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diff --git a/old/60068-0.txt b/old/60068-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 1a20773..0000000 --- a/old/60068-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11207 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of An ethical philosophy of life presented in -its main outlines, by Felix Adler - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: An ethical philosophy of life presented in its main outlines - -Author: Felix Adler - -Release Date: August 6, 2019 [EBook #60068] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE *** - - - - -Produced by Turgut Dincer, Les Galloway and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from images made available by the -HathiTrust Digital Library.) - - - - - - Transcriber’s Notes - -Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected. Variations -in hyphenation and accents have been standardised but all other -spelling and punctuation remains unchanged. - -Footnotes are located at the end of the chapters. - -Italics are represented thus _italic_. - - - - - AN ETHICAL - PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE - - PRESENTED IN ITS MAIN OUTLINES - - BY - FELIX ADLER - - - - - D. APPLETON AND COMPANY - NEW YORK LONDON - 1920 - - - - - COPYRIGHT, 1918, BY - D. APPLETON AND COMPANY - - - Printed in the United States of America - - - - -PREFACE - - -This book records a philosophy of life growing out of the experience -of a lifetime. The convictions put in it are not dogmatic, for dogma -is the conviction of one man imposed authoritatively upon others. The -convictions herein expounded are submitted to those who search, as the -writer has searched, for light on the problems of life, in order that -they may compare their experience with his, and their interpretations -of their experience with his interpretation.[1] - -It is a great hope that some of the readers of this book may find the -general world-view expounded congenial, and for them also real and -true. It is believed that others may find the practical suggestions as -to the conduct of life in which the theory issues helpful in part, if -not in whole, as many of us accept from the teachings of the Stoics, or -of other thinkers, practical precepts, without on that account adopting -the philosophy from which these precepts are derived. - -The book is divided into four parts: the first an autobiographical -introduction describing the various stations on the road by which -the author arrived at his present position, and offering incidental -appreciations and appraisements of the Hebrew religion, of Emerson, -of the ethics of the Gospels, of Socialism and of other social reform -movements. - -The second part expounds the philosophical theory. - -The third part contains the applications of the theory to the more -strictly personal life, under the captions of the Three Shadows of -Sickness, Sorrow and Sin, and also to the principal so-called Rights to -Life, Property, Reputation. - -The fourth part applies the theory to the social institutions, to the -Family, the Vocation, the State, the International Society, and the -Church, these institutions being considered as an expanding series -through which the individual is to pass on his pilgrimage in the -direction of the supreme spiritual end. - -The principal problems considered are: - -1. How to establish the fundamental ethical dictum that every human -being ought to count, and is intrinsically worth while. This dictum has -been denied by many of the greatest thinkers, who assert the intrinsic -inferiority of some men, the intrinsic superiority of others. The -practice of the world also runs most distinctly contrary to it. How -then is it to be validated? - -2. The problem of how to attach a precise meaning to the term -“spiritual,” thereby divesting it of the flavor of sentimentality and -vagueness that attaches to it. - -3. How to link up the world’s activities in science, art, politics, -business, to the supreme ethical end. - -4. How to lay foundations whereon to erect the conviction that there -verily is a supersensible reality. - -For the repetitions that occur throughout the volume indulgence is -requested. In presenting an unfamiliar system of thought they may -sometimes assist the reader in retaining the thread. - -The work is conceived as a whole, and should be read through before any -part of it is more minutely examined. The theory of Part II especially -should be read in the light of the applications submitted in Parts III -and IV. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - BOOK I - - AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION - - CHAPTER PAGE - - I. PRELUDE 3 - - II. THE HEBREW RELIGION 14 - - III. EMERSON 27 - - IV. THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS 30 - - V. SOCIAL REFORM 43 - - VI. THE INFLUENCE OF MY VOCATION ON INNER DEVELOPMENT 58 - - - BOOK II - - PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY - - I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: CRITIQUE OF KANT 73 - - II. CRITIQUE OF KANT (_Continued_) 82 - - III. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON WORTH, AND ON THE REASONS - WHY THE METHOD EMPLOYED BY ETHICS - MUST BE THE OPPOSITE OF THAT EMPLOYED BY - THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 91 - - IV. THE IDEAL OF THE WHOLE 100 - - V. THE IDEAL OF THE WHOLE AND THE ETHICAL MANIFOLD 114 - - VI. THE IDEAL OF THE SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE AND THE GOD-IDEAL 125 - - - BOOK III - - APPLICATIONS: THE THREE SHADOWS, SICKNESS, - SORROW AND SIN, AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE, - PROPERTY AND REPUTATION - - I. INTRODUCTION 147 - - II. THE THREE SHADOWS: SICKNESS, SORROW, SIN 154 - - III. BEREAVEMENT 162 - - IV. THE SHADOW OF SIN 171 - - V. THE SPIRITUAL ATTITUDE TO BE OBSERVED TOWARDS - FELLOW-MEN IN GENERAL, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE - SPECIAL RELATIONS WHICH CONNECT US MORE - CLOSELY WITH SOME THAN OTHERS 179 - - VI. THE MEANING OF FORGIVENESS 202 - - VII. THE SUPREME ETHICAL RULE: ACT SO AS TO ELICIT - THE BEST IN OTHERS AND THEREBY IN THYSELF 208 - - VIII. THE SUPREME ETHICAL RULE (_Continued_) 220 - - IX. HOW TO LEARN TO SEE THE SPIRITUAL _Numen_ IN - OTHERS 223 - - - BOOK IV - - APPLICATIONS: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY, THE - STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, ETC. - - I. THE COLLECTIVE TASK OF MANKIND AND THE THREE-FOLD - REVERENCE 241 - - II. THE FAMILY 249 - - III. THE VOCATIONS 260 - - IV. THE PRACTICAL VOCATIONS 270 - - V. THE VOCATION OF THE ARTIST: OUTLINE OF A THEORY - OF THE RELATION OF ART TO ETHICS 277 - - VI. EDUCATIONAL VOCATIONS, OR VOCATIONS CONNECTED - WITH THE STATE 289 - - VII. THE STATE 305 - - VIII. THE NATIONAL CHARACTER SPIRITUALLY TRANSFORMED: - THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, OR THE - ORGANIZATION OF MANKIND 324 - - IX. RELIGIOUS FELLOWSHIP AS THE CULMINATING SOCIAL - INSTITUTION 341 - - X. THE LAST OUTLOOK ON LIFE 354 - - - APPENDIX - - APPENDIX I: SPIRITUAL SELF-DISCIPLINE 365 - - APPENDIX II: THE EXERCISE OF FORCE IN THE INTEREST OF - FREEDOM 369 - - INDEX 375 - - - - - BOOK I - - AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION - - - - -CHAPTER I - -PRELUDE - - -What this book offers is a system of thought and of points of view as -to conduct, as these have jointly grown out of personal experience. It -will be useful to introduce them with an autobiographical statement. -The ideas which follow are such as have been found by me, the author, -to be fruitful. Certainly I claim for them objectivity; but I do so -because of what I have found them to mean in my own life. He who has -been scorched by lightning knows that the effects of the lightning will -be felt by all who are exposed to the same experience. I narrate my -experience; let others compare with it theirs. - -There is, however, a serious, and most embarrassing difficulty in -the way of discussing the phases and vicissitudes of one’s ethical -development. Self-appraisement is necessarily involved in the -narration. The outstanding subject of ethics is the self and its -relations. The physicist, the chemist, the biologist, however the -methods they use may differ in other respects, agree in the endeavor -to eliminate the personal equation. The psychologist likewise does his -best to see the procession that moves across the inner stage like an -interested but detached spectator. In the case of ethics, however, the -personal factor cannot be eliminated, because the personal factor is -just the Alpha and the Omega of the whole matter; and if this be left -out of account, the very object to be studied disappears. - -Ethical standards are exacting, separated often from performance by the -widest interval. To set up a standard, therefore, is to reflect upon -oneself, to expose oneself to the backstroke of one’s own deliverances, -to be plunged perhaps into deep pits of self-humiliation. How shall -anyone have the courage to face so searching a test, or the hardihood -to discuss with a lofty air, and to recommend to others ideals of -conduct against which he knows that he daily offends? How can anyone -teach ethics or write about it? The words of the Sermon on the Mount, -“Judge not that ye be not judged,” seem to apply very closely. Do not -judge others, do not lay down the law for others, because in so doing -you will be judged in the inner forum, becoming a repulsive object in -your own eyes, or standing forth a whited sepulcher. In brief, to touch -the subject of ethics is to handle a knife that cuts both ways, to cast -a weapon which returns upon him who sends it. - -The difficulty then which confronts the ethical writer is that the -attitude of detachment possible in other branches of investigation is -found to be impossible when one attempts to sound the profundities -of that kind of inner experience which is called ethical. The self -obtrudes itself at every point, and it instinctively refuses to be -humbled. What may be denominated the struggle for self-esteem has -indeed played a leading rôle both in the outer and inner history of -mankind. This struggle, whose immense importance is often overlooked, -accounts for even more interesting facts than the biological struggle -for existence. The desire to exercise power over others, often ruthless -in the means adopted, is frequently nothing more than a miserable -attempt to save self-esteem by covering up the inner sense of the -weakness of the self. But the same struggle penetrates also into the -realm of theoretical ethics with which we are concerned. Here it -tampers with the standards which mortify self-esteem, by inventing -such ethical theories as seem to make the problems of personality easy -of solution, and by blinking the tragic facts of guilt, remorse, etc. -Various ethical systems that are in vogue at the present time are, at -least in part, exemplars of this process—the theory for instance that -ethics is nothing more than a calculus of self-interest, or a matter -of sympathetic feeling, or a balancing of the more refined against the -grosser pleasures. The instinct of self-preservation, in the shape of -the preservation of self-esteem, is quite incorrigible, and against its -insidious suggestion we have reason to be particularly on our guard in -the discussion which we are entering. - -Are we then to refrain, out of sheer regard for decency, from touching -on this subject at all? Is everyone who writes on ethics, or attempts -to teach it, either a pedant or a hypocrite? But we cannot avoid -discussing it, nor resist the impulse to teach and write about it, for -it is the subject on which more than any other we and others sorely -need help and enlightenment. And we shall get help in the endeavor -to afford it to others. This, then, is my position: I do not presume -to lay down the law for anyone. I find that I can set forth the -better standards which in the course of trial and error I have come to -recognize. I would not shamelessly expose mere private failures and -failings after the manner of Rousseau in the “Confessions”; for there -is a tract of the inner life which ought to be kept from publicity and -prying intrusion. I shall then deal with deflections only in so far as -they can be traced to false standards or principles, and as they tend -to illustrate the flaw in those standards and principles. - -What I state as certain is certain for me. It has approved itself as -such in my experience. Let others consult their experience, and see -how far it tallies with that which is here set forth. A distinction, -however, I wish to call attention to between the theory as expounded -in the second part of this volume, and the practical applications to -be found in the third and fourth parts. Persons who are not trained -in metaphysical thinking or interested in it, may do well to omit the -reading of the second part. To those who are competent in philosophical -thinking, and who disagree with the positions there taken, I may -perhaps be permitted to suggest that one can dissent from a philosophy -and yet find help in the applications to which it leads. And, after -all, it is the practice that counts. - -With these preliminaries, I now proceed to delineate briefly the stages -of inner development which have led me slowly and with much labor to -the system of thought described in the following pages. - -One of the leading principles to which I early gave assent, and to -which I have ever since adhered as a correct fundamental insight, is -expressed in the statement that every human being is an end _per se_, -worth while on his own account.[2] - -Every human personality is to be safe against infringement and is, -in this sense, sacred. There is a certain precinct which may not be -invaded. The experience which served me especially as the matrix of -this idea was the adolescent experience of sex-life,—the necessity -felt of inhibiting, out of reverence for the personality of women, the -powerful instincts then awakened.[3] - -The fact that I had lived abroad for three years in frequent contact -with young men, especially students, who derided my scruples, and in -the impure atmosphere of three capital cities of Europe, Berlin, -Paris and Vienna, where the “primrose path” is easy, tended to make -the retention of my point of view more difficult, and at the same time -to give it greater fixity, also to drive me into a kind of inward -solitude. I felt myself in opposition to my surroundings, and acquired -a confidence, perhaps exaggerated, to persevere along my own lines -against prevailing tendencies. - -I ought next to mention the decay of theism which took place in my mind -in consequence of philosophic reading. Already at an early age I had -stumbled over the doctrine of Creation. I remember asking my Sunday -School teacher—How is creation possible? How can something originate -out of nothing? The answer I received was evasive, and left me uneasy -and unsatisfied. On another occasion I ventured to suggest to the same -authority—a revered and beloved authority—that the conception of God -seemed to me too much like that of a man, too much fashioned on the -human model; and he amazed me beyond words by replying that he himself -sympathized more or less with the ideas of Spinoza. This chance remark -set me thinking, and seemed to open wide spaces in which my mind felt -free to travel—though I never tended in the direction of Spinoza.[4] - -My thoughts were driven still further by reaction against the narrow -theology of the lectures on Christian Evidences as taught at that time -in Columbia College, where I was a student. And all these influences -came to a head in the atmosphere of the German university at Berlin. -There I heard Zeller, Duhring, Steinthal, Bonitz. Above all I came into -contact with Herman Cohen, subsequently and for many years professor -of philosophy at the University of Marburg, and undertook to grapple -in grim earnest with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The net outcome -was not atheism in the moral sense,—I have never been what is called -an atheist,—but the definite and permanent disappearance of the -individualistic conception of Deity. I was attracted by the rigor, -the sublimity, of Kant’s system, and especially by his transcendental -derivation of the moral law. The individualistic basis of his ethics, -which is quite uncongenial to me, I ignored, and for a time simply -accounted myself a follower of Kant. Very often since then I have -discovered that men, unbeknown to themselves, are apt to sail under -false flags, ranking themselves Kantians, Socialists, or what not, -because the system to which they give their adherence attracts them -at some one outstanding point, the point namely, where it sharply -conflicts with views which they themselves strongly reprobate; and they -are thus led to overlook other features no less important in which the -system is really uncongenial to them. Thus a person who recognizes the -evils of the present wage system may label himself a Socialist, simply -because Socialism is most in evidence as an adversary of the wage -system, while he may by no means agree with the positive principles -that underlie Socialism, when he comes to examine them dispassionately. - -I thought at that time of the Moral Law as that which answers to -or should replace the individualistic God-idea. I believed in an -unknown principle or power in things of which the Moral Law is -the manifestation, and I found the evidence of the moral law in -man’s consciousness. Matthew Arnold’s “the power that makes for -righteousness” is a phrase which at that time would have suited -me,—though perhaps not entirely even at that time. I have since come -to see that “making for righteousness” is a conception inapplicable to -the ultimate reality, and is properly applied only to human effort; -since purpose implies that the end sought has not as yet been realized, -and non-realization and ultimate reality are contradictory ideas. The -power that only makes for righteousness cannot be the ultimate truth in -things. The utmost we can say is that the ultimate reality expresses -itself in the human world as the power that inspires in men moral -purpose. - -To return to my personal experiences, there fell into my hands, while -still a student abroad, a book by Friedrich Albert Lange entitled -_Die Arbeiterfrage_ (The Labor Question), which proved epoch-making -in my life. Bacon says in his essay _Of Studies_: “Some books are -to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and -digested.” He might have added that there are books that make a man -over, changing the current of his existence, or at least opening -channels which previously had been blocked.[5] - -_Die Arbeiterfrage_ is not a great book. In the literature of the -subject it has long since been superseded. Yet it opened for me a -wide and tragic prospect, an outlook of which I had been until then -in great measure oblivious, an outlook on all the moral as well as -economic issues involved in what is called the Labor Question. My -teacher in philosophy, Cohen, once said to me sharply, that if there -is to be anything like religion in the world hereafter, Socialism -must be the expression of it. I did not agree with his statement that -Socialism spells religion, and have not seen my way to this day toward -identifying the two. But I realized that there was a measure of truth -in what he said,—and that I must square myself with the issues that -Socialism raises. Lange helped me to do this. - -He aided me in other respects as well. His _History of Materialism_ -dispelled some of the fictitious glamor that still hung about the -materialistic hypothesis at that time,—though the last chapter on the -ultimate philosophy of life, in which he identifies religion with -poetry, is distinctly weak. I read his book on the Labor Question with -burning cheeks; no work of fiction ever excited me as did this little -treatise. It was ethical in spirit, if not in its ruling ideas. It -favored productive co-operation, and seemed to point a way to immediate -action, as Socialism did not. - -The upshot of it was that I now possessed a second object, namely, the -laborer, to whom I could apply my non-violation ethics. I had always -felt an instinctive, idealizing reverence for women, and this had its -influence in the first practical outcome of the philosophy of life with -which I started on my career. I would go out as the minister of a new -religious evangel. Instead of preaching the individual God, I was to -stir men up to enact the Moral Law; and to enact the Moral Law meant at -that time primarily to influence the young men with whom I came into -contact to reverence womanhood, and to keep inviolate the sacred thing, -woman’s honor. And now I had a second arrow in my quiver. I was to go -out to help to arouse the conscience of the wealthy, the advantaged, -the educated classes, to a sense of their guilt in violating the human -personality of the laborer. My mother had often sent me as a child -on errands of charity, and had always impressed upon me the duty of -respecting the dignity of the poor while ministering sympathetically -to their needs. I was prepared by this youthful training to resent the -indignity offered to the personality of the laborer, as well as the -suffering endured by him in consequence of existing conditions. - -Accordingly, on returning from abroad, my first action consisted in -founding among men of my own or nearly my own age a little society -which we ambitiously called a Union for the Higher Life, based on -three tacit assumptions: sex purity, the principle of devoting the -surplus of one’s income beyond that required for one’s own genuine -needs to the elevation of the working class, and thirdly, continued -intellectual development. A second practical enterprise attempted was -the establishment of a co-operative printing shop. This having failed -because of the selfishness actuating the members, the Workingman’s -School was founded, with the avowed object of creating a truly -co-operative spirit among workingmen. - -I must, however, pause at this point to explain how the development -described led me to separation from the Hebrew religion, the religion -in which I was born, and to the service of which as a Jewish minister -it was expected that I should devote my life. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] In view of the writer’s connection with the Ethical Culture -Societies it is fitting to state expressly that the philosophical -positions herein set forth are not to be taken as an official -pronouncement on behalf of the Ethical Culture Movement. The Ethical -Societies as such have no official philosophy. _See_ Book IV, Chapter 9. - -[2] Though I must at once mention the first great error which -accompanied the true insight, the shadow which went alongside of the -light, namely, my understanding of the above principle mainly in a -negative sense. My ethics was largely what may be called non-violation -ethics. - -[3] The relation of chastity to the birth of the idea of personality -among the Hebrews I have touched upon elsewhere. The Hebrew people -abhorred promiscuity, or the dishonoring of oneself by indiscriminate -mingling. It is instructive that this did not stand in the way of -polygamy. Those persons whom the Hebrew received, so to speak, into -the sphere of his personality, did not imperil his sense of personal -intactness. And personal intactness seems to have been the determining -motive in the severe attitude taken toward prostitution. The fact -that the worship of other gods, the worst of crimes in the eyes of -the Hebrew legislator, was described as “whoring after other gods” is -particularly significant. The sacred, sensitive self, the holy thing -whatever it might be, which the Hebrew discovered within his own sex -experience, was thereafter attributed also to others, and especially to -those who had the same aversion to promiscuity as he. Hence perhaps the -limited ascription of holiness to members of the Hebrew people. - -[4] Pantheism has always seemed to me the least satisfactory of -theological or ethical solutions. The system of thought which will -be found later on in this volume may have a certain superficial -resemblance to Pantheism, but in reality is as far from it in origin -and purpose as pole from pole. - -[5] There are also passages in books that have the same revolutionizing -effect (Cf. the passage quoted from St. Paul in St. Augustine’s -“Confessions”). However, it is curious to observe that the effect -brought about may be quite out of proportion to the cause. The book or -the passage may prove to be of inferior value, so far as its subject -is concerned, and may yet serve suddenly to call attention to the -subject itself, and give rise to trains of thought that eventually -go far beyond the impetus that set them in motion. “Ripeness,” says -Shakespeare, “is everything,”—ripeness to receive the impetus. -Relatedness to the state of mind of the recipient is the decisive -factor, and this accounts for the astounding changes that result. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE HEBREW RELIGION - - -The separation was not violent. There was no sudden wrenching off. -There were none of those painful struggles which many others have had -to undergo when breaking away from the faith of their fathers. It was -all a gradual, smooth transition, the unfolding of a seed that had long -been planted. I have never felt the bitterness often characteristic of -the radical, nor his vengeful impulse to retaliate upon those who had -imposed the yoke of dogmas upon his soul. I had never worn the yoke. I -had never been in bondage. I had been gently guided. And consequently -the wine did not turn into vinegar, the love into hate. The truth is, I -was hardly aware of the change that had taken place until it was fairly -consummated. One day I awoke, and found that I had traveled into a new -country. The landscape was different; the faces I encountered were -different; and looking casually into a mental mirror, as it were, I -perceived that I too had become different. And I was sure also that I -had gained, not lost, that into my new spiritual home I had taken with -me, not indeed the images of my gods, like Æneas, fleeing from Troy, -but something for which those images had stood, and which in other ways -would remain for me a permanent possession. - -It has been said that the science of today lives only in so far -as it supersedes the science of yesterday. Whatever may be true -of science (and the statement is certainly not true without large -qualifications—the science of Newton and Darwin has not been -“superseded”—and it may even come to pass that outreachings of a more -ancient science frustrated at the time will hereafter be taken up anew -with fairer results than formerly were attainable), in religion at -all events there is no such thing as the bare substitution of the new -for the old. The religions of the past, at least the more advanced -religions, are not simply to be cast on the scrap heap, or treated as -exploded superstitions. There is in all of them a certain fund of truth -which may not be allowed to perish, but should be rescued out of the -wreck. - -On the other hand, even the most advanced religions contain a large -admixture of error, survivals of primitive taboos, mythological -elements having their root in polytheism, while the very truths which I -have just admitted to be infinitely precious require to be restated so -as to fit them into a larger synthesis. - -It is not easy to define my attitude toward the Old Masters, I mean -the Old Masters in religion, the incomparably great religious teachers -of the past, who tower above us like giants. My attitude is one of -profoundest reverence—toward the Hebrew prophets and Jesus especially. -The Hebrew religion first sounded the distinctively spiritual note. -Zoroaster had emphasized the struggle of the powers of Light and -the powers of Darkness, but the conception of light in his system -remained to a considerable extent materialistic. Buddha emphasized -Enlightenment in the sense of escape from Illusion, and in conjunction -with it sympathy for all who remain under the spell of illusion. -Confucius endeavored to walk, and taught his followers to walk, with -equipoise in the Middle Path; he emphasized what he thought to be the -cosmic principle of balance or equilibrium. Plato, taking his stand on -the highest terrestrial platform, caught, or believed himself to have -caught, sight of transcendental beauty as the ultimate principle in -things. But the prophets of Israel assigned to the ethical principle -the highest rank in man’s life and in the world at large. The best -thing in man, they declared, is his moral personality; and the best -thing in the world, the supreme and controlling principle, is the moral -power that pervades it. - -The predominance of the ethical principle in religion dates from the -prophets of Israel. The religious development of the human race took -a new turn in their sublime predications, and I for one am certainly -conscious of having drawn my first draught of moral inspiration from -their writings.[6] - -But nevertheless I found myself compelled to separate from the religion -of Israel. Now why was it necessary for me to take this step? Why not -continue along the path first blazed by the Hebrew prophets—smoothing -it perhaps and widening it? Why not separate the dross from the -gold, the error from the truth, explicating what is implicit in that -truth, and adapting it to the needs and conditions of the modern -age? The answer is that the truth contained in the Hebrew, and as I -shall presently show, in the Christian religion, is not capable of -such adaptation. It claims finality. I have mentioned that there is -an element of permanent value in both the Hebrew and the Christian -religion, and that it should be restated and fitted into a larger -synthesis. But this is impossible unless the Hebrew or Christian -setting be broken, unless the element to be preserved is taken out of -its context, and treated freshly and with perfect freedom. A religion -like the two I am concerned with is a determinate thing. It is a closed -circle of thoughts and beliefs. It is capable of a certain degree -of change but not of indefinite change. The limits of change are -determined by its leading conceptions—the monotheistic idea in the one -case, and the centrality of the figure of Christ in the other. Abandon -these, and the boundaries by which the religion is circumscribed are -passed. - -The great religious teachers are men who see the spiritual landscape -from a certain point of view, including whatever is visible from their -station, excluding whatever is not. The religion which they originate -is thus both inclusive and sharply exclusive. What they see with -their rapt eyes they describe with a trenchancy and fitness never -thereafter to be equaled.[7] But in order to progress in religion it is -necessary to advance toward a different station, to reach a different, -a higher eminence, and from that to look forth anew upon the spiritual -landscape, comprehending the outlook of one’s predecessors in a new -perspective, seeing what they saw and much besides. - -Religious growth may also be compared to the growth of a tree. To -expect that development shall continue along the Hebrew or Christian -lines is like expecting that a tree will continue to develop along -one of its branches. There is a limit beyond which the extension of a -branch cannot go. Then growth must show itself in the putting forth of -a new branch. - -But let me now state with somewhat greater particularity the reasons -that compelled me to depart from the faith of Israel, and to leave my -early religious home, cherishing pious memories of it, but nevertheless -firmly set in my course towards new horizons.[8] - -1. The difficulty created by the claim that Israel is an elect people, -that it stands in a peculiar relation to the Deity. This claim, at -the time when it was put forth, was neither arrogant nor unfounded. -It was not arrogant because the mission was understood to be a heavy -burden not a privilege: or if a privilege at all, then the tragic -privilege of martyrdom, a martyrdom continued through generations. -And the claim was not unfounded or preposterous at the time when it -was put forth because the Hebrews were in reality the only people who -conceived of morality in terms of holiness. It was not absurd for them -to assert their mission to be the teachers of mankind in respect to -the spiritual interpretation of morality, since there was something, -and that something infinitely important, which they actually had to -teach. Moral thinking and moral practices of course had existed from -immemorial times everywhere, but the conception of morality as divine -in its source, as spiritual in its inmost essence,—this immense idea -was the offspring of the Hebrew mind. On the other hand, I asked -myself, has not the task of Israel in this respect been accomplished? -Have not its Scriptures become the common property of the civilized -nations? And does not that teacher mistake his office who attempts to -maintain his magisterial authority after his pupils have come to man’s -estate, and are capable of original contributions? The “nations” are -not to be looked upon in the light of mere pupils. The ethical message -of Israel so far as it is sane is universalistic. It is founded on -the conviction that there is a moral nature in every human being, and -that the moral nature is a spiritual nature. And if this be so, then -the utterances, the insights, the new visions with which the spiritual -nature is pregnant, cannot be supposed to be restricted to members of -the Jewish people. If the teaching function is to be maintained it -must be exercised by all who have the gift. If there is to be an elect -body (a dangerous conception, the meaning of which is to be carefully -defined), it must consist of gentiles and Jews, of men of every race -and condition in whom the spiritual nature is more awakened than in -others, peculiarly vivid, pressing towards utterance. - -2. Aside from the spiritual interpretation of morality, the mission -of the Jewish people has been said to consist in holding aloft the -standard of pure monotheism as against trinitarianism. But pure -monotheism is a philosophy rather than a religion. Taken by itself it -is too pure, too empty of content to serve the purposes of a living -faith. The attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, etc., ascribed to -Deity are highly abstract, too abstruse to be even thinkable, save -indirectly, and they certainly fail to touch the heart. As a matter -of fact it was the image of the Father projected upon the background -of these abstractions, that made the object of Jewish piety. Jahweh -is the heavenly spouse; Israel is to be his faithful earthly spouse. -The Children of Israel are pre-eminently his children. Other nations -likewise are his children,—some children of wrath to be cast out -and destroyed like the rebellious son in Deuteronomy, others to be -eventually gathered into the patriarchal household. But this view comes -back to the same general conception of the relations of Israel to other -nations which has just been discussed. Moreover, the Father image, as -representing the divine life in the world, even when extended so as to -include all mankind on equal terms, is open to a serious objection.[9] - -3. If, nevertheless, the Jews have a mission, is it perhaps this: to -rehabilitate the prophetic ideal of social justice? Is it not social -justice that the world is crying for today? Were not the prophets of -Israel the great preachers of righteousness in the sense of social -justice? Did they not affirm that religion consists in justice and in -its concomitant mercifulness, but above all in justice? Did not Isaiah -say: “When ye come to tread my courts, who has demanded this of you? -Go wash you, make you clean. Put away the evil that is in your hands. -Cease to do evil; learn to do good.” And later on, “That ye let the -oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke.” These are solemn, -marvelous words assuredly! They have been ringing down through the -ages, and still find their echo in our hearts. And yet the justice -idea of the prophets is inadequate to serve the purpose of social -reconstruction today. To go back to it would mean repristination, not -renovation. It is sound as far as it goes, but it does not go far -enough. It is negative, rather than positive; it is based on the idea -of non-violation. What we require today is a positive conception, and -this implies a positive definition of that holy thing in man that -is to be treated as inviolable. To the mind of the prophets justice -meant chiefly resistance to oppression, since oppression is the most -palpable exemplification of the forbidden violation. The prophets in -their outlook on the external relations of their people stood for the -weak, the oppressed, against the strong, the oppressor. They stood for -their own weak little nation, the Belgium of those days, against the -two over-mighty empires, Egypt and Assyria, that bordered it on either -side. In the internal affairs of Israel they espoused the cause of -the weak against the rich and strong: “Woe unto them that add house -to house and field to field, that grind the faces of the poor.” Ever -and ever again the same note resounds, the same intense, passionately -indignant feeling against violation in the form of oppression. But this -aspect of justice, as I have said, is the negative aspect,—inestimably -important, but insufficient. Where oppression does not occur, have the -claims of justice ceased? Is there not something even greater than -mere non-infringement, greater than mercifulness or kindness, which in -justice we owe to the personality of our fellows, namely, to aid in the -development of their personality? Righteousness, yes, by all means,—but -does the righteousness of the prophets of Israel exhaust or begin to -exhaust the content of that vast idea? - -The universalistic ethical idea in the Hebrew religion is bound up with -and bound down by racial restrictions. The issue between monotheism -and trinitarianism is no longer a vital issue of our day. The Father -image as the symbol of Deity raises expectations which experience does -not confirm. The ideal of social justice as conceived by the prophets -of Israel is a valid but incomplete expression of what is implied in -social justice. These are weighty considerations that make it difficult -to retain the belief in the elect character attributed to the people of -Israel. There is one other, of very deep-reaching importance, that must -be noticed. An elect people is supposed to be an exemplary people, one -that sets a moral example which other nations are expected to copy. But -it has become more and more clear to me that the value of example in -the moral life has been overestimated and misunderstood. No individual, -for instance, can really serve as an example to others so as to be -copied by them. The circumstances are always somewhat different, the -natures are different, and the obligations, finely examined, are never -quite the same. In fact, the best that anyone can do for another by his -example is to stimulate him to express with consummate fidelity his -different nature in his own different way. I do not of course deny that -there are certain uniformities, chiefly negative, in moral conduct, but -I have come to think that the ethical quality of moral acts consists -in the points in which they differ rather than in those in which they -agree. The ideally ethical act, to my mind, is the most completely -individualized act. - -And what is true of individuals is no less true of peoples. No people -can really be exemplary for other peoples, and in this sense elect. -Every people possesses a character of its own to which it is to give -expression in ways which I shall indicate in the last part of this -work. But the way rightly adopted by one nation cannot be a law or a -model for its sister nations. If the ideal of the modern Zionists were -realized, if the Jews were to return to Palestine, to speak once more -the language of the Bible, to cultivate their distinctive gifts, they -would not therefore produce a pattern which could be copied in Japan, -or among the 400 millions of China, or in the United States, or among -the Slavic or Latin peoples. - -In concluding these reflections, I may not conceal from myself or -from others that the objection to the function of exemplariness, if -sustained, affects at the root both the theology and the ethics of the -past. If no individual can be in the strict sense an example to others, -neither can an individual Deity be an example to be copied by men, -neither can Christ be the perfect exemplar to be imitated. There can -be no single perfect exemplar. Virtues that bear the same name are not -therefore the same virtues. Often it is only the name that is the same, -not the substance; and where they are in a broad way the same, yet -there remains a difference of accent. The natures of men are unlike. -Their moral destiny is to work out the unlikeness of each in harmony -with that of the others. The moral equivalence of men, rather than -their moral equality, is for me the expression of the fundamental moral -relation.[10] - -At the early stage of my career to which I am still adverting it was -urgently put to me that with all the changes that had taken place in -my inner life, I need not separate myself from the religion of the -Fathers, nay, that I might remain a servant and teacher of religion -within the Jewish fold, gradually weaning away from the beliefs which -they held those whom I might contrive to influence, and drawing them -up—such was the phrase used—to my own “higher level.” But this advice -was repelled by every inmost fibre of my being, and could not but be -utterly rejected. I was to publicly represent a certain belief with -the purpose of undermining it. I was to trade upon the simplicity of -my hearers in order to rob them of what they, crudely and mistakenly -perhaps, considered their most sacred truth, by feigning provisionally, -until I could alter their views, to be in agreement with them. Would -this be fair to them or to myself? Was I to act a lie in order to teach -the truth? There was especially one passage in the Sabbath service -which brought me to the point of resolution: I mean the words spoken -by the officiating minister as he holds up the Pentateuch scroll, “And -this is the Law which Moses set before the people of Israel.” I had -lately returned from abroad where I had had a fairly thorough course in -Biblical exegesis, and had become convinced that the Mosaic religion is -so to speak a religious mosaic, and that there is hardly a single stone -in it which can with certainty be traced to the authorship of Moses. -Was I to repeat these words? It was impossible. I was certain that they -would stick in my throat. On these grounds the separation was decided -on by me, and became irremediable. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[6] I still go back to that fountain-head for refreshment and -inspiration, much as a modern poet may go back to Homer, without -attempting to copy him, or as a modern sculptor or architect may go -back to the Greek artists without relinquishing his right and his duty -to help in producing a different kind of art, which perchance may one -day culminate in masterpieces like theirs, though his own performance -be but the poor beginning. - -[7] Compare the ejaculatory deliverance of Isaiah, the Sermon on the -Mount, and the Parables of Jesus. Who can attempt in language to -express what they saw as they did? - -[8] No seriously religious person will attempt to strike out into a -new path unless he be under inward coercion to do so. The advantages -of what is commonly called historic continuity (I have just shown -wherein real continuity consists, that of growth along the trunk, and -not of growth along the branch) are great. There is for one thing -the support derived from leaning on an ancient tradition, the proud -humility felt in passing on the torch that had been held by mighty -predecessors, the self-dedication to that which is larger than self, -_i.e._, to an institution and ideas that existed in the world before -one was born, and will exist after one is gone. There is the strength -drawn from contact with a large and powerful organization, powerful -both in sustaining one’s efforts, and in restraining and correcting -them when need be. There are, on the other side, the perils of -innovation, the errors into which one is led for lack of restraint and -correction, the too great dependence on self, the spiritual loneliness -and the lack of many gracious and useful aids to the religious life -such as a noble ritual, majestic music, the fit emotional expressions -of religious feeling, which are not to be had for the asking, the -fine embellishments that are precious in their way, and that, like -the fruits in the Gardens of the Gods, ripen slowly, and may not be -extemporized or anticipated. - -[9] See Chapter IX on the Religious Society in Part IV of this volume. -It gives rise to the belief that men as individuals or collectively -are the objects of a special Providence, and that the universe is -so arranged as to be adapted to man’s needs, not to say his wishes; -whereas the facts show that man must adapt himself to the universe, -and find his physical safety and his ethical salvation in so doing. -The belief in the Father who allows not one hair of our heads to fall -unnoticed raises expectations to which actual experience fails to -correspond. - -As to the issue between monotheism and trinitarianism, it has long -since become obsolescent, if not obsolete. The forward-looking men and -women of our time are absorbed in far other issues—Is the mechanical -theory propounded by science the ultimate account of things? Is the -world in which we live a blind machine? Is man a chance product of -nature, like the beasts that perish? Not is God one in unity or is He -a Triune God, but, is there a God at all? Is there a supersensible -reality? Is religion capable of a new lease of life, and of giving a -new lease of life to us who now are spiritually dead? - -[10] Of many ethical types of behavior no examples whatever as yet -exist, for instance, of the ethically-minded employer or merchant, -ethically-minded in thought and in practice. The standard of ethical -behavior which we apply is at present higher and more exacting. The -standard itself indeed is in process of being defined, and there are -no illustrations of it, or none but very imperfect ones, on which to -dwell with satisfaction. But the same is true of other vocations. We -are very thankful for any examples that can be found. They seem to -prove that that which ought to be can be. But we may not lean on them -too hard. They are never quite adequate, even in their limited sphere; -and there is ever an Ought-to-be beyond that which has been even -partially realized, beyond that which has even as yet been conceived. -To make too much of example is to check moral progress. Along with a -due appreciation of past moral achievements, there should be encouraged -a spirit of brave adventure, a certain intrepidity of soul to venture -forth on voyages of discovery into unknown ethical regions, taking the -risks but bent upon the prize. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -EMERSON - - -I find on looking backward that my development proceeded with the help -of a series of definitions fixing my attitude toward teachers who made -a special appeal to me, and toward great historic tendencies past and -present. I was helped both by what I was able to appreciate in them, -and, where I diverged, by what they forced me to think out for myself. -Here let me acknowledge a passing debt to Emerson. As in the case -of Kant, a strong attraction drew me toward Emerson with temporary -disregard of radical differences,—although the spell was never so -potent or so persistent in the latter instance as in the former. I made -Emerson’s acquaintance in 1875. I came into touch with the Emerson -circle and read and re-read the _Essays_. The value of Emerson’s -teaching to me at that time consisted in the exalted view he takes -of the self. Divinity as an object of extraneous worship for me had -vanished. Emerson taught that immediate experience of the divine power -in self may take the place of worship. His doctrine of self-reliance -also was bracing to a youth just setting out to challenge prevailing -opinions and to urge plans of transformation upon the community in -which he worked. But I soon discovered that Emerson overstresses -self-affirmation at the expense of service. For a time indeed I -reconciled in my own fashion the two contrary tendencies. The divine -power, I argued, flows through me as a channel—hence the grandeur -which attaches to my spiritual nature. But the divine power manifests -itself in redressing the wrongs that exist in the world, and in putting -an end to such violations of personality as the sexual and economic -exploitations which disgrace human society. So for a time I continued -to walk on air with Emerson, and had my head in the clouds,—the clouds -in which Emerson enveloped me. - -Out of this false sense of security, this quasi-pantheistic -self-affirmation, the experiences of the next few years effectually -roused me. I came to see that Emerson’s pantheism in effect spoils his -ethics. Be thyself, he says, not a counterfeit or imitation of someone -else. Be different. But why! Because the One manifests itself in -endless variety. Penetrating below the surface, however, one finds that -in this kind of philosophy the value of difference, to which I attach -essential importance on ethical grounds, is nothing more than that of -a foil. According to Emerson life is a universal masquerade, and the -interest of the whole business of living consists in the ever-renewed -discovery that the face behind the different masks is still the same. -Difference is not cherished on its own account. And here, as in the -case of the uniformity principle of Hebraism, I found myself dissenting. - -Emerson is a kind of eagle, circling high up in the ether—_non soli -cedit_. - -Emerson with his oracular sayings might have served as a priest at -Dodona or led the mysteries at Eleusis. Yet, withal, he is genuinely -American,—a rare blend of ancient mystic and modern Yankee,—a valued -poet too, but as an ethical guide to be accepted only with large -reservations. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS - - -At about this time I began to occupy myself more seriously than I -had done before, with the study of the New Testament. I had, I think -a great advantage in my approach to it, for the very reason that I -had not been brought up in the Christian tradition. I came from the -outside, with a mind fresh to receive first-hand impressions. I had -not had instilled into me from childhood the kind of hesitant awe -that prevents impartial appraisement of excellences and of possible -deficiencies. On the other hand, as a searcher I was deeply interested -to ascertain what Christianity could give me, and to what extent it -could further my spiritual development. I had not the enforcedly -apologetic attitude; I did not come prepared to accept without question -nor yet to find fault; I came to test for my own use. Here am I, with -life and its problem before me—how can the teachings of Jesus help me -in my search, in my dire perplexities? - -I must say to begin with that I was particularly struck with the -originality of Jesus’ teachings, a quality in them which to my -amazement I had found disputed, not only by Jews, but by representative -Christians. In Jewish circles it is not uncommon to speak almost -condescendingly of Christianity as of a daughter religion commissioned -to spread abroad the truths of Judaism, with such alloy as may be -needed to suit them to the apprehension of the gentiles. But Christian -teachers likewise—I remember particularly a recent sermon to that -effect—have taken the ground that Jesus added nothing new to the -ethical insight of mankind. His work, it is said, consisted merely in -supplying a sufficient motive for performing the duties which everyone -knows, but which, lacking this motive, we are supposedly impotent to -practice. This strange misapprehension of the intimate nature of Jesus’ -contribution to ethical progress is largely due, I take it, to the -poverty of our moral vocabulary. Language puts at our disposal only -a few terms, such as Justice, Righteousness, Love,—which must needs -stand for a great variety of moral ideas. Thus Justice in Plato’s use -of the word, implies that “a shoemaker shall stick to his last,” that -those who perform the humble functions shall be content to perform -them in due subservience to their superiors. A very different meaning -was attached to justice by the Hebrew prophets as I have explained -in the last chapter. Again, a quite different conception of justice -is framed and stressed by modern social reformers. Now it is this -ambiguity of the moral vocabulary that conceals the novelty of Jesus’ -precepts. Thus, to mention only a single capital instance, it has been -asserted that the Golden Rule as taught by Jesus is not original, but -substantially the same rule that had been laid down by Confucius 500 -years before the time of Jesus. But on closer scrutiny it will be seen -that the two Golden Rules are by no means the same. As propounded -by the Chinese sage the rule appears to mean: Keep the balance true -between thyself and thy neighbor; illustrate in thy conduct the -principle of equilibrium. As impressed upon his disciples by Jesus it -means: Look upon thy neighbor as thy other self; act towards him as if -thou wert he. - -To return to my point, the impression of novelty which I received -in reading the Gospels was definite and striking. The mythological -idealization of Jesus, indeed, I put aside as a thing that did not -concern me. On the other hand, to say with certain modern liberals -that he was just a man, an infinitely gracious personality, one who -exemplified in his life the virtues of forgiveness and self-sacrifice, -did not satisfy me either. Buddha too had taught forgiveness: “For -hatred is not conquered by hatred at any time; hatred is conquered by -love.” It could not then be the bare precept of forgiveness that lets -light on the secret of Jesus. And self-sacrifice—“Greater love hath no -man than this, that he should lay down his life for his friend”—had -been practiced within and without the pale of Hebraism. - -That he continued the work of his Hebrew predecessors I made no doubt. -On the Hebrew side he was a prophet, or rather, a saint in Israel. But -I had just as little doubt that he took a step beyond his predecessors, -that his teachings bear upon them the signature of originality. - -To put my thought briefly, I came to conclude that the ethical -originality of Jesus consists in a new way of dealing with the problem -of evil, that is, of evil in the guise of oppression. The prophets, his -predecessors, as we have seen, identified injustice with oppression; -and in the first flush of their moral enthusiasm the more optimistic -among them believed that justice as they conceived of it would -presently triumph and that oppression would cease altogether—“Arise, -shine, for thy light is come.” God would miraculously interfere, and -bring about on earth a state of righteousness. But years and centuries -passed by, and oppression, far from ceasing, became under the ruthless -administration of Rome ever more grinding and terrible. The yoke of -Rome weighed upon the Jews as it did upon other peoples; but perhaps, -because they were more independent in spirit, it galled them more -sorely. The fiery zealots among the Jews persisted in hoping that -by supreme desperate efforts, God coming to their aid, they might -yet succeed in shaking off this yoke—efforts which culminated in the -horrors of the last siege of Jerusalem. Jesus was not of their way of -thinking. He seems indeed to have believed that the end of the existing -order was near. It was too incredibly bad to last. The world would -be consumed by fire. A new earth and a new heaven would appear. But -in the meantime how accommodate oneself to the intolerable fact of -oppression? Jesus said, Resist not evil in the guise of oppression, it -is irresistible. He mentions in particular three forms of intolerable -oppression: a blow in the face, the stripping of a man of his garment, -and the coercing him to do the arbitrary bidding of another. He says, -Resist not evil, resist not oppression. Shall then evil triumph? Is the -victim helplessly at the mercy of the injurer? Shall he even be told -that in a servile spirit he must accept the indignities that are put -upon him? No; this is not the meaning. Quite a different meaning is -implied. And here the teaching of Jesus takes its novel turn. There is -a way, he says to the victim, in which you can spiritually triumph over -the evildoer, and make your peace with irresistible oppression. Use -it as a means of self-purification; pause to consider what the inner -motives are that lead your enemy, and others like him, to do such acts -as they are guilty of, and to so violate your personality and that -of others. The motives _in them_ are lust, greed, anger, wilfulness, -pride. Now turn your gaze inward upon yourself, look into your own -heart and learn, perhaps to your amazement, that the same evil streams -trickle through you; that you, too, are subject, even if it be only -subconsciously and incipiently, to the same appetites, passions, and -pride, that animate your injurers. Therefore let the sufferings you -endure at the hands of those who allow these bad impulses free rein in -their treatment of you lead you to expel the same bad impulses that -stir potentially in your breast; let this experience fill you with a -deeper horror of the evil, and prove the incentive to secure your own -emancipation from its control. In this way you will achieve a real -triumph over your enemy, and will be able to make your peace with -oppression. There are other intolerable evils in the world besides -oppression which nevertheless must be tolerated. The method of Jesus -can be applied to these also. This method I regard as a permanent -contribution to the ethical progress of humanity. - -A second original trait in Jesus’ teaching I found in his conception -of the spiritual nature, and of his doctrine of love as dependent on -that conception. The conception or definition is still negative as -in the non-violation ethics of the Hebrew prophets. The spiritual -element in man is hidden. It cannot be apprehended as to what it -is substantively. The attributes ascribed to it are the effects in -which it manifests itself; this goes without saying. To define the -spiritual nature means to describe these effects, these manifestations. -According to the Hebrew predecessors of Jesus the spiritual power is -to be conceived of as that which prompts a man to respect the holy -precinct of personality in others and in himself. What the holy thing -is remains unknown. This view leads to acts of justice and mercy, as -above explained. According to Jesus the spiritual essence in man bids -him expel the inner, impure impulses that lead to external violations. -In brief, the spiritual power is conceived of in terms of purity. It -is the pure thing in man that thrusts out as alien to itself whatever -is impure—whatever is of the world, the flesh, and, in mythological -language, whatever is Satanic. In this sense I say that the definition -is negative. It marks out, indeed, a definite line of conduct; and it -even leads, as we shall presently see, to active efforts in a specific -direction. A negative principle may have certain positive results. -But in the main, nevertheless, the teaching of Jesus enlightens us as -to what shall not be rather than as to what shall be. From the Hebrew -prophets we learn that there shall not be violation of personality or -injustice, the positive concomitant being mercy; from Jesus’ teachings -we learn that there shall not be impurity in the inner forum, the -positive by-product being the doctrine of love. - -Taking over the Hebrew heritage, Jesus affirmed that the spiritual -nature exists in all human beings. In every man there is presumed to -be this inner power to reject the unclean admixtures, to ward off and -repel the carnal solicitations, to withdraw from the “world,” and to -move upward toward the source of purity, which is God. The spirituality -of man consisting of purity, the Father-God, the Father of Lights, -is likewise conceived as the absolutely pure, in this sense as the -most holy. In every man there is a ray of the eternal light emanating -from the eternal luminary, and all men are one in so far as their -rays converge at the focus of Godhead. To love men is to be conscious -of one’s unity with them in the central life, and to give effect to -this consciousness. Hence Christian love, the love that Jesus taught, -is no earthly love, no mere sentiment, or outreaching of the human -affections. On the contrary, the natural human ties are repeatedly set -aside in the _logia_. To love another is to love him in God. Later the -current phrase became, to love him in Christ; that is, to think of him, -and act towards him, as if he possessed the same capacity for purity -with oneself. - -The love of others in God or Christ encouraged a particular kind of -earthly beneficence, and it especially inspired the followers of -Jesus with an unparalleled zeal in works of remedial (though never of -preventive) charity. This may at first sight seem paradoxical. The -young man is advised to dispossess himself of all he has, and in the -same breath is told to distribute his possessions among the poor. -Why not rather scatter them to the winds? Why should not the poor too -cease to toil and spin and take heed for the morrow? For their simple -necessities God would provide. The two-fold attitude, however, is easy -to understand if we remember that certain acts of helpfulness have a -symbolic significance, as attesting the value we set upon the person to -whose needs we minister, much as a flower offered to a beloved person -emblematically intimates our sense of the beauty and worth of the one -to whom the tribute is offered. Christian charity, on its earthly -side, has a similar meaning and purpose. It is intended to efface the -indignity to which human beings are subjected when reduced to extreme -indigence or allowed to suffer without relief, for it is the disdain -of the spiritual personality thus evinced which Jesus disallows. He -bids his followers intimate by earthly tokens their consciousness of -the super-earthly worth of their fellow-beings. But the pursuit of -riches as such he nowhere encourages—quite the contrary. And it is -certainly a mistake to represent Jesus, as has recently been done, as -a kind of precursor of modern Socialism, and to think of him as one -who, if he had lived in our time, would have laid stress on equality -of opportunity for all to gain earthly possessions. He who advocated -wealth for none could not be supposed to have sympathized with a social -movement whose first object it is to secure wealth for all. - -It is this interpretation of love that helped me to understand the -interior meaning of the doctrine of the forgiveness of enemies -as taught by Jesus, and to perceive wherein it differs from the -apparently identical mode of behavior enjoined by Buddha and the Stoic -Seneca. It plays a capital rôle in Jesus’ teaching. As illustrated -by the proto-martyr Stephen it probably effected the conversion of -Paul. Jesus says: “Bless them that curse you.” But how is it possible -to bless those that curse us? How, for instance, was it possible for -Stephen to bless the men of blood at the very moment when they were -crushing him under stones? To bless them that curse you, to bless them -that despitefully use you, means to distinguish between the spiritual -possibilities latent in them and their overt conduct, to see the human, -the potentially divine face behind the horrible mask, and to invoke the -influence of the divine power upon them in order that it may change -them into their purer, better selves. - -With complete and eager appreciation of the points of excellence -contained in these teachings, with a reverence which it is impossible -to express in words for their incomparable Author, and with a large -sense of the beneficent influence which they have exercised on human -history, I still could not avoid the question, so vital for me, Have -these ethical teachings of the great Master the stamp of finality upon -them? Has Jesus really spoken the last word in ethics? Is nothing left -for us but further to expand and apply the truth which he laid down -once and for all? When theology goes, the last stand of apologetic -writers is apt to be made on the ethics. The instinct to claim finality -for the religion in which one has been brought up asserts itself in the -claim that the moral teachings at least are unexceptionable and valid -for all time to come. The searcher who is in great moral perplexities -and who seeks help for others and himself, is bound to ask and will ask -in no captious spirit, is this so? - -The decisive point is whether the ethical teachings of Jesus supply -a principle which enables us to work with zest in the world, to take -the keenest interest in all the manifold activities of human society, -to embrace the world with the view of penetrating it with a spiritual -purpose and of thus transforming it. Do these teachings exhibit a -way of making the world and the flesh instrumental to the spirit, or -do they serve to turn us away from the world and its interests, to -abandon the world in despair? Is the conception of spirituality as -purity adequate? Purity is certainly one aspect of morality; is it -the sole or the principal factor in it? The other-worldly attitude -in the Gospels is certainly clearly marked. It is the background on -which the ethical precepts stand forth. Tyrrel has argued as against -Harnack for the close connection between the thought of Jesus and the -apocalyptic vision. I asked myself, Can the apocalyptic vision, that -is to say the other-worldliness, be dissociated from the ethics, or -is the relation between them necessary?[11] If the world is speedily, -almost immediately, coming to an end, then it is justifiable to prefer -celibacy to marriage, to ignore the state, to counsel disregard of the -toiling and the spinning. All of this is warranted on the assumption -that the order of things in which these institutions and activities -have their place is about to disappear. - -But if this expectation is deceived, if things continue in their -ancient course, if the world and the flesh persist, taking on ever new -and more baffling shapes, how is a system of ethics which is based on -the assumption of one state of things to be reconciled with a state -of things exactly the opposite? How shall an ethical person conduct -himself in a world which his philosophy of life teaches him to reject, -but with which the necessities of his existence compel him to come to -terms day by day and hour by hour? There must then be compromise. And -the history of Christianity up to the present moment is the record of -such compromises. Monasticism was one of the earliest. A distinction -was made, so to speak, between perfect and imperfect Christians, -between a class of men and women who lived in ascetic seclusion, as if -the world did not exist, and another class, the greater number, who -managed ethically as best they could, dependent on the supererogatory -merits of the real Christians or saints to eke out their unholiness. -Another species of compromise is illustrated, especially in Protestant -countries. It appears as a division between the contracted sphere -of holiness and the circumambient sphere of the practical life, in -both of which, however, the same individual has his place. Chastity, -forgiveness of personal enemies, and the like virtues are to be -practiced in the contracted sphere of private life, the ability to -practice these virtues being derived from mystical identification -with Jesus. In the Christian’s public life no such identification is -possible, and he is left to be consciously or unconsciously unholy. As -a politician, as a competitor in the struggle for wealth, he remains -without ethical direction. The ethical ideal of the Gospels requires -for its setting the apocalyptic vision. It derives its cogency from the -belief that the world is about to perish. Can it serve as a sufficient -guide to those who must live in the world, and affirm their ethical -personality in dealing with it? In politics, in business, in science, -in art, must we not somehow see our way to the conception that these -great interests are not alien to the spiritual nature, introducing -perchance impure admixtures into it, but rather can be made subservient -or instrumental to it? Yes; but instrumental in what way? At this -point, not only the Christian system, but every one of the systems of -ethics that have arisen since then has failed. And it is, moreover, -perfectly evident that the instrumental function of the sex relation -or of the pursuit of knowledge or of patriotism cannot be determined -unless we first answer the one question which the ethical writers are -in the habit of evading—Instrumental to what end? What is the ethical -end? Instruments are means to ends—how can the means be rightly -appraised without a definite conception of the end? And if the end be -the affirmation of our ethical personality, of our spiritual nature, of -that holy thing in us without which man loses his worth (and without -which the rule of non-violation itself falls to the ground, since where -there is nothing inviolable there can be no infringement), it is plain -that we must seek a positive definition of the spiritual nature which -shall serve as a principle of regulation where the empty concept of -purity has manifestly failed. - -Christian ethics has promoted the moral development of mankind in a -thousand ways. It has helped even by its mythological embodiment of a -transcendental idea to place the individual more firmly on his feet. It -has emphasized the inner springs of conduct; it has given prominence to -certain principal virtues of the private life; but, like every product -of the mind and aspirations of man, it exhibits the limitations of the -time and of the social conditions under which it arose. The conditions -have since changed. Society has become infinitely more complex, and -in consequence new moral problems have forced themselves upon men’s -attention; and with the help of Christianity itself the human race has -advanced beyond the point of view for which Christianity stands.[12] - -Speaking again only for myself I could not assent to the position -that finality appertains to the ethical teachings of the Gospel, that -they or their Author have spoken the last word in ethics. I could not -persuade myself that this is so because I failed to get from these -teachings, inestimably precious as they are, an answer to the question -that most pressed upon me—Instrumental in what sense, instrumental to -what end? - -FOOTNOTES: - -[11] I am aware that a highly esteemed school of modern theologians -maintain that the apocalyptic element is a secondary and even an -embarrassing feature for Jesus. But I am unable to convince myself of -the justice of this view. - -[12] See the similes used in the previous chapter on the growth of the -tree as manifested in the putting forth of a new branch, and the ascent -of an eminence which includes the part of the spiritual landscape -previously seen, but also that part which from the previous station was -excluded. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -SOCIAL REFORM - - -My position at that time may be summarized as follows: There is a -divine power in the world, not individual, manifest in the moral law -as revealed in human experience. The moral law involves recognition -of the presence of a something holy in each human being. Since the -world presents innumerable examples of the grossest violation of human -personality (e.g., prostitution and exploitation of laborers), the -business immediately in hand is to make an end of these violations. -There was as yet in my mind no positive definition of personality. -Clarification and further development were promoted by the necessity of -grappling with the problems of poverty and with the attempted solutions -of the Socialists and of other social reformers. At this period, the -notion of personality in my mind being still without determinate -content, empirical matter intruded, and a species of millennialism for -a time vitiated my thinking. In order to set up a goal for humanity, I -dallied with Utopias, and flattered my imagination with the vision of -something like a state of ultimate earthly felicity. The cheap cry of -“Let us have heaven on earth” was also on my lips, though the delusion -did not last long and perhaps never penetrated very deeply. - -The problem of poverty, as mentioned above, engrossed me early. I -acted as chairman of the meeting at which Henry George was first -introduced to the public in New York City. But Henry George’s -remedy,—a single draught of Socialism with unstinted individualism -thereafter—never attracted me, while his descriptions of the misery -of the poor, eloquent as they were, and fitted to awaken persons -unacquainted with actual conditions, conveyed to me no novel message. I -had before then been profoundly stirred by the chapters in Karl Marx’s -_Kapital_ in which he collects from the English Blue Books frightful -evidence of the mistreatment of laborers and especially of children in -the early part of the nineteenth century. My errands in the tenement -slums of New York had also made me fairly familiar with the bitter -facts, and throughout my life I have been in touch in a practical way -with the appalling complexus of misery and wrong which we abstractly -designate as the Labor Question. I shall not here take time to discuss -Socialism or other social reform movements in detail. My intention is -to sketch a certain philosophy of life, and to trace the steps by which -I reached it. My reaction against Socialism and related movements, -however, was a prime factor in this inner development; and it is of -this reaction and the causes of it that I must speak. - -The evils inherent in poverty are, in the first place, obviously, the -privations entailed by it; secondly, the fact that the greater part -of the life of the poor is consumed in efforts to provide the bare -necessaries, the mind being thus kept in bondage to bodily needs and -prevented from rising to other interests more appropriate to rational -beings; thirdly, the fact that the first two wrongs are caused, -not wholly it is true, but yet in a large measure, by fellow human -beings.[13] The sting in poverty is not so much the hardships suffered, -as the contempt for the manhood of the poor, exhibited by their -exploiters,—the inequity being thus turned into iniquity. - -Now my reaction against Socialism was and is that it neglects the -third, the moral evil, and stresses only the first and second. I -am now speaking of Marxian Socialism, with which in its rigid form -I early acquainted myself. The Marxian Socialist does not deny the -pain felt in consequence of the inequity, nor the desire of those who -suffer to become the equals of their masters; but he regards this -desire as a fact of nature explicable on deterministic grounds, a -consequence of improvement in the technique or tools of industry. He -does not deny that there are so-called moral ideas, but he considers -them epiphenomena or by-products of economic development. The tendency -toward equilibrium of power in human society, termed democracy, is to -him just a fact and nothing more. The mere desire for it apart from -the rightness of the desire is the efficient cause which leads to -social readjustments. But evidently this account of the matter will -be persuasive only in case the efficient cause proves to be really -efficient, that is to say, in case the desire for equilibration is -on the point of effectuating itself. If it is not, if the desire -of the masses for power is thwarted, if the realization of their -hopes is indefinitely postponed, then the foundations of the theory -are undermined. Hence Marxian Socialism has been coupled with and -depends on a belief which is a kind of materialistic parallel of the -apocalyptic vision of Jesus,—the belief that the end of the present -world (the world of the wage system) is close at hand, only with -the difference that the end is to be brought about not by divine -interference but automatically by the acquisition of power on the part -of the masses. - -To me neither hunger nor the bondage of the mind to physical -necessities nor the bare fact of inequity seem sufficient to justify -the demand for social reconstruction, apart from moral right. If there -be no such thing as morality, or if morality be but an epiphenomenon of -economic conditions, what warrant have the hungry or the disadvantaged -for complaining? Animals, too, hunger and sicken. If man be like them -a mere chance product of nature, why should he not share their fate? -Let the weak succumb! Surely the bald fact that the democratic masses -today chafe under the yoke of their masters and demand a better state -of things, is no more a ground of obligation for the former than the -tendency toward an ultimate equilibrium in nature of which scientists -speak can be a ground of obligation. The tendency will effectuate -itself or not as the acting forces determine. There is in truth no such -thing as obligation from this point of view. Then why not fold our arms -and wait for what will happen? The notion of democracy currently held -is obnoxious to the same criticism. Leave out the moral basis in the -claim to equity, and nothing remains but the brute fact that men, being -egotists, fret under the exercise of superior power by their fellow -egotists. But let Nietzsche or some one else demonstrate that certain -higher values, higher merely because subjectively relished as higher, -are incompatible with equilibrium of power, and he will be justified -at least in his own eyes in scoffing at equality and scourging the -democratic dogs back to their kennels. No one denies that the masses -have the desire to be treated as the equals of their masters (very -inconveniently for the latter), but it is quite another matter whether -their desire ought to be gratified. Social reconstruction, in other -words, must be motivated by other considerations than those by which -according to Marx the great change is to come about. - -I have not stopped to consider whether the Socialistic scheme is -workable, whether the run of mankind are capable of coöperative effort -on a large scale without the preëminent leadership of master minds; -whether Socialism, if carried out, would really breed, as it is -expected to, the sentiment of ideal brotherhood; whether the sentiment -of brotherhood itself, unless it be rooted in the closer family and -national ties, is morally sound, whether the emotional forces that -sweep through and overwhelm large aggregations of men, can be bridled -and sufficiently enlightened to promote the ends of Socialism. All such -questions as these touch the feasibility of the ideal proposed; my own -reaction was and is against the ideal _itself_. Instead of pronouncing -as some do that mankind are not yet ripe to carry out so high an -ideal, I found myself seriously challenging and finally rejecting the -very ideal on the ground that it is not a genuine moral ideal at all. -It is ethically spurious, because it omits the notion of right and -substitutes for it that of power. - -A different objection lies against certain modifications of Socialism -and against many of the social reform movements of our time. In -these movements the idea of personality is not absent as in Marx’s -theory. The inherent dignity of every human being is deeply felt, and -_per contra_ the indignity of the present condition of the greater -number. Man is worth while; and for the sake of the worth in him, the -unfavorable circumstances which stifle the promise of his nature are -to be changed. My objection in this case is that the higher spiritual -nature of man, or the notion of personality, is left indefinite and -remains vaguely in the background. It supplies indeed the initial -motive for practical efforts; but the instrumental relation of the -goods of life to the supreme good is not apprehended positively. And -thus the door is left open, as we shall presently see, for corrupting -influences to enter in. - -There seems, it is true, at first sight, considerable warrant for -demanding certain instant reforms without troubling about ulterior -spiritual ends. We are confronted in modern society with evils which -seem to require immediate abolition. Exploitation is palpably one of -them. It is the clearest possible case of trespass on personality. Why -not then demand respect simply for personality in general, without -inquiring into the nature of personality? Is it not beyond all -question dishonoring to human nature that some should be on the verge -of starvation while others are even themselves injured by excessive -possessions; that the energies of children should be exhausted by -premature toil; that adults should be worked like beasts of burden? -Why not leave in abeyance the definition of the supreme end, and -concentrate effort on the removal of these incontestable evils? - -My answer to this is, in the first place, that we cannot gain the -best leverage even for these initial reforms without a high and -defined conception of man as a spiritual being. Efforts directed -toward improving even material conditions are apt to be fluctuating, -spasmodic, and are ever in danger of dying down, unless material -improvement is seen in its relation towards something else that -commands the highest respect—implicit respect. Sympathy alone is -altogether inadequate. It often works grave harm; it is notoriously -intermittent, at one time broadly expansive and then again contracting -upon the nearest objects. Furthermore, we can at best sympathize -genuinely with only a very limited number of persons. If anyone were -to open his heart to the sufferings of all the millions of human -beings at present engaged in conflict on the battlefields of Europe; -if he were to try to realize the indirect consequences of this war; if -he were to take a still wider sweep and embrace in his imagination -the populations of India, China, and the races of Africa, the effect -upon him would be simply paralyzing. The possible effect of one’s -sympathetic action upon this huge volume of human suffering would -appear so insignificant as to make exertion on his part seem quite -irrational. We are assisted by sympathy in the matter of social reform -by the narrowness of our horizons; and even within these narrow -boundaries the efficiency of the motive depends largely upon the -transciency of the sympathetic mood. Sympathy as a permanent attitude -would disintegrate the self.[14] - -The second answer is that by ignoring the ultimate end we _install -proximate ends in its place_. The reform movements of our day abstain -from attempting to set up an ultimate good. They are content, as they -say, “to evaluate the tangible goods ready at hand.” In consequence -these tangible goods inevitably usurp the place of the supreme good. -Begin as we may with the high notion of personality, we become -materialists before we have proceeded very far, and we infect the -laboring masses with our materialism if we omit to define the relation -of proximate ends to the ultimate aim. For remember that the ultimate -end is that which prescribes the limits within which the nearer aims -are to be sanctioned,—the limit for each being the degree in which it -conduces toward the highest end. Without a goal set up, without an -explicit conception of its regulative function, the proximate ends -abound, and are likely to expand _ad indefinitum_. This is evident, -for instance, in the case of wealth-getting. The poor have not enough -wealth, the rich have too much. “Let us then redress the balance by -at least securing enough for the poor. The necessary limitations -we can discuss after they shall have at least reached the limit of -sufficiency.” But we are thus kindling the desire for wealth; and this -desire and its possible gratifications are boundless. It is in the -nature of desire to be prolific of new desire, and to aim unceasingly -at new satisfactions. First, a decent dwelling, sufficient food, -education for the children, are wanted, then luxury, then millions, -then multi-millions. Secondary motives take the place of primary ones. -Wealth becomes a token; the satisfactions it gives are no longer -related to actual wants or needs, but solely to a fantastic desire for -preëminence. Has not this been the actual history of many of those -who have risen from poverty to great riches? But the same desires are -present, though suppressed, unsatisfied, in the masses, who look up to -the few with admiration or envy. And suppressed desires are often even -more insidiously poisoning, more contaminating in their effects than -satisfied desires. - -The psychological fact is that human volition as expressed in action -is always determined by some end. A means is never adopted without -there being some object or purpose in view. Leave out the ultimate aim -and the means become themselves the ends. A decent subsistence should -be treated as related to the ultimate end,— a decent living, for -example, as a means to fit the worker for the duties of fatherhood and -citizenship. - -It may again be urged that what has been said is true only of the -ambitious minority, and that the masses would be quite content with a -decent subsistence if only that much could be assured them. But the -prevalence of cheap imitations of luxury among the poor points in the -opposite direction. At least in a democratic community, the ambitions -of the few are apt to be contagious. And where this is not the case, as -in some of the older countries of Europe, a certain sordid Philistinism -is apt to manifest itself. The life of the middle class in Europe is -without the restless brilliance that characterizes the upward-striving -class in America,—is not daringly but meanly materialistic. Redeeming -features are, of course, not wanting, yet how anyone can conceive the -social ideal as a state of things in which the laboring people shall -be raised to the level at present occupied by the “middle class” is -difficult for me to understand. Nor is it a sufficient rejoinder to -say that the present complexion of the middle class, its narrowness -and Philistinism, are due to isolation from the social classes -beneath them, and that the broad sentiment of universal fellowship -and fraternity, when it shall have come to prevail, will purify the -atmosphere on the middle level. I have sufficiently indicated my doubts -as to the efficiency and soundness of what is called fraternalism. - -In brief, if we are to preserve a man’s respect for himself as a moral -being, we must find a ground on which he can maintain his self-esteem -apart from the material conditions in which he is placed, and in -the interval before the desirable material changes can possibly be -accomplished. This interval is certain to be long. The betterment of -social conditions is sure to be gradual. The slum ought to be abolished -immediately, but until it goes we must find a reason to respect the man -in the slums even now, and a reason why he should respect himself even -now. This reason can only be derived from the spiritual nature of man, -from the spiritual end for which he exists; and on this account, above -all others, it is indispensable that the spiritual end be defined. How -painfully social reformers may be led into error by slighting this -consideration is seen in the readiness with which some have subscribed -to the amazing opinion that the issue between chastity and dishonor for -the working-girl depends ultimately on the amount of her wages. - -There are two fallacies that affect the social reform movements of -today. The substitution of power for right is one. What I venture to -call the fallacy of provisionalism is the second. This is the fallacy -of the opportunist movements. “Lead the laboring classes provisionally -up to the level of sufficiency, or of decent existence, and then we -shall see.” But man does not act without ends, and unless we define the -ultimate end, we give license to the proximate ends. In other words, we -simply cannot act provisionally. We cannot ignore our spiritual nature -without offending against it. We may start with the idea of serving it, -but without explicit definition of it we shall presently find ourselves -disgraced in all sorts of idolatries. - -What I am trying to show is how I came to perceive the inadequacy -of the non-violation ethics. Its formula is: “Admit the existence of -personality; do not infringe upon it. In your actions for the good of -others, try to abolish the manifest infringements or violations. Since -there must be some positive content to the idea of good, accept the -material or empirical goods as the provisional content with the general -understanding that they are to be instrumental to the higher life but -without troubling to define exactly how.” - -The aberrations to which this view leads on the side of action toward -others I have pointed out. A word now as to the injurious effect on -self. Of these the following are the most important: - -1. The leader in social reform is apt to be regarded by his followers -and to think of himself as a kind of savior. It is his sincere -intention to save society from some of the glaring evils with which it -is afflicted. But if salvation is sought in the betterment of external -conditions, the social savior is apt to become the victim of a false -sense of moral security. He is likely to be off his guard at the weak -points of his own character, and to fall abruptly from high levels into -the ditch. - -2. The social reformer who adopts the fallacy of provisionalism is apt -to be absorbed in the _mechanical_ details of his work,—the settlement -or the municipal reform society, or the charitable association tend -to become highly organized and efficient pieces of machinery. But -moral idealism declines in proportion as this kind of efficiency -increases,—the salt loses its savor. - -3. The social reformer who sets his heart on external changes is apt to -become _impatient_ to bring about those changes. For since he attempts -to work from without inwardly, and not at the same time from within -outwardly, he has nothing to show for his pains unless the desired -outward changes are actually effected. In this way may be explained a -certain dictatorial manner, a certain arbitrariness sometimes observed -in social workers of whose earnestness and devotion there can be no -question, the preposterous outcome being that in attempting to carry -out plans of reform in a democratic community such reformers offend -against the very principle of democracy by over-riding the personality -of others. - -4. The Social reformer who concentrates his attention on external -changes is apt to be ambitious of large results, to measure betterment -by statistical standards. Though quality be not overlooked, _quantity_ -is likely to be over-emphasized. - -5. The painful spectacle is sometimes presented of a leader in social -movements who _goes to pieces morally in his private relations_ -(becomes a bad father, a worthless husband, an unscrupulous sponge on -his friends, etc.). Absorption in extensive public movements has this -danger in it that it often tends to make men neglectful of the nearer -duties. - -Facts of this kind, which came repeatedly under my observation in -the course of years, drove home to my mind the conviction that the -provisional method in social reform (the method of working for external -changes without definition of the end) is morally perilous, both in its -effects on those who are to be benefited, and in its reaction on the -character of the reformer himself. I parted company with opportunism in -every one of its forms; I became more and more imbued with the belief -that no one can really help others who in the effort to do so is not -himself morally helped, i.e., whose character is not improved in every -respect, who does not become a _better_ father, husband, citizen, a -more upright man in all his relations in and because of his endeavors -to benefit society. I became convinced that the ethical principle must -run like a golden thread through the whole of a man’s life, in a word, -that social reform unless inspired by the spiritual view of it, that -is, unless it is made tributary to the spiritual, the total end of -life, is not social reform in any true sense at all.[15] - -The fundamental question, therefore, echoed and re-echoed with ever -intenser insistence: “What then is the holy thing in others? What -is the supreme end or good to which all the lesser goods should be -subordinate and subservient? And what is the holy thing in me?—for -I may not spiritually sacrifice myself. My own highest good must be -achievable in agreement with that of others. What definition of the -essential end is possible that shall reconcile egoism and altruism by -transforming and transcending them? And if there be such end thinkable -and definable, how establish the applicability of this end to empirical -man, either in the person of others or in my own?” - -I shall have to dwell on this subject at length in the sequel. Here at -the outset I cannot forbear expressing my sense of the obliquities, the -folly, the meanness, the cruelties which human nature often exhibits -on the empirical side when dispassionately contemplated. That there -are also finer traits in people, gleams of gold in the quartz, I do -not deny. But even in the best exemplars of the race the alloy is -not wanting. And it is an open question how far any human being, if -his whole make-up and all the circumstances that influenced him be -considered, can be called predominantly good, assuming that goodness -is a matter of desert and not of chance. How, therefore, a being that -to actual, impartial observation reveals himself as so dubiously worth -while, can be regarded as possessing the quality of transcendent worth -(which seems to be implied in the idea of personality as inviolable -and precious) will be the starting-point of my inquiry into the -philosophical first principle in the second part of this volume. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[13] I say _caused_, but perhaps not deliberately intended, although -there are instances of the latter. An act is diabolical when -maliciously designed to inflict a wrong on another; as rape for the -purpose of dishonoring a family. It is cruelly selfish but not fiendish -when it springs from scorn of others as if they were only fractional -human beings. The Brahmin’s attitude towards the lower castes, the -attitude of the feudal lord toward the serf, of Shakespeare’s nobility -toward the common citizens, and of some modern theorists toward the -democratic multitude, are instances in point. In such cases the moral -sense itself is astray, but there is perhaps no deliberate sinning -against the light. - -[14] I have not touched upon the further question to what extent we can -really compass the happiness, except at rare moments, even of a single -human being. The altruistic philosophy is apt to confound the removal -of manifest evils with positive benefaction. But the removal of one -kind of evil lets in new kinds; and wherein then consists the gain so -far as happiness is concerned? - -[15] To ward off the most serious misunderstanding, I must remind -every reader of the chapter on Social Reform, as well as on the Hebrew -religion and on the ethics of the Gospels, that I am narrating the -phases of my own development. I am not attempting to do justice to -all that is excellent in those great religions and in these great -social movements; I am trying to show at what points, despite those -excellences, I myself felt compelled to diverge from them, to push -beyond them. In regard to Socialism I recognize the immense service -it has performed in awakening the conscience of modern society to the -sufferings of the working class. And in pointing out the dangers of -opportunism, the fallacy of provisionalism, I am speaking of dangers -from which I felt that I must escape, not casting a slur on the noble -personalities that have appeared in the field of social reform during -my own time and among my friends and acquaintances. Such personalities, -because of their inbred fineness, may be immune against tendencies -which yet undeniably exist, and which therefore require to be -explicitly apprehended. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE INFLUENCE OF MY VOCATION ON INNER DEVELOPMENT - - -The present chapter deals with my inner development as I believe it -to have been furthered by my connection with the Society for Ethical -Culture. The functions intrusted to me in this connection were, first, -various forms of so-called philanthropic activity. The effects of the -experience gathered in them has been described in a preceding chapter; -they may be summed up in the formula: littleness in the external -results achieved, consciousness of moral danger to self. - -Secondly, the ministerial function of offering “edification” in public -addresses to Sunday assemblies, the solemnizing of marriages, and -the conducting of funeral services,—while in addition a large part -of my vocational life consisted in the building up of an educational -institution.[16] - -_The Public Addresses._ Edification, or building up, as I understood -it, involved the profoundly difficult task of supplying a working -philosophy of life without traveling into the field of metaphysics, -teaching the practicable counterpart of a connected system of thought -concerning the problems of life,—the system being so firmly knit as to -make the appropriate feelings and impulses more or less natural to its -exponent. In my case, not having fallen heir to such a system, the task -of edification became doubly difficult. It meant from the beginning -unceasing self-edification, with a view to edifying others.[17] Setting -out with a general scheme along Kantian lines, I proceeded to fill in -the outline in the course of my public teachings, with the result that -the content filled in eventually disrupted the scheme, and compelled -a thoroughgoing reconstruction. The Holiness conception had been my -starting point. I never gave it up. I was attracted to Kant because -he affirmed it. I broke with him because he does not make good his -affirmation. - -I began with Kantianism, which is predominantly individualistic, and I -found that in dealing with the problems of the family, with the labor -question, and in the attempt to reach an ideal of democracy beyond -the materialistic conception of it which is at present current—I -was introducing into my initial sketch elements incompatible with -individualism, and necessitating formulation in social terms. And since -I retained and stressed the notion of personality, I had to seek a way -of interpreting the term Social spiritually, as Kant had undertaken to -interpret the term individual spiritually. I certainly could not fall -in with Darwinism or other evolutionary interpretations of sociality, -inasmuch as they all leave out the concept of inviolable personality, -the indefeasible factor in my ethical thinking. - -These things are here alluded to in order to emphasize the influence -of the public Sunday addresses delivered by me regularly for more than -forty years in stimulating, I had almost said forcing, my ethical -growth. To care for anyone else enough to make his problem one’s own -is ever the beginning of one’s real ethical development. To care for -a group of people in the sense of being challenged to suggest to -them ideas and ways of behavior that shall really be of use to them -in the storm and stress of life, is the most searching incentive to -self-development imaginable. It is more powerful than the desire to -get truth for one’s own sake. The closet philosopher may be serious -enough in his search for truth, and he may succeed in constructing a -symmetrical system which at the time seems complete. Will it stand wear -and tear? Will it in the bitter moments of his life hold together? If -not, he has failed; but then he only is the loser, it is only his ship -that has gone down. But the situation is different when a company of -people venture with you on the same voyage, and trust to you as in a -way their pilot. - -The challenge that comes from the expectant eyes of those who are in -trouble, of those whose relations to their friends or the members of -their family have become tangled, the challenge that comes from the -larger public towards which every public speaker has a certain ethical -duty—all these challenges press home the question: are the things that -you believe true, so true that you may confidently expect them to be -confirmed by the experience of those who in some measure depend upon -you? Are they genuinely of use? - -There is also another kind of challenge that in a way is even more -taxing and searching: the silent appeal that comes from those who are -spiritually dead, from those who are sunk in sloth or sensuality, or -who waste their precious days in the pursuit of trivial, frivolous -ends, and from the insensitive consciences of the self-righteous and -the self-complacent. In the Bible we read that the prophet Elisha -once threw himself on the body of a dead child, in order with his own -life to kindle there the life that seemed extinct. In some such way -in public addresses, in which it is not the word but the personality -behind the word that counts, the speaker is bound to throw himself -body and soul, as it were, upon those who are spiritually numbed, and -to _enhance the life within himself_ in order to stir up life in them. -All of which means that the task of edifying others involves continuous -efforts at self-edification. - -_The Solemnizing of Marriages._ In solemnizing marriages I had -the experience that some of those at which I had officiated ended -disastrously,—there had been no real marriage at all. Though such -instances were not numerous in my own experience, yet the statistics -of divorce prove that the number of unfortunate marriages in this -and other countries is very large, and is increasing. What are -the foundations of a permanent relation such as would tend to the -development of personality in and through marriage? was the question -urged upon me. Here is a social tie in which two individuals, and later -the offspring, are combined in the closest propinquity. How can an -ethical theory of marriage be reached, that is, a theory dependent -on the idea of the joint realization of the highest end of life by -the members of the family group? This ethical theory of marriage will -be set forth in a subsequent part of this volume. Here I wish again -to mark the retroactive effect of the function I was called upon to -exercise in the Ethical Society on the development of theory. The most -incisive effect of my practical experience, however, was the being -compelled to encounter the effect of _frustration_. How reluctant is -the natural man to face this fact! How he shrinks, and puts up screens -between his face and the head of Medusa! In my earliest marriage -addresses I remember how I used to describe the relation as one in -which each of the partners receives the cup of happiness at the hands -of the other. The second time I performed the ceremony, the bride -was the only child of excellent friends, whose life was completely -wrapped up in their one daughter. She was a charming young girl, and -the bridegroom was a fine-grained person entirely devoted to her. That -marriage feast I shall never forget. A little less than a year after, -the young wife having died in child-birth, I was called in to speak -at her bier. Where, then, was the exchange of happiness? How suddenly -had the house of bliss fallen into ruins! A similar experience that -touched me even more deeply was that of a friend, the first one among -my associates who believed with me in the possibility of a religious -society without a dogmatic creed. The course of love in his case had -not run smooth. The marriage between himself and the lovely young -woman he wedded was the happy culmination of many trials, a haven -of peace after storms. Hardly more than two years elapsed when he -suddenly developed a fatal form of mental disease, and lingered for -ten years in a long, slow, degrading decline. I thus became acquainted -with frustration in one of its most woeful shapes. I remember how the -poor young wife, during those ten years, widow in all but name, sought -alleviation in various directions for her intolerable grief. Work to -occupy her mind was one; caring for the needs of the poor another. I -remember also how futile these devices seemed. She had lived “on the -heights”; she must now descend to lower levels; she had had first best, -she must now put up with second or third best. Gladly indeed would she -have exchanged places with some of the poor women whom she assisted, -could she have kept her husband at her side as they had theirs. It was -well enough for her to try to alleviate the troubles of these people, -but what were their sorrows compared to hers? And to keep the mind -occupied by work, what was it at best but a temporary anodyne? When -the work was over, in the still, lonely hours of the night, the storm -of grief would break with all the greater violence. I had not taught -these my friends a really valid spiritual conception of the purpose -of marriage: I had failed in that: and when they were in need of it -they did not have it to support them. They had looked on marriage as a -scene of felicity; they had not been taught to make allowance for the -frustration. - -I had not made preparation for the palpable frustrations just -mentioned, nor yet for others, for the discovery that the beloved -person is faulty, that the nimbus of divine personality does not -coincide with the character. And especially did the lack of any -explicit idea of personality prove fatal in those cases where the -frustration is most serious, where real or apparent incompatibilities -appear, or where actual degeneration occurs, and the hope of -regeneration becomes remote. - -_Bereavement_ was the second shape in which the fact of frustration -most often came home to me. Hundreds of times I have spoken to people -in the moment of the last leave-taking. The usual consolations, aside -from those that depend on mythological beliefs, are: Submit to the -inevitable; clinch your teeth and face the storms of fate. Remember -the debt you owe to the living. There is work that remains for you -to do. See to it that you do not by excessive grieving destroy your -capacity for work. Instead of indulging in sorrow for your own loss, -take upon yourself the sorrows of others. In particular it is uplifting -for one who has been more severely afflicted to take upon himself the -sorrow of those whose burden is lighter. Be grateful for what you have -possessed. Think not so much of what you have lost, as of what you were -privileged for a season to call your own. Make the virtues of those -who are no longer living a force for good in your own life. Paint the -portrait of your friend incessantly. Retouch it. Eliminate what was of -merely transient value in him. Remember him in the light of his best -qualities, and live so as to be able to endure his purified glance. -Or, in the case of those whose lives were stained, seek to expiate -their faults in your life. Purify and perpetuate them in this way -in yourself. Memory is not a mere passive receptacle, it is rather -a creative faculty. Let it play upon the lives that are no longer -sensibly present, and thus maintain the connection with them. A friend -living across the sea, whom you will never see again, may yet be a -living presence for you if you continue by the aid of memory to be in -communication with him. In the case of the departed, likewise, their -effectual influence may remain none the less real. - -These various modes of consolation have each a certain value. To -the one last mentioned I attach the greatest value. Bereavement is -a challenge for a fresh start in spiritual development. It should -not mean putting up with the second best, but reaching out toward -first best. The object to be achieved by the ethical teacher on such -occasions is to help the bereaved to tie anew the threads that have -been sundered, or rather to substitute a more ethereal but firmer tie -for the contacts mediated by the senses. But this task of the reweaving -of ties, spiritually, not sensibly, depends entirely for its success -upon a spiritual conception of personality. And if this be lacking, the -attempt is hopeless. Frustration itself must be recognized as partial -if it is to lead beyond itself. There must be found in man that which -cannot be defeated if the defeat is not to be accepted as final. - -A third kind of frustration was brought home to me by the problem of -specialization, as it presented itself in the course of my efforts to -work out an ethical theory true to the facts of life. To discharge -competently my own special function, I saw that I ought to be -acquainted with the best ethical thought of the past. This meant an -exhaustive study of the philosophical systems of which the ethical -thought of the philosophers is the fruit. I ought further to be -familiar with the great religions, in which so much of the ethical -insight of mankind is incorporated. I ought to acquaint myself with -the moral history of mankind in so far as it is accessible, including -that of the primitive races. I ought to gain a survey of the variations -of moral opinion that have so staggered belief in the possibility of -ethical truth. I ought to master at least the general principles of the -physical and biological sciences, since it is impossible that the first -principles of ethics should not be related to the governing principles -that obtain in other departments of knowledge. I ought in addition to -master in their ethical aspect the economic and political problems of -the present day, as well as the psychology of individual and social -life, in order to be able to apply with some degree of competence the -directives of ethics to actual conduct. There are in addition other -subjects, such as jurisprudence, poetry and the fine arts, that have -ultimate relation to ethics, and that may not safely be neglected. -Behold, then, the problem of specialism in one of its most appalling -forms. For how can any one individual hope to adequately fill out such -a programme? And what I have said is but my own personal illustration -of a general problem that more and more besets every reflective person -in our time. And it is a problem that has direct bearings upon the -question of human personality. The personality is not a detached and -isolated thing. It is a center that radiates out in every possible -direction, and depends for the release of its energy on the influences -received in turn from all directions. On the one hand, to have a -footing at all in reality one must be a specialist, and the fields of -specialism are becoming more and more restricted. To know one thing -well is the indispensable condition of the sense of mastery, yes, of -self-respect. And yet it seems to be becoming increasingly clear that -one cannot really master a single specialty without knowing of other -specialties whatsoever is related to one’s own. Narrowness, and loss -of power, and consequent decay of the special function itself, seems -the one alternative. Dilettantism, the other. But again I ask, who can -actually fill out such a programme? The frustration of effort thus -appears, in its intellectual guise, as one more manifestation of that -general fact of frustration which we meet with wherever we turn.[18] - -On the side of character the same reflections occur. Unity in the -direction of distinctiveness or uniqueness is the end and aim. -But instead of unity of character, conflict of inner tendencies, -ever-recurrent rupture of provisional harmonies, a duality of self -or multiplicity of selves, are the facts attested by one’s inner -experience. And frustration here, at the core of a man’s being, is -perhaps more painful and more seemingly contradictory of the very ideal -and purpose of ethical development than in any of the forms previously -recorded. - -The last instance of frustration that I will mention appears in -connection with the cosmic relation of our race. The thought of the -death of the individual may be overcome by the idea of perpetuity in -the lives of successors. The death of the human race, its eventual -extinction, is capable of no such assured compensation. We are ethical -beings, committed to the pursuit of an ideal end, yet the cosmic -conditions are such as to make the end unattainable within the limits -of a finite world. This unattainableness of the end it is true is the -very ground and foundation of the supersensible interpretation of -ethical experience. Yet this thought itself can only be made good by a -positive interpretation of personality (of the spiritual nature), which -we are yet to seek. As viewed empirically, the human generations are -but accidents of nature, waves on the sea of life, passing shadows. And -viewing ourselves in this manner our self-respect goes to pieces. The -idea of obligation vanishes. Man’s claim to infinite worth is bitterly -mocked. Unless we can reach the spiritual view of life, the frustration -of purpose in the large, that is, of humanity as a whole, is final. - -These then, summarily stated, are the problems with which an ethical -philosophy of life has to deal. - -1. How to remedy the belittlement of man, the infinitesimal -insignificance of him as a creature of time and space, when compared -with the immensities of the world around him—its spatial and temporal -immensities. What is man in the presence of these myriads of worlds, of -this unending procession of time that he should attribute to himself -significance, nay, worth? Is he perhaps an infinitesimal member of an -Infinite?—preserving in this way the sense of his littleness, and of -the vastness that bears down upon him, and yet maintaining himself -irrefragably at his station, as indispensable to the perfection of the -whole. - -2. How to discover a way of retaining the connection between man and -the lower forms of life that preceded him, not doing violence to the -facts which the evolutionists have brought out, and yet at the same -time assuring man’s spiritual distinction? Does he perhaps possess in -his ethical nature a window, so to speak, through which he can catch at -least a glimpse of the ultimate reality, of the infinite life which is -the real life, behind the picture screen of sea and mountain, plants -and animals? - -3. How to overcome the various types of frustration mentioned above: -frustration on its intellectual side, or the reconciliation of -specialist efficiency with breadth and relatedness; frustration on the -character side. - -Frustration in the social relations, as in marriage, or as in the case -of defective children. - -Frustration through bereavement, or the privation suffered by the going -out of our life of lives with which we are inseparably connected by -ethical as well as affectional ties. - -Frustration in the attempt to carry out projects of social betterment; -on what moral ground to assert the possible moral value of life in the -slums today, and at the same time to put forth and to stimulate the -most assiduous efforts to abolish the slum; on what grounds to affirm -that the best life is possible under the worst conditions, and yet not -to cease or for an instant relax the effort to change the conditions. - -The problem of how to support and console the wretched multitudes -of mankind in the interval that must elapse before the reform of -conditions can take real effect; the problem of support and consolation -in fatal sickness, on the deathbed, and in the harrowing recollection -of irremediable and irrevocable wrong done to others; the problem -raised by the prospective extinction, or the possible old age and -degeneration before extinction of mankind—all these problems should be -taken together, not one, for instance the so-called social problem, -accentuated, leaving the rest out of sight. From one peg they all -hang, on one cardinal idea they all depend—the idea of personality -as positively defined, of the holy thing as not merely inviolable -without regard to its content, but inviolable because of a certain -positive content. The ascription of worth to man, in this sense, is the -fundamental problem of all, and to the full discussion of this we shall -turn in the constructive part of the volume which is now to follow. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[16] See the published accounts of the Ethical Culture School. - -[17] The word “edification” as commonly used has a sentimental flavor. -It does not as a rule convey the idea of constructiveness at all. It -frequently suggests a kind of warm, moist, semi-tropical atmosphere for -the emotions of the hearer to simmer in. But in its genuine meaning of -“building up” it is too valuable a word to lose. - -[18] A new conception of culture is needed, based neither on exclusive -specialism, nor on the ambition to know everything after the manner of -Goethe in his early days, and such a conception of culture must supply -the foundation of an educational philosophy. - - - - - BOOK II - - PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY - - - - -CHAPTER I - -INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: CRITIQUE OF KANT - - -I begin my statement of the ethical ideal with a critique of Kant. -The reason for this is that Kant stands forth preëminent among all -philosophers as the one who emphatically asserts that the attribute -of inviolability attaches to every human being, in his formula that -_every_ man is to be treated as an end _per se_, and never to be -used as a mere tool by others. The formula as thus worded by him is -subject to grave objections which will be dealt with later on. But the -grand conception of the moral worthwhileness of all men is specially -connected with the name of Kant. Did he succeed, on the basis of his -system, in establishing this conception? He seems to make it the -corner-stone of his ethics. Is the corner-stone secure? - -Referring again to my individual development, I should find it -difficult to express how much Kant’s _Metaphysik der Sitten_ and -_Kritik der praktischen Vernunft_ at one time meant to me. - -The one ethical fact of which I was so to speak perfectly assured, -the “inviolability” so often mentioned in previous chapters, is -extremely hard to justify to the thinking mind. The empirical school -of philosophers scoff at the very notion of it. The practice of the -world is a perpetual, painful evidence of the small attention paid -to it, and even idealistic philosophers from Plato down have found it -quite possible to construct quasi-ethical systems based on the idea, -not of human equality, but of the inferiority of the greater number. -In Kant, however, one encounters an epoch-making philosopher who not -only accepts as a fact the idea of inviolability, and of the kind of -equality that goes with it, but who undertakes to set it forth in such -a manner as to command the assent of the reason. For a long time I -believed that he had succeeded in his great enterprise; and it was only -after years of discipleship, not indeed without suppressed misgivings, -that I began to see that I had been mistaken. - -My eyes were opened when I realized certain extremely questionable -moral consequences to which his doctrine led him: for instance, his -unspeakable theory of marriage, his defense of capital punishment, -the stiff individualism of his system, and his failure to establish -an instrumental connection between the empirical goods, of wealth, -culture, and the like, and the supreme good or supreme end as defined -by him. I was forced by these unsound conclusions to ask myself whether -the foundations of the system are sound. Surely if it is true of any -system of thought, it is true of an ethical system that it must be -judged by its fruits. The Kantian system is indeed vastly impressive, -and even sublime in some of its aspects. We travel on the road along -which Kant leads with a certain sense of exaltation, but when at the -end of our journey we find that we have reached a goal at which we -cannot consent to abide, it is imperative to inquire whether the point -of departure was well taken. - -The point of departure in Kant’s exposition is the existence in all men -of a sense of duty. Moral relations subsist only between moral beings. -All men possess a sense of duty,—therefore all men are moral beings, -therefore all are morally equal,—therefore no one may be used as a mere -tool for the benefit of others, but is to be treated as worth while on -his own account. Thus runs the argument. - -The sense of duty is the consciousness of being bound to render -implicit obedience to a categorical imperative. Our rational nature -tells us categorically what is right to do. Our rational nature issues -absolute commands. The sense of duty is man’s response to them. Kant -does not for a moment imply that either he or anyone else has ever -adequately obeyed. The moral dignity, the moral equality of men, does -not depend on the obedience but on the consciousness of the obligation -to obey—on acknowledged subjection to the command. The actual moral -performances of some men are certainly better than those of others; but -of no one, not even of the best of men, can it be shown that the moral -principle in its purity, that is, unadulterated by baser incentives, -was ever the actuating motive of his conduct. The different members of -the human species differ morally in degree, but are of the same moral -kind, being distinguished from the lower animals not because they obey -the moral law, but because they recognize the obligation to obey it. -This sort of consciousness may be dim in some, but it exists in all. -The most brutal murderer is dimly aware of the holy law which he has -transgressed. - -The great dictum of the universal moral equality of mankind is thus -made to depend on an assumed fact. If this fact can be successfully -disputed, the dictum itself is imperilled. It has been disputed, not -flippantly, but most seriously, and it is in my opinion obnoxious to -fatal objections. I do not indeed believe it possible to establish the -negative, to wit, that the sense of duty does not lurk somewhere, is -not latent somewhere in the consciousness of persons morally the most -obtuse; but I hold it to be impossible to prove the affirmative, to -wit, that a sense of duty does exist in all human beings, even in the -most degraded. Kant’s dictum of equality depends on making good the -affirmative proposition, but this he has failed to do. - -One circumstance especially which at first sight seems favorable to -Kant’s contention turns against him. He has been assailed on the -ground that his categorical imperative is a fiction, that no such -an imperative plays a rôle in the actual experience of men. On the -contrary, the actual experience of men is replete with categorical -imperatives. Nothing in the life of man plays a greater rôle than these -imperatives. The danger that threatens Kant’s demonstration is due -to the number of rival categoricals that compete with his, and from -which the one he sets up is not with certainty distinguishable. To put -the matter simply, what is called in technical language a categorical -imperative is nothing else than a way of acting somehow felt by the -individual to be obligatory upon him, whether he likes it or dislikes -it. It is a constraint in which he is bound to acquiesce, a public rule -of some sort which overrides his private propensities. - -Constraints of this sort are numerous. Many of them no one would think -of designating as moral. Some are distinctly antimoral. I will mention -a few:—for instance, the rules of behavior derived from the _tabu_ -notion. Certain kinds of food may not be eaten; certain objects like -the Ark of the Covenant in David’s time may not be touched.[19] Strict -_tabus_ obtain in regard to marriage such as the rules of endogamy and -exogamy. Certain persons may not even be looked at. A feeling of horror -is felt toward those who transgress these rules; and the transgression -of them is often considered far more reprehensible than a moral sin. -It would evidently be absurd to characterize a Hottentot or a Fiji -Islander as the moral equal of a civilized man on the ground that, like -the latter, he possesses the sense of duty, consisting in his case -of an unquestioning acknowledgment of the categorical imperative of -_tabus_. - -Gang loyalty is another instance in point. In one of our prisons a -certain convict is at present paying the penalty of a crime which was -really committed by one of his pals. He could have got off scot free -if he had “squealed.” But “squealing” is contrary to the honor code of -the gang and he preferred to sacrifice his liberty rather than prove -recreant to the claims of gang loyalty. There are some writers who hold -that this is an instance of morality, genuine as far as it goes, but -restricted within too narrow a circle. The fact that it is restricted -within too narrow a circle, that fidelity to a few is compatible with -violent hostility against the community at large, seems to me to -prove that the moral quality is absent. Morality is either universal -or nothing. Gang loyalty is a social phenomenon, but not an ethical -phenomenon. The distinction between the two terms will be enforced -later on. In any event the sense of constraint is manifest. The moral -character of the constraint I deny. - -Another example of an imperative which is categorical enough but -at the same time non-ethical is furnished by Darwin’s well-known -explanation of the original of conscience. He assumes that certain -ways of behaving which our ancestors found to be socially useful, have -become registered as it were in our organisms, and constitute a kind -of race-consciousness which persists in each individual. This latent -consciousness is potent as a tendency, though often not masterful -enough to repress the recalcitrant egoistic impulses. A conflict -ensues. The deep ingrained tendency makes itself felt. And as social -beings we are aware that we ought to side with it. But the egoistic -impulses break out on the surface of consciousness and vehemently -urge us in the opposite direction. The feeling of obligation, and -thereafter of remorse, are the record of the inner struggle. I do not -here undertake to discuss at length the truth of Darwin’s theory. -There are a number of weak spots in it, to which I shall merely allude -in passing. First, he speaks of acts found to be socially useful in -primitive communities. Is it possible to show that the same or similar -acts retain their utility in a developed industrial society like that -of the present day? Is not the term “socially useful” extremely vague, -and can the notion implied in it be expanded without the assistance -of a truly ethical principle?[20] Then again, why should the thing -called social utility overawe the individual mind and thwart individual -purpose? Why should not the daring egotist affirm his right to be and -flourish in the present hour, in the teeth of social utility? It will -be said that the claims are insistent, that the tendency is ingrained, -that it has become instinctive in him, and that he cannot release -himself from the control it exercises over him. But instincts can be -weakened and in time extinguished, like the fear of the dark, when -the absence of an objective cause is recognized. Why should not the -altruistic impulse likewise, by the method of Freudian analysis, if you -please, be exposed to the light, and the egotist thereby be enabled to -disembarrass himself of the interference of dead ancestors in his life -purposes, and to proceed on his way undisturbed by any inward qualms? - -These examples serve to illustrate the point with which we are here -concerned, namely, that the presence and operation of undoubted -constraints does not establish the existence in all men of the sense -of duty on which Kant founds universal moral equality. Kant would -indeed object that all these so-called constraints or imperatives are -hypothetical, and not really categorical. By an hypothetical imperative -he understands one in which the command depends upon an “if”—_if_ there -be invisible spirits such as primitive men imagined, then the rules of -_tabu_ follow. _If_ the safety of the gang is an object of commanding -interest, then gang loyalty is obligatory. _If_ the preservation and -prosperity of human society in general (a society superior to that -of ants and of bees indeed but like them a product of nature and not -radically distinct from them) be regarded as the supreme end of desire -and endeavor, then the rules of social behavior are to be obeyed. But, -he would say, none of these objects are fit to rank so high. They all -are optional ends. An hypothetical imperative is one in which the end -pursued is optional, the imperative extending only to the means. If the -end be desired, then it is reasonable, and in so far imperative, that -we adopt the means that lead to its attainment. An imperative truly -categorical, however, is one in which the obligation extends to the end -proposed as well as to the means. It is not left to our inclination to -embrace or to refuse the end, it being of such a kind as absolutely to -constrain us to accept it. - -But if this be so, then in this first part of our criticism we turn -upon Kant and declare that he has nowhere given us reason to believe -that the acceptance of an absolute end is implied in the kind of -constraints to which the generality of men submit. And again if such -acceptance cannot be proved, then the universal moral equality of men -based by him on the presence in all of the sense of duty disappears, -and his lofty ethical structure breaks down at this point. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[19] See II Samuel, VI, 6, 7. - -[20] Primitive communities valued coöperation because it was socially -useful. But there are different kinds of coöperation. Which kind shall -we of today adopt? The mere idea of coöperation affords no clue. The -self-sacrifice of the individual to the whole of which he is a part is -socially useful. But on what occasions and to what degree is it useful? -Altruism is socially useful. We are to serve others. But what in them -shall we serve? Their physical needs, their intellectual needs, all -their needs together? Is that humanly possible? Here again an ethical -principle is required to define the quality and the limits of the -service. The latent race-consciousness of which Darwin speaks affords -no light on the ethical problems proper. The concept of social utility, -if not valueless, is at best only of subsidiary value in any attempt to -solve these problems. So far from reading once and for all the riddle -of conscience, Darwin has not read aright the terms of the riddle. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -CRITIQUE OF KANT (_Continued_) - - -I now proceed to the second point of criticism, which strikes at the -heart of Kant’s ethics. Man according to Kant is worth while on his -own account (an end _per se_), never to be used as a mere tool or -thing. He is a person, an object towards whom we are bound to evince -absolute respect. Yet Kant immediately goes on to say that there is -no object in all the world, neither man nor any other, that is worth -while on its own account, that deserves such respect. Kant’s views -of actual human nature are tinged with somber pessimism. (Compare -the chapter on Radical Evil in his _Religion Within the Limits of -Pure Reason_.) A strange paradox is thus presented to us. Man is -to be accepted as a worth while object, and yet there is no worth -while object. How does Kant seek to escape from this predicament? He -says, not the man primarily, but something that happens in the man, -is supremely significant: certain acts are worth while on their own -account,—the agent only in so far as he performs such acts (or, let -us add with a sigh, as he tries to perform them)—namely, acts which -have as their sole motive respect for universal law. Then he informs -us that similar processes occur in other agents, in fellow human -beings, or, more precisely, that these others are capable of trying to -act as I myself feel bound to try to act. Consider how far fetched -is the argument, on what wavering foundations has been placed the -ethical pronouncement of human worth and human equality in which our -interest is so profoundly engaged. We do wish to be assured of this -cardinal truth. No other truth is practically and theoretically of -greater importance. As against the iniquitous practices of the world, -as against the exploitation of labor, as against the degradation of -woman, as against political tyranny whether exercised by kings or by -mobs, we raise up for our shield the indefeasible worth of men—not of -some men but of all men. And now, behold! the thinker to whom we owe -the forcible expression of this truth seems to have left it in the air. -I scrutinize my neighbors, and find in their behavior no sure sign of -real worth. I fall back on myself and I discover what? The idea of an -act which, if I could perform it, would stand on its own merits (would -be self-justified). I then find that I am bound to try to perform such -acts. I cannot affirm that in a single instance I have ever performed -such an act. I next infer—on what tenuous ground has been shown in -the last chapter—that my fellow-beings have the same inner experience -as mine. And it is for this reason that by a circuitous inference I -declare them to be worth while objects. - -That Kant has formulated a truth of the utmost importance for -mankind (that no man is to be treated as a mere tool), seems to me -incontestable. That he has not made good his own proposition is my -contention, and that the whole problem must therefore be taken up -_de novo_. It will assist us in doing so to expose the flaw in his -categorical imperative, or the formal principle of universality and -necessity applied to human actions, which in his view imprints upon -them the character of absolute rightness. - -Note that Kant approaches the problems of ethics from the side of -physical science, and with the bias of the physical scientist. The -ethical principle he sets up, the bare idea of universal necessity or -of law in general, is derived by way of abstraction from the particular -laws of nature. It is a physical principle in disguise. To understand -Kant’s system, it is simply indispensable to keep this point in mind. -He was pre-occupied during the major portion of his life with profound -speculations on scientific subjects. The title of the _Critique of -Pure Reason_ might not be inappropriately changed into “A treatise on -the fundamental assumptions of science, as handled by Newton and his -successors.” He was undeniably interested in ethics. His ultimate aim -was to clear the way for the confident holding of ethical principles. -(See the Preface to the _Critique of Pure Reason_.) But he could not -divest himself of the prejudice of his temperament and of his lifelong -pursuit. He is not singular in this respect. To borrow the first -principle of ethics from some other field is a common and apparently -ineradicable error. Mechanics, æsthetics, and recently biology, have -been laid under contribution for this purpose. A consistent attempt to -study ethical phenomena on their own ground, to mark off what is really -distinctive in the data of ethical experience, and then to search for -some principle which shall serve to give a coherent account of them, -has to my knowledge never yet been undertaken. Always ethics has been -treated as an annex to some other discipline. Always we behold the -attempt to assimilate before the distinctive traits and characteristics -have been carefully investigated. Never yet has the independence of -this wonderful aspect of human nature been truly acknowledged. Kant -indeed freed ethics from its long tutelage to theology; but he left -it still in subjection, subject to his own favorite study, physical -science. - -But though the notion of necessity, together with that of universality, -which he derived from physics was employed by him as a fundamental -principle of rightness in conduct, the principle itself insensibly, and -as it would seem unbeknown to himself, underwent a remarkable change -in the course of his undertaking to give it a new application. The -following brief comments will serve to elucidate this point. - -In physics, whenever an antecedent phenomenon has been exactly -described, and a sequent phenomenon is defined in the same fashion, -the connection is pronounced to be necessary—as for instance the -transformation of mechanical energy into heat, and conversely. A -single carefully guarded experiment may suffice to establish the -necessary nexus between two phenomena. And after having established -the necessity, we are confident of the universality. If exceptions -should occur and contravene the supposed law, the calculations or the -observations are to be corrected. But never in physical science do -we start from universality and predict necessity therefrom. Kant in -his ethics invariably couples together the two terms Universal and -Necessary. But he reverses the procedure of science, he _begins with -the universality and thereupon affirms the necessity_. - -Universality is for him the test of moral necessity. If an act can be -universalized, the performance of it, according to him, is morally -necessary. For instance, the question is asked, Is it right to kill? -Look at the act of killing, says Kant, and see whether it can be -universalized, that is to say, whether if everybody felt at liberty to -kill, the act of the murderer would or would not be self-defeating? He -kills in order to affirm his life at the expense of another’s. If his -action were to be generally imitated, his own life would be forfeit, -or at least in danger, and he would be annulling what he intends to -affirm. Hence murder is morally wrong: to sacredly respect the life of -others is right. - -But not only is the order reversed, so that necessity follows on the -heels of universality, but the very meaning of the term necessity is -altered. _A logical necessity is substituted for a physical necessity._ -The idea of necessity as handled by physical science denotes the -connection between one thing and something else. It is not the thing -itself but its relation to some other thing that is necessary. It is -not the phenomenon A nor the phenomenon B, in the case of a cause -and its effect, that is declared to be necessary, but the sequence -of B on A, the circumstance that B is tied up to A, must follow in -its wake. But the term Necessity as used by Kant in his _Ethics_, -denotes a relation of a thing to itself. It is in fact equivalent to -self-consistency, which is a logical notion derived from the principle -of self-identity. A is A, and it is not thinkable that it should -be non-A. Similarly Kant says: If a man desires to affirm his life, -that is, to be self-preserving, it is not thinkable, it would not be -rational or logical on his part, to perform an act which would be -self-defeating. Kant does not say that a man might not irrationally -take another man’s life, regardless of the consequences to himself; he -says that as a rational intelligence acting on purely logical motives -he could not do so.[21] To repeat, then, physical necessity is a -relation of one thing to another thing: the logical necessity involved -in self-consistency is a relation of a thing to itself. - -My next contention, and this touches the root of the matter, is -that the notion of end is incompatible with self-consistency as the -paramount principle in ethics. For a self-consistent rational being -is a being in harmony with himself, one who if this harmony should in -some unaccountable way ever be broken would by his own endeavor seek -to return to himself. (Kant declares that the morality of any one man -cannot be affected by his fellows, by any influence from the outside; -it must be his own act.) But an end presupposes some outside object -as a means: means and ends are inseparable correlatives. On the other -hand, an entity which merely affirms itself, or if somehow alienated -from self endeavors without assistance from beyond its sphere to -return to itself, is no true end at all, and cannot be designated as -such. It is no end because it employs no means. - -What warrant then has Kant for introducing the foreign notion of end -into a world of pure self-consistency? When we use the term Necessity -in relation to physical phenomena, as of cause and effect, we assert -unalterable sequence, unity of temporal and spatial differentiæ. -When we use the same term as Kant uses it, we assert the unity of a -thing with itself. But this in the nature of the case does not admit -the intrusion of the alien concept of the outside. The spiritual -society or pattern to which human society ought to be conformed, is -according to Kant a society of ends, of ends _per se_. This is his -great pronouncement. But the very idea on which he lays so much stress, -the idea of end, on closer scrutiny of his premises disappears. The -entities composing that society are self-sufficing, and moreover -intrinsically unrelated to each other. Rational self-preservation is -the only character that can be predicated of any of them. - -I have laid stress on the fact that Kant derived his ethical principle -from his physics. The passage in which he speaks of the ethical order -as a universal and necessary order like that of nature is to my mind -conclusive. I now urge in addition that this sort of second nature -superimposed upon existing nature would not have to our contemplating -minds a dignity superior to that of physical nature. The moral order -as thus exhibited would not possess the worth we attribute to it as -exalted above what is called the natural order. The falling stone is -a perfect illustration of physical necessity. Necessity passed through -human consciousness, or bathed in human consciousness, is not on that -account a more eligible principle. Nay, since human consciousness -interferes and causes contingent actions, due to passion, appetite, -etc., the moral order constructed by men should be even less worth -while than the physical order of nature, if indeed necessity be the -touchstone of worth.[22] - -To summarize: according to Kant man as an object is unfit to warrant -the claim of unconditional obligation on the part of others toward -himself. An abstract principle must be sought. This principle is -universality, and necessity based on universality. Respect for this -purely abstract notion is that which alone imparts a moral quality to -so-called moral acts. We start, according to Kant, with the declaration -that man is an end _per se_. But we reject him as an object, and take -refuge in a formal principle. We then assume that every human being is -conscious of the working within himself of this formal principle and -acknowledges his subjection to it, whether he is able to analyze it out -or not. And thus indirectly we derive out of emptiness a ray of glory -which we allow to fall upon each and every man. - -The question now is, since this approach to the ethical problem -manifestly fails, must we not begin at the opposite end, and take the -attribution of worth to men, however unworthy they may actually be, as -our starting-point? - -FOOTNOTES: - -[21] He also assumes a society not only of rational intelligences -determined by the same rational motives, but equal in ability to carry -out their motives. (See my article in _Mind_ [new series, Vol. XI, No. -42, p. 162], reprinted in the volume dedicated to William James, by the -Philosophical Faculty of Columbia University.) - -[22] Surefootedness, or certainty in thinking and in acting seems -to have been the chief desideratum at which Kant aimed. As against -scepticism or mere empirical groping this element of the inner life is -obviously of exceeding value. But it is far from being the only element -to be taken into account. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON WORTH, AND ON THE REASONS WHY THE METHOD -EMPLOYED BY ETHICS MUST BE THE OPPOSITE OF THAT EMPLOYED BY THE -PHYSICAL SCIENCES - - -The moral equality of men is a corollary of the attribution of worth -to all men. Did we not ascribe worth to them, there is no reason why -we should not make servile use of them. But there are admittedly -formidable difficulties in the way of attributing worth to human nature. - -The first and most obvious of these is the existence of repulsive -traits in human beings, such as sly cunning, deceit, falsehood, -grossness, cruelty: _homo homini lupus_! Secondly, there is the -prevalent error of employing ethical terms, like good and bad, to -denote the merely attractive and repellent traits.[23] Attractive -traits, such as gentleness, sweetness, kindness, a sympathetic -disposition, are, in those fortunate enough to possess them, pleasing -accidents of nature. We delight in them, but have no reason to ascribe -the superlative quality of worth to those who possess them. If the evil -that men do revolts us, the so-called good in them does not give us the -right to surround their heads with the nimbus of worth. Thirdly, and -perhaps even more deterrent than the ever-present spectacle of evil -and the inadequacy of so-called goodness, is the commonplaceness, the -cheapness of men. - -It must be admitted that, with rare exceptions, our estimates of others -are apt to be low rather than lofty. Can we ascribe worth to those -whom we hold cheap? The reason of our habitual under-estimation of -fellowmen I think is that we regard them from the standpoint of the -use to which we can put them, and do not see them from the inside, -as it were, in the light of the marvelous energies of which human -nature is the scene. The grossest matter, the most ordinary physical -happenings, reveal to the instructed eye of the scientist the play of -forces which it taxes the most powerful intellects in some measure to -apprehend and describe. Yet these miracles escape the dull senses of -those of us who deal with the forces of nature from the point of view -of their immediate use. We turn on the electric light, but have little -more than a crude surmise of the things that the word electricity -meant to Faraday, Clerk Maxwell, or Hertz. And as we turn on the -electric light, so we turn on our fellowmen, as it were, to use them. -The thought of the poet—“What a piece of work is man, how infinite -in faculty!” occurs to us only at scattered moments. And yet things -transpire in the inner life of human beings far more marvelous than the -chemical processes or the flux of electric waves, did we but attend to -them. There is in particular one kind of energy to which the quality -of worth may well attach itself. It is unlike the physical forces; it -is not a transformed mode of mechanical energy. It is _sui generis_, -underivative, unique; it is synonymous with highest freedom; it is -power raised to the Nth degree. It is ethical energy. To release it -in oneself is to achieve unbounded expansion. Morality, as commonly -understood, is a system of rules, chiefly repressive. Ethical energy, -on the contrary, is determined by the very opposite tendency; a -tendency, it is true, never more than tentatively effectuated under -finite conditions. And because the energy is unique, it points toward -a unique, irreducible, hence substantive entity in man, from which it -springs. This entity is itself incognizable, yet the effect it produces -requires that it be postulated. The category of substance, which is -almost disappearing from science, is to be reinstalled in ethics. -Ethics cannot dispense with it. This, as a prelude, may suffice to -indicate the path along which we shall proceed. - - -_The Reason Why the Method of Ethics Must Be the Opposite of the Method -Employed by the Physical Sciences_ - -Physical science begins from the bottom and builds upwards. It analyzes -phenomena into their elements, and thereupon seeks to combine these -elements into structures that shall correspond to experience. In this -business it never comes to a finish. Its analysis of the elements is -provisional. Every element is hypothetical. Indeed it is plain in the -nature of the case that no element can be ultimate. An element is a -unit, and every empirical unit necessarily conceals in its bosom a -plexus of which it is the unification. The very idea of unit requires -for its complement a manifold of some kind. In hypothetical units, or -ideal constructs that have for their purpose to lead to the discovery -and arrangement of real phenomena, science abounds. Atoms, electrons, -energy conceived as a substance by Ostwald, Spencer’s physiological -units, are examples. - -The results achieved by science are never more than approximations in -the sense that the units, the bricks with which the house is built, are -liable to be rejected, and the constructions achieved are subject to -revision. - -The point however which I wish to emphasize is that the scientist is -satisfied of the truth, the reality of its partial results. Newton, -for instance, in formulating the law of gravitation has, so to speak, -marked off a strip of reality. The ground covered cannot be lost; when -some natural law is enunciated, the proper conditions for its discovery -and verification having been observed, a sure footing in reality has -been gained, science standing to this extent on _terra firma_, though -beyond the domain within which the law applies the phenomena may be -heaving and billowing like the sea. - -Now the question I am intent upon is, Why is it possible for science -to be content with partial acquisition? Why does it profess to know -positively a part without knowing the whole? And why can ethics not -take a step without an ideal of the whole? - -Kant’s chief purpose in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ was to vindicate -the certainty of the physical knowledge of a part as being compatible -with total ignorance of the whole. The older metaphysics was engaged -in the attempt to supply the whole, to sketch it out in order to -give certainty to the part that is within the reach of science. The -older metaphysics said to science: You have in hand the conditioned, -but remember the conditioned depends on the unconditioned. Unless, -therefore, you round out what you possess, with the help of the -unconditioned, the certainty you seem to have within the field of the -conditioned disappears. Again, science traces causes, and the older -metaphysicians insisted that the whole chain of causes hangs in air -unless it be attached to a first cause. Now Kant’s _Critique of Pure -Reason_ really amounts _in nuce_ to this: you do not require the whole -in order to explain the part. Link the partial phenomena together in a -certain way, a way dependent on the joint action of the space and time -intuitions and the categories, and you will gain the desired certainty. -The certainty is in the linkage. We may add link to link of the chain -of reality without troubling to consider by what piers it is supported -or on what shore the piers rest—if indeed there be piers and shores at -all. The bridge hangs over the River of Time and we can safely travel -on it. How we get on to this bridge we do not know, and where we shall -leave it we cannot know either. - -It is a mistake to speak of Kant as a rationalist pure and simple. When -he expelled the older metaphysics he antagonized pure rationalism. -The older metaphysics held that the mere existence of the conditioned -proves the existence of the unconditioned, requires the unconditioned. -In Kant’s answer to this lies the gist of his enterprise in philosophy: -You are quite right, he says, that the _idea_ of the conditioned -requires the idea of the unconditioned, logically, rationally. But -observe well, nature is not just logical or rational. There is an -irrational element in it, namely, extended manifold and temporal -sequence. Juxtaposition and sequence are irrational, because, if I -interpret him rightly, in the case of each the relation presented to -the mind is that of parts outside each other—in the one case alongside, -in the other before and after; while in the logical or rational -relation the parts are implicit in the whole as in the case of the -premises of a syllogism and the conclusion, the relation of a genus to -the species, the universal to the particular. - -We have in nature, according to Kant, a partnership between the -irrational and the rational factors. And thereupon he proceeds to -argue that we impose laws on nature, understanding thereby that we get -hold of reality or objectivity in so far as we are able to imprint -the rational element upon the irrational. The positing of the thing -_per se_, which has proved a stumbling-block to many, is no more than -a confession that we shall never succeed entirely in this business of -subjecting the irrational to the rational factor. The thing _per se_ is -the X that remains over when the rational function has done its utmost. -A thing, a real object, is that which is imprinted with, penetrated -with, rationality. The manifolds of space and time, of juxtaposition -and sequence are incapable of completely receiving this imprint, that -is, of completely responding to our quest for reality, and this their -incompetency is expressed in the notion of the thing _per se_. - -To return to the main question as to the difference between the method -by which science proceeds and the reverse method prescribed to ethics, -I ask, Why is absolute knowledge of nature impossible? The answer -is, Because absolute knowledge would mean the completely rational -construction of nature, and this is prevented by the irrational element -existing in it. But why has the relative knowledge we possess the -character of certainty? Why are we sure of the law of gravitation? Why -are we justified in saying that science within certain limits plants -her foot on _terra solida_? Because at certain points the sense data do -coincide with the rational requirements. There are recurrent phenomena -of such a kind, coupled together in such a way, that each is capable of -mathematical measurement, and that the sequence of the one after the -other can therefore be predicted. - -Nature might have been arranged quite otherwise. The time spans might -have been so long, as to prevent our observing the recurrences. A -day-fly cannot observe the periodicity of the earth’s revolution around -its axis. The fact however that there is this partial correspondence -between human rationality and the unknown nature of things is a bare -fact, incapable of explanation.[24] The answer, then, I take it, is: -our knowledge of nature is relative, which means incompletely rational, -because of the foreign element in nature unamenable to the operation -of the rational, the synthetic, function. This relative knowledge is -none the less certain, that is, in some sense absolute, because of -the partial coincidence of the phenomena of nature and the synthetic -processes of the mind. - -With this degree of certainty we must perforce content ourselves, in -dealing with outside nature. In trying to understand and interpret -that which is not ourselves, we hit upon barriers which cannot be -transcended, upon a foreign factor which opposes itself to our -endeavors. But it is otherwise in the sphere of conduct. Here, if there -is to be certainty at all, in regard to right as distinguished from -wrong, if there is to be such a thing as right in the strict sense, -we cannot content ourselves with the paradoxical, relative-absolute -just described. For here we not merely interpret but act, and we must -possess an ideal plan of the whole if we are to be certain of our -rightness in any particular part of conduct. _For in conduct there is -no such partial coincidence between the rational and the irrational as -in the case of physical law._ There is not a single partial rule of -conduct, neither “Thou shalt not kill” nor “Thou shalt not lie,” nor -any other that, taken by itself, is of itself ethically right. It may -be right, it may be wrong. It takes its ethical quality from the plan -of conduct as a whole, and without reference to the whole it is devoid -of rightness.[25] - -I have thus indicated the ground of the distinction between the method -of science and the method of ethics, a distinction, it is true, to -which Kant himself did not adhere. Partial coincidence of the rational -with the irrational is expressed in physical law; absence of such -concurrence destroys any attempt to build up an ethical theory on the -empirical method. We cannot plant our feet on the part, gaining there -the sense of certainty: we must creatively conceive the ideal of the -whole and educe every partial mode of ethical conduct from that. - -But how shall we proceed in the construction of such an ideal, for it -is obvious that knowledge, in the scientific sense of the word, is -entirely out of the question? - -FOOTNOTES: - -[23] See the more extended remarks on this subject in Book III. - -[24] In Kant’s view the rational element is projected on the -irrational. In this way spatial juxtaposition is ideally transformed -into a spatial continuum. In the same manner temporal sequence is -ideally changed into a uniform temporal flux. Without the former, -geometry could not have established its propositions; without the -latter Galileo could not have measured the fall of the stone. - -[25] The ethical character of acts depends on the worth of the agent -and the object. Is it right to kill or to enslave a fellowman? We do -not hesitate to kill an animal, or to harness horses to vehicles, or to -use them as beasts of burden. Why not kill men, or use them as beasts -of burden in like manner?—Only because they possess a worth which gives -them a different standing. - -Is it on grounds of sympathy that I should observe the so-called moral -rules? But if I am not sympathetic by nature, why should I be subject -to censure in case I refrain from displaying a tenderness which I do -not feel? Why should I sympathize with the pleasures and pains of -fellow human beings any more than with the pleasures and pains of -inferior sentient creatures, unless men have worth? And worth, as will -appear in the subsequent chapters, signifies indispensableness in a -perfect whole. No detached thing has worth. No part of an incomplete -system has worth. Worth belongs to those to whom it is attributed in -so far as they are conceived of as not to be spared, as representing a -distinctive indispensable preciousness, a mode of being without which -perfection would be less than perfect. - -So that morality depends on the attribution of worth to men, and -worth depends on the formation in the mind of an ideal plan of the -whole—or instead of a complete plan let me say more precisely a rule of -relations whereby the plan is itself progressively developed. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE IDEAL OF THE WHOLE - - -To recapitulate and at the same time to enlarge somewhat the points -thus far covered in Book II: Kant proclaims man an end _per se_. This -promises a philosophic basis for an ethical world-view. The promise is -not kept. Kant takes as his point of departure absolute obligation, and -attempts to deduce out of an empty formula a worthwhile object. Kant’s -formula is: Treat man never merely as a means, but also as an end _per -se_. But how far man may be treated as a means, and what the relation -of the means to the end may be is left undetermined. An upper crust of -morality is formed, as it were, upon the empirical flood of passions, -desires, etc. A straight line is drawn beyond which the under world in -every man may not emerge. But a truly instrumental view of the means as -related to the end is not established. This is one of the great gaps -in Kant’s system. Note the almost puerile reason given for culture: we -should cultivate our talents _weil sie zu allerhand Zwecken nützlich -sein mögen_. - -Kant’s ethical order is a duplicate of the physical order. The notion -of law is taken from physics, and expanded into the concept of law -in general. Ethical behavior is represented as behavior motivated by -the notion of lawfulness. Law is characterized by universality and -necessity. Chapter II, however, shows that in physics universality is -predicated on the ground of an ascertained necessary connection. In -physics, necessity has its true meaning as pertaining to a relation -between one thing and another. If the linkage can be established, the -universality follows. In Kant’s ethics, on the contrary, necessity is -taken as the consequence of the universality and the proper meaning of -necessity is lost. Self-consistency takes the place of the relation -to something else. The ideal society, as described, would therefore -be a society of self-preserving rational intelligences, ethically -solipsistic. - -Next we began the investigation into the idea of worth. Why do men -hold themselves and others cheap? They regard each other from the -point of view of the _use_ to be made of others and of their own life, -and not from the point of view of the energies deployed. The turning -on of electric power was used as an illustration. Nevertheless, even -exceptional men, men regarded as illustrating in the highest degree the -mental energies implicit in human nature, would not possess the quality -of worth, that is, of being ends _per se_, merely on the score of their -scientific or their artistic activities. We cannot say that the world -would be less perfect if there were no scientists to discover its laws. -There is a supreme, a unique energy and it is to this that the quality -of worth belongs.[26] - -The ethical quality called worth is the supreme good, and must be -accessible to all, even to those to whom the lesser goods are denied. -Ethics is a system of thought which stands or falls with the contention -that while the better may be within reach only of the exceptional few, -the best is within reach of all. - -In attempting to approach the task of building up a world-view based -on ethical experience, it became unavoidable to consider the method -by which the approach might be made, and for this purpose to contrast -the methods of science and the methods of ethics. Science, as we have -seen, collects its bricks and builds its house by composition. Science -analyzes phenomena into units, which it then combines. The mystery is -how science can achieve certainty in respect to certain phenomena of -nature without previous knowledge of the whole of nature. Kant’s answer -is that there is partial congruity between the mental functions and the -data that come to us from the unknown. Kant’s _Critique of Pure Reason_ -faces in two directions. It expels the older metaphysics which assumed -that the empirical world is rational throughout, or rationalizable, and -which thence argued the existence of the unconditioned as necessarily -implied in the existence of the conditioned, and of a first cause as -actually implied in the chain of causes and effects. Kant contends -that there is an irrational element, namely, bare juxtaposition -(part outside part), and bare sequence (part before and after part), -while the logical or rational relation implies that the part is to -be conceived as implicit in the whole. Juxtaposition and sequence, -therefore, can never be completely rationalized. On the other hand, -Kant undertakes to prove that whatever of reality we know is traceable -to the projection of the rational factor upon the irrational. One -might even say that, according to Kant, the mind itself produces the -irrational factor, since the intuitions of space and time are according -to him, functions of the mind itself—the mind setting up a manifold so -constituted as to receive sense impressions. At any rate the capital -point to which we were led up was that science puts her foot on _terra -firma_ in a restricted area, without reference to what lies beyond, -while if we are to proceed in ethics at all, we must begin with some -ideal plan of the whole, since in ethics we are not interpreting a -foreign nature, but act upon natures similar to our own; and since, -in the case of conduct, there is no such partial concurrence of -the rational and irrational as in physics, no one of the so-called -moral modes of behavior being moral when taken separately. Hence the -conclusion that there is no possibility of establishing the conception -of worth unless we have some ideal of the whole in which and in -relation to which the incomparable worthwhileness of a human being can -be made good. - -We need hardly again remind ourselves that this conception of worth, -or of man as end _per se_, is not a mere abstraction, and that our -interest in it is not academic. Every outcry against the oppression -of man by man, or against whatsoever is morally hideous, is but the -affirmation of the cardinal principle that a human being as such is -not to be violated, is not to be handled like a tool, but is to be -respected and revered as an end _per se_. But what do we mean by end -_per se_, and how account for this notion? Does it come into our mind -like a bolt from the blue, or is it revealed as prefigured in the human -mind when we follow it into its intimate constitution? - -Our knowledge of the world we live in is extremely limited—in its -details it is confined to the planet we live on, extending to -the myriads of celestial bodies beyond us only by means of scant -generalizations. If we have knowledge of only so small a portion, how -can we frame an ideal of the whole? At the same time we must remember -that the world we actually know, this earth and yonder starry myriads, -is in very truth _our_ world, the world as it exists for us, a world -which with the help of data coming to us from the unknown, we ourselves -have built up on certain constructive principles; and that these -principles have been found, within certain limits, availing.[27] I -say availing within certain limits. The defeat they meet with beyond -those limits is due to the intractable elements of juxtaposition and -sequence, of the time and space manifolds, which in themselves are -incapable of being completely rationalized. - -Now the ideal of the whole is a plan or scheme in which the -constructive principles of the mind are conceived as having untrammeled -course and unhindered application, and the task of world-building, or -rather universe-building, is in idea carried out to completion. - -The attempt to present an ideal forecast, or outline of the whole of -reality, as it would satisfy a mind constituted like ours, an ideal -landscape of this sort, is not at all to be confounded with the -arrogation of _a priori_ knowledge. _A priori_ knowledge is supposed -to be a kind of knowledge, and _knowledge_ of the whole is utterly -and confessedly beyond our reach. The phrase _a priori_, too, is -objectionable and unfortunate for two reasons. First, as just said, -because it has been supposed to be a kind of knowledge. By some -theologians men were supposed to possess _a priori_ knowledge of -God.[28] Secondly, because the word _a priori_ suggests precedence -in time, and our knowledge of the human mind and of its irreducible -capacities comes out only in the course of experience. Much that has -been called _a priori_, that is implicit in experience, did not become -explicit until after prolonged experience. The Greek thinkers before -Aristotle doubtless thought in terms of syllogism, but it was not until -Greek science had attained a certain ripeness that Aristotle was able -to dissect out the logic which had previously been employed more or -less unconsciously. - -Instead, therefore, of using the term _a priori_, which gives rise to -the two-fold misapprehension of an _a priori_ knowledge and of temporal -precedence, and instead of throwing out the child with the bath, that -is, of ignoring the independent part played by our mental constitution -in building up experience, and in affording us the conviction of -certainty, and of reality, it is highly desirable that a new term be -found to take the place of _a priori_. The term “functional finality” -suggests itself to me for this purpose.[29] - -My field is ethics. I am entirely desirous of sticking to my own last, -that is, dealing with such concepts as the data of my subject force -upon me. I do not wish to trespass, or to seem to trespass, on the -domain of my neighbors. Hence in dealing with functional finalities I -must deal with them primarily as they appear in the field of ethics, -that is, in the domain of the actions and reactions of human beings -upon one another. Irreducible _principia_ of ethics are the functional -finalities, which prescribe rules for such intercourse, or better which -create a scheme of ideal intercourse whereby the conduct of men shall -be measured and determined. - -I must, however, glance for a moment at fields outside my own, for the -purpose not of controversy but of elucidation; not to deal with the -subject matter of my neighbors, but to mark off my own more definitely. -What then, I ask, is the most general expression by which to designate -the singularities of the human mind, the principles on which it acts, -its immutable modes of behavior, the invariants that recur amid all -the complex varieties of its processes? The principal invariants are -the positing of a manifold of some kind, and the apprehending of -that manifold as coherent. The manifold is not given, but is posited -by the mind. The positing is a mental function, just as much as the -apprehending of the plurality as coherent is a mental function. The -particular manifolds of space and time experience are said to be given, -but they would not be received by the mind were not the function of -manifold-positing prepared to apprehend them. - -In recent physical science the notion of the manifold plays a -conspicuous rôle. Subtle speculations are employed to define the -kinds of manifold which the physicist finds opportune, and the kind -of unity of which these manifolds are respectively capable. The two -terms mentioned are themselves the most abstract conceivable, and -naturally, that which is here taken to underlie all the constructive, -world-building activity of the mind in every possible direction can -only be expressed in the most sublimated language. But the notions -themselves, or rather the acts of the mind, the functions designated, -are rich and replete with concrete utility when applied to subject -matter in the different fields. - -Wherever we turn we find that the assurance of reality depends on the -joint use of the two principles mentioned, the joint operation of -the two kinds of mental action; that is to say—on the positing of a -manifold and on the simultaneous apprehension of the subject matter to -which it relates as coherent, as unified. - -The simultaneity, the inseparableness of the two mental acts or -functions in regard to the same subject-matter is the essential point -on which hangs the web of the argument here submitted. Thus in geometry -space must be regarded as a continuum, unbroken, uninterrupted at any -point, and at the same time the same space must be treated as capable -of puncture, of linear and superficial delimitations; that is to say, -of division. That which is one must yet be apprehended as divided; -that which is divided, or delimitated, must yet be apprehended as one. -The difficulties that arise spring from the vain endeavor to separate -the two inseparable acts—the act of apprehending the manifold of space -_sub specie pluralitatis_, and the act of apprehending it _sub specie -unitatis_. Hence arises the puzzling question: How can that which is -continuous be divided, how can chasms between the parts of space, -however infinitesimal, be bridged? Witness the problem of Zeno, and -the pragmatist solution of it by a demonstration that satisfies us -indeed as to the fact (which no one doubts), but leaves the mental -puzzle as before; and also Bergson’s Method of accounting for division -by a comparison of the inner and the outer flux, wherein he seems to -overlook the difficulty that for the purpose of comparison two points -must be fixed, one in each flux, that is to say, the division in the -flux must be regarded as already existing. - -In the physical sciences we are compelled to assume on the one hand -the atomic or granular constitution of matter, in other words, -manifoldness. On the other hand, if “action at a distance” is to be -escaped, we are bound to assume a continuum of some sort like the -ether. Again, in the organic world there is the manifold of structures -and functions, and the unity of organism. To whatever object of -inquiry we give our attention, we find ourselves not only restricted -fundamentally to the two functions described, but we discover that to -their insunderable co-operation we owe whatever of truth we possess. - -Now the business of ethics is to define its own subject-matter, that -is to say the particular kind of manifold with which it deals, and the -kind of unity of which that manifold is susceptible. But as I approach -this first goal of my enterprise, there is one obstacle which I must -try to remove out of the way of the reader, before I can hope to win -him to a hospitable consideration of my conclusions. The jointness -or inseparableness of the two acts out of which certainty or reality -issues has created all the difficulties. The fact that the manifold -must be regarded as remaining a manifold, unaltered in its character -as such, not derivative from the One (there is no such One), and that -the unity does not contrariwise result from the manifold in the sense -of springing from or being derived from it;—in other words that we -must see the same landscape of things and events both _sub specie -pluralitatis_ and _sub specie unitatis_—has been the stumbling-block. -The history of philosophy might be written under the two headings: 1, -monistic systems that undertake, collapsing in their futile effort, to -derive the world and its plurality from the One, as if there were such -an One, out of whose bosom philosophy might evoke the many (creational -systems, pantheistic systems, emanation systems, evolution systems); 2, -pluralistic systems that essay, with equal lack of success, to explain -the unity as somehow the offspring of the plurality. - -Why then have these systems flourished? Why are these vain undertakings -still renewed? The reason is that we cannot understand the joint action -of the two functions, and the very point where enlightenment is needed -is for us to recognize that no fundamental truths can be understood -by us, that we can only look at them, contemplate and accept them. -The point, I say, where enlightenment is needed is that the habit of -trying to understand is due to a prejudice, to what may be called the -_superstition of causality_. - -I shall have to explain this hardy assertion with some care to prevent -misconception. Causality, it will be objected, is the one thread that -leads us through the labyrinth of nature. The search for causes enables -us to become at home in our world by foreseeing events. In what sense -then can it be permissible to speak of the prejudice of causality, -nay, of the superstition of it? With what warrant prescribe a limit to -the aspirations of the human intellect to push its inquiries to the -farthest limit, even so far as to understand the functional finalities -themselves, if such there be? - -The answer, succinctly put, is this: explaining or understanding things -means tracing effects to their causes, and this is only one mode, a -somewhat _disguised_ mode, of the joint functional activity of which -I have spoken. The manifold in this case is that of the temporal -sequence of phenomena, of differences due to change of position in -time; and the unity established between them (as for instance energy, -of which the sequent phenomena represent the transformations) is an -ideal, fictive unity, mentally superimposed (real despite its ideal -or imaginary character, because of the necessity we are under to view -the sequent phenomena _sub specie unitatis_). That there is nothing -in the antecedent to compel the sequent to follow has been since the -days of Hume a commonplace in philosophy. That nevertheless there is -such a thing as the prediction of eclipses was made by Kant the basis -of his doctrine of synthesis _a priori_. Be the terms used what they -may, what counts is the fact that the _joint action of two functions, -which itself is inexplicable_, not to be understood, that is, not to be -referred back to a preceding cause (as if there could be such a thing -as a cause why we think in terms of causality) is the foundation of all -so-called understanding. - -Moreover causality is an incomplete example of the fundamental -functional process. We never do thoroughly understand; we gain a -certain relief, a certain increased ease of mind by pushing the problem -back a step. And what I have called the prejudice of causality, is the -unwillingness on our part to acknowledge the fact that we are face to -face, in the case of causality, with the inexplicable; that that which -helps us partially to understand (and serves for practical purposes -well enough) is in its nature not to be understood, one of the modes in -which the joint action of the functional finalities manifests itself. - -An ultimate principle has been defined as one which is presupposed in -every attempt to account for it. The functional finalities of which I -speak bear the test of this definition. The upshot of it all is that -the constitutive principles of the human mind cannot be explained or -understood, but can nevertheless be verified. And verification, in the -last analysis, means exemplification. If we look at these ultimate -truths, whether in geometry, in physics, or, as we shall later see, in -ethics and æsthetics, as enunciated abstractly, baldly, we confront -them blankly, we are as it were dumbfounded in their presence. They -seem arbitrarily imposed upon us. And why? Because we are endeavoring -to understand them. We have acquired the habit of trying to get hold of -truth by referring back to some antecedent. And therefore we are uneasy -and disconcerted. But the moment we see them exemplified, as in the -constructions of the geometer, in the laws or uniformities established -by the physicist, etc., we are convinced. The subject-matter of ethics -is different. The kind of exemplification is likewise different. But -verification is exemplification in ethics as elsewhere; and this will -be found to mean that the life, the ethical experience, must lead to -the certainty. - -And now we have reached the point where a brief discussion of the -ethical manifold and its mode of unification comes up in proper order. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[26] To rate anyone as an end _per se_ means that in a world conceived -as perfect his existence would be indispensable. The world we know may -not be perfect, is not perfect, but we do conceive of an ideal world -that is. And to ascribe to anyone the quality of worth, to denominate -him an end _per se_, is to place him into that world, to regard him as -potentially a member of it. - -[27] For a creature endowed with different senses, and having a mind -unlike our own, the world would be a totally different world. - -[28] To deny such _a priori_ knowledge of the object called God is -not to deny that the production of this object is due to constructive -principles of human thinking; while, in turn, to assert the functional -derivation of the God-idea is not to validate that idea itself as -permanent and inexpugnable. It may have owed its origin to a permanent -disposition of the mind, and yet be fallible because of the historical -conditions under which it arose and the defective data in which it was -expressed. By way of illustration we might apply the same reflection -to the Ptolemaic astronomy. The mathematical processes by which this -astronomy was constructed may be traced to permanent singularities of -human thinking, yet the astronomical theory of Ptolemy is not on that -account _a priori_ true. - -[29] It must, however, be understood that the formula in which a -finality is expressed is not itself a final formula. The business of -definition is precarious, liable to error and dogmatic abuse, and -the formulas of finality are to be constantly subjected to revision. -Possible and even probable abuse, however, does not warrant the -negative attitude at present taken; it does not justify the revulsion -of feeling against _A Priorism_ which is just now general. Exasperation -with absolutism does not of itself justify recourse to the opposite -extreme of pragmatism. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE IDEAL OF THE WHOLE AND THE ETHICAL MANIFOLD - - -The ethical manifold, conceived of as unified, furnishes, or rather is, -the ideal of the whole. The ethical manifold is the true universe, not -“Universe” in the sense in which the word is too laxly used at present -to designate those fragmentary and in many respects unconnected lines -of experience which might better by way of discrimination be called -World. - -The ideal of the whole, as the terms imply, must fulfill two -conditions: it must be a whole, that is, include all manifoldness -whatsoever; and it must be ideal, or perfectly unified. In such an -ideal whole the two reality-producing functions of the human mind would -find their complete fruition. - - Point 1.—The totality of manifoldness must be comprised. - - Point 2.—The connectedness must be without flaw. - -From point one it follows that the ethical manifold cannot be -spatial or temporal, since juxtaposition and sequence lapse into -indefiniteness, abounding without ceasing, but never attaining or -promising the attainment of totality. Our first conclusion then is that -the ethical manifold is non-temporal and non-spatial. - -Furthermore it is necessary and decisive for the theoretical -construction here attempted to keep sharply in view, that the -manifoldness may not be derived from the unity, or conversely. The -manifold remains forever manifold. This means that in the ethical -manifold each member[30] will differ uniquely from all the rest, -and preserve his irreducible singularity. The member of the ethical -manifold was not created by _the_ One or any One. He is not derived -as effect from any cause. Causality does not apply to the ethical -manifold, being a category of spatial sequence. The member of the -ethical manifold, or the ethical unit, as we may now call him (I say -him metaphorically and provisionally) is unbegotten, induplicable, -unique. In the ethical manifold each infinitesimal member is -indispensable, inasmuch as he is one of the totality of intrinsically -unlike differentiæ. A duplicate would be superfluous. Inclusion implies -indispensableness; no member acquires a place within the ethical -universe save on the score of his title, as one of the possible modes -of being that are required to complete the totality of manifoldness. - -But the reality-producing functions of the mind are two, and they -act jointly. The same manifold that is regarded as the scene of -irreducible manifoldness, is also regarded _sub specie unitatis_. -The immense practical importance of holding fast to diversity as -indefeasible, and at the same time stressing the unity, will amply -appear in the course of the third Book. It is this insistence on the -two aspects _jointly_, that distinguishes the theory here worked out -from preceding ethical philosophies, and will be found to open new -ethical applications to conduct. It is this insistence on the joint -action of the two reality-producing functions that will enable us to -see in the ideal of the whole _a pattern traced_, and to derive from -this pattern of relations a supreme rule of conduct. If the differences -that exist among the members of the manifold be slurred over, if the -indefeasible singularity of each member be overlooked, if the many be -derived from the One, since the One is an empty concept, we shall gain -no light upon the conduct to be followed by each of the many. It is -true that our notion of the distinctive difference or the uniqueness of -each ethical unit is also empty as far as knowledge goes. The unique -is incognizable. Yet we are able to apprehend, and do apprehend, a -determinate relation as subsisting between the ethical units, and this -relation supplies us with an ideal plan of the ethical universe and a -first principle and rule of ethics. The relation is that of reciprocal -universal interdependence. - -Consider that an infinite number of ethical entities is presented to -our minds—each of them radically different from the rest. In what -then possibly can the unity of this infinite assemblage consist? In -this—_that the unique difference of each shall be such as to render -possible the correlated unique differences of all the rest_. It is in -this formula that we find the key to a new ethical system, in this -conception we get our hand firmly on the notion of right, and by means -of it we discover the object which Kant failed to find, the object to -which worth attaches, the object which is so indispensable to the ideal -of the whole as to authenticate unconditional obligation or rightness -in conduct with respect to it. It is as an ethical unit, as a member of -the infinite ethical manifold, that man has worth.[31] - -In accordance with the above, the first principle of ethics may be -expressed in the following formulas: - -A. Act as a member of the ethical manifold (the infinite spiritual -universe). - -B. Act so as to achieve uniqueness (complete individualization—the most -completely individualized act is the most ethical). - -C. Act so as to elicit in another the distinctive, unique quality -characteristic of him as a fellow-member of the infinite whole. - -A and B are comprised in C. I am taking three steps toward a fuller -exposition of the meaning of the principle. To act as a member -according to A is to strive to achieve uniqueness as declared in -B. To achieve uniqueness as declared in C is to seek to elicit the -diverse uniqueness in others. The actual unique quality in myself -is incognizable, and only appears, so far as it does appear, in the -effect produced by myself upon my fellows. Hence, to advance towards -uniqueness I must project dynamically my most distinctive mode of -energy upon my fellow-members. - -Since the finite nature of man is a clog and screen, clouding and -checking the action of man viewed as an ethical unit, it follows that -no man will ever succeed in carrying out completely the rule which is -derived from the ideal pattern. He will invariably meet with partial -frustration in his efforts to do so, and yet in virtue of his ethical -character he will always renew the effort. While in physical science -the recurrence of phenomena supplies the occasion for exemplification -or verification, in conduct, or the sphere of volition, not recurrence -but the persistence of the effort after defeat is at least a help to -verification, arguing in one’s self a consciousness, however obscured, -of the relation of reciprocal interdependence and of subjection to the -urge or pressure thence derived.[32] It is our own reality-producing -functions, exerted to their utmost, to which we are delivered over. -Hence the final formulation: So act as to raise up in others the ideal -of the relation of give and take, of universal interdependence in -which they stand with an infinity of beings like themselves, members of -the infinite universe, irreducible, like and unlike themselves in their -respective uniqueness. - -The simile that may be used is that of a ray of light which has the -effect of kindling other rays, unlike but complementary to itself. -Each ethical unit, each member of the infinite universe, is to be -regarded as a center from which such a ray emanates, touching other -centers, and awakening there the light intrinsic in them. Or we may -think of a fountain from which stream forth jets of indescribable -life-power—playing out of it, playing into other life, and evoking -there kindred and yet unkindred life-waves, waves effluent and -refluent. Whatever the symbolism may be, inadequate in any case, the -idea of the enmeshing of one’s life in universal life without loss of -distinctness—the everlasting selfhood to be achieved on the contrary, -by means of the cross-relation—is the cardinal point. - -I have here to answer one question. By what warrant do I ascribe worth -to any human being? Where is the head deserving that this ray that -streams out from me shall light upon it? What man or woman merits that -he be invested with this glory? Does not the same objection opposed -to Kant hold with respect to my own view? It is true that he found no -object at all, and sought indirectly to draw from the empty notion -of obligation the inference that man is an end _per se_. Perhaps -it will be admitted that the supremely worthwhile object has now -been found, the holy thing (holy in two ways, as being inviolable, -reverence-inspiring, holding at a distance those who would encroach: -and intrinsically priceless as a component of the ethical manifold, as -indispensable in a perfect whole). But this object, you will say, is -in the air, or in the heavens, and how shall it be made to descend on -empirical man? - -My answer is that certainly I do not discover the quality of worth -in people as an empirical fact. In many people I do not even -discover value. Judging from the point of view of bare fact, many -of us could very well be spared. Many are even in the way of what -is called “progress.” And the suggestion of some extreme disciples -of Darwin that the degenerate and defective should be removed, or -the opinion of others that pestilence and war should be allowed to -take the unpleasant business off our hands, is, from the empirical -point of view, not easily to be refuted. I can also enter into, if -I do not wholly share, the pessimistic mood with regard to actual -human nature expressed by Schopenhauer and others. To the list of -repulsive human creatures mentioned by Marcus Aurelius in one of his -morning meditations,—the back-biter, the scandal-monger, the informer, -etc.—might be added in modern times, the white-slaver, the exploiter of -child-labor, the fawning politician, and many another revolting type. -And even more discouraging in a way, than these examples of deepest -human debasement—the copper natures, as Plato calls them, or the -leaden natures, as we might call them—is the disillusionment we often -experience with regard to the so-called gold natures, the discovery of -the large admixture of baser metal which is often combined with their -gold. - -It is imperative to acquaint oneself, nay, to impregnate one’s mind -thoroughly with these contrary facts, if the doctrine of worth, the -sanest and to my mind the most real of all conceptions, is to be saved -from the appearance of an optimistic illusion. - -The answer to the objection is that I do not _find_ worth in others -or in myself, I _attribute_ it to them and to myself. And why do I -attribute it? In virtue of the reality-producing functions of my own -mind. I create the ethical manifold. The pressure of the essential -rationality within me, seeking to complete itself in the perfect -fruition of these functions, _i.e._, in the positing of a total -manifold and its total unification, drives me forward. I need an idea -of the whole in order to act rightly, in such a way as to satisfy the -dual functions within me. My own nature as a spiritual being urges me -to seek this satisfaction. This ideal whole, as I have shown, is a -complexus of uniquely differentiated units. In order to advance toward -uniqueness, in order to achieve what in a word may be called my own -truth, to build myself into the truth, to become essentially real, -I must seek to elicit the consciousness of the uniqueness and the -interrelation in others. I must help others in order to save myself; -I must look upon the other as an ethical unit or moral being in order -to become a moral being myself. And wherever I find consciousness of -relation, of connectedness, even incipient, I project myself upon -that consciousness, with a view to awaking in it the consciousness -of universal connectedness. Wherever I can hope to get a response -I test my power. Fields and trees do not speak to me, as Socrates -said, but human beings do. I should attribute worth to stones and to -animals could they respond, were the power of forming ideas, without -which the idea of relation or connectedness is impossible, apparent in -them. Doubtless stones and trees and animals, and the physical world -itself, are but the screen behind which lies the infinite universe. -But the light of that universe does not break through the screen where -it is made up of stones and trees and the lower animals. It breaks -through, however faintly, where there is consciousness of relation: and -wherever I discover that consciousness I find my opportunity. It is -quite possible that the men and women upon whom I try my power will not -actually respond. The complaint is often heard from moral persons, or -persons who think themselves such, that what they call the moral plan -of rousing the moral consciousness in others will not work. Perhaps the -plan they follow is not the moral plan at all, but the plan of sympathy -or of some other empirically derived rule. But be that as it may, -the question is not whether we get the response but whether we shall -achieve reality or truth ourselves; in theological terms, save our own -life, by trying to elicit the response. - -And here one profoundly important practical consideration will come to -our aid, namely, the sense of our own imperfection, coupled indeed with -the consciousness of inextinguishable power of moral renewal. Instead -of attributing the lack of response to the hopeless dullness of the -person upon whom we labor, a sense of humility, based on the knowledge -of our own exceeding spiritual variability—best moments followed by -worst moments, imperfect grasp on our own ideals, most imperfect -fidelity in executing them—will lead us to turn upon ourselves, and -far from permitting us to despair of others, will impel us rather to -make ourselves more fitting instruments of spiritual influence than -obviously as yet we are.[33] - -FOOTNOTES: - -[30] Say not _part_ or _element_, but _member_, to distinguish the -components of the ethical manifold from such concepts as are used in -mathematics and physical science. - -[31] The distinction between value and worth must be stressed for -it is capital. Value is subjective. The worth notion is the most -objective conceivable. Value depends on the wants or needs of our -empirical nature. That has value which satisfies our needs or wants. -We possess value for one another, for the reason that each of us has -wants which the others alone are capable of satisfying, as in the case -of sex, of coöperation, in the vocation, etc. But value ceases when -the want or need is gratified. The value which one human being has for -another is transient. There are, in the strict sense, no permanent -values. The value which the majority have for the more advanced and -developed members of a community is small; from the standpoint of value -most persons are duplicable and dispensable. Consider only the ease -with which factory labor is replaced, in consequence of the prolific -fertility of the human race. The custom of speaking of ethics as a -theory of values is regrettable. It evidences the despair into which -many writers on ethics have fallen as to the possibility of discovering -an objective basis for rightness. - -[32] But the verification itself is the clearer and more explicit -vision of the ethical relation, as it ought to be. - -[33] The term “ethical unit” used above should be found useful. The -chemists have found the concept of the atom useful, though no one -has ever seen an atom. And all the sciences have recourse to similar -inventions,—such as the electron, or the ion, or energy regarded as -a substance, and in mathematics the sublimated, space-transcending -concepts. Looking through the eyes of science, we are taught to see, -underlying the grossest forms of matter, imaginary entities which are -well-nigh metaphysical in nature. Science starts from the realm of -the sensible, and constructs its super-rarefied devices on mechanical -models. Then it leaves the field of the intuitively perceptible, and -rises by the path of analogy into realms where the notions with which -it operates are no longer imaginable. I do not wish, in speaking of an -ethical, invisible, and unimaginable entity, to derive the postulation -of this conception from science. The ethical concept transcends wholly -the field of sensible experience. It is not discovered by way of -analogy. It is frankly and overtly supersensible. It is not exemplified -in the effects it produces in the world of volition as the most -nearly metaphysical concepts of science are exemplified in the field -of phenomena by the recurrences or uniformities which they serve to -account for. The ethical concepts are not verified by their results -at all, not by recurrences of phenomena, but by the persistence of -the effort to attain that which is finitely never attained, and _by -the more explicit perception of the ideal itself_ which follows the -persistent effort; for as has been shown above, when face to face with -fundamental truth, _seeing is believing_. But I allude to these matters -in order to show that the movement in ethical thinking represented -by the system which I propose is not contrary to the present-day -movement in science, but in line with it, though beyond it. It does -not ask leave of science; it does not base its certainty on scientific -precedent; but neither does it expect a veto from the lips of science. -The worthwhileness of scientific endeavor itself depends at bottom -on the sanction which the ideal of the complete carrying out of the -reality-producing functions lends to their incomplete execution in the -world of the space and time manifold. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE IDEAL OF THE SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE AND THE GOD-IDEAL - - -We have seen whence the ideal of a spiritual universe arises. It is -unnecessary to prove that the universe is moral. What it is necessary -to verify is that a universe exists; for “universe” is an ethical -ideal, it is the ethical manifold, or, if we distinguish ethical as -concerning relations between man and man, then we may use the term -“spiritual” to designate that infinite system of interdependence -in which men as ethical units have their place. We begin with the -affirmation—Man is an end _per se_. This wonderful affirmation, -which the democracies are darkly and confusedly trying to express in -political and social arrangements, constitutes the problem of all -problems. It is the great datum of ethics, of which ethical theory -must give an account. All other data or problems that have been thrust -into the foreground—freedom of the will, responsibility, altruistic -self-sacrifice—are secondary, in the sense that they depend for their -solution on a right conception of man as end _per se_. As possessing -worth on his own account he is an ethical unit. Only as a member -of the infinite spiritual universe does he possess the two-fold -attributes implied in worth—inviolability with respect to outsiders -and indefeasible, intrinsic preciousness. Therefore I say that around -the individual, the ethical unit, we build up as a necessary postulate -the spiritual universe. Man ethically considered carries with him this -infinite environment. - -Does this universe exist or is it a mere figment? It is the product of -the reality-producing functions in their ideal completion. It is the -necessary postulate required if the idea of right is to have validity, -and the idea of right is required by man in so far as he is an agent -and not merely a spectator of life. The ethical manifold, the spiritual -universe, exists in so far as there is a right. - -Have we then reinstated the idea of God as existent? Not the idea of -God as an individual. We have on the contrary set aside that idea by -affirming that manifoldness cannot be derived from unity, that the -positing of plurality is just as much a primary function of the mind as -the positing of unity. We have discarded the God-idea as the _locus_ of -unity, since the unity subsists in the relation of the units. Strictly -speaking, we have replaced the God-idea by that of a universe of -spiritual beings interacting in infinite harmony. - -But at this point I must go back for a moment to Kant, using his ideas -once more as a foil to make my own more explicit. Wilhelm von Humboldt -said of Kant that some of the things he had destroyed would never -be rebuilt, and that some of the things he had built would never be -destroyed. - -For more than a hundred years the impression has prevailed that among -the things forever destroyed by Kant are the proofs of the existence -of God. He is represented as an intellectual giant whose blows have -forever shattered the proofs on which the existence of a supersensible -reality rested. Kant’s mind was preëminently scientific. He was the -philosopher who made explicit the principles underlying Newtonian -science as Aristotle had made explicit the logic underlying the Greek -science. His philosophy is essentially agnostic. The use that he -continues to make of the God-idea can be dissociated from his system -with advantage to the latter.[34] - -But did Kant indeed destroy the idea of a supersensible reality -as existent, or are we warranted in undertaking to build anew the -supersensible world.[35] “_Du hast sie zerstörrt, die schöne Welt, -In deinem Busen baue sie wieder_”—not indeed in the realm of mere -feelings, but in the sphere of will. The spell of Kant’s shattering -attack still rests upon the intellectual world today. The notion of a -supersensible reality, if held at all, is held timidly, apologetically -and is apt to be based on subjective emotional need. The wish is more -or less admitted to be father to the faith—the will to believe is -defiantly asserted in despair of sound foundations. A scientist like -Dubois-Reymond enumerates seven world riddles, or mysteries that cannot -be explained, and after saying that they cannot be explained, he seems -to see that no alternative remains but to take refuge in resignation: -“Ignoramus, ignorabimus!” - -That “explanation” is not the only avenue to truth, that the referring -of effects to their causes is not the highest operation of the -reality-producing functions, I have pointed out in a previous chapter. -But Kant, as has been said, is supposed to have utterly annihilated -the arguments intended to demonstrate the existence of God, and it -will clear up the matter at issue if we consider wherein he actually -succeeded and wherein he quite failed. As he himself declares, his -method is regressive; he does not attempt the progressive method path. -He seeks to ascertain whether by going backward along the chain of -effects and causes, or of conditions, he can somewhere find God as -first cause or as unconditioned. He does not look forward looking to -the ideals of the will. He does not enter into the realm of ends, where -the necessity of determining action in obedience to some universal plan -or scheme of relations might have forced itself on his attention. His -approach, like his habit of mind, is scientific. He is not primarily -an ethicist. Proceeding in this manner he shows that the notion of a -first cause is untenable, and he attacks in particular the ontological -argument by which every other argument supplements itself at the point -where it breaks down. - -Did Kant, however, annihilate the Ontological Argument? Yes, in the -scholastic form in which it was held. No, in a form, based on the idea -of the ethical manifold, in which it can be restated. In the scholastic -form it runs: “There is such a thing as the idea of a perfect being. -Existence is an element of perfection. If the perfect being did not -exist it would be less than perfect. But the _ens realissimum_, the -perfect being, is present as an idea in the mind. Therefore it exists.” -The disproof of this amounts to the curt statement that what exists in -the mind does not necessarily exist outside of it, or, as Kant put it: -“The idea of 100 thalers in the head of a man is one thing, lacking no -element of conceptual integrity; while the existence of the 100 thalers -in the man’s purse is an entirely different matter.” The evidence of -existence, in other words, depends on the synthesis of the data of -sense as arranged in the space and time manifold in accordance with the -categories of the understanding. Existence is temporal and spatial. To -prove that God exists we should have to prove that he exists in the -world of the senses. Of any other kind of existence we are agnostic. -Kant’s disproof of the Ontological Argument thus depends on his -agnosticism. - -But suppose that on ethical grounds we find ourselves compelled to -affirm that there is an object which has worth, and that to account for -the inviolableness, indispensableness and preciousness of this object -we are compelled to give free rein to the reality-producing functions, -and to place this object having worth as a member in a manifold -not spatial and temporal but infinite: and suppose we say that the -existence of this worth-endowed object, of this ethical unit with its -compeers, is as certain as the notion of rightness is certain, have we -not then without blame widened the conception of existence, and placed -the Ontological Argument where Kant’s disproof does not even touch -it?[36] - -One more important remark is here in place, suggested by Kant’s -designation of God as the ideal of reason, and by his designation of -our highest nature as the rational nature. - -Is “rational” equivalent to intellectual? If it be so, then feeling -must be classed as irrational, and impulse likewise, since neither -feeling nor impulse is subject to logical rules. And then the war will -be on between the intellectualists or rationalists and the champions of -irrational conceptions of life, since feeling and impulse actually make -up the major part of life, and can neither be left out of account nor -compressed into intellectualist formulas.[37] - -Plainly, there is a deep misunderstanding between the two parties. An -error is involved somewhere. It appears to consist in assuming that -objectivity can be supplied only by the intellect, in overlooking the -fact that the feelings and still more the volition possess intrinsic -controls and norms of their own, that Science, the work of the -intellect, and art and ethics, spring from a common root, namely, -the reality-producing functions. The manifolds with which each of -the three respectively deals are different, the methods of synthesis -are different, but the root principle, synthesis of the manifold, is -identical in all. - -To describe our highest nature, therefore, as the rational nature is -perilous, since the word rational suggests intellectual. Either we must -strain the signification of reason to include feeling and will, which -is contrary to common usage, or we should select some other term, such -as _spiritual_, to designate that nature within us which operates in -science and art and achieves its highest manifestation in producing the -ethical ideal. - -Finally, if what has been said regarding the ethical manifold holds -good, then a genuine philosophy of life can only be reached by the -ethical approach to the problems of life. This has never yet been -consistently attempted. The approach has been made from the scientific -or the logical side, or as in the case of Plato from the æsthetic, -or as in modern times from the biological. Yet the ethical approach -is full of promise. A philosophy of physical nature may be feasible -without it, a philosophy of art may be possible without it, but not so -a philosophy of life. It has not been tried because ethics has lain -in the lap of theology, which was itself corrupted by the attempt to -apply to ethical problems the inadequate principle of causality in the -form of creation theories, while again in recent times, by way of -reaction against theology, the solution of ethical questions is sought -for in the empirical disciplines where a measure at least of objective -certainty has rewarded the investigators. Even Kant, who asserted -the independence of ethics, actually made it dependent on Newtonian -science. The great task now is, strictly to carry out the idea of the -independence of ethics, not indeed as if its principles were unrelated -to those of science and art, but in the sense of independently -investigating the problems _peculiar_ to ethical consciousness. I am -well aware that the attempt made in this volume to take the ethical -line of approach to a general philosophy of life, is tentative and -defective in a hundred ways, nevertheless it is an attempt in a new -direction. - -In the next book I shall take up the practical consequences that -follow from the theory here advanced. Having delineated the ethical -ideal, and discovered the invaluable fact that there is a structural -plan contained in it, we shall see that our actual human duties -may be derived by applying this ideal scheme to the quasi-organic -groups already existing in human society. There are provocative -correspondences to the ethical ideal in the social life of men; -otherwise it would be impossible to apply it. There are human groups -in which a quasi-correlative membership in a common life already -exists. In the case of each of these groups we find some sort of -empirical multiplicity which must be studied scientifically, and also -an empirical motive which may be utilized in the interest of developing -the ethical relation. The family is the first of these groups which -offers a footing in the world of experience for the ideal. In the -family natural affection is the motive; in the vocational group, the -desire to express a talent or special gift; in the state, patriotism; -in the church, the need felt to integrate all human ideals. - -Thus the things of earth are to be used as instrumentalities by -which we are to become aware of the spiritual reality. Only that the -disparateness of the physical world and the ethical universe should -ever be kept in the foreground. Every effort to solve the riddle by -somehow identifying the two has failed. To account for the existence of -a finite world of indefinite extensibility side by side with a universe -_ex hypothesi_ infinite is impossible. Instead of seeking to explain -let effort go toward utilizing. Let the _world_ be used instrumentally -for the purpose of verifying the existence of _universe_. - -For the average man, and indeed for all men, the test of the truth of -a theory is in the practice to which it leads. Abstract metaphysical -arguments appeal only to a few, and even for them the formula in its -abstract guise is unconvincing. Look at the mathematical figure, and -see whether the axioms hold good. Look at the sequent phenomena and see -whether the so-called law of nature is exemplified. And so with respect -to conduct: look at the ways of human behavior traced out in accordance -with the plan of the ethical manifold, and see whether such behavior -wins the approval of the spiritual nature implicit within you.[38] - - - NOTE I - - There are various points at which the system sketched in the text - deviates from current opinion, but in regard to the underlying - proposition the reader’s particular attention is called to the remarks - on the “prejudice of causality” and to the statement that verification - is exemplification. - - How can ethical truth be verified? How can we be sure that ethical - ideals are more than fine wishes, expressing subjective aspiration, - but having no counterpart in the ultimate constitution of things? This - is the dark doubt that haunts the minds of ethical writers, as well - as of the average man. We ask to have the things we believe in, the - objects of our supreme aspiration, verified. How can they be verified? - - I think that we shall see light in this matter once we have grasped - the thought that verification, both in science and in ethics, is - nothing more than exemplification. In the case of causality, in - science, verification does not consist in mere recurrence. For if - we find, even by a single carefully guarded experiment, that a - given phenomenon A is the true antecedent of B, then we take leave - to predict that B will always follow A, without regard to the - repetition of the sequence in our experience.[39] Indeed, no amount - of repetition would justify prediction. The problem in the case of - causality is to determine the true antecedent and the true consequent. - For at any moment there are innumerable phenomena that might possibly - be antecedents of B. How obtain certainty that A is the causal - antecedent? By the synthetic process. We assume a unity, say energy. - We assume that there are differentiæ, say a certain mathematically - determined quantum of mechanical energy in A, and a determined - quantum of thermal energy in B. No sooner have these differentiæ - been mathematically determined, than in virtue of the assumed unity - of energy underlying the differences, we pronounce the nexus to be - necessary. We predict that B will always follow A. - - Causality, therefore, is an example of a synthesis which over-arches - sequences. The fact that the phenomena are sequent does not affect the - principle involved. Whenever we contemplate an example of synthesis, - that is, defined differentiæ of some sort, and a defined underlying - unity of some sort, the mind affirms that reality exists. There - are degrees of reality. The degree of completeness with which the - synthetic function is carried out in any instance determines the - degree. - - Ethical verification is likewise exemplification, though in another - sense. When the ideal plan of ethical relations is presented, the - ideal plan being a synthesis not of sequences but of all co-existent - entities whatsoever, the mind assents to this ideal plan as - representing the complete synthesis or the complete reality. The - more explicitly and definitely the relation between the ethical - units is conceived, the greater the conviction of reality resulting. - Now frustration after partial achievement has the effect of making - more explicit the idea of the plan of relations as it ought to be - carried out in human life. And in this sense I would have the reader - understand the main practical argument of the book—that frustration - is the condition of our intensified conviction as to the reality of - the supersensible universe. - - In virtue of the constitution of our minds we cannot help - acknowledging as real that which is synthesized. Synthesized and - real are synonymous terms. Hence the idea of the completed synthesis - necessarily is the idea of the ultimate reality. - - - NOTE II - - The three principal respects wherein Kant has failed to justify his - affirmation that every human being is to be regarded as an end _per - se_, and not to be used as a tool, are: - - 1. Out of the bare experience of oughtness, absolute constraint, he - seeks to derive personality. Out of the empty categorical imperative - he seeks to draw a substantive entity—a being possessed of worth. - - 2. The society of ends _per se_ described by him is not a true - society, but a collection of atomic individuals juxtaposed. The - capital flaw in his ethics is here. He begins by detaching the - individual. He studies the individual, and discovers, or believes - himself to have discovered, that something happens in him (the - consciousness of absolute constraint) which entitles him to be - considered worth while on his own account. - - Next, since the formula of university proposes imitability by others - as the test of a moral act, all others are called in as concomitants - of the detached atom first considered. Each of the concomitants in - turn is an atomic entity. It is in this mechanical way that the - conception of a kingdom of ends, or a holy community, is supposed - to be validated. Kant’s mistake is to assume that an individual - regarded as an isolated being can be worth while, can be an end _per - se_. The notion of end involves relation to others, not mechanical - juxtaposition, but intrinsic connection. No one is worth while by - himself. He has worth only as an organic member of a spiritual whole. - The unique quality which lends him incomparable distinction is the - creative life which emanates from him and quickens cognate but - diversely modified life in his associates. - - 3. Kant’s version of the ethical rule is strong on the side of - interdiction, but quite inadequate on the positive side. He tells us - that we are to look on others not merely as means to our own ends, but - also ends _per se_. The vagueness is in the formula “not merely ... - but also.” Where the dividing line is to be drawn he does not tell. I - am at liberty to use the services of others in the prosecution of my - own interests, as they may use mine, since we are social beings and - dependent on one another. But how far may I go in this direction? On - this point we are left wholly in the dark. Kant admits into his system - the so-called natural ends,[40] such as wealth, culture and the like, - gives them leave to abound, only with the proviso that they may not - overpass a certain limit,—the limit beyond which they would interfere - with the rights of fellowmen. An instrumental view of wealth, science, - culture, as positively promoting the ethical end of man, he does not - and cannot establish.[41] But the instrumental view is precisely that - in which modern society has most at stake, on the working out of - which the solution of our most pressing problems,—such as the labor - problem, the problem of the family, the problem of patriotism and - international relations—is entirely dependent. If Kant has failed at - this point, as I believe he has, his usefulness as a guide in the - reconstruction of modern life is seriously diminished. What he had - set out to demonstrate, the inalienable worth of man, remains; but - foundations other than his must be found. For the formula “not merely - as a means but also as an end” I would substitute: Treat every man - as a spiritual means to thine own spiritual end and conversely ... - treat the extent and the manner in which we are to use one another as - means being determined by the criterion that our exchange of services - shall conduce to the attainment of each other’s ends as ethical beings - conjointly. - - - NOTE III - - I would also ask the reader to consider well the effect upon the - philosophy of life of the position taken throughout this volume that - there is no intellectual bridge between the finite order and the - infinite order. This involves dropping creation at the beginning and - immortality in its usual sense at the end. Creation is an attempt to - show how the world, including man, proceeded out of the infinite. - Immortality is an attempt to express how man returns to the infinite. - In this volume man’s dealings with the finite order are represented - as having for their purpose the achievement of the conviction that - there verily is an infinite life, a supersensible universe. Creation - systems, pantheistic systems, certain evolutionary systems, also - the Hegelian system, are futile attempts to explain the How. But - explanation is impossible; for to explain means to understand, and to - understand means to trace an effect to its cause. And causality is not - the kind of synthesis applicable to a co-existent totality. - - Among practical consequences note the difference between the theistic - attitude in fatal sickness and the spiritual attitude.[42] The theist - presupposes that there is a God to whose will he must patiently - submit. But theism is a principle of explanation, the God-idea being - employed to account for the finite order. God is thus made responsible - for the suffering of the sick as well as for all other evils in the - world. Hence the very idea which is presupposed in order to produce - patience raises up doubts and perplexities, which imperil patience. - If God made the world why does he permit pain and evil? The spiritual - attitude, on the contrary, ethically interpreted, does not presuppose - the idea of a divine order as a dogma, but offers it as the product - of the experience of suffering itself. The conviction that there is - in man an essential spiritual self, a holy thing, and a spiritual - universe, a holy community, are not gifts to which we fall heir at - birth, or by some sort of revelation borrow from the experience of - ancient teachers; they are a supreme good to be arduously worked out - by ourselves. And the interpretation given to the facts of suffering - and frustration is that they can be used as the means of bringing to - birth in us that supreme conviction. - - In general it may be said that the purpose of existence, both of the - individual and of the race, is so to work in the finite world as to - become possessed with ever greater distinctness of the conviction - of the reality of the wholly real world, the infinite supersensible - universe. - - The attitude of the Christian is other-worldly. He shuns intimacy - with the finite world and turns his face toward his “true home.” The - attitude herein described is that of hearty attack upon the business - of life, and close embrace of all the partial reality which finite - experience contains, with a view of thus acquiring in some measure an - appreciation of the utter reality of which these partial realities are - hints and glimmerings. - - - NOTE IV - - In the case of any new theory, it is true that one must live with it - for a considerable time before acquiring the habit of thinking in - accordance with it. The older habits constantly crop up and interfere - with the correct understanding of any new point of view. This is - especially so of a new attitude towards reality. The world seems - topsy-turvy to one who learns for the first time that grass and the - leaves of trees are not really green apart from the eye that sees - them, that beings with different organs might interpret differently - that which stimulates the human eye to its specific color reactions. - The heliocentric theory, when first announced by Copernicus, outraged - naïve commonsense. It exacted a new habit of thinking in regard to - the relation of the sun to the earth,—the real relation, apprehended - by intercalated mental processes being the direct opposite of the - apparent relation. The sun evidently revolves around the earth, - nevertheless the truth is that the earth revolves around the sun. - - Modern science reveals behind the palpable world around us - unimaginable fluids, speeds, and physical units which are so - sublimated in thought as to be barely distinguishable from - metaphysical entities. The habit of penetrating with radium-like - glance the concrete screen of things, and of seeing behind the screen - the company of atoms, ions, etc., may be gradually acquired; but the - older habit of regarding the palpable and visible as the truly real - continues to assert itself in conflict with the new habit. - - The ethical unit in an ethical manifold postulated in the text as the - closest, though still symbolic, reading of the ultimate reality, makes - a similar demand upon the reader, and requires of him in like manner - the formation of a new habit of thinking, against which the older - habits will doubtless continue to protest. - - The most obstinate of the older habits that stand in the way has - been dealt with in the note on causality, namely,—the unscientific - habit of ignoring the boundaries of science, and of taking the method - employed in the physical sciences as the sole method that leads to - certainty. The prejudice of causality is probably ineradicable, just - as the illusion that the sun revolves about the earth persists. But - we can at least reach the point of realizing that it is a prejudice, - and to this extent overcome it. If it be synthesis, or the employment - in inseparable conjunction of the two functions mentioned, that for - the human mind spells reality, then one kind of synthesis called - causality, that of sequent phenomena, does not exclude the ampler, - though ideal synthesis, which is carried out in the mental production - of the ethical manifold. So much I wish to add to the statements - contained in the text in regard to the theory. - - But there is also a new habit to be acquired in regard to the - practical ethical consequences of the theory. The chief of these is - the prizing of distinctive difference above uniformity or sameness. - The ethical quality is that quality in which a man is intrinsically - unique. The ethical act is the most completely individualized act (I - ought perhaps to say personalized, but the completely individualized - act _is_ that of a unique personality). In brief, the emphasis is - here put on that in which a man differs from all others, and not on - the common nature which he shares with the rest; or rather, since the - common nature is not denied, the stress is put on the intrinsically - different mode in which the common nature is expressed in him.[43] - - The accentuation in current ethical discussion of the common nature of - man, and the fallacious assumption that the common interests are the - pre-eminently moral interests, that uniformity is the test of ethical - quality, is easy to understand. It is the reaction of the modern world - against feudalism, a social system not yet entirely outgrown, in - which the empirical differences of rank and birth were made the basis - of intolerably oppressive discriminations, and in which it was an - accepted axiom that some men are baked of better clay than others. It - is also a reaction against the capitalistic system that has taken the - place of the feudal, in which wealth is to a considerable extent made - the standard of social appraisement. - - It is against these false discriminations that the voice of humanity - is now indignantly raised, affirming the moral equality of all men. - But equality is mistakenly taken to mean likeness in the sense of - sameness, not in the sense of that fundamental likeness on the - background of which the desirable unlikenesses stand forth. And this - notion of equality as identical with sameness leads to great practical - aberrations. Thus, for instance, women are not only to be recognized - as the equals of men, but are to be the same as men,—their education - patterned on that of men, their specific functions, as far as - possible, ignored. For unlikeness is supposed to connote inferiority, - and inferiority is justly repelled as morally intolerable. But aside - from this one example, the stressing of the common nature, or of the - basis of likeness at the expense of the outstanding unlikenesses, - leads to other leveling tendencies of which modern democracies - furnish many unpleasing illustrations. Thus uniform popular opinion, - encompassing the individual on every side, penetrates into his inmost - thinking, so that he hardly ventures to hold to his own judgment - against the judgments of the majority. And the impulses of the mass - tend also to threaten his independence in action. There is indeed a - certain intoxication in the very sense of being submerged in a large - whole, a certain glad loss of self in great impersonal movements, a - certain strain of democratic pantheism, as it were, that takes the - place with some of mystic absorption in Deity. But whatever the value - that may attach to these upswellings of feeling, it is counterbalanced - by the circumstance that in proportion as indiscriminate devotion to - society as a whole becomes the paramount motive, the sub-organisms of - society, the family, the vocation and the state, in which the ethical - personality is ripened, are threatened with effacement. Instead of - moral equality it were better to use the term “moral equivalence.” The - differences are to be stressed; they are the coruscating points in the - spiritual life of mankind. That every man is the equal of his fellows - means that he has the same right as each of the others to become - unlike the others, to acquire a distinct personality, to contribute - his one peculiar ray to the white light of the spiritual life. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [34] I do not however agree with those who regard the shreds of - theology remaining in his system as a concession, not wholly - ingenuous, to orthodoxy. He was brought up in the pietistic faith, - and had probably not entirely outgrown the emotional impressions - of those early teachings. The noumena, however, play a part in the - system itself distinct from the theology, and are not to be taken as - supersensible realities. They are limiting concepts intended to serve - as incentives or lures, winning the mind to continue without cessation - its advance along certain paths within the field of experience; - but they are not supposed to give any clue as to what is beyond - experience. That which is beyond the field of experience is simply - unknowable. Thus the noumenon called “thing _per se_” is notice given - to the mind not to be deterred in its proper business of unifying the - space and time manifold by the difficulties which arise when the time - and space manifold is taken as an ultimate account of reality. The - thing _per se_ is a welcome to science and not a bar set up in its - path. - - The noumenon of freedom is an incentive to man urging him to act - as if he were capable of practicing the law of universality and - necessity. In fact the phrase “as if” plays a leading rôle in the - Kantian philosophy. The noumenon of God, as will presently be shown, - is afflicted with this conditional “as if” character to even a higher - degree. We are to assume God in order to look upon the vast field of - possible experience as if it were unified, as if a being who himself - stands for unity had been its creator. This assumption is supposed to - be necessary in order to encourage the scientist in his search for - the thread of unity, lest he flag by the way. As a matter of fact - scientists have contented themselves with the simple assumption of - the uniformity of nature as necessary to the prosecution of their - investigations, and have as a rule troubled themselves little to - hypostasize the notion of unity. Nor has recent progress in science - been associated with and influenced by the belief in an individual - Deity. The noumenon of God is unnecessary for science while in Kant’s - ethical application of it it is positively harmful. He introduces the - God notion as an artificial device for linking together happiness and - virtue, a device quite inconsistent with the noble austerity of his - ethical system, whatever its other defects may be. - - The noumena, then, are apparitions that appear at the end of certain - paths in the field of experience, far off where the sky and the ground - seem to meet. These paths run off in different directions. At the - end of each is one of these limiting apparitions, and the society of - noumena is disconnected internally: there is no relation of unity - between the unifiers. - - [35] The difference between “supersensible” and “supernatural” - is capital. I do not encourage relapse into supernaturalism. The - supernatural is the opposite of the supersensible. It is an attempt to - represent in natural or _sensible_ guise what is supposed to be beyond - the senses; and the naturalistic representation of the supersensible - is then taken not metaphorically but literally. - - [36] He allows indeed the _Ens Realissimum_ to remain, and calls it - the ideal of the reason, the ideal of unity hypostasized, centralized - in an individual, and somehow harboring within itself all real - properties whatsoever. But it is quite impossible to conceive how all - real properties can belong to a single individual. For the properties - as we know them are incompatible with each other. Surely an individual - cannot be both great and small, beautiful and ugly, of all colors and - sounds, etc., etc. Or again if all properties were somehow assembled - in one individual, since that individual is conceived of as an - hypostasized unity, it would be impossible to speak of a relation - between them, and yet upon the relation of the differentiæ depends the - ethical utility of the idea of a supreme reality. - - [37] Compare, for instance, the anti-intellectualistic philosophy - of Bergson, with its emphasis on planless spurts of energy, the - irrationalist philosophy of Schopenhauer, etc. - - [38] The above exposition is not a transcendental derivation of - ethics. The ideal of the infinite society is a fulguration _out - of_ ethical experience, to be ever renewed _in it_. We build not - only our world, but our universe. The ethical principle is not a - working hypothesis, like those provisionally used in science. It is - the outgrowth of the functional finalities. It is a postulate. The - specific moral laws, or expressions of the ethical principle indeed, - are changeable, being the product of the principle with the varying - empirical conditions of human society. The fundamental principle is - unchangeable. - - The consciousness of universal interrelation is not to be described as - mystical consciousness. The identity of the self remains intact; it is - never lost in the One or the All. The ethical consciousness includes - indeed the consciousness of other selves related to our own, in a kind - of superindividual consciousness. But this is reached along the sunlit - path of action (So _act_, etc.), and not along the dreamy flux of - emotionalism or in the silent depths of quietism. - - [39] The frequent recurrence gives us a sense of safety in expecting - the consequent on the appearance of the antecedent. But the sense of - safety should not be confounded with the sense of the certainty. We - expect that day will follow night, because it has followed innumerable - times. But no amount of repetition can warrant the assertion that it - will and must do so. The Pragmatist view explains the sense of safety - in expectation, but does not appear to account for the certainty in - prediction, as for instance in the astronomer’s prediction of an - eclipse. - - [40] A hybrid conception, since in nature there are only happenings, - but no ends. - - [41] His efforts in some measure to remedy this defect in the Doctrine - of Virtue are artificial and unconvincing. - - [42] See Book III for a fuller development of this point. - - [43] Difference in the ethical meaning is not to be confounded with - mere idiosyncrasy, or originality, not to say eccentricity. It is - the kind of difference which elicits correlated difference in all - spiritual associates. - - - - - BOOK III - - APPLICATIONS: THE THREE SHADOWS, SICKNESS, SORROW AND SIN, AND THE - RIGHT TO LIFE, PROPERTY AND REPUTATION - - - - -CHAPTER I - -INTRODUCTION - - -Three main thoughts should be kept clear: the end to be realized, the -incongruity of the finite and the infinite order, and hence, thirdly, -the indispensable ministry of frustration in the realization of the -purpose of life. - -In regard to the so-called moral end of life, there has been much -variety and contrarity of teaching. I shall touch only upon that -aspect of the doctrine expounded in the previous book wherein it seems -to resemble other doctrines, and where a distinct statement of the -difference is therefore imperative. “So act as to develop the faculties -of thy fellowman” is not the rule proposed. “So act as to develop -the so-called good qualities in the man” is not the rule proposed. -The rule reads, “Act so as to bring out the spiritual personality, -the unique nature of the other.” Now, in putting the matter in this -way, we incurred the danger of seeming to concentrate attention on -the individual as a detached being, we seemed to have him only in -mind, though it is true, in respect to what is intrinsic in him, the -irreducible ethical unit which he essentially is. We must, therefore, -constantly remind ourselves that the ethical unit, while unique, is -at the same time an inseparable member of a society of differentiated -units; that its very distinctiveness consists in injecting, as it -were, streams of dynamic energy into its fellow-beings. Or, as I have -elsewhere figuratively put it, the distinctiveness of any ethical -being consists, so to speak, in emitting a ray the color of which is -nowhere else to be found, the miraculous quality of which consists in -acquiring this color at the very instant in which it causes counter or -complementary colors to appear in its fellow-being. (I am using the -words “instant,” “miraculous,” “ray of light,” etc., of course, in a -wholly figurative sense.) - -We have at last, this is my belief, achieved a positive definition of -the spiritual nature. The spiritual nature is that which forever is -social in a supra-social sense, as embracing not only human society, -but a universal society of spirits. The spiritual nature is that -of which the very life consists in starting up unlike but equally -worthwhile life elsewhere, everywhere. The spiritual experience to get -hold of, therefore, is the consciousness of this interrelation. - -The moral end to be realized, in accordance with the deductions -of Book II, is “So to act upon another as to evoke in him, and -conjointly in oneself, in the same movement and counter-movement the -consciousness of the interlacedness of life with life, the reciprocal, -universal, infinite interrelatedness.” - -Now, as a fact, we never realize this end. If we did we should possess -what alone is properly called freedom,—freedom in the positive sense -being the exercise of power peculiar to ourselves, welling up out of -our veriest self, and executing the totality of its effects. Freedom is -marked by these two signs: energy coming unborrowed out of self, and -producing the totality of its effects. I am free when the thing I do -is verily my own, when the power released is the power of my essential -self; and when that power is nowhere checked, inhibited or interrupted, -so that it produces its due, that is, its universal effects. - -An ethical being in an ethical universe would be free. The dynamic -energy proceeding from it would be aboriginal. And since it would -radiate upon every other member of the infinite society, it would also -produce the unstinted plenitude of its effects. Each ethical unit, at -its station, would be at once the _producer and the recipient of the -totality of life_.[44] - -It is apparent from what has been said that the superlative, sublime -thing, freedom, is not realizable except in an infinite world. And -hence that the supreme end to be realized by man as a finite being -cannot be the full release of unique power in himself. But neither can -the end be approximation. In so serious a business as a philosophy of -life we ought not to play with words, nor delude ourselves with the -implication of proximity seemingly contained in the word approximation. -For it being admitted that we cannot reach the ideal, approximation -seems to suggest that we come into its neighborhood. But the truth -is that the more we advance the less do we arrive in the immediate -neighborhood of the ideal, the distance at which it lies becoming ever -more remote. The moral end, therefore, for a finite nature, like that -of man, is just to realize the unattainableness of the end. There must -be no heaven-on-earth illusions, no resting in the development of our -inadequate human faculties, and no illusions as to approximation. The -unattainableness of the infinite end in the finite world by the finite -nature is the Alpha and Omega of the doctrine, as I propound it. Only -after this truth has been fully faced and recognized, shall we be in -a position to take in the vast significance of the fact that we are -nevertheless under a certain coercion to persist in our efforts to -attain the unattainable, and in inquiring into the source from which -this pressure comes, we shall be led to infer the influence in us of -an infinite nature enshrined in this finite nature of ours. In other -words, to admit the unattainableness of the end in a finite world by -a finite being is the very condition of our acquiring the conviction -that there is an infinite world, and that we, as possessing an infinite -nature, are included in it.[45] - -I have now covered the points mentioned: the end to be realized, -the incongruity of the two orders, and the cardinal importance of -frustration as a spiritual experience, as a means of spiritual -education. - -From this point of view the whole question of how to deal with the -frustrations of life assumes a new aspect. Lessing published his -well-known essay on the Education of the Race towards the close of the -eighteenth century.[46] Interest in the subject has since been obscured -by the scientific movement, and especially by the evolutionary -philosophy. The latter excludes the idea of education in the proper -sense, and substitutes for it a natural process, a genetic unfolding. -The education of the human race, and of the human individual from the -spiritual point of view consists in a series of efforts never to be -intermitted, but not necessarily following each other in an orderly -series, aiming to embody the infinite in the finite. - -Both partial success and failure in these efforts are instrumental -to the achievement of the task of mankind. Both serve to make more -explicit the character and extent of the ideal, while the ultimate -inevitable failure painfully instructs man in the fact of the -incongruity of the two orders. The only outcome of human history that -we can view with satisfaction on a large scale, is the same as that -which we should regard as the best outcome of an individual life, -namely, the growing conviction and the clearer vision of the eternal -spiritual universe as real. We might say that that man had lived best -who on his deathbed could declare with perfect truth: “I have achieved -the certainty, and in through the vicissitudes of my life, that there -is a universe.” I here emphasize again the distinction between universe -and world. To say that the universe is “good” is equivocal. The term -“good,” as commonly used, describes the moral striving of a finite -nature, and not the quality that belongs to the spiritual universe -and its members, thinking of them as ideally we must, as freed from -finite limitation. Of the spiritual universe, we might use the term -“supra-good,” only we should then be careful to add that the “beyond -good” is to be conceived as lying in the direction of the good, while -transcending it. Thereby we avoid the pitfall of Nietzsche and of -others who speak in a totally different sense of the “beyond good and -evil.” We read of a man blessing his children on his deathbed. The -highest type of man is the one who _in articulo mortis_ can bless the -universe. - -The discrepancy of the finite and the infinite order appears on the -physical and moral sides. On the physical side it thrusts itself upon -our attention in the circumstance that juxtaposition and sequence are -incapable of being unified, or totalized. Space and time and that -which fills them, matter, are by nature incongruous with spirit. On -the moral side the incongruity appears in the deflecting forces of -appetite and passion which hinder us in the attainment of the spiritual -end and in the fact that our so-called higher faculties are in -irreconcilable conflict with one another. The harmonious union of all -of them in any individual is a fiction. It is impossible to be fully -developed on all sides. And in addition the social substrata in which -the spiritual relation has to be worked out, are themselves too deeply -beset with internal contrarieties to serve their purpose adequately. -The sex relation, for instance, is to a certain extent favorable to the -achievement of spirituality, that is, of living in the life of another; -yet on the other hand there are elements in it that defeat this very -object. - -I write, therefore, at the head of such words of counsel as I can hope -to give in respect to the conduct of life, the word _Frustration_. -It is understood that this word is not used in the pathetic sense. -First because there is partial achievement, moments in life at which -the rainbow actually seems to touch the earth. Love and marriage, the -completing of a beautiful work of art, the discovery of a new law of -nature, the emancipation of an oppressed class, are examples. But these -partial successes are presently seen to be partial; they are followed, -or even in the moment of triumph, permeated, with the sense of -incompleteness and the foreboding of new obscurities and perplexities -advancing upon the mind. Yet essentially the doctrine is not a -melancholy doctrine, because frustration, though a painful instrument, -is yet a necessary instrument of spiritual development. We are not open -to the reproach of dampening the zest and relish for life of those who -are setting out to try the hazard of their fortunes. They shall put -forth their best effort to succeed, but let them be so guided herein -that they may meet in the right attitude of mind the disillusionment -which is the condition of the revelation. The shadows will and must -descend before they can be parted, disclosing the landscape of the -spiritual universe. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[44] Incidentally it may be remarked that in introducing the category -of interrelation we remove the objection against freedom which remains -unmitigable so long as freedom is supposed to be a kind of causality, -competing with natural causality. Causality is the unity of a temporal -manifold of sequent phenomena. The concept of interrelation is the -concept of the unity of co-existent entities. - -[45] See some fine remarks on the unattainableness in Tyrrel’s -_Christianity at the Cross-roads_. - -[46] _Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts._ - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE THREE GREAT SHADOWS: SICKNESS, SORROW, SIN - - -Having concentrated attention upon the point that the end is not the -development of any particular faculty or assemblage of faculties, -but the awakening in man, in and through his development, of the -consciousness of interrelation, of life in life, we shall now turn to -the three great shadows: sickness, sorrow, sin. In the case of sickness -the suffering, however acute, must be made to pass over into action. -There is a certain work to be done, something to be accomplished on the -sick bed. What is it? I shall briefly review a few of the answers that -have been given. - -First, the Stoic says: A man in pain is to resist the pain by an act -of will, thereby demonstrating that his essential self is inaccessible -to bodily suffering. “If there is a pain in thy limb, remember that -the pain is in thy limb, and not in thyself.” Now the fortitude of the -Stoic is admirable as far as it goes; his counsels are bracing and -manly. But, because he is a materialistic pantheist, the reason he -gives for his defiance of pain is not convincing. In effect his appeal -is rather to the empirical than to the spiritual nature of man. The -spiritual nature is characterized by humility; the appeal of the Stoic -is to pride. Fate with all its sledgehammer blows shall not crush him. -Yet the Stoic’s pride when put to the supreme test does not avail, and -the proof of it is that at the last it breaks down in suicide. - -We come to a second answer. There is business in hand for the sufferer -on the sick bed. What is the business? To hide the expression of his -suffering, so that the cloud which rests on him may not cast its shadow -upon others, obscuring their sunshine. But, we are bound to ask, are -others always worthy of such consideration? Is not our sympathetic -regard for their pleasures, their sunshine, often misplaced? Are not -their pleasures often selfish and frivolous? The Greeks believed that -outcries in situations of great distress are perfectly legitimate, -since they seem to afford a kind of relief. Is it not cruel to forbid -such outcries? In our age the view prevails that it is a proof of moral -grandeur to suppress the signs of suffering. But the cynical question -obtrudes itself whether it may not be the collective selfishness of the -multitude that imposes this rule. The common run of men desire to go -on their way undisturbed by cries that emanate from the sick chamber, -and perhaps it is on this account that they impose a rule of behavior -based, not on the principle of human worth, but on its opposite. The -individual forsooth is not to count; the unhappiness of one is not to -interfere with the happiness of the greater number! - -There is, however, another view of the matter possible. Everyone -carries his own particular burden. When tortured by some painful -malady, we are apt to think that others, because they wear a smiling -exterior, are therefore free from pain. But often those who seem in -sound health are in fact as great sufferers as we, or even greater. And -physical pain is not the only kind of suffering. Why, then, should I, -for one, add to the troubles of others by imposing my own upon them? -Put in this way, it is plain that there is an ethical element in the -kind of behavior that is expected of a manly person. But the reason -assigned, sympathy with the pleasures of others, is unconvincing. -Unless there be some good to which grievous suffering can be made -instrumental, there is no warrant for enduring it. As for the Stoics, -so for the philosopher of sympathy, the logical end would be suicide, -at least when the pain is exceptionally intense. - -There is a third answer. Something is to be worked out on the sick bed. -What is it? To be purified in the furnace, to learn patience and humble -submission to the inscrutable will of God. Patience is the supreme -virtue. “Be patient, Oh, be patient,” I once heard a dying man repeat -with touching accents. But patience for the sake of what? There must be -some object to be gained by the patience to make it commendable. I can -be patient in a storm at sea if I may entertain the hope of reaching -port. I can be patient in conducting a difficult scientific experiment -if I may hope that it will issue in an important discovery, or prepare -the way for such discovery by others. I can be patient in sickness if -I have any reason to expect a return to health. But patience for mere -patience’s sake is absurd. Well, then, the third answer is,—patience -for the sake of manifesting your faith and trust in a wise and -beneficent Deity. Why he has sent this suffering, why he has so made -the world that it is replete with the agony of sentient creatures we do -not know. We cannot know. But he knows. Trust him, have faith in him: -“Though he slay me yet will I trust him.” - -Here a genuine characteristic of the spiritual attitude has been -expressed, but the ground on which it is put is once more unconvincing. -How do I know that there is such a being as this wise and loving Deity -of whom you tell me? By the evidence of his works, by the testimony -of the world he has created, by the life for which I am indebted to -him. But the world is the playground of good and evil forces. There -is a semblance of design; there is on the other hand apparently the -wildest disorder. The stars in their courses travel with incredible -celerity in every direction, but no astronomer has ever yet been -able to discern a plan in their journeyings. Human life is full of -sorrow as well as joy; and whether there be more sorrow or more joy -in the lives of most persons, who will venture to say? There is -kindness, but there is also cruelty. There is coöperation, and there -is merciless competition. There is health and bloom, and there is -miserable physical decay. At present, in my case, suffering and sorrow -are in the ascendant. The picture of the Deity as fashioned from the -evidence of experience is dark and bright, cruel and kind. If he be -omnipotent, why did he introduce the elements of discord and trouble -into his creation? Why, in particular, does he at present torture me -so cruelly? In order that I may believe in him despite the evidence! -But how can I believe, seeing that in my own case the evidence on the -bad side preponderates? Thus the mind of the sufferer on his couch -of pain gropes in the labyrinth of argument and counter-argument—for -the intellectual processes are often preternaturally acute in times of -physical suffering—and there is no outlet. In a fine spiritual nature -there is something which pleads that the counter-arguments ought not -to prevail. Desperately, by an act of faith, a man lays hold on his -God. But presently his faith again relaxes, his state of mind becomes -confused, and unless supported by strong impressions received in and -retained from childhood on, the third answer will not avail him. - -There is business in hand on the sick bed. What is it? The fourth -answer, the answer as it appeals to me, depends on the very incongruity -of the finite and the infinite order. Every attempt to explain this -incongruity breaks down, every theodicy is a fiction. To explain is to -find the cause of effects. But the notion of cause does not apply to -the relation between the finite and the infinite. And of the infinite -order itself we possess only the plan or scheme of relations. The -members of this ideal world are related to one another in such a manner -that the essential uniqueness of the one is to be provocative of the -diverse distinctiveness of the others. This, as I think, is a very -fruitful formula, furnishing a rule of conduct to be applied to our -finite relations. But it sheds no light on the uniqueness itself, which -is forever ideal. What in its ultimate constitution our spiritual being -may be, remains unknown. Did we know, were we capable of comprehending -the infinite order, and seeing things in that supersolar light, we -might then be able to solve the insoluble riddle, the coexistence -side by side of the finite and the infinite. As it is, the problem of -finiteness especially in its human aspect of suffering and evil is -impenetrable, inexplicable. _But if we cannot explain suffering and -evil, we can utilize them for a definite spiritual end._ And that end -is to achieve through the ministry of frustration and the persistence -of the effort toward the unattainable, the consciousness of the reality -of the spiritual universe and of our membership in it. - -The answer, therefore, which I should offer, is based on this pivotal -distinction between explaining and using. And thus the business in -hand, the end to be gained, is the intensified realization of our -spiritual interconnectedness with others, the life in life. To this end -we accept from the Stoic, though for a reason which he does not give, -resistance to pain, and from the philosopher of sympathy the obligation -of not clouding the life of others with our shadow, and from the -theologian the law of patience—and we take a step beyond all three. - -Let me carry this out somewhat more in detail. To gain the -consciousness of interrelation, there must be an object outside of -myself of supreme interest to me, enabling me to transcend the ego. -Now, pain has the opposite effect, that of concentrating attention -on the ego. Pain builds a prison around us, raises up high walls -which shut us in. Anyone in great pain is incessantly reminded of his -physical state. In order that the mind may pass out of the prison -cell and over the encompassing wall, there needs to be some object -beyond the wall appealing enough to solicit the outward movement. -This object is the spiritual self of my fellowmen. It is my concern -for their spiritual self which is their highest good, it is my eager -wish to reinforce what is best in them that works the transcendence of -the ego and of its pains. In such supreme moments the lesser values -dwindle into relative insignificance. And what is best in others is -the same consciousness on their part of the interrelation. It is this -that I am to awaken in them, to strengthen in them by the intensity -with which I myself realize it. In the case of loving kin and friends, -they, too, suffer with me. In vain I try to hide my sufferings. They -divine what I try to suppress; and the more I try to suppress it, the -more they suffer with me. They suffer not only with the suffering, but -with the attempt to conceal the suffering. I have seen this in the -case of a mother at the bedside of her dying daughter. They go with me -to the brink of life. They enter into the anxieties and forebodings -that haunt my mind as I face death. There may be young children that -still need fostering care. Dangers to the family may arise after I am -gone. The more my life is implicated in the lives around me, the more -as I stand on the edge of life will my thoughts be occupied, not with -the obliteration of my empirical self, but with the future of those -that survive—that best future of theirs which I long to assure. And -they, in turn, if they are fine natures, will pass through this inward -experience with me. Thus I descend into the darkness and the depths, -and they descend with me; and I am also to rise out of the darkness and -the depths, and am to gain the force to do this in order that I may -lift them with me. - -This is the business in hand. I am to draw myself out of the depths, -to overcome the centralizing, egotizing effects of physical and mental -pain, in order by my effort to make those around me realize the -intensity with which I feel my interrelatedness with them, and thereby -to reveal to them the same spiritual power in themselves. Plans for -the future education of the children, counsels of peace, by way of -anticipation for the too lonely hours that await the most loving and -the most beloved,—these things have value chiefly in so far as they are -insignificant of the indissoluble interlacing of life with life.[47] - -FOOTNOTES: - -[47] I have spoken of the sick bed as surrounded by loving friends -and near of kin. There are sick beds where the situation is quite -different,—in the poor wards of hospitals for instance. Nevertheless, -the loneliest person is never without certain human relations. It may -be the pauper in the next bed, the nurse, or the physician, to whom his -behavior will be of lasting meaning. - -I would add a word as to the attitude of a person who is threatened -with insanity, and who is aware that the disease is approaching. His -last conscious act should be to honor the community to which he belongs -by voluntarily putting himself out of the way of harming them. Not that -the physical harm is itself the principal thing, but that the wish not -to harm physically is the sign of his sense of the ethical relation in -which he stands to his fellows. Also a person threatened in this way -ought to be willing to put himself in the keeping of others, even of -strangers, as being no longer himself competent to judge rightly of -what shall be done to him. It is true that in accepting the judgment of -strangers as a substitute for his own he is taking the risk of being -treated with insufficient consideration, and possibly even mistreated. -Yet the jeopardy in which he thus puts his future, the sacrificial act -he performs, is evidence of mental nobility at the very moment when -mental night is about to set in for him. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -BEREAVEMENT - - -When we reflect on what actually happens in cases of bereavement, we -shall find great diversity in different situations. It may be that the -deceased person has led a worthless life, and that the grave is allowed -to close over him without much regret. Nevertheless, the honor due to -worth that _never appeared in him_ ought to be shown. In the worst -cases we may not treat human beings like animals. Besides, there are -generally one or more persons who seem to have an unreasoning natural -affection for the wretched being, and so he does not go wholly without -the tribute of tears. Others, like sufferers from cancer, pass through -days, weeks, months of acute pain before they die. In their case it is -said that death comes as a relief, and often the final relief from the -suffering obscures the loss. - -Again, in most men’s lives there is an upper and an under side. Though -the public career of statesmen, poets, artists may be dazzling, yet -their faults or obliquities are probably well enough known to those -who have seen them at close range. Obituaries are seldom truthful. -Sometimes, however, the reverse happens; men whose names are held up -to public obloquy are not always as black as they are painted. Their -worst side becomes known to the public, yet they sometimes possess -wonderfully fine traits. - -Very pathetic is the mourning for a baby, and its unfulfilled promise, -or for a defective child, long a burden, yet strangely grieved for when -its feeble little flame of life is extinguished. - -The most poignant sorrow is that which cannot be communicated to others -or shared by others, because the tie severed by bereavement, like -that of husband and wife, is between two only. The loss by death of -a beloved life companion is apt to lead to an inconsolable state of -mind, because in this relation, when finely interpreted, the empirical -and the spiritual appear almost to coincide. The ethical rule, Live -in the life of another, live so as to enhance to the highest degree -the possibilities of another, seems almost no longer a counsel of -perfection but an actual experience. Hence the utter grief into which -the sundering of the tie is apt to plunge the survivor. On the other -hand, Jonathan Edwards said on his deathbed to his wife: “Our relation -has been spiritual, and therefore is eternal.” And there is indeed an -element of eternality in marriage, only it is not the sex relation as -such that is or can be conceived of as eternal. It is not man and woman -in their empirical form to which this attribute belongs. Marriage is -the sign; the spiritual relation that which is signified.[48] - -It may be objected that marriage being a tie strictly between two, one -can hardly think without repugnance of an equally intimate, nay, far -more intimate, relation with all spiritual beings whatsoever. Yet the -spiritual relation is one in which the ethical being is conceived to be -in touch with each of the infinite beings that comprise the spiritual -universe, pouring its essential life into them, and receiving theirs in -return. Is not then the sign incompatible with and contradictory to the -thing signified? But it is not of the multitude of mortal men and women -surrounding us that we think when we speak of the eternal hosts. From -this surrounding swarm of mortals, we retreat, taking refuge in the -inmost privacy which we share with one other only. Yet this very inmost -intimacy, so far as it is pure, is the emblem of that pure intercourse -of essential being with essential being in which we are related to -all.[49] - -Following up the subject of bereavement, we find the following -consolations employed: - -The first to be mentioned is, “Bow to the inevitable.” I include -this because frustration is inevitable, on account of the discrepancy -between the finite and the infinite order, and because we are to use -inevitable frustration for the purpose of experiencing the reality -of the ideal. But without this use in mind, the inevitable presents -itself as a mere blind necessity, in which we can see neither right nor -reason, a hostile doom that simply crushes us. The psychological effect -of the thought of an event as inevitable, it is true, is in any case -calming, but the tranquillity thus induced is a heavy and hopeless one. -And those who accept the inevitable in this stupefying manner often -become meaner in their way of living. The light of life is for them -extinguished. They put up perhaps with creature comforts, or with work -that merely keeps the mind occupied, and prevents it from fretting the -wound, thus allowing slow time to cicatrize it. - -There is, however, a larger way in which a materialist may regard the -inevitable. The world in his view being a vast machine, he may, as it -were, identify himself with the machine, and thereby rise in thought -superior to the injury it inflicts on him. But though we can imagine -someone thus deadening his feelings when he himself is the victim, we -cannot well conceive of the same remedy applying when a beloved person, -say an only child, is being crushed under the Juggernaut car of the -world-machine. _The great test of one’s philosophy of life is whether -it helps us in the case of those whom we love, rather than in the case -of the sufferings we experience in our own person._ - -A second consolation is: Remember the universality of sorrow. Look -around you, behold the vast multitude who are suffering like you; -remember the countless generations who have suffered in the past, -think of the generations to come that will suffer in like manner. Such -are some of the consolations of the choruses in the Greek tragedies. -Latent perhaps in this mournful view of the facts of existence is -another aspect of the matter, namely, the uprising from frustration -toward ideal realization. And in so far as this other uplifting view is -indeed latent or suggested, the thought of the universality of sorrow -has an ennobling effect. On the other hand, without the explication of -what may be regarded as implicit in them the consolations of the Greek -choruses are inexpressibly saddening. - -A third and active variant of the former consolation is: Seek to -mitigate the sorrow and trouble of thy fellow-sufferers. Appease the -passion of thine own grief by compassion and the works to which it -leads. And by as much as activity of any kind is better than passivity, -or mere feeling, by so much is this third kind of consolation better -than the ones above mentioned. But at bottom the same criticism applies -to it. It leaves still unanswered the question, To what end this -suffering both of others and of oneself? Not Why? is the question, -but To what end? How bereavement may be used so as to bring it into -relation with the final end of life? - -A fourth consolation is the popular belief in immortality. This -is a resort to supernaturalism, and the supernatural should ever -be distinguished from the supersensible. Immortality as popularly -held involves the continued existence in some empirical form of the -essential, central entity in man. For the suggestion that new organs -may replace the wornout terrestrial body does not alter the empirical -character of the conception. The new organs are still conceived in some -vague fashion as similar to those with which we are acquainted. - -Finally, my own interpretation of consolation may be set forth in -contrast to all these. Again I say that for the bereaved, as for the -sick, there is business in hand, there is a task to be performed, a -work to be done. What is it? Let me endeavor to explain. The spiritual -nature of man is incognizable, only the plan of the relations between -spirit and spirit being given. Yet to think of a relation at all -we must think of entities or objects between which it subsists. Of -the spiritual part of our fellow-beings, therefore, we are bound to -fashion mentally a symbolic image, one that shall stand for the real -object, the spiritual nature, though we are well aware that it does not -adequately express it. - -When the beloved person is no longer visibly present, the work we do -upon the symbolic image of him is not to cease. We are to review, to -summarize the whole existence of a departed friend, as we have probably -never done while he was with us. We are to get the total perspective of -his life, to see the fine qualities standing out more distinctly; to -seize the net result of his existence so far as those character traits -are concerned which in him were most analogous to spiritual traits. -This image we can now ideally contemplate with the advantage that none -of the actual infirmities of his nature can mar it, and that no future -events can henceforth alter our impression. The work of clarifying -the image of our friend goes on unimpeded. And our own activity in -the process of purifying his image of all that was merely fallible in -him benefits us in return. The effect of this activity of ours on the -datum of his life is our permanent gain. Thus both what he was and what -he was not is stimulative. While he lived we performed the function -of elimination and concentration with a view of producing progress in -him and in ourselves jointly. Progress, induced by us, so far as he -is concerned, for all we know is at an end. Progress so far as we are -concerned is assured by the activity we continue to expend as long as -we live on his memory. And the memory, or the image, stands for the -beloved person. There is real mental intercourse wherever there is a -movement of one mind towards the outgoings of another, even though the -retroactive relation be suspended. The beloved person benefits me, -though I no longer benefit him, except indirectly so far as in my own -life I possibly expiate his shortcomings and in so far as I bestow on -other living persons the advantage I receive from my mental intercourse -with him.[50] - -What, then, is the business in hand? What is the work to be done? -Plainly to tie anew the threads that were broken, to bring it about -that the loss, infinitely painful though it be, shall lead to gain, -to substitute for the mixed relation of touch and sight the purely -spiritual relation. - -One more remark must be made in connection with the above. There is -at present a tendency to dishonor the past in comparison with the -future. Interest seems to lie in what lies ahead. Hence a breathless, -forward-urging mood. One consequence of this is that the dead are less -honored than of old. Within a single generation, for instance, I have -seen not a few eminent persons in the city of New York pass away who -up to the time of their death and in their obituaries were greatly and -justly praised. I have hardly ever seen their names publicly mentioned -since. Already they seem practically forgotten. In our national history -likewise only a few of the most eminent are remembered. In like manner -in families, the names even of father and mother are seldom mentioned -by their surviving adult children, and ancestors at second remove -are barely remembered. Now excessive reverence for the past, as in -China, is a mark of stationariness. A retrospective point of view -is inconsistent with progress. Our face must necessarily be turned -toward the future. And yet forgetfulness of those human beings whom -we have known, and who represented to us while they lived much of the -best that life had to give, seems inhuman and incredible. It is true -that I have drawn a sharp distinction between the empirical selves -and those spiritual selves which the former for a time enshrined. The -empirical selves have now disappeared. The gleam of love in the eye, -the luster of beauty, whether of form or of expression, that touched -for a season the sacred features, have vanished. On the other hand, the -spiritual self as a member of the spiritual universe is confessedly -past knowing and past imagining. On what object then shall memory -dwell? It may dwell on the empirical self in so far as it was the sign -of the thing signified, in so far as the being we knew and loved was -to us convincing of the reality of that spiritual world which itself -is incognizable by sense or mind. The greatest boon any human being -can confer on another is to serve him in attaining the end for which -he exists; and the supreme end for us all is the realization of our -interrelation with the infinite community of spirits. The woman whom -we say we loved, we loved precisely because she revealed to us that -spiritual galaxy—because she was a Beatrice, ascending with us, and -opening to our sight the eternal expanses. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[48] In the New Testament, despite the preference expressed for -celibacy, the relation of the bridegroom to the bride is used -metaphorically to represent that of Christ with the church, and among -the mystics the same figure represents the union of Christ with the -believing soul. - -[49] I call attention to the difference between the view here expressed -and that of Emerson in the last paragraphs of his _Essay on Love_, -where he says: “Our affections are tents of a night. Our warm loves -are clouds that pass over the firmament of mind with its overarching -vault, its galaxies of immutable lights. In the personal relations -we are put in training for impersonal submergence and absorption in -God.” In my own view the infinite community of spiritual beings that -takes the place of God consists altogether of personalities. Godhead, -if you choose to apply that name to this infinite society, is not a -person but a community of personalities. Personality is not drowned in -the impersonal. On the contrary, the individual becomes a personality -through his relation to his associates in the eternal life. - -[50] I have real intercourse with Aristotle and Kant, as the outgoings -of their minds are still effectual in me—more vital intercourse than -with many of those who surround me. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE SHADOW OF SIN - - -If any term in the moral vocabulary stands in need of strict -redefinition, it is sin. Three elements combine to complete the idea -of sin: first, that the deed was one that ought not to have been done, -not so much because of its painful consequences to others or to self, -or to both, or, by repercussion on society as a whole; but because it -was opposed to what is intrinsically right: in other words, because it -contravened the kind of interrelation which would exist in its purity -in the ethical manifold. - -Secondly, the idea of sin implies that the sinner himself is the doer -of the deed, or that there is to this extent freedom of the will. I do -not say that he is the cause of which the deed is the effect. Causality -appertains to sequent phenomena. As regards freedom of the will, -the distinction between the category of interdependence and that of -causality is vital. A long series of causes, such as bad heredity, bad -environment, etc., may have led A to determine to murder B.[51] - -The notion of the freedom of the will as here viewed signifies that -no matter what the causal series may have been which leads up to the -act, when the act itself is about to be performed, when B is about to -experience the effect of A as cause, in that moment the relation of -interdependence between A and B ought to arise before the mind of A and -withhold him from completing his evil purpose. - -Thirdly, it is characteristic of sin that the fuller knowledge that the -harmful deed is sinful _comes after the act_,—that it is the Fruit of -the Tree, the enlightenment of the eyes. As the serpent said: “If ye -eat of the fruit ye shall be as gods.” - -Many a man has done what is called evil, and done it most deliberately, -knowing evil as evil. Remember the career of a Cæsar Borgia, the -extermination of the Caribbean Indians by the Spaniards, the outrages -on women perpetrated during the present war, the exploitation of human -labor practiced on a large scale among the civilized nations. That the -blackest crimes may be committed with a full knowledge of the horrible -consequences to the victims seems hardly to admit of doubt. Evil is -known as evil. - -But evil in its character as sin cannot be fully recognized prior -to the act. In this respect the Greeks had a certain prescience of -the truth when they asserted that no one can knowingly commit evil; -only they failed to distinguish between evil and sin. A man _can_ -knowingly commit evil, but cannot with full consciousness commit sin. -The knowledge of the sin is the divine elixir which may be distilled -from the evil deed (“Ye shall be as gods”), and the object of every -kind of punishment should be to extract that pain-giving but ultimately -peace-giving elixir. - -Above I mentioned the criminal as the extreme type. But evils in -less formidable guise, though not on that account less evil, refined -invasions of the personality of others, spiritual oppressions, -sometimes deliberate, often unwitting, are included in everyone’s -experience. And the process of expiation, by which evil is transcended -through the recognition of sin (with its prostrating effect at first, -its strangely elevating effect later on) is alike applicable to all. -The best of men have to go through this ordeal as well as the worst. -Especially is unwitting transgression inevitable. Sophocles makes it -the text of his philosophy in the _Œdipus_, though the solution offered -is that of Greek enlightenment and not that of the more profound -ethical consciousness. - -We have next, in close connection with sin, to consider the tremendous -question of responsibility, interpreted from the point of view of our -ethical principle. Responsible means answerable. Answerable to whom, -and in what sense? As commonly understood, it means answerable to God -the Law-giver, to God regarded as the Author of the moral law. God is -likened to a sovereign. Any infraction of his law is an offense against -the sovereign. Answerable means subject to the pains and penalties -which it suits the sovereign to annex to moral offences. There is no -intrinsic connection implied between pain and redemption. The pain is -supposed to break the will of the offender, or to mellow him, so that -he will in future obey the mandates of the sovereign without a murmur. - -Again, responsibility may mean responsibility to society. Crime is -infectious. A fissure opening at any one point in the dykes erected -against crime may let in a flood. The social order as a whole is -threatened in every single violation of law. The offender must answer -for his defiance of the public will by being subjected to the pains or -penalties which society annexes to his crime. The object is the same -as before, to break him into submission, to fit or force him into the -social mould, to make him harmless, or if possible what is called a -“useful citizen.” No internal redemptive change in the nature of the -evildoer is contemplated, except as it may be necessary to lead him to -a useful or at least a harmless life. The antisocial attitude is to be -replaced by the social attitude. Appeals to enlightened self-interest, -and to the sympathies are commonly thought sufficient for this purpose. - -Thirdly, responsibility means responsible to oneself. There is an -inner forum, a tribunal in which the spiritual self sits in judgment -on the empirical self. Conscience, the voice of this spiritual self, -pronounces the verdict. (Cf. the passages in Kant in which this figure -of speech is used.) These are metaphorical expressions. - -To grasp the meaning of responsibility from the ethical standpoint, we -must lift into view the concept of _the task of mankind as a whole_, -and of the individual as a factor in the fulfilment of that task. This -introduces a momentous turn into the discussion of the subject. - -The task of mankind is to arrive through its commerce with the finite -world, through its unremitting efforts to incorporate the infinite -plan within the sphere of human relations, at an increasingly explicit -conception of the ideal of the infinite universe; and through partial -success and frustration to seize the reality of that universe. -Responsibility means _participation in this task_, sharing its doom, -and attaining in oneself, in part, its sublime compensation. The -evildoer is to achieve the knowledge that his evil deed is sin, that is -to say, that it not only carries with it harm to others and indirectly -to himself, but that it is _the defeat in him_ of the task which is -set for the human race as a whole on earth. Instead of doing his share -in fulfilling this task, in gaining a footing in the finite world for -the spiritual relation of living so as to enhance the life of others -and thereby his own, he has miserably sought to enhance his life at -the expense of other life. The knowledge that he has so acted sears -his awakened soul like fire, but it is also the beginning of healing. -The transgressor, now sees what he did not see before. He sees by way -of contrast the holy pattern of relations which in his act he has -travestied, the holy laws which he has infringed, and in imputing -sin to himself for transgressing them, he at the same time proclaims -himself in his essential being holy, that is, capable of executing -them, or at least of striving unceasingly to do so. It is thus that -he opens within himself the sources of redemption, unseals the deeper -fountains of spiritual energy. - -That man is responsible means that he is answerable to do his share in -discharging the task of mankind. And when he is inwardly transformed -by the consciousness of the holy laws, and of himself as intrinsically -committed to holiness, he does thereby advance the business of his kind -on earth. In him humanity does take a step forward on the spiritual -road. In him one other member of our race has been lifted out of evil, -becoming perhaps, from the spiritual point of view, a more advanced -member of the forward-pressing host than those who have never passed -through an experience like his, who have not been overtly tempted, who -have remained conventionally moral, who have not realized the evil -that remains unexpurgated within them, and have not passed through the -cleansing process of self-condemnation and rebirth. - -The incongruity between the finite and the infinite order is the basis -of this doctrine of responsibility. Mankind is responsible for seeking -to embody the infinite in the finite. It fails to do so, but gains -its compensation. The individual shares this responsibility, but both -mankind and the individual jointly take a step forward whenever an -evil deed is recognized, branded and expiated as sinful. The object -of punishment, whether inflicted by society or self-inflicted, is to -promote this regeneration which is the expiation.[52] - - - NOTE - - - Evil in its ethical meaning presupposes worth as attaching to human - beings. To do evil is to offend against worth. To assert the worth of - man is to view him as one of an infinite number of beings, united in - an infinite universe, each induplicable in its kind. Of this spiritual - multitude ideally projected by us as enveloping human society only our - fellow human beings are known to us. _The moral law is the law which - reigns throughout the infinite spiritual universe applied within, the - narrow confines of human society. It is applied within those confines, - it is spiritual, universal in its jurisdiction._ - - The task of humanity as a whole is to embody more and more the - universal spiritual law in human relationships, and thus to transform - and transfigure human society. In the New Testament we read the - expression: “the light of God reflected in the face of Christ.” The - ideal here indicated may be expressed in the phrase, The spiritual - universe with its endless lights reflected on the face of human - society! The task of humanity is one which can never be completed, one - from which mankind may never desist. To see evil as sin is to see it - as contravening the collective task of mankind, the task of weaving - the human groups more and more into the fabric of the spiritual - relations. - - To see evil as sin is to see any single act or series of acts ideally - in their infinite connections. This is what I mean when I say that the - knowledge of sin comes after the act. I do not mean that there may not - be before the act a vague consciousness of the ramified consequences - of evil, but that the fuller knowledge of it as sin is the fruit - of the act. Nor do I mean that evil in its deeper significance is - revealed to every guilty person. The opposite is obviously true. What - I mean is that it is possible after having eaten of the Fruit of the - Tree to gain the enlightenment, in other words, to become aware of - the intrinsic holiness of our nature in consequence of our offense - against the holy laws. If anyone should ask “Must I then do evil in - order to gain the enlightenment?” the answer is that this question - is an idle one. No one can escape doing evil. If not in its grosser - forms, then in ways subtler and more complex, but not therefore less - evil, every one is bound to make acquaintance with guilt. He need not - go out of his way to seek occasion, let him see to it that he improves - the occasion when it comes, as inevitably it will, to his spiritual - advantage. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[51] The category of interdependence implies that the lines of energy -between A and B cross, so that A is subject to B’s influence, B subject -to A’s influence, simultaneously. The simultaneity of the relation -distinguishes the category of interdependence from that of causality. - -[52] This implies that the evil deed shall not be lost sight of, simply -forgotten. Compare the inadequate account of repentance as given by -Goethe in _Faust_ and elsewhere. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE SPIRITUAL ATTITUDE TO BE OBSERVED TOWARDS FELLOW-MEN IN GENERAL, -IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONS WHICH CONNECT US MORE CLOSELY -WITH SOME THAN OTHERS - - -_The Right to Life_ - -The thoughts presented above on the subject of sin naturally lead over -to the next topic, the obligations we are under regarding the life, -the property and the reputation of others. The ancient moral laws -unquestionably remain: “Thou shalt not kill”; “Thou shalt not steal”; -“Thou shalt not bear false witness.” But their application is extended -and their significance intensified by the positive definition which has -been given to the term _Spiritual_. - -So long as the mere inviolateness of the human personality is -emphasized, without any defined conception of what it is that is -inviolate (the inviolateness without the infinite preciousness), -there is danger that the physical part of man will be invested with -the sacred character that belongs to the spiritual, that the two, the -spiritual and the physical parts, will be identified. - -The result will be mischievous in two ways: First, while the act -of killing will be reprobated, a kind of tabu being attached to -bloodshed, the taking of the life of fellow-beings in more indirect -ways, or what may be called constructive murder, will be lightly -regarded. The following case is mentioned by a recent writer. The -directors of a railroad refused to vote the sum of five thousand -dollars to provide a certain safety appliance for their cars. Soon -after an accident occurred, in which a number of men were killed. -The accident might have been prevented had the five thousand dollars -required for the installation of the safety appliance been voted. -Now the men were undoubtedly killed by the directors of the company. -As to the difference in the degree of guilt in the case of direct -and indirect murder, there is room for casuistical debate. The -consequences it is true were not present to the directors’ minds. But -are they not responsible for the very fact that the consequences were -excluded from their view? They were intent on their dividends, and -ignored the endangered lives. But is not this the substance of their -guilt? Does not moral progress lie in the direction of extending the -sense of responsibility so as to cover the indirect taking of life? -Similarly the use of poisonous substances in industry, bad sanitation, -inadequate fire protection, must be stigmatized as indirect murder. The -Commandment “Thou shalt not kill” must extend over a far wider area -than it has covered in the past.[53] - -Secondly, the positive definition of the spiritual nature enables us -to perceive more distinctly that the physical part is the means and -the spiritual part the end, and to draw the necessary consequences. -That which is means is not to be cherished if to do so would defeat -the end itself; hence the physical life is _not_ to be preserved if by -preserving it we deny or defeat the very purpose which the physical -part is to serve. So long as men have the tabu feeling about bloodshed, -the fact that life ought of right to be taken in certain instances will -seem a hopeless contradiction of the general rule against killing. -Keeping in mind the spiritual end of existence on the other hand, we -affirm unhesitatingly that it is better that a man should die than -commit a heinous crime. It was better for the young girl mentioned -in a well-known tale, threatened with outrage, and seeing no other -possible way of escape, to strangle herself with her own hair rather -than submit. According to the opinion of certain scholastic writers on -ethics, dishonor resides solely in the consent of the soul, and where -this is absent the mere physical infringement cannot leave a moral -stain. This is a helpful point of view in regard to the victims of the -atrocities of war, the inmates of certain Belgian nunneries, and the -hapless objects of unspeakable brutality in certain Polish villages. -The anguish of a pure-minded woman who becomes a mother under such -circumstances is hardly conceivable. And to discriminate between the -infamy done to her and her own unpolluted soul is a plain duty, as well -as to relieve the innocent offspring of outrage from any participation -in the guilt to which it owes its existence. But the case to which -I refer is different. It is one in which the choice remains between -voluntary death and submission to intended violation. Submission in -such a situation argues a kind of consent, or at least the absence of a -sufficient revulsion. - -It is right to kill an intending murderer supposing that there is no -other way of preventing him from committing his crime, whether the -intended victim be oneself or someone else. It is not only the life -thus protected from attack that is saved, but the murderer in a sense -is saved as well, so far as he can be saved, by the intervention. Also -the members of his family are saved, humanity is saved from moral -disgrace in his person. The same reasoning applies to the position -of the extreme non-resistants. They will not, they tell us, do a -wrong to prevent a wrong. In their eyes to take the physical life of -another is in every possible instance an absolute wrong. They fail to -take account of the instrumental relation between the physical and -the spiritual parts. And on the same grounds, a defensive war, a war -to ward off aggression, may be theoretically justified. But here the -application of the theory is dubious as well as dangerous. Exceptional -cases of high-handed aggression that ought to be resisted occur, but -aggression is rarely, if ever, one-sided. As a rule, there is more or -less wrong on both sides, and the tangle of accusations and mutual -recriminations is almost impossible to unravel. Very rarely, indeed, if -ever, is right altogether on one side, and wrong on the other, though -predominant right may be on one side and predominant wrong on the -other. And aside from this, the instruments of destruction in modern -warfare have become so monstrous, the efficiency notion applied to war -has led to such ruthlessness, the attempt to distinguish between the -civilian population and the armed forces has so nearly broken down, -that right-thinking persons everywhere are now eagerly intent on how to -prevent aggression before it can take effect, rather than to resist it -after it has occurred. - - NOTE - - The casuistical question may be raised whether from this point of - view we are not all murderers. The amount I spend on my house, food, - recreation, might if divided prolong the life of many a child in the - slums. Am I not then actually a parasite, that is, a murderer? It is - this shocking scruple that has led fine people to live among the poor, - and to try to equalize their mode of living with that prevailing in - the environment. The motive is noble, though as a matter of fact they - may never succeed in doing what they set out to do because they never - actually touch bottom. There are always depths of poverty to which - they can not descend. They may spend comparatively little, yet that - little is far in excess of the spending of the most indigent. And had - they stripped themselves of everything they would have been face to - face with the _reductio ad absurdum_ of their method, for they would - have abandoned civilization and degraded their human life to the level - of the wayside tramp. - - What is inspiring in their example is just the immense compassion, - the willingness to give up so much. But the method itself is not a - solution. - - Are we then murderers, all of us? Perhaps a distinction may be drawn - between acts which in themselves are hostile to the life of fellowmen, - like overtaxing the worker, and acts which tend positively to maintain - the higher values of life,—such as the providing of decent shelter, - support and education, for the members of one’s family. It is true - that, as Tolstoy warns us, we easily slip into indefensible luxury - under the pretence of maintaining the higher values. But this does not - affect the validity of the distinction itself. - - And yet the distinction does not relieve us of what may be called our - share of the social or collective guilt. The exploiter is chargeable - with individual guilt. I who am trying to keep up the standard of - civilized living within my little sphere am nevertheless conscious of - participating in the social guilt, the guilt of a society that has - permitted and still permits such misery to exist. Well, it does exist, - and I can do but a very little to change it. Can I then endure the - contrast between my own lot and that of the greater number. Is it not - true after all that if I give up the comforts, or let me say the helps - to the maintenance of the higher values, I should be saving the lives - of many children? Those children are dying because I am not dividing - my possessions among the poor. Can I stand up and look at that fact, - at those deaths? - - The only answer which it is possible to give at the point we have thus - far reached in our exposition is: push on, perfect civilization, a way - will eventually be found to uplift the masses and make them partakers - of the future civilization. The other alternative, that of Tolstoy, - is stagnation. Yet I cannot disguise from myself the fact that in the - meanwhile, while we are trying to push on, millions are perishing. - This is the true “burden of world pain,” not the sentimental world - pain due to the fact that one is not having oneself the best kind of a - time in the world, but the pain caused by the fact that while we are - reaching forward to help the suffering masses, those masses, though - composed of individuals morally as worth while as ourselves, and many - of them doubtless better, if we only knew it, are perishing before - our very eyes, and that we stand by and cannot save them. I have said - that in the meanwhile while we are trying to push on, millions are - perishing. The actual moral problem so often overlooked is underlined - in the words “in the meanwhile.” - - There is one pathetic consolation. Envy is not the widespread vice - which it is sometimes represented to be. Those who are in trouble take - the will very largely for the deed. People in the worst conditions are - grateful to anyone who shows a real desire to help, even if his actual - performance does not go very far. And there is a still finer trait - in ordinary human nature, namely, the tendency to find a certain - vicarious relief in the joy of the few, provided that their joy be - pure. - - -_The Right to Property_[54] - -“Property,” according to Blackstone, “is the sole and despotic dominion -which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the -world in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the -universe.” - -Orthodox jurisprudence, like orthodox religion, is characterized by the -absoluteness of its formula. It ignores the genesis of its concepts in -the long line of antecedent historical development, and it disdains to -entertain the demand for modification, though the circumstances of the -time loudly call for it. - -“The sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises,” -etc., may be a fact, but it is not a right. Property can only be -regarded as a right if shown to be subservient to the ethical end,—the -maintenance and development of personality. Orthodox jurisprudence -effaces the end, and treats that which is or has been at one time a -means as if it possessed a sanctity of its own. On the other hand, the -empirical treatment of jurisprudence, in dismissing the supposedly -absolute means, tends to leave out of sight the ethical end, and to -treat the social institutions as subservient to mere convenience. - -The following propositions will indicate the changes in the conception -of the right of property required by our ethical theory. - -1. Property is a relation between a person or persons and things. There -can be no property right in persons, but only in things.[55] - -2. The right of property faces in two directions: Toward outside nature -and toward fellow human beings. We have a right over the external -things of nature. We have a right to the services, though not to the -personality, of fellow human beings. These two aspects of the right of -property must be kept apart and defined. - -It is sometimes held that the human race as a whole, as over against -nature, has the right of dominion. Nature, it is said, is our quarry, -we can take out of it the stones we need to construct the edifice -of civilization. Nature is our tool. The laws of nature, as science -discovers them, become our servants. Nature offers the raw material -which we consume. Nature has no rights as against man. But I hold -that neither has man rights as against nature, except in so far as -he rightly defines the end in the interest of which he makes use of -nature—the maintenance and development of personality. - -To suppose that the right of property as the extension of personality -over things is tenable without regard to its instrumental use, to -suppose that bare appropriation of nature as of “treasure trove” is -a prerogative of man, is to lend countenance to the false notion of -occupation, or first appropriation, which has confused the ethics of -the subject in the literature of jurisprudence, and prevented a right -understanding of it. If bare appropriation be the foundation, then the -first comer has a right against his successors, since the extension -of personality over the thing has been actually accomplished by him, -and that is all there is to be said about it. Again, on this view, a -case may be made out for vested interests, that is to say, for those -who have successfully appropriated the earth, yes, and the fullness -thereof, and who having thus effectually extended their personality -over things without regard to the uses they make of their possessions, -are then to be entitled to remain indefinitely in secure ownership of -them. - -Without an ethical standard, without the notion of an end to be -subserved, stubborn possession will always be able to resist -modification, and on the other hand attempts at modification will be -haphazard. Neither the human species collectively nor the individual -has a right simply to appropriate the things of the external world. -Neither the first occupier nor the last is entitled to his goods unless -he can make out a greater good in the interest of which he should be -allowed to possess them. - -But the case of primary occupation is academic. It occurs on Robinson -Crusoe’s island and in legal fiction. Even when the white race invades -Africa, it does not commonly take possession of unoccupied land, but -dispossesses the natives. On what ground does it dispossess them? -Is there an ethical standard by which the dealings of the civilized -nations with the populations of Africa can be measured? Is the -introduction of the appliances of modern civilization, the opening up -to trade, a sufficient ground for the subjection or the extermination -of the inhabitants? In this connection it becomes clear how urgent a -more clarified conception of property rights is. False ideas of this -so-called right are to no small extent responsible for the massacre -of the inferior races, and the mutual slaughter of those who covet -their lands. A proclamation of the Queen of England or of the Emperor -of Germany, or the signature of an irresponsible chief to a treaty -the meaning of which he scarcely understands, transfers millions of -subjects and their territory to one or other of the European powers. -What right of property have these European powers in the territory and -the peoples acquired by them in this fashion? - -The last example shows that the right of ownership, except in very -rare instances, is not in question in respect to the dealings of man -with nature, but comes into play chiefly in the relation of man to his -fellows. There are competitors to be outstripped, thwarted. There are -weaker fellow-beings to be subdued. The use of force and cunning in -acquiring property is well nigh the general rule. Are there any ethical -ideals which, if they could be realized, might disclose a better way, -might bring order into this frightful chaos, and abate the conflicts? -From the ethical ideal as outlined in previous chapters this follows: - -The extension of personality over things is a right in so far as things -are employed to maintain and develop potential personality. The use of -the services of a fellowman is a right in so far as his services are -used in such a manner as to preserve and develop his personality as -well as that of the user. - -In speaking of the use of the services of others we touch upon the -social aspect of the property relation, and here is the crux of the -whole matter. It is coming to be affirmed more and more that property -is a “social” concept, that it cannot be explained either as implying -a relation of the individual to outside nature, save exceptionally, -nor as a relation of the individual considered atomistically to other -atomic individuals. The social tie, it is held, is intrinsic. The -nature of man as such is social, but the word “social” in current -discussion is very ill-defined, and is commonly understood to denote -merely the fact of the interdependence of men upon one another, without -conveying the idea of a rule or standard by which the system of -interdependence may be regulated. Vague notions, such as that of social -happiness, are believed sufficient to take the place of such a standard. - -Let me then consider first the bare fact of interdependence, and see -what follows from it, and how far it will take us. - -Every man has manifold wants for the satisfaction of which he depends -on others. His wants are legion; his ability and opportunity to satisfy -them exceedingly limited. It is this cross relation that expresses -the so-called social nature of man. But the reciprocal dependence -of men upon one another for the satisfaction of their wants by no -means constitutes an ethical tie. The tie between the Greek master -and the Greek slave, as described by Aristotle, was social, but not -ethical. The same is true of the tie that united the Southern planter -to his negro slaves. The relation was indeed far more social than that -between the modern mill-owner and the operatives in his factory, but -still it was not ethical. The reason is clearly stated by Aristotle -himself. According to him the slave is a living tool: the purpose of -his existence is not realized in himself but in his master. He fulfils -the end of his being by setting free the higher functions exercised by -his master. But from the ethical point of view no man may be regarded -as the tool of another. Each human being is an end _per se_, and the -highest object of his existence is to be fulfilled, not in others, but -jointly in them and in himself. - -I have just said that the social and the ethical views are not -synonymous or coincident, as the loose use of language in current -literature would imply. I go farther and say that the social and the -ethical point of view are even on their face contradictory. It cannot -be denied that the natural system of interdependence resembles that of -the body and its members. A hierarchy of organs and of functions is -apparent in the human body, and likewise in the social body. Some men -do the lowest kind of work. Their function appears to be to produce -food, clothing and shelter, to satisfy the mere physical wants. -Some are the hands, so to speak, of society, while only a very few -effectually represent the brain. The simile has been carried out in -detail by well-known writers, in both ancient and modern times. It -is quite true that the artist and the scientist are dependent on the -manual laborer, just as he in turn is dependent on them. But then, -consider the difference in the dignity of the services they render one -another. Was not the Greek, who saw things dispassionately as they are, -right in asserting that, taking society in the large, the purpose of -human life is fulfilled in the few, and that the greater number exist -in order that by their inferior services they may enable these few to -express humanity in its highest terms? - -It seems to me that the kind of social arrangement contemplated by the -great Greek philosophers, and by some of the mediæval publicists, as -well as by certain modern thinkers, is unquestionably social. The fact -of interdependence is stressed by them. The ethical note of equality, -or, as I should prefer to put it, equivalence, is left out. - -I have endeavored in a recent book to indicate how the ethical system -may be superinduced over the social system.[56] Here I am concerned -chiefly to mark as strictly as possible the distinction between the -two terms social and ethical. And I must, therefore, at once amend my -previous statement that property is a social concept by saying that it -is the concept of a social relation considered as the substratum in -which is to be worked out the ethical relation. - -The general consequences of the property concept as defined are these: - -1. He who will not work, neither shall he eat; or better, he who will -not work if able-bodied shall be disciplined and trained in such a -manner that he will work. The fruits of nature do not fall into the lap -of mankind. We are not living in a state of Paradise. The human race -is engaged in the arduous labor of constantly renewing the capital on -which it subsists. As a member of the race, everyone is bound to do his -part. - -2. No one has a property right in harmful or superfluous luxuries, -since property is the control of external things for the maintenance -and development of personality; and luxury, so far from maintaining, -undermines personality, and hinders its development. - -No one has ethically a right of property in great fortunes like those -accumulated under the modern system of industry. Whatever is in excess -of one’s needs, rightly estimated, is not appropriate to one, not -proper to one, not his property. Since the present system of ownership -cannot be changed abruptly, the idea of the stewardship of wealth has -been suggested to quiet the consciences of those who have come to -realize that they have no moral right to excessive wealth. But the idea -of stewardship should be held with fear and trembling. It is at best -a makeshift, a bridge leading over to something more sound. It may be -so taught and received as to seem to justify by philanthropic use the -possession of great fortunes. But the power to dispose of vast funds -for philanthropic uses may come to be itself a badge of superiority. -And even if this be not so, if surplus wealth be used modestly, and -with a sincere intention to apply it in the best possible way, there -is yet no surety that any individual owner will have the breadth of -vision, the experience, the insight, to discharge adequately the -function of distributor. The defects of his early education, habits -ingrained in him in the course of his business career, may lead him to -bestow lavishly in one direction while turning a deaf ear to the appeal -of other needs even more urgent and fundamental. Nothing short of the -collective wisdom of the community, the collaboration of the best, can -safely direct the surplus wealth available for social benefaction. - -3. Everyone is ethically entitled to a share of the products furnished -by nature and worked up into usable shape by his fellows, and also to -the direct services of fellow human beings, in so far as that share -and those services are necessary in order to enable him to perform in -the best possible way the specific service which he in turn is capable -of rendering. Our ethical theory here supplies us with a principle -which takes the place of remuneration. There is no such thing as a just -remuneration of labor, there is no such thing as a fair wage, if the -wage be considered as the equivalent of, or the reward for the work -done. It is not possible by any process of calculation to construct -an equation between labor and reward. The laborer is assuredly -not entitled to the product of his labor, as the current formula -awkwardly puts it, for it is an entirely hopeless undertaking to try -to ascertain what the product of any man’s labor is. In the modern -forms of industry, the contributions of the different factors engaged -in production are intimately intermingled, play into one another, and -are inseparable. Neither the so-called workers alone are the producers -of wealth, nor the employers and capitalists, nor yet both together -irrespective of the labors of past generations of which they enjoy the -usufruct. The question, what is a fair wage, or a fair profit, is badly -posed. There is no such thing as a fair wage or profit in the sense of -a fair compensation for the work performed. - -The proper payment of the human factors engaged in production is -unascertainable genetically, _i.e._, if one goes back to the origin -of the product. It can only be approximately determined by fixing -attention on the end to be served. And the end in each case is the -maintenance and development of personality. In other words, that is -a fair wage which suffices to enable the different functionaries -coöperating in production each to perform his function, or render -his service, in the most efficient possible manner. The solution of -the labor question must be along teleological not genetic lines. -Adequate nourishment as to quantity and quality, suitable dwellings, -educational opportunities, etc., are all indispensable to the rendering -of service, even by “common laborers.” Specific requirements come up -for consideration with respect to the different special functions, and -those who perform them. - -My intention in this chapter is to indicate the bearings of the ethical -theory on living questions of the day. Nothing is more emphatic in the -programmes of the working-class than this demand for social justice. -Nothing is more discouraging than to see the futile efforts made to -define social justice by extemporizing a notion of fair adjustment -which goes to pieces in every serious labor controversy. - -One more remark should be made in regard to what is meant by property -as a relation between persons and things considered as a means of -developing personality. A convenient illustration is the use of a block -of stone by a sculptor. The sculptor’s attempt at self-expression is -an effort to combine two things in themselves uncongenial, an ideal -image, and an external tangible thing, the block of stone. The mental -image does not leap from the mind upon the stone and transform it -magically into its own likeness. The external thing, the stone, offers -resistance, and the resistance limits the artist’s effort. But the -limitation itself becomes in time an indispensable aid. For the ideal -image as at first it started up in the artist’s mind was vague, and the -limitations imposed by the intractable nature of the material compel -him to articulate the image, to grasp more firmly its complex details, -and thus to become more surely possessed of it. The same is true of the -mental thing which we call the relation of cause and effect in the mind -of the scientist, and of his endeavor to impose this mental relation -on the sequence of phenomena observed by him. And the same is again -true of that supreme thing which we call the ethical ideal, and of the -effort to embody it in the social relations. The attempt to express -the ethical ideal in human society inevitably hits on limitations, and -leads to frustrations. We have in our heads fine schemes of universal -regeneration. We find elements in human nature that resent and resist -our Socialisms, our communisms. We desire to enlarge men’s moral -horizon, the field of their moral interest, to lead out from the family -to the nation, to fraternity in general. We presently discover that -we are losing the benefit of the closer ties. In the very process of -building we seem to be in danger of destroying the foundations, and to -be building in the air. In this way our formulations of the ethical -ideal are tested. We are compelled to recast them, and the frustrations -which we meet with become the means of clarifying and articulating -the ideal itself, and of enabling us to experience more vividly the -coercive impulses that go out from it. - - -_The Right to Reputation_ - -The ethical rule is to show a sacred respect for the reputation of -others. In the present discussion intellectual and moral reputation may -be considered separately. - -Under the first head of intellectual reputation, certain points suggest -themselves, one of them in regard to controversies concerning priority -of scientific discovery. What is the sense of such controversies? What -difference does it make whether the law of the conservation of energy -was first enunciated by Helmholtz or by Robert Mayer, or whether the -method of fluxions was invented by Newton or Leibnitz,—not to mention -lesser contrarieties of claims? Would it not argue, on the part of -the scientists and their friends, a more entire devotion to objective -truth if they showed themselves indifferent to personal credit? The -discovery, the invention, it may be said, is important, not the -reputation of the discoverer or the inventor. Nevertheless, such -controversies are carried on in a lively spirit. And it is usually felt -that something more than vanity is at stake, that a man is entitled to -be named in connection with the productions of his mind. - -Such controversies resemble a suit at law undertaken to determine a -disputed title to some valuable property. Plagiarism is different. It -is barefaced intellectual theft. The title to the property in this case -is not disputed. The plagiarist just steals an idea or a form of words -in which an idea has been happily expressed, and palms it off as his -own, hoping to escape with his stolen goods undetected. In this case -too, it seems, one might say the idea is important, not the authorship. -Nevertheless, a profound resentment is felt, not only by the author, -but by the general public, against a plagiarist. - -A rule is ethical when the conduct prescribed is instrumental to the -development of personality. Respect for reputation is ethical because -reputation is a help to the development of personality. A man projects -his mind outward, so to speak, into the productions of his mind. As -a thinking being he anchors himself in outside reality. He transfers -himself, as it were, into an external thing,—a discovery, an invention, -the expression of an idea in apt language,—each a thing that goes on -existing independently of himself. To deny his connection with it is to -infringe upon his personality, to efface his personality in so far as -his personality is enshrined in his mental product. - -Again, a man’s reputation as a scientist or scholar is a prop to his -personality as a thinker. A man can never be quite certain of the -validity of his thinking until it is approved by the consensus of the -competent. To win that approbation is to know that as far as he has -gone he is on sure ground. He can thence proceed, can turn toward new -problems with a sense of power and a measure of self-confidence not -previously attained. To rob him of his reputation is to deprive him of -this invaluable aid to further mental development.[57] - -Coming next to moral reputation, we find that the ethical rule -requiring respect for the moral character of others is even more -exacting, and that any contravention of it deserves an even more -strenuous reprobation. The Decalogue prohibits the bearing of false -witness and this rule is extensible from courts of law to ordinary -conversation, since the principle involved is the same. The Sermon on -the Mount menacingly warns against judging others: “Judge not that ye -be not judged.” Buddha enjoins his followers to refrain from malicious -gossip, and includes a prohibition to this effect among the principal -pronouncements of his religion. All the great teachers of ethics and -religion insist on this point, perhaps because the natural propensities -of men constantly tend in the opposite direction, and are so hard -to restrain. To stab one’s neighbor in the back, morally speaking, -to insinuate base motives, to spread damaging reports about him, to -suggest as possibly and then as probably true rumors which one does not -positively know to be untrue, to allow private repugnance to take the -place of evidence,—are infringements of the moral reputation of others -with some of which notoriously many even of the so-called best people -are chargeable. I do not here speak of the grosser attacks, attacks on -character inspired by envy, rivalry, and greed. The soundness of the -rule is generally admitted, though its violations are past belief and -without number. - -But is the rule itself as to moral reputation tenable? There is a -difference between intellectual and moral reputation at which we must -at least cast a glance. Intellectual reputation is a fairly safe index -of merit; moral reputation is not. A man’s mind is reflected in his -intellectual performances. Is the same true of his moral character? -Is not the moral character an interior, elusive thing? The real -character escapes the eye of the outside spectator and judge; and if -this be so, why should it be so important a matter to safeguard a man’s -moral reputation, seeing that the reputation he deserves is past -finding out? A public official, for instance, is accused of corrupt -practices. He is innocent, and his friends and he are indignant at the -damaging accusations brought against him. But if not guilty of the -palpable derelictions with which he is charged, yet, in view of his -opportunities and education, he may not be less blameworthy for other -acts with which he has not been charged, and in his heart of hearts he -knows that this is so. Why then, this outcry? - -Other examples might be adduced. The honor of a young woman is attacked -by the circulation of atrocious rumors, and the reaction at this most -sensitive point is certain to be extreme when the falseness of the -accusation is exposed. But is outward decorum, correct behavior, always -a sure sign of inward purity? - -There is this difference then between the intellectual and the moral -character. The one can be measured, the other cannot. But the reply -to these sophistical objections is still the same as before. The -purpose of the ethical rule is to furnish aids in the development -of personality. The aim in view is not genetic, but teleological, -not to determine how far in analyzing a man’s character down to the -bottom he may be found to be already admirable, but to help him in -attaining excellence, by progressively advancing toward strength and -virtue. And moral reputation is a great help to this end. It is a prop -on which he can lean. He who does right acts and has the credit for -them, is thereby encouraged to do other right acts. And if the inner -voice whispers, as it is sure to do in the finer natures, that the -good opinion of his fellows, founded on his correct deportment, is -undeserved, the shame of it may lead him to more determined efforts -to merit the character which, on however insufficient evidence, is -attributed to him. - -Reputation is sacred because it is an almost indispensable means to -further mental and moral progress. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[53] _Vide_ note at the end of the Chapter. - -[54] A right is a claim of one person upon another or others, and the -justification consists in its relation to personality. Rights exist -between persons for the sake of the maintenance and development of -personality. - -[55] Animals, for the purpose now in hand, may be regarded as things, -being devoid of personality, though certain modifications in the -treatment of animals are prescribed by the fact that they are sentient -creatures. But there is no moral interdiction of the involuntary -servitude of animals. - -[56] See Chapter VII on “An Ethical Programme of Social Reform” in _The -World Crisis_, published by D. Appleton and Company, 1915. - -[57] A remark may here be in place regarding the erudition expended in -determining which of the writings attributed to some great philosopher -like Plato are spurious, and which genuine. Is the time and labor spent -on such researches worth while? The object in this case is not so much -to clear or vindicate the reputation of the philosopher, or to give him -his due, as to rescue for posterity, free from corruptions, a living -and quickening thing to which he has given birth, and which the world -cannot afford to lose. For the work of a great philosopher like Plato -is alive, and is valuable because it is still quickening. And it is -quickening, not because of any positive formulation of truth (like a -scientific law), but because of the élan of the human spirit with which -it is vibrant in attacking the eternal problems of life and destiny. -The same applies to the industry of modern critics in collecting -material wherewith to facilitate the deeper understanding of some great -poet like Dante or Goethe. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE MEANING OF FORGIVENESS - - -In the last chapter we treated the imputation of evil to the innocent. -We must now consider the right attitude toward actual evildoers. - -In discussing sin, one of the points emphasized was that of the moral -solidarity between the individual and society. The moral interest of -the individual is always identical with the moral interest of society; -and, on the other hand, the failure of the individual is a social -failure. The human race sags morally at the point of some particular -member of it. - -Again, we defined the task of humanity as the incessant endeavor -to embody the ideal spiritual order in the finite sphere of human -relations. This effort meets both with partial success and with -failure. The gain derived by the human race from its experiences, -its labors, its sufferings, is that the spiritual universe in its -unattainable elevation and sublimity is more and more revealed to -the inner eye; in other words, that by way of effort and recoil, and -renewed effort and renewed recoil from the finite, the infiniteness of -the infinite world is realized. The essential point is that the boon of -realization must be gained both through partial success and failure. -Now sin is failure; everyone fails, everyone is convicted of sin. There -is no exception. In insisting on this point the Christian account -is exact. Only it should be remembered that sin or failure itself is -one of the instrumentalities by which the end of human existence is -achieved. These preliminaries being understood, certain propositions -may be brought forward as to the treatment of sin, and in particular as -to repentance, punishment and forgiveness. - -Repentance is recoil, recoil not from the bad act and its painful -consequences, but from the principle underlying the act. Every kind of -sin is an attempt in some fashion to live at the expense of other life. -The spiritual principle is: live in the life of others, in the energy -expended to promote the essential life in others. Moral badness is -self-isolation, detachment. Spirituality is consciousness of infinite -interrelatedness. - -Punishment, rightly regarded, is a name for the steps taken to lead the -unrepentant up to the point of repentance, _i.e._, up to the recoil. -Punishment is itself criminal when undertaken for any other object. -Punishment on the vindictive _lex talionis_ theory, or on the bare -deterrent theory, is excluded. Reformatory punishment as commonly -understood is no less inadequate, because it restricts the idea of -reformation as a rule to the externals of conduct.[58] - -The steps taken to lead the evildoer up to the point of repentance -are to be criticised from this point of view. Transient or prolonged -separation from ordinary society may be necessary. Severe discipline -may be indispensable. Capital punishment, however, is wholly out of -the question, since the prevention of the crime now being impossible, -the achievement of the spiritual gain is the point to be aimed at. But -the most effectual aid in promoting repentance is faith in the better -nature of the wrongdoer, in that spiritual principle resident within -him which no crime committed by him can wholly crush, and which in -the most apparently hopeless cases is still to be presumed. But faith -in the good that persists in those whom we call bad must go hand in -hand with the acknowledgment of the bad that remains unexpurgated in -those whom we call good. The prison reformer who poses as impeccable -and righteous himself can never win the confidence of the poor human -derelicts with whom he has to deal nor effect in them the desired -change. He must share with them the conviction of sin if he would -impart to them the power of the resilience which he experiences within -himself. - -Faith in the potential power of goodness resident in the evildoer is -often confounded with forgiveness. The distinction between the two, -however, should not be obliterated. Faith is help proffered from the -outside to effectuate the inner change. Forgiveness is a record of the -fact that the change has actually taken place, and belief that it is -likely to be permanent. Forgiveness, in the mind of spiritually-minded -persons, takes place almost automatically when the conditions on which -it depends are fulfilled. So long as he remains unrepentant a man -cannot be forgiven, although we may have the conviction that it is in -his power to repent and the earnest desire to bring about the change -in him. Jesus on the Cross says: “Forgive them, for they know not what -they do.” Perhaps “open their eyes so that they may see the Light” may -be the more just interpretation of the meaning—not “forgive” in the -strict sense, for forgiveness is not feasible while the heart of the -offender remains closed.[59] - -Both faith and forgiveness are factors in regeneration: the one to -assist in accomplishing the change, the other to assist in making it -permanent. But both the faith and the forgiveness are exceptionally -difficult in the case of our personal enemies. _Enemies in the -spiritual sense there are and can be none._ Every human being, even -one who has done me the most cruel harm, is yet, from another point of -view, a fellow member of the spiritual society. But to discriminate -between the two relations in which the man stands to me—that in which -he is my foe, and the other in which he is my fellow—to be able to put -aside as less important the harm he has done, the suffering he has -forced me to endure, and to desire with perfect sincerity that the -recoil, the transformation, may take place in him, that is the most -searching test of one’s own ethical character.[60] - -The forgiveness of personal foes, when complete, establishes a -strangely tender spiritual fellowship between the pardoner and the -pardoned. Both have transcended their normal empirical selves, both -have become partners in a sublime transaction: the one delivered from -the clinging of his baser desires, the other released from his first -crude reaction against evil. They will never forget what they thus owe -to one another. They will continue to walk hand in hand, the one still -leaning, the other supporting and himself unspeakably strengthened by -the support he gives. - -Finally, to forgive is not to forget—quite the contrary. To forgive is -to remember the past action, but to remember it as belonging to the -past, as the act of one who has since undergone the great change. The -miracle of the change of water into wine at the feast of Cana would -not have seemed so wonderful to the guests had they not remembered -that what was turned into wine had before been water. To forgive is to -remember that what was water has become wine. And he, too, who has -been forgiven may not forget. The remembrance of the past he will need -as a warning and a safeguard.[61] Not to see the essentially divine -nature in others, and thus also in one’s self is the essence of the -wrong. To teach the guilty to see it is the object of punishment. To -forgive is to declare that what before was ignored is now seen and -known. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[58] I mean that it is usually considered sufficient, for purposes -of reformation, to bring the wrongdoer up to the average standard of -law-abiding citizenship, to restore him to the bosom of society as a -safe and industrious member. Whereas a person who has had the searching -experience of deep guilt is a candidate for a higher station in the -moral scale. Humanity having fallen in him, he should be helped to rise -to a higher than the average altitude. This at least should be the -aim. Consider the fact that Jesus selected some of his most spiritual -companions from among publicans and harlots. - -[59] Compare the words addressed by Sir Thomas More to his judges -when sentence of death had been pronounced upon him—“For though you -have been my judges to condemnation, may we meet merrily hereafter in -everlasting salvation.” - -[60] Everyone admires a disinterested prison reformer, one who is able -to see and to call out the good in a so-called bad man; but it is one -thing to be disinterested and generous towards men who have acted badly -towards others, and quite another thing to take the ethical attitude -towards those who have acted wickedly towards oneself. Hence the -touchstone of the character of the prison-reformer is to be found in -the way in which he behaves and feels towards his personal enemies, for -instance, towards those who malignantly attack him and interfere with -the business of prison reform on which he has set his heart. - -[61] Perhaps I may add a word as to the forgiveness of those who, -by an extension of meaning, may be called our intellectual enemies. -By intellectual enemies I understand those whose point of view is -radically opposed to our own, whose principles and premises, if -accepted, would render the entire theory of life on which we act, -and on which we found our convictions, untenable. We are apt to be -exasperated in listening to them, or in reading the works in which -they express their opinions. We are apt to feel that there is no room -in the world in which we live for such ideas as theirs, that we and -they cannot exist side by side. The bitter feuds of rival religious -factions, the notorious _odium theologicum_, and in more recent times -the thinly veiled animus shown in the controversies of philosophical -schools are all alike traceable to this source. Racial antagonisms, -too, are partly to be accounted for on the same ground. There are -certain primary attitudes of mind, modes of feeling and directions of -impulse, the correctness of which we cannot demonstrate just because -they are primary, and which we all the more vehemently assert when we -find them disputed. Love your intellectual enemies, may usefully be -added to the stock of moral commandments; keep an open and hospitable -mind to opinions and ways of acting, thinking and feeling which -naturally repel you. And it will help us to discipline ourselves in -this difficult behavior if we reflect that the views most contrary to -our own are nevertheless sure to contain some element of truth which -we cannot afford to disregard, and which will serve the purpose of -correcting and supplementing such truth as we may ourselves possess. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -THE SUPREME ETHICAL RULE: ACT SO AS TO ELICIT THE BEST IN OTHERS AND -THEREBY IN THYSELF[62] - - -It is difficult to see the potentially divine nature in men when masked -by the forbidding traits which human beings so often exhibit. - -A number of vital considerations will now have to be emphasized as -pertinent to the subject we are dealing with. - -The first point is that the character of every person contains contrary -elements.[63] Let the two kinds of qualities be called the fair and -foul, or more simply still the plus and minus traits. The bright -qualities, the plus traits, are undoubtedly more predominant in some, -the dark or minus traits in others. But potential plus qualities exist -in the worst characters, and potential minus traits may be surmised, -and on scrutiny will be found, in those whom the world most admires. - -A second point is mentioned as an hypothesis not indeed as yet -verified, but I believe verifiable, namely, that certain defined minus -traits will be found to go with certain plus traits. Wherever bright -qualities stand out we are likely to meet with _corresponding_ dark -qualities or dispositions, and conversely. There are, I am persuaded, -uniformities of correspondence between the plus and minus traits, and -it would be of greatest practical help in judging others and ourselves -if these uniformities could be worked out. A kind of chart might then -be made, a description of the principal types of human character, -with the salient defects and qualities that belong to each. Extensive -statistical treatment of a multitude of biographies would lay the -foundation for such an undertaking; also sketches of the prominent -characteristics of nations, like those furnished by Fouillée, would be -utilized. Also the study of the character traits of primitive races as -partially carried out by Waitz in his _Anthropology_ and the character -types of animals, so far as accessible to observation, might be used -for comparison. Instructed in this manner, we should, on coming into -contact with others, either on their attractive or repellent side, -be prepared to expect and to allow for the opposite traits. And we -should learn to see ourselves in the same manner; we should see our -empirical character as it really is, the dark traits side by side with -the bright. The courage to wish to know the truth about one’s self is -rare, and when the revelation comes or is forced upon us, it often -breeds a kind of sick self-disgust and despair. The saint at such times -in moral agony declares himself to be the worst of sinners. He has -striven to attain a higher than the average moral level, and behold -he has slipped into only deeper depths. The minister of religion, the -revered teacher, the political and social leader, when abruptly shocked -into self-examination by some evidence of grossness or deviousness -in themselves, no longer to be glossed over or explained away, are -fated to go through the same ordeal. A profound despondency is the -consequence. It is not only the badness now exposed, but the previous -state of hypocrisy that seems in the retrospect intolerable. Some -persons live what is called a double life in the face of the world. -But who is quite free from living a double life in his own estimate? -Achilles said of himself ἄχθος ἀροῦρας (“cumberer of the ground”). Many -a man has echoed that cry with a bitterness of soul more poignant than -that which Achilles felt when he uttered the words. - -Now the principle of the duality[64] of character traits, or as we may -also designate it, the principle of the polarity of character, applies -to our natural or empirical character, and our empirical character is -not our moral character. The distinction between the two will serve, as -we shall presently see, to rescue us from the state of moral dejection -just described. But first it is indispensable to fix attention on the -natural character, to recognize that we are composite, each and every -one of us, and that the all-important thing to know is which of our -plus qualities go with which of the minus. Here the psychologist -can help us. Here a great field is open for a practical science of -ethology. This would give us a more adequate knowledge of the empirical -character, the substratum in which ethical character is to be worked -out. - -Point three opens up a great enlightenment in regard to the whole -subject. It is that the distinction must be drawn, and ever be kept in -mind, between the bright and dark qualities and the virtues and vices. -The bright qualities are not of themselves virtues. The dark qualities -are not of themselves vices. To suppose that they are, to confuse the -bright with virtue and the dark with viciousness, is the most prevalent -of moral fallacies.[65] - -A person is found to be kind, sympathetic, gentle, and on this score is -said to be virtuous or good. But gentleness, kindness, a sympathetic -disposition, while they lend themselves to the process of being -transformed into virtues, are not of themselves moral qualities at all, -but gifts of nature, happy endowments for which the possessor can claim -no merit. And sullenness, irascibility, the hot, fierce cravings and -passions with which some men are cursed, are not vices, though it is -obvious how readily they turn into vices as soon as the will consents -to them. - -The question becomes urgent: What then is a virtue? The fair qualities -are the basis, the natural substratum of the virtues, the material -susceptible of transformation into virtues. In what does the -transformation consist? When does it take place? The answer is, when -the plus quality has been raised to the Nth degree, and in consequence -the minus qualities are expelled. This result, of course, is never -actually achieved. The concept here presented is a concept of limits. -But in the direction defined lies growth and continuous development -not of but toward ethical personality. In public addresses I have -often said: Look to your virtues, and your vices will take care of -themselves. I can put this thought more exactly by saying: Change your -so-called virtues into real virtues: raise your plus qualities to the -Nth degree. And the degree to which you succeed in so doing you can -judge of by the extent to which the minus qualities are in process of -disappearing. - -One or two examples will illustrate the pivotal thought thus reached -in the exposition of our ethical system with respect to its practical -consequences. To raise to the Nth degree is to infinitize a finite -quality, or to enhance it in the direction of infinity. I shall take -two examples, one _self-sacrifice_, the other _justice_, both viewed -in their finite aspect as plus traits requiring to be subjected to the -process of transformation. - -The empirical motive of self-sacrifice may be egocentric or altruistic. -In egocentric self-sacrifice, doing for others is a means of exalting -the idea of self to the mind of the doer. He uses others, not as sacred -personalities, worth while on their own account, but subtly exploits -them by benefiting them. He uses them as objects by means of which to -achieve a finer self-aggrandizement. He may indeed go to the utmost -lengths of devotion for his friends. He may perform for them the most -repulsive offices. He may give freely of his means, denying himself -meanwhile comforts and even necessaries in order perhaps to extricate -them from pecuniary difficulties. He may contribute in refined ways -to their pleasure. As a physician he may watch night after night -at the bedside of the sick, foregoing sleep though fatigued to the -point of exhaustion in order to be at hand to mitigate the pains of -the sufferer, jeopardizing his own health in order to assist others -in recovering theirs. Yes, he may even give of his own blood to -renew their ebbing life. In all this he will look for no material -compensation. Gratitude, especially gratitude expressed in words, is -repugnant to him. The lofty image of self which he strives to create -would be marred if any such coarsely selfish motive were allowed to -intrude. All that he requires, but this he does inexorably require, -is that his beneficiaries shall silently confess their dependence on -him, that he shall see the exalted image of himself mirrored in their -attitude, and that they shall move in their orbits as satellites -around his sun. The egocentrism is veiled and easily confounded with -the purest moral disposition. But it is there all the same, and the -proof of it is that the very same person who is thus friendly to his -friends, and an unstinting benefactor to those who pay him the kind -of homage he exacts, is capable of behaving with almost inconceivable -hardness and even cruelty toward others who will not stand in this -subordinate relation to him, or who in any way wound his self-esteem. -Sister Dora, serving enthusiastically in a small-pox hospital, while -neglecting the nearer duties at home, intent on dramatic, histrionic -self-representation, is likewise a palpable instance of egocentric -self-sacrifice. - -The self is precious on its own account. The non-self, the other, -equally so. A virtuous act is one in which the ends of self and of -the other are respected and promoted jointly. It is an act which has -for its result the more vivid consciousness of this very jointness. -Egocentric self-sacrifice errs on the one side, the personality of -another being made tributary to the empirical self, despite the actual -benefits conferred. Altruistic self-sacrifice errs in the opposite way. -In it the personality of the self is effaced or made servile to the -interests or supposed interests of another. Not, let me add, to the -real interests, for the spiritual interests are never achievable at the -expense of other spiritual natures. The wife or mother is an instance, -who slaves for husband or children, obliterating herself, never -requiring the services due to her in return and the respect for her -which such services imply, degrading herself and thereby injuring the -moral character of those whom she pampers. An historic instance of the -altruistic error on a larger scale is afforded by the Platonic scheme -of scientific breeding under state supervision, a suggestion revived -in modern times, in which freedom of choice between the sexes, and the -integrity of the personality of those concerned, is sacrificed to the -supposed interests of the community. Nietzsche’s doctrine may possibly -be regarded as a compound of the two errors described, the Superman -representing the egocentrism, while altruistic self-sacrifice, entire -annulment of their personalities is expected of the multitude. - -It is easy to distinguish the plus and minus qualities in the -characters of the egocentrist and the altruist: in the one case, -beneficence combined with hardness; in the other, service of others -combined with absence of self-respect. - -The second example to be briefly considered is the finite trait -commonly mistaken for justice. A typical illustration of this is -presented by the merchant who ascribes to himself a just character on -the ground that he is punctual in the payment of his debts, that his -word is as good as his bond; or by the manufacturer who entertains -the same opinion of himself because he pays scrupulously the wages -on which he has agreed with his employees.[66] One wonders that so -great and profound a notion as that of justice should be understood -so superficially, restricted to such narrow limits, and that rational -human beings should claim to possess so lofty a virtue on the score of -credentials so inadequate. The reason is that the empirical substratum -of justice is mistaken for the ethical virtue itself. This substratum -may be described as an inborn propensity toward order in things -and in relations, a natural impatience of loose fringes, a certain -mental neatness. Hence insistence on explicitly defined arrangements -and on simple, over-simple formulas. These are favored because they -keep out of sight the complex elements which if considered might -introduce uncertainty and possibly disorder into the situation. Thus -a manufacturer, impatient of looseness, over-rating explicitness, -will be led to grasp at a formula of justice which reduces it to the -bare literal performance of a fixed agreement, no matter with what -unfreedom, owing to the pressure of want, it was entered into by -the wage-earners, and no matter how deteriorating the effect of the -insufficient wage may prove to be on their standard of living. - -But it is a far cry from this empirical predisposition to the sublime -ethical idea itself. The idea of “the just” as exemplified in any act -performed by me includes the totality of all those conditions which -make for the development of the ethical personality of others in so far -as it can be affected by my action. To do a just act is to act with the -totality of these conditions in view, in order to promote the end in -view, which is the liberation of personality or at least the idea of -personality in others and in myself. - -It is thus evident that a just act—an ideally, perfectly just act,—can -be performed by no man. First because the right conditions of human -development are but very imperfectly known, and are only brought -to light by slow degrees. Secondly because even as to the known -conditions of justice, for instance the abolition of the evils of the -present industrial wage system, a single employer, or even a group of -well-intentioned employers can bring about the desired changes only to -a very limited extent. - -Raising the finite quality underlying justice to the Nth degree -therefore means opening an illimitable prospect. The ethical effort -in this, as in all other instances, is destined to be thwarted. It is -an effort in the direction of the finitely unattainable; the effort -itself, with the conviction it fosters as to the reality of that -which is finitely unattainable, being the ethically valuable outcome. -The just man, therefore, in any proper sense of the word, is one who -is convinced of the fact that he is _essentially not a just man_, -and a deep humility as to both his actual and possible achievements -will distinguish him from the “just man” so-called, who arrogates to -himself that sublime attribute on the ground of the scrupulous payment -of debts, or the fulfilment of contracts. Humility in fact will be -found to be the characteristic mark of those who have attained ethical -enlightenment in any direction. It is the outward sign from which we -may infer that the finite quality in them is in process of being raised -to the Nth degree. - -I have given these few specific illustrations of my meaning, but what -has been said applies equally to any of the plus qualities. The plus -qualities are the ones which are favorable for transformation into -the infinitized ethical quality. The ethical principle itself is one -and indivisible. Any one of the plus qualities, when ethicized, will -conduce to the same result. From whatever point of the periphery of the -ethical sphere we advance toward the center we shall meet with the same -experience. Thus self-affirmation or egoism when in idea raised to the -Nth degree will reveal that the highest selfhood can be achieved only -when the unique power of a spiritual being is deployed in such a way as -to challenge the unique, distinctive power that is lodged in each of -the infinite multitude of spiritual beings that are partners with us in -the eternal life. - -And altruism, or care for others, at its spiritual climax, will -conversely involve the recognition that true service to others can -only be perfectly performed when the power that is resident in -ourselves is exercised in its most vigorous, most spontaneous, and most -self-affirming mode. And as the diverse empirical qualities which we -observe in one another all appear to be modes of or cognate with these -two principal tendencies—the self-affirming and the altruistic—the -method of transfiguring empirical qualities which has been set forth -may be found to apply in every instance. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[62] Or more exactly act so as to elicit the sense of unique -distinctive selfhood, as interconnected with all other distinctive -spiritual beings in the infinite universe. - -[63] The conception underlying Robert L. Stevenson’s sketch of Jekyl -and Hyde is to be taken seriously, and applied without exception -_mutatis mutandis_ to every human being whatsoever (but see footnote p. -76). It is not original with Stevenson. The French, who are perhaps the -keenest psychologists, long ago invented the _apercu_ that everyone has -the defects of his qualities. - -[64] The use of the term duality is not intended to exclude the -possibility of multiplicity, but only to call attention to one striking -bifurcation of human character. - -[65] Stevenson falls into this error. He confounds Jekyl with the -virtuous and Hyde with the vicious side of character. In reality the -one should stand for the empirical plus traits, the other for the -empirical minus traits. - -[66] Contract-keeping is peculiarly the moral rule applicable to -mercantile transactions. To apply it without modification to the -dealings of employers and wage-earners is to intrude the mercantile -standard into the industrial sphere. This is what we are now -witnessing. The industrial standard is only in process of development -and clarification, and the accepted mercantile standard is really in -conflict with it. Among merchants it is of the very essence of their -transactions that a contract shall not be invalidated, despite the -injurious consequences to one or the other party which it may turn -out later on to involve. The security of commercial transactions -would be gone if revision of the contract should be permitted -whenever consequent loss appears. Again, and this is particularly -important, merchants are assumed to be on a footing of equality in -dealing with one another, equally free in accepting or rejecting a -proposed contract, equally competent to take care of their respective -interests. The relation of employers to wage-earners however is not -that of economic equals, but of the economically stronger with the -economically weaker. And this difference is of cardinal importance in -determining the rule of justice as it should obtain in the industrial -sphere. I do not of course intend to imply that an agreement between -employer and wage-earners once made should not as a rule be kept as -scrupulously as that between merchant and merchant. What I affirm is -that in view of the greatness of the injury possibly inflicted upon -the weaker, the economically stronger party is bound at least to share -the responsibility with the weaker for the essential fairness of the -terms of the agreement before it is finally completed. Nay, I would go -a step farther, and say that despite the indispensable condemnation of -contract-breaking, provision should be made for possible revision in -cases where it can be shown that exceptional hardships have appeared, -unforeseen and unforeseeable at the time when the agreement was made. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -THE SUPREME ETHICAL RULE (_Continued_) - - -Whatever the steps that have thus far been taken, they are preliminary -to the final step. And the _method_ of “salvation,” the distinctive -feature wherein this ethical system differs from others, may now be -briefly stated. So act as to elicit the unique personality in others, -and _thereby_ in thyself. Salvation is found in the effort to save -others! The difference in method consists in the joint pursuit of the -two ends, that of the other and that of the self. The controlling -idea is that the _numen_ in the self is raised out of potentiality -into actuality by the energy put forth to raise the _numen_ in the -other,—the two divinities greeting each other as simultaneously they -rise into the light. - -It is thus that both egoism and altruism are transcended. To be -egoistic is to assert one’s empirical self at the expense of other -empirical selves. To be altruistic is to prefer the empirical selves -of others to one’s own. It is not true that self-realization, keeping -to the empirical signification of self, leads insensibly to altruistic -conduct. The life of the great “self-realizer,” Goethe, may be cited -in evidence of this. Nor is it true that preference for the empirical -self of another necessarily involves maintaining the integrity of one’s -own empirical self. In the empirical field egoism and altruism are -conflicting and mutually contradictory. It is in the spiritual field -that they cease to be so, because both disappear in an object of the -will which includes them both and transcends them both. If this be so, -it may be asked why does the formula we have adopted read: So act as to -elicit the unique personality in others, and thereby in thyself? Why -not conversely:—So act as to realize the unique personality in thyself, -and thereby in others?—since in any case the ends in view are to be -achieved conjointly. The answer is that in the pure spiritual field, -in the world of ideal ethical units, it would make no difference from -which point of view the relation were regarded. But when the spiritual -formula is applied as a regulative rule to the mutual relations -of empirical beings there is a difference. Thus applied, it must -necessarily be couched in such terms as will make the spiritual birth -of the other the prime object, and the spiritual birth of the self its -incidental though inseparable concomitant. This is so because ethics -is a science of energetics, which has to do with the potencies of our -nature in their most affirmative efferent expression. All our higher -faculties are active, and touch for good or ill the lives of those who -surround us. Even the secret thoughts which seem only to affect our own -individuality, inevitably project their influence upon our associates. - -Now ethics is a science of _right_ energizing. And since as a matter of -fact we do inevitably energize in such a manner as to affect others, -the fundamental question in ethics is: how are we to regulate the -incidences of our natures that fall upon other lives so that they shall -be right? Since we cannot help acting upon them and influencing them, -how can we act rightly toward them and rightly influence them? And the -rule supplied by the ethical principle is: Act upon their empirical -selves in such a manner as to draw from their empirical natures the -hidden personality, or at least the consciousness of it. And the -repercussion of the rule is: in the attempt to do so you will convert -your own empirical self into a spiritual personality, or at least evoke -in yourself the idea of yourself as a spiritual personality. - -Incontestably, in the attempt to change others we are compelled to try -to change ourselves. The transformation undergone by a parent in the -attempt to educate his child is an obvious instance. No parent is a -true parent at the outset. As his perception deepens of the real needs -of the child, which is so entirely dependent on his self-control, on -his wisdom as well as his love, he will realize more and more his -own deficiencies, and seek to remedy them. The same is true of the -professor in relation to his students, of a leader and his followers, -of a religious teacher and those who look to him for advice and help. -In all such relations when rightly understood there is simultaneous -growth on both sides. In the ethical sphere there is a law of -levitation, the contrary of the law of gravitation that obtains in the -realm of matter. We actually tend to rise from a lower to a higher -level in proportion as we bend downward to lift those still lower than -ourselves. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -HOW TO LEARN TO SEE THE SPIRITUAL _NUMEN_ IN OTHERS - - -We now have to consider how to acquire the faculty of seeing the light -that in our fellowmen is often so deeply hidden. We can love only that -which is lovable. If we could see holiness, beauty concealed within our -fellow-beings, we should be drawn towards them by the most powerful -attraction, willingly living in their life, and permitting them to live -in ours. We should then love all men, for we should see in all what is -unspeakably lovable. But the empirical man stands between us and the -spiritual man, and the empirical woman between us and the spiritual -woman; and very often the former are most repulsive, even when their -ugly traits do not affect us personally, even when as spectators merely -we observe how they behave. - -Much more is it well-nigh insuperably difficult to worship, in the -sense of holding worthy, those whose characteristic traits directly -offend us, or are perpetual thorns in our side. We must somehow learn -to regard the empirical traits, odious, harmful or merely commonplace -and vulgar as they may be, as the mask, the screen interposed between -our eyes and the real self of others. We must acquire the faculty of -second sight, of seeing the lovable self as the true self. And how -without self deception we can possibly succeed in doing so is the -question. - -In the first place, it is my own craving for resurrection out of that -death in life to which I seem doomed that must impel me to penetrate to -the essential life in others. My own spiritual nature is in fetters, -and to burst the fetters, to escape from the prison, there is but one -way. The unique personality, which is the real life in me, I cannot -gain, nor even approximate to, unless I search and go on searching for -the spiritual _numen_ in others.[67] The force which incites me to -penetrate beyond the empirical traits of others, to surmount the walls -which surround the shrine in them, is the consciousness that unless I -do so I am myself spiritually lost, I remain myself spiritually dead. -For it is only face to face with the god enthroned in the innermost -shrine of the other that the god hidden in me will consent to appear. - -The expression “death in life” means living, even living passionately -and in a way efficiently, with a sense, nevertheless, underneath of the -hollowness, the futility of the objects of pursuit. The death in life -is the state of discontent that slowly gathers and augments in a man’s -mind as he pursues his customary ends, as he reviews his intellectual -achievement, the books he has written, the pictures he has painted, -the meager outcome of his schemes of social reform, the uncertain -result of his efforts at moral self-development. It is the ensuing -distaste for what he has actually accomplished, the disallowance of -it as in any way ultimately satisfying. And yet this death in life is -itself the well-spring of resurrection, out of which is engendered -an irrepressible yearning of the mind to attach itself to something -greater than all ephemeral interests, to something that has eternal -worth, and is of such a kind as to communicate of its eternal nature to -him who touches it. The god in the other, the eternal personality in -the inner sanctuary of the other, is that object which must be sought -and touched. The cry of my own soul for salvation is the impulse that -leads me on to search for that object. Without the previous discontent, -I shall not seek; without the appraisement of the temporal ends and -interests of man as in the last analysis unsatisfying, I shall not set -out on my quest. Enmeshed in the jungle of the empirical world, I shall -find no exit. I shall remain the victim of the illusion that the peace -I need can be found in the realm of temporal desire. I shall commit -what the theologians called Original Sin, that is, the preferring of -“the works of the Creator to the Creator himself.” - -But there is a second force that must act in conjunction with this keen -desire for personal liberation or highest personal self-affirmation. -It is the sense of the _dependence of others_ upon what I can do for -them. Notoriously it is the dependence of the child that evokes in the -parent the noblest qualities of which he is capable, the self-denial, -the incessant willingness to labor for the good of the offspring. It is -the dependence of the student on the teacher, of the disciple on the -master that elicits the latter’s best thought. It is the dependence of -the multitude on the religious teacher that puts him on his mettle. But -if the dependence of others upon oneself is to produce its appropriate -results, that dependence will have to be interpreted in a spiritual -sense. We shall have to think of others as dependent on us not only for -the necessary empirical services we are bound to render them, but those -empirical services themselves will have to be regarded as instruments -by means of which we may render them the highest spiritual service. - -This leads to a more _rigorous scrutiny of the notion of service_ than -has hitherto been customary. - -The question we must answer, and it is one that has never been -adequately met, is: What is it in the other that we are to serve, -what is the true object of our service? Man is worth while on his own -account. Now no one can pretend that the welfare of the animal part of -man is an object worth while on its own account. To satisfy the hunger -or the thirst of another, or to promote his health is to serve his -body. But the body is the servant of a master. And I am not bound to -serve a servant. If I am to serve the servant at all it must be for the -sake of the master. Who then is the master? - -The same argument applies also to the intellect. Human science is after -all but a narrow littoral along the illimitable continent of nescience. -No one who compares the intellectual achievements of mankind with the -problems that remain unsolved will pretend that the accomplishments -of the intellect are worth while on their own account. The mental no -less than the physical part of us has a master. There is an object -higher than the acquisition of knowledge to be attained in the course -of the mind’s endeavors to acquire knowledge, namely the growth of the -scientist towards unique personality, as will be shown in the chapter -on the Vocations in the last Book. Analogous considerations apply to -art and its achievements. - -And if someone should say that neither the satisfaction of the body -alone, nor of the intellect, nor of the æsthetic sense, nor of the -affections, but of all of them taken together, is to be the object -of our service, the answer is that this would be merely serving a -whole household of servants, and still not serving the master. This -quite aside from the fact that the ideal of happiness as consisting -in the harmonious gratification of the various elements enumerated is -chimerical. Since some of the most indispensable elements of happiness, -such as freedom from disease and from bereavement, are beyond our -control. While even the higher faculties are far from harmoniously -coöperating, the one-sidedness of human nature being such that a marked -development in one direction is actually incompatible with complete -development in other directions. - -Unless, then, there be some master end in everyone’s life, one -paramount to all others, to which all others are subordinate (the -subordination and the renunciation involved being themselves means -of spiritualizing one’s nature) there is no point to the notion of -service. That master end I have defined as the attainment of the -conviction of one’s infinite interrelatedness, the consciousness of -oneself as a member of the spiritual universe, a ἄπαξ λεγόμενον[68] -in the eternal life, a source of energy induplicable in its kind, -which radiates out and touches at the center each one of the infinite -multitude of spiritual associates, and receives from them the effect of -their aboriginally diverse modes of energizing in return. - -I have mentioned two motives that impel me to search for the _numen_ -in others. The one, the craving for my own liberation from the death -in life, my own desperate outreaching toward salvation; the other, the -sense of the dependence of others upon me. Yes, but this dependence -of theirs I must now interpret as spiritual dependence. I must look -for them also beyond the death in life to life itself. I must have -the courage and the truthfulness to look upon neighbor, friend, wife, -husband, son, daughter _sub specie æternitatis_, that is, as primarily -spiritual beings, and estimate any physical, intellectual or emotional -help I can give them by the consideration whether it does or does not -advance them toward the master end of their being. - -Courage of this sort is rare, because precisely the physical, mental -and emotional wants of those who depend on us are the most obvious -and clamorous. I do not of course mean that we should not attend -effectually to their immediate wants. How could we avoid doing so? How -could we neglect the health, the education, etc., of our children? What -I say is that we should acquire the habit of looking upon the immediate -ends as instrumental, and keep in view the supreme end which they in -turn are to serve, and that we should beware of what I have called the -fallacy of provisionalism—that of supposing that we are at liberty to -provide for the lower immediate necessities first, leaving the higher -and the highest needs to be attended to later on. - -The manner in which parents commonly plan for the future of their sons -and daughters is perhaps the fittest illustration of the idea I am -here seeking to exclude. During the period of infancy they pilot the -child through the dangers that beset its physical existence. Later on, -what is called education, the preliminary mental training required to -fit the young for the business of life, is felt to be imperative. Then -comes the selection of a vocation with a view of assuring the material -basis of subsistence. Still later, the advancement of the sons or -daughters in their chosen vocations, or their social success occupies -perhaps the parent’s mind. Thoughts of a happy marriage flatter the -parent’s imagination. If the moral side receives attention, the -utmost that as a rule is demanded is that the young person shall not -fall below the average moral standard that happens to prevail in the -community. And it is in such ways as these that we are apt to respond -to the claims of those spiritual beings for whose essential future -welfare we are to so large an extent responsible. - -To widen this all too narrow conception of our responsibilities, the -following reflections may be found useful. A father in the last decade -of his life realizes acutely the brevity of his own past existence. -The curve of his life is now rapidly descending. Supposing him to be -nearing seventy, his adult sons and daughters may by this time have -reached the age of thirty or forty. Looking back on the thirty or -more years that separate him from them, and remembering how like a -dream the intervening years have glided by, it may come home to him -with sudden force how soon these, his sons and daughters too, though -now in their prime, will reach the point at which he has arrived. The -error of parents is to think of their grown sons and daughters only -as moving on the upward curve of life. They stop short in imagination -there. They look forward to marriage, vocational success and the like, -as finalities for those who are still young. We ought to remember -that the upward curve in the lives of our children will presently -descend just as ours has descended, that the few decades which separate -them from old age will pass as quickly for them as they have passed -for us,—almost in the twinkling of an eye,—and we ought to ask on -their behalf as we must on ours,—What is to be the result of it all? -What does it all profit? And it is this thought that will turn our -attention for them as for ourselves to the spiritual end which should -be dominant at all times,—in the morning, at noon, and in the evening -twilight of a human existence. - -All that has been said has to do with the arousing in us of the desire -to see in others the god, the _numen_, the master end. The wish to -escape from our own death in life, the sense of the dependence of -others on us as interpreted,—these two are the means of stirring us up -to go forth upon the quest, and the seeking is already more than half -the journey. Seek, and ye shall find. But what exactly is it that we -are to seek? What are we to see in the other?—The spiritual nature. But -what is the spiritual nature? I have frequently urged that the lack of -a definite description of the spiritual nature is the chief defect in -ethics up to the present time. This defect I endeavor to supply. The -spiritual nature is the unique nature conceived as interrelated with an -infinity of natures unique like itself. The spiritual nature in another -is the fair quality distinctive of the other raised toward the Nth -degree. We are to paint ideal portraits of our spiritual associates. We -are to see them in the light of what is better in them as it would be -if it were transfigured into the best. We are to go on as long as we -live painting these ideal portraits of them. We are to retouch their -portraits constantly. We are not indeed to obtrude or impose upon -others these sketches, these mental creations of ours, but to propose -them diffidently, reverently, to hold them up as glasses in which our -associates may possibly see themselves mirrored. It is for them to -accept in whole or in part our rendering of their inner selves or to -reject it. But we are not to desist from our labor in creating the -ideal portraits, for in this consists the spiritual artistry of human -intercourse. - -Our friends we are to see in the light of these glorified sketches,—our -friends and our enemies too. For only thus can we win them, and be -essentially their benefactors. There is no power so irresistible, -it has been said, as love. I do not quite accept the word Love. It -signifies the feeling that goes with the ideal appreciation of others; -and mere feeling supplies no directive rule of conduct. But it is -true that the power of ideally appreciating others, of seeing them in -the light of their possible best, and the feeling of love consequent -on this vision, is the mightiest lever for transforming evil into -good, and for sweetening the embittered lives of men. No greater boon -can anyone receive from another than to be helped to think well of -himself. Flattery is the base counterfeit of appreciation. Spiritual -appreciation, appreciation of the inner self despite the mask, is -the greatest of gifts, to manifest it is the greatest of arts. In -its supreme form it is the art of going down to the lowest of human -beings—the man in the ditch, the woman on the street—and making them -think well of themselves because of possibilities in their nature -they themselves hardly surmise. It is also the art of making the most -developed and advanced human beings realize in themselves something -still higher and better than they have ever reached. It is this art -by which the supreme human benefactors have worked their spiritual -miracles, and it is an art which to the extent of our ability we must -each acquire and practice, if human society is to be redeemed. - -There are specially two points to be remembered: the one, that of -seeing the unattained excellence in those who are already in the way of -excellence; the other, where there is or seems to be a complete absence -of fine qualities or of the promise of development, as in the case of -backward children, that we should still not abate one jot of hope or -effort, seeking to win even the smallest improvement, in the conviction -that the best possible under the circumstances is incalculably worth -while. For, compared with the infinite ideal even the achievements of -the most advanced and most developed fall infinitely short, and what -are they more than the best possible under the circumstances. The best -possible under the circumstances represents for us the absolute best. - -Now a word in regard to those who resist the better influence which we -may seek to exercise over them, for instance, the so-called black sheep -in families. Our chief concern should here be to prevent the resistance -from infecting ourselves and provoking unethical reactions. Ethics is -a system of relations. The ethical point of view consists in seeing -the relation between the offending person and ourselves as it ought -to be, in seeing with perfect objectivity the kind of conduct ideally -required by the relation on both sides, seeing it and thereby assisting -the other to see it. But we shall never succeed in doing this until we -purge from our thoughts and speech every trace of private irritation. -If we can point out to the one who has gone wrong how he has hurt -another, and has spiritually hurt himself; if while we do this we see -the fineness that is possible to him and make him realize that we see -it, we shall not utterly fail. I am aware that other methods should -accompany the spiritual appeal. In some cases, a temporary separation -is indicated, in other cases, a prolonged change of environment, or -the gradual formation of new habits of industry and application, the -awakening of interest in some pursuit that leads the mind away from -egocentric pre-occupation. Psychology and experience crystallized, -into commonsense have valuable counsels to give. But, along with the -technical aids, the spiritual influence should never be lost sight of -or relegated to the second place. - -And finally two ideas should be mentioned which are pertinent to broken -relations, as for instance to the unhappy marriage relation and to -interrupted friendships: One that the break is never complete. There -remain certain threads unsundered, which should be most sedulously -preserved intact. They may serve as points of attachment to weave the -tie anew. Again, and this is still more important, thought that the -break would never have occurred if the relation had been as finely -conceived as it ought to have been on my side as well as on the others. -Take friendship as an example. A friendship of many years’ standing -is suddenly wrecked. Why? What were the terms on which the friendship -had been based? What had friendship meant to me?—A certain personal -attraction, mutual aid and comfort, taking counsel together, sympathy -in joy and sorrow. These are valuable elements of friendship, but -they do not even touch the essential point. They do not describe the -principal function which a friend has to fulfil. The friend ideally -is one who stands alongside another as the spectator of his spiritual -development, as one who appraises his friend’s advance toward the -master end of life disinterestedly, and yet with deepest personal -concern. He is the mirror in which his friend may see the stages of -his spiritual progress reflected. Now I have lost my friend. Why have -I lost him? Because he was never a true friend to me, and, I must add, -because I was never a real friend to him. I have not really lost him, -because I never really possessed him. And on making this discovery I -shall have a new light shed on what friendship might mean. I may never -be so fortunate as to find the actual friend, but I shall know what he -ought to be, and what it is in me to be to him. And when I say, “what -it is in me to be to him,” I think of resources of my inner being which -have never been called out; I think of the worth that belongs to me -as a spiritual being capable of giving forth and receiving highest -spiritual influence, and I am thereby immeasurably aggrandized in my -own esteem, the self in me is lifted nearer as it were to its infinite -counterpart in the eternal life. I walk henceforth on a higher level, I -dwell amid serener presences. And this aggrandizement of the self, not -on the ground of what I am but what I may be, and of others too, not on -the ground of what they are, but what they may be, is the compensation -derived from the bitter experience of broken relations. And what has -been said of friendship by way of example is true of frustration in -marriage as well, and of frustrations of every kind. - - - NOTE TO BOOK III - - I may mention a certain test case for trying out the proposed rule, - namely, to idealize the fair quality in others, and thereby achieve - the concomitant transformation of the self. I mean the case of the - victims of a cruel race prejudice, such as is entertained against the - colored people of the South by the more brutal whites. I remember a - long evening which I once spent in the company of a leader among the - colored people, and one of the best men I have ever known. I looked - that night deep into a suffering, sensitive human soul, and I tried - to put myself in his place. I realized the hardships of his lot, the - anguish that I myself should suffer if I were in his position. But - would there be the spiritual equivalent? Would the way I had found - in trials less poignant be the way of release? To make the situation - clear, I selected two points in which the white man, my supposed - oppressor, has the advantage, two fair qualities of which he can - boast. His family life is purer on the average than that of a large - number of the colored people. And he has also learned in the case - of white men to distinguish between the criminal and the innocent. - He will protect the latter, and give up the former to justice. Now - my own people, putting myself in the place of the colored man, are - backward in both these respects. In consequence of the long centuries - of slavery their family relations are often unstable, while they are - apt to shield the colored criminal from the arm of the law. In both - respects I want to represent to myself the white man as he ought to - act. He ought to help me lift up my race, first, by making their - family life purer and more stable. But instead, many of the whites - debauch the women of my race, while perhaps respecting those of their - own race; moreover, by refusing decent accommodation on railroads they - compel educated and refined colored women to travel in cars in which - the coarsest men are herded together. - - Again, how can I, as a leader among my people, teach them to - distinguish between the criminal and the innocent of their race so - long as mobs of white men indiscriminately lynch the innocent and - the criminal of my race alike on the barest suspicion? Against their - actual behavior I set up in my mind a picture of how the superior - race, superior in point of civilization, but still morally backward, - ought to act. I can but suggest this picture, keep it in view as a - constant protest, or still better as an imperative model. - - But I can do more. I can turn upon myself, and upon others of my own - people who are in advance of the majority of them, and presently - I shall be compelled to admit that amongst ourselves something - of the same pride of superiority exists, something of the same - prejudice against those who are lower in the scale. For there is - also a stratification and a hierarchy of higher and lower among the - oppressed. And the relatively higher are apt to behave toward the - lower in the same fashion as their common oppressors behave toward - them all. We find the same tendency among other oppressed races, as - for instance in the attitude of certain of the Spanish and the German - Jews toward the Polish and the Russian. Purge thyself, therefore, is - the incisive monition; purify thine own nature of that pride which - hurts so cruelly when it is directed upon thee from without. Let the - sin committed against thee be the means of purifying thee from the - like sin. This is the spiritual compensation, this the thought that - leads to inward peace! - -FOOTNOTES: - -[67] In a previous chapter I remarked that the cheap estimate of others -and of oneself is due to the habit of regarding human beings from the -point of view of the use they can be put to, ignoring the wonderful -and mysterious energies and potencies which are exhibited day by day -in every human being. If the force stored in an infinitesimal particle -of radium is calculated to excite admiration, how much more the forces -exhibited in man, looking at him merely as the stage on which the -spectacle of these forces is displayed. Consider the occurrence of such -a thing as thought, the sheer miracle of mentality, the working of the -constructive imagination in the artist, etc. If we sufficiently dwell -on these inward facts about men, instead of merely emphasizing their -external utility to one another, we shall thereby be put in tune, as -it were, for the higher spiritual view of man. The difference I have -said is like that between understanding the theory of electricity and -merely turning on electric power in the workshop or the home. And yet -the scientific contemplation of the miracles of human nature as seen -from within, while it serves as a propædeutic, cannot actually bring -us up to the ethical point of view. For this sort of contemplation -reveals only the working of impersonal forces or powers, thought, -feeling, impulse in their endless actions and reactions, similar, in -so far as they are impersonal, to the forces observed in nature. The -ethical point of view alone discloses a centrality, an underivative, -irreducible core, a substantive being, personality. - -[68] An expression occurring once only. - - - - - BOOK IV - - APPLICATIONS: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY, THE STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL - RELATIONS, ETC. - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE COLLECTIVE TASK OF MANKIND AND THE THREE-FOLD REVERENCE - - -The social institutions, the family, the organs of education, the -vocation, the political organization, the organization of mankind, the -ideal religious society are to be treated as a progressive series. The -individual is to pass successively through them, advancing from station -to station toward ethical personality. - -In designating the social institutions as an ethical series, care -must be taken not to confound the terms of the series as now existent -with the terms as they would be did they conform to their ethical -functions. For instance, even the monogamic family is as yet only in -part ethically organized. School and university are adrift as to their -ethical purpose. The majority of mankind are engaged in occupations -which it would be absurd to call vocations, and the international group -exists as yet barely in embryo. Hence when we speak of the social -institutions as a progressive series through which the individual is -to advance towards personality, we are describing the aim of social -reconstruction, not the present state of things. The spiritual nature -of man must create for itself appropriate social organs. It has been -painfully engaged in the attempt to do so since the existence of our -race on earth. - -In each of the social institutions we are to distinguish between the -empirical substratum and the spiritual imprint which it is to receive. -We find in each ready to hand some natural non-moral motive or set of -motives of which we are to avail ourselves in the endeavor to evoke the -spiritual result. Thus in the family the non-moral motive is affection -due to consanguinity; in the school sociality, the school society being -the first society into which the child enters; in the vocation there -is the craving for mental self-expression, in the state, patriotism, -or the feeling we have for the larger whole in which we are included -on the basis of similarity of language, historic tradition, etc. The -natural basis of the international group of society is the empirical, -and as yet in no way ethical, fact of the commercial and industrial -interdependence of the different countries, a fact used by M. Bloch and -his more recent followers as an argument against war. - -In popular literature the empirical substratum and the spiritual -relation to be produced by means of it are constantly confused. In any -genuinely ethical system they must be carefully discriminated.[69] - -In each of the social institutions, or, as we may now call them, the -phases of life experience through which the individual must pass on the -way toward personality, the winning of the ethical result depends on -observance of _the three-fold reverence_. What I mean by the three-fold -reverence must be explained in some detail, especially as the reader -might otherwise be led into identifying my view with that expressed by -Goethe in _Wilhelm Meister_. The three modes of reverence mentioned -by Goethe in his sketch of the “pedagogical province” have for their -background the poet’s pantheism. The view here set forth is based on -ethical idealism. - -In order to introduce my thought let me go back to the phrase -repeatedly used in Book III—“the task of humanity.” Mankind as a whole, -the generations past, present and to come, have a certain work to do, a -task to accomplish. A collective obligation rests on our race, spanning -the generations. - -The spiritual conception of the collective task is the basis of the -three-fold reverence. The spiritual result, as was said above, is in -every instance to be superinduced upon an empirical substratum. The -empirical substratum in this case is mankind considered as a developing -entity, which partially reproduces in the present the mental and moral -acquisitions of ancestors, partially increases the heritage and passes -it on to the newcomers. I, as an individual, am also inextricably -linked up backward and forward with those who come before and those who -are to come after. I cannot take myself out of this web. The task laid -upon human society as a whole is also laid upon me. I am a conscious -thread in the fabric that is weaving, conscious in a general way of the -pattern to be woven. - -But viewed empirically the development of humanity is haphazard. Much -is preserved from the past that ought to be cast aside. Many traces -of past error remain unexpunged in the life of the present. A mixed -stream, compounded of good and evil, passes through our veins into -our successors’. The empirical fact is simply the fact of partial -reproduction, partial augmentation and partial transmission. The -ethical conception of progress depends on the view that there is an -ideal pattern of the spiritual relation in the mind of man, destined -to become more explicit as it is tested out and that the present -generation ought to appraise the heritage of the past according to this -pattern, preserving and rejecting and adding its own quota in such a -way as to enable the succeeding generations to sift the worthful from -the worthless more successfully, and to see the ideal pattern more -explicitly. - -The three-fold reverence has been described as reverence towards -superiors, equals and inferiors. For this inadequate description -I would substitute the following: In place of reverence towards -superiors, reverence for the valid work of ethicizing human relations -already accomplished in the past, reverence for the precious permanent -achievements and for those who achieved them,—the “Old Masters.” The -human race has gained a certain ethical footing in the empirical -sphere. The general task has not to be begun _ab initio_. In the act -of separating what is worth while from what is worthless, in the very -process of revision and reinterpretation, we manifest our reverence for -the past. It is thus that true historicity is distinguished from blind -conservatism. And besides, by studying the old masters, we acquire -a certain standard of excellence. Since those who have contributed -epoch-making advances in philosophy, in religion, in science, inspire -us by the grandeur of their attack on the great problems; and the -spirit of their attack, is unspeakably stimulating to us, even when we -reject their solutions. We cannot too humbly sit as disciples at the -feet of the great masters if discipleship has this meaning. - -Reverence of the first type prescribes the same attitude towards -preëminent personalities among our contemporaries. They rank with the -great predecessors inasmuch as they are in a way for us predecessors. -They are in advance of us. To revere them is to endeavor to come -abreast of them, to obtain the advantage of the forward movement which -their superior capacity enabled them to initiate, and to start where -they leave off, adding our small quota. - -The second kind of reverence is directed toward those who are, in -respect to their gifts and opportunities, approximately on the same -level with us, but whose gifts differ from and are supplementary -to ours. In our relation to them we may learn the great lesson of -appreciating unlikeness, and working out our own correlative unlikeness -by way of reaction. - -The third kind of reverence is directed toward the undeveloped, -among whom I include the young, the backward groups among civilized -peoples, and the uncivilized peoples. We are to reverence that which -is potential in all of these individuals and groups, and we do so by -fitting ourselves to help them actualize their spiritual possibilities. -Reverence of the third kind takes the highest rank among the three. -The spiritual life of the world is a deep mine as yet explored only -near the surface. The unrealized possibilities of mankind are the chief -asset. But in order to effectuate our purpose with respect to the -undeveloped, we must have reverence toward the great Old Masters, to -gain a certain standard of excellence; and reverence towards unlikeness -in others to become ourselves differentiated individualities, and in -order to respect the unlikeness which we shall presently likewise find -in the backward and the young. So that the three reverences play into -one another and are inseparable from one another, the first two being -indispensable to the third. They are in truth a “trinity in unity.” -But the third reverence is the supreme one. The chief objective must -be the undeveloped, because our face must be turned toward the future, -because the task of mankind is as yet in its early stages. The third -reverence is supreme. Now it is only when we have grasped the meaning -of the triple reverence that we can fully appreciate the significance -of the family as the first matrix in which the reverential attitudes -are to be acquired. It is only then that we can rightly conceive of -the organs of education, and of the end upon which the activities of -school and university should converge. And similarly we shall find -our interpretation of the vocation, the state, and the international -society illuminated by this conception of the three-fold reverence. - -In popular religious teaching the individual is thrust into the -foreground. His salvation as a detached entity is the principal object. -In positivism and evolutionalism society in its empirical aspect is -exalted, and the individual tends to be regarded as a stepping-stone. -In the spiritual interpretation of the collective task as outlined, -the individual remains integral and sacrosanct. The spiritual society -of which the image is to be imprinted on human society is a society -of indefeasible ethical personalities.[70] The individual even now at -his station in the present attributes to himself this lofty character -and the various obligations which he already recognizes, and which he -endeavors to fulfil, afford him ample opportunity to vindicate his -spiritual selfhood. If in addition he looks forward longingly to the -future, and to the greater spiritual fulfilment that may be expected -among posterity, this expectation is founded on the belief that what he -already possesses in germ will then be more unfolded, that the ideal -of the indefeasible worth of man of which he is already conscious -in himself will then be more completely recognized and its infinite -implications be more fully understood.[71] - -FOOTNOTES: - -[69] Thus the interdependence of nations in respect to their material -interests is often erroneously expatiated on as if it constituted an -actually ethical bond between them. - -[70] While at the same time the ethical personality, unlike -the “windowless monads” of Leibnitz is effectuated only in the -cross-relations which subsist between each one and his spiritual -associates. - -[71] I may here point out the bearings of this general point of view -on the much-mooted and confused question of the value of the study -of history. Ranke holds that the aim of the historian should be to -reproduce factually the occurrences of the past. Robinson insists on -the uses of history. But uses to what end? The history of the past is -fragmentary and full of gaps. The data with respect to some of the -most important periods are irrecoverable. The attitude of the human -race towards its own history, I take it, should be like that of an -individual towards his past. I cannot really resuscitate my past. -Memory is treacherous. Much has been forgotten. The events of my youth -are discolored when seen in the perspective of later years. I should -try to know myself as far as I can, but with a view of pressing on and -realizing with such light upon myself as I have, the ethical aim. The -same applies to mankind. And the important point is in the review to -disengage the ideas that controlled the principal social institutions -in the past, and to appraise these ideas from the standpoint of our -present ethical insight. Thus, in treating the history of the family, -we should single out the ideas that controlled the family relation, the -idea of the _patria potestas_, the feudal idea, or the connection of -the family with landed property. In writing the history of the organs -of education, we should bring into view priestly education as among the -Brahmins, musical or æsthetic education as among the Greeks, the idea -of princely education, the idea of preparation for the government of -an empire, which accounts for the system of the English universities, -the controlling idea of the German universities. And then at the end of -our survey we shall be in a better position to discern what is to be -the ideal of school and university education in an ethical democracy. -The same applies to the controlling ideas of the state, and of the -remaining social institutions. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE FAMILY - - -The family is in process of change. We should fix attention on the kind -of change that is desirable. The change desirable is the more perfect -expression of the ethical ideal in the life of the family. One striking -fact is that in the past the family was never supposed to exist merely -for the “benefit” of its individual members. The latter view is an -individualistic novelty of our age, and, as commonly understood, it is -radically false. - -Under the caste system the family subordinates the welfare of its -members to the function of the caste. Society being stationary -and stratified, the family is the organ for the reproduction of a -stratified social system. - -A similar view prevails under feudalism. We of today resent the idea -underlying primogeniture. From the modern point of view we ask why the -eldest born should be preferred to his brothers. Primogeniture appears -to us to assert the inequality of individual men; but from the feudal -point of view the eldest born was preferred, not as an individual, but -as the steward of the family property. The family had a fixed place -in the social hierarchy, and to maintain this place the estate was to -remain undivided in the hands of one person. - -Now what is amiss with the modern family? This is profoundly amiss—that -the idea of the family as serving a larger purpose is disappearing, -and that the family is supposed to exist for the benefit of its -individual members, benefit meaning happiness. Frequent divorce and -disintegration are the natural consequences of this view, for if the -tie exists solely for the happiness of those bound by it, then it ought -indeed to be dissolved when the relation entails suffering. - -Society has passed from status to contract, and many seem to hold -that contract is the last word, the true expression of freedom. We -have passed from status to contract, we must pass on from contract to -organization, and thus to true freedom. - -Status is based on the analogy of the animal organism. The caste -society and the feudal society, ethically regarded, are spurious -organisms. This spurious type of organization is no longer viable, -and now bald individualism is taking its place. The malady with which -the family is afflicted is individualism. The desirable change is -genuine organization on the basis of the spiritual equivalence of all -functions.[72] The relation of the family to the general social task of -organization is two-fold. The family is the seminary in which shall be -implanted the germinal principle of organization, that principle which -is destined to transform all the subsequent terms of the social series, -the instrumentality to be employed being the three-fold reverence. -Again, the family will reach its more perfect form in proportion as the -succeeding social institutions, the school, vocation, state, shall -themselves be essentially organized, the influence of the later terms -retroacting on the first term. - -The family, in the spiritual view of it which I am sketching, differs -from the family of other days, and also from the modern family, in two -particulars. It does not recruit some one social class or stratum. -It does not direct the offspring into a single specific vocation. It -is the vestibule that leads into all the different professions and -vocations. And secondly, the family does not prepare the young to enter -into a vocation for the purpose of securing happiness. It does not -regard the vocation as servile to the empirical ends of the individual, -but as a phase through which he is to pass on the road toward ethical -personality, the fulfilment of the objective aims of the vocation being -the means of acquiring the ethical development which the vocation is -competent to furnish. Thus we regain, but on a much higher plane, what -the family possessed before it began to break down under the influence -of modern individualism, namely, an ulterior greater purpose imbedded -within itself and yet extending beyond itself. - -When we have grasped this relation of the family to the subsequent -terms of the social series, and bear constantly in mind as we should -that the three-fold reverence is the instrument by which _organization_ -is to be effected, we shall then be able to give adequate reasons why -the monogamic ideal alone is the true ethical ideal, why the marriage -relation, if it is to be ethical, must be permanent between two and -exclusive of all others. - -Let me briefly point out the relation of the monogamic family to -the three types of reverence. The third type ranks highest. The -tie of consanguinity between parents and offspring supplies the -empirical substratum. To be interested in the undeveloped, to surmise -possibilities as yet wholly unapparent, to go to infinite pains to -nurture and educate an immature being like a child, for all this -natural affection is almost indispensable. As a rule no one can so -love a child as its own parents do. The plan of state education for -infants to replace home education is advocated by some on the ground -that professional kindergartners and teachers are more competent to -train the budding human mind than unpedagogical fathers and mothers. -The function to be performed by the scientific educator in co-operation -with the home is doubtless not to be missed; but taking children away -from under the care of their parents, assembling them in what would be -equivalent to state orphan asylums, is a procedure which precisely for -pedagogical reasons would be preposterous. For the parent supplies that -concentrated love for the individual child, that intimate cherishing -which the most generous teacher, whose affections are necessarily -distributed over many, can never give. And the child needs this -selective affection. The love of the parent is the warm nest for the -fledgling spirit of the child. To be at home in this strange world -the young being with no claims as yet on the score of usefulness to -society or of merit of any kind, must find somewhere a place where it -is welcomed without regard to usefulness or merit. And it is the love -of the parents that makes the home, and it is his own home that makes -the child at home in the world. - -It does not follow that parents in general do reverence the spiritual -possibilities latent in their children. The natural affection is there, -but the empirical substratum and the spiritual relation are not to be -confounded. The kind of reverence of which I speak is an ideal thing to -be worked towards, not something that as yet actually exists, save in -exceptional cases. In the caste family and the feudal family the father -incarnated, as it were, the social system so far as that stratum or -class was concerned to which he belonged. He inspired awe. He demanded -implicit obedience. It was the existing social system that spoke from -his lips. But this system itself had an arbitrary character, and the -worship of the father was hardly ethical. The modern family goes to -the opposite extreme. In it the relations between parents and children -are loose, and tend to become more and more so. Reverence is scarcely -looked for by the parent, and is not likely to be accorded. On the -individualistic theory the child at a very early age is treated as an -equal, and whether encouraged to do so or not is apt to assert its -independence. The members of the family are not joined in an organic -connection, but resemble a collection of atomic units that easily -fall apart. The ethical relation, the real reverence must spring from -the service the parent renders in bringing to light the specific -individuality of the child with an eye to the transmutation which it is -to receive in the later terms of the social series. Not only highest -gratitude but genuine reverence are due to the parent who performs -this office. “You have given me physical birth, you are now giving me -spiritual birth,” will be the child’s response to the parent’s efforts. - -Thus much may be said as to the reason why the marriage relation should -be exclusive. The principal reason why it should be lifelong, is that -the office of the parent in furthering the spiritual development of -the children does not end when they reach the threshold of manhood or -womanhood. On the contrary, the finest touches are often added to the -work of education when the sons and daughters have become established -in a business or profession, and have founded families of their -own. The wisdom gathered from the experience of their elders, the -disinterested counsel inspired by love, will then be of the greatest -use to them. The young mother, especially, confronted with the problems -of child-rearing, will naturally turn to her own mother for advice. -The son, who comes to close quarters with the difficulties of life, -will find in the father, who is detached from life and has the tranquil -vision of old age, his best friend. - -In speaking of the third type of reverence I have already included all -that need here be said of the first type. The reverential relation -is mutual. The child will truly reverence the parent who on his side -reverences the child’s spiritual possibilities. The child does not -understand the word Spiritual, but is unconsciously affected by the -thing itself which I am here describing. A person who has the vision, -who has the gift of divining what is as yet unmanifested, will convey -to others the illumination of his vision. The child will realize in his -parent the presence of something higher, and will revere it, worship -it. Certain looks, certain expressions of the countenance, certain -gestures, though not understood in their meaning at the time, will be -imprinted on memory to be recalled in later life and then understood. -But it is essential, in order to evoke reverence in the young, to have -it oneself. He who does not steadfastly revere something, yes, someone -greater than himself, will never elicit reverence in others. - -The second type of reverence, towards those who are unlike ourselves -but none the less our equals, can be inculcated in an elementary way -in the family through the relations of brothers and sisters. Fraternal -feeling is an empirical means whereby to produce or at least prepare -the way for a very notable spiritual result—the willingness not only to -respect difference in others, but to welcome it. In current teaching -the emphasis in fraternity is placed on likeness. It should rather be -placed on the unlikeness. These exist, and are sometimes very marked -between brothers, and often cause discord and separation. The novices -in life should therefore be taught betimes to overcome their repugnance -to those who are unlike themselves, and the common relation of the -brothers to their parents will be helpful to this end. Naturally we -dislike the unlike. Alienness is ever productive of disharmony. The -fact, however, that the unlike person in the case of a brother is the -child of the same parents draws us powerfully toward him despite the -tendency to recoil. - -I must not omit to mention that the triple reverence is most naturally -and easily learned in the family, because of the simplicity of the -relations, and the limited number of persons involved. - -The question may be raised whether the single family should remain the -primary social unit, or whether a group of families united in close -coöperation would better fulfil the purposes for which the family -exists. The privacy and separateness of each family would not need -to be disturbed, coöperation might be limited to specific objects, -such as simplifying the work of the household, providing kindergarten -education for the young children, better play facilities, separate -study rooms for adolescents, common entertainments for all, and a -service of song at the beginning or close of the day. One obvious -difficulty in constituting such a group would be: the diversities of -tastes and opinions, particularly such as are not perceived at the -outset, but emerge on nearer acquaintance, and as the younger members -grow up and develop their idiosyncrasies. One great advantage, however, -would result if care were taken to include in the group persons -belonging to different vocations—scientist, scholar, architect, lawyer, -artist. Young persons as they mature would then have the benefit of -contact with those who are intimately familiar with different lines of -vocational activity, and would be helped to know their own mind as to -their future career better than they commonly do now. Personal contact -with one who is engaged in a certain line of work is a far better -instruction as to the nature of the work than reading about it or -observation from a distance. - -The ethical theory of marriage has been developed in my published -addresses.[73] But certain topics not there treated I would at least -allude to here in passing, and among them the need of a more careful -study of the causes that lead to infelicity in marriage. Kant mentions, -as an instance of the discrepancy between the natural and the moral -order, the fact that the sex passion is often at its height before -the period when marriage may be wisely entered into. There are other -seemingly radical incongruities, for instance, that between the -face, the features of a person and his real character. The one may -be borrowed so to speak from some ancestor, while the real nature is -quite at variance with the impression created by the face, so that -one who thinks he marries A really marries B. There are diversities -also between partners in marriage that only show themselves in the -latter part of life, when the outlines of character are apt to stand -forth bare. Besides, there is assumed to be, by some modern writers, a -certain fundamental sex antagonism. - -The whole question of the characteristics of sex requires to be far -more carefully investigated than it has been. And here let me take the -opportunity to express my positive appreciation of empirical science in -connection with ethical theory. The chief object of this volume is to -work out the general plan of the ethical relations, or the regulative -principle in ethics, and this I am deeply convinced is supersensible -and non-empirical. Applied ethics, however, is dependent not only on -the regulative principle but on empirical science, that is, on an -extended and ever-increasing knowledge of physiology, psychology, -and of the environmental conditions that influence human beings, and -I am keenly desirous to ward off the possible misunderstanding that -the ethical theory here proposed is intended to replace the empirical -science of man, individual or social - - Without the way there is no going. - Without the truth there is no knowing; - -says Thomas à Kempis. The way is the empirical knowledge, the truth is -the regulative principle. The way itself, as we proceed along it, will -shed additional light on the truth. Nevertheless, without the outlines -of the truth, without a goal in view, we should but be wandering -blindly. - -It is likely that the relations between persons in marriage will in -future become more complex, and the difficulties of adjustment more -serious, in proportion as under the influence of the new education -the individualities of men and women become more developed. Problems -hardly as yet envisaged will then become pressing. But whatever the -difficulties, they can be overcome if the ideal purpose of marriage be -kept in view, namely, that two beings of opposite sexes shall spend -their lives in the spiritual reproduction of offspring. The relation is -triangular. Husband and wife are each to elicit the distinctive best -in the other, incited, impelled to do so in order jointly to evoke -the distinctive best in the young. And the young represent posterity. -What the parents do for their own children they do for posterity, -since children are that portion of posterity which comes under their -immediate influence. And in this sense it may be said that marriage is -an organ for the spiritual reproduction and advancement of the human -race. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[72] Spurious or bastard organization was based on the empirical -preëminence of some function like that of the priest or the warrior. - -[73] See _Marriage and Divorce_, D. Appleton & Co. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE VOCATIONS - - -The next term in the series of social institutions is the school, -inclusive of its higher departments. But for reasons which will -sufficiently appear to anyone who carefully reads this chapter, it is -advisable to treat the vocations first. - -A more ludicrous mistake cannot be conceived than that of taking the -ideal for the fact, the wish for the deed, in matters touching the -social institutions. Thus the term “vocational guidance” is often used, -as if the occupations of the majority of men already answered to what -is implied in the idea of a vocation as if, for instance, industrial -labor in a factory were a “vocation” into which the young only needed -to be guided, whereas guidance means, in this case, being directed into -some mechanical _occupation_ not already overcrowded, or turned into -other unvocational occupations when they happen not to be over-filled. -But what is true of monotonous, mechanical labor in factories is true -in a greater or less degree of all human occupations. None of them at -least are as yet vocations in the highest sense. - -I dwell on this because, in describing the vocation as the third term -in the series, I would not have the reader imagine that this third -term exists in any adequate manner. Rather is it to be the task of -what is often loosely called “social reform” _to create the ethical -series_,—not only the third term (the vocation), but the whole -series from beginning to end, the family, the school, the state, the -international society, the ideal religious society. The phrase “social -reform” is strictly correct only when used comprehensively in this -way. To confine its usage to the more equable repartition of wealth, -or to changes in economic conditions is unwarrantably to narrow its -signification. Social reform is the _reformation of all the social -institutions in such a way that they may become successive phases -through which the individual shall advance towards the acquisition of -an ethical personality_. - -In sketching the ideals of the different vocations, I have to -consider in what way each contributes to the formation of an ethical -personality. There is an empirical side to each vocation. Every -vocation satisfies some one or more of the empirical human needs; but -in the very act or process of doing so, it ought, in order to deserve -the name of a vocation, to satisfy also a spiritual need, to contribute -in a specific way toward the formation of a spiritual personality.[74] -Agriculture furnishes food. The different trades minister to a great -variety of wants. The scientist extends our knowledge of nature. -With this empirical aspect of the vocations, however, I am not here -concerned. A scientific classification of the vocations is not a task -to which I need address myself. _My task is an ethical classification -of the vocations._ As this has never been undertaken, the first -attempt is difficult and perforce provisional. - -I outline my topics as follows: - -1. The theoretical physical sciences (including mathematics) considered -from the point of view of the specific way in which the ethical -personality may be developed by those who pursue them. - -2. The practical counterparts of the theoretical sciences, _e.g._, -engineering, and the industrial arts in so far as they depend on and -illustrate and use principles and methods furnished by science. Work -in factories, mines, and also in the fields, is to be regarded as the -executive side of theoretical science. - -3. The historical sciences, those which have to do with mentally -reproducing the life of the human race in the past, including history -proper, philology, archæology, etc. - -4. The vocation of the artist. - -5. The vocation of the lawyer and the judge. - - The vocation of the statesman. - - The vocation of the religious teacher. - -The three last mentioned are classed together as educational vocations, -that is, as vocations which, in respect to their highest significance, -are branches of the _pedagogy of mankind_, having for their object -to educate the human race; the ethical object of the lawyer being to -educate society in the idea of justice; of the statesman to educate -society in the idea of the state; of the religious teacher to educate -society in the idea of the spiritual universe. - -This conception of the lawyer, the politician, etc., as primarily -educators, is a point to which particular attention is directed. The -significance of it will appear further on. I shall now indicate in -bare outline what I conceive to be the specific contribution of the -vocations mentioned to the formation of a spiritual personality. - - -_Science_ - -Conspicuously important in this connection is the question whether -and by what means the pursuit of the physical sciences can be linked -up to the supreme spiritual end of man. The scientist may develop -into a great thinker in the course of comprehensive and intricate -investigations, but he does not thereby necessarily develop into a -personality. His mind will become in this way a mirror of the orderly -procession of nature’s phenomena. He will be the accurate recorder of -what happens, the knowing spectator of the play, whose eye recognizes -the actors, the forces, beneath their disguises. The pursuit of -knowledge of this kind for the sake of knowledge, or it may be for the -sake of exercising the faculty of cognition, represents the purely -scientific conception of the aim of science. Whatever moral qualities -are exacted of the scientist, such as accuracy or intellectual -veracity, self-abnegation, scorn of mere vulgar pecuniary reward or -celebrity, and at least a provisional disregard of the practical -benefits to be derived by mankind from scientific discovery—all these -fine traits of character are prized as subordinate to the strictly -scientific object. The ethical character of the man himself is -not regarded as the supreme end to be fostered by his scientific -occupation, but as instrumental to his occupation the aims of which are -said to be purely _impersonal_. - -There is thus a scientific conception of the aim of science; on the -other hand, there is an ethical conception of it. The former points -in the direction of the indefinite extension of knowledge which never -embraces a totality of the knowable, never reaches a limit, even in -idea. The latter points to the _infinite_, not to the _indefinite_, -sets up an ideal of the infinite as the goal, takes the man out of the -flux, centralizes his individuality into a personality by relating him -to the infinite, not as the mere spectator and scribe of nature, but -through his action or other potential spiritual beings like himself. - -The scientist, in brief, like every one else, becomes a personality -by eliciting the potential spiritual nature in other human beings. -But be it noted that he is to perform this task _as a scientist_. His -particular occupation is to be the means of producing a particular -spiritual result in others as well as in himself, and by this means his -occupation is to be converted into a vocation. - -How? Through partial success and frustration. Partial success in the -case of a scientist means for one thing, increased mental grasp, the -power to hold before the mind ever more and more complex relations,—a -faculty supremely serviceable in mastering complexities of relation in -the economic, in the political spheres, in the sphere of international -intercourse, in the sphere of the social relations in general, and -wherever the ethical principle has to be applied. The scientific -occupation trains powers which are to be exercised so as to illuminate -obscurities in the ethical field. - -The frustration which the scientist meets with when he reflects in -thoroughgoing fashion on the business he has in hand is the inevitable -realization that _Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichniss_, that the -sphere of the finite in which he labors, though capable of indefinite -extension, is forever incapable of being rounded out to a true -infinity, and hence that the complete unification of the manifold (in -which alone the reality-producing functions of the mind can find repose -and ultimate satisfaction), can never be carried out in the manifold -of juxtaposition and sequence with which, as a physical scientist, he -deals. He will thus be led to face in thought the limits of what is -finitely attainable, not only by him as an individual scientist, but -by physical science in general. And in proportion as his spiritual -nature is energetic it will then assert itself all the more resiliently -after this defeat, and turn in a new direction, and towards another -kind of truth, the truth which is discovered in the realm of _will_, -in the sphere of intercourse with fellow human beings. The propædeutic -result of science with respect to ethical personality is the training -of the more complex mental faculties. The positive result following the -frustration is the new turn toward the spiritual, the escape from the -spell wherewith the physical world enchains the mind, the dissipating -of the widespread illusion that the truths of physical science are the -only kind of truth, the more determined setting of the face towards a -different kind of truth. The scientist, in brief, is to travel along -the paths of the finite in order to arrive and stand at the gate of the -infinite. - -I have said that the boon of personality is gained in intercourse with -others, through the influence which we exert on others. How does the -scientist as a scientist spiritually affect others? The great specific -service, as I have just said, which he is to render is to destroy the -illusion that the material world is a finality. And it is just he, the -scientist, who works most successfully in the field of physical truth -who must assist the rest of us in escaping from the spell to which we -are all subject. He is the one, he who more than others succeeds in -unifying the manifold of juxtaposition and sequence, to whom we look to -liberate others as well as himself from the deceptive belief that the -reality-producing functions of the human mind can be satisfied in the -temporal and spatial manifold. Not from the tyro, not from the purveyor -of “popular science” can we hope to learn the profoundest lessons as to -the incapacity of physical nature to appease the spirit of man. It is -from the familiar friend of nature, from one more deeply read than we -are in her secrets, that we are to obtain this great instruction, to -receive this boon. - -Ethics is a science of reactions. Each vocation reacts upon the others. -The general reaction of science I have mentioned. In addition the work -of the scientist reacts upon agriculture, industry, etc. The industrial -arts, as has been stated, are to be regarded as the executive -auxiliaries of science, receiving from it the knowledge of the -uniformities of nature, and in turn setting for science new problems by -attention to which scientific theory is advanced. - -The relations of science to art also need to be considered at greater -length than is possible here. I have in mind inquiries into the -scientific basis of music like those of Helmholtz, the scientific -theory of color and the like, and also detailed studies of the return -gift which art confers on science, especially the value to the -scientist of that cultivation of the imagination which is gained by -the contemplation and study of works of art. There are different kinds -of imagination: the purely artistic, the scientific, the mechanical -imagination, the ethical imagination. The function of the imagination -in advancing science has been discussed by Tyndall and others, but the -subject is far indeed from being exhausted. - -The scientist then may be defined as one who stands in reciprocal -relations to all other departments of human interest and activity, who -gives to each from his specific standpoint as a scientist, and receives -from each, from religion,[75] from art, from the practical vocations, -etc. Ideally speaking, every man participates in all the principal -interests and activities of the human mind. Every man is something of -an artist, something of a practical or executive worker, scientist, -religious being. But in each individual the different interests are -colored by his special pursuit, and the influence he wields in return -is modified in the same fashion.[76] - -There are three great tasks that occupy human life: - -1. To build our finite world (science and its adjuncts). - -2. To create in the finite the semblance of the infinite, or spiritual -relation (art). - -3. To strive to realize the spiritual relation in human intercourse -(ethics and religion). - -This discussion of science affords me the opportunity to give an -exact definition of the word “instrumental” as I use it. And the word -“instrumental” is of decisive importance as to the entire ethical -conception of life. Instrumental in what sense? The finite ends of man -are to be the means used in the pursuit of the infinite end. But in -what manner are they to be the means? To be a _cheerful world-builder_, -to take an active and whole-hearted interest in the improvement of -material conditions, in political reforms, in the embellishment of -earthly life—how is it possible to do this and at the same time keep -the spiritual end in view as the supreme end? - -Christianity in its pristine form,[77] abandons the task in dismay. -Instead of seeking action in the finite world as a means, it counsels -renunciation and withdrawal. Modern social reform movements, on the -other hand, are devoted to finite ends, more or less ignoring the -spiritual. How is it possible to work in the world, in the finite -sphere, for an end beyond the finite? The answer, as I have shown in -the case of science (and the same applies to all other vocations), is -to be found in the words “partial success and frustration.” The finite, -lesser ends, are means to the highest end in so far as we are partially -able to embody the spiritual relation in the finite world, and in so -far as the inevitable defeat of our effort to do so serves to implant -in us the conviction of the reality of the infinite ethical ideal. - -The points contained in this chapter may be briefly summarized as -follows: - -What is the relation of science to the ethical end? We are seeking to -link up the world to spirit. Along what line can the connection be -marked out in the case of science? Science is instrumental in founding -more securely the empirical basis of self-respect, inasmuch as it -gives to man to a certain extent a sense of mastery over nature. With -the help of science he feels himself no longer the helpless sport of -nature’s forces. - -The training in complex thinking afforded by science is favorable to -the ethical reformer. Science also incidentally encourages the virtues -of veracity, and the like. - -Knowledge for knowledge’s sake cannot be the final end of the pursuit -of science, since the world of space and time with which science -deals is not only not as yet rationalized but is not ultimately -rationalizable. - -While in all the respects just mentioned the pursuit of science is -indirectly instrumental to the spiritual end—instrumental to the -instrument—it is directly instrumental to it in so far as, at the hand -of the supreme scientist, man is conducted through the finite as far as -the gate of the infinite. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[74] Just as the family is the organ of physical reproduction, but -in that very capacity is ethically required to bring to birth the -spiritual nature of its members. - -[75] All that I have said in the beginning as to the relation of the -finite and the infinite belongs under this head. - -[76] There is one point too obvious to be overlooked, but perhaps it -had better be expressly mentioned. The scientist helps us to build our -world, the physical nest in which we live, first by mastering nature’s -procedures, then by making possible inventions, which increase the -security of our footing in the physical world; dispense us from the -brute task of pitting our merely physical strength against the forces -of nature; render communication between distant peoples feasible, and -thereby lay the first foundation for an international society. - -[77] _Vide_ Introduction to the First Book. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE PRACTICAL VOCATIONS - - -Medicine is the executive of the science of physiology, and the others, -on which it depends. The physician has a certain work to do, a certain -need to satisfy—the need of health, the alleviation of pain. In -endeavoring to satisfy this need he uses the sciences that underlie his -vocation and in turn promotes those sciences. - -On the lower levels of agriculture and the industrial arts the same -holds true. Our physical necessities vociferously demand satisfaction. -They cannot wait. Men must have food or they perish. The agriculturist -supplies the food they need. But the spiritual view of life declares -that man, _while_ engaged in satisfying his material wants, shall in so -doing assert his spiritual nature. He is to hammer out his personality -on the anvil of his empirical necessities. Even as human beings do not -partake of food like animals, but indicate by the manner in which they -take it the superior worth of the being who is dependent on food, so -the agriculturist who raises the food should testify to his spiritual -character. He does so in part at least by his reaction on the sciences -which he applies, biology, chemistry, etc. The same holds good of the -industrial occupations. The work a man does should be the means of -promoting the development of his mental and æsthetic nature, and of his -will. The mental and æsthetic development is acquired by mastering -and reacting on the science and the art that enter into the trade. The -development of the will, the most important of all, depends on the -organic relations of the industrial workers among themselves and to -their chiefs. - -This raises the problem of the right organization of “industrial -vocationalists” from the ethical point of view, and the following -questions present themselves: Shall the present division into the two -hostile camps of trade-unionists and employers continue? Or is it to be -regarded as a makeshift, perhaps necessary during the present period -of transition, but certainly untenable in the long run? Is the uniform -arrangement contemplated by Socialism desirable, the government of -every industry and indeed of every vocation by the representatives -of the community as a whole? Shall what is called coöperation be -adopted, that is, the formation of independent groups of workers on the -voluntary principle, associated for the purpose of equably dividing the -profits? - -The three alternatives mentioned may be examined from various points of -view. Here we consider them from the ethical point of view. Assuming -that the ethical end of life is to be supreme, what kind of industrial -re-organization of society will be most in harmony with it? All three -plans are open to the ethical objection that they concentrate attention -on the material gain to be derived from the industry instead of on the -specific service which those who follow the industry as a vocation are -to render. Collective bargaining between unions and employers is after -all just bargaining. Socialism differs from trade-unionism not in the -object so much as in the means. Instead of securing for the workers a -larger share it would secure for them at once an approximately equal -share. Coöperation aims at the same result as Socialism by voluntary -association instead of by collective compulsion. - -None of the three plans is ethically satisfying, and a fourth -arrangement should be contemplated. Its characteristics are the -following: - -1. The idea of service to be pre-eminent instead of the gain, the wage -or salary to be apportioned as the means of sustaining the worker in -the best possible performance of the service. - -2. The work done by the workers to be the means of developing them -mentally, æsthetically and volitionally, the educational features -therefore to be pre-eminent. - -3. The industrial group to be transformed into a social sub-organism -(in the ethical sense a sub-organ of the larger organism of the -nation). By this is meant that the employers cease to be employers and -become functionaries, while each worker in his place and in his degree -likewise becomes a functionary. A common social service group will thus -be formed embracing the chiefs and the humbler workers. The chiefs -will be the executive and administrative functionaries, and will be -safeguarded in the due discharge of their proper functions. The workers -will not attempt to wrest from their chiefs as they do at present the -directive functions which properly belong to the latter (subject, -however, to due control). To each of the lesser functionaries in turn -will be assigned a sphere within which a relative independence would be -his. - -The industry as a whole will be an _organ_ of the _corpus sociale_, and -this its character will be expressed in its government. The workers, -not required to render implicit obedience to rules imposed upon them -by masters and superintendents, will have a voice in the legislation -of the industry, in framing the policy of the industry, in electing -the chiefs, and in this way the development of the will, upon which -I lay the greatest stress, will be attained. The will of the worker, -at present fettered, will be liberated by the opportunity given it to -become enlightened and effectual. - -I am not here describing a scheme which is to be immediately launched -in its completeness. I am illustrating the ethical principle as I see -it as applied to this particular vocation. I am endeavoring to show -how an occupation can be changed into a vocation. The constitutional -government of industries would be an intermediate stage between the -present autocratic form, in which more or less absolute power is vested -in the employer, and that organic constitution of industry which is -ethically desirable. - -Thus far the following plans have been before the minds of social -reformers: - -A. Competition, or life and death struggle. - -B. Modified competition, or raising the plane of competition, as it is -called, that is, doing away with the more ferocious and unscrupulous -methods of competition. - -C. Socialism. - -D. Coöperation. - -I propose to add (E) organization in the ethical sense. The word -“organization” is deplorably misused at present. It is commonly -employed as a synonym for aggregation, which is the very reverse of -organization. Thus “organized labor” really means aggregate labor, -labor acting _en masse_. - -A further remark on the difference between industrial vocationalism as -outlined and Socialism may be of use in clarifying the main idea. The -relative independence of the social sub-organism is the salient point. -This kind of independence is based on the general conception underlying -my entire ethical philosophy, that the ethical quality resides in -uniqueness in distinctiveness, that ethical progress consists in -driving towards individualization in the sense of personalization. -This as opposed to those philosophies of life that see the ethical -quality in uniformity. Socialism is on the side of uniformity. It is -indeed an extreme expression of it. If sometimes it is urged that the -relative independence of the vocational groups might be recognized in -the socialistic state, the answer is that the tendency would be in the -opposite direction. And besides, the all-important question is to what -end the relative independence is to be used. Under socialism it would -be used for the purpose of increasing the quantity of valuable products -at the disposal of the community as a whole. From the ethical point of -view, the independence of the organic group would be used to insure -reciprocal relations, and by means of these the development mentally, -æsthetically and volitionally of _the producers_. The distinction -certainly is clear enough to its members, whichever way the reader may -incline.[78] - - -_The Historical Sciences_ - -I refer now briefly to historical science. The ethical aim of history -and its adjunct sciences is to redeem from oblivion as far as is -possible the past of the human race, its documents, its monuments, -the knowledge of its political adventures, its customs, laws and -institutions, its religious beliefs. In view of the lacunae in our -knowledge a complete revival of the past is impossible. We must -therefore principally seek to understand the ruling ideas that have -governed our ancestors, in the family, in the state, etc. The task of -the historian is to present these ideas as seen in the light of their -consequences, so as to help us revalue them from the point of view of -present experience and insight. The historian will thus enable us to -carry over from the past what is truly valuable, for the business we -have in hand. - -There is just now a strong reaction against the kind of historical -science which deals principally with wars and the actions of princes or -of great leaders. Detailed attention is being given to the more obscure -life of the people. But it must be remembered that mere penetration -into the lower strata of bygone societies, the mere heaping up of facts -concerning mass movements, is as unprofitable as the more picturesque -recitals with which works on history were formerly adorned. The mass -movements and _the ideas_ which gave rise to them should be set clear -as far as possible; but without the evaluation and the revaluation, or -the ethical appraisement, the voluminous knowledge of details is merely -stupefying, and leaves us as much at sea as ever.[79] - -Many men have read many books on history, and filled their minds with -information on subjects like the Protestant Reformation or the French -Revolution, without being in the least wiser themselves, or more fitted -to enlighten others in respect to the religious and ethical problems -which were involved in these great movements, and which still touch us -so closely today. As to the ordinary high school or college student, -what as a rule does he carry away from his study of past “history”? - -FOOTNOTES: - -[78] The vocational group must be independent because the expert -familiar with the conditions under which a service is performed is -specially competent to decide on the improvements required to render -the conditions more favorable to the development of human nature, the -service more adequate. The representatives of the collective community, -that is of the inexpert, outside mass (inexpert in respect to this -particular service) can never perform the same office. - -With regard to the present state of industry the gigantic obstacle in -the way of improvement is obviously the subjection of the man to the -machine. The great hardship which the millions of factory operatives -suffer is not only the insufficient wage, it is the depersonalizing -effect produced by the substitution of the machine for the hand and the -blind subjection of adult workers to the arbitrary will of superiors. -(Compare what I have said on this subject in the chapter on “An Ethical -Programme of Social Reform” in _The World Crisis_.) - -[79] Think of Mommsen, the author of a thousand treatises, whose -knowledge of the facts of Roman history was unsurpassed and probably -unequalled. Yet is his judgment on Cæsar or Cæsarism helpful as an -ethical appraisement? - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE VOCATION OF THE ARTIST: OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF THE RELATION OF ART -TO ETHICS - - -The three great directions of effort are: to work in the finite; to -create in the finite the semblance of the infinite; to realize through -effort the reality of the infinite. The vocation of the artist is to -create the semblance of the spiritual relation between the parts of -an empirical object. The object may be a vase or a lamp; it may be a -human figure, it may be a group of _dramatis personae_. By introducing -into the discussion of art the idea that a semblance of the spiritual -relation is to be produced by the artist, we get rid at the outset of -the barren formula of unity in variety. - -Let me endeavor to elucidate the main ideas that flow from this -definition of the spiritual aim of art. - -1. The two points to be discussed are: What is meant by semblance? and -What is meant by the quasi-spiritual relation as subsisting between the -parts of a work of Art? - -First, then, there is the semblance of _totality_. The spiritual -relation is characterized by the totality of the parts related. That -totality is realized only in the universal manifold. But a semblance of -totality is furnished in the case of colors by the circumstance that -the chromatic scale is cut off at the bottom and top in consequence -of our inability to perceive the colors below and above; the musical -scale likewise presents a quasi-totality, and the human figure in its -contours presents a thing cut off from its surroundings, and in so far -relatively complete in itself. - -Because the spiritual relation involves the idea of the perfect -totality, a relative totality, due to the accidental limitations of our -sensory organs and power of attention, may become a semblance of the -spiritual totality. I say, _may become_. A certain relation must be -established between the parts of the relative totality in order that -the semblance shall result. - -One thing is clear; the subject of the work of art must possess -relative completeness, and be capable of being contemplated as -circumscribed and separated off. It must stand out like a tree, or like -an oasis encircled by the desert, or like an island. The subject of art -cannot be a mere length of cloth cut off from the fabric of things as -they reel unceasingly from the loom of time—the mistake of Realism. - -The point, emphasized in our third Book, namely, that an empirical -substratum is to be spiritualized, and that ethics consists in -spiritualizing this physical and psychical substratum, applies to -art, but with the difference, that in the case of art the physical or -psychical substratum cannot be spiritualized, but is to be made to take -on the semblance of spirituality. - -Now what is meant by this kind of transformation? I can perhaps -explain by using as an illustration the color scheme of a picture. -The transformation appears in the difference between the colors on -the palette and the colors on the canvas. The colors on the palette -represent the empirical substratum, the natural colors; the colors seen -on the canvas show the same natural tints after they have taken on a -new or second nature. - -The second nature,—in what does it consist? In the circumstance that -each color on the canvas, by its juxtaposition and its relation to the -rest, is altered in tone and value, and that all the rest are altered -by it. The spiritual relation is a give and take relation actually -carried out. The semblance produced in art is the illusive appearance -of such a relation as seen by the beholder. - -We have thus set down two points—the apparent totality, and the -apparent give and take relation between the parts (the second nature -assumed by the parts, the illusory transformation of the substratum). - -A third point involved in the second is that each part of a work of -art shall remain invincibly individualized, despite the closeness -of the relation which connects it with the rest. The individual -member of a work of art may never be submerged in the whole, may -never merely convey the abstract idea of unity amid variation. The -“unity in variety” formula is not only empty but misleading, based -on the same misconception which we have noted in dealing with Kant -and with the Pantheists. The unity of a work of art consists in the -reciprocal effect produced by the members on each other. Hence the more -accentuated, the more distinctive the members are, always provided that -the reciprocal relation is maintained, the more artistically satisfying -will be the result. In this manner the work of art will be true to its -essential character as a semblance of the spiritual relation. - -I have thus far spoken of the form. In regard to content I have -only remarked that it must be capable of relative detachment. It -must also be capable of interior articulation. The idea that an -empirical substratum is to be transformed will here be found helpful -in determining what is and what is not a fit subject for art. A vase -or a pitcher is a utensil. As such it is a detached thing. Is it -capable of articulation _without destroying_ its utility? If it is, as -the beautiful vases show, it is a fit subject for art to treat. The -embellishment of utensils, of tables, chairs, etc., that is to say, -the giving of artistic form to objects with which we bodily come into -contact, is a means of casting the appearance of the spiritual relation -over these objects, and thus in a fine sense making them congenial to -ourselves as spiritual personalities. This justifies the time spent by -artist artisans on their handiwork, and also justifies our availing -ourselves of their products (provided that the store set by these -symbolic reminders of the spiritual relation do not divert us from the -main business of life, which is to attempt to _realize_ that relation -in human intercourse). The war song sung by a primitive tribe is a -detachable, empirical thing, and possesses natural articulation. It has -its slow beginning, its gradual rise, its paroxysmic culminations, its -wild ecstasy, its final dying down. - -The love passion expressed in lyric form has for its basis the natural -ups and downs, dejections and transports characteristic of that passion. - -The theme of a tragedy, as Aristotle says, must have a beginning, a -middle, and an end. Repetition (always with a difference), contrast, -apparent triumph, defeat, and somehow a triumph in defeat—whatever -may be the elements with which the tragic poet deals, the crude -substance of them is furnished by the theme itself. And the result -becomes artistic when the articulation is such that each part becomes -a member of an organized whole, that is, when each part exchanges its -first nature for the second nature mentioned above in connection with -painting.[80] - -The next point of interest to consider is whether beauty is to -be regarded as the invariable object of art. Relative detachment -and susceptibility to articulation in the manner described are -indispensable. But if tragedy is to be included, beauty cannot be the -exclusive object. Lear, on the heath, the harpy daughters, Lear and -Cordelia perishing together, are not beautiful objects. The task of -the artist is to produce the semblance of the spiritual relation in -any material which is capable of bearing that imprint. In the great -tragedies we are lifted into an exalted mood by the form of the work -even though the subject treated evokes horror—perhaps because of the -very contrast between the form and the subject-matter. Beauty, on -the other hand, is produced when both subject-matter and form are -satisfying to our needs or aspirations. A vase is beautiful when -perfectly adapted to its use and at the same time perfect in form. For -this reason any kind of embellishment, for instance, in architecture -not structurally in place is offensive, while on the other hand mere -structural utility without the formal touch is mechanical. It is not -true that utility itself inevitably flowers into beauty. - -It should be added, however, that the artistic expression even of -unsatisfied desires may come within the scope of beauty. The “Lycidas” -is beautiful, Wordsworth’s “Laodamia” is beautiful, the Gothic form of -architecture is beautiful, and so is Keats’ “Ode to the Nightingale,” -and Shelley’s “Ode to the West Wind.” In such productions the adequate -expression of the need itself affords relief and induces tranquillity. -The mind ceases to strive toward a beyond longed for, and rests -tranquillized in the longing itself. That it should thus aspire and -long, in consequence of its higher nature, and the assurance of the -existence of this higher nature, as evidenced by the longing, is -peace-giving. - -But it is hardly possible to discuss even in the most cursory manner -the subject matter or content of a work of art without drawing -attention to the ideals which at various times have been expressed in -art, and to the function of art in respect to these ideals. For here -the _grandeur_ of the great art as connected with the ultimate aim and -purpose of life appears. - -Art in its fictions has endeavored to present to men the solution of -the problem of life, the things most worth striving for. The ideals, of -course, have varied. In the Greek epic the heroes contend around the -walls of wind-swept Ilion. They themselves are wind-swept apparitions. -Life is short; presently they too will pass out of sight, yet their -names and deeds will live after them. Fate is inscrutable. There is no -ulterior meaning in things. To glitter for a time in shining armor, and -then to be remembered in the song of the rhapsodists is alone worth -while. It is this ideal of life that Homer records. - -The romantic ideal of feudalism is reflected in the poems of chivalry. -The ideal of the English Renascence is found in Shakespeare. The -religious ideals are expressed in the Hindu temples, in the Parthenon, -in the mediæval cathedrals, and in the poems of Dante and Milton. The -ideals of the oriental monarchs are visibly embodied in the Assyrian -and Babylonian palaces; the ideal of the merchant class in the stones -of Venice, in the architecture of the German and Flemish cities, etc. -The plastic arts especially owe their rise and prosperity to the -princely and religious ideals—to the demand for temples, churches and -palaces suitable for monarchs or merchant princes to dwell and worship -in. The aim of the artificer is to furnish a splendid setting for -princes and divinities. - -Mankind at different periods is in labor to give birth to ideals -representing the purpose for which man exists, or the things that make -life worth while, and art _assists in bringing to the birth these -ideals_. It seeks to express them, and in the effort to do so it helps -to develop and clarify them. This, and not merely to give pleasure, is -its _grand_ function. - -In an age like the present, in which a new ideal is in the early stages -of formation, art is likely to become, as in fact it has become, -uncertain of its function, and hence apt to lose its direction, either -turning back to the servile reproduction of past art forms, or seeking -to achieve progress in the perfection of technical detail, or in the -ways of subjective impressionism.[81] - -The efforts of a serious artist today, in so far as he undertakes to -assist in bringing to the birth a new ideal by his endeavor to express -it, must necessarily be tentative, if not crude. But such as they are -their worth, if wholly sincere, can hardly be overestimated. - -In the vocation of the artist, as everywhere, the three-fold reverence -is the capital point. Reverence for the great masters, as shown not in -slavishly copying them, but in understanding the qualities that made -them great, and in delivering from past art the things that are to be -reincorporated and to live on; reverence for those who in different -fields are intent on the problem of art today—all this to prepare the -way for future artists, for the greater art that is to come. - -The relation of art to ethics, or to the spiritual life, is now -sufficiently clear. In general it is to produce the semblance of the -spiritual relation, and thereby to rejuvenate the world’s workers, to -give them the joy of relative perfection, and thus to stimulate them to -persevere in the real business of life, which is to approximate toward -actual perfection. The specific task of the artist _at its height_ -is to enshrine in his creation the ideals of the age with respect to -the ultimate purpose of human existence, and in the endeavor so to -incorporate them as to assist in defining them. - -The dangers of pre-occupation with art, however, must not be passed -over. Just because it creates the illusion of perfection it is apt to -encourage the indolence of our nature, which ever prefers to content -itself with illusion, and to desist from effort. It is on this account -that periods in which art greatly flourishes are apt to lead to the -halting of progress and eventually to decay. A second danger is that -the artist, in applying the ideal of present perfection, is in danger -of selfishly subordinating other persons to himself (cf. Goethe as -a notable example), or of setting up a special kind of morality for -artists.[82] - -In a full account of the matter, the different so-called fine arts -should be specifically treated from the point of view of this chapter. -The particular contribution of each to the general purpose of art -should be noted, the distinctions marked between painting, sculpture, -poetry, etc., and in each case the kind of art which is favorable to -the spiritual development of man be discriminated from that which is -hostile to it. Plato attempted to do this in the case of music. - -To summarize: What has been attempted in this chapter is a theory -not of art but of the relation of art to ethics. The dominating -thought is this: in a work of art each line, color, sound, word, -must be irreplaceable, and on that account convincing. Each member -must be indispensable in its place and the connection with the rest -inevitable. Substitute for line, color, sound, etc., a life—an ethical -being,—conceive the members to be not a few but in number infinite, and -you have the spiritual ideal, which is the reality whereof the art work -is a semblance. This is the relation of art to ethics—the quality which -we call in art “convincing,” in ethics we call “worth.” - - -NOTES - - As one example architecture may be mentioned. Architecture furnishes - _the envelope for the social life_, the dwelling, the nest of the - family, the workshops that house the vocational life, the public - buildings that provide a habitation for the political life, the - temples, the churches that enshrine the religious life. The relation - of the enshrining dwelling to the inner social life should be the - same as that of the body to the soul in sculpture. That which goes on - within should be significantly indicated externally. The progress - of architecture will depend on its holding fast to this idea, and - changing the outside as the inner life changes. Thus, we have, or - are beginning to have, a conception of the family very different - from that which prevailed at the time when the princely mansions of - the Renaissance were built. To reproduce these princely mansions - because they beautifully expressed the princely idea is a mistake. To - provide a proper dwelling-place for the modern family the architect - should clearly apprehend what functions go on in the family, what the - distribution of functions should be, and the rank to be assigned to - the different functions. There is to be, for instance, in addition - to the ordinary requirements, provision for separate study rooms, - places of retirement, refuges of intellectual solitude for the adult - members; a playroom for children, a place of reunion for the household - religion. The formation of a number of families into a larger group - (_vid. supra_) would help in the solution of this problem. - - In like manner the conception of what a religious society should be is - changing. The church-building, the Mosque, the Synagogue, certainly - no longer declare the spirit and the purpose that animate the new - religious fellowships that are forming among us today. The progress of - architecture will thus depend, not on the out of hand invention of new - styles, but on a thorough understanding of _the new kind of life which - is to be domiciled within buildings_, accepting this as the empirical - substratum, and articulating it in accordance with the spiritual - relation of give and take between the parts; and the architect will - assist in clarifying the ideal of the new kind of life that is to - be lived within the buildings by endeavoring to give it outward - expression. - - One more remark: The limitations opposed to the artist, for instance - to the sculptor, by the material in which he works, are a helpful - illustration of one of the most important ethical truths. The material - is found to be intractable to the idea. The hardness of the stone, - the veins that run through the marble, the unpropitious qualities of - the wood, are so many hindrances to execution. The value of these - hindrances is that they compel the artist to achieve a more definite - grasp of the ideal itself. Before the attempt to carry it out into - stone, the idea is apt to be vague in the mind of the artist. The same - is true of every ideal conception—that of the author before he writes - a book, that of the social reformer before he attempts to carry his - scheme into practice. And it applies no less to the ethical ideal of - life in general. The empirical analogue or substratum is ductile to a - certain degree, else we could never achieve even partial success. But - it is also hostile and mutinous in many ways, and the fact that it is - so compels us to adapt our ideal to existing empirical requirements, - and to make it more explicit in the process of adapting it. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[80] Aristotle regards the _Œdipus Rex_ as the most perfect example -of tragedy; let it serve the purpose of illustrating the idea here -proposed. Read the play and get the total impression of it. Analyze it -into its parts. Synthesize after the analysis. You will not fail to -realize how every character, every speech and act, contributes to the -total effect, and how in turn every single factor in the play receives -a new significance from its relation to the rest, while still retaining -its obvious meaning (the meaning it would have when taken out of the -context of the play). Take the first speech of Œdipus as an example. -He is the king solicitous for the welfare of his subjects, to whom -they look up with admiration and gratitude. He is the father of his -people. Read this speech again after you have taken in the entire play, -and note how its color is changed. How the firmness, the fatherly, -protective attitude is now seen to be the outward mask of a fugitive -soul, unsure of itself, haunted by hideous fears. - -[81] The use made of pageantry, the revival of English and other -folk-songs, the morris-dances and the like, the attempt to ennoble the -leisure of the industrial workers by leading them back to forms of art -which sprang up centuries ago in foreign countries, is evidence of the -keen desire for art rather than a step in a new direction. - -[82] Art, like science, is to be subordinate. The relation between -persons and persons is mankind’s supreme concern. The views above -expressed differ radically from those of Schiller. See his _Æsthetic -Education of Man_. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -EDUCATIONAL VOCATIONS, OR VOCATIONS CONNECTED WITH THE STATE - - -Every vocation on its ethical side is educational. The reason for -accentuating the educational aspect of the vocations connected with the -state is that this educational significance is generally overlooked. -The vocations referred to are those of the lawyer, the judge, the -statesman, the teacher in the narrower sense of the word (the teacher -in schools and universities). - - -_The Vocation of the Lawyer_ - -Vocation, as I use the term, invariably means related to the spiritual -end of life. A profession or occupation becomes a vocation when he -who follows it seeks to respond to the _call_ of the latent spiritual -possibilities in his fellowmen. If this be not the common definition -of calling or vocation, yet I think it will bear scrutiny. It is the -vocation of the lawyer to be the _teacher of justice_ to his clients,—I -mean of justice in so far as it is already embodied in law,—and at the -same time to promote a desire for and a preliminary understanding of -the justice which is not yet embodied in law. - -The lawyer is commonly regarded as the learned _alter ego_ of his -client. The lawyer is the client as he would be if he were versed -in the law, and skilled to employ it in his interest. The client is -supposed to be an egotist, intent solely on securing his advantage -to the fullest extent possible under the existing system of social -regulations. The lawyer is his expert substitute. The judge appears on -the scene as the impartial representative of the law. - -From the vocational point of view the lawyer is an assistant to the -judge, the agent not so much of his client as of justice. He is as much -interested in the just issue of the suit as is his legal opponent. His -educational function is to teach his client to take the same point -of view. Another point, no less important, is the following: Law is -a system of general rules, at best a rude social mechanics. And even -as such it is constantly deflected from its ostensible purpose by -selfishness and prejudice. The discriminations against women, the -conspiracy laws against combinations of laborers, the laws enacted in -the interests of landed aristocracies, are ample evidence in point. -In every country the law as it stands is still largely infected with -unfair discriminations, and it is the special duty of those who follow -the legal vocation to open the eyes of their clients and of the public -to these defects and to suggest remedies. - -Every vocation has its special vice, that is, a kind of behavior -the very opposite of that prescribed by the particular ethical -function with which it is charged. The vice of the lawyer is -_blind_ conservatism (unless he is at the same time progressive and -conservative he fails to fulfil his ethical function). - -The judge, too, is a teacher, especially in criminal cases. The -voice of the judge, when he pronounces sentence on a criminal, should -reverberate throughout the whole of society, awakening all men to the -fact that society as such shares the guilt. - - -_The Vocation of the Statesman_ - -What I have to say on this subject will find its proper setting in the -next chapter. In general, it is the vocation of the statesman to teach -the citizens a sublime conception of the state. He is neither to be the -obedient tool of the mass—the docile “public servant” in that sense—nor -yet to impose his arbitrary will upon the people, consulting only his -own genius. The one type is seen in the average American politician, -who is or affects to be a mere instrument executing the public will; -the other type is exemplified by the supermen statesmen of ancient and -modern times. The ethically-minded statesman is to evoke the spiritual -conception of the State in the minds of his constituents, and in the -process of doing so to become more essentially a citizen himself. - - -_The Vocation of the Educator_ - -It was unavoidable to discuss the vocations and their aims before -considering the school, college and university; for these institutions -are orientated towards the vocations, are preparatory to the latter, -and the true aim of school and university cannot possibly be defined -unless the vocational outlook be first distinctly spread before our -eyes. - -In dealing with the vocation of the teacher, I shall necessarily be -led to define the purpose of the social institution in which he labors -and I shall for the sake of brevity use the word school to designate -the social organs of education, which cover the period of childhood, -adolescence and the beginning of manhood and womanhood. - -The school is like the hundred-gated Thebes. It leads out into a -hundred vocational avenues. But note the following: its aim is far -greater than merely to prepare the student for that future vocation to -which he is best suited. It should no less supply the incentive for -creating new vocations, and for changing what are at present still -occupations into vocations. The school searches out the individuality -of its pupils. It undertakes to differentiate and to personalize -individualities. But when it has done its part, it sends the pupils -into a world where little account is taken of the finer differences -of aptitude, where occupations predominate and vocations are few, and -where most things, ethically speaking, are still in the rough. The -school cannot indeed transform society by merely raising its indignant -voice and asking society to pay heed to the finer things which it has -fostered, and which often are subsequently crushed. But it can at least -contribute to the vocational evolution of society by reiterating its -unsatisfied demands. - -Taking the three-fold reverence for my guide, I lay it down in the -first place that the school is an organ of tradition. True conservatism -has its place in the school. In it are preserved the knowledges -and the skills of the past. The heir of today comes to his own by -appropriating the products of past thinking and past labor, and the -school superintends the process of appropriation and assimilation. At -the same time it sifts in tradition what is clean from what is unclean, -what is true from what is false, what is usable from what is dead. -Reverence is shown in this very sifting process. To revere the past is -to make the past live again; but only what is vital can go on living. - -The teaching should be reverential in spirit. The business spirit, -the drive towards mere efficiency, cannot in the long run satisfy. -Efficiency as commonly understood has in view the utilities of the -moment. It merely exploits the past for the sake of present interests, -and as a rule is unmindful of the future. Industrial efficiency, -in particular, reverses the right ethical relation between work -and personality; instead of work being so contrived as to liberate -personality, it is mechanized so as to sacrifice personality. - -The teacher should be reverent towards the great masters of his own -craft, his own art. No one is reverenced by others who does not himself -habitually revere someone. The teachers should be acquainted at first -hand with the master educators, such as Plato, Comenius, Pestalozzi and -the others. - -I pass on to speak of the second type of reverence. This involves -cordial reciprocally stimulating relations between the members of the -teaching staff. It is generally agreed that no other factor counts for -more in shaping the character of the young than personal influence. The -best personal influence, however, is not unilateral, like that which -radiates from a single teacher upon his class. The best is that which -proceeds from cross-relations between a number of teachers. Just as in -the home it is not the father singly, nor the mother singly, but the -reciprocal relations between the two that touch child life to finer -issues and create a spiritual atmosphere in the learner, so also in -the school the best spirit is created by the relations of reciprocal -furtherance between the teachers, each doing his work in such a way as -to make easier and more successful the work of his colleagues, with a -strong sense of partnership in the common work of man-building. - -The teachers as an organized body should also relate themselves to an -organized body of parents. Home and school should not merely coöperate -but interpenetrate. The interests and efforts of both are centered on -the same young lives. The home is supremely concerned in what goes on -in the school, and the school in the kind of influence that prevails in -the home. An organized conference of parents is in a position to render -signal service to a school by appraising its ideals, by keeping tally -on the extent to which acknowledged standards are carried out, and by -joining in the unceasing endeavor to advance the standards. Schools -must be backed by the interest and appreciation of the community. -Parents whose children are pupils of a school are for that particular -school the best representatives of the community. - -The school is to prepare its charges, not only for vocational life, but -for citizenship. Teachers must be good citizens. They cannot give what -they do not possess. They must keep in living contact with the civic -and social movements of the time. - -The first and second types are instrumental to the third. Now here, -if anywhere, a new departure in educational philosophy is called -for. For when we discuss this third kind of reverence, the question -of all questions is raised: To what end do we educate? What is to be -the aim and outcome of all our effort? And our answer to this question -will depend on our philosophy, and if our philosophy is ethical our -answer must be distinctively ethical. Froebel was a pantheist, and his -pantheism colored his conception of the educational end. Pestalozzi was -an eighteenth century humanitarian. Many modern writers on education -are biological evolutionists. Others even expressly disclaim any -general outlook, and appear to be exclusively interested in perfecting -the technique of schoolmastering. Reverence of the third type is -reverence for the undeveloped human being,—for the new generation, -for our successors. What is it that we are to revere in a child? Its -spiritual possibilities, its latent personality. To bring to birth its -personality is the supreme educational end. We show our reverence for -the child in the effort to personalize it. Let us consider in brief -some of the practical consequences of this idea. - -To personalize the individual the first step is to discover the -empirical substratum in his nature. There is ever an empirical -substratum subject to ethical transformations. The empirical substratum -of personality is individuality! Individuality manifests itself in a -leading interest of some kind, a predominant bias which indicates the -thing which the individual is fit to be and do. To discover the bent or -bias is the first step, and the difficulties in the way of taking even -this first step are admittedly great. Children and even adolescents -often show no marked intellectual preferences whatever. Many adults -too appear to be neutral so far as their mental life is concerned. -Circumstances ran them perhaps into a certain mould—they might have -been run into some other just as well. It is the task of the educator -to discover the predominant interest where it exists, and to try to -produce such an interest where it does not. What nature has not done in -such cases art must attempt. - -When the leading interest is found it should next be made the means -of creating interest in subjects to which the pupil is naturally -indifferent or even averse. I have illustrated the process here implied -in a paper on the prevocational art school which is connected with -the Ethical Culture School. Young persons devoted to art are often -unwilling to take up subjects which seem to them unrelated to what -they really care for, like science and history. They are obsessed by a -single passionate ambition. They are all eagerness to become artists—to -draw, paint, model, etc. Time spent on any other subject seems to them -misspent. If indulged in this one-sided activity, the chances are -that they will not even become competent artists. In any case they -will lack breadth and vision. They will lack a cultural background. -They will be inferior as human beings. They will not be personalized. -For personality, on its mental as well as on its social side, depends -on relatedness,—depends not so much on what one does, as on the -interrelation between what one does and what other people do. - -In order to expand the interest of the young art student, the method -employed in the school just mentioned is to present those subjects -which appear to be alien in such a way as to bring out the art aspects -of them, the contact points between them and art. Thus in history -special prominence is given to the age of Pericles, the age of -Rembrandt. In science special attention is paid to the theory of color, -the chemistry of etching. And all other branches of knowledge are -treated similarly. The aim is not indeed to exploit the other subjects -in the interest of art, but so to utilize the artistic interest as to -lead the mind out to a larger comprehensive interest in other related -branches on their own account. Or rather, to put my thought precisely, -and thus to connect it with the underlying ethical theory, the aim is -to prepare the future artist for the give and take relation between his -own pursuit and the activities of men in other vocations. He should be -helped to enrich his own life as an artist by drawing upon all that the -sciences and the humanities can give him, with a view to eventually -returning with interest the profit he has derived. What the artist can -do for the scientist, the religious teacher, etc., I have indicated in -the previous chapter. - -Precisely the same cultural idea should be worked out in prevocational -schools of commerce, of technology, of science, etc. In each case the -paramount interest should be the starting-point, the center from which -lines of interest are to be made to radiate out into the correlated -branches. - -If this ethical idea is carried out the whole educational system -will be remodeled. The cæsura in education will then fall about the -sixteenth year. Before that the task will be to lay the general -foundations and to reconnoiter the individuality of the pupil. After -that there will be a system of _prevocational schools_. The college, a -legacy which has come to us from a type of society unlike our own, will -disappear, and the university will become an organism of vocational -schools succeeding the prevocational.[83] - -I mentioned at the end of Book I the problem of specialization, the -increased necessity of restricting oneself to a limited field in -order to achieve anything like the consciousness of mastery, and the -inevitable fractionalizing of men which is the consequence of this very -tendency toward specialization. In the idea of outreaching radiations -of interest and of the give and take relation there is the promise of -liberation from the narrowness of specialism without the calamity of -dilettantism. That this idea cannot be fully realized, that no one -can actually extend his web of interest so far, that his reactions -at best will be feeble, is perhaps a palmary instance of that law of -frustration which fatally besets all human effort. But the effort will -be in the right direction, and the effort counts. - - -_The University_ - -In sketching the ethical or spiritual side of the University, initial -stress is to be laid on the meaning of the word _universitas_. The term -as at present used hardly suggests more than all-inclusiveness. A -modern university is an institution in which all the different schools, -the school of engineering, the school of science, the school of -philosophy, etc., _exist side by side_, under a single governing body, -and in which the various branches of knowledge are pursued without any -visible systematic connection between them! The spiritual ideal of a -university is that of system, of organic connection, for this is what -spiritual means. - -In looking back on the history of the higher institutions of learning -one cannot but be struck by the close correspondence of those -institutions to the general ideals of life of the people among whom -they flourished. I call to mind the Hindu education with its Brahmanic -background; the Mandarin education, with Confucianism as its inspiring -principle; the musical education of the Greeks; the theological -education of Jews and Mohammedans; then among the Western nations, the -English university a seminary for training rulers of the Empire; the -German university, a training institution for the higher bureaucracy; -the French university, visibly reflecting the logical tendency of the -French mind. - -We in America, instructed by the survey of the past, are bound to face -the question: In what way shall the American university differ from -universities elsewhere? What characteristic shape shall the American -university take on? _How can the American university correspond to -the American ideal of life?_ At present our notions in this respect -are in a formative, not to say in a chaotic, condition. The college -still survives—an institution designed for the education of gentlemen. -Practical tendencies, looking toward materialistic success, prevail -in many of our Western universities. The German research idea has come -in as a third factor, penetrating deeply in some of our institutions, -less deeply in others, but inharmonious everywhere with the rival -conceptions that still persist. - -The principal circumstance that retards our university development -doubtless is that the ideal of American life itself, which the -university is to express and to promote, is as yet undefined in the -minds of the American people. But without presuming to anticipate what -must be the outcome of gradual and prolonged growth, it may still be -serviceable to clear our minds as to the goal towards which we desire -that the development shall tend. The fundamental ideal of the American -people is that of freedom! The notion of freedom is crude as yet, but -is capable of being ennobled and refined. To be free is to express -power. To be free in the highest sense is to express the highest kind -of power. The highest kind is that which is exercised in such wise as -to elicit unlike yet cognate power in others. A people is to be called -free when all the different social or vocational groups of which it is -the integrated whole spontaneously react upon one another, and when in -each group each member of it realizes some mental gift of his own. A -free people is not one which is merely released from the authority of -autocrats. That is only a condition of freedom, not freedom itself. A -free people is not one in which strong individuals are permitted to -thrive parasitically at the expense of the weak. Nor yet one in which -merely equal opportunity is afforded to all in the race for material -well-being. A free people is one in which the essential energies of -all effectuate themselves unhindered, the life of each swelling the -surrounding tide of life, and being enriched in turn by the returning -tide. This to my mind is liberty,—the liberation of what is best in -each. This is freedom,—the free flow of life into life. The ideal -American University is one which expresses and promotes this ideal of -freedom. - -A university is a group of vocational schools. A truly democratic -university is an organic system of vocational schools, one which in -the relations that subsist between its schools affords a shining, -stimulating example of the kind of relations that ought to subsist -between the vocational groups in the state. - -The aim of an American university should be to furnish leaders for -all the various groups who will undertake the great business of truly -organizing democracy. - - -_Education for Adults_ - -Education should be continuous through life. The University Extension -movement is endeavoring to meet this demand. It has already to its -credit a considerable extension of knowledge, as well as the stirring -up of interest in things of the mind among those whom it reaches. But -far greater tasks than it has yet attacked remain. The academic method -is not suited to the instruction of adults. A method will have to be -worked out for teaching a subject to mature minds different from that -which is appropriate in introducing the subject to the relatively -immature minds of students. The student who has not yet entered -vocational life needs to be put in possession of the principles by -which he can lay hold of life. A mature person who is deficient in -theoretical education needs to be helped to interpret his vocational -experience in such a manner as to find his way back to the principles. -In the one case there is the outlook and the emptiness; in the other -case the fullness of content without the comprehensive outlook. - -Secondly, the stages of vocational development through which the -worker has already passed in his vocation are to be borne in mind, and -the teaching adapted to the different stages. I have suggested four -divisions: that of apprenticeship, that of initial mastery, that of -more complete mastery, and the emeritus stage.[84] - -Thirdly, it is getting to be increasingly difficult for a specialist in -any one branch to keep abreast of the progress made in other branches. -Popularization of the ordinary kind does not satisfy. It means, as a -rule, diluting the subject-matter, not truly simplifying it. Provision -should be made, in any large and generous scheme of public education, -for enabling ripe minds to assimilate the ripest fruits produced by -contemporary thinkers and writers who work in other fields. - - - NOTE - - - A few outstanding points in regard to what is called Moral Education - may be added to this chapter. - - There should be ethical teaching in the universities. The kinds of - ethics taught should be adapted to the university period of life, - emphasis being put on the experiences of the student at that time of - life,—on friendship, the sex relation, the vocational outlook, etc. be - included in the programme for the education of adults. - - Systematic moral education in schools and high schools is advisable. - It is frequently criticised on the ground that it is apt to be - schematic and unreal. Moral counsels given as the occasion arises - are believed to be more effective. They hit the nail on the head and - drive it home. The reply to this is that incidental moral advice - and exhortation is not excluded, but that it by no means adequately - answers the purpose. The occasions for giving the necessary guidance - simply do not arise. This kind of moral teaching is apt to be patchy. - In the next place, ethical instruction, when rightly planned, has - two objects: the one to bring into clear relief the life axioms that - underlie the entire home and school experience of the pupil, and - secondly, to give to the pupil a provisional chart and compass or - ethical outlook upon his future life. Ethical teaching conceived of - and conducted in this manner is neither schematic nor artificial. It - does not drive home a nail here and there, it constructs a mental - house in which the mind of the pupil can be at home,—with windows in - it, looking out upon a large landscape outside. - - The capital significance of right relations, ethical relations, - between the members of the teaching staff has been noted in the text. - In every school clubs should be formed consisting of pupils specially - interested in any one subject and of the special teachers of that - subject:—or if not formal clubs, then at least more intimate personal - relations should exist between the special teacher and those selected - pupils, the object being through personal intercourse to introduce - the young aspirant to a knowledge of the problems on which the older - person is intent. There is nothing nearly so educative for the young - as to be taken into the counsels of their elders. - - The more gifted pupils of the school should be invited to take a - personal interest in helping the more backward students. In every - school, high school and university there are social misfits,—shy, - sensitive, solitary youths who fail to come into easy touch with their - fellows, and suffer acutely. They are objects of the most delicate, - deferential charity, and the task of bringing them into fellowship - offers one of the finest opportunities for ethical education. - - A vital system of self-government is to be used as a means of - placing real responsibility upon the students under due advice. To - exercise responsibility is to acquire character. Self-government is - particularly important so far as it relates to the administration of - justice in a school. Cases of discipline should be used as means to - create the right conception of punishment, the right attitude towards - those who have erred. - - The relation between the adolescent boy and girl and the parents is - of prime significance as illustrating in a way that young persons - can understand the general conception of the ethical relation as - _reciprocal_. The youth should be shown that he can be not only the - recipient but a giver of benefits, that he can be a real help to his - parents, chiefly by sympathetically entering into the problems and - difficulties with which they have to contend. The parents, instead - of being regarded by the young as an earthly providence, existing - only for the purpose of bestowing benefits, should be seen in their - true light as struggling, and often heavily burdened human beings. - At the same time the young son or daughter will in this way gain an - invaluable preparation for comprehending the difficulties under which - the effort to live must be carried on. - - In regard to patriotism, it is important that the errors and mistakes - committed by one’s nation in the past should not be overlooked or - minimized. - - The school should furnish to the students various outlets for social - service such as they in their period of life are capable of rendering. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[83] Compare with the spiritual conception of culture here outlined -Matthew Arnold’s “knowing the best which has been thought and said”; -and a recent definition of culture by an eminent American as “the -knowing one thing well and a little of everything else,” without -correlation of the little one knows of everything else with the one -thing one is supposed to know extremely well. - -[84] See the chapter on “Ethical Development Extending Through Life” in -_The World Crisis_. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -THE STATE - - -The leading theories of the state should be kept in view for comparison -with the ethical theory here set forth—the theories of Aristotle -and Plato, St. Augustine and the mediæval schoolmen, Rousseau’s -contract theory, and the German conceptions of the state propounded by -Kant, Fichte, Hegel. Moreover, since the ideas actually embodied in -governments, in the Persian monarchy, for instance, in the Greek City -State, Venice, etc., are not identical with the constructions of the -philosophers, the leading facts of the history of politics should be -borne in mind as well as the leading theories. - -The state has two aspects: (1) It is the balance wheel of the -vocational groups included within it. (2) It is the political -expression of the national character, and its ethical purpose is to -develop this empirical national character into a spiritual character. I -shall speak of the first aspect in this chapter. - -1. The state exists in order to furnish increasingly from age to age -the conditions under which the reactions between the groups described -above can take place effectually. In concentrating attention upon the -vocational groups as the entities to be harmonized with one another, -account is taken by implication of the family and of the individual. -The sub-organisms are embraced within the superior organisms. A -more general statement would be that the state supplies the external -conditions required for development towards ethical personality by -those who pass through the institutions of the family, of the vocation, -etc. - -The state possesses a spiritual character in so far as it supplies -these conditions, and in as much as it has a spiritual character it -is not merely justified but ethically required to use force. Force is -spiritualized when employed to establish the conditions indispensable -to spiritual life. The conditions enforced must be such as in the -opinion of the preponderant number of citizens indisputably make -for the development of personality. Examples of such conditions are -protection of life, property, reputation, compulsory education, the -maintenance of the monogamic family, protection against foreign -invasion, etc. All the functions of the state commonly enumerated -follow from the ethical principle. But over and above the recognized -ones, new and nobler functions of the state will appear. - -The redeeming thought with respect to the use of force by the state -consists in regarding _force as ethical discipline_, and in making the -extent to which it is favorable to spiritual freedom the measure and -test of its rightful use.[85] When men are compelled to spend the major -part of their time in the protection of bare life, as was the case, -for instance, in the early days of feudalism, they are to that extent -unfree. Freedom consists in energizing the highest and most distinctive -human faculties. - -_The development of the state_ should proceed in two directions. It -should withdraw from many functions exercised by it in the past, -notably from such as properly belong to the sub-organisms. At the -same time, it should lay its coercive hands upon new matters, -imposing new limitations on capricious freedom in the interest of -spiritual freedom, as soon as the pertinency of such limitations -to the ethical end becomes clear. For instance, the state may, and -doubtless will, interfere with marriage to a far greater extent -than it has yet done. It will forbid the marriage of the unsound. -If a study of character-types should ever become advanced enough—a -hazardous conjecture—to make it predictable that the union of certain -character-types will lead to infelicitous marriage, the state will be -justified in prohibiting such unions. - -_Law_, ideally defined, is the sum total of conditions, capable of -being enforced, which are necessary or favorable to the development -of personality. The purpose of law is two-fold: to maintain the more -developed members of society at the level they have reached, and, by -educative penalties, to bring the backward up to the same level. In -the article on “Force and Freedom” referred to above, law is compared -to such bodily actions as walking, which at first are superintended by -consciousness, and then become automatic, thereby setting consciousness -free to attend to new and more important business. Similarly, law is -designed to render the conditions favorable to personality so explicit -that their observance shall become automatic, and that mankind shall be -at liberty to discover new and more significant conditions which in -their turn are again to become automatic. - -Because of the lack of the ethical point of view, the exercise of force -by the state has seemed purely arbitrary, and has given rise to a -perverted and disastrous conception of _sovereignty_. The sovereignty -of the state has two aspects: the one internal, the other external. -Sovereignty means supremacy. The state is sovereign, within limits, -however, with respect to its citizens. The state is also sovereign, -within limits, however, with respect to other outside states. - -With respect to the internal aspect of sovereignty some writers hold -that citizens have no rights as against the state—only rights accorded -by the state. But this from the ethical point of view is a wholly -untenable position. There are rights of the individual, rights of -the family, rights of the vocational group, which the state does not -create but is bound to acknowledge and which its power cannot properly -infringe. As against the state the individual has, for instance, the -right which is commonly designated as “the freedom of conscience.” The -family has rights against the state; the law cannot interfere with -the intimacies of the marriage and parental relations. The vocational -group likewise is only partially subject to public reglementation. I -have defined law as the sum total of the conditions. The state can -prescribe the conditions, but cannot trace the ways of freedom within -the conditions. The state prescribes the enforceable conditions; it has -no concern with unenforceable inner processes. - -It thus appears that sovereignty or supremacy is an attribute not -peculiar to the state, although it looms up larger and more impressive -when exercised by the state. Supremacy belongs to the individual in -his private sphere, to the family in its proper province, to the -vocation, etc. Sovereignty or supremacy belongs to each of the social -institutions within its precincts, in so far as the supremacy within -that precinct is requisite for the accomplishment of the ethical end -to be therein attained. But sovereignty is not absolute in any sphere; -neither in that of the individual, nor of the family, nor yet of the -state. _The absolute conception of sovereignty is the result of the -lack of an ethical conception of the social institutions._ The state is -sovereign only so far as the exercise of its supremacy is necessary to -the spiritual end of citizenship. On this account and for this purpose -it may rightfully constrain the sub-organisms within it, and may also -pronounce its _noli me tangere_ as against the larger group of states -encompassing it. But so far as the spiritual ends to be achieved in -the international relations are concerned, the state with respect to -these is subject to international sovereignty,—a new conception which -mankind is striving to bring to the birth today. The false notion of -state sovereignty as arbitrary and absolute, is admittedly today a -chief stumbling-block in the way of the formation of an international -organization of peoples. - - -_The System of Representation Which Is Required to Give Expression to -the Organic Idea of the State._ - -The ethical aim of political reformation and reconstruction may be -put in a single word, Organization. _The state and especially the -democratic state must be organized._[86] This means practically that -the basis of representation shall be the vocational group, that -vocational representation shall replace representation by geographical -districts.[87] The law-making body on this basis will consist of -representatives or delegates of the agricultural, the commercial, the -industrial, the scientific group, etc. Women belonging to these groups -will exercise the franchise within them. There will also be a distinct -group of home-makers; motherhood will be recognized as a vocation. - -Attention may be called to certain practical advantages of the -proposed rearrangement of the representative system. It will tend to -bring forward in political life the best citizens, instead of the -mediocre or the base. This is likely to come about because there is no -distinction that men more ardently covet than that of being considered -_primus inter pares_; as, for instance, the first or one of the first -of the city’s merchants, or one of the most eminent scientists, or an -artist whom his fellow-artists select as the fittest to represent them -in the great council of city, state, or nation. And if only this much -can be gained by the new representative system, that the law-making -body shall consist of the most experienced, the most enlightened, the -wisest, the actual leaders in the various walks of life, in brief, -that the elected shall be the elect, certainly one of the principal -evils with which individualistic democracy is afflicted will tend to be -removed. - -But other advantages will accrue. This, in particular, that the -constituencies, instead of merely delegating their powers, will -share in the business of law-making, will be in vital touch with -their leaders or representatives, while the latter conversely will -politically educate the constituencies. The mode of procedure under the -system here sketched will be somewhat as follows: - -Take, as an illustration, the group of industrial laborers. They will -first meet in a primary assembly, and discuss measures deemed by them -important in the interests of their group. The leader who represents -them in the legislature will take part in the initial discussions, and -exercise no doubt a strong influence in bringing matter finally to a -head. He will then carry into the law-making body,—which consists of -representatives of the various social groups,—the sifted-out demands -of the laborers, the measures which they desire to have enacted into -law. He will bring forward these measures in the legislature. But -there objections are likely to be raised. The representatives of the -other groups will discover what the laborers naturally failed to -note, that the proposed law or laws, if enacted, will have certain -injurious effects on the interests of the other groups. The sifting-out -process, therefore, will now begin anew and be carried on on a higher -level in the legislature. The representatives of all the various -groups will separate the wheat from the chaff in what is proposed -by any one group. The next stop will be that the representative of -the laborers, returning to his constituency, will communicate to -them the difficulties that were raised, the decisions reached, and -will thus impart to them the wider vision which he himself gained -in the discussions of the law-making body. In this way he will be -the instructor, the political teacher of his constituents. And the -principle by which the value of any new measure will finally be judged -will be simply this: that the supposed interests of one group cannot be -its true interests unless they are found to promote the interests of -all the other vocational groups.[88] - -The law-making body should be a council of the groups. It should not be -a “Parliament,” or “talking body,” but a sifting body. Nor yet a body -of mandatories commissioned to merely give effect to a public opinion -or a public sentiment already existing. In fact, public opinion or -public sentiment in the raw is apt to be a poor index of what is really -for the public good. Public opinion is apt to be unripe, haphazard, -impulsive rather than reflective. Besides, it is often contaminated -at its very source, the facts on which the public depend for their -opinions being deliberately falsified or placed in false perspective; -while the opinions furnished in newspaper editorials are almost -inevitably biased. Only on great occasions, when simple moral issues -are presented, can the common sense and moral sense of the people be -wholly depended on. But such occasions are episodical; and the orderly -business of government cannot be carried on by spurts. Government by -public opinion may be and in some respects is better indeed than class -government; in other important respects it is worse. A class at the -head of the state at least as a rule knows what it wants, and proceeds -methodically to carry out its purposes. Public opinion, on the other -hand, like all opinion, is unsure, unsafe, as Plato has long since -made dialectically clear. And public sentiment, like all sentiment, is -fluctuating. To build the state on public opinion and public sentiment, -as many of our writers on politics would have us do, is after all a -good deal like building a house on sand.[89] - -Instead of “public opinion” and “public sentiment” let us say public -reason and public will!—reason and will to discover in conjunction -what the public good really is. For what it really is no one as yet -knows. The “public good” is a problem to be approximately solved. The -public good will be consummated when the conditions are furnished -necessary and favorable to the development of personality in each of -the constituent groups of the social body. To study these conditions is -the office of the law-making body, and therefore that body must be so -constituted as to include these groups in their capacity as groups. - -Another advantage to be expected from vocational representation is that -the different interests of society,—I stress the fact that they are -different, and often temporarily conflicting,—will be compelled under -this plan to come out into the open. An industry, for instance, may -require the assistance of a protective tariff, in its infant stages, -and the agricultural group may rightly be asked to make the necessary -sacrifices. - -In the long run there will be compensation. The agriculturists will -eventually benefit by the diversification of the national life. -But “in the long run” means that the next generation will benefit, -not the present agriculturists, a distinction sometimes somewhat -cavalierly ignored. The present generation will be called upon to make -a sacrifice, precisely as in the family some of the members may have -to sacrifice a part of their income to provide for a weaker member. -But the circumstance that the sacrifice is recognized as a sacrifice -will serve to put an end to the protection when the special need for it -has ceased. Under the present system, on the other hand, the state is -supposed to have no concern with the special interests of any group. -All the same, there are the special interests, and in consequence -that which is for the interest of one group has to be advocated as -if it were for the general interest of the entire community. And -since general interest is easily mistaken for perpetual interest, the -protection is apt to be continued long after its particular usefulness -has ceased.[90] - -I am earnestly concerned that vocational representation shall not -be regarded as a mere device in the mechanism of politics, like the -substitution of the long for the short ballot, or the initiative -and referendum. Innovations of the latter kind leave the prevalent -conception of democracy untouched, they are merely intended to improve -the machinery by which that conception is to be worked out in practice; -they are mechanical contrivances, not fundamental reconstructions. -Vocational representation, in my view of it, is the appropriate -expression of the organic idea of the state. The state is the soul. The -soul must have a body. Vocational representation is that body. - -Two remarks may here be added. One relates to a question which has -given rise to considerable discussion, namely, the question where -the state resides? In a monarchy it seems to reside visibly in the -person of the king. Louis XIV is said to have declared “I am the -state.” But where does it reside in a democracy? The chief executive, -the law-making body, and even the constituencies, are organs of the -state. But where does the state itself have its habitation? The state -has no separate domicile. So far as it truly exists at all it exists -in the minds of the individuals who truly conceive of it. The object -of political life is to educate the citizen so that he may more and -more truly conceive of the state, so that he may give birth to the -state idea within himself. To do this is to pass through one of -the necessary phases on the road to personality. In the family the -individual is in reactive relations with a few, in the vocation with -a larger number. In the state or nation he may be one of a hundred -millions or more. Yet it is not the numerical extension as such that -constitutes the enlargement. It is rather the diversity of the points -of contact, and the complexity of the relations by which the spiritual -ideal is more fully illustrated in the finite world in proportion as -the circle widens. To engender the idea of the state in oneself is to -place oneself ideally into reactive relations with the diverse groups -embraced within one’s nation. And to do this is a spiritual achievement -of no mean order. I should prefer to use the word “stateship” instead -of citizenship. Stateship is attained by one who brings to birth -within himself the idea of the state, and in whom that idea becomes a -controlling ethical force. - -A second remark concerns the perplexed subject of the conflict of -duties. The nearer duties are sometimes preferred to the more remote, -and at other times we are asked to sacrifice everything to the larger -whole. We owe our first devotion, it is said, to the members of our -family; but then again we must be willing to sacrifice life itself and -the welfare of our family to our country when it calls upon us in its -need. Largeness alone certainly does not serve as an ethical ground for -preference. The quantitative standard implied in such phrases as “the -greatest good of the greatest number” is out of place when we deal with -ethical relations, which in their very nature are qualitative. Now -the account of the social institutions given in previous chapters as -successive stations on the road to the spiritual goal may throw some -light on this difficult subject. Normally, the claims of the anterior -stations are to be preferred—the claims of the family for instance -to those of the vocation, because the family is the matrix of the -three-fold reverence, and the individual must pass under the ethical -influence of family life before he is fit to use vocational life -ethically to good purpose. The anterior groups are not merely smaller, -they are germinal. The training received in them is the condition on -which spiritual progress depends later on. On the other hand, the later -groups are the more complete and more explicated expressions of the -spiritual ideal; hence if the very existence of one of the later groups -is threatened, or is in danger of being denatured of its spiritual use, -then the later group is to be preferred to the earlier, the _terminus -ad quem_, precisely because it is the _terminus ad quem_, to the -_terminus a quo_. - -To give a familiar illustration. In our time, which is a time of -transition and doubt, many a religious teacher finds himself in sore -straits to decide between the claims of the vocation and the family. -As a religious teacher he is pledged to teach only what in his heart -of hearts he believes to be true; he is especially under obligation to -use words in such a way as to convey to others the same meaning that -he attaches to them himself. But this may mean exposing his family to -serious privations. The situation is full of perplexity and pain, but -the line of choice is plain enough. The claims of his high vocation -must in this case take precedence. In like manner, when the existence -or the integrity of the state is at issue, the claims of the state as -the _terminus ad quem_ override those of the vocation, the family, and -the state, and may even demand the sacrifice of the physical existence -of the individual himself. - - - NOTES - - - 1. The idea of democracy is often neatly put—all too neatly, into the - following formula: In antiquity the individual existed for the sake of - the state, in modern democracy the state exists for the sake of the - individual. Both of these statements as they stand are mischievous - and misleading and require to be qualified. It is not true that in - antiquity the individual existed for the sake of the state in the - sense that his separate existence was extinguished. The citizen class - in Aristotle’s state, the rulers in Plato’s state, and even a member - of one of the inferior classes, each in his own way fulfilled a - distinct function. He was not suppressed in the state, he expressed - his function by the action appropriate to his station. The philosophic - rulers might do the thinking and governing. They were the head of the - body politic—others the hands and feet. The underlying conception was - what may be called spuriously organic, borrowed more or less from the - animal type of organism. - - The second limb of the formula is no less superficial. In no modern - nation does the state exist, or at bottom is it supposed to exist, for - the benefit of the individuals who at any time compose it. If this - were the ruling conception, how could the democratic state require its - citizens to give up their lives in its defense? If the state existed - for the benefit of the individuals, the state would be the means, and - the so-called good of the individual the end. And in that case it - would surely be irrational to sacrifice the end for the sake of the - means, in other words to put an end to one’s life in defense of the - state, a mere instrument for the protection and prosperity of one’s - own life. - - To reply that the state exists for the sake not of one individual but - of all (observe however that the formula says “the individual,” and is - ambiguous and slippery at this point), nor even only for the sake of - all the individuals now living, but also for the sake of the millions - yet unborn—to say this is once more to introduce an ideal entity which - it was the very object of the formula as quoted to banish. The formula - was intended to give us, in place of “the metaphysical entities” of - the Greeks and the Germans, a very palpable thing—the good of the - individual. The good of the individual seemed to be a palpable thing, - though in truth it is the most impalpable thing in the world. And by - defining the state in this wise we were supposed to come onto solid - ground. But now, behold, it is the good of unborn millions which is to - be the object of our devotion, and who can imagine what this good of - unborn millions is likely to be? - - The fact is that without ideal entities the conception of the state - in any noble shape cannot be construed at all. The organic conception - must now take the place of the individualistic. The organic conception - indeed as it was worked out in antiquity, or as it lived on in the - theories of mediæval writers, or as it survives in the works of - certain German publicists, who use it to defend the feudalistic - structure of society, has rightly fallen into discredit,—not because - it is organic, but because it is pseudo-organic, that is, based on the - type of the animal organism. The individualistic conception of the - state at present current in America and in all modern democracies, - is a violent reaction against this false idea of organization. The - inestimable germ of truth individualism contains is that no such - distinction can be allowed as between head and hands or feet in - political life, that all the multitudes of “hands” who work in the - factories, for instance, must be respected as personalities having - not only hands but also heads and hearts. But individualism, though - it affirms this idea, belies it in practice, as the actual state of - society in America and elsewhere abundantly proves. And it is bound - to do so, because personality implies more than material well-being, - either for a single individual or for all individuals now living - or for all future individuals. Personality implies truly organic - relations to other fellow-beings—and this can only be achieved by - organizing the society in which men live. - - The way taken has been, by reaction from pseudo-organization, to - extreme individualism and concomitant materialism. The way out lies in - the direction of genuine organization. - - - 2. Certain evils observable in the workings of American democracy may - be traced to the following causes: - - (a) The people as a whole are still in the pioneer stage. A country - enormously rich in material resources stimulates wealth-production. - A host of immigrants escaped from poverty abroad are stung into - wealth-getting here. The frontier line is now far to the West, but the - influence of the pioneer movement still in progress flows back upon - the Eastern states. - - (b) More important still are the evils due to the crude - individualistic idea of democracy just characterized. If the state - exists for the good of the individual, and if the good of the - individual is conceived to be the acquisition of wealth, then private - business will take precedence of the public business. Yet under the - democratic system of frequent elections the public business demands - constant attention. In consequence, a special class of professional - politicians arises, comprising a minority of disinterestedly - patriotic men, and a majority of persons whose private business - is not sufficiently remunerative to divert them from the public - service. The appearance of the political dictator called “boss” is - the inevitable outcome of these conditions. This army of professional - politicians, and in particular the vulgar figure at their hand, is the - chief disgrace of the American democracy, and has been the target of - incessant invective by American writers. But it is idle to stigmatize - the effect and overlook the cause, to squander invective upon the - symptom and at the same time to leave the malady untouched. The malady - itself is the individualistic conception of democracy, and until this - is replaced by a better one, the evil in question may be modified in - form but will certainly not disappear. - - A way must be found for the citizen to attend to his private business, - which is coming to be more and more exacting, and to the public - business at the same time. The system of vocational representation - offers an opportunity in this direction. Citizens will be voting - in their vocational groups for measures intended to advance their - vocational interests, but will be taught to advance them in such a way - that the related interests of other groups, or the public interest, - shall be thereby promoted. - - 3. Proportional representation, which is at present being tested - abroad, and earnestly considered in France, England and Germany, may - be a bridge leading over from the present plan of geographical to that - of vocational representation. The proportional system itself, it is - true, is still based on the individualistic idea. It is a movement - on behalf of submerged minorities. It quarrels with the present - arrangement for the reason that the will of the greater number of - individuals, but not of all individuals, is brought to bear on public - decisions. But if adopted it may well offer, without violent change, a - way for the collective representation of vocational groups. - - 4. Citizenship should be graded. A youth of twenty-one is scarcely - prepared to exercise the duties of the citizen intelligently. As - long as the view prevails that the functions of the state are to be - restricted to a minimum, it is perhaps not wholly absurd to admit a - mere stripling to a share in the conduct of government. But the sphere - of government is steadily enlarging, and its problems are becoming - more and more intricate. Twenty-five would certainly be a better - minimum age. Under vocational representation there is likely to be an - Upper House consisting of members who have served in the Lower House. - Citizens who have attained the age of twenty-five might be empowered - to vote for members of the Lower House, those who have attained the - age of thirty-five for members of the Upper House, but these are - details upon which it is unfitting to expatiate here. The point I have - in mind is that citizenship should be graded. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[85] _Vide_ Appendix II, on _Force and Freedom_. - -[86] I use the word Organize in its spiritual sense. The empirical, -animal organism is commonly taken as the type upon which the notion of -organism is modeled. The animal organism, however, fails to express -the implicit idea, for the following reasons: The number of members -is limited; the combination of organs is, so far as we can know, -accidental, and the relation is hierarchical,—there are inferior and -superior organs. The spiritual conception differs in each of these -points. The number of members is infinite; the relation is necessary; -and they are equal, that is, of equal worth. To distinguish the -spiritual pattern from the animal type the term metorganic may be used -for the former, in analogy to such terms as metempirical, metaphysical, -etc., and the system of ethics expounded in this volume may be called -the _metorganic system of ethics_. - -[87] Representation by geographical districts is the logical outcome -of the individualistic conception of democracy. Where this prevails, -the state is supposed to take account only of the common interests, -those in respect to which all individuals are alike, such as security -of life and property, those interests being ignored in respect to -which the groups that constitute society, the farmers, the merchants, -the industrial laborers, etc., differ. Hence any convenient number -of citizens, pursuing their life purposes side by side within a -certain geographical area, may serve as a constituency. The absence -of regard for the real diversity, and often the clash of interests, -between persons belonging to such constituencies, is due to the -atomistic, individualistic notion of democracy just mentioned. But -sheer individualism is everywhere on the wane, and is bound to become -less and less dominant in the degree that the industrial evolution -of society proceeds, and the various groups stand out distinctly as -different against one another in their functions and in the conditions -subservient to those functions. Society is in fact not an aggregate of -human atoms. It is already an imperfect organism, destined to become -more and more adequately organized. And the system of representation -has got to be remodeled and adjusted to this fact and this ideal. - -[88] By “interests” I understand fulfilment of the social function with -which the group is charged. - -[89] And, as a matter of fact, because this is so, there is no state, -no democracy, in which public opinion or public sentiment actually -does rule, save by fits and starts. Government is usually in the hands -of more or less selfish coteries, who operate behind the scenes, who -do know what they want and who, like the Piper of Hamelin, are past -masters of the art of leading the political children whither they will. - -[90] I am not of course discussing the merits or demerits of the -protective tariff as such, but am using it as illustration. As such it -will serve the purpose. - -The practice of “log-rolling” may at first sight seem to resemble the -proposed plan. But, in reality, the two are diametrical opposites. By -“log-rolling” is meant the kind of concessions made by the shipping -interests to the manufacturers by the manufacturers to the farmers, or -to the workingmen when the latter happen to be strong enough to enforce -their demands. Each group persists in pursuing its selfish aims; only, -in order to achieve them it makes concessions to the selfishness of the -others. Each follows the path into the Hades of egotism, and throws the -necessary sops to Cerberus on the way. The plan outlined in the text, -on the other hand, has for its object the interlocking of the various -social interests, the fitting them reciprocally into one another; or -better, the object is to cure each group as far as possible of its -selfishness by so modifying its claims, that the granting of them shall -become beneficial to the rest. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -THE NATIONAL CHARACTER SPIRITUALLY TRANSFORMED: THE INTERNATIONAL -SOCIETY, OR THE ORGANIZATION OF MANKIND - - -There is such a thing as a national character.[91] The national -character is reflected in the language, literature, laws and customs, -arts, institutions and religion of a people. Even when the religion -professed by different peoples is the same in name it is strongly -tinctured in the different countries by the national differences. -Compare for example the Christianity of Prussia with that of France, or -that of England with that of Russia. - -The national character, like that of the individual, has its plus and -minus qualities, its excellent and its repellent traits. - -The national character is to be spiritualized by raising the plus -traits to the Nth degree. - -To this end, as before, the three-fold reverence and especially the -third reverence is the means. _The backward peoples of the earth are -the paramount object of reverence._ The more advanced peoples are to -bring to light the spiritual life latent in the backward. In order -to do so, they are to carry out the principle of reverence toward -past civilization, to sift out what is vital in the work of previous -generations. And further, they are to conform to the second principle -of reverence, that toward contemporaries approximately on the same -level, _i.e._, toward the other civilized nations. No single nation is -really competent to undertake the great task of awaking the stationary -peoples of India and China, of educating the primitive peoples of -Africa. A union of the civilized nations should be formed in order -that together they may jointly accomplish _the pedagogy of the less -developed_. The educational point of view once again appears as the -ethical. The relation of the less developed to the more advanced -peoples should be analogous to that of the child towards the parents. -Just as neither the father singly nor the mother alone can release -spiritual life in the offspring, so the different civilized nations, -each of which has its own gift, its own plus traits, are to interact -for the purpose of jointly awakening the creative energies within the -slumbering souls of the undeveloped peoples. - -It follows that a nation cannot even be defined ethically except as -a member of an international society, and we begin to see the help -afforded by the spiritual conception in solving at least ideally the -problem of right international relations. Whereas hitherto the notion -of the sovereignty of each nation has been a formidable impediment to -the formation of an overarching world society, the ethical conception -not only permits this expansion of sovereignty, but necessitates -it. A nation, ethically defined, is a unique member of the _corpus -internationale_ of mankind. As unique it maintains of right its -relative independence, as a member it is bound by intrinsic ties -to its fellow-members, and is subject to the greater sovereignty -including them all alike.[92] A nation indeed cannot even maintain -its independence against other nations except by sheer might if it -acknowledges none but capricious ties between itself and them, such -as treaties, or Hague Conference agreements which can be dissolved at -pleasure. There must be recognized an inner ethical tie between nation -and nation, and it must receive legal formulation. This ethical tie is -the true _vinculum societatis humanæ_ and supplies what has hitherto -been absolutely lacking,—an ethical basis for international law. - -The ethical relation between nations is founded on the fact that each -nation represents a significant type of humanity, that each nation -has certain plus and minus qualities, that it is dependent on other -nations to supplement its defects; and more than this, that it can -expurgate, as it ought, its minus qualities only by striving to evoke -the spiritual life in other peoples. - -One salient point I must emphasize. The national character with its -plus and minus traits is empirical, and the development of the -empirical character is not itself the highest aim of the state. The -spiritual transformation of this empirical character, as I must take -pains to repeat, is the aim. - -And herein appears the difference between the point of view taken in -this chapter and the political doctrine of the eminent Swiss publicist -Bluntschli. He too recognizes the development of the national character -as the aim of the state; and in so far as he does this he is in advance -of writers who limit the state’s functions to the protection of life -and property, to defense against foreign aggression, promotion of -prosperity, and of power and prestige. Bluntschli has the insight to -perceive that a nation is a collective entity, having a certain defined -character, and the development of the distinctive national gifts -is in his eyes the supreme purpose of national life, the political -organization of the state being a means to this end. But he falls into -a grave error by identifying the empirical with the spiritual character -of the nation, and setting up the former as an end worthy on its own -account. The empirical character of a collective entity is in this -respect no more worthy of honor, and no more fit to be a ground of -obligation, than the empirical character of the individual. And the -conclusions at which Bluntschli arrives are a sufficient proof of the -ethical inadequacy of his vision. Some nations, a very few he thinks, -possess political capacity, and they are to rule other peoples. Here -we have the “White Man’s Burden”—an obvious violation of the ethical -principle of national independence. Further, the world state, which is -to include all nations, is to concern itself only with their common -interests. Bluntschli thus accepts the uniformity principle in ethics, -excluding the idea of the reaction of differences which is of the very -essence of the ethical relation; while the ideal future as he sees -it is that of nations coexisting peacefully side by side, competing -peacefully with each other, and doubtless borrowing from one another -the best fruits produced by each. But it is idle to expect peaceful -coexistence so long as the strong exist by the side of the weak without -there being acknowledged an _intrinsic_ spiritual tie between them; -and competition between peoples will result, like competition between -individuals, in strife and exploitation; while the mere borrowing by -each of the fruits produced by the rest omits the vital point, upon -which I lay the greatest stress, of the eliciting of the fruits in each -by the spiritualizing influence of the rest. - -Surveying Bluntschli’s doctrine as a whole, it is clear that his -empirical conception of the state leaves it a purely secular -institution concerned with externals, and not really related to the -inner life, certainly not a station in the development of personality. -He practically acknowledges as much when he says that the state is man -writ large, and the church woman writ large; that the state represents -the masculine principle, the church the feminine principle. For the -feminine, according to him, is the spiritual principle. The state deals -with externals; to the church is reserved the prerogative of entering -into and transforming the inner life.[93] - -But what shall be the motive force for the creation of an international -society? I hold that the sense of national sin, or of national guilt, -must supply the motive force. At present all the more advanced nations -are to be censured because of their pride. Germany prides itself on -its science and its efficiency, England on its political liberalism, -France on its logical conception of equality, America on its democratic -individualism. Each of the great nations dwells complacently upon -its fair traits, and vaunts its special type of civilization as that -which should rightfully prevail among mankind generally. The national -defects, acknowledged perhaps by the critical few, are glozed over. -Indeed the consciousness of a collective national character though -latent is not yet distinct. It must be evoked. National self-knowledge -must be promoted by the leaders and teachers of mankind, and with it -must come, as in the case of the individual, the conscious recognition -of deep defects—in the case of Germany the narrowness of the conception -of the expert:[94] in the case of England the discrepancy between -political liberalism as applied to the white inhabitants of the British -Isles and of the self-governing dominions on the one hand, and the -“benevolent despotism” exercised over the subject millions of India on -the other; in America the effacement of true individualism under the -crushing pressure of mass opinion, etc. - -Moreover not only will the defects be admitted, but their detrimental -influence on other peoples will have to be frankly avowed—every nation -must cry its _Peccavi_—the effect for instance on Europe of the French -love of glory, the effect of the efficiency notion of the Germans -as it is at present penetrating all other nations,[95] and in the -still wider view the effect of Western civilization as a whole on the -stationary civilization of China, on Egypt, on the myriads of Africa. -The civilized peoples of the earth have sinned their sins and are best -seen when we consider: - -A. The spoliation and outrages perpetrated by the Western nations, for -instance at the time of the entrance of the Allies into Pekin, the -wholesale destruction of human life and the mutilations of the natives -on the Congo. It has been stated that some ten millions of the natives -of Africa perished as victims of the white race. If these acts do not -warrant our speaking of the sins of the civilized nations, what kind of -human behavior does deserve that name? - -B. The effect of European example in practically forcing the peoples of -the Orient to adopt militarism and navalism. - -C. The effect of Western individualism in undermining the religious -foundation in Eastern civilization.[96] The spreading of Christianity -itself, despite the exemplary influence of the higher type of -missionary, must yet be classed, in one important respect, among -the detrimental influences exercised by the West upon the East. For -Christianity, in the form in which it is usually taught, tends to -break up the sense of solidarity which is often strong among the less -civilized peoples, without supplying an adequate principle upon which -solidarity might be reëstablished on a higher plane. Hence Christian -teaching in the Orient and in Africa, however friendly and merciful in -intention, and however beneficent in many ways, is yet a disintegrating -influence. - -The great problem of the spiritual education of the lower races -will have to be taken up anew. Not only are individual missionaries -of broader mental and moral horizons needed, the civilized nations -as such must reach a common understanding and establish a union -among themselves, the keynote of which shall be reverence for the -undeveloped, that is to say divination of what, under right educational -influence, they, the undeveloped, may come to mean for humanity. And -a union of this kind, consecrated to a noble object, will at the same -time be the means of leading the Western world out of the chaotic -condition in which it is at present weltering. The object for which -nations combine may not be their own peace, their own prosperity. -The key to peace between the adult peoples is a common, effectual -resolve to win new varieties of spiritual expression from the child -and adolescent peoples of the earth. Peace must come incidentally. -The common object must be disinterested, spiritual, because there is a -duty on the part of the civilized towards the uncivilized to exercise -a spiritual function. The task of humanity in general consists in -extending the web of spiritual relations so as to cover larger and -still larger areas of the finite world. The family is only partly -spiritualized. The vocations, the state, are not yet spiritualized. The -international society hardly exists. But what I here endeavor to sketch -is the human world as it would be in the light and under the influence -of the spiritual ideal. And I set down as the saving task of the -civilized nations that of extending the spiritual realm so as to cover -backward, undeveloped peoples, so as to embody them in the _corpus -spirituale_ of mankind. - -_Some of the Principal Obstacles That Stand in the Way of the -Organization of Mankind._ - -The first obstacle is to be found in the inadequate theories that -underlie international law. Seventeenth and eighteenth century thinking -is still, strange to say, the theoretical foundation. Grotius and -Vattel remain the chief authorities. Grotius’s theory is a system of -empirical individualism with Christian individualism grafted upon it, -to mitigate its harsher features. The right of conquest is admitted. -A nation is allowed to punish another, punishment being taken in -the crude sense, while what has been permitted under natural law is -subsequently modified by counsels of perfection derived from Christian -individualism. - -Vattel is the intellectual grandchild of Leibnitz. He derives from -Leibnitz through Wolff. Vattel envisages the various states as so many -individual entities without intrinsic ties. Peaceful coexistence and -unhindered pursuit by each people of its own perfection or welfare with -mutual aid to be voluntarily rendered are the ultimate conceptions -beyond which this thinker does not venture. And if the root principles -are thus infertile, small wonder that the fruit of the tree should be -what it is. In any handbook of international law, the preponderant -space is allotted to the laws of war, and yet international law has -proved impotent to restrain the passion of war, or even to prevent its -excesses. International law binds the Samson of war with green withes -which the giant snaps in derision. It is plain that we are still in -the earliest stages, not only of international practice, but even of -international thinking. The problem of the right ethical relations -between the nations has hardly been broached. - -Another conspicuous obstacle in the way of international progress is to -be seen in false hopes. Among the false hopes I class: - -A. The hope that increased facilities of intercourse will automatically -bring about more friendly relations. To expect this is to forget that -closeness accentuates repugnances as well as congenialities, increases -antipathy as well as amity. When nations come within short range of -each other they resemble antipathetical kinsmen who are compelled -to live together. The Czechs and Germans in Bohemia would not hate -each other as they do were they not such near neighbors. Spatial -rapprochement, for instance, between East and West will not of itself -guarantee moral rapprochement—far from it. - -B. The hope that science may be relied on to bring the nations -together. Science is neutral. Science is subservient to evil as well -as good. Science is at present distilling the poisonous gases used on -the European battlefields as well as inventing the improved methods -of surgery. It has made possible instruments of destruction such as -savages might have shrunk from using. Moreover, scientific as well as -artistic interests are partial manifestations of a people’s life and -the ethical relation is between peoples as totalities or collective -entities—just as the ethical relation between man and man is between -the whole man and the whole man, and not between some partial aspect -of the man and of his fellows. Hence it is easy to explain why the -scientists and the scholars of the different belligerent peoples were -swept away by the war passion like the rest, and in their utterance -have even carried animosity to greater lengths, expressing it in -language calculated to wound more deeply and to leave more permanent -scars. They felt that they belonged to the people as a whole, and -when the occasion came for them to choose between their scientific -co-workers across the frontier and their fellow-nationals, they sided -with the latter. - -C. The hope that reliance can be placed on international trade to bring -about ethical relations between nations. But trade, like science, -is ethically neutral. In its own interest it is favorable to order -and security in colonies and dependencies, and when, sufficiently -enlightened, to the impartial administration of justice. The European -nations abolished the slave trade in Africa because it decimated the -native population, and decreased the supply of labor.[97] On the other -hand England in the eighteenth century, even at that time the most -liberal country of Europe, did not hesitate to wage war with Spain for -the maintenance of the monopoly of the hideous slave-trade, and the -Opium War occurred in the “full light” of the nineteenth century. But -the most striking example of the ethical neutrality of the commercial -mind is to be found in the recent partition of Africa between England, -France, the Congo Free State and Germany. The methods which these four -nations adopted in the “scramble for Africa” were marked by a perfect -disregard of the rights of the native populations of the African -continent. Two devices were used—proclamations, and treaties with -native chiefs. The Queen of England proclaimed that a certain territory -would thenceforth be a British possession, as if proclamation could -convey a right to the territory. The German emperor indulged in the -same fiction. And there was a veritable race between French and English -in the West; between Germans and English in the East, as to which of -the two could outdistance or outwit the other in treaty-making. Karl -Peters came in disguise with a stock of blank treaties in his pocket. -Forty or fifty treaties were concluded by the French annually for -several years in the West—as if a treaty with a native chief, who -might be bribed or coerced into lending his signature, could be the -foundation of moral right to the territory occupied by his tribe. The -European nations artfully employed the fictions of sovereignty in -order to varnish their acts of plunder with a semblance of legality. -Of course these proclamations and treaties were not intended to -justify exploitation in the eyes of the natives—the natives were not -consulted or regarded—but rather to base thereon the division of the -spoils between the exploiters. A proclamation or the conclusion of a -treaty with a chief was notice given to rivals not to interfere with -the spoils reserved for the nation that had issued the proclamation or -secured the treaty. It meant “hands off” to competing exploiters. - -If it be asked whether this picture is not too dark? Whether the -civilized nations of the twentieth century in their dealings with the -helpless natives were merely selfish? Whether their motives are so -sinister? Whether they are not animated by better, more moral aims? -the answer is that the commercial mind, and it is the commercial -mind that chiefly rules the world today, allays its scruples and -justifies its aggressions by the fallacy that to extend trade is to -spread civilization, and to spread civilization is to contribute to -the advancement of the human race. The interests of trade and of -civilization are simply identified. To build railroads, to stretch -telegraph lines across the Dark Continent, to launch steamboats on -lakes that never heard the whistle of a steam engine before, these -are assumed to be the evidences of “progress.” Besides are not the -natives disciplined in habits of industry, are they not encouraged to -cultivate the raw products needed by Europe, and in return to receive -the overflow of European markets? The instruments of civilization are -thus confounded with civilization itself; the means with the end; while -the real object, veiled by sophistry, is nevertheless the material -benefit to be secured by the white race. Even the humane treatment of -the natives, where it is humane, resembles somewhat too unpleasantly -the fattening of the calf prior to its consumption by the owner. - -Furthermore, the interests of Trade being supposed to be paramount, -it is held that any country the people of which do not sufficiently -cultivate the products desired by other peoples, or who close their -doors against the industrial surplus of Europe, may be annexed, the -land forcibly seized, and the inhabitants subjugated, and moreover -that such action is right and proper and in the interests of humanity. -So long as this view obtains, there will be no peace on earth. The -competition for foreign territories and foreign markets, the scramble -between the “civilized” exploiters, will be indefinitely provocative of -new wars. - -The root disease that afflicts the world at the present day is the -supremacy of the commercial point of view. Intercourse and exchange -of products is no doubt desirable. The education of backward peoples -in agriculture and in industry for their own good and along their own -line is indispensable. The fallacy of the commercial mind consists -in erecting the means into the paramount end, in brusquing the love -of independence which is so strongly entrenched, even among many -primitive peoples, and in preventing their development in the direction -prescribed by their own natures. All this for the sake of the -immediate increase of material wealth. The white race shall have the -lion’s share of the wealth; the native population are to be accorded a -lesser share, with which they must be content. This is the extent of -the concession to humanity. This is, in plain words, what is signified -by the haughty phrase—“the spread of civilization.” - -The commercial mind is neither benevolent nor malevolent—as little as -science is. It seems at times to be beneficent; at other times it seems -to be almost fiendish—as in the case of the atrocities perpetrated on -the Congo. It is not fiendish, it is simply ethically neutral or blind. - -From this series of reflections, certain conclusions may be drawn as -to fundamental points of view relating to international law. The main -principle is respect for the total personality of peoples, recognition -of them as potential members of the spiritual body of mankind. - -The territory of a people is to be regarded as the body of that -people’s soul. Their independence is to be strictly respected. -Expropriation or annexation is to be characterized as outrage. -Intrusion, except for purposes of education, is to be forbidden. The -conception which underlies the scramble for Africa and for the Far -East—that the material interests of the advanced nations entitle them -to force the backward to become receptacles of the industrial overflow -of the West, the producers of raw material for the factories of the -West must be abandoned.[98] - -And now the main point may once more be stated. The salvation of the -civilized peoples, their spiritualization in the effort to spiritualize -the less advanced demands a new turn in the history of humanity. _Union -in a common sublime object will overcome the antagonisms and discords -that prevail among the civilized nations themselves._ The sword will -never be turned into a plow-share until the nations come to love the -work of the plow—the work of spiritual _tilth in the human_ field. The -strong peoples will never cease to harm the weak, and in so doing to -harm themselves, until they see in the weak, members of the _corpus -spirituale_ of mankind, depositaries of potential spiritual life in -liberating which they the strong themselves will find increased life. -And the task of uplifting the lower peoples will never be successfully -prosecuted until it is seen to be part of the task of humanity in -general, which is to spread the web of spiritual relations over larger -and ever larger provinces of the finite realm.[99] - -FOOTNOTES: - -[91] See Fouillée’s _Esquisse psychologique des Peuples européens_, -also the Chapter on German, English and American Ideals in _The World -Crisis_. - -[92] Each term in the series of social institutions is ethically -defined by referring to the succeeding terms. The family prepares for -the vocation, the vocation for the state or nation, the nation for -the international society, and all the successive terms receive their -ultimate definition from the infinite spiritual universe which includes -them, and broods over them and dwells in each, so that the expanding -ethical experience gained at the successive stations is spiritually the -_ratio cognoscendi_, not the _ratio essendi_. - -[93] It is true that the state is concerned with those conditions of -the spiritual reactions that are capable of being enforced, but in -instituting such conditions the spiritual content is inevitably kept in -view. And in the very process of fitting the body to the spirit, the -form to the content, the content itself will be discerned more clearly -and explicitly. - -[94] See the chapter in _The World Crisis_. - -[95] To myself as an individual I say: look to your radiations, -consider the effects you produce on others; if the effects are -harmful trace them to faults in your character, and let your desire -and obligation to influence others beneficently be the spur to lead -you to transform your own character. The same each people should -say to itself. For instance the obvious faults of our democracy -have retarded the progress of democracy in Europe. Our failure in -municipal government is constantly quoted abroad as an argument against -democracy. This should be a real incentive to rouse us out of our -self-complacency. - -[96] Cf. Lord Cromer’s remarks on this subject in his book on Egypt. - -[97] See, however, the importation of Indian and Chinese coolies, and -the surreptitious resurrection of the slave trade mentioned by Sir -Charles Dilke in his _Problems of Greater Britain_. - -[98] As to practical steps that might be taken to give effect to -this conception of international law, see my published address “The -Great Rôle of the United States After the War,” in which is discussed -the creation of an international law-making body or a Parliament of -Parliaments. In connection with the latter, I should attach particular -importance to the institution of commissions which may serve as a -link between the international legislature and the less civilized -peoples—the commissions to study the needs and gifts of those peoples -with a view to securing their development along their own lines. In the -case of civilized peoples that have until recently been stationary, -like the Chinese, the commission representing the Western nations would -sit in consultation with the most enlightened leaders of the Chinese -people themselves, the common object being to discover the points -of attachment in Chinese civilization which may wisely be made the -starting point of a more modern and progressive evolution. For instance -the filial piety of the Chinese, the rectitude of their merchants, the -absence of an aristocracy, and their civil service resting on education -(despite its defects). In this manner it may become possible to avoid -the abrupt, superficial, and infinitely destructive substitution -of modern ideas for the system at present existing, and gradual -development will take the place of intrusive and uncongenial change. - -[99] I add that this conception will react on the internal life of -democracy. Democracy is at present regarded as a relation between -equals. In fact, we have in America the negro population, the -illiterate and backward immigrants. A truer conception of democracy -depends on our realizing that within each people as well as between -people and people there is the distinction of the more advanced and -the less advanced groups. Democracy rightly conceived will be found to -consist in the effort spent by the more advanced in each vocational -group to uplift the less advanced, the more advanced themselves coming -into possession of their spiritual worth in the degree that they -realize this their task of leadership and its great responsibilities. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -RELIGIOUS FELLOWSHIP AS THE CULMINATING SOCIAL INSTITUTION - - -In this chapter I shall undertake to sketch the plan of a religious -society as determined by the spiritual ideal herein set forth. -The religious society is the last term in the series of social -institutions, and its peculiar office is to furnish the principle for -the successive transformation of the entire series. It is to be the -laboratory in which the ideal of the spiritual universe is created -and constantly recreated, the womb in which the spiritual life is -conceived. No single religious society can adequately fulfill this -purpose. The spiritual ideal itself must necessarily be conceived -differently by different minds; but the great general purpose will be -the same, despite variations in shades of meaning and points of view. - -The fellowship of the religious society must be based on the voluntary -principle; membership must be a matter of free choice.[100] In -antiquity the boundaries of the political and religious organizations -coincided. The citizen was under obligations as a part of his civic -duty to worship the divinities of the state. In modern times a state -church is still maintained in some countries and supported out of the -public funds, while dissenting and nonconformist bodies exist more -or less on sufferance at its side. But this arrangement is harmful, -especially so to those whom it seems to favor. Erastianism paralyzes -religious spontaneity. The state, it is true, is profoundly interested -in the flourishing of ethical idealism, and in the constant rebirth in -its midst of spiritual ideals. But it is not competent to determine -what the character of these ideals shall be. The moment they cease to -be freely produced they lose their life-giving power. The state within -limits may enforce actions; it may not even attempt to enforce beliefs. - -On the other hand, the “secularization of the state” has given rise -to the deplorable impression that the state exists only for so-called -secular purposes, and has stripped the idea of the state of the lofty -attributes with which the greatest thinkers of antiquity had clothed -it. It is the function of the religious society, dwelling uncoerced in -the midst of the state, to reinvest the state with the sacred character -that belongs to it. I do not of course intend to exalt the state after -the manner of Hegel, as if it were a kind of earthly god or to set it -up as an object of religious or quasi-religious devotion. The object -of religious devotion is the infinite holy community, the spiritual -universe. The function of the religious society is to generate the -ideal of the infinite holy community, of the spiritual universe. The -family, the vocation, the nation, are sub-groups of this, lesser -entities. Even mankind itself is but a province of the ideal spiritual -commonwealth that extends beyond it. To concentrate worship upon the -state or nation as some propose, would be to usurp for the part the -piety that belongs to the whole. - -In describing a religious society three main aspects are to be borne in -mind: - -The teaching, the organization, the worship. - - -_A. The Teaching_ - -In the religious society as here conceived there is to be worked out -a body of doctrine, and there is to be a body of specially designated -teachers. An ethico-religious society cannot ignore or dispense with a -general philosophy of life and statements of belief. It cannot restrict -itself to encouraging practical morality without regard to what are -called metaphysical subtleties. A moral society of this kind would soon -become ossified. On the contrary, an ethico-religious society should -excel in the fertility with which it gives rise to new metaphysical -constructions and original formulations of ethical faith. The will -cannot be divorced from the intellect. The active volitional life -cannot be successfully stimulated and guided without the assistance of -the mind as well as of the imagination. - -But the relation between philosophy and formulas of belief on the one -hand and volitional experience on the other should be the reverse of -what it has been in the past. Here there must be a new departure. The -doctrine, the formulations, whatever they may be, must not be dogmatic -but flexible. Growing originally out of ethical experience, they must -ever prove themselves apt to enlarge and deepen ethical experience. -By this test they will be judged and they must therefore ever be -subject to revision and correction. Every dogma, every philosophic or -theological creed, was at its inception a statement in terms of the -intellect of a certain inner experience. But then it claimed for itself -eternal validity, compressing the spiritual life within its mold, and -checking further development. The body of doctrine which I desire and -foresee will likewise be an interpretation of ethical experience, -intended to make explicit the fundamental principles implicit in -ethical experience, and thereby clarifying it, and assisting its -further unfolding. But it is not and should never be allowed to -become dogmatic. The difference, I take it, is plain: in the one case -experience contracted in procrustean fashion into a rigid formula, in -the other case an elastic formula adapted to and subordinated to the -experience. - -Thus much for the body of teachings. There should also be a body -of teachers. A teacher in an ethico-religious society will retain -something of the character of his predecessors—priest, prophet, rabbi, -pastor. The priest is the mediator of grace; the prophet is the seer -of visions; the rabbi is learned in the Divine law, and the pastor is -the helper of the individual in securing his individual salvation. -But these functions will now be seen in an altered light, and will be -radically modified in their exercise. The magical attribute of the -priest disappears. The confident prediction of future events, based -on the assumption that the moral order is to be completely realized -in human society, has ceased to be convincing. The Divine law is no -longer identical with the Law revealed in the Scriptures and their -commentaries, and the salvation of the individual is to be accomplished -by other means. - -The religious teacher of the new kind is to resemble his predecessors -in being a specialist. The word specialist in this connection may, -perhaps, awaken misgivings, and these must be removed. He is not a -specialist in the sense of having a conscience unlike that of others, -or in being the keeper of other men’s consciences. Nor shall he impose -his philosophy of life or his belief authoritatively, but propose -it suggestively. His best results will be gained if he succeeds in -so stimulating those whom he influences that they will attain an -individualized spiritual outlook of their own, consonant with their -own individual nature and need. But specialists of this kind are -indispensable. The generality of men have neither the time nor the -mental equipment to think out the larger problems of life without -assistance, and the attempt on their part to do so leads to crudities -and eccentricities of which one meets nowadays with many pathetic -examples among those who have severed their connection with the -traditional faiths, and have tried in their groping fashion to invent -a metaphysic or a creed of their own.[101] - -The preparation of the ethical teacher for his special task consists in -making himself thoroughly acquainted with the great religious systems -of the past, in which much that is of permanent spiritual value is -enshrined.[102] He is to fit himself to revitalize what is vital, not -to repristinate what is obsolete. There is required of him a first-hand -knowledge of the great ethical systems, and of their philosophical -backgrounds: furthermore acquaintance, so far as it is as yet -accessible, with the moral history of mankind, as distinguished from -the history of ethical thinking; in addition, he should intensively -study the economic, social and political problems of the time from -the ethical point of view, and the psychology both of individual -and national character, so far as that fascinating and difficult -subject has been opened up by competent writers. Apprenticeship in -the social reform movements of the day, direct touch with the inner -life of people, on its healthful as well as on its sick side, is also -presupposed. - -Since no single person can be adequately prepared in these various -subjects, and since a variety of gifts and talents is demanded, it -follows that the teaching function shall be exercised by a body -or group of teachers, not by a single pastor at whose feet the -congregation are supposed to sit. Some of the persons engaged in this -work will excel as public speakers, others as writers, others as -teachers of the young, others as leaders of vocational groups. But all -these different functionaries must learn to work, not only in harmony, -but in organic, reciprocal support, themselves illustrating in their -group life the spiritual relation, the knowledge and the practice of -which they are to carry out into the world. The guild or group idea -must be applied to the religious teachers of the future. - - -_B. The Organization_ - -Every religion exhibits a certain form of organization peculiar to -itself and derived from its controlling idea. The organization of the -Buddhist fellowship is dependent on the Buddhist ideal of preparation -for absorption in Nirvana. The constitution of the Jewish synagogue -reflects the conception of the relation of the Chosen People, as an -_élite_ corps of the divinity. The organization of the Christian church -is characterized by its bifurcation into an _ecclesia militans_ and an -_ecclesia triumphans_, and further by the idea of incorporation into -the body of Christ, a difficult mystical conception as of a typical -divine individual including within his body a multitude of other -individuals. - -The organization of the ethico-religious society has been foreshadowed -in the chapter on the vocations. The society is to be divided into -vocational groups. In each vocational group is to be worked out the -specific ethical ideal of that vocation. In the groups the general -ethical philosophy of life is to be applied, tested and enriched. -The so-called ethical teachers will here come into fruitful contact -with those who are in touch at first hand with actual conditions, -and are cognizant of the difficulties to be surmounted in ethicizing -vocational standards. The members of the groups in democratic fashion -will contribute to the advancement, not only of ethical practice, but -of ethical knowledge, and thus become on their side teachers of the -teachers. The danger of the formation of an ethical clergy will be -averted. The teachers will be in certain respects the pupils of the -taught, and the relation be reciprocal, that is, ethical. - -Among the groups the vocational group of Mothers will occupy the -central place. The influence of women, especially of the mother group, -must penetrate the religious society through and through, for the -purpose of drawing the entire fellowship together into a coherent -unity. Women henceforth will take a deeper interest in the ethical -development of human society. A main factor, if not the only factor -in the ethical development of human society, is the elevation of the -vocational standards. The group of mothers will therefore be in close -touch with the other vocational groups in order to gain a knowledge of -the higher standards therein proposed, in order to appraise them, and -to inspire the growing generation with the devoted purpose to carry -these standards out in practice. - - -_C. The Worship or Public Manifestation of Religion_ - -The ideal of worship likewise must undergo transformation. It has -meant an act of homage toward a superior or supreme individual; it -has meant eulogistic affirmation of the power, wisdom, goodness, of -that individual; it has meant prayer or petition for help from that -individual. It has also meant spiritual edification. - -In all these various modes, religious worship heretofore has focused -attention on a single individual deity as one who embodies in himself -the sum of perfection. In thus presenting the ideal of perfection, it -has encouraged preference for unity at the expense of plurality. The -salient feature of the spiritual ideal sketched in this volume is the -affirmation, on ethical grounds, that plurality is of equal dignity -with unity, and hence that the divine ideal is to be represented not as -One, but as manifold; not as an individual, however supereminent, but -as an infinite holy community,—every human being being in his essential -nature a member of that community. - -But can worship be offered to the members of a holy community? In a -certain sense one might say, Yes, preëminently so, since worship may -be taken to mean Worthship, and the worth intrinsic in our fellowmen -is the object of our unceasing homage. At the same time very different -associations have gathered about the word. Public worship consists -largely of eulogistic singing, prayer, adoration, genuflexion, and -these are appropriate only to deity conceived as an individual. We -cannot even say with the Psalmist “the heavens declare the glory -of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork.” For though the -beauty and order apparent in Nature is one aspect of nature on which -we delight to dwell, yet we cannot disingenuously suppress the -counter evidence of disorder, ugliness and suffering which Nature -no less obtrudes on our sight. The argument from design implied in -the Psalmist’s words is no longer tenable. Certainly we cannot any -longer pray for material assistance as our forefathers did, or invoke -supernatural intervention in situations where human science and human -helpfulness are impotent. But worship also aims at ethical edification, -by holding up to the mind the moral ideal as an object of imitation, -and as a rebuke to man’s shortcomings. This indeed is its highest -function. Nevertheless the moral ideal, as we conceive it, is incapable -of being presented in the guise of an individual being, no matter by -what superlative language the limitation inseparable from individuality -be concealed. The bare attributes of omniscience and omnipotence are -abstract and convey no positive meaning whatever. In actual worship -a concrete image is invariably associated with the notion of the -individualized Deity, such as the Father image or the Christ image. And -as soon as this is done, the vast ethical ideal tends to shrink to the -dimensions of a human image; and instead of the ideal in its fullness, -only certain selected but inadequate aspects of ethical excellence are -presented to the worshiper. - -And yet in an ethico-religious society also the public manifestation of -religion is indispensable. Of what elements shall it consist? - -First, there are to be the public addresses by the teachers, having -for their main object to arouse or intensify a certain kind of -spiritual distress, and then as far as possible to appease it. Every -religion in my judgment originates in a particular kind of anguish, -and is an attempt to assuage it. The spiritual distress in which the -ethico-religious society has its origin is the agonizing consciousness -of tangled relations with one’s fellow-beings, and the inexpressible -longing to come into right relations with them. He is fit to be a -public teacher of this religion who profoundly experiences this -distress, who desires nothing so much as to cease to be, for his part, -a thorn in his neighbor’s side. We are that, each of us, inevitably. -The more this feeling is strong in him the more will he arouse similar -feelings in others, and thus awaken those who are spiritually asleep, -the self-righteous, the self-satisfied, and he will then indicate to -the utmost of his power, the way of relief. - -The specific ethical ideals of life are also to be presented in public -assemblies—the ideals of private ethics, of marriage, friendship, -and the rest. These expressions of the specific ideals, charged with -feeling, and taking on appropriate imagery, will gradually attain a -certain classical fitness—classical at least for a time—and may be used -as public readings. - -But is there a substitute for prayer? - -Among the advantages of prayer is often mentioned this: that in it -the soul reaches out towards its source, and in so doing wonderfully -recruits its spiritual energy. It finds, ethically speaking, its second -wind. It reaches down beneath its utmost strength to find an increment -of strength not previously at its disposal. The question is whether -this increment of strength cannot be obtained more surely and to better -purpose in another way, namely, by concentrating attention on the -spiritual need of the fellow-beings with whom we are in daily touch, -and by becoming aware to what an extent the finer nature imprisoned in -them is dependent for its release upon our exertions. The appeal of the -God in our neighbor is the substitute for the appeal in prayer to the -God in heaven, the call of the stifled spiritual nature in the men and -women at our side, is to draw out of us our utmost latent force, the -strengths underneath the strength. - -The common life we share with our fellow-members in the religious -society demands expression in song and in responsive services. The -high wave of this common life welling up in us, rising to the surface, -makes the glow of religious meetings, gives them fervor, and a touch of -rapture, not indeed the common life conceived as a uniform life, but as -the life we live in others, and they in us. - -The addresses that awaken and appease spiritual pain, the presentation -of the various modes of right living, the songs that lift the -individual above his private self and help him to live, not indeed -submerged, but rather spiritually accentuated in the life of the whole, -these are the public manifestations of ethical religion as I see them. -They will contribute to make of the society itself the symbol of its -ethical faith. We shall not have an external symbol like the cross: the -fellowship itself will be our symbol. - -There will also be festivals. Every religion must have its -festivals. In place of Baptism the solemn taking of responsibility -for the spiritual development of the child. A festival of vocational -initiation, like the ancient assumption of the _toga_. Festivals of -citizenship, inspired by the ideal of the national character as one to -be spiritually transformed. Festivals of humanity in connection with -the commemoration of great events in the history of our race and of -great leaders who were inspired in some degree by the ideal task of -humanity. Festivals of the seasons, deriving their significance from -the spiritual interpretation of the corresponding seasons of human -life,—youth, middle age, old age. And a solemn though not mournful -festival in commemoration of the departed. - -The religious assembly should itself be organized; the members of the -different vocational groups should be allocated to different parts -of the meeting hall, as were the Guilds in certain of the mediæval -cathedrals. - -Besides the public manifestations, the private religion will receive -attention. The religious society as a whole is to be the microcosm of -the spiritual macrocosm, a miniature model of the ideal society, but -care must also be taken for the private communion of the individual -with the spiritual presences which the ideal evokes. There should be a -special breviary for the sick, a Book of Consolation for the bereaved, -a Book of Friendship, a Book of direction for those who pass through -the experience of sin, and a book of preparation for those who face the -end. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[100] Among other ethical relations based on free election, friendship -is the most important. In a separate _Book of Friendship_ which I hope -to publish, I intend to review the ideals of friendship as they have -arisen from time to time in the history of civilized mankind—the ideal -of Pythagorean friendship, the ideals presented by Aristotle, Kant, -Emerson. And I shall endeavor to show in each case the connection -between the friendship ideal and the general philosophy of life. I -shall then set forth that ideal of friendship which is the corollary -of the spiritual conceptions outlined in this volume: the friend being -in my view one who assists spiritual development as a spectator. He -is the faithful mirror of his friend’s progress toward personality, -the benevolent yet incorruptible recorder and appraiser. By this token -friendship is distinguished from the interlocking relations such as -that between partners in marriage, vocational co-workers, etc. - -[101] In certain Ethical Societies abroad, the fear of encouraging -the rise of a new clericalism led to the plan of drawing for ethical -teachers on professors of universities, and others engaged in various -lines of practical activity. These persons could of necessity give -only the leavings of their time and thought to the complex questions -which they undertook to discuss; and the experiment, as might have been -foreseen, proved disastrous. - -[102] It has been said that the science of today lives only in -superseding the science of yesterday. Whether this be true of science -or not it is not true of religion. The religions of the past are not -merely superseded. There is much in them that is to be reinterpreted, -and thus perpetuated. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -THE LAST OUTLOOK ON LIFE - - -The view of life that man has on leaving it is the final test of his -philosophy of life. These are my thoughts: It is time to detach thyself -from this earth. The shadows are lengthening. Look around you and note -the strange changes that have taken place in the men and women of your -acquaintance. Those that you once knew in their prime are now old and -wrinkled,—and how many already dead! As you survey the procession of -life, how many vacant places are there in it! How many true and loyal -comrades have been swept away! Or go into the busy streets of the -city, and look at the multitude passing through them. You are still -one of this multitude. Presently you will drop out. There will perhaps -be a little ripple on the surface, and then the stream will flow on -as before. How curious is it to think that this frame of life which -sustains such high faculties should crumble into a little heap of dust -at the touch of the wand of death! Detach thyself, therefore, relax -thy hold by anticipation as thou shalt soon relax it actually. But -detachment does not mean cold inattention or unnatural shrinking from -the earthly scene, like that of the monk in his cell. Relax thy hold -on what is earthly in the earthly scene, and fix thy loving attention -all the more on what is _spiritually significant_ in it. Regard with -a friendly eye the beauty of the natural landscape around thee—yonder -lake and yonder noble mountain summit. They are earthly, yet are they -also hieroglyphs and symbols. - -Still more is this true of thy social relations. Detach thyself means -relax thy hold on what is transient in those relations. Cling all the -more firmly to what is spiritual in them. The earth is thy foundation, -thou art Antæus as long as thou remainest in contact with the earth. -Until the very last thou must lean for strength upon the earthly bases -and substrata. - -Consider the drive of the human race through the time and space world, -and its net result. Thou standest now on a high tower. Lean over -the parapet and peer as far out into the future as thou canst. Thou -standest as did Moses on Mount Pisgah. Strain thy eyes to catch sight -of the Promised Land. But remember that the Promised Land turned out -to be a land still of promise, not of fulfilment,—a land in which the -prophetic soul of Israel matured its visions of a fulfilment never on -earth to be attained. - -Remember that as thou art linked to thy ancestry, so art thou linked -to posterity. The future centuries of the human race are like the -future years of an individual. Thou art keenly interested in what may -happen hereafter to the race with which thou art interlinked. But the -race, like the individual, will be cut off and become extinct before -ever the ideal is reached. Remember, therefore, that the purpose for -which humanity exists is achieved at every moment in everyone who -appropriates the fruits of partial success and frustration. Whosoever -standing on the earth as a foundation builds up for himself the -spiritual universe attains the purpose of human existence. There is -indeed progress in the explicitness with which the spiritual ideal is -conceived, and we are immeasurably interested in the greater light to -be attained by our posterity. But the essential fruition of the contact -of the infinite that is in us with the finite world is achievable at -every moment in every human being. And this gives an entirely new -meaning to the spiritual gains achieved in solitude, which seem vain -because there are no witnesses. But neither will there be witnesses -when the last human beings perish on earth. The spiritual bravery of -the shipwrecked man who sinks on the lonely ocean springs from the -conviction that though the sea can overwhelm him there is that in -him greater than ocean’s immensity; a conviction achieved through -the experience of living in the life of others. The same is the gain -achieved by the sick man who lies in solitude like a helpless log in -the darkened room. The altruistic philosophy fails in accounting for -the moral grandeur that attaches to the spiritual victories gained in -silence and solitude. - -Face the terrors of life before you leave life. Be resolute to the -last not to cherish illusions. Face the terrors of life, the absence -of observable design, the cruelties, the ferocities. Think of William -Blake’s poem “The Tiger”: “Did he who made the lamb make thee?” In your -philosophy there is no question any longer of a Creator. Creation is an -attempt to explain the coexistence of the imperfect with the perfect, -to account for a lower stage in terms of a higher. The ultimate -inability of man to understand, to explain, is one of the principal -frustrations he meets with, is the crucifixion of man at the point of -his intellect. - -The radical incompetence of man to grasp with his intellect the -world as a “universe,” is to be faced by him and accepted without -qualification. It marks off this philosophy of life from those -philosophies and theologies which have attempted to explain the -universe, and which, while affecting humility, are the dupes of an -unwarranted self-confidence. Unqualified admission of the incompetence -of the human intellect to resolve the world riddle is the determining -factor in the more profound humility which characterizes the religion -of ethical experience. Agnosticism on the intellectual side is the very -condition of the transcending ethical conviction subsequently attained. -Without intellectual agnosticism there is no ethical certainty. - -Consider now frustration and its supreme outcome, or the various -points at which man is crucified. I have mentioned the intellectual -crucifixion, due to the incompetence of the mind to understand. I must -now speak of still more poignant experiences due to the incompetence of -man adequately to fulfill the moral law, or to carry out the spiritual -relation in finite terms. - -I have reached the bourne, or am very near it. The shadows lengthen, -the twilight deepens. I look back on my life and its net results. I -have seen spiritual ideals, and the more clearly I saw them, the wider -appeared the distance between them and the empirical conditions, and -the changes I could effect in those conditions. I have worked in -social reform, and the impression I have been able to make now seems to -me so utterly insignificant as to make my early sanguine aspirations -appear pathetic. I have seen the vision of democracy in the air, and on -the ground around me I have seen the sordid travesty of democracy—not -only in practice but in idea. I have caught the far outlook upon the -organization of mankind, the extension of the spiritual empire over the -earth by the addition to it of new provinces, and I do not find even -the faintest beginnings, or recognition of the task which the advanced -nations should set themselves. I scrutinize closely my relations -to those who have been closest to me,—and I find that I have been -groping in the dark with respect to their most real needs, and that my -faculty of divination has been feeble. I look lastly into my heart, -my own character, and the effort I have made to fuse the discordant -elements there, to achieve a genuine integrity there, and I find the -disappointment in that respect the deepest of all. - -These are the various points of my life at which I have undergone the -crucifixion. I am like Arnold Winkelried, who gathered the sheaf of -spears into his breast, and even pressed them inward, to make a way for -liberty. So do I press the sharp-pointed spears of frustration into my -breast to make way for spiritual liberty. For these cruel spears turn -into shafts of light, radiating outward along which my spirit travels, -building its final nest—the spiritual universe. - -Consider the new and profounder humility. In ethical experience is -revealed the plan of the spiritual relations, but the entities or -substances which are thus related are incognizable, unknowable. Did -I know them I should be able to solve the riddle of the universe. I -should know how it is that the finite exists side by side with the -infinite. But I cannot know. I cannot enter into the counsels of -the multiform godhead. There are the mighty powers that weave and -interweave behind the veil, but the veil between them and myself is -down, not to be lifted. Within the palace of light is the solemn and -serene assembly of the gods: I, man, stand at the gate. - -The world as we know it is itself the veil, the screen, that shuts out -the interplay, the weavings and the interweavings of the spiritual -universe. But at least at one point, in the ethical experience of man, -is the screen translucent. The plan of the spiritual relation is there -traced in outline. It is this plan that conveys the certainty as to -what verily exists beyond, within, beneath. - -As to my empirical self, I let go my hold on it. I see it perish with -the same indifference which the materialist asserts, for whom man is -but a compound of physical matter and physical force. It is the real -self, of which the empirical was the substratum, upon which I tighten -my hold. I do not assert immortality, since immortality, like creation, -is a bridge between the phenomenal and the spiritual levels. Creation -is the bridge at the beginning; immortality the bridge at the end. Were -I able to build the bridge, I should know. I do not affirm immortality. -I affirm the real and irreducible existence of the essential self. Or -rather, as my last act, I affirm that the ideal of perfection which -my mind inevitably conceives has its counterpart in the ultimate -reality of things, is the truest reading of that reality whereof man is -capable. I turn away from the thought of the self, even the essential -self, as if that could be my chief concern, toward the vaster infinite -whole in which the self is integrally preserved. I affirm that there -verily is an eternal divine life, a best beyond the best I can think -or imagine, in which all that is best in me, and best in those who are -dear to me, is contained and continued. In this sense _I bless the -universe. And to be able to bless the universe in one’s last moments -is the supreme prize which man can wrest from life’s struggles, life’s -experience._ - -I look back upon my life once more, and am grateful for the eternal -worth which it was permitted me in this frail vessel of my mortal -existence to hold, for the shimmer of the spiritual reality of things -which I was permitted to see; grateful especially to those who loved -me, and whom I was permitted to love, and who were to me in some -measure revealers of the eternal life. - -Consider lastly the peace that passeth understanding. Now, if ever, -this peace should descend upon me. There is a kind of peace that is -accessible to the understanding, and there is the peace that passeth -understanding. The peace that can be understood is that which consists -in the relief of pain. It arises in various ways. After an acute attack -of physical pain how like balm is felt the succeeding absence of pain. -After a prolonged sickness, when the convalescent takes his first walk, -what a sweet tranquillity fills his mind! There is also the mental -relief that comes when some danger has been safely passed; the peace -of the sheltered fireside to one who has passed through a storm. Again, -there is the peace that follows pecuniary anxiety, or the removal of -some carking care, as when an erring son is reclaimed, or an estranged -wife or husband is found anew. - -But the peace that passeth understanding is that which comes when the -pain is _not_ relieved, which subsists in the midst of the painful -situation, suffusing it, which springs out of the pain itself, which -shimmers on the crest of the wave of pain, which is the spear of -frustration transfigured into the shaft of light. - -It is upon those we love that we must anchor ourselves spiritually in -the last moments. The sense of interconnectedness with them stands -out vividly by way of contrast at the very moment when our mortal -connection with them is about to be dissolved. And the intertwining of -our life with theirs, the living in the life that is in them, is but -a part of our living in the infinite manifold of the spiritual life. -The thought of this, as apprehended, not in terms of knowledge, but in -_immediate experience_, begets the peace that passeth understanding. -And it is upon the bosom of that peace that we can pass safely out of -the realm of time and space. - - - - -APPENDIX - - - - -APPENDIX I - -SPIRITUAL SELF-DISCIPLINE - - -The preceding volume in its entirety and in every part is nothing else -than a book of spiritual self-discipline. Every religion presents to -its followers as real objects that the eye has not seen. The certainty -of the existence of these objects, religious certainty, religious -conviction, springs from one or other kind of need and distress. The -object that the eye has not seen is believed in because it corresponds -to that need, and relieves that distress. Furthermore, the conviction -is strengthened, the certainty intensified, by two methods: (1) -elaboration of the ideas presented; (2) performing acts in the doing -of which the existence of the objects is presupposed. Thus the idea of -the Heavenly Father corresponds to the childlike need of protection. -The elaboration of this idea in theological systems strengthens its -hold, every idea being powerful as an active force in proportion as it -is worked out in detail and linked up with other ideas. And ceremonies, -prayers, acts of worship in the doing of which the reality of the -Father-God is presupposed, strengthen the belief in him. Conduct is -one of the chief sources of belief. The more frequently a devout -Roman Catholic prays to the Virgin Mary, the more firmly will he be -convinced that she exists and hears him. These features are common to -all religion: unseen objects are presented as real; the belief in their -reality is augmented by elaboration of the ideas; and above all their -hold is reinforced by practice founded on and presuming the reality of -the ideas. - -The unseen object which the religion of spiritual experience presents -is the unique personality. The lines along which the ideas are to be -elaborated have been sketched in the above. Conduct based on the -presumption that the divine nature exists in every human being is the -principal means of fortifying that conviction, and this presumption -itself rests on the fundamental fact of worth. - -The difference in rank between the various religions depends on the -kind of need which they seek to satisfy. It may be physical, as when -the worshiper prays for large herds and fruitful crops. It may be the -urging of a passion, as when a man prays for revenge on his enemies. -And it may be ethical. And if ethical, it may be purely ethical, or -ethical with non-ethical elements admixed. A religion is neither -approved nor condemned because it satisfies a need. The judgment passed -on it depends on the kind of need it undertakes to satisfy. - -Seek to raise the plus traits to the Nth degree. Seek through spiritual -sex interaction to release the spiritual life in the child. Bring -to birth in thyself the idea of the state, etc. Every chapter of -this volume contains some direction as to the lines of conduct to be -followed. The principal self-discipline consists in the effort to -follow these lines. - -But experience tells us that the effort may be hindered or helped in -certain ways. I shall mention a few of the helps and hindrances: - -Physical and Mental _Athleticism_ are helps to Moral Athleticism. -Ethics is a science of energetics. Bodily and mental energy is -favorable to ethical energizing. By mental energy I understand -especially the habit of vigorously attacking complex and difficult -mental problems. - -Right _Asceticism_ is related to Ethical Development. I exclude -self-abnegation and self-repression practiced as drill apart from any -particular occasion requiring them, holding that self-repression should -always be incidental to self-expression. This applies especially to the -hygiene of the sex passion. A positive ideal of the sex relation, as in -marriage, is an invaluable help in ennobling and thereby restraining -the passion. - -The Ethical Life is the supremely Planful Life. There is a hierarchy of -ends of which the ethical is the apex. The ethical end is the supreme -end to which all others are to be planfully subordinated. The habit of -conducting one’s life planfully is favorable to ethical behavior. I say -planfully, not pedantically, due regard being always had to spontaneity. - -Among hindrances to Ethical development may be mentioned the tendency -to be satisfied with the _minor perfections_. The better is the -greatest enemy of the best. The disproportionate value set on the -embellishments of life is but one illustration of this point. - -A great hindrance to the spiritual life is the necessity under which -we lie of restricting our actual ethical relations to a _few persons_. -We cannot extend our influence to the millions of China and India. -We cannot even deeply influence a considerable number of our fellow -citizens. On ethical grounds we do acknowledge the claims of each -individual, of all these myriads of human beings. Yet as far as any -actual good we can do them is concerned, we are powerless, and must -leave them to their fate. The tragic aspect of life comes home to us -sharply at this point. Intensity must take the place of extensity. -Intensive spiritual relations with a few will teach us at least to -conceive worthily of those personalities whom we cannot directly -affect, and to invest them in idea with the honor which is their due. - -Intimate spiritual relations with a few will also counteract the -unethical habit of labeling those with whom we come into casual -contact according to the special functions they happen to exercise. -Thus a letter-carrier is apt to be thought of as an animated machine -to carry letters, a stenographer as a kind of animated machine to -take dictation, the servant in the house a machine to render physical -service. The more complete our appreciation of personality is in the -case of the few, the more we shall be impelled to transfer the concept -of personality, at least in its outlines, to all others. In this way -our friendships, our close relations, will not restrict our ethical -horizon. In the narrower circle we shall engender those ideas which -in thought at least we can carry out to the farthest limits of human -society. - -But among the hindrances to ethical practice the two most conspicuous -must not be omitted. They are _pity_ and _terror_, pity for the pain -suffered by others, fear of pain for oneself. Aristotle regarded it -as the high function of the tragic drama to liberate men from these -disturbing factors. The two are combined and in consequence exacerbated -to an extreme degree in those situations where the pain suffered by -another person is at the same time poignantly felt as one’s own pain. -And the anguish felt in seeing the physical suffering of another is -even exceeded in witnessing the moral degradation of another, as of an -erring son or an apparently irreclaimable husband or wife. The doctrine -of frustration as explained in this volume is intended to show the way -of relief in such situations. But it is only by not shirking the pain, -by permitting it fully to penetrate, by uncovering the breast entirely -to the entrance of the pointed spear that we shall have the experience -of the transformation of it into the shaft of light. - - - - -APPENDIX II[103] - -THE EXERCISE OF FORCE IN THE INTEREST OF FREEDOM - - -Force is a moral adiaphoron. The stigma attaching to the use of force -belongs rather to its abuse. The employment of force is good or bad -according as the ends for which it is used are good or bad. - -The precept of non-resistance in the Sermon on the Mount is to be -understood as a piece of ethical irony. - -The right, or to be more explicit, the duty, of society to coerce -individual members of it rests on the same ground and holds within -the same limits as the duty of the individual to coerce himself. -Self-coercion depends on the difference in the quality of one’s -impulses, on the choice one is bound to make between competitive ends. -Self-coercion is of two kinds: stimulative and repressive; stimulative -to overcome inertia, repressive to subject wrong to right impulses. - -He who denies the duty of self-coercion, to be consistent, must -fall back on the position of the Cynics. For the Cynics were indeed -consistent. They asserted not only the right of the individual to be -free from outside compulsion, but also the right of each individual -moment of the individual’s life to be lived without regard or -subjection to future moments. Hence they rejected civilization and -its tasks, inasmuch as the prosecution of any task involves the -subordination of the present to the content of some future moment. - -But if the coercion of a man by himself be admitted, it follows that -the exercise of force upon a man by society must in principle be -likewise admitted. For we are social by nature; we take an interest in -the achievement by each one of his ends, and we regard such achievement -as a social-benefit. - -As to the limits within which outside interference is to be permitted -and welcomed, these can best be ascertained by fastening attention -upon the end to be attained. And here the positive conception of -freedom seems to be the most helpful,—freedom defined as the release -in each one of his essential self, that is, of his distinctive gift -and capability, or of that in him which is unique or most nearly so. A -society in which such valuable contributions were elicited from each -would be the ideal society. Stimulative and repressive social coercion -are justified in so far as they provoke energy and check disturbing -impulses,—always of course without discouraging spontaneity, which is -the very good to be secured. - -The antithesis of reason and force common in discussions of this -subject seems misleading and inadequate; since reason is a faculty of -inference and not of preference, has to do with the adapting of means -to ends, and does not of itself afford guidance in the choice of ends. - -The concept of freedom as defined is more illuminating. Let freedom and -force be contrasted, not reason and force. - -The idea of law that would follow from what has been said may be -illustrated by comparing the action of law with that of automatism -in the human body. The system of co-ordinations by which we learn to -walk, or acquire any kind of skill, such as that of performing on a -musical instrument, is at first painfully and consciously acquired. -Consciousness superintends every step in the process. But after a -time the sequences reel off automatically. Consciousness retires from -the field, ascends to a higher plane, and devotes itself to more -interesting and significant business. Law, taking it in its broadest -sense, may be regarded as the automatic machinery of freedom. It is -the system of stimulations and repressions which the experience of -mankind at any given time has found conducive to the attainment of the -superior ends of life. In the minds of the more advanced members of -the community repressive laws like the prohibitions of murder, theft, -etc., have already become automatic. Such a thing as questioning or -transgressing these laws never once in a lifetime occurs to them. (Of -the stimulative laws, such as the requirement to pay taxes in support -of the progressive interests of society, the same is not yet true.) As -regards the backward members of society, however, the repressive laws -are educative. Just as in certain diseases the convalescent needs to -acquire anew the art of walking, which his neighbors exercise without -thinking, so the backward members of society have to learn painfully -those habits of repression which for others have sunk below the -threshold of consciousness. - -Social compulsion therefore may be defined as discipline in the -interest of positive freedom. We may expect that in future this -salutary kind of compulsion will go to even much greater lengths than -it has yet gone. Society as organized in the state has undoubtedly -the right to interfere in the choice of the sexes by prohibiting the -marriage of persons afflicted with infectious disease. If the study of -human character could ever be so far developed as to determine what -kind of temperaments are radically incompatible with one another (a -bare throw in the air of course), it would be within the province of -the state to prohibit the conjugal union of such temperaments, and -thus to prevent the disastrous effects on real freedom which such -incompatibilities are apt to cause. - -I am well aware of the perils of this point of view. There is a -brutal factor in the action of society, as in that of individuals. A -given community is apt to mistake its prejudices for principles, its -torpor for conservatism, its superstitions for spirituality. Such -apprehensions as those that weighed on the mind of John Stuart Mill as -set forth in his _Essay on Liberty_ are not to be lightly dismissed. -And yet the main trend of his argument was plainly determined by an -individualistic conception of liberty which many of us no longer share. -It is safe to say that on the whole the benefits of coercion outweigh -the detriments. We have only to picture to ourselves a state of society -in which these coercions should not exist to realize that this is so. -The dangers are real, but are due to the abuse of force and not to the -exercise of it under the controlling idea of positive freedom which is -here proposed. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[103] A paper read before the Fourth Conference on Legal and Social -Philosophy at Columbia University, November, 1915. (Reprinted from the -_International Journal of Ethics_, April, 1916, pp. 420-423.) - - - - -INDEX - - - Achilles, 210 - - Africa, exploitation of, 187f, 335 - - Altruism, 79, 218, 220, 256 - - Antæus, 355 - - ἄπαξ λεγόμενον, 228 - - A priori knowledge, 105f, 111 - - Architecture, 286n - - Aristotle, 105, 127, 168n, 190, 281, 305, 319, 365 - - Ark of the Covenant, 77 - - Arnold, Matthew, 10, 298 - - Arnold von Winkelried, 358 - - Art, relation to Ethics, 277f; - limitations, 287n; - students of, 296 - - Asceticism, 363 - - - Bacon, _On Studies_, 10 - - Baptism, 353 - - Beatrice, 170 - - Beauty, 281f - - Bereavement, 64, 162f - - Bergson, 108, 131n - - Blackstone, 185 - - Blake, William, 356 - - Bloch, 242 - - Bluntschli, 327f - - Buddha, 16, 32, 199, 347 - - - Cæsar Borgia, 172 - - Cana, feast at, 206 - - Categorical Imperative, 75f; - and hypothetical, 80 - - Causality, “prejudice of,” 110f, 136, 141, 171 - - Christianity, an estimate of, 30-42; - other-worldliness of, 140, 268; - national, 321; - forced on the East, 331 - - Church, 347 - - Citizenship, 322 - - Confucius, 16, 31, 299 - - Congo, atrocities in, 330, 335, 338 - - Conscience, origin of, 78 - - Copernicus, 141 - - Creation, doctrine of, 139, 356 - - Cromer, Lord, 331n - - Crucifixion, of man, 357f - - Cynics, 366 - - - Dante, 198n, 283 - - Darwinism, 59, 78f, 120 - - “Death in Life,” 225 - - Decalogue, 198 - - Democracy, ethical aspect of, 125, 143; - political, 319n; - evils in, 321, 330n; - new conception of, 340n - - Dependence, 226 - - Dilke, Sir Charles, 335n - - Discipline, 244f - - Duality, of character traits, 208f - - Duty, in Kant, 75f; - conflicts of, 317f - - - Education, state, 252; - as vocation, 291f; - for adults, 301f; - moral, 302n - - Edwards, Jonathan, 163 - - Egoism, 220 - - Elisha, the prophet, 61 - - Emerson, estimate of, 27-29; - _Essay on Love_, 164n - - Ends, proximate and ultimate, 50-51; - in Kant, 74, 89; - instrumental, 138, 166, 229f, 268; - unattainable in finite world, 149f, 158; - hierarchy of, 363 - - Enemies, 205; - intellectual, 207n - - Erastianism, 342 - - Ethical Culture, Society for, 58, 346n; - School, 58n, 276 - - Ethics, as non-violation of personality, 7, 35, 54; - individuality of, 24; - as science of ends, 40, 50f; - and social reform, 48; - relation to other subjects, 66; - Kantian, 73f; - an independent discipline, 84f, 132f; - energizing quality of, 93, 101, 135n, 221, 228, 274, 363; - contrast with physical science, 93, 99; - its peculiar manifold, 109f, 114f, 126, 132, 141; - verification in, 112; - and social structure, 191; - and empirical traits, 212f, 223f, 242f; - the law of levitation, 222; - as science of relations, 233; - and industry, 272f; - and art, 277f; - and nationality, 325f; - historical systems of, 346; - and worship, 349, 352 - - Evil, problem of, 32-34; - immediate reform, 49; - contrasted with sin, 172f - - - Family, as empirical group, 133, 249f; - spiritual view of, 251f - - Festivals, religious, 353 - - Feudalism, 142 - - Force, as ethical discipline, 356f; - and freedom, 366f - - Forgiveness, 202f - - Fouillée, Alfred, 209, 324 - - Freedom, 148f, 300, 306, 366f - - Freud, 79 - - Friendship, 234f - - Froebel, 295 - - Frustration, in marriage, 62f, 235; - in bereavement, 64; - in intellectual ambition, 65f, 227; - cosmic, 67; - in social betterment, 69; - in achieving ethical uniqueness, 118; - and ethical plan, 137, 140, 147, 150f; - mission of, 152f, 165, 195, 365; - in science, 265; - in vocation, 269; - final realization of, 356f - - “Functional Finalities,” 106, 111f - - - Galileo, 97n - - Gang Loyalty, 77 - - George, Henry, 44 - - Goethe, 67n, 176n, 198n, 220, 243, 285 - - God, idea of, 136, 139, 362; - submission to will of, 156; - worship, 350 - - Greek, art, 16n; - philosophy, 105; - treatment of suffering, 155, 166; - idea of evil, 172; - social system, 190f; - epic, 283; - education, 299 - - Grotius, 332 - - - Hague Conference, 326 - - Happiness, 227f - - Harnack, Adolf, 39 - - Hebrews, sex purity, 7; - religion, 14-26; - as elect people, 19; - their mission, 21f; - and problem of evil, 33 - - Hegel, 139, 343 - - Helmholtz, 196, 267 - - History, value of, 247n; - ethical aim of, 275f - - Humboldt, William von, 126 - - Hume, 111 - - - Ilion, 283 - - Imagination, 267 - - Immortality, 139, 166f, 359 - - Individual, the, 246, 250, 295, 319f - - Industry, organization of, 271, 274; - representation of, 312 - - Insanity, 161n - - Intellect, 227 - - Internationalism, 325f; - obstacles to, 332f; - organized, 338n - - Isaiah, 22 - - - Jerusalem, siege of, 33 - - Jesus, as exemplar, 25; - his teaching, 30-42; - and the problem of evil, 33f; - and socialism, 37; - attitude toward sin, 204n, 205 - - Jews, 347 - - Justice, social, 194f; - commercial, 215f; - ethical, 217; - legal, 289 - - - Kant, individualistic ethics, 9; - and holiness idea, 59; - Critique of Ethical Ideal, 73f, 137f; - his pre-occupation with physical science, 84f, 88, 100, 133; - doctrine of ends, 74, 80, 87, 100; - _Critique of Pure Reason_, 84, 95, 102; - not a pure rationalist, 95f; - _a priori_ doctrine, 111; - doctrine of worth, 119; - and God idea, 126f; - and ontological argument, 129; - on marriage, 257 - - Keats, 282 - - - Labor, remuneration of, 193 - - Lange, Albert, _Die Arbeiterfrage_, 10; - _History of Materialism_, 11 - - Law, 290, 307; - international, 332f; - divine, 345; - and freedom, 367 - - Lawyer, vocation of, 289 - - Lear, King, 282 - - Leibnitz, 196, 247n, 332 - - Lessing, 150 - - Life, right to, 179f - - Louis XIV, 316 - - “Lycidas,” 282 - - - Manifold, of time and space, 96; - in physical science, 107f; - ethical, 109f, 132, 134, 141 - - Marcus Aurelius, 120 - - Marriage, and happiness, 61f; - _tabu_ notion of, 77; - spiritual relation in, 163, 258f; - monogamic, 251, 254; - infelicitous, 257; - state control of, 307 - - Marx, Karl, _Das Kapital_, 44; - type of socialism, 45f - - Materialism, of middle class, 52 - - Mayer, Robert, 196 - - Mill, J. S., 368 - - Mommsen, 276n - - Monasticism, 40 - - Monotheism, 20f - - Moral Law, as worshipful, 10, 12; - obligation to obey, 75; - universality of, 177; - and worship, 350 - - More, Sir Thomas, 205n - - Moses, 26, 355 - - - National Character, 324; - sins of, 330, 336f - - Nature, exploitation of, 186f - - Necessity, applied to ethics, 85f; - Kantian, 88 - - Newton, 84, 94, 196 - - Nietzsche, 47, 152, 214 - - Non-resistance, doctrine of, 182 - - _Noumena_, Kantian, 127n - - _Numen_, spiritual, 220, 224, 228, 231 - - - _Œdipus Rex_, 173, 281n - - Ontological Argument, 129f - - Ostwald, 94 - - - Pantheism, 8n - - Paul, St., 38 - - Peace, spiritual, 360 - - Pekin, 330 - - Personal Factor in Ethics, 3-6 - - Personality, 197, 222, 247, 321 - - Pestalozzi, 295 - - Peters, Karl, 335 - - Philistinism, 52 - - Philosophy, monism and pluralism, 110 - - Plagiarism, 197 - - Plato, transcendent vision of, 16; - his idea of justice, 31; - ethics of, 74, 120, 132; - influence of, 198n; - and eugenics, 214; - and art, 286; - and the State, 305, 313, 319 - - Poverty, evils of, 44f; - relief of, 51 - - Pragmatism, 106n, 136n - - Prayer, 351f - - Property, its rights, 185f; - as a social concept, 189 - - Ptolemy, 105n - - Public Good, 314 - - Punishment, its object, 176, 203; - capital, 204 - - - Race Prejudice, 236n - - Ranke, 247n - - “Reality-producing functions,” 114f, 124n, 126, 130, 132, 265 - - Religion, Types of, 363 - - Religious Society, 341f; - its teaching, 343f; - organization, 347f; - worship, 349f - - Repentance, 203f - - Representation, in State, 310n, 322; - proportional, 322 - - Reputation, right to, 196f - - Responsibility, definition, 173f; - for others’ life, 180; - for poverty and suffering, 183f - - Reverence, three-fold, 241f, 250; - in family, 253; - in artist, 284f; - in education, 292; - among nations, 324 - - Reymond, Dubois, 128 - - Rousseau, _Confessions_, 6; - idea of State, 305 - - - Schiller, 285n - - School, 292; - and home, 294; - objects of, 295f; - prevocational, 298; - moral education in, 303; - self-government in, 304 - - Schopenhauer, 120, 131n - - Science, as vocation, 263f; - and internationalism, 334 - - Self-discipline, 362f - - Self-sacrifice, 212f - - Sermon on the Mount, 4, 198, 366 - - Service, 226f - - Shelley, 282 - - Sin, 171f, 202f - - Social reform, 48f; - fallacies of, 53f, 268; - spiritual view of, 56; - its object, 261; - various schemes of, 273; - ethical program of, 275n - - Socialism, 11, 37, 43f, 56n, 196, 271f, 274 - - Socrates, 122 - - Sophocles, 173 - - Spencer, Herbert, 94 - - Spinoza, 8 - - Spiritual Nature, 148, 224, 231 - - State, ethical conception of, 305f; - sovereignty of, 308f; - organization of, 310f; - as lawmaker, 313; - duty towards, 319; - and individual, 319n; - international relations, 326f; - and religion, 342f - - Stephen, the Martyr, 38 - - Stevenson, R. L., 208n, 211n - - Stoicism, 154, 159 - - Suffering, various attitudes toward, 154f; - ethical attitude, 159f - - Sympathy, as ethical motive, 49f, 99n, 156 - - - _Tabus_, 77, 179 - - Tariff, 314, 315n - - Tasks of Life, 268 - - Thomas à Kempis, 258 - - Tolstoy, 184 - - Trade, international, 334f; - slave, 335 - - Tyndall, 268 - - Tyrrel, Father, 39, 150n - - - Universe, spiritual, 125f, 134; - last blessing of, 360 - - University, ideal of, 298f; - American, 300f - - - Value, _vs._ Worth, 117n - - Vattel, 332 - - Verification in ethics, 112, 118, 135n - - Virtue, 211 - - Vocation, influence on development, 58f; - _vs._ occupation, 260f; - an ethical classification, 262f; - practical, 270f; - educational, 289f; - represented in State, 310f, 322 - - - Wages and wage-earners, 194, 215n, 216 - - Waitz, _Anthropologie_, 209 - - War, when justified, 182f - - Wealth, 51; - stewardship of, 192 - - Whole, ideal of, in ethics, 100f, 114f, 121 - - Women, in State, 311; - in religious societies, 348 - - Wordsworth, 282 - - Worship, religious, 349 - - Worth, in human personality, 57, 68, 70, 224n, 247; - Kant’s doctrine of, 82f, 89f, 101; - ethical justification of, 91f, 98n; - attributed to man, 101n, 102f; - as member of ethical manifold, 117, 119, 121; - _vs._ value, 117n; - homage to, 349, 360 - - - Zeno, 108 - - Zionism, 24 - - Zoroaster, 15 - - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of An ethical philosophy of life -presented in its main outline, by Felix Adler - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE *** - -***** This file should be named 60068-0.txt or 60068-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/0/0/6/60068/ - -Produced by Turgut Dincer, Les Galloway and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from images made available by the -HathiTrust Digital Library.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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