the conference. I can suggest explanations, but none -which is not a grave reflection on the way in which the proceedings -of that conference were handled. I can understand those who wish to -exploit reparations for ulterior purposes being anxious to keep America -out of the business. But why did Britain, Italy and Belgium neglect -this chance of securing the association of the one power which could -be helpful to the Allies in reaching a fair and sound decision, and -what is equally important, helpful in all subsequent operations for -cashing that decision? Now Germany states categorically that, if her -cash tender is unacceptable to the Allies, she is willing to leave the -question of the amount she is capable of paying to an international -tribunal on which America is represented, and to abide by the decision -of that tribunal, whatever it may be. That is in substance Mr. -Secretary Hughes's suggestion. How can a note containing so reasonable -a proposal, and a proposal originally emanating from so powerful and so -friendly a quarter, be treated as if it were an insult to the dignity -of France--and of Belgium! To declare--as the French note does--that -the Hughes proposition is an abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles is -to ignore the provisions of that treaty. As a matter of fact it would -be a restoration of the treaty. As I have repeatedly pointed out, -that treaty delegated the question of the amount which Germany has to -pay in respect of reparations to an Allied commission on which the -United States of America was to be represented. The function of this -commission was to assess the amount of the damages for which Germany is -responsible under the treaty, and then to adjudicate on the capacity of -Germany to pay those damages in whole or in part. - -The commission was authorised to fix the amount of the annual -payments to be demanded of Germany on the double basis of liability -and capacity. The withdrawal of the only country which had no direct -interest in reparations from the treaty left the commission a lop-sided -and highly prejudiced tribunal. The reparations commission no longer -carries out the treaty idea. Its character has completely changed. -It is essential in order to adhere to the Treaty of Versailles that -America should have a representative on the tribunal that fixes the -payments to be exacted from Germany. The German government now offer -to submit the fate of their country to the unaltered clauses of the -treaty which was signed in the Galerie des Glaces in June, 1919. -France and Belgium have no right in honour to demand submission to any -other. Because they insist on enforcing something which is entirely -different from the contract entered into by them with Germany in -1919, Europe is disquieted and international relations are saturated -with the inflammable spirit of resentment, hatred, and revenge. No -wonder Marshal Foch is touring Central Europe to put the Allied armies -in order! He seems to me to be the one man in France who has an -understanding of what all this is leading up to. - -_London, May 14th, 1923._ - - - - -XVII - -THE SECOND GERMAN NOTE - - -The Germans have tried another note. Inasmuch as all the Allied press -without exception are agreed in describing it as a great improvement -over the first, it is hardly worth while taking up time and space -to demonstrate how the essentials of this more favoured document -were contained in its reprobated predecessor. Psychologically it is -a decided advance on the first note. It is crisp and condensed, and -does not indulge in the irritating processes of an argument. You -should never attempt to argue with an angry man who is brandishing a -bludgeon--unless you are at a safe distance from him. Germany is in -this case at his feet. The second German note therefore is wise in -avoiding the provocation of an appeal to reason. It makes its offer -simply and uncontentiously. - -It also suggests a number of substantial guarantees for the payment of -interest on the loans to be raised for reparations purposes. I cannot -pretend to assess the value that would be attached to these _gages_ by -prospective borrowers. I have no doubt they would add materially to the -security of the investment. But this array of securities standing alone -will not entice the investor to risk his money on a German reparations -loan. He will look at Germany as a whole, and not in parts. He will -want to know what is likely to happen to that great country during -the coming years, and to its industry, its finance, its politics, and -its people. A railway which collects its rates and fares in a corrupt -currency is of no use as a security for any loan--a customs revenue -collected in a fugitive coin is equally worthless. The only reliable -basis for a loan is a stable Germany. You can have no stable Germany -until you settle reparations. That is, therefore, the first essential -preliminary to all discussions on _gages_ be they _productifs_ or -otherwise. - -Hence the propositions that really matter in the German note are not -those which give a schedule of guarantees, but those which bear on -the fixation of the amount which Germany is to be called upon to pay. -On this question the note does not increase the sum which the first -note estimated as the limit of German capacity. But it reaffirms the -readiness of the German government to submit the consideration of the -capacity of Germany to pay to an impartial tribunal. It offers to place -at the disposal of this body all the material which is necessary to -enable it to arrive at a just conclusion. It proceeds to suggest that -all further discussion on the subjects at issue between the parties -should take place at a conference rather than by interchange of notes. -How can any unprejudiced person refuse to recognise the essential -reasonableness of this part of the offer? It is common ground that -the annuities imposed upon Germany in May, 1921, demand modification. -Even M. Poincaré proceeds on that assumption. There is, therefore, a -most important and highly difficult figure to be ascertained. What -annuity can Germany pay? And when will she be in a position to pay? -Is it unreasonable to propose that this question which involves a -most searching examination into German assets should be referred to -a tribunal which would be capable of giving it calm and judicial -consideration? And what objection can there be to discussing the -matter at a conference where Germany as well as all the Allies would -be represented? If this were a business or a trade dispute these two -proposals would be regarded as eminently sensible and fair, and the -party that rejected them would be condemned by public opinion. - -What are the objections to acceptance formulated by the French press? -Up to the date of writing this article the French government have not -officially expressed their views on the German note. But one may safely -assume from past experience that Parisian journalists consulted the -Quai d'Orsay before writing their critical articles. - -The first is that the French government will discuss no proposals -emanating from Germany until the latter withdraw its passive resistance -to French and Belgian exploitation of the Ruhr. What does this exactly -mean? If it imports--as a preliminary condition to conference or -consideration of terms--an acquiescence by Germany in the occupation -and exploitation by France and Belgium of the Ruhr valley until -reparations be fully paid, then the position is hopeless. A German -government may submit to such an occupation because it has no force -at its command to offer resistance. But no German government can -give assent to such an invasion of its territories. A peace signed -on such terms would inevitably be repudiated at the first favourable -opportunity. Meanwhile there would be constant friction and trouble in -the Ruhr. I can hardly believe that this is what the French government -mean to insist upon, in spite of an article in the _Temps_ which bears -that interpretation. But they may only ask that whilst terms are being -discussed an armistice shall be concluded, the first condition of which -will be that all obstacles now interposed in the way of supplying -France, Belgium, and Italy with reparation coal and coke shall be -withdrawn. An armistice on those terms ought not to be difficult to -arrange, especially if the French and Belgian authorities withdraw the -ban they have placed on the export of Ruhr products to the unoccupied -parts of Germany. Unless the terms are mutually accommodating, I -surmise that the German government will experience an insurmountable -difficulty in persuading the stubborn miners and railway operatives -of the Ruhr to assist in furnishing to France the products of their -labour which are denied to their own fellow-countrymen. It is too -readily taken for granted that the Ruhr workmen will obey any behest -that comes from Berlin. Governments in Germany have ceased to receive -that kind of obedience. It is one of the indirect consequences of the -great disaster that the decrees of Wilhelmstrasse no longer command -the respect which attached to them in pre-war days. Still, a conference -at which all the interests concerned were represented would experience -no difficulty in fixing up stipulations which would make it possible -for France to enter a conference on reparations without any suspicion -being attached to her ministers that they had lowered the national flag -on entering the room. I trust that good sense will prevail over temper -and exaggerated pride--on both sides. - -Should this preliminary point of honour be disposed of, then what -remains? The fixation of the annuities and the guarantees for their -payment. What are the objections to accepting the method put forward in -the German note for these two points? It is not the German method--it -is the American method adopted by the German government. A conference -with an impartial tribunal if conference fails. I know of no other way -except a resort to blind force. - -It is objected that the Treaty of Versailles has already provided such -a tribunal in the reparations commission for the specific purpose of -adjudicating upon Germany's liability and Germany's capacity, and that -to set up another for exactly the same purpose would be to supersede -that treaty. There are two answers to this contention. The first is -that the reparations commission as at present constituted is not the -body to which Germany agreed to refer these questions so vital to -her existence. It is not the body which Britain and the other Allies -contemplated. The withdrawal of America from the commission--after -Germany had already signed the treaty--has completely changed the -balance and therefore the character of this tribunal. No man in his -senses can pretend that in its mutilated form it is either impartial -in its composition or judicial in its methods. M. Poincaré does not -conceal the fact that the French government issues orders to its -representative on that "judicial" body. The chairman is an eminent -French deputy who has played and still plays a conspicuous and -influential part in French politics, and is looking forward to pursuing -his career as a politician whithersoever it may lead. Ever since he has -been chairman he has delivered speeches in public denouncing the party -of whose case he is supposed to be the chief judge. All his colleagues -represent powers who have a direct pecuniary interest in the result of -their decisions. The only disinterested power has retired from the -commission. The American proposal is very moderate. It implies the -restoration of the treaty by reintroducing America to the body that -settles reparations. If France objects to the appointment of a separate -commission why should it not be agreed between the Allies that their -representatives on the body of experts to be set up shall be the men -who now constitute the reparations commission? To these the American -government could add their nominee. Germany has a right under the -treaty to present her case. The whole question of capacity could then -be gone into in the light of the experience acquired during the last -four years, and a settlement could thus be effected on a sound basis. -Such settlement would have a much better chance of being workable, and -therefore more durable than terms imposed by force on a people who only -accept under duress. - -But whatever the French view may be of the suggested annuities or -guarantees, or of the impartial commission, it is inconceivable -that they should reject the conference. It is the surest road to -reparations. At Spa the method of pelting the bewildered Reich with -demand notes was for a time abandoned, and that of conference at the -same table was substituted. The results were admirable. The process of -disarmament made immediate strides towards satisfactory completion, -and the coal deliveries became fuller and steadier. At Cannes last -year the Allies once more started to confer with German ministers. All -those who were present at those discussions--without exception--admit -that satisfactory progress was being made towards a comprehensive -settlement when the conferees were scattered by a bomb. It is too -early yet to estimate the loss which inured to Europe through that -explosion. But all idea of discussion between the parties has since -been loftily and petulantly dismissed as an exhibition of pernicious -weakness. What has been substituted for it? For twelve months we had -rather a ridiculous display of feather-rustling about the farmyard to -inspire terror. Threatening speeches full of ominous hints of impending -action were delivered at intervals in different parts of France. These -produced nothing but increased confusion and incapacity to pay. Every -speech cost France milliards in postponed reparations. French opinion -not unnaturally insisted on some action being taken. Hence this rash -invasion. At Cannes a two-year moratorium would have been accepted as a -settlement. Already a year and a half of that period would by now have -elapsed. German finances would, under the strict Allied supervision -which was conceded, by now have been restored to soundness--the mark -would have been stabilised, and a loan could have been negotiated which -would have provided the Allies with substantial sums towards lightening -the burdens they are all bearing. Confidence would have been restored -in Europe, and for the first time there would have been real peace. -One can see what the alternative has produced. Whatever the final -terms may be, Germany is not in a financial position to pay what she -was able to offer then. These eighteen months have been devoted to -reducing assiduously German capacity to pay Allied debts, and the value -of the German security for such payment. At Cannes the mark stood at -770 to the pound sterling. It now stands at 500,000. Germany will need -an extended moratorium to recover from the clumsy mishandling of the -past year and a half. The mark has to be picked up out of the abyss -into which it has been thrown by those whose interest it was to lift -it out of the depression wherein it lay. A debtor on whose restored -health and nerve payment entirely depends has been violently pushed -down several flights of stairs. It will take him a long time to recover -from the bruises, the shake, and the loss of blood. What an achievement -in scientific debt collecting! If reparations are ever to be paid the -Allies must retrace their steps and get back to conference. Once the -parties--all the parties--sit round the table I feel assured that the -common sense of most will in the end prevail. We shall never get back -what has been lost during 1922-23, but we shall get something that will -help. It will take some time to set up the tackle for hoisting the mark -out of the crevass and some to do the winding. But the sooner a start -is made the less winding there will be to do. So for everybody's sake -it is high time to stop the strutting and get back to business. - - - - -XVIII - -THE NAPOLEONIC DREAM - - -What a muddle it all is! France and Germany are both anxious to settle -in the Ruhr, but are too proud to admit it. The struggle, therefore, -goes on, and will continue to the detriment of both. Belgium is sorry -she ever entered the Ruhr, but cannot get out of it. Every time she -tries to get away France pulls her back roughly by the tail of her -coat, so she has to do sentry-go at Essen whilst her franc is leading -a wild life at home. Italy has forgotten that she ever sanctioned -the occupation, and her moral indignation is mounting rapidly, -although it has not yet risen to a height which is visible across -the Alps. Great Britain is growling futile notes of dissatisfaction -with everybody--France and Germany alike. The confusion of tongues is -deafening and paralysing, and no one is quite happy except the spirit -of mischief who is holding his sides with ghoulish laughter. He never -had such a time--not since the Tower of Babel. And this time it may -end in a second deluge. - -The horror of the Great War seems to have unhinged the European mind. -Nations do not think normally. The blood pressure is still very high. -The excitement over the Ruhr does not tend to improve it. When some -of the articles written and speeches delivered to-day come to be read -by the diligent historian a generation hence, he will recognise there -the ravings of a continent whose mental equilibrium has been upset -by a great shock. The real issue involved in all this struggle is a -comparatively simple one. How much can Germany pay and in what way -can she pay? America, Britain, Italy and Germany are all agreed that -the only way to settle that question is to appoint competent experts -to investigate and report upon it. The Pope also has blessed this -reasonable suggestion. France, on the contrary, says it is a question -to be determined by guns and generals--both equally well fitted for -that task. Germany must present her accounts to the mitrailleuse and -argue her case before the soixante-quinze. It is a mad world. - -Every one is interested in one question--or perhaps two. How will -it all end and how soon is that end coming? Although I have nothing -to fear from recalling the predictions of my early articles on this -subject, I hesitate to hazard a fresh forecast. But one may review the -possibilities and note the drift of the whirling currents. In assessing -the chances, you must begin with some knowledge of the man who will -decide the event. M. Poincaré is possessed of undoubted ability and -patriotism, but he is also a man who lives in a world of prejudices so -dense that they obscure facts. You have but to turn to one statement -in his last note where he says the conferences and ultimatums of the -past four years secured nothing from Germany. What are the facts? -During the three and a half years that preceded the Ruhr invasion, -Germany paid to the Allies in cash and in kind over ten milliards of -gold marks,--£500,000,000 in sterling, 2,000,000,000 in dollars--a -considerable effort for a country which had but lately emerged out of -the most exhausting of wars and whose foreign trade was down sixty to -seventy per cent. You might imagine that a man who had taken the grave -step of ordering armies to invade a neighbour's territories would also -have taken the trouble to ascertain the elementary facts of his case. -Part of this gigantic sum went to pay for Armies of Occupation; part -for Reparations, but it all came out of German assets. Will the next -three and a half years bring anything approximating that figure to the -Allied coffers? - -It is a safe statement to make that no one in charge of the French -movements anticipated a resistance approaching in its stubbornness to -that which they have encountered. The friendly Press, both in France -and in England, foretold a speedy collapse of the German opposition, -and on this assumption all the French plans were based. During the -first days of the occupation an Englishman asked a French officer -how long he thought it would take. The answer is indicative of the -spirit in which the venture started: "Optimists think it will take -a fortnight," he said; "pessimists think it may take three weeks." -A reference to the January telegrams from Paris and Düsseldorf will -show that this officer accurately expressed the general sentiment of -those who were responsible for the Ruhr invasion. Soldiers estimate -the chances of resistance in terms of material and trained men, and -statesmen too often build their hopes on the same shallow foundation. -They never allow for the indomitable reserves of the human heart, -which do not figure in Army Lists or Statesmen's Annuals. The -resistance of Paris in 1870 was as confounding to Bismarck as the -stubbornness of the Ruhr miners is to Poincaré to-day. The last regular -army had been destroyed, all docketed food stores exhausted, and still -the struggle of the devoted citizens went on for months. There were -few men in England who thought the Boer peasants could continue their -resistance for more than three months after our armies reached South -Africa. The three months ran into three years and only then capitulated -on honourable terms. The Northern States of America never contemplated -the possibility of a five years' struggle with a blockaded, starved -and overwhelmed Confederacy. The War of 1914-18 is littered with -miscalculations attributable to the blind refusal of rulers and their -advisers to recognise the moral element as a factor in the reckoning. -The Ruhr tragedy is not the first, nor indeed may it be the last, to -be initiated by facile memoranda framed by General Staffs and civilian -functionaries, drawing their inspiration from pigeonholes. - -Whatever may transpire in the Ruhr it is already clear that the -estimates of military men, of transport officials, of intelligence -departments, and of presiding Ministers, have been hopelessly -falsified. Many more soldiers have been sent into the Ruhr than had -been thought necessary: a great deal less coal has come out of the -Ruhr than had been confidently expected. There are already as many -Frenchmen in the Ruhr as Napoleon commanded at Waterloo; and they -have succeeded in sending across the frontier in six months only as -much coal as the Germans delivered in one month during the period of -"default" which provoked the invasion. Desperate efforts have been -made at great cost to increase the yield with a view to satisfying -French and foreign opinion that resistance is gradually breaking down. -Rubbish is shovelled into wagons in order anyhow to swell the quota. -Coal is seized anywhere, even in the streets. And Monsieur Trocquer, -the bluff and genial Breton in charge of the transport arrangements, -breezily challenges all the critics to look at the mounting pyramids of -his dustcart collection and rejoice with him in the triumph of French -organisation under his control. Alas, the Celtic fire of Monsieur -Trocquer, even when fed by the sweepings of the Ruhr, cannot keep -going the blast furnaces of Lorraine! So we find disappointment and -discontent amongst the forge-masters of France. - -But there is a limit to human endurance. Either France or Germany must -give way in the end. Which will it be, and when will it come--and how? -In answering these questions one must remember that for France the -honour of her flag is involved in success. Failure would irretrievably -damage her prestige. Every Frenchman knows that. That is why French -statesmen who disapprove of the invasion support the Government in -all their proposals for bringing it to a successful end. And here -France has a legitimate complaint against her Allies. It is useless -for Italy now to counsel wisdom. Signor Mussolini was present at the -"hush Conference" which sanctioned the invasion. He fixed the price of -assent in coal tonnage. That price has been regularly paid. Belgium -is now becoming scared at the swelling magnitude of the venture. But -she committed her own honour as well as that of France to carrying it -through. I regret to think that Britain is not free from responsibility -in the matter. It is true that her representatives disapproved of the -enterprise, but not on grounds of right or justice. On the contrary, -whilst expressing grave doubt as to the ultimate success of the -invasion they wished the French Government well in the undertaking on -which they were about to embark. Not one of the Allies is in a position -with a clean conscience to urge France to haul down her flag. There is -only one course which could be urged on the French Government as being -consistent with French honour, and that is the reference of the dispute -to the League of Nations. Such a reference would be an enforcement of -the Treaty of Versailles. That suggestion the British Government have -refused to press on France. The struggle must, therefore, proceed to -its destined end. - -It may be assumed that the British Government will not intervene -effectively. How about the ministerial declarations? Surely these -strong words must be followed by strong action! Those who rely on that -inference know nothing of the men who use the words or of the forces -upon which they depend for their ministerial existence. It is true -that some weeks ago Mr. Snodgrass took off his coat and proclaimed -cryptically, but fearlessly, that unless peace was restored on his -terms something would happen. The French Government, unperturbed, -replied that they meant to persist in their course. So last week Mr. -Snodgrass takes off his waistcoat. But do not be alarmed: there will -be no blows: his friends will hold him back. Meanwhile, Mr. Winkle -has left for Paris in order to lunch with one of the combatants. Next -week he will be followed by Mr. Pickwick, who will call on another, -and the week after Mr. Tupman proposes to pay another propitiatory -visit. It will be an incalculable advantage to M. Poincaré that they -each represent a different and conflicting point of view. The French -have accurately taken the measure of the mind and muscle of those -who indulge in these spectacular exhibitions of ball punching in -Westminster with cakes and ale at Rambouillet. We may therefore assume -that whatever conversations take place at these general gatherings or -ensue from them, the French will not be talked out of the Ruhr. - -From the emphatic declarations made by the head of the French -Government it is gathered that France will insist at all costs on -enforcing her will. She has put forward two demands. The first is that -Germany shall abandon passive resistance as an essential preliminary to -negotiation. The second is that her forces should remain in the Ruhr -until the last payment is made. Will the German Government accept -these conditions? A settlement on these terms is only possible on two -assumptions. The first is that a German Government can be found strong -enough to accept them and to survive their acceptance. The second -is that there is a French Government wise enough to give a liberal -interpretation to these demands. The first depends to a large extent on -the second. - -The events of the past few months have added immeasurably to the -difficulties of negotiation. Incidents inseparable from a foreign -occupation in any land have exasperated German opinion and reached -depths of hatred which had never been stirred even by the Great -War--the deportation of 75,000 Germans from their homes in the Ruhr -area, the repression, the shooting, the starving, the holding up -of food trains until essential supplies rot. The myriad insolences -of unchallengeable force, the passions which make French policy so -intractable are entirely attributable to the German occupation of -France. Frenchmen are now sowing the same seeds of anger in the German -breast. Hatreds are bad negotiators. That is why I despair of a real -settlement. - -But Germany may collapse. She might even break up, temporarily. The -authority of the Central Government has already largely disappeared. -There is practically no collection of taxes. The mark has gone down -in a little over a week from 1,000,000 to the £ to 27,000,000.[3] How -can any Government collect taxes in such a fugitive and attenuated -currency? You might as well try to collect land taxes on the tail of -a comet. The state of the currency is but a symptom of the general -disintegration. Berlin has ceased to wield any influence in Bavaria, -and the Monarchy might be restored in that Province at no distant -date. There is a movement in the Rhineland to set up a Republic freed -from the dominion of Prussia. This movement is fostered by French -agencies and financed by French subventions. If it is declared Prussia -will not be allowed to suppress it. We may, therefore, soon witness -a Rhineland Republic whose glorious freedom and independence will be -jealously guarded against internal as well as external foes by the -coloured warriors of Senegal and Cochin-China. Saxony might be captured -by Communists and Prussia be torn between Monarchist and Communist. -These are not unlikely happenings. Is it too much to say they are -not altogether out of the computation of French statesmanship? If -Germany dissolves, then the Rhineland and the Ruhr would remain under -the dominion of France. France would not secure reparations, but she -would enjoy security, and she would, so it is conjectured, enormously -enhance her power in the world. An old French dream would be realised. -The work of Bismarck would be undone and the achievement of Napoleon -would be restored and perpetuated. There is an old Welsh adage which -says that it is easy to kindle a fire on an old hearthstone. This -idea of a Rhineland under French domination is the old hearthstone -of Charlemagne. Mazarin sought to relight its flames. Napoleon the -First kindled on it a blaze that scorched Europe. Napoleon the Third -had hopes of warming his chilling fortunes at the glow of its embers, -and now the great victory of 1918 has set French ambitions once more -reviving the fires on the old hearthstone of a Rhineland ruled by the -Frank. - -Altogether it is a bad look-out for Europe. - -_London, August 6th, 1923._ - -FOOTNOTE: - -[3] Since this was written the mark has fallen far beyond. - - - - -XIX - -IS IT PEACE? - - -The Charleville speech[4] and M. Poincaré's reply to Lord Curzon's -despatch[5] leave things exactly where they were. Rumour said the reply -would be long and logical. For once rumour hath not lied. M. Poincaré -regards this exchange of bolstered notes as a pillow fight which he -is quite prepared to prolong in order to gain time whilst the real -struggle is developing to its destined end. The prominence given in the -press to the fact that this rigid reply is "courteous" is significant -of the pitiable condition to which the Entente has been brought by -these maladroit negotiations. - -What will Mr. Stanley Baldwin and Lord Curzon do next? Much depends -for Europe on that next step, and something for them also hangs upon -their action or inaction. One is reminded of the answer given by Émile -Ollivier to the question addressed to him as to his opinion of one of -Napoleon the Third's experiments in constitutional government: "Si -c'est une fin, vous êtes perdu; si c'est un commencement, vous êtes -fondé." That sage comment is equally applicable to the Curzon note. - -We can only "wait and see," first for the French official reply, and -second for the decision of the British Government upon that note. -The only new factor in the situation that may have a determining -influence on events is the accession of Herr Stresemann to the German -Chancellorship.[6] I know nothing of him beyond newspaper report, -but he is generally supposed to be a man of energy, courage and -resource. If that be true, his appointment to the official leadership -of the German people may be an event of the first magnitude. We shall -soon know what he is made of. Germany has suffered more from weak -or misguided leadership in recent years than any great country in -the world. It blundered her into the War, it blundered through the -War, it blundered into the armistice, it blundered during the peace -negotiations, and it has blundered her affairs badly after the peace. -But no one can predict what Germany is capable of with a wise and -strong leadership. Herr Stresemann has a responsibility cast upon him -and an opportunity afforded him such as have not been given to any -statesman since the days of Stein and his coadjutors for regenerating -his country and lifting her out of the slough of despond in which she -has been sinking deeper and deeper. Those who ignore the effect which -powerful and magnetic personalities may have upon the fortunes of -nations in despair must have forgotten their history books. The fall of -Dr. Cuno and the rise of Herr Stresemann may well turn out to be a more -decisive event than the despatch or the publication of the Curzon note. -But if he lacks those rare qualities which alone can inspire a people -in an emergency to heroic action and endurance, then there is nothing -but chaos ahead of Germany. For the moment it is more important to keep -a discerning eye on Herr Stresemann than to watch this endless fencing -between Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay. - -It is not often I find myself in agreement with M. Poincaré, but -when he states that British unemployment is not attributable to the -occupation of the Ruhr I am substantially in accord with him. In -July last[7] I called the attention of the House of Commons to world -conditions which injuriously affected our export trade and made -unemployment on a large scale inevitable in the British labour market -for some time to come. We are more dependent on our overseas trade, -export, entrepôt, shipping and incidental business than any country in -the world. Almost half our industrial and commercial activities are -associated with outside trade in all its forms. That is not a full -statement of the case, for if this important section of our business -were to languish, the home trade would also necessarily suffer by the -consequential diminution in the purchasing capacity of our people. -Before the French ever entered the Ruhr our overseas trade was down -to 75 per cent. of its pre-war level. Our population has increased -by two millions since 1913; our taxation has increased fourfold; our -national debt tenfold; but our business is down 25 per cent. To what -is this fall in our outside sales and services attributable? It is -the direct consequence of the War. Our customers throughout Europe -are impoverished. What is just as bad, our customers' customers are -impoverished. So that neither can buy at our stalls the quantities or -the qualities which they could be relied upon to purchase before the -War. Until Europe can buy, Australia, Canada, India and China cannot -pay, as the Prime Minister pointed out in his last speech in the House -of Commons. Germany, before the War, bought Australian wool, Canadian -grain, Indian jute and tea, and the proceeds as often as not went to -pay for goods bought by those countries in British markets. The same -observation applies to Russia, Austria, and the Levantine countries. -The purchasing capacity of Europe must, therefore, be replenished, -a process which will, at best, take years of patient industry. The -mischief of the Ruhr lies not in the creation of bad trade, but in -retarding the process of recovery. It has undoubtedly had that effect. - -Before the French entered the Ruhr trade was gradually if slowly -improving all round. The prices of 1922 were lower than those of 1921; -therefore, the contrast in sterling was not as apparent as it became -on the examination of weights and measures. The export figures, -notably in manufactured goods, show a decided increase on those of -the preceding year. This advance is reflected in the statistics of -unemployment. During the first ten months of 1922 there was a reduction -of over 500,000 in the numbers of the registered unemployed. The -succeeding ten months give only a slight improvement. Something has -happened to arrest the rate of progress towards better times. This -is where the Ruhr comes in. Even if it is not, to quote the Prime -Minister, a penknife stuck in the watch and stopping the works, it is -certainly more than a grain of dust which has perceptibly slowed the -action of the sensitive machinery of trade. - -The effect of the Ruhr disturbance would continue for some time if the -penknife were removed now. For the moment M. Poincaré is wedging it in -more deeply and firmly. Even if he withdrew it now, the works would not -recover their normal steadiness for a long while. During these last -disturbing months Germany has become appreciably poorer. Her wealth -production has been depressed throughout most of her industrial areas. -To a certain extent Lorraine and Belgium have also been affected -adversely. The reservoir of wealth upon which industry draws has not -been filling up as it ought if the world is ever to recover. - -These things are hidden from France. She is a more self-contained -country than Britain--perhaps also a more self-centred country. Even -after the Napoleonic wars, which drained her best manhood and exhausted -her fine nervous virility, she suffered from no interval of economic -depression. Her great and victorious rival across the Channel lumbered -painfully through fifteen years of misery, poverty and distress. Her -own population, basking in the sunshine of prosperity, regarded across -the narrow waters, with a natural contentment, the dark fogs that -enveloped and drenched their old enemies. Commiseration or sympathy -from them at that time was not to be expected. We had fought them for -twenty years with an inveterate pertinacity and at last beaten them -to the ground and occupied their capital. To-day we suffer because we -helped to save their capital from foreign occupation and their country -from being humbled to the dust by a foreign foe. Neither in French -speeches, notes, nor articles is there any appreciation shown of that -cardinal fact in the situation. - -All that is clear at the moment is the stubbornness of the French -attitude. M. Poincaré has not so far receded one millimetre from his -original position. Threats and cajoleries alike are answered by a -repetition of the same formulæ, with the slight variations in word or -phrase which one would expect from a practised writer. But the theme -is always the same and the application is identical to the point -of monotony. He is not winning much coal out of his discourses and -literary exercises, but to do him justice he is getting something for -his country. Last year Lord Balfour, in the note he sent to the Allies -on behalf of the British Government, offered to forego all claims -for debts and reparations if Britain were secured against payment of -the American debt. That meant a surrender of claims aggregating over -£3,000,000,000 in return for an assured £1,000,000,000. A very handsome -and generous offer. The Curzon note proposes to surrender all our -claims for a precarious return of £710,000,000. The Ruhr occupation -has already brought down the British claim against the Allies by -£290,000,000. M. Poincaré may not be able to extract reparations out of -Germany, but in seven months he has succeeded in forcing £290,000,000 -out of Great Britain. He will certainly ask for more--and probably -receive it. - -Mr. Bonar Law was right when he said that under certain conditions -Great Britain would be the only country to pay a war indemnity. Those -conditions have arisen under his successors. - -_Criccieth, August 20th, 1923._ - -FOOTNOTES: - -[4] M. Poincaré's speech at Charleville on August 19th, on the subject -of French policy in the Ruhr. - -[5] The British note was sent to France, August 13th, 1923, and M. -Poincaré's reply was received on August 23rd. - -[6] The German Government fell on August 13th, 1923, and Herr -Stresemann succeeded Dr. Cuno as Chancellor. - -[7] House of Commons, July 16th, 1923. - - - - -XX - -WHAT NEXT?[8] - - -The pen-and-ink joust is suspended for a fortnight, whilst the figures -of British unemployment are leaping upwards. When the exhausted British -knights have been reinvigorated by French waters they will once more -charge full tilt at the French champion--at least, they will have made -up their minds by then whether they will shiver another fountain-pen -against his blotting-pad. - -This is the advice ponderously and pompously tendered them in inspired -articles. So far, the French nation is jubilant that M. Poincaré has -scored heavily on points. He is a defter penman, and, moreover, he -does not delegate his draughtsmanship to a Committee of Ministers, all -holding irreconcilable views as to how to proceed, when to proceed, and -whither to proceed, and amongst whom there is no agreement except on -one point--that no one quite knows what action to propose. - -Up to this last reply they cherished the vain delusion that the -French could be shelled out of the Ruhr by reproaches which were both -querulous and apologetic. That is not the way to shift continental -statesmanship from its purpose. The French Foreign Office is better -informed as to Cabinet divisions in this country than are the British -public. It knows that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary dare not -take measures which will hamper French action in the Ruhr. - -When the Tory Diehards placed co-operation with France in the forefront -of their programme they honestly meant it. For them it was not a mere -manoeuvre to unhorse the Coalition. They cannot, therefore, support an -attitude of resistance to French pressure on Germany. A refusal to join -France in squeezing Germany is to them a continuation of the evil of -the Coalition they overthrew with the help of Mr. Stanley Baldwin and -Lord Curzon. They will not tolerate it. - -That explains the impotence of British diplomacy in a situation which -is so critical to our existence as a great commercial people. The -Cabinet can agree on wordy notes; they are hopelessly divided as to -action. They have, therefore, dispersed far and wide to search for -fortuitous guidance hither and thither--some in the tranquillity of -their English country houses; some in the healing springs of France; -some in the mists of Scottish moorlands. Mayhap one of them will bring -home a policy acceptable to his colleagues. It is all very humiliating -to the Empire that raised ten millions of men and spent £10,000,000,000 -of its treasure to win the War. The net result of the voluminous -correspondence on which our rulers have concentrated months of anxious -wisdom and unwearying hesitancy is that the Allies whom we saved from -destruction refuse to move one inch out of their road to secure our -friendly companionship. They are marching resolutely in one direction, -whilst we are shambling along in another. - -We have travelled long distances from each other since January last, -and we are now altogether out of sight of the position we held in -common when we met the Germans at Cannes early last year.[9] The -Entente has never been more cordial than it was then--it has never -shown more promise of hopeful partnership for the peace of the world. -We were on the point of securing an amicable and businesslike -arrangement with Germany for the payment of reparations and of -concluding an agreement for protecting the frontiers of France and -Belgium against the possibility of future invasion. - -From these starting-points it was proposed that Britain, France, -Italy, and Belgium should advance together to a general settlement of -European problems in East and West--political, financial, economic and -transport. This we had agreed to do and, with the unity and goodwill -which then prevailed, could have accomplished. - -But M. Poincaré had no use for the dove of peace. He wanted to fly -his falcon. He had trained and bred it in the French farmyard, and -there it had brought down many a domestic bird successfully. When his -chance came he flew it at the wounded German eagle. It is poor sport, -and somewhat cruel, but it evidently gives great joy to Frenchmen of -a sort. The best are ashamed of it, but their voices are drowned in -the clamour of the unthinking. If the helpless bird is torn to pieces, -there is nothing in that for French or Belgian larders. - -Quite unintentionally the hawk has brought down the Entente also. -It may not be dead, but it has made its last flight. Henceforth -international arrangements will be on a less exclusive basis. France -is irrevocably committed to the exploitation of the Ruhr by force. -That is what "pay or stay" means. To that policy the majority in this -country are definitely opposed. If the Diehards in the Cabinet were by -any chance to win, and either Mr. Baldwin surrendered or resigned in -favour of a Poincarist administration in this country, neither he nor -any possible successors could carry the country along into the Ruhr -venture. - -Some of them around the Prime Minister who have so suddenly assumed -pro-French sentiments as the shortest cut to higher altitudes than -those to which they have yet succeeded in climbing, know full well -that, although they may use the Diehards for their own ends, if they -succeeded in their somewhat sinister purpose they could not carry out -the Diehard policy. - -They are, therefore, endeavouring to provide for contingencies by -negotiating on their own a fresh understanding with France. But British -Premiers are not appointed at Rambouillet nor do they draw their -authority from the Quai d'Orsay. Whatever may be thought of Mr. Bonar -Law or of Mr. Stanley Baldwin by political partisans, no one suggests -that they derived their promotion from other than purely British -sources. - -But for a fortnight nothing is to happen--except the spread of -unemployment in Britain and of despair in Germany. At the end of the -fortnight will there be a surrejoinder to M. Poincaré's rejoinder? Or -will there be another conference? - -Both M. Poincaré and the present Parliamentary régime in Britain came -into power on the cry of "Enough of these eternal conferences; let -us return to the good old diplomatic methods that prevailed before -the War"--and, they might add, "which helped to make it possible." -Nevertheless, Mr. Bonar Law's administration during its short tenure of -six months participated in four European conferences, and M. Poincaré, -during his eighteen months' official career, has found it necessary to -take part, directly, in five conferences, and directly and indirectly -in eight. The French Press are urging him on to add another to a record -which already beats that of M. Briand in the matter of "joy-riding"--to -quote the contemptuous Diehard name for international conferences -during Coalition days. - -It is a suspicious circumstance that those who were once resentful -and scornful of conferences should now be clamouring for one both here -and in France. The reason is scarcely concealed by ardent advocates of -the resumption of "picnic diplomacy." At the old conferences, so it is -contended, France was invariably forced to give way. Now she can and -will command the situation. - -There is a new note of confidence ringing through French despatches and -echoed in the French Press. France must get what she wants; Britain -must take what she is given. The French share of reparations must -first be assured--debts due to Britain can come out of what is left. -It is rather greedy, but characteristic, of the British that they -should expect to be paid what is owing to them! With their smug and -hypocritical Puritan temperament and outlook they insist that contracts -should be respected! France, for the sake of the Entente, will make -a concession even to British cupidity and pharisaism. It will permit -the British Empire to collect--not the whole of what is due to her, -but a much-reduced claim out of Germany once the French demand for -reparations is cashed or as good as cashed! - -To me this is a new France. During my years of discussion with French -statesmen I never heard this voice. I had three or four talks with M. -Poincaré, and I never heard him speak in these supercilious tones. -Impunity has developed them since to their present pitch of stridency. - -Belgium is to suggest a meeting of the Premiers. When it comes the -French minimum terms are to be rigid and unequivocal. Here they are:-- - - - 1. France must be paid her irreducible minimum of £1,300,000,000 - in respect of reparations, whatever happens to any one else. - - 2. Belgium is also to have her priority of £100,000,000. - - 3. As Germany cannot raise these huge sums immediately, France - and Belgium are to hold the Ruhr until they are paid. Hints have - been thrown out by the more conciliatory French journals that the - French Government might consider an early retirement from the - Ruhr if the payment of reparations were made the subject of an - international guarantee. That implies Britain and America becoming - sureties for payment of the German indemnity! - - 4. As to the rest, France and Belgium have no objection, subject - to the above conditions, to Great Britain collecting £700,000,000, - _i.e._, about 23 per cent., of her international claims (debts and - reparations) from Germany. But this munificent concession is to - be made on the distinct understanding that she forgoes entirely - the remaining 77 per cent. of her bonds. The Allies and Germany - between them owe Great Britain £3,000,000,000. The French and - Belgian governments are willing that Great Britain should collect - £700,000,000 of that amount from Germany, provided the remaining - £2,300,000,000 is for ever cancelled--and always provided that the - £1,400,000,000 due to France and Belgium has been satisfactorily - guaranteed. - - 5. These handsome terms can only be propounded if Germany first - of all withdraws all passive resistance in the Ruhr. That is an - essential preliminary. - - -The French government have stated these terms with such precision and -such emphasis, and repeated them with such undeviating insistence, -that any departure from them on the French side seems impossible. The -hope of a conference rests entirely on the confidence in a British -surrender. There is a dismal "joy-ride" in prospect for the British -Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary. Is it conceivable they -can contemplate such a capitulation? I do not see how the present -Government, after all it has said and written, can so far submit to -French dictation as to make it likely that further discussions would -lead to agreement. - -What is the alternative? Herr Stresemann can alone answer that -question. It is not yet clear what he means to do. Perhaps he is -feeling his way to a decision. - -_London, August 27th, 1923._ - -FOOTNOTES: - -[8] London, August 27th, 1923. - -[9] The Cannes Conference, January, 1922. - - - - -XXI - -THE BRITISH DEBT TO AMERICA - - -As I roll homeward along the coast of Spain a wireless message -announces that the British government have accepted the American debt -terms. - -The details which I have received are not sufficient to enable me -to form an opinion regarding the character of those terms, or their -bearing on Allied indebtedness to Britain as to the terms of payment. -I know nothing of the steps taken by Mr. Baldwin and the government -of which he is a member to make this the first step in an all-round -settlement of inter-Allied debts. That is a matter of infinite moment -to us, and I assume that this is somewhere--and effectively--in the -arrangement. - -As to the payment of our own debt, the government represent the real -sentiment of the nation as a whole. The British taxpayer is no doubt -fully alive to the fact that this heavy debt was incurred by him -during the war in the main in order to finance American supplies to -our Allies. We could have paid for all the supplies we required for -our own use without resort to any loan from the American government. -Nevertheless, the money was advanced by the lender on our credit and -our signature. - -Our credit as a nation, therefore, demands that we should pay. Whether -we can collect enough money from our own debtors to meet this charge -becomes increasingly doubtful, as it is becoming increasingly needful. - -Britain is alone in thinking she is under any moral obligation to pay -the external liabilities incurred for the effective prosecution of -the war. The attitude of the late and of the present government is -identical in this respect. - -Why have the British public taken a different view of their national -obligations towards external war debts from that adopted by other -Allies? In giving the answer I do not wish to dwell on obvious ethical -considerations which must weigh whenever you consider whether you will -carry out an engagement which you have entered into with another who -has already performed his part of the engagement on the strength of -your promise. - -These ought to be conclusive; but to urge them might be deemed to be -an unworthy reflection on the honour of those who take a different view -of their national duty. - -I have no desire to offer censure or criticism upon their decision. -They, no doubt, have their reasons for the course they are adopting. We -have certainly overwhelming reasons for showing an honest readiness to -pay our debts. - -The settling up of accounts is always an unpleasant business, -especially amongst friends. Strangers expect it and prepare for it--and -there is no resentment when the bill arrives. But a man hates reminding -his friend at the end of a business in which both have been engaged -in warm amity that there is "a little balance" to be paid up. He has -been expecting the friend to mention the matter to him. So he puts off -introducing the unpleasant topic from year to year. But the friend -disappoints his expectations. Not a hint comes from that quarter of any -realisation that there is anything due. It soon looks as if it had been -forgotten altogether. - -The friend is most insistent on collecting the business accounts due -to himself. He is angry at all delays in payment of his own bills. -But his conscience is blind on the side of the debts he himself owes. -It is not an uncommon experience, and we are suffering from it to-day. -The war left us a creditor nation to the extent of over 2,000 million -pounds, and a debtor nation to the extent of about half that amount. -We readily accepted an invitation from our creditor to discuss the -repayment of the debt we owe. Our debtors have displayed an invincible -reluctance to enter into a similar discussion with us. - -That ought not to influence our final decision. Britain is the greatest -of all international traders, and her credit rests on the reputation -she has well earned--that her bond is a sacred trust which her people -always honour and redeem without counting the cost in toil and -treasure. I remember when war broke out the panic which seized bankers -and brokers as they contemplated the obligations incurred by British -firms with their support to finance world trade. These liabilities ran -into hundreds of millions sterling, and the only security for repayment -was represented by a bundle of flimsy paper, criss-crossed with the -signatures of men most of whom no British banker had ever seen, many -of them dwelling in countries with whom we were actually at war. - -There was one signature, however, on each paper which was known to -bankers and carried with it the good name of Britain throughout the -world; and it was that of some well-known British firm. Traders in -far-distant lands parted with their produce on the credit of that -signature and of the country with which it was associated. - -It is true that the government had no responsibility for any of these -transactions; but the honour of Britain was involved in seeing that the -foreign merchants should not suffer ruin because they put their trust -in British commercial integrity. For that reason the British government -of the day shouldered the burden, took all the risk, and although it -meant a liability of between four hundred and five hundred millions -sterling, not a voice was raised in protest. - -The action then taken, though quite unprecedented, was not only -honourable; it was wise. It saved British pride from a reproach; it -also saved British credit from a blow from which it would not have -recovered for a generation. During that generation this lucrative -business would have passed into other hands. - -As soon as the war was over the people of Britain, with an instinctive -impulse that required no persuasion to stimulate its activity, set -about the task of restoring their war-battered credit. Government, -bankers, merchants, brokers, manufacturers, and workers of all kinds -were of one mind; borrowing must come to an end; Britain must pay her -way--whatever the sacrifice. Expenditure was ruthlessly cut down. The -army and navy were reduced below pre-war dimensions. Other services -were curtailed. Heavy taxation was imposed--taxation such as no -other country bears. The budget at home must balance. Debts to other -countries must be paid off. Already large sums have been paid abroad. -It required courage and constancy to pursue such a policy; but the -endurance of the nation was beyond praise. It is now calmly facing the -liquidation of this heavy debt to the United States of America; but no -party has yet arisen, or is likely to arise, to demand that the hand of -the negotiators should be arrested. Britain means to pay the last of -her debts without a murmur. - -We are already reaping some of the reward. The purchasing value of our -currency has already risen under its burdens, and, as a consequence, -the cost of living has fallen steadily, while other countries who have -pursued a different policy find the cost of living for their people -ascending month by month. - -A short time ago we were taunted in the French Chamber of Deputies by -the president of the council that our unsound financial policy had -been responsible for our unemployment. It is true that if we had gone -on borrowing instead of paying our way--if we had defied our foreign -creditors instead of paying them--we also, like many other European -countries, might have fostered an artificial prosperity by means of a -discredited currency. But British credit would have rapidly disappeared -beyond recovery and British trade would soon have followed. Meanwhile, -the cost of living in Great Britain would have been double what it is -to-day. We all therefore dismissed that policy from our minds without -paying it the tribute of a discussion. - -Trust is the only soil in which credit flourishes. Had that trust been -forfeited British buyers and consequently British consumers would -to-day have been paying more for their wheat, their meat, their -cotton, and their wool. The burden of repayment to the United States -will be infinitely less than that of the indirect burden involved in -large purchases with a discredited currency. - -The government are therefore right in arranging with the American -treasury without loss of time for the liquidation of a debt incurred by -this country. I am taking for granted that they have made every effort -to see that the agreement shall form a part of an all-round settlement -of inter-Allied debts. But as to our own debt the moral obligation -must remain whatever our Allies do or fail to do. Why it was incurred, -the circumstances in which it was entered into, the purposes for which -the money was advanced, were open to the consideration of the American -government in arranging terms. That, however, was their privilege; ours -is to honour our signature. - - - - -XXII - -INTER-ALLIED DEBTS - - -A cold shiver ran down the back of England when it was announced -officially that the British government had definitely agreed to pay -over £30,000,000 a year for sixty years to the United States in respect -of debts incurred by us on behalf of our Allies without seeking a -contribution from our debtors to protect the taxpayers of this country. -It is not that anyone dreamt the evil dream of repudiation. That was -never woven into the texture even of the worst nightmare out of the -many that have disturbed our repose since the greatest nightmare of all -left the world a quivering nervous wreck. - -Nor did we expect remission of our debts. Whenever we were tempted -to exaggerate the bounds of human charity paragraphs appeared that -reminded us of the attitude of the "Middle West." America was -discovered by Europe centuries ago, but the "Middle West," as a -political entity, is to untutored Europeans a discovery of the war. -We were then told by returning explorers that it was the seat of the -American conscience--inexorable, intractable, but irresistible when -engaged in any enterprise. How potent this conscience was, as a world -force, the war demonstrated. From the heights it hurled an avalanche -of force against Germany that overwhelmed the last hope of resistance. -Unfortunately for us when it came to debts we struck against the hard -side of the Middle West conscience. - -Our hope was therefore not in remission. There were, however, many -other possibilities. We were not the only debtors of the American -government. Other Allies had borrowed not merely indirectly through -us, but directly from America. We had every confidence that the United -States government would not mete out to Britain severer treatment -than it was prepared to accord to our Allies. We had to contend, it -is true, with legends of our inexhaustible wealth. Apart from our -great coal deposits, and a climate which leaves those who endure it -no alternative but activity, we have no treasure except the industry, -the resources and the inherited skill of our people. We have nothing -like the rich plains and the fertilising and ripening sunshine of -France, which maintain sixty per cent. of its population. Our sources -of wealth--apart from coal--are precarious, for they depend more -largely than any other country on conditions outside our own. We are -international providers, merchants and carriers. A sixty-year contract -to pay large sums across the seas is in many respects a more serious -consideration for us than for countries whose riches are inherent in -their soil and are, therefore, more self-contained. The demoralised -condition of the world markets has left us with a larger proportion -of our industrial population unemployed than any other European -country. I hear tales of unemployment in the United States of America, -but the reports that reach us here on American unemployment are so -contradictory that I can build no argument upon them. But, as to the -gigantic dimensions of our unemployed problem there can be no doubt. We -have 1,400,000 workmen on the unemployed register drawing unemployment -pay in one form or another. The annual cost to the nation of feeding -its workless population runs to over £100,000,000--almost the figure of -the annuity demanded from Germany as a war indemnity. - -Although there are signs of improvement the omens point to a prolonged -period of subnormal trade. Continuous depression for years will mean -that Britain will suffer more from the devastation to her trade caused -by the war than France from the devastation of her provinces. Our -country, anxious about its means of livelihood, with a million and a -half of its workmen walking the streets in a vain search for work, has -to bear the heaviest burden of taxation in the world. Why? Because it -has not only to pay interest on its own heavy war debts, but also on -£3,000,000,000 which it either advanced to the Allies or incurred on -their behalf. That is why we felt hopeful that the United States would -not discriminate against a nation so situated. - -When I talk of debts the Allies owe to us, I want to emphasise the -fact that these debts are not paper myths nor tricks of accountancy. -They are onerous facts representing a real burden borne at this hour -by the bent and panting taxpayer of Britain. If these loans had never -been made the weight on his shoulders to-day would have been lighter by -over two shillings in the pound. He is every year paying to the actual -lenders--some British, some American--that proportion of his income. -It is a weight he undertook to carry for his Allies during the war on -the sacred pledge of those Allies that they would take it over after -the war. The American government borrowed from their public to make -advances to Great Britain, and have called upon the British taxpayer to -redeem his pledge. We make no complaint, for the demand is a mitigation -of the strict letter of the bond. But that amount is in substance part -of the debt owing by the Allies to Britain. And the British taxpayer -naturally feels it is hard on him to have to bear not only his own -legitimate burdens but that he should in addition have to carry the -debts of his less heavily taxed brethren in continental countries. He -naturally inferred that if equal pressure had been administered on all -debtors alike it would have forced an all-around consultation which -would have terminated in an all-round settlement. - -That was the real purport of the Balfour note. The true significance -of that great document has been entirely misunderstood--sometimes -carelessly, sometimes purposely, sometimes insolently. I guarantee -that not one per cent. of its critics if confronted suddenly with an -examination on its contents would secure one mark out of a hundred. -It has suffered the same fate as the treaty of Versailles. Opinion -is sharply divided as to both between those who rend without reading -and those who read without rending. Most men have received their -impressions of the Balfour note from denunciatory phrases penned -by writers who received their ideas about it from men who gave -instructions to condemn it without ever reading it. The men who really -understood both the Versailles treaty and the Balfour note have been -too busy to find time to inform, to interpret, and to explain. - -But the time has come when the public attention should be once more -drawn to the remarkable and far-reaching proposals of the Balfour note. -They constitute an offer on the part of Britain to measure the amount -of her claims against her Allies by the extent of her obligations to -the United States of America. The British government even offered to -include the claim of their country against Germany in this generous -concession. What does that mean in reference to present conditions? -That if the Allies and Germany between them found the £30,000,000 a -year which Britain has undertaken to pay America, she would forgo her -claim to the £3,300,000,000 due to her under contract and treaty. -It was a great offer and if accepted would have produced results -beneficent beyond computation. Britain, which would have been the -heaviest direct loser, would have profited indirectly through the world -recovery that would have ensued. - -How was it received? Some criticised it because it asked too -little--some because it demanded too much. Many criticised because -they were determined to approve nothing that emanated from such a -government, but most of its censors condemned it because they never -took the trouble to understand it, and the shrillest among the street -cries happened to denounce it. The government that propounded it soon -after left the seat of authority, and the administration that succeeded -put forward a new scheme which attracted even less acceptance. So this -great project which would have settled for ever the question which -above all others is vexing peace and unsettling minds in Europe was -pigeon-holed where it was not already basketed. - -But surely this is not the end of all endeavours to reach a settlement -of the question of inter-Allied debts. We cannot rest satisfied with an -arrangement which effectively binds us to pay without prospect of the -slightest contribution from our debtors. What America cannot indulge -in we cannot afford. The gold of Europe now lies in its coffers. -Who are we--plunged in the mire of debt up to our nostrils--to give -ourselves airs of generosity superior to the only golden land left in -this war-stripped earth? - -If there is to be a general jubilee in which all alike participate in -order to give the world a new start, then I feel sure Britain will play -her part bravely and nobly. But a jerry-mandered jubilee which frees -France, Italy and Belgium from all their debts whilst leaving Britain -sweating to pay off debts incurred for her Allies on the strength of -their bond--that we cannot bear. - -I trust the government will insist on an arrangement with our Allies -which, even if it is not a replica of our contract with the American -government, will at any rate ensure us a contribution that will -safeguard us against loss under that contract. It is I fear hopeless -to expect that we should be recouped the 2_s._ in the pound which -interest on Allied debts costs our taxpayers, but at any rate we -might be guaranteed against the 6_d._ in the pound which the American -instalments involve. I feel the effort is beset with difficulties -and that the outlook is not hopeful. There have of late been a few -discouraging symptoms. One is the reception accorded at the recent -Paris conference to the British prime minister's liberal offer -regarding inter-Allied debts. It was a tactical error to open the -conference with such a scheme and the effect was singularly unfortunate. - -Had I been disposed to press my criticisms on the conduct of the recent -negotiations in Paris it would have been that they were so managed that -for the first time since the war Britain has been completely isolated -at a European conference. That is a misfortune, for it encouraged the -French government to rash action. Up to the last conference Britain and -Italy had remained in substantial accord even when France and Belgium -took a different view, and Belgium had never before quitted any of the -gatherings in complete disagreement with Great Britain. So France, -always tempted as she was to occupy the Ruhr, hesitated to do so in the -face of so formidable an Allied resistance. What is relevant, however, -to the subject of this article is the cause of our unwonted isolation -on the occasion of the last conference. The British premier started -the negotiations by tabling proposals which promised forgiveness of -most of the indebtedness of these countries to Britain, but which -implied immediate arrangements for beginning repayment of the rest. -This suggestion of repayment instantly consolidated opposition to the -whole of the British plan. It became clear that existing governments -on the continent had no intention, unless firmly pressed, of paying -the smallest percentage of the debt they incurred on the faith of a -solemn engagement to repay the loan when that was possible, and to pay -interest meanwhile. If we point to the fact as we did in the Balfour -note, that we have undertaken to repay the United States of America -the heavy debt incurred by us on behalf of the Allies, they simply -shrug their shoulders and say in effect: "That is your affair. We repay -neither Britain nor America, and there is an end of it." - -The other unpleasant incident is a speech delivered by M. Poincaré -in the French Chamber in the course of which he dealt casually with -the subject of inter-Allied indebtedness. The French prime minister -then announced categorically that France had no intention of paying -her debts until she has first received her share of reparations from -Germany. What does that mean in effect? That the France represented -by M. Poincaré has no intention of ever paying her debts. When -the colossal figure of German reparations is taken into account -thirty years is a moderate estimate of the period required for its -liquidation. Is the French debt to lie dormant carrying no interest -meanwhile? If it is, then the debt is practically wiped out, for the -present value of £500,000,000 debt payable thirty years hence is -insignificant. The present government of France have therefore declared -they do not mean to pay what France owes. Surely the time to dictate -the conditions of your repayment of a loan--when you propose to pay, -how much you propose to pay, or whether you mean to pay at all--is when -you are borrowing and not after you have spent the money. - -And yet in the same speech in which M. Poincaré serves up hot -platitudes for senatorial palates about the sanctity of national -obligations, he dismisses France's faithful ally with the cold comfort -that France is too busy collecting the accounts due to her to attend -to the debts she owes. I believe in my heart that there is a France -of which he is not the spokesman--a great France which will not treat -shabbily a faithful friend who stood by her in the hour of despair -and who is now staggering under unparalleled burdens incurred in the -discharge of the obligations of friendship. - -All this makes it more necessary that the situation should be cleared -up without undue delay. Having just completed negotiations for -liquidating our own war indebtedness to America we are in a position -to insist on a settlement with those on whose behalf we incurred that -indebtedness. If nothing is done the conditions will harden against us. -We shall be assumed to have accepted the Poincaré repudiation. I do not -know what conditions the government have made with the United States -government as to the marketability of the securities to be created in -funding our debt. If they are to be placed on the market the chance of -any future deal is destroyed. Ere that be done we must know where we -are in reference to our own claims. I trust the government will act -promptly. Delay was justifiable so long as we were in the same position -in reference to what we owed as what we claimed. The Baldwin settlement -has altered all that. If we do not insist on an arrangement now the -British taxpayer will have the fate of Issachar--that of the poor beast -between two burdens--his own and that of the Allies. - - - - -XXIII - -THE BRITISH ELECTIONS - - -It is the duty of every patriotic citizen, in view of the difficulties -with which the country is confronted, to assist the government of -the day by every means at his disposal. Factious criticism disturbs -judgment and tends to unnerve. Governments to-day require full command -of mind and nerve to enable them to arrive at sound decisions and to -persevere in them. Faction is, therefore, treason to the country. - -That does not, however, preclude a calm survey of the elections and -their meaning. Quite the contrary, for we must think of the future and -prepare for it. - -The result of the elections has fully justified those who maintained -that no party standing alone could hope to secure the measure of public -support which will guarantee stable government. It is true that the -Conservatives have succeeded in obtaining the return of a majority of -members to the new Parliament. But the most notable feature of the -elections is the return of a decisive majority of members by a very -definite minority of the electors. - -I observe that the prime minister, in returning thanks to the nation, -claims that he has received a vote of confidence from the people of -this country. Out of a total poll of fifteen millions his candidates -secured less than six million votes. Making full allowance for -uncontested seats, this figure cannot be stretched out to a height much -above six millions. - -That means that only two-fifths of the electorate voted confidence -in the administration, whilst three-fifths voted confidence in other -leaders or groups. A party which has a majority of three millions -recorded against it on a national referendum can hardly claim to have -received a national vote of confidence. - -It might be argued that when the question of confidence or no -confidence comes to be stated, the National Liberals having promised -co-operation, the votes recorded by them ought not to be placed on the -debit side of the confidence account. The basis of the appeal made by -the National Liberal candidates for support is practically that stated -by me in my Manchester speech: - -"The supreme task of statesmanship at this hour is the pacification of -the nations, so that the people shall have leisure to devote themselves -to the peaceful avocations of life, to fill up the depleted reservoirs -from which we all draw. - -"My course is a clear one. I will support with all my might any -government that devotes itself and lends its energy to that task -with single-mindedness, fearlessness, and with resolution--provided -it does not embark upon measures which inflict permanent injury upon -the country, whether these measures be reactionary or revolutionary. -That does not mean that I pledge myself to support inefficiency, -vacillation, or infirmity in any government or in any party. But any -government that does not pursue that course I will resist with all my -might. That is my policy." - -I have perused the addresses of many National Liberal candidates and I -have addressed many meetings in their constituencies, and I find that -their attitude towards the government is defined in these terms, with -purely verbal variations. The address of Mr. J. D. Gilbert, who won -Central Southwark, is a very fair sample taken out of the bulk: - - - "If you honour me again with your confidence I will support any - progressive measures brought forward by the present government or - any other government. I shall not offer factious opposition or - nagging criticism while our country is in difficulties at home or - abroad." - - -There may be one or two who went further, but none expressed confidence. - -I have made some inquiries as to the number of Conservative votes -polled by National Liberal candidates. I am informed that on an average -it represents less than one-third of the total. At the last election -167 National Liberal candidates were put up. They polled an aggregate -of 1,652,823 votes, that is, an average of 9,897 per candidate. What -proportion of this vote was Conservative? There is a good practical -method of testing this question. In sixty-two seats National Liberals -were fought by Conservative as well as by other candidates. In -these cases the average vote polled by National Liberals was 6,820. -That means that where the Conservatives supported National Liberal -candidates their votes would represent about 30 per cent. of the -poll for these candidates. On the other hand, the number of Liberal -votes polled by Conservatives, where a compact existed, at least -balances this account, for although the total in each constituency -does not equal the figures of the Conservative support in National -Liberal constituencies, still, that support was spread over many more -constituencies. - -The prime minister and his chief electioneering manager both -emphatically repudiated the suggestion that there was any pact between -Conservatives and National Liberals, and urged that there were only -local arrangements made between the candidates of the two parties for -their mutual convenience. - -As the head of the National Liberal group I expressed grave doubts as -to the composition of the ministry, and much apprehension as to the -language in which its policy was defined. That represents the general -attitude of the National Liberals toward the government. Their support, -therefore, cannot be claimed in totalling the votes recorded for the -government. - -The fact, therefore, remains that those who voted confidence in the -government represent only forty per cent. of those who went to the poll -and twenty-five per cent. of the total electorate. - -I place this fact in the forefront, because it is bound to have a -profound effect upon the course of events during--maybe beyond--the -lifetime of this parliament. It is the first time, certainly since the -Reform Act, that a pronounced minority of the electorate has succeeded -in securing the control of parliament and the government of the country. - -It would be idle to pretend that in a democratic country like ours, -thoroughly imbued with the spirit of representative government, this -does not weaken the moral authority of the government of the day. -Therefore, if the government is wise it will bear that fact in mind and -will not commit itself to policies which challenge the nine millions -who between them represent a majority of the people of this country. - -It is not a very good beginning to claim these striking figures as a -vote of confidence. I sincerely trust it does not indicate a resolve to -ignore, if not to defy, what is an obvious and ought to be a governing -factor in the policy of the government. - -A corollary to this curious working of our electoral system is to be -found in the under-representation of the other parties in the present -parliament, and unless representative government is to be discredited -altogether, the present parliament ought at once to devote its mind and -direct its energies to the discovery of some method and machinery which -will avert the danger which clearly arises from the working of the -present system. - -The parliament of 1918 undoubtedly gave a larger majority to the -government than the figures warranted. But the majority of votes cast -for government candidates was so overwhelming that under any system -of voting there would have been a larger working majority for the -government than that which the present government can command. So when -trouble arose it was not open to any section of the community to object -that the government had no authority because it did not represent the -electorate of this country. - -We are faced with a new danger to constitutional government. What -has happened at this election may be repeated at the next--but not -necessarily in favour of the same party. - -If we are to be governed by a succession of administrations who rule -in spite of the protest of a majority of the people, the authority of -government will be weakened beyond repair. - -The luck of the electoral table has this time favoured the -Conservatives. Next time it may turn in favour of the Labour Party. -They have at this election secured 55 seats out of a total of 141 by a -minority of votes. - -The conditions were, in many respects, against them. Their funds were -exhausted by the prolonged period of heavy unemployment. The trade -union movement was passing through an ebb tide in its prosperity, both -in funds and in members. There was a good deal of discontent with the -trade union leaders. Many workmen felt they had been let down badly by -some of their activities in industrial disputes. - -Moreover, Labour has been committed by visionaries to a rash experiment -which handicapped it severely in the election. Next time may be the -spring tide of Labour. They have learnt their lesson at the polls, and -are not likely to repeat the blunder of November, 1922. - -This time the votes cast for them have attained the gigantic aggregate -of four millions and a quarter. Supposing under those conditions they -add another two millions to their poll. Although the other groups may -secure between them nine millions of votes, Labour may have the same -luck as the Conservatives at the last election and be placed in power -by a decisive majority of members elected by a minority of votes. - -I am not going to speculate as to what may happen under those -conditions; the kind of legislation that may be proposed; the action -of the House of Lords in reference to it, provoking, as it undoubtedly -will, a fierce class conflict; or the turn given to administration in -the various departments of government. - -Of one thing I am, however, certain. That is, that as a minority -administration in 1922 and onwards will help to discredit government -with certain classes of the community, a minority Labour administration -would weaken the respect of other classes for representative -government, and between them an atmosphere will be created inimical to -the moral authority of all government in this country. - -I have many a time warned the public that, in spite of -appearances, this country is in many respects very top-heavy. It -is over-industrialised. Its means of livelihood are in some ways -precarious, and depend on conditions over which we have very little -control, and once something happens which may have the effect of -causing a lean-over either in one direction or in the other, it will be -more difficult to recover than in lands where the population depends in -the main for its livelihood upon the cultivation of the soil and the -development of the natural resources of the country. - -I therefore earnestly trust that in the interests of stability and good -government, which must be based on the goodwill and co-operation of the -community as a whole, this parliament will apply its mind seriously to -finding some means of preventing a repetition either in one direction -or another of this freak of representative government. - -Another feature of the election is the heavy vote polled by Liberal -candidates in spite of untoward circumstances. - -Whatever the difficulties of the Labour Party might be in this election -they were not comparable to those under which Liberalism fought the -campaign. It was divided by bitter internecine conflicts. The leaders -of one section seemed to be more intent on keeping representatives of -the other section out of parliament than on fighting for the common -cause. The bulk of their speeches was devoted to attacks on the leaders -of the other Liberal group, and there was not much room left for a -statement of the Liberal case. - -What happened in Manchester is typical. Here the rank and file took the -matter in hand and enforced agreement. Lord Grey was brought down to -bless it. But the whole of his benedictory speech consisted of a thin -and dreary drip of querulous comment on the leaders of the other group, -with a distinct hint that the return of a Conservative government would -be by no means a bad thing in the interests of the country. - -The speech was hailed by a Tory journal with the heading "Lord Grey -Supports Mr. Bonar Law." He then went straight to support Mr. McKinnon -Wood as candidate with a repetition of the same speech. Thence he -rushed off to reiterate the same performance at Bedford in support -of Lady Lawson, and he finished off by reciting it for two days at -meetings in support of Mr. Walter Runciman. - -No wonder that he succeeded in damping Liberal enthusiasm to such an -extent that his unfortunate protégés surprised even their opponents in -the poverty of the support given them at the polls. - -As soon as the coalition broke up the leaders of this Liberal section -met to consider the situation. The one positive result of their -deliberations was not the issue of a ringing appeal for unity on the -basis of Liberal principles, but a peevish intimation through the press -that efforts at unity were to be discouraged at the election. It was -clearly ordained that the Coalition Liberals should be crushed out. The -Conservatives spurned them, and the Independent Liberals gave notice -that they had no use for them. They were destined for extinction. Lord -Crewe's speech proceeded on the same lines. May I say how sincerely I -rejoice in the tribute to the "amateur diplomatist" which is implied -in the conferring by a Conservative government of the blue ribbon of -diplomacy upon the leader of the Independent Liberals in the House of -Lords? - -This precipitate and lamentable decision lost at least forty Liberal -seats, gave to the Conservatives their majority, and what is equally -important established the Labour Party as His Majesty's official -Opposition in the House of Commons. The latter is much the most -serious practical result of the decisions of the Independent leaders -to debar united action at the last election. If Liberals had united -when the Coalition came to an end, Liberalism might have polled five -million votes. It would have now held a powerful second position in -parliament, and the country and the nation would have looked to it in -the future as it has hitherto done in the past for the alternative to -"Toryism." Instead of that it is a poor split third. How could they -expect to win at the polls? The National Liberals were pursued into -their constituencies. Thirty-five National Liberal seats were assailed -by Independent Liberal candidates. I am not making a complaint, but -offering an explanation. Whatever the views of the National Liberal -leaders might have been on the subject of Liberal unity they were given -no chance to effect it, and although they entered into no national -compact with the Conservatives their followers in certain areas had no -option but to negotiate local arrangements with the Conservatives for -mutual support. The implacable attitude of the Independent Liberals -left them no choice in the matter. - -What was the inevitable result? No real fight was put up for Liberal -principles on either side. The Independent Liberals were tangled by -the personal preoccupation of their leaders. They had accumulated -enormous dumps of ammunition for the day of battle on the assumption -that the main attack would be on the Coalition Liberals, and, although -the Conservatives now lined the opposite trenches, anger dominated -strategy, and the guns were still fired at their old foes, whilst the -Tory government was only bombarded with bouquets. On the other hand, -the National Liberal leaders were embarrassed by the engagements into -which their followers had been driven by the action of the Independent -Liberal leaders and the two warring factions. - -The National Liberals, in spite of their enormous difficulties, have -not been exterminated. I am not going to enter into a barren inquiry -as to whether their numbers are or are not greater than those of Mr. -Asquith's followers. Let it be assumed that they are equal. The marvel -is that under these fratricidal conditions so many Liberals of any -complexion have been returned. - -I am not setting forth these unhappy facts in order to prolong the -controversy which has poisoned Liberalism for years, but in order to -call attention to the vitality which, in spite of these depressing -conditions, can bring up 4,100,000 voters to the polls. Electorally -Liberalism is the balancing power, and if it casts its united strength -against either reaction or subversion its influence must be decisive, -whatever the composition of this parliament may be. - -It is common knowledge that the Independent Liberals confidently -anticipated the return of at least 120 members of their group. The -fact that they only succeeded in securing the return of about fifty is -naturally to them a source of deep disappointment. - -If the failure of high hopes leads to contemplation of the real causes -of that failure and a sincere desire is manifested to substitute -co-operation for conflict my colleagues and I will welcome it. We -cannot force our society on an unwilling company. - -During the campaign I repeatedly expressed the hope that one outcome of -this election would be to bring moderate men of progressive outlook in -all parties to see the wisdom of acting together. - -But progressive minds are by no means confined to the Liberal party. -I have met and worked with them in the Conservative party, and the -election will have taught many men and women in the Labour party that -violent and extravagant proposals impede progress. If the limits are -not too narrowly drawn, this parliament may witness the effective -association of men of many parties who are genuinely concerned in the -advancement of mankind along the paths of peace and progress for the -attainment of their common ideals. If that end is achieved, the coming -years will not be spent in vain. - -One word as to the National Liberals. When the dissolution came no -party was ever placed in a more embarrassing and even desperate -situation. - -The Conservatives have at their disposal a great political machine. The -Labour party could command the support of all the trade unions, with -their elaborate machinery for organising the wage-earning population. -The Independent Liberals had in England and in Scotland captured the -Liberal machine almost in its entirety, and had spent six years in -perfecting it, their leaders having no other occupation. - -The National Liberal leaders inherited no political machinery, and were -too preoccupied with great world affairs to be able to devote any time -to the improvisation of an effective new organisation. - -Conservatives, Independent Liberals, and Labour all alike attacked -National Liberal seats where they thought any advantage might be gained -for their respective parties by doing so. The Conservatives only -refrained from attack in cases where they thought there was more to be -gained by arrangement. There was a great volume of popular sentiment -behind our group. I visited Britain, north, south, east, west, and I -have never witnessed such crowds nor such enthusiasm at any electoral -contest in which I have ever taken part; but there was no organisation -to convert acclamation into electoral power, and you could not build -up a vast political machine in three weeks. Our supporters were not -provided with an opportunity to test their strength in two-thirds of -the constituencies. In nearly three hundred constituencies they could -not do so without impairing the chances of Liberal candidates. A -compact with Conservatives ruled them out of others. - -It is a wonder that, in spite of these adverse and even paralysing -conditions our numbers are twice those of the Independent Liberals in -1918. - -We have now for the first time full opportunity for placing our case -and point of view before the country and organising support for them. -It is our duty to do so. - -Every month will contribute its justification for the course we have -hitherto pursued, and for the counsel we have steadfastly given to a -country struggling through abnormal difficulties. - -_London, November 20th, 1922._ - - - - -XXIV - -HOW DEMOCRACY WORKS - - -The startling English by-elections of the last few weeks have called -attention to the working of the new electorate in Great Britain and -set men pondering about its possibilities in a way a general election -failed to make them think. Democracy in the sense of government of a -great state by the absolute and unfettered authority of the majority of -its own citizens of all ranks and conditions is a modern experiment. -The United States of America are the oldest democracy in the world -to-day. - -How many realise that Britain became a democracy for the first time in -1917? Until then the majority of its adult population had no voice in -the making or administration of the laws that ruled their lives. - -The United States of America, France and Italy have adopted universal -suffrage as the basis of authority for many a year. So have the -British Dominions, but Britain herself, the pioneer of representative -institutions, until recently shrank from the experiment of adult -suffrage. Before the Reform Act of 1832 the total electorate of this -country numbered only 3 per cent. of the population. The distribution -of power amongst this small percentage was so arranged that even the 3 -per cent. represented in effect no more than at best 1 per cent. - -A generation of turmoil and agitation, almost culminating in -revolution, succeeded in forcing through a measure which increased -the 3 per cent. to 4.5 per cent. of the population! It is true that -the distribution of votes was more equitable, but even with that -improvement to call this ridiculous percentage a democracy would be -absurd. Another generation of growing agitation ensued. This also ended -in violence. Then Mr. Disraeli, one of the boldest and most venturesome -of British statesmen, in 1867 doubled the electorate. His measure -increased the number of voters to 9 per cent. of the population. - -Disraeli's audacious plunge horrified some of his aristocratic -supporters and shocked many Whigs. "Bob" Lowe had already foretold -calamities that would follow Gladstone's more cautious proposals. Seven -years later saw the election of the first Tory parliament since 1841. -So much for the prophecies of the men who always fear evil must flow -from justice. - -Fifteen years after the Disraeli measure the Gladstone administration -added another 7 per cent. to the electorate. The Gladstone proposals, -which raised the number of voters to 16 per cent., were so vehemently -contested that they nearly precipitated a Constitutional crisis of the -first magnitude. Ultimately, however, they were carried, and there the -franchise remained until the war. - -The electorate that, through its representatives, accepted the German -challenge in 1914, and was therefore responsible for involving -the country in the most costly and sanguinary war it ever waged, -represented one-sixth of the population and about one-third of the -adults. The conscription act converted the country to the injustice of -this state of things. Millions of men were forced to risk their lives -for a policy which they had no share in fashioning. Millions of women -faced anxieties and tortures worse than death in pursuit of the same -policy, and yet no woman was allowed to express any opinion as to the -selection of the rulers who led them to this sacrifice. - -It was felt to be so unjust that in the exaltation of war, which lifted -men to a higher plane of equity, this obvious wrong was redressed. -Hence the greatest of all the enfranchisement acts, the Act of 1917, -that for the first time converted the British system of government into -a democracy. - -How has it worked? It is too early to speak of its results. Mr. Austen -Chamberlain in a letter[10] has called attention to one aspect of its -operation. He emphasises a fact which is already known to every man who -has passed through the experience of a contested election, that nearly -one-half the new electorate is unattached to any political party. - -If you deduct out of the total the numbers of the old electorate which -had already formed ties of a party character, you will find from the -result of the elections that more than half the new electorate is free -and floating about without any anchor or rudder and ready to be towed -by the first party that succeeded in roping them. Millions of the new -electors are too indifferent or too undecided about political issues to -take sides at the polling booths. - -In the hotly contested election of January, 1910, 92 per cent. of the -voters went to the poll. At the second election which took place in -the same year the percentage was 89. The slight difference between the -two elections would be accounted for by the fact that in the second -election the register was old. Compare these results with the two -elections which have occurred since the 1917 enfranchisement. At the -1918 election 64 per cent. only of the voters could be induced to make -the acquaintance of the ballot-boxes. This might be explained by the -inevitable political apathy which follows a great war. The pulse of -party beat feebly and irregularly. The old party organisations had, -through five years of neglect, fallen into complete disrepair--the new -party had not yet had time to perfect its machinery. Hence the failure -of competitive effort to induce at least 6,000,000 of the new voters to -take a sufficient interest in their new privileges to exercise them at -the election. - -The next four years were a period of growing political activity. -The new party was especially energetic. Their chief organiser, Mr. -Arthur Henderson, M.P., is one of the most gifted party managers of -this generation, and his achievement is an outstanding feature of -political organisation in this country. The old parties also had time -to repair their machinery; by the time the election was called their -organisations were in full working order. The only party which had no -organisation worth speaking of was the National Liberal party. The -others were ready for the struggle. - -Nevertheless, when the election came in November nearly 5,000,000 of -the electors were not sufficiently interested in the contest to take -the trouble to record their votes. It showed an improvement of 10 per -cent. on the previous election, but there still remained nearly 20 per -cent.--making allowance for death, sickness, removals, etc.--who stayed -at home, and could not be persuaded by personal or public appeal or -pressure exercised by three or four great organisations, to walk a few -hundred yards out of their way in order to place a simple cross on the -ballot paper that was awaiting them. - -The municipal elections tell a still more dismal story of apathy. But -that is an old story. It was with difficulty that the old electorate, -with all its long training, could be cajoled to visit the polling -booths where the good government of the towns in which they breathed, -lived, toiled, enjoyed themselves, and rested was being determined. -At their worst, however, they made a better show than the newly -enfranchised voters. - -How does the record compare with democracy in other lands? France is -no better. On the whole, I understand it is worse. The voting in the -United States of America fluctuates according to the interest excited -by the particular election. In this respect America does not differ -from Britain. I cannot lay my hand on the percentage of the poll at the -last presidential election, but I gather it was higher than ours at -the general election. The Germans polled at their last election 89 per -cent. of their electorate; in Italy the percentage was much lower. - -With an unpolled and unticketed electorate of over 4,000,000 anything -may happen. They have clearly no interest in the ordinary political -conflicts that engage the minds of their fellow-citizens; otherwise, -the excitement of two general elections would have roused them to such -faint exhibition of partisanship as is implied in the choosing of a -candidate out of the two or three who have taken the trouble to send -along their pictures. - -But one day an issue may arise which will wake up the most lethargic. -What will it be? And what view will they take of it when it comes? And -who will succeed in catching the eye of the slumbering multitude when -it opens? Much depends on the answer to these questions. They may rally -to the defence of property menaced by rapacious creeds. They may rush -to the protection of their homes threatened by avaricious wealth. - -Even those who have already voted are liable to sudden and devastating -changes of opinion. Witness Mitcham, Willesden, and Edgehill. These -three seats were regarded as being amongst the safest in England, and -were selected for that very reason. - -Amongst many disquieting factors there is one which ought to be dealt -with ere another election arrive. Under the present system a minority -of electors may usurp absolute dominion over the fortunes of this -kingdom for fully five years. - -This is one of the freaks of the group system. The present -parliamentary majority has been elected by an aggregate vote which -represents something a little better than one-fourth of the total -electorate and one-third of those who recorded their votes. If Mitcham -and Edgehill are a foretaste of what is to happen at the "General," -Labour will be the lucky third. A similar turnover of votes in every -constituency would place them easily in that position. - -America has brought its vast electorate under what seems to us to be -a perfect discipline. But in the process it has passed through much -tribulation, including the furnace of a terrible civil war. Italy has -been impelled to correct the working of democratic institutions by a -display of force. Britain may mobilise and drill its electoral forces -with less trouble. But it has a Socialist party, which has grown by -millions within less than a decade--and is still growing. This week its -most eloquent member has proposed, in the House of Commons, a solemn -motion for the abolition of private property. Deputies chosen by four -and a quarter million of British electors will vote for this proposal, -and if, four years hence, they add another million and a half to their -poll, they will be in a position to place that motion on the statute -book. Their increase between 1918 and 1922 was greater than that. - -FOOTNOTE: - -[10] See the _Times_, March 14, 1923. - - - - -XXV - -POLITICAL REALITIES - - -A few weeks ago I predicted that the comparative calm which has -prevailed in the political seas of Britain during the past few years -was coming to an end. Recent parliamentary scenes leave no doubt that -the prolonged political depression is to be followed by a period of -storms--it may be hurricanes. - -No amount of organisation or propaganda can excite real feeling in -an electorate over trivial and unreal issues. Why did the coalition -of 1915 fall? And why did the Liberal party split in 1916? Who was -responsible? Should the general election have taken place in 1918 -or 1919? Ought open and declared opponents of the government of the -day to have then received government support or at least government -neutrality? These are questions which agitate a few who are personally -interested, but they leave the nation cold. - -The war was real enough. But the war was supported by men of -all parties, and, therefore, provoked no political controversy. -The minority which opposed it was negligible, and challenged no -parliamentary discussion on the question. The treaty of peace was, -on the whole, accepted by all parties when it was first submitted to -Parliament. The leaders of the opposition parties in the Lords and -Commons at the time of its presentation offered no serious criticism of -its provisions. - -The legislation proposed by the Coalition, although in ordinary seasons -much of it would have aroused angry passions, coming as it did after -the war had exhausted emotion, passed with no more than a feeble murmur -of protest. Take, for instance, such controversial topics as adult -suffrage, the enfranchisement of women, the wholesale reductions in -hours of labour, representative government in India, and notably the -conferring upon Ireland of a measure of Home Rule more complete than -any proposed by Gladstone. - -Any one of these measures proposed before the war would have led to -heated discussion throughout the land. The case of Ireland is perhaps -the most significant of the changed temper of the nation immediately -after the great war. The conflict over Irish Home Rule has now -culminated in a treaty accepted by the nation as a whole and acquiesced -in by the most violent amongst its opponents. - -But fiercer political passions were stirred up by the struggle between -parties over Ireland than by any political question of modern times. -The causes underlying the conflict dealt with two of the most powerful -motives which make the human heart throb--race and religion. There -was the old feud between Saxon and Gael extending over at least seven -centuries. It drenched the moors of Ireland with the blood of both -races before a keener edge was given to its hatreds by the introduction -of an acute religious quarrel. - -After the Reformation the religious differences which rent Europe -with fratricidal wars added fresh fury to the racial enmities which -made poor Ireland a cauldron of perpetual strife. When Mr. Gladstone -proposed to settle this raging tumult by wresting supremacy from a race -which had been dominant in that island for 700 years and a faith which -had been supreme there for 400 years and transferring it to the race -and religion which all that time had been in a condition of servitude, -and when in order to attain his ends he had to secure the adhesion of -men of the ruling blood and creed to his proposals, the passions raised -were deeper and angrier than any witnessed in British politics for many -a day. It led for the first time in the history of parliament to scenes -of physical violence on the floor of the House. It shows what we may -expect when there are genuine divisions of opinion which profoundly -move masses of men and women in a democracy. Those who recall the -tropical heat of parliamentary debates in 1893 naturally regard their -voyage through the frigid proceedings of the last parliament as they -would a sail through Arctic seas. That voyage is now over, and there -are signs that the waters will soon be lashed into fury. - -For years political controversy between parties has been suspended -in the presence of a common danger. Reaction was inevitable, and the -greater the suppression the more violent the rebound. That does not, -however, altogether account for the visible omens of a coming struggle -unprecedented in its gravity. Fundamental issues have been raised of -such moment to millions that they cannot be settled without a struggle -that will rock society. - -The scene enacted in the Commons a few days ago was by no means as -exciting as that which some of us witnessed in 1893. But it gave me an -uneasy feeling that the period of calm is definitely over, and that -Parliament henceforth must expect gusts and gales--and worse. Emotions -are once more welling up, and there are signs of a great stir coming in -British politics. - -The cause is easily explained. The sense of exhaustion is passing -away, and issues containing a serious challenge to the privileges and -rights of powerful classes in the community and vital to the interests -of all classes have been raised by one of the great political parties -that divide Britain. The momentous character of that challenge may be -gathered from the terms of the motion submitted by Mr. Philip Snowden -to the judgment of the House of Commons:-- - - - "That in view of the failure of the capitalist system to - adequately utilise and organise natural resources and productive - power, or to provide the necessary standard of life for vast - numbers of the population, and believing that the cause of this - failure lies in the private ownership and control of the means of - production and distribution, this House declares that legislative - effort should be directed to the gradual supersession of the - capitalist system by an industrial and social order based on the - public ownership and democratic control of the instruments of - production and distribution." - - -This motion will receive the full support of every member of the Labour -party. A few men outside the Socialist party who have acquainted -themselves with the publications of that party were quite prepared -for this demand of a complete change in the organisation of society. -And as they saw that party grow with startling rapidity they knew we -should not have long to wait before these subversive ideas would be -formulated in the House of Commons. Still, even for the students of -Socialist literature, the actual tabling of the resolution on behalf -of the second largest party in the State came as a surprise and a -shock. Too much credit was given to the restraining influence of the -trade union section of the party. Sir Lynden Macassey, in his informing -book on "Labour Policy, False and True," points out that it was in -1885 that the avowed advocates of this proposal for the abolition of -private property and for the nationalisation of all the means of -production and distribution first stood for Parliament. There were -only two candidates standing on this platform, and they polled 32 and -29 votes respectively. Last election the aggregate Socialist poll -reached the imposing figure of 4,251,011 votes. The party that secured -a majority of members in the House of Commons only polled 5,457,871 -votes. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald states categorically that he knows that -the Independent Liberal members--exclusive of their leaders--favour -nationalisation and the capital levy. If that be an accurate statement -of the views of the majority of these gentlemen, and of those who elect -them, nearly one-half the British electorate are already prepared to -assent to Socialism by easy stages--which is the purport of Mr. Philip -Snowden's motion. - -On that assumption we are on the eve of greater and more fundamental -changes affecting the lives of every class and condition of men and -women than have yet been seen in this country. Hence the new sense of -struggle with which the political atmosphere is palpitating. Capitalism -is to be arraigned before the Supreme Court of the Nation, condemned, -sentenced, and executed by instalments--Chinese fashion. The -composition of that court is not to-day favourable to the prosecution. -But who will be the judge after the next general election? It is -customary in political controversy to state that the election which -is for the moment impending will be the most epoch-making in history. -Without exaggeration, the next British election may well turn out to be -so. The British people, with their inherited political instinct, are -beginning to realise that grave decisions must then be taken. Hence the -greater keenness shown by the voters at by-elections--hence the new -interest taken by the public in the proceedings of Parliament. There is -still a good deal of apathy and indifference. The average comfortable -citizen is still inclined to think these Socialist schemes so crazy as -to be impossible. They cannot believe that 21,000,000 of sane people -can possibly contemplate giving their sanction to such fantasies. - -There are two cardinal facts which are constantly overlooked by the -complacent. The men and women who have no property for the State to -seize constitute an overwhelming majority of the electors of the -country. The second fact to note is the great preponderance of the -industrial population over the steadier and more stolid agricultural -population. America, in spite of its gigantic manufacturing and -distributing industries, still retains 60 per cent. of its population -on the land. The same proportion of the French and Italian populations -is agrarian. Barely 10 per cent. of the British workers are engaged -in cultivating the soil. Most of our workers breathe and have their -being in the crowded and excitable atmosphere of factories, workshops, -and mines. The air is filled with germs of all kinds, and isolation in -these thronging areas is impossible. Hence the rapidity with which the -fever has spread. - -Can it be arrested? Nothing will be done until the danger is visible to -every eye. To vary the metaphor, no one will believe in the flood until -it is upon us. Trained weather prophets who forecast its coming will -be laughed at or told they have a personal or party interest in ark -building. It is an old tale--as old as the dawn of history. "As in the -days before the flood, they were eating and drinking and knew not until -the flood came and took them all away." - -The trouble can only be averted in two ways. One is the systematic -inculcation of sound doctrines of economic truth into the minds of the -working people of this country. The second, and the more important, is -the rooting out of the social evils which furnish the revolutionary -with striking and indisputable object-lessons of the failure of the -capitalistic system as an agent of human happiness. Without the latter -the former effort will be futile. Arguments in favour of the existing -order will be refuted by glaring and painful facts. Meanwhile, let -the champions of that order take note of the efforts put forth by the -Socialists to advertise their eagerness to redress the wrongs of the -ex-service men and to soften the asperities of discipline for the -soldier. The Socialist leaders have shrewdly taken note of the causes -that produced the overthrow of their Italian brethren, and they mean to -take such steps as will ensure that if Fascism comes in Britain it will -be an ally, and not a foe. - -_London, April 16th, 1923._ - - - - -XXVI - -SHOULD WE MAKE PEACE WITH RUSSIA? - - -I am frankly delighted that negotiations between Lord Curzon and the -Soviet government seem to indicate a genuine desire on the part of both -parties to establish a more satisfactory understanding between this -country and Russia. The Bolshevist episode, like all revolutionary -terrors, has been at times a shrieking nightmare which has made the -world shudder. It did render one supreme service to civilisation--it -terrified democracy back into sanity just at the time when the -nervous excitability that followed the war was bordering on mental -instability. In our attitude towards the Soviet government we must, -however, constantly bear in mind one consideration. What matters to us -is not so much the Russian government as the people of Russia, and for -the moment the Bolshevist administration represents the only medium -for dealing with that mighty nation. As long as it remains the only -constituted authority in Russia, every act of hostility against it -injures Russia. As we discovered in 1919, you cannot wage war against -the government for the time being of a country without devastating -the land and alienating its people. You cannot refuse to trade with -it now without depriving its people of commodities--and especially of -equipments--essential to their well-being. It is the people, therefore, -who would suffer, and it is the people who would ultimately resent that -suffering. Governments come and go, but the nation goes on for ever. - -The Russian people deserve--especially at the hands of all the Allied -nations--every sympathetic consideration we can extend to them. Not -only because they have to endure the sway of a tyrannical oligarchy -imposing its will by ruthless violence, but even more for the reasons -that led to the establishment of that tyranny. If the fruit is bitter -we must bear in mind how the tree came to be planted in the soil. It -may sound like quoting ancient history to revert to the events of eight -or nine years ago, but no one can understand Russia, or do justice to -its unhappy people, without recalling the incidents that led to the -great catastrophe. - -Those who denounce any dealings with the existing order seem to have -persuaded themselves that pre-revolutionary Russia was governed by -a gentle and beneficent despotism which conferred the blessings of -a tolerant and kindly fatherland upon a well-ruled household. In no -particular is this a true picture of the _ancien régime_. The fortress -of Peter and Paul was not erected, nor its dungeons dug, by the -Bolshevists. Siberia was not set up as a penal settlement for political -offenders for the first time--if at all--by the Bolshevists. In 1906 -alone 45,000 political offenders were deported to endure the severities -of Siberia. Persecution of suspected religious leaders was not started -by the Soviets. To them does not belong the discredit of initiating the -methods of Pogromism. Under the "paternal" reign of the Tsars dissent -from the Orthodox faith was proscribed and persecuted, and the Jews -were hunted like vermin. - -Let us not forget also that beyond all these circumstances the -revolution was rendered inevitable by the ineptitude and corruption -of the old system, and especially by the terrible suffering and -humiliation which that state of things inflicted on Russia in the Great -War. - -Any one who has read the _Memoirs of an Ambassador_, by M. Paléologue, -will find a complete explanation in its pages of the savage hatred with -which the Russian revolutionaries view all those who were associated -in any degree with the old order. He tells the story of how the -gallant army found itself at the critical hour without ammunition, -rifles, transport, and often without food. No braver or more devoted -men ever fought for their country than the young peasants who made up -the Russian armies of 1914-15-16. With little and often no artillery -support, they faced without faltering the best-equipped heavy artillery -in the world. They were mown down by shell fire and machine guns by -the million. Their aggregate casualties up to September, 1916, even -according to the reluctant admissions of the Tsarist generals of the -day, were five millions. In reality they were much heavier. Often they -went into action with sticks, as the Russian War Office had no rifles -with which to arm them. They picked up as they advanced rifles dropped -by fallen comrades. There is nothing in the war comparable to the -trustful heroism of these poor peasants. We know now why there were no -rifles, or shells, or wagons. The wholesale corruption of the _régime_ -has been exposed to the world by irrefutable documentary evidence. - -Here are a few extracts from M. Paléologue's interesting book. One -extract from his diary reads:-- - - - "The lack of ammunition means that the rôle of the artillery - in battle is necessarily insignificant. The whole burden of - the fighting falls on the infantry and the result is a ghastly - expenditure of human life. A day or two ago one of the Grand - Duke Sergius's collaborators, Colonel Englehardt, said to Major - Wehrlin, my second military attaché: 'We're paying for the crimes - of our administration with the blood of our men.'" - - -About the same date talking about the deplorable state of things, the -Grand Duke Sergius, who was Inspector-General of Artillery, said to the -French ambassador, "When I think that this exhibition of impotence is -all that our aristocratic system has to show, it makes me want to be a -Republican." - -When a Grand Duke talked like that early in 1915, what must a peasant -soldier have thought by the spring of 1917, after many more millions of -his comrades had been slaughtered as a result of the same "exhibition -of impotence." - -It is no use pointing to the fact that our army was also short of -ammunition at that date. The British army was a small army organised -on the basis of a maximum expeditionary force of six divisions. The -Russian army was a great conscript force organised on the basis of a -hundred divisions in the field. - -I recollect well our own military reports from the Russian fronts. They -provided much distressing reading. They filled you with compassion for -the millions of gallant men who were the victims of corruption and -stupidity in high places. I recall one statement made to our general -which betrays the callous indifference with which men in authority -seemed to treat the appalling sacrifice of life amongst loyal soldiers -who were facing death without a murmur, because the "Little Father" -willed it. Whenever anxious inquiries were directed by our officer as -to the gigantic losses in men which filled him with dismay as well -as horror, the usual reply was, "Don't worry yourself. Thank God, of -men at all events we have enough." An answer which sends a thrill of -horror through you when you read it. That is why at the end of two -and a half years the patient men in the field at last mutinied. That -is why their parents and brothers in the fields supported them. The -"Little Father" had failed them, and his minions had betrayed them. It -is a sordid and horrid tale of peculation, maladministration, and cruel -treachery. Millions of British and French money went in shameless and -open bribery, whilst the soldiers in the field, for need of what the -money could buy, were opposing bare breasts covering brave hearts to -the most terrible artillery in the world. If the rest of the money had -been well spent, what was left after providing for profuse graft would -still have sufficed to save that gallant army from destruction. But -unhappily no real interest was taken in anything beyond the amount and -the payment of the pocket-money. That seemed to be the main purpose of -the transaction. Nothing was well managed except the inevitable bribe. -There were honourable and upright men who did their duty by their -distracted and plundered country, but they were helpless in the torrent -of corruption. - -No wonder a great Russian industrialist engaged in the ministry of -war, in dwelling on the sad failure of tsarism and its probable -results in June, 1905, predicted a revolution with "ten years of -the most frightful anarchy." "We shall," he added, "see the days of -Pugatchef[11] again and perhaps worse"--a striking prophecy verified -with appalling accuracy. - -It is not pleasant to recall these dreadful episodes, which reveal the -betrayal of a devotion faithful unto death. But this story is essential -to the right appreciation of events. There is no savagery like that of -a trustful people which finds that its trust was being imposed upon the -whole time. Here the retribution has been hideous in all its aspects. -But the provocation was also revolting from every point of view. To -judge Russia fairly that must be taken into account. - -I think the government are, therefore, taking the right view of -their responsibilities when through their foreign secretary they -open negotiations with the representative of the Soviet government -in this country. You can easily evoke resounding cheers amongst the -thoughtless by declaring melodramatically that you will never "shake -hands with murder." In practice this policy has always been a failure. -Mr. Pitt in a famous passage declined to assent to that doctrine when -he was attacked for trying to open negotiations with the "assassins" -of the French Revolution. He was driven out of this calm and rational -attitude by the inflammable rhetoric of Burke, aided by the arrogance -of the victorious revolutionaries. Nevertheless, the sequel proved he -was right. French Bolshevism was not defeated by foreign armies, nor -starved out by the British blockade. But it was driven into the arms of -Napoleon, and Europe suffered bitterly for the folly of the hotheads -on both sides. It would have been better for that generation had it -listened to the wise counsel of William Pitt. - -If you decline to treat with Russia as long as its present rulers -remain in power, then you ought to place Turkey in the same category. -The military junta that governed Turkey has been guilty of atrocities -at least as vile as any committed by the Bolshevists. But at Lausanne -we ostentatiously stretched the friendly hand of Britain to the authors -of the Armenian massacres. And France, Italy--yes, and America -also--tendered the same warm handshake. I am not criticising the offer -of amity made as a condition of peace. We must make peace in the world, -and you cannot do so if you put whole nations off your visiting list -because of the misconduct of those who govern them. Once you begin you -are not quite sure where it will end. - -In these cases the innocent suffer the most. A refusal to trade with -Russia would not deprive the Soviet commissaries of a single necessity -or comfort of life. The Communists are quite strong enough to take care -of themselves. But the peasants--who are not Communists--would continue -to suffer, and their sufferings would increase as their reserves of -clothing and other essentials became completely exhausted. And the -people of this country who need the produce of Russia for their own use -would also suffer to a certain extent. America can afford this exalted -aloofness. She does not need the Russian grain and timber. She is an -exporter of those commodities. But we cannot do as well without them, -and we also sadly need Russian flax for our linen industries, which are -languishing for the want of it. Last year there were quite considerable -imports of Russian produce into this country. This year owing to the -prospects of an improved harvest these imports will be much larger. -They are greatly needed here for our own consumption, and they pay -for exports of machinery and textiles which the Russian on his part -urgently requires. - -But beyond and above all these material considerations, the world needs -peace. In the old days conveyancing attorneys in this country kept a -property transaction going by interminable requisitions on the title -of the other party. They exercised all their ingenuity and invoked the -added ingenuity of trained counsel to probe for defects in the right of -the vendor to deal. Those were leisurely days, and men could afford to -dawdle. Even then these exercises often ended in ruinous litigation. -To-day time presses and the atmosphere is dangerous for the plying of -irritating interrogatories. It is time we made up our minds that the -Soviets have come to stay, whether we like it or no, and that one or -other of the formidable men who rule Russia to-day are likely to rule -it for some time to come. The sooner we have the courage to recognise -this fact, the sooner will real peace be established. - -FOOTNOTE: - -[11] Pugatchef was the Pretender who led a revolt of the peasants -in the reign of Catherine and spread rapine and carnage through the -provinces bordering the Volga and Ural. - - - - -XXVII - -PALESTINE AND THE JEWS - - "What's his reason? I am a Jew." - _The Merchant of Venice._ - - -Of all the bigotries that savage the human temper there is none so -stupid as the anti-Semitic. It has no basis in reason; it is not -rooted in faith; it aspires to no ideal; it is just one of those dank -and unwholesome weeds that grow in the morass of racial hatred. How -utterly devoid of reason it is may be gathered from the fact that it -is almost entirely confined to nations who worship Jewish prophets and -apostles, revere the national literature of the Hebrews as the only -inspired message delivered by the deity to mankind, and whose only hope -of salvation rests on the precepts and promises of the great teachers -of Judah. Yet in the sight of these fanatics the Jews of to-day can do -nothing right. If they are rich they are birds of prey. If they are -poor they are vermin. If they are in favour of a war it is because they -want to exploit the bloody feuds of the Gentiles to their own profit. -If they are anxious for peace they are either instinctive cowards -or traitors. If they give generously--and there are no more liberal -givers than the Jews--they are doing it for some selfish purpose of -their own. If they do not give--then what could one expect of a Jew -but avarice? If labour is oppressed by great capital, the greed of -the Jew is held responsible. If labour revolts against capital--as -it did in Russia--the Jew is blamed for that also. If he lives in a -strange land he must be persecuted and pogrommed out of it. If he wants -to go back to his own he must be prevented. Through the centuries -in every land, whatever he does, or intends, or fails to do, he has -been pursued by the echo of the brutal cry of the rabble of Jerusalem -against the greatest of all Jews--"Crucify Him!" No good has ever come -of nations that crucified Jews. It is poor and pusillanimous sport, -lacking all the true qualities of manliness, and those who indulge in -it would be the first to run away were there any element of danger in -it. Jew-baiters are generally of the type that found good reasons for -evading military service when their own country was in danger. - -The latest exhibition of this wretched indulgence is the agitation -against settling poor Jews in the land their fathers made famous. -Palestine under Jewish rule once maintained a population of 5,000,000. -Under the blighting rule of the Turk it barely supported a population -of 700,000. The land flowing with milk and honey is now largely a stony -and unsightly desert. To quote one of the ablest and most far-sighted -business men of to-day, "It is a land of immense possibilities, in -spite of the terrible neglect of its resources resulting from Turkish -misrule. It is a glorious estate let down by centuries of neglect. The -Turks cut down the forests and never troubled to replant them. They -slaughtered the cattle and never troubled to replace them." It is one -of the peculiarities of the Jew-hunter that he adores the Turk. - -If Palestine is to be restored to a condition even approximate to -its ancient prosperity, it must be by settling Jews on its soil. The -condition to which the land has been reduced by centuries of the most -devastating oppression in the world is such that restoration is only -possible by a race that is prepared for sentimental reasons to make and -endure sacrifices for the purpose. What is the history of the Jewish -settlement in Palestine? It did not begin with the Balfour Declaration. -A century ago there were barely 10,000 Jews in the whole of Palestine. -Before the war there were 100,000. The war considerably reduced these -numbers, and immigration since 1918 has barely filled up the gaps. At -the present timorous rate of progress it will be many years before it -reaches 200,000. Jewish settlement started practically seventy years -ago, with Sir Moses Montefiore's experiment in 1854--another war year. -The Sultan had good reasons for propitiating the Jews in that year, -as the Allies had in 1917. So the Jewish resettlement of Palestine -began. From that day onward it has proceeded slowly but steadily. The -land available was not of the best. Prejudices and fears had to be -negotiated. Anything in the nature of wholesale expropriation of Arab -cultivators, even for cash, had to be carefully avoided. The Jews were, -therefore, often driven to settle on barren sand dunes and malarial -swamps. The result can best be given by quoting from an article written -by Mrs. Fawcett, the famous woman leader. She visited Palestine in 1921 -and again in 1922, and this is her account of the Jewish settlements: - - - "So far from the colonies and the colonists draining the country - of its resources they have created resources which were previously - non-existent; they have planted and skilfully cultivated desert - sands and converted them into fruitful vineyards and orange - and lemon orchards; in other parts they have created valuable - agricultural land out of what were previously dismal swamps - producing nothing but malaria and other diseases. The colonists - have not shrunk from the tremendous work and the heavy sacrifices - required. Many of the early arrivals laid down their lives over - their work; the survivors went on bravely, draining the swamps, - planting eucalyptus trees by the hundred thousand so that at - length the swamp became a fruitful garden, and the desert once - more blossomed like the rose." - - -Everywhere the Jew cultivator produces heavier and richer crops than -his Arab neighbour. He has introduced into Palestine more scientific -methods of cultivation, and his example is producing a beneficent -effect on the crude tillage of the Arab peasant. It will be long ere -Canaan becomes once more a land flowing with milk and honey. The -effects of the neglect and misrule of centuries cannot be effaced by -the issue of a declaration. The cutting down of the trees has left -the soil unprotected against the heavy rains and the rocks which were -once green with vineyards and olive groves have been swept bare. The -terraces which ages of patient industry built up have been destroyed -by a few generations of Turkish stupidity. They cannot be restored in -a single generation. Great irrigation works must be constructed if -settlement is to proceed on a satisfactory scale. Palestine possesses -in some respects advantages for the modern settler which to its ancient -inhabitants were a detriment. Its one great river and its tributaries -are rapid and have a great fall. For power this is admirable. Whether -for irrigation, or for the setting up of new industries, this gift of -nature to Palestine is capable of exploitation only made possible by -the scientific discoveries of the last century. The tableland of Judea -has a rainfall which if caught in reservoirs at appropriate centres -would make of the "desert of Judea" a garden. If this be done Arab and -Jew alike share in the prosperity. - -There are few countries on earth which have made less of their -possibilities. Take its special attractions for the tourist. I was -amazed to find that the visitors to Palestine in the whole course of a -year only aggregate 15,000. It contains the most famous shrines in the -world. Its history is of more absorbing interest to the richest peoples -on earth, and is better taught to their children, than even that of -their own country. Some of its smallest villages are better known to -countless millions than many a prosperous modern city. Hundreds of -thousands ought to be treading this sacred ground every year. Why are -they not doing so? The answer is: Turkish misrule scared away the -pilgrim. Those who went there came back disillusioned and disappointed. -The modern "spies" on their return did not carry with them the luscious -grapes of Escol to thrill the multitude with a desire to follow their -example. They brought home depressing tales of squalor, discomfort, -and exaction which dispelled the glamour and discouraged further -pilgrimages. Settled government gives the Holy Land its first chance -for 1900 years. But there is so much undeveloped country demanding the -attention of civilisation that Palestine will lose that chance unless -it is made the special charge of some powerful influence. The Jews -alone can redeem it from the wilderness and restore its ancient glory. - -In that trust there is no injustice to any other race. The Arabs have -neither the means, the energy, nor the ambition to discharge this duty. -The British Empire has too many burdens on its shoulders to carry this -experiment through successfully. The Jewish race with its genius, -its resourcefulness, its tenacity, and not least its wealth, can -alone perform this essential task. The Balfour Declaration is not an -expropriating but an enabling clause. It is only a charter of equality -for the Jews. Here are its terms: - - - "His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in - Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will - use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this - object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done - which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing - non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political - status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." - - -The declaration was subsequently endorsed and adopted by President -Wilson and the French and Italian foreign ministers. - -The Zionists ask for no more. It has been suggested by their enemies -that they are seeking to establish a Jewish oligarchy in Palestine -that will reduce the Arab inhabitant to a condition of servitude to a -favoured Hebrew minority. The best answer to that charge is to be found -in the memorandum submitted by the Zionist Association to the League of -Nations. - - - "The Jews demand no privilege, unless it be the privilege of - rebuilding by their own efforts and sacrifices a land which, once - the seat of a thriving and productive civilisation, has long been - suffered to remain derelict. They expect no favoured treatment - in the matter of political or religious rights. They assume, as - a matter of course, that all the inhabitants of Palestine, be - they Jews or non-Jews, will be in every respect on a footing of - perfect equality. They seek no share in the government beyond that - to which they may be entitled under the Constitution as citizens - of the country. They solicit no favours. They ask, in short, no - more than an assured opportunity of peacefully building up their - national home by their own exertions and of succeeding on their - merits." - - -It is a modest request which these exiles from Zion propound to the -nations. And surely it is just that it should be conceded, and if -conceded then carried out in the way men of honour fulfil their bond. -There are fourteen millions of Jews in the world. They belong to a -race which for at least 1900 years has been subjected to proscription, -pillage, massacre, and the torments of endless derision--a race that -has endured persecution, which for the variety of torture, physical, -material and mental, inflicted on its victims, for the virulence and -malignity with which it has been sustained, for the length of time it -has lasted, and more than all for the fortitude and patience with which -it has been suffered, is without parallel in the history of any other -people. Is it too much to ask that those amongst them whose sufferings -are the worst shall be able to find refuge in the land their fathers -made holy by the splendour of their genius, by the loftiness of their -thoughts, by the consecration of their lives, and by the inspiration of -their message to mankind? - - - - -XXVIII - -THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE[12] - - -The vanquished have returned to their spiritual home at Angora throwing -their fezzes in the air. The victors have returned with their tails -well between their legs. All tragedies have their scenes of comedy, and -the Lausanne Conference is one of those amusing episodes interpolated -by fate to relieve the poignancy of one of its greatest tragic -pieces--the Turk and civilisation. - -The Turk may be a bad ruler, but he is the prince of anglers. The -cunning and the patience with which he lands the most refractory fish -once he has hooked it is beyond compare. What inimitable play we have -witnessed for six months on the shores of Lake Leman! Once the fish -seemed to have broken the tackle--that was when the first conference -came to an abrupt end. It simply meant, however, that the wily -Oriental was giving out plenty of line. Time never worries him, he can -sit and wait. He knew the moment would come when they would return -with the hook well in their gullets, and the play begin once more--the -reeling in and the reeling out, the line sometimes taut and strained -but never snapping. Time and patience rewarded him. At last the huge -tarpon are all lying beached on the banks--Britain, France, Italy, -and the United States of America--high and dry, landed and helpless, -without a swish left in their tails, glistening and gasping in the -summer sun. - -It is little wonder that Ismet had a smile on his face when all was -over. Reports from Angora state that the peace is hailed there as -a great Turkish triumph; and so it is. The Turk is truly a great -fisherman. If he could govern as well as he angles, his would be the -most formidable Empire in the world. Unfortunately he is the worst of -rulers, hence the trouble--his own and that of those who unhappily have -drawn him as governor in the lottery of life. - -The able correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_ at the Lausanne -Conference has supplied us from time to time with vivid pen pictures -of the four greatest Powers of the world struggling in the toils of the -squalid and broken remains of an Empire with an aggregate population -equal to that of a couple of English counties that I could name. This -is what he wrote about this conference, which constitutes one of the -most humiliating incidents in the history of Western civilisation:-- - - - "The records of the present Conference present an even more - marvellous series of concessions and surrenders. What was frayed - before is threadbare now. The Allies have whittled away their - own rights with a lavish hand in the cause of peace. They have - also--and this is a graver matter, for which it seems they will - have to give an account in the not distant future--gone back on - their promises to small races, which are none the less promises - because the small races have not the power to enforce their - performance. The figure that the European delegates are cutting in - Lausanne, and the agents of the _concessionnaires_ in Angora--all - alike representatives of the West--has been rendered undignified - as much by the manner as the matter of their worsting." - - -Since those distressing words were written the Powers have sunk yet -deeper into the slough of humiliation. - -_The Times_ correspondent wiring after the agreement writes in a strain -of deep indignation at the blow inflicted on the prestige of the West -by this extraordinary Treaty. In order to gauge the extent of the -disaster to civilisation which this Treaty implies it is only necessary -to give a short summary of the war aims of the Allies in Turkey. - -They were stated by Mr. Asquith with his usual succinctness and clarity -in a speech which he delivered when Prime Minister at the Guildhall on -November 9th, 1914:-- - - - "It is not the Turkish people--it is the Ottoman Government that - has drawn the sword, and which, I venture to predict, will perish - by the sword. It is they and not we who have rung the death-knell - of Ottoman dominion, not only in Europe but in Asia. With their - disappearance will disappear as I, at least, hope and believe, the - blight which for generations past has withered some of the fairest - regions of the earth." - - -In pursuance of the policy thus declared by the British Premier on -behalf of the Allies a series of Agreements was entered into in the -early months of 1915 between France, Russia, and ourselves, by which -the greater part of Turkey, with its conglomerate population, was to be -partitioned at the end of the War. Cilicia and Syria were allocated to -France; Mesopotamia to Britain; Armenia and Constantinople to Russia. -Palestine was to be placed under the joint control of Britain and -France. Arabia was to be declared independent and a territory carved -largely out of the desert--but including some famous cities of the -East, Damascus, Homs and Aleppo--was to be constituted into a new Arab -State, partly under the protection of France and partly of Britain. -Smyrna and its precincts were to be allotted to Greece if she joined -her forces with those of the Allies in the war. The Straits were to be -demilitarised and garrisoned. When Italy came into the war later on in -1915, it was stipulated that in the event of the partition of Turkey -being carried out in pursuance of these agreements, territories in -Southern Anatolia should be assigned to Italy for development. - -What was the justification for breaking up the Turkish Empire? The -portions to be cut out of Turkey have a population the majority of -which is non-Turkish. Cilicia and Southern Anatolia might constitute a -possible exception. In these territories massacres and misgovernment -had perhaps succeeded at last in turning the balance in favour of the -Turk. But in the main the distributed regions were being cultivated -and developed before the war by a population which was Western and not -Turanian in its origin and outlook. This population represented the -original inhabitants of the soil. - -The experiences, more especially of the past century, had demonstrated -clearly that the Turk could no longer be entrusted with the -property, the honour, or the lives of any Christian race within his -dominions. Whole communities of Armenians had been massacred under -circumstances of the most appalling cruelty in lands which their -ancestors had occupied since the dawn of history. And even after the -war began 700,000 of these wretched people had been done to death -by these savages, to whom, it must be remembered, the Great Powers -so ostentatiously proffered the hand of friendship at the first -Lausanne conference. Even while the conference was in session, and the -handshaking was going on, the Turks were torturing to death scores -of thousands of young Greeks whom they deported into the interior. -As "a precautionary measure" 150,000 Greeks of military age, of whom -30,000 were military prisoners, were last year driven inland to the -mountains of Anatolia. On the way they were stripped of their clothes, -and in this condition were herded across the icy mountains. It is not -surprising that when an agreement was arrived at for the exchange -of military prisoners, the Turks found the greatest difficulty in -producing 11,000, and of the total 150,000 it is estimated that -two-thirds perished. The Allied Powers had every good reason for -determining, as they hoped for all time, that this barbarian should -cease to shock the world by repeated exhibitions of savagery against -helpless and unarmed people committed to his charge by a cruel fate. - -Apart from these atrocities the fact that great tracts of country, -once the most fertile and populous in the world, have been reduced by -Turkish misrule and neglect to a condition which is indistinguishable -from the wilderness, alone proves that the Turk is a blight and a -curse wherever he pitches his tent, and that he ought in the interests -of humanity to be treated as such. When a race, which has no title to -its lands other than conquest, so mismanages the territories it holds -by violence as to deprive the world of an essential contribution to -its well-being, the nations have a right--nay, a duty--to intervene -in order to restore these devastated areas to civilisation. This same -duty constitutes the reason and justification for the white settlers of -America overriding the prior claims of the Indian to the prairies and -forests of the great West. - -On the shores of the Mediterranean are two races with a surplus -population of hard-working, intelligent cultivators, both of them -belonging to countries which had themselves in the past been -responsible for the government of the doomed lands covered by the -Turkish Empire. Greece and Italy could claim that under their rule -this vast territory throve and prospered mightily. They now pour -their overflow of population into lands far away from the motherland. -Yet they are essentially Mediterranean peoples. The history of the -Mediterranean will for ever be associated with their achievements on -its shores and its waters. The derelict wastes of Asia Minor need them. -Valleys formerly crowded with tillers are now practically abandoned -to the desert weeds. Irrigation has been destroyed or neglected. The -Italian engineers are amongst the best in the world, and once they -were introduced into Asia Minor would make cultivation again possible. -There is plenty of scope in the deserts of Anatolia for both Italian -and Greek. I was hoping for a peace that would set them both working. -Had such a settlement been attained, a generation hence would have -witnessed gardens thronging with happy men, women, and children, where -now you have a wilderness across which men, women, and children are -periodically hunted down into nameless horror. - -Yet another reason for the Allied decision was the bitter resentment -that existed at the ingratitude displayed by the Turk towards Britain -and France. They were naturally indignant that he should have joined -their foes and slammed the gate of the Dardanelles in their face, -and by that means complicated and prolonged their campaign and added -enormously to their burdens, their losses, and their dangers. But he -had not the thankfulness even of the beast of prey in the legend -towards the man who had cured his wounded limb. France and Britain -had many a time extracted the thorn from the Turkish paw when he was -limping along in impotent misery. They had done more. They had often -saved the life of that Empire when the Russian bear was on the point of -crushing it out of existence; and yet without provocation, without even -a quarrel, he had betrayed them to their enemies. - -I have set out shortly what the war policy of the Allies was in -reference to Turkey. The Treaty of Sèvres considerably modified that -policy in many vital aspects. By that Treaty, Constantinople, Cilicia, -and Southern Anatolia were left to the Turk; Armenia was created into -an independent State. There were many objections which could be raised -to the original proposals of 1915, as it might be argued that they -contemplated handing over in Cilicia and Southern Anatolia populations -which in the main were Turkish and Moslem to Christian rulers. But in -substance the modified plan of Sèvres was sound, and if carried out -would have conduced to the well-being of the millions to be liberated -by its terms for ever from Turkish rule. The world at large also -would have benefited by the opportunity afforded to the industrious -and intelligent Armenian and Greek populations of Turkey to renew the -fertility of this land, once so bountiful in its gifts, thus enriching -man's store of good things. The barbarian invasion which withered that -fertility was pushed back into the interior by the Treaty of Sèvres. -The Treaty of Lausanne has extended and perpetuated its sway from the -Black Sea to the Mediterranean. I have explained the why and wherefore -of Sèvres. But why Lausanne? It is a long and painful story--a compound -of shortsightedness, disloyalty, selfishness, and pusillanimity amongst -nations and their statesmen. And more than all, Fate happened to be -in its grimmest mood when dealing with this problem. The Russian -Revolution eliminated that great country from the solution of the -problem on the lines of protection for the oppressed races of Turkey, -and instead cast its might on the side of the oppressor. President -Wilson was inclined to recommend that the United States of America -should undertake the mandate for the Armenians. Had he succeeded, what -a different story would now have been told! What a different story the -generations to come would also tell! But his health broke down at the -vital moment and America would have none of his humanitarian schemes. -Then came the departure of Sonnino from the Quirinal. With him went -for a momentous while the old dreams of Italian colonisation, which in -the past had done so much to spread civilisation in three continents. -His successors were homelier men. I have still my doubts as to whether -they served Italy best by the less adventurous and more domesticated -policy they pursued. The future may decide that issue. But whatever the -decision, the time for action passed away, and unless and until there -is another break up in Turkey, the chance Italy has lost since 1919 -will not be recovered. Will it ever come back? - -There followed the French check in Cilicia, and the negotiations -at Angora with Mustapha Kemal, which were both single-handed and -under-handed; for the Allies were not even informed of what was going -on. This was a fatal step, for it broke up the unity which alone would -enable the Western Powers to deal effectively with the Turk. This -unity was never fully re-created. There can be no reunion without -confidence. There can be no trust in the West that is broken in -the East. Much of the recent mischief in the Entente came from the -clandestine negotiations at Angora. - -The last fatal change was the Greek revolt against Venizelos. It is -often said that he is the greatest statesman thrown up by that race -since Pericles. In all he has undertaken he has never failed his -people. Disaster has always come to them when they refused to follow -his guidance. When King Alexander was killed by a monkey, the Greeks -were called upon to decide between Constantine and Venizelos. Their -choice was ruinous to their country. No greater evil can befall a -nation than to choose for its ruler a stubborn man with no common -sense. Before the advent of Constantine, Greece, with no aid and -little countenance from the Powers, was able to hold the forces of -Mustapha Kemal easily at bay and even to drive him back into the -fastnesses of Anatolia. In encounter after encounter the Greek army, -led by men chosen for their military gifts and sufficiently well -equipped, inflicted defeat after defeat on the armies of Angora. But -with Constantine came a change. In the Greek army, courtiers were -substituted for soldiers in the high command. French, British and -Italian public opinion, with the memory of Constantine's treachery -during the war still fresh in their minds, altered their attitude -towards the Greeks who had elevated him to the throne in defiance of -Allied sentiment. Indifferent Powers became hostile; hostile Powers -became active. The final catastrophe began with the heroic but foolish -march of the Greek army into the defiles of Asia Minor, followed -by the inevitable retreat. It was consummated when Constantine for -dynastic reasons appointed to the command of the troops in Asia Minor -a crazy general whose mental condition had been under medical review. -The Greeks fight valiantly when well led, but like the French, once -they know they are not well led, confidence goes, and with confidence -courage. Before the Kemalist attack reached their lines the Greek -army was beaten and in full retreat. With attack came panic, with -panic the complete destruction of what was once a fine army. With the -disappearance of that army vanished the last hope for the salvation of -Anatolia. That the history of the East, and probably the West, should -have been changed by the bite of a monkey is just another grimace of -the comic spirit which bursts now and again into the pages of every -great tragedy. - -All that could be done afterwards was to save the remnants of a great -policy. Western civilisation put up its last fight against the return -of savagery into Europe, when in September and October of last year -British soldiers and sailors, deserted by allies and associates alike, -saved Constantinople from hideous carnage. The Pact of Mudania was -not Sèvres, but it certainly was better than Lausanne. From Sèvres to -Mudania was a retreat. From Mudania to Lausanne is a rout. - -What next? Lausanne is not a terminus, it is only a milestone. Where -is the next? No one claims that this Treaty is peace with honour. It -is not even peace. If one were dealing with a regenerated Turk, there -might be hope. But the burning of Smyrna, and the cold-blooded murders -of tens of thousands of young Greeks in the interior, prove that the -Turk is still unchanged. To quote again from the correspondent of _The -Times_ at Lausanne:-- - - - "All such evidence as can be obtained here confirms the belief - that the new Turk is but the old, and that the coming era of - enlightenment and brotherly love in Turkey, for which it is the - correct thing officially to hope, will be from the foreigners' - point of view at best a humiliating, and at worst a bloody, chaos." - - -The amazing legend that the Turk is a gentleman is dying hard. -That legend has saved him many a time when he was on the brink of -destruction. It came to his aid in October last when the policy of -this country was changed by the revolt of the Turcophile against the -Coalition. The Turk has massacred hundreds of thousands of Armenians, -and dishonoured myriads of Christian women who trusted to his -protection. Nevertheless the Turk is a gentleman! By his indolence, -his shiftiness, his stupidity, and his wantonness, he has reduced a -garden to a desert. What better proof can there be that he is a real -gentleman? For a German bribe he sold the friends who had repeatedly -saved his wretched life. All the same, what a gentleman he is! He -treated British prisoners with a barbarous neglect that killed them off -in hundreds. Still, he is such a gentleman! He plunders, he slays, and -outrages those who are unable to defend themselves. He misgoverns, -cheats, lies, and betrays. For all that, the Turk is a gentleman! So an -agitation was engineered with perverse tenacity to save this fine old -Oriental gentleman from the plebeian hands that sought his destruction. -Hence the black Treaty of Lausanne. - -_London, July 25th, 1923_ - -FOOTNOTE: - -[12] London, July 25th, 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne, between the -Allies and the Turks, was signed on July 24th, 1923. - - - - -XXIX - -THE SIGNING OF THE IRISH TREATY - - -When a few days ago I was half-way through the speech I delivered in -the House of Commons on the land system the faithful Commons were -summoned in the manner consecrated by centuries of tradition to the bar -of the House of Lords to hear the royal assent being given to the bill -for the constitution of the Irish Free State. Notwithstanding a natural -preoccupation with my interrupted speech two scenes came to my mind -during my short journey to and from the upper chamber. - -The first was the spectacle of a crowded House of Commons nearly -thirty years ago. When the doors were opened for prayers there was the -unwonted sight of a throng of hustling M.P.'s pressing through the -swing doors to secure seats. I need hardly say this was not the symptom -or the outcome of any religious revival amongst our legislators. It -was entirely due to the ancient custom that confers upon a member -occupying a seat at prayers the unchallengeable right to that seat -for the rest of the sitting. Rows of chairs were arrayed on the floor -of the House. That was an innovation never since followed. What was it -all about? There sat in the middle of the Treasury bench huddled up and -almost hidden by more stalwart and upright figures an old man of 83 -years, to all appearances in the last stage of physical decrepitude and -mental lassitude. His name was William Ewart Gladstone, the greatest -parliamentary gladiator of all time. The lifelong champion of oppressed -nationalities was to-day to inaugurate his final effort to give freedom -to the Irish race trodden for centuries by ruthless force. The last -remnant of his strength was to be consecrated to the achievement of -Irish liberty, and hundreds of eager legislators to whom Peel and -Russell, Palmerston and Disraeli were but historical names, were avid -competitors for seats from which they could better listen to a man who -had sat in governments with the first three and crossed swords with the -fourth. It was a memorable sight. - -The preliminary questions which precede all parliamentary business were -by common consent postponed, and a deep and solemn silence thrilling -with expectancy fell upon the humming assembly as Mr. Speaker Peel -in his sonorous voice called out "the Prime Minister." The inert heap -which was the centre of all gaze sprang to the table an erect and -alert figure. The decrepitude was cast off like a cloak--the lassitude -vanished as by a magician's wand, the shoulders were thrown back, the -chest was thrown forward, and in deep, ringing tones full of music and -force the proposed new Irish charter was expounded for three unwearying -hours by the transfigured octogenarian rejuvenated by the magic of an -inspired soul. I had a seat just opposite the great orator. I was one -of the multitude who on that occasion listened with marvel to that -feat of intellectual command and physical endurance. It was more than -that. It was an unrivalled display of moral courage, rare in political -conflict. Mr. Gladstone had only just emerged out of a general election -where, in spite of six years of his eloquent advocacy, the voice of -Great Britain had declared emphatically against his Irish policy, and -the poor parliamentary majority at his back was made up out of the -preponderating Irish vote in favour of Home Rule. He was confronted -with the most formidable parliamentary opposition ever ranged against -a minister, redoubtable in debating quality, still more redoubtable in -its hold on British pride. He was eighty-three years of age, but he -never quailed, and through the sultry summer months of 1893 he fought -night by night with mighty strokes the battle of Irish emancipation. He -did not live to carry the cause through to victory, but he planted the -banner so firmly in the soil that no assault could succeed in tearing -it down, and on the day when I stood with Mr. Bonar Law at the bar of -the House of Lords I saw this banner flourished in triumph from the -steps of the throne by a Unionist Lord Chancellor. That was the first -memory that flashed through my brain. - -The next was of a dreary December night just one year ago when on one -side of the Cabinet table in 10 Downing Street sat four representatives -of Great Britain and on the other five Irish leaders. It was the famous -room wherein British cabinets have for generations forged their Irish -policies. Coercion and concession alike issued from that chamber. -Pitt's Act of Union was discussed there, and so were Gladstone's -Home Rule bills, the decision to use British soldiers to throw Irish -tenants out of their houses with battering ram and torch and equally -the bill which made every Irish tenant lord and master of his home at -the expense of the British treasury--all issued forth from this simple -and unadorned council chamber. And now came the final treaty of peace. -Would it be signed? It was an anxious moment charged with destiny for -the two great races who confronted each other at that green table. - -The British representatives who were associated with me on the occasion -were Mr. Austen Chamberlain; [I recall now how he sat by the side of -his doughty father, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, in 1893, during the famous -nightly duel between him and Mr. Gladstone. How strangely little thirty -arduous years have changed his personal appearance!] Lord Birkenhead, -who, in 1893 was carving for himself a brilliant career as a student -at Oxford and as a debater in the Union; Mr. Winston Churchill who was -then a cadet at Sandhurst whilst his father was engaged in the last -great parliamentary struggle of his dazzling but tragic career; Sir -Gordon Hewart, now Lord Hewart, the man who has risen on the pinions of -a powerful intelligence to the height of Lord Chief Justice of England. -My recollection is that the other two British delegates--Sir Laming -Worthington-Evans and Sir Hamar Greenwood--were stricken with illness -and were unable to be present. After weeks of close investigation the -climax of decision had been reached. Britain had gone to the limit of -concession. No British statesman could have faced any assembly of his -countrymen had he appended his signature to a convention that placed -Ireland outside that fraternity of free nations known as the British -Empire or freed her from that bond of union which is represented by a -common fealty to the sovereign. It is not easy to interpret the potency -of this invisible bond to those who are brought up to venerate other -systems. It is nevertheless invincible. Would the Irish leaders have -the courage to make peace on the only conditions under which peace was -attainable--liberty within the Empire? - -Opposite me sat a dark, short, but sturdy figure with the face of a -thinker. That was Mr. Arthur Griffith, the most un-Irish leader that -ever led Ireland, quiet to the point of gentleness, reserved almost -to the point of appearing saturnine. A man of laconic utterance, he -answered in monosyllables where most men would have considered an -oratorical deliverance to be demanded by the dignity of the occasion. -But we found in our few weeks' acquaintance that his yea was yea and -his nay meant nay. He led the Irish deputation. He was asked whether he -would sign. In his abrupt, staccato manner he replied, "Speaking on my -own behalf I mean to sign." - -By his side sat a handsome young Irishman. No one could mistake his -nationality. He was Irish through and through, in every respect a -contrast to his taciturn neighbour. Vivacious, buoyant, highly strung, -gay, impulsive, but passing readily from gaiety to grimness and back -again to gaiety, full of fascination and charm--but also of dangerous -fire. That was Michael Collins, one of the most courageous leaders ever -produced by a valiant race. Nevertheless he hesitated painfully when -the quiet and gentle little figure on his left had taken his resolve. -Both saw the shadow of doom clouding over that fateful paper--their own -doom. They knew that the pen which affixed their signature at the same -moment signed their death-warrant. The little man saw beyond his own -fall Ireland rising out of her troubles a free nation and that sufficed -for him. Michael Collins was not appalled by the spectre of death, but -he had the Irishman's fear of encountering that charge which comes -so readily to the lips of the oppressed--that of having succumbed to -alien wile and betrayed their country. Patriots who cheerfully face -the tyrant's steel lose their nerve before that dread accusation. It -was the first time Michael Collins ever showed fear. It was also the -last. I knew the reason why he halted, although he never uttered a -word which revealed his mind, and I addressed my appeal to an effort -to demonstrate how the treaty gave Ireland more than Daniel O'Connell -and Parnell had ever hoped for, and how his countrymen would be ever -grateful to him not only for the courage which won such an offer, but -for the wisdom that accepted it. - -He asked for a few hours to consider, promising a reply by nine -o'clock. Nine passed, but the Irish leaders did not return. Ten. -Eleven, and they were not yet back. We had doubts as to whether we -should see them again. Then came a message from the secretary of the -Irish delegation that they were on their way to Downing Street. When -they marched in it was clear from their faces that they had come to -a great decision after a prolonged struggle. But there were still -difficulties to overcome--they were, however, difficulties not of -principle but of detail. These were discussed in a businesslike way, -and soon after one o'clock in the morning the treaty was complete. A -friendly chat full of cheerful goodwill occupied the time whilst the -stenographers were engaged in copying the draft so disfigured with the -corrections, interpolations and additions, each of which represented so -many hours of hammering discussion. - -Outside in the lobby sat a man who had used all the resources of an -ingenious and well-trained mind backed by a tenacious will to wreck -every endeavour to reach agreement--Mr. Erskine Childers, a man whose -slight figure, whose kindly, refined and intellectual countenance, -whose calm and courteous demeanour offered no clue to the fierce -passions which raged inside his breast. At every crucial point in the -negotiations he played a sinister part. He was clearly Mr. de Valera's -emissary, and faithfully did he fulfil the trust reposed in him by that -visionary. Every draft that emanated from his pen--and all the first -drafts were written by him--challenged every fundamental position to -which the British delegates were irrevocably committed. He was one of -those men who by temperament are incapable of compromise. Brave and -resolute he undoubtedly was, but unhappily for himself he was also -rigid and fanatical. When we walked out of the room where we had sat -for hours together, worn with tense and anxious labour, but all happy -that our great task of reconciliation had been achieved, we met Mr. -Erskine Childers outside sullen with disappointment and compressed -wrath at what he conceived to be the surrender of principles he had -fought for. - -I never saw him after that morning. Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith -I met repeatedly after the signature of the treaty, to discuss the -many obstacles that surged up in the way of its execution, and I -acquired for both a great affection. Poor Collins was shot by one of -his own countrymen on a bleak Irish roadside, whilst he was engaged -in restoring to the country he had loved so well the order and good -government which alone enables nations to enjoy the blessings of -freedom. Arthur Griffith died worn out by anxiety and toil in the cause -he had done so much to carry to the summit of victory. Erskine Childers -was shot at dawn for rebellion against the liberties he had helped to -win. - -Truly the path of Irish freedom right up to the goal is paved with -tragedy. But the bloodstained wilderness is almost through, the -verdant plains of freedom are stretched before the eyes of this -tortured nation. Ireland will soon honour the name of the Green Isle, -and I am proud to have had a hand in erecting the pillar which will for -ever mark the boundary between the squalor of the past and the hope of -the future. - -_London, December 16th, 1922._ - - - - -XXX - -PROHIBITION - - -Four years ago the United States of America, by a two-thirds majority, -voted prohibition of the sale of alcoholic liquors. The British -House of Commons have just voted down a bill for the same purpose by -a majority of 236 to 14. America treats prohibition as one of its -greatest moral triumphs. Britain treats it as a joke. - -What accounts for this remarkable disparity in the attitude of the two -great English-speaking communities towards one of the most baffling -and elusive problems civilisation has to deal with? It cannot be a -fundamental difference in temperament or in moral outlook. The men who -engineered prohibition in America are of our own race and kind, bred in -the Puritan traditions that came originally from our shores. - -If the evils of excessive drinking had been more apparent in America -than in Britain I could understand the States of the Union deciding -to take more drastic action than has been thought necessary in our -country. But the facts are exactly the reverse. The consumption of -alcohol in the United Kingdom some years before the war per head of -the population was higher than that of the United States. The poverty, -disease, and squalor caused by alcohol was much greater in Britain than -in America. - -What, then, accounts for the readiness of America to forbid the sale -and the reluctance of Britain even seriously to restrict it? - -I would not care to dogmatise on the subject, but I will hazard two or -three possible explanations. - -I set aside the suggestion that property owners are frightened by -the sequel to prohibition in Russia. I have heard it argued that -the prohibition ukase of the tsar was responsible for the Russian -revolution. That is probably true, for a people stupefied by alcohol -will stand anything. The inefficiency and corruption of the tsarist -régime was so appalling that no sober nation could have tolerated it -without rebellion for a single year, and when the fumes of vodka ceased -to muddle and blind the _moujik_, he rebelled against the autocracy -that had betrayed his country into disaster. The Russian experiment in -drink, therefore, contains no warning against prohibition, except a -very limited one, that those who wish to misrule a country in safety -must first of all drench it with alcohol. - -There is, of course, the ready explanation that old countries are very -conservative, and do not take kindly to change. Their joints are stiff -with age, and they creak along well-worn paths slowly and painfully, -but they lack the suppleness of limb that tempts younger communities -to sprint across untrodden country. That is the argument. I am afraid -this explanation will not hold. Old countries when thoroughly moved can -leap like the hart. The French Revolution demonstrated how vigorously -one of the oldest nations of Europe could tear along unbroken tracks -when impelled by a new passion. And I saw Britain spring to arms in -1914, when five millions of men joined the colours without the lash -of compulsion to stir their blood. England renewed her youth, and her -movements had the energy, the audacity, and the endurance of a people -untired by a march of centuries. This people, if stirred by a call -which reaches its heart or conscience, is capable of action as bold -as that which wrested Magna Charta out of a despot in the twelfth -century, overthrew an ancient religion in the fifteenth century, led -a king to the scaffold in the seventeenth century, or challenged -the greatest military empires in the world in the sixteenth, the -nineteenth, and the twentieth centuries. And if they were convinced -that the liquor traffic must be destroyed, they would execute it with -as little compunction or hesitation as they displayed in suppressing -the mass or in decapitating Charles I. - -At the present moment the British people are not in the least persuaded -that the evils of alcohol for a minority of the population cannot be -dealt with effectively without resorting to the very drastic expedient -of forbidding its consumption by the majority who use it in moderation. -Are they likely to be convinced? That depends on the failure or success -of all other expedients to exterminate the evil of alcoholism. - -That brings me to another explanation. America reached prohibition by -the path of experiment. The federal system lent itself to the trial -of every form of remedy, including prohibition. For well over half a -century you have had almost every form of temperance expedient ever -suggested in actual working in some State or other of the American -republic. - -When I was a lad I heard debates and addresses in Welsh about the -comparative merits of the "Maine Law" and high license. High license, -reduction of licenses, local option, prohibition, have all been -tried. They have all been in operation quite long enough to enable -the American public to form a judgment on their merits. Statistical -results over long periods constitute a reliable basis for inference. -American federalism furnished the opportunity, and the States took full -advantage of it. Hence the prohibition law. - -To the practical man the figures in the prohibition States looked -attractive from a business point of view. He hesitated, but the moral -wave that swept over America carried him over the bar. But without the -experience at his door I doubt whether the American business man would -have assented to prohibition. - -The British constitution does not lend itself to these valuable -experiments. Otherwise, London might have tried one experiment, -Lancashire another, Yorkshire a third, Scotland a fourth, and Wales a -fifth. The whole legislative power of the United Kingdom was until -quite recently vested in the imperial Parliament. Ireland has now a -legislature of its own. In theory, what suited one part of the kingdom -must do for the whole, and what did not suit the more populous parts -could not be permitted to others. - -As far as Scotland, Ireland, and Wales are concerned, there was in -practice a certain relaxation of this rule. But as far as the liquor -laws went, any serious alteration in any part of the kingdom was -difficult to secure if it offended the prejudices or damaged the -interests of the rest. It took years to get it through Parliament even -in a mutilated condition. - -There was no real freedom of experiment. The Scottish local veto act is -a compromise modified to suit English sentiment. Even as it is, it took -thirty years of Scottish insistence to carry. Wales has been unable to -secure local option, although it has been demanded by four-fifths of -its representatives for over a generation. We have, therefore, in this -country been denied the practical experience which has guided America -to so dramatic a conclusion. - -In the absence of such experience it has been found impossible to -educate and organise public opinion throughout Britain to the point of -concentrating attention and pressure on this one issue. Other issues -always cut across and jam the current. - -You cannot secure unanimity of action on temperance reform even amongst -the religious forces. If they were united in their demand, and prepared -to enforce it at elections, nothing could resist their power. Between -elections they seem agreed in their policy; but no sooner does the -party bugle sound than they all fall into rank in opposite armies, and -the temperance banner is hurriedly packed into the cupboard for use -after the polls have been declared. It is then once more brought out to -wave over the tabernacle, and its wrinkles are straightened out in the -breeze. - -I have seen the fiercest champions of local option supporting brewers -at elections because they were the official opponents of Irish Home -Rule in the contest. I remember being told by an eminent Scottish -divine, who was a strong temperance advocate, but who had hitherto -supported anti-temperance candidates because of his inveterate -opposition to Gladstone's Home Rule, that, unless his party carried a -measure of local option for Scotland soon, he would have to abandon -them, home rule or no home rule. He died without redeeming his -promise. The time never came for him. The Irish issue dominated -elections for nearly a generation. Free trade played a great part also. - -If the exigencies of party conflict had permitted the same consistent -propaganda work, extending over the same number of years, to be devoted -to the drink problem as was given to the wrongs of Ireland or free -trade, no doubt public opinion could have been educated up to the point -of supporting drastic reform. But this has not been found practicable -by political parties owing to the distraction of other issues. - -This is the main reason why British opinion is so far behind American -opinion on the temperance question. In America the battle of sobriety -was fought on the State platform, whilst the national platform was left -free for other conflicts. - -The war, however, enabled the British government to effect reforms -which have materially reduced the consumption of alcohol in this -kingdom. These results have been achieved by an enormous increase in -the taxation of alcoholic liquors, and by a considerable reduction in -the hours of sale. The taxation of beer was raised from £13,000,000 -in 1913 to £123,000,000 in 1921. The duty on spirits in 1913 yielded -£22,000,000, in 1921 it gave the revenue £71,000,000. - -One of the effects has been an appreciable reduction in the alcoholic -strength of the beverage sold. The hours of sale in the morning and -afternoon have been curtailed appreciably. By this measure the workman -is prevented from starting his day by drinking alcohol, and the -afternoon break prevents the drinker from soddening all day. - -The effect of these combined measures has been highly beneficial. The -quantity of beer sold fell from 34,152,739 barrels of 36 gallons at -standard gravity of 10.55 in 1913, to 23,885,472 standard barrels in -1921. Spirits fell from 30,736,088 proof gallons in 1913 to 20,162,395 -in 1921. These figures represent a remarkable and almost sensational -reduction in the quantity of alcohol consumed by the population. -Convictions for drunkenness fell from 188,877 in 1913 to 77,789 in -1921. Deaths from alcoholic diseases were more than halved during the -same period. This is the most distinct advance in the direction of -effective temperance reform hitherto taken by the British Parliament, -and the effect is striking in its encouragement. - -It would be a serious national misfortune if the admirable results -attained by these war measures were lost by relaxations. Most of -the pressure exerted upon Parliament has up to the present been in -the direction of easing the grip of the state on the traffic. Most -candidates in all parties at the last election were forced to pledge -themselves to support reduction in the beer duty. Clubs, even more than -"pubs," have urged extensions in drinking hours. The beer duty has -already been reduced. It is anticipated that the reduction will have -the effect of increasing consumption. This is regrettable, for it means -so much reclaimed land once more sinking into the malarial swamp. - -There is one consolation, however, that the women will claim the -next turn in reduction of taxation. Sugar and tea will then provide -effective barriers in the way of a further cheapening of alcoholic -liquors just yet. But all this is a long, long way off prohibition. -A majority of 20 to 1 against Mr. Scrymgeour's prohibition bill, and -a majority of 4 to 1 in favour of cheaper beer--both recorded in the -same parliamentary week--is not encouraging to those who would suppress -alcohol in Britain. - -Temperance reformers here are, therefore, watching the progress of -America's bold bid for sobriety with hopeful, if anxious, eyes, and -with longing hearts. What Britain does next will depend entirely on the -success or failure of what America is doing now. - - - - -XXXI - -UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF "OFFICIAL" INFORMATION - - -A storm is working up over the publication by public servants of -information which came into their possession in the course of their -official careers. The immediate occasion is Mr. Winston Churchill's -story of the war. Angry questions are being asked in parliament, and it -is publicly announced that the Cabinet have appointed a committee of -its members to consider the whole problem. - -It is rather late in the day to make all this fuss about the -publication of war documents, for generals, admirals, and ministers -in all lands, including ours, have during the last three years -been inundating the European and American public with a flood of -reminiscences, explanations, criticisms, attacks and defences on the -conduct of operations, either of the Great War or the Great Peace, in -which they were engaged. Warriors on land and on sea have displayed an -unprecedented eagerness to inform the public as to their own share -in the great victory, and as to how much more brilliant that share -would have been but for the wrongheadedness or stupidity of some -collaborator. Like Julius Cæsar, they mean to live in history not -merely through their battles, but also through their commentaries upon -them. On the other hand, statesmen have been engaged in disclaiming -responsibility for particular parts of the Treaty of Versailles, -and where blame has been attached to them, either by opponents or -supporters, for the form in which those parts were cast, they have -striven hard to prove that it was attributable to pressure which -they were unable to resist from other actors in the drama. In each -case highly confidential information is disclosed, secret documents -are used, cabinet and council proceedings are published, without the -slightest regard to precedent. One disclosure has led to another, one -revelation has rendered another inevitable. - -A general, admiral or minister criticises on the strength of -half-disclosed minutes or documents some other public functionary, -military, naval, or political. What is the latter to do? His -reputation is at stake. Is he not to be allowed to repair the -omission or to correct the misquotation? Take the case of ministers -who played an important part in the conduct of the war or the peace, -and whose actions have been subjected to malignant and persistent -misrepresentation. In attacking these ministers statements are made -which, if accepted by the public, would irretrievably damage or even -destroy their reputation. In formulating the attack a document is -partially quoted, or the report of a council or cabinet meeting is -misquoted. The minister knows that a full and fair quotation would -clear his good name of the imputation sought to be cast upon it. Is -he not to be allowed, in those circumstances, to publish it? A mere -denial would carry no weight. A full revelation would settle the -dispute in his favour. The publication cannot conceivably affect any -public interest, it would supply no information which could serve any -possible enemy of his country. Is he not to be allowed to use the only -means available to redeem his credit from the ruin of accepted calumny? -His critic has been allowed to disclose secret information without -protest. Is he to be forbidden to do so in self-defence? He claims that -he served his country faithfully to the best of his powers in time -of crisis and peril. For that he is defamed by men who had access -to secret information and use it freely without criticism, censure -or demur. Why should his country deny him the same privilege for his -protection? That is the case which the cabinet committee will have to -consider. Whatever general rules may be laid down they must in all -fairness take into account these exceptional circumstances. Those who -are now taking a prominent part in emphasising the enormity of giving -to the public documents which were acquired in the public service -had not a word to say when portions of those documents were used for -purposes with which they were in sympathy. Is it not rather late for -them to protest now? There is such a thing as fair play even when -politicians are attacked. - -So far as the British are concerned the writing of the books of the -type alluded to was started, I think, by Field-Marshal Lord French of -Ypres, in his book, _1914_. This work is of the nature of an apologia; -and the writer, to assist in establishing his case, alludes to -discussions with the cabinet and does not hesitate to quote textually -secret memoranda and dispatches written by himself and others. The late -Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fisher, gives in his book, _Memories_, -examples of his own intervention at the war council meetings. In his -autobiography, _From Private to Field-Marshal_, which appeared some -time later, Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, who was for over two -years the confidential adviser of the cabinet and as such attended -all war councils and most war cabinet meetings, when it suits his -argument gives to the public his version of what passed at these highly -secret conclaves. Though he does not quote secret documents textually, -he describes the proceedings and deliberations of the supreme war -council, inter-Allied conferences and the war cabinet, and refers to -the opinions of individuals. In his recent speeches he has gone even -further. A still more recent work, _Sir Douglas Haig's Command_, is -the result of collaboration by two authors of whom one, at least, -held an official position during the war, being Sir Douglas Haig's -private secretary when he was Commander-in-Chief of the British army -in France. This book is even less reticent. It, also, is essentially -an apologia and justification of an individual. To establish their -case, the writers not only summarise some of the secret proceedings of -the supreme war council and war cabinet, but give extracts of their -decisions. These extracts are freely used as the basis of animadversion -on the council and cabinet of that day. It is true that some of -the quotations are stated to be taken from French books previously -published, but others are not, which arouses curiosity as to the source -of the knowledge displayed. - -In addition there have been endless articles in magazines and -newspapers, some signed, some written anonymously, all attacking either -ministers, generals or admirals, and most of them clearly supplied with -secret information by men who must have acquired it in their official -capacity. As to all these disclosures protest has hitherto been silent. -But when it is indicated that replies are forthcoming and that these -replies will reveal the real nature of the misquoted documents or -proceedings, the wrath of the assailants and their sympathisers knows -no bounds. - -What happened in reference to the consultations held in connection -with the framing of the peace treaty affords an illustration of the -way these revelations occur. The question of the publication of -these proceedings was definitely discussed at Versailles, after the -signature of the peace treaty with Germany on the 28th June, 1919, by -President Wilson, representing the United States, M. Clemenceau and M. -Simon, representing France, M. Sonnino, representing Italy, M. Makino, -representing Japan, and myself. This is what occurred on that occasion. -For the first time I quote from my own notes written at the time: - - - "President Wilson was strongly of opinion that these documents - ought to be treated as purely private conversation, and he - objected to the communication of the accounts given in the Notes - of the private conversations, in which all present had spoken - their minds with great freedom, as improper use might afterwards - be made of these documents. On the other hand, he did not object - to the Notes being communicated to special individuals in the - personal confidence of members of the Council. Though he looked - upon certain statements, the conclusions and the actions as being - official, and therefore available in the appropriate offices, the - actual conversations were private. In the United States no one - had the right to claim documents of this kind. President Wilson's - view was that each government should take the course traditional - in its own country with the clear and distinct understanding that - no one should under any circumstances make the _procès verbal_ - public. M. Clemenceau did not think that such documents should be - regarded as private property, whilst M. Sonnino thought they need - not be considered as official documents. - - "For my own part I was anxious to know what the precedents were. I - also felt bound to enter a caveat that if attacks should be made - on the political heads I might be forced in particular cases to - refer to these Notes, and I gave warning that I might have to do - so unless a protest was then made. M. Clemenceau agreed so far, - that it might be impossible to refuse extracts from the _procès - verbaux_ to prove particular facts." - - -It will be observed from this record that I was the first to safeguard -the interest of persons who, I felt certain, would be attacked for -their share in the treaty. I am the last to take advantage of the -proviso. - -What followed? M. Clemenceau was bitterly attacked by his political -opponents for surrendering French rights to the treaty. President -Wilson was also attacked by his political opponents for his assent to -other provisions of the treaty. In self-defence they authorised the -publication of the secret reports of the Paris meeting. - -M. Clemenceau entrusted his defence to M. Tardieu. M. Tardieu, in -his book _The Truth About the Treaty_, gives most of his attention -to the drawing up of that international instrument, but deals with -the last portion of the war period and quotes from the proceedings -of inter-allied conferences, and also of the supreme war council, -giving the opinions of individuals. He does the same with the -deliberations of the peace conference. In fact the whole book is -based on international proceedings of a secret nature. M. Poincaré, -in maligning his rivals, has not refrained from making full use -of information which came to his knowledge as President of the -Republic. For example, in his article, _Souvenirs et Documents_, in -the _Temps_ of the 12th September, 1921, he quotes _in extenso_ a -letter of April, 1919, from himself as President of the Republic to -the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, and a letter from me in -reply to the President of the Council. My consent was not even asked -to the publication of my letter. This correspondence referred to the -period proposed to be placed on the occupation by the Allies of the -left bank of the Rhine. According to Signor Nitti, M. Poincaré makes -somewhat similar disclosures in his articles published in the _Revue -des Deux Mondes_. All these disclosures were partial, truncated and, -therefore, misleading. They did not give the public a complete account -of what occurred. The impression created was, therefore, unfair to the -other actors in that great drama. That is undoubtedly what impelled -ex-President Wilson to hand over his documents to Mr. Ray Baker -with a view to the presentation of the case from the standpoint of -the American delegation. Hence his book, _Woodrow Wilson and World -Settlement_. It is mostly based on the secret minutes of the supreme -war council, numerous extracts from which are given. Signor Nitti, -the late Italian premier, on the other hand, expressly states that he -does not publish any document which was not intended for publication. -Nevertheless, he prints a memorandum written by myself for the peace -conference in March, 1919, under the title of _Some Considerations -for the Peace Conference before they finally Draft their Terms_, and -also M. Clemenceau's reply, both of which are secret documents. But he -excuses his action in this case because extracts from this memorandum -had already been published. - -I only mention these matters, not by way of arraignment of these -various distinguished men for divulging secrets they ought to have kept -under lock and key. That is not in the least my object. I do so in -order to point out that general rules as to the conditions under which -confidential material can be used are not applicable to circumstances -of the Great War and the peace that ensued. Disclosures already made -largely for purposes of criticism and aspersion upon individuals -or bodies of individuals have given the assailed parties a special -position which cannot in justice be overlooked. - -_London, March 17th, 1923._ - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHERE ARE WE GOING?*** - - -******* This file should be named 60262-8.txt or 60262-8.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/6/0/2/6/60262 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it -under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this -eBook or online at <a -href="http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you are not -located in the United States, you'll have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this ebook.</p> -<p>Title: Where Are We Going?</p> -<p>Author: David Lloyd George</p> -<p>Release Date: September 8, 2019 [eBook #60262]</p> -<p>Language: English</p> -<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> -<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHERE ARE WE GOING?***</p> -<p> </p> -<h4>E-text prepared by Tim Lindell, Martin Pettit,<br /> - and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br /> - (<a href="http://www.pgdp.net">http://www.pgdp.net</a>)<br /> - from page images generously made available by<br /> - Internet Archive<br /> - (<a href="https://archive.org">https://archive.org</a>)</h4> -<p> </p> -<table border="0" style="background-color: #ccccff;margin: 0 auto;" cellpadding="10"> - <tr> - <td valign="top"> - Note: - </td> - <td> - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive. See - <a href="https://archive.org/details/wherearewegoing00lloy"> - https://archive.org/details/wherearewegoing00lloy</a> - </td> - </tr> -</table> -<p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> - -<div class="center"><a name="cover.jpg" id="cover.jpg"></a><img src="images/cover.jpg" alt="cover" /></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</a></span></p> - -<p class="bold uline">WHERE ARE WE GOING?</p> - -<p class="bold">DAVID LLOYD GEORGE</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> - -<h1>WHERE ARE WE <br />GOING?</h1> - -<p class="bold space-above">BY</p> - -<p class="bold">THE RIGHT HONOURABLE</p> - -<p class="bold2">DAVID LLOYD GEORGE</p> - -<p class="bold">O.M., P.C., M.P.</p> - -<p class="bold">BRITISH PRIME MINISTER 1916-1922</p> - -<div class="center space-above"><img src="images/logo.jpg" alt="logo" /></div> - -<p class="bold">NEW YORK<br />GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">COPYRIGHT, 1923,<br />BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY</p> - -<div class="center"><img src="images/logo2.jpg" alt="logo" /></div> - -<p class="bold space-above">WHERE ARE WE GOING? II<br />——<br /> -PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> - -<h2>PREFACE</h2> - -<p>The chapters collected in this book represent a running comment on the -European situation during the past ten months. Although in the haze -that covers the Continent it is difficult always to see clearly what -is happening, and still more difficult to forecast what is likely to -occur, I have not deemed it necessary to revise any of the estimates -I made from time to time in these periodic reviews on the position. -In the period covered by them peace has gone back perceptibly and -unmistakably. Of the years immediately after the end of the Great War -it may be said that up to the present year each showed a distinct -improvement over its predecessor. The temper of the warring nations -showed a gradual healing and improvement, and East and West there was a -return to reason and calm in their attitude towards each other. In the -Cannes discussions of January 1922 the atmosphere of hostility which -poisoned the Spa discussions in 1920 had largely disappeared, and the -applause which greeted Herr<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span> Rathenau's fine speech at Genoa in April -1922 was cordial and general. The electric messages from Paris failed -to provoke a thunderstorm, and one of the speakers, at the last meeting -of the Assembly, drawing an illustration from the weather outside, said -the Conference had broken up under blue skies and a serene firmament.</p> - -<p>That was in May 1922. Those words, when used, met with cheering -approval: if used to-day they would be greeted with scoffing laughter. -The present year has been one of growing gloom and menace. The -international temper is distinctly worse all round. A peace has been -patched up with the Turkish Empire. No one believes it can endure -long. The only question is, How long? There may be other patched-up -treaties between struggling nations before the year is out. There is -only one prediction concerning them which can at this stage be safely -made—they will leave European peace in a more precarious plight than -ever. A peace wrung by triumphant force out of helplessness is never a -good peace. That is why I view with apprehension the character of the -settlement which may soon be wrung out of German despair in the Ruhr -and imposed on Greek impotence in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span> Adriatic. The Fiume settlement -may turn out to be more satisfactory in spite of threatening omens. -The Jugo-Slavs are a formidable military proposition to be tackled by -any Power. The War proved them to be about the best fighting material -in Europe. They are also fairly well equipped with modern weapons, and -if unhappily the need arose their deficiencies in this respect would -soon be supplied from the workshops of Czecho-Slovakia and elsewhere. I -am, therefore, still hopeful that Fiume may be remitted for settlement -to diplomatists and not to gunmen. International right in these -turbulent days seems to depend, not on justice, but on a reckoning of -chances. The Slavs are ready to defend their rights and can do so. -There is, therefore, some talk of conferences and even arbitration in -their case. Germany and Greece cannot put up a fight. Unconditional -surrender is, therefore, their lot. All the same, this is not only a -wrong but a miscalculation. Unjust concessions, extracted by violence, -are not settlements; they are only postponements. Unfortunately, the -decisions at the next great hearing of the cause are just as likely to -be provisional—and so the quarrel will go on to the final catastrophe -unless humanity one day sees the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span> light and has the courage to follow -it. But that day must not be too distant, otherwise it will come too -late to save civilisation. The last conflict between great nations has -exposed the devastating possibilities of modern science. Henceforth -progress in the destructiveness of the apparatus of war has been, and -will continue to be, so rapid that a conflict to-morrow would spread -ten times the desolation caused by the Great War of 1914-18. There is a -concentration of much scientific and mechanical skill on strengthening -the machinery of devastation. Incredible progress—if progress be the -word—has been made within the last three or four years in perfecting -and increasing the shattering power of this kind of devilry. What will -it be like five, ten, twenty years hence!</p> - -<p>Whilst nations are piling up, perfecting and intensifying their -explosives, they are also saturating the ground with the inflammable -passions which one day will precipitate the explosion. Injustice, -insult, insolence, distilled into the spirit of revenge, is everywhere -soaking into the earth.</p> - -<p>I have never doubted that France could impose terms on Germany. It was -clear that she could starve Germany into submission to any conditions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span> -dictated to her. It is astonishing that the Germans should have held -out so long. What I have steadily predicted in these articles is that -those terms will not produce as much reparation as a more conciliatory -course would have brought—that to operate them will be a source of -constant friction, and that the methods employed to impose and execute -them will rouse a spirit of patriotic wrath which will in the end bring -disaster to the victor of to-day.</p> - -<p>When the invasion of the Ruhr was decided upon, the shortage in the -promised coal deliveries upon which default was declared was barely -10 per cent. A little better organisation of the wagon service on the -French side would have made up that deficiency in a very short time. -During the months of the occupation the French and Belgians have not -succeeded in collecting one-sixth the tonnage delivered during the -corresponding months last year. It will take weeks after passive -resistance has collapsed to restore railways and collieries to working -order. The new <i>régime</i> will have to liquidate arrears of at least -15,000,000 tons before it begins its regular monthly deliveries. What -about cash payments? It is not too much to say that Germany is much -less able to meet her obligations in this respect than she was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span> before -the invasion. Her credit has been blown out of sight into infinite -space. It will take a long time to pull it back from its wanderings and -set its feet once more firmly on European earth. There are only four -ways in which the huge sum due from Germany can be liquidated:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>(1) By handing over to the Allies the gold reserves of Germany -and of Germans either at home or on deposit abroad. The former -is negligible; the amount of the latter is disputable. Much of -it is essential to enable Germany to purchase abroad the raw -material and food necessary to her existence. The worse German -credit becomes the larger must this deposit be. As for the foreign -securities and deposits which are not strictly necessary for -trading, they cannot all be made available, for nothing will -induce some of the depositors to part with the whole of these -securities. The sum, therefore, derivable from this source would -amount to but a small percentage of the total figure payable for -reparations.</p> - -<p>(2) Deliveries of coal, timber, potash, dyes and other raw -material. With the exception of timber, these deliveries have -been, on the whole, satisfactory<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span>—since the Spa Agreement. It -did not require the pressure of armed invasion to improve these -deliveries, including the timber demands of the Allies.</p> - -<p>(3) A percentage levied on German exports. These are paid for in -gold or its equivalent, and the levy would therefore be remitted -in gold. A levy of 20 per cent. on German exports would have -produced between £40,000,000 and £50,000,000 a year on the basis -of last year's exports. When German trade returned to normal it -would yield £100,000,000. This sum, added to the value of the -material delivered, would cover interest and sinking fund on -the £2,500,000,000 which is now the accepted maximum of German -capacity.</p> - -<p>(4) The restoration of German credit with a view to the immediate -raising of a loan on reparation account. This would help the -Allies over their urgent financial difficulties.</p></blockquote> - -<p>These four methods of payment are the only known and knowable means of -obtaining reparations. They would have been more immediately fruitful -if so much time, money and resource had not been wasted over this -ill-judged invasion.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span></p> - -<p>The apologists of French action in the Ruhr contend that France was -driven to these extremes by the refusal of Britain to co-operate -with her in bringing legitimate pressure to bear on Germany to carry -out the Treaty. Those who put forward this contention argue in -ignorance of the proposals submitted by the British Government to the -Allied Conference in August 1922. These would have exploited all the -methods above set forth to the limit of their productiveness. These -proposals were substantially accepted by all the Allies except France. -Repeated efforts have been made this year in Parliament to induce the -Government to publish this scheme. Both the present and the late Prime -Minister gave favourable if not definite answers to the request for -publication. But so far the August proceedings have not made their -public appearance. Why this reluctance to give the whole facts to the -public? The discussions at the November and January Conferences have -been published in full. These meetings were only adjournments from the -August Conference. The story of the fateful Conference is, therefore, -incomplete if August is suppressed. Ought not the world to know the -proposals which France rejected in August 1922? In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span> the absence of -official publication I will take the responsibility now of giving a -Summary.</p> - -<p>It was proposed:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>(1) That Germany should be called upon to take such measures as -the Reparations Commission should stipulate, in order to balance -her Budget and restore her financial stability.</p> - -<p>(2) That the Reichsbank should be made independent of Government -control.</p> - -<p>(3) That 26 per cent. of the total value of German exports -should be collected in gold or foreign currencies and paid -into a separate account in the Reichsbank in the name of the -Sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission known as the Committee -of Guarantees.</p> - -<p>(4) That the produce of all German import and export duties other -than the levy should be paid monthly to a special account at the -Reichsbank, which should be under the scrutiny of the Committee -of Guarantees. The German Government should have the disposal -of the sums standing to the credit of this account so long as -the Reparations Commission was satisfied that it fulfilled the -obligations imposed upon it. If at any time the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span>Commission was -not satisfied that this was the case the Committee of Guarantees -should have the right to take over the sums standing to the credit -of this account and to secure the payment to it of the produce of -these duties thereafter.</p> - -<p>(5) There were stern provisions for supervision of German finance -by the Committee of Guarantees and for preventing the export of -German capital.</p> - -<p>(6) There were provisions for supervision over State mines and -forests in the event of their being a failure in delivery of coal -or timber as the case might be.</p></blockquote> - -<p>A Moratorium up to December 1922 was to be given conditionally on -the acceptance of the above terms by the German Government, and the -Reparations Commission were then to proceed to fix the further annual -payments.</p> - -<p>Had these drastic proposals been adopted and enforced by the Allies, -what would have been the result? Deliveries of coal and timber would -have been ensured up to the full quota arranged. By means of the levy -on exports, £50,000,000 would have been already collected in gold and -paid into Allied account. The mark would have been <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span>stabilised, and -could have been made the basis of a considerable loan. As German trade -gradually recovered the export levy would bring in larger amounts. This -year would certainly have produced a yield of between £60,000,000 and -£70,000,000. This is what would have been effected for Reparations if -the plan put forward by the British Government had been accepted and -put into execution in August. By the settlement of this most troublous -question, the great cost and the still greater irritation of the -Ruhr episode would have been avoided, trade would have continued its -convalescence, and the peace of Europe would have been established.</p> - -<p>What would have happened if Germany had refused these terms? We should -certainly have heard what objections or counter-proposals Germany had -to offer. But we were resolved to have a settlement that would put an -end to the fiscal chaos inside Germany, and having thus put her in a -position to pay we were equally resolved that she should pay up to the -limit of her capacity. We, therefore, undertook, if Germany rejected -the terms finally agreed upon, to join France and the other Allies -in any coercive measures deemed advisable to compel acceptance. M. -Poincaré refused to agree. His <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span>refusal alone rendered that Conference -fruitless. Over a year has elapsed since then. He has pursued a -different policy. So far it has brought him nothing. I am bold enough -to predict that in future it will bring France considerably less than -the August 1922 plan would have yielded.</p> - -<p>If he is out for reparations his policy will inevitably fail in -comparison with that he so rashly threw over. But if he is out for -trouble it has been a great success, and in future it will be an even -greater triumph for his statesmanship. A permanent garrison in the Ruhr -has possibilities of mischief which it does not require any special -vision to foresee.</p> - -<p>Enduring peace can only rest on a foundation of justice. It is just -that Germany should exert herself to the limit of her strength to -repair the damage wrought by her armies. She was the aggressor; she was -the invader. Her aggression inflicted serious hurt on her neighbours. -By the established precepts of every civilised law in the world she -ought to pay up. A peace which did not recognise that obligation -would be unjust and provoke a righteous resentment in the breasts of -the wronged. That sentiment would have been inimical to the good<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span> -understanding that is one of the essentials of peace. Moreover, it -is not conducive to good behaviour amongst nations that they should -be allowed to ravage and destroy without paying the penalty of their -misdeeds. That is why I do not agree with those who would wipe out -the claim for reparations entirely. On the other hand, civilised -jurisprudence has also advanced to the stage where it forbids the -creditor to attach his debtor's freedom and independence as security -for the payment of the debt. The law that permitted a debtor to be sold -into bondage for an unliquidated liability has now been voted barbarous -by the more humane usage and wont of the day. That is why I protest -against using armed force to occupy and control a country whilst the -scourge of starvation is being used to whip its workmen into toiling -for payment of a foreign debt. As Mr. Gladstone once said: "Justice -means justice to all." The main difficulty of a just settlement of -reparations comes from the growing disposition to take sides blindly -in this dispute. One party sees nothing but the outrage of 1914-18, -the costly vindication of right, and the just claim of the victims to -compensation for their losses. The other party sees nothing but the -harsh fury with which the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[Pg xviii]</a></span>victors in the cause press their verdict -to execution. Peace can only be restored by a full recognition of the -equities as well as the humanities—of the humanities as well as the -equities. I have sought in these pages to deal fairly with both.</p> - -<p class="right"><span class="smcap">D. Lloyd George.</span></p> - -<p><i>September 13th, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[Pg xix]</a></span></p> - -<h2>CONTENTS</h2> - -<table summary="CONTENTS"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left"><span class="smaller">CHAPTER</span></td> - <td><span class="smaller">PAGE</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>I: </td> - <td class="left">THE GREAT PERIL</td> - <td><a href="#Page_25">25</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Post-war Europe Revisited—Impoverishment<br /> -and Taxation—Race Hatreds Unchanged—How<br /> -War Is Begun—Vengeance Is<br />the Lord's—The Churches and the<br /> -League of Nations.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>II: </td> - <td class="left">EUROPE STILL ARMING</td> - <td><a href="#Page_51">51</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Marshal Foch and the Cause of the Great<br /> -War—Navies for Defence—Strength of<br /> -Europe's Armies—Europe More Militant<br /> -Than Ever.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>III: </td> - <td class="left">THE ERUPTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN</td> - <td><a href="#Page_59">59</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dropping Hot Cinders in the Balkans—Seeing<br /> -War in Pictures—Force the Arbiter<br /> -of Right and Wrong—Limiting the<br /> -Activities of the League—Bottling up<br /> -the Adriatic.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>IV: </td> - <td class="left">IS THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS A SUCCESS?</td> - <td><a href="#Page_68">68</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Triumphs of the League—All Great<br /> -Powers Should Be in It—America and<br /> -the League—Treaty and the League—Ending<br /> -the Arbitrament of the Sword.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[Pg xx]</a></span>V: </td> - <td class="left">THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND ITS CRITICS</td> - <td><a href="#Page_81">81</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Treaty Criticised But Not Read—America<br /> -and the Treaty—Labour and the Treaty—Treaty<br /> -and League of Nations Interwoven.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>VI: </td> - <td class="left">1922</td> - <td><a href="#Page_95">95</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">War Dance Still in the World—Ultimatum<br /> -Instead of Conference—Cannes<br /> -and Genoa—Enemies at Council Table—Talk<br /> -of an American Loan.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>VII: </td> - <td class="left">WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER?</td> - <td><a href="#Page_104">104</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Clemenceau and the Rhine—Annexation<br /> -and Revenge—Anglo-American Guarantee<br /> -to France—Poincaré and the Rhine.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>VIII: </td> - <td class="left">WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER?</td> - <td><a href="#Page_116">116</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Versailles Treaty and the Rhine Frontier—Foch<br /> -and the Political Frontier—American<br /> -and British Pressure—Sham<br /> -Republic of the Rhine.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>IX: </td> - <td class="left">WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER?</td> - <td><a href="#Page_130">130</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Bonar Law and Poincaré—Productive<br /> -Sanctions and Reparations—Moratorium<br /> -for Germany Fails—Britain Stands Aside.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>X: </td> - <td class="left">REPARATIONS</td> - <td><a href="#Page_136">136</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Reparations and the Treaty—Capacity to<br /> -Pay—Reparations Commission Changed—America's<br /> -Vacant Chair—Worthless "C"<br /> -Bonds for Britain.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[Pg xxi]</a></span>XI: </td> - <td class="left">MR. HUGHES'S NEW HAVEN SPEECH</td> - <td><a href="#Page_147">147</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary Hughes's New Haven Speech,<br /> -a Timid Deliverance—Impartial Tribunal<br /> -of Experts—Offer of American Help.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XII: </td> - <td class="left">THE FRENCH INVASION OF THE RUHR</td> - <td><a href="#Page_156">156</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">What Germany Has Paid—"In Technical<br /> -Default"—Wrong Way to Make Germany<br /> -Pay—Ruining German Industry—France's<br /> -Secret Aim.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XIII: </td> - <td class="left">LOST OPPORTUNITIES</td> - <td><a href="#Page_167">167</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">French Failure in the Ruhr—Wild Oats<br /> -of Reparation—The Ruhr and the League<br /> -of Nations—The Bankers' Conference.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XIV: </td> - <td class="left">FRENCH SCHEMES</td> - <td><a href="#Page_175">175</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Italy and the Ruhr—Iron Ore of Lorraine<br /> -and German Coal Deposits—Loucheur<br /> -and Hugo Stinnes—German<br /> -Workmen in Bondage.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XV: </td> - <td class="left">THE QUICKSAND</td> - <td><a href="#Page_183">183</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Loucheur and the Ruhr—Lack of Leader<br /> -in France—Disregard of Allies—Aggression<br /> -and Security—Failure of Bonar Law.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XVI: </td> - <td class="left">THE FIRST GERMAN OFFER</td> - <td><a href="#Page_191">191</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Does France Seek a Settlement?—Demand<br /> -for Submission in the Ruhr—German<br /> -Offer Inadequate—Keeping America<br /> -Out—Treaty Idea Not Followed.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XVII: </td> - <td class="left">THE SECOND GERMAN NOTE</td> - <td><a href="#Page_202">202</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">German Offer and the Loan to Germany—Can<br /> -Berlin Assent to Invasion?—Reintroducing<br /> -America—Weakening Debtors<br /> -Ability to Pay.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">[Pg xxii]</a></span>XVIII: </td> - <td class="left">THE NAPOLEONIC DREAM</td> - <td><a href="#Page_213">213</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">European Mind Unhinged—What Every<br /> -Frenchman Knows—Pickwick Follows<br /> -Snodgrass—Germany May Collapse—Undoing<br /> -the Work of Bismarck.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XIX: </td> - <td class="left">IS IT PEACE?</td> - <td><a href="#Page_225">225</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Stresemann Man of Energy—Chaos Ahead<br /> -for Germany—British Unemployment—France<br /> -a Self-contained Country—Balfour's<br /> -Note a Generous Offer.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XX: </td> - <td class="left">WHAT NEXT?</td> - <td><a href="#Page_234">234</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Pen-and-ink Jousting—Tory "Diehards"<br /> -and France—Poincaré and the Dove of<br /> -Peace—What "Pay and Stay" Means—France's<br /> -Minimum and Britain's Surrender.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XXI: </td> - <td class="left">THE BRITISH DEBT TO AMERICA</td> - <td><a href="#Page_244">244</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Borrowing for Allies—British Taxpayer's<br /> -Burden—Creditor Nation Now Debtor—Britain<br /> -Must Pay Her Way—Her Currency<br /> -Not Discredited—Inter-Allied Debts.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XXII: </td> - <td class="left">INTER-ALLIED DEBTS</td> - <td><a href="#Page_252">252</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Discovery of the Middle West—Legend<br /> -of British Wealth—1,400,000 Unemployed—The<br /> -Balfour Note—Can Britain Afford<br /> -To Be More Generous Than America?</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XXIII: </td> - <td class="left">THE BRITISH ELECTIONS</td> - <td><a href="#Page_264">264</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Minority Rule and Moral Authority—National<br /> -Liberals at the Polls—Danger<br /> -of England's Electoral System—Labour's<br /> -Prospects—Warring Liberal Factions.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii">[Pg xxiii]</a></span>XXIV: </td> - <td class="left">HOW DEMOCRACY WORKS</td> - <td><a href="#Page_282">282</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Growth of Britain's Electorate—Women<br /> -Suffrage—New Voters Without a Party—Absentees<br /> -from the Polls—Freaks of<br /> -the Group System.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XXV: </td> - <td class="left">POLITICAL REALITIES</td> - <td><a href="#Page_291">291</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Post-war Legislation—The Irish Cauldron—Labour<br /> -and Capital—Agriculture and<br /> -Industry—Socialism Courting Fascism.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XXVI: </td> - <td class="left">SHOULD WE MAKE PEACE WITH RUSSIA?</td> - <td><a href="#Page_301">301</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Pre-revolutionary Russia—Corruption and<br /> -Betrayal—"Shaking Hands with Murder"—If<br /> -Turkey, Why Not Russia?—Need for<br /> -Russia's Exports.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XXVII: </td> - <td class="left">PALESTINE AND THE JEWS</td> - <td><a href="#Page_312">312</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Stupidity of Anti-Semitism—Blighting Rule<br /> -of the Turk—The Jew as a Cultivator—Race<br /> -Equality in Palestine—Zionist Declaration.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XXVIII: </td> - <td class="left">THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE</td> - <td><a href="#Page_322">322</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Turkish Fezzes in the Air—Blow of Prestige<br /> -of the West—Massacres and Misgovernment—Fertile<br /> -Country a Wilderness—Had<br /> -Wilson Succeeded—Lausanne a<br /> -Milestone, not a Terminus.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XXIX: </td> - <td class="left">THE SIGNING OF THE IRISH TREATY</td> - <td><a href="#Page_339">339</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Gladstone's Home-rule Fight—Scene in<br /> -No. 10 Downing Street—Griffith and Collins—To<br /> -Sign or Not to Sign—Childers,<br /> -Sullen and Disappointed—Treaty a Pillar<br /> -of Hope for Future.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv">[Pg xxiv]</a></span>XXX: </td> - <td class="left">PROHIBITION</td> - <td><a href="#Page_350">350</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">The Lesson from Russia—Britain Not<br /> -Convinced—Experiments Difficult—Public<br /> -Uneducated—Outlook Not Encouraging.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>XXXI: </td> - <td class="left">UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF "OFFICIAL" INFORMATION</td> - <td><a href="#Page_361">361</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="left"><span class="smcap">Julius Cæsar Began It—Self Defence and<br /> -Secret Information—The Versailles Decision—General<br /> -Rules and Special Cases.</span></td> - <td></td> - </tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<p class="bold2">WHERE ARE WE GOING?</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p> - -<p class="bold2">WHERE ARE WE GOING?</p> - -<h2><span>I</span> <span class="smaller">THE GREAT PERIL</span></h2> - -<p>If a man on a bright July morning in 1914 had sailed abroad and had the -misfortune to be wrecked on a desert island, returning to civilisation -a week ago, the change which Europe presented to him would be -sufficient to induce him to believe that his long solitude had unhinged -his mind. To him it would have appeared as the stuff of which dreams -are made. He would have remembered a German empire with an august -head, ruling with autocratic sway a population striding with giant -steps into prosperity and wealth, possessing a matchless army, whose -tread terrified Europe; with a fleet that provoked articles and novels -and agitations about the invasion of England; with vast possessions -across the seas. In its place he would see Germany, instead of being a -confident, powerful,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> arrogant empire, a timid, nervous, and apologetic -republic presided over by a respectable and intelligent workman, her -minister issuing notes to propitiate Belgium, and having them sent -back like the stupid exercises of a backward schoolboy to be rewritten -in accordance with the pleasure of the taskmaster; the great army -reduced to a force one-half the size of that of Serbia; the menacing -fleet at the bottom of the sea; the watch on the Rhine kept by French, -British, and Belgian soldiers. He would see the Krupp works in French -occupation; not a German colony left.</p> - -<p>Russia he would have recollected as a powerful autocracy rooted in a -superstitious belief by the peasantry in the divinity of its head. -He would find it now a revolutionary area ruled by the exiles of -yesterday, shunned by the rest of the world because of the violence -of its communistic doctrines; tsardom, with its gilded retinue of -splendour, flung into a hideous doom, and the sceptre of Peter the -Great enforcing the doctrines of Karl Marx. He would see the Austrian -empire as much a thing of the past as the empire of Nebuchadnezzar, a -poor province lifted out of beggary by the charity of her foes: new -states, which had been dead and buried<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> for centuries, risen from the -dead, casting off their shrouds, marching in full panoply; Trieste -an Italian port; the Dolomites an Italian bastion. The Turk alone -quite unchanged, a few more amputating operations performed upon -him, but still preserving sufficient vitality to massacre Christians -irrespective of denomination or race, and to become a sore trial and -perplexity to the rest of the world.</p> - -<p>If our returned voyager travelled through Europe he would find -even more fundamental changes in the world of finance, trade and -commerce. He would find impoverishment, dislocation; the elaborate -and finely-spun web of commerce rent to pieces, and its torn threads -floating in the wind. With a few sovereigns in his pocket, he would -expect in return 25 francs, 20 marks, and about 26 lire. Instead of -that, with a paper sovereign he would find that he could buy 70 francs, -nearly 100 lire, 250,000 German marks, 300,000 Austrian kronen, and -millions of Russian roubles. The money-changers who once prospered on -decimal fractions now earning a precarious livelihood in the flights -of the multiplication table. That would give him a better indication -perhaps of the reality of the change than even the fall of empires. On -his journeys he would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> travel through prosperous provinces rutted and -overturned as by a gigantic earthquake; he would pass vast cemeteries -where 10,000,000 young men fallen in the Great War were having their -last sleep; he would see on all hands signs of mutilation of men who -had been engaged in the great struggle. Taxation everywhere quintupled -with nothing but debt to show for it; industry with its back bent under -a burden of taxation which when he left existed only in the nightmares -of the dyspeptic rich. He would then be able to realise something of -the tremendous upheaval that had taken place in the world.</p> - -<p>But what would surprise him more than all these amazing and bewildering -transformations would be the one thing in which there was no change. -He would naturally expect that after such terrifying experiences, the -world would have learnt its lesson, turned its back finally on war, -its crimes and its follies, and set its face resolutely toward peace. -It is the one thing he discovers has not changed—the world has not -learned one single syllable. Suspicions amongst nations exist just -as ever, only more intense; hatreds between races and peoples, only -fiercer; combinations forming everywhere for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> the next war; great -armies drilling; conventions and compacts for joint action when the -tocsin sounds; general staffs meeting to arrange whether they should -march, where they should march, how they should march, and where they -should strike; little nations only just hatched, just out of the -shell, staggering under the burden of great armaments, and marching -along towards unknown battlefields; new machinery of destruction and -slaughter being devised and manufactured with feverish anxiety; every -day science being brought under contribution to discover new methods to -destroy human life—in fact, a deep laid and powerfully concerted plot -against civilisation, openly organised in the light of the sun. And -that after his experience of four or five years ago! Man the builder, -and man the breaker, working side by side in the same workshop, and -apparently on the best of terms with each other, playing their part -in the eternal round of creation and dissolution, with characteristic -human energy. What a complex creature is man! It is little wonder that -God gave him up repeatedly in despair. He is unteachable.</p> - -<p>I wonder whether it is realised that if war were to break out again, -the calamity would be a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span>hundredfold greater than that of the last -experience. Next time, cities will be laid waste. Possible, and I am -sorry to say, probable enemy nations are more closely intertwined, -and the engines of havoc are becoming more and more terrible. I have -called attention repeatedly to the developments which took place during -the late War, in the variety, the range, and the power of destructive -weapons. Compare the aëroplane at the beginning of the war, and its -small bomb which could easily be manhandled, with the same machine at -the end. By the end of the war machines had been built, and but for -the armistice would have been used, the devastating power of which -was terrific. Since then the power of the machine, the weight of the -explosive, and the incendiary material it drops, have grown, and are -still growing. Science is perfecting old methods of destruction, and -searching out new methods. One day, in its exploration, it may hit on -something that may make the fabric of civilisation rock.</p> - -<p>Can anything be done to avert this approaching catastrophe? That is -the problem of all problems for those who love their fellowmen. I warn -you that it is madness to trust to the hope that mankind,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> after such -an experience, will not be so rash as to court another disaster of the -same kind. The memory of the terrors, the losses, the sufferings of the -war, will not restrain men from precipitating the world into something -which is infinitely worse, and those who think so, and, therefore, urge -that it is not necessary to engage in a new crusade for peace, have -not studied the perverse, the stubborn, and the reckless nature of -man. There is the danger that the last war may even make some nations -believe in war.</p> - -<p>I have talked to many young soldiers who were fortunate enough to have -passed unscathed through some of the worst experiences of the war, to -many who suffered mutilation in some of these experiences; they have -given me one common impression that the memory of fear is evanescent, -and that they cannot now re-create in their own minds the sensations -of terror through which they passed. If that is true of those who -went through the furnace, what of the multitudes who simply looked -on?—the multitudes of those who were too young to take part, and can -only recall the excitement produced by the conflict and the glory of -victory? The recollection of the headaches of an orgy never lasts as -long as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> that of its pleasures. It is useless to recall memories of the -terror and torture of the war, and expect them to crusade for peace. -Memory is a treacherous crusader. It starts with a right purpose fresh -and hot on its path, but its zeal gets fainter as the days roll past, -and it ends by handing over its banner to the foe.</p> - -<p>You can only redeem mankind by appealing to its nobler instincts. -Fear is base, and you cannot lift mankind by using it as a lever. The -churches alone can effectively rouse the higher impulses of our nature. -That is where their task comes in.</p> - -<p>There is another reason why we cannot regard the danger as having -passed away. You have all the elements which made for the Great War of -1914 more potent than ever to-day. The atmosphere of Europe is charged -with them.</p> - -<p>What made the last war? Armed international dislikes, rivalries, and -suspicions. The dislikes were based on age-long racial feuds stimulated -by memories of recent wrongs. Celt and Teuton disliking each other; -Slav and Teuton suspicious of each other; the hatred of the Slav for -the Teuton intensified by the arrogance with which Germany humiliated -Russia at the moment of her weakness <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>immediately after the Japanese -War, when she was peculiarly sensitive to insult. You will recollect -the peremptoriness and the insolence of her gesture over the Bosnian -annexation, and insolences are always more painful than wrongs and -rankle longer. They corrode the flesh, and burn into the soul of a -nation, keeping its anger aflame. I wish nations always remembered -that. There was the hatred of the Celt for the Teuton deepened by the -annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and by the incidents inseparable from -the invasion of a foreign soil. There was Germany suspecting that -every railway constructed by Russia was aimed at her heart. There -was France convinced that Germany was only waiting her opportunity -to pick a quarrel which would enable her to deprive France of her -much-coveted colonies. There was England watching with vigilant insight -and increasing anger the growth of Germany's great fleet, which she -was convinced was aimed at her shores. There were great armies in -every continental country ready to march at a moment's notice, fully -equipped, each commander firmly persuaded that his own legions were -irresistible. You had there all the conditions that made for war. Had -it come of set purpose? I have read<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> most of the literature concerning -the events that led up to that war, and it is full of warning as to -how wars happen. They do not come because the majority of those who -are concerned are bent upon bloodshed, not even the majority who have -the decisive voice if they exercised it in time. Had a plebiscite been -taken in every country in Europe a week before war was declared as to -whether they wished to engage in a European conflict, the proposal -would have been turned down by a majority so overwhelming as to show -that the proposition was one that no nation had the slightest idea of -entertaining. That is not the reason why it came. But you have always -in control of the affairs of nations some men who hesitate; many who -are apathetic, many who are merely inefficient and stupid; and then -most men, even in a government, have their minds concentrated on their -own immediate tasks.</p> - -<p>I will give you an illustration of how war is begun, once you have the -predisposition to quarrel, without anybody wanting it and with the -vast majority of the people who are to be engaged in it opposed to it. -Austria issued an ultimatum to Serbia. There is nothing a big bully -likes better than to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> hector a little man who is near the point of his -toe. Serbia was so near the boot that Austria was constantly tempted -to give it a kick, and it did. It issued an ultimatum, which was a -very insolent one. The Serbian reply was a practical acceptance of the -Austrian demands. This is the note the kaiser wrote on it: "A brilliant -performance this. But with it disappears"—listen to this written by -the Kaiser of Germany just a few days before war was declared—"but -with it disappears every reason for war, and the Austrian minister -ought to have remained quietly in Belgrade. After that I would never -have given orders for mobilisation." In three days there was war.</p> - -<p>Let me give another illustration. Admiral Tirpitz said he saw Von -Jagow two days after the Austrian reply. Von Jagow, the German foreign -minister, was so little interested in the Austro-Serbian conflict that -he confessed to the German ambassador to Austria on July 27th, two days -after the reply had been received, that he had not yet found time to -read the Serbian reply to Austria. Here is the document on which ten -million young men who had no responsibility for it have been slain, -homes have been desolated, and a debt of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> taxation, confusion and -sorrow incurred which will not be wiped out as long as this generation -lasts.</p> - -<p>It is inconceivable, if one had not some knowledge of the carelessness -and the procrastination which are bred in official circles by long -practice. That was only three days before war was declared. This high -official in the Wilhelmstrasse, who subsequently agreed to the fateful -decision to declare war against Russia, had not even read the critical -document which ought to have averted the struggle. But there are -always the vigilant few, the very few resolute men whose whole mind -and energy and skill is engaged ceaselessly in driving forward the -chariots of war. Whilst others are asleep, they are craftily dodging -the traffic, and stealing along unawares, slowly getting their chariots -into position for the next push forward. Whilst others are asleep, they -lash the fiery steeds along their destructive course. In the press, -on the platform, in the council chambers, in the chancelleries, in -society of all kinds, high and low, they are always pressing along. -When the precipice is reached, they dash through the feeble resistance -of the panic-stricken mob of counsellors and officials, and nations are -plunged into the abyss before they know it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p> - -<p>This is the way most wars come.</p> - -<p>Read the history of the war of 1870. It came about in the same -confused, clumsy, purposeless way. In all these cases there is always -in the background the sinister figure of that force for mischief which -used to be known by our Puritan fathers as the devil. Have these -hatreds and suspicions abated? Are there no rivalries to-day? Are -there no men whose one joy is in war? Was the devil numbered amongst -the slain in the last war? I have never seen his name in any casualty -list. Look around. His agents are more numerous, more active, more -pressing and efficient than ever. Europe to-day is a cauldron of -suspicions and hatreds. It is well to speak frankly. Celt and Teuton -are now interlocked in a conflict which is none the less desperate -because one of the parties is disarmed. There is a suppressed savagery -which is but ill concealed, and there are new hatreds which, if they -have not been brought into existence during the war, have at any -rate come to the surface. Mankind has learnt no lesson from the four -or five years of war, although it has been scourged with scorpions. -There was nothing that contributed more to the last catastrophe than -the annexation by Germany<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> of Alsace-Lorraine. As long as that act -of folly remained uncorrected there was no real peace possible in -Europe. The nations concerned were just abiding their opportunity, -and the opportunity came. Now you have two Alsace-Lorraines at least. -There is the annexation of Vilna by force; there is the annexation -of Galicia by force, by violence, by the use of arms against the -will of the population. Elsewhere you have the German and the Pole -quarrelling over Silesia; the Russian and the Pole over doubtful -boundaries; the Czech and the Magyar; the Serbian and the Bulgarian; -the Russian and the Rumanian; the Rumanian and the Magyar. There is -the age-long feud between Greek and Turk. All have an air of biding -opportunity, all are armed ready for slaughter. Europe is a seething -cauldron of international hates, with powerful men in command of the -fuel stores feeding the flames and stoking the fires. It is no use -blaming the treaty of Versailles. This state of things has nothing -to do with treaties. Here it is the spirit that killeth and not the -letter. Sometimes wrongs are imaginary. Where the wrongs are imaginary -time will heal the sense of hurt, but sometimes they are real, and -time will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> fester the wound, but everywhere and always the hatreds are -real enough. Can nothing be done? If it can, let it be done in time. -Let it be done at once. Yet, once more I remind you that if the gun -is loaded—and it is loaded in every land—when the quarrel begins it -is apt to go off, not because the trigger is deliberately pulled, but -because some clumsy fellow in his excitement stumbles against it.</p> - -<p>In a continent which is nominally Christian, the churches surely are -not impotent. When the West was all Catholic, and it had the good -fortune to have a high-minded and capable occupant of the throne -of St. Peter, many a struggle was averted by his intervention. Can -the churches not once more display their power? They can only do -so by moving together, not merely every denomination in Britain, -but every Christian community throughout Europe—Catholic and -Protestant—Catholics even more than Protestants, for the countries -where the peril is most imminent are more under the domination of the -Catholic churches than of the Protestant faiths. If all the heroism -of millions, their sacrifice and their sufferings, are to be thrown -away, it will be the most colossal, criminal and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span>infamous waste ever -perpetrated in human history. Millions of men endangered their lives -willingly. Millions lost their lives for the sake of establishing peace -on earth on the basis of international right. A temple to human right -was built with material quarried out of all that is choicest in the -soul of man. But its timbers are being drenched with the kerosene of -hatred, and one day a match will be lit by some careless or malignant -hand which will set fire to this magnificent edifice; its splendour -will be reduced to black embers, and the hope of mankind will be once -more laid in ashes. The task of the churches is to put forth the whole -of their united strength to avert that catastrophe.</p> - -<p>Peace is only possible when you introduce into the attitude of nations -towards each other principles which govern the demeanour of decent -people in a community towards their neighbours. If international -methods were introduced into the dealings of neighbours with each other -life would become intolerable—the unconcealed suspicions, distrusts -and ill-will which rule everywhere, the eternal expectancy of and -preparation for blows, the readiness of the strong to use violence, -either to enforce his will on his weaker neighbour or to deprive him of -his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> liberty or his possessions, or even his life, to satisfy anger, -revenge, or greed. Had this been the rule in private affairs, we should -all have to live in caves, or in castles, according to our means. As a -matter of fact, man is only half civilised. In international matters he -is still a savage, in his heart he recognises no law but that of force. -The savage has his restraints. His instinct warns him not to pounce -save when he thinks he can do so effectively and with impunity, and -for some purpose which he thinks worth his while. Whether he hates or -covets, he has no other restraint. I wish I could say that in essence -nations to-day obey any other impulse. Man must be civilised in his -international relations, otherwise wars will go on as long as mankind -remains on this earth.</p> - -<p>I have seen a city wrenched from its people. I have seen a whole -province appropriated against the protests of its people, and -all within the last four years, since the Great War to establish -international right. There was no conceivable justification for either -of these depredations except that both the city and the province were -desirable, were at hand, were very tempting, and that the owners were -too feeble to resist their pillagers.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p> - -<p>The lesson must be taught that larceny does not diminish in turpitude -as it increases in the scale of its operations. A nation that -feloniously steals, takes, and carries away a city or province is just -as criminal as the thief sentenced to imprisonment for robbery by -violence on the high-road. And these national felonies will assuredly -bring trouble one day. They invariably do so, and unfortunately -international trouble is never confined to the felon. Human -retribution, once it begins, is as indiscriminating and uncontrollable -as a prairie fire. The flames consume the wheat as well as the tares. -Hell fire administered by the hand of man scorches the innocent -equally with the guilty. The doom of Germany involved millions in its -tortures who were outside her gates, abominated her crimes, and did all -they could to prevent their perpetration. That is why it is written: -"'Vengeance is mine, I will repay,' saith the Lord." It is the supreme -duty of the churches to teach nations to understand that the moral law -is just as applicable to them in their corporate capacity as it is to -the individuals who compose them; to teach them that hatred is just as -unseemly between nations as it is between individuals, and far more -dangerous. Goodwill must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> be assiduously cultivated between nations. -It must be ingeminated in every way—in schools, in the press, in -sermons, in classes. The men who are always sowing distrust and dislike -of men of other races and lands should be picked out, condemned, -shown up, hunted by the scorn, the contempt and the wrath of their -fellowmen. They are more dangerous than the incendiary who burns down -an occasional hay-rick or habitation.</p> - -<p>Let the best side of every nation be better known. Each nation has made -its contribution to the sum of human greatness. Dwell on that, and not -on the failings and the deficiencies, the errors, and the crimes which -are unhappily common to all nations. Name me the land that has no stain -on its record. There is no end to the resourcefulness of hate. Its -variety is infinite. I recollect, not so long ago, a time when you were -not a patriot if you were pro-French; the fact that you were pro-French -stamped you as a Little Englander. France was supposed to be a busy -and malignant foe of Britain all the world over, scheming everywhere -against British interests. She stood for all that was unpleasant and -repugnant to the British mind—in her thought, her literature, her -politics, and her manners.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> France heartily reciprocated our dislike. -There were at least two occasions when war between the two countries -was apprehended, was openly talked of, and was even likely. The -atmosphere of the press in both capitals was charged with brimstone.</p> - -<p>Now it is to Germany you must not utter one word of toleration or even -fair play. I am not counselling the abandonment of the just measure of -our national rights as against either of these two countries, but they -are both great nations. They are both nations that have contributed -richly of the things that make for the elevation, for the happiness, -for the splendour of mankind. If Germany is the land of Bismarck with -its blood and iron, all Protestants will remember that she is also the -land of Luther and the Reformation. If she fought in the late war for -four years to establish a military domination in Europe, she fought -for thirty years with enduring valour and much suffering to establish -the freedom of conscience in Europe. She has given to the world great -literature, great painters, great philosophers, great explorers in -all the continents of thought. She is the land of unrivalled song. -Even in the middle of the bloody conflict with Germany, every Sunday -we praised God in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> our churches to the notes of German music. Let us -give credit for these things in our efforts to reconstitute the reign -of goodwill. And if we feel angry with France, let us remember her -dazzling array of great writers, her gigantic struggles for liberty, -the penetrating imagination devoted to scientific research, which has -brought incalculable blessings to humanity. Let us not judge France -by the fussy little men that give expression to her petulance in the -fits of temper that overtake every nation, but by the great men who -have given noble expression to her immortal soul. France is the land -of Victor Hugo, of Pascal, of Renan, and many another teacher who has -taken humanity by the hand along the upward road.</p> - -<p>Everything depends on a consistent, determined, continuous inculcation -of the principles and the ideal of goodfellowship, between nations. -Goodwill on earth means to think well of and dwell on the best side -of others, and goodwill on earth and peace have been linked together. -Without the one you will not have the other. Let us, therefore, -cultivate the spirit of brotherhood amongst men. The church must -appeal to the noblest sentiments of the human heart. Mankind can -only be redeemed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> by an appeal to those higher instincts. Not by an -appeal to ignoble fear. War means terror, war means death, war means -anguish. That will not prevent war, and never has. Man is the most -fearless of God's creatures, and when his passions are roused there -is no fear that will restrain him. The fire of his passion burns the -restraints of self-preservation like bands of tow, so that fear will -not restrain the nations and make peace among them. War destroys trade, -it brings unemployment. Look at all the losses, reckoning them up in -cash. That will not prevent war: it never has. Selfish interests have -a means of deluding themselves. Greed has a blind side. Do not trust -to selfishness and selfish interest to ensure peace. Selfishness will -ensure nothing which is worth keeping in the world. Selfishness pays -good dividends, but it wastes capital. The nation or the individual -that makes self-love the managing-director of the soul will end in -bankruptcy—bankruptcy of respect, bankruptcy of ideals—bankruptcy of -honour—bankruptcy of friendships. What is it that Germany is suffering -from now? Her great tragedy is not her indemnity, not even her gigantic -casualties, not even the destruction of her trade. The one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> great -tragedy of Germany is that she has lost the respect of mankind. It -affects her trade, it affects her business, it makes it difficult for -her to climb to the pitch whence she fell. The rope is gone. She has -done things of which she herself is now ashamed. Her people—I can -see it when I meet them—are ashamed. That is the tragedy. They are a -gallant people, they are a brave people, they fought bravely, but they -are broken-spirited. Why? They have lost their self-respect because -they have done something that they know in their hearts was wrong. -These are the things that have to be taught to nations.</p> - -<p>A public opinion must be worked up that will be strong enough to -sustain international right. No law is possible without an active -public opinion for its enforcement, least of all international law. -Without it the League of Nations is a farce. You might as well have a -wooden cannon; however splendidly mounted it may be, however imposing -its appearance, every one knows that the moment it is fired it will -burst. Unless the world is taught to respect its authority, it will -become a butt of derision. It is no use keeping up pretences. Pretences -never delude events. The League of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span>Nations may gather together -representatives of all the great powers of the earth, and yet it may -be a futile, barren, costly nothing unless it has behind it the spirit -of the people who constitute those nations. The real danger of the -moment is lest the League of Nations should become a mere make-believe, -whilst the same old intrigues, the same old schemes, the same old -international greed and hatred, should be working their will freely -outside. The decision of the League of Nations has been, within the -last two or three years, openly flouted by a member of that league, -a member which owes its national independence to the treaty which -founded that league. Another nation, one of the principal authors of -the league, refuses to refer a question in which is it concerned, and -in which Europe is concerned, to the arbitrament of the league. Both -these nations prefer to resort to force. The rest of the world looks -on feebly with indifference, accepting the rebuff to their league in -each case. Why? Because there is no public opinion in the recalcitrant -countries to bring pressure to bear on the respective governments, -and there is no public opinion strong enough outside to exercise the -necessary insistence.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span></p> - -<p>The churches alone can remedy this. There ought to be an international -movement of all the churches, Catholic and Protestant, Protestant -and Catholic. I know it is difficult to compass. The divisions in -Christendom are too often fatal to common action for the attainment of -common aims. They ought to be overcome. They must be overcome. There -was a time in the Middles Ages when religion exercised a direct as -well as an indirect influence in the domain of government and social -relations. It helped to win for Englishmen their great charter. It -gradually emancipated the serfs. It preserved the peace of Europe many -a time when it was gravely imperilled by the quarrels of kings. In -the days of Puritanism, and the days of the Covenant, the partnership -between religion and politics won for us the two great boons of -parliamentary liberty and liberty of conscience. When Methodism spurred -the conscience of England, its influence was felt in the political -movement that emancipated the slaves throughout the British Empire.</p> - -<p>That was one of the greatest feats of disinterested righteousness ever -exhibited by a nation. The tasks awaiting religion to-day in the sphere -of government are even greater—emancipation of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> worker from the -tyrannies of economic greed, the saving of the nation from the curse of -alcohol, and the spreading of the angels' message heard on the hills -of Bethlehem until the obdurate heart of man shall at last re-echo it: -"Peace on earth and goodwill amongst men."</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>II</span> <span class="smaller">EUROPE STILL ARMING</span></h2> - -<p>Marshal Foch once told me that he considered the German army of 1914 -the finest army the world ever saw, in numbers, organisation, training, -and equipment.</p> - -<p>What set that army in motion?</p> - -<p>Much has been written and spoken as to the origin of the Great War, and -as to who and what was responsible for so overwhelming a cataclysm. No -one ever believed that it was the assassination of a royal archduke. -Some said it was the working out of the pan-German scheme to rule the -earth; some contended it was the German fear of the growing power of -Russia, the nervous apprehension of what looked like an encircling -movement by Russia, France and Britain.</p> - -<p>The great French marshal's dictum is the real explanation. Unless due -weight is given to this outstanding fact the diplomatic muddle of July, -1914, becomes unintelligible.</p> - -<p>Were it not that the German army was more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> perfect and more potent than -either the French or the Russian army—were it not that every German -officer was convinced that the German military machine was superior -to all its rivals—there would have been no war, whatever emperors, -diplomatists, or statesmen said, thought, or intended.</p> - -<p>All nations have their ambitions, but they are not tempted to impose -them upon their neighbours if the hazard is too obviously great. But -a sense of overpowering force behind national aims is a constant -incitement to recklessness, to greed, and to ambitious patriotism.</p> - -<p>The more one examines, in the growing calm, the events of July, 1914, -the more one is impressed with the shrinking of the nominal rulers -of the attacking empires as they approached the abyss, and with the -relentless driving onward of the military organisation behind these -terror-stricken dummies.</p> - -<p>Navies are essentially defensive weapons. No capital in the world -can be captured by navies alone, and no country can be annexed or -invaded by a fleet. But armies are grabbing machines. A transcendent -army has always led to aggression. No country can resist the lure of -an easy military <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>triumph paraded before its eyes for two successive -generations.</p> - -<p>The inference is an obvious one. To ensure peace on earth nations must -disarm their striking forces. Without disarmament, pacts, treaties, and -covenants are of no avail. They are the paper currency of diplomacy. -That is the reason why all the friends of peace are filled with despair -when they see nations still arming and competing in armies whilst -trusting to mere words and signatures to restrain the irresistible -impetus of organised force.</p> - -<p>A statistical survey of European armies to-day is calculated to cause -alarm. Europe has not learnt the lesson of the war. It has rather -drawn a wrong inference from that calamity. There are more men under -arms in Europe to-day than there were in 1913-14, with none of the -justification or excuse which could be pleaded in those days.</p> - -<p>In pre-war times the statesmen of each country could make a -parliamentary case for their military budgets by calling attention to -the menace of prodigious armies across their frontiers. Germany and -Austria built up great armaments because their frontiers were open -to the attack of two great <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span>military powers who had engaged to pool -their resources in the event of war. France and Russia raised huge -armies because Germany possessed the most redoubtable army in the -world, and could rely in the case of war upon the assistance of the -not inconsiderable forces of the Austrian empire. And both Austria -and France had always the uncertain factor of Italy, with her army of -3,000,000, to reckon with.</p> - -<p>But since the war these mutual excuses no longer exist. The two great -military empires of Central Europe have disappeared. Germany, which -before the war had a peace establishment of 800,000 men and reserves -running into millions, has to-day a total army of 100,000 men—about -one-third the size of the Polish army. The formidable German equipment -which for four years pounded the cities and villages of northern France -to dust is either destroyed or scattered for display amongst the towns -and villages of the victors. The Austrian army, which had in 1913-14 -a peace establishment of 420,000 men and a reserve of two or three -millions of trained men, has to-day been reduced to a tiny force of -30,000 men.</p> - -<p>In spite of these facts France has still an army<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> of 736,000 men now -under arms, with a trained reserve of two or three millions more. She -is strengthening and developing her air force as if she feared—or -contemplated—an immediate invasion. In 1914 France had an air force of -400 aëroplanes; to-day she has 1,152.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> But numbers signify little. -The size, the power, and the purpose of the machines signify much. -Amongst the 1,152 air machines of to-day will be found bombers of a -destructiveness such as was not dreamt of in 1914.</p> - -<p>Should human folly drift once more into war these preparations are -full of evil omen as to the character of that conflict. A single bomb -dropped from one of the new bombers contains more explosive material -than one hundred of those carried by the old type. And the size of the -machine and of its bombs is growing year by year. Where is it to stop? -And what is it all for? Where is the enemy? Where is the menace which -demands such gigantic military developments? Not one of the neighbours -of France has to-day a force which reaches one-fourth the figures -of her formidable army. Germany no longer affords a decent pretext. -The population of Germany is equal to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> aggregate population of -Poland, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Czecho-Slovakia, but her army barely -numbers one-seventh of the aggregate peace establishment of these four -countries. Rumania alone, with a population of 15,000,000, has an army -twice the size of that allowed by the Treaty of Versailles to Germany -with her population of 60,000,000. These countries have in addition -to their standing armies reserve forces of millions of trained men, -whilst the young men of Germany are no longer permitted to train in -the use of arms. Her military equipment is destroyed, and her arsenals -and workshops are closely inspected by Allied officers lest a fresh -equipment should be clandestinely produced. An army of 700,000 is, -therefore, not necessary in order to keep Germany within bounds.</p> - -<p>The only other powerful army in Europe is the Russian army. It is -difficult to gather any reliable facts about Russia. The mists that -arise from that unhealthy political and economic swamp obscure and -distort all vision. The statistics concerning her army vary according -to the point of view of the person who cites them. The latest figure -given by the Russians themselves is 800,000. On paper that indicates -as formidable a force as that possessed by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> the French. But the events -of the past few years show clearly that the Russian army is powerful -only for defence, and that it is valueless for purposes of invasion. It -has neither the transport that gives mobility nor the artillery that -makes an army redoubtable in attack. The Polish invasion of 1923 was a -comedy, and as soon as the Poles offered the slightest resistance the -Bolsheviks ran back to their fastnesses without striking a Parthian -blow at their pursuers. The state of Russian arsenals and factories -under Bolshevism is such that any attempt to re-equip these armies must -fail. The Russian army, therefore, affords no justification for keeping -up armaments in Europe on the present inflated scale. The fact is that -Europe is thoroughly frightened by its recent experience, and, like all -frightened things, does not readily listen to reason, and is apt to -resort to expedients which aggravate the evils which have terrified it.</p> - -<p>Militarism has reduced it to its present plight, and to save itself -from a similar disaster in future it has become more militarist than -ever. Every little state bristles with guns to scare off invaders. -Meanwhile no country in Europe pays its way, except Britain, with her -reduced army and navy.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> But by means of loans and inflated currencies -they all, even the smallest of them, contrive to maintain larger armies -than Frederick the Great or the Grand Monarque ever commanded in their -most triumphant years. And the cost of armaments to-day has grown -vastly out of proportion to the numbers of the units that compose them. -France—in many ways the richest country in Europe—displays a gaping -and a growing rent in her national finance which has to be patched up -by paper. The deficit grows in spite of the fact that a large part of -her army is quartered on Germany to the detriment of reparations, and -that the German contribution conceals much of the cost of that large -army.</p> - -<p>A good deal of the borrowing is attributable to the cost of repairing -her devastated area, but the burden of maintaining so huge an army is -responsible for a considerable share of the deficiency. The economic -recovery of Europe is seriously retarded by the cost of the new -militarism. The old continent is throwing to the dogs of war with both -hands the bread that should feed her children. One day those dogs will, -in their arrogant savagery, turn upon the children and rend them.</p> - -<p><i>Algeciras, December 26th, 1922.</i></p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> 1,152 refers to when this chapter was written, <i>i. e.</i>, -January 6th, 1923. The figure has increased since then.</p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>III</span> <span class="smaller">THE ERUPTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN</span></h2> - -<p>The shores of the Mediterranean have from time immemorial been the -scene of eruptions and earthquakes. They generally break out without -warning. Sometimes they are devastating in their effects, destroying -life and property over wide areas and on a vast scale. Sometimes they -provide a brilliant spectacular display, terrifying in appearance, but -not causing much destruction. To which of these two categories does the -last eruption of Mussolini belong? To drop hot cinders in the Balkans -is a dangerous experiment. The soil is everywhere soaked with naphtha -and it floats about in uncharted pools and runlets which easily catch -fire. A cinder flung from Vienna started a conflagration which spread -over continents. That was only nine years ago. The ground is still -hot—the smoke blinds and stifles. You cannot see clearly or breathe -freely. Now and again there is a suspicious ruddiness in the banks of -smoke which proves that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> fire is not yet out. And yet there are -statesmen flinging burning faggots about with reckless swagger.</p> - -<p>The temper of Europe may be gauged from the reception accorded to these -heedless pyrotechnics on the part of national leaders by their own -countrymen. Every time it occurs, whether in France, Italy or Turkey, -and whether it be Poincaré, Mussolini, or Mustapha Kemal who directs -the show, applause greets the exhibition. I remember the first days -of the Great War. There was not a belligerent capital where great and -enthusiastic crowds did not parade the streets to cheer for war. In -those days men did not know what war meant. Their conception of it -was formed from the pictures of heroic—and always victorious—feats, -hung in national galleries and reproduced in the form of the cheap -chromos, engravings, and prints, which adorn the walls in every cottage -throughout most lands. The triumphant warriors on horseback with the -gleaming eye and the flourishing sabre are their own countrymen; the -poor vanquished under the crashing hoofs are the foe. Hurrah for -more pictures! The Crown Prince denies that he ever used the phrase -"This jolly war." His denial ought to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> be accepted in the absence of -better proof than is yet forthcoming as to the statement ever having -been made. But the phrase represented the temper of millions in those -fateful days. It used to be said that in wars one lot cheered and -the other fought. But the cheering mobs who filled the streets in -August were filling the trenches in September, and multitudes were -filling graves ere the year was out. But when they cheered they had no -realisation of the actualities of war. They idealised it. They only saw -it in pictures.</p> - -<p>But the cheerers of to-day know what war means. France lost well over a -million lives in the last fight. Italy lost 600,000, and there are men -in every workshop in both countries who know something of the miseries -as well as the horrors of war and can tell those who do not. What, -then, accounts for the readiness, at the slightest provocation, to rush -into all the same wretchedness over again? The infinite capacity of -mankind for deluding itself. Last time, it is true, it was a ghastly -affair. This time it will be an easy victory. Then you had to fight -a perfectly armed Germany, or Austria; now it is a very small affair -indeed—in one case a disarmed Germany which cannot fight, or, in the -other case, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> miserable little country like Greece with no Army or -Navy to talk of. So hurrah for the guns! A bloodless victory, except, -of course, to the vanquished. More pictures for the walls to show our -children what terrible people we are when provoked!</p> - -<p>This episode may end peaceably, but it was a risk to take, and quite -an unnecessary risk under the circumstances of the case. Italy was -indignant, and naturally indignant, at the murder of her emissaries -in cold blood on Greek territory and, although it took place in a -well-known murder area—on the Albanian border where comitadjis and -other forms of banditti reign—still, Greece was responsible for -giving adequate protection to all the Boundary Commissioners who were -operating within her frontiers. Italy is, therefore, entitled to demand -stern reparation for this outrage. This Greece promptly concedes. Not -merely has Greece shown her readiness to pay a full indemnity, but -she has offered to salute the Italian flag by way of making amends -for the offence involved to the Italian nation in this failure to -protect Italian officers transacting legitimate business on Greek -soil. Mussolini's answer to the Greek acknowledgment of liability -is to bombard a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> defenceless town, kill a few unarmed citizens, and -enter into occupation of a Greek island. Does any one imagine, if the -incident had occurred on French soil, and the French Government had -displayed the same willingness to express regret and offer reparation, -that, without further parley, he would have bombarded Ajaccio? Or, -had it been Britain, would he have shelled Cowes and occupied the -Isle of Wight? But Greece has no Navy. That, I suppose, alters the -merits of the case! Force is still the supreme arbiter of right and -wrong in international affairs in Europe. It is worth noting how a new -code of international law is coming into existence since the War. The -French armies invade a neighbour's territory, occupy it, establish -martial law, seize and run the railways, regulate its Press, deport -tens of thousands of its inhabitants, imprison or shoot down all who -resist, and then proclaim that this is not an act of war. It is only -a peaceful occupation to enforce rights under a peace treaty. Signor -Mussolini shells a town belonging to a country with whom he is at -peace, and forcibly occupies part of its territory, and then solemnly -declares that it is not an act of war, but just a reasonable measure -of diplomatic precaution. Once force decides the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> issue it also -settles the rules. There was a time when English and Spaniards fought -each other in the West Indies whilst their Governments at home were -ostensibly at peace. And French and English fought in India without any -diplomatic rupture between Versailles and St. James's. But in those -days these lands were very remote and the control of the centre over -events at these distances was intermittent and occasionally feeble. -And sometimes it suited Governments to ignore what was taking place on -the fringe of Empire. But even in those days an attack on the homeland -meant war, and it would mean war to-day were the attacked countries not -powerless. I have heard it said that there is one law for the rich and -another for the poor. There is no doubt one international law for the -strong and another for the weak.</p> - -<p>What about the League of Nations? This is pre-eminently a case for -action under the Covenant. Italy and Greece are both parties. How -can they, consistently with the terms of the Treaty they so recently -signed, refuse to leave this dispute to be dealt with by the League? -Italy had a special part in drafting the Treaty and in imposing it -upon Germany and Austria. She cannot now in decency<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> repudiate its -clauses. It is suggested in some quarters that, the dignity of Italy -being involved in the dispute, she cannot possibly consent to leave -it in the hands of the League. That surely is a fatal limitation on -the activities of the League of Nations. Every dispute involving right -implicates the national honour and as every nation is the judge of -its own honour, ultimately all differences would be ruled out of the -Covenant which it did not suit one country or the other to refer. The -League is not allowed to touch Reparations. If this quarrel also is -excluded from the consideration of the League, it is no exaggeration -to say that this valuable part of the Treaty of Versailles becomes a -dead letter. It is one of the gross ironies of the European situation -that the Treaty of Versailles is being gradually torn to pieces by the -countries which are not only the authors but have most to gain by its -provisions. France has already repudiated the first and most important -part of the Treaty by declaring that it will refer no question arising -between herself and her neighbours under the Treaty itself to the -League of Nations. She has further invaded and occupied her neighbour's -territory in defiance of the provisions of the Treaty. If Italy also -declines to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> respect the first part of that Treaty, then nothing is -left of it except what it suits nations to enforce or obey. And if the -framers do not owe allegiance to the Treaty they drafted, why should -those who only accepted it under duress bow to its behests? The victors -are busily engaged in discrediting their own charter. It would have -been a more honourable course for the nations to pursue if they had -followed the example of America by refusing to ratify the whole Treaty. -To sign a contract and then to pick and choose for execution the parts -of it that suit you is unworthy of the honour of great nations which -profess to lead the world towards a higher civilisation.</p> - -<p>There are ugly rumours of possible complications arising out of this -unfortunate incident. It does not need a vivid imagination to foretell -one or two possible results of a disastrous character. In this country -they would be deplored, not only for their effect on European peace, -but for the damage they must inevitably inflict on the best interests -of Italy. She has had enough of victory. What she needs now—what we -all need—is peace. There is no country which has more genuine goodwill -for Italy's prosperity and greatness than Great Britain. It is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> an old -and tried friendship. The two nations have many common interests: they -have no rivalries. Hence, the deep anxiety of Britain that Italy should -not commit a mistake which will mortgage her future even if it does not -imperil her present.</p> - -<p>There are no doubt strategic advantages for Italy in holding Corfu. -It enables them to "bottle up" the Adriatic. But it is Greek and it -menaces Slavonia, and this introduction of foreign elements into the -body of a State for strategic reasons always provokes inflammatory -symptoms injurious to the general health of a community. They tend -to become malignant and sooner or later they bring disaster. Bosnia -ultimately proved to be the death of the Austrian Empire. When the -Bosnian cancer became active the evil of Italia Irredenta broke out -once more, and between them they laid the Empire of the Hapsburgs in -the dust. Italy has played a great part in the work of civilisation, -and so has Greece. They have still greater tasks awaiting them—one on -a great and the other necessarily on a smaller scale. It would be a -misfortune to humanity if they spent their fine enthusiasm on hating -and thwarting each other.</p> - -<p><i>London, September 3rd, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>IV</span> <span class="smaller">IS THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS A SUCCESS?</span></h2> - -<p>Is the League of Nations a success? It is impossible to answer the -question candidly without giving offence to rival partisans. If you -indicate successes already placed to the account of the League, -opponents deny or minimise these triumphs, and suggest that you are -blinded by attachment to a chimera. If you point to shortcomings, the -extreme zealots of the League get angry and hint that you are a secret -enemy.</p> - -<p>I mean nevertheless to attempt an answer, for much depends on a -fearless examination of progress made or missed.</p> - -<p>My first answer would be that it is scarcely fair to pose this question -just yet. The League was founded only three years ago—much too short -a period to afford a test of the working of a gigantic, complex, but -very delicate and sensitive human machine. There has been hardly time -enough even to catalogue and chart the myriads of nerves that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> thread -its system. You cannot move a finger at the councils of Geneva without -touching some hidden nerve and setting it in a condition of quivering -protest. The League has, however, been long enough in existence to -reveal its strength and its weaknesses, its power, its potentialities -and its perils.</p> - -<p>It has already achieved triumphs of which its founders may well be -proud. The restoration of Austria to life when it seemed to have been -hopelessly submerged in the deluge of economic, financial and political -disaster which had overwhelmed it, is a notable feat of artificial -respiration. The successful effort organised by the League to stamp out -typhus in Eastern Europe and prevent its spread to the West is also a -success worthy of record. But for this intelligently conducted campaign -that terrible disease would have ravaged Russia and Central Europe -and laid low millions out of populations so enfeebled by hunger and -privation as to become easy victims to its devastating assaults.</p> - -<p>The Labour branch of the League has also been specially active and -energetic, and its persistent endeavours to raise and co-ordinate the -standards<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> of toil in all countries are producing marked and important -results. In addition great credit is due to the League for the splendid -work it has accomplished in alleviating the distress which prevailed -amongst the famine-stricken areas of Eastern Europe and amongst the -refugees who fled from the horrors of victorious Bolshevism in Russia, -and the still greater horrors of Turkish savagery in Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>But these humanitarian tasks, praiseworthy though they be, were not the -primary objects of the foundation of the League. Its main purpose was -the averting of future wars by the setting up of some tribunal to which -nations would be bound by their own covenant and the pressure of other -nations to resort in order to settle their differences. Its failure or -success as an experiment will be judged by this test alone. How does it -stand in this respect?</p> - -<p>It succeeded in effecting a settlement of a dangerous dispute between -Sweden and Finland over the possession of the Aaland Islands. That -success was on the line of its main purpose. Here the methods of the -League gave confidence in its complete impartiality.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span></p> - -<p>So much can, unfortunately, not be said of another question where it -was called in and gave its decision. Its Silesian award has been acted -upon but hardly accepted by both parties as a fair settlement. That is -due to the manner adopted in reaching judgment. Instead of following -the Aaland precedent in the choice of a tribunal, it pursued a course -which engendered suspicion of its motives. It created a regrettable -impression of anxiety to retain a certain measure of control over -the decision. There was a suspicion of intrigue in the choice of the -tribunal and the conduct of the proceedings. In the Aaland case no -great power was particularly interested in influencing the conclusions -arrived at either way. But here two powers of great authority in the -League—France and Poland—were passionately engaged in securing a -result adverse to Germany. The other party to the dispute had no -friends, and was moreover not a member of the League.</p> - -<p>Britain stood for fair play, but she was not a protagonist of the -claims of Germany. Poland had a powerful advocate on the League—a -country with a vital interest in securing a pro-Polish decision. In -these circumstances the League ought to have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> exercised the most -scrupulous care to avoid any shadow of doubt as to its freedom from -all bias. Had it chosen distinguished jurists outside its own body to -undertake at least a preliminary investigation as it did in the Aaland -case, all would have been well. It preferred, however, to retain the -matter in its own hands. Hence the doubts and misgivings with which -the judgment of the League has been received not only by the whole of -Germany, but by many outside Germany.</p> - -<p>This decision, and the way Poland has flouted the League over Vilna -served to confirm the idea which prevails in Russia and Germany that -France and Poland dominate the League. The Silesian award may be just, -but the fact remains that it will take a long series of decisions -beyond cavil to restore or rather to establish German and Russian -confidence in the League.</p> - -<p>It is unfortunate that countries which cover more than half Europe -should feel thus about a body whose success depends entirely on the -confidence reposed in its impartiality by all the nations which may be -called upon to carry out its decrees, even though these may be adverse -to their views or supposed interests. The Vilna fiasco, the Armenian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> -failure, the suspicions that surround the Silesian award, the timidity -which prevents the tackling of reparations, which is the one question -disturbing the peace of Europe to-day, the futile conversations and -committees on disarmament which everyone knows, will not succeed in -scrapping one flight of aëroplanes or one company of infantry. All -these disappointments arise from one predominating cause. What is it?</p> - -<p>Undoubtedly the great weakness of the League comes from the fact that -it only represents one half the great powers of the world. Until the -others join you might as well call the Holy Alliance a League of -Nations.</p> - -<p>The ostensible purpose of that combination was also to prevent a -recurrence of the wars that had for years scorched Europe, and to -establish European peace on the firm basis of a joint guarantee of -delimited frontiers. But certain powers with selfish ambitions dictated -its policy. They terrorised Europe into submission and called that -peace.</p> - -<p>No historical parallel is quite complete, but there is enough material -in the occurrences of to-day to justify the reference. The League to be -a reality must represent the whole civilised world. That is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> necessary -to give it balance as well as authority. That was the original -conception. To ask why that failed is to provoke a bitter and a barren -controversy.</p> - -<p>I do not propose to express any opinion as to the merits of the -manœuvres which led to the defeat of the treaty in America. Whether -the Senate should have honoured the signature of an American President -given in the name of his country at an international conference, or -whether the commitment was too fundamentally at variance with American -ideas to justify sanction—whether the amendments demanded as the -condition of approval would have crippled the League and ought to have -been rejected, or whether they were harmless and ought to have been -accepted—these are issues which it would serve no helpful purpose for -me to discuss.</p> - -<p>But as to the effect of the American refusal to adhere to the League, -there can be no doubt. It robbed that body of all chance of dominating -success in the immediate future. It is true that three great powers -remained in the League, but Russia was excluded, Germany was not -included, and when America decided not to go in, of the great powers, -Britain, France and Italy alone remained.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span></p> - -<p>The effect has been paralysing. Where these three powers disagree on -important issues upon which action is required, nothing is done. The -smaller powers cannot, on questions where one or more of the great -powers have deep and acute feeling, impose their will; and no two great -powers will take the responsibility of overruling the third.</p> - -<p>Hence questions like reparations which constitute a standing menace to -European peace are not dealt with by the League. Had America been in, -even with an amended and expurgated constitution, the situation would -have been transformed. America and Britain, acting in concert with an -openly sympathetic Italy and a secretly assenting Belgium, would have -brought such pressure to bear on France as to make it inevitable that -the League should act.</p> - -<p>The success of the League depends upon the readiness of nations great -and small to discuss all their differences at the council table. But no -great power has so far permitted any international question in which -it has a direct and vital interest to be submitted to the League for -decision.</p> - -<p>It has been allowed to adjudicate upon the destiny of the Aaland -Islands, over the fate of which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> Sweden and Finland had a controversy. -It has taken cognisance of disputes between Poland and Lithuania -about Vilna, although even here its decision has been ignored by the -parties. But the acute and threatening quarrel which has broken out -between France and Germany over the question of reparations the former -resolutely declines to submit to consideration by the League.</p> - -<p>The Treaty of Versailles is so wide in its application and so -comprehensive and far-reaching in its character that it touches -international interests almost at every point. So that the French -refusal to agree to a reference of any problems in which they are -directly concerned which may arise out of this treaty has had the -effect of hobbling the League. As long as that attitude is maintained, -the League is impotent to discharge its main function of restoring and -keeping peace.</p> - -<p>The dispute over reparations clouds the sky to-day, and until it is -finally settled it will cause grave atmospheric disturbances for -a whole generation. It is not an impossibility that it may end in -the most destructive conflict that ever broke over the earth. It is -churning up deadly passions. If ever there was an occasion which called -for the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span>intervention of an organisation set up for the express purpose -of finding peaceable solutions for trouble-charged international feuds, -surely this is pre-eminently such a case. Not only do the French -government decline to entertain the idea of putting the covenant which -constitutes the first and foremost part of the Treaty of Versailles -into operation: they have gone so far as to intimate that they will -treat any proposal of the kind as an unfriendly act. The constitution -of the League stipulates that it will be the friendly duty of any power -to move that any international dispute which threatens peace shall -be referred to the League. Nevertheless, one leading signatory rules -out of the covenant all the questions which vitally affect its own -interests. This is the power which has invaded the territory of another -because the latter has failed to carry out one of the provisions of the -same treaty!</p> - -<p>This emphatic repudiation of a solemn contract by one of its promoters -has been acquiesced in by all the other signatories. Repudiation and -acquiescence complete the electrocuting circuit. This limitation of -the activities of the League is the gravest check which it has yet -sustained in its career. I do not believe it would have occurred had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> -America, with or without Article 10, been an active member of this -body. Its great authority, added to that of Britain and Italy, would -have made the pressure irresistible, and its presence on the council -would have helped materially to give such confidence in the stability -and impartiality of the League that Germany would have accepted the -conclusions arrived at without demur and acted upon them without -chicane. A rational settlement of the reparations problem by the League -would have established its authority throughout the world. Germany, -Russia and Turkey, who now treat its deliberations with distrust and -dislike tinctured with contempt, would be forced to respect its power, -and would soon be pleading for incorporation in its councils. The -covenant would thus become a charter—respected, feared, honoured and -obeyed by all. There would still be injustice, but redress would be -sought and fought for in the halls of the League. There would still -be oppression, but freedom would be wrung from the clauses of the -covenant. Argument, debate and intercession would be the recognised -substitutes for shot, shell and sword. Wars would cease unto the ends -of the earth, and the reign of law would be supreme.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span></p> - -<p>Wherein lies the real power of the League, or to be more accurate, its -possibility of power? It brings together leading citizens of most of -the civilised states of the world to discuss all questions affecting or -likely to affect peace and concord amongst nations. The men assembled -at Geneva do not come there of their own initiative, nor do they merely -represent propagandist societies engaged in preaching the gospel of -peace. They are the chosen emissaries of their respective governments. -They are the authorised spokesmen of these governments. When in doubt -they refer to their governments and receive their instructions, and the -proceedings are reported direct to the governments. They meet often and -regularly, and they debate their problems with complete candour as well -as courtesy.</p> - -<p>It is in itself a good thing to accustom nations to discuss their -difficulties face to face in a public assembly where reasons have -to be sought and given for their attitude which will persuade and -satisfy neutral minds of its justice and fairness. It is a practice -to be cultivated. It is the practice that ended in eliminating the -arbitrament of the sword in the internal affairs of nations. It is -only thus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> that international disputes will gradually drift into the -debating chamber instead of on to the battlefield for settlement. Wars -are precipitated by motives which the statesmen responsible for them -dare not publicly avow. A public discussion would drag these emotives -in their nudity into the open where they would die of exposure to the -withering contempt of humanity. The League by developing the habit -amongst nations of debating their differences in the presence of the -world, and of courting the judgment of the world upon the merits of -their case, is gradually edging out war as a settler of quarrels. That -is the greatest service it can render mankind. Will it be allowed to -render that service? If not, then it will perish like many another -laudable experiment attempted by mankind in the effort to save itself.</p> - -<p>But if it dies, the hope of establishing peace on earth will be buried -in the same tomb.</p> - -<p><i>London, April 2nd, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>V</span> <span class="smaller">THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND ITS CRITICS</span></h2> - -<p>I have had recently special opportunities for appreciating the extent -to which the Treaty of Versailles has not been read by those who -have formed very definite opinions concerning its qualities. There -is no justification for a failure to peruse this great international -instrument. It is the most important document of modern times. It has -reshaped for better or for worse much of the geography of Europe. It -has resurrected dead and buried nationalities. It constitutes the deed -of manumission of tens of millions of Europeans who, up to the year of -victory, 1918, were the bondsmen of other races. It affects profoundly -the economics, the finance, the industrial and trade conditions of the -world; it contains clauses upon the efficacy of which may depend the -very existence of our civilisation. Nevertheless there are few who can -tell you what is in the Treaty of Versailles. You might have thought -that although men differed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> widely as to its merits, there would -have been no difficulty in securing some measure of agreement as to -its actual contents. Every endeavour was made to give full publicity -to the draft when it was first presented to the Germans, and to the -final document when signed. Even before the form of the draft was ever -settled, the actual decisions were reported from day to day. Never -was a treaty so reported and so discussed in every article and every -particle of its constitution, and to-day you can procure an official -copy of it from any bookseller for the moderate price of 2<i>s.</i> 6<i>d.</i> In -spite of that no two men who happen to profess diverse opinions as to -its justice or injustice can agree as to its contents.</p> - -<p>A visitor to England in the year 1713 probably experienced the same -perplexity in seeking information from a Whig and a Tory respectively -as to the Treaty of Utrecht. So this treaty has become one of those -fiercely debated subjects, as to which the contestants deliberately -refuse to regard any testimony, or recognise the existence of any fact, -which is in the least inconsistent with their particular point of view. -It has come to pass that the real Treaty of Versailles has already -disappeared, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> several imaginary versions have emerged. It is around -these that the conflict rages.</p> - -<p>In France there exist at least two or three schools of thought -concerning the Versailles Treaty. There is one powerful section -which has always regarded it as a treasonable pact, in which M. -Clemenceau gave away solid French rights and interests in a moment of -weakness under pressure from President Wilson and myself. That is the -Poincaré-Barthou-Pertinax school. That is why they are now, whilst in -form engaged in enforcing the treaty, in fact carrying out a gigantic -operation for amending it without consulting the other signatories. -This has come out very clearly in the remarkable report from a French -official in the Rhineland which was disclosed in the London <i>Observer</i>. -It is obvious from this paper that whilst the French government have -worked their public into a frenzied state of indignation over the -failure of Germany to carry out the Treaty of Versailles, they were -the whole time deliberately organising a plot to overthrow that treaty -themselves. Their representative on the Rhine was spending French money -with the consent of the French government to promote a conspiracy for -setting up an independent republic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> on the Rhine under the protection -of France. It was a deliberate attempt by those who disapproved of -the moderation of the Treaty of Versailles to rewrite its clauses in -the terms of the militarist demands put forward by Marshal Foch at -the Peace conference. Marshal Foch, the soul of honour, wanted to see -this done openly and straightforwardly. What he would have done like -the gentleman he is, these conspirators would have accomplished by -deceit—by deceiving their Allies and by being faithless to the treaty -to which their country had appended its signature. That is one French -school of thought on the Treaty of Versailles. It is the one which has -brought Europe to its present state of confusion and despair.</p> - -<p>There is the second school which reads into the treaty powers -and provisions which it does not contain, and never contemplated -containing. These critics maintain stoutly that M. Briand, and all -other French prime ministers, with the exception of M. Poincaré, -betrayed their trust by failing to enforce these imaginary -stipulations. They still honestly believe that M. Poincaré is the first -French minister to have made a genuine attempt to enforce French rights -under the treaty.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span></p> - -<p>In the background there is a third school which knows exactly what -the treaty means, but dares not say so in the present state of French -opinion. Perhaps they think it is better to bide their time. That time -will come, and when it does arrive, let us hope it will not be too late -to save Europe from the welter.</p> - -<p>In America there are also two or three divergent trends of opinion -about this treaty. One regards it as an insidious attempt to trap -America into the European cockpit, so as to pluck its feathers to line -French and English bolsters. If anything could justify so insular -an estimate it would be the entirely selfish interpretation which -is put upon the treaty by one or two of the Allied governments. The -other American party, I understand, defends it with vigour as a great -human instrument second only in importance to the Declaration of -Independence. There may be a third which thinks that on the whole it -is not a bad settlement, and that the pity is a little more tact was -not displayed in passing it through the various stages of approval and -ratification. This party is not as vocal as the others.</p> - -<p>In England we find at least three schools.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> There are the critics who -denounce it as a brutal outrage upon international justice. It is to -them a device for extorting incalculable sums out of an impoverished -Germany as reparation for damages artificially worked up. Then there -is the other extreme—the "die-hard" section—more influential since -it became less numerous, who think the treaty let Germany off much -too lightly. In fact they are in complete agreement with the French -Chauvinists as to the reprehensible moderation of its terms. In -Britain also there is a third party which regards its provisions as -constituting the best settlement, when you take into account the -conflicting aims, interests, and traditions of the parties who had to -negotiate and come to an agreement.</p> - -<p>But take all these variegated schools together, or separately, and -you will find not one in a thousand of their pupils could give you -an intelligent and comprehensive summary of the main principles of -the treaty. I doubt whether I should be far wrong in saying there -would not be one in ten thousand. Controversialists generally are -satisfied to concentrate on the articles in the treaty which are -obnoxious or pleasing to them as the case may be, and ignore the rest -completely, however essential<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> they may be to a true judgment of the -whole. Most of the disputants are content to take their views from -press comments and denunciatory speeches. Unhappily the explanatory -speeches have been few. Some there are who have in their possession -the full text—nominally for reference; but you will find parts of -the reparations clauses in their copies black with the thumb-marks -which note the perspiring dialectician searching for projectiles to -hurl at the object of his fury. The clauses which ease and modify the -full demand are treated with stern neglect, and the remainder of the -pages are pure as the untrodden snow. You can trace no footprints of -politicians, publicists, or journalists, in whole provinces of this -unexplored treaty. The covenant of the League of Nations is lifted -bodily out of the text, and is delivered to the public as a separate -testament for the faithful so that the saints may not defile their -hands with the polluted print which exacts justice. They have now come -to believe that it never was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles, -and that it has nothing to do with that vile and sanguinary instrument.</p> - -<p>And yet the first words of this treaty are the following:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote><p>"The High Contracting Parties,</p> - -<p>"In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve -international peace and security,</p> - -<p>"By the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,</p> - -<p>"By the prescription of open, just and honourable relations -between nations,</p> - -<p>"By the firm establishment of the understandings of international -law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and</p> - -<p>"By the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all -treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one -another,</p> - -<p>"Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Then follow the articles of the debated covenant.</p> - -<p>A speaker who took part recently in a university debate on the subject -told me that the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span>undergraduates exhibited the greatest surprise -when he informed them that the League of Nations was founded by the -Versailles Treaty. A few days ago I had a similar experience at the -Oxford Union. I was speaking against a motion framed to condemn the -principles of the treaty as unwise and unjust. In its defence I -recalled some of its outstanding features. But as most of my narrative -had no bearing on reparations it was greeted with impatience and -cries of "Question" from a group of anti-Versaillists. They honestly -thought I was travelling outside the motion in giving a short summary -of the other sections of the treaty. To them it is all condensed in -Mr. Keynes's book, and other hostile commentaries. Anything which -is inconsistent with these, or supplements the scanty or misleading -statements they make, is deemed to be tainted and biassed. To refer to -the text itself they regard as unfair, and as playing into the hands -of the defenders of a wicked and oppressive pact. The actual treaty -has been already put by them out of bounds, and you wander into its -forbidden clauses on pain of being put into the guardroom by one or -other of the intolerant factions who patrol the highways and byways of -international politics.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span></p> - -<p>In all the debates on the subject in the House of Commons I have only -once heard the treaty itself quoted by a critic, and strangely enough -that was by way of approval.</p> - -<p>I have indicated one important section of the treaty to which is -accorded something of the reverence due to Holy Writ by an influential -section of the public. This group would be shocked were they reminded -that their devotion is given to a chapter in the hateful treaty. -There is yet another large and important section which is completely -ignored by the critics—that which reconstructs Central Europe on the -basis of nationality and the free choice of the people instead of on -the basis of strategy and military convenience. This is the section -that liberated Poland from the claws of the three carnivorous empires -that were preying on its vitals, and restored it to life, liberty and -independence. It is the section that frees the Danes of Schleswig -and the Frenchmen of Alsace-Lorraine. For these oppressed provinces -the Treaty of Versailles is the title-deed of freedom. Why are these -clauses all suppressed in controversial literature? Here is another -of the ignored provisions—that which sets up permanent machinery for -dealing with labour <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span>problems throughout the world, and for raising the -standard of life amongst the industrial workers by means of a great -international effort. No more beneficent or more fruitful provision -was ever made in any treaty. It is so momentous and so completely -overlooked in general discussion, that I think it worth while to quote -at length the general principles laid down by a provision which will -one day be claimed as the first great international charter of the -worker.</p> - -<p>"The High Contracting Parties recognise that differences of climate, -habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, -make strict uniformity in the conditions of labour difficult of -immediate attainment. But, holding as they do, that labour should not -be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there -are methods and principles for regulating labour conditions which -all industrial communities should endeavour to apply so far as their -special circumstances will permit.</p> - -<blockquote><p>"Among these methods and principles, the following seem to the -High Contracting Parties to be of special and urgent importance:—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span></p> - -<p>"<i>First.</i>—The guiding principle above enunciated that labour -should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of -commerce.</p> - -<p>"<i>Second.</i>—The right of association for all lawful purposes by -the employed as well as by the employers.</p> - -<p>"<i>Third.</i>—The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to -maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in -their time and country.</p> - -<p>"<i>Fourth.</i>—The adoption of an eight-hour day or forty-eight hour -week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been -attained.</p> - -<p>"<i>Fifth.</i>—The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four -hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable.</p> - -<p>"<i>Sixth.</i>—The abolition of child labour and the imposition of -such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit -the continuation of their education and assure their proper -physical development.</p> - -<p>"<i>Seventh.</i>—The principle that men and women should receive equal -remuneration for work of equal value.</p> - -<p>"<i>Eighth.</i>—The standard set by law in each <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span>country with respect -to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the -equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident -therein.</p> - -<p>"<i>Ninth</i>.—Each State should make provision for a system of -inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the -enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the -employed."</p></blockquote> - -<p>It will take long before the principles propounded in the covenant of -the league under the labour articles are fully and faithfully carried -out, but in both a good deal of quiet and steady progress have already -been attained. M. Albert Thomas is an admirable chief for the labour -bureau. He has zeal, sympathy, tact, energy and great organising -talent. He is pressing along with patience, as well as persistence. But -that is another question. It raises grave issues as to the execution of -the treaty. What I have to deal with to-day is the misunderstandings -which exist as to the character of the treaty itself. The British -public are certainly being deliberately misled on this point. Why are -those sections which emancipate oppressed races, which seek to lift -the worker to a condition above <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span>destitution and degradation, and -which build up a breakwater against the raging passions which make -for war, never placed to the credit of the Treaty of Versailles? The -type of controversialist who is always advertising his idealism has -made a point of withholding these salient facts from the public which -he professes to enlighten and instruct. There is no more unscrupulous -debater in the ring than the one who affects to be particularly -high-minded. I do not mean the man who is possessed of a really high -mind, but the man who is always posing as having been exalted by grace -above his fellows. He is the Pharisee of controversy. Beware of him, -for he garbles and misquotes and suppresses to suit his arguments or -prejudices in a way that would make a child of this world blush.</p> - -<p>That is why I venture to put in a humble, although I fear belated, plea -for the reading of the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text, -of the Treaty of Versailles. Herein lies the only fair way of arriving -at a just conclusion on the merits of a treaty which holds in its hands -the destiny of Europe for many a generation.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>VI</span> <span class="smaller">1922</span></h2> - -<p>The year nineteen hundred and twenty-two witnessed a genuine struggle -on the part of the nations to re-establish peace conditions in the -world.</p> - -<p>During 1919-20 and 1921 "the tarantella was still in their blood." The -mad war dance was still quivering in their limbs and they could not -rest. The crackle of musketry was incessant and made needful repose -impossible. There was not a country in Europe or Asia whose troops were -not firing shots in anger at some external or internal foe.</p> - -<p>America rang down the fire curtain until this hysterical frenzy had -burnt itself out. Was she right? It is too early yet to give the -answer. The case is but yet "part heard"—many witnessing years whose -evidence is relevant have not yet entered the box: it will, therefore, -be some time before the verdict of history as to her attitude can be -delivered.</p> - -<p>But 1922 testifies to many striking symptoms of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> recovering sanity on -the part of the tortured continents. Before 1922 you had everywhere -the querulity of the overstrained nerve. The slightest offence or -misunderstanding, however unintentional, provoked a quarrel, and almost -every quarrel was followed by a blow. It was a mad world to live in. -The shrieks of clawing nations rent the European night and made it -hideous. A distinguished general declared that at one period—I think -it was the year of grace 1920—there were thirty wars, great and small, -proceeding simultaneously. Who was to blame? Everybody and nobody. -Mankind had just passed through the most nerve-shattering experience in -all its racking history, and it was not responsible for its actions. -Millions of young men had for years marched through such a pitiless -rain of terror as had not been conceived except in Milton's description -of the battle scenes when the fallen angels were driven headlong to the -deep. And when the Angel of Peace led the nations out from the gates -of hell, no wonder it took them years to recover sight and sanity. -Nineteen twenty-two was a year of restored composure.</p> - -<p>The outward visible sign was seen in the changed character of the -international conferences held <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span>during the year. The ultimatum kind of -conference gave way to the genuine peace conference. The old method -insisted upon by French statesmen was to hammer out demands on the -conference anvil and send them in the form of an ultimatum to nations -who, in spite of peace treaties, were still treated as enemies; the new -method was to discuss on equal terms the conditions of appeasement.</p> - -<p>Germany, having no fleet in the Pacific, was not invited to the -Washington conference, and Russia was excluded for other reasons. But -at Cannes Germany was represented, and at Genoa both Germany and Russia -had their delegates.</p> - -<p>The Washington conference was, in some respects, the most remarkable -international conference ever held. It was the first time great -nations commanding powerful armaments had ever sat down deliberately -to discuss a voluntary limitation of their offensive and defensive -forces. Restrictions and reductions have often been imposed in peace -treaties by triumphant nations upon their beaten foes. The Versailles -treaty is an example of that operation. But at Washington the victors -negotiated a mutual cutting-down of navies built for national safety -and strengthened by national<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> pride. The friends of peace therefore -have solid ground for their rejoicing in a contemplation of substantial -reductions already effected in the naval programmes of the most -powerful maritime countries in the world—Britain, the United States of -America, and Japan—as a direct result of the Washington negotiations.</p> - -<p>American statesmanship has given a lead of which it is entitled -to boast, and 1922 is entitled to claim that this triumph of good -understanding has brought a measure of glory which will give it a -peculiar splendour amongst the years of earth's history.</p> - -<p>The gatherings at Cannes and Genoa can also claim outstanding merit -in the large and growing family of international conferences. At -Washington the Allies alone foregathered. At Cannes and Genoa nations -came together which had only recently emerged out of deadly conflict -with each other. At each conference I met on both sides men who had -but just recovered from severe wounds sustained in this struggle. -At Cannes French, Belgian, Italian, Japanese, as well as British -ministers and experts, sat down in council with German ministers and -experts to discuss the vexed question<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> of reparations without taunt or -recrimination. There was a calm recognition not only of the needs of -the injured countries, but also of the difficulties of the offending -state. Outside and beyond the German problem there was a resolve to -eliminate all the various elements of disturbance, political and -economic, that kept Europe in a ferment and made its restoration -impossible.</p> - -<p>Here it was decided to summon all the late belligerent nations to a -great conference at Genoa to discuss reconstruction. To these were -added the neutral nations of Europe. It was a great decision. There -were three obstacles in the way of realising the programme. The first -was the stipulation of France that the specific problems raised by the -treaty of Versailles should be excluded altogether from the purview -of the conference. This was a grave limitation of its functions and -chances. Still, if the Cannes sittings had continued, an arrangement -might have been arrived at with the Germans which would have helped the -deliberations of Genoa. The second obstacle was the refusal of America -to participate in the discussions. Why did the American government -refuse? There were probably good reasons for that refusal, but the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> -recording angel alone knows them all fully and accurately. The third -obstacle was the fall of the Briand ministry, and the substitution -of a less sympathetic administration. In spite of all these serious -drawbacks Genoa accomplished great things. It brought together into the -same rooms enemies who had not met for years except on the battlefield. -They conferred and conversed around the same table for weeks—at -conferences, committees, and sub-committees. They broke bread and drank -wine together at the same festive boards. Before the conference came -to an end there was an atmosphere of friendliness which was in itself -a guarantee of peaceable relations, for the delegates who represented -the nations at Genoa were all men of real influence in their respective -countries.</p> - -<p>But however important the intangible result, there was much more -achieved. The thirty nations represented in the assembly entered -into a solemn pact not to commit any act of aggression against their -neighbours. When they entered the conference there were few of them -who were not oppressed with suspicions that these neighbours meditated -violence against their frontiers. When they arrived at Genoa they -were all anxious for peace, but <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span>apprehensive of impending war. Genoa -dispelled those anxieties.</p> - -<p>One of the most promising results of the pact and the improved -atmospheric conditions out of which it arose is the substantial -reduction in the Bolshevik army. It has already been reduced to -the dimensions of the French army, and we are now promised a -further reduction. That removes a real menace to European peace. -If the reduction of armies in the East of Europe is followed by a -corresponding reduction in the West the reign of peace is not far -distant.</p> - -<p>This is not the time to dwell upon the important agreements effected -at Genoa on questions of exchange, credit, and transport. All the -recommendations made depend for their successful carrying out on the -establishment of a real peace and a friendly understanding between -nations. Peace and goodwill on earth is still the only healing evangel -for idealists to preach and statesmen to practise. Without it plans and -protocols must inevitably fail.</p> - -<p>Where does peace stand? The weary angel is still on the wing, for the -waters have not yet subsided. She may perhaps find a foothold in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> -Great West, and Britain is fairly safe—not yet Ireland.</p> - -<p>But the continent of Europe is still swampy and insecure. The debate -in the French Chamber on reparations is not encouraging. The only -difference of opinion in the discussion was that displayed between -those who advocated an advance into the Ruhr, and the seizure of -pledges further into German territory, and those who preferred -"developing" the left bank of the Rhine. Occupying, controlling, -developing, annexing—they all mean the same thing; that the province -to the left bank of the Rhine is to be torn from Germany and grafted -into France.</p> - -<p>There is no peace in this talk. It is a sinister note on which to -end the pacific music of 1922. You must interpret it in connection -with another event of 1922—the Russo-German agreement. Since then -Chicherin—a spirit of mischief incarnate—has almost made Berlin -his abode. The men who are devoting their ingenuity to devising new -torments for Germany are preparing new terrors for their own and their -neighbours' children.</p> - -<p>The year ends with rumours of great American projects for advancing -large sums of money to all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> and sundry in the hope of settling the -vexed question of German reparation. The loan, it is surmised, will be -accompanied by guarantees on the part of France not to invade further -German territory. Some go so far as to conjecture that it is to be an -essential condition of participation in this Christmas bounty of Madame -Rumour that France is to reduce her armies and to undertake not to -exceed Washington limits for her navies.</p> - -<p>Nobody seems to know, and I am only repeating the gossip of the press. -But if the £350,000,000 loan is likely to materialise, its projectors -are wise in imposing conditions that would afford them some chance -of receiving payment of a moderate interest in the lifetime of this -generation.</p> - -<p>No prudent banker would lend money on the security of a flaming volcano.</p> - -<p><i>London, December 20th, 1922.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>VII</span> <span class="smaller">WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER?</span></h2> - -<p class="bold"><i>1. The Rhine</i></p> - -<p>M. Clemenceau, in the remarkable series of speeches delivered in -the United States of America, implies a breach of faith on the part -of Britain in reference to the pact to guarantee France against the -possibility of German aggression. England has no better friend in -the whole of France than M. Clemenceau. Throughout a strenuous but -consistent career he has never varied in his friendship for England. -Many a time has he been bitterly assailed for that friendship. French -journalists are not sparing of innuendo against those they hate. -They hate fiercely and they hit recklessly, and M. Clemenceau, a man -of scrupulous integrity, at one period in his stormy political life -was charged by certain organs of the Paris press with being in the -pay of England. If, therefore, he now does an injustice to Britain I -am convinced it is not from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> blind hatred of our country, but from -temporary forgetfulness of the facts.</p> - -<p>He states the facts with reference to the original pact quite fairly. -It was proffered as an answer to those who claimed that the left bank -of the Rhine should be annexed to France.</p> - -<p>There was a strong party in France which urged M. Clemenceau to demand -that the Rhine should be treated as the natural frontier of their -country, and that advantage should be taken of the overwhelming defeat -of Germany to extend the boundaries of France to that fateful river. -For unknown centuries it has been fought over and across—a veritable -river of blood. If French Chauvinism had achieved its purpose at the -Paris conference the Rhine would within a generation once more overflow -its banks and devastate Europe. The most moderate and insidious form -this demand took was a proposal that the German provinces on the left -bank of the Rhine should remain in French occupation until the treaty -had been fulfilled. That meant for ever. Reparations alone—skilfully -handled by the Quai d'Orsay—would preclude the possibility of ever -witnessing fulfilment. The argument by which they supported their claim -was the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> defencelessness of the French frontier without some natural -barrier. France had been twice invaded and overrun within living memory -by her formidable neighbour. The German military power was now crushed, -and rich and populous provinces of the German Empire had been restored -to France and Poland, but the population of Germany was still fifty per -cent. greater than that of France and it was growing at an alarming -rate, whilst the French population was at a standstill. German towns -and villages were clamant with sturdy children.</p> - -<p>You cannot talk long to a Frenchman without realising how this spectre -of German children haunts France and intimidates her judgment. These -children, it is said, are nourished on vengeance: one day the struggle -will be resumed, and France has no natural defence against the avenging -hordes that are now playing on German streets and with the hum of whose -voices German kindergartens resound.</p> - -<p>We were told the Rhine is the only possible line of resistance. -Providence meant it to play that part, and it is only the sinister -interference of statesmen who love not France that deprives<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> Frenchmen -of this security for peace which a far-seeing Nature has provided.</p> - -<p>The fact that this involved the subjection to a foreign yoke of -millions of men of German blood, history, and sympathies, and that the -incorporation of so large an alien element, hostile in every fibre to -French rule, would be a constant source of trouble and anxiety to the -French Government, whilst it would not merely provide an incentive -to Germany to renew war but would justify and dignify the attack by -converting it into a war of liberation—all that had no effect on the -Rhenian school of French politics.</p> - -<p>This school is as powerful as ever. In one respect it is more powerful, -for in 1919 there was a statesman at the head of affairs who had the -strength as well as the sagacity to resist their ill-judged claims.</p> - -<p>But what about 1922? Where is the foresight and where is the strength? -There is a real danger that the fifteen years' occupation may on one -pretext or another be indefinitely prolonged. When it comes to an -end will there be a ministry in France strong enough to withdraw the -troops? Before the fifteen years' occupation is terminated will there -be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> a ministry or a series of ministries strong enough to resist -the demand put forward without ceasing in the French press that the -occupation should be made effective?</p> - -<p>Upon the answer to these questions the peace of Europe—the peace of -the world, perhaps the life of our civilisation—depends. The pressure -to do the evil thing that will once more spill rivers of human blood -is insistent. The temptation is growing, the resistance is getting -feebler. America and Britain standing together can alone avert the -catastrophe. But they can do so only by making it clear that the -aggressor—whoever it be—will have the invincible might of these two -commonwealths arrayed against any nation that threatens to embroil the -world in another conflict.</p> - -<p>There are men in Germany who preach vengeance. They must be told that -a war of revenge will find the same allies side by side inflicting -punishment on the peace-breakers. There are men in France who counsel -annexation of territories populated by another race. They must be -warned that such a step will alienate the sympathies of Britain and -America, and that when the inevitable war of liberation comes the -sympathies of America and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> Britain will be openly ranged on the side of -those who are fighting for national freedom.</p> - -<p>The time has come for saying these things, and if they are not said in -high places humanity will one day call those who occupy those places to -a reckoning.</p> - -<p>The pact was designed to strengthen the hands of M. Clemenceau against -the aggressive party which was then and still is anxious to commit -France to the colossal error of annexing territory which has always -been purely German.</p> - -<p>M. Clemenceau knows full well that Britain has been ready any time -during the last three years up to a few months ago to take upon herself -the burden of that pact with or without the United States of America. -At Cannes early this year I made a definite proposal to that effect. It -was a written offer made by me on behalf of the British government to -M. Briand, who was then prime minister of France.</p> - -<p>I was anxious to secure the co-operation of France in a general -endeavour to clear up the European situation and establish a real -peace from the Urals to the Atlantic seaboard. French suspicions and -French apprehensions constituted a serious <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span>difficulty in the way of -settlement, and I thought that if it were made clear to France that the -whole strength of the British Empire could be depended upon to come to -her aid in the event of threatened invasion French opinion would be in -a better mood to discuss the outstanding questions which agitate Europe.</p> - -<p>International goodwill is essential to the re-establishment of the -shattered machinery of international commerce. With a great country -like France, to which the issue of the war had given a towering -position on the continent of Europe, in a condition of fretfulness, it -was impossible to settle Europe.</p> - -<p>Hence the offer which was made by the British government. M. Briand was -prepared to welcome this offer and to proceed to a calm consideration -of the perplexities of the European situation. It was agreed to summon -a conference at Genoa to discuss the condition of European exchange, -credit and trade. It was also resolved that an effort should be made -to establish peace with Russia and to bring that great country once -more inside the community of nations. A great start was made on the -path of genuine appeasement. The German<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> Government were invited to -send their chief Minister to the Cannes conference in order to arrive -at a workable settlement of the vexed question of reparations. The -invitation received a prompt response, and Dr. Rathenau, accompanied -by two or three leading ministers and a retinue of financial experts, -reached Cannes in time to take part in the discussions.</p> - -<p>The negotiations were proceeding helpfully, and another week might have -produced results which would have pacified the tumult of suspicious -nations and inaugurated the promise of fraternity. But, alas, Satan is -not done with Europe. A ministerial crisis in France brought our hopes -tumbling to the ground. The conference was broken up on the threshold -of fulfilment.</p> - -<p>Suspicion once more seized the tiller, and Europe, just as she seemed -to be entering the harbour of goodwill, was swung back violently into -the broken seas of international distrust. The offer made by Britain -to stand alone on the pact of guarantee to France was rejected with -disdain. We were told quite brutally that it was no use without a -military convention. This we declined to enter into. Europe has -suffered too much from military<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> conventions to warrant the repetition -of such a disastrous experiment.</p> - -<p>The pact with Britain lies for the moment in the waste-paper basket. -But we never flung it there. M. Clemenceau ought to have made his -complaint in Paris against men of his own race and not in New York -against Englishmen. With the pact went the effort to make peace in -Europe.</p> - -<p>The history of Genoa is too recent to require any recapitulation of its -features. The new French ministry did not play the part of an inviting -government responsible for pressing to a successful end the objects of -Cannes, but rather that of the captious critic who had to be persuaded -along every inch of the road and who threatened at every obstacle to -turn back and leave the rest of Europe to struggle along with its -burden, amid the mocking laughter of France.</p> - -<p>I am not complaining of M. Barthou. He did his best under most -humiliating conditions to remain loyal to the conference which his -government had joined in summoning. But his task was an impossible one. -He was hampered, embarrassed and tangled at every turn. Whenever he -took any step<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> forward he was lassoed by a despatch from Paris. I have -good authority for stating that he received over eight hundred of these -communications in the course of the conference!</p> - -<p>What could the poor man do under such bewildering conditions? The other -European countries were perplexed and distracted. They were anxious -that Genoa should end in a stable peace. There was no doubt about the -sincerity, the passionate sincerity, of the desire for peace throughout -Europe, but European nations could not help seeing that one of the -great powers was working for a failure. They had a natural anxiety not -to appear to take sides.</p> - -<p>It is a marvel that in spite of this unfortunate attitude adopted -by the French Government a pact was signed which has, at any rate, -preserved the peace in Eastern Europe for several months.</p> - -<p>Before the conference we heard of armies being strengthened along -frontiers and of movements of troops with a menacing intent from the -Baltic to the Black Sea. Genoa at least dispelled that cloud. But a -permanent peace has not yet been established and the pact with Russia -will soon expire. I am,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> however, hopeful that the spirit of Genoa will -stand between contending armies and prevent the clash of swords.</p> - -<p>All this, however, is leading me away from an examination of M. -Clemenceau's suggestion that Britain did not keep faith in the matter -of guaranteeing France against German aggression.</p> - -<p>The offer was definitely renewed at Cannes, and M. Poincaré has not -accepted it.</p> - -<p>I have my own opinion as to why he has not done so. It is not -merely that he does not wish to set the seal of his approval upon a -predecessor's achievement. I am afraid the reason is of a more sinister -kind. If France accepts Britain's guarantee of defence of her frontier -every excuse for annexing the left bank of the Rhine disappears.</p> - -<p>If this is the explanation, if French ministers have made up their -minds that under no conditions will they, even at the end of the period -of occupation, withdraw from the Rhine, then a new chapter opens in -the history of Europe and the world, with a climax of horror such as -mankind has never yet witnessed.</p> - -<p>The German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine are intensely -German—in race, language,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> tradition and sympathies. There are seventy -millions of Germans in Europe. A generation hence there may be a -hundred millions. They will never rest content so long as millions of -their fellow-countrymen are under a foreign yoke on the other side of -the Rhine, and it will only be a question of time and opportunity for -the inevitable war of liberation to begin.</p> - -<p>We know what the last war was like. No one can foretell the terrors of -the next. The march of science is inexorable, and wherever it goes it -is at the bidding of men, whether to build or to destroy. Is it too -much to ask that America should, in time, take an effective interest in -the development along the Rhine? To that extent I am in complete accord -with M. Clemenceau. Neither Britain nor America can afford to ignore -the manœuvres going on along its banks. It is a far cry from the -Rhine to the Mississippi, but not so far as it used to be.</p> - -<p>There are now graves not far from the Rhine wherein lies the dust -of men who, less than six years ago, came from the banks of the -Mississippi, with their faces towards the Rhine.</p> - -<p><i>London, December 2nd, 1922.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>VIII</span> <span class="smaller">WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER?</span></h2> - -<p class="bold"><i>2. The Rhine</i> (Continued)</p> - -<p>The breakdown of the London conference, and especially the reason for -that breakdown, proves the warning I uttered in my last chapter was -necessary and timely.</p> - -<p>M. Poincaré demanded the occupation of the only rich coalfield left to -Germany as a guarantee for the carrying out of impossible terms.</p> - -<p>It is because I am profoundly convinced that the policy represented by -this project will lead to trouble of the gravest kind for Europe and -the world that I felt moved to sound a note of warning. I knew it would -provoke much angry misrepresentation. I am accustomed to that. I deemed -it to be my duty to face it.</p> - -<p>The statement I made in my last chapter about the existence of a -strong party in France which regarded the Rhine as the natural barrier -of that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> country has provoked a storm of denial, repudiation and -indignation. It is denounced as a wicked invention. Some are amazed at -the impudence of the calumny. Where is the party? France knows nothing -of it. Is it not a monster which has emanated from the brain of the -enemy of France?</p> - -<p>Repudiations have their value, especially if they come from men of -authority, and I shall bear invective with the fortitude to which all -men who wish to be happy though politicians should be hardened provided -I elicit denials which may render future international mischief -difficult.</p> - -<p>But a further perusal of the evidence on which I based my statement has -served to deepen my apprehensions. What was the statement? Let me quote -the actual words I used:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"There was a strong party in France which urged M. Clemenceau to -demand that the Rhine should be treated as the natural frontier -of their country, and that advantage should be taken of the -overwhelming defeat of Germany to extend the boundaries of France -to that fateful river.</p> - -<p>"The most moderate and insidious form this demand took was a -proposal that the German <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span>provinces on the left bank of the Rhine -should remain in French occupation until the treaty had been -fulfilled. That meant for ever. Reparations alone—skilfully -handled by the Quai d'Orsay—would preclude the possibility of -ever witnessing fulfilment.</p> - -<p>"The pact was designed to strengthen the hands of M. Clemenceau -against the aggressive party which was then, and still is, anxious -to commit France to the colossal error of annexing territory which -has always been purely German."</p></blockquote> - -<p>What was the basis on which I made this assertion? It was thoroughly -well known to all those who were engaged in the operations of the Peace -conference. The Rhine was the background of all manœuvre for weeks -and months. Whether the subject matter was the League of Nations, the -German fleet, or the status of Fiume, we knew that the real struggle -would come over the Rhine.</p> - -<p>On one hand, How much would France demand? on the other, How much would -the Allies concede? There was a subconscious conflict about the Rhine -throughout the whole discussion, however irrelevant the topic under -actual consideration happened to be.</p> - -<p>But unrecorded memories are of little use as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> testimony unless -corroborated by more tangible proofs. Do such proofs exist? I will -recall a few.</p> - -<p>There was a party which considered the Rhine to be the only natural -frontier of France. It was a strong party, with a strong man as its -spokesman—in many ways the strongest in France—Marshal Foch. His -splendid services in the war gave him a position such as no soldier in -France or in any other country could command. The soldier who, by his -genius, leads a nation to victory, possesses a measure of influence on -the public opinion of the people he has saved from destruction such as -no other individual can aspire to—as long as his services are fresh in -the memory of his fellow-countrymen. That, I admit, is not very long. -Gratitude is like manna—it must be gathered and enjoyed quickly, for -its freshness soon disappears. But in the early months of 1919 Marshal -Foch was still sitting at the banquet table of popular favour enjoying -the full flavour of grateful recognition. His word on all questions -affecting the security and destiny of France was heard with a deference -which no other man in France could succeed in securing. He has also -a quality which is not usually an attribute of generalship: he is a -lucid, forceful and picturesque<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> speaker. He was, therefore, listened -to for what he was, for what he said, and for the way he said it.</p> - -<p>What did he say? He said a good deal on the subject of the Rhine -frontier and I cannot quote it all. I will take a few germane sentences -out of his numerous utterances on the subject. On the 19th day of -April, 1919, there appeared in the London <i>Times</i> an interview with -Marshal Foch. From that interview I take these salient passages:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"'And now, having reached the Rhine, <i>we must stay there</i>,' -went on the Marshal very emphatically. 'Impress that upon your -fellow-countrymen. It is our only safety, their only safety. We -must have a barrier. We must double-lock the door. Democracies -like ours, which are never aggressive, must have strong <i>natural -military frontiers</i>. Remember that those seventy millions -of Germans will always be a menace to us. Do not trust the -appearances of the moment. Their natural characteristics have not -changed in four years. <i>Fifty years hence</i> they will be what they -are to-day.'</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>"From the table at the other end of the room Marshal Foch brought -a great map, six or eight feet<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> square, on which the natural -features of this part of western Europe were marked. The Rhine -was a thick line of blue. To the west of the river the Marshal -had drawn in pencil a concave arc representing the new frontier -that France will receive under the Peace treaty. It was clearly an -arbitrary political boundary conforming to no natural feature of -the land.</p> - -<p>"'Look at that,' said Marshal Foch. 'There is no natural obstacle -along that frontier. Is it there that we can hold the Germans if -they attack us again? No. Here! here! here!' and he tapped the -blue Rhine with his pencil.</p> - -<p>"'Here we must be ready to face our enemies. This is a barrier -which will take some crossing. If the Germans try to force a -passage over the Rhine—ho! ho! But here'—touching the black -pencilled line running north-west from Lorraine past the Saar -valley to the Belgian frontier—'here there is nothing.'</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>"'No; if you are wise you insist on having your locks and your -wall, and we must have our armies on the Rhine. Some people object -that it will take<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> many troops to hold the Rhine. Not so many as -it would take to hold a political frontier. For the Rhine can be -crossed only at certain places, whereas the new political frontier -of France can be broken anywhere and would have to be held in -force along its entire length.'"</p></blockquote> - -<p>He expounded his doctrine in greater detail in an official memorandum -which, as commander-in-chief of the Allied armies, he submitted to M. -Clemenceau:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"To stop the enterprises towards the west of this nation, -everlastingly warlike, and covetous of the good things belonging -to other people, only recently formed and pushed on to conquest -by force regardless of all rights and by ways the most contrary -to all law, seeking always the mastery of the world, <i>Nature has -only made one barrier—the Rhine. This barrier must be forced on -Germany. Henceforward the Rhine will be the western frontier of -the Germanic peoples....</i>"</p></blockquote> - -<p>He repeated this demand in a subsequent memorandum. Many of us recall -his dramatic irruption<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> into the placid arena of the Peace conference -in May, 1919, still brandishing the same theme.</p> - -<p>It may be said that Marshal Foch is not and does not pretend to be a -statesman. He is only a great soldier. Nevertheless, his political -influence was so great that even in 1920 he overthrew the most powerful -statesman in France within a month of his triumphant return at the -polls with a huge supporting majority in the French Parliament. It -was Marshal Foch who, by his antagonism, was responsible for M. -Clemenceau's defeat at the presidential election of 1920. But for -Marshal Foch's intervention M. Clemenceau would have been to-day -president of the French republic.</p> - -<p>Why was he beaten, at the height of his fame, by a candidate of -infinitely less prestige and power? The wrath of Marshal Foch and his -formidable following was excited against M. Clemenceau because the -latter had, under pressure from the Allies, gone back on the agreed -French policy about the Rhine. M. Tardieu, as is well known, was one of -the two most prominent ministers in M. Clemenceau's administration, and -closely associated with his chief in the framing of the Peace treaty. -He has written a book, and in that book he gives at length a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> document -which he handed to the Allies on March 12th, 1919, containing the -following proposal:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"In the general interest of peace and to assure the effective -working of the constituent clause of the League of Nations, the -western frontier of Germany is fixed at the Rhine. Consequently -Germany renounces all sovereignty over, as well as any customs -union with, the territories of the former German empire on the -left bank of the Rhine."</p></blockquote> - -<p>There is a sardonic humour about the words "in the general interest of -peace and to assure the effective working of the constituent clause of -the League of Nations."</p> - -<p>But it demonstrates that at that date M. Clemenceau and his minister -had become converts to the doctrine of the Rhine as the natural -boundary of Germany. American and British pressure subsequently induced -him to abandon this position and, as I said in a previous chapter, the -pact was part of the argument addressed to him. But the party of the -Rhine never forgave. Hence his failure to reach the presidential chair. -It was an honourable failure and will ever do him credit.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span></p> - -<p>The reasons assigned for that defeat by the <i>Annual Register</i>, -1919-20—certainly not a partisan authority—prove that even an -unexcitable chronicler laboured then under the delusion—if it be -a delusion—which possessed me when I wrote the offending article. -Explaining the remarkable defeat the <i>Annual Register</i> says:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>" ... Clemenceau's supporters contended that the terms of the -Treaty of Versailles were satisfactory from the French point -of view; his opponents declared that he had given way too much -to the American and British standpoints and that the peace was -unsatisfactory, particularly in respect of the guarantees for the -reparations due to France <i>and in the matter of the French eastern -frontier. It will be remembered that a large body of French -opinion had desired that France should secure the line of the -Rhine as her eastern frontier.</i>"</p></blockquote> - -<p>I can if necessary quote endless leading articles in French journals -and writings and speeches of French politicians. Men of such divergent -temperaments and accomplishments as M. Franklin Bouillon and M. Tardieu -gave countenance to this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> claim that Germany should be amputated at the -Rhine. One carried the theme along on the torrent of his clattering -lava and the other on the dome of an iceberg. Later on at the reception -of Marshal Foch when he was elected a member of the French Academy, -M. Poincaré, turning at one moment in his discourse to the Marshal, -said in reference to the veteran General's well-known attitude on the -Peace treaty, "Ah, Monsieur le Maréchal, if only your advice had been -listened to." Has he also gone back on an opinion so histrionically -expressed? Let us hope for the best.</p> - -<p>I know it will be said that although the boundaries of Germany were to -end at the Rhine, the province on the left bank was not to be annexed, -but to be reconstituted into an "independent" republic. What manner of -independence and what kind of republic? All German officers were to be -expelled; it was to be detached by special provision from the economic -life of Germany upon which it is almost entirely dependent for its -existence. It was not to be allowed to associate with the fatherland.</p> - -<p>The Rhine which divided the new territory from Germany was to be -occupied in the main by French<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> troops: the territories of the -independent republic were to be occupied by foreign soldiers. Its young -men were to be conscripted and trained with a view to absorbing them -into French and Belgian armies to fight against their own countrymen on -the other side of the Rhine. The whole conditions of life in the "free -and independent republic" were to be dictated by an "accord" between -France, Luxemburg and Belgium, and, in the words of Marshal Foch, -"Britain would be ultimately brought in."</p> - -<p>But I am told that these proposals did not mean annexation. Then what -else did they mean? You do not swallow the oyster. You only first give -it an independent existence by detaching it from its hard surroundings. -You then surround it on all sides and absorb it into your own system -to equip you with added strength to prey on other oysters! What -independence! And what a republic! It would have been and was intended -to be a sham republic. Had the plan been adopted it would have been a -blunder and a crime, for which not France alone but the world would -later on have paid the penalty.</p> - -<p>In the face of these quotations and of these undoubted facts, can any -one say that I calumniated France when I said there was a powerful -party in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> that country which claimed that the Rhine should be treated -as the natural barrier of Germany, and that the Peace treaty should be -based upon that assumption?</p> - -<p>Let it be observed that I never stated that this claim had the -support of the French democracy. The fact that the treaty, which did -not realise that objective, secured ratification by an overwhelming -majority in the French parliament and subsequently by an emphatic -verdict in the country, demonstrates clearly that the French people as -a whole shrank with their invincible good sense from following even -a lead they admired on to this path of future disaster. But the mere -fact that there are potent influences in France that still press this -demand, and take advantage of every disappointment to urge it forward, -calls for unremitting vigilance amongst all peoples who have the -welfare of humanity at heart.</p> - -<p>In conclusion I should like to add that to denounce me as an enemy of -France because I disagree with the international policy of its present -rulers is a petulant absurdity.</p> - -<p>During the whole of my public career I have been a consistent advocate -of co-operation between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> the French and British democracies. I took -that line when it was fashionable in this country to fawn on German -imperialism.</p> - -<p>During the war I twice risked my premiership in the effort to place the -British army under the supreme command of a French general. To preserve -French friendship I have repeatedly given way to French demands, and -thus have often antagonised opinion in this country. But I cannot go to -the extent of approving a policy which is endangering the peace of the -world, even to please one section of a people for whose country I have -always entertained the most genuine affection.</p> - -<p><i>London, December 9th, 1922.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>IX</span> <span class="smaller">WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER?</span></h2> - -<p class="bold"><i>3. The Paris Conference</i></p> - -<p>The third conference with M. Poincaré over reparations has ended, like -its two predecessors, in a complete breakdown.</p> - -<p>The first was held in August, the second in December, and the third -fiasco has just been witnessed.</p> - -<p>I congratulate Mr. Bonar Law on having the courage to face a double -failure rather than agree to a course of policy which would in the end -prove disappointing, and probably disastrous.</p> - -<p>Agreement amongst allies is in itself a desirable objective for -statesmen to aim at, but an accord to commit their respective countries -to foolishness is worse than disagreement.</p> - -<p>France and Britain must not quarrel, even if they cannot agree; but if -French ministers persist in the Poincaré policy, the companionship of -France and Britain over this question will be that of parallel lines -which never meet, even if they never conflict.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span></p> - -<p>What is the object of this headstrong policy? Reparations?</p> - -<p>There is no financier of repute, in any quarter of the globe, who -will agree that these methods will bring the Allies any contributions -towards their impoverished resources.</p> - -<p>At the August conference all the experts were in accord on this -subject, but whilst these methods will produce no cash, they will -produce an unmistakable crash.</p> - -<p>My recollections of the August discussions enable me to follow with -some understanding the rather confused reports which have so far -reached me here.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>It is common ground amongst all the Allies that Germany cannot under -present conditions pay her instalments.</p> - -<p>It is common ground that she must be pressed to put her finances in -order, and by balancing her budget restore the efficiency of her -currency, so as to meet her obligations.</p> - -<p>But M. Poincaré insisted that, as a condition of granting the -moratorium, pledges inside German territory should be seized by the -Allies.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span></p> - -<p>These pledges consisted of customs already established, and of new -customs to be set up on the Rhine and around the Ruhr, so that no goods -should be permitted to pass from these German provinces into the rest -of Germany without the payment of heavy customs dues.</p> - -<p>The other proposed pledges were the seizure of German forests, of -German mines, and of 60 per cent. of the shares in certain German -factories.</p> - -<p>Mr. Bonar Law, judging by his official <i>communiqué</i> after the breakdown -of the conference, seems to have raised the same objections to these -pledges as I put forward at the August conference.</p> - -<blockquote><p>They would bring in nothing comparable to the cost of collection;</p> - -<p>They would provoke much disturbance and irritation and might lead -to consequences of a very grave character.</p></blockquote> - -<p>In fact, these pledges are nothing but paper and provocation.</p> - -<p>The customs barrier on the Rhine was tried once before, and was a -complete failure.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span></p> - -<p>It was tried then as a sanction and not as a means of raising money. -For the former purpose it may have achieved some measure of success, -but from the point of view of collecting money it was a ludicrous -fiasco.</p> - -<p>There are at the present moment hundreds of millions of paper marks -collected at these new tollhouses still locked up in the safe of the -Reparations Commission. They are admittedly worthless.</p> - -<p>As long as these tolls lasted, they were vexatious; they interfered -with business; they dealt lightly with French luxuries working their -way into Germany, but laid a heavy hand on all useful commodities -necessary to the industry and life of the people.</p> - -<p>They were ultimately withdrawn by consent. M. Poincaré now seeks to -revive them.</p> - -<p>The seizure of German forests and mines will inevitably lead to even -more serious consequences. The allied control established in the far -interior of Germany would require protection.</p> - -<p>Protection means military occupation in some shape or other.</p> - -<p>Military occupation of these remote areas means incidents, and -incidents quickly ripen into more serious complications.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span></p> - -<p>Hence the reluctance of the British government of which I was the head -to concur in this dangerous policy. Hence the refusal of Mr. Bonar -Law's government to accept the responsibility for sanctioning such a -policy. Even logically it is indefensible.</p> - -<p>There are only two alternative points of view. One is that Germany -cannot pay under present conditions until her finances are restored, -and that a moratorium ought to be granted for a period which will -enable that financial restoration to mature. The second is that -Germany can pay, that she is only shamming insolvency, and that all -that you have to do is to apply the thumbscrew firmly and cash will be -forthcoming.</p> - -<p>Logically I can understand either of these two alternatives, but I fail -to comprehend the reason for a proposal that will grant a moratorium -on the ground that Germany cannot pay, and at the same time apply the -thumbscrew until she pays.</p> - -<p>I am glad the British Prime Minister has had the wisdom not to -associate himself with a policy which will bring inevitable discredit -upon those who share the responsibility of enforcing it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span></p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the prospects of Europe's recovery are once more to be -retarded by the vain stubbornness of some of her rulers.</p> - -<p><i>Ronda (Spain), January 6th, 1923.</i></p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> This chapter was written at Ronda (Spain).</p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>X</span> <span class="smaller">REPARATIONS</span></h2> - -<p>What is the reparations problem? Why does it appear to be further from -solution than ever?</p> - -<p>The great public in all lands are perplexed and worried by its -disturbing insolubility. It keeps them wondering what may happen next, -and that is never good for a nerve-ridden subject like postwar Europe.</p> - -<p>The real trouble is not in solving the problem itself, but in -satisfying the public opinion which surrounds it. I do not mean to -suggest that it is an easy matter to ascertain what payments Germany -can make, or for Germany to pay and keep paying these sums once they -have been ascertained. But if the difficulty were purely financial it -could be overcome. The heart of the problem lies in the impossibility -at present of convincing the expectant, indignant, hard-hit and heavily -burdened people of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> France that the sums so fixed represent all that -Germany is capable of paying.</p> - -<p>The question of compelling a country to pay across its frontiers huge -sums convertible into the currency of other countries is a new one. -At first it was too readily taken for granted that a wealth which -could bear a war debt of £8,000,000,000 could surely afford to bear an -indemnity of £6,000,000,000 provided that this smaller sum were made a -first charge on the national revenues; and it took time for the average -mind to appreciate the fundamental difference between payment inside -and transmission outside a country.</p> - -<p>When I think of the estimates framed in 1919 by experts of high -intelligence and trained experience as to Germany's capacity to pay -cash over the border I am not disposed to complain of the impatience -displayed by French taxpayers at the efforts made at successive -conferences to hew down those sanguine estimates to feasible -dimensions. I am content to point with pride to the fact that the -common sense of the more heavily burdened British taxpayer has long ago -taught him to cut his loss and keep his temper. When his example is -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span>followed all round, the reparations question is already solved.</p> - -<p>When public opinion in all the Allied countries has subsided into -sanity on German reparations, as it already has in Britain, financiers -can soon find a way out, and trade and commerce will no longer be -scared periodically from their desks by the seismic shocks given to -credit every time a French minister ascends the tribune to make a -statement on reparations.</p> - -<p>Regarding the payment of reparations solely from the point of view of -finance, the issues can be stated simply, and I think solved readily.</p> - -<p>It is always assumed by those who have never read the Treaty of -Versailles, and the letter that accompanied it, that this much-abused -and little-perused document fixed a fabulous indemnity for payment by -Germany. The treaty may have its defects; that is not one of them, for -it fixed no sum for payment, either great or small.</p> - -<p>It stipulated that a reparations commission should be set up in order, -<i>inter alia</i>, to assess the damage inflicted by Germany on Allied -property and the compensation for injury to life and limb in Allied -countries.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span></p> - -<p>In the second place—and this is also overlooked—it was to ascertain -how much of that claim Germany was capable of paying. On both these -questions Germany is entitled to be heard before adjudication.</p> - -<p>It is in accordance with all jurisprudence that as Germany was the -aggressor and the loser she should pay the costs. But it would be not -only oppressive but foolish to urge payment beyond her capacity.</p> - -<p>The amount of damage was to be ascertained and assessed by May, 1921. -Capacity was to be then determined and revised from time to time, -according to the varying conditions. Even so fair a controversialist -as the eminent Italian statesman Signor Nitti has ignored the latter -provision in the Versailles treaty. No wonder that he should, for there -are multitudes who treat every alteration in the annuities fixed in -May, 1921, as if it were a departure from the Treaty of Versailles -to the detriment of the victors; whereas every modification made was -effected under the provisions and by the machinery incorporated in the -treaty for that express purpose.</p> - -<p>But there has undoubtedly been a departure from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> the treaty—a -fundamental departure. It has, however, been entirely to the detriment -of the vanquished. In what respect? I propose to explain, for the -whole trouble has arisen from this change in the treaty. The treaty -provided that the body to be set up for deciding the amount to be paid -in respect of reparations should consist of a representative each of -the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and -Belgium.</p> - -<p>With the exception of the United States of America, all these powers -are pecuniarily interested in the verdict. At best it was therefore -on the face of it not a very impartial tribunal. Still, Britain, as a -great trading community, was more interested in a settlement than in a -few millions more or less of indemnity wrung out of Germany; and Italy -also was a country which had large business dealings with Germany and -would not therefore be tempted to take a violently anti-German view on -the commission. The presence therefore of the United States of America, -Britain and Italy together on the commission constituted a guarantee -for moderation of view.</p> - -<p>Now the only disinterested party has retired from the tribunal. The -most interested party is in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> the chair, with a casting vote on certain -questions. That is not the treaty signed by Germany.</p> - -<p>If you sign an agreement to pay a sum to be awarded by A, B, C, D, and -E, trusting for a fair hearing largely to the influence of A, who is -not only very powerful but who is the only completely disinterested -referee and A then retires from the board of arbitrators, you are -entitled to claim that the character of the agreement is changed. The -representatives of France and Belgium on the Reparations Commission are -honourable men who are most anxious to do justice, but they are watched -by a jealous, vigilant and exacting opinion constantly ready to find -fault with concession and to overpower moderating judgment.</p> - -<p>The balance of the treaty has therefore been entirely upset. What is -really needed is to restore that balance so as to secure a fair verdict -on the only question in issue—how much Germany can pay.</p> - -<p>When you come to consider that issue you must view the claim for -reparations as you would any ordinary debt. You must make up your mind -whether you wish to ruin the debtor or to recover the cash. If there -are no sufficient realisable assets,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> then, if you want your money, you -must keep your debtor alive. If you want beef from your cow you must -forgo the milk. If your object is to destroy your debtor, you press -for payment of more than he can be reasonably expected to pay, and -then seize his house, his lands, and his chattels, whether they can be -disposed of or not.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, if you want your money, you will find out what he -can pay, and then proceed judiciously, patiently, and firmly to recover -that amount. By that I do not mean what he can pay by condemning -himself to a life of servitude and poverty. No brave nation will -stand that long. That is not a method of recovering an old debt, but -of creating a new one. I mean, what a nation can be expected to pay -steadily without revolt for a whole generation.</p> - -<p>If you scrape the butter from the bread of every German child for -thirty years you may add to the sum of your indemnity a milliard or -two of gold marks. That is not what was intended by the Treaty of -Versailles. Hungry faces make angry hearts, and the anger spreads -further than the hunger. I mean, what Germany can pay without -condemning a generation of workers to Egyptian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> bondage, and their -children to semi-starvation. Every oppression, if persisted in, -ultimately ends in the ruin of the Red Sea for the oppressors. Europe -has only just escaped with great loss from its waters. We do not want -to be overwhelmed in another.</p> - -<p>How are you to arrive at the exact figure of the annuities Germany -can reasonably be expected to pay without creating these intolerable -conditions for her people? That is the question. The answer was given -in the treaty as signed: by setting up a commission to inquire and -determine. That commission has been weakened, and its character almost -destroyed by the defection of the United States of America.</p> - -<p>Is it possible to find a substitute? I am afraid a reference of that -question to a new committee of experts would not advance matters, for -each country would demand a representative on that committee, and that -would only mean the Reparations Commission over again under another -name.</p> - -<p>The only hope of a fair and final decision is to secure the presence of -a representative of the United States of America on the adjudicating -body, whatever it may be. Is that impossible?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span></p> - -<p>I need hardly say that I am not venturing to express any opinion as to -the American refusal to ratify the treaty as a whole. I am only stating -quite frankly my view that, unless America takes a hand in reparations, -real settlement will be postponed until the hour of irreparable -mischief strikes. If for reasons of which I am not competent to judge -America cannot occupy her vacant chair on the tribunal which may decide -fateful issues for humanity, I despair of any real progress being made.</p> - -<p>Allied ministers can accept from a body representing the leading -powers who won the war decisions they dare not take on their own -responsibility. That is the essence of the matter. It is no use blaming -politicians. If they of their own initiative attempt to ride down -public sentiment, which alone confers authority upon them, they will -inevitably fail. In every country there are plenty of itching partisans -ready to take advantage of tactical blunders committed by political -opponents or personal rivals. But the judgment of an international -tribunal is another matter, and statesmen can accept it and act upon it -without being taxed with responsibility for its conclusions.</p> - -<p>British opinion cannot and will not accept a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span>settlement based on the -assumption that abatements in the sum claimed for reparations, if and -when made, must be discounted by the British taxpayer alone.</p> - -<p>France undoubtedly suffered more severely from the ravages of war -than any other belligerent. But that is recognised in the proportion -allocated to her of the reparations payments. She is to be paid 52 per -cent. of the total, <i>i. e.</i>, more than all the other Allied countries -put together.</p> - -<p>Britain comes next in the damage sustained by her people, and she is -given 22 per cent. In many respects she has suffered more heavily than -any other Allied country, especially in taxation and in trade. She is -willing to stand in with the Allies for loss as well as for profit, but -she will resent bitterly the suggestion that the loss must necessarily -be her share, whilst such profit as there is belongs to others.</p> - -<p>The American people, who receive no part of the compensation awarded -and collected, will <i>a fortiori</i> take the same view of their -obligations in the matter. They certainly will not see the force of a -settlement to be made at their expense, as if they had been condemned -to pay an indemnity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span></p> - -<p>The question is not what remission or indulgence shall be granted to -Germany, but what payment she is capable of making. If Germany can pay -a large indemnity France gets 52 per cent. of that, and Britain only -22 per cent. If Germany can only make a disappointing payment, France -still gets 52 per cent. and Britain 22 per cent. There is, therefore, -no ground for debiting Britain and America with the cost of reduced -expectations.</p> - -<p>The offer to hand over the worthless "C" bonds to the British Empire in -return for her claims is an insult to the intelligence of the British -public. Let us get away from these shifts on to the straight road. Back -to the treaty—that is the real remedy. There is no need to revise -it—all that is required is to restore it.</p> - -<p>If America reappears on the arbitrating tribunal she need not accept -the rest of the treaty. Then a fair and enduring settlement would soon -ensue, this irritating sore would rapidly heal, and the condition of -the world would steadily improve.</p> - -<p><i>Algeciras, January 1st, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XI</span> <span class="smaller">MR. HUGHES'S NEW HAVEN SPEECH</span></h2> - -<p>The preceding chapter was written at Algeciras on January 2nd, 1923. -On January 3rd there appeared in the Spanish papers a compressed -report of the speech delivered by the American Secretary of State, Mr. -Hughes, at New Haven. It made suggestions on the subject of reparations -which were obviously intended for consideration at the forthcoming -Paris conference. I knew the chairman of that conference, M. Poincaré, -would not be too anxious to bring these proposals to the notice of his -colleagues, but I had some hope that the British, Italian, and Belgian -premiers might do so. I therefore cabled the following message to the -British and American press:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"I have read with gladness Secretary Hughes's important speech. -As far as I can judge from compressed report appearing in the -local paper of this remote corner of Spain his suggestions and -mine travel in same direction. Earnestly hope Paris<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> conference -will give American proposals priority of consideration. All other -expedients will but postpone mischief which will in the end have -to be redeemed with compound interest at usurious rates by an -embarrassed Europe."</p></blockquote> - -<p>I constantly refer to this speech in subsequent articles, and as it has -been suggested that the interpretation I placed on it is not borne out -by the text, I append the full report which appeared in <i>The Times</i> of -December 30th, 1922:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"Mr. Hughes, the Secretary of State, in a speech which he -delivered before the American Historical Association at New Haven, -Connecticut, to-night lifted yet another corner of the veil which -has shrouded the immediate plans of the United States government. -Much of his address concerned the Washington conference of 1921, -but it ended with a discussion of economic conditions in Europe -which are of prime importance.</p> - -<p>"Mr. Hughes began with the admission that 'we cannot dispose -of these problems by calling them European, for they are world -problems, and we cannot escape the injurious consequences of -failure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> to settle them.' They were, however, European problems in -the sense that they cannot be solved without the consent of the -European governments, and the <i>crux</i> of the situation lay in the -settlement of reparations. 'There will be no adjustment of other -needs, however pressing, until a definite and accepted basis for -the discharge of reparations claims has been fixed. It is futile -to attempt to erect any economic structure in Europe until the -foundation is laid.'</p> - -<p>"Then followed a passage referring to the attempts to link up the -debts owed to the United States with the question of reparations -or with projects of cancellation, attempts which had been steadily -resisted. It led up to a discussion of the attitude of the United -States towards reparations, 'standing, as it does, a distinct -question, and as one which cannot be settled unless the European -governments concerned are able to agree.' First came a denial that -America desired to see Germany relieved of her responsibility -for the war, or of her just obligations, or that America wished -that France should lose 'any part of her just claims.' On the -other hand, America did not wish to see a prostrate Germany. Some -Americans had <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span>suggested that the United States should assume the -<i>rôle</i> of arbitrator, but Mr. Hughes did not think 'we should -assume such a burden of responsibility.'</p> - -<p>"From this point the speech deserves quotation in full:</p> - -<p>"'But the situation,' said Mr. Hughes, 'does call for a settlement -upon its merits. The first condition of a satisfactory settlement -is that the question should be taken out of politics. Statesmen, -have their difficulties, their public opinion, the exigencies they -must face. It is devoutly to be hoped that they will effect a -settlement among themselves, and that the coming meeting in Paris -will find a solution. But if it does not, what should be done?</p> - -<p>"'The alternative of forcible measures to obtain reparations is -not an attractive one. No one can foretell the extent of the -serious consequences which might ensue from such a course. Apart -from political results, I believe that the opinion of experts -is that such measures will not produce reparation payments, but -might tend to destroy the basis of those payments, which must be -found in economic recuperation. If, however, statesmen cannot -agree, and such an alternative is faced, what can be done? Is -there not another way out? The fundamental <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span>condition is that in -this critical moment the merits of the question as an economic -one must alone be regarded. Sentiment, however natural, must be -disregarded; mutual recriminations are of no avail; reviews of the -past, whether accurate or inaccurate, promise nothing; assertions -of blame on the one hand and excuses on the other come to naught.</p> - -<p>"'There ought to be a way for statesmen to agree upon what Germany -can pay, for no matter what claims may be made against her that is -the limit of satisfaction. There ought to be a way to determine -that limit and to provide a financial plan by which immediate -results can be obtained and European nations can feel that the -foundations have been laid for their mutual and earnest endeavours -to bring about the utmost prosperity to which the industry of -their people entitles them.</p> - -<p>"'If statesmen cannot agree and the exigencies of public opinion -make their course difficult, then there should be called to their -aid those who can point the way to a solution.</p> - -<p>"'Why should they not invite men of the highest authority in -finance in their respective countries—men of such prestige, -experience, and honour that their agreement upon the amount to -be paid and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> upon the financial plan for working out payments -would be accepted throughout the world as the most authoritative -expression obtainable? The governments need not bind themselves -in advance to accept the recommendations, but they can at least -make possible such an inquiry with their approval and free the -men who may represent their country in such a commission from -any responsibility to foreign offices and from any duty to obey -political instructions.</p> - -<p>"'In other words, they may invite an answer to this difficult -question from men of such standing and in such circumstances of -freedom as will ensure a reply prompted only by knowledge and -conscience. I have no doubt that distinguished Americans would -be willing to serve on such a commission. If the governments saw -fit to reject the recommendation upon which such a body agreed -they would be free to do so, but they would have the advantage -of impartial advice and of an enlightened public opinion. The -peoples would be informed that the question would be rescued from -assertion and counter-assertion and the problem put upon its way -to solution.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span></p> - -<p>"'I do not believe that any general conference would answer the -purpose better, much less that any political conference would -accomplish a result which prime ministers find it impossible to -reach. But I do believe that a small group, given proper freedom -of action, would be able soon to devise a proper plan. It would be -time enough to consider forcible measures after such opportunity -had been exhausted.'</p> - -<p>"Mr. Hughes's closing words were:</p> - -<p>"'There lies the open broad avenue of opportunity, if those whose -voluntary action is indispensable are willing to take advantage -of it. And once this is done, the avenues of American helpfulness -cannot fail to open hopefully.'"</p></blockquote> - -<p>The argument developed by Mr. Hughes in this speech is identical with -that upon which I based my appeal in the previous chapter for an -impartial investigation into Germany's capacity, and he concludes with -a proposal which is in effect identical with mine. He does not state -categorically that the American government would be prepared to be -officially represented on the commission. But when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> he says, "I have -no doubt that distinguished Americans would be willing to serve on -such a commission," it means that the government would be indirectly -represented. The Allied governments would certainly have consulted the -government of the U.S.A. as to the American representative nominated -to sit on the commission, and no American expert would be appointed -without full assurance that he was acceptable to the government of his -country.</p> - -<p>It is a misfortune that such important proposals should have been put -forward so timorously that those who wished to ignore them could easily -pretend they had never heard them made. Speeches delivered even by -Secretaries of State at an academic function in a small provincial town -might very well be overlooked in foreign chancelleries, whose postbags -bulge with weighty despatches from many lands, without any suggestion -of studied neglect. It was clear from Mr. Bonar Law's subsequent -attitude in the course of the debate in the House of Commons on the -Ruhr invasion that he at any rate had not seen Mr. Hughes's New Haven -deliverance. Timid diplomatic flutterings make no impression in a great -situation, and so lead to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span>nothing. This is an excellent example of how -not to speak if you wish to be heard, and of how to speak if you have -no desire to be heeded.</p> - -<p><i>London, July 4th, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XII</span> <span class="smaller">THE FRENCH INVASION OF THE RUHR</span></h2> - -<p>France has once more jumped on the prostrate form of Germany, and -the sabots have come down with a thud that will sicken the hearts of -multitudes on both sides of the Atlantic whose friendship for France -stood the losses and griefs of a four years' war.</p> - -<p>Germany having been overthrown and disarmed after a prodigious effort, -involving a strain upon the combined strength of America, Italy, and -the whole British Empire, as well as France, and her arms bound with -the thongs of a stern treaty, the process of dancing upon her while she -is down can at any time now be performed with complete impunity by any -one of these powers alone.</p> - -<p>The spectacle every time it is repeated, provides much satisfaction to -those who indulge in the barren delights of revenging the memory of -past wrongs. There is no doubt some joy for the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span>unsportsmanlike mind -in kicking a helpless giant who once maltreated you and who, but for -the assistance of powerful neighbours, would have done so a second time.</p> - -<p>But what good will it bring devastated France or her overtaxed Allies? -The additional coal and timber that will be wrung out of Germany will -barely cover the direct cost of collection. Although Germany bears the -extra cost, the expense of these punitive measures must all in the end -diminish the means of reparation, and therefore fall on the victor.</p> - -<p>How many students of the problem of reparations have ever taken the -trouble to ascertain the extent to which the maintenance of Allied -armies of occupation has already drained the resources of Germany? -Between direct cash payments, the cost of supplies, and outlay in -labour and material for building huge barracks, these armies have -already cost Germany 6,000,000,000 gold marks—roughly 1,200,000,000 -dollars, or over £300,000,000.</p> - -<p>How much better it would have been if most of this money had gone -towards rebuilding the devastated area!</p> - -<p>It is not without significance, now that war is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> being waged against -Germany for what the American representative in Paris termed her -technical default, to recollect that, between the expense of the army -of occupation and contributions already made towards reparations, -Germany has already paid to the Allies over three times the amount of -the total indemnity exacted by Bismarck in 1871.</p> - -<p>This is without making any allowance for the vast and highly developed -colonies which she surrendered. Let, therefore, no one approach this -problem as if he were dealing with a recalcitrant country that is -deliberately refusing to acknowledge any of her obligations under a -treaty which she has signed.</p> - -<p>The costs of the last war are acknowledged to be irrecoverable. It is -difficult enough to find the means for payment of damages. Who will pay -the growing cost of this new war?</p> - -<p>So far I have referred only to the direct outlay upon these aggressive -measures. The indirect cost to victor and vanquished alike will be -crushing.</p> - -<p>It is already accumulating. The mere threat has depreciated the value -of the franc, and thus reduced its purchasing capacity abroad. This -loss must be borne by the French consumer. There may be a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> rally; but I -shall be surprised if the improvement is more than temporary.</p> - -<p>All that is obvious for the moment to the untrained eye is the way in -which the mark is dragging the French and Belgian franc slowly along -its own downward course.</p> - -<p>As the distance between them lengthens and the invisible cord which -ties them together becomes more and more attenuated, it may ultimately -snap and the franc be released from this dangerous association. That I -doubt, for a bankrupt Germany means a country to which even the most -hopeful cannot look as a means of redeeming French deficits.</p> - -<p>Once that is clear to the French peasant he will not so readily part -with his savings, and the real difficulties of French finance will -begin at that stage. A policy, therefore, which demoralises the German -currency is one which is also fatal to the solvency of French finance.</p> - -<p>Let us follow the probable sequence of events. The terrified German -mark is rushing headlong to the bottom of the pit where the Austrian -krone is already lost beyond rescue.</p> - -<p>As long as reparation coal is dug out by bayonets,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> and reparation -timber is cut down by swords, it is idle to talk of restoring the mark -by putting German finance in order.</p> - -<p>No tariff, however nimble, can keep pace with the runaway mark. It -would baffle the most resourceful finance minister to adapt his budget -to a currency which disappears beyond the horizon while he is sitting -at his desk to pen his proposals.</p> - -<p>If the mere threat of force has produced such a panic, what will be the -effect of the actual measures? It is safe to predict that the advance -of French troops into Germany will not restore the composure of the -frightened mark and arrest its flight.</p> - -<p>What, then, becomes of the hope of renewed payments of the annuity? At -best Germany could only be expected to pay when her foreign trade was -so improved that she could provide a margin out of her exports with -which to pay her annuities. Her foreign trade is largely dependent -upon her foreign exchanges. These are now destroyed beyond prospect of -recovery for years.</p> - -<p>Britain proposed a voluntary moratorium for a short term of years in -order to place Germany in a position where she could at the end of that -term pay a reasonable annuity. The French <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span>government have in effect -substituted a compulsory moratorium for an indefinite period with no -prospect of payment in sight.</p> - -<p>The only chance of securing an early instalment of reparation payments -was by pressing Germany to put her finances in order and giving her -fair time in which to do so. The only chance of negotiating a loan -on German security to assist France to pay for the repair of her -devastated provinces, and to enable her to put her own finances in -order, was by restoring the stability of German currency.</p> - -<p>French statesmen have deliberately thrown both these chances away. The -effect on the value of their own currency must be grave, and Frenchmen -will have to pay in increased cost of living for a venture dictated by -short-sighted and short-tempered statesmanship.</p> - -<p>When one thinks of the consequences one is driven to ask whether French -politicians are really seeking reparations or are pursuing another -purpose quite incompatible with the recovery of money payments under -the treaty.</p> - -<p>This is the wrong road to reparations. It leads in exactly the opposite -direction.</p> - -<p>Whither, then, does it lead? There is no doubt<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> that its effect will -be ruinous as far as German industry is concerned. I have already -dealt with its disastrous influence upon German currency, and with the -indirect effect of a rapidly depreciating currency upon German foreign -trade. The seizure of the Ruhr mines will have another serious effect.</p> - -<p>Even now the result of the compulsory alienation of so much of -Germany's coal supply in the Ruhr, in Silesia, and the Saar, from -German industry, has diminished German productiveness. The fuel -deficiency thereby created inside Germany has been partially supplied -by purchases of coal from outside sources. The necessity for providing -gold to pay for foreign coal has added considerably to Germany's -financial difficulties.</p> - -<p>A still larger foreign purchase will be the inevitable result of the -forcible diversion of large quantities of Ruhr coal to France and -Italy, with further financial embarrassments as a consequence.</p> - -<p>That is bad enough. But I fear worse. Will the German miner work with -the same regularity and efficiency for a foreign master as he does for -a German employer? Is there the least possibility of the production -being maintained at its present level?</p> - -<p>The influence of this added muddle on world<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> trade is incalculable. -Nobody gains; everybody is a loser by the move. How is a Germany whose -embarrassed finances are made still more involved—how is a Germany -whose industry becomes more and more difficult—how is a Germany -reduced to despair to be of the slightest use to France, Belgium, -Italy, or anybody else?</p> - -<p>The feather-headed scribes who have advocated this rash policy assume -that France will be helped because Germany will thus be reduced to -impotence. For how long?</p> - -<p>The disintegration of Germany is not an unlikely consequence of this -move. I know that is the expectation. Frenchmen still hanker after -the days when Saxons and Bavarians and Wurtembergers were allies, and -almost vassals, of France against Prussia. It was the lure that led the -Third Napoleon to his ruin. It is the attraction which is now drawing -France once more to a sure doom. The policy will bring no security to -France in the future. It deprives her of all hope of reparations in the -immediate present. There will no longer be a Germany to pay. It would -be too hopeless a task to attempt recovery from each of the severed -states.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span></p> - -<p>But what of increased security? Nothing can keep Germans permanently -apart. They will, at the suitable moment reunite under more favourable -conditions, freed from external as well as internal debt. France will -have lost her reparations and only retained the hatred of an implacable -foe become more redoubtable than ever.</p> - -<p>How would Europe have fared in the interval whilst France was learning -from events what every other country can see now? There is no knowing -what will happen when a brave people of 60,000,000 find themselves -faced with utter ruin. Whether they turn to the left or to the right -will depend on questions of personal leadership, which are not yet -determined. All we can be sure of is that they can hardly go on as they -are, maintaining an honest struggle for ordered freedom and democratic -self-government. The French proclamation, with its threat of "severest -measures in case of recalcitrancy," is ominous of much that may happen. -No people accustomed to national independence have ever been able long -to tolerate a foreign yoke.</p> - -<p>Chancellor Cuno's action is the first manifestation of the spirit of -revolt. It will certainly grow in intensity. The lash will then fall, -sooner or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> later, and Germany will be inevitably driven to desperate -courses. A Communist Germany would infect Europe. European vitality -is so lowered by exhaustion that it is in no condition to resist the -plague. Would a reactionary Germany be much better—brooding and -scheming vengeance?</p> - -<p>Russia, with her incalculable resources of men and material, is at -hand, needing all that Germany can best give and best spare. The -Bolshevik leaders only require what Germany is so well fitted to supply -in order to reorganise their country and convert it into the most -formidable state in Europe or Asia.</p> - -<p>Nations hard pressed on the East have in the past moved forward -irresistibly to the West. In obedience to the same law a people hard -pressed on the West will look to the East.</p> - -<p>When the French troops marched on Essen they began a movement the most -far-reaching, and probably the most sinister in its consequences, that -has been witnessed for many centuries in Europe. And these are the -people who, after fifty years of patient and laborious waiting, have -demonstrated to the world in 1918 the stupidity of abusing victory in -1871.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span></p> - -<p>If the teacher so soon forgets his own special lesson the pupil is not -likely to remember when fury overcomes terror.</p> - -<p><i>Algeciras, January 15th, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XIII</span> <span class="smaller">LOST OPPORTUNITIES</span></h2> - -<p>The French government, having conspicuously failed to win its -anticipated coup, is doubling the stakes each time it loses. When will -it end? And where will it end? It is ill gambling with human passions. -They are all engaged in this wild venture—on both sides of the -table. Pride, greed, vanity, obstinacy, temper, combativeness, racial -antagonisms, but also patriotism, love of justice, hatred of wrong and -high courage. Each side draws from the same arsenal of fiery human -emotions. Unless some one steps in to induce a halt I fear the result -will be devastating.</p> - -<p>France has now abandoned all hope of being able to run the mines, -railways, and workshops of the Ruhr by military agencies. In these -days you cannot shoot every worker who fails to excavate so many -hundredweights of coal per diem, or who refuses to fill a wagon or -drive a locomotive when and by whomsoever he is told to do so. France<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> -cannot provide the necessary complement of miners and railwaymen from -outside to fill vacancies created by sulky workers. And even if she -could it would take many months ere they become sufficiently accustomed -to their new conditions to work without peril to themselves. So a -new policy has been improvised. It is nothing less than the siege of -Germany. Sixty millions of Germans are to be starved into surrender. -That is a long business, as every one knows who has been engaged on -the difficult operations of strike breaking. We have often witnessed -workers with little support or sympathy from the rest of the community -hold out for weeks after their funds have been exhausted. In Germany -all classes are united in resistance. The national pride fortifies -endurance and incites to sacrifice. And the ports are still open. -Meanwhile incidents may happen, developments may occur which will -create a situation that will baffle all the resources the invaders can -command.</p> - -<p>It is very little use looking backward. But there are many who are -disposed to say that the invasion of the Ruhr was bound to come and -the sooner the safer. The Ruhr coal mines were the wild oats of -reparation. Get it over quickly. The headache<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> will bring repentance -and France will then settle down to a quiet life. That is the argument. -I must enter an emphatic protest against this view. If this ill-judged -enterprise had been put off for a few more months I do not believe -any French government would have embarked upon it. There is no French -statesman of any standing who, in his heart, believes in its wisdom. -Now that the credit of France is involved in its success they will all -support it. But French opinion, as a whole, was moving with startling -rapidity from this policy. The Parisian pulse was still feverish, -but the provinces had completely calmed down. Vacancies occurring in -the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies and the provincial assemblies -during several months have afforded an opportunity of testing real -French opinion and the results have been sensational. At election -after election, fought in typical constituencies all over France, the -champions of Ruhrism have been beaten by emphatic majorities. Masses of -French workmen have always opposed this policy. The peasant in every -land always moves slowly. But there can be no doubt that the French -peasant has had enough of military adventures. His sons were never -numbered amongst the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> "exempts," and the losses in the peasant homes -of France were appalling. Driving through the villages in agricultural -France you find yourself asking, "Where are the young men?" The answer -invariably comes, "This village suffered severely in the war." You -will receive the same answer in the next village, and the next. We -cannot wonder, therefore, that by-elections in rural as well as in -urban France display an unmistakable weariness of plans which involve -the marching of armed Frenchmen into hostile territory. The sorrowing -people of France have good reason to shrink from any course of action -that leads to further shedding of blood.</p> - -<p>For these reasons I have steadily favoured every scheme that had the -effect of postponing decision as to the Ruhr. Delay meant ultimate -defeat for the Chauvinists. That is why they strove so hard to rush -their government into this precipitate action. The abrupt termination -of the Paris conference was their opportunity and they seized it with -tingling fingers. Until then there had never been a clean break on -which violence could be founded. The friends of moderation both here -and on the continent had seen to that. There had been <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span>reference of -questions for the scrutiny of experts and calming adjournments to -await their report. When it arrived there were endless suggestions and -counter-suggestions to meet difficulties. In the end Europe was saved -from the catastrophe of once more handing over its destinies to the -guidance of blind force. Unhappily, weariness or impatience induced -the Paris negotiators in a few hours to drop the reins which had for -at least four years held the furies from dashing along their career of -destruction. There were many alternative plans that might have been -discussed. There was the proposal to refer the whole question to the -League of Nations. It is true that when I suggested it in August last -M. Poincaré summarily rejected it. But the Allies also rejected M. -Poincaré's proposals by a majority of four to one at that conference. -That did not prevent his repeating them in January—and this time he -succeeded in winning over the majority to his view. A little more -persistence and less pessimism might have persuaded Belgium, Italy and -Japan to aid our appeals to France to trust rather to the League of -Nations than to the uncertainties of war.</p> - -<p>What is still more inexplicable is the failure of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> the conference to -take any note of Mr. Secretary Hughes's New Haven speech. Neglected -opportunities litter the path of this troublesome question. There -were the Cannes conversations, broken off just as they were reaching -fruition. Had they been continued another week they would have ended in -a helpful settlement which would have brought reparations to France, -confidence to Germany, and peace to Europe. They struck on one of the -many sunken reefs which bestrew the French political seas, and it will -not surprise me to find that the whole cargo of reparations disappeared -then beyond salvage into the deep with these shipwrecked negotiations.</p> - -<p>Again, Germany threw away a great opportunity at Genoa when all -the nations of Europe came together for the first time to discuss -their troubles in the spirit of equality and amity. It is true that -reparations were excluded at the instance of France from the programme -of the conference. But the spirit engendered by a friendly settlement -of all other outstanding questions would have rendered a reasonable -and temperate consideration of reparations inevitable. Germany, by its -foolish staging of its Russian agreement, made all that impossible.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> -Resentment and suspicion were once more equipped with a scourge and -they used it relentlessly to drive out all goodwill for Germany from -the purlieus of that great congress. Another lost opportunity.</p> - -<p>Then there was the bankers' committee, appointed to consider the -question of raising an international loan to help France to finance -the repair of her devastated area and also to assist Germany to -restore her demoralised currency. I remember how eager poor Rathenau -was to float that loan and how sanguine he was that it would succeed. -He was confident that the German nationals who have invested their -gold in other lands could be induced to subscribe heavily to the -loan. The bankers concerned—all were of the highest reputation in -the financial world—were confident that if German reparations were -fixed at a reasonable sum investors throughout the world would gladly -put their money into a great international loan which would help to -restore Europe. The French government testily declined to consider -the essential conditions indicated by the bankers. Another lost -opportunity, and Europe once more lumbered along its dreary way to seek -another.</p> - -<p>It came with Mr. Hughes's famous speech. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> was clearly the result -of prolonged consideration. For weeks there had been rumours of -much consultation in Washington on the state of Europe, and we were -encouraged to hope that America meant business. The result was Mr. -Secretary Hughes's offer. It was made four days before the Paris -conference and was obviously intended to be discussed by the Allies -there. An endeavour has been made to minimise the importance of this -American approach to Europe, but it is incomprehensible to me how so -momentous a pronouncement has been treated as if it were merely the -casual utterance of a politician who had to find some topic of more or -less interest with which to illuminate a discourse. Another opportunity -lost—perhaps the greatest—perhaps the last. Never has luck striven so -hard to save stupidity. But luck loses its temper easily and then it is -apt to hit hard.</p> - -<p><i>London, February 15th, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XIV</span> <span class="smaller">FRENCH SCHEMES</span></h2> - -<p>"French troops occupying fresh German territory." "Further advance into -Germany." "Reinforcements." "French cut off the British bridgehead on -the Rhine." "Proposals for new coinage in the Ruhr." What is it all -leading to? Is it really reparations? Signor Nitti, who has made a -thorough study of all the documents bearing on French designs against -Germany, has come definitely to the conclusion that these measures -have no reference to the recovery of damages for the devastated area, -but that they are all taken in the execution of a vast project for -securing French control over all the coal and iron of continental -Europe. He supplies chapter and verse for his theory. Something has -undoubtedly roused the suspicions of Signor Mussolini. They come rather -late in the day to be effective. He naturally does not relish the idea -of an Italy whose coal and steel supplies are placed at the mercy of -a gigantic trust<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> directed from Paris. Italy has no coal and iron of -her own. Her interest is, therefore, in a free market. Hence Signor -Mussolini's alarm. Is there any ground for it? Let those who imagine -that Italian statesmen are unnecessarily disturbed read the discussions -in the French press leading up to the speeches recently delivered by M. -Millerand, M. Barthou, and M. Poincaré.</p> - -<p>With regard to M. Barthou's intervention, I feel I must, as one of -the founders of the Reparations Commission, say a word. There were -important questions of amount, method, and time which could not be -determined before the signature of the peace treaty and could not be -settled at all without giving Germany a full opportunity of being -heard. Hence the appointment of the Reparations Commission. It was -called into existence to settle these questions after hearing evidence -and deliberating on its effect. Of this commission M. Barthou is now -chairman. He, therefore, presides over a body which has committed -to its charge judicial functions of a momentous character. He has -to adjudicate from time to time on the case presented by Germany -under a multitude of different heads. Inflammatory speeches on the -very subjects upon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> which he has to preserve judicial calm are quite -incompatible with his position. When he occupied the same post M. -Poincaré ultimately recognised that he could not continue to write -controversial articles on questions which might come before him -for decision as a judge. He, therefore, very properly resigned his -commissionership.</p> - -<p>But to revert to the speeches delivered by these eminent statesmen. -If they mean what the actual words convey, then France means to stick -to the Ruhr. Not by way of annexation. Oh, no. That, according to M. -Barthou, is a "foolish, mendacious and stupid" lie. But France means -to hang on to the <i>gages</i> until reparation is paid. What are the -<i>gages</i>? The industries of the Ruhr. If the French government is to -control the industries which represent the life of this prosperous -area for thirty years it assumes greater authority over the district -than it exercises over the mining area of the Pas de Calais. In its -own mining districts no government takes upon itself—except during a -war—to give directions as to the destination and distribution of the -coal produced. But there are indications that the control over the Ruhr -industries is to be of a much more far-reaching character than this. -And<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> this is where the hints—broad hints—thrown out by the French -press come in. France, in order to secure the payment of the reparation -instalments in future, is to be given shares in these great mines and -industries. What proportion of shares? Amongst the <i>gages</i> demanded by -M. Poincaré in August of last year were sixty per cent. of the shares -in certain pivotal German industries in the Rhine area. Now the Ruhr -industries are clearly to be included within the scope of the demand. -France has the iron ore of Lorraine and the coal of the Saar valley. -Her financiers have been engaged in buying up coal mines in Silesia. If -she can secure the controlling interest in the Ruhr mines and Belgium -and Poland can be persuaded to join in the deal, then the continent of -Europe will be at the mercy of this immense coal and iron combine.</p> - -<p>I said in the previous chapter that the ports were still open. As long -as they are, Central Europe can protect itself to a certain extent -against this gigantic trust, for the products of Britain and America -will be available. But that possibility is to be provided against. -Nothing is to be left to chance. One of the <i>gages</i> is to be control -over German customs. How can Germany balance her<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> budget without a -revenue? How can she raise a revenue without a tariff? What more -productive tariff than a duty on foreign coal and metal manufactures? -And thus all competitive products will be excluded from the German -markets. The combine will be supreme.</p> - -<p>It is true that if this cynical scheme comes off there is an end of -reparations—for the independence of German industry is strangled and -its life will soon languish. But there are signs that French enterprise -has abandoned all idea of recovering reparations and that it is now -brooding upon loot—on an immense scale. For the discussions in the -French press contemplate even wider and more far-reaching developments -than those involved in the control of German industries. Italy, Poland, -and even Russia are to be brought in. The high line taken for years -by the Parisian papers about "no traffic with murder" is being given -up. Instead we have much sentimental twaddle about restoring the -old friendly relations between France and Russia—of course, for a -consideration. Russia is to buy; Germany is to manufacture; France is -to profit.</p> - -<p>These proposals, which have for some time been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> in the air, are now -actually in type. Now the type is ordinary black—later on it may be -red. Twenty lives have already been lost over the preliminaries of -execution. I fear there will be many more as the difficulties become -more apparent.</p> - -<p>It is not without significance that the terms which Germany is to be -called upon to accept in the event of her submission have never been -formulated. No ultimatum was issued before invasion. If Germany were -to-morrow to throw up her hands what conditions would she have to -comply with? Who can tell? Germany clearly does not know. The British -government does not know. They were never discussed at the Paris -conference. M. Poincaré has only asserted with emphasis that he "will -not accept promises." If the Ruhr is to be evacuated promises must be -accepted at some stage, for Germany cannot deliver ten years' coal -instalments in advance, and she cannot pay fifty milliards of gold -marks over the counter. So, if M. Poincaré's statement means anything, -then the control of Ruhr industries must be vested in France until the -whole of the mortgage has been redeemed. Hence the vast plan for the -exploitation of Germany, and through Germany of Europe.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span></p> - -<p>A pretty scheme, but—like most plans which make no allowance for -human nature—bound to fail. How long would Italy and Russia consent -to be exploited for the enrichment of French capitalists? Italy has -already made it clear that she has no intention of walking into the -trap. Russia may or may not have been approached. It is not improbable -that there have been informal soundings. It is not easy to reckon what -the Bolshevists may or may not do in any circumstances. But one can be -fairly assured that they will not place their heads in the jaws of a -rapacious capitalistic crocodile of this character. Brigands are not -made of that simple stuff.</p> - -<p>Will German statesmen consent to sell their country into political -and economic bondage for an indefinite period? It is incredible. No -doubt there had been feelers between French and German capitalists for -some time before the Ruhr invasion. M. Loucheur and Herr Stinnes are -credited with having had conversations on the subject of amalgamating -the interests of Lorraine iron ore and Ruhr coal. But the Ruhr invasion -has awakened the patriotism of Germany from its stupor. A potent -new element has therefore been introduced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> into the calculation. -This element does not mix well with international finance. It may be -depended upon to resist to the last any effort to put German industry -under foreign control, and without control the <i>gage</i> is worthless.</p> - -<p>Then there is the German workman who must be taken into account. The -miner and the engineer in all countries are proverbially independent. -They take no orders even from their own governments. During the war -they had to be reasoned with before they could be persuaded to take a -course urged upon them by the government of the day in the interests -of their own country. They will view the commands of a syndicate -controlled by foreign governments with suspicion and repugnance. Should -disputes arise—and they are more likely than ever to arise constantly -under these conditions—who will be responsible for the protection of -life, liberty, and property? Will foreign troops operate? Or will the -German army and police act practically under orders given from Paris? -The popular sympathy will be with the strikers.</p> - -<p>It is a fantastic idea born of failure and, therefore, bound itself to -be a failure.</p> - -<p><i>London, March 1st, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XV</span> <span class="smaller">THE QUICKSAND</span></h2> - -<p>When you have walked some distance into a quicksand, and are sinking -deeper and deeper with every step you take, it is always difficult to -decide whether you are more likely to reach firm ground by pressing -forward or by going backward. You must do one or other. You cannot just -stand fast, for that is inevitable destruction. The French government -clearly are of opinion that safety lies in marching further into -the quagmire. So three more German cities have been occupied, more -burgomasters and officials expelled, more men and boys shot in the -streets, more black troops imported, more regulations and more decrees -issued; there are more depressions of French, Belgian and Italian -exchanges, more confusion in everybody's business in Central Europe—in -a sentence, everywhere there is more quaking sand and less solid -coal. The total shortage in deliveries as compared with the promises -of Spa was only eight per cent.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> Had it not been for this fatuous -invasion, France during the past six or seven weeks would have already -received from the Ruhr nearly 3,000,000 tons in coal and in coke. -France has actually received 50,000 tons during this period. A swarm -of engineers, railwaymen, bargemen, officials of all kinds, and hotel -waiters, supported by a formidable army have in six weeks produced this -ridiculous output. No doubt the amount will later on be increased by -further pressure and by pouring in more railwaymen, but it will be a -long time ere France receives her Spa quota minus eight per cent., and -then there will be some months' arrears to make up.</p> - -<p>No wonder that M. Loucheur stated flatly in the French Chamber that he -did not approve of the Ruhr enterprise. He has one distinct advantage -over the Ruhr plungers—he does know something about business. He can -boast also of another gift, the possession of which is not without -significance when you consider his present attitude. He is an admirable -judge of to-morrow's weather. That is a rare endowment amongst -politicians. Any simpleton can tell you which way the wind is blowing -to-day, but it requires a man of special insight and experience in -these matters to forecast the direction<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> of the wind to-morrow. M. -Loucheur is one of those exceptionally well-equipped weather prophets. -So he satisfies the opinion of to-day by giving his support to M. -Poincaré, and he safeguards his position against the morrow's change -by stating clearly that he does not approve the policy he supports. I -have read no declaration from any French statesman of eminence—with -the doubtful exception of M. Barthou—indicating a belief in the wisdom -of the venture. And yet French courage, French pride, French loyalty, -French patriotism—and maybe French blood and treasure—are committed -irretrievably to a reckless gamble which most of the responsible -statesmen who led France by their wisdom through her great troubles -regard with doubt, anxiety and apprehension.</p> - -<p>Will the French government try to extricate themselves from the -difficulties into which they have precipitated their country and -Europe? I fear not. Heedlessness rushes a man into danger; it needs -courage to get out. And when getting out involves an admission of -blame there are few men who possess that exalted type of courage. -There are other reasons why the present government of France will -flounder further into the quicksand. When <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span>governments make mistakes in -England, the threat of a Parliamentary defeat or a couple of adverse -by-elections pulls them out roughly but safely, and the governments -start on a new course amid the general satisfaction of friend and foe. -The Willesden, Mitcham, and Liverpool elections rescued the government -from one of the most hopeless muddles into which any administration has -ever contrived to get its affairs. In similar circumstances in France a -change of government is negotiated with amazing dexterity and celerity. -But you cannot arrange the preliminary overthrow of an existing -government unless there is some one in the background ready and willing -to form the next. There are generally two or three outstanding men -of high repute prepared to serve their country in any emergency. The -trouble to-day in France is that every alternative leader disapproves -of this enterprise and believes it must ultimately fail. On the other -hand, there is no prominent figure in French politics prepared to take -upon himself the odium of sounding the retreat. It would always be -said that success was in sight, and that had it not been for the new -minister's cowardice and perfidy France would have emerged triumphantly -out of all her<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> financial worries. The <i>drapeau</i> would have been -lowered and betrayed. No French statesmen dare face that deadly -accusation. So the present French government is tied to the saddle of -its charger and is forced to go on.</p> - -<p>Another explanation of the difficulty of withdrawing is to be found -in the increasing fury of the original fomenters of this rashness. -The more fruitless the enterprise the greater the energy they display -in spurring the government further into its follies. In the previous -article I gave a summary of the ambitious plans they had conceived for -syndicating European resources under French control. The industries -of Europe controlled from Paris—that is their magnificent dream. -Now they propound a new treaty which is to supersede the treaty of -Versailles. Boundaries are to be revised, rich provinces and towns -practically annexed, the Ruhr coal is to be harnessed to Lorraine -coal, and Germany, having been further mutilated and bound, is to be -reduced to a state of complete economic subjection. There has been -nothing comparable to these ideas since the Norman conquest, when -the Saxons, having first of all been disarmed, were reduced to a -condition of economic thraldom for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> enrichment and glorification -of their new masters. Needless to say Britain and America are not -to be invited to attend this new peace conference. They are to be -graciously informed of the conditions of the new peace when finally -established by French arms. The British Empire, which raised millions -of men to liberate French soil from the German invaders and which lost -hundreds of thousands of its best young lives in the effort, is not -even to be consulted as to the settlement which its losses alone make -possible. America, who came to the rescue with millions of its bravest, -is barely worth a sentence in these ravings of brains intoxicated -with an unwholesome mixture of hatred, greed and military arrogance. -The French government are not committed by any overt declarations -to these schemes; but it is ominous that they issue from the pens -whose insistent prodding has driven this government on to its present -action. Up to the present no repudiation has come from the head of the -government or from any of his subordinates. The very vagueness of his -published aims would leave him free to adopt any plans. Pledges for -reparation and security will cover a multitude of aggressions.</p> - -<p>The British government have just issued as a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> Parliamentary paper -a full report of the proceedings of the Paris conference. It is an -amazing document. As far as I can see no real endeavour was made by any -of its members to prevent a break-up. At the first failure to secure -agreement the delegates threw up their hands in despair and sought -no alternatives. They agreed about nothing except that it was not -worth while spending another day in trying to agree. Even M. Theunis, -the resourceful Belgian premier, had nothing to suggest. A blight of -sterility seems to have swept over the conference. On this aspect of -the fateful and fatal conference of Paris I do not now propose to -dwell. I wish to call attention to it for another purpose. I have -perused the Blue Book with great care. I was anxious to find out -exactly what M. Poincaré proposed to demand of Germany as a condition -of submission to the French will. What was Germany to do if she was -anxious to avert the fall of the axe? I have read his speeches and -annexes in vain for any exposition of these terms. It is true he was -never asked the question. That sounds incomprehensible. But every one -engaged was in such a hurry to break up the conference and thus put an -end to disagreeable disagreements that it never seems to have <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span>occurred -to them to ask this essential question. And the party principally -concerned was not represented. The result is that no one knows the -terms upon which the French army is prepared to evacuate the Ruhr. Mr. -Bonar Law could not explain when questioned in the House of Commons. I -am not surprised, for no one has ever told him and he never asked. I am -sure that by this time M. Poincaré has quite forgotten why he ever went -into the Ruhr. For that, amongst other reasons, he will remain there -until something happens that will provide us with an answer.</p> - -<p>Most human tragedy is fortuitous.</p> - -<p><i>London, March 10th, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XVI</span> <span class="smaller">THE FIRST GERMAN OFFER</span></h2> - -<p>The French and Belgian governments have slapped another opportunity -in the face. To make that slap resound as well as sting, they have -accompanied their rejection of the German offer by a savage sentence -of fifteen years' imprisonment on the head of the greatest industrial -concern in the Ruhr, if not in Europe. What for? Because he ordered the -works' syren to sound "cease work" for one day when the French troops -occupied the place. There is a swagger of brutality about that sentence -which betokens recklessness. It came at a moment when the German -government had just made an offer of peace, and when that ally of -France who had made the deepest sacrifices in the war to save her and -Belgium from ruin was urging the French government to regard that offer -at least as a starting-point for discussion. The answer was to treat -the German note as an offence, to promulgate that penal sentence which -outrages every sense<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> of decency throughout the world, and to refuse -to permit an ally, who had been so faithful in the time of trouble for -France and Belgium, even the courtesy of a discussion on the tenor -of the reply to be given to a note that so vitally concerned the -interest of all the Allies without exception. Prussian arrogance in its -crudest days can furnish no such example of clumsy and short-sighted -ineptitude. It gives point to Lord Robert Cecil's observation in the -House of Commons that it is very difficult to reconcile the French -attitude with a conception that the French government, with the opinion -behind it, desires a settlement.</p> - -<p>What is the German offer? It proposes to limit the total obligations -of Germany in cash and in kind to thirty milliards of gold marks -(£1,500,000,000) to be raised by loans on the international money -markets at normal conditions in instalments of:—</p> - -<table summary="loans on the international money markets"> - <tr> - <td>20 milliards up to July 1, 1927.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>5 milliards up to July 1, 1929.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>5 milliards up to July 1, 1931.</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p>There are provisions for payment of interest from July, 1923, onward, -and the agreements entered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> into for delivery of payments in kind on -account of reparations are to be carried out in accordance with the -arrangements already made. Then comes this important provision. After a -paragraph in which it is argued that the above figures would strain the -resources of Germany to the utmost it adds:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"Should others not share this opinion, the German government -propose to submit the whole reparations problem to an -international commission uninfluenced by political considerations, -as suggested by State Secretary Hughes."</p></blockquote> - -<p>They further state that the German government are prepared to devise -suitable measures in order that the whole German national resources -should participate "in guaranteeing the service of the loan." -Guarantees are also offered for deliveries in kind. In order to -ensure a permanent peace between France and Germany they propose an -agreement that all contentious questions arising between them in future -should be referred to arbitration. The note finally stipulates that -the evacuation of the Ruhr "within the shortest space of time" and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> -the restoration of treaty conditions in the Rhineland constitute "an -essential leading up to negotiations on basis of above ideas." The -above represents the substance of the German proposals.</p> - -<p>The French and Belgian governments in their reply stand by the May, -1921, schedule of payments and decline to forego even the very -problematical "C" bonds of £4,250,000,000. Hitherto it has been -common ground that £2,500,000,000 is the figure which Germany can be -expected to pay. The French and Belgian governments are now insisting -on the full measure of the £6,600,000,000 award. The Hughes proposal -they scoff at and treat its putting forward by Germany as part of "an -expression of a systematic revolt against the Treaty of Versailles." -The real temper and purpose of this intransigeant attitude is to be -found in two sentences. Here is the first. Alluding to the resistance -offered in the Ruhr to the French attempt to exploit its resources -the note says: "The Belgian and French governments cannot take into -consideration any German proposal whilst the resistance continues." -That is, however complete and satisfactory a proposal may be in itself, -it would be rejected unless preceded by abject surrender to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> French -designs in the Ruhr. Then later on comes this significant sentence -emphasising the moral of the first:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"The Belgian government and the French government have decided -that they will only evacuate the newly occupied territories -according to the measure and in proportion to the payments -effected. They have nothing to alter in this resolution."</p></blockquote> - -<p>An impossible payment is to be insisted upon—costs of occupation are -to be added to that, and until both are liquidated French armies are -to remain in possession of the richest areas in Germany. Meanwhile the -British Empire and the United States of America, who, at a prodigious -cost in life and treasure, saved France from a similar humiliation -to that which she is now inflicting on Germany, are practically told -when they venture to offer suggestions to mind their own business. No -interference will be tolerated from meddlers of any sort.</p> - -<p>The sum offered by Germany in settlement of reparations is no doubt -inadequate. It cannot be accepted by any of the Allies in discharge of -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> German obligations under the treaty. The German government must -make a very substantial advance on that offer before they can hope to -come to terms with the Allied governments. I have no doubt the German -government fully realise that fact, and I am sure they did not put -forward these figures as their final tender. They meant them to be -taken as a beginning and a basis for negotiation. In fact they say so. -When you enter into negotiations your lawyer, if he knows his business, -never starts with the figure he is authorised ultimately to propose. -Nor does the client always communicate to his advocate the last figure -he would be prepared to pay if he had to decide between that and a -continuation of the struggle, with its costs and its complications. -Once pourparlers begin the original figure disappears, and disappears -quickly. That is the history of all negotiation, private and public. A -refusal to meet in conference until the figure proposed is acceptable -rules out discussion between parties as a means of coming to terms on -the main question in a dispute.</p> - -<p>I have taken part in the settlement of probably more industrial -differences than most politicians. In every case I have started with -an <i>impasse</i>. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> first meeting of the parties always revealed an -apparently unbridgeable chasm between their respective positions; but -perseverance and an honest endeavour on both sides to find a solution -usually ends in agreement. Goodwill can bridge any abyss. Unconditional -surrender if insisted upon between independent bodies is a sure prelude -to fresh disputes. The mere fact, therefore, that Germany put forward -a proposal which falls short of the needs and equities of the case is -not a sufficient reason for declining to meet her representatives at -a conference to determine what the right sum should be, and the best -method of liquidating it.</p> - -<p>But there is another and a stronger reason why the German offer -should not have been so peremptorily rejected. It did not end with a -submission of an inadequate amount in discharge of reparations claims. -Had it done so the French government might perhaps contend that Germany -must make up her mind, before she is allowed to confer, to raise that -figure to something which at least approximates to the region of -acceptability. But even if the French contention in that respect were -reasonable, it is ruled out by the circumstance that in this note the -German government have proposed an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> alternative if the figure they -offer is considered unacceptable. That alternative changes the whole -character of the note, when you come to judge of the question of its -<i>bona fides</i>. This proposition consists in the complete and categorical -acceptance by the German government of Mr. Secretary Hughes's famous -New Haven suggestions. It will be recollected that, as a way out of -the reparations entanglement, he proposed that an international expert -commission should be set up to inquire into the question of the amount -which Germany is capable of paying, and the best method of discharging -her obligations once they were fixed. Mr. Hughes made it clear that the -United States of America were prepared to assist in such an inquiry. -It is this that lent such significance and importance to his speech. -When I first read that speech I thought it of such moment that I cabled -from Spain to the British and American papers my earnest hope that the -Allies, about to sit in conference in Paris, would immediately consider -its terms, and act upon it. It seemed to me the supreme opportunity -for placing the vexed question which is fretting Europe almost into -nervous paralysis on a pathway which must inevitably lead to a real -settlement. The more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> I think of that proposal, the more am I convinced -that it was right, and the more am I perplexed by the rude indifference -with which it was treated by the Allied governments. To this hour I am -baffled to explain why those who are anxious for a conclusion never -brought this momentous declaration of American readiness to take a hand -to the notice of the conference. I can suggest explanations, but none -which is not a grave reflection on the way in which the proceedings -of that conference were handled. I can understand those who wish to -exploit reparations for ulterior purposes being anxious to keep America -out of the business. But why did Britain, Italy and Belgium neglect -this chance of securing the association of the one power which could -be helpful to the Allies in reaching a fair and sound decision, and -what is equally important, helpful in all subsequent operations for -cashing that decision? Now Germany states categorically that, if her -cash tender is unacceptable to the Allies, she is willing to leave the -question of the amount she is capable of paying to an international -tribunal on which America is represented, and to abide by the decision -of that tribunal, whatever it may be. That is in substance Mr. -Secretary Hughes's suggestion.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> How can a note containing so reasonable -a proposal, and a proposal originally emanating from so powerful and so -friendly a quarter, be treated as if it were an insult to the dignity -of France—and of Belgium! To declare—as the French note does—that -the Hughes proposition is an abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles is -to ignore the provisions of that treaty. As a matter of fact it would -be a restoration of the treaty. As I have repeatedly pointed out, -that treaty delegated the question of the amount which Germany has to -pay in respect of reparations to an Allied commission on which the -United States of America was to be represented. The function of this -commission was to assess the amount of the damages for which Germany is -responsible under the treaty, and then to adjudicate on the capacity of -Germany to pay those damages in whole or in part.</p> - -<p>The commission was authorised to fix the amount of the annual -payments to be demanded of Germany on the double basis of liability -and capacity. The withdrawal of the only country which had no direct -interest in reparations from the treaty left the commission a lop-sided -and highly prejudiced tribunal. The reparations commission no longer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> -carries out the treaty idea. Its character has completely changed. -It is essential in order to adhere to the Treaty of Versailles that -America should have a representative on the tribunal that fixes the -payments to be exacted from Germany. The German government now offer -to submit the fate of their country to the unaltered clauses of the -treaty which was signed in the Galerie des Glaces in June, 1919. -France and Belgium have no right in honour to demand submission to any -other. Because they insist on enforcing something which is entirely -different from the contract entered into by them with Germany in -1919, Europe is disquieted and international relations are saturated -with the inflammable spirit of resentment, hatred, and revenge. No -wonder Marshal Foch is touring Central Europe to put the Allied armies -in order! He seems to me to be the one man in France who has an -understanding of what all this is leading up to.</p> - -<p><i>London, May 14th, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XVII</span> <span class="smaller">THE SECOND GERMAN NOTE</span></h2> - -<p>The Germans have tried another note. Inasmuch as all the Allied press -without exception are agreed in describing it as a great improvement -over the first, it is hardly worth while taking up time and space -to demonstrate how the essentials of this more favoured document -were contained in its reprobated predecessor. Psychologically it is -a decided advance on the first note. It is crisp and condensed, and -does not indulge in the irritating processes of an argument. You -should never attempt to argue with an angry man who is brandishing a -bludgeon—unless you are at a safe distance from him. Germany is in -this case at his feet. The second German note therefore is wise in -avoiding the provocation of an appeal to reason. It makes its offer -simply and uncontentiously.</p> - -<p>It also suggests a number of substantial guarantees for the payment of -interest on the loans to be raised for reparations purposes. I cannot -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span>pretend to assess the value that would be attached to these <i>gages</i> by -prospective borrowers. I have no doubt they would add materially to the -security of the investment. But this array of securities standing alone -will not entice the investor to risk his money on a German reparations -loan. He will look at Germany as a whole, and not in parts. He will -want to know what is likely to happen to that great country during -the coming years, and to its industry, its finance, its politics, and -its people. A railway which collects its rates and fares in a corrupt -currency is of no use as a security for any loan—a customs revenue -collected in a fugitive coin is equally worthless. The only reliable -basis for a loan is a stable Germany. You can have no stable Germany -until you settle reparations. That is, therefore, the first essential -preliminary to all discussions on <i>gages</i> be they <i>productifs</i> or -otherwise.</p> - -<p>Hence the propositions that really matter in the German note are not -those which give a schedule of guarantees, but those which bear on -the fixation of the amount which Germany is to be called upon to pay. -On this question the note does not increase the sum which the first -note estimated as the limit of German capacity. But it reaffirms the -readiness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> of the German government to submit the consideration of the -capacity of Germany to pay to an impartial tribunal. It offers to place -at the disposal of this body all the material which is necessary to -enable it to arrive at a just conclusion. It proceeds to suggest that -all further discussion on the subjects at issue between the parties -should take place at a conference rather than by interchange of notes. -How can any unprejudiced person refuse to recognise the essential -reasonableness of this part of the offer? It is common ground that -the annuities imposed upon Germany in May, 1921, demand modification. -Even M. Poincaré proceeds on that assumption. There is, therefore, a -most important and highly difficult figure to be ascertained. What -annuity can Germany pay? And when will she be in a position to pay? -Is it unreasonable to propose that this question which involves a -most searching examination into German assets should be referred to -a tribunal which would be capable of giving it calm and judicial -consideration? And what objection can there be to discussing the -matter at a conference where Germany as well as all the Allies would -be represented? If this were a business or a trade dispute these two -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span>proposals would be regarded as eminently sensible and fair, and the -party that rejected them would be condemned by public opinion.</p> - -<p>What are the objections to acceptance formulated by the French press? -Up to the date of writing this article the French government have not -officially expressed their views on the German note. But one may safely -assume from past experience that Parisian journalists consulted the -Quai d'Orsay before writing their critical articles.</p> - -<p>The first is that the French government will discuss no proposals -emanating from Germany until the latter withdraw its passive resistance -to French and Belgian exploitation of the Ruhr. What does this exactly -mean? If it imports—as a preliminary condition to conference or -consideration of terms—an acquiescence by Germany in the occupation -and exploitation by France and Belgium of the Ruhr valley until -reparations be fully paid, then the position is hopeless. A German -government may submit to such an occupation because it has no force -at its command to offer resistance. But no German government can -give assent to such an invasion of its territories. A peace signed -on such terms would inevitably be repudiated at the first favourable -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span>opportunity. Meanwhile there would be constant friction and trouble in -the Ruhr. I can hardly believe that this is what the French government -mean to insist upon, in spite of an article in the <i>Temps</i> which bears -that interpretation. But they may only ask that whilst terms are being -discussed an armistice shall be concluded, the first condition of which -will be that all obstacles now interposed in the way of supplying -France, Belgium, and Italy with reparation coal and coke shall be -withdrawn. An armistice on those terms ought not to be difficult to -arrange, especially if the French and Belgian authorities withdraw the -ban they have placed on the export of Ruhr products to the unoccupied -parts of Germany. Unless the terms are mutually accommodating, I -surmise that the German government will experience an insurmountable -difficulty in persuading the stubborn miners and railway operatives -of the Ruhr to assist in furnishing to France the products of their -labour which are denied to their own fellow-countrymen. It is too -readily taken for granted that the Ruhr workmen will obey any behest -that comes from Berlin. Governments in Germany have ceased to receive -that kind of obedience. It is one of the indirect consequences of the -great<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> disaster that the decrees of Wilhelmstrasse no longer command -the respect which attached to them in pre-war days. Still, a conference -at which all the interests concerned were represented would experience -no difficulty in fixing up stipulations which would make it possible -for France to enter a conference on reparations without any suspicion -being attached to her ministers that they had lowered the national flag -on entering the room. I trust that good sense will prevail over temper -and exaggerated pride—on both sides.</p> - -<p>Should this preliminary point of honour be disposed of, then what -remains? The fixation of the annuities and the guarantees for their -payment. What are the objections to accepting the method put forward in -the German note for these two points? It is not the German method—it -is the American method adopted by the German government. A conference -with an impartial tribunal if conference fails. I know of no other way -except a resort to blind force.</p> - -<p>It is objected that the Treaty of Versailles has already provided such -a tribunal in the reparations commission for the specific purpose of -adjudicating upon Germany's liability and Germany's capacity,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> and that -to set up another for exactly the same purpose would be to supersede -that treaty. There are two answers to this contention. The first is -that the reparations commission as at present constituted is not the -body to which Germany agreed to refer these questions so vital to -her existence. It is not the body which Britain and the other Allies -contemplated. The withdrawal of America from the commission—after -Germany had already signed the treaty—has completely changed the -balance and therefore the character of this tribunal. No man in his -senses can pretend that in its mutilated form it is either impartial -in its composition or judicial in its methods. M. Poincaré does not -conceal the fact that the French government issues orders to its -representative on that "judicial" body. The chairman is an eminent -French deputy who has played and still plays a conspicuous and -influential part in French politics, and is looking forward to pursuing -his career as a politician whithersoever it may lead. Ever since he has -been chairman he has delivered speeches in public denouncing the party -of whose case he is supposed to be the chief judge. All his colleagues -represent powers who have a direct pecuniary interest in the result of -their decisions. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> only disinterested power has retired from the -commission. The American proposal is very moderate. It implies the -restoration of the treaty by reintroducing America to the body that -settles reparations. If France objects to the appointment of a separate -commission why should it not be agreed between the Allies that their -representatives on the body of experts to be set up shall be the men -who now constitute the reparations commission? To these the American -government could add their nominee. Germany has a right under the -treaty to present her case. The whole question of capacity could then -be gone into in the light of the experience acquired during the last -four years, and a settlement could thus be effected on a sound basis. -Such settlement would have a much better chance of being workable, and -therefore more durable than terms imposed by force on a people who only -accept under duress.</p> - -<p>But whatever the French view may be of the suggested annuities or -guarantees, or of the impartial commission, it is inconceivable -that they should reject the conference. It is the surest road to -reparations. At Spa the method of pelting the bewildered Reich with -demand notes was for a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> time abandoned, and that of conference at the -same table was substituted. The results were admirable. The process of -disarmament made immediate strides towards satisfactory completion, -and the coal deliveries became fuller and steadier. At Cannes last -year the Allies once more started to confer with German ministers. All -those who were present at those discussions—without exception—admit -that satisfactory progress was being made towards a comprehensive -settlement when the conferees were scattered by a bomb. It is too -early yet to estimate the loss which inured to Europe through that -explosion. But all idea of discussion between the parties has since -been loftily and petulantly dismissed as an exhibition of pernicious -weakness. What has been substituted for it? For twelve months we had -rather a ridiculous display of feather-rustling about the farmyard to -inspire terror. Threatening speeches full of ominous hints of impending -action were delivered at intervals in different parts of France. These -produced nothing but increased confusion and incapacity to pay. Every -speech cost France milliards in postponed reparations. French opinion -not unnaturally insisted on some action being taken. Hence this rash<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> -invasion. At Cannes a two-year moratorium would have been accepted as a -settlement. Already a year and a half of that period would by now have -elapsed. German finances would, under the strict Allied supervision -which was conceded, by now have been restored to soundness—the mark -would have been stabilised, and a loan could have been negotiated which -would have provided the Allies with substantial sums towards lightening -the burdens they are all bearing. Confidence would have been restored -in Europe, and for the first time there would have been real peace. -One can see what the alternative has produced. Whatever the final -terms may be, Germany is not in a financial position to pay what she -was able to offer then. These eighteen months have been devoted to -reducing assiduously German capacity to pay Allied debts, and the value -of the German security for such payment. At Cannes the mark stood at -770 to the pound sterling. It now stands at 500,000. Germany will need -an extended moratorium to recover from the clumsy mishandling of the -past year and a half. The mark has to be picked up out of the abyss -into which it has been thrown by those whose interest it was to lift -it out of the depression wherein it lay.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> A debtor on whose restored -health and nerve payment entirely depends has been violently pushed -down several flights of stairs. It will take him a long time to recover -from the bruises, the shake, and the loss of blood. What an achievement -in scientific debt collecting! If reparations are ever to be paid the -Allies must retrace their steps and get back to conference. Once the -parties—all the parties—sit round the table I feel assured that the -common sense of most will in the end prevail. We shall never get back -what has been lost during 1922-23, but we shall get something that will -help. It will take some time to set up the tackle for hoisting the mark -out of the crevass and some to do the winding. But the sooner a start -is made the less winding there will be to do. So for everybody's sake -it is high time to stop the strutting and get back to business.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XVIII</span> <span class="smaller">THE NAPOLEONIC DREAM</span></h2> - -<p>What a muddle it all is! France and Germany are both anxious to settle -in the Ruhr, but are too proud to admit it. The struggle, therefore, -goes on, and will continue to the detriment of both. Belgium is sorry -she ever entered the Ruhr, but cannot get out of it. Every time she -tries to get away France pulls her back roughly by the tail of her -coat, so she has to do sentry-go at Essen whilst her franc is leading -a wild life at home. Italy has forgotten that she ever sanctioned -the occupation, and her moral indignation is mounting rapidly, -although it has not yet risen to a height which is visible across -the Alps. Great Britain is growling futile notes of dissatisfaction -with everybody—France and Germany alike. The confusion of tongues is -deafening and paralysing, and no one is quite happy except the spirit -of mischief who is holding his sides with ghoulish laughter. He never -had such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> a time—not since the Tower of Babel. And this time it may -end in a second deluge.</p> - -<p>The horror of the Great War seems to have unhinged the European mind. -Nations do not think normally. The blood pressure is still very high. -The excitement over the Ruhr does not tend to improve it. When some -of the articles written and speeches delivered to-day come to be read -by the diligent historian a generation hence, he will recognise there -the ravings of a continent whose mental equilibrium has been upset -by a great shock. The real issue involved in all this struggle is a -comparatively simple one. How much can Germany pay and in what way -can she pay? America, Britain, Italy and Germany are all agreed that -the only way to settle that question is to appoint competent experts -to investigate and report upon it. The Pope also has blessed this -reasonable suggestion. France, on the contrary, says it is a question -to be determined by guns and generals—both equally well fitted for -that task. Germany must present her accounts to the mitrailleuse and -argue her case before the soixante-quinze. It is a mad world.</p> - -<p>Every one is interested in one question—or <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span>perhaps two. How will -it all end and how soon is that end coming? Although I have nothing -to fear from recalling the predictions of my early articles on this -subject, I hesitate to hazard a fresh forecast. But one may review the -possibilities and note the drift of the whirling currents. In assessing -the chances, you must begin with some knowledge of the man who will -decide the event. M. Poincaré is possessed of undoubted ability and -patriotism, but he is also a man who lives in a world of prejudices so -dense that they obscure facts. You have but to turn to one statement -in his last note where he says the conferences and ultimatums of the -past four years secured nothing from Germany. What are the facts? -During the three and a half years that preceded the Ruhr invasion, -Germany paid to the Allies in cash and in kind over ten milliards of -gold marks,—£500,000,000 in sterling, 2,000,000,000 in dollars—a -considerable effort for a country which had but lately emerged out of -the most exhausting of wars and whose foreign trade was down sixty to -seventy per cent. You might imagine that a man who had taken the grave -step of ordering armies to invade a neighbour's territories would also -have taken the trouble to ascertain the elementary facts<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> of his case. -Part of this gigantic sum went to pay for Armies of Occupation; part -for Reparations, but it all came out of German assets. Will the next -three and a half years bring anything approximating that figure to the -Allied coffers?</p> - -<p>It is a safe statement to make that no one in charge of the French -movements anticipated a resistance approaching in its stubbornness to -that which they have encountered. The friendly Press, both in France -and in England, foretold a speedy collapse of the German opposition, -and on this assumption all the French plans were based. During the -first days of the occupation an Englishman asked a French officer -how long he thought it would take. The answer is indicative of the -spirit in which the venture started: "Optimists think it will take -a fortnight," he said; "pessimists think it may take three weeks." -A reference to the January telegrams from Paris and Düsseldorf will -show that this officer accurately expressed the general sentiment of -those who were responsible for the Ruhr invasion. Soldiers estimate -the chances of resistance in terms of material and trained men, and -statesmen too often build their hopes on the same shallow foundation. -They never allow for the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span>indomitable reserves of the human heart, -which do not figure in Army Lists or Statesmen's Annuals. The -resistance of Paris in 1870 was as confounding to Bismarck as the -stubbornness of the Ruhr miners is to Poincaré to-day. The last regular -army had been destroyed, all docketed food stores exhausted, and still -the struggle of the devoted citizens went on for months. There were -few men in England who thought the Boer peasants could continue their -resistance for more than three months after our armies reached South -Africa. The three months ran into three years and only then capitulated -on honourable terms. The Northern States of America never contemplated -the possibility of a five years' struggle with a blockaded, starved -and overwhelmed Confederacy. The War of 1914-18 is littered with -miscalculations attributable to the blind refusal of rulers and their -advisers to recognise the moral element as a factor in the reckoning. -The Ruhr tragedy is not the first, nor indeed may it be the last, to -be initiated by facile memoranda framed by General Staffs and civilian -functionaries, drawing their inspiration from pigeonholes.</p> - -<p>Whatever may transpire in the Ruhr it is already clear that the -estimates of military men, of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span>transport officials, of intelligence -departments, and of presiding Ministers, have been hopelessly -falsified. Many more soldiers have been sent into the Ruhr than had -been thought necessary: a great deal less coal has come out of the -Ruhr than had been confidently expected. There are already as many -Frenchmen in the Ruhr as Napoleon commanded at Waterloo; and they -have succeeded in sending across the frontier in six months only as -much coal as the Germans delivered in one month during the period of -"default" which provoked the invasion. Desperate efforts have been -made at great cost to increase the yield with a view to satisfying -French and foreign opinion that resistance is gradually breaking down. -Rubbish is shovelled into wagons in order anyhow to swell the quota. -Coal is seized anywhere, even in the streets. And Monsieur Trocquer, -the bluff and genial Breton in charge of the transport arrangements, -breezily challenges all the critics to look at the mounting pyramids of -his dustcart collection and rejoice with him in the triumph of French -organisation under his control. Alas, the Celtic fire of Monsieur -Trocquer, even when fed by the sweepings of the Ruhr, cannot keep -going the blast furnaces of Lorraine! So we find <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span>disappointment and -discontent amongst the forge-masters of France.</p> - -<p>But there is a limit to human endurance. Either France or Germany must -give way in the end. Which will it be, and when will it come—and how? -In answering these questions one must remember that for France the -honour of her flag is involved in success. Failure would irretrievably -damage her prestige. Every Frenchman knows that. That is why French -statesmen who disapprove of the invasion support the Government in -all their proposals for bringing it to a successful end. And here -France has a legitimate complaint against her Allies. It is useless -for Italy now to counsel wisdom. Signor Mussolini was present at the -"hush Conference" which sanctioned the invasion. He fixed the price of -assent in coal tonnage. That price has been regularly paid. Belgium -is now becoming scared at the swelling magnitude of the venture. But -she committed her own honour as well as that of France to carrying it -through. I regret to think that Britain is not free from responsibility -in the matter. It is true that her representatives disapproved of the -enterprise, but not on grounds of right or justice. On the contrary, -whilst <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span>expressing grave doubt as to the ultimate success of the -invasion they wished the French Government well in the undertaking on -which they were about to embark. Not one of the Allies is in a position -with a clean conscience to urge France to haul down her flag. There is -only one course which could be urged on the French Government as being -consistent with French honour, and that is the reference of the dispute -to the League of Nations. Such a reference would be an enforcement of -the Treaty of Versailles. That suggestion the British Government have -refused to press on France. The struggle must, therefore, proceed to -its destined end.</p> - -<p>It may be assumed that the British Government will not intervene -effectively. How about the ministerial declarations? Surely these -strong words must be followed by strong action! Those who rely on that -inference know nothing of the men who use the words or of the forces -upon which they depend for their ministerial existence. It is true -that some weeks ago Mr. Snodgrass took off his coat and proclaimed -cryptically, but fearlessly, that unless peace was restored on his -terms something would happen. The French Government, unperturbed, -replied that they meant to persist in their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> course. So last week Mr. -Snodgrass takes off his waistcoat. But do not be alarmed: there will -be no blows: his friends will hold him back. Meanwhile, Mr. Winkle -has left for Paris in order to lunch with one of the combatants. Next -week he will be followed by Mr. Pickwick, who will call on another, -and the week after Mr. Tupman proposes to pay another propitiatory -visit. It will be an incalculable advantage to M. Poincaré that they -each represent a different and conflicting point of view. The French -have accurately taken the measure of the mind and muscle of those -who indulge in these spectacular exhibitions of ball punching in -Westminster with cakes and ale at Rambouillet. We may therefore assume -that whatever conversations take place at these general gatherings or -ensue from them, the French will not be talked out of the Ruhr.</p> - -<p>From the emphatic declarations made by the head of the French -Government it is gathered that France will insist at all costs on -enforcing her will. She has put forward two demands. The first is that -Germany shall abandon passive resistance as an essential preliminary to -negotiation. The second is that her forces should remain in the Ruhr -until the last payment is made. Will the German <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span>Government accept -these conditions? A settlement on these terms is only possible on two -assumptions. The first is that a German Government can be found strong -enough to accept them and to survive their acceptance. The second -is that there is a French Government wise enough to give a liberal -interpretation to these demands. The first depends to a large extent on -the second.</p> - -<p>The events of the past few months have added immeasurably to the -difficulties of negotiation. Incidents inseparable from a foreign -occupation in any land have exasperated German opinion and reached -depths of hatred which had never been stirred even by the Great -War—the deportation of 75,000 Germans from their homes in the Ruhr -area, the repression, the shooting, the starving, the holding up -of food trains until essential supplies rot. The myriad insolences -of unchallengeable force, the passions which make French policy so -intractable are entirely attributable to the German occupation of -France. Frenchmen are now sowing the same seeds of anger in the German -breast. Hatreds are bad negotiators. That is why I despair of a real -settlement.</p> - -<p>But Germany may collapse. She might even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> break up, temporarily. The -authority of the Central Government has already largely disappeared. -There is practically no collection of taxes. The mark has gone down -in a little over a week from 1,000,000 to the £ to 27,000,000.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> How -can any Government collect taxes in such a fugitive and attenuated -currency? You might as well try to collect land taxes on the tail of -a comet. The state of the currency is but a symptom of the general -disintegration. Berlin has ceased to wield any influence in Bavaria, -and the Monarchy might be restored in that Province at no distant -date. There is a movement in the Rhineland to set up a Republic freed -from the dominion of Prussia. This movement is fostered by French -agencies and financed by French subventions. If it is declared Prussia -will not be allowed to suppress it. We may, therefore, soon witness -a Rhineland Republic whose glorious freedom and independence will be -jealously guarded against internal as well as external foes by the -coloured warriors of Senegal and Cochin-China. Saxony might be captured -by Communists and Prussia be torn between Monarchist and Communist. -These are not unlikely <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span>happenings. Is it too much to say they are -not altogether out of the computation of French statesmanship? If -Germany dissolves, then the Rhineland and the Ruhr would remain under -the dominion of France. France would not secure reparations, but she -would enjoy security, and she would, so it is conjectured, enormously -enhance her power in the world. An old French dream would be realised. -The work of Bismarck would be undone and the achievement of Napoleon -would be restored and perpetuated. There is an old Welsh adage which -says that it is easy to kindle a fire on an old hearthstone. This -idea of a Rhineland under French domination is the old hearthstone -of Charlemagne. Mazarin sought to relight its flames. Napoleon the -First kindled on it a blaze that scorched Europe. Napoleon the Third -had hopes of warming his chilling fortunes at the glow of its embers, -and now the great victory of 1918 has set French ambitions once more -reviving the fires on the old hearthstone of a Rhineland ruled by the -Frank.</p> - -<p>Altogether it is a bad look-out for Europe.</p> - -<p><i>London, August 6th, 1923.</i></p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Since this was written the mark has fallen far beyond.</p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XIX</span> <span class="smaller">IS IT PEACE?</span></h2> - -<p>The Charleville speech<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> and M. Poincaré's reply to Lord Curzon's -despatch<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> leave things exactly where they were. Rumour said the reply -would be long and logical. For once rumour hath not lied. M. Poincaré -regards this exchange of bolstered notes as a pillow fight which he -is quite prepared to prolong in order to gain time whilst the real -struggle is developing to its destined end. The prominence given in the -press to the fact that this rigid reply is "courteous" is significant -of the pitiable condition to which the Entente has been brought by -these maladroit negotiations.</p> - -<p>What will Mr. Stanley Baldwin and Lord Curzon do next? Much depends -for Europe on that next step, and something for them also hangs upon -their action or inaction. One is reminded of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> the answer given by Émile -Ollivier to the question addressed to him as to his opinion of one of -Napoleon the Third's experiments in constitutional government: "Si -c'est une fin, vous êtes perdu; si c'est un commencement, vous êtes -fondé." That sage comment is equally applicable to the Curzon note.</p> - -<p>We can only "wait and see," first for the French official reply, and -second for the decision of the British Government upon that note. -The only new factor in the situation that may have a determining -influence on events is the accession of Herr Stresemann to the German -Chancellorship.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> I know nothing of him beyond newspaper report, -but he is generally supposed to be a man of energy, courage and -resource. If that be true, his appointment to the official leadership -of the German people may be an event of the first magnitude. We shall -soon know what he is made of. Germany has suffered more from weak -or misguided leadership in recent years than any great country in -the world. It blundered her into the War, it blundered through the -War, it blundered into the armistice, it <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span>blundered during the peace -negotiations, and it has blundered her affairs badly after the peace. -But no one can predict what Germany is capable of with a wise and -strong leadership. Herr Stresemann has a responsibility cast upon him -and an opportunity afforded him such as have not been given to any -statesman since the days of Stein and his coadjutors for regenerating -his country and lifting her out of the slough of despond in which she -has been sinking deeper and deeper. Those who ignore the effect which -powerful and magnetic personalities may have upon the fortunes of -nations in despair must have forgotten their history books. The fall of -Dr. Cuno and the rise of Herr Stresemann may well turn out to be a more -decisive event than the despatch or the publication of the Curzon note. -But if he lacks those rare qualities which alone can inspire a people -in an emergency to heroic action and endurance, then there is nothing -but chaos ahead of Germany. For the moment it is more important to keep -a discerning eye on Herr Stresemann than to watch this endless fencing -between Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay.</p> - -<p>It is not often I find myself in agreement with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> M. Poincaré, but -when he states that British unemployment is not attributable to the -occupation of the Ruhr I am substantially in accord with him. In -July last<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> I called the attention of the House of Commons to world -conditions which injuriously affected our export trade and made -unemployment on a large scale inevitable in the British labour market -for some time to come. We are more dependent on our overseas trade, -export, entrepôt, shipping and incidental business than any country in -the world. Almost half our industrial and commercial activities are -associated with outside trade in all its forms. That is not a full -statement of the case, for if this important section of our business -were to languish, the home trade would also necessarily suffer by the -consequential diminution in the purchasing capacity of our people. -Before the French ever entered the Ruhr our overseas trade was down -to 75 per cent. of its pre-war level. Our population has increased -by two millions since 1913; our taxation has increased fourfold; our -national debt tenfold; but our business is down 25 per cent. To what -is this fall in our outside sales and services attributable? It is -the direct consequence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> of the War. Our customers throughout Europe -are impoverished. What is just as bad, our customers' customers are -impoverished. So that neither can buy at our stalls the quantities or -the qualities which they could be relied upon to purchase before the -War. Until Europe can buy, Australia, Canada, India and China cannot -pay, as the Prime Minister pointed out in his last speech in the House -of Commons. Germany, before the War, bought Australian wool, Canadian -grain, Indian jute and tea, and the proceeds as often as not went to -pay for goods bought by those countries in British markets. The same -observation applies to Russia, Austria, and the Levantine countries. -The purchasing capacity of Europe must, therefore, be replenished, -a process which will, at best, take years of patient industry. The -mischief of the Ruhr lies not in the creation of bad trade, but in -retarding the process of recovery. It has undoubtedly had that effect.</p> - -<p>Before the French entered the Ruhr trade was gradually if slowly -improving all round. The prices of 1922 were lower than those of 1921; -therefore, the contrast in sterling was not as apparent as it became -on the examination of weights and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> measures. The export figures, -notably in manufactured goods, show a decided increase on those of -the preceding year. This advance is reflected in the statistics of -unemployment. During the first ten months of 1922 there was a reduction -of over 500,000 in the numbers of the registered unemployed. The -succeeding ten months give only a slight improvement. Something has -happened to arrest the rate of progress towards better times. This -is where the Ruhr comes in. Even if it is not, to quote the Prime -Minister, a penknife stuck in the watch and stopping the works, it is -certainly more than a grain of dust which has perceptibly slowed the -action of the sensitive machinery of trade.</p> - -<p>The effect of the Ruhr disturbance would continue for some time if the -penknife were removed now. For the moment M. Poincaré is wedging it in -more deeply and firmly. Even if he withdrew it now, the works would not -recover their normal steadiness for a long while. During these last -disturbing months Germany has become appreciably poorer. Her wealth -production has been depressed throughout most of her industrial areas. -To a certain extent Lorraine and Belgium have also been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> affected -adversely. The reservoir of wealth upon which industry draws has not -been filling up as it ought if the world is ever to recover.</p> - -<p>These things are hidden from France. She is a more self-contained -country than Britain—perhaps also a more self-centred country. Even -after the Napoleonic wars, which drained her best manhood and exhausted -her fine nervous virility, she suffered from no interval of economic -depression. Her great and victorious rival across the Channel lumbered -painfully through fifteen years of misery, poverty and distress. Her -own population, basking in the sunshine of prosperity, regarded across -the narrow waters, with a natural contentment, the dark fogs that -enveloped and drenched their old enemies. Commiseration or sympathy -from them at that time was not to be expected. We had fought them for -twenty years with an inveterate pertinacity and at last beaten them -to the ground and occupied their capital. To-day we suffer because we -helped to save their capital from foreign occupation and their country -from being humbled to the dust by a foreign foe. Neither in French -speeches, notes, nor articles is there any appreciation shown of that -cardinal fact in the situation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span></p> - -<p>All that is clear at the moment is the stubbornness of the French -attitude. M. Poincaré has not so far receded one millimetre from his -original position. Threats and cajoleries alike are answered by a -repetition of the same formulæ, with the slight variations in word or -phrase which one would expect from a practised writer. But the theme -is always the same and the application is identical to the point -of monotony. He is not winning much coal out of his discourses and -literary exercises, but to do him justice he is getting something for -his country. Last year Lord Balfour, in the note he sent to the Allies -on behalf of the British Government, offered to forego all claims -for debts and reparations if Britain were secured against payment of -the American debt. That meant a surrender of claims aggregating over -£3,000,000,000 in return for an assured £1,000,000,000. A very handsome -and generous offer. The Curzon note proposes to surrender all our -claims for a precarious return of £710,000,000. The Ruhr occupation -has already brought down the British claim against the Allies by -£290,000,000. M. Poincaré may not be able to extract reparations out of -Germany, but in seven months he has succeeded in forcing £290,000,000<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> -out of Great Britain. He will certainly ask for more—and probably -receive it.</p> - -<p>Mr. Bonar Law was right when he said that under certain conditions -Great Britain would be the only country to pay a war indemnity. Those -conditions have arisen under his successors.</p> - -<p><i>Criccieth, August 20th, 1923.</i></p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> M. Poincaré's speech at Charleville on August 19th, on the -subject of French policy in the Ruhr.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The British note was sent to France, August 13th, 1923, -and M. Poincaré's reply was received on August 23rd.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> The German Government fell on August 13th, 1923, and Herr -Stresemann succeeded Dr. Cuno as Chancellor.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> House of Commons, July 16th, 1923.</p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XX</span> <span class="smaller">WHAT NEXT?<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></span></h2> - -<p>The pen-and-ink joust is suspended for a fortnight, whilst the figures -of British unemployment are leaping upwards. When the exhausted British -knights have been reinvigorated by French waters they will once more -charge full tilt at the French champion—at least, they will have made -up their minds by then whether they will shiver another fountain-pen -against his blotting-pad.</p> - -<p>This is the advice ponderously and pompously tendered them in inspired -articles. So far, the French nation is jubilant that M. Poincaré has -scored heavily on points. He is a defter penman, and, moreover, he -does not delegate his draughtsmanship to a Committee of Ministers, all -holding irreconcilable views as to how to proceed, when to proceed, and -whither to proceed, and amongst whom there is no agreement except on -one point—that no one quite knows what action to propose.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span></p> - -<p>Up to this last reply they cherished the vain delusion that the -French could be shelled out of the Ruhr by reproaches which were both -querulous and apologetic. That is not the way to shift continental -statesmanship from its purpose. The French Foreign Office is better -informed as to Cabinet divisions in this country than are the British -public. It knows that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary dare not -take measures which will hamper French action in the Ruhr.</p> - -<p>When the Tory Diehards placed co-operation with France in the forefront -of their programme they honestly meant it. For them it was not a mere -manœuvre to unhorse the Coalition. They cannot, therefore, support -an attitude of resistance to French pressure on Germany. A refusal to -join France in squeezing Germany is to them a continuation of the evil -of the Coalition they overthrew with the help of Mr. Stanley Baldwin -and Lord Curzon. They will not tolerate it.</p> - -<p>That explains the impotence of British diplomacy in a situation which -is so critical to our existence as a great commercial people. The -Cabinet can agree on wordy notes; they are hopelessly divided as to -action. They have, therefore, dispersed far and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> wide to search for -fortuitous guidance hither and thither—some in the tranquillity of -their English country houses; some in the healing springs of France; -some in the mists of Scottish moorlands. Mayhap one of them will bring -home a policy acceptable to his colleagues. It is all very humiliating -to the Empire that raised ten millions of men and spent £10,000,000,000 -of its treasure to win the War. The net result of the voluminous -correspondence on which our rulers have concentrated months of anxious -wisdom and unwearying hesitancy is that the Allies whom we saved from -destruction refuse to move one inch out of their road to secure our -friendly companionship. They are marching resolutely in one direction, -whilst we are shambling along in another.</p> - -<p>We have travelled long distances from each other since January last, -and we are now altogether out of sight of the position we held in -common when we met the Germans at Cannes early last year.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> The -Entente has never been more cordial than it was then—it has never -shown more promise of hopeful partnership for the peace of the world. -We were on the point of securing an amicable and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span>businesslike -arrangement with Germany for the payment of reparations and of -concluding an agreement for protecting the frontiers of France and -Belgium against the possibility of future invasion.</p> - -<p>From these starting-points it was proposed that Britain, France, -Italy, and Belgium should advance together to a general settlement of -European problems in East and West—political, financial, economic and -transport. This we had agreed to do and, with the unity and goodwill -which then prevailed, could have accomplished.</p> - -<p>But M. Poincaré had no use for the dove of peace. He wanted to fly -his falcon. He had trained and bred it in the French farmyard, and -there it had brought down many a domestic bird successfully. When his -chance came he flew it at the wounded German eagle. It is poor sport, -and somewhat cruel, but it evidently gives great joy to Frenchmen of -a sort. The best are ashamed of it, but their voices are drowned in -the clamour of the unthinking. If the helpless bird is torn to pieces, -there is nothing in that for French or Belgian larders.</p> - -<p>Quite unintentionally the hawk has brought down the Entente also. -It may not be dead, but it has made its last flight. Henceforth -international<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> arrangements will be on a less exclusive basis. France -is irrevocably committed to the exploitation of the Ruhr by force. -That is what "pay or stay" means. To that policy the majority in this -country are definitely opposed. If the Diehards in the Cabinet were by -any chance to win, and either Mr. Baldwin surrendered or resigned in -favour of a Poincarist administration in this country, neither he nor -any possible successors could carry the country along into the Ruhr -venture.</p> - -<p>Some of them around the Prime Minister who have so suddenly assumed -pro-French sentiments as the shortest cut to higher altitudes than -those to which they have yet succeeded in climbing, know full well -that, although they may use the Diehards for their own ends, if they -succeeded in their somewhat sinister purpose they could not carry out -the Diehard policy.</p> - -<p>They are, therefore, endeavouring to provide for contingencies by -negotiating on their own a fresh understanding with France. But British -Premiers are not appointed at Rambouillet nor do they draw their -authority from the Quai d'Orsay. Whatever may be thought of Mr. Bonar -Law or of Mr. Stanley Baldwin by political partisans, no one suggests<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> -that they derived their promotion from other than purely British -sources.</p> - -<p>But for a fortnight nothing is to happen—except the spread of -unemployment in Britain and of despair in Germany. At the end of the -fortnight will there be a surrejoinder to M. Poincaré's rejoinder? Or -will there be another conference?</p> - -<p>Both M. Poincaré and the present Parliamentary régime in Britain came -into power on the cry of "Enough of these eternal conferences; let -us return to the good old diplomatic methods that prevailed before -the War"—and, they might add, "which helped to make it possible." -Nevertheless, Mr. Bonar Law's administration during its short tenure of -six months participated in four European conferences, and M. Poincaré, -during his eighteen months' official career, has found it necessary to -take part, directly, in five conferences, and directly and indirectly -in eight. The French Press are urging him on to add another to a record -which already beats that of M. Briand in the matter of "joy-riding"—to -quote the contemptuous Diehard name for international conferences -during Coalition days.</p> - -<p>It is a suspicious circumstance that those who<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> were once resentful -and scornful of conferences should now be clamouring for one both here -and in France. The reason is scarcely concealed by ardent advocates of -the resumption of "picnic diplomacy." At the old conferences, so it is -contended, France was invariably forced to give way. Now she can and -will command the situation.</p> - -<p>There is a new note of confidence ringing through French despatches and -echoed in the French Press. France must get what she wants; Britain -must take what she is given. The French share of reparations must -first be assured—debts due to Britain can come out of what is left. -It is rather greedy, but characteristic, of the British that they -should expect to be paid what is owing to them! With their smug and -hypocritical Puritan temperament and outlook they insist that contracts -should be respected! France, for the sake of the Entente, will make -a concession even to British cupidity and pharisaism. It will permit -the British Empire to collect—not the whole of what is due to her, -but a much-reduced claim out of Germany once the French demand for -reparations is cashed or as good as cashed!</p> - -<p>To me this is a new France. During my years<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> of discussion with French -statesmen I never heard this voice. I had three or four talks with M. -Poincaré, and I never heard him speak in these supercilious tones. -Impunity has developed them since to their present pitch of stridency.</p> - -<p>Belgium is to suggest a meeting of the Premiers. When it comes the -French minimum terms are to be rigid and unequivocal. Here they are:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>1. France must be paid her irreducible minimum of £1,300,000,000 -in respect of reparations, whatever happens to any one else.</p> - -<p>2. Belgium is also to have her priority of £100,000,000.</p> - -<p>3. As Germany cannot raise these huge sums immediately, France -and Belgium are to hold the Ruhr until they are paid. Hints have -been thrown out by the more conciliatory French journals that the -French Government might consider an early retirement from the -Ruhr if the payment of reparations were made the subject of an -international guarantee. That implies Britain and America becoming -sureties for payment of the German indemnity!</p> - -<p>4. As to the rest, France and Belgium have no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> objection, subject -to the above conditions, to Great Britain collecting £700,000,000, -<i>i.e.</i>, about 23 per cent., of her international claims (debts and -reparations) from Germany. But this munificent concession is to -be made on the distinct understanding that she forgoes entirely -the remaining 77 per cent. of her bonds. The Allies and Germany -between them owe Great Britain £3,000,000,000. The French and -Belgian governments are willing that Great Britain should collect -£700,000,000 of that amount from Germany, provided the remaining -£2,300,000,000 is for ever cancelled—and always provided that the -£1,400,000,000 due to France and Belgium has been satisfactorily -guaranteed.</p> - -<p>5. These handsome terms can only be propounded if Germany first -of all withdraws all passive resistance in the Ruhr. That is an -essential preliminary.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The French government have stated these terms with such precision and -such emphasis, and repeated them with such undeviating insistence, -that any departure from them on the French side seems impossible. The -hope of a conference rests entirely on the confidence in a British -surrender. There is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> a dismal "joy-ride" in prospect for the British -Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary. Is it conceivable they -can contemplate such a capitulation? I do not see how the present -Government, after all it has said and written, can so far submit to -French dictation as to make it likely that further discussions would -lead to agreement.</p> - -<p>What is the alternative? Herr Stresemann can alone answer that -question. It is not yet clear what he means to do. Perhaps he is -feeling his way to a decision.</p> - -<p><i>London, August 27th, 1923.</i></p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> London, August 27th, 1923.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> The Cannes Conference, January, 1922.</p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXI</span> <span class="smaller">THE BRITISH DEBT TO AMERICA</span></h2> - -<p>As I roll homeward along the coast of Spain a wireless message -announces that the British government have accepted the American debt -terms.</p> - -<p>The details which I have received are not sufficient to enable me -to form an opinion regarding the character of those terms, or their -bearing on Allied indebtedness to Britain as to the terms of payment. -I know nothing of the steps taken by Mr. Baldwin and the government -of which he is a member to make this the first step in an all-round -settlement of inter-Allied debts. That is a matter of infinite moment -to us, and I assume that this is somewhere—and effectively—in the -arrangement.</p> - -<p>As to the payment of our own debt, the government represent the real -sentiment of the nation as a whole. The British taxpayer is no doubt -fully alive to the fact that this heavy debt was incurred by him -during the war in the main in order to finance American supplies to -our Allies. We could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> have paid for all the supplies we required for -our own use without resort to any loan from the American government. -Nevertheless, the money was advanced by the lender on our credit and -our signature.</p> - -<p>Our credit as a nation, therefore, demands that we should pay. Whether -we can collect enough money from our own debtors to meet this charge -becomes increasingly doubtful, as it is becoming increasingly needful.</p> - -<p>Britain is alone in thinking she is under any moral obligation to pay -the external liabilities incurred for the effective prosecution of -the war. The attitude of the late and of the present government is -identical in this respect.</p> - -<p>Why have the British public taken a different view of their national -obligations towards external war debts from that adopted by other -Allies? In giving the answer I do not wish to dwell on obvious ethical -considerations which must weigh whenever you consider whether you will -carry out an engagement which you have entered into with another who -has already performed his part of the engagement on the strength of -your promise.</p> - -<p>These ought to be conclusive; but to urge them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> might be deemed to be -an unworthy reflection on the honour of those who take a different view -of their national duty.</p> - -<p>I have no desire to offer censure or criticism upon their decision. -They, no doubt, have their reasons for the course they are adopting. We -have certainly overwhelming reasons for showing an honest readiness to -pay our debts.</p> - -<p>The settling up of accounts is always an unpleasant business, -especially amongst friends. Strangers expect it and prepare for it—and -there is no resentment when the bill arrives. But a man hates reminding -his friend at the end of a business in which both have been engaged -in warm amity that there is "a little balance" to be paid up. He has -been expecting the friend to mention the matter to him. So he puts off -introducing the unpleasant topic from year to year. But the friend -disappoints his expectations. Not a hint comes from that quarter of any -realisation that there is anything due. It soon looks as if it had been -forgotten altogether.</p> - -<p>The friend is most insistent on collecting the business accounts due -to himself. He is angry at all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> delays in payment of his own bills. -But his conscience is blind on the side of the debts he himself owes. -It is not an uncommon experience, and we are suffering from it to-day. -The war left us a creditor nation to the extent of over 2,000 million -pounds, and a debtor nation to the extent of about half that amount. -We readily accepted an invitation from our creditor to discuss the -repayment of the debt we owe. Our debtors have displayed an invincible -reluctance to enter into a similar discussion with us.</p> - -<p>That ought not to influence our final decision. Britain is the greatest -of all international traders, and her credit rests on the reputation -she has well earned—that her bond is a sacred trust which her people -always honour and redeem without counting the cost in toil and -treasure. I remember when war broke out the panic which seized bankers -and brokers as they contemplated the obligations incurred by British -firms with their support to finance world trade. These liabilities ran -into hundreds of millions sterling, and the only security for repayment -was represented by a bundle of flimsy paper, criss-crossed with the -signatures of men most of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> whom no British banker had ever seen, many -of them dwelling in countries with whom we were actually at war.</p> - -<p>There was one signature, however, on each paper which was known to -bankers and carried with it the good name of Britain throughout the -world; and it was that of some well-known British firm. Traders in -far-distant lands parted with their produce on the credit of that -signature and of the country with which it was associated.</p> - -<p>It is true that the government had no responsibility for any of these -transactions; but the honour of Britain was involved in seeing that the -foreign merchants should not suffer ruin because they put their trust -in British commercial integrity. For that reason the British government -of the day shouldered the burden, took all the risk, and although it -meant a liability of between four hundred and five hundred millions -sterling, not a voice was raised in protest.</p> - -<p>The action then taken, though quite unprecedented, was not only -honourable; it was wise. It saved British pride from a reproach; it -also saved British credit from a blow from which it would not have -recovered for a generation. During that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span>generation this lucrative -business would have passed into other hands.</p> - -<p>As soon as the war was over the people of Britain, with an instinctive -impulse that required no persuasion to stimulate its activity, set -about the task of restoring their war-battered credit. Government, -bankers, merchants, brokers, manufacturers, and workers of all kinds -were of one mind; borrowing must come to an end; Britain must pay her -way—whatever the sacrifice. Expenditure was ruthlessly cut down. The -army and navy were reduced below pre-war dimensions. Other services -were curtailed. Heavy taxation was imposed—taxation such as no -other country bears. The budget at home must balance. Debts to other -countries must be paid off. Already large sums have been paid abroad. -It required courage and constancy to pursue such a policy; but the -endurance of the nation was beyond praise. It is now calmly facing the -liquidation of this heavy debt to the United States of America; but no -party has yet arisen, or is likely to arise, to demand that the hand of -the negotiators should be arrested. Britain means to pay the last of -her debts without a murmur.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span></p> - -<p>We are already reaping some of the reward. The purchasing value of our -currency has already risen under its burdens, and, as a consequence, -the cost of living has fallen steadily, while other countries who have -pursued a different policy find the cost of living for their people -ascending month by month.</p> - -<p>A short time ago we were taunted in the French Chamber of Deputies by -the president of the council that our unsound financial policy had -been responsible for our unemployment. It is true that if we had gone -on borrowing instead of paying our way—if we had defied our foreign -creditors instead of paying them—we also, like many other European -countries, might have fostered an artificial prosperity by means of a -discredited currency. But British credit would have rapidly disappeared -beyond recovery and British trade would soon have followed. Meanwhile, -the cost of living in Great Britain would have been double what it is -to-day. We all therefore dismissed that policy from our minds without -paying it the tribute of a discussion.</p> - -<p>Trust is the only soil in which credit flourishes. Had that trust been -forfeited British buyers and consequently British consumers would -to-day have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> been paying more for their wheat, their meat, their -cotton, and their wool. The burden of repayment to the United States -will be infinitely less than that of the indirect burden involved in -large purchases with a discredited currency.</p> - -<p>The government are therefore right in arranging with the American -treasury without loss of time for the liquidation of a debt incurred by -this country. I am taking for granted that they have made every effort -to see that the agreement shall form a part of an all-round settlement -of inter-Allied debts. But as to our own debt the moral obligation -must remain whatever our Allies do or fail to do. Why it was incurred, -the circumstances in which it was entered into, the purposes for which -the money was advanced, were open to the consideration of the American -government in arranging terms. That, however, was their privilege; ours -is to honour our signature.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXII</span> <span class="smaller">INTER-ALLIED DEBTS</span></h2> - -<p>A cold shiver ran down the back of England when it was announced -officially that the British government had definitely agreed to pay -over £30,000,000 a year for sixty years to the United States in respect -of debts incurred by us on behalf of our Allies without seeking a -contribution from our debtors to protect the taxpayers of this country. -It is not that anyone dreamt the evil dream of repudiation. That was -never woven into the texture even of the worst nightmare out of the -many that have disturbed our repose since the greatest nightmare of all -left the world a quivering nervous wreck.</p> - -<p>Nor did we expect remission of our debts. Whenever we were tempted -to exaggerate the bounds of human charity paragraphs appeared that -reminded us of the attitude of the "Middle West." America was -discovered by Europe centuries ago, but the "Middle West," as a -political entity, is to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> untutored Europeans a discovery of the war. -We were then told by returning explorers that it was the seat of the -American conscience—inexorable, intractable, but irresistible when -engaged in any enterprise. How potent this conscience was, as a world -force, the war demonstrated. From the heights it hurled an avalanche -of force against Germany that overwhelmed the last hope of resistance. -Unfortunately for us when it came to debts we struck against the hard -side of the Middle West conscience.</p> - -<p>Our hope was therefore not in remission. There were, however, many -other possibilities. We were not the only debtors of the American -government. Other Allies had borrowed not merely indirectly through -us, but directly from America. We had every confidence that the United -States government would not mete out to Britain severer treatment -than it was prepared to accord to our Allies. We had to contend, it -is true, with legends of our inexhaustible wealth. Apart from our -great coal deposits, and a climate which leaves those who endure it -no alternative but activity, we have no treasure except the industry, -the resources and the inherited skill of our people. We have nothing -like the rich<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> plains and the fertilising and ripening sunshine of -France, which maintain sixty per cent. of its population. Our sources -of wealth—apart from coal—are precarious, for they depend more -largely than any other country on conditions outside our own. We are -international providers, merchants and carriers. A sixty-year contract -to pay large sums across the seas is in many respects a more serious -consideration for us than for countries whose riches are inherent in -their soil and are, therefore, more self-contained. The demoralised -condition of the world markets has left us with a larger proportion -of our industrial population unemployed than any other European -country. I hear tales of unemployment in the United States of America, -but the reports that reach us here on American unemployment are so -contradictory that I can build no argument upon them. But, as to the -gigantic dimensions of our unemployed problem there can be no doubt. We -have 1,400,000 workmen on the unemployed register drawing unemployment -pay in one form or another. The annual cost to the nation of feeding -its workless population runs to over £100,000,000—almost the figure of -the annuity demanded from Germany as a war indemnity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span></p> - -<p>Although there are signs of improvement the omens point to a prolonged -period of subnormal trade. Continuous depression for years will mean -that Britain will suffer more from the devastation to her trade caused -by the war than France from the devastation of her provinces. Our -country, anxious about its means of livelihood, with a million and a -half of its workmen walking the streets in a vain search for work, has -to bear the heaviest burden of taxation in the world. Why? Because it -has not only to pay interest on its own heavy war debts, but also on -£3,000,000,000 which it either advanced to the Allies or incurred on -their behalf. That is why we felt hopeful that the United States would -not discriminate against a nation so situated.</p> - -<p>When I talk of debts the Allies owe to us, I want to emphasise the -fact that these debts are not paper myths nor tricks of accountancy. -They are onerous facts representing a real burden borne at this hour -by the bent and panting taxpayer of Britain. If these loans had never -been made the weight on his shoulders to-day would have been lighter by -over two shillings in the pound. He is every year paying to the actual -lenders—some British, some American—that proportion of his income.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> -It is a weight he undertook to carry for his Allies during the war on -the sacred pledge of those Allies that they would take it over after -the war. The American government borrowed from their public to make -advances to Great Britain, and have called upon the British taxpayer to -redeem his pledge. We make no complaint, for the demand is a mitigation -of the strict letter of the bond. But that amount is in substance part -of the debt owing by the Allies to Britain. And the British taxpayer -naturally feels it is hard on him to have to bear not only his own -legitimate burdens but that he should in addition have to carry the -debts of his less heavily taxed brethren in continental countries. He -naturally inferred that if equal pressure had been administered on all -debtors alike it would have forced an all-around consultation which -would have terminated in an all-round settlement.</p> - -<p>That was the real purport of the Balfour note. The true significance -of that great document has been entirely misunderstood—sometimes -carelessly, sometimes purposely, sometimes insolently. I guarantee -that not one per cent. of its critics if confronted suddenly with an -examination on its contents would secure one mark out of a hundred.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> -It has suffered the same fate as the treaty of Versailles. Opinion -is sharply divided as to both between those who rend without reading -and those who read without rending. Most men have received their -impressions of the Balfour note from denunciatory phrases penned -by writers who received their ideas about it from men who gave -instructions to condemn it without ever reading it. The men who really -understood both the Versailles treaty and the Balfour note have been -too busy to find time to inform, to interpret, and to explain.</p> - -<p>But the time has come when the public attention should be once more -drawn to the remarkable and far-reaching proposals of the Balfour note. -They constitute an offer on the part of Britain to measure the amount -of her claims against her Allies by the extent of her obligations to -the United States of America. The British government even offered to -include the claim of their country against Germany in this generous -concession. What does that mean in reference to present conditions? -That if the Allies and Germany between them found the £30,000,000 a -year which Britain has undertaken to pay America, she would forgo her -claim to the £3,300,000,000 due to her under contract and treaty. -It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> was a great offer and if accepted would have produced results -beneficent beyond computation. Britain, which would have been the -heaviest direct loser, would have profited indirectly through the world -recovery that would have ensued.</p> - -<p>How was it received? Some criticised it because it asked too -little—some because it demanded too much. Many criticised because -they were determined to approve nothing that emanated from such a -government, but most of its censors condemned it because they never -took the trouble to understand it, and the shrillest among the street -cries happened to denounce it. The government that propounded it soon -after left the seat of authority, and the administration that succeeded -put forward a new scheme which attracted even less acceptance. So this -great project which would have settled for ever the question which -above all others is vexing peace and unsettling minds in Europe was -pigeon-holed where it was not already basketed.</p> - -<p>But surely this is not the end of all endeavours to reach a settlement -of the question of inter-Allied debts. We cannot rest satisfied with an -arrangement which effectively binds us to pay without prospect of the -slightest contribution from our debtors.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> What America cannot indulge -in we cannot afford. The gold of Europe now lies in its coffers. -Who are we—plunged in the mire of debt up to our nostrils—to give -ourselves airs of generosity superior to the only golden land left in -this war-stripped earth?</p> - -<p>If there is to be a general jubilee in which all alike participate in -order to give the world a new start, then I feel sure Britain will play -her part bravely and nobly. But a jerry-mandered jubilee which frees -France, Italy and Belgium from all their debts whilst leaving Britain -sweating to pay off debts incurred for her Allies on the strength of -their bond—that we cannot bear.</p> - -<p>I trust the government will insist on an arrangement with our Allies -which, even if it is not a replica of our contract with the American -government, will at any rate ensure us a contribution that will -safeguard us against loss under that contract. It is I fear hopeless -to expect that we should be recouped the 2<i>s.</i> in the pound which -interest on Allied debts costs our taxpayers, but at any rate we -might be guaranteed against the 6<i>d.</i> in the pound which the American -instalments involve. I feel the effort is beset with difficulties -and that the outlook is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> hopeful. There have of late been a few -discouraging symptoms. One is the reception accorded at the recent -Paris conference to the British prime minister's liberal offer -regarding inter-Allied debts. It was a tactical error to open the -conference with such a scheme and the effect was singularly unfortunate.</p> - -<p>Had I been disposed to press my criticisms on the conduct of the recent -negotiations in Paris it would have been that they were so managed that -for the first time since the war Britain has been completely isolated -at a European conference. That is a misfortune, for it encouraged the -French government to rash action. Up to the last conference Britain and -Italy had remained in substantial accord even when France and Belgium -took a different view, and Belgium had never before quitted any of the -gatherings in complete disagreement with Great Britain. So France, -always tempted as she was to occupy the Ruhr, hesitated to do so in the -face of so formidable an Allied resistance. What is relevant, however, -to the subject of this article is the cause of our unwonted isolation -on the occasion of the last conference. The British premier started -the negotiations by tabling proposals which promised forgiveness of -most of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span>indebtedness of these countries to Britain, but which -implied immediate arrangements for beginning repayment of the rest. -This suggestion of repayment instantly consolidated opposition to the -whole of the British plan. It became clear that existing governments -on the continent had no intention, unless firmly pressed, of paying -the smallest percentage of the debt they incurred on the faith of a -solemn engagement to repay the loan when that was possible, and to pay -interest meanwhile. If we point to the fact as we did in the Balfour -note, that we have undertaken to repay the United States of America -the heavy debt incurred by us on behalf of the Allies, they simply -shrug their shoulders and say in effect: "That is your affair. We repay -neither Britain nor America, and there is an end of it."</p> - -<p>The other unpleasant incident is a speech delivered by M. Poincaré -in the French Chamber in the course of which he dealt casually with -the subject of inter-Allied indebtedness. The French prime minister -then announced categorically that France had no intention of paying -her debts until she has first received her share of reparations from -Germany. What does that mean in effect? That the France represented -by M. Poincaré has no <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span>intention of ever paying her debts. When -the colossal figure of German reparations is taken into account -thirty years is a moderate estimate of the period required for its -liquidation. Is the French debt to lie dormant carrying no interest -meanwhile? If it is, then the debt is practically wiped out, for the -present value of £500,000,000 debt payable thirty years hence is -insignificant. The present government of France have therefore declared -they do not mean to pay what France owes. Surely the time to dictate -the conditions of your repayment of a loan—when you propose to pay, -how much you propose to pay, or whether you mean to pay at all—is when -you are borrowing and not after you have spent the money.</p> - -<p>And yet in the same speech in which M. Poincaré serves up hot -platitudes for senatorial palates about the sanctity of national -obligations, he dismisses France's faithful ally with the cold comfort -that France is too busy collecting the accounts due to her to attend -to the debts she owes. I believe in my heart that there is a France -of which he is not the spokesman—a great France which will not treat -shabbily a faithful friend who stood by her in the hour of despair -and who is now staggering under<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> unparalleled burdens incurred in the -discharge of the obligations of friendship.</p> - -<p>All this makes it more necessary that the situation should be cleared -up without undue delay. Having just completed negotiations for -liquidating our own war indebtedness to America we are in a position -to insist on a settlement with those on whose behalf we incurred that -indebtedness. If nothing is done the conditions will harden against us. -We shall be assumed to have accepted the Poincaré repudiation. I do not -know what conditions the government have made with the United States -government as to the marketability of the securities to be created in -funding our debt. If they are to be placed on the market the chance of -any future deal is destroyed. Ere that be done we must know where we -are in reference to our own claims. I trust the government will act -promptly. Delay was justifiable so long as we were in the same position -in reference to what we owed as what we claimed. The Baldwin settlement -has altered all that. If we do not insist on an arrangement now the -British taxpayer will have the fate of Issachar—that of the poor beast -between two burdens—his own and that of the Allies.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXIII</span> <span class="smaller">THE BRITISH ELECTIONS</span></h2> - -<p>It is the duty of every patriotic citizen, in view of the difficulties -with which the country is confronted, to assist the government of -the day by every means at his disposal. Factious criticism disturbs -judgment and tends to unnerve. Governments to-day require full command -of mind and nerve to enable them to arrive at sound decisions and to -persevere in them. Faction is, therefore, treason to the country.</p> - -<p>That does not, however, preclude a calm survey of the elections and -their meaning. Quite the contrary, for we must think of the future and -prepare for it.</p> - -<p>The result of the elections has fully justified those who maintained -that no party standing alone could hope to secure the measure of public -support which will guarantee stable government. It is true that the -Conservatives have succeeded in obtaining the return of a majority of -members to the new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> Parliament. But the most notable feature of the -elections is the return of a decisive majority of members by a very -definite minority of the electors.</p> - -<p>I observe that the prime minister, in returning thanks to the nation, -claims that he has received a vote of confidence from the people of -this country. Out of a total poll of fifteen millions his candidates -secured less than six million votes. Making full allowance for -uncontested seats, this figure cannot be stretched out to a height much -above six millions.</p> - -<p>That means that only two-fifths of the electorate voted confidence -in the administration, whilst three-fifths voted confidence in other -leaders or groups. A party which has a majority of three millions -recorded against it on a national referendum can hardly claim to have -received a national vote of confidence.</p> - -<p>It might be argued that when the question of confidence or no -confidence comes to be stated, the National Liberals having promised -co-operation, the votes recorded by them ought not to be placed on the -debit side of the confidence account. The basis of the appeal made by -the National Liberal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> candidates for support is practically that stated -by me in my Manchester speech:</p> - -<p>"The supreme task of statesmanship at this hour is the pacification of -the nations, so that the people shall have leisure to devote themselves -to the peaceful avocations of life, to fill up the depleted reservoirs -from which we all draw.</p> - -<p>"My course is a clear one. I will support with all my might any -government that devotes itself and lends its energy to that task -with single-mindedness, fearlessness, and with resolution—provided -it does not embark upon measures which inflict permanent injury upon -the country, whether these measures be reactionary or revolutionary. -That does not mean that I pledge myself to support inefficiency, -vacillation, or infirmity in any government or in any party. But any -government that does not pursue that course I will resist with all my -might. That is my policy."</p> - -<p>I have perused the addresses of many National Liberal candidates and I -have addressed many meetings in their constituencies, and I find that -their attitude towards the government is defined in these terms, with -purely verbal variations. The address of Mr. J. D. Gilbert, who won -Central<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> Southwark, is a very fair sample taken out of the bulk:</p> - -<blockquote><p>"If you honour me again with your confidence I will support any -progressive measures brought forward by the present government or -any other government. I shall not offer factious opposition or -nagging criticism while our country is in difficulties at home or -abroad."</p></blockquote> - -<p>There may be one or two who went further, but none expressed confidence.</p> - -<p>I have made some inquiries as to the number of Conservative votes -polled by National Liberal candidates. I am informed that on an average -it represents less than one-third of the total. At the last election -167 National Liberal candidates were put up. They polled an aggregate -of 1,652,823 votes, that is, an average of 9,897 per candidate. What -proportion of this vote was Conservative? There is a good practical -method of testing this question. In sixty-two seats National Liberals -were fought by Conservative as well as by other candidates. In -these cases the average vote polled by National Liberals was 6,820. -That means that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> where the Conservatives supported National Liberal -candidates their votes would represent about 30 per cent. of the -poll for these candidates. On the other hand, the number of Liberal -votes polled by Conservatives, where a compact existed, at least -balances this account, for although the total in each constituency -does not equal the figures of the Conservative support in National -Liberal constituencies, still, that support was spread over many more -constituencies.</p> - -<p>The prime minister and his chief electioneering manager both -emphatically repudiated the suggestion that there was any pact between -Conservatives and National Liberals, and urged that there were only -local arrangements made between the candidates of the two parties for -their mutual convenience.</p> - -<p>As the head of the National Liberal group I expressed grave doubts as -to the composition of the ministry, and much apprehension as to the -language in which its policy was defined. That represents the general -attitude of the National Liberals toward the government. Their support, -therefore, cannot be claimed in totalling the votes recorded for the -government.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span></p> - -<p>The fact, therefore, remains that those who voted confidence in the -government represent only forty per cent. of those who went to the poll -and twenty-five per cent. of the total electorate.</p> - -<p>I place this fact in the forefront, because it is bound to have a -profound effect upon the course of events during—maybe beyond—the -lifetime of this parliament. It is the first time, certainly since the -Reform Act, that a pronounced minority of the electorate has succeeded -in securing the control of parliament and the government of the country.</p> - -<p>It would be idle to pretend that in a democratic country like ours, -thoroughly imbued with the spirit of representative government, this -does not weaken the moral authority of the government of the day. -Therefore, if the government is wise it will bear that fact in mind and -will not commit itself to policies which challenge the nine millions -who between them represent a majority of the people of this country.</p> - -<p>It is not a very good beginning to claim these striking figures as a -vote of confidence. I sincerely trust it does not indicate a resolve to -ignore, if not to defy, what is an obvious and ought to be a governing -factor in the policy of the government.</p> - -<p>A corollary to this curious working of our <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span>electoral system is to be -found in the under-representation of the other parties in the present -parliament, and unless representative government is to be discredited -altogether, the present parliament ought at once to devote its mind and -direct its energies to the discovery of some method and machinery which -will avert the danger which clearly arises from the working of the -present system.</p> - -<p>The parliament of 1918 undoubtedly gave a larger majority to the -government than the figures warranted. But the majority of votes cast -for government candidates was so overwhelming that under any system -of voting there would have been a larger working majority for the -government than that which the present government can command. So when -trouble arose it was not open to any section of the community to object -that the government had no authority because it did not represent the -electorate of this country.</p> - -<p>We are faced with a new danger to constitutional government. What -has happened at this election may be repeated at the next—but not -necessarily in favour of the same party.</p> - -<p>If we are to be governed by a succession of administrations who rule -in spite of the protest of a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> majority of the people, the authority of -government will be weakened beyond repair.</p> - -<p>The luck of the electoral table has this time favoured the -Conservatives. Next time it may turn in favour of the Labour Party. -They have at this election secured 55 seats out of a total of 141 by a -minority of votes.</p> - -<p>The conditions were, in many respects, against them. Their funds were -exhausted by the prolonged period of heavy unemployment. The trade -union movement was passing through an ebb tide in its prosperity, both -in funds and in members. There was a good deal of discontent with the -trade union leaders. Many workmen felt they had been let down badly by -some of their activities in industrial disputes.</p> - -<p>Moreover, Labour has been committed by visionaries to a rash experiment -which handicapped it severely in the election. Next time may be the -spring tide of Labour. They have learnt their lesson at the polls, and -are not likely to repeat the blunder of November, 1922.</p> - -<p>This time the votes cast for them have attained the gigantic aggregate -of four millions and a quarter. Supposing under those conditions they -add<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> another two millions to their poll. Although the other groups may -secure between them nine millions of votes, Labour may have the same -luck as the Conservatives at the last election and be placed in power -by a decisive majority of members elected by a minority of votes.</p> - -<p>I am not going to speculate as to what may happen under those -conditions; the kind of legislation that may be proposed; the action -of the House of Lords in reference to it, provoking, as it undoubtedly -will, a fierce class conflict; or the turn given to administration in -the various departments of government.</p> - -<p>Of one thing I am, however, certain. That is, that as a minority -administration in 1922 and onwards will help to discredit government -with certain classes of the community, a minority Labour administration -would weaken the respect of other classes for representative -government, and between them an atmosphere will be created inimical to -the moral authority of all government in this country.</p> - -<p>I have many a time warned the public that, in spite of -appearances, this country is in many respects very top-heavy. It -is over-industrialised. Its means of livelihood are in some ways -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span>precarious, and depend on conditions over which we have very little -control, and once something happens which may have the effect of -causing a lean-over either in one direction or in the other, it will be -more difficult to recover than in lands where the population depends in -the main for its livelihood upon the cultivation of the soil and the -development of the natural resources of the country.</p> - -<p>I therefore earnestly trust that in the interests of stability and good -government, which must be based on the goodwill and co-operation of the -community as a whole, this parliament will apply its mind seriously to -finding some means of preventing a repetition either in one direction -or another of this freak of representative government.</p> - -<p>Another feature of the election is the heavy vote polled by Liberal -candidates in spite of untoward circumstances.</p> - -<p>Whatever the difficulties of the Labour Party might be in this election -they were not comparable to those under which Liberalism fought the -campaign. It was divided by bitter internecine conflicts. The leaders -of one section seemed to be more intent on keeping representatives of -the other section out of parliament than on fighting for the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span>common -cause. The bulk of their speeches was devoted to attacks on the leaders -of the other Liberal group, and there was not much room left for a -statement of the Liberal case.</p> - -<p>What happened in Manchester is typical. Here the rank and file took the -matter in hand and enforced agreement. Lord Grey was brought down to -bless it. But the whole of his benedictory speech consisted of a thin -and dreary drip of querulous comment on the leaders of the other group, -with a distinct hint that the return of a Conservative government would -be by no means a bad thing in the interests of the country.</p> - -<p>The speech was hailed by a Tory journal with the heading "Lord Grey -Supports Mr. Bonar Law." He then went straight to support Mr. McKinnon -Wood as candidate with a repetition of the same speech. Thence he -rushed off to reiterate the same performance at Bedford in support -of Lady Lawson, and he finished off by reciting it for two days at -meetings in support of Mr. Walter Runciman.</p> - -<p>No wonder that he succeeded in damping Liberal enthusiasm to such an -extent that his unfortunate protégés surprised even their opponents in -the poverty of the support given them at the polls.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span></p> - -<p>As soon as the coalition broke up the leaders of this Liberal section -met to consider the situation. The one positive result of their -deliberations was not the issue of a ringing appeal for unity on the -basis of Liberal principles, but a peevish intimation through the press -that efforts at unity were to be discouraged at the election. It was -clearly ordained that the Coalition Liberals should be crushed out. The -Conservatives spurned them, and the Independent Liberals gave notice -that they had no use for them. They were destined for extinction. Lord -Crewe's speech proceeded on the same lines. May I say how sincerely I -rejoice in the tribute to the "amateur diplomatist" which is implied -in the conferring by a Conservative government of the blue ribbon of -diplomacy upon the leader of the Independent Liberals in the House of -Lords?</p> - -<p>This precipitate and lamentable decision lost at least forty Liberal -seats, gave to the Conservatives their majority, and what is equally -important established the Labour Party as His Majesty's official -Opposition in the House of Commons. The latter is much the most -serious practical result of the decisions of the Independent leaders -to debar united action at the last election. If Liberals had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> united -when the Coalition came to an end, Liberalism might have polled five -million votes. It would have now held a powerful second position in -parliament, and the country and the nation would have looked to it in -the future as it has hitherto done in the past for the alternative to -"Toryism." Instead of that it is a poor split third. How could they -expect to win at the polls? The National Liberals were pursued into -their constituencies. Thirty-five National Liberal seats were assailed -by Independent Liberal candidates. I am not making a complaint, but -offering an explanation. Whatever the views of the National Liberal -leaders might have been on the subject of Liberal unity they were given -no chance to effect it, and although they entered into no national -compact with the Conservatives their followers in certain areas had no -option but to negotiate local arrangements with the Conservatives for -mutual support. The implacable attitude of the Independent Liberals -left them no choice in the matter.</p> - -<p>What was the inevitable result? No real fight was put up for Liberal -principles on either side. The Independent Liberals were tangled by -the personal preoccupation of their leaders. They had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> accumulated -enormous dumps of ammunition for the day of battle on the assumption -that the main attack would be on the Coalition Liberals, and, although -the Conservatives now lined the opposite trenches, anger dominated -strategy, and the guns were still fired at their old foes, whilst the -Tory government was only bombarded with bouquets. On the other hand, -the National Liberal leaders were embarrassed by the engagements into -which their followers had been driven by the action of the Independent -Liberal leaders and the two warring factions.</p> - -<p>The National Liberals, in spite of their enormous difficulties, have -not been exterminated. I am not going to enter into a barren inquiry -as to whether their numbers are or are not greater than those of Mr. -Asquith's followers. Let it be assumed that they are equal. The marvel -is that under these fratricidal conditions so many Liberals of any -complexion have been returned.</p> - -<p>I am not setting forth these unhappy facts in order to prolong the -controversy which has poisoned Liberalism for years, but in order to -call attention to the vitality which, in spite of these depressing -conditions, can bring up 4,100,000 voters to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> polls. Electorally -Liberalism is the balancing power, and if it casts its united strength -against either reaction or subversion its influence must be decisive, -whatever the composition of this parliament may be.</p> - -<p>It is common knowledge that the Independent Liberals confidently -anticipated the return of at least 120 members of their group. The -fact that they only succeeded in securing the return of about fifty is -naturally to them a source of deep disappointment.</p> - -<p>If the failure of high hopes leads to contemplation of the real causes -of that failure and a sincere desire is manifested to substitute -co-operation for conflict my colleagues and I will welcome it. We -cannot force our society on an unwilling company.</p> - -<p>During the campaign I repeatedly expressed the hope that one outcome of -this election would be to bring moderate men of progressive outlook in -all parties to see the wisdom of acting together.</p> - -<p>But progressive minds are by no means confined to the Liberal party. -I have met and worked with them in the Conservative party, and the -election will have taught many men and women in the Labour party that -violent and extravagant proposals<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> impede progress. If the limits are -not too narrowly drawn, this parliament may witness the effective -association of men of many parties who are genuinely concerned in the -advancement of mankind along the paths of peace and progress for the -attainment of their common ideals. If that end is achieved, the coming -years will not be spent in vain.</p> - -<p>One word as to the National Liberals. When the dissolution came no -party was ever placed in a more embarrassing and even desperate -situation.</p> - -<p>The Conservatives have at their disposal a great political machine. The -Labour party could command the support of all the trade unions, with -their elaborate machinery for organising the wage-earning population. -The Independent Liberals had in England and in Scotland captured the -Liberal machine almost in its entirety, and had spent six years in -perfecting it, their leaders having no other occupation.</p> - -<p>The National Liberal leaders inherited no political machinery, and were -too preoccupied with great world affairs to be able to devote any time -to the improvisation of an effective new organisation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span></p> - -<p>Conservatives, Independent Liberals, and Labour all alike attacked -National Liberal seats where they thought any advantage might be gained -for their respective parties by doing so. The Conservatives only -refrained from attack in cases where they thought there was more to be -gained by arrangement. There was a great volume of popular sentiment -behind our group. I visited Britain, north, south, east, west, and I -have never witnessed such crowds nor such enthusiasm at any electoral -contest in which I have ever taken part; but there was no organisation -to convert acclamation into electoral power, and you could not build -up a vast political machine in three weeks. Our supporters were not -provided with an opportunity to test their strength in two-thirds of -the constituencies. In nearly three hundred constituencies they could -not do so without impairing the chances of Liberal candidates. A -compact with Conservatives ruled them out of others.</p> - -<p>It is a wonder that, in spite of these adverse and even paralysing -conditions our numbers are twice those of the Independent Liberals in -1918.</p> - -<p>We have now for the first time full opportunity for placing our case -and point of view before the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> country and organising support for them. -It is our duty to do so.</p> - -<p>Every month will contribute its justification for the course we have -hitherto pursued, and for the counsel we have steadfastly given to a -country struggling through abnormal difficulties.</p> - -<p><i>London, November 20th, 1922.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXIV</span> <span class="smaller">HOW DEMOCRACY WORKS</span></h2> - -<p>The startling English by-elections of the last few weeks have called -attention to the working of the new electorate in Great Britain and -set men pondering about its possibilities in a way a general election -failed to make them think. Democracy in the sense of government of a -great state by the absolute and unfettered authority of the majority of -its own citizens of all ranks and conditions is a modern experiment. -The United States of America are the oldest democracy in the world -to-day.</p> - -<p>How many realise that Britain became a democracy for the first time in -1917? Until then the majority of its adult population had no voice in -the making or administration of the laws that ruled their lives.</p> - -<p>The United States of America, France and Italy have adopted universal -suffrage as the basis of authority for many a year. So have the -British Dominions, but Britain herself, the pioneer of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span>representative -institutions, until recently shrank from the experiment of adult -suffrage. Before the Reform Act of 1832 the total electorate of this -country numbered only 3 per cent. of the population. The distribution -of power amongst this small percentage was so arranged that even the 3 -per cent. represented in effect no more than at best 1 per cent.</p> - -<p>A generation of turmoil and agitation, almost culminating in -revolution, succeeded in forcing through a measure which increased -the 3 per cent. to 4.5 per cent. of the population! It is true that -the distribution of votes was more equitable, but even with that -improvement to call this ridiculous percentage a democracy would be -absurd. Another generation of growing agitation ensued. This also ended -in violence. Then Mr. Disraeli, one of the boldest and most venturesome -of British statesmen, in 1867 doubled the electorate. His measure -increased the number of voters to 9 per cent. of the population.</p> - -<p>Disraeli's audacious plunge horrified some of his aristocratic -supporters and shocked many Whigs. "Bob" Lowe had already foretold -calamities that would follow Gladstone's more cautious proposals. Seven -years later saw the election of the first Tory<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> parliament since 1841. -So much for the prophecies of the men who always fear evil must flow -from justice.</p> - -<p>Fifteen years after the Disraeli measure the Gladstone administration -added another 7 per cent. to the electorate. The Gladstone proposals, -which raised the number of voters to 16 per cent., were so vehemently -contested that they nearly precipitated a Constitutional crisis of the -first magnitude. Ultimately, however, they were carried, and there the -franchise remained until the war.</p> - -<p>The electorate that, through its representatives, accepted the German -challenge in 1914, and was therefore responsible for involving -the country in the most costly and sanguinary war it ever waged, -represented one-sixth of the population and about one-third of the -adults. The conscription act converted the country to the injustice of -this state of things. Millions of men were forced to risk their lives -for a policy which they had no share in fashioning. Millions of women -faced anxieties and tortures worse than death in pursuit of the same -policy, and yet no woman was allowed to express any opinion as to the -selection of the rulers who led them to this sacrifice.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span></p> - -<p>It was felt to be so unjust that in the exaltation of war, which lifted -men to a higher plane of equity, this obvious wrong was redressed. -Hence the greatest of all the enfranchisement acts, the Act of 1917, -that for the first time converted the British system of government into -a democracy.</p> - -<p>How has it worked? It is too early to speak of its results. Mr. Austen -Chamberlain in a letter<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> has called attention to one aspect of its -operation. He emphasises a fact which is already known to every man who -has passed through the experience of a contested election, that nearly -one-half the new electorate is unattached to any political party.</p> - -<p>If you deduct out of the total the numbers of the old electorate which -had already formed ties of a party character, you will find from the -result of the elections that more than half the new electorate is free -and floating about without any anchor or rudder and ready to be towed -by the first party that succeeded in roping them. Millions of the new -electors are too indifferent or too undecided about political issues to -take sides at the polling booths.</p> - -<p>In the hotly contested election of January, 1910,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> 92 per cent. of the -voters went to the poll. At the second election which took place in -the same year the percentage was 89. The slight difference between the -two elections would be accounted for by the fact that in the second -election the register was old. Compare these results with the two -elections which have occurred since the 1917 enfranchisement. At the -1918 election 64 per cent. only of the voters could be induced to make -the acquaintance of the ballot-boxes. This might be explained by the -inevitable political apathy which follows a great war. The pulse of -party beat feebly and irregularly. The old party organisations had, -through five years of neglect, fallen into complete disrepair—the new -party had not yet had time to perfect its machinery. Hence the failure -of competitive effort to induce at least 6,000,000 of the new voters to -take a sufficient interest in their new privileges to exercise them at -the election.</p> - -<p>The next four years were a period of growing political activity. -The new party was especially energetic. Their chief organiser, Mr. -Arthur Henderson, M.P., is one of the most gifted party managers of -this generation, and his achievement is an outstanding feature of -political organisation in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> this country. The old parties also had time -to repair their machinery; by the time the election was called their -organisations were in full working order. The only party which had no -organisation worth speaking of was the National Liberal party. The -others were ready for the struggle.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, when the election came in November nearly 5,000,000 of -the electors were not sufficiently interested in the contest to take -the trouble to record their votes. It showed an improvement of 10 per -cent. on the previous election, but there still remained nearly 20 per -cent.—making allowance for death, sickness, removals, etc.—who stayed -at home, and could not be persuaded by personal or public appeal or -pressure exercised by three or four great organisations, to walk a few -hundred yards out of their way in order to place a simple cross on the -ballot paper that was awaiting them.</p> - -<p>The municipal elections tell a still more dismal story of apathy. But -that is an old story. It was with difficulty that the old electorate, -with all its long training, could be cajoled to visit the polling -booths where the good government of the towns in which they breathed, -lived, toiled, enjoyed themselves, and rested was being determined. -At their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> worst, however, they made a better show than the newly -enfranchised voters.</p> - -<p>How does the record compare with democracy in other lands? France is -no better. On the whole, I understand it is worse. The voting in the -United States of America fluctuates according to the interest excited -by the particular election. In this respect America does not differ -from Britain. I cannot lay my hand on the percentage of the poll at the -last presidential election, but I gather it was higher than ours at -the general election. The Germans polled at their last election 89 per -cent. of their electorate; in Italy the percentage was much lower.</p> - -<p>With an unpolled and unticketed electorate of over 4,000,000 anything -may happen. They have clearly no interest in the ordinary political -conflicts that engage the minds of their fellow-citizens; otherwise, -the excitement of two general elections would have roused them to such -faint exhibition of partisanship as is implied in the choosing of a -candidate out of the two or three who have taken the trouble to send -along their pictures.</p> - -<p>But one day an issue may arise which will wake up the most lethargic. -What will it be? And<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> what view will they take of it when it comes? And -who will succeed in catching the eye of the slumbering multitude when -it opens? Much depends on the answer to these questions. They may rally -to the defence of property menaced by rapacious creeds. They may rush -to the protection of their homes threatened by avaricious wealth.</p> - -<p>Even those who have already voted are liable to sudden and devastating -changes of opinion. Witness Mitcham, Willesden, and Edgehill. These -three seats were regarded as being amongst the safest in England, and -were selected for that very reason.</p> - -<p>Amongst many disquieting factors there is one which ought to be dealt -with ere another election arrive. Under the present system a minority -of electors may usurp absolute dominion over the fortunes of this -kingdom for fully five years.</p> - -<p>This is one of the freaks of the group system. The present -parliamentary majority has been elected by an aggregate vote which -represents something a little better than one-fourth of the total -electorate and one-third of those who recorded their votes. If Mitcham -and Edgehill are a foretaste of what is to happen at the "General,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> -Labour will be the lucky third. A similar turnover of votes in every -constituency would place them easily in that position.</p> - -<p>America has brought its vast electorate under what seems to us to be -a perfect discipline. But in the process it has passed through much -tribulation, including the furnace of a terrible civil war. Italy has -been impelled to correct the working of democratic institutions by a -display of force. Britain may mobilise and drill its electoral forces -with less trouble. But it has a Socialist party, which has grown by -millions within less than a decade—and is still growing. This week its -most eloquent member has proposed, in the House of Commons, a solemn -motion for the abolition of private property. Deputies chosen by four -and a quarter million of British electors will vote for this proposal, -and if, four years hence, they add another million and a half to their -poll, they will be in a position to place that motion on the statute -book. Their increase between 1918 and 1922 was greater than that.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See the <i>Times</i>, March 14, 1923.</p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXV</span> <span class="smaller">POLITICAL REALITIES</span></h2> - -<p>A few weeks ago I predicted that the comparative calm which has -prevailed in the political seas of Britain during the past few years -was coming to an end. Recent parliamentary scenes leave no doubt that -the prolonged political depression is to be followed by a period of -storms—it may be hurricanes.</p> - -<p>No amount of organisation or propaganda can excite real feeling in -an electorate over trivial and unreal issues. Why did the coalition -of 1915 fall? And why did the Liberal party split in 1916? Who was -responsible? Should the general election have taken place in 1918 -or 1919? Ought open and declared opponents of the government of the -day to have then received government support or at least government -neutrality? These are questions which agitate a few who are personally -interested, but they leave the nation cold.</p> - -<p>The war was real enough. But the war was <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span>supported by men of -all parties, and, therefore, provoked no political controversy. -The minority which opposed it was negligible, and challenged no -parliamentary discussion on the question. The treaty of peace was, -on the whole, accepted by all parties when it was first submitted to -Parliament. The leaders of the opposition parties in the Lords and -Commons at the time of its presentation offered no serious criticism of -its provisions.</p> - -<p>The legislation proposed by the Coalition, although in ordinary seasons -much of it would have aroused angry passions, coming as it did after -the war had exhausted emotion, passed with no more than a feeble murmur -of protest. Take, for instance, such controversial topics as adult -suffrage, the enfranchisement of women, the wholesale reductions in -hours of labour, representative government in India, and notably the -conferring upon Ireland of a measure of Home Rule more complete than -any proposed by Gladstone.</p> - -<p>Any one of these measures proposed before the war would have led to -heated discussion throughout the land. The case of Ireland is perhaps -the most significant of the changed temper of the nation immediately -after the great war. The conflict<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> over Irish Home Rule has now -culminated in a treaty accepted by the nation as a whole and acquiesced -in by the most violent amongst its opponents.</p> - -<p>But fiercer political passions were stirred up by the struggle between -parties over Ireland than by any political question of modern times. -The causes underlying the conflict dealt with two of the most powerful -motives which make the human heart throb—race and religion. There -was the old feud between Saxon and Gael extending over at least seven -centuries. It drenched the moors of Ireland with the blood of both -races before a keener edge was given to its hatreds by the introduction -of an acute religious quarrel.</p> - -<p>After the Reformation the religious differences which rent Europe -with fratricidal wars added fresh fury to the racial enmities which -made poor Ireland a cauldron of perpetual strife. When Mr. Gladstone -proposed to settle this raging tumult by wresting supremacy from a race -which had been dominant in that island for 700 years and a faith which -had been supreme there for 400 years and transferring it to the race -and religion which all that time had been in a condition of servitude, -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> when in order to attain his ends he had to secure the adhesion of -men of the ruling blood and creed to his proposals, the passions raised -were deeper and angrier than any witnessed in British politics for many -a day. It led for the first time in the history of parliament to scenes -of physical violence on the floor of the House. It shows what we may -expect when there are genuine divisions of opinion which profoundly -move masses of men and women in a democracy. Those who recall the -tropical heat of parliamentary debates in 1893 naturally regard their -voyage through the frigid proceedings of the last parliament as they -would a sail through Arctic seas. That voyage is now over, and there -are signs that the waters will soon be lashed into fury.</p> - -<p>For years political controversy between parties has been suspended -in the presence of a common danger. Reaction was inevitable, and the -greater the suppression the more violent the rebound. That does not, -however, altogether account for the visible omens of a coming struggle -unprecedented in its gravity. Fundamental issues have been raised of -such moment to millions that they cannot be settled without a struggle -that will rock society.</p> - -<p>The scene enacted in the Commons a few days<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> ago was by no means as -exciting as that which some of us witnessed in 1893. But it gave me an -uneasy feeling that the period of calm is definitely over, and that -Parliament henceforth must expect gusts and gales—and worse. Emotions -are once more welling up, and there are signs of a great stir coming in -British politics.</p> - -<p>The cause is easily explained. The sense of exhaustion is passing -away, and issues containing a serious challenge to the privileges and -rights of powerful classes in the community and vital to the interests -of all classes have been raised by one of the great political parties -that divide Britain. The momentous character of that challenge may be -gathered from the terms of the motion submitted by Mr. Philip Snowden -to the judgment of the House of Commons:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"That in view of the failure of the capitalist system to -adequately utilise and organise natural resources and productive -power, or to provide the necessary standard of life for vast -numbers of the population, and believing that the cause of this -failure lies in the private ownership and control of the means of -production and distribution, this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> House declares that legislative -effort should be directed to the gradual supersession of the -capitalist system by an industrial and social order based on the -public ownership and democratic control of the instruments of -production and distribution."</p></blockquote> - -<p>This motion will receive the full support of every member of the Labour -party. A few men outside the Socialist party who have acquainted -themselves with the publications of that party were quite prepared -for this demand of a complete change in the organisation of society. -And as they saw that party grow with startling rapidity they knew we -should not have long to wait before these subversive ideas would be -formulated in the House of Commons. Still, even for the students of -Socialist literature, the actual tabling of the resolution on behalf -of the second largest party in the State came as a surprise and a -shock. Too much credit was given to the restraining influence of the -trade union section of the party. Sir Lynden Macassey, in his informing -book on "Labour Policy, False and True," points out that it was in -1885 that the avowed advocates of this proposal for the abolition of -private property and for the nationalisation of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> all the means of -production and distribution first stood for Parliament. There were -only two candidates standing on this platform, and they polled 32 and -29 votes respectively. Last election the aggregate Socialist poll -reached the imposing figure of 4,251,011 votes. The party that secured -a majority of members in the House of Commons only polled 5,457,871 -votes. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald states categorically that he knows that -the Independent Liberal members—exclusive of their leaders—favour -nationalisation and the capital levy. If that be an accurate statement -of the views of the majority of these gentlemen, and of those who elect -them, nearly one-half the British electorate are already prepared to -assent to Socialism by easy stages—which is the purport of Mr. Philip -Snowden's motion.</p> - -<p>On that assumption we are on the eve of greater and more fundamental -changes affecting the lives of every class and condition of men and -women than have yet been seen in this country. Hence the new sense of -struggle with which the political atmosphere is palpitating. Capitalism -is to be arraigned before the Supreme Court of the Nation, condemned, -sentenced, and executed by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span>instalments—Chinese fashion. The -composition of that court is not to-day favourable to the prosecution. -But who will be the judge after the next general election? It is -customary in political controversy to state that the election which -is for the moment impending will be the most epoch-making in history. -Without exaggeration, the next British election may well turn out to be -so. The British people, with their inherited political instinct, are -beginning to realise that grave decisions must then be taken. Hence the -greater keenness shown by the voters at by-elections—hence the new -interest taken by the public in the proceedings of Parliament. There is -still a good deal of apathy and indifference. The average comfortable -citizen is still inclined to think these Socialist schemes so crazy as -to be impossible. They cannot believe that 21,000,000 of sane people -can possibly contemplate giving their sanction to such fantasies.</p> - -<p>There are two cardinal facts which are constantly overlooked by the -complacent. The men and women who have no property for the State to -seize constitute an overwhelming majority of the electors of the -country. The second fact to note is the great preponderance of the -industrial population over<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> the steadier and more stolid agricultural -population. America, in spite of its gigantic manufacturing and -distributing industries, still retains 60 per cent. of its population -on the land. The same proportion of the French and Italian populations -is agrarian. Barely 10 per cent. of the British workers are engaged -in cultivating the soil. Most of our workers breathe and have their -being in the crowded and excitable atmosphere of factories, workshops, -and mines. The air is filled with germs of all kinds, and isolation in -these thronging areas is impossible. Hence the rapidity with which the -fever has spread.</p> - -<p>Can it be arrested? Nothing will be done until the danger is visible to -every eye. To vary the metaphor, no one will believe in the flood until -it is upon us. Trained weather prophets who forecast its coming will -be laughed at or told they have a personal or party interest in ark -building. It is an old tale—as old as the dawn of history. "As in the -days before the flood, they were eating and drinking and knew not until -the flood came and took them all away."</p> - -<p>The trouble can only be averted in two ways. One is the systematic -inculcation of sound doctrines<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> of economic truth into the minds of the -working people of this country. The second, and the more important, is -the rooting out of the social evils which furnish the revolutionary -with striking and indisputable object-lessons of the failure of the -capitalistic system as an agent of human happiness. Without the latter -the former effort will be futile. Arguments in favour of the existing -order will be refuted by glaring and painful facts. Meanwhile, let -the champions of that order take note of the efforts put forth by the -Socialists to advertise their eagerness to redress the wrongs of the -ex-service men and to soften the asperities of discipline for the -soldier. The Socialist leaders have shrewdly taken note of the causes -that produced the overthrow of their Italian brethren, and they mean to -take such steps as will ensure that if Fascism comes in Britain it will -be an ally, and not a foe.</p> - -<p><i>London, April 16th, 1923.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXVI</span> <span class="smaller">SHOULD WE MAKE PEACE WITH RUSSIA?</span></h2> - -<p>I am frankly delighted that negotiations between Lord Curzon and the -Soviet government seem to indicate a genuine desire on the part of both -parties to establish a more satisfactory understanding between this -country and Russia. The Bolshevist episode, like all revolutionary -terrors, has been at times a shrieking nightmare which has made the -world shudder. It did render one supreme service to civilisation—it -terrified democracy back into sanity just at the time when the -nervous excitability that followed the war was bordering on mental -instability. In our attitude towards the Soviet government we must, -however, constantly bear in mind one consideration. What matters to us -is not so much the Russian government as the people of Russia, and for -the moment the Bolshevist administration represents the only medium -for dealing with that mighty nation. As long as it <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span>remains the only -constituted authority in Russia, every act of hostility against it -injures Russia. As we discovered in 1919, you cannot wage war against -the government for the time being of a country without devastating -the land and alienating its people. You cannot refuse to trade with -it now without depriving its people of commodities—and especially of -equipments—essential to their well-being. It is the people, therefore, -who would suffer, and it is the people who would ultimately resent that -suffering. Governments come and go, but the nation goes on for ever.</p> - -<p>The Russian people deserve—especially at the hands of all the Allied -nations—every sympathetic consideration we can extend to them. Not -only because they have to endure the sway of a tyrannical oligarchy -imposing its will by ruthless violence, but even more for the reasons -that led to the establishment of that tyranny. If the fruit is bitter -we must bear in mind how the tree came to be planted in the soil. It -may sound like quoting ancient history to revert to the events of eight -or nine years ago, but no one can understand Russia, or do justice to -its unhappy people, without recalling the incidents that led to the -great catastrophe.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span></p> - -<p>Those who denounce any dealings with the existing order seem to have -persuaded themselves that pre-revolutionary Russia was governed by -a gentle and beneficent despotism which conferred the blessings of -a tolerant and kindly fatherland upon a well-ruled household. In no -particular is this a true picture of the <i>ancien régime</i>. The fortress -of Peter and Paul was not erected, nor its dungeons dug, by the -Bolshevists. Siberia was not set up as a penal settlement for political -offenders for the first time—if at all—by the Bolshevists. In 1906 -alone 45,000 political offenders were deported to endure the severities -of Siberia. Persecution of suspected religious leaders was not started -by the Soviets. To them does not belong the discredit of initiating the -methods of Pogromism. Under the "paternal" reign of the Tsars dissent -from the Orthodox faith was proscribed and persecuted, and the Jews -were hunted like vermin.</p> - -<p>Let us not forget also that beyond all these circumstances the -revolution was rendered inevitable by the ineptitude and corruption -of the old system, and especially by the terrible suffering and -humiliation which that state of things inflicted on Russia in the Great -War.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span></p> - -<p>Any one who has read the <i>Memoirs of an Ambassador</i>, by M. Paléologue, -will find a complete explanation in its pages of the savage hatred with -which the Russian revolutionaries view all those who were associated -in any degree with the old order. He tells the story of how the -gallant army found itself at the critical hour without ammunition, -rifles, transport, and often without food. No braver or more devoted -men ever fought for their country than the young peasants who made up -the Russian armies of 1914-15-16. With little and often no artillery -support, they faced without faltering the best-equipped heavy artillery -in the world. They were mown down by shell fire and machine guns by -the million. Their aggregate casualties up to September, 1916, even -according to the reluctant admissions of the Tsarist generals of the -day, were five millions. In reality they were much heavier. Often they -went into action with sticks, as the Russian War Office had no rifles -with which to arm them. They picked up as they advanced rifles dropped -by fallen comrades. There is nothing in the war comparable to the -trustful heroism of these poor peasants. We know now why there were no -rifles, or shells, or wagons. The wholesale <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span>corruption of the <i>régime</i> -has been exposed to the world by irrefutable documentary evidence.</p> - -<p>Here are a few extracts from M. Paléologue's interesting book. One -extract from his diary reads:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"The lack of ammunition means that the rôle of the artillery -in battle is necessarily insignificant. The whole burden of -the fighting falls on the infantry and the result is a ghastly -expenditure of human life. A day or two ago one of the Grand -Duke Sergius's collaborators, Colonel Englehardt, said to Major -Wehrlin, my second military attaché: 'We're paying for the crimes -of our administration with the blood of our men.'"</p></blockquote> - -<p>About the same date talking about the deplorable state of things, the -Grand Duke Sergius, who was Inspector-General of Artillery, said to the -French ambassador, "When I think that this exhibition of impotence is -all that our aristocratic system has to show, it makes me want to be a -Republican."</p> - -<p>When a Grand Duke talked like that early in 1915, what must a peasant -soldier have thought by the spring of 1917, after many more millions of -his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> comrades had been slaughtered as a result of the same "exhibition -of impotence."</p> - -<p>It is no use pointing to the fact that our army was also short of -ammunition at that date. The British army was a small army organised -on the basis of a maximum expeditionary force of six divisions. The -Russian army was a great conscript force organised on the basis of a -hundred divisions in the field.</p> - -<p>I recollect well our own military reports from the Russian fronts. They -provided much distressing reading. They filled you with compassion for -the millions of gallant men who were the victims of corruption and -stupidity in high places. I recall one statement made to our general -which betrays the callous indifference with which men in authority -seemed to treat the appalling sacrifice of life amongst loyal soldiers -who were facing death without a murmur, because the "Little Father" -willed it. Whenever anxious inquiries were directed by our officer as -to the gigantic losses in men which filled him with dismay as well -as horror, the usual reply was, "Don't worry yourself. Thank God, of -men at all events we have enough." An answer which sends a thrill of -horror through you when you<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> read it. That is why at the end of two -and a half years the patient men in the field at last mutinied. That -is why their parents and brothers in the fields supported them. The -"Little Father" had failed them, and his minions had betrayed them. It -is a sordid and horrid tale of peculation, maladministration, and cruel -treachery. Millions of British and French money went in shameless and -open bribery, whilst the soldiers in the field, for need of what the -money could buy, were opposing bare breasts covering brave hearts to -the most terrible artillery in the world. If the rest of the money had -been well spent, what was left after providing for profuse graft would -still have sufficed to save that gallant army from destruction. But -unhappily no real interest was taken in anything beyond the amount and -the payment of the pocket-money. That seemed to be the main purpose of -the transaction. Nothing was well managed except the inevitable bribe. -There were honourable and upright men who did their duty by their -distracted and plundered country, but they were helpless in the torrent -of corruption.</p> - -<p>No wonder a great Russian industrialist engaged in the ministry of -war, in dwelling on the sad <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span>failure of tsarism and its probable -results in June, 1905, predicted a revolution with "ten years of -the most frightful anarchy." "We shall," he added, "see the days of -Pugatchef<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> again and perhaps worse"—a striking prophecy verified -with appalling accuracy.</p> - -<p>It is not pleasant to recall these dreadful episodes, which reveal the -betrayal of a devotion faithful unto death. But this story is essential -to the right appreciation of events. There is no savagery like that of -a trustful people which finds that its trust was being imposed upon the -whole time. Here the retribution has been hideous in all its aspects. -But the provocation was also revolting from every point of view. To -judge Russia fairly that must be taken into account.</p> - -<p>I think the government are, therefore, taking the right view of -their responsibilities when through their foreign secretary they -open negotiations with the representative of the Soviet government -in this country. You can easily evoke resounding cheers amongst the -thoughtless by declaring <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span>melodramatically that you will never "shake -hands with murder." In practice this policy has always been a failure. -Mr. Pitt in a famous passage declined to assent to that doctrine when -he was attacked for trying to open negotiations with the "assassins" -of the French Revolution. He was driven out of this calm and rational -attitude by the inflammable rhetoric of Burke, aided by the arrogance -of the victorious revolutionaries. Nevertheless, the sequel proved he -was right. French Bolshevism was not defeated by foreign armies, nor -starved out by the British blockade. But it was driven into the arms of -Napoleon, and Europe suffered bitterly for the folly of the hotheads -on both sides. It would have been better for that generation had it -listened to the wise counsel of William Pitt.</p> - -<p>If you decline to treat with Russia as long as its present rulers -remain in power, then you ought to place Turkey in the same category. -The military junta that governed Turkey has been guilty of atrocities -at least as vile as any committed by the Bolshevists. But at Lausanne -we ostentatiously stretched the friendly hand of Britain to the authors -of the Armenian massacres. And France,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> Italy—yes, and America -also—tendered the same warm handshake. I am not criticising the offer -of amity made as a condition of peace. We must make peace in the world, -and you cannot do so if you put whole nations off your visiting list -because of the misconduct of those who govern them. Once you begin you -are not quite sure where it will end.</p> - -<p>In these cases the innocent suffer the most. A refusal to trade with -Russia would not deprive the Soviet commissaries of a single necessity -or comfort of life. The Communists are quite strong enough to take care -of themselves. But the peasants—who are not Communists—would continue -to suffer, and their sufferings would increase as their reserves of -clothing and other essentials became completely exhausted. And the -people of this country who need the produce of Russia for their own use -would also suffer to a certain extent. America can afford this exalted -aloofness. She does not need the Russian grain and timber. She is an -exporter of those commodities. But we cannot do as well without them, -and we also sadly need Russian flax for our linen industries, which are -languishing for the want of it. Last year there were quite considerable -imports of Russian produce<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> into this country. This year owing to the -prospects of an improved harvest these imports will be much larger. -They are greatly needed here for our own consumption, and they pay -for exports of machinery and textiles which the Russian on his part -urgently requires.</p> - -<p>But beyond and above all these material considerations, the world needs -peace. In the old days conveyancing attorneys in this country kept a -property transaction going by interminable requisitions on the title -of the other party. They exercised all their ingenuity and invoked the -added ingenuity of trained counsel to probe for defects in the right of -the vendor to deal. Those were leisurely days, and men could afford to -dawdle. Even then these exercises often ended in ruinous litigation. -To-day time presses and the atmosphere is dangerous for the plying of -irritating interrogatories. It is time we made up our minds that the -Soviets have come to stay, whether we like it or no, and that one or -other of the formidable men who rule Russia to-day are likely to rule -it for some time to come. The sooner we have the courage to recognise -this fact, the sooner will real peace be established.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Pugatchef was the Pretender who led a revolt of the -peasants in the reign of Catherine and spread rapine and carnage -through the provinces bordering the Volga and Ural.</p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXVII</span> <span class="smaller">PALESTINE AND THE JEWS</span></h2> - -<div class="center"><div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<div>"What's his reason? I am a Jew."</div> -<div class="i7"><i>The Merchant of Venice.</i></div> -</div></div></div> - -<p>Of all the bigotries that savage the human temper there is none so -stupid as the anti-Semitic. It has no basis in reason; it is not -rooted in faith; it aspires to no ideal; it is just one of those dank -and unwholesome weeds that grow in the morass of racial hatred. How -utterly devoid of reason it is may be gathered from the fact that it -is almost entirely confined to nations who worship Jewish prophets and -apostles, revere the national literature of the Hebrews as the only -inspired message delivered by the deity to mankind, and whose only hope -of salvation rests on the precepts and promises of the great teachers -of Judah. Yet in the sight of these fanatics the Jews of to-day can do -nothing right. If they are rich they are birds of prey. If they are -poor they are vermin. If they are in favour of a war it is because they -want to exploit the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> bloody feuds of the Gentiles to their own profit. -If they are anxious for peace they are either instinctive cowards -or traitors. If they give generously—and there are no more liberal -givers than the Jews—they are doing it for some selfish purpose of -their own. If they do not give—then what could one expect of a Jew -but avarice? If labour is oppressed by great capital, the greed of -the Jew is held responsible. If labour revolts against capital—as -it did in Russia—the Jew is blamed for that also. If he lives in a -strange land he must be persecuted and pogrommed out of it. If he wants -to go back to his own he must be prevented. Through the centuries -in every land, whatever he does, or intends, or fails to do, he has -been pursued by the echo of the brutal cry of the rabble of Jerusalem -against the greatest of all Jews—"Crucify Him!" No good has ever come -of nations that crucified Jews. It is poor and pusillanimous sport, -lacking all the true qualities of manliness, and those who indulge in -it would be the first to run away were there any element of danger in -it. Jew-baiters are generally of the type that found good reasons for -evading military service when their own country was in danger.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span></p> - -<p>The latest exhibition of this wretched indulgence is the agitation -against settling poor Jews in the land their fathers made famous. -Palestine under Jewish rule once maintained a population of 5,000,000. -Under the blighting rule of the Turk it barely supported a population -of 700,000. The land flowing with milk and honey is now largely a stony -and unsightly desert. To quote one of the ablest and most far-sighted -business men of to-day, "It is a land of immense possibilities, in -spite of the terrible neglect of its resources resulting from Turkish -misrule. It is a glorious estate let down by centuries of neglect. The -Turks cut down the forests and never troubled to replant them. They -slaughtered the cattle and never troubled to replace them." It is one -of the peculiarities of the Jew-hunter that he adores the Turk.</p> - -<p>If Palestine is to be restored to a condition even approximate to -its ancient prosperity, it must be by settling Jews on its soil. The -condition to which the land has been reduced by centuries of the most -devastating oppression in the world is such that restoration is only -possible by a race that is prepared for sentimental reasons to make and -endure sacrifices for the purpose. What is the history of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> the Jewish -settlement in Palestine? It did not begin with the Balfour Declaration. -A century ago there were barely 10,000 Jews in the whole of Palestine. -Before the war there were 100,000. The war considerably reduced these -numbers, and immigration since 1918 has barely filled up the gaps. At -the present timorous rate of progress it will be many years before it -reaches 200,000. Jewish settlement started practically seventy years -ago, with Sir Moses Montefiore's experiment in 1854—another war year. -The Sultan had good reasons for propitiating the Jews in that year, -as the Allies had in 1917. So the Jewish resettlement of Palestine -began. From that day onward it has proceeded slowly but steadily. The -land available was not of the best. Prejudices and fears had to be -negotiated. Anything in the nature of wholesale expropriation of Arab -cultivators, even for cash, had to be carefully avoided. The Jews were, -therefore, often driven to settle on barren sand dunes and malarial -swamps. The result can best be given by quoting from an article written -by Mrs. Fawcett, the famous woman leader. She visited Palestine in 1921 -and again in 1922, and this is her account of the Jewish settlements:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote><p>"So far from the colonies and the colonists draining the country -of its resources they have created resources which were previously -non-existent; they have planted and skilfully cultivated desert -sands and converted them into fruitful vineyards and orange -and lemon orchards; in other parts they have created valuable -agricultural land out of what were previously dismal swamps -producing nothing but malaria and other diseases. The colonists -have not shrunk from the tremendous work and the heavy sacrifices -required. Many of the early arrivals laid down their lives over -their work; the survivors went on bravely, draining the swamps, -planting eucalyptus trees by the hundred thousand so that at -length the swamp became a fruitful garden, and the desert once -more blossomed like the rose."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Everywhere the Jew cultivator produces heavier and richer crops than -his Arab neighbour. He has introduced into Palestine more scientific -methods of cultivation, and his example is producing a beneficent -effect on the crude tillage of the Arab peasant. It will be long ere -Canaan becomes once more a land flowing with milk and honey. The -effects of the neglect and misrule of centuries cannot be <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span>effaced by -the issue of a declaration. The cutting down of the trees has left -the soil unprotected against the heavy rains and the rocks which were -once green with vineyards and olive groves have been swept bare. The -terraces which ages of patient industry built up have been destroyed -by a few generations of Turkish stupidity. They cannot be restored in -a single generation. Great irrigation works must be constructed if -settlement is to proceed on a satisfactory scale. Palestine possesses -in some respects advantages for the modern settler which to its ancient -inhabitants were a detriment. Its one great river and its tributaries -are rapid and have a great fall. For power this is admirable. Whether -for irrigation, or for the setting up of new industries, this gift of -nature to Palestine is capable of exploitation only made possible by -the scientific discoveries of the last century. The tableland of Judea -has a rainfall which if caught in reservoirs at appropriate centres -would make of the "desert of Judea" a garden. If this be done Arab and -Jew alike share in the prosperity.</p> - -<p>There are few countries on earth which have made less of their -possibilities. Take its special attractions for the tourist. I was -amazed to find<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> that the visitors to Palestine in the whole course of a -year only aggregate 15,000. It contains the most famous shrines in the -world. Its history is of more absorbing interest to the richest peoples -on earth, and is better taught to their children, than even that of -their own country. Some of its smallest villages are better known to -countless millions than many a prosperous modern city. Hundreds of -thousands ought to be treading this sacred ground every year. Why are -they not doing so? The answer is: Turkish misrule scared away the -pilgrim. Those who went there came back disillusioned and disappointed. -The modern "spies" on their return did not carry with them the luscious -grapes of Escol to thrill the multitude with a desire to follow their -example. They brought home depressing tales of squalor, discomfort, -and exaction which dispelled the glamour and discouraged further -pilgrimages. Settled government gives the Holy Land its first chance -for 1900 years. But there is so much undeveloped country demanding the -attention of civilisation that Palestine will lose that chance unless -it is made the special charge of some powerful influence. The Jews -alone can redeem it from the wilderness and restore its ancient glory.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span></p> - -<p>In that trust there is no injustice to any other race. The Arabs have -neither the means, the energy, nor the ambition to discharge this duty. -The British Empire has too many burdens on its shoulders to carry this -experiment through successfully. The Jewish race with its genius, -its resourcefulness, its tenacity, and not least its wealth, can -alone perform this essential task. The Balfour Declaration is not an -expropriating but an enabling clause. It is only a charter of equality -for the Jews. Here are its terms:</p> - -<blockquote><p>"His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in -Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will -use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this -object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done -which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing -non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political -status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."</p></blockquote> - -<p>The declaration was subsequently endorsed and adopted by President -Wilson and the French and Italian foreign ministers.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Zionists ask for no more. It has been suggested by their enemies -that they are seeking to establish a Jewish oligarchy in Palestine -that will reduce the Arab inhabitant to a condition of servitude to a -favoured Hebrew minority. The best answer to that charge is to be found -in the memorandum submitted by the Zionist Association to the League of -Nations.</p> - -<blockquote><p>"The Jews demand no privilege, unless it be the privilege of -rebuilding by their own efforts and sacrifices a land which, once -the seat of a thriving and productive civilisation, has long been -suffered to remain derelict. They expect no favoured treatment -in the matter of political or religious rights. They assume, as -a matter of course, that all the inhabitants of Palestine, be -they Jews or non-Jews, will be in every respect on a footing of -perfect equality. They seek no share in the government beyond that -to which they may be entitled under the Constitution as citizens -of the country. They solicit no favours. They ask, in short, no -more than an assured opportunity of peacefully building up their -national home by their own exertions and of succeeding on their -merits."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span></p> - -<p>It is a modest request which these exiles from Zion propound to the -nations. And surely it is just that it should be conceded, and if -conceded then carried out in the way men of honour fulfil their bond. -There are fourteen millions of Jews in the world. They belong to a -race which for at least 1900 years has been subjected to proscription, -pillage, massacre, and the torments of endless derision—a race that -has endured persecution, which for the variety of torture, physical, -material and mental, inflicted on its victims, for the virulence and -malignity with which it has been sustained, for the length of time it -has lasted, and more than all for the fortitude and patience with which -it has been suffered, is without parallel in the history of any other -people. Is it too much to ask that those amongst them whose sufferings -are the worst shall be able to find refuge in the land their fathers -made holy by the splendour of their genius, by the loftiness of their -thoughts, by the consecration of their lives, and by the inspiration of -their message to mankind?</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXVIII</span> <span class="smaller">THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></span></h2> - -<p>The vanquished have returned to their spiritual home at Angora throwing -their fezzes in the air. The victors have returned with their tails -well between their legs. All tragedies have their scenes of comedy, and -the Lausanne Conference is one of those amusing episodes interpolated -by fate to relieve the poignancy of one of its greatest tragic -pieces—the Turk and civilisation.</p> - -<p>The Turk may be a bad ruler, but he is the prince of anglers. The -cunning and the patience with which he lands the most refractory fish -once he has hooked it is beyond compare. What inimitable play we have -witnessed for six months on the shores of Lake Leman! Once the fish -seemed to have broken the tackle—that was when the first conference -came to an abrupt end. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> simply meant, however, that the wily -Oriental was giving out plenty of line. Time never worries him, he can -sit and wait. He knew the moment would come when they would return -with the hook well in their gullets, and the play begin once more—the -reeling in and the reeling out, the line sometimes taut and strained -but never snapping. Time and patience rewarded him. At last the huge -tarpon are all lying beached on the banks—Britain, France, Italy, -and the United States of America—high and dry, landed and helpless, -without a swish left in their tails, glistening and gasping in the -summer sun.</p> - -<p>It is little wonder that Ismet had a smile on his face when all was -over. Reports from Angora state that the peace is hailed there as -a great Turkish triumph; and so it is. The Turk is truly a great -fisherman. If he could govern as well as he angles, his would be the -most formidable Empire in the world. Unfortunately he is the worst of -rulers, hence the trouble—his own and that of those who unhappily have -drawn him as governor in the lottery of life.</p> - -<p>The able correspondent of the <i>Daily Telegraph</i> at the Lausanne -Conference has supplied us from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> time to time with vivid pen pictures -of the four greatest Powers of the world struggling in the toils of the -squalid and broken remains of an Empire with an aggregate population -equal to that of a couple of English counties that I could name. This -is what he wrote about this conference, which constitutes one of the -most humiliating incidents in the history of Western civilisation:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"The records of the present Conference present an even more -marvellous series of concessions and surrenders. What was frayed -before is threadbare now. The Allies have whittled away their -own rights with a lavish hand in the cause of peace. They have -also—and this is a graver matter, for which it seems they will -have to give an account in the not distant future—gone back on -their promises to small races, which are none the less promises -because the small races have not the power to enforce their -performance. The figure that the European delegates are cutting in -Lausanne, and the agents of the <i>concessionnaires</i> in Angora—all -alike representatives of the West—has been rendered undignified -as much by the manner as the matter of their worsting."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span></p> - -<p>Since those distressing words were written the Powers have sunk yet -deeper into the slough of humiliation.</p> - -<p><i>The Times</i> correspondent wiring after the agreement writes in a strain -of deep indignation at the blow inflicted on the prestige of the West -by this extraordinary Treaty. In order to gauge the extent of the -disaster to civilisation which this Treaty implies it is only necessary -to give a short summary of the war aims of the Allies in Turkey.</p> - -<p>They were stated by Mr. Asquith with his usual succinctness and clarity -in a speech which he delivered when Prime Minister at the Guildhall on -November 9th, 1914:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"It is not the Turkish people—it is the Ottoman Government that -has drawn the sword, and which, I venture to predict, will perish -by the sword. It is they and not we who have rung the death-knell -of Ottoman dominion, not only in Europe but in Asia. With their -disappearance will disappear as I, at least, hope and believe, the -blight which for generations past has withered some of the fairest -regions of the earth."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span></p> - -<p>In pursuance of the policy thus declared by the British Premier on -behalf of the Allies a series of Agreements was entered into in the -early months of 1915 between France, Russia, and ourselves, by which -the greater part of Turkey, with its conglomerate population, was to be -partitioned at the end of the War. Cilicia and Syria were allocated to -France; Mesopotamia to Britain; Armenia and Constantinople to Russia. -Palestine was to be placed under the joint control of Britain and -France. Arabia was to be declared independent and a territory carved -largely out of the desert—but including some famous cities of the -East, Damascus, Homs and Aleppo—was to be constituted into a new Arab -State, partly under the protection of France and partly of Britain. -Smyrna and its precincts were to be allotted to Greece if she joined -her forces with those of the Allies in the war. The Straits were to be -demilitarised and garrisoned. When Italy came into the war later on in -1915, it was stipulated that in the event of the partition of Turkey -being carried out in pursuance of these agreements, territories in -Southern Anatolia should be assigned to Italy for development.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span></p> - -<p>What was the justification for breaking up the Turkish Empire? The -portions to be cut out of Turkey have a population the majority of -which is non-Turkish. Cilicia and Southern Anatolia might constitute a -possible exception. In these territories massacres and misgovernment -had perhaps succeeded at last in turning the balance in favour of the -Turk. But in the main the distributed regions were being cultivated -and developed before the war by a population which was Western and not -Turanian in its origin and outlook. This population represented the -original inhabitants of the soil.</p> - -<p>The experiences, more especially of the past century, had demonstrated -clearly that the Turk could no longer be entrusted with the -property, the honour, or the lives of any Christian race within his -dominions. Whole communities of Armenians had been massacred under -circumstances of the most appalling cruelty in lands which their -ancestors had occupied since the dawn of history. And even after the -war began 700,000 of these wretched people had been done to death -by these savages, to whom, it must be remembered, the Great Powers -so ostentatiously proffered the hand of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> friendship at the first -Lausanne conference. Even while the conference was in session, and the -handshaking was going on, the Turks were torturing to death scores -of thousands of young Greeks whom they deported into the interior. -As "a precautionary measure" 150,000 Greeks of military age, of whom -30,000 were military prisoners, were last year driven inland to the -mountains of Anatolia. On the way they were stripped of their clothes, -and in this condition were herded across the icy mountains. It is not -surprising that when an agreement was arrived at for the exchange -of military prisoners, the Turks found the greatest difficulty in -producing 11,000, and of the total 150,000 it is estimated that -two-thirds perished. The Allied Powers had every good reason for -determining, as they hoped for all time, that this barbarian should -cease to shock the world by repeated exhibitions of savagery against -helpless and unarmed people committed to his charge by a cruel fate.</p> - -<p>Apart from these atrocities the fact that great tracts of country, -once the most fertile and populous in the world, have been reduced by -Turkish misrule and neglect to a condition which is indistinguishable -from the wilderness, alone proves that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> the Turk is a blight and a -curse wherever he pitches his tent, and that he ought in the interests -of humanity to be treated as such. When a race, which has no title to -its lands other than conquest, so mismanages the territories it holds -by violence as to deprive the world of an essential contribution to -its well-being, the nations have a right—nay, a duty—to intervene -in order to restore these devastated areas to civilisation. This same -duty constitutes the reason and justification for the white settlers of -America overriding the prior claims of the Indian to the prairies and -forests of the great West.</p> - -<p>On the shores of the Mediterranean are two races with a surplus -population of hard-working, intelligent cultivators, both of them -belonging to countries which had themselves in the past been -responsible for the government of the doomed lands covered by the -Turkish Empire. Greece and Italy could claim that under their rule -this vast territory throve and prospered mightily. They now pour -their overflow of population into lands far away from the motherland. -Yet they are essentially Mediterranean peoples. The history of the -Mediterranean will for ever be associated with their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> achievements on -its shores and its waters. The derelict wastes of Asia Minor need them. -Valleys formerly crowded with tillers are now practically abandoned -to the desert weeds. Irrigation has been destroyed or neglected. The -Italian engineers are amongst the best in the world, and once they -were introduced into Asia Minor would make cultivation again possible. -There is plenty of scope in the deserts of Anatolia for both Italian -and Greek. I was hoping for a peace that would set them both working. -Had such a settlement been attained, a generation hence would have -witnessed gardens thronging with happy men, women, and children, where -now you have a wilderness across which men, women, and children are -periodically hunted down into nameless horror.</p> - -<p>Yet another reason for the Allied decision was the bitter resentment -that existed at the ingratitude displayed by the Turk towards Britain -and France. They were naturally indignant that he should have joined -their foes and slammed the gate of the Dardanelles in their face, -and by that means complicated and prolonged their campaign and added -enormously to their burdens, their losses, and their dangers. But he -had not the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span>thankfulness even of the beast of prey in the legend -towards the man who had cured his wounded limb. France and Britain -had many a time extracted the thorn from the Turkish paw when he was -limping along in impotent misery. They had done more. They had often -saved the life of that Empire when the Russian bear was on the point of -crushing it out of existence; and yet without provocation, without even -a quarrel, he had betrayed them to their enemies.</p> - -<p>I have set out shortly what the war policy of the Allies was in -reference to Turkey. The Treaty of Sèvres considerably modified that -policy in many vital aspects. By that Treaty, Constantinople, Cilicia, -and Southern Anatolia were left to the Turk; Armenia was created into -an independent State. There were many objections which could be raised -to the original proposals of 1915, as it might be argued that they -contemplated handing over in Cilicia and Southern Anatolia populations -which in the main were Turkish and Moslem to Christian rulers. But in -substance the modified plan of Sèvres was sound, and if carried out -would have conduced to the well-being of the millions to be liberated -by its terms for ever from Turkish<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> rule. The world at large also -would have benefited by the opportunity afforded to the industrious -and intelligent Armenian and Greek populations of Turkey to renew the -fertility of this land, once so bountiful in its gifts, thus enriching -man's store of good things. The barbarian invasion which withered that -fertility was pushed back into the interior by the Treaty of Sèvres. -The Treaty of Lausanne has extended and perpetuated its sway from the -Black Sea to the Mediterranean. I have explained the why and wherefore -of Sèvres. But why Lausanne? It is a long and painful story—a compound -of shortsightedness, disloyalty, selfishness, and pusillanimity amongst -nations and their statesmen. And more than all, Fate happened to be -in its grimmest mood when dealing with this problem. The Russian -Revolution eliminated that great country from the solution of the -problem on the lines of protection for the oppressed races of Turkey, -and instead cast its might on the side of the oppressor. President -Wilson was inclined to recommend that the United States of America -should undertake the mandate for the Armenians. Had he succeeded, what -a different story would now have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span> been told! What a different story the -generations to come would also tell! But his health broke down at the -vital moment and America would have none of his humanitarian schemes. -Then came the departure of Sonnino from the Quirinal. With him went -for a momentous while the old dreams of Italian colonisation, which in -the past had done so much to spread civilisation in three continents. -His successors were homelier men. I have still my doubts as to whether -they served Italy best by the less adventurous and more domesticated -policy they pursued. The future may decide that issue. But whatever the -decision, the time for action passed away, and unless and until there -is another break up in Turkey, the chance Italy has lost since 1919 -will not be recovered. Will it ever come back?</p> - -<p>There followed the French check in Cilicia, and the negotiations -at Angora with Mustapha Kemal, which were both single-handed and -under-handed; for the Allies were not even informed of what was going -on. This was a fatal step, for it broke up the unity which alone would -enable the Western Powers to deal effectively with the Turk. This -unity was never fully re-created. There can be no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> reunion without -confidence. There can be no trust in the West that is broken in -the East. Much of the recent mischief in the Entente came from the -clandestine negotiations at Angora.</p> - -<p>The last fatal change was the Greek revolt against Venizelos. It is -often said that he is the greatest statesman thrown up by that race -since Pericles. In all he has undertaken he has never failed his -people. Disaster has always come to them when they refused to follow -his guidance. When King Alexander was killed by a monkey, the Greeks -were called upon to decide between Constantine and Venizelos. Their -choice was ruinous to their country. No greater evil can befall a -nation than to choose for its ruler a stubborn man with no common -sense. Before the advent of Constantine, Greece, with no aid and -little countenance from the Powers, was able to hold the forces of -Mustapha Kemal easily at bay and even to drive him back into the -fastnesses of Anatolia. In encounter after encounter the Greek army, -led by men chosen for their military gifts and sufficiently well -equipped, inflicted defeat after defeat on the armies of Angora. But -with Constantine came a change. In the Greek army, courtiers were -substituted for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> soldiers in the high command. French, British and -Italian public opinion, with the memory of Constantine's treachery -during the war still fresh in their minds, altered their attitude -towards the Greeks who had elevated him to the throne in defiance of -Allied sentiment. Indifferent Powers became hostile; hostile Powers -became active. The final catastrophe began with the heroic but foolish -march of the Greek army into the defiles of Asia Minor, followed -by the inevitable retreat. It was consummated when Constantine for -dynastic reasons appointed to the command of the troops in Asia Minor -a crazy general whose mental condition had been under medical review. -The Greeks fight valiantly when well led, but like the French, once -they know they are not well led, confidence goes, and with confidence -courage. Before the Kemalist attack reached their lines the Greek -army was beaten and in full retreat. With attack came panic, with -panic the complete destruction of what was once a fine army. With the -disappearance of that army vanished the last hope for the salvation of -Anatolia. That the history of the East, and probably the West, should -have been changed by the bite of a monkey is just another grimace of -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> comic spirit which bursts now and again into the pages of every -great tragedy.</p> - -<p>All that could be done afterwards was to save the remnants of a great -policy. Western civilisation put up its last fight against the return -of savagery into Europe, when in September and October of last year -British soldiers and sailors, deserted by allies and associates alike, -saved Constantinople from hideous carnage. The Pact of Mudania was -not Sèvres, but it certainly was better than Lausanne. From Sèvres to -Mudania was a retreat. From Mudania to Lausanne is a rout.</p> - -<p>What next? Lausanne is not a terminus, it is only a milestone. Where -is the next? No one claims that this Treaty is peace with honour. It -is not even peace. If one were dealing with a regenerated Turk, there -might be hope. But the burning of Smyrna, and the cold-blooded murders -of tens of thousands of young Greeks in the interior, prove that the -Turk is still unchanged. To quote again from the correspondent of <i>The -Times</i> at Lausanne:—</p> - -<blockquote><p>"All such evidence as can be obtained here confirms the belief -that the new Turk is but the old,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> and that the coming era of -enlightenment and brotherly love in Turkey, for which it is the -correct thing officially to hope, will be from the foreigners' -point of view at best a humiliating, and at worst a bloody, chaos."</p></blockquote> - -<p>The amazing legend that the Turk is a gentleman is dying hard. -That legend has saved him many a time when he was on the brink of -destruction. It came to his aid in October last when the policy of -this country was changed by the revolt of the Turcophile against the -Coalition. The Turk has massacred hundreds of thousands of Armenians, -and dishonoured myriads of Christian women who trusted to his -protection. Nevertheless the Turk is a gentleman! By his indolence, -his shiftiness, his stupidity, and his wantonness, he has reduced a -garden to a desert. What better proof can there be that he is a real -gentleman? For a German bribe he sold the friends who had repeatedly -saved his wretched life. All the same, what a gentleman he is! He -treated British prisoners with a barbarous neglect that killed them off -in hundreds. Still, he is such a gentleman! He plunders, he slays, and -outrages those who are unable to defend themselves.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> He misgoverns, -cheats, lies, and betrays. For all that, the Turk is a gentleman! So an -agitation was engineered with perverse tenacity to save this fine old -Oriental gentleman from the plebeian hands that sought his destruction. -Hence the black Treaty of Lausanne.</p> - -<p><i>London, July 25th, 1923</i></p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> London, July 25th, 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne, between -the Allies and the Turks, was signed on July 24th, 1923.</p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXIX</span> <span class="smaller">THE SIGNING OF THE IRISH TREATY</span></h2> - -<p>When a few days ago I was half-way through the speech I delivered in -the House of Commons on the land system the faithful Commons were -summoned in the manner consecrated by centuries of tradition to the bar -of the House of Lords to hear the royal assent being given to the bill -for the constitution of the Irish Free State. Notwithstanding a natural -preoccupation with my interrupted speech two scenes came to my mind -during my short journey to and from the upper chamber.</p> - -<p>The first was the spectacle of a crowded House of Commons nearly -thirty years ago. When the doors were opened for prayers there was the -unwonted sight of a throng of hustling M.P.'s pressing through the -swing doors to secure seats. I need hardly say this was not the symptom -or the outcome of any religious revival amongst our legislators. It -was entirely due to the ancient custom that confers upon a member -occupying a seat at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> prayers the unchallengeable right to that seat -for the rest of the sitting. Rows of chairs were arrayed on the floor -of the House. That was an innovation never since followed. What was it -all about? There sat in the middle of the Treasury bench huddled up and -almost hidden by more stalwart and upright figures an old man of 83 -years, to all appearances in the last stage of physical decrepitude and -mental lassitude. His name was William Ewart Gladstone, the greatest -parliamentary gladiator of all time. The lifelong champion of oppressed -nationalities was to-day to inaugurate his final effort to give freedom -to the Irish race trodden for centuries by ruthless force. The last -remnant of his strength was to be consecrated to the achievement of -Irish liberty, and hundreds of eager legislators to whom Peel and -Russell, Palmerston and Disraeli were but historical names, were avid -competitors for seats from which they could better listen to a man who -had sat in governments with the first three and crossed swords with the -fourth. It was a memorable sight.</p> - -<p>The preliminary questions which precede all parliamentary business were -by common consent postponed, and a deep and solemn silence thrilling -with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> expectancy fell upon the humming assembly as Mr. Speaker Peel -in his sonorous voice called out "the Prime Minister." The inert heap -which was the centre of all gaze sprang to the table an erect and -alert figure. The decrepitude was cast off like a cloak—the lassitude -vanished as by a magician's wand, the shoulders were thrown back, the -chest was thrown forward, and in deep, ringing tones full of music and -force the proposed new Irish charter was expounded for three unwearying -hours by the transfigured octogenarian rejuvenated by the magic of an -inspired soul. I had a seat just opposite the great orator. I was one -of the multitude who on that occasion listened with marvel to that -feat of intellectual command and physical endurance. It was more than -that. It was an unrivalled display of moral courage, rare in political -conflict. Mr. Gladstone had only just emerged out of a general election -where, in spite of six years of his eloquent advocacy, the voice of -Great Britain had declared emphatically against his Irish policy, and -the poor parliamentary majority at his back was made up out of the -preponderating Irish vote in favour of Home Rule. He was confronted -with the most formidable parliamentary opposition ever ranged<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> against -a minister, redoubtable in debating quality, still more redoubtable in -its hold on British pride. He was eighty-three years of age, but he -never quailed, and through the sultry summer months of 1893 he fought -night by night with mighty strokes the battle of Irish emancipation. He -did not live to carry the cause through to victory, but he planted the -banner so firmly in the soil that no assault could succeed in tearing -it down, and on the day when I stood with Mr. Bonar Law at the bar of -the House of Lords I saw this banner flourished in triumph from the -steps of the throne by a Unionist Lord Chancellor. That was the first -memory that flashed through my brain.</p> - -<p>The next was of a dreary December night just one year ago when on one -side of the Cabinet table in 10 Downing Street sat four representatives -of Great Britain and on the other five Irish leaders. It was the famous -room wherein British cabinets have for generations forged their Irish -policies. Coercion and concession alike issued from that chamber. -Pitt's Act of Union was discussed there, and so were Gladstone's -Home Rule bills, the decision to use British soldiers to throw Irish -tenants out of their houses with battering ram and torch<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> and equally -the bill which made every Irish tenant lord and master of his home at -the expense of the British treasury—all issued forth from this simple -and unadorned council chamber. And now came the final treaty of peace. -Would it be signed? It was an anxious moment charged with destiny for -the two great races who confronted each other at that green table.</p> - -<p>The British representatives who were associated with me on the occasion -were Mr. Austen Chamberlain; [I recall now how he sat by the side of -his doughty father, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, in 1893, during the famous -nightly duel between him and Mr. Gladstone. How strangely little thirty -arduous years have changed his personal appearance!] Lord Birkenhead, -who, in 1893 was carving for himself a brilliant career as a student -at Oxford and as a debater in the Union; Mr. Winston Churchill who was -then a cadet at Sandhurst whilst his father was engaged in the last -great parliamentary struggle of his dazzling but tragic career; Sir -Gordon Hewart, now Lord Hewart, the man who has risen on the pinions of -a powerful intelligence to the height of Lord Chief Justice of England. -My recollection is that the other two British <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span>delegates—Sir Laming -Worthington-Evans and Sir Hamar Greenwood—were stricken with illness -and were unable to be present. After weeks of close investigation the -climax of decision had been reached. Britain had gone to the limit of -concession. No British statesman could have faced any assembly of his -countrymen had he appended his signature to a convention that placed -Ireland outside that fraternity of free nations known as the British -Empire or freed her from that bond of union which is represented by a -common fealty to the sovereign. It is not easy to interpret the potency -of this invisible bond to those who are brought up to venerate other -systems. It is nevertheless invincible. Would the Irish leaders have -the courage to make peace on the only conditions under which peace was -attainable—liberty within the Empire?</p> - -<p>Opposite me sat a dark, short, but sturdy figure with the face of a -thinker. That was Mr. Arthur Griffith, the most un-Irish leader that -ever led Ireland, quiet to the point of gentleness, reserved almost -to the point of appearing saturnine. A man of laconic utterance, he -answered in monosyllables where most men would have considered an -oratorical deliverance to be demanded by the dignity of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> the occasion. -But we found in our few weeks' acquaintance that his yea was yea and -his nay meant nay. He led the Irish deputation. He was asked whether he -would sign. In his abrupt, staccato manner he replied, "Speaking on my -own behalf I mean to sign."</p> - -<p>By his side sat a handsome young Irishman. No one could mistake his -nationality. He was Irish through and through, in every respect a -contrast to his taciturn neighbour. Vivacious, buoyant, highly strung, -gay, impulsive, but passing readily from gaiety to grimness and back -again to gaiety, full of fascination and charm—but also of dangerous -fire. That was Michael Collins, one of the most courageous leaders ever -produced by a valiant race. Nevertheless he hesitated painfully when -the quiet and gentle little figure on his left had taken his resolve. -Both saw the shadow of doom clouding over that fateful paper—their own -doom. They knew that the pen which affixed their signature at the same -moment signed their death-warrant. The little man saw beyond his own -fall Ireland rising out of her troubles a free nation and that sufficed -for him. Michael Collins was not appalled by the spectre of death, but -he had the Irishman's fear of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> encountering that charge which comes -so readily to the lips of the oppressed—that of having succumbed to -alien wile and betrayed their country. Patriots who cheerfully face -the tyrant's steel lose their nerve before that dread accusation. It -was the first time Michael Collins ever showed fear. It was also the -last. I knew the reason why he halted, although he never uttered a -word which revealed his mind, and I addressed my appeal to an effort -to demonstrate how the treaty gave Ireland more than Daniel O'Connell -and Parnell had ever hoped for, and how his countrymen would be ever -grateful to him not only for the courage which won such an offer, but -for the wisdom that accepted it.</p> - -<p>He asked for a few hours to consider, promising a reply by nine -o'clock. Nine passed, but the Irish leaders did not return. Ten. -Eleven, and they were not yet back. We had doubts as to whether we -should see them again. Then came a message from the secretary of the -Irish delegation that they were on their way to Downing Street. When -they marched in it was clear from their faces that they had come to -a great decision after a prolonged struggle. But there were still -difficulties to overcome—they were, however, difficulties not of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span>principle but of detail. These were discussed in a businesslike way, -and soon after one o'clock in the morning the treaty was complete. A -friendly chat full of cheerful goodwill occupied the time whilst the -stenographers were engaged in copying the draft so disfigured with the -corrections, interpolations and additions, each of which represented so -many hours of hammering discussion.</p> - -<p>Outside in the lobby sat a man who had used all the resources of an -ingenious and well-trained mind backed by a tenacious will to wreck -every endeavour to reach agreement—Mr. Erskine Childers, a man whose -slight figure, whose kindly, refined and intellectual countenance, -whose calm and courteous demeanour offered no clue to the fierce -passions which raged inside his breast. At every crucial point in the -negotiations he played a sinister part. He was clearly Mr. de Valera's -emissary, and faithfully did he fulfil the trust reposed in him by that -visionary. Every draft that emanated from his pen—and all the first -drafts were written by him—challenged every fundamental position to -which the British delegates were irrevocably committed. He was one of -those men who by temperament are incapable of compromise. Brave and -resolute he <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span>undoubtedly was, but unhappily for himself he was also -rigid and fanatical. When we walked out of the room where we had sat -for hours together, worn with tense and anxious labour, but all happy -that our great task of reconciliation had been achieved, we met Mr. -Erskine Childers outside sullen with disappointment and compressed -wrath at what he conceived to be the surrender of principles he had -fought for.</p> - -<p>I never saw him after that morning. Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith -I met repeatedly after the signature of the treaty, to discuss the -many obstacles that surged up in the way of its execution, and I -acquired for both a great affection. Poor Collins was shot by one of -his own countrymen on a bleak Irish roadside, whilst he was engaged -in restoring to the country he had loved so well the order and good -government which alone enables nations to enjoy the blessings of -freedom. Arthur Griffith died worn out by anxiety and toil in the cause -he had done so much to carry to the summit of victory. Erskine Childers -was shot at dawn for rebellion against the liberties he had helped to -win.</p> - -<p>Truly the path of Irish freedom right up to the goal is paved with -tragedy. But the bloodstained<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> wilderness is almost through, the -verdant plains of freedom are stretched before the eyes of this -tortured nation. Ireland will soon honour the name of the Green Isle, -and I am proud to have had a hand in erecting the pillar which will for -ever mark the boundary between the squalor of the past and the hope of -the future.</p> - -<p><i>London, December 16th, 1922.</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXX</span> <span class="smaller">PROHIBITION</span></h2> - -<p>Four years ago the United States of America, by a two-thirds majority, -voted prohibition of the sale of alcoholic liquors. The British -House of Commons have just voted down a bill for the same purpose by -a majority of 236 to 14. America treats prohibition as one of its -greatest moral triumphs. Britain treats it as a joke.</p> - -<p>What accounts for this remarkable disparity in the attitude of the two -great English-speaking communities towards one of the most baffling -and elusive problems civilisation has to deal with? It cannot be a -fundamental difference in temperament or in moral outlook. The men who -engineered prohibition in America are of our own race and kind, bred in -the Puritan traditions that came originally from our shores.</p> - -<p>If the evils of excessive drinking had been more apparent in America -than in Britain I could understand the States of the Union deciding -to take<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> more drastic action than has been thought necessary in our -country. But the facts are exactly the reverse. The consumption of -alcohol in the United Kingdom some years before the war per head of -the population was higher than that of the United States. The poverty, -disease, and squalor caused by alcohol was much greater in Britain than -in America.</p> - -<p>What, then, accounts for the readiness of America to forbid the sale -and the reluctance of Britain even seriously to restrict it?</p> - -<p>I would not care to dogmatise on the subject, but I will hazard two or -three possible explanations.</p> - -<p>I set aside the suggestion that property owners are frightened by -the sequel to prohibition in Russia. I have heard it argued that -the prohibition ukase of the tsar was responsible for the Russian -revolution. That is probably true, for a people stupefied by alcohol -will stand anything. The inefficiency and corruption of the tsarist -régime was so appalling that no sober nation could have tolerated it -without rebellion for a single year, and when the fumes of vodka ceased -to muddle and blind the <i>moujik</i>, he rebelled against the autocracy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> -that had betrayed his country into disaster. The Russian experiment in -drink, therefore, contains no warning against prohibition, except a -very limited one, that those who wish to misrule a country in safety -must first of all drench it with alcohol.</p> - -<p>There is, of course, the ready explanation that old countries are very -conservative, and do not take kindly to change. Their joints are stiff -with age, and they creak along well-worn paths slowly and painfully, -but they lack the suppleness of limb that tempts younger communities -to sprint across untrodden country. That is the argument. I am afraid -this explanation will not hold. Old countries when thoroughly moved can -leap like the hart. The French Revolution demonstrated how vigorously -one of the oldest nations of Europe could tear along unbroken tracks -when impelled by a new passion. And I saw Britain spring to arms in -1914, when five millions of men joined the colours without the lash -of compulsion to stir their blood. England renewed her youth, and her -movements had the energy, the audacity, and the endurance of a people -untired by a march of centuries. This people, if stirred by a call -which reaches its heart or conscience, is capable of action as bold -as that which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span> wrested Magna Charta out of a despot in the twelfth -century, overthrew an ancient religion in the fifteenth century, led -a king to the scaffold in the seventeenth century, or challenged -the greatest military empires in the world in the sixteenth, the -nineteenth, and the twentieth centuries. And if they were convinced -that the liquor traffic must be destroyed, they would execute it with -as little compunction or hesitation as they displayed in suppressing -the mass or in decapitating Charles I.</p> - -<p>At the present moment the British people are not in the least persuaded -that the evils of alcohol for a minority of the population cannot be -dealt with effectively without resorting to the very drastic expedient -of forbidding its consumption by the majority who use it in moderation. -Are they likely to be convinced? That depends on the failure or success -of all other expedients to exterminate the evil of alcoholism.</p> - -<p>That brings me to another explanation. America reached prohibition by -the path of experiment. The federal system lent itself to the trial -of every form of remedy, including prohibition. For well over half a -century you have had almost every form of temperance expedient ever -suggested in actual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> working in some State or other of the American -republic.</p> - -<p>When I was a lad I heard debates and addresses in Welsh about the -comparative merits of the "Maine Law" and high license. High license, -reduction of licenses, local option, prohibition, have all been -tried. They have all been in operation quite long enough to enable -the American public to form a judgment on their merits. Statistical -results over long periods constitute a reliable basis for inference. -American federalism furnished the opportunity, and the States took full -advantage of it. Hence the prohibition law.</p> - -<p>To the practical man the figures in the prohibition States looked -attractive from a business point of view. He hesitated, but the moral -wave that swept over America carried him over the bar. But without the -experience at his door I doubt whether the American business man would -have assented to prohibition.</p> - -<p>The British constitution does not lend itself to these valuable -experiments. Otherwise, London might have tried one experiment, -Lancashire another, Yorkshire a third, Scotland a fourth, and Wales a -fifth. The whole legislative power of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> United Kingdom was until -quite recently vested in the imperial Parliament. Ireland has now a -legislature of its own. In theory, what suited one part of the kingdom -must do for the whole, and what did not suit the more populous parts -could not be permitted to others.</p> - -<p>As far as Scotland, Ireland, and Wales are concerned, there was in -practice a certain relaxation of this rule. But as far as the liquor -laws went, any serious alteration in any part of the kingdom was -difficult to secure if it offended the prejudices or damaged the -interests of the rest. It took years to get it through Parliament even -in a mutilated condition.</p> - -<p>There was no real freedom of experiment. The Scottish local veto act is -a compromise modified to suit English sentiment. Even as it is, it took -thirty years of Scottish insistence to carry. Wales has been unable to -secure local option, although it has been demanded by four-fifths of -its representatives for over a generation. We have, therefore, in this -country been denied the practical experience which has guided America -to so dramatic a conclusion.</p> - -<p>In the absence of such experience it has been found impossible to -educate and organise public<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> opinion throughout Britain to the point of -concentrating attention and pressure on this one issue. Other issues -always cut across and jam the current.</p> - -<p>You cannot secure unanimity of action on temperance reform even amongst -the religious forces. If they were united in their demand, and prepared -to enforce it at elections, nothing could resist their power. Between -elections they seem agreed in their policy; but no sooner does the -party bugle sound than they all fall into rank in opposite armies, and -the temperance banner is hurriedly packed into the cupboard for use -after the polls have been declared. It is then once more brought out to -wave over the tabernacle, and its wrinkles are straightened out in the -breeze.</p> - -<p>I have seen the fiercest champions of local option supporting brewers -at elections because they were the official opponents of Irish Home -Rule in the contest. I remember being told by an eminent Scottish -divine, who was a strong temperance advocate, but who had hitherto -supported anti-temperance candidates because of his inveterate -opposition to Gladstone's Home Rule, that, unless his party carried a -measure of local option for Scotland soon, he would have to abandon -them, home rule or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span> no home rule. He died without redeeming his -promise. The time never came for him. The Irish issue dominated -elections for nearly a generation. Free trade played a great part also.</p> - -<p>If the exigencies of party conflict had permitted the same consistent -propaganda work, extending over the same number of years, to be devoted -to the drink problem as was given to the wrongs of Ireland or free -trade, no doubt public opinion could have been educated up to the point -of supporting drastic reform. But this has not been found practicable -by political parties owing to the distraction of other issues.</p> - -<p>This is the main reason why British opinion is so far behind American -opinion on the temperance question. In America the battle of sobriety -was fought on the State platform, whilst the national platform was left -free for other conflicts.</p> - -<p>The war, however, enabled the British government to effect reforms -which have materially reduced the consumption of alcohol in this -kingdom. These results have been achieved by an enormous increase in -the taxation of alcoholic liquors, and by a considerable reduction in -the hours of sale. The taxation of beer was raised from £13,000,000 -in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> 1913 to £123,000,000 in 1921. The duty on spirits in 1913 yielded -£22,000,000, in 1921 it gave the revenue £71,000,000.</p> - -<p>One of the effects has been an appreciable reduction in the alcoholic -strength of the beverage sold. The hours of sale in the morning and -afternoon have been curtailed appreciably. By this measure the workman -is prevented from starting his day by drinking alcohol, and the -afternoon break prevents the drinker from soddening all day.</p> - -<p>The effect of these combined measures has been highly beneficial. The -quantity of beer sold fell from 34,152,739 barrels of 36 gallons at -standard gravity of 10.55 in 1913, to 23,885,472 standard barrels in -1921. Spirits fell from 30,736,088 proof gallons in 1913 to 20,162,395 -in 1921. These figures represent a remarkable and almost sensational -reduction in the quantity of alcohol consumed by the population. -Convictions for drunkenness fell from 188,877 in 1913 to 77,789 in -1921. Deaths from alcoholic diseases were more than halved during the -same period. This is the most distinct advance in the direction of -effective temperance reform hitherto taken by the British Parliament, -and the effect is striking in its encouragement.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span></p> - -<p>It would be a serious national misfortune if the admirable results -attained by these war measures were lost by relaxations. Most of -the pressure exerted upon Parliament has up to the present been in -the direction of easing the grip of the state on the traffic. Most -candidates in all parties at the last election were forced to pledge -themselves to support reduction in the beer duty. Clubs, even more than -"pubs," have urged extensions in drinking hours. The beer duty has -already been reduced. It is anticipated that the reduction will have -the effect of increasing consumption. This is regrettable, for it means -so much reclaimed land once more sinking into the malarial swamp.</p> - -<p>There is one consolation, however, that the women will claim the -next turn in reduction of taxation. Sugar and tea will then provide -effective barriers in the way of a further cheapening of alcoholic -liquors just yet. But all this is a long, long way off prohibition. -A majority of 20 to 1 against Mr. Scrymgeour's prohibition bill, and -a majority of 4 to 1 in favour of cheaper beer—both recorded in the -same parliamentary week—is not encouraging to those who would suppress -alcohol in Britain.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span></p> - -<p>Temperance reformers here are, therefore, watching the progress of -America's bold bid for sobriety with hopeful, if anxious, eyes, and -with longing hearts. What Britain does next will depend entirely on the -success or failure of what America is doing now.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span></p> - -<h2><span>XXXI</span> <span class="smaller">UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF "OFFICIAL" INFORMATION</span></h2> - -<p>A storm is working up over the publication by public servants of -information which came into their possession in the course of their -official careers. The immediate occasion is Mr. Winston Churchill's -story of the war. Angry questions are being asked in parliament, and it -is publicly announced that the Cabinet have appointed a committee of -its members to consider the whole problem.</p> - -<p>It is rather late in the day to make all this fuss about the -publication of war documents, for generals, admirals, and ministers -in all lands, including ours, have during the last three years -been inundating the European and American public with a flood of -reminiscences, explanations, criticisms, attacks and defences on the -conduct of operations, either of the Great War or the Great Peace, in -which they were engaged. Warriors on land and on sea have displayed an -unprecedented eagerness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> to inform the public as to their own share -in the great victory, and as to how much more brilliant that share -would have been but for the wrongheadedness or stupidity of some -collaborator. Like Julius Cæsar, they mean to live in history not -merely through their battles, but also through their commentaries upon -them. On the other hand, statesmen have been engaged in disclaiming -responsibility for particular parts of the Treaty of Versailles, -and where blame has been attached to them, either by opponents or -supporters, for the form in which those parts were cast, they have -striven hard to prove that it was attributable to pressure which -they were unable to resist from other actors in the drama. In each -case highly confidential information is disclosed, secret documents -are used, cabinet and council proceedings are published, without the -slightest regard to precedent. One disclosure has led to another, one -revelation has rendered another inevitable.</p> - -<p>A general, admiral or minister criticises on the strength of -half-disclosed minutes or documents some other public functionary, -military, naval, or political. What is the latter to do? His -reputation is at stake. Is he not to be allowed to repair<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span> the -omission or to correct the misquotation? Take the case of ministers -who played an important part in the conduct of the war or the peace, -and whose actions have been subjected to malignant and persistent -misrepresentation. In attacking these ministers statements are made -which, if accepted by the public, would irretrievably damage or even -destroy their reputation. In formulating the attack a document is -partially quoted, or the report of a council or cabinet meeting is -misquoted. The minister knows that a full and fair quotation would -clear his good name of the imputation sought to be cast upon it. Is -he not to be allowed, in those circumstances, to publish it? A mere -denial would carry no weight. A full revelation would settle the -dispute in his favour. The publication cannot conceivably affect any -public interest, it would supply no information which could serve any -possible enemy of his country. Is he not to be allowed to use the only -means available to redeem his credit from the ruin of accepted calumny? -His critic has been allowed to disclose secret information without -protest. Is he to be forbidden to do so in self-defence? He claims that -he served his country faithfully to the best of his powers in time -of crisis and peril. For<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span> that he is defamed by men who had access -to secret information and use it freely without criticism, censure -or demur. Why should his country deny him the same privilege for his -protection? That is the case which the cabinet committee will have to -consider. Whatever general rules may be laid down they must in all -fairness take into account these exceptional circumstances. Those who -are now taking a prominent part in emphasising the enormity of giving -to the public documents which were acquired in the public service -had not a word to say when portions of those documents were used for -purposes with which they were in sympathy. Is it not rather late for -them to protest now? There is such a thing as fair play even when -politicians are attacked.</p> - -<p>So far as the British are concerned the writing of the books of the -type alluded to was started, I think, by Field-Marshal Lord French of -Ypres, in his book, <i>1914</i>. This work is of the nature of an apologia; -and the writer, to assist in establishing his case, alludes to -discussions with the cabinet and does not hesitate to quote textually -secret memoranda and dispatches written by himself and others. The late -Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fisher,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> gives in his book, <i>Memories</i>, -examples of his own intervention at the war council meetings. In his -autobiography, <i>From Private to Field-Marshal</i>, which appeared some -time later, Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, who was for over two -years the confidential adviser of the cabinet and as such attended -all war councils and most war cabinet meetings, when it suits his -argument gives to the public his version of what passed at these highly -secret conclaves. Though he does not quote secret documents textually, -he describes the proceedings and deliberations of the supreme war -council, inter-Allied conferences and the war cabinet, and refers to -the opinions of individuals. In his recent speeches he has gone even -further. A still more recent work, <i>Sir Douglas Haig's Command</i>, is -the result of collaboration by two authors of whom one, at least, -held an official position during the war, being Sir Douglas Haig's -private secretary when he was Commander-in-Chief of the British army -in France. This book is even less reticent. It, also, is essentially -an apologia and justification of an individual. To establish their -case, the writers not only summarise some of the secret proceedings of -the supreme war council and war cabinet, but give<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span> extracts of their -decisions. These extracts are freely used as the basis of animadversion -on the council and cabinet of that day. It is true that some of -the quotations are stated to be taken from French books previously -published, but others are not, which arouses curiosity as to the source -of the knowledge displayed.</p> - -<p>In addition there have been endless articles in magazines and -newspapers, some signed, some written anonymously, all attacking either -ministers, generals or admirals, and most of them clearly supplied with -secret information by men who must have acquired it in their official -capacity. As to all these disclosures protest has hitherto been silent. -But when it is indicated that replies are forthcoming and that these -replies will reveal the real nature of the misquoted documents or -proceedings, the wrath of the assailants and their sympathisers knows -no bounds.</p> - -<p>What happened in reference to the consultations held in connection -with the framing of the peace treaty affords an illustration of the -way these revelations occur. The question of the publication of -these proceedings was definitely discussed at Versailles, after the -signature of the peace treaty with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> Germany on the 28th June, 1919, by -President Wilson, representing the United States, M. Clemenceau and M. -Simon, representing France, M. Sonnino, representing Italy, M. Makino, -representing Japan, and myself. This is what occurred on that occasion. -For the first time I quote from my own notes written at the time:</p> - -<blockquote><p>"President Wilson was strongly of opinion that these documents -ought to be treated as purely private conversation, and he -objected to the communication of the accounts given in the Notes -of the private conversations, in which all present had spoken -their minds with great freedom, as improper use might afterwards -be made of these documents. On the other hand, he did not object -to the Notes being communicated to special individuals in the -personal confidence of members of the Council. Though he looked -upon certain statements, the conclusions and the actions as being -official, and therefore available in the appropriate offices, the -actual conversations were private. In the United States no one -had the right to claim documents of this kind. President Wilson's -view was that each government should take the course traditional -in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> own country with the clear and distinct understanding that -no one should under any circumstances make the <i>procès verbal</i> -public. M. Clemenceau did not think that such documents should be -regarded as private property, whilst M. Sonnino thought they need -not be considered as official documents.</p> - -<p>"For my own part I was anxious to know what the precedents were. I -also felt bound to enter a caveat that if attacks should be made -on the political heads I might be forced in particular cases to -refer to these Notes, and I gave warning that I might have to do -so unless a protest was then made. M. Clemenceau agreed so far, -that it might be impossible to refuse extracts from the <i>procès -verbaux</i> to prove particular facts."</p></blockquote> - -<p>It will be observed from this record that I was the first to safeguard -the interest of persons who, I felt certain, would be attacked for -their share in the treaty. I am the last to take advantage of the -proviso.</p> - -<p>What followed? M. Clemenceau was bitterly attacked by his political -opponents for surrendering French rights to the treaty. President -Wilson was also attacked by his political opponents for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> his assent to -other provisions of the treaty. In self-defence they authorised the -publication of the secret reports of the Paris meeting.</p> - -<p>M. Clemenceau entrusted his defence to M. Tardieu. M. Tardieu, in -his book <i>The Truth About the Treaty</i>, gives most of his attention -to the drawing up of that international instrument, but deals with -the last portion of the war period and quotes from the proceedings -of inter-allied conferences, and also of the supreme war council, -giving the opinions of individuals. He does the same with the -deliberations of the peace conference. In fact the whole book is -based on international proceedings of a secret nature. M. Poincaré, -in maligning his rivals, has not refrained from making full use -of information which came to his knowledge as President of the -Republic. For example, in his article, <i>Souvenirs et Documents</i>, in -the <i>Temps</i> of the 12th September, 1921, he quotes <i>in extenso</i> a -letter of April, 1919, from himself as President of the Republic to -the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, and a letter from me in -reply to the President of the Council. My consent was not even asked -to the publication of my letter. This correspondence referred to the -period proposed to be placed on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> occupation by the Allies of the -left bank of the Rhine. According to Signor Nitti, M. Poincaré makes -somewhat similar disclosures in his articles published in the <i>Revue -des Deux Mondes</i>. All these disclosures were partial, truncated and, -therefore, misleading. They did not give the public a complete account -of what occurred. The impression created was, therefore, unfair to the -other actors in that great drama. That is undoubtedly what impelled -ex-President Wilson to hand over his documents to Mr. Ray Baker -with a view to the presentation of the case from the standpoint of -the American delegation. Hence his book, <i>Woodrow Wilson and World -Settlement</i>. It is mostly based on the secret minutes of the supreme -war council, numerous extracts from which are given. Signor Nitti, -the late Italian premier, on the other hand, expressly states that he -does not publish any document which was not intended for publication. -Nevertheless, he prints a memorandum written by myself for the peace -conference in March, 1919, under the title of <i>Some Considerations -for the Peace Conference before they finally Draft their Terms</i>, and -also M. Clemenceau's reply, both of which are secret documents. But he -excuses his <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span>action in this case because extracts from this memorandum -had already been published.</p> - -<p>I only mention these matters, not by way of arraignment of these -various distinguished men for divulging secrets they ought to have kept -under lock and key. That is not in the least my object. I do so in -order to point out that general rules as to the conditions under which -confidential material can be used are not applicable to circumstances -of the Great War and the peace that ensued. Disclosures already made -largely for purposes of criticism and aspersion upon individuals -or bodies of individuals have given the assailed parties a special -position which cannot in justice be overlooked.</p> - -<p><i>London, March 17th, 1923.</i></p> - -<p> </p> -<p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> -<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHERE ARE WE GOING?***</p> -<p>******* This file should be named 60262-h.htm or 60262-h.zip *******</p> -<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br /> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/6/0/2/6/60262">http://www.gutenberg.org/6/0/2/6/60262</a></p> -<p> -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed.</p> - -<p>Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: Where Are We Going? - - -Author: David Lloyd George - - - -Release Date: September 8, 2019 [eBook #60262] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHERE ARE WE GOING?*** - - -E-text prepared by Tim Lindell, Martin Pettit, and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made -available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org) - - - -Note: Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive. See - https://archive.org/details/wherearewegoing00lloy - - - - - -WHERE ARE WE GOING? - -by - -The Right Honourable - -DAVID LLOYD GEORGE - -O.M., P.C., M.P. - -BRITISH PRIME MINISTER 1916-1922 - - - - - - -[Illustration: Logo] - - -New York -George H. Doran Company - -Copyright, 1923, -by George H. Doran Company - - -[Illustration: Logo] - - -WHERE ARE WE GOING? II - -Printed in the United States of America - - - - -PREFACE - - -The chapters collected in this book represent a running comment on the -European situation during the past ten months. Although in the haze -that covers the Continent it is difficult always to see clearly what -is happening, and still more difficult to forecast what is likely to -occur, I have not deemed it necessary to revise any of the estimates -I made from time to time in these periodic reviews on the position. -In the period covered by them peace has gone back perceptibly and -unmistakably. Of the years immediately after the end of the Great War -it may be said that up to the present year each showed a distinct -improvement over its predecessor. The temper of the warring nations -showed a gradual healing and improvement, and East and West there was a -return to reason and calm in their attitude towards each other. In the -Cannes discussions of January 1922 the atmosphere of hostility which -poisoned the Spa discussions in 1920 had largely disappeared, and the -applause which greeted Herr Rathenau's fine speech at Genoa in April -1922 was cordial and general. The electric messages from Paris failed -to provoke a thunderstorm, and one of the speakers, at the last meeting -of the Assembly, drawing an illustration from the weather outside, said -the Conference had broken up under blue skies and a serene firmament. - -That was in May 1922. Those words, when used, met with cheering -approval: if used to-day they would be greeted with scoffing laughter. -The present year has been one of growing gloom and menace. The -international temper is distinctly worse all round. A peace has been -patched up with the Turkish Empire. No one believes it can endure -long. The only question is, How long? There may be other patched-up -treaties between struggling nations before the year is out. There is -only one prediction concerning them which can at this stage be safely -made--they will leave European peace in a more precarious plight than -ever. A peace wrung by triumphant force out of helplessness is never a -good peace. That is why I view with apprehension the character of the -settlement which may soon be wrung out of German despair in the Ruhr -and imposed on Greek impotence in the Adriatic. The Fiume settlement -may turn out to be more satisfactory in spite of threatening omens. -The Jugo-Slavs are a formidable military proposition to be tackled by -any Power. The War proved them to be about the best fighting material -in Europe. They are also fairly well equipped with modern weapons, and -if unhappily the need arose their deficiencies in this respect would -soon be supplied from the workshops of Czecho-Slovakia and elsewhere. I -am, therefore, still hopeful that Fiume may be remitted for settlement -to diplomatists and not to gunmen. International right in these -turbulent days seems to depend, not on justice, but on a reckoning of -chances. The Slavs are ready to defend their rights and can do so. -There is, therefore, some talk of conferences and even arbitration in -their case. Germany and Greece cannot put up a fight. Unconditional -surrender is, therefore, their lot. All the same, this is not only a -wrong but a miscalculation. Unjust concessions, extracted by violence, -are not settlements; they are only postponements. Unfortunately, the -decisions at the next great hearing of the cause are just as likely to -be provisional--and so the quarrel will go on to the final catastrophe -unless humanity one day sees the light and has the courage to follow -it. But that day must not be too distant, otherwise it will come too -late to save civilisation. The last conflict between great nations has -exposed the devastating possibilities of modern science. Henceforth -progress in the destructiveness of the apparatus of war has been, and -will continue to be, so rapid that a conflict to-morrow would spread -ten times the desolation caused by the Great War of 1914-18. There is a -concentration of much scientific and mechanical skill on strengthening -the machinery of devastation. Incredible progress--if progress be the -word--has been made within the last three or four years in perfecting -and increasing the shattering power of this kind of devilry. What will -it be like five, ten, twenty years hence! - -Whilst nations are piling up, perfecting and intensifying their -explosives, they are also saturating the ground with the inflammable -passions which one day will precipitate the explosion. Injustice, -insult, insolence, distilled into the spirit of revenge, is everywhere -soaking into the earth. - -I have never doubted that France could impose terms on Germany. It was -clear that she could starve Germany into submission to any conditions -dictated to her. It is astonishing that the Germans should have held -out so long. What I have steadily predicted in these articles is that -those terms will not produce as much reparation as a more conciliatory -course would have brought--that to operate them will be a source of -constant friction, and that the methods employed to impose and execute -them will rouse a spirit of patriotic wrath which will in the end bring -disaster to the victor of to-day. - -When the invasion of the Ruhr was decided upon, the shortage in the -promised coal deliveries upon which default was declared was barely -10 per cent. A little better organisation of the wagon service on the -French side would have made up that deficiency in a very short time. -During the months of the occupation the French and Belgians have not -succeeded in collecting one-sixth the tonnage delivered during the -corresponding months last year. It will take weeks after passive -resistance has collapsed to restore railways and collieries to working -order. The new _regime_ will have to liquidate arrears of at least -15,000,000 tons before it begins its regular monthly deliveries. What -about cash payments? It is not too much to say that Germany is much -less able to meet her obligations in this respect than she was before -the invasion. Her credit has been blown out of sight into infinite -space. It will take a long time to pull it back from its wanderings and -set its feet once more firmly on European earth. There are only four -ways in which the huge sum due from Germany can be liquidated:-- - - - (1) By handing over to the Allies the gold reserves of Germany - and of Germans either at home or on deposit abroad. The former - is negligible; the amount of the latter is disputable. Much of - it is essential to enable Germany to purchase abroad the raw - material and food necessary to her existence. The worse German - credit becomes the larger must this deposit be. As for the foreign - securities and deposits which are not strictly necessary for - trading, they cannot all be made available, for nothing will - induce some of the depositors to part with the whole of these - securities. The sum, therefore, derivable from this source would - amount to but a small percentage of the total figure payable for - reparations. - - (2) Deliveries of coal, timber, potash, dyes and other raw - material. With the exception of timber, these deliveries have - been, on the whole, satisfactory--since the Spa Agreement. It - did not require the pressure of armed invasion to improve these - deliveries, including the timber demands of the Allies. - - (3) A percentage levied on German exports. These are paid for in - gold or its equivalent, and the levy would therefore be remitted - in gold. A levy of 20 per cent. on German exports would have - produced between L40,000,000 and L50,000,000 a year on the basis - of last year's exports. When German trade returned to normal it - would yield L100,000,000. This sum, added to the value of the - material delivered, would cover interest and sinking fund on - the L2,500,000,000 which is now the accepted maximum of German - capacity. - - (4) The restoration of German credit with a view to the immediate - raising of a loan on reparation account. This would help the - Allies over their urgent financial difficulties. - - -These four methods of payment are the only known and knowable means of -obtaining reparations. They would have been more immediately fruitful -if so much time, money and resource had not been wasted over this -ill-judged invasion. - -The apologists of French action in the Ruhr contend that France was -driven to these extremes by the refusal of Britain to co-operate -with her in bringing legitimate pressure to bear on Germany to carry -out the Treaty. Those who put forward this contention argue in -ignorance of the proposals submitted by the British Government to the -Allied Conference in August 1922. These would have exploited all the -methods above set forth to the limit of their productiveness. These -proposals were substantially accepted by all the Allies except France. -Repeated efforts have been made this year in Parliament to induce the -Government to publish this scheme. Both the present and the late Prime -Minister gave favourable if not definite answers to the request for -publication. But so far the August proceedings have not made their -public appearance. Why this reluctance to give the whole facts to the -public? The discussions at the November and January Conferences have -been published in full. These meetings were only adjournments from the -August Conference. The story of the fateful Conference is, therefore, -incomplete if August is suppressed. Ought not the world to know the -proposals which France rejected in August 1922? In the absence of -official publication I will take the responsibility now of giving a -Summary. - -It was proposed:-- - - - (1) That Germany should be called upon to take such measures as - the Reparations Commission should stipulate, in order to balance - her Budget and restore her financial stability. - - (2) That the Reichsbank should be made independent of Government - control. - - (3) That 26 per cent. of the total value of German exports - should be collected in gold or foreign currencies and paid - into a separate account in the Reichsbank in the name of the - Sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission known as the Committee - of Guarantees. - - (4) That the produce of all German import and export duties other - than the levy should be paid monthly to a special account at the - Reichsbank, which should be under the scrutiny of the Committee - of Guarantees. The German Government should have the disposal - of the sums standing to the credit of this account so long as - the Reparations Commission was satisfied that it fulfilled the - obligations imposed upon it. If at any time the Commission was - not satisfied that this was the case the Committee of Guarantees - should have the right to take over the sums standing to the credit - of this account and to secure the payment to it of the produce of - these duties thereafter. - - (5) There were stern provisions for supervision of German finance - by the Committee of Guarantees and for preventing the export of - German capital. - - (6) There were provisions for supervision over State mines and - forests in the event of their being a failure in delivery of coal - or timber as the case might be. - - -A Moratorium up to December 1922 was to be given conditionally on -the acceptance of the above terms by the German Government, and the -Reparations Commission were then to proceed to fix the further annual -payments. - -Had these drastic proposals been adopted and enforced by the Allies, -what would have been the result? Deliveries of coal and timber would -have been ensured up to the full quota arranged. By means of the levy -on exports, L50,000,000 would have been already collected in gold and -paid into Allied account. The mark would have been stabilised, and -could have been made the basis of a considerable loan. As German trade -gradually recovered the export levy would bring in larger amounts. This -year would certainly have produced a yield of between L60,000,000 and -L70,000,000. This is what would have been effected for Reparations if -the plan put forward by the British Government had been accepted and -put into execution in August. By the settlement of this most troublous -question, the great cost and the still greater irritation of the -Ruhr episode would have been avoided, trade would have continued its -convalescence, and the peace of Europe would have been established. - -What would have happened if Germany had refused these terms? We should -certainly have heard what objections or counter-proposals Germany had -to offer. But we were resolved to have a settlement that would put an -end to the fiscal chaos inside Germany, and having thus put her in a -position to pay we were equally resolved that she should pay up to the -limit of her capacity. We, therefore, undertook, if Germany rejected -the terms finally agreed upon, to join France and the other Allies -in any coercive measures deemed advisable to compel acceptance. M. -Poincare refused to agree. His refusal alone rendered that Conference -fruitless. Over a year has elapsed since then. He has pursued a -different policy. So far it has brought him nothing. I am bold enough -to predict that in future it will bring France considerably less than -the August 1922 plan would have yielded. - -If he is out for reparations his policy will inevitably fail in -comparison with that he so rashly threw over. But if he is out for -trouble it has been a great success, and in future it will be an even -greater triumph for his statesmanship. A permanent garrison in the Ruhr -has possibilities of mischief which it does not require any special -vision to foresee. - -Enduring peace can only rest on a foundation of justice. It is just -that Germany should exert herself to the limit of her strength to -repair the damage wrought by her armies. She was the aggressor; she was -the invader. Her aggression inflicted serious hurt on her neighbours. -By the established precepts of every civilised law in the world she -ought to pay up. A peace which did not recognise that obligation -would be unjust and provoke a righteous resentment in the breasts of -the wronged. That sentiment would have been inimical to the good -understanding that is one of the essentials of peace. Moreover, it -is not conducive to good behaviour amongst nations that they should -be allowed to ravage and destroy without paying the penalty of their -misdeeds. That is why I do not agree with those who would wipe out -the claim for reparations entirely. On the other hand, civilised -jurisprudence has also advanced to the stage where it forbids the -creditor to attach his debtor's freedom and independence as security -for the payment of the debt. The law that permitted a debtor to be sold -into bondage for an unliquidated liability has now been voted barbarous -by the more humane usage and wont of the day. That is why I protest -against using armed force to occupy and control a country whilst the -scourge of starvation is being used to whip its workmen into toiling -for payment of a foreign debt. As Mr. Gladstone once said: "Justice -means justice to all." The main difficulty of a just settlement of -reparations comes from the growing disposition to take sides blindly -in this dispute. One party sees nothing but the outrage of 1914-18, -the costly vindication of right, and the just claim of the victims to -compensation for their losses. The other party sees nothing but the -harsh fury with which the victors in the cause press their verdict -to execution. Peace can only be restored by a full recognition of the -equities as well as the humanities--of the humanities as well as the -equities. I have sought in these pages to deal fairly with both. - -D. LLOYD GEORGE. - -_September 13th, 1923._ - - - - -CONTENTS - -CHAPTER PAGE - I: THE GREAT PERIL 25 - - POST-WAR EUROPE REVISITED--IMPOVERISHMENT - AND TAXATION--RACE HATREDS UNCHANGED--HOW - WAR IS BEGUN--VENGEANCE IS THE - LORD'S--THE CHURCHES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. - - - II: EUROPE STILL ARMING 51 - - MARSHAL FOCH AND THE CAUSE OF THE GREAT - WAR--NAVIES FOR DEFENCE--STRENGTH OF EUROPE'S - ARMIES--EUROPE MORE MILITANT THAN EVER. - - - III: THE ERUPTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 59 - - DROPPING HOT CINDERS IN THE BALKANS--SEEING - WAR IN PICTURES--FORCE THE ARBITER OF RIGHT - AND WRONG--LIMITING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE - LEAGUE--BOTTLING UP THE ADRIATIC. - - - IV: IS THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS A SUCCESS? 68 - - TRIUMPHS OF THE LEAGUE--ALL GREAT - POWERS SHOULD BE IN IT--AMERICA AND - THE LEAGUE--TREATY AND THE LEAGUE--ENDING - THE ARBITRAMENT OF THE SWORD. - - - V: THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND ITS CRITICS 81 - - TREATY CRITICISED BUT NOT READ--AMERICA - AND THE TREATY--LABOUR AND THE TREATY--TREATY - AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS INTERWOVEN. - - - VI: 1922 95 - - WAR DANCE STILL IN THE WORLD--ULTIMATUM - INSTEAD OF CONFERENCE--CANNES - AND GENOA--ENEMIES AT COUNCIL TABLE--TALK - OF AN AMERICAN LOAN. - - - VII: WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? 104 - - CLEMENCEAU AND THE RHINE--ANNEXATION - AND REVENGE--ANGLO-AMERICAN GUARANTEE - TO FRANCE--POINCARE AND THE RHINE. - - - VIII: WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? 116 - - VERSAILLES TREATY AND THE RHINE FRONTIER--FOCH - AND THE POLITICAL FRONTIER--AMERICAN AND - BRITISH PRESSURE--SHAM REPUBLIC OF THE RHINE. - - - IX: WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? 130 - - BONAR LAW AND POINCARE--PRODUCTIVE - SANCTIONS AND REPARATIONS--MORATORIUM - FOR GERMANY FAILS--BRITAIN STANDS ASIDE. - - - X: REPARATIONS 136 - - REPARATIONS AND THE TREATY--CAPACITY TO - PAY--REPARATIONS COMMISSION CHANGED--AMERICA'S - VACANT CHAIR--WORTHLESS "C" BONDS FOR BRITAIN. - - - XI: MR. HUGHES'S NEW HAVEN SPEECH 147 - - SECRETARY HUGHES'S NEW HAVEN SPEECH, - A TIMID DELIVERANCE--IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL - OF EXPERTS--OFFER OF AMERICAN HELP. - - - XII: THE FRENCH INVASION OF THE RUHR 156 - - WHAT GERMANY HAS PAID--"IN TECHNICAL - DEFAULT"--WRONG WAY TO MAKE GERMANY - PAY--RUINING GERMAN INDUSTRY--FRANCE'S - SECRET AIM. - - - XIII: LOST OPPORTUNITIES 167 - - FRENCH FAILURE IN THE RUHR--WILD OATS - OF REPARATION--THE RUHR AND THE LEAGUE - OF NATIONS--THE BANKERS' CONFERENCE. - - - XIV: FRENCH SCHEMES 175 - - ITALY AND THE RUHR--IRON ORE OF LORRAINE - AND GERMAN COAL DEPOSITS--LOUCHEUR - AND HUGO STINNES--GERMAN WORKMEN IN BONDAGE. - - - XV: THE QUICKSAND 183 - - LOUCHEUR AND THE RUHR--LACK OF LEADER - IN FRANCE--DISREGARD OF ALLIES--AGGRESSION - AND SECURITY--FAILURE OF BONAR LAW. - - - XVI: THE FIRST GERMAN OFFER 191 - - DOES FRANCE SEEK A SETTLEMENT?--DEMAND - FOR SUBMISSION IN THE RUHR--GERMAN - OFFER INADEQUATE--KEEPING AMERICA - OUT--TREATY IDEA NOT FOLLOWED. - - - XVII: THE SECOND GERMAN NOTE 202 - - GERMAN OFFER AND THE LOAN TO GERMANY--CAN - BERLIN ASSENT TO INVASION?--REINTRODUCING - AMERICA--WEAKENING DEBTORS ABILITY TO PAY. - - - XVIII: THE NAPOLEONIC DREAM 213 - - EUROPEAN MIND UNHINGED--WHAT EVERY - FRENCHMAN KNOWS--PICKWICK FOLLOWS - SNODGRASS--GERMANY MAY COLLAPSE--UNDOING - THE WORK OF BISMARCK. - - - XIX: IS IT PEACE? 225 - - STRESEMANN MAN OF ENERGY--CHAOS AHEAD - FOR GERMANY--BRITISH UNEMPLOYMENT--FRANCE - A SELF-CONTAINED COUNTRY--BALFOUR'S - NOTE A GENEROUS OFFER. - - - XX: WHAT NEXT? 234 - - PEN-AND-INK JOUSTING--TORY "DIEHARDS" - AND FRANCE--POINCARE AND THE DOVE OF - PEACE--WHAT "PAY AND STAY" MEANS--FRANCE'S - MINIMUM AND BRITAIN'S SURRENDER. - - - XXI: THE BRITISH DEBT TO AMERICA 244 - - BORROWING FOR ALLIES--BRITISH TAXPAYER'S - BURDEN--CREDITOR NATION NOW DEBTOR--BRITAIN - MUST PAY HER WAY--HER CURRENCY - NOT DISCREDITED--INTER-ALLIED DEBTS. - - - XXII: INTER-ALLIED DEBTS 252 - - DISCOVERY OF THE MIDDLE WEST--LEGEND - OF BRITISH WEALTH--1,400,000 UNEMPLOYED--THE - BALFOUR NOTE--CAN BRITAIN AFFORD - TO BE MORE GENEROUS THAN AMERICA? - - - XXIII: THE BRITISH ELECTIONS 264 - - MINORITY RULE AND MORAL AUTHORITY--NATIONAL - LIBERALS AT THE POLLS--DANGER - OF ENGLAND'S ELECTORAL SYSTEM--LABOUR'S - PROSPECTS--WARRING LIBERAL FACTIONS. - - - XXIV: HOW DEMOCRACY WORKS 282 - - GROWTH OF BRITAIN'S ELECTORATE--WOMEN - SUFFRAGE--NEW VOTERS WITHOUT A PARTY--ABSENTEES - FROM THE POLLS--FREAKS OF THE GROUP SYSTEM. - - - XXV: POLITICAL REALITIES 291 - - POST-WAR LEGISLATION--THE IRISH CAULDRON--LABOUR - AND CAPITAL--AGRICULTURE AND - INDUSTRY--SOCIALISM COURTING FASCISM. - - - XXVI: SHOULD WE MAKE PEACE WITH RUSSIA? 301 - - PRE-REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA--CORRUPTION AND - BETRAYAL--"SHAKING HANDS WITH MURDER"--IF - TURKEY, WHY NOT RUSSIA?--NEED FOR - RUSSIA'S EXPORTS. - - - XXVII: PALESTINE AND THE JEWS 312 - - STUPIDITY OF ANTI-SEMITISM--BLIGHTING RULE - OF THE TURK--THE JEW AS A CULTIVATOR--RACE - EQUALITY IN PALESTINE--ZIONIST DECLARATION. - - -XXVIII: THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE 322 - - TURKISH FEZZES IN THE AIR--BLOW OF PRESTIGE - OF THE WEST--MASSACRES AND MISGOVERNMENT--FERTILE - COUNTRY A WILDERNESS--HAD WILSON - SUCCEEDED--LAUSANNE A MILESTONE, NOT A TERMINUS. - - - XXIX: THE SIGNING OF THE IRISH TREATY 339 - - GLADSTONE'S HOME-RULE FIGHT--SCENE IN - NO. 10 DOWNING STREET--GRIFFITH AND COLLINS--TO - SIGN OR NOT TO SIGN--CHILDERS, - SULLEN AND DISAPPOINTED--TREATY A PILLAR - OF HOPE FOR FUTURE. - - - XXX: PROHIBITION 350 - - THE LESSON FROM RUSSIA--BRITAIN NOT - CONVINCED--EXPERIMENTS DIFFICULT--PUBLIC - UNEDUCATED--OUTLOOK NOT ENCOURAGING. - - - XXXI: UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF "OFFICIAL" INFORMATION 361 - - JULIUS CAESAR BEGAN IT--SELF DEFENCE AND - SECRET INFORMATION--THE VERSAILLES - DECISION--GENERAL RULES AND SPECIAL CASES. - - - - -WHERE ARE WE GOING? - - - - -I - -THE GREAT PERIL - - -If a man on a bright July morning in 1914 had sailed abroad and had the -misfortune to be wrecked on a desert island, returning to civilisation -a week ago, the change which Europe presented to him would be -sufficient to induce him to believe that his long solitude had unhinged -his mind. To him it would have appeared as the stuff of which dreams -are made. He would have remembered a German empire with an august -head, ruling with autocratic sway a population striding with giant -steps into prosperity and wealth, possessing a matchless army, whose -tread terrified Europe; with a fleet that provoked articles and novels -and agitations about the invasion of England; with vast possessions -across the seas. In its place he would see Germany, instead of being a -confident, powerful, arrogant empire, a timid, nervous, and apologetic -republic presided over by a respectable and intelligent workman, her -minister issuing notes to propitiate Belgium, and having them sent -back like the stupid exercises of a backward schoolboy to be rewritten -in accordance with the pleasure of the taskmaster; the great army -reduced to a force one-half the size of that of Serbia; the menacing -fleet at the bottom of the sea; the watch on the Rhine kept by French, -British, and Belgian soldiers. He would see the Krupp works in French -occupation; not a German colony left. - -Russia he would have recollected as a powerful autocracy rooted in a -superstitious belief by the peasantry in the divinity of its head. -He would find it now a revolutionary area ruled by the exiles of -yesterday, shunned by the rest of the world because of the violence -of its communistic doctrines; tsardom, with its gilded retinue of -splendour, flung into a hideous doom, and the sceptre of Peter the -Great enforcing the doctrines of Karl Marx. He would see the Austrian -empire as much a thing of the past as the empire of Nebuchadnezzar, a -poor province lifted out of beggary by the charity of her foes: new -states, which had been dead and buried for centuries, risen from the -dead, casting off their shrouds, marching in full panoply; Trieste -an Italian port; the Dolomites an Italian bastion. The Turk alone -quite unchanged, a few more amputating operations performed upon -him, but still preserving sufficient vitality to massacre Christians -irrespective of denomination or race, and to become a sore trial and -perplexity to the rest of the world. - -If our returned voyager travelled through Europe he would find -even more fundamental changes in the world of finance, trade and -commerce. He would find impoverishment, dislocation; the elaborate -and finely-spun web of commerce rent to pieces, and its torn threads -floating in the wind. With a few sovereigns in his pocket, he would -expect in return 25 francs, 20 marks, and about 26 lire. Instead of -that, with a paper sovereign he would find that he could buy 70 francs, -nearly 100 lire, 250,000 German marks, 300,000 Austrian kronen, and -millions of Russian roubles. The money-changers who once prospered on -decimal fractions now earning a precarious livelihood in the flights -of the multiplication table. That would give him a better indication -perhaps of the reality of the change than even the fall of empires. On -his journeys he would travel through prosperous provinces rutted and -overturned as by a gigantic earthquake; he would pass vast cemeteries -where 10,000,000 young men fallen in the Great War were having their -last sleep; he would see on all hands signs of mutilation of men who -had been engaged in the great struggle. Taxation everywhere quintupled -with nothing but debt to show for it; industry with its back bent under -a burden of taxation which when he left existed only in the nightmares -of the dyspeptic rich. He would then be able to realise something of -the tremendous upheaval that had taken place in the world. - -But what would surprise him more than all these amazing and bewildering -transformations would be the one thing in which there was no change. -He would naturally expect that after such terrifying experiences, the -world would have learnt its lesson, turned its back finally on war, -its crimes and its follies, and set its face resolutely toward peace. -It is the one thing he discovers has not changed--the world has not -learned one single syllable. Suspicions amongst nations exist just -as ever, only more intense; hatreds between races and peoples, only -fiercer; combinations forming everywhere for the next war; great -armies drilling; conventions and compacts for joint action when the -tocsin sounds; general staffs meeting to arrange whether they should -march, where they should march, how they should march, and where they -should strike; little nations only just hatched, just out of the -shell, staggering under the burden of great armaments, and marching -along towards unknown battlefields; new machinery of destruction and -slaughter being devised and manufactured with feverish anxiety; every -day science being brought under contribution to discover new methods to -destroy human life--in fact, a deep laid and powerfully concerted plot -against civilisation, openly organised in the light of the sun. And -that after his experience of four or five years ago! Man the builder, -and man the breaker, working side by side in the same workshop, and -apparently on the best of terms with each other, playing their part -in the eternal round of creation and dissolution, with characteristic -human energy. What a complex creature is man! It is little wonder that -God gave him up repeatedly in despair. He is unteachable. - -I wonder whether it is realised that if war were to break out again, -the calamity would be a hundredfold greater than that of the last -experience. Next time, cities will be laid waste. Possible, and I am -sorry to say, probable enemy nations are more closely intertwined, -and the engines of havoc are becoming more and more terrible. I have -called attention repeatedly to the developments which took place during -the late War, in the variety, the range, and the power of destructive -weapons. Compare the aeroplane at the beginning of the war, and its -small bomb which could easily be manhandled, with the same machine at -the end. By the end of the war machines had been built, and but for -the armistice would have been used, the devastating power of which -was terrific. Since then the power of the machine, the weight of the -explosive, and the incendiary material it drops, have grown, and are -still growing. Science is perfecting old methods of destruction, and -searching out new methods. One day, in its exploration, it may hit on -something that may make the fabric of civilisation rock. - -Can anything be done to avert this approaching catastrophe? That is -the problem of all problems for those who love their fellowmen. I warn -you that it is madness to trust to the hope that mankind, after such -an experience, will not be so rash as to court another disaster of the -same kind. The memory of the terrors, the losses, the sufferings of the -war, will not restrain men from precipitating the world into something -which is infinitely worse, and those who think so, and, therefore, urge -that it is not necessary to engage in a new crusade for peace, have -not studied the perverse, the stubborn, and the reckless nature of -man. There is the danger that the last war may even make some nations -believe in war. - -I have talked to many young soldiers who were fortunate enough to have -passed unscathed through some of the worst experiences of the war, to -many who suffered mutilation in some of these experiences; they have -given me one common impression that the memory of fear is evanescent, -and that they cannot now re-create in their own minds the sensations -of terror through which they passed. If that is true of those who -went through the furnace, what of the multitudes who simply looked -on?--the multitudes of those who were too young to take part, and can -only recall the excitement produced by the conflict and the glory of -victory? The recollection of the headaches of an orgy never lasts as -long as that of its pleasures. It is useless to recall memories of the -terror and torture of the war, and expect them to crusade for peace. -Memory is a treacherous crusader. It starts with a right purpose fresh -and hot on its path, but its zeal gets fainter as the days roll past, -and it ends by handing over its banner to the foe. - -You can only redeem mankind by appealing to its nobler instincts. -Fear is base, and you cannot lift mankind by using it as a lever. The -churches alone can effectively rouse the higher impulses of our nature. -That is where their task comes in. - -There is another reason why we cannot regard the danger as having -passed away. You have all the elements which made for the Great War of -1914 more potent than ever to-day. The atmosphere of Europe is charged -with them. - -What made the last war? Armed international dislikes, rivalries, and -suspicions. The dislikes were based on age-long racial feuds stimulated -by memories of recent wrongs. Celt and Teuton disliking each other; -Slav and Teuton suspicious of each other; the hatred of the Slav for -the Teuton intensified by the arrogance with which Germany humiliated -Russia at the moment of her weakness immediately after the Japanese -War, when she was peculiarly sensitive to insult. You will recollect -the peremptoriness and the insolence of her gesture over the Bosnian -annexation, and insolences are always more painful than wrongs and -rankle longer. They corrode the flesh, and burn into the soul of a -nation, keeping its anger aflame. I wish nations always remembered -that. There was the hatred of the Celt for the Teuton deepened by the -annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and by the incidents inseparable from -the invasion of a foreign soil. There was Germany suspecting that -every railway constructed by Russia was aimed at her heart. There -was France convinced that Germany was only waiting her opportunity -to pick a quarrel which would enable her to deprive France of her -much-coveted colonies. There was England watching with vigilant insight -and increasing anger the growth of Germany's great fleet, which she -was convinced was aimed at her shores. There were great armies in -every continental country ready to march at a moment's notice, fully -equipped, each commander firmly persuaded that his own legions were -irresistible. You had there all the conditions that made for war. Had -it come of set purpose? I have read most of the literature concerning -the events that led up to that war, and it is full of warning as to -how wars happen. They do not come because the majority of those who -are concerned are bent upon bloodshed, not even the majority who have -the decisive voice if they exercised it in time. Had a plebiscite been -taken in every country in Europe a week before war was declared as to -whether they wished to engage in a European conflict, the proposal -would have been turned down by a majority so overwhelming as to show -that the proposition was one that no nation had the slightest idea of -entertaining. That is not the reason why it came. But you have always -in control of the affairs of nations some men who hesitate; many who -are apathetic, many who are merely inefficient and stupid; and then -most men, even in a government, have their minds concentrated on their -own immediate tasks. - -I will give you an illustration of how war is begun, once you have the -predisposition to quarrel, without anybody wanting it and with the -vast majority of the people who are to be engaged in it opposed to it. -Austria issued an ultimatum to Serbia. There is nothing a big bully -likes better than to hector a little man who is near the point of his -toe. Serbia was so near the boot that Austria was constantly tempted -to give it a kick, and it did. It issued an ultimatum, which was a -very insolent one. The Serbian reply was a practical acceptance of the -Austrian demands. This is the note the kaiser wrote on it: "A brilliant -performance this. But with it disappears"--listen to this written by -the Kaiser of Germany just a few days before war was declared--"but -with it disappears every reason for war, and the Austrian minister -ought to have remained quietly in Belgrade. After that I would never -have given orders for mobilisation." In three days there was war. - -Let me give another illustration. Admiral Tirpitz said he saw Von -Jagow two days after the Austrian reply. Von Jagow, the German foreign -minister, was so little interested in the Austro-Serbian conflict that -he confessed to the German ambassador to Austria on July 27th, two days -after the reply had been received, that he had not yet found time to -read the Serbian reply to Austria. Here is the document on which ten -million young men who had no responsibility for it have been slain, -homes have been desolated, and a debt of taxation, confusion and -sorrow incurred which will not be wiped out as long as this generation -lasts. - -It is inconceivable, if one had not some knowledge of the carelessness -and the procrastination which are bred in official circles by long -practice. That was only three days before war was declared. This high -official in the Wilhelmstrasse, who subsequently agreed to the fateful -decision to declare war against Russia, had not even read the critical -document which ought to have averted the struggle. But there are -always the vigilant few, the very few resolute men whose whole mind -and energy and skill is engaged ceaselessly in driving forward the -chariots of war. Whilst others are asleep, they are craftily dodging -the traffic, and stealing along unawares, slowly getting their chariots -into position for the next push forward. Whilst others are asleep, they -lash the fiery steeds along their destructive course. In the press, -on the platform, in the council chambers, in the chancelleries, in -society of all kinds, high and low, they are always pressing along. -When the precipice is reached, they dash through the feeble resistance -of the panic-stricken mob of counsellors and officials, and nations are -plunged into the abyss before they know it. - -This is the way most wars come. - -Read the history of the war of 1870. It came about in the same -confused, clumsy, purposeless way. In all these cases there is always -in the background the sinister figure of that force for mischief which -used to be known by our Puritan fathers as the devil. Have these -hatreds and suspicions abated? Are there no rivalries to-day? Are -there no men whose one joy is in war? Was the devil numbered amongst -the slain in the last war? I have never seen his name in any casualty -list. Look around. His agents are more numerous, more active, more -pressing and efficient than ever. Europe to-day is a cauldron of -suspicions and hatreds. It is well to speak frankly. Celt and Teuton -are now interlocked in a conflict which is none the less desperate -because one of the parties is disarmed. There is a suppressed savagery -which is but ill concealed, and there are new hatreds which, if they -have not been brought into existence during the war, have at any -rate come to the surface. Mankind has learnt no lesson from the four -or five years of war, although it has been scourged with scorpions. -There was nothing that contributed more to the last catastrophe than -the annexation by Germany of Alsace-Lorraine. As long as that act -of folly remained uncorrected there was no real peace possible in -Europe. The nations concerned were just abiding their opportunity, -and the opportunity came. Now you have two Alsace-Lorraines at least. -There is the annexation of Vilna by force; there is the annexation -of Galicia by force, by violence, by the use of arms against the -will of the population. Elsewhere you have the German and the Pole -quarrelling over Silesia; the Russian and the Pole over doubtful -boundaries; the Czech and the Magyar; the Serbian and the Bulgarian; -the Russian and the Rumanian; the Rumanian and the Magyar. There is -the age-long feud between Greek and Turk. All have an air of biding -opportunity, all are armed ready for slaughter. Europe is a seething -cauldron of international hates, with powerful men in command of the -fuel stores feeding the flames and stoking the fires. It is no use -blaming the treaty of Versailles. This state of things has nothing -to do with treaties. Here it is the spirit that killeth and not the -letter. Sometimes wrongs are imaginary. Where the wrongs are imaginary -time will heal the sense of hurt, but sometimes they are real, and -time will fester the wound, but everywhere and always the hatreds are -real enough. Can nothing be done? If it can, let it be done in time. -Let it be done at once. Yet, once more I remind you that if the gun -is loaded--and it is loaded in every land--when the quarrel begins it -is apt to go off, not because the trigger is deliberately pulled, but -because some clumsy fellow in his excitement stumbles against it. - -In a continent which is nominally Christian, the churches surely are -not impotent. When the West was all Catholic, and it had the good -fortune to have a high-minded and capable occupant of the throne -of St. Peter, many a struggle was averted by his intervention. Can -the churches not once more display their power? They can only do -so by moving together, not merely every denomination in Britain, -but every Christian community throughout Europe--Catholic and -Protestant--Catholics even more than Protestants, for the countries -where the peril is most imminent are more under the domination of the -Catholic churches than of the Protestant faiths. If all the heroism -of millions, their sacrifice and their sufferings, are to be thrown -away, it will be the most colossal, criminal and infamous waste ever -perpetrated in human history. Millions of men endangered their lives -willingly. Millions lost their lives for the sake of establishing peace -on earth on the basis of international right. A temple to human right -was built with material quarried out of all that is choicest in the -soul of man. But its timbers are being drenched with the kerosene of -hatred, and one day a match will be lit by some careless or malignant -hand which will set fire to this magnificent edifice; its splendour -will be reduced to black embers, and the hope of mankind will be once -more laid in ashes. The task of the churches is to put forth the whole -of their united strength to avert that catastrophe. - -Peace is only possible when you introduce into the attitude of nations -towards each other principles which govern the demeanour of decent -people in a community towards their neighbours. If international -methods were introduced into the dealings of neighbours with each other -life would become intolerable--the unconcealed suspicions, distrusts -and ill-will which rule everywhere, the eternal expectancy of and -preparation for blows, the readiness of the strong to use violence, -either to enforce his will on his weaker neighbour or to deprive him of -his liberty or his possessions, or even his life, to satisfy anger, -revenge, or greed. Had this been the rule in private affairs, we should -all have to live in caves, or in castles, according to our means. As a -matter of fact, man is only half civilised. In international matters he -is still a savage, in his heart he recognises no law but that of force. -The savage has his restraints. His instinct warns him not to pounce -save when he thinks he can do so effectively and with impunity, and -for some purpose which he thinks worth his while. Whether he hates or -covets, he has no other restraint. I wish I could say that in essence -nations to-day obey any other impulse. Man must be civilised in his -international relations, otherwise wars will go on as long as mankind -remains on this earth. - -I have seen a city wrenched from its people. I have seen a whole -province appropriated against the protests of its people, and -all within the last four years, since the Great War to establish -international right. There was no conceivable justification for either -of these depredations except that both the city and the province were -desirable, were at hand, were very tempting, and that the owners were -too feeble to resist their pillagers. - -The lesson must be taught that larceny does not diminish in turpitude -as it increases in the scale of its operations. A nation that -feloniously steals, takes, and carries away a city or province is just -as criminal as the thief sentenced to imprisonment for robbery by -violence on the high-road. And these national felonies will assuredly -bring trouble one day. They invariably do so, and unfortunately -international trouble is never confined to the felon. Human -retribution, once it begins, is as indiscriminating and uncontrollable -as a prairie fire. The flames consume the wheat as well as the tares. -Hell fire administered by the hand of man scorches the innocent -equally with the guilty. The doom of Germany involved millions in its -tortures who were outside her gates, abominated her crimes, and did all -they could to prevent their perpetration. That is why it is written: -"'Vengeance is mine, I will repay,' saith the Lord." It is the supreme -duty of the churches to teach nations to understand that the moral law -is just as applicable to them in their corporate capacity as it is to -the individuals who compose them; to teach them that hatred is just as -unseemly between nations as it is between individuals, and far more -dangerous. Goodwill must be assiduously cultivated between nations. -It must be ingeminated in every way--in schools, in the press, in -sermons, in classes. The men who are always sowing distrust and dislike -of men of other races and lands should be picked out, condemned, -shown up, hunted by the scorn, the contempt and the wrath of their -fellowmen. They are more dangerous than the incendiary who burns down -an occasional hay-rick or habitation. - -Let the best side of every nation be better known. Each nation has made -its contribution to the sum of human greatness. Dwell on that, and not -on the failings and the deficiencies, the errors, and the crimes which -are unhappily common to all nations. Name me the land that has no stain -on its record. There is no end to the resourcefulness of hate. Its -variety is infinite. I recollect, not so long ago, a time when you were -not a patriot if you were pro-French; the fact that you were pro-French -stamped you as a Little Englander. France was supposed to be a busy -and malignant foe of Britain all the world over, scheming everywhere -against British interests. She stood for all that was unpleasant and -repugnant to the British mind--in her thought, her literature, her -politics, and her manners. France heartily reciprocated our dislike. -There were at least two occasions when war between the two countries -was apprehended, was openly talked of, and was even likely. The -atmosphere of the press in both capitals was charged with brimstone. - -Now it is to Germany you must not utter one word of toleration or even -fair play. I am not counselling the abandonment of the just measure of -our national rights as against either of these two countries, but they -are both great nations. They are both nations that have contributed -richly of the things that make for the elevation, for the happiness, -for the splendour of mankind. If Germany is the land of Bismarck with -its blood and iron, all Protestants will remember that she is also the -land of Luther and the Reformation. If she fought in the late war for -four years to establish a military domination in Europe, she fought -for thirty years with enduring valour and much suffering to establish -the freedom of conscience in Europe. She has given to the world great -literature, great painters, great philosophers, great explorers in -all the continents of thought. She is the land of unrivalled song. -Even in the middle of the bloody conflict with Germany, every Sunday -we praised God in our churches to the notes of German music. Let us -give credit for these things in our efforts to reconstitute the reign -of goodwill. And if we feel angry with France, let us remember her -dazzling array of great writers, her gigantic struggles for liberty, -the penetrating imagination devoted to scientific research, which has -brought incalculable blessings to humanity. Let us not judge France -by the fussy little men that give expression to her petulance in the -fits of temper that overtake every nation, but by the great men who -have given noble expression to her immortal soul. France is the land -of Victor Hugo, of Pascal, of Renan, and many another teacher who has -taken humanity by the hand along the upward road. - -Everything depends on a consistent, determined, continuous inculcation -of the principles and the ideal of goodfellowship, between nations. -Goodwill on earth means to think well of and dwell on the best side -of others, and goodwill on earth and peace have been linked together. -Without the one you will not have the other. Let us, therefore, -cultivate the spirit of brotherhood amongst men. The church must -appeal to the noblest sentiments of the human heart. Mankind can -only be redeemed by an appeal to those higher instincts. Not by an -appeal to ignoble fear. War means terror, war means death, war means -anguish. That will not prevent war, and never has. Man is the most -fearless of God's creatures, and when his passions are roused there -is no fear that will restrain him. The fire of his passion burns the -restraints of self-preservation like bands of tow, so that fear will -not restrain the nations and make peace among them. War destroys trade, -it brings unemployment. Look at all the losses, reckoning them up in -cash. That will not prevent war: it never has. Selfish interests have -a means of deluding themselves. Greed has a blind side. Do not trust -to selfishness and selfish interest to ensure peace. Selfishness will -ensure nothing which is worth keeping in the world. Selfishness pays -good dividends, but it wastes capital. The nation or the individual -that makes self-love the managing-director of the soul will end in -bankruptcy--bankruptcy of respect, bankruptcy of ideals--bankruptcy of -honour--bankruptcy of friendships. What is it that Germany is suffering -from now? Her great tragedy is not her indemnity, not even her gigantic -casualties, not even the destruction of her trade. The one great -tragedy of Germany is that she has lost the respect of mankind. It -affects her trade, it affects her business, it makes it difficult for -her to climb to the pitch whence she fell. The rope is gone. She has -done things of which she herself is now ashamed. Her people--I can -see it when I meet them--are ashamed. That is the tragedy. They are a -gallant people, they are a brave people, they fought bravely, but they -are broken-spirited. Why? They have lost their self-respect because -they have done something that they know in their hearts was wrong. -These are the things that have to be taught to nations. - -A public opinion must be worked up that will be strong enough to -sustain international right. No law is possible without an active -public opinion for its enforcement, least of all international law. -Without it the League of Nations is a farce. You might as well have a -wooden cannon; however splendidly mounted it may be, however imposing -its appearance, every one knows that the moment it is fired it will -burst. Unless the world is taught to respect its authority, it will -become a butt of derision. It is no use keeping up pretences. Pretences -never delude events. The League of Nations may gather together -representatives of all the great powers of the earth, and yet it may -be a futile, barren, costly nothing unless it has behind it the spirit -of the people who constitute those nations. The real danger of the -moment is lest the League of Nations should become a mere make-believe, -whilst the same old intrigues, the same old schemes, the same old -international greed and hatred, should be working their will freely -outside. The decision of the League of Nations has been, within the -last two or three years, openly flouted by a member of that league, -a member which owes its national independence to the treaty which -founded that league. Another nation, one of the principal authors of -the league, refuses to refer a question in which is it concerned, and -in which Europe is concerned, to the arbitrament of the league. Both -these nations prefer to resort to force. The rest of the world looks -on feebly with indifference, accepting the rebuff to their league in -each case. Why? Because there is no public opinion in the recalcitrant -countries to bring pressure to bear on the respective governments, -and there is no public opinion strong enough outside to exercise the -necessary insistence. - -The churches alone can remedy this. There ought to be an international -movement of all the churches, Catholic and Protestant, Protestant -and Catholic. I know it is difficult to compass. The divisions in -Christendom are too often fatal to common action for the attainment of -common aims. They ought to be overcome. They must be overcome. There -was a time in the Middles Ages when religion exercised a direct as -well as an indirect influence in the domain of government and social -relations. It helped to win for Englishmen their great charter. It -gradually emancipated the serfs. It preserved the peace of Europe many -a time when it was gravely imperilled by the quarrels of kings. In -the days of Puritanism, and the days of the Covenant, the partnership -between religion and politics won for us the two great boons of -parliamentary liberty and liberty of conscience. When Methodism spurred -the conscience of England, its influence was felt in the political -movement that emancipated the slaves throughout the British Empire. - -That was one of the greatest feats of disinterested righteousness ever -exhibited by a nation. The tasks awaiting religion to-day in the sphere -of government are even greater--emancipation of the worker from the -tyrannies of economic greed, the saving of the nation from the curse of -alcohol, and the spreading of the angels' message heard on the hills -of Bethlehem until the obdurate heart of man shall at last re-echo it: -"Peace on earth and goodwill amongst men." - - - - -II - -EUROPE STILL ARMING - - -Marshal Foch once told me that he considered the German army of 1914 -the finest army the world ever saw, in numbers, organisation, training, -and equipment. - -What set that army in motion? - -Much has been written and spoken as to the origin of the Great War, and -as to who and what was responsible for so overwhelming a cataclysm. No -one ever believed that it was the assassination of a royal archduke. -Some said it was the working out of the pan-German scheme to rule the -earth; some contended it was the German fear of the growing power of -Russia, the nervous apprehension of what looked like an encircling -movement by Russia, France and Britain. - -The great French marshal's dictum is the real explanation. Unless due -weight is given to this outstanding fact the diplomatic muddle of July, -1914, becomes unintelligible. - -Were it not that the German army was more perfect and more potent than -either the French or the Russian army--were it not that every German -officer was convinced that the German military machine was superior -to all its rivals--there would have been no war, whatever emperors, -diplomatists, or statesmen said, thought, or intended. - -All nations have their ambitions, but they are not tempted to impose -them upon their neighbours if the hazard is too obviously great. But -a sense of overpowering force behind national aims is a constant -incitement to recklessness, to greed, and to ambitious patriotism. - -The more one examines, in the growing calm, the events of July, 1914, -the more one is impressed with the shrinking of the nominal rulers -of the attacking empires as they approached the abyss, and with the -relentless driving onward of the military organisation behind these -terror-stricken dummies. - -Navies are essentially defensive weapons. No capital in the world -can be captured by navies alone, and no country can be annexed or -invaded by a fleet. But armies are grabbing machines. A transcendent -army has always led to aggression. No country can resist the lure of -an easy military triumph paraded before its eyes for two successive -generations. - -The inference is an obvious one. To ensure peace on earth nations must -disarm their striking forces. Without disarmament, pacts, treaties, and -covenants are of no avail. They are the paper currency of diplomacy. -That is the reason why all the friends of peace are filled with despair -when they see nations still arming and competing in armies whilst -trusting to mere words and signatures to restrain the irresistible -impetus of organised force. - -A statistical survey of European armies to-day is calculated to cause -alarm. Europe has not learnt the lesson of the war. It has rather -drawn a wrong inference from that calamity. There are more men under -arms in Europe to-day than there were in 1913-14, with none of the -justification or excuse which could be pleaded in those days. - -In pre-war times the statesmen of each country could make a -parliamentary case for their military budgets by calling attention to -the menace of prodigious armies across their frontiers. Germany and -Austria built up great armaments because their frontiers were open -to the attack of two great military powers who had engaged to pool -their resources in the event of war. France and Russia raised huge -armies because Germany possessed the most redoubtable army in the -world, and could rely in the case of war upon the assistance of the -not inconsiderable forces of the Austrian empire. And both Austria -and France had always the uncertain factor of Italy, with her army of -3,000,000, to reckon with. - -But since the war these mutual excuses no longer exist. The two great -military empires of Central Europe have disappeared. Germany, which -before the war had a peace establishment of 800,000 men and reserves -running into millions, has to-day a total army of 100,000 men--about -one-third the size of the Polish army. The formidable German equipment -which for four years pounded the cities and villages of northern France -to dust is either destroyed or scattered for display amongst the towns -and villages of the victors. The Austrian army, which had in 1913-14 -a peace establishment of 420,000 men and a reserve of two or three -millions of trained men, has to-day been reduced to a tiny force of -30,000 men. - -In spite of these facts France has still an army of 736,000 men now -under arms, with a trained reserve of two or three millions more. She -is strengthening and developing her air force as if she feared--or -contemplated--an immediate invasion. In 1914 France had an air force of -400 aeroplanes; to-day she has 1,152.[1] But numbers signify little. -The size, the power, and the purpose of the machines signify much. -Amongst the 1,152 air machines of to-day will be found bombers of a -destructiveness such as was not dreamt of in 1914. - -Should human folly drift once more into war these preparations are -full of evil omen as to the character of that conflict. A single bomb -dropped from one of the new bombers contains more explosive material -than one hundred of those carried by the old type. And the size of the -machine and of its bombs is growing year by year. Where is it to stop? -And what is it all for? Where is the enemy? Where is the menace which -demands such gigantic military developments? Not one of the neighbours -of France has to-day a force which reaches one-fourth the figures -of her formidable army. Germany no longer affords a decent pretext. -The population of Germany is equal to the aggregate population of -Poland, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Czecho-Slovakia, but her army barely -numbers one-seventh of the aggregate peace establishment of these four -countries. Rumania alone, with a population of 15,000,000, has an army -twice the size of that allowed by the Treaty of Versailles to Germany -with her population of 60,000,000. These countries have in addition -to their standing armies reserve forces of millions of trained men, -whilst the young men of Germany are no longer permitted to train in -the use of arms. Her military equipment is destroyed, and her arsenals -and workshops are closely inspected by Allied officers lest a fresh -equipment should be clandestinely produced. An army of 700,000 is, -therefore, not necessary in order to keep Germany within bounds. - -The only other powerful army in Europe is the Russian army. It is -difficult to gather any reliable facts about Russia. The mists that -arise from that unhealthy political and economic swamp obscure and -distort all vision. The statistics concerning her army vary according -to the point of view of the person who cites them. The latest figure -given by the Russians themselves is 800,000. On paper that indicates -as formidable a force as that possessed by the French. But the events -of the past few years show clearly that the Russian army is powerful -only for defence, and that it is valueless for purposes of invasion. It -has neither the transport that gives mobility nor the artillery that -makes an army redoubtable in attack. The Polish invasion of 1923 was a -comedy, and as soon as the Poles offered the slightest resistance the -Bolsheviks ran back to their fastnesses without striking a Parthian -blow at their pursuers. The state of Russian arsenals and factories -under Bolshevism is such that any attempt to re-equip these armies must -fail. The Russian army, therefore, affords no justification for keeping -up armaments in Europe on the present inflated scale. The fact is that -Europe is thoroughly frightened by its recent experience, and, like all -frightened things, does not readily listen to reason, and is apt to -resort to expedients which aggravate the evils which have terrified it. - -Militarism has reduced it to its present plight, and to save itself -from a similar disaster in future it has become more militarist than -ever. Every little state bristles with guns to scare off invaders. -Meanwhile no country in Europe pays its way, except Britain, with her -reduced army and navy. But by means of loans and inflated currencies -they all, even the smallest of them, contrive to maintain larger armies -than Frederick the Great or the Grand Monarque ever commanded in their -most triumphant years. And the cost of armaments to-day has grown -vastly out of proportion to the numbers of the units that compose them. -France--in many ways the richest country in Europe--displays a gaping -and a growing rent in her national finance which has to be patched up -by paper. The deficit grows in spite of the fact that a large part of -her army is quartered on Germany to the detriment of reparations, and -that the German contribution conceals much of the cost of that large -army. - -A good deal of the borrowing is attributable to the cost of repairing -her devastated area, but the burden of maintaining so huge an army is -responsible for a considerable share of the deficiency. The economic -recovery of Europe is seriously retarded by the cost of the new -militarism. The old continent is throwing to the dogs of war with both -hands the bread that should feed her children. One day those dogs will, -in their arrogant savagery, turn upon the children and rend them. - -_Algeciras, December 26th, 1922._ - -FOOTNOTE: - -[1] 1,152 refers to when this chapter was written, _i. e._, January -6th, 1923. The figure has increased since then. - - - - -III - -THE ERUPTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - - -The shores of the Mediterranean have from time immemorial been the -scene of eruptions and earthquakes. They generally break out without -warning. Sometimes they are devastating in their effects, destroying -life and property over wide areas and on a vast scale. Sometimes they -provide a brilliant spectacular display, terrifying in appearance, but -not causing much destruction. To which of these two categories does the -last eruption of Mussolini belong? To drop hot cinders in the Balkans -is a dangerous experiment. The soil is everywhere soaked with naphtha -and it floats about in uncharted pools and runlets which easily catch -fire. A cinder flung from Vienna started a conflagration which spread -over continents. That was only nine years ago. The ground is still -hot--the smoke blinds and stifles. You cannot see clearly or breathe -freely. Now and again there is a suspicious ruddiness in the banks of -smoke which proves that the fire is not yet out. And yet there are -statesmen flinging burning faggots about with reckless swagger. - -The temper of Europe may be gauged from the reception accorded to these -heedless pyrotechnics on the part of national leaders by their own -countrymen. Every time it occurs, whether in France, Italy or Turkey, -and whether it be Poincare, Mussolini, or Mustapha Kemal who directs -the show, applause greets the exhibition. I remember the first days -of the Great War. There was not a belligerent capital where great and -enthusiastic crowds did not parade the streets to cheer for war. In -those days men did not know what war meant. Their conception of it -was formed from the pictures of heroic--and always victorious--feats, -hung in national galleries and reproduced in the form of the cheap -chromos, engravings, and prints, which adorn the walls in every cottage -throughout most lands. The triumphant warriors on horseback with the -gleaming eye and the flourishing sabre are their own countrymen; the -poor vanquished under the crashing hoofs are the foe. Hurrah for -more pictures! The Crown Prince denies that he ever used the phrase -"This jolly war." His denial ought to be accepted in the absence of -better proof than is yet forthcoming as to the statement ever having -been made. But the phrase represented the temper of millions in those -fateful days. It used to be said that in wars one lot cheered and -the other fought. But the cheering mobs who filled the streets in -August were filling the trenches in September, and multitudes were -filling graves ere the year was out. But when they cheered they had no -realisation of the actualities of war. They idealised it. They only saw -it in pictures. - -But the cheerers of to-day know what war means. France lost well over a -million lives in the last fight. Italy lost 600,000, and there are men -in every workshop in both countries who know something of the miseries -as well as the horrors of war and can tell those who do not. What, -then, accounts for the readiness, at the slightest provocation, to rush -into all the same wretchedness over again? The infinite capacity of -mankind for deluding itself. Last time, it is true, it was a ghastly -affair. This time it will be an easy victory. Then you had to fight -a perfectly armed Germany, or Austria; now it is a very small affair -indeed--in one case a disarmed Germany which cannot fight, or, in the -other case, a miserable little country like Greece with no Army or -Navy to talk of. So hurrah for the guns! A bloodless victory, except, -of course, to the vanquished. More pictures for the walls to show our -children what terrible people we are when provoked! - -This episode may end peaceably, but it was a risk to take, and quite -an unnecessary risk under the circumstances of the case. Italy was -indignant, and naturally indignant, at the murder of her emissaries -in cold blood on Greek territory and, although it took place in a -well-known murder area--on the Albanian border where comitadjis and -other forms of banditti reign--still, Greece was responsible for -giving adequate protection to all the Boundary Commissioners who were -operating within her frontiers. Italy is, therefore, entitled to demand -stern reparation for this outrage. This Greece promptly concedes. Not -merely has Greece shown her readiness to pay a full indemnity, but -she has offered to salute the Italian flag by way of making amends -for the offence involved to the Italian nation in this failure to -protect Italian officers transacting legitimate business on Greek -soil. Mussolini's answer to the Greek acknowledgment of liability -is to bombard a defenceless town, kill a few unarmed citizens, and -enter into occupation of a Greek island. Does any one imagine, if the -incident had occurred on French soil, and the French Government had -displayed the same willingness to express regret and offer reparation, -that, without further parley, he would have bombarded Ajaccio? Or, -had it been Britain, would he have shelled Cowes and occupied the -Isle of Wight? But Greece has no Navy. That, I suppose, alters the -merits of the case! Force is still the supreme arbiter of right and -wrong in international affairs in Europe. It is worth noting how a new -code of international law is coming into existence since the War. The -French armies invade a neighbour's territory, occupy it, establish -martial law, seize and run the railways, regulate its Press, deport -tens of thousands of its inhabitants, imprison or shoot down all who -resist, and then proclaim that this is not an act of war. It is only -a peaceful occupation to enforce rights under a peace treaty. Signor -Mussolini shells a town belonging to a country with whom he is at -peace, and forcibly occupies part of its territory, and then solemnly -declares that it is not an act of war, but just a reasonable measure -of diplomatic precaution. Once force decides the issue it also -settles the rules. There was a time when English and Spaniards fought -each other in the West Indies whilst their Governments at home were -ostensibly at peace. And French and English fought in India without any -diplomatic rupture between Versailles and St. James's. But in those -days these lands were very remote and the control of the centre over -events at these distances was intermittent and occasionally feeble. -And sometimes it suited Governments to ignore what was taking place on -the fringe of Empire. But even in those days an attack on the homeland -meant war, and it would mean war to-day were the attacked countries not -powerless. I have heard it said that there is one law for the rich and -another for the poor. There is no doubt one international law for the -strong and another for the weak. - -What about the League of Nations? This is pre-eminently a case for -action under the Covenant. Italy and Greece are both parties. How -can they, consistently with the terms of the Treaty they so recently -signed, refuse to leave this dispute to be dealt with by the League? -Italy had a special part in drafting the Treaty and in imposing it -upon Germany and Austria. She cannot now in decency repudiate its -clauses. It is suggested in some quarters that, the dignity of Italy -being involved in the dispute, she cannot possibly consent to leave -it in the hands of the League. That surely is a fatal limitation on -the activities of the League of Nations. Every dispute involving right -implicates the national honour and as every nation is the judge of -its own honour, ultimately all differences would be ruled out of the -Covenant which it did not suit one country or the other to refer. The -League is not allowed to touch Reparations. If this quarrel also is -excluded from the consideration of the League, it is no exaggeration -to say that this valuable part of the Treaty of Versailles becomes a -dead letter. It is one of the gross ironies of the European situation -that the Treaty of Versailles is being gradually torn to pieces by the -countries which are not only the authors but have most to gain by its -provisions. France has already repudiated the first and most important -part of the Treaty by declaring that it will refer no question arising -between herself and her neighbours under the Treaty itself to the -League of Nations. She has further invaded and occupied her neighbour's -territory in defiance of the provisions of the Treaty. If Italy also -declines to respect the first part of that Treaty, then nothing is -left of it except what it suits nations to enforce or obey. And if the -framers do not owe allegiance to the Treaty they drafted, why should -those who only accepted it under duress bow to its behests? The victors -are busily engaged in discrediting their own charter. It would have -been a more honourable course for the nations to pursue if they had -followed the example of America by refusing to ratify the whole Treaty. -To sign a contract and then to pick and choose for execution the parts -of it that suit you is unworthy of the honour of great nations which -profess to lead the world towards a higher civilisation. - -There are ugly rumours of possible complications arising out of this -unfortunate incident. It does not need a vivid imagination to foretell -one or two possible results of a disastrous character. In this country -they would be deplored, not only for their effect on European peace, -but for the damage they must inevitably inflict on the best interests -of Italy. She has had enough of victory. What she needs now--what we -all need--is peace. There is no country which has more genuine goodwill -for Italy's prosperity and greatness than Great Britain. It is an old -and tried friendship. The two nations have many common interests: they -have no rivalries. Hence, the deep anxiety of Britain that Italy should -not commit a mistake which will mortgage her future even if it does not -imperil her present. - -There are no doubt strategic advantages for Italy in holding Corfu. -It enables them to "bottle up" the Adriatic. But it is Greek and it -menaces Slavonia, and this introduction of foreign elements into the -body of a State for strategic reasons always provokes inflammatory -symptoms injurious to the general health of a community. They tend -to become malignant and sooner or later they bring disaster. Bosnia -ultimately proved to be the death of the Austrian Empire. When the -Bosnian cancer became active the evil of Italia Irredenta broke out -once more, and between them they laid the Empire of the Hapsburgs in -the dust. Italy has played a great part in the work of civilisation, -and so has Greece. They have still greater tasks awaiting them--one on -a great and the other necessarily on a smaller scale. It would be a -misfortune to humanity if they spent their fine enthusiasm on hating -and thwarting each other. - -_London, September 3rd, 1923._ - - - - -IV - -IS THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS A SUCCESS? - - -Is the League of Nations a success? It is impossible to answer the -question candidly without giving offence to rival partisans. If you -indicate successes already placed to the account of the League, -opponents deny or minimise these triumphs, and suggest that you are -blinded by attachment to a chimera. If you point to shortcomings, the -extreme zealots of the League get angry and hint that you are a secret -enemy. - -I mean nevertheless to attempt an answer, for much depends on a -fearless examination of progress made or missed. - -My first answer would be that it is scarcely fair to pose this question -just yet. The League was founded only three years ago--much too short -a period to afford a test of the working of a gigantic, complex, but -very delicate and sensitive human machine. There has been hardly time -enough even to catalogue and chart the myriads of nerves that thread -its system. You cannot move a finger at the councils of Geneva without -touching some hidden nerve and setting it in a condition of quivering -protest. The League has, however, been long enough in existence to -reveal its strength and its weaknesses, its power, its potentialities -and its perils. - -It has already achieved triumphs of which its founders may well be -proud. The restoration of Austria to life when it seemed to have been -hopelessly submerged in the deluge of economic, financial and political -disaster which had overwhelmed it, is a notable feat of artificial -respiration. The successful effort organised by the League to stamp out -typhus in Eastern Europe and prevent its spread to the West is also a -success worthy of record. But for this intelligently conducted campaign -that terrible disease would have ravaged Russia and Central Europe -and laid low millions out of populations so enfeebled by hunger and -privation as to become easy victims to its devastating assaults. - -The Labour branch of the League has also been specially active and -energetic, and its persistent endeavours to raise and co-ordinate the -standards of toil in all countries are producing marked and important -results. In addition great credit is due to the League for the splendid -work it has accomplished in alleviating the distress which prevailed -amongst the famine-stricken areas of Eastern Europe and amongst the -refugees who fled from the horrors of victorious Bolshevism in Russia, -and the still greater horrors of Turkish savagery in Asia Minor. - -But these humanitarian tasks, praiseworthy though they be, were not the -primary objects of the foundation of the League. Its main purpose was -the averting of future wars by the setting up of some tribunal to which -nations would be bound by their own covenant and the pressure of other -nations to resort in order to settle their differences. Its failure or -success as an experiment will be judged by this test alone. How does it -stand in this respect? - -It succeeded in effecting a settlement of a dangerous dispute between -Sweden and Finland over the possession of the Aaland Islands. That -success was on the line of its main purpose. Here the methods of the -League gave confidence in its complete impartiality. - -So much can, unfortunately, not be said of another question where it -was called in and gave its decision. Its Silesian award has been acted -upon but hardly accepted by both parties as a fair settlement. That is -due to the manner adopted in reaching judgment. Instead of following -the Aaland precedent in the choice of a tribunal, it pursued a course -which engendered suspicion of its motives. It created a regrettable -impression of anxiety to retain a certain measure of control over -the decision. There was a suspicion of intrigue in the choice of the -tribunal and the conduct of the proceedings. In the Aaland case no -great power was particularly interested in influencing the conclusions -arrived at either way. But here two powers of great authority in the -League--France and Poland--were passionately engaged in securing a -result adverse to Germany. The other party to the dispute had no -friends, and was moreover not a member of the League. - -Britain stood for fair play, but she was not a protagonist of the -claims of Germany. Poland had a powerful advocate on the League--a -country with a vital interest in securing a pro-Polish decision. In -these circumstances the League ought to have exercised the most -scrupulous care to avoid any shadow of doubt as to its freedom from -all bias. Had it chosen distinguished jurists outside its own body to -undertake at least a preliminary investigation as it did in the Aaland -case, all would have been well. It preferred, however, to retain the -matter in its own hands. Hence the doubts and misgivings with which -the judgment of the League has been received not only by the whole of -Germany, but by many outside Germany. - -This decision, and the way Poland has flouted the League over Vilna -served to confirm the idea which prevails in Russia and Germany that -France and Poland dominate the League. The Silesian award may be just, -but the fact remains that it will take a long series of decisions -beyond cavil to restore or rather to establish German and Russian -confidence in the League. - -It is unfortunate that countries which cover more than half Europe -should feel thus about a body whose success depends entirely on the -confidence reposed in its impartiality by all the nations which may be -called upon to carry out its decrees, even though these may be adverse -to their views or supposed interests. The Vilna fiasco, the Armenian -failure, the suspicions that surround the Silesian award, the timidity -which prevents the tackling of reparations, which is the one question -disturbing the peace of Europe to-day, the futile conversations and -committees on disarmament which everyone knows, will not succeed in -scrapping one flight of aeroplanes or one company of infantry. All -these disappointments arise from one predominating cause. What is it? - -Undoubtedly the great weakness of the League comes from the fact that -it only represents one half the great powers of the world. Until the -others join you might as well call the Holy Alliance a League of -Nations. - -The ostensible purpose of that combination was also to prevent a -recurrence of the wars that had for years scorched Europe, and to -establish European peace on the firm basis of a joint guarantee of -delimited frontiers. But certain powers with selfish ambitions dictated -its policy. They terrorised Europe into submission and called that -peace. - -No historical parallel is quite complete, but there is enough material -in the occurrences of to-day to justify the reference. The League to be -a reality must represent the whole civilised world. That is necessary -to give it balance as well as authority. That was the original -conception. To ask why that failed is to provoke a bitter and a barren -controversy. - -I do not propose to express any opinion as to the merits of the -manoeuvres which led to the defeat of the treaty in America. Whether -the Senate should have honoured the signature of an American President -given in the name of his country at an international conference, or -whether the commitment was too fundamentally at variance with American -ideas to justify sanction--whether the amendments demanded as the -condition of approval would have crippled the League and ought to have -been rejected, or whether they were harmless and ought to have been -accepted--these are issues which it would serve no helpful purpose for -me to discuss. - -But as to the effect of the American refusal to adhere to the League, -there can be no doubt. It robbed that body of all chance of dominating -success in the immediate future. It is true that three great powers -remained in the League, but Russia was excluded, Germany was not -included, and when America decided not to go in, of the great powers, -Britain, France and Italy alone remained. - -The effect has been paralysing. Where these three powers disagree on -important issues upon which action is required, nothing is done. The -smaller powers cannot, on questions where one or more of the great -powers have deep and acute feeling, impose their will; and no two great -powers will take the responsibility of overruling the third. - -Hence questions like reparations which constitute a standing menace to -European peace are not dealt with by the League. Had America been in, -even with an amended and expurgated constitution, the situation would -have been transformed. America and Britain, acting in concert with an -openly sympathetic Italy and a secretly assenting Belgium, would have -brought such pressure to bear on France as to make it inevitable that -the League should act. - -The success of the League depends upon the readiness of nations great -and small to discuss all their differences at the council table. But no -great power has so far permitted any international question in which -it has a direct and vital interest to be submitted to the League for -decision. - -It has been allowed to adjudicate upon the destiny of the Aaland -Islands, over the fate of which Sweden and Finland had a controversy. -It has taken cognisance of disputes between Poland and Lithuania -about Vilna, although even here its decision has been ignored by the -parties. But the acute and threatening quarrel which has broken out -between France and Germany over the question of reparations the former -resolutely declines to submit to consideration by the League. - -The Treaty of Versailles is so wide in its application and so -comprehensive and far-reaching in its character that it touches -international interests almost at every point. So that the French -refusal to agree to a reference of any problems in which they are -directly concerned which may arise out of this treaty has had the -effect of hobbling the League. As long as that attitude is maintained, -the League is impotent to discharge its main function of restoring and -keeping peace. - -The dispute over reparations clouds the sky to-day, and until it is -finally settled it will cause grave atmospheric disturbances for -a whole generation. It is not an impossibility that it may end in -the most destructive conflict that ever broke over the earth. It is -churning up deadly passions. If ever there was an occasion which called -for the intervention of an organisation set up for the express purpose -of finding peaceable solutions for trouble-charged international feuds, -surely this is pre-eminently such a case. Not only do the French -government decline to entertain the idea of putting the covenant which -constitutes the first and foremost part of the Treaty of Versailles -into operation: they have gone so far as to intimate that they will -treat any proposal of the kind as an unfriendly act. The constitution -of the League stipulates that it will be the friendly duty of any power -to move that any international dispute which threatens peace shall -be referred to the League. Nevertheless, one leading signatory rules -out of the covenant all the questions which vitally affect its own -interests. This is the power which has invaded the territory of another -because the latter has failed to carry out one of the provisions of the -same treaty! - -This emphatic repudiation of a solemn contract by one of its promoters -has been acquiesced in by all the other signatories. Repudiation and -acquiescence complete the electrocuting circuit. This limitation of -the activities of the League is the gravest check which it has yet -sustained in its career. I do not believe it would have occurred had -America, with or without Article 10, been an active member of this -body. Its great authority, added to that of Britain and Italy, would -have made the pressure irresistible, and its presence on the council -would have helped materially to give such confidence in the stability -and impartiality of the League that Germany would have accepted the -conclusions arrived at without demur and acted upon them without -chicane. A rational settlement of the reparations problem by the League -would have established its authority throughout the world. Germany, -Russia and Turkey, who now treat its deliberations with distrust and -dislike tinctured with contempt, would be forced to respect its power, -and would soon be pleading for incorporation in its councils. The -covenant would thus become a charter--respected, feared, honoured and -obeyed by all. There would still be injustice, but redress would be -sought and fought for in the halls of the League. There would still -be oppression, but freedom would be wrung from the clauses of the -covenant. Argument, debate and intercession would be the recognised -substitutes for shot, shell and sword. Wars would cease unto the ends -of the earth, and the reign of law would be supreme. - -Wherein lies the real power of the League, or to be more accurate, its -possibility of power? It brings together leading citizens of most of -the civilised states of the world to discuss all questions affecting or -likely to affect peace and concord amongst nations. The men assembled -at Geneva do not come there of their own initiative, nor do they merely -represent propagandist societies engaged in preaching the gospel of -peace. They are the chosen emissaries of their respective governments. -They are the authorised spokesmen of these governments. When in doubt -they refer to their governments and receive their instructions, and the -proceedings are reported direct to the governments. They meet often and -regularly, and they debate their problems with complete candour as well -as courtesy. - -It is in itself a good thing to accustom nations to discuss their -difficulties face to face in a public assembly where reasons have -to be sought and given for their attitude which will persuade and -satisfy neutral minds of its justice and fairness. It is a practice -to be cultivated. It is the practice that ended in eliminating the -arbitrament of the sword in the internal affairs of nations. It is -only thus that international disputes will gradually drift into the -debating chamber instead of on to the battlefield for settlement. Wars -are precipitated by motives which the statesmen responsible for them -dare not publicly avow. A public discussion would drag these emotives -in their nudity into the open where they would die of exposure to the -withering contempt of humanity. The League by developing the habit -amongst nations of debating their differences in the presence of the -world, and of courting the judgment of the world upon the merits of -their case, is gradually edging out war as a settler of quarrels. That -is the greatest service it can render mankind. Will it be allowed to -render that service? If not, then it will perish like many another -laudable experiment attempted by mankind in the effort to save itself. - -But if it dies, the hope of establishing peace on earth will be buried -in the same tomb. - -_London, April 2nd, 1923._ - - - - -V - -THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND ITS CRITICS - - -I have had recently special opportunities for appreciating the extent -to which the Treaty of Versailles has not been read by those who -have formed very definite opinions concerning its qualities. There -is no justification for a failure to peruse this great international -instrument. It is the most important document of modern times. It has -reshaped for better or for worse much of the geography of Europe. It -has resurrected dead and buried nationalities. It constitutes the deed -of manumission of tens of millions of Europeans who, up to the year of -victory, 1918, were the bondsmen of other races. It affects profoundly -the economics, the finance, the industrial and trade conditions of the -world; it contains clauses upon the efficacy of which may depend the -very existence of our civilisation. Nevertheless there are few who can -tell you what is in the Treaty of Versailles. You might have thought -that although men differed widely as to its merits, there would -have been no difficulty in securing some measure of agreement as to -its actual contents. Every endeavour was made to give full publicity -to the draft when it was first presented to the Germans, and to the -final document when signed. Even before the form of the draft was ever -settled, the actual decisions were reported from day to day. Never -was a treaty so reported and so discussed in every article and every -particle of its constitution, and to-day you can procure an official -copy of it from any bookseller for the moderate price of 2_s._ 6_d._ In -spite of that no two men who happen to profess diverse opinions as to -its justice or injustice can agree as to its contents. - -A visitor to England in the year 1713 probably experienced the same -perplexity in seeking information from a Whig and a Tory respectively -as to the Treaty of Utrecht. So this treaty has become one of those -fiercely debated subjects, as to which the contestants deliberately -refuse to regard any testimony, or recognise the existence of any fact, -which is in the least inconsistent with their particular point of view. -It has come to pass that the real Treaty of Versailles has already -disappeared, and several imaginary versions have emerged. It is around -these that the conflict rages. - -In France there exist at least two or three schools of thought -concerning the Versailles Treaty. There is one powerful section -which has always regarded it as a treasonable pact, in which M. -Clemenceau gave away solid French rights and interests in a moment of -weakness under pressure from President Wilson and myself. That is the -Poincare-Barthou-Pertinax school. That is why they are now, whilst in -form engaged in enforcing the treaty, in fact carrying out a gigantic -operation for amending it without consulting the other signatories. -This has come out very clearly in the remarkable report from a French -official in the Rhineland which was disclosed in the London _Observer_. -It is obvious from this paper that whilst the French government have -worked their public into a frenzied state of indignation over the -failure of Germany to carry out the Treaty of Versailles, they were -the whole time deliberately organising a plot to overthrow that treaty -themselves. Their representative on the Rhine was spending French money -with the consent of the French government to promote a conspiracy for -setting up an independent republic on the Rhine under the protection -of France. It was a deliberate attempt by those who disapproved of -the moderation of the Treaty of Versailles to rewrite its clauses in -the terms of the militarist demands put forward by Marshal Foch at -the Peace conference. Marshal Foch, the soul of honour, wanted to see -this done openly and straightforwardly. What he would have done like -the gentleman he is, these conspirators would have accomplished by -deceit--by deceiving their Allies and by being faithless to the treaty -to which their country had appended its signature. That is one French -school of thought on the Treaty of Versailles. It is the one which has -brought Europe to its present state of confusion and despair. - -There is the second school which reads into the treaty powers -and provisions which it does not contain, and never contemplated -containing. These critics maintain stoutly that M. Briand, and all -other French prime ministers, with the exception of M. Poincare, -betrayed their trust by failing to enforce these imaginary -stipulations. They still honestly believe that M. Poincare is the first -French minister to have made a genuine attempt to enforce French rights -under the treaty. - -In the background there is a third school which knows exactly what -the treaty means, but dares not say so in the present state of French -opinion. Perhaps they think it is better to bide their time. That time -will come, and when it does arrive, let us hope it will not be too late -to save Europe from the welter. - -In America there are also two or three divergent trends of opinion -about this treaty. One regards it as an insidious attempt to trap -America into the European cockpit, so as to pluck its feathers to line -French and English bolsters. If anything could justify so insular -an estimate it would be the entirely selfish interpretation which -is put upon the treaty by one or two of the Allied governments. The -other American party, I understand, defends it with vigour as a great -human instrument second only in importance to the Declaration of -Independence. There may be a third which thinks that on the whole it -is not a bad settlement, and that the pity is a little more tact was -not displayed in passing it through the various stages of approval and -ratification. This party is not as vocal as the others. - -In England we find at least three schools. There are the critics who -denounce it as a brutal outrage upon international justice. It is to -them a device for extorting incalculable sums out of an impoverished -Germany as reparation for damages artificially worked up. Then there -is the other extreme--the "die-hard" section--more influential since -it became less numerous, who think the treaty let Germany off much -too lightly. In fact they are in complete agreement with the French -Chauvinists as to the reprehensible moderation of its terms. In -Britain also there is a third party which regards its provisions as -constituting the best settlement, when you take into account the -conflicting aims, interests, and traditions of the parties who had to -negotiate and come to an agreement. - -But take all these variegated schools together, or separately, and -you will find not one in a thousand of their pupils could give you -an intelligent and comprehensive summary of the main principles of -the treaty. I doubt whether I should be far wrong in saying there -would not be one in ten thousand. Controversialists generally are -satisfied to concentrate on the articles in the treaty which are -obnoxious or pleasing to them as the case may be, and ignore the rest -completely, however essential they may be to a true judgment of the -whole. Most of the disputants are content to take their views from -press comments and denunciatory speeches. Unhappily the explanatory -speeches have been few. Some there are who have in their possession -the full text--nominally for reference; but you will find parts of -the reparations clauses in their copies black with the thumb-marks -which note the perspiring dialectician searching for projectiles to -hurl at the object of his fury. The clauses which ease and modify the -full demand are treated with stern neglect, and the remainder of the -pages are pure as the untrodden snow. You can trace no footprints of -politicians, publicists, or journalists, in whole provinces of this -unexplored treaty. The covenant of the League of Nations is lifted -bodily out of the text, and is delivered to the public as a separate -testament for the faithful so that the saints may not defile their -hands with the polluted print which exacts justice. They have now come -to believe that it never was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles, -and that it has nothing to do with that vile and sanguinary instrument. - -And yet the first words of this treaty are the following: - - - "The High Contracting Parties, - - "In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve - international peace and security, - - "By the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, - - "By the prescription of open, just and honourable relations - between nations, - - "By the firm establishment of the understandings of international - law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and - - "By the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all - treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one - another, - - "Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations." - - -Then follow the articles of the debated covenant. - -A speaker who took part recently in a university debate on the subject -told me that the undergraduates exhibited the greatest surprise -when he informed them that the League of Nations was founded by the -Versailles Treaty. A few days ago I had a similar experience at the -Oxford Union. I was speaking against a motion framed to condemn the -principles of the treaty as unwise and unjust. In its defence I -recalled some of its outstanding features. But as most of my narrative -had no bearing on reparations it was greeted with impatience and -cries of "Question" from a group of anti-Versaillists. They honestly -thought I was travelling outside the motion in giving a short summary -of the other sections of the treaty. To them it is all condensed in -Mr. Keynes's book, and other hostile commentaries. Anything which -is inconsistent with these, or supplements the scanty or misleading -statements they make, is deemed to be tainted and biassed. To refer to -the text itself they regard as unfair, and as playing into the hands -of the defenders of a wicked and oppressive pact. The actual treaty -has been already put by them out of bounds, and you wander into its -forbidden clauses on pain of being put into the guardroom by one or -other of the intolerant factions who patrol the highways and byways of -international politics. - -In all the debates on the subject in the House of Commons I have only -once heard the treaty itself quoted by a critic, and strangely enough -that was by way of approval. - -I have indicated one important section of the treaty to which is -accorded something of the reverence due to Holy Writ by an influential -section of the public. This group would be shocked were they reminded -that their devotion is given to a chapter in the hateful treaty. -There is yet another large and important section which is completely -ignored by the critics--that which reconstructs Central Europe on the -basis of nationality and the free choice of the people instead of on -the basis of strategy and military convenience. This is the section -that liberated Poland from the claws of the three carnivorous empires -that were preying on its vitals, and restored it to life, liberty and -independence. It is the section that frees the Danes of Schleswig -and the Frenchmen of Alsace-Lorraine. For these oppressed provinces -the Treaty of Versailles is the title-deed of freedom. Why are these -clauses all suppressed in controversial literature? Here is another -of the ignored provisions--that which sets up permanent machinery for -dealing with labour problems throughout the world, and for raising the -standard of life amongst the industrial workers by means of a great -international effort. No more beneficent or more fruitful provision -was ever made in any treaty. It is so momentous and so completely -overlooked in general discussion, that I think it worth while to quote -at length the general principles laid down by a provision which will -one day be claimed as the first great international charter of the -worker. - -"The High Contracting Parties recognise that differences of climate, -habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, -make strict uniformity in the conditions of labour difficult of -immediate attainment. But, holding as they do, that labour should not -be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there -are methods and principles for regulating labour conditions which -all industrial communities should endeavour to apply so far as their -special circumstances will permit. - - - "Among these methods and principles, the following seem to the - High Contracting Parties to be of special and urgent importance:-- - - "_First._--The guiding principle above enunciated that labour - should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of - commerce. - - "_Second._--The right of association for all lawful purposes by - the employed as well as by the employers. - - "_Third._--The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to - maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in - their time and country. - - "_Fourth._--The adoption of an eight-hour day or forty-eight hour - week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been - attained. - - "_Fifth._--The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four - hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable. - - "_Sixth._--The abolition of child labour and the imposition of - such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit - the continuation of their education and assure their proper - physical development. - - "_Seventh._--The principle that men and women should receive equal - remuneration for work of equal value. - - "_Eighth._--The standard set by law in each country with respect - to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the - equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident - therein. - - "_Ninth_.--Each State should make provision for a system of - inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the - enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the - employed." - - -It will take long before the principles propounded in the covenant of -the league under the labour articles are fully and faithfully carried -out, but in both a good deal of quiet and steady progress have already -been attained. M. Albert Thomas is an admirable chief for the labour -bureau. He has zeal, sympathy, tact, energy and great organising -talent. He is pressing along with patience, as well as persistence. But -that is another question. It raises grave issues as to the execution of -the treaty. What I have to deal with to-day is the misunderstandings -which exist as to the character of the treaty itself. The British -public are certainly being deliberately misled on this point. Why are -those sections which emancipate oppressed races, which seek to lift -the worker to a condition above destitution and degradation, and -which build up a breakwater against the raging passions which make -for war, never placed to the credit of the Treaty of Versailles? The -type of controversialist who is always advertising his idealism has -made a point of withholding these salient facts from the public which -he professes to enlighten and instruct. There is no more unscrupulous -debater in the ring than the one who affects to be particularly -high-minded. I do not mean the man who is possessed of a really high -mind, but the man who is always posing as having been exalted by grace -above his fellows. He is the Pharisee of controversy. Beware of him, -for he garbles and misquotes and suppresses to suit his arguments or -prejudices in a way that would make a child of this world blush. - -That is why I venture to put in a humble, although I fear belated, plea -for the reading of the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text, -of the Treaty of Versailles. Herein lies the only fair way of arriving -at a just conclusion on the merits of a treaty which holds in its hands -the destiny of Europe for many a generation. - - - - -VI - -1922 - - -The year nineteen hundred and twenty-two witnessed a genuine struggle -on the part of the nations to re-establish peace conditions in the -world. - -During 1919-20 and 1921 "the tarantella was still in their blood." The -mad war dance was still quivering in their limbs and they could not -rest. The crackle of musketry was incessant and made needful repose -impossible. There was not a country in Europe or Asia whose troops were -not firing shots in anger at some external or internal foe. - -America rang down the fire curtain until this hysterical frenzy had -burnt itself out. Was she right? It is too early yet to give the -answer. The case is but yet "part heard"--many witnessing years whose -evidence is relevant have not yet entered the box: it will, therefore, -be some time before the verdict of history as to her attitude can be -delivered. - -But 1922 testifies to many striking symptoms of recovering sanity on -the part of the tortured continents. Before 1922 you had everywhere -the querulity of the overstrained nerve. The slightest offence or -misunderstanding, however unintentional, provoked a quarrel, and almost -every quarrel was followed by a blow. It was a mad world to live in. -The shrieks of clawing nations rent the European night and made it -hideous. A distinguished general declared that at one period--I think -it was the year of grace 1920--there were thirty wars, great and small, -proceeding simultaneously. Who was to blame? Everybody and nobody. -Mankind had just passed through the most nerve-shattering experience in -all its racking history, and it was not responsible for its actions. -Millions of young men had for years marched through such a pitiless -rain of terror as had not been conceived except in Milton's description -of the battle scenes when the fallen angels were driven headlong to the -deep. And when the Angel of Peace led the nations out from the gates -of hell, no wonder it took them years to recover sight and sanity. -Nineteen twenty-two was a year of restored composure. - -The outward visible sign was seen in the changed character of the -international conferences held during the year. The ultimatum kind of -conference gave way to the genuine peace conference. The old method -insisted upon by French statesmen was to hammer out demands on the -conference anvil and send them in the form of an ultimatum to nations -who, in spite of peace treaties, were still treated as enemies; the new -method was to discuss on equal terms the conditions of appeasement. - -Germany, having no fleet in the Pacific, was not invited to the -Washington conference, and Russia was excluded for other reasons. But -at Cannes Germany was represented, and at Genoa both Germany and Russia -had their delegates. - -The Washington conference was, in some respects, the most remarkable -international conference ever held. It was the first time great -nations commanding powerful armaments had ever sat down deliberately -to discuss a voluntary limitation of their offensive and defensive -forces. Restrictions and reductions have often been imposed in peace -treaties by triumphant nations upon their beaten foes. The Versailles -treaty is an example of that operation. But at Washington the victors -negotiated a mutual cutting-down of navies built for national safety -and strengthened by national pride. The friends of peace therefore -have solid ground for their rejoicing in a contemplation of substantial -reductions already effected in the naval programmes of the most -powerful maritime countries in the world--Britain, the United States of -America, and Japan--as a direct result of the Washington negotiations. - -American statesmanship has given a lead of which it is entitled -to boast, and 1922 is entitled to claim that this triumph of good -understanding has brought a measure of glory which will give it a -peculiar splendour amongst the years of earth's history. - -The gatherings at Cannes and Genoa can also claim outstanding merit -in the large and growing family of international conferences. At -Washington the Allies alone foregathered. At Cannes and Genoa nations -came together which had only recently emerged out of deadly conflict -with each other. At each conference I met on both sides men who had -but just recovered from severe wounds sustained in this struggle. -At Cannes French, Belgian, Italian, Japanese, as well as British -ministers and experts, sat down in council with German ministers and -experts to discuss the vexed question of reparations without taunt or -recrimination. There was a calm recognition not only of the needs of -the injured countries, but also of the difficulties of the offending -state. Outside and beyond the German problem there was a resolve to -eliminate all the various elements of disturbance, political and -economic, that kept Europe in a ferment and made its restoration -impossible. - -Here it was decided to summon all the late belligerent nations to a -great conference at Genoa to discuss reconstruction. To these were -added the neutral nations of Europe. It was a great decision. There -were three obstacles in the way of realising the programme. The first -was the stipulation of France that the specific problems raised by the -treaty of Versailles should be excluded altogether from the purview -of the conference. This was a grave limitation of its functions and -chances. Still, if the Cannes sittings had continued, an arrangement -might have been arrived at with the Germans which would have helped the -deliberations of Genoa. The second obstacle was the refusal of America -to participate in the discussions. Why did the American government -refuse? There were probably good reasons for that refusal, but the -recording angel alone knows them all fully and accurately. The third -obstacle was the fall of the Briand ministry, and the substitution -of a less sympathetic administration. In spite of all these serious -drawbacks Genoa accomplished great things. It brought together into the -same rooms enemies who had not met for years except on the battlefield. -They conferred and conversed around the same table for weeks--at -conferences, committees, and sub-committees. They broke bread and drank -wine together at the same festive boards. Before the conference came -to an end there was an atmosphere of friendliness which was in itself -a guarantee of peaceable relations, for the delegates who represented -the nations at Genoa were all men of real influence in their respective -countries. - -But however important the intangible result, there was much more -achieved. The thirty nations represented in the assembly entered -into a solemn pact not to commit any act of aggression against their -neighbours. When they entered the conference there were few of them -who were not oppressed with suspicions that these neighbours meditated -violence against their frontiers. When they arrived at Genoa they -were all anxious for peace, but apprehensive of impending war. Genoa -dispelled those anxieties. - -One of the most promising results of the pact and the improved -atmospheric conditions out of which it arose is the substantial -reduction in the Bolshevik army. It has already been reduced to -the dimensions of the French army, and we are now promised a -further reduction. That removes a real menace to European peace. -If the reduction of armies in the East of Europe is followed by a -corresponding reduction in the West the reign of peace is not far -distant. - -This is not the time to dwell upon the important agreements effected -at Genoa on questions of exchange, credit, and transport. All the -recommendations made depend for their successful carrying out on the -establishment of a real peace and a friendly understanding between -nations. Peace and goodwill on earth is still the only healing evangel -for idealists to preach and statesmen to practise. Without it plans and -protocols must inevitably fail. - -Where does peace stand? The weary angel is still on the wing, for the -waters have not yet subsided. She may perhaps find a foothold in the -Great West, and Britain is fairly safe--not yet Ireland. - -But the continent of Europe is still swampy and insecure. The debate -in the French Chamber on reparations is not encouraging. The only -difference of opinion in the discussion was that displayed between -those who advocated an advance into the Ruhr, and the seizure of -pledges further into German territory, and those who preferred -"developing" the left bank of the Rhine. Occupying, controlling, -developing, annexing--they all mean the same thing; that the province -to the left bank of the Rhine is to be torn from Germany and grafted -into France. - -There is no peace in this talk. It is a sinister note on which to -end the pacific music of 1922. You must interpret it in connection -with another event of 1922--the Russo-German agreement. Since then -Chicherin--a spirit of mischief incarnate--has almost made Berlin -his abode. The men who are devoting their ingenuity to devising new -torments for Germany are preparing new terrors for their own and their -neighbours' children. - -The year ends with rumours of great American projects for advancing -large sums of money to all and sundry in the hope of settling the -vexed question of German reparation. The loan, it is surmised, will be -accompanied by guarantees on the part of France not to invade further -German territory. Some go so far as to conjecture that it is to be an -essential condition of participation in this Christmas bounty of Madame -Rumour that France is to reduce her armies and to undertake not to -exceed Washington limits for her navies. - -Nobody seems to know, and I am only repeating the gossip of the press. -But if the L350,000,000 loan is likely to materialise, its projectors -are wise in imposing conditions that would afford them some chance -of receiving payment of a moderate interest in the lifetime of this -generation. - -No prudent banker would lend money on the security of a flaming volcano. - -_London, December 20th, 1922._ - - - - -VII - -WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? - -_1. The Rhine_ - - -M. Clemenceau, in the remarkable series of speeches delivered in -the United States of America, implies a breach of faith on the part -of Britain in reference to the pact to guarantee France against the -possibility of German aggression. England has no better friend in -the whole of France than M. Clemenceau. Throughout a strenuous but -consistent career he has never varied in his friendship for England. -Many a time has he been bitterly assailed for that friendship. French -journalists are not sparing of innuendo against those they hate. -They hate fiercely and they hit recklessly, and M. Clemenceau, a man -of scrupulous integrity, at one period in his stormy political life -was charged by certain organs of the Paris press with being in the -pay of England. If, therefore, he now does an injustice to Britain I -am convinced it is not from blind hatred of our country, but from -temporary forgetfulness of the facts. - -He states the facts with reference to the original pact quite fairly. -It was proffered as an answer to those who claimed that the left bank -of the Rhine should be annexed to France. - -There was a strong party in France which urged M. Clemenceau to demand -that the Rhine should be treated as the natural frontier of their -country, and that advantage should be taken of the overwhelming defeat -of Germany to extend the boundaries of France to that fateful river. -For unknown centuries it has been fought over and across--a veritable -river of blood. If French Chauvinism had achieved its purpose at the -Paris conference the Rhine would within a generation once more overflow -its banks and devastate Europe. The most moderate and insidious form -this demand took was a proposal that the German provinces on the left -bank of the Rhine should remain in French occupation until the treaty -had been fulfilled. That meant for ever. Reparations alone--skilfully -handled by the Quai d'Orsay--would preclude the possibility of ever -witnessing fulfilment. The argument by which they supported their claim -was the defencelessness of the French frontier without some natural -barrier. France had been twice invaded and overrun within living memory -by her formidable neighbour. The German military power was now crushed, -and rich and populous provinces of the German Empire had been restored -to France and Poland, but the population of Germany was still fifty per -cent. greater than that of France and it was growing at an alarming -rate, whilst the French population was at a standstill. German towns -and villages were clamant with sturdy children. - -You cannot talk long to a Frenchman without realising how this spectre -of German children haunts France and intimidates her judgment. These -children, it is said, are nourished on vengeance: one day the struggle -will be resumed, and France has no natural defence against the avenging -hordes that are now playing on German streets and with the hum of whose -voices German kindergartens resound. - -We were told the Rhine is the only possible line of resistance. -Providence meant it to play that part, and it is only the sinister -interference of statesmen who love not France that deprives Frenchmen -of this security for peace which a far-seeing Nature has provided. - -The fact that this involved the subjection to a foreign yoke of -millions of men of German blood, history, and sympathies, and that the -incorporation of so large an alien element, hostile in every fibre to -French rule, would be a constant source of trouble and anxiety to the -French Government, whilst it would not merely provide an incentive -to Germany to renew war but would justify and dignify the attack by -converting it into a war of liberation--all that had no effect on the -Rhenian school of French politics. - -This school is as powerful as ever. In one respect it is more powerful, -for in 1919 there was a statesman at the head of affairs who had the -strength as well as the sagacity to resist their ill-judged claims. - -But what about 1922? Where is the foresight and where is the strength? -There is a real danger that the fifteen years' occupation may on one -pretext or another be indefinitely prolonged. When it comes to an -end will there be a ministry in France strong enough to withdraw the -troops? Before the fifteen years' occupation is terminated will there -be a ministry or a series of ministries strong enough to resist -the demand put forward without ceasing in the French press that the -occupation should be made effective? - -Upon the answer to these questions the peace of Europe--the peace of -the world, perhaps the life of our civilisation--depends. The pressure -to do the evil thing that will once more spill rivers of human blood -is insistent. The temptation is growing, the resistance is getting -feebler. America and Britain standing together can alone avert the -catastrophe. But they can do so only by making it clear that the -aggressor--whoever it be--will have the invincible might of these two -commonwealths arrayed against any nation that threatens to embroil the -world in another conflict. - -There are men in Germany who preach vengeance. They must be told that -a war of revenge will find the same allies side by side inflicting -punishment on the peace-breakers. There are men in France who counsel -annexation of territories populated by another race. They must be -warned that such a step will alienate the sympathies of Britain and -America, and that when the inevitable war of liberation comes the -sympathies of America and Britain will be openly ranged on the side of -those who are fighting for national freedom. - -The time has come for saying these things, and if they are not said in -high places humanity will one day call those who occupy those places to -a reckoning. - -The pact was designed to strengthen the hands of M. Clemenceau against -the aggressive party which was then and still is anxious to commit -France to the colossal error of annexing territory which has always -been purely German. - -M. Clemenceau knows full well that Britain has been ready any time -during the last three years up to a few months ago to take upon herself -the burden of that pact with or without the United States of America. -At Cannes early this year I made a definite proposal to that effect. It -was a written offer made by me on behalf of the British government to -M. Briand, who was then prime minister of France. - -I was anxious to secure the co-operation of France in a general -endeavour to clear up the European situation and establish a real -peace from the Urals to the Atlantic seaboard. French suspicions and -French apprehensions constituted a serious difficulty in the way of -settlement, and I thought that if it were made clear to France that the -whole strength of the British Empire could be depended upon to come to -her aid in the event of threatened invasion French opinion would be in -a better mood to discuss the outstanding questions which agitate Europe. - -International goodwill is essential to the re-establishment of the -shattered machinery of international commerce. With a great country -like France, to which the issue of the war had given a towering -position on the continent of Europe, in a condition of fretfulness, it -was impossible to settle Europe. - -Hence the offer which was made by the British government. M. Briand was -prepared to welcome this offer and to proceed to a calm consideration -of the perplexities of the European situation. It was agreed to summon -a conference at Genoa to discuss the condition of European exchange, -credit and trade. It was also resolved that an effort should be made -to establish peace with Russia and to bring that great country once -more inside the community of nations. A great start was made on the -path of genuine appeasement. The German Government were invited to -send their chief Minister to the Cannes conference in order to arrive -at a workable settlement of the vexed question of reparations. The -invitation received a prompt response, and Dr. Rathenau, accompanied -by two or three leading ministers and a retinue of financial experts, -reached Cannes in time to take part in the discussions. - -The negotiations were proceeding helpfully, and another week might have -produced results which would have pacified the tumult of suspicious -nations and inaugurated the promise of fraternity. But, alas, Satan is -not done with Europe. A ministerial crisis in France brought our hopes -tumbling to the ground. The conference was broken up on the threshold -of fulfilment. - -Suspicion once more seized the tiller, and Europe, just as she seemed -to be entering the harbour of goodwill, was swung back violently into -the broken seas of international distrust. The offer made by Britain -to stand alone on the pact of guarantee to France was rejected with -disdain. We were told quite brutally that it was no use without a -military convention. This we declined to enter into. Europe has -suffered too much from military conventions to warrant the repetition -of such a disastrous experiment. - -The pact with Britain lies for the moment in the waste-paper basket. -But we never flung it there. M. Clemenceau ought to have made his -complaint in Paris against men of his own race and not in New York -against Englishmen. With the pact went the effort to make peace in -Europe. - -The history of Genoa is too recent to require any recapitulation of its -features. The new French ministry did not play the part of an inviting -government responsible for pressing to a successful end the objects of -Cannes, but rather that of the captious critic who had to be persuaded -along every inch of the road and who threatened at every obstacle to -turn back and leave the rest of Europe to struggle along with its -burden, amid the mocking laughter of France. - -I am not complaining of M. Barthou. He did his best under most -humiliating conditions to remain loyal to the conference which his -government had joined in summoning. But his task was an impossible one. -He was hampered, embarrassed and tangled at every turn. Whenever he -took any step forward he was lassoed by a despatch from Paris. I have -good authority for stating that he received over eight hundred of these -communications in the course of the conference! - -What could the poor man do under such bewildering conditions? The other -European countries were perplexed and distracted. They were anxious -that Genoa should end in a stable peace. There was no doubt about the -sincerity, the passionate sincerity, of the desire for peace throughout -Europe, but European nations could not help seeing that one of the -great powers was working for a failure. They had a natural anxiety not -to appear to take sides. - -It is a marvel that in spite of this unfortunate attitude adopted -by the French Government a pact was signed which has, at any rate, -preserved the peace in Eastern Europe for several months. - -Before the conference we heard of armies being strengthened along -frontiers and of movements of troops with a menacing intent from the -Baltic to the Black Sea. Genoa at least dispelled that cloud. But a -permanent peace has not yet been established and the pact with Russia -will soon expire. I am, however, hopeful that the spirit of Genoa will -stand between contending armies and prevent the clash of swords. - -All this, however, is leading me away from an examination of M. -Clemenceau's suggestion that Britain did not keep faith in the matter -of guaranteeing France against German aggression. - -The offer was definitely renewed at Cannes, and M. Poincare has not -accepted it. - -I have my own opinion as to why he has not done so. It is not -merely that he does not wish to set the seal of his approval upon a -predecessor's achievement. I am afraid the reason is of a more sinister -kind. If France accepts Britain's guarantee of defence of her frontier -every excuse for annexing the left bank of the Rhine disappears. - -If this is the explanation, if French ministers have made up their -minds that under no conditions will they, even at the end of the period -of occupation, withdraw from the Rhine, then a new chapter opens in -the history of Europe and the world, with a climax of horror such as -mankind has never yet witnessed. - -The German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine are intensely -German--in race, language, tradition and sympathies. There are seventy -millions of Germans in Europe. A generation hence there may be a -hundred millions. They will never rest content so long as millions of -their fellow-countrymen are under a foreign yoke on the other side of -the Rhine, and it will only be a question of time and opportunity for -the inevitable war of liberation to begin. - -We know what the last war was like. No one can foretell the terrors of -the next. The march of science is inexorable, and wherever it goes it -is at the bidding of men, whether to build or to destroy. Is it too -much to ask that America should, in time, take an effective interest in -the development along the Rhine? To that extent I am in complete accord -with M. Clemenceau. Neither Britain nor America can afford to ignore -the manoeuvres going on along its banks. It is a far cry from the -Rhine to the Mississippi, but not so far as it used to be. - -There are now graves not far from the Rhine wherein lies the dust -of men who, less than six years ago, came from the banks of the -Mississippi, with their faces towards the Rhine. - -_London, December 2nd, 1922._ - - - - -VIII - -WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? - -_2. The Rhine_ (Continued) - - -The breakdown of the London conference, and especially the reason for -that breakdown, proves the warning I uttered in my last chapter was -necessary and timely. - -M. Poincare demanded the occupation of the only rich coalfield left to -Germany as a guarantee for the carrying out of impossible terms. - -It is because I am profoundly convinced that the policy represented by -this project will lead to trouble of the gravest kind for Europe and -the world that I felt moved to sound a note of warning. I knew it would -provoke much angry misrepresentation. I am accustomed to that. I deemed -it to be my duty to face it. - -The statement I made in my last chapter about the existence of a -strong party in France which regarded the Rhine as the natural barrier -of that country has provoked a storm of denial, repudiation and -indignation. It is denounced as a wicked invention. Some are amazed at -the impudence of the calumny. Where is the party? France knows nothing -of it. Is it not a monster which has emanated from the brain of the -enemy of France? - -Repudiations have their value, especially if they come from men of -authority, and I shall bear invective with the fortitude to which all -men who wish to be happy though politicians should be hardened provided -I elicit denials which may render future international mischief -difficult. - -But a further perusal of the evidence on which I based my statement has -served to deepen my apprehensions. What was the statement? Let me quote -the actual words I used:-- - - - "There was a strong party in France which urged M. Clemenceau to - demand that the Rhine should be treated as the natural frontier - of their country, and that advantage should be taken of the - overwhelming defeat of Germany to extend the boundaries of France - to that fateful river. - - "The most moderate and insidious form this demand took was a - proposal that the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine - should remain in French occupation until the treaty had been - fulfilled. That meant for ever. Reparations alone--skilfully - handled by the Quai d'Orsay--would preclude the possibility of - ever witnessing fulfilment. - - "The pact was designed to strengthen the hands of M. Clemenceau - against the aggressive party which was then, and still is, anxious - to commit France to the colossal error of annexing territory which - has always been purely German." - - -What was the basis on which I made this assertion? It was thoroughly -well known to all those who were engaged in the operations of the Peace -conference. The Rhine was the background of all manoeuvre for weeks -and months. Whether the subject matter was the League of Nations, the -German fleet, or the status of Fiume, we knew that the real struggle -would come over the Rhine. - -On one hand, How much would France demand? on the other, How much would -the Allies concede? There was a subconscious conflict about the Rhine -throughout the whole discussion, however irrelevant the topic under -actual consideration happened to be. - -But unrecorded memories are of little use as testimony unless -corroborated by more tangible proofs. Do such proofs exist? I will -recall a few. - -There was a party which considered the Rhine to be the only natural -frontier of France. It was a strong party, with a strong man as its -spokesman--in many ways the strongest in France--Marshal Foch. His -splendid services in the war gave him a position such as no soldier in -France or in any other country could command. The soldier who, by his -genius, leads a nation to victory, possesses a measure of influence on -the public opinion of the people he has saved from destruction such as -no other individual can aspire to--as long as his services are fresh in -the memory of his fellow-countrymen. That, I admit, is not very long. -Gratitude is like manna--it must be gathered and enjoyed quickly, for -its freshness soon disappears. But in the early months of 1919 Marshal -Foch was still sitting at the banquet table of popular favour enjoying -the full flavour of grateful recognition. His word on all questions -affecting the security and destiny of France was heard with a deference -which no other man in France could succeed in securing. He has also -a quality which is not usually an attribute of generalship: he is a -lucid, forceful and picturesque speaker. He was, therefore, listened -to for what he was, for what he said, and for the way he said it. - -What did he say? He said a good deal on the subject of the Rhine -frontier and I cannot quote it all. I will take a few germane sentences -out of his numerous utterances on the subject. On the 19th day of -April, 1919, there appeared in the London _Times_ an interview with -Marshal Foch. From that interview I take these salient passages:-- - - - "'And now, having reached the Rhine, _we must stay there_,' - went on the Marshal very emphatically. 'Impress that upon your - fellow-countrymen. It is our only safety, their only safety. We - must have a barrier. We must double-lock the door. Democracies - like ours, which are never aggressive, must have strong _natural - military frontiers_. Remember that those seventy millions - of Germans will always be a menace to us. Do not trust the - appearances of the moment. Their natural characteristics have not - changed in four years. _Fifty years hence_ they will be what they - are to-day.' - - * * * * * * * - - "From the table at the other end of the room Marshal Foch brought - a great map, six or eight feet square, on which the natural - features of this part of western Europe were marked. The Rhine - was a thick line of blue. To the west of the river the Marshal - had drawn in pencil a concave arc representing the new frontier - that France will receive under the Peace treaty. It was clearly an - arbitrary political boundary conforming to no natural feature of - the land. - - "'Look at that,' said Marshal Foch. 'There is no natural obstacle - along that frontier. Is it there that we can hold the Germans if - they attack us again? No. Here! here! here!' and he tapped the - blue Rhine with his pencil. - - "'Here we must be ready to face our enemies. This is a barrier - which will take some crossing. If the Germans try to force a - passage over the Rhine--ho! ho! But here'--touching the black - pencilled line running north-west from Lorraine past the Saar - valley to the Belgian frontier--'here there is nothing.' - - * * * * * * * - - "'No; if you are wise you insist on having your locks and your - wall, and we must have our armies on the Rhine. Some people object - that it will take many troops to hold the Rhine. Not so many as - it would take to hold a political frontier. For the Rhine can be - crossed only at certain places, whereas the new political frontier - of France can be broken anywhere and would have to be held in - force along its entire length.'" - - -He expounded his doctrine in greater detail in an official memorandum -which, as commander-in-chief of the Allied armies, he submitted to M. -Clemenceau:-- - - - "To stop the enterprises towards the west of this nation, - everlastingly warlike, and covetous of the good things belonging - to other people, only recently formed and pushed on to conquest - by force regardless of all rights and by ways the most contrary - to all law, seeking always the mastery of the world, _Nature has - only made one barrier--the Rhine. This barrier must be forced on - Germany. Henceforward the Rhine will be the western frontier of - the Germanic peoples...._" - - -He repeated this demand in a subsequent memorandum. Many of us recall -his dramatic irruption into the placid arena of the Peace conference -in May, 1919, still brandishing the same theme. - -It may be said that Marshal Foch is not and does not pretend to be a -statesman. He is only a great soldier. Nevertheless, his political -influence was so great that even in 1920 he overthrew the most powerful -statesman in France within a month of his triumphant return at the -polls with a huge supporting majority in the French Parliament. It -was Marshal Foch who, by his antagonism, was responsible for M. -Clemenceau's defeat at the presidential election of 1920. But for -Marshal Foch's intervention M. Clemenceau would have been to-day -president of the French republic. - -Why was he beaten, at the height of his fame, by a candidate of -infinitely less prestige and power? The wrath of Marshal Foch and his -formidable following was excited against M. Clemenceau because the -latter had, under pressure from the Allies, gone back on the agreed -French policy about the Rhine. M. Tardieu, as is well known, was one of -the two most prominent ministers in M. Clemenceau's administration, and -closely associated with his chief in the framing of the Peace treaty. -He has written a book, and in that book he gives at length a document -which he handed to the Allies on March 12th, 1919, containing the -following proposal:-- - - - "In the general interest of peace and to assure the effective - working of the constituent clause of the League of Nations, the - western frontier of Germany is fixed at the Rhine. Consequently - Germany renounces all sovereignty over, as well as any customs - union with, the territories of the former German empire on the - left bank of the Rhine." - - -There is a sardonic humour about the words "in the general interest of -peace and to assure the effective working of the constituent clause of -the League of Nations." - -But it demonstrates that at that date M. Clemenceau and his minister -had become converts to the doctrine of the Rhine as the natural -boundary of Germany. American and British pressure subsequently induced -him to abandon this position and, as I said in a previous chapter, the -pact was part of the argument addressed to him. But the party of the -Rhine never forgave. Hence his failure to reach the presidential chair. -It was an honourable failure and will ever do him credit. - -The reasons assigned for that defeat by the _Annual Register_, -1919-20--certainly not a partisan authority--prove that even an -unexcitable chronicler laboured then under the delusion--if it be -a delusion--which possessed me when I wrote the offending article. -Explaining the remarkable defeat the _Annual Register_ says:-- - - - " ... Clemenceau's supporters contended that the terms of the - Treaty of Versailles were satisfactory from the French point - of view; his opponents declared that he had given way too much - to the American and British standpoints and that the peace was - unsatisfactory, particularly in respect of the guarantees for the - reparations due to France _and in the matter of the French eastern - frontier. It will be remembered that a large body of French - opinion had desired that France should secure the line of the - Rhine as her eastern frontier._" - - -I can if necessary quote endless leading articles in French journals -and writings and speeches of French politicians. Men of such divergent -temperaments and accomplishments as M. Franklin Bouillon and M. Tardieu -gave countenance to this claim that Germany should be amputated at the -Rhine. One carried the theme along on the torrent of his clattering -lava and the other on the dome of an iceberg. Later on at the reception -of Marshal Foch when he was elected a member of the French Academy, -M. Poincare, turning at one moment in his discourse to the Marshal, -said in reference to the veteran General's well-known attitude on the -Peace treaty, "Ah, Monsieur le Marechal, if only your advice had been -listened to." Has he also gone back on an opinion so histrionically -expressed? Let us hope for the best. - -I know it will be said that although the boundaries of Germany were to -end at the Rhine, the province on the left bank was not to be annexed, -but to be reconstituted into an "independent" republic. What manner of -independence and what kind of republic? All German officers were to be -expelled; it was to be detached by special provision from the economic -life of Germany upon which it is almost entirely dependent for its -existence. It was not to be allowed to associate with the fatherland. - -The Rhine which divided the new territory from Germany was to be -occupied in the main by French troops: the territories of the -independent republic were to be occupied by foreign soldiers. Its young -men were to be conscripted and trained with a view to absorbing them -into French and Belgian armies to fight against their own countrymen on -the other side of the Rhine. The whole conditions of life in the "free -and independent republic" were to be dictated by an "accord" between -France, Luxemburg and Belgium, and, in the words of Marshal Foch, -"Britain would be ultimately brought in." - -But I am told that these proposals did not mean annexation. Then what -else did they mean? You do not swallow the oyster. You only first give -it an independent existence by detaching it from its hard surroundings. -You then surround it on all sides and absorb it into your own system -to equip you with added strength to prey on other oysters! What -independence! And what a republic! It would have been and was intended -to be a sham republic. Had the plan been adopted it would have been a -blunder and a crime, for which not France alone but the world would -later on have paid the penalty. - -In the face of these quotations and of these undoubted facts, can any -one say that I calumniated France when I said there was a powerful -party in that country which claimed that the Rhine should be treated -as the natural barrier of Germany, and that the Peace treaty should be -based upon that assumption? - -Let it be observed that I never stated that this claim had the -support of the French democracy. The fact that the treaty, which did -not realise that objective, secured ratification by an overwhelming -majority in the French parliament and subsequently by an emphatic -verdict in the country, demonstrates clearly that the French people as -a whole shrank with their invincible good sense from following even -a lead they admired on to this path of future disaster. But the mere -fact that there are potent influences in France that still press this -demand, and take advantage of every disappointment to urge it forward, -calls for unremitting vigilance amongst all peoples who have the -welfare of humanity at heart. - -In conclusion I should like to add that to denounce me as an enemy of -France because I disagree with the international policy of its present -rulers is a petulant absurdity. - -During the whole of my public career I have been a consistent advocate -of co-operation between the French and British democracies. I took -that line when it was fashionable in this country to fawn on German -imperialism. - -During the war I twice risked my premiership in the effort to place the -British army under the supreme command of a French general. To preserve -French friendship I have repeatedly given way to French demands, and -thus have often antagonised opinion in this country. But I cannot go to -the extent of approving a policy which is endangering the peace of the -world, even to please one section of a people for whose country I have -always entertained the most genuine affection. - -_London, December 9th, 1922._ - - - - -IX - -WHAT IS FRANCE AFTER? - -_3. The Paris Conference_ - - -The third conference with M. Poincare over reparations has ended, like -its two predecessors, in a complete breakdown. - -The first was held in August, the second in December, and the third -fiasco has just been witnessed. - -I congratulate Mr. Bonar Law on having the courage to face a double -failure rather than agree to a course of policy which would in the end -prove disappointing, and probably disastrous. - -Agreement amongst allies is in itself a desirable objective for -statesmen to aim at, but an accord to commit their respective countries -to foolishness is worse than disagreement. - -France and Britain must not quarrel, even if they cannot agree; but if -French ministers persist in the Poincare policy, the companionship of -France and Britain over this question will be that of parallel lines -which never meet, even if they never conflict. - -What is the object of this headstrong policy? Reparations? - -There is no financier of repute, in any quarter of the globe, who -will agree that these methods will bring the Allies any contributions -towards their impoverished resources. - -At the August conference all the experts were in accord on this -subject, but whilst these methods will produce no cash, they will -produce an unmistakable crash. - -My recollections of the August discussions enable me to follow with -some understanding the rather confused reports which have so far -reached me here.[2] - -It is common ground amongst all the Allies that Germany cannot under -present conditions pay her instalments. - -It is common ground that she must be pressed to put her finances in -order, and by balancing her budget restore the efficiency of her -currency, so as to meet her obligations. - -But M. Poincare insisted that, as a condition of granting the -moratorium, pledges inside German territory should be seized by the -Allies. - -These pledges consisted of customs already established, and of new -customs to be set up on the Rhine and around the Ruhr, so that no goods -should be permitted to pass from these German provinces into the rest -of Germany without the payment of heavy customs dues. - -The other proposed pledges were the seizure of German forests, of -German mines, and of 60 per cent. of the shares in certain German -factories. - -Mr. Bonar Law, judging by his official _communique_ after the breakdown -of the conference, seems to have raised the same objections to these -pledges as I put forward at the August conference. - - - They would bring in nothing comparable to the cost of collection; - - They would provoke much disturbance and irritation and might lead - to consequences of a very grave character. - - -In fact, these pledges are nothing but paper and provocation. - -The customs barrier on the Rhine was tried once before, and was a -complete failure. - -It was tried then as a sanction and not as a means of raising money. -For the former purpose it may have achieved some measure of success, -but from the point of view of collecting money it was a ludicrous -fiasco. - -There are at the present moment hundreds of millions of paper marks -collected at these new tollhouses still locked up in the safe of the -Reparations Commission. They are admittedly worthless. - -As long as these tolls lasted, they were vexatious; they interfered -with business; they dealt lightly with French luxuries working their -way into Germany, but laid a heavy hand on all useful commodities -necessary to the industry and life of the people. - -They were ultimately withdrawn by consent. M. Poincare now seeks to -revive them. - -The seizure of German forests and mines will inevitably lead to even -more serious consequences. The allied control established in the far -interior of Germany would require protection. - -Protection means military occupation in some shape or other. - -Military occupation of these remote areas means incidents, and -incidents quickly ripen into more serious complications. - -Hence the reluctance of the British government of which I was the head -to concur in this dangerous policy. Hence the refusal of Mr. Bonar -Law's government to accept the responsibility for sanctioning such a -policy. Even logically it is indefensible. - -There are only two alternative points of view. One is that Germany -cannot pay under present conditions until her finances are restored, -and that a moratorium ought to be granted for a period which will -enable that financial restoration to mature. The second is that -Germany can pay, that she is only shamming insolvency, and that all -that you have to do is to apply the thumbscrew firmly and cash will be -forthcoming. - -Logically I can understand either of these two alternatives, but I fail -to comprehend the reason for a proposal that will grant a moratorium -on the ground that Germany cannot pay, and at the same time apply the -thumbscrew until she pays. - -I am glad the British Prime Minister has had the wisdom not to -associate himself with a policy which will bring inevitable discredit -upon those who share the responsibility of enforcing it. - -Meanwhile, the prospects of Europe's recovery are once more to be -retarded by the vain stubbornness of some of her rulers. - -_Ronda (Spain), January 6th, 1923._ - -FOOTNOTE: - -[2] This chapter was written at Ronda (Spain). - - - - -X - -REPARATIONS - - -What is the reparations problem? Why does it appear to be further from -solution than ever? - -The great public in all lands are perplexed and worried by its -disturbing insolubility. It keeps them wondering what may happen next, -and that is never good for a nerve-ridden subject like postwar Europe. - -The real trouble is not in solving the problem itself, but in -satisfying the public opinion which surrounds it. I do not mean to -suggest that it is an easy matter to ascertain what payments Germany -can make, or for Germany to pay and keep paying these sums once they -have been ascertained. But if the difficulty were purely financial it -could be overcome. The heart of the problem lies in the impossibility -at present of convincing the expectant, indignant, hard-hit and heavily -burdened people of France that the sums so fixed represent all that -Germany is capable of paying. - -The question of compelling a country to pay across its frontiers huge -sums convertible into the currency of other countries is a new one. -At first it was too readily taken for granted that a wealth which -could bear a war debt of L8,000,000,000 could surely afford to bear an -indemnity of L6,000,000,000 provided that this smaller sum were made a -first charge on the national revenues; and it took time for the average -mind to appreciate the fundamental difference between payment inside -and transmission outside a country. - -When I think of the estimates framed in 1919 by experts of high -intelligence and trained experience as to Germany's capacity to pay -cash over the border I am not disposed to complain of the impatience -displayed by French taxpayers at the efforts made at successive -conferences to hew down those sanguine estimates to feasible -dimensions. I am content to point with pride to the fact that the -common sense of the more heavily burdened British taxpayer has long ago -taught him to cut his loss and keep his temper. When his example is -followed all round, the reparations question is already solved. - -When public opinion in all the Allied countries has subsided into -sanity on German reparations, as it already has in Britain, financiers -can soon find a way out, and trade and commerce will no longer be -scared periodically from their desks by the seismic shocks given to -credit every time a French minister ascends the tribune to make a -statement on reparations. - -Regarding the payment of reparations solely from the point of view of -finance, the issues can be stated simply, and I think solved readily. - -It is always assumed by those who have never read the Treaty of -Versailles, and the letter that accompanied it, that this much-abused -and little-perused document fixed a fabulous indemnity for payment by -Germany. The treaty may have its defects; that is not one of them, for -it fixed no sum for payment, either great or small. - -It stipulated that a reparations commission should be set up in order, -_inter alia_, to assess the damage inflicted by Germany on Allied -property and the compensation for injury to life and limb in Allied -countries. - -In the second place--and this is also overlooked--it was to ascertain -how much of that claim Germany was capable of paying. On both these -questions Germany is entitled to be heard before adjudication. - -It is in accordance with all jurisprudence that as Germany was the -aggressor and the loser she should pay the costs. But it would be not -only oppressive but foolish to urge payment beyond her capacity. - -The amount of damage was to be ascertained and assessed by May, 1921. -Capacity was to be then determined and revised from time to time, -according to the varying conditions. Even so fair a controversialist -as the eminent Italian statesman Signor Nitti has ignored the latter -provision in the Versailles treaty. No wonder that he should, for there -are multitudes who treat every alteration in the annuities fixed in -May, 1921, as if it were a departure from the Treaty of Versailles -to the detriment of the victors; whereas every modification made was -effected under the provisions and by the machinery incorporated in the -treaty for that express purpose. - -But there has undoubtedly been a departure from the treaty--a -fundamental departure. It has, however, been entirely to the detriment -of the vanquished. In what respect? I propose to explain, for the -whole trouble has arisen from this change in the treaty. The treaty -provided that the body to be set up for deciding the amount to be paid -in respect of reparations should consist of a representative each of -the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and -Belgium. - -With the exception of the United States of America, all these powers -are pecuniarily interested in the verdict. At best it was therefore -on the face of it not a very impartial tribunal. Still, Britain, as a -great trading community, was more interested in a settlement than in a -few millions more or less of indemnity wrung out of Germany; and Italy -also was a country which had large business dealings with Germany and -would not therefore be tempted to take a violently anti-German view on -the commission. The presence therefore of the United States of America, -Britain and Italy together on the commission constituted a guarantee -for moderation of view. - -Now the only disinterested party has retired from the tribunal. The -most interested party is in the chair, with a casting vote on certain -questions. That is not the treaty signed by Germany. - -If you sign an agreement to pay a sum to be awarded by A, B, C, D, and -E, trusting for a fair hearing largely to the influence of A, who is -not only very powerful but who is the only completely disinterested -referee and A then retires from the board of arbitrators, you are -entitled to claim that the character of the agreement is changed. The -representatives of France and Belgium on the Reparations Commission are -honourable men who are most anxious to do justice, but they are watched -by a jealous, vigilant and exacting opinion constantly ready to find -fault with concession and to overpower moderating judgment. - -The balance of the treaty has therefore been entirely upset. What is -really needed is to restore that balance so as to secure a fair verdict -on the only question in issue--how much Germany can pay. - -When you come to consider that issue you must view the claim for -reparations as you would any ordinary debt. You must make up your mind -whether you wish to ruin the debtor or to recover the cash. If there -are no sufficient realisable assets, then, if you want your money, you -must keep your debtor alive. If you want beef from your cow you must -forgo the milk. If your object is to destroy your debtor, you press -for payment of more than he can be reasonably expected to pay, and -then seize his house, his lands, and his chattels, whether they can be -disposed of or not. - -On the other hand, if you want your money, you will find out what he -can pay, and then proceed judiciously, patiently, and firmly to recover -that amount. By that I do not mean what he can pay by condemning -himself to a life of servitude and poverty. No brave nation will -stand that long. That is not a method of recovering an old debt, but -of creating a new one. I mean, what a nation can be expected to pay -steadily without revolt for a whole generation. - -If you scrape the butter from the bread of every German child for -thirty years you may add to the sum of your indemnity a milliard or -two of gold marks. That is not what was intended by the Treaty of -Versailles. Hungry faces make angry hearts, and the anger spreads -further than the hunger. I mean, what Germany can pay without -condemning a generation of workers to Egyptian bondage, and their -children to semi-starvation. Every oppression, if persisted in, -ultimately ends in the ruin of the Red Sea for the oppressors. Europe -has only just escaped with great loss from its waters. We do not want -to be overwhelmed in another. - -How are you to arrive at the exact figure of the annuities Germany -can reasonably be expected to pay without creating these intolerable -conditions for her people? That is the question. The answer was given -in the treaty as signed: by setting up a commission to inquire and -determine. That commission has been weakened, and its character almost -destroyed by the defection of the United States of America. - -Is it possible to find a substitute? I am afraid a reference of that -question to a new committee of experts would not advance matters, for -each country would demand a representative on that committee, and that -would only mean the Reparations Commission over again under another -name. - -The only hope of a fair and final decision is to secure the presence of -a representative of the United States of America on the adjudicating -body, whatever it may be. Is that impossible? - -I need hardly say that I am not venturing to express any opinion as to -the American refusal to ratify the treaty as a whole. I am only stating -quite frankly my view that, unless America takes a hand in reparations, -real settlement will be postponed until the hour of irreparable -mischief strikes. If for reasons of which I am not competent to judge -America cannot occupy her vacant chair on the tribunal which may decide -fateful issues for humanity, I despair of any real progress being made. - -Allied ministers can accept from a body representing the leading -powers who won the war decisions they dare not take on their own -responsibility. That is the essence of the matter. It is no use blaming -politicians. If they of their own initiative attempt to ride down -public sentiment, which alone confers authority upon them, they will -inevitably fail. In every country there are plenty of itching partisans -ready to take advantage of tactical blunders committed by political -opponents or personal rivals. But the judgment of an international -tribunal is another matter, and statesmen can accept it and act upon it -without being taxed with responsibility for its conclusions. - -British opinion cannot and will not accept a settlement based on the -assumption that abatements in the sum claimed for reparations, if and -when made, must be discounted by the British taxpayer alone. - -France undoubtedly suffered more severely from the ravages of war -than any other belligerent. But that is recognised in the proportion -allocated to her of the reparations payments. She is to be paid 52 per -cent. of the total, _i. e._, more than all the other Allied countries -put together. - -Britain comes next in the damage sustained by her people, and she is -given 22 per cent. In many respects she has suffered more heavily than -any other Allied country, especially in taxation and in trade. She is -willing to stand in with the Allies for loss as well as for profit, but -she will resent bitterly the suggestion that the loss must necessarily -be her share, whilst such profit as there is belongs to others. - -The American people, who receive no part of the compensation awarded -and collected, will _a fortiori_ take the same view of their -obligations in the matter. They certainly will not see the force of a -settlement to be made at their expense, as if they had been condemned -to pay an indemnity. - -The question is not what remission or indulgence shall be granted to -Germany, but what payment she is capable of making. If Germany can pay -a large indemnity France gets 52 per cent. of that, and Britain only -22 per cent. If Germany can only make a disappointing payment, France -still gets 52 per cent. and Britain 22 per cent. There is, therefore, -no ground for debiting Britain and America with the cost of reduced -expectations. - -The offer to hand over the worthless "C" bonds to the British Empire in -return for her claims is an insult to the intelligence of the British -public. Let us get away from these shifts on to the straight road. Back -to the treaty--that is the real remedy. There is no need to revise -it--all that is required is to restore it. - -If America reappears on the arbitrating tribunal she need not accept -the rest of the treaty. Then a fair and enduring settlement would soon -ensue, this irritating sore would rapidly heal, and the condition of -the world would steadily improve. - -_Algeciras, January 1st, 1923._ - - - - -XI - -MR. HUGHES'S NEW HAVEN SPEECH - - -The preceding chapter was written at Algeciras on January 2nd, 1923. -On January 3rd there appeared in the Spanish papers a compressed -report of the speech delivered by the American Secretary of State, Mr. -Hughes, at New Haven. It made suggestions on the subject of reparations -which were obviously intended for consideration at the forthcoming -Paris conference. I knew the chairman of that conference, M. Poincare, -would not be too anxious to bring these proposals to the notice of his -colleagues, but I had some hope that the British, Italian, and Belgian -premiers might do so. I therefore cabled the following message to the -British and American press:-- - - - "I have read with gladness Secretary Hughes's important speech. - As far as I can judge from compressed report appearing in the - local paper of this remote corner of Spain his suggestions and - mine travel in same direction. Earnestly hope Paris conference - will give American proposals priority of consideration. All other - expedients will but postpone mischief which will in the end have - to be redeemed with compound interest at usurious rates by an - embarrassed Europe." - - -I constantly refer to this speech in subsequent articles, and as it has -been suggested that the interpretation I placed on it is not borne out -by the text, I append the full report which appeared in _The Times_ of -December 30th, 1922:-- - - - "Mr. Hughes, the Secretary of State, in a speech which he - delivered before the American Historical Association at New Haven, - Connecticut, to-night lifted yet another corner of the veil which - has shrouded the immediate plans of the United States government. - Much of his address concerned the Washington conference of 1921, - but it ended with a discussion of economic conditions in Europe - which are of prime importance. - - "Mr. Hughes began with the admission that 'we cannot dispose - of these problems by calling them European, for they are world - problems, and we cannot escape the injurious consequences of - failure to settle them.' They were, however, European problems in - the sense that they cannot be solved without the consent of the - European governments, and the _crux_ of the situation lay in the - settlement of reparations. 'There will be no adjustment of other - needs, however pressing, until a definite and accepted basis for - the discharge of reparations claims has been fixed. It is futile - to attempt to erect any economic structure in Europe until the - foundation is laid.' - - "Then followed a passage referring to the attempts to link up the - debts owed to the United States with the question of reparations - or with projects of cancellation, attempts which had been steadily - resisted. It led up to a discussion of the attitude of the United - States towards reparations, 'standing, as it does, a distinct - question, and as one which cannot be settled unless the European - governments concerned are able to agree.' First came a denial that - America desired to see Germany relieved of her responsibility - for the war, or of her just obligations, or that America wished - that France should lose 'any part of her just claims.' On the - other hand, America did not wish to see a prostrate Germany. Some - Americans had suggested that the United States should assume the - _role_ of arbitrator, but Mr. Hughes did not think 'we should - assume such a burden of responsibility.' - - "From this point the speech deserves quotation in full: - - "'But the situation,' said Mr. Hughes, 'does call for a settlement - upon its merits. The first condition of a satisfactory settlement - is that the question should be taken out of politics. Statesmen, - have their difficulties, their public opinion, the exigencies they - must face. It is devoutly to be hoped that they will effect a - settlement among themselves, and that the coming meeting in Paris - will find a solution. But if it does not, what should be done? - - "'The alternative of forcible measures to obtain reparations is - not an attractive one. No one can foretell the extent of the - serious consequences which might ensue from such a course. Apart - from political results, I believe that the opinion of experts - is that such measures will not produce reparation payments, but - might tend to destroy the basis of those payments, which must be - found in economic recuperation. If, however, statesmen cannot - agree, and such an alternative is faced, what can be done? Is - there not another way out? The fundamental condition is that in - this critical moment the merits of the question as an economic - one must alone be regarded. Sentiment, however natural, must be - disregarded; mutual recriminations are of no avail; reviews of the - past, whether accurate or inaccurate, promise nothing; assertions - of blame on the one hand and excuses on the other come to naught. - - "'There ought to be a way for statesmen to agree upon what Germany - can pay, for no matter what claims may be made against her that is - the limit of satisfaction. There ought to be a way to determine - that limit and to provide a financial plan by which immediate - results can be obtained and European nations can feel that the - foundations have been laid for their mutual and earnest endeavours - to bring about the utmost prosperity to which the industry of - their people entitles them. - - "'If statesmen cannot agree and the exigencies of public opinion - make their course difficult, then there should be called to their - aid those who can point the way to a solution. - - "'Why should they not invite men of the highest authority in - finance in their respective countries--men of such prestige, - experience, and honour that their agreement upon the amount to - be paid and upon the financial plan for working out payments - would be accepted throughout the world as the most authoritative - expression obtainable? The governments need not bind themselves - in advance to accept the recommendations, but they can at least - make possible such an inquiry with their approval and free the - men who may represent their country in such a commission from - any responsibility to foreign offices and from any duty to obey - political instructions. - - "'In other words, they may invite an answer to this difficult - question from men of such standing and in such circumstances of - freedom as will ensure a reply prompted only by knowledge and - conscience. I have no doubt that distinguished Americans would - be willing to serve on such a commission. If the governments saw - fit to reject the recommendation upon which such a body agreed - they would be free to do so, but they would have the advantage - of impartial advice and of an enlightened public opinion. The - peoples would be informed that the question would be rescued from - assertion and counter-assertion and the problem put upon its way - to solution. - - "'I do not believe that any general conference would answer the - purpose better, much less that any political conference would - accomplish a result which prime ministers find it impossible to - reach. But I do believe that a small group, given proper freedom - of action, would be able soon to devise a proper plan. It would be - time enough to consider forcible measures after such opportunity - had been exhausted.' - - "Mr. Hughes's closing words were: - - "'There lies the open broad avenue of opportunity, if those whose - voluntary action is indispensable are willing to take advantage - of it. And once this is done, the avenues of American helpfulness - cannot fail to open hopefully.'" - - -The argument developed by Mr. Hughes in this speech is identical with -that upon which I based my appeal in the previous chapter for an -impartial investigation into Germany's capacity, and he concludes with -a proposal which is in effect identical with mine. He does not state -categorically that the American government would be prepared to be -officially represented on the commission. But when he says, "I have -no doubt that distinguished Americans would be willing to serve on -such a commission," it means that the government would be indirectly -represented. The Allied governments would certainly have consulted the -government of the U.S.A. as to the American representative nominated -to sit on the commission, and no American expert would be appointed -without full assurance that he was acceptable to the government of his -country. - -It is a misfortune that such important proposals should have been put -forward so timorously that those who wished to ignore them could easily -pretend they had never heard them made. Speeches delivered even by -Secretaries of State at an academic function in a small provincial town -might very well be overlooked in foreign chancelleries, whose postbags -bulge with weighty despatches from many lands, without any suggestion -of studied neglect. It was clear from Mr. Bonar Law's subsequent -attitude in the course of the debate in the House of Commons on the -Ruhr invasion that he at any rate had not seen Mr. Hughes's New Haven -deliverance. Timid diplomatic flutterings make no impression in a great -situation, and so lead to nothing. This is an excellent example of how -not to speak if you wish to be heard, and of how to speak if you have -no desire to be heeded. - -_London, July 4th, 1923._ - - - - -XII - -THE FRENCH INVASION OF THE RUHR - - -France has once more jumped on the prostrate form of Germany, and -the sabots have come down with a thud that will sicken the hearts of -multitudes on both sides of the Atlantic whose friendship for France -stood the losses and griefs of a four years' war. - -Germany having been overthrown and disarmed after a prodigious effort, -involving a strain upon the combined strength of America, Italy, and -the whole British Empire, as well as France, and her arms bound with -the thongs of a stern treaty, the process of dancing upon her while she -is down can at any time now be performed with complete impunity by any -one of these powers alone. - -The spectacle every time it is repeated, provides much satisfaction to -those who indulge in the barren delights of revenging the memory of -past wrongs. There is no doubt some joy for the unsportsmanlike mind -in kicking a helpless giant who once maltreated you and who, but for -the assistance of powerful neighbours, would have done so a second time. - -But what good will it bring devastated France or her overtaxed Allies? -The additional coal and timber that will be wrung out of Germany will -barely cover the direct cost of collection. Although Germany bears the -extra cost, the expense of these punitive measures must all in the end -diminish the means of reparation, and therefore fall on the victor. - -How many students of the problem of reparations have ever taken the -trouble to ascertain the extent to which the maintenance of Allied -armies of occupation has already drained the resources of Germany? -Between direct cash payments, the cost of supplies, and outlay in -labour and material for building huge barracks, these armies have -already cost Germany 6,000,000,000 gold marks--roughly 1,200,000,000 -dollars, or over L300,000,000. - -How much better it would have been if most of this money had gone -towards rebuilding the devastated area! - -It is not without significance, now that war is being waged against -Germany for what the American representative in Paris termed her -technical default, to recollect that, between the expense of the army -of occupation and contributions already made towards reparations, -Germany has already paid to the Allies over three times the amount of -the total indemnity exacted by Bismarck in 1871. - -This is without making any allowance for the vast and highly developed -colonies which she surrendered. Let, therefore, no one approach this -problem as if he were dealing with a recalcitrant country that is -deliberately refusing to acknowledge any of her obligations under a -treaty which she has signed. - -The costs of the last war are acknowledged to be irrecoverable. It is -difficult enough to find the means for payment of damages. Who will pay -the growing cost of this new war? - -So far I have referred only to the direct outlay upon these aggressive -measures. The indirect cost to victor and vanquished alike will be -crushing. - -It is already accumulating. The mere threat has depreciated the value -of the franc, and thus reduced its purchasing capacity abroad. This -loss must be borne by the French consumer. There may be a rally; but I -shall be surprised if the improvement is more than temporary. - -All that is obvious for the moment to the untrained eye is the way in -which the mark is dragging the French and Belgian franc slowly along -its own downward course. - -As the distance between them lengthens and the invisible cord which -ties them together becomes more and more attenuated, it may ultimately -snap and the franc be released from this dangerous association. That I -doubt, for a bankrupt Germany means a country to which even the most -hopeful cannot look as a means of redeeming French deficits. - -Once that is clear to the French peasant he will not so readily part -with his savings, and the real difficulties of French finance will -begin at that stage. A policy, therefore, which demoralises the German -currency is one which is also fatal to the solvency of French finance. - -Let us follow the probable sequence of events. The terrified German -mark is rushing headlong to the bottom of the pit where the Austrian -krone is already lost beyond rescue. - -As long as reparation coal is dug out by bayonets, and reparation -timber is cut down by swords, it is idle to talk of restoring the mark -by putting German finance in order. - -No tariff, however nimble, can keep pace with the runaway mark. It -would baffle the most resourceful finance minister to adapt his budget -to a currency which disappears beyond the horizon while he is sitting -at his desk to pen his proposals. - -If the mere threat of force has produced such a panic, what will be the -effect of the actual measures? It is safe to predict that the advance -of French troops into Germany will not restore the composure of the -frightened mark and arrest its flight. - -What, then, becomes of the hope of renewed payments of the annuity? At -best Germany could only be expected to pay when her foreign trade was -so improved that she could provide a margin out of her exports with -which to pay her annuities. Her foreign trade is largely dependent -upon her foreign exchanges. These are now destroyed beyond prospect of -recovery for years. - -Britain proposed a voluntary moratorium for a short term of years in -order to place Germany in a position where she could at the end of that -term pay a reasonable annuity. The French government have in effect -substituted a compulsory moratorium for an indefinite period with no -prospect of payment in sight. - -The only chance of securing an early instalment of reparation payments -was by pressing Germany to put her finances in order and giving her -fair time in which to do so. The only chance of negotiating a loan -on German security to assist France to pay for the repair of her -devastated provinces, and to enable her to put her own finances in -order, was by restoring the stability of German currency. - -French statesmen have deliberately thrown both these chances away. The -effect on the value of their own currency must be grave, and Frenchmen -will have to pay in increased cost of living for a venture dictated by -short-sighted and short-tempered statesmanship. - -When one thinks of the consequences one is driven to ask whether French -politicians are really seeking reparations or are pursuing another -purpose quite incompatible with the recovery of money payments under -the treaty. - -This is the wrong road to reparations. It leads in exactly the opposite -direction. - -Whither, then, does it lead? There is no doubt that its effect will -be ruinous as far as German industry is concerned. I have already -dealt with its disastrous influence upon German currency, and with the -indirect effect of a rapidly depreciating currency upon German foreign -trade. The seizure of the Ruhr mines will have another serious effect. - -Even now the result of the compulsory alienation of so much of -Germany's coal supply in the Ruhr, in Silesia, and the Saar, from -German industry, has diminished German productiveness. The fuel -deficiency thereby created inside Germany has been partially supplied -by purchases of coal from outside sources. The necessity for providing -gold to pay for foreign coal has added considerably to Germany's -financial difficulties. - -A still larger foreign purchase will be the inevitable result of the -forcible diversion of large quantities of Ruhr coal to France and -Italy, with further financial embarrassments as a consequence. - -That is bad enough. But I fear worse. Will the German miner work with -the same regularity and efficiency for a foreign master as he does for -a German employer? Is there the least possibility of the production -being maintained at its present level? - -The influence of this added muddle on world trade is incalculable. -Nobody gains; everybody is a loser by the move. How is a Germany whose -embarrassed finances are made still more involved--how is a Germany -whose industry becomes more and more difficult--how is a Germany -reduced to despair to be of the slightest use to France, Belgium, -Italy, or anybody else? - -The feather-headed scribes who have advocated this rash policy assume -that France will be helped because Germany will thus be reduced to -impotence. For how long? - -The disintegration of Germany is not an unlikely consequence of this -move. I know that is the expectation. Frenchmen still hanker after -the days when Saxons and Bavarians and Wurtembergers were allies, and -almost vassals, of France against Prussia. It was the lure that led the -Third Napoleon to his ruin. It is the attraction which is now drawing -France once more to a sure doom. The policy will bring no security to -France in the future. It deprives her of all hope of reparations in the -immediate present. There will no longer be a Germany to pay. It would -be too hopeless a task to attempt recovery from each of the severed -states. - -But what of increased security? Nothing can keep Germans permanently -apart. They will, at the suitable moment reunite under more favourable -conditions, freed from external as well as internal debt. France will -have lost her reparations and only retained the hatred of an implacable -foe become more redoubtable than ever. - -How would Europe have fared in the interval whilst France was learning -from events what every other country can see now? There is no knowing -what will happen when a brave people of 60,000,000 find themselves -faced with utter ruin. Whether they turn to the left or to the right -will depend on questions of personal leadership, which are not yet -determined. All we can be sure of is that they can hardly go on as they -are, maintaining an honest struggle for ordered freedom and democratic -self-government. The French proclamation, with its threat of "severest -measures in case of recalcitrancy," is ominous of much that may happen. -No people accustomed to national independence have ever been able long -to tolerate a foreign yoke. - -Chancellor Cuno's action is the first manifestation of the spirit of -revolt. It will certainly grow in intensity. The lash will then fall, -sooner or later, and Germany will be inevitably driven to desperate -courses. A Communist Germany would infect Europe. European vitality -is so lowered by exhaustion that it is in no condition to resist the -plague. Would a reactionary Germany be much better--brooding and -scheming vengeance? - -Russia, with her incalculable resources of men and material, is at -hand, needing all that Germany can best give and best spare. The -Bolshevik leaders only require what Germany is so well fitted to supply -in order to reorganise their country and convert it into the most -formidable state in Europe or Asia. - -Nations hard pressed on the East have in the past moved forward -irresistibly to the West. In obedience to the same law a people hard -pressed on the West will look to the East. - -When the French troops marched on Essen they began a movement the most -far-reaching, and probably the most sinister in its consequences, that -has been witnessed for many centuries in Europe. And these are the -people who, after fifty years of patient and laborious waiting, have -demonstrated to the world in 1918 the stupidity of abusing victory in -1871. - -If the teacher so soon forgets his own special lesson the pupil is not -likely to remember when fury overcomes terror. - -_Algeciras, January 15th, 1923._ - - - - -XIII - -LOST OPPORTUNITIES - - -The French government, having conspicuously failed to win its -anticipated coup, is doubling the stakes each time it loses. When will -it end? And where will it end? It is ill gambling with human passions. -They are all engaged in this wild venture--on both sides of the -table. Pride, greed, vanity, obstinacy, temper, combativeness, racial -antagonisms, but also patriotism, love of justice, hatred of wrong and -high courage. Each side draws from the same arsenal of fiery human -emotions. Unless some one steps in to induce a halt I fear the result -will be devastating. - -France has now abandoned all hope of being able to run the mines, -railways, and workshops of the Ruhr by military agencies. In these -days you cannot shoot every worker who fails to excavate so many -hundredweights of coal per diem, or who refuses to fill a wagon or -drive a locomotive when and by whomsoever he is told to do so. France -cannot provide the necessary complement of miners and railwaymen from -outside to fill vacancies created by sulky workers. And even if she -could it would take many months ere they become sufficiently accustomed -to their new conditions to work without peril to themselves. So a -new policy has been improvised. It is nothing less than the siege of -Germany. Sixty millions of Germans are to be starved into surrender. -That is a long business, as every one knows who has been engaged on -the difficult operations of strike breaking. We have often witnessed -workers with little support or sympathy from the rest of the community -hold out for weeks after their funds have been exhausted. In Germany -all classes are united in resistance. The national pride fortifies -endurance and incites to sacrifice. And the ports are still open. -Meanwhile incidents may happen, developments may occur which will -create a situation that will baffle all the resources the invaders can -command. - -It is very little use looking backward. But there are many who are -disposed to say that the invasion of the Ruhr was bound to come and -the sooner the safer. The Ruhr coal mines were the wild oats of -reparation. Get it over quickly. The headache will bring repentance -and France will then settle down to a quiet life. That is the argument. -I must enter an emphatic protest against this view. If this ill-judged -enterprise had been put off for a few more months I do not believe -any French government would have embarked upon it. There is no French -statesman of any standing who, in his heart, believes in its wisdom. -Now that the credit of France is involved in its success they will all -support it. But French opinion, as a whole, was moving with startling -rapidity from this policy. The Parisian pulse was still feverish, -but the provinces had completely calmed down. Vacancies occurring in -the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies and the provincial assemblies -during several months have afforded an opportunity of testing real -French opinion and the results have been sensational. At election -after election, fought in typical constituencies all over France, the -champions of Ruhrism have been beaten by emphatic majorities. Masses of -French workmen have always opposed this policy. The peasant in every -land always moves slowly. But there can be no doubt that the French -peasant has had enough of military adventures. His sons were never -numbered amongst the "exempts," and the losses in the peasant homes -of France were appalling. Driving through the villages in agricultural -France you find yourself asking, "Where are the young men?" The answer -invariably comes, "This village suffered severely in the war." You -will receive the same answer in the next village, and the next. We -cannot wonder, therefore, that by-elections in rural as well as in -urban France display an unmistakable weariness of plans which involve -the marching of armed Frenchmen into hostile territory. The sorrowing -people of France have good reason to shrink from any course of action -that leads to further shedding of blood. - -For these reasons I have steadily favoured every scheme that had the -effect of postponing decision as to the Ruhr. Delay meant ultimate -defeat for the Chauvinists. That is why they strove so hard to rush -their government into this precipitate action. The abrupt termination -of the Paris conference was their opportunity and they seized it with -tingling fingers. Until then there had never been a clean break on -which violence could be founded. The friends of moderation both here -and on the continent had seen to that. There had been reference of -questions for the scrutiny of experts and calming adjournments to -await their report. When it arrived there were endless suggestions and -counter-suggestions to meet difficulties. In the end Europe was saved -from the catastrophe of once more handing over its destinies to the -guidance of blind force. Unhappily, weariness or impatience induced -the Paris negotiators in a few hours to drop the reins which had for -at least four years held the furies from dashing along their career of -destruction. There were many alternative plans that might have been -discussed. There was the proposal to refer the whole question to the -League of Nations. It is true that when I suggested it in August last -M. Poincare summarily rejected it. But the Allies also rejected M. -Poincare's proposals by a majority of four to one at that conference. -That did not prevent his repeating them in January--and this time he -succeeded in winning over the majority to his view. A little more -persistence and less pessimism might have persuaded Belgium, Italy and -Japan to aid our appeals to France to trust rather to the League of -Nations than to the uncertainties of war. - -What is still more inexplicable is the failure of the conference to -take any note of Mr. Secretary Hughes's New Haven speech. Neglected -opportunities litter the path of this troublesome question. There -were the Cannes conversations, broken off just as they were reaching -fruition. Had they been continued another week they would have ended in -a helpful settlement which would have brought reparations to France, -confidence to Germany, and peace to Europe. They struck on one of the -many sunken reefs which bestrew the French political seas, and it will -not surprise me to find that the whole cargo of reparations disappeared -then beyond salvage into the deep with these shipwrecked negotiations. - -Again, Germany threw away a great opportunity at Genoa when all -the nations of Europe came together for the first time to discuss -their troubles in the spirit of equality and amity. It is true that -reparations were excluded at the instance of France from the programme -of the conference. But the spirit engendered by a friendly settlement -of all other outstanding questions would have rendered a reasonable -and temperate consideration of reparations inevitable. Germany, by its -foolish staging of its Russian agreement, made all that impossible. -Resentment and suspicion were once more equipped with a scourge and -they used it relentlessly to drive out all goodwill for Germany from -the purlieus of that great congress. Another lost opportunity. - -Then there was the bankers' committee, appointed to consider the -question of raising an international loan to help France to finance -the repair of her devastated area and also to assist Germany to -restore her demoralised currency. I remember how eager poor Rathenau -was to float that loan and how sanguine he was that it would succeed. -He was confident that the German nationals who have invested their -gold in other lands could be induced to subscribe heavily to the -loan. The bankers concerned--all were of the highest reputation in -the financial world--were confident that if German reparations were -fixed at a reasonable sum investors throughout the world would gladly -put their money into a great international loan which would help to -restore Europe. The French government testily declined to consider -the essential conditions indicated by the bankers. Another lost -opportunity, and Europe once more lumbered along its dreary way to seek -another. - -It came with Mr. Hughes's famous speech. It was clearly the result -of prolonged consideration. For weeks there had been rumours of -much consultation in Washington on the state of Europe, and we were -encouraged to hope that America meant business. The result was Mr. -Secretary Hughes's offer. It was made four days before the Paris -conference and was obviously intended to be discussed by the Allies -there. An endeavour has been made to minimise the importance of this -American approach to Europe, but it is incomprehensible to me how so -momentous a pronouncement has been treated as if it were merely the -casual utterance of a politician who had to find some topic of more or -less interest with which to illuminate a discourse. Another opportunity -lost--perhaps the greatest--perhaps the last. Never has luck striven so -hard to save stupidity. But luck loses its temper easily and then it is -apt to hit hard. - -_London, February 15th, 1923._ - - - - -XIV - -FRENCH SCHEMES - - -"French troops occupying fresh German territory." "Further advance into -Germany." "Reinforcements." "French cut off the British bridgehead on -the Rhine." "Proposals for new coinage in the Ruhr." What is it all -leading to? Is it really reparations? Signor Nitti, who has made a -thorough study of all the documents bearing on French designs against -Germany, has come definitely to the conclusion that these measures -have no reference to the recovery of damages for the devastated area, -but that they are all taken in the execution of a vast project for -securing French control over all the coal and iron of continental -Europe. He supplies chapter and verse for his theory. Something has -undoubtedly roused the suspicions of Signor Mussolini. They come rather -late in the day to be effective. He naturally does not relish the idea -of an Italy whose coal and steel supplies are placed at the mercy of -a gigantic trust directed from Paris. Italy has no coal and iron of -her own. Her interest is, therefore, in a free market. Hence Signor -Mussolini's alarm. Is there any ground for it? Let those who imagine -that Italian statesmen are unnecessarily disturbed read the discussions -in the French press leading up to the speeches recently delivered by M. -Millerand, M. Barthou, and M. Poincare. - -With regard to M. Barthou's intervention, I feel I must, as one of -the founders of the Reparations Commission, say a word. There were -important questions of amount, method, and time which could not be -determined before the signature of the peace treaty and could not be -settled at all without giving Germany a full opportunity of being -heard. Hence the appointment of the Reparations Commission. It was -called into existence to settle these questions after hearing evidence -and deliberating on its effect. Of this commission M. Barthou is now -chairman. He, therefore, presides over a body which has committed -to its charge judicial functions of a momentous character. He has -to adjudicate from time to time on the case presented by Germany -under a multitude of different heads. Inflammatory speeches on the -very subjects upon which he has to preserve judicial calm are quite -incompatible with his position. When he occupied the same post M. -Poincare ultimately recognised that he could not continue to write -controversial articles on questions which might come before him -for decision as a judge. He, therefore, very properly resigned his -commissionership. - -But to revert to the speeches delivered by these eminent statesmen. -If they mean what the actual words convey, then France means to stick -to the Ruhr. Not by way of annexation. Oh, no. That, according to M. -Barthou, is a "foolish, mendacious and stupid" lie. But France means -to hang on to the _gages_ until reparation is paid. What are the -_gages_? The industries of the Ruhr. If the French government is to -control the industries which represent the life of this prosperous -area for thirty years it assumes greater authority over the district -than it exercises over the mining area of the Pas de Calais. In its -own mining districts no government takes upon itself--except during a -war--to give directions as to the destination and distribution of the -coal produced. But there are indications that the control over the Ruhr -industries is to be of a much more far-reaching character than this. -And this is where the hints--broad hints--thrown out by the French -press come in. France, in order to secure the payment of the reparation -instalments in future, is to be given shares in these great mines and -industries. What proportion of shares? Amongst the _gages_ demanded by -M. Poincare in August of last year were sixty per cent. of the shares -in certain pivotal German industries in the Rhine area. Now the Ruhr -industries are clearly to be included within the scope of the demand. -France has the iron ore of Lorraine and the coal of the Saar valley. -Her financiers have been engaged in buying up coal mines in Silesia. If -she can secure the controlling interest in the Ruhr mines and Belgium -and Poland can be persuaded to join in the deal, then the continent of -Europe will be at the mercy of this immense coal and iron combine. - -I said in the previous chapter that the ports were still open. As long -as they are, Central Europe can protect itself to a certain extent -against this gigantic trust, for the products of Britain and America -will be available. But that possibility is to be provided against. -Nothing is to be left to chance. One of the _gages_ is to be control -over German customs. How can Germany balance her budget without a -revenue? How can she raise a revenue without a tariff? What more -productive tariff than a duty on foreign coal and metal manufactures? -And thus all competitive products will be excluded from the German -markets. The combine will be supreme. - -It is true that if this cynical scheme comes off there is an end of -reparations--for the independence of German industry is strangled and -its life will soon languish. But there are signs that French enterprise -has abandoned all idea of recovering reparations and that it is now -brooding upon loot--on an immense scale. For the discussions in the -French press contemplate even wider and more far-reaching developments -than those involved in the control of German industries. Italy, Poland, -and even Russia are to be brought in. The high line taken for years -by the Parisian papers about "no traffic with murder" is being given -up. Instead we have much sentimental twaddle about restoring the -old friendly relations between France and Russia--of course, for a -consideration. Russia is to buy; Germany is to manufacture; France is -to profit. - -These proposals, which have for some time been in the air, are now -actually in type. Now the type is ordinary black--later on it may be -red. Twenty lives have already been lost over the preliminaries of -execution. I fear there will be many more as the difficulties become -more apparent. - -It is not without significance that the terms which Germany is to be -called upon to accept in the event of her submission have never been -formulated. No ultimatum was issued before invasion. If Germany were -to-morrow to throw up her hands what conditions would she have to -comply with? Who can tell? Germany clearly does not know. The British -government does not know. They were never discussed at the Paris -conference. M. Poincare has only asserted with emphasis that he "will -not accept promises." If the Ruhr is to be evacuated promises must be -accepted at some stage, for Germany cannot deliver ten years' coal -instalments in advance, and she cannot pay fifty milliards of gold -marks over the counter. So, if M. Poincare's statement means anything, -then the control of Ruhr industries must be vested in France until the -whole of the mortgage has been redeemed. Hence the vast plan for the -exploitation of Germany, and through Germany of Europe. - -A pretty scheme, but--like most plans which make no allowance for -human nature--bound to fail. How long would Italy and Russia consent -to be exploited for the enrichment of French capitalists? Italy has -already made it clear that she has no intention of walking into the -trap. Russia may or may not have been approached. It is not improbable -that there have been informal soundings. It is not easy to reckon what -the Bolshevists may or may not do in any circumstances. But one can be -fairly assured that they will not place their heads in the jaws of a -rapacious capitalistic crocodile of this character. Brigands are not -made of that simple stuff. - -Will German statesmen consent to sell their country into political -and economic bondage for an indefinite period? It is incredible. No -doubt there had been feelers between French and German capitalists for -some time before the Ruhr invasion. M. Loucheur and Herr Stinnes are -credited with having had conversations on the subject of amalgamating -the interests of Lorraine iron ore and Ruhr coal. But the Ruhr invasion -has awakened the patriotism of Germany from its stupor. A potent -new element has therefore been introduced into the calculation. -This element does not mix well with international finance. It may be -depended upon to resist to the last any effort to put German industry -under foreign control, and without control the _gage_ is worthless. - -Then there is the German workman who must be taken into account. The -miner and the engineer in all countries are proverbially independent. -They take no orders even from their own governments. During the war -they had to be reasoned with before they could be persuaded to take a -course urged upon them by the government of the day in the interests -of their own country. They will view the commands of a syndicate -controlled by foreign governments with suspicion and repugnance. Should -disputes arise--and they are more likely than ever to arise constantly -under these conditions--who will be responsible for the protection of -life, liberty, and property? Will foreign troops operate? Or will the -German army and police act practically under orders given from Paris? -The popular sympathy will be with the strikers. - -It is a fantastic idea born of failure and, therefore, bound itself to -be a failure. - -_London, March 1st, 1923._ - - - - -XV - -THE QUICKSAND - - -When you have walked some distance into a quicksand, and are sinking -deeper and deeper with every step you take, it is always difficult to -decide whether you are more likely to reach firm ground by pressing -forward or by going backward. You must do one or other. You cannot just -stand fast, for that is inevitable destruction. The French government -clearly are of opinion that safety lies in marching further into -the quagmire. So three more German cities have been occupied, more -burgomasters and officials expelled, more men and boys shot in the -streets, more black troops imported, more regulations and more decrees -issued; there are more depressions of French, Belgian and Italian -exchanges, more confusion in everybody's business in Central Europe--in -a sentence, everywhere there is more quaking sand and less solid -coal. The total shortage in deliveries as compared with the promises -of Spa was only eight per cent. Had it not been for this fatuous -invasion, France during the past six or seven weeks would have already -received from the Ruhr nearly 3,000,000 tons in coal and in coke. -France has actually received 50,000 tons during this period. A swarm -of engineers, railwaymen, bargemen, officials of all kinds, and hotel -waiters, supported by a formidable army have in six weeks produced this -ridiculous output. No doubt the amount will later on be increased by -further pressure and by pouring in more railwaymen, but it will be a -long time ere France receives her Spa quota minus eight per cent., and -then there will be some months' arrears to make up. - -No wonder that M. Loucheur stated flatly in the French Chamber that he -did not approve of the Ruhr enterprise. He has one distinct advantage -over the Ruhr plungers--he does know something about business. He can -boast also of another gift, the possession of which is not without -significance when you consider his present attitude. He is an admirable -judge of to-morrow's weather. That is a rare endowment amongst -politicians. Any simpleton can tell you which way the wind is blowing -to-day, but it requires a man of special insight and experience in -these matters to forecast the direction of the wind to-morrow. M. -Loucheur is one of those exceptionally well-equipped weather prophets. -So he satisfies the opinion of to-day by giving his support to M. -Poincare, and he safeguards his position against the morrow's change -by stating clearly that he does not approve the policy he supports. I -have read no declaration from any French statesman of eminence--with -the doubtful exception of M. Barthou--indicating a belief in the wisdom -of the venture. And yet French courage, French pride, French loyalty, -French patriotism--and maybe French blood and treasure--are committed -irretrievably to a reckless gamble which most of the responsible -statesmen who led France by their wisdom through her great troubles -regard with doubt, anxiety and apprehension. - -Will the French government try to extricate themselves from the -difficulties into which they have precipitated their country and -Europe? I fear not. Heedlessness rushes a man into danger; it needs -courage to get out. And when getting out involves an admission of -blame there are few men who possess that exalted type of courage. -There are other reasons why the present government of France will -flounder further into the quicksand. When governments make mistakes in -England, the threat of a Parliamentary defeat or a couple of adverse -by-elections pulls them out roughly but safely, and the governments -start on a new course amid the general satisfaction of friend and foe. -The Willesden, Mitcham, and Liverpool elections rescued the government -from one of the most hopeless muddles into which any administration has -ever contrived to get its affairs. In similar circumstances in France a -change of government is negotiated with amazing dexterity and celerity. -But you cannot arrange the preliminary overthrow of an existing -government unless there is some one in the background ready and willing -to form the next. There are generally two or three outstanding men -of high repute prepared to serve their country in any emergency. The -trouble to-day in France is that every alternative leader disapproves -of this enterprise and believes it must ultimately fail. On the other -hand, there is no prominent figure in French politics prepared to take -upon himself the odium of sounding the retreat. It would always be -said that success was in sight, and that had it not been for the new -minister's cowardice and perfidy France would have emerged triumphantly -out of all her financial worries. The _drapeau_ would have been -lowered and betrayed. No French statesmen dare face that deadly -accusation. So the present French government is tied to the saddle of -its charger and is forced to go on. - -Another explanation of the difficulty of withdrawing is to be found -in the increasing fury of the original fomenters of this rashness. -The more fruitless the enterprise the greater the energy they display -in spurring the government further into its follies. In the previous -article I gave a summary of the ambitious plans they had conceived for -syndicating European resources under French control. The industries -of Europe controlled from Paris--that is their magnificent dream. -Now they propound a new treaty which is to supersede the treaty of -Versailles. Boundaries are to be revised, rich provinces and towns -practically annexed, the Ruhr coal is to be harnessed to Lorraine -coal, and Germany, having been further mutilated and bound, is to be -reduced to a state of complete economic subjection. There has been -nothing comparable to these ideas since the Norman conquest, when -the Saxons, having first of all been disarmed, were reduced to a -condition of economic thraldom for the enrichment and glorification -of their new masters. Needless to say Britain and America are not -to be invited to attend this new peace conference. They are to be -graciously informed of the conditions of the new peace when finally -established by French arms. The British Empire, which raised millions -of men to liberate French soil from the German invaders and which lost -hundreds of thousands of its best young lives in the effort, is not -even to be consulted as to the settlement which its losses alone make -possible. America, who came to the rescue with millions of its bravest, -is barely worth a sentence in these ravings of brains intoxicated -with an unwholesome mixture of hatred, greed and military arrogance. -The French government are not committed by any overt declarations -to these schemes; but it is ominous that they issue from the pens -whose insistent prodding has driven this government on to its present -action. Up to the present no repudiation has come from the head of the -government or from any of his subordinates. The very vagueness of his -published aims would leave him free to adopt any plans. Pledges for -reparation and security will cover a multitude of aggressions. - -The British government have just issued as a Parliamentary paper -a full report of the proceedings of the Paris conference. It is an -amazing document. As far as I can see no real endeavour was made by any -of its members to prevent a break-up. At the first failure to secure -agreement the delegates threw up their hands in despair and sought -no alternatives. They agreed about nothing except that it was not -worth while spending another day in trying to agree. Even M. Theunis, -the resourceful Belgian premier, had nothing to suggest. A blight of -sterility seems to have swept over the conference. On this aspect of -the fateful and fatal conference of Paris I do not now propose to -dwell. I wish to call attention to it for another purpose. I have -perused the Blue Book with great care. I was anxious to find out -exactly what M. Poincare proposed to demand of Germany as a condition -of submission to the French will. What was Germany to do if she was -anxious to avert the fall of the axe? I have read his speeches and -annexes in vain for any exposition of these terms. It is true he was -never asked the question. That sounds incomprehensible. But every one -engaged was in such a hurry to break up the conference and thus put an -end to disagreeable disagreements that it never seems to have occurred -to them to ask this essential question. And the party principally -concerned was not represented. The result is that no one knows the -terms upon which the French army is prepared to evacuate the Ruhr. Mr. -Bonar Law could not explain when questioned in the House of Commons. I -am not surprised, for no one has ever told him and he never asked. I am -sure that by this time M. Poincare has quite forgotten why he ever went -into the Ruhr. For that, amongst other reasons, he will remain there -until something happens that will provide us with an answer. - -Most human tragedy is fortuitous. - -_London, March 10th, 1923._ - - - - -XVI - -THE FIRST GERMAN OFFER - - -The French and Belgian governments have slapped another opportunity -in the face. To make that slap resound as well as sting, they have -accompanied their rejection of the German offer by a savage sentence -of fifteen years' imprisonment on the head of the greatest industrial -concern in the Ruhr, if not in Europe. What for? Because he ordered the -works' syren to sound "cease work" for one day when the French troops -occupied the place. There is a swagger of brutality about that sentence -which betokens recklessness. It came at a moment when the German -government had just made an offer of peace, and when that ally of -France who had made the deepest sacrifices in the war to save her and -Belgium from ruin was urging the French government to regard that offer -at least as a starting-point for discussion. The answer was to treat -the German note as an offence, to promulgate that penal sentence which -outrages every sense of decency throughout the world, and to refuse -to permit an ally, who had been so faithful in the time of trouble for -France and Belgium, even the courtesy of a discussion on the tenor -of the reply to be given to a note that so vitally concerned the -interest of all the Allies without exception. Prussian arrogance in its -crudest days can furnish no such example of clumsy and short-sighted -ineptitude. It gives point to Lord Robert Cecil's observation in the -House of Commons that it is very difficult to reconcile the French -attitude with a conception that the French government, with the opinion -behind it, desires a settlement. - -What is the German offer? It proposes to limit the total obligations -of Germany in cash and in kind to thirty milliards of gold marks -(L1,500,000,000) to be raised by loans on the international money -markets at normal conditions in instalments of:-- - - - 20 milliards up to July 1, 1927. - 5 milliards up to July 1, 1929. - 5 milliards up to July 1, 1931. - - -There are provisions for payment of interest from July, 1923, onward, -and the agreements entered into for delivery of payments in kind on -account of reparations are to be carried out in accordance with the -arrangements already made. Then comes this important provision. After a -paragraph in which it is argued that the above figures would strain the -resources of Germany to the utmost it adds:-- - - - "Should others not share this opinion, the German government - propose to submit the whole reparations problem to an - international commission uninfluenced by political considerations, - as suggested by State Secretary Hughes." - - -They further state that the German government are prepared to devise -suitable measures in order that the whole German national resources -should participate "in guaranteeing the service of the loan." -Guarantees are also offered for deliveries in kind. In order to -ensure a permanent peace between France and Germany they propose an -agreement that all contentious questions arising between them in future -should be referred to arbitration. The note finally stipulates that -the evacuation of the Ruhr "within the shortest space of time" and -the restoration of treaty conditions in the Rhineland constitute "an -essential leading up to negotiations on basis of above ideas." The -above represents the substance of the German proposals. - -The French and Belgian governments in their reply stand by the May, -1921, schedule of payments and decline to forego even the very -problematical "C" bonds of L4,250,000,000. Hitherto it has been -common ground that L2,500,000,000 is the figure which Germany can be -expected to pay. The French and Belgian governments are now insisting -on the full measure of the L6,600,000,000 award. The Hughes proposal -they scoff at and treat its putting forward by Germany as part of "an -expression of a systematic revolt against the Treaty of Versailles." -The real temper and purpose of this intransigeant attitude is to be -found in two sentences. Here is the first. Alluding to the resistance -offered in the Ruhr to the French attempt to exploit its resources -the note says: "The Belgian and French governments cannot take into -consideration any German proposal whilst the resistance continues." -That is, however complete and satisfactory a proposal may be in itself, -it would be rejected unless preceded by abject surrender to French -designs in the Ruhr. Then later on comes this significant sentence -emphasising the moral of the first:-- - - - "The Belgian government and the French government have decided - that they will only evacuate the newly occupied territories - according to the measure and in proportion to the payments - effected. They have nothing to alter in this resolution." - - -An impossible payment is to be insisted upon--costs of occupation are -to be added to that, and until both are liquidated French armies are -to remain in possession of the richest areas in Germany. Meanwhile the -British Empire and the United States of America, who, at a prodigious -cost in life and treasure, saved France from a similar humiliation -to that which she is now inflicting on Germany, are practically told -when they venture to offer suggestions to mind their own business. No -interference will be tolerated from meddlers of any sort. - -The sum offered by Germany in settlement of reparations is no doubt -inadequate. It cannot be accepted by any of the Allies in discharge of -the German obligations under the treaty. The German government must -make a very substantial advance on that offer before they can hope to -come to terms with the Allied governments. I have no doubt the German -government fully realise that fact, and I am sure they did not put -forward these figures as their final tender. They meant them to be -taken as a beginning and a basis for negotiation. In fact they say so. -When you enter into negotiations your lawyer, if he knows his business, -never starts with the figure he is authorised ultimately to propose. -Nor does the client always communicate to his advocate the last figure -he would be prepared to pay if he had to decide between that and a -continuation of the struggle, with its costs and its complications. -Once pourparlers begin the original figure disappears, and disappears -quickly. That is the history of all negotiation, private and public. A -refusal to meet in conference until the figure proposed is acceptable -rules out discussion between parties as a means of coming to terms on -the main question in a dispute. - -I have taken part in the settlement of probably more industrial -differences than most politicians. In every case I have started with -an _impasse_. The first meeting of the parties always revealed an -apparently unbridgeable chasm between their respective positions; but -perseverance and an honest endeavour on both sides to find a solution -usually ends in agreement. Goodwill can bridge any abyss. Unconditional -surrender if insisted upon between independent bodies is a sure prelude -to fresh disputes. The mere fact, therefore, that Germany put forward -a proposal which falls short of the needs and equities of the case is -not a sufficient reason for declining to meet her representatives at -a conference to determine what the right sum should be, and the best -method of liquidating it. - -But there is another and a stronger reason why the German offer -should not have been so peremptorily rejected. It did not end with a -submission of an inadequate amount in discharge of reparations claims. -Had it done so the French government might perhaps contend that Germany -must make up her mind, before she is allowed to confer, to raise that -figure to something which at least approximates to the region of -acceptability. But even if the French contention in that respect were -reasonable, it is ruled out by the circumstance that in this note the -German government have proposed an alternative if the figure they -offer is considered unacceptable. That alternative changes the whole -character of the note, when you come to judge of the question of its -_bona fides_. This proposition consists in the complete and categorical -acceptance by the German government of Mr. Secretary Hughes's famous -New Haven suggestions. It will be recollected that, as a way out of -the reparations entanglement, he proposed that an international expert -commission should be set up to inquire into the question of the amount -which Germany is capable of paying, and the best method of discharging -her obligations once they were fixed. Mr. Hughes made it clear that the -United States of America were prepared to assist in such an inquiry. -It is this that lent such significance and importance to his speech. -When I first read that speech I thought it of such moment that I cabled -from Spain to the British and American papers my earnest hope that the -Allies, about to sit in conference in Paris, would immediately consider -its terms, and act upon it. It seemed to me the supreme opportunity -for placing the vexed question which is fretting Europe almost into -nervous paralysis on a pathway which must inevitably lead to a real -settlement. The more I think of that proposal, the more am I convinced -that it was right, and the more am I perplexed by the rude indifference -with which it was treated by the Allied governments. To this hour I am -baffled to explain why those who are anxious for a conclusion never -brought this momentous declaration of American readiness to take a hand -to the notice of the conference. I can suggest explanations, but none -which is not a grave reflection on the way in which the proceedings -of that conference were handled. I can understand those who wish to -exploit reparations for ulterior purposes being anxious to keep America -out of the business. But why did Britain, Italy and Belgium neglect -this chance of securing the association of the one power which could -be helpful to the Allies in reaching a fair and sound decision, and -what is equally important, helpful in all subsequent operations for -cashing that decision? Now Germany states categorically that, if her -cash tender is unacceptable to the Allies, she is willing to leave the -question of the amount she is capable of paying to an international -tribunal on which America is represented, and to abide by the decision -of that tribunal, whatever it may be. That is in substance Mr. -Secretary Hughes's suggestion. How can a note containing so reasonable -a proposal, and a proposal originally emanating from so powerful and so -friendly a quarter, be treated as if it were an insult to the dignity -of France--and of Belgium! To declare--as the French note does--that -the Hughes proposition is an abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles is -to ignore the provisions of that treaty. As a matter of fact it would -be a restoration of the treaty. As I have repeatedly pointed out, -that treaty delegated the question of the amount which Germany has to -pay in respect of reparations to an Allied commission on which the -United States of America was to be represented. The function of this -commission was to assess the amount of the damages for which Germany is -responsible under the treaty, and then to adjudicate on the capacity of -Germany to pay those damages in whole or in part. - -The commission was authorised to fix the amount of the annual -payments to be demanded of Germany on the double basis of liability -and capacity. The withdrawal of the only country which had no direct -interest in reparations from the treaty left the commission a lop-sided -and highly prejudiced tribunal. The reparations commission no longer -carries out the treaty idea. Its character has completely changed. -It is essential in order to adhere to the Treaty of Versailles that -America should have a representative on the tribunal that fixes the -payments to be exacted from Germany. The German government now offer -to submit the fate of their country to the unaltered clauses of the -treaty which was signed in the Galerie des Glaces in June, 1919. -France and Belgium have no right in honour to demand submission to any -other. Because they insist on enforcing something which is entirely -different from the contract entered into by them with Germany in -1919, Europe is disquieted and international relations are saturated -with the inflammable spirit of resentment, hatred, and revenge. No -wonder Marshal Foch is touring Central Europe to put the Allied armies -in order! He seems to me to be the one man in France who has an -understanding of what all this is leading up to. - -_London, May 14th, 1923._ - - - - -XVII - -THE SECOND GERMAN NOTE - - -The Germans have tried another note. Inasmuch as all the Allied press -without exception are agreed in describing it as a great improvement -over the first, it is hardly worth while taking up time and space -to demonstrate how the essentials of this more favoured document -were contained in its reprobated predecessor. Psychologically it is -a decided advance on the first note. It is crisp and condensed, and -does not indulge in the irritating processes of an argument. You -should never attempt to argue with an angry man who is brandishing a -bludgeon--unless you are at a safe distance from him. Germany is in -this case at his feet. The second German note therefore is wise in -avoiding the provocation of an appeal to reason. It makes its offer -simply and uncontentiously. - -It also suggests a number of substantial guarantees for the payment of -interest on the loans to be raised for reparations purposes. I cannot -pretend to assess the value that would be attached to these _gages_ by -prospective borrowers. I have no doubt they would add materially to the -security of the investment. But this array of securities standing alone -will not entice the investor to risk his money on a German reparations -loan. He will look at Germany as a whole, and not in parts. He will -want to know what is likely to happen to that great country during -the coming years, and to its industry, its finance, its politics, and -its people. A railway which collects its rates and fares in a corrupt -currency is of no use as a security for any loan--a customs revenue -collected in a fugitive coin is equally worthless. The only reliable -basis for a loan is a stable Germany. You can have no stable Germany -until you settle reparations. That is, therefore, the first essential -preliminary to all discussions on _gages_ be they _productifs_ or -otherwise. - -Hence the propositions that really matter in the German note are not -those which give a schedule of guarantees, but those which bear on -the fixation of the amount which Germany is to be called upon to pay. -On this question the note does not increase the sum which the first -note estimated as the limit of German capacity. But it reaffirms the -readiness of the German government to submit the consideration of the -capacity of Germany to pay to an impartial tribunal. It offers to place -at the disposal of this body all the material which is necessary to -enable it to arrive at a just conclusion. It proceeds to suggest that -all further discussion on the subjects at issue between the parties -should take place at a conference rather than by interchange of notes. -How can any unprejudiced person refuse to recognise the essential -reasonableness of this part of the offer? It is common ground that -the annuities imposed upon Germany in May, 1921, demand modification. -Even M. Poincare proceeds on that assumption. There is, therefore, a -most important and highly difficult figure to be ascertained. What -annuity can Germany pay? And when will she be in a position to pay? -Is it unreasonable to propose that this question which involves a -most searching examination into German assets should be referred to -a tribunal which would be capable of giving it calm and judicial -consideration? And what objection can there be to discussing the -matter at a conference where Germany as well as all the Allies would -be represented? If this were a business or a trade dispute these two -proposals would be regarded as eminently sensible and fair, and the -party that rejected them would be condemned by public opinion. - -What are the objections to acceptance formulated by the French press? -Up to the date of writing this article the French government have not -officially expressed their views on the German note. But one may safely -assume from past experience that Parisian journalists consulted the -Quai d'Orsay before writing their critical articles. - -The first is that the French government will discuss no proposals -emanating from Germany until the latter withdraw its passive resistance -to French and Belgian exploitation of the Ruhr. What does this exactly -mean? If it imports--as a preliminary condition to conference or -consideration of terms--an acquiescence by Germany in the occupation -and exploitation by France and Belgium of the Ruhr valley until -reparations be fully paid, then the position is hopeless. A German -government may submit to such an occupation because it has no force -at its command to offer resistance. But no German government can -give assent to such an invasion of its territories. A peace signed -on such terms would inevitably be repudiated at the first favourable -opportunity. Meanwhile there would be constant friction and trouble in -the Ruhr. I can hardly believe that this is what the French government -mean to insist upon, in spite of an article in the _Temps_ which bears -that interpretation. But they may only ask that whilst terms are being -discussed an armistice shall be concluded, the first condition of which -will be that all obstacles now interposed in the way of supplying -France, Belgium, and Italy with reparation coal and coke shall be -withdrawn. An armistice on those terms ought not to be difficult to -arrange, especially if the French and Belgian authorities withdraw the -ban they have placed on the export of Ruhr products to the unoccupied -parts of Germany. Unless the terms are mutually accommodating, I -surmise that the German government will experience an insurmountable -difficulty in persuading the stubborn miners and railway operatives -of the Ruhr to assist in furnishing to France the products of their -labour which are denied to their own fellow-countrymen. It is too -readily taken for granted that the Ruhr workmen will obey any behest -that comes from Berlin. Governments in Germany have ceased to receive -that kind of obedience. It is one of the indirect consequences of the -great disaster that the decrees of Wilhelmstrasse no longer command -the respect which attached to them in pre-war days. Still, a conference -at which all the interests concerned were represented would experience -no difficulty in fixing up stipulations which would make it possible -for France to enter a conference on reparations without any suspicion -being attached to her ministers that they had lowered the national flag -on entering the room. I trust that good sense will prevail over temper -and exaggerated pride--on both sides. - -Should this preliminary point of honour be disposed of, then what -remains? The fixation of the annuities and the guarantees for their -payment. What are the objections to accepting the method put forward in -the German note for these two points? It is not the German method--it -is the American method adopted by the German government. A conference -with an impartial tribunal if conference fails. I know of no other way -except a resort to blind force. - -It is objected that the Treaty of Versailles has already provided such -a tribunal in the reparations commission for the specific purpose of -adjudicating upon Germany's liability and Germany's capacity, and that -to set up another for exactly the same purpose would be to supersede -that treaty. There are two answers to this contention. The first is -that the reparations commission as at present constituted is not the -body to which Germany agreed to refer these questions so vital to -her existence. It is not the body which Britain and the other Allies -contemplated. The withdrawal of America from the commission--after -Germany had already signed the treaty--has completely changed the -balance and therefore the character of this tribunal. No man in his -senses can pretend that in its mutilated form it is either impartial -in its composition or judicial in its methods. M. Poincare does not -conceal the fact that the French government issues orders to its -representative on that "judicial" body. The chairman is an eminent -French deputy who has played and still plays a conspicuous and -influential part in French politics, and is looking forward to pursuing -his career as a politician whithersoever it may lead. Ever since he has -been chairman he has delivered speeches in public denouncing the party -of whose case he is supposed to be the chief judge. All his colleagues -represent powers who have a direct pecuniary interest in the result of -their decisions. The only disinterested power has retired from the -commission. The American proposal is very moderate. It implies the -restoration of the treaty by reintroducing America to the body that -settles reparations. If France objects to the appointment of a separate -commission why should it not be agreed between the Allies that their -representatives on the body of experts to be set up shall be the men -who now constitute the reparations commission? To these the American -government could add their nominee. Germany has a right under the -treaty to present her case. The whole question of capacity could then -be gone into in the light of the experience acquired during the last -four years, and a settlement could thus be effected on a sound basis. -Such settlement would have a much better chance of being workable, and -therefore more durable than terms imposed by force on a people who only -accept under duress. - -But whatever the French view may be of the suggested annuities or -guarantees, or of the impartial commission, it is inconceivable -that they should reject the conference. It is the surest road to -reparations. At Spa the method of pelting the bewildered Reich with -demand notes was for a time abandoned, and that of conference at the -same table was substituted. The results were admirable. The process of -disarmament made immediate strides towards satisfactory completion, -and the coal deliveries became fuller and steadier. At Cannes last -year the Allies once more started to confer with German ministers. All -those who were present at those discussions--without exception--admit -that satisfactory progress was being made towards a comprehensive -settlement when the conferees were scattered by a bomb. It is too -early yet to estimate the loss which inured to Europe through that -explosion. But all idea of discussion between the parties has since -been loftily and petulantly dismissed as an exhibition of pernicious -weakness. What has been substituted for it? For twelve months we had -rather a ridiculous display of feather-rustling about the farmyard to -inspire terror. Threatening speeches full of ominous hints of impending -action were delivered at intervals in different parts of France. These -produced nothing but increased confusion and incapacity to pay. Every -speech cost France milliards in postponed reparations. French opinion -not unnaturally insisted on some action being taken. Hence this rash -invasion. At Cannes a two-year moratorium would have been accepted as a -settlement. Already a year and a half of that period would by now have -elapsed. German finances would, under the strict Allied supervision -which was conceded, by now have been restored to soundness--the mark -would have been stabilised, and a loan could have been negotiated which -would have provided the Allies with substantial sums towards lightening -the burdens they are all bearing. Confidence would have been restored -in Europe, and for the first time there would have been real peace. -One can see what the alternative has produced. Whatever the final -terms may be, Germany is not in a financial position to pay what she -was able to offer then. These eighteen months have been devoted to -reducing assiduously German capacity to pay Allied debts, and the value -of the German security for such payment. At Cannes the mark stood at -770 to the pound sterling. It now stands at 500,000. Germany will need -an extended moratorium to recover from the clumsy mishandling of the -past year and a half. The mark has to be picked up out of the abyss -into which it has been thrown by those whose interest it was to lift -it out of the depression wherein it lay. A debtor on whose restored -health and nerve payment entirely depends has been violently pushed -down several flights of stairs. It will take him a long time to recover -from the bruises, the shake, and the loss of blood. What an achievement -in scientific debt collecting! If reparations are ever to be paid the -Allies must retrace their steps and get back to conference. Once the -parties--all the parties--sit round the table I feel assured that the -common sense of most will in the end prevail. We shall never get back -what has been lost during 1922-23, but we shall get something that will -help. It will take some time to set up the tackle for hoisting the mark -out of the crevass and some to do the winding. But the sooner a start -is made the less winding there will be to do. So for everybody's sake -it is high time to stop the strutting and get back to business. - - - - -XVIII - -THE NAPOLEONIC DREAM - - -What a muddle it all is! France and Germany are both anxious to settle -in the Ruhr, but are too proud to admit it. The struggle, therefore, -goes on, and will continue to the detriment of both. Belgium is sorry -she ever entered the Ruhr, but cannot get out of it. Every time she -tries to get away France pulls her back roughly by the tail of her -coat, so she has to do sentry-go at Essen whilst her franc is leading -a wild life at home. Italy has forgotten that she ever sanctioned -the occupation, and her moral indignation is mounting rapidly, -although it has not yet risen to a height which is visible across -the Alps. Great Britain is growling futile notes of dissatisfaction -with everybody--France and Germany alike. The confusion of tongues is -deafening and paralysing, and no one is quite happy except the spirit -of mischief who is holding his sides with ghoulish laughter. He never -had such a time--not since the Tower of Babel. And this time it may -end in a second deluge. - -The horror of the Great War seems to have unhinged the European mind. -Nations do not think normally. The blood pressure is still very high. -The excitement over the Ruhr does not tend to improve it. When some -of the articles written and speeches delivered to-day come to be read -by the diligent historian a generation hence, he will recognise there -the ravings of a continent whose mental equilibrium has been upset -by a great shock. The real issue involved in all this struggle is a -comparatively simple one. How much can Germany pay and in what way -can she pay? America, Britain, Italy and Germany are all agreed that -the only way to settle that question is to appoint competent experts -to investigate and report upon it. The Pope also has blessed this -reasonable suggestion. France, on the contrary, says it is a question -to be determined by guns and generals--both equally well fitted for -that task. Germany must present her accounts to the mitrailleuse and -argue her case before the soixante-quinze. It is a mad world. - -Every one is interested in one question--or perhaps two. How will -it all end and how soon is that end coming? Although I have nothing -to fear from recalling the predictions of my early articles on this -subject, I hesitate to hazard a fresh forecast. But one may review the -possibilities and note the drift of the whirling currents. In assessing -the chances, you must begin with some knowledge of the man who will -decide the event. M. Poincare is possessed of undoubted ability and -patriotism, but he is also a man who lives in a world of prejudices so -dense that they obscure facts. You have but to turn to one statement -in his last note where he says the conferences and ultimatums of the -past four years secured nothing from Germany. What are the facts? -During the three and a half years that preceded the Ruhr invasion, -Germany paid to the Allies in cash and in kind over ten milliards of -gold marks,--L500,000,000 in sterling, 2,000,000,000 in dollars--a -considerable effort for a country which had but lately emerged out of -the most exhausting of wars and whose foreign trade was down sixty to -seventy per cent. You might imagine that a man who had taken the grave -step of ordering armies to invade a neighbour's territories would also -have taken the trouble to ascertain the elementary facts of his case. -Part of this gigantic sum went to pay for Armies of Occupation; part -for Reparations, but it all came out of German assets. Will the next -three and a half years bring anything approximating that figure to the -Allied coffers? - -It is a safe statement to make that no one in charge of the French -movements anticipated a resistance approaching in its stubbornness to -that which they have encountered. The friendly Press, both in France -and in England, foretold a speedy collapse of the German opposition, -and on this assumption all the French plans were based. During the -first days of the occupation an Englishman asked a French officer -how long he thought it would take. The answer is indicative of the -spirit in which the venture started: "Optimists think it will take -a fortnight," he said; "pessimists think it may take three weeks." -A reference to the January telegrams from Paris and Duesseldorf will -show that this officer accurately expressed the general sentiment of -those who were responsible for the Ruhr invasion. Soldiers estimate -the chances of resistance in terms of material and trained men, and -statesmen too often build their hopes on the same shallow foundation. -They never allow for the indomitable reserves of the human heart, -which do not figure in Army Lists or Statesmen's Annuals. The -resistance of Paris in 1870 was as confounding to Bismarck as the -stubbornness of the Ruhr miners is to Poincare to-day. The last regular -army had been destroyed, all docketed food stores exhausted, and still -the struggle of the devoted citizens went on for months. There were -few men in England who thought the Boer peasants could continue their -resistance for more than three months after our armies reached South -Africa. The three months ran into three years and only then capitulated -on honourable terms. The Northern States of America never contemplated -the possibility of a five years' struggle with a blockaded, starved -and overwhelmed Confederacy. The War of 1914-18 is littered with -miscalculations attributable to the blind refusal of rulers and their -advisers to recognise the moral element as a factor in the reckoning. -The Ruhr tragedy is not the first, nor indeed may it be the last, to -be initiated by facile memoranda framed by General Staffs and civilian -functionaries, drawing their inspiration from pigeonholes. - -Whatever may transpire in the Ruhr it is already clear that the -estimates of military men, of transport officials, of intelligence -departments, and of presiding Ministers, have been hopelessly -falsified. Many more soldiers have been sent into the Ruhr than had -been thought necessary: a great deal less coal has come out of the -Ruhr than had been confidently expected. There are already as many -Frenchmen in the Ruhr as Napoleon commanded at Waterloo; and they -have succeeded in sending across the frontier in six months only as -much coal as the Germans delivered in one month during the period of -"default" which provoked the invasion. Desperate efforts have been -made at great cost to increase the yield with a view to satisfying -French and foreign opinion that resistance is gradually breaking down. -Rubbish is shovelled into wagons in order anyhow to swell the quota. -Coal is seized anywhere, even in the streets. And Monsieur Trocquer, -the bluff and genial Breton in charge of the transport arrangements, -breezily challenges all the critics to look at the mounting pyramids of -his dustcart collection and rejoice with him in the triumph of French -organisation under his control. Alas, the Celtic fire of Monsieur -Trocquer, even when fed by the sweepings of the Ruhr, cannot keep -going the blast furnaces of Lorraine! So we find disappointment and -discontent amongst the forge-masters of France. - -But there is a limit to human endurance. Either France or Germany must -give way in the end. Which will it be, and when will it come--and how? -In answering these questions one must remember that for France the -honour of her flag is involved in success. Failure would irretrievably -damage her prestige. Every Frenchman knows that. That is why French -statesmen who disapprove of the invasion support the Government in -all their proposals for bringing it to a successful end. And here -France has a legitimate complaint against her Allies. It is useless -for Italy now to counsel wisdom. Signor Mussolini was present at the -"hush Conference" which sanctioned the invasion. He fixed the price of -assent in coal tonnage. That price has been regularly paid. Belgium -is now becoming scared at the swelling magnitude of the venture. But -she committed her own honour as well as that of France to carrying it -through. I regret to think that Britain is not free from responsibility -in the matter. It is true that her representatives disapproved of the -enterprise, but not on grounds of right or justice. On the contrary, -whilst expressing grave doubt as to the ultimate success of the -invasion they wished the French Government well in the undertaking on -which they were about to embark. Not one of the Allies is in a position -with a clean conscience to urge France to haul down her flag. There is -only one course which could be urged on the French Government as being -consistent with French honour, and that is the reference of the dispute -to the League of Nations. Such a reference would be an enforcement of -the Treaty of Versailles. That suggestion the British Government have -refused to press on France. The struggle must, therefore, proceed to -its destined end. - -It may be assumed that the British Government will not intervene -effectively. How about the ministerial declarations? Surely these -strong words must be followed by strong action! Those who rely on that -inference know nothing of the men who use the words or of the forces -upon which they depend for their ministerial existence. It is true -that some weeks ago Mr. Snodgrass took off his coat and proclaimed -cryptically, but fearlessly, that unless peace was restored on his -terms something would happen. The French Government, unperturbed, -replied that they meant to persist in their course. So last week Mr. -Snodgrass takes off his waistcoat. But do not be alarmed: there will -be no blows: his friends will hold him back. Meanwhile, Mr. Winkle -has left for Paris in order to lunch with one of the combatants. Next -week he will be followed by Mr. Pickwick, who will call on another, -and the week after Mr. Tupman proposes to pay another propitiatory -visit. It will be an incalculable advantage to M. Poincare that they -each represent a different and conflicting point of view. The French -have accurately taken the measure of the mind and muscle of those -who indulge in these spectacular exhibitions of ball punching in -Westminster with cakes and ale at Rambouillet. We may therefore assume -that whatever conversations take place at these general gatherings or -ensue from them, the French will not be talked out of the Ruhr. - -From the emphatic declarations made by the head of the French -Government it is gathered that France will insist at all costs on -enforcing her will. She has put forward two demands. The first is that -Germany shall abandon passive resistance as an essential preliminary to -negotiation. The second is that her forces should remain in the Ruhr -until the last payment is made. Will the German Government accept -these conditions? A settlement on these terms is only possible on two -assumptions. The first is that a German Government can be found strong -enough to accept them and to survive their acceptance. The second -is that there is a French Government wise enough to give a liberal -interpretation to these demands. The first depends to a large extent on -the second. - -The events of the past few months have added immeasurably to the -difficulties of negotiation. Incidents inseparable from a foreign -occupation in any land have exasperated German opinion and reached -depths of hatred which had never been stirred even by the Great -War--the deportation of 75,000 Germans from their homes in the Ruhr -area, the repression, the shooting, the starving, the holding up -of food trains until essential supplies rot. The myriad insolences -of unchallengeable force, the passions which make French policy so -intractable are entirely attributable to the German occupation of -France. Frenchmen are now sowing the same seeds of anger in the German -breast. Hatreds are bad negotiators. That is why I despair of a real -settlement. - -But Germany may collapse. She might even break up, temporarily. The -authority of the Central Government has already largely disappeared. -There is practically no collection of taxes. The mark has gone down -in a little over a week from 1,000,000 to the L to 27,000,000.[3] How -can any Government collect taxes in such a fugitive and attenuated -currency? You might as well try to collect land taxes on the tail of -a comet. The state of the currency is but a symptom of the general -disintegration. Berlin has ceased to wield any influence in Bavaria, -and the Monarchy might be restored in that Province at no distant -date. There is a movement in the Rhineland to set up a Republic freed -from the dominion of Prussia. This movement is fostered by French -agencies and financed by French subventions. If it is declared Prussia -will not be allowed to suppress it. We may, therefore, soon witness -a Rhineland Republic whose glorious freedom and independence will be -jealously guarded against internal as well as external foes by the -coloured warriors of Senegal and Cochin-China. Saxony might be captured -by Communists and Prussia be torn between Monarchist and Communist. -These are not unlikely happenings. Is it too much to say they are -not altogether out of the computation of French statesmanship? If -Germany dissolves, then the Rhineland and the Ruhr would remain under -the dominion of France. France would not secure reparations, but she -would enjoy security, and she would, so it is conjectured, enormously -enhance her power in the world. An old French dream would be realised. -The work of Bismarck would be undone and the achievement of Napoleon -would be restored and perpetuated. There is an old Welsh adage which -says that it is easy to kindle a fire on an old hearthstone. This -idea of a Rhineland under French domination is the old hearthstone -of Charlemagne. Mazarin sought to relight its flames. Napoleon the -First kindled on it a blaze that scorched Europe. Napoleon the Third -had hopes of warming his chilling fortunes at the glow of its embers, -and now the great victory of 1918 has set French ambitions once more -reviving the fires on the old hearthstone of a Rhineland ruled by the -Frank. - -Altogether it is a bad look-out for Europe. - -_London, August 6th, 1923._ - -FOOTNOTE: - -[3] Since this was written the mark has fallen far beyond. - - - - -XIX - -IS IT PEACE? - - -The Charleville speech[4] and M. Poincare's reply to Lord Curzon's -despatch[5] leave things exactly where they were. Rumour said the reply -would be long and logical. For once rumour hath not lied. M. Poincare -regards this exchange of bolstered notes as a pillow fight which he -is quite prepared to prolong in order to gain time whilst the real -struggle is developing to its destined end. The prominence given in the -press to the fact that this rigid reply is "courteous" is significant -of the pitiable condition to which the Entente has been brought by -these maladroit negotiations. - -What will Mr. Stanley Baldwin and Lord Curzon do next? Much depends -for Europe on that next step, and something for them also hangs upon -their action or inaction. One is reminded of the answer given by Emile -Ollivier to the question addressed to him as to his opinion of one of -Napoleon the Third's experiments in constitutional government: "Si -c'est une fin, vous etes perdu; si c'est un commencement, vous etes -fonde." That sage comment is equally applicable to the Curzon note. - -We can only "wait and see," first for the French official reply, and -second for the decision of the British Government upon that note. -The only new factor in the situation that may have a determining -influence on events is the accession of Herr Stresemann to the German -Chancellorship.[6] I know nothing of him beyond newspaper report, -but he is generally supposed to be a man of energy, courage and -resource. If that be true, his appointment to the official leadership -of the German people may be an event of the first magnitude. We shall -soon know what he is made of. Germany has suffered more from weak -or misguided leadership in recent years than any great country in -the world. It blundered her into the War, it blundered through the -War, it blundered into the armistice, it blundered during the peace -negotiations, and it has blundered her affairs badly after the peace. -But no one can predict what Germany is capable of with a wise and -strong leadership. Herr Stresemann has a responsibility cast upon him -and an opportunity afforded him such as have not been given to any -statesman since the days of Stein and his coadjutors for regenerating -his country and lifting her out of the slough of despond in which she -has been sinking deeper and deeper. Those who ignore the effect which -powerful and magnetic personalities may have upon the fortunes of -nations in despair must have forgotten their history books. The fall of -Dr. Cuno and the rise of Herr Stresemann may well turn out to be a more -decisive event than the despatch or the publication of the Curzon note. -But if he lacks those rare qualities which alone can inspire a people -in an emergency to heroic action and endurance, then there is nothing -but chaos ahead of Germany. For the moment it is more important to keep -a discerning eye on Herr Stresemann than to watch this endless fencing -between Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay. - -It is not often I find myself in agreement with M. Poincare, but -when he states that British unemployment is not attributable to the -occupation of the Ruhr I am substantially in accord with him. In -July last[7] I called the attention of the House of Commons to world -conditions which injuriously affected our export trade and made -unemployment on a large scale inevitable in the British labour market -for some time to come. We are more dependent on our overseas trade, -export, entrepot, shipping and incidental business than any country in -the world. Almost half our industrial and commercial activities are -associated with outside trade in all its forms. That is not a full -statement of the case, for if this important section of our business -were to languish, the home trade would also necessarily suffer by the -consequential diminution in the purchasing capacity of our people. -Before the French ever entered the Ruhr our overseas trade was down -to 75 per cent. of its pre-war level. Our population has increased -by two millions since 1913; our taxation has increased fourfold; our -national debt tenfold; but our business is down 25 per cent. To what -is this fall in our outside sales and services attributable? It is -the direct consequence of the War. Our customers throughout Europe -are impoverished. What is just as bad, our customers' customers are -impoverished. So that neither can buy at our stalls the quantities or -the qualities which they could be relied upon to purchase before the -War. Until Europe can buy, Australia, Canada, India and China cannot -pay, as the Prime Minister pointed out in his last speech in the House -of Commons. Germany, before the War, bought Australian wool, Canadian -grain, Indian jute and tea, and the proceeds as often as not went to -pay for goods bought by those countries in British markets. The same -observation applies to Russia, Austria, and the Levantine countries. -The purchasing capacity of Europe must, therefore, be replenished, -a process which will, at best, take years of patient industry. The -mischief of the Ruhr lies not in the creation of bad trade, but in -retarding the process of recovery. It has undoubtedly had that effect. - -Before the French entered the Ruhr trade was gradually if slowly -improving all round. The prices of 1922 were lower than those of 1921; -therefore, the contrast in sterling was not as apparent as it became -on the examination of weights and measures. The export figures, -notably in manufactured goods, show a decided increase on those of -the preceding year. This advance is reflected in the statistics of -unemployment. During the first ten months of 1922 there was a reduction -of over 500,000 in the numbers of the registered unemployed. The -succeeding ten months give only a slight improvement. Something has -happened to arrest the rate of progress towards better times. This -is where the Ruhr comes in. Even if it is not, to quote the Prime -Minister, a penknife stuck in the watch and stopping the works, it is -certainly more than a grain of dust which has perceptibly slowed the -action of the sensitive machinery of trade. - -The effect of the Ruhr disturbance would continue for some time if the -penknife were removed now. For the moment M. Poincare is wedging it in -more deeply and firmly. Even if he withdrew it now, the works would not -recover their normal steadiness for a long while. During these last -disturbing months Germany has become appreciably poorer. Her wealth -production has been depressed throughout most of her industrial areas. -To a certain extent Lorraine and Belgium have also been affected -adversely. The reservoir of wealth upon which industry draws has not -been filling up as it ought if the world is ever to recover. - -These things are hidden from France. She is a more self-contained -country than Britain--perhaps also a more self-centred country. Even -after the Napoleonic wars, which drained her best manhood and exhausted -her fine nervous virility, she suffered from no interval of economic -depression. Her great and victorious rival across the Channel lumbered -painfully through fifteen years of misery, poverty and distress. Her -own population, basking in the sunshine of prosperity, regarded across -the narrow waters, with a natural contentment, the dark fogs that -enveloped and drenched their old enemies. Commiseration or sympathy -from them at that time was not to be expected. We had fought them for -twenty years with an inveterate pertinacity and at last beaten them -to the ground and occupied their capital. To-day we suffer because we -helped to save their capital from foreign occupation and their country -from being humbled to the dust by a foreign foe. Neither in French -speeches, notes, nor articles is there any appreciation shown of that -cardinal fact in the situation. - -All that is clear at the moment is the stubbornness of the French -attitude. M. Poincare has not so far receded one millimetre from his -original position. Threats and cajoleries alike are answered by a -repetition of the same formulae, with the slight variations in word or -phrase which one would expect from a practised writer. But the theme -is always the same and the application is identical to the point -of monotony. He is not winning much coal out of his discourses and -literary exercises, but to do him justice he is getting something for -his country. Last year Lord Balfour, in the note he sent to the Allies -on behalf of the British Government, offered to forego all claims -for debts and reparations if Britain were secured against payment of -the American debt. That meant a surrender of claims aggregating over -L3,000,000,000 in return for an assured L1,000,000,000. A very handsome -and generous offer. The Curzon note proposes to surrender all our -claims for a precarious return of L710,000,000. The Ruhr occupation -has already brought down the British claim against the Allies by -L290,000,000. M. Poincare may not be able to extract reparations out of -Germany, but in seven months he has succeeded in forcing L290,000,000 -out of Great Britain. He will certainly ask for more--and probably -receive it. - -Mr. Bonar Law was right when he said that under certain conditions -Great Britain would be the only country to pay a war indemnity. Those -conditions have arisen under his successors. - -_Criccieth, August 20th, 1923._ - -FOOTNOTES: - -[4] M. Poincare's speech at Charleville on August 19th, on the subject -of French policy in the Ruhr. - -[5] The British note was sent to France, August 13th, 1923, and M. -Poincare's reply was received on August 23rd. - -[6] The German Government fell on August 13th, 1923, and Herr -Stresemann succeeded Dr. Cuno as Chancellor. - -[7] House of Commons, July 16th, 1923. - - - - -XX - -WHAT NEXT?[8] - - -The pen-and-ink joust is suspended for a fortnight, whilst the figures -of British unemployment are leaping upwards. When the exhausted British -knights have been reinvigorated by French waters they will once more -charge full tilt at the French champion--at least, they will have made -up their minds by then whether they will shiver another fountain-pen -against his blotting-pad. - -This is the advice ponderously and pompously tendered them in inspired -articles. So far, the French nation is jubilant that M. Poincare has -scored heavily on points. He is a defter penman, and, moreover, he -does not delegate his draughtsmanship to a Committee of Ministers, all -holding irreconcilable views as to how to proceed, when to proceed, and -whither to proceed, and amongst whom there is no agreement except on -one point--that no one quite knows what action to propose. - -Up to this last reply they cherished the vain delusion that the -French could be shelled out of the Ruhr by reproaches which were both -querulous and apologetic. That is not the way to shift continental -statesmanship from its purpose. The French Foreign Office is better -informed as to Cabinet divisions in this country than are the British -public. It knows that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary dare not -take measures which will hamper French action in the Ruhr. - -When the Tory Diehards placed co-operation with France in the forefront -of their programme they honestly meant it. For them it was not a mere -manoeuvre to unhorse the Coalition. They cannot, therefore, support an -attitude of resistance to French pressure on Germany. A refusal to join -France in squeezing Germany is to them a continuation of the evil of -the Coalition they overthrew with the help of Mr. Stanley Baldwin and -Lord Curzon. They will not tolerate it. - -That explains the impotence of British diplomacy in a situation which -is so critical to our existence as a great commercial people. The -Cabinet can agree on wordy notes; they are hopelessly divided as to -action. They have, therefore, dispersed far and wide to search for -fortuitous guidance hither and thither--some in the tranquillity of -their English country houses; some in the healing springs of France; -some in the mists of Scottish moorlands. Mayhap one of them will bring -home a policy acceptable to his colleagues. It is all very humiliating -to the Empire that raised ten millions of men and spent L10,000,000,000 -of its treasure to win the War. The net result of the voluminous -correspondence on which our rulers have concentrated months of anxious -wisdom and unwearying hesitancy is that the Allies whom we saved from -destruction refuse to move one inch out of their road to secure our -friendly companionship. They are marching resolutely in one direction, -whilst we are shambling along in another. - -We have travelled long distances from each other since January last, -and we are now altogether out of sight of the position we held in -common when we met the Germans at Cannes early last year.[9] The -Entente has never been more cordial than it was then--it has never -shown more promise of hopeful partnership for the peace of the world. -We were on the point of securing an amicable and businesslike -arrangement with Germany for the payment of reparations and of -concluding an agreement for protecting the frontiers of France and -Belgium against the possibility of future invasion. - -From these starting-points it was proposed that Britain, France, -Italy, and Belgium should advance together to a general settlement of -European problems in East and West--political, financial, economic and -transport. This we had agreed to do and, with the unity and goodwill -which then prevailed, could have accomplished. - -But M. Poincare had no use for the dove of peace. He wanted to fly -his falcon. He had trained and bred it in the French farmyard, and -there it had brought down many a domestic bird successfully. When his -chance came he flew it at the wounded German eagle. It is poor sport, -and somewhat cruel, but it evidently gives great joy to Frenchmen of -a sort. The best are ashamed of it, but their voices are drowned in -the clamour of the unthinking. If the helpless bird is torn to pieces, -there is nothing in that for French or Belgian larders. - -Quite unintentionally the hawk has brought down the Entente also. -It may not be dead, but it has made its last flight. Henceforth -international arrangements will be on a less exclusive basis. France -is irrevocably committed to the exploitation of the Ruhr by force. -That is what "pay or stay" means. To that policy the majority in this -country are definitely opposed. If the Diehards in the Cabinet were by -any chance to win, and either Mr. Baldwin surrendered or resigned in -favour of a Poincarist administration in this country, neither he nor -any possible successors could carry the country along into the Ruhr -venture. - -Some of them around the Prime Minister who have so suddenly assumed -pro-French sentiments as the shortest cut to higher altitudes than -those to which they have yet succeeded in climbing, know full well -that, although they may use the Diehards for their own ends, if they -succeeded in their somewhat sinister purpose they could not carry out -the Diehard policy. - -They are, therefore, endeavouring to provide for contingencies by -negotiating on their own a fresh understanding with France. But British -Premiers are not appointed at Rambouillet nor do they draw their -authority from the Quai d'Orsay. Whatever may be thought of Mr. Bonar -Law or of Mr. Stanley Baldwin by political partisans, no one suggests -that they derived their promotion from other than purely British -sources. - -But for a fortnight nothing is to happen--except the spread of -unemployment in Britain and of despair in Germany. At the end of the -fortnight will there be a surrejoinder to M. Poincare's rejoinder? Or -will there be another conference? - -Both M. Poincare and the present Parliamentary regime in Britain came -into power on the cry of "Enough of these eternal conferences; let -us return to the good old diplomatic methods that prevailed before -the War"--and, they might add, "which helped to make it possible." -Nevertheless, Mr. Bonar Law's administration during its short tenure of -six months participated in four European conferences, and M. Poincare, -during his eighteen months' official career, has found it necessary to -take part, directly, in five conferences, and directly and indirectly -in eight. The French Press are urging him on to add another to a record -which already beats that of M. Briand in the matter of "joy-riding"--to -quote the contemptuous Diehard name for international conferences -during Coalition days. - -It is a suspicious circumstance that those who were once resentful -and scornful of conferences should now be clamouring for one both here -and in France. The reason is scarcely concealed by ardent advocates of -the resumption of "picnic diplomacy." At the old conferences, so it is -contended, France was invariably forced to give way. Now she can and -will command the situation. - -There is a new note of confidence ringing through French despatches and -echoed in the French Press. France must get what she wants; Britain -must take what she is given. The French share of reparations must -first be assured--debts due to Britain can come out of what is left. -It is rather greedy, but characteristic, of the British that they -should expect to be paid what is owing to them! With their smug and -hypocritical Puritan temperament and outlook they insist that contracts -should be respected! France, for the sake of the Entente, will make -a concession even to British cupidity and pharisaism. It will permit -the British Empire to collect--not the whole of what is due to her, -but a much-reduced claim out of Germany once the French demand for -reparations is cashed or as good as cashed! - -To me this is a new France. During my years of discussion with French -statesmen I never heard this voice. I had three or four talks with M. -Poincare, and I never heard him speak in these supercilious tones. -Impunity has developed them since to their present pitch of stridency. - -Belgium is to suggest a meeting of the Premiers. When it comes the -French minimum terms are to be rigid and unequivocal. Here they are:-- - - - 1. France must be paid her irreducible minimum of L1,300,000,000 - in respect of reparations, whatever happens to any one else. - - 2. Belgium is also to have her priority of L100,000,000. - - 3. As Germany cannot raise these huge sums immediately, France - and Belgium are to hold the Ruhr until they are paid. Hints have - been thrown out by the more conciliatory French journals that the - French Government might consider an early retirement from the - Ruhr if the payment of reparations were made the subject of an - international guarantee. That implies Britain and America becoming - sureties for payment of the German indemnity! - - 4. As to the rest, France and Belgium have no objection, subject - to the above conditions, to Great Britain collecting L700,000,000, - _i.e._, about 23 per cent., of her international claims (debts and - reparations) from Germany. But this munificent concession is to - be made on the distinct understanding that she forgoes entirely - the remaining 77 per cent. of her bonds. The Allies and Germany - between them owe Great Britain L3,000,000,000. The French and - Belgian governments are willing that Great Britain should collect - L700,000,000 of that amount from Germany, provided the remaining - L2,300,000,000 is for ever cancelled--and always provided that the - L1,400,000,000 due to France and Belgium has been satisfactorily - guaranteed. - - 5. These handsome terms can only be propounded if Germany first - of all withdraws all passive resistance in the Ruhr. That is an - essential preliminary. - - -The French government have stated these terms with such precision and -such emphasis, and repeated them with such undeviating insistence, -that any departure from them on the French side seems impossible. The -hope of a conference rests entirely on the confidence in a British -surrender. There is a dismal "joy-ride" in prospect for the British -Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary. Is it conceivable they -can contemplate such a capitulation? I do not see how the present -Government, after all it has said and written, can so far submit to -French dictation as to make it likely that further discussions would -lead to agreement. - -What is the alternative? Herr Stresemann can alone answer that -question. It is not yet clear what he means to do. Perhaps he is -feeling his way to a decision. - -_London, August 27th, 1923._ - -FOOTNOTES: - -[8] London, August 27th, 1923. - -[9] The Cannes Conference, January, 1922. - - - - -XXI - -THE BRITISH DEBT TO AMERICA - - -As I roll homeward along the coast of Spain a wireless message -announces that the British government have accepted the American debt -terms. - -The details which I have received are not sufficient to enable me -to form an opinion regarding the character of those terms, or their -bearing on Allied indebtedness to Britain as to the terms of payment. -I know nothing of the steps taken by Mr. Baldwin and the government -of which he is a member to make this the first step in an all-round -settlement of inter-Allied debts. That is a matter of infinite moment -to us, and I assume that this is somewhere--and effectively--in the -arrangement. - -As to the payment of our own debt, the government represent the real -sentiment of the nation as a whole. The British taxpayer is no doubt -fully alive to the fact that this heavy debt was incurred by him -during the war in the main in order to finance American supplies to -our Allies. We could have paid for all the supplies we required for -our own use without resort to any loan from the American government. -Nevertheless, the money was advanced by the lender on our credit and -our signature. - -Our credit as a nation, therefore, demands that we should pay. Whether -we can collect enough money from our own debtors to meet this charge -becomes increasingly doubtful, as it is becoming increasingly needful. - -Britain is alone in thinking she is under any moral obligation to pay -the external liabilities incurred for the effective prosecution of -the war. The attitude of the late and of the present government is -identical in this respect. - -Why have the British public taken a different view of their national -obligations towards external war debts from that adopted by other -Allies? In giving the answer I do not wish to dwell on obvious ethical -considerations which must weigh whenever you consider whether you will -carry out an engagement which you have entered into with another who -has already performed his part of the engagement on the strength of -your promise. - -These ought to be conclusive; but to urge them might be deemed to be -an unworthy reflection on the honour of those who take a different view -of their national duty. - -I have no desire to offer censure or criticism upon their decision. -They, no doubt, have their reasons for the course they are adopting. We -have certainly overwhelming reasons for showing an honest readiness to -pay our debts. - -The settling up of accounts is always an unpleasant business, -especially amongst friends. Strangers expect it and prepare for it--and -there is no resentment when the bill arrives. But a man hates reminding -his friend at the end of a business in which both have been engaged -in warm amity that there is "a little balance" to be paid up. He has -been expecting the friend to mention the matter to him. So he puts off -introducing the unpleasant topic from year to year. But the friend -disappoints his expectations. Not a hint comes from that quarter of any -realisation that there is anything due. It soon looks as if it had been -forgotten altogether. - -The friend is most insistent on collecting the business accounts due -to himself. He is angry at all delays in payment of his own bills. -But his conscience is blind on the side of the debts he himself owes. -It is not an uncommon experience, and we are suffering from it to-day. -The war left us a creditor nation to the extent of over 2,000 million -pounds, and a debtor nation to the extent of about half that amount. -We readily accepted an invitation from our creditor to discuss the -repayment of the debt we owe. Our debtors have displayed an invincible -reluctance to enter into a similar discussion with us. - -That ought not to influence our final decision. Britain is the greatest -of all international traders, and her credit rests on the reputation -she has well earned--that her bond is a sacred trust which her people -always honour and redeem without counting the cost in toil and -treasure. I remember when war broke out the panic which seized bankers -and brokers as they contemplated the obligations incurred by British -firms with their support to finance world trade. These liabilities ran -into hundreds of millions sterling, and the only security for repayment -was represented by a bundle of flimsy paper, criss-crossed with the -signatures of men most of whom no British banker had ever seen, many -of them dwelling in countries with whom we were actually at war. - -There was one signature, however, on each paper which was known to -bankers and carried with it the good name of Britain throughout the -world; and it was that of some well-known British firm. Traders in -far-distant lands parted with their produce on the credit of that -signature and of the country with which it was associated. - -It is true that the government had no responsibility for any of these -transactions; but the honour of Britain was involved in seeing that the -foreign merchants should not suffer ruin because they put their trust -in British commercial integrity. For that reason the British government -of the day shouldered the burden, took all the risk, and although it -meant a liability of between four hundred and five hundred millions -sterling, not a voice was raised in protest. - -The action then taken, though quite unprecedented, was not only -honourable; it was wise. It saved British pride from a reproach; it -also saved British credit from a blow from which it would not have -recovered for a generation. During that generation this lucrative -business would have passed into other hands. - -As soon as the war was over the people of Britain, with an instinctive -impulse that required no persuasion to stimulate its activity, set -about the task of restoring their war-battered credit. Government, -bankers, merchants, brokers, manufacturers, and workers of all kinds -were of one mind; borrowing must come to an end; Britain must pay her -way--whatever the sacrifice. Expenditure was ruthlessly cut down. The -army and navy were reduced below pre-war dimensions. Other services -were curtailed. Heavy taxation was imposed--taxation such as no -other country bears. The budget at home must balance. Debts to other -countries must be paid off. Already large sums have been paid abroad. -It required courage and constancy to pursue such a policy; but the -endurance of the nation was beyond praise. It is now calmly facing the -liquidation of this heavy debt to the United States of America; but no -party has yet arisen, or is likely to arise, to demand that the hand of -the negotiators should be arrested. Britain means to pay the last of -her debts without a murmur. - -We are already reaping some of the reward. The purchasing value of our -currency has already risen under its burdens, and, as a consequence, -the cost of living has fallen steadily, while other countries who have -pursued a different policy find the cost of living for their people -ascending month by month. - -A short time ago we were taunted in the French Chamber of Deputies by -the president of the council that our unsound financial policy had -been responsible for our unemployment. It is true that if we had gone -on borrowing instead of paying our way--if we had defied our foreign -creditors instead of paying them--we also, like many other European -countries, might have fostered an artificial prosperity by means of a -discredited currency. But British credit would have rapidly disappeared -beyond recovery and British trade would soon have followed. Meanwhile, -the cost of living in Great Britain would have been double what it is -to-day. We all therefore dismissed that policy from our minds without -paying it the tribute of a discussion. - -Trust is the only soil in which credit flourishes. Had that trust been -forfeited British buyers and consequently British consumers would -to-day have been paying more for their wheat, their meat, their -cotton, and their wool. The burden of repayment to the United States -will be infinitely less than that of the indirect burden involved in -large purchases with a discredited currency. - -The government are therefore right in arranging with the American -treasury without loss of time for the liquidation of a debt incurred by -this country. I am taking for granted that they have made every effort -to see that the agreement shall form a part of an all-round settlement -of inter-Allied debts. But as to our own debt the moral obligation -must remain whatever our Allies do or fail to do. Why it was incurred, -the circumstances in which it was entered into, the purposes for which -the money was advanced, were open to the consideration of the American -government in arranging terms. That, however, was their privilege; ours -is to honour our signature. - - - - -XXII - -INTER-ALLIED DEBTS - - -A cold shiver ran down the back of England when it was announced -officially that the British government had definitely agreed to pay -over L30,000,000 a year for sixty years to the United States in respect -of debts incurred by us on behalf of our Allies without seeking a -contribution from our debtors to protect the taxpayers of this country. -It is not that anyone dreamt the evil dream of repudiation. That was -never woven into the texture even of the worst nightmare out of the -many that have disturbed our repose since the greatest nightmare of all -left the world a quivering nervous wreck. - -Nor did we expect remission of our debts. Whenever we were tempted -to exaggerate the bounds of human charity paragraphs appeared that -reminded us of the attitude of the "Middle West." America was -discovered by Europe centuries ago, but the "Middle West," as a -political entity, is to untutored Europeans a discovery of the war. -We were then told by returning explorers that it was the seat of the -American conscience--inexorable, intractable, but irresistible when -engaged in any enterprise. How potent this conscience was, as a world -force, the war demonstrated. From the heights it hurled an avalanche -of force against Germany that overwhelmed the last hope of resistance. -Unfortunately for us when it came to debts we struck against the hard -side of the Middle West conscience. - -Our hope was therefore not in remission. There were, however, many -other possibilities. We were not the only debtors of the American -government. Other Allies had borrowed not merely indirectly through -us, but directly from America. We had every confidence that the United -States government would not mete out to Britain severer treatment -than it was prepared to accord to our Allies. We had to contend, it -is true, with legends of our inexhaustible wealth. Apart from our -great coal deposits, and a climate which leaves those who endure it -no alternative but activity, we have no treasure except the industry, -the resources and the inherited skill of our people. We have nothing -like the rich plains and the fertilising and ripening sunshine of -France, which maintain sixty per cent. of its population. Our sources -of wealth--apart from coal--are precarious, for they depend more -largely than any other country on conditions outside our own. We are -international providers, merchants and carriers. A sixty-year contract -to pay large sums across the seas is in many respects a more serious -consideration for us than for countries whose riches are inherent in -their soil and are, therefore, more self-contained. The demoralised -condition of the world markets has left us with a larger proportion -of our industrial population unemployed than any other European -country. I hear tales of unemployment in the United States of America, -but the reports that reach us here on American unemployment are so -contradictory that I can build no argument upon them. But, as to the -gigantic dimensions of our unemployed problem there can be no doubt. We -have 1,400,000 workmen on the unemployed register drawing unemployment -pay in one form or another. The annual cost to the nation of feeding -its workless population runs to over L100,000,000--almost the figure of -the annuity demanded from Germany as a war indemnity. - -Although there are signs of improvement the omens point to a prolonged -period of subnormal trade. Continuous depression for years will mean -that Britain will suffer more from the devastation to her trade caused -by the war than France from the devastation of her provinces. Our -country, anxious about its means of livelihood, with a million and a -half of its workmen walking the streets in a vain search for work, has -to bear the heaviest burden of taxation in the world. Why? Because it -has not only to pay interest on its own heavy war debts, but also on -L3,000,000,000 which it either advanced to the Allies or incurred on -their behalf. That is why we felt hopeful that the United States would -not discriminate against a nation so situated. - -When I talk of debts the Allies owe to us, I want to emphasise the -fact that these debts are not paper myths nor tricks of accountancy. -They are onerous facts representing a real burden borne at this hour -by the bent and panting taxpayer of Britain. If these loans had never -been made the weight on his shoulders to-day would have been lighter by -over two shillings in the pound. He is every year paying to the actual -lenders--some British, some American--that proportion of his income. -It is a weight he undertook to carry for his Allies during the war on -the sacred pledge of those Allies that they would take it over after -the war. The American government borrowed from their public to make -advances to Great Britain, and have called upon the British taxpayer to -redeem his pledge. We make no complaint, for the demand is a mitigation -of the strict letter of the bond. But that amount is in substance part -of the debt owing by the Allies to Britain. And the British taxpayer -naturally feels it is hard on him to have to bear not only his own -legitimate burdens but that he should in addition have to carry the -debts of his less heavily taxed brethren in continental countries. He -naturally inferred that if equal pressure had been administered on all -debtors alike it would have forced an all-around consultation which -would have terminated in an all-round settlement. - -That was the real purport of the Balfour note. The true significance -of that great document has been entirely misunderstood--sometimes -carelessly, sometimes purposely, sometimes insolently. I guarantee -that not one per cent. of its critics if confronted suddenly with an -examination on its contents would secure one mark out of a hundred. -It has suffered the same fate as the treaty of Versailles. Opinion -is sharply divided as to both between those who rend without reading -and those who read without rending. Most men have received their -impressions of the Balfour note from denunciatory phrases penned -by writers who received their ideas about it from men who gave -instructions to condemn it without ever reading it. The men who really -understood both the Versailles treaty and the Balfour note have been -too busy to find time to inform, to interpret, and to explain. - -But the time has come when the public attention should be once more -drawn to the remarkable and far-reaching proposals of the Balfour note. -They constitute an offer on the part of Britain to measure the amount -of her claims against her Allies by the extent of her obligations to -the United States of America. The British government even offered to -include the claim of their country against Germany in this generous -concession. What does that mean in reference to present conditions? -That if the Allies and Germany between them found the L30,000,000 a -year which Britain has undertaken to pay America, she would forgo her -claim to the L3,300,000,000 due to her under contract and treaty. -It was a great offer and if accepted would have produced results -beneficent beyond computation. Britain, which would have been the -heaviest direct loser, would have profited indirectly through the world -recovery that would have ensued. - -How was it received? Some criticised it because it asked too -little--some because it demanded too much. Many criticised because -they were determined to approve nothing that emanated from such a -government, but most of its censors condemned it because they never -took the trouble to understand it, and the shrillest among the street -cries happened to denounce it. The government that propounded it soon -after left the seat of authority, and the administration that succeeded -put forward a new scheme which attracted even less acceptance. So this -great project which would have settled for ever the question which -above all others is vexing peace and unsettling minds in Europe was -pigeon-holed where it was not already basketed. - -But surely this is not the end of all endeavours to reach a settlement -of the question of inter-Allied debts. We cannot rest satisfied with an -arrangement which effectively binds us to pay without prospect of the -slightest contribution from our debtors. What America cannot indulge -in we cannot afford. The gold of Europe now lies in its coffers. -Who are we--plunged in the mire of debt up to our nostrils--to give -ourselves airs of generosity superior to the only golden land left in -this war-stripped earth? - -If there is to be a general jubilee in which all alike participate in -order to give the world a new start, then I feel sure Britain will play -her part bravely and nobly. But a jerry-mandered jubilee which frees -France, Italy and Belgium from all their debts whilst leaving Britain -sweating to pay off debts incurred for her Allies on the strength of -their bond--that we cannot bear. - -I trust the government will insist on an arrangement with our Allies -which, even if it is not a replica of our contract with the American -government, will at any rate ensure us a contribution that will -safeguard us against loss under that contract. It is I fear hopeless -to expect that we should be recouped the 2_s._ in the pound which -interest on Allied debts costs our taxpayers, but at any rate we -might be guaranteed against the 6_d._ in the pound which the American -instalments involve. I feel the effort is beset with difficulties -and that the outlook is not hopeful. There have of late been a few -discouraging symptoms. One is the reception accorded at the recent -Paris conference to the British prime minister's liberal offer -regarding inter-Allied debts. It was a tactical error to open the -conference with such a scheme and the effect was singularly unfortunate. - -Had I been disposed to press my criticisms on the conduct of the recent -negotiations in Paris it would have been that they were so managed that -for the first time since the war Britain has been completely isolated -at a European conference. That is a misfortune, for it encouraged the -French government to rash action. Up to the last conference Britain and -Italy had remained in substantial accord even when France and Belgium -took a different view, and Belgium had never before quitted any of the -gatherings in complete disagreement with Great Britain. So France, -always tempted as she was to occupy the Ruhr, hesitated to do so in the -face of so formidable an Allied resistance. What is relevant, however, -to the subject of this article is the cause of our unwonted isolation -on the occasion of the last conference. The British premier started -the negotiations by tabling proposals which promised forgiveness of -most of the indebtedness of these countries to Britain, but which -implied immediate arrangements for beginning repayment of the rest. -This suggestion of repayment instantly consolidated opposition to the -whole of the British plan. It became clear that existing governments -on the continent had no intention, unless firmly pressed, of paying -the smallest percentage of the debt they incurred on the faith of a -solemn engagement to repay the loan when that was possible, and to pay -interest meanwhile. If we point to the fact as we did in the Balfour -note, that we have undertaken to repay the United States of America -the heavy debt incurred by us on behalf of the Allies, they simply -shrug their shoulders and say in effect: "That is your affair. We repay -neither Britain nor America, and there is an end of it." - -The other unpleasant incident is a speech delivered by M. Poincare -in the French Chamber in the course of which he dealt casually with -the subject of inter-Allied indebtedness. The French prime minister -then announced categorically that France had no intention of paying -her debts until she has first received her share of reparations from -Germany. What does that mean in effect? That the France represented -by M. Poincare has no intention of ever paying her debts. When -the colossal figure of German reparations is taken into account -thirty years is a moderate estimate of the period required for its -liquidation. Is the French debt to lie dormant carrying no interest -meanwhile? If it is, then the debt is practically wiped out, for the -present value of L500,000,000 debt payable thirty years hence is -insignificant. The present government of France have therefore declared -they do not mean to pay what France owes. Surely the time to dictate -the conditions of your repayment of a loan--when you propose to pay, -how much you propose to pay, or whether you mean to pay at all--is when -you are borrowing and not after you have spent the money. - -And yet in the same speech in which M. Poincare serves up hot -platitudes for senatorial palates about the sanctity of national -obligations, he dismisses France's faithful ally with the cold comfort -that France is too busy collecting the accounts due to her to attend -to the debts she owes. I believe in my heart that there is a France -of which he is not the spokesman--a great France which will not treat -shabbily a faithful friend who stood by her in the hour of despair -and who is now staggering under unparalleled burdens incurred in the -discharge of the obligations of friendship. - -All this makes it more necessary that the situation should be cleared -up without undue delay. Having just completed negotiations for -liquidating our own war indebtedness to America we are in a position -to insist on a settlement with those on whose behalf we incurred that -indebtedness. If nothing is done the conditions will harden against us. -We shall be assumed to have accepted the Poincare repudiation. I do not -know what conditions the government have made with the United States -government as to the marketability of the securities to be created in -funding our debt. If they are to be placed on the market the chance of -any future deal is destroyed. Ere that be done we must know where we -are in reference to our own claims. I trust the government will act -promptly. Delay was justifiable so long as we were in the same position -in reference to what we owed as what we claimed. The Baldwin settlement -has altered all that. If we do not insist on an arrangement now the -British taxpayer will have the fate of Issachar--that of the poor beast -between two burdens--his own and that of the Allies. - - - - -XXIII - -THE BRITISH ELECTIONS - - -It is the duty of every patriotic citizen, in view of the difficulties -with which the country is confronted, to assist the government of -the day by every means at his disposal. Factious criticism disturbs -judgment and tends to unnerve. Governments to-day require full command -of mind and nerve to enable them to arrive at sound decisions and to -persevere in them. Faction is, therefore, treason to the country. - -That does not, however, preclude a calm survey of the elections and -their meaning. Quite the contrary, for we must think of the future and -prepare for it. - -The result of the elections has fully justified those who maintained -that no party standing alone could hope to secure the measure of public -support which will guarantee stable government. It is true that the -Conservatives have succeeded in obtaining the return of a majority of -members to the new Parliament. But the most notable feature of the -elections is the return of a decisive majority of members by a very -definite minority of the electors. - -I observe that the prime minister, in returning thanks to the nation, -claims that he has received a vote of confidence from the people of -this country. Out of a total poll of fifteen millions his candidates -secured less than six million votes. Making full allowance for -uncontested seats, this figure cannot be stretched out to a height much -above six millions. - -That means that only two-fifths of the electorate voted confidence -in the administration, whilst three-fifths voted confidence in other -leaders or groups. A party which has a majority of three millions -recorded against it on a national referendum can hardly claim to have -received a national vote of confidence. - -It might be argued that when the question of confidence or no -confidence comes to be stated, the National Liberals having promised -co-operation, the votes recorded by them ought not to be placed on the -debit side of the confidence account. The basis of the appeal made by -the National Liberal candidates for support is practically that stated -by me in my Manchester speech: - -"The supreme task of statesmanship at this hour is the pacification of -the nations, so that the people shall have leisure to devote themselves -to the peaceful avocations of life, to fill up the depleted reservoirs -from which we all draw. - -"My course is a clear one. I will support with all my might any -government that devotes itself and lends its energy to that task -with single-mindedness, fearlessness, and with resolution--provided -it does not embark upon measures which inflict permanent injury upon -the country, whether these measures be reactionary or revolutionary. -That does not mean that I pledge myself to support inefficiency, -vacillation, or infirmity in any government or in any party. But any -government that does not pursue that course I will resist with all my -might. That is my policy." - -I have perused the addresses of many National Liberal candidates and I -have addressed many meetings in their constituencies, and I find that -their attitude towards the government is defined in these terms, with -purely verbal variations. The address of Mr. J. D. Gilbert, who won -Central Southwark, is a very fair sample taken out of the bulk: - - - "If you honour me again with your confidence I will support any - progressive measures brought forward by the present government or - any other government. I shall not offer factious opposition or - nagging criticism while our country is in difficulties at home or - abroad." - - -There may be one or two who went further, but none expressed confidence. - -I have made some inquiries as to the number of Conservative votes -polled by National Liberal candidates. I am informed that on an average -it represents less than one-third of the total. At the last election -167 National Liberal candidates were put up. They polled an aggregate -of 1,652,823 votes, that is, an average of 9,897 per candidate. What -proportion of this vote was Conservative? There is a good practical -method of testing this question. In sixty-two seats National Liberals -were fought by Conservative as well as by other candidates. In -these cases the average vote polled by National Liberals was 6,820. -That means that where the Conservatives supported National Liberal -candidates their votes would represent about 30 per cent. of the -poll for these candidates. On the other hand, the number of Liberal -votes polled by Conservatives, where a compact existed, at least -balances this account, for although the total in each constituency -does not equal the figures of the Conservative support in National -Liberal constituencies, still, that support was spread over many more -constituencies. - -The prime minister and his chief electioneering manager both -emphatically repudiated the suggestion that there was any pact between -Conservatives and National Liberals, and urged that there were only -local arrangements made between the candidates of the two parties for -their mutual convenience. - -As the head of the National Liberal group I expressed grave doubts as -to the composition of the ministry, and much apprehension as to the -language in which its policy was defined. That represents the general -attitude of the National Liberals toward the government. Their support, -therefore, cannot be claimed in totalling the votes recorded for the -government. - -The fact, therefore, remains that those who voted confidence in the -government represent only forty per cent. of those who went to the poll -and twenty-five per cent. of the total electorate. - -I place this fact in the forefront, because it is bound to have a -profound effect upon the course of events during--maybe beyond--the -lifetime of this parliament. It is the first time, certainly since the -Reform Act, that a pronounced minority of the electorate has succeeded -in securing the control of parliament and the government of the country. - -It would be idle to pretend that in a democratic country like ours, -thoroughly imbued with the spirit of representative government, this -does not weaken the moral authority of the government of the day. -Therefore, if the government is wise it will bear that fact in mind and -will not commit itself to policies which challenge the nine millions -who between them represent a majority of the people of this country. - -It is not a very good beginning to claim these striking figures as a -vote of confidence. I sincerely trust it does not indicate a resolve to -ignore, if not to defy, what is an obvious and ought to be a governing -factor in the policy of the government. - -A corollary to this curious working of our electoral system is to be -found in the under-representation of the other parties in the present -parliament, and unless representative government is to be discredited -altogether, the present parliament ought at once to devote its mind and -direct its energies to the discovery of some method and machinery which -will avert the danger which clearly arises from the working of the -present system. - -The parliament of 1918 undoubtedly gave a larger majority to the -government than the figures warranted. But the majority of votes cast -for government candidates was so overwhelming that under any system -of voting there would have been a larger working majority for the -government than that which the present government can command. So when -trouble arose it was not open to any section of the community to object -that the government had no authority because it did not represent the -electorate of this country. - -We are faced with a new danger to constitutional government. What -has happened at this election may be repeated at the next--but not -necessarily in favour of the same party. - -If we are to be governed by a succession of administrations who rule -in spite of the protest of a majority of the people, the authority of -government will be weakened beyond repair. - -The luck of the electoral table has this time favoured the -Conservatives. Next time it may turn in favour of the Labour Party. -They have at this election secured 55 seats out of a total of 141 by a -minority of votes. - -The conditions were, in many respects, against them. Their funds were -exhausted by the prolonged period of heavy unemployment. The trade -union movement was passing through an ebb tide in its prosperity, both -in funds and in members. There was a good deal of discontent with the -trade union leaders. Many workmen felt they had been let down badly by -some of their activities in industrial disputes. - -Moreover, Labour has been committed by visionaries to a rash experiment -which handicapped it severely in the election. Next time may be the -spring tide of Labour. They have learnt their lesson at the polls, and -are not likely to repeat the blunder of November, 1922. - -This time the votes cast for them have attained the gigantic aggregate -of four millions and a quarter. Supposing under those conditions they -add another two millions to their poll. Although the other groups may -secure between them nine millions of votes, Labour may have the same -luck as the Conservatives at the last election and be placed in power -by a decisive majority of members elected by a minority of votes. - -I am not going to speculate as to what may happen under those -conditions; the kind of legislation that may be proposed; the action -of the House of Lords in reference to it, provoking, as it undoubtedly -will, a fierce class conflict; or the turn given to administration in -the various departments of government. - -Of one thing I am, however, certain. That is, that as a minority -administration in 1922 and onwards will help to discredit government -with certain classes of the community, a minority Labour administration -would weaken the respect of other classes for representative -government, and between them an atmosphere will be created inimical to -the moral authority of all government in this country. - -I have many a time warned the public that, in spite of -appearances, this country is in many respects very top-heavy. It -is over-industrialised. Its means of livelihood are in some ways -precarious, and depend on conditions over which we have very little -control, and once something happens which may have the effect of -causing a lean-over either in one direction or in the other, it will be -more difficult to recover than in lands where the population depends in -the main for its livelihood upon the cultivation of the soil and the -development of the natural resources of the country. - -I therefore earnestly trust that in the interests of stability and good -government, which must be based on the goodwill and co-operation of the -community as a whole, this parliament will apply its mind seriously to -finding some means of preventing a repetition either in one direction -or another of this freak of representative government. - -Another feature of the election is the heavy vote polled by Liberal -candidates in spite of untoward circumstances. - -Whatever the difficulties of the Labour Party might be in this election -they were not comparable to those under which Liberalism fought the -campaign. It was divided by bitter internecine conflicts. The leaders -of one section seemed to be more intent on keeping representatives of -the other section out of parliament than on fighting for the common -cause. The bulk of their speeches was devoted to attacks on the leaders -of the other Liberal group, and there was not much room left for a -statement of the Liberal case. - -What happened in Manchester is typical. Here the rank and file took the -matter in hand and enforced agreement. Lord Grey was brought down to -bless it. But the whole of his benedictory speech consisted of a thin -and dreary drip of querulous comment on the leaders of the other group, -with a distinct hint that the return of a Conservative government would -be by no means a bad thing in the interests of the country. - -The speech was hailed by a Tory journal with the heading "Lord Grey -Supports Mr. Bonar Law." He then went straight to support Mr. McKinnon -Wood as candidate with a repetition of the same speech. Thence he -rushed off to reiterate the same performance at Bedford in support -of Lady Lawson, and he finished off by reciting it for two days at -meetings in support of Mr. Walter Runciman. - -No wonder that he succeeded in damping Liberal enthusiasm to such an -extent that his unfortunate proteges surprised even their opponents in -the poverty of the support given them at the polls. - -As soon as the coalition broke up the leaders of this Liberal section -met to consider the situation. The one positive result of their -deliberations was not the issue of a ringing appeal for unity on the -basis of Liberal principles, but a peevish intimation through the press -that efforts at unity were to be discouraged at the election. It was -clearly ordained that the Coalition Liberals should be crushed out. The -Conservatives spurned them, and the Independent Liberals gave notice -that they had no use for them. They were destined for extinction. Lord -Crewe's speech proceeded on the same lines. May I say how sincerely I -rejoice in the tribute to the "amateur diplomatist" which is implied -in the conferring by a Conservative government of the blue ribbon of -diplomacy upon the leader of the Independent Liberals in the House of -Lords? - -This precipitate and lamentable decision lost at least forty Liberal -seats, gave to the Conservatives their majority, and what is equally -important established the Labour Party as His Majesty's official -Opposition in the House of Commons. The latter is much the most -serious practical result of the decisions of the Independent leaders -to debar united action at the last election. If Liberals had united -when the Coalition came to an end, Liberalism might have polled five -million votes. It would have now held a powerful second position in -parliament, and the country and the nation would have looked to it in -the future as it has hitherto done in the past for the alternative to -"Toryism." Instead of that it is a poor split third. How could they -expect to win at the polls? The National Liberals were pursued into -their constituencies. Thirty-five National Liberal seats were assailed -by Independent Liberal candidates. I am not making a complaint, but -offering an explanation. Whatever the views of the National Liberal -leaders might have been on the subject of Liberal unity they were given -no chance to effect it, and although they entered into no national -compact with the Conservatives their followers in certain areas had no -option but to negotiate local arrangements with the Conservatives for -mutual support. The implacable attitude of the Independent Liberals -left them no choice in the matter. - -What was the inevitable result? No real fight was put up for Liberal -principles on either side. The Independent Liberals were tangled by -the personal preoccupation of their leaders. They had accumulated -enormous dumps of ammunition for the day of battle on the assumption -that the main attack would be on the Coalition Liberals, and, although -the Conservatives now lined the opposite trenches, anger dominated -strategy, and the guns were still fired at their old foes, whilst the -Tory government was only bombarded with bouquets. On the other hand, -the National Liberal leaders were embarrassed by the engagements into -which their followers had been driven by the action of the Independent -Liberal leaders and the two warring factions. - -The National Liberals, in spite of their enormous difficulties, have -not been exterminated. I am not going to enter into a barren inquiry -as to whether their numbers are or are not greater than those of Mr. -Asquith's followers. Let it be assumed that they are equal. The marvel -is that under these fratricidal conditions so many Liberals of any -complexion have been returned. - -I am not setting forth these unhappy facts in order to prolong the -controversy which has poisoned Liberalism for years, but in order to -call attention to the vitality which, in spite of these depressing -conditions, can bring up 4,100,000 voters to the polls. Electorally -Liberalism is the balancing power, and if it casts its united strength -against either reaction or subversion its influence must be decisive, -whatever the composition of this parliament may be. - -It is common knowledge that the Independent Liberals confidently -anticipated the return of at least 120 members of their group. The -fact that they only succeeded in securing the return of about fifty is -naturally to them a source of deep disappointment. - -If the failure of high hopes leads to contemplation of the real causes -of that failure and a sincere desire is manifested to substitute -co-operation for conflict my colleagues and I will welcome it. We -cannot force our society on an unwilling company. - -During the campaign I repeatedly expressed the hope that one outcome of -this election would be to bring moderate men of progressive outlook in -all parties to see the wisdom of acting together. - -But progressive minds are by no means confined to the Liberal party. -I have met and worked with them in the Conservative party, and the -election will have taught many men and women in the Labour party that -violent and extravagant proposals impede progress. If the limits are -not too narrowly drawn, this parliament may witness the effective -association of men of many parties who are genuinely concerned in the -advancement of mankind along the paths of peace and progress for the -attainment of their common ideals. If that end is achieved, the coming -years will not be spent in vain. - -One word as to the National Liberals. When the dissolution came no -party was ever placed in a more embarrassing and even desperate -situation. - -The Conservatives have at their disposal a great political machine. The -Labour party could command the support of all the trade unions, with -their elaborate machinery for organising the wage-earning population. -The Independent Liberals had in England and in Scotland captured the -Liberal machine almost in its entirety, and had spent six years in -perfecting it, their leaders having no other occupation. - -The National Liberal leaders inherited no political machinery, and were -too preoccupied with great world affairs to be able to devote any time -to the improvisation of an effective new organisation. - -Conservatives, Independent Liberals, and Labour all alike attacked -National Liberal seats where they thought any advantage might be gained -for their respective parties by doing so. The Conservatives only -refrained from attack in cases where they thought there was more to be -gained by arrangement. There was a great volume of popular sentiment -behind our group. I visited Britain, north, south, east, west, and I -have never witnessed such crowds nor such enthusiasm at any electoral -contest in which I have ever taken part; but there was no organisation -to convert acclamation into electoral power, and you could not build -up a vast political machine in three weeks. Our supporters were not -provided with an opportunity to test their strength in two-thirds of -the constituencies. In nearly three hundred constituencies they could -not do so without impairing the chances of Liberal candidates. A -compact with Conservatives ruled them out of others. - -It is a wonder that, in spite of these adverse and even paralysing -conditions our numbers are twice those of the Independent Liberals in -1918. - -We have now for the first time full opportunity for placing our case -and point of view before the country and organising support for them. -It is our duty to do so. - -Every month will contribute its justification for the course we have -hitherto pursued, and for the counsel we have steadfastly given to a -country struggling through abnormal difficulties. - -_London, November 20th, 1922._ - - - - -XXIV - -HOW DEMOCRACY WORKS - - -The startling English by-elections of the last few weeks have called -attention to the working of the new electorate in Great Britain and -set men pondering about its possibilities in a way a general election -failed to make them think. Democracy in the sense of government of a -great state by the absolute and unfettered authority of the majority of -its own citizens of all ranks and conditions is a modern experiment. -The United States of America are the oldest democracy in the world -to-day. - -How many realise that Britain became a democracy for the first time in -1917? Until then the majority of its adult population had no voice in -the making or administration of the laws that ruled their lives. - -The United States of America, France and Italy have adopted universal -suffrage as the basis of authority for many a year. So have the -British Dominions, but Britain herself, the pioneer of representative -institutions, until recently shrank from the experiment of adult -suffrage. Before the Reform Act of 1832 the total electorate of this -country numbered only 3 per cent. of the population. The distribution -of power amongst this small percentage was so arranged that even the 3 -per cent. represented in effect no more than at best 1 per cent. - -A generation of turmoil and agitation, almost culminating in -revolution, succeeded in forcing through a measure which increased -the 3 per cent. to 4.5 per cent. of the population! It is true that -the distribution of votes was more equitable, but even with that -improvement to call this ridiculous percentage a democracy would be -absurd. Another generation of growing agitation ensued. This also ended -in violence. Then Mr. Disraeli, one of the boldest and most venturesome -of British statesmen, in 1867 doubled the electorate. His measure -increased the number of voters to 9 per cent. of the population. - -Disraeli's audacious plunge horrified some of his aristocratic -supporters and shocked many Whigs. "Bob" Lowe had already foretold -calamities that would follow Gladstone's more cautious proposals. Seven -years later saw the election of the first Tory parliament since 1841. -So much for the prophecies of the men who always fear evil must flow -from justice. - -Fifteen years after the Disraeli measure the Gladstone administration -added another 7 per cent. to the electorate. The Gladstone proposals, -which raised the number of voters to 16 per cent., were so vehemently -contested that they nearly precipitated a Constitutional crisis of the -first magnitude. Ultimately, however, they were carried, and there the -franchise remained until the war. - -The electorate that, through its representatives, accepted the German -challenge in 1914, and was therefore responsible for involving -the country in the most costly and sanguinary war it ever waged, -represented one-sixth of the population and about one-third of the -adults. The conscription act converted the country to the injustice of -this state of things. Millions of men were forced to risk their lives -for a policy which they had no share in fashioning. Millions of women -faced anxieties and tortures worse than death in pursuit of the same -policy, and yet no woman was allowed to express any opinion as to the -selection of the rulers who led them to this sacrifice. - -It was felt to be so unjust that in the exaltation of war, which lifted -men to a higher plane of equity, this obvious wrong was redressed. -Hence the greatest of all the enfranchisement acts, the Act of 1917, -that for the first time converted the British system of government into -a democracy. - -How has it worked? It is too early to speak of its results. Mr. Austen -Chamberlain in a letter[10] has called attention to one aspect of its -operation. He emphasises a fact which is already known to every man who -has passed through the experience of a contested election, that nearly -one-half the new electorate is unattached to any political party. - -If you deduct out of the total the numbers of the old electorate which -had already formed ties of a party character, you will find from the -result of the elections that more than half the new electorate is free -and floating about without any anchor or rudder and ready to be towed -by the first party that succeeded in roping them. Millions of the new -electors are too indifferent or too undecided about political issues to -take sides at the polling booths. - -In the hotly contested election of January, 1910, 92 per cent. of the -voters went to the poll. At the second election which took place in -the same year the percentage was 89. The slight difference between the -two elections would be accounted for by the fact that in the second -election the register was old. Compare these results with the two -elections which have occurred since the 1917 enfranchisement. At the -1918 election 64 per cent. only of the voters could be induced to make -the acquaintance of the ballot-boxes. This might be explained by the -inevitable political apathy which follows a great war. The pulse of -party beat feebly and irregularly. The old party organisations had, -through five years of neglect, fallen into complete disrepair--the new -party had not yet had time to perfect its machinery. Hence the failure -of competitive effort to induce at least 6,000,000 of the new voters to -take a sufficient interest in their new privileges to exercise them at -the election. - -The next four years were a period of growing political activity. -The new party was especially energetic. Their chief organiser, Mr. -Arthur Henderson, M.P., is one of the most gifted party managers of -this generation, and his achievement is an outstanding feature of -political organisation in this country. The old parties also had time -to repair their machinery; by the time the election was called their -organisations were in full working order. The only party which had no -organisation worth speaking of was the National Liberal party. The -others were ready for the struggle. - -Nevertheless, when the election came in November nearly 5,000,000 of -the electors were not sufficiently interested in the contest to take -the trouble to record their votes. It showed an improvement of 10 per -cent. on the previous election, but there still remained nearly 20 per -cent.--making allowance for death, sickness, removals, etc.--who stayed -at home, and could not be persuaded by personal or public appeal or -pressure exercised by three or four great organisations, to walk a few -hundred yards out of their way in order to place a simple cross on the -ballot paper that was awaiting them. - -The municipal elections tell a still more dismal story of apathy. But -that is an old story. It was with difficulty that the old electorate, -with all its long training, could be cajoled to visit the polling -booths where the good government of the towns in which they breathed, -lived, toiled, enjoyed themselves, and rested was being determined. -At their worst, however, they made a better show than the newly -enfranchised voters. - -How does the record compare with democracy in other lands? France is -no better. On the whole, I understand it is worse. The voting in the -United States of America fluctuates according to the interest excited -by the particular election. In this respect America does not differ -from Britain. I cannot lay my hand on the percentage of the poll at the -last presidential election, but I gather it was higher than ours at -the general election. The Germans polled at their last election 89 per -cent. of their electorate; in Italy the percentage was much lower. - -With an unpolled and unticketed electorate of over 4,000,000 anything -may happen. They have clearly no interest in the ordinary political -conflicts that engage the minds of their fellow-citizens; otherwise, -the excitement of two general elections would have roused them to such -faint exhibition of partisanship as is implied in the choosing of a -candidate out of the two or three who have taken the trouble to send -along their pictures. - -But one day an issue may arise which will wake up the most lethargic. -What will it be? And what view will they take of it when it comes? And -who will succeed in catching the eye of the slumbering multitude when -it opens? Much depends on the answer to these questions. They may rally -to the defence of property menaced by rapacious creeds. They may rush -to the protection of their homes threatened by avaricious wealth. - -Even those who have already voted are liable to sudden and devastating -changes of opinion. Witness Mitcham, Willesden, and Edgehill. These -three seats were regarded as being amongst the safest in England, and -were selected for that very reason. - -Amongst many disquieting factors there is one which ought to be dealt -with ere another election arrive. Under the present system a minority -of electors may usurp absolute dominion over the fortunes of this -kingdom for fully five years. - -This is one of the freaks of the group system. The present -parliamentary majority has been elected by an aggregate vote which -represents something a little better than one-fourth of the total -electorate and one-third of those who recorded their votes. If Mitcham -and Edgehill are a foretaste of what is to happen at the "General," -Labour will be the lucky third. A similar turnover of votes in every -constituency would place them easily in that position. - -America has brought its vast electorate under what seems to us to be -a perfect discipline. But in the process it has passed through much -tribulation, including the furnace of a terrible civil war. Italy has -been impelled to correct the working of democratic institutions by a -display of force. Britain may mobilise and drill its electoral forces -with less trouble. But it has a Socialist party, which has grown by -millions within less than a decade--and is still growing. This week its -most eloquent member has proposed, in the House of Commons, a solemn -motion for the abolition of private property. Deputies chosen by four -and a quarter million of British electors will vote for this proposal, -and if, four years hence, they add another million and a half to their -poll, they will be in a position to place that motion on the statute -book. Their increase between 1918 and 1922 was greater than that. - -FOOTNOTE: - -[10] See the _Times_, March 14, 1923. - - - - -XXV - -POLITICAL REALITIES - - -A few weeks ago I predicted that the comparative calm which has -prevailed in the political seas of Britain during the past few years -was coming to an end. Recent parliamentary scenes leave no doubt that -the prolonged political depression is to be followed by a period of -storms--it may be hurricanes. - -No amount of organisation or propaganda can excite real feeling in -an electorate over trivial and unreal issues. Why did the coalition -of 1915 fall? And why did the Liberal party split in 1916? Who was -responsible? Should the general election have taken place in 1918 -or 1919? Ought open and declared opponents of the government of the -day to have then received government support or at least government -neutrality? These are questions which agitate a few who are personally -interested, but they leave the nation cold. - -The war was real enough. But the war was supported by men of -all parties, and, therefore, provoked no political controversy. -The minority which opposed it was negligible, and challenged no -parliamentary discussion on the question. The treaty of peace was, -on the whole, accepted by all parties when it was first submitted to -Parliament. The leaders of the opposition parties in the Lords and -Commons at the time of its presentation offered no serious criticism of -its provisions. - -The legislation proposed by the Coalition, although in ordinary seasons -much of it would have aroused angry passions, coming as it did after -the war had exhausted emotion, passed with no more than a feeble murmur -of protest. Take, for instance, such controversial topics as adult -suffrage, the enfranchisement of women, the wholesale reductions in -hours of labour, representative government in India, and notably the -conferring upon Ireland of a measure of Home Rule more complete than -any proposed by Gladstone. - -Any one of these measures proposed before the war would have led to -heated discussion throughout the land. The case of Ireland is perhaps -the most significant of the changed temper of the nation immediately -after the great war. The conflict over Irish Home Rule has now -culminated in a treaty accepted by the nation as a whole and acquiesced -in by the most violent amongst its opponents. - -But fiercer political passions were stirred up by the struggle between -parties over Ireland than by any political question of modern times. -The causes underlying the conflict dealt with two of the most powerful -motives which make the human heart throb--race and religion. There -was the old feud between Saxon and Gael extending over at least seven -centuries. It drenched the moors of Ireland with the blood of both -races before a keener edge was given to its hatreds by the introduction -of an acute religious quarrel. - -After the Reformation the religious differences which rent Europe -with fratricidal wars added fresh fury to the racial enmities which -made poor Ireland a cauldron of perpetual strife. When Mr. Gladstone -proposed to settle this raging tumult by wresting supremacy from a race -which had been dominant in that island for 700 years and a faith which -had been supreme there for 400 years and transferring it to the race -and religion which all that time had been in a condition of servitude, -and when in order to attain his ends he had to secure the adhesion of -men of the ruling blood and creed to his proposals, the passions raised -were deeper and angrier than any witnessed in British politics for many -a day. It led for the first time in the history of parliament to scenes -of physical violence on the floor of the House. It shows what we may -expect when there are genuine divisions of opinion which profoundly -move masses of men and women in a democracy. Those who recall the -tropical heat of parliamentary debates in 1893 naturally regard their -voyage through the frigid proceedings of the last parliament as they -would a sail through Arctic seas. That voyage is now over, and there -are signs that the waters will soon be lashed into fury. - -For years political controversy between parties has been suspended -in the presence of a common danger. Reaction was inevitable, and the -greater the suppression the more violent the rebound. That does not, -however, altogether account for the visible omens of a coming struggle -unprecedented in its gravity. Fundamental issues have been raised of -such moment to millions that they cannot be settled without a struggle -that will rock society. - -The scene enacted in the Commons a few days ago was by no means as -exciting as that which some of us witnessed in 1893. But it gave me an -uneasy feeling that the period of calm is definitely over, and that -Parliament henceforth must expect gusts and gales--and worse. Emotions -are once more welling up, and there are signs of a great stir coming in -British politics. - -The cause is easily explained. The sense of exhaustion is passing -away, and issues containing a serious challenge to the privileges and -rights of powerful classes in the community and vital to the interests -of all classes have been raised by one of the great political parties -that divide Britain. The momentous character of that challenge may be -gathered from the terms of the motion submitted by Mr. Philip Snowden -to the judgment of the House of Commons:-- - - - "That in view of the failure of the capitalist system to - adequately utilise and organise natural resources and productive - power, or to provide the necessary standard of life for vast - numbers of the population, and believing that the cause of this - failure lies in the private ownership and control of the means of - production and distribution, this House declares that legislative - effort should be directed to the gradual supersession of the - capitalist system by an industrial and social order based on the - public ownership and democratic control of the instruments of - production and distribution." - - -This motion will receive the full support of every member of the Labour -party. A few men outside the Socialist party who have acquainted -themselves with the publications of that party were quite prepared -for this demand of a complete change in the organisation of society. -And as they saw that party grow with startling rapidity they knew we -should not have long to wait before these subversive ideas would be -formulated in the House of Commons. Still, even for the students of -Socialist literature, the actual tabling of the resolution on behalf -of the second largest party in the State came as a surprise and a -shock. Too much credit was given to the restraining influence of the -trade union section of the party. Sir Lynden Macassey, in his informing -book on "Labour Policy, False and True," points out that it was in -1885 that the avowed advocates of this proposal for the abolition of -private property and for the nationalisation of all the means of -production and distribution first stood for Parliament. There were -only two candidates standing on this platform, and they polled 32 and -29 votes respectively. Last election the aggregate Socialist poll -reached the imposing figure of 4,251,011 votes. The party that secured -a majority of members in the House of Commons only polled 5,457,871 -votes. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald states categorically that he knows that -the Independent Liberal members--exclusive of their leaders--favour -nationalisation and the capital levy. If that be an accurate statement -of the views of the majority of these gentlemen, and of those who elect -them, nearly one-half the British electorate are already prepared to -assent to Socialism by easy stages--which is the purport of Mr. Philip -Snowden's motion. - -On that assumption we are on the eve of greater and more fundamental -changes affecting the lives of every class and condition of men and -women than have yet been seen in this country. Hence the new sense of -struggle with which the political atmosphere is palpitating. Capitalism -is to be arraigned before the Supreme Court of the Nation, condemned, -sentenced, and executed by instalments--Chinese fashion. The -composition of that court is not to-day favourable to the prosecution. -But who will be the judge after the next general election? It is -customary in political controversy to state that the election which -is for the moment impending will be the most epoch-making in history. -Without exaggeration, the next British election may well turn out to be -so. The British people, with their inherited political instinct, are -beginning to realise that grave decisions must then be taken. Hence the -greater keenness shown by the voters at by-elections--hence the new -interest taken by the public in the proceedings of Parliament. There is -still a good deal of apathy and indifference. The average comfortable -citizen is still inclined to think these Socialist schemes so crazy as -to be impossible. They cannot believe that 21,000,000 of sane people -can possibly contemplate giving their sanction to such fantasies. - -There are two cardinal facts which are constantly overlooked by the -complacent. The men and women who have no property for the State to -seize constitute an overwhelming majority of the electors of the -country. The second fact to note is the great preponderance of the -industrial population over the steadier and more stolid agricultural -population. America, in spite of its gigantic manufacturing and -distributing industries, still retains 60 per cent. of its population -on the land. The same proportion of the French and Italian populations -is agrarian. Barely 10 per cent. of the British workers are engaged -in cultivating the soil. Most of our workers breathe and have their -being in the crowded and excitable atmosphere of factories, workshops, -and mines. The air is filled with germs of all kinds, and isolation in -these thronging areas is impossible. Hence the rapidity with which the -fever has spread. - -Can it be arrested? Nothing will be done until the danger is visible to -every eye. To vary the metaphor, no one will believe in the flood until -it is upon us. Trained weather prophets who forecast its coming will -be laughed at or told they have a personal or party interest in ark -building. It is an old tale--as old as the dawn of history. "As in the -days before the flood, they were eating and drinking and knew not until -the flood came and took them all away." - -The trouble can only be averted in two ways. One is the systematic -inculcation of sound doctrines of economic truth into the minds of the -working people of this country. The second, and the more important, is -the rooting out of the social evils which furnish the revolutionary -with striking and indisputable object-lessons of the failure of the -capitalistic system as an agent of human happiness. Without the latter -the former effort will be futile. Arguments in favour of the existing -order will be refuted by glaring and painful facts. Meanwhile, let -the champions of that order take note of the efforts put forth by the -Socialists to advertise their eagerness to redress the wrongs of the -ex-service men and to soften the asperities of discipline for the -soldier. The Socialist leaders have shrewdly taken note of the causes -that produced the overthrow of their Italian brethren, and they mean to -take such steps as will ensure that if Fascism comes in Britain it will -be an ally, and not a foe. - -_London, April 16th, 1923._ - - - - -XXVI - -SHOULD WE MAKE PEACE WITH RUSSIA? - - -I am frankly delighted that negotiations between Lord Curzon and the -Soviet government seem to indicate a genuine desire on the part of both -parties to establish a more satisfactory understanding between this -country and Russia. The Bolshevist episode, like all revolutionary -terrors, has been at times a shrieking nightmare which has made the -world shudder. It did render one supreme service to civilisation--it -terrified democracy back into sanity just at the time when the -nervous excitability that followed the war was bordering on mental -instability. In our attitude towards the Soviet government we must, -however, constantly bear in mind one consideration. What matters to us -is not so much the Russian government as the people of Russia, and for -the moment the Bolshevist administration represents the only medium -for dealing with that mighty nation. As long as it remains the only -constituted authority in Russia, every act of hostility against it -injures Russia. As we discovered in 1919, you cannot wage war against -the government for the time being of a country without devastating -the land and alienating its people. You cannot refuse to trade with -it now without depriving its people of commodities--and especially of -equipments--essential to their well-being. It is the people, therefore, -who would suffer, and it is the people who would ultimately resent that -suffering. Governments come and go, but the nation goes on for ever. - -The Russian people deserve--especially at the hands of all the Allied -nations--every sympathetic consideration we can extend to them. Not -only because they have to endure the sway of a tyrannical oligarchy -imposing its will by ruthless violence, but even more for the reasons -that led to the establishment of that tyranny. If the fruit is bitter -we must bear in mind how the tree came to be planted in the soil. It -may sound like quoting ancient history to revert to the events of eight -or nine years ago, but no one can understand Russia, or do justice to -its unhappy people, without recalling the incidents that led to the -great catastrophe. - -Those who denounce any dealings with the existing order seem to have -persuaded themselves that pre-revolutionary Russia was governed by -a gentle and beneficent despotism which conferred the blessings of -a tolerant and kindly fatherland upon a well-ruled household. In no -particular is this a true picture of the _ancien regime_. The fortress -of Peter and Paul was not erected, nor its dungeons dug, by the -Bolshevists. Siberia was not set up as a penal settlement for political -offenders for the first time--if at all--by the Bolshevists. In 1906 -alone 45,000 political offenders were deported to endure the severities -of Siberia. Persecution of suspected religious leaders was not started -by the Soviets. To them does not belong the discredit of initiating the -methods of Pogromism. Under the "paternal" reign of the Tsars dissent -from the Orthodox faith was proscribed and persecuted, and the Jews -were hunted like vermin. - -Let us not forget also that beyond all these circumstances the -revolution was rendered inevitable by the ineptitude and corruption -of the old system, and especially by the terrible suffering and -humiliation which that state of things inflicted on Russia in the Great -War. - -Any one who has read the _Memoirs of an Ambassador_, by M. Paleologue, -will find a complete explanation in its pages of the savage hatred with -which the Russian revolutionaries view all those who were associated -in any degree with the old order. He tells the story of how the -gallant army found itself at the critical hour without ammunition, -rifles, transport, and often without food. No braver or more devoted -men ever fought for their country than the young peasants who made up -the Russian armies of 1914-15-16. With little and often no artillery -support, they faced without faltering the best-equipped heavy artillery -in the world. They were mown down by shell fire and machine guns by -the million. Their aggregate casualties up to September, 1916, even -according to the reluctant admissions of the Tsarist generals of the -day, were five millions. In reality they were much heavier. Often they -went into action with sticks, as the Russian War Office had no rifles -with which to arm them. They picked up as they advanced rifles dropped -by fallen comrades. There is nothing in the war comparable to the -trustful heroism of these poor peasants. We know now why there were no -rifles, or shells, or wagons. The wholesale corruption of the _regime_ -has been exposed to the world by irrefutable documentary evidence. - -Here are a few extracts from M. Paleologue's interesting book. One -extract from his diary reads:-- - - - "The lack of ammunition means that the role of the artillery - in battle is necessarily insignificant. The whole burden of - the fighting falls on the infantry and the result is a ghastly - expenditure of human life. A day or two ago one of the Grand - Duke Sergius's collaborators, Colonel Englehardt, said to Major - Wehrlin, my second military attache: 'We're paying for the crimes - of our administration with the blood of our men.'" - - -About the same date talking about the deplorable state of things, the -Grand Duke Sergius, who was Inspector-General of Artillery, said to the -French ambassador, "When I think that this exhibition of impotence is -all that our aristocratic system has to show, it makes me want to be a -Republican." - -When a Grand Duke talked like that early in 1915, what must a peasant -soldier have thought by the spring of 1917, after many more millions of -his comrades had been slaughtered as a result of the same "exhibition -of impotence." - -It is no use pointing to the fact that our army was also short of -ammunition at that date. The British army was a small army organised -on the basis of a maximum expeditionary force of six divisions. The -Russian army was a great conscript force organised on the basis of a -hundred divisions in the field. - -I recollect well our own military reports from the Russian fronts. They -provided much distressing reading. They filled you with compassion for -the millions of gallant men who were the victims of corruption and -stupidity in high places. I recall one statement made to our general -which betrays the callous indifference with which men in authority -seemed to treat the appalling sacrifice of life amongst loyal soldiers -who were facing death without a murmur, because the "Little Father" -willed it. Whenever anxious inquiries were directed by our officer as -to the gigantic losses in men which filled him with dismay as well -as horror, the usual reply was, "Don't worry yourself. Thank God, of -men at all events we have enough." An answer which sends a thrill of -horror through you when you read it. That is why at the end of two -and a half years the patient men in the field at last mutinied. That -is why their parents and brothers in the fields supported them. The -"Little Father" had failed them, and his minions had betrayed them. It -is a sordid and horrid tale of peculation, maladministration, and cruel -treachery. Millions of British and French money went in shameless and -open bribery, whilst the soldiers in the field, for need of what the -money could buy, were opposing bare breasts covering brave hearts to -the most terrible artillery in the world. If the rest of the money had -been well spent, what was left after providing for profuse graft would -still have sufficed to save that gallant army from destruction. But -unhappily no real interest was taken in anything beyond the amount and -the payment of the pocket-money. That seemed to be the main purpose of -the transaction. Nothing was well managed except the inevitable bribe. -There were honourable and upright men who did their duty by their -distracted and plundered country, but they were helpless in the torrent -of corruption. - -No wonder a great Russian industrialist engaged in the ministry of -war, in dwelling on the sad failure of tsarism and its probable -results in June, 1905, predicted a revolution with "ten years of -the most frightful anarchy." "We shall," he added, "see the days of -Pugatchef[11] again and perhaps worse"--a striking prophecy verified -with appalling accuracy. - -It is not pleasant to recall these dreadful episodes, which reveal the -betrayal of a devotion faithful unto death. But this story is essential -to the right appreciation of events. There is no savagery like that of -a trustful people which finds that its trust was being imposed upon the -whole time. Here the retribution has been hideous in all its aspects. -But the provocation was also revolting from every point of view. To -judge Russia fairly that must be taken into account. - -I think the government are, therefore, taking the right view of -their responsibilities when through their foreign secretary they -open negotiations with the representative of the Soviet government -in this country. You can easily evoke resounding cheers amongst the -thoughtless by declaring melodramatically that you will never "shake -hands with murder." In practice this policy has always been a failure. -Mr. Pitt in a famous passage declined to assent to that doctrine when -he was attacked for trying to open negotiations with the "assassins" -of the French Revolution. He was driven out of this calm and rational -attitude by the inflammable rhetoric of Burke, aided by the arrogance -of the victorious revolutionaries. Nevertheless, the sequel proved he -was right. French Bolshevism was not defeated by foreign armies, nor -starved out by the British blockade. But it was driven into the arms of -Napoleon, and Europe suffered bitterly for the folly of the hotheads -on both sides. It would have been better for that generation had it -listened to the wise counsel of William Pitt. - -If you decline to treat with Russia as long as its present rulers -remain in power, then you ought to place Turkey in the same category. -The military junta that governed Turkey has been guilty of atrocities -at least as vile as any committed by the Bolshevists. But at Lausanne -we ostentatiously stretched the friendly hand of Britain to the authors -of the Armenian massacres. And France, Italy--yes, and America -also--tendered the same warm handshake. I am not criticising the offer -of amity made as a condition of peace. We must make peace in the world, -and you cannot do so if you put whole nations off your visiting list -because of the misconduct of those who govern them. Once you begin you -are not quite sure where it will end. - -In these cases the innocent suffer the most. A refusal to trade with -Russia would not deprive the Soviet commissaries of a single necessity -or comfort of life. The Communists are quite strong enough to take care -of themselves. But the peasants--who are not Communists--would continue -to suffer, and their sufferings would increase as their reserves of -clothing and other essentials became completely exhausted. And the -people of this country who need the produce of Russia for their own use -would also suffer to a certain extent. America can afford this exalted -aloofness. She does not need the Russian grain and timber. She is an -exporter of those commodities. But we cannot do as well without them, -and we also sadly need Russian flax for our linen industries, which are -languishing for the want of it. Last year there were quite considerable -imports of Russian produce into this country. This year owing to the -prospects of an improved harvest these imports will be much larger. -They are greatly needed here for our own consumption, and they pay -for exports of machinery and textiles which the Russian on his part -urgently requires. - -But beyond and above all these material considerations, the world needs -peace. In the old days conveyancing attorneys in this country kept a -property transaction going by interminable requisitions on the title -of the other party. They exercised all their ingenuity and invoked the -added ingenuity of trained counsel to probe for defects in the right of -the vendor to deal. Those were leisurely days, and men could afford to -dawdle. Even then these exercises often ended in ruinous litigation. -To-day time presses and the atmosphere is dangerous for the plying of -irritating interrogatories. It is time we made up our minds that the -Soviets have come to stay, whether we like it or no, and that one or -other of the formidable men who rule Russia to-day are likely to rule -it for some time to come. The sooner we have the courage to recognise -this fact, the sooner will real peace be established. - -FOOTNOTE: - -[11] Pugatchef was the Pretender who led a revolt of the peasants -in the reign of Catherine and spread rapine and carnage through the -provinces bordering the Volga and Ural. - - - - -XXVII - -PALESTINE AND THE JEWS - - "What's his reason? I am a Jew." - _The Merchant of Venice._ - - -Of all the bigotries that savage the human temper there is none so -stupid as the anti-Semitic. It has no basis in reason; it is not -rooted in faith; it aspires to no ideal; it is just one of those dank -and unwholesome weeds that grow in the morass of racial hatred. How -utterly devoid of reason it is may be gathered from the fact that it -is almost entirely confined to nations who worship Jewish prophets and -apostles, revere the national literature of the Hebrews as the only -inspired message delivered by the deity to mankind, and whose only hope -of salvation rests on the precepts and promises of the great teachers -of Judah. Yet in the sight of these fanatics the Jews of to-day can do -nothing right. If they are rich they are birds of prey. If they are -poor they are vermin. If they are in favour of a war it is because they -want to exploit the bloody feuds of the Gentiles to their own profit. -If they are anxious for peace they are either instinctive cowards -or traitors. If they give generously--and there are no more liberal -givers than the Jews--they are doing it for some selfish purpose of -their own. If they do not give--then what could one expect of a Jew -but avarice? If labour is oppressed by great capital, the greed of -the Jew is held responsible. If labour revolts against capital--as -it did in Russia--the Jew is blamed for that also. If he lives in a -strange land he must be persecuted and pogrommed out of it. If he wants -to go back to his own he must be prevented. Through the centuries -in every land, whatever he does, or intends, or fails to do, he has -been pursued by the echo of the brutal cry of the rabble of Jerusalem -against the greatest of all Jews--"Crucify Him!" No good has ever come -of nations that crucified Jews. It is poor and pusillanimous sport, -lacking all the true qualities of manliness, and those who indulge in -it would be the first to run away were there any element of danger in -it. Jew-baiters are generally of the type that found good reasons for -evading military service when their own country was in danger. - -The latest exhibition of this wretched indulgence is the agitation -against settling poor Jews in the land their fathers made famous. -Palestine under Jewish rule once maintained a population of 5,000,000. -Under the blighting rule of the Turk it barely supported a population -of 700,000. The land flowing with milk and honey is now largely a stony -and unsightly desert. To quote one of the ablest and most far-sighted -business men of to-day, "It is a land of immense possibilities, in -spite of the terrible neglect of its resources resulting from Turkish -misrule. It is a glorious estate let down by centuries of neglect. The -Turks cut down the forests and never troubled to replant them. They -slaughtered the cattle and never troubled to replace them." It is one -of the peculiarities of the Jew-hunter that he adores the Turk. - -If Palestine is to be restored to a condition even approximate to -its ancient prosperity, it must be by settling Jews on its soil. The -condition to which the land has been reduced by centuries of the most -devastating oppression in the world is such that restoration is only -possible by a race that is prepared for sentimental reasons to make and -endure sacrifices for the purpose. What is the history of the Jewish -settlement in Palestine? It did not begin with the Balfour Declaration. -A century ago there were barely 10,000 Jews in the whole of Palestine. -Before the war there were 100,000. The war considerably reduced these -numbers, and immigration since 1918 has barely filled up the gaps. At -the present timorous rate of progress it will be many years before it -reaches 200,000. Jewish settlement started practically seventy years -ago, with Sir Moses Montefiore's experiment in 1854--another war year. -The Sultan had good reasons for propitiating the Jews in that year, -as the Allies had in 1917. So the Jewish resettlement of Palestine -began. From that day onward it has proceeded slowly but steadily. The -land available was not of the best. Prejudices and fears had to be -negotiated. Anything in the nature of wholesale expropriation of Arab -cultivators, even for cash, had to be carefully avoided. The Jews were, -therefore, often driven to settle on barren sand dunes and malarial -swamps. The result can best be given by quoting from an article written -by Mrs. Fawcett, the famous woman leader. She visited Palestine in 1921 -and again in 1922, and this is her account of the Jewish settlements: - - - "So far from the colonies and the colonists draining the country - of its resources they have created resources which were previously - non-existent; they have planted and skilfully cultivated desert - sands and converted them into fruitful vineyards and orange - and lemon orchards; in other parts they have created valuable - agricultural land out of what were previously dismal swamps - producing nothing but malaria and other diseases. The colonists - have not shrunk from the tremendous work and the heavy sacrifices - required. Many of the early arrivals laid down their lives over - their work; the survivors went on bravely, draining the swamps, - planting eucalyptus trees by the hundred thousand so that at - length the swamp became a fruitful garden, and the desert once - more blossomed like the rose." - - -Everywhere the Jew cultivator produces heavier and richer crops than -his Arab neighbour. He has introduced into Palestine more scientific -methods of cultivation, and his example is producing a beneficent -effect on the crude tillage of the Arab peasant. It will be long ere -Canaan becomes once more a land flowing with milk and honey. The -effects of the neglect and misrule of centuries cannot be effaced by -the issue of a declaration. The cutting down of the trees has left -the soil unprotected against the heavy rains and the rocks which were -once green with vineyards and olive groves have been swept bare. The -terraces which ages of patient industry built up have been destroyed -by a few generations of Turkish stupidity. They cannot be restored in -a single generation. Great irrigation works must be constructed if -settlement is to proceed on a satisfactory scale. Palestine possesses -in some respects advantages for the modern settler which to its ancient -inhabitants were a detriment. Its one great river and its tributaries -are rapid and have a great fall. For power this is admirable. Whether -for irrigation, or for the setting up of new industries, this gift of -nature to Palestine is capable of exploitation only made possible by -the scientific discoveries of the last century. The tableland of Judea -has a rainfall which if caught in reservoirs at appropriate centres -would make of the "desert of Judea" a garden. If this be done Arab and -Jew alike share in the prosperity. - -There are few countries on earth which have made less of their -possibilities. Take its special attractions for the tourist. I was -amazed to find that the visitors to Palestine in the whole course of a -year only aggregate 15,000. It contains the most famous shrines in the -world. Its history is of more absorbing interest to the richest peoples -on earth, and is better taught to their children, than even that of -their own country. Some of its smallest villages are better known to -countless millions than many a prosperous modern city. Hundreds of -thousands ought to be treading this sacred ground every year. Why are -they not doing so? The answer is: Turkish misrule scared away the -pilgrim. Those who went there came back disillusioned and disappointed. -The modern "spies" on their return did not carry with them the luscious -grapes of Escol to thrill the multitude with a desire to follow their -example. They brought home depressing tales of squalor, discomfort, -and exaction which dispelled the glamour and discouraged further -pilgrimages. Settled government gives the Holy Land its first chance -for 1900 years. But there is so much undeveloped country demanding the -attention of civilisation that Palestine will lose that chance unless -it is made the special charge of some powerful influence. The Jews -alone can redeem it from the wilderness and restore its ancient glory. - -In that trust there is no injustice to any other race. The Arabs have -neither the means, the energy, nor the ambition to discharge this duty. -The British Empire has too many burdens on its shoulders to carry this -experiment through successfully. The Jewish race with its genius, -its resourcefulness, its tenacity, and not least its wealth, can -alone perform this essential task. The Balfour Declaration is not an -expropriating but an enabling clause. It is only a charter of equality -for the Jews. Here are its terms: - - - "His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in - Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will - use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this - object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done - which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing - non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political - status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." - - -The declaration was subsequently endorsed and adopted by President -Wilson and the French and Italian foreign ministers. - -The Zionists ask for no more. It has been suggested by their enemies -that they are seeking to establish a Jewish oligarchy in Palestine -that will reduce the Arab inhabitant to a condition of servitude to a -favoured Hebrew minority. The best answer to that charge is to be found -in the memorandum submitted by the Zionist Association to the League of -Nations. - - - "The Jews demand no privilege, unless it be the privilege of - rebuilding by their own efforts and sacrifices a land which, once - the seat of a thriving and productive civilisation, has long been - suffered to remain derelict. They expect no favoured treatment - in the matter of political or religious rights. They assume, as - a matter of course, that all the inhabitants of Palestine, be - they Jews or non-Jews, will be in every respect on a footing of - perfect equality. They seek no share in the government beyond that - to which they may be entitled under the Constitution as citizens - of the country. They solicit no favours. They ask, in short, no - more than an assured opportunity of peacefully building up their - national home by their own exertions and of succeeding on their - merits." - - -It is a modest request which these exiles from Zion propound to the -nations. And surely it is just that it should be conceded, and if -conceded then carried out in the way men of honour fulfil their bond. -There are fourteen millions of Jews in the world. They belong to a -race which for at least 1900 years has been subjected to proscription, -pillage, massacre, and the torments of endless derision--a race that -has endured persecution, which for the variety of torture, physical, -material and mental, inflicted on its victims, for the virulence and -malignity with which it has been sustained, for the length of time it -has lasted, and more than all for the fortitude and patience with which -it has been suffered, is without parallel in the history of any other -people. Is it too much to ask that those amongst them whose sufferings -are the worst shall be able to find refuge in the land their fathers -made holy by the splendour of their genius, by the loftiness of their -thoughts, by the consecration of their lives, and by the inspiration of -their message to mankind? - - - - -XXVIII - -THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE[12] - - -The vanquished have returned to their spiritual home at Angora throwing -their fezzes in the air. The victors have returned with their tails -well between their legs. All tragedies have their scenes of comedy, and -the Lausanne Conference is one of those amusing episodes interpolated -by fate to relieve the poignancy of one of its greatest tragic -pieces--the Turk and civilisation. - -The Turk may be a bad ruler, but he is the prince of anglers. The -cunning and the patience with which he lands the most refractory fish -once he has hooked it is beyond compare. What inimitable play we have -witnessed for six months on the shores of Lake Leman! Once the fish -seemed to have broken the tackle--that was when the first conference -came to an abrupt end. It simply meant, however, that the wily -Oriental was giving out plenty of line. Time never worries him, he can -sit and wait. He knew the moment would come when they would return -with the hook well in their gullets, and the play begin once more--the -reeling in and the reeling out, the line sometimes taut and strained -but never snapping. Time and patience rewarded him. At last the huge -tarpon are all lying beached on the banks--Britain, France, Italy, -and the United States of America--high and dry, landed and helpless, -without a swish left in their tails, glistening and gasping in the -summer sun. - -It is little wonder that Ismet had a smile on his face when all was -over. Reports from Angora state that the peace is hailed there as -a great Turkish triumph; and so it is. The Turk is truly a great -fisherman. If he could govern as well as he angles, his would be the -most formidable Empire in the world. Unfortunately he is the worst of -rulers, hence the trouble--his own and that of those who unhappily have -drawn him as governor in the lottery of life. - -The able correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_ at the Lausanne -Conference has supplied us from time to time with vivid pen pictures -of the four greatest Powers of the world struggling in the toils of the -squalid and broken remains of an Empire with an aggregate population -equal to that of a couple of English counties that I could name. This -is what he wrote about this conference, which constitutes one of the -most humiliating incidents in the history of Western civilisation:-- - - - "The records of the present Conference present an even more - marvellous series of concessions and surrenders. What was frayed - before is threadbare now. The Allies have whittled away their - own rights with a lavish hand in the cause of peace. They have - also--and this is a graver matter, for which it seems they will - have to give an account in the not distant future--gone back on - their promises to small races, which are none the less promises - because the small races have not the power to enforce their - performance. The figure that the European delegates are cutting in - Lausanne, and the agents of the _concessionnaires_ in Angora--all - alike representatives of the West--has been rendered undignified - as much by the manner as the matter of their worsting." - - -Since those distressing words were written the Powers have sunk yet -deeper into the slough of humiliation. - -_The Times_ correspondent wiring after the agreement writes in a strain -of deep indignation at the blow inflicted on the prestige of the West -by this extraordinary Treaty. In order to gauge the extent of the -disaster to civilisation which this Treaty implies it is only necessary -to give a short summary of the war aims of the Allies in Turkey. - -They were stated by Mr. Asquith with his usual succinctness and clarity -in a speech which he delivered when Prime Minister at the Guildhall on -November 9th, 1914:-- - - - "It is not the Turkish people--it is the Ottoman Government that - has drawn the sword, and which, I venture to predict, will perish - by the sword. It is they and not we who have rung the death-knell - of Ottoman dominion, not only in Europe but in Asia. With their - disappearance will disappear as I, at least, hope and believe, the - blight which for generations past has withered some of the fairest - regions of the earth." - - -In pursuance of the policy thus declared by the British Premier on -behalf of the Allies a series of Agreements was entered into in the -early months of 1915 between France, Russia, and ourselves, by which -the greater part of Turkey, with its conglomerate population, was to be -partitioned at the end of the War. Cilicia and Syria were allocated to -France; Mesopotamia to Britain; Armenia and Constantinople to Russia. -Palestine was to be placed under the joint control of Britain and -France. Arabia was to be declared independent and a territory carved -largely out of the desert--but including some famous cities of the -East, Damascus, Homs and Aleppo--was to be constituted into a new Arab -State, partly under the protection of France and partly of Britain. -Smyrna and its precincts were to be allotted to Greece if she joined -her forces with those of the Allies in the war. The Straits were to be -demilitarised and garrisoned. When Italy came into the war later on in -1915, it was stipulated that in the event of the partition of Turkey -being carried out in pursuance of these agreements, territories in -Southern Anatolia should be assigned to Italy for development. - -What was the justification for breaking up the Turkish Empire? The -portions to be cut out of Turkey have a population the majority of -which is non-Turkish. Cilicia and Southern Anatolia might constitute a -possible exception. In these territories massacres and misgovernment -had perhaps succeeded at last in turning the balance in favour of the -Turk. But in the main the distributed regions were being cultivated -and developed before the war by a population which was Western and not -Turanian in its origin and outlook. This population represented the -original inhabitants of the soil. - -The experiences, more especially of the past century, had demonstrated -clearly that the Turk could no longer be entrusted with the -property, the honour, or the lives of any Christian race within his -dominions. Whole communities of Armenians had been massacred under -circumstances of the most appalling cruelty in lands which their -ancestors had occupied since the dawn of history. And even after the -war began 700,000 of these wretched people had been done to death -by these savages, to whom, it must be remembered, the Great Powers -so ostentatiously proffered the hand of friendship at the first -Lausanne conference. Even while the conference was in session, and the -handshaking was going on, the Turks were torturing to death scores -of thousands of young Greeks whom they deported into the interior. -As "a precautionary measure" 150,000 Greeks of military age, of whom -30,000 were military prisoners, were last year driven inland to the -mountains of Anatolia. On the way they were stripped of their clothes, -and in this condition were herded across the icy mountains. It is not -surprising that when an agreement was arrived at for the exchange -of military prisoners, the Turks found the greatest difficulty in -producing 11,000, and of the total 150,000 it is estimated that -two-thirds perished. The Allied Powers had every good reason for -determining, as they hoped for all time, that this barbarian should -cease to shock the world by repeated exhibitions of savagery against -helpless and unarmed people committed to his charge by a cruel fate. - -Apart from these atrocities the fact that great tracts of country, -once the most fertile and populous in the world, have been reduced by -Turkish misrule and neglect to a condition which is indistinguishable -from the wilderness, alone proves that the Turk is a blight and a -curse wherever he pitches his tent, and that he ought in the interests -of humanity to be treated as such. When a race, which has no title to -its lands other than conquest, so mismanages the territories it holds -by violence as to deprive the world of an essential contribution to -its well-being, the nations have a right--nay, a duty--to intervene -in order to restore these devastated areas to civilisation. This same -duty constitutes the reason and justification for the white settlers of -America overriding the prior claims of the Indian to the prairies and -forests of the great West. - -On the shores of the Mediterranean are two races with a surplus -population of hard-working, intelligent cultivators, both of them -belonging to countries which had themselves in the past been -responsible for the government of the doomed lands covered by the -Turkish Empire. Greece and Italy could claim that under their rule -this vast territory throve and prospered mightily. They now pour -their overflow of population into lands far away from the motherland. -Yet they are essentially Mediterranean peoples. The history of the -Mediterranean will for ever be associated with their achievements on -its shores and its waters. The derelict wastes of Asia Minor need them. -Valleys formerly crowded with tillers are now practically abandoned -to the desert weeds. Irrigation has been destroyed or neglected. The -Italian engineers are amongst the best in the world, and once they -were introduced into Asia Minor would make cultivation again possible. -There is plenty of scope in the deserts of Anatolia for both Italian -and Greek. I was hoping for a peace that would set them both working. -Had such a settlement been attained, a generation hence would have -witnessed gardens thronging with happy men, women, and children, where -now you have a wilderness across which men, women, and children are -periodically hunted down into nameless horror. - -Yet another reason for the Allied decision was the bitter resentment -that existed at the ingratitude displayed by the Turk towards Britain -and France. They were naturally indignant that he should have joined -their foes and slammed the gate of the Dardanelles in their face, -and by that means complicated and prolonged their campaign and added -enormously to their burdens, their losses, and their dangers. But he -had not the thankfulness even of the beast of prey in the legend -towards the man who had cured his wounded limb. France and Britain -had many a time extracted the thorn from the Turkish paw when he was -limping along in impotent misery. They had done more. They had often -saved the life of that Empire when the Russian bear was on the point of -crushing it out of existence; and yet without provocation, without even -a quarrel, he had betrayed them to their enemies. - -I have set out shortly what the war policy of the Allies was in -reference to Turkey. The Treaty of Sevres considerably modified that -policy in many vital aspects. By that Treaty, Constantinople, Cilicia, -and Southern Anatolia were left to the Turk; Armenia was created into -an independent State. There were many objections which could be raised -to the original proposals of 1915, as it might be argued that they -contemplated handing over in Cilicia and Southern Anatolia populations -which in the main were Turkish and Moslem to Christian rulers. But in -substance the modified plan of Sevres was sound, and if carried out -would have conduced to the well-being of the millions to be liberated -by its terms for ever from Turkish rule. The world at large also -would have benefited by the opportunity afforded to the industrious -and intelligent Armenian and Greek populations of Turkey to renew the -fertility of this land, once so bountiful in its gifts, thus enriching -man's store of good things. The barbarian invasion which withered that -fertility was pushed back into the interior by the Treaty of Sevres. -The Treaty of Lausanne has extended and perpetuated its sway from the -Black Sea to the Mediterranean. I have explained the why and wherefore -of Sevres. But why Lausanne? It is a long and painful story--a compound -of shortsightedness, disloyalty, selfishness, and pusillanimity amongst -nations and their statesmen. And more than all, Fate happened to be -in its grimmest mood when dealing with this problem. The Russian -Revolution eliminated that great country from the solution of the -problem on the lines of protection for the oppressed races of Turkey, -and instead cast its might on the side of the oppressor. President -Wilson was inclined to recommend that the United States of America -should undertake the mandate for the Armenians. Had he succeeded, what -a different story would now have been told! What a different story the -generations to come would also tell! But his health broke down at the -vital moment and America would have none of his humanitarian schemes. -Then came the departure of Sonnino from the Quirinal. With him went -for a momentous while the old dreams of Italian colonisation, which in -the past had done so much to spread civilisation in three continents. -His successors were homelier men. I have still my doubts as to whether -they served Italy best by the less adventurous and more domesticated -policy they pursued. The future may decide that issue. But whatever the -decision, the time for action passed away, and unless and until there -is another break up in Turkey, the chance Italy has lost since 1919 -will not be recovered. Will it ever come back? - -There followed the French check in Cilicia, and the negotiations -at Angora with Mustapha Kemal, which were both single-handed and -under-handed; for the Allies were not even informed of what was going -on. This was a fatal step, for it broke up the unity which alone would -enable the Western Powers to deal effectively with the Turk. This -unity was never fully re-created. There can be no reunion without -confidence. There can be no trust in the West that is broken in -the East. Much of the recent mischief in the Entente came from the -clandestine negotiations at Angora. - -The last fatal change was the Greek revolt against Venizelos. It is -often said that he is the greatest statesman thrown up by that race -since Pericles. In all he has undertaken he has never failed his -people. Disaster has always come to them when they refused to follow -his guidance. When King Alexander was killed by a monkey, the Greeks -were called upon to decide between Constantine and Venizelos. Their -choice was ruinous to their country. No greater evil can befall a -nation than to choose for its ruler a stubborn man with no common -sense. Before the advent of Constantine, Greece, with no aid and -little countenance from the Powers, was able to hold the forces of -Mustapha Kemal easily at bay and even to drive him back into the -fastnesses of Anatolia. In encounter after encounter the Greek army, -led by men chosen for their military gifts and sufficiently well -equipped, inflicted defeat after defeat on the armies of Angora. But -with Constantine came a change. In the Greek army, courtiers were -substituted for soldiers in the high command. French, British and -Italian public opinion, with the memory of Constantine's treachery -during the war still fresh in their minds, altered their attitude -towards the Greeks who had elevated him to the throne in defiance of -Allied sentiment. Indifferent Powers became hostile; hostile Powers -became active. The final catastrophe began with the heroic but foolish -march of the Greek army into the defiles of Asia Minor, followed -by the inevitable retreat. It was consummated when Constantine for -dynastic reasons appointed to the command of the troops in Asia Minor -a crazy general whose mental condition had been under medical review. -The Greeks fight valiantly when well led, but like the French, once -they know they are not well led, confidence goes, and with confidence -courage. Before the Kemalist attack reached their lines the Greek -army was beaten and in full retreat. With attack came panic, with -panic the complete destruction of what was once a fine army. With the -disappearance of that army vanished the last hope for the salvation of -Anatolia. That the history of the East, and probably the West, should -have been changed by the bite of a monkey is just another grimace of -the comic spirit which bursts now and again into the pages of every -great tragedy. - -All that could be done afterwards was to save the remnants of a great -policy. Western civilisation put up its last fight against the return -of savagery into Europe, when in September and October of last year -British soldiers and sailors, deserted by allies and associates alike, -saved Constantinople from hideous carnage. The Pact of Mudania was -not Sevres, but it certainly was better than Lausanne. From Sevres to -Mudania was a retreat. From Mudania to Lausanne is a rout. - -What next? Lausanne is not a terminus, it is only a milestone. Where -is the next? No one claims that this Treaty is peace with honour. It -is not even peace. If one were dealing with a regenerated Turk, there -might be hope. But the burning of Smyrna, and the cold-blooded murders -of tens of thousands of young Greeks in the interior, prove that the -Turk is still unchanged. To quote again from the correspondent of _The -Times_ at Lausanne:-- - - - "All such evidence as can be obtained here confirms the belief - that the new Turk is but the old, and that the coming era of - enlightenment and brotherly love in Turkey, for which it is the - correct thing officially to hope, will be from the foreigners' - point of view at best a humiliating, and at worst a bloody, chaos." - - -The amazing legend that the Turk is a gentleman is dying hard. -That legend has saved him many a time when he was on the brink of -destruction. It came to his aid in October last when the policy of -this country was changed by the revolt of the Turcophile against the -Coalition. The Turk has massacred hundreds of thousands of Armenians, -and dishonoured myriads of Christian women who trusted to his -protection. Nevertheless the Turk is a gentleman! By his indolence, -his shiftiness, his stupidity, and his wantonness, he has reduced a -garden to a desert. What better proof can there be that he is a real -gentleman? For a German bribe he sold the friends who had repeatedly -saved his wretched life. All the same, what a gentleman he is! He -treated British prisoners with a barbarous neglect that killed them off -in hundreds. Still, he is such a gentleman! He plunders, he slays, and -outrages those who are unable to defend themselves. He misgoverns, -cheats, lies, and betrays. For all that, the Turk is a gentleman! So an -agitation was engineered with perverse tenacity to save this fine old -Oriental gentleman from the plebeian hands that sought his destruction. -Hence the black Treaty of Lausanne. - -_London, July 25th, 1923_ - -FOOTNOTE: - -[12] London, July 25th, 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne, between the -Allies and the Turks, was signed on July 24th, 1923. - - - - -XXIX - -THE SIGNING OF THE IRISH TREATY - - -When a few days ago I was half-way through the speech I delivered in -the House of Commons on the land system the faithful Commons were -summoned in the manner consecrated by centuries of tradition to the bar -of the House of Lords to hear the royal assent being given to the bill -for the constitution of the Irish Free State. Notwithstanding a natural -preoccupation with my interrupted speech two scenes came to my mind -during my short journey to and from the upper chamber. - -The first was the spectacle of a crowded House of Commons nearly -thirty years ago. When the doors were opened for prayers there was the -unwonted sight of a throng of hustling M.P.'s pressing through the -swing doors to secure seats. I need hardly say this was not the symptom -or the outcome of any religious revival amongst our legislators. It -was entirely due to the ancient custom that confers upon a member -occupying a seat at prayers the unchallengeable right to that seat -for the rest of the sitting. Rows of chairs were arrayed on the floor -of the House. That was an innovation never since followed. What was it -all about? There sat in the middle of the Treasury bench huddled up and -almost hidden by more stalwart and upright figures an old man of 83 -years, to all appearances in the last stage of physical decrepitude and -mental lassitude. His name was William Ewart Gladstone, the greatest -parliamentary gladiator of all time. The lifelong champion of oppressed -nationalities was to-day to inaugurate his final effort to give freedom -to the Irish race trodden for centuries by ruthless force. The last -remnant of his strength was to be consecrated to the achievement of -Irish liberty, and hundreds of eager legislators to whom Peel and -Russell, Palmerston and Disraeli were but historical names, were avid -competitors for seats from which they could better listen to a man who -had sat in governments with the first three and crossed swords with the -fourth. It was a memorable sight. - -The preliminary questions which precede all parliamentary business were -by common consent postponed, and a deep and solemn silence thrilling -with expectancy fell upon the humming assembly as Mr. Speaker Peel -in his sonorous voice called out "the Prime Minister." The inert heap -which was the centre of all gaze sprang to the table an erect and -alert figure. The decrepitude was cast off like a cloak--the lassitude -vanished as by a magician's wand, the shoulders were thrown back, the -chest was thrown forward, and in deep, ringing tones full of music and -force the proposed new Irish charter was expounded for three unwearying -hours by the transfigured octogenarian rejuvenated by the magic of an -inspired soul. I had a seat just opposite the great orator. I was one -of the multitude who on that occasion listened with marvel to that -feat of intellectual command and physical endurance. It was more than -that. It was an unrivalled display of moral courage, rare in political -conflict. Mr. Gladstone had only just emerged out of a general election -where, in spite of six years of his eloquent advocacy, the voice of -Great Britain had declared emphatically against his Irish policy, and -the poor parliamentary majority at his back was made up out of the -preponderating Irish vote in favour of Home Rule. He was confronted -with the most formidable parliamentary opposition ever ranged against -a minister, redoubtable in debating quality, still more redoubtable in -its hold on British pride. He was eighty-three years of age, but he -never quailed, and through the sultry summer months of 1893 he fought -night by night with mighty strokes the battle of Irish emancipation. He -did not live to carry the cause through to victory, but he planted the -banner so firmly in the soil that no assault could succeed in tearing -it down, and on the day when I stood with Mr. Bonar Law at the bar of -the House of Lords I saw this banner flourished in triumph from the -steps of the throne by a Unionist Lord Chancellor. That was the first -memory that flashed through my brain. - -The next was of a dreary December night just one year ago when on one -side of the Cabinet table in 10 Downing Street sat four representatives -of Great Britain and on the other five Irish leaders. It was the famous -room wherein British cabinets have for generations forged their Irish -policies. Coercion and concession alike issued from that chamber. -Pitt's Act of Union was discussed there, and so were Gladstone's -Home Rule bills, the decision to use British soldiers to throw Irish -tenants out of their houses with battering ram and torch and equally -the bill which made every Irish tenant lord and master of his home at -the expense of the British treasury--all issued forth from this simple -and unadorned council chamber. And now came the final treaty of peace. -Would it be signed? It was an anxious moment charged with destiny for -the two great races who confronted each other at that green table. - -The British representatives who were associated with me on the occasion -were Mr. Austen Chamberlain; [I recall now how he sat by the side of -his doughty father, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, in 1893, during the famous -nightly duel between him and Mr. Gladstone. How strangely little thirty -arduous years have changed his personal appearance!] Lord Birkenhead, -who, in 1893 was carving for himself a brilliant career as a student -at Oxford and as a debater in the Union; Mr. Winston Churchill who was -then a cadet at Sandhurst whilst his father was engaged in the last -great parliamentary struggle of his dazzling but tragic career; Sir -Gordon Hewart, now Lord Hewart, the man who has risen on the pinions of -a powerful intelligence to the height of Lord Chief Justice of England. -My recollection is that the other two British delegates--Sir Laming -Worthington-Evans and Sir Hamar Greenwood--were stricken with illness -and were unable to be present. After weeks of close investigation the -climax of decision had been reached. Britain had gone to the limit of -concession. No British statesman could have faced any assembly of his -countrymen had he appended his signature to a convention that placed -Ireland outside that fraternity of free nations known as the British -Empire or freed her from that bond of union which is represented by a -common fealty to the sovereign. It is not easy to interpret the potency -of this invisible bond to those who are brought up to venerate other -systems. It is nevertheless invincible. Would the Irish leaders have -the courage to make peace on the only conditions under which peace was -attainable--liberty within the Empire? - -Opposite me sat a dark, short, but sturdy figure with the face of a -thinker. That was Mr. Arthur Griffith, the most un-Irish leader that -ever led Ireland, quiet to the point of gentleness, reserved almost -to the point of appearing saturnine. A man of laconic utterance, he -answered in monosyllables where most men would have considered an -oratorical deliverance to be demanded by the dignity of the occasion. -But we found in our few weeks' acquaintance that his yea was yea and -his nay meant nay. He led the Irish deputation. He was asked whether he -would sign. In his abrupt, staccato manner he replied, "Speaking on my -own behalf I mean to sign." - -By his side sat a handsome young Irishman. No one could mistake his -nationality. He was Irish through and through, in every respect a -contrast to his taciturn neighbour. Vivacious, buoyant, highly strung, -gay, impulsive, but passing readily from gaiety to grimness and back -again to gaiety, full of fascination and charm--but also of dangerous -fire. That was Michael Collins, one of the most courageous leaders ever -produced by a valiant race. Nevertheless he hesitated painfully when -the quiet and gentle little figure on his left had taken his resolve. -Both saw the shadow of doom clouding over that fateful paper--their own -doom. They knew that the pen which affixed their signature at the same -moment signed their death-warrant. The little man saw beyond his own -fall Ireland rising out of her troubles a free nation and that sufficed -for him. Michael Collins was not appalled by the spectre of death, but -he had the Irishman's fear of encountering that charge which comes -so readily to the lips of the oppressed--that of having succumbed to -alien wile and betrayed their country. Patriots who cheerfully face -the tyrant's steel lose their nerve before that dread accusation. It -was the first time Michael Collins ever showed fear. It was also the -last. I knew the reason why he halted, although he never uttered a -word which revealed his mind, and I addressed my appeal to an effort -to demonstrate how the treaty gave Ireland more than Daniel O'Connell -and Parnell had ever hoped for, and how his countrymen would be ever -grateful to him not only for the courage which won such an offer, but -for the wisdom that accepted it. - -He asked for a few hours to consider, promising a reply by nine -o'clock. Nine passed, but the Irish leaders did not return. Ten. -Eleven, and they were not yet back. We had doubts as to whether we -should see them again. Then came a message from the secretary of the -Irish delegation that they were on their way to Downing Street. When -they marched in it was clear from their faces that they had come to -a great decision after a prolonged struggle. But there were still -difficulties to overcome--they were, however, difficulties not of -principle but of detail. These were discussed in a businesslike way, -and soon after one o'clock in the morning the treaty was complete. A -friendly chat full of cheerful goodwill occupied the time whilst the -stenographers were engaged in copying the draft so disfigured with the -corrections, interpolations and additions, each of which represented so -many hours of hammering discussion. - -Outside in the lobby sat a man who had used all the resources of an -ingenious and well-trained mind backed by a tenacious will to wreck -every endeavour to reach agreement--Mr. Erskine Childers, a man whose -slight figure, whose kindly, refined and intellectual countenance, -whose calm and courteous demeanour offered no clue to the fierce -passions which raged inside his breast. At every crucial point in the -negotiations he played a sinister part. He was clearly Mr. de Valera's -emissary, and faithfully did he fulfil the trust reposed in him by that -visionary. Every draft that emanated from his pen--and all the first -drafts were written by him--challenged every fundamental position to -which the British delegates were irrevocably committed. He was one of -those men who by temperament are incapable of compromise. Brave and -resolute he undoubtedly was, but unhappily for himself he was also -rigid and fanatical. When we walked out of the room where we had sat -for hours together, worn with tense and anxious labour, but all happy -that our great task of reconciliation had been achieved, we met Mr. -Erskine Childers outside sullen with disappointment and compressed -wrath at what he conceived to be the surrender of principles he had -fought for. - -I never saw him after that morning. Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith -I met repeatedly after the signature of the treaty, to discuss the -many obstacles that surged up in the way of its execution, and I -acquired for both a great affection. Poor Collins was shot by one of -his own countrymen on a bleak Irish roadside, whilst he was engaged -in restoring to the country he had loved so well the order and good -government which alone enables nations to enjoy the blessings of -freedom. Arthur Griffith died worn out by anxiety and toil in the cause -he had done so much to carry to the summit of victory. Erskine Childers -was shot at dawn for rebellion against the liberties he had helped to -win. - -Truly the path of Irish freedom right up to the goal is paved with -tragedy. But the bloodstained wilderness is almost through, the -verdant plains of freedom are stretched before the eyes of this -tortured nation. Ireland will soon honour the name of the Green Isle, -and I am proud to have had a hand in erecting the pillar which will for -ever mark the boundary between the squalor of the past and the hope of -the future. - -_London, December 16th, 1922._ - - - - -XXX - -PROHIBITION - - -Four years ago the United States of America, by a two-thirds majority, -voted prohibition of the sale of alcoholic liquors. The British -House of Commons have just voted down a bill for the same purpose by -a majority of 236 to 14. America treats prohibition as one of its -greatest moral triumphs. Britain treats it as a joke. - -What accounts for this remarkable disparity in the attitude of the two -great English-speaking communities towards one of the most baffling -and elusive problems civilisation has to deal with? It cannot be a -fundamental difference in temperament or in moral outlook. The men who -engineered prohibition in America are of our own race and kind, bred in -the Puritan traditions that came originally from our shores. - -If the evils of excessive drinking had been more apparent in America -than in Britain I could understand the States of the Union deciding -to take more drastic action than has been thought necessary in our -country. But the facts are exactly the reverse. The consumption of -alcohol in the United Kingdom some years before the war per head of -the population was higher than that of the United States. The poverty, -disease, and squalor caused by alcohol was much greater in Britain than -in America. - -What, then, accounts for the readiness of America to forbid the sale -and the reluctance of Britain even seriously to restrict it? - -I would not care to dogmatise on the subject, but I will hazard two or -three possible explanations. - -I set aside the suggestion that property owners are frightened by -the sequel to prohibition in Russia. I have heard it argued that -the prohibition ukase of the tsar was responsible for the Russian -revolution. That is probably true, for a people stupefied by alcohol -will stand anything. The inefficiency and corruption of the tsarist -regime was so appalling that no sober nation could have tolerated it -without rebellion for a single year, and when the fumes of vodka ceased -to muddle and blind the _moujik_, he rebelled against the autocracy -that had betrayed his country into disaster. The Russian experiment in -drink, therefore, contains no warning against prohibition, except a -very limited one, that those who wish to misrule a country in safety -must first of all drench it with alcohol. - -There is, of course, the ready explanation that old countries are very -conservative, and do not take kindly to change. Their joints are stiff -with age, and they creak along well-worn paths slowly and painfully, -but they lack the suppleness of limb that tempts younger communities -to sprint across untrodden country. That is the argument. I am afraid -this explanation will not hold. Old countries when thoroughly moved can -leap like the hart. The French Revolution demonstrated how vigorously -one of the oldest nations of Europe could tear along unbroken tracks -when impelled by a new passion. And I saw Britain spring to arms in -1914, when five millions of men joined the colours without the lash -of compulsion to stir their blood. England renewed her youth, and her -movements had the energy, the audacity, and the endurance of a people -untired by a march of centuries. This people, if stirred by a call -which reaches its heart or conscience, is capable of action as bold -as that which wrested Magna Charta out of a despot in the twelfth -century, overthrew an ancient religion in the fifteenth century, led -a king to the scaffold in the seventeenth century, or challenged -the greatest military empires in the world in the sixteenth, the -nineteenth, and the twentieth centuries. And if they were convinced -that the liquor traffic must be destroyed, they would execute it with -as little compunction or hesitation as they displayed in suppressing -the mass or in decapitating Charles I. - -At the present moment the British people are not in the least persuaded -that the evils of alcohol for a minority of the population cannot be -dealt with effectively without resorting to the very drastic expedient -of forbidding its consumption by the majority who use it in moderation. -Are they likely to be convinced? That depends on the failure or success -of all other expedients to exterminate the evil of alcoholism. - -That brings me to another explanation. America reached prohibition by -the path of experiment. The federal system lent itself to the trial -of every form of remedy, including prohibition. For well over half a -century you have had almost every form of temperance expedient ever -suggested in actual working in some State or other of the American -republic. - -When I was a lad I heard debates and addresses in Welsh about the -comparative merits of the "Maine Law" and high license. High license, -reduction of licenses, local option, prohibition, have all been -tried. They have all been in operation quite long enough to enable -the American public to form a judgment on their merits. Statistical -results over long periods constitute a reliable basis for inference. -American federalism furnished the opportunity, and the States took full -advantage of it. Hence the prohibition law. - -To the practical man the figures in the prohibition States looked -attractive from a business point of view. He hesitated, but the moral -wave that swept over America carried him over the bar. But without the -experience at his door I doubt whether the American business man would -have assented to prohibition. - -The British constitution does not lend itself to these valuable -experiments. Otherwise, London might have tried one experiment, -Lancashire another, Yorkshire a third, Scotland a fourth, and Wales a -fifth. The whole legislative power of the United Kingdom was until -quite recently vested in the imperial Parliament. Ireland has now a -legislature of its own. In theory, what suited one part of the kingdom -must do for the whole, and what did not suit the more populous parts -could not be permitted to others. - -As far as Scotland, Ireland, and Wales are concerned, there was in -practice a certain relaxation of this rule. But as far as the liquor -laws went, any serious alteration in any part of the kingdom was -difficult to secure if it offended the prejudices or damaged the -interests of the rest. It took years to get it through Parliament even -in a mutilated condition. - -There was no real freedom of experiment. The Scottish local veto act is -a compromise modified to suit English sentiment. Even as it is, it took -thirty years of Scottish insistence to carry. Wales has been unable to -secure local option, although it has been demanded by four-fifths of -its representatives for over a generation. We have, therefore, in this -country been denied the practical experience which has guided America -to so dramatic a conclusion. - -In the absence of such experience it has been found impossible to -educate and organise public opinion throughout Britain to the point of -concentrating attention and pressure on this one issue. Other issues -always cut across and jam the current. - -You cannot secure unanimity of action on temperance reform even amongst -the religious forces. If they were united in their demand, and prepared -to enforce it at elections, nothing could resist their power. Between -elections they seem agreed in their policy; but no sooner does the -party bugle sound than they all fall into rank in opposite armies, and -the temperance banner is hurriedly packed into the cupboard for use -after the polls have been declared. It is then once more brought out to -wave over the tabernacle, and its wrinkles are straightened out in the -breeze. - -I have seen the fiercest champions of local option supporting brewers -at elections because they were the official opponents of Irish Home -Rule in the contest. I remember being told by an eminent Scottish -divine, who was a strong temperance advocate, but who had hitherto -supported anti-temperance candidates because of his inveterate -opposition to Gladstone's Home Rule, that, unless his party carried a -measure of local option for Scotland soon, he would have to abandon -them, home rule or no home rule. He died without redeeming his -promise. The time never came for him. The Irish issue dominated -elections for nearly a generation. Free trade played a great part also. - -If the exigencies of party conflict had permitted the same consistent -propaganda work, extending over the same number of years, to be devoted -to the drink problem as was given to the wrongs of Ireland or free -trade, no doubt public opinion could have been educated up to the point -of supporting drastic reform. But this has not been found practicable -by political parties owing to the distraction of other issues. - -This is the main reason why British opinion is so far behind American -opinion on the temperance question. In America the battle of sobriety -was fought on the State platform, whilst the national platform was left -free for other conflicts. - -The war, however, enabled the British government to effect reforms -which have materially reduced the consumption of alcohol in this -kingdom. These results have been achieved by an enormous increase in -the taxation of alcoholic liquors, and by a considerable reduction in -the hours of sale. The taxation of beer was raised from L13,000,000 -in 1913 to L123,000,000 in 1921. The duty on spirits in 1913 yielded -L22,000,000, in 1921 it gave the revenue L71,000,000. - -One of the effects has been an appreciable reduction in the alcoholic -strength of the beverage sold. The hours of sale in the morning and -afternoon have been curtailed appreciably. By this measure the workman -is prevented from starting his day by drinking alcohol, and the -afternoon break prevents the drinker from soddening all day. - -The effect of these combined measures has been highly beneficial. The -quantity of beer sold fell from 34,152,739 barrels of 36 gallons at -standard gravity of 10.55 in 1913, to 23,885,472 standard barrels in -1921. Spirits fell from 30,736,088 proof gallons in 1913 to 20,162,395 -in 1921. These figures represent a remarkable and almost sensational -reduction in the quantity of alcohol consumed by the population. -Convictions for drunkenness fell from 188,877 in 1913 to 77,789 in -1921. Deaths from alcoholic diseases were more than halved during the -same period. This is the most distinct advance in the direction of -effective temperance reform hitherto taken by the British Parliament, -and the effect is striking in its encouragement. - -It would be a serious national misfortune if the admirable results -attained by these war measures were lost by relaxations. Most of -the pressure exerted upon Parliament has up to the present been in -the direction of easing the grip of the state on the traffic. Most -candidates in all parties at the last election were forced to pledge -themselves to support reduction in the beer duty. Clubs, even more than -"pubs," have urged extensions in drinking hours. The beer duty has -already been reduced. It is anticipated that the reduction will have -the effect of increasing consumption. This is regrettable, for it means -so much reclaimed land once more sinking into the malarial swamp. - -There is one consolation, however, that the women will claim the -next turn in reduction of taxation. Sugar and tea will then provide -effective barriers in the way of a further cheapening of alcoholic -liquors just yet. But all this is a long, long way off prohibition. -A majority of 20 to 1 against Mr. Scrymgeour's prohibition bill, and -a majority of 4 to 1 in favour of cheaper beer--both recorded in the -same parliamentary week--is not encouraging to those who would suppress -alcohol in Britain. - -Temperance reformers here are, therefore, watching the progress of -America's bold bid for sobriety with hopeful, if anxious, eyes, and -with longing hearts. What Britain does next will depend entirely on the -success or failure of what America is doing now. - - - - -XXXI - -UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF "OFFICIAL" INFORMATION - - -A storm is working up over the publication by public servants of -information which came into their possession in the course of their -official careers. The immediate occasion is Mr. Winston Churchill's -story of the war. Angry questions are being asked in parliament, and it -is publicly announced that the Cabinet have appointed a committee of -its members to consider the whole problem. - -It is rather late in the day to make all this fuss about the -publication of war documents, for generals, admirals, and ministers -in all lands, including ours, have during the last three years -been inundating the European and American public with a flood of -reminiscences, explanations, criticisms, attacks and defences on the -conduct of operations, either of the Great War or the Great Peace, in -which they were engaged. Warriors on land and on sea have displayed an -unprecedented eagerness to inform the public as to their own share -in the great victory, and as to how much more brilliant that share -would have been but for the wrongheadedness or stupidity of some -collaborator. Like Julius Caesar, they mean to live in history not -merely through their battles, but also through their commentaries upon -them. On the other hand, statesmen have been engaged in disclaiming -responsibility for particular parts of the Treaty of Versailles, -and where blame has been attached to them, either by opponents or -supporters, for the form in which those parts were cast, they have -striven hard to prove that it was attributable to pressure which -they were unable to resist from other actors in the drama. In each -case highly confidential information is disclosed, secret documents -are used, cabinet and council proceedings are published, without the -slightest regard to precedent. One disclosure has led to another, one -revelation has rendered another inevitable. - -A general, admiral or minister criticises on the strength of -half-disclosed minutes or documents some other public functionary, -military, naval, or political. What is the latter to do? His -reputation is at stake. Is he not to be allowed to repair the -omission or to correct the misquotation? Take the case of ministers -who played an important part in the conduct of the war or the peace, -and whose actions have been subjected to malignant and persistent -misrepresentation. In attacking these ministers statements are made -which, if accepted by the public, would irretrievably damage or even -destroy their reputation. In formulating the attack a document is -partially quoted, or the report of a council or cabinet meeting is -misquoted. The minister knows that a full and fair quotation would -clear his good name of the imputation sought to be cast upon it. Is -he not to be allowed, in those circumstances, to publish it? A mere -denial would carry no weight. A full revelation would settle the -dispute in his favour. The publication cannot conceivably affect any -public interest, it would supply no information which could serve any -possible enemy of his country. Is he not to be allowed to use the only -means available to redeem his credit from the ruin of accepted calumny? -His critic has been allowed to disclose secret information without -protest. Is he to be forbidden to do so in self-defence? He claims that -he served his country faithfully to the best of his powers in time -of crisis and peril. For that he is defamed by men who had access -to secret information and use it freely without criticism, censure -or demur. Why should his country deny him the same privilege for his -protection? That is the case which the cabinet committee will have to -consider. Whatever general rules may be laid down they must in all -fairness take into account these exceptional circumstances. Those who -are now taking a prominent part in emphasising the enormity of giving -to the public documents which were acquired in the public service -had not a word to say when portions of those documents were used for -purposes with which they were in sympathy. Is it not rather late for -them to protest now? There is such a thing as fair play even when -politicians are attacked. - -So far as the British are concerned the writing of the books of the -type alluded to was started, I think, by Field-Marshal Lord French of -Ypres, in his book, _1914_. This work is of the nature of an apologia; -and the writer, to assist in establishing his case, alludes to -discussions with the cabinet and does not hesitate to quote textually -secret memoranda and dispatches written by himself and others. The late -Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fisher, gives in his book, _Memories_, -examples of his own intervention at the war council meetings. In his -autobiography, _From Private to Field-Marshal_, which appeared some -time later, Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, who was for over two -years the confidential adviser of the cabinet and as such attended -all war councils and most war cabinet meetings, when it suits his -argument gives to the public his version of what passed at these highly -secret conclaves. Though he does not quote secret documents textually, -he describes the proceedings and deliberations of the supreme war -council, inter-Allied conferences and the war cabinet, and refers to -the opinions of individuals. In his recent speeches he has gone even -further. A still more recent work, _Sir Douglas Haig's Command_, is -the result of collaboration by two authors of whom one, at least, -held an official position during the war, being Sir Douglas Haig's -private secretary when he was Commander-in-Chief of the British army -in France. This book is even less reticent. It, also, is essentially -an apologia and justification of an individual. To establish their -case, the writers not only summarise some of the secret proceedings of -the supreme war council and war cabinet, but give extracts of their -decisions. These extracts are freely used as the basis of animadversion -on the council and cabinet of that day. It is true that some of -the quotations are stated to be taken from French books previously -published, but others are not, which arouses curiosity as to the source -of the knowledge displayed. - -In addition there have been endless articles in magazines and -newspapers, some signed, some written anonymously, all attacking either -ministers, generals or admirals, and most of them clearly supplied with -secret information by men who must have acquired it in their official -capacity. As to all these disclosures protest has hitherto been silent. -But when it is indicated that replies are forthcoming and that these -replies will reveal the real nature of the misquoted documents or -proceedings, the wrath of the assailants and their sympathisers knows -no bounds. - -What happened in reference to the consultations held in connection -with the framing of the peace treaty affords an illustration of the -way these revelations occur. The question of the publication of -these proceedings was definitely discussed at Versailles, after the -signature of the peace treaty with Germany on the 28th June, 1919, by -President Wilson, representing the United States, M. Clemenceau and M. -Simon, representing France, M. Sonnino, representing Italy, M. Makino, -representing Japan, and myself. This is what occurred on that occasion. -For the first time I quote from my own notes written at the time: - - - "President Wilson was strongly of opinion that these documents - ought to be treated as purely private conversation, and he - objected to the communication of the accounts given in the Notes - of the private conversations, in which all present had spoken - their minds with great freedom, as improper use might afterwards - be made of these documents. On the other hand, he did not object - to the Notes being communicated to special individuals in the - personal confidence of members of the Council. Though he looked - upon certain statements, the conclusions and the actions as being - official, and therefore available in the appropriate offices, the - actual conversations were private. In the United States no one - had the right to claim documents of this kind. President Wilson's - view was that each government should take the course traditional - in its own country with the clear and distinct understanding that - no one should under any circumstances make the _proces verbal_ - public. M. Clemenceau did not think that such documents should be - regarded as private property, whilst M. Sonnino thought they need - not be considered as official documents. - - "For my own part I was anxious to know what the precedents were. I - also felt bound to enter a caveat that if attacks should be made - on the political heads I might be forced in particular cases to - refer to these Notes, and I gave warning that I might have to do - so unless a protest was then made. M. Clemenceau agreed so far, - that it might be impossible to refuse extracts from the _proces - verbaux_ to prove particular facts." - - -It will be observed from this record that I was the first to safeguard -the interest of persons who, I felt certain, would be attacked for -their share in the treaty. I am the last to take advantage of the -proviso. - -What followed? M. Clemenceau was bitterly attacked by his political -opponents for surrendering French rights to the treaty. President -Wilson was also attacked by his political opponents for his assent to -other provisions of the treaty. In self-defence they authorised the -publication of the secret reports of the Paris meeting. - -M. Clemenceau entrusted his defence to M. Tardieu. M. Tardieu, in -his book _The Truth About the Treaty_, gives most of his attention -to the drawing up of that international instrument, but deals with -the last portion of the war period and quotes from the proceedings -of inter-allied conferences, and also of the supreme war council, -giving the opinions of individuals. He does the same with the -deliberations of the peace conference. In fact the whole book is -based on international proceedings of a secret nature. M. Poincare, -in maligning his rivals, has not refrained from making full use -of information which came to his knowledge as President of the -Republic. For example, in his article, _Souvenirs et Documents_, in -the _Temps_ of the 12th September, 1921, he quotes _in extenso_ a -letter of April, 1919, from himself as President of the Republic to -the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, and a letter from me in -reply to the President of the Council. My consent was not even asked -to the publication of my letter. This correspondence referred to the -period proposed to be placed on the occupation by the Allies of the -left bank of the Rhine. According to Signor Nitti, M. Poincare makes -somewhat similar disclosures in his articles published in the _Revue -des Deux Mondes_. All these disclosures were partial, truncated and, -therefore, misleading. They did not give the public a complete account -of what occurred. The impression created was, therefore, unfair to the -other actors in that great drama. That is undoubtedly what impelled -ex-President Wilson to hand over his documents to Mr. Ray Baker -with a view to the presentation of the case from the standpoint of -the American delegation. Hence his book, _Woodrow Wilson and World -Settlement_. It is mostly based on the secret minutes of the supreme -war council, numerous extracts from which are given. Signor Nitti, -the late Italian premier, on the other hand, expressly states that he -does not publish any document which was not intended for publication. -Nevertheless, he prints a memorandum written by myself for the peace -conference in March, 1919, under the title of _Some Considerations -for the Peace Conference before they finally Draft their Terms_, and -also M. Clemenceau's reply, both of which are secret documents. But he -excuses his action in this case because extracts from this memorandum -had already been published. - -I only mention these matters, not by way of arraignment of these -various distinguished men for divulging secrets they ought to have kept -under lock and key. That is not in the least my object. I do so in -order to point out that general rules as to the conditions under which -confidential material can be used are not applicable to circumstances -of the Great War and the peace that ensued. Disclosures already made -largely for purposes of criticism and aspersion upon individuals -or bodies of individuals have given the assailed parties a special -position which cannot in justice be overlooked. - -_London, March 17th, 1923._ - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHERE ARE WE GOING?*** - - -******* This file should be named 60262.txt or 60262.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/6/0/2/6/60262 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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