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diff --git a/old/60036-0.txt b/old/60036-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index c2064b9..0000000 --- a/old/60036-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10996 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Clemenceau, by H. M. Hyndman - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Clemenceau - The Man and His Time - -Author: H. M. Hyndman - -Release Date: August 1, 2019 [EBook #60036] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CLEMENCEAU *** - - - - -Produced by David T. Jones, Al Haines, Ron Tolkien & the -online Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net - - - - - - - - - - - CLEMENCEAU - - - - - _ By the same Author_:-- - England for All - The Historical Basis of Socialism - Commercial Crises of the Nineteenth Century - The Bankruptcy of India - The Record of an Adventurous Life - Further Reminiscences - The Future of Democracy - Etc. - -[Illustration: GEORGES CLEMENCEAU - -1918] - - - - - CLEMENCEAU - THE MAN AND HIS TIME - - BY H · M · HYNDMAN - - GRANT RICHARDS, LTD. - ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON, W.C.2 - - - - - _First Printed_ 1919 - - Printed in Great Britain by W. H. Smith & Son. - The Arden Press, Stamford Street, London. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - CHAP. PAGE - INTRODUCTION 7 - - I. EARLY LIFE 13 - - II. PARIS UNDER THE EMPIRE 22 - - III. DOWNFALL AND RECONSTRUCTION 29 - - IV. THE COMMUNE 41 - - V. CLEMENCEAU THE RADICAL 53 - - VI. FROM GAMBETTA TO CLEMENCEAU 64 - - VII. THE TIGER 80 - - VIII. THE RISE AND FALL OF BOULANGER 95 - - IX. PANAMA AND DRAGUIGNAN 106 - - X. PHILOSOPHER AND JOURNALIST 127 - - XI. CLEMENCEAU AS A WRITER 141 - - XII. CLEMENCEAU AND THE DREYFUS AFFAIR 151 - - XIII. THE DREYFUS AFFAIR (II) 162 - - XIV. AS ADMINISTRATOR 171 - - XV. STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF CLEMENCEAU 202 - - XVI. END OF CLEMENCEAU'S MINISTRY 220 - - XVII. CLEMENCEAU AND GERMANY 233 - - XVIII. THE GREAT WAR 247 - - XIX. THE ENEMY WITHIN 257 - - XX. "LA VICTOIRE INTÉGRALE" 281 - - XXI. CONCLUSION 295 - - - - - INTRODUCTION - - -I began to write this book in June. We were then holding our breath as -we looked on, after the disasters of Cambrai and St. Quentin, upon the -British troops still fighting desperately against superior numbers and -defending the Channel Ports "with their backs to the wall" and barely -left with room to manœuvre. The enemy was at the same time seriously -threatening Amiens and Epernay, and the possible withdrawal of the -French Government from Paris was being again discussed. It was a trying -four months on both sides of the Channel. But England and France never -despaired of the future. Both nations were determined to fight on to -the last. - -In July came the second great victory of the Marne, followed by the -wonderful triumphant advance of the Allied Armies all along the line, -side by side with our brethren of the United States, who were pouring -into France at the rate of 300,000 men a month. And now I finish when -the all-important matter of discussion is what shall be the terms of -permanent peace imposed upon Germany, what shall be the punishment -inflicted upon her and, so far as is possible, the compensation exacted -from her for her unforgivable crimes against our common humanity. The -transformation scene of the huge world war within four months has been -one of the most astounding episodes in the history of mankind, and the -tremendous struggle on the West Front has proved, as it was bound to -prove from the first, the crisis of the whole conflict. - -Throughout the terrible period from November, 1917, when for the -second time in his long political career he took office as Premier -of the French Republic, Georges Clemenceau has borne the full burden -of political responsibility in his war-worn and devastated country. -It has been no light task for any man, especially for one within -easy hail of eighty years of age. When he became President of Council -and Minister of War the prospect of anything approaching to complete -success seemed remote indeed. It was a thankless post he assumed, and -neither friends nor enemies believed at first that physically, mentally -or politically could he bear the strain and overcome the intrigues -which were at once set on foot against him. But those who had the -advantage of knowing Clemenceau well took a much more hopeful view of -his chances of remaining Prime Minister until the close of the war. -His mind as well as his body has been in strict training all his life. -The one is as alert and as vigorous as the other. In the course of his -stirring career his lightness of heart and gaiety of spirit, his power -of taking the most discouraging events as part of the day's work, have -carried him triumphantly through many a difficulty. Personally, I felt -confident that nothing short of unforeseen disease, or a bomb from the -foreign or domestic enemy, would bring him down before he had done his -work. For below his exterior vigour and his brilliancy of conversation -he possesses the most relentless determination that ever inspired a -human being. Moreover, a Frenchman may be witty and light-hearted and -very wise at the same time. The world of the Middle Ages found that out. - -I read, therefore, with some amusement in Mrs. Humphry Ward's recent -book of Victorian Recollections that, having met Clemenceau at dinner, -in the 'eighties, she came to the conclusion that he was "too light a -weight to ride such a horse as the French democracy." A very natural -mistake, no doubt, for one of us staid and solemn Victorians to make, -according to the young cynics and jesters of to-day who gird at us! -It is precisely this inexhaustible fund of animal spirits and his -never-failing cheerfulness and brilliancy which have given Clemenceau -the power over France which he possesses to-day. Frenchmen have felt -the more assured confidence in themselves and their future when they -saw, day after day, their own representative and ruler full of go and -of belief in himself at the time when the issue for them all was -hanging in the balance. No real leader of men can ever afford to be a -pessimist. He must assume a certitude if he have it not. There was no -need for Clemenceau to assume anything. It was all there. - -I have known this great Frenchman at many critical stages in his -exciting life. What I most admire about him, is that he is always the -same man, no matter what his personal position at the moment may be. -Never excessively elated: never by any chance cast down. Good or bad -fortune, success or failure, made no difference to him. The motto of -the Tenth Legion might well be taken as his own. "_Utrinque paratus_" -has been the watchword of this indefatigable and undaunted political -warrior throughout. It is well to recall, also, that he has invariably -told his country the full truth about the situation as it appeared -to him at the time, alike in opposition and in office, as deputy, as -senator, and as journalist at large. - -Beginning his political career as the intimate friend and almost pupil -of the out-and-out Radical Republican, Etienne Arago, a sympathiser -with the nobler men of the Commune, whom he endeavoured to save from -the ruthless vengeance of the reactionaries headed by Thiers, he had -previously voted at Bordeaux in the minority of genuine Republicans -who were in favour of continuing the war against Germany when all but -enthusiastic patriots held that further resistance was hopeless. Many a -time of late those events of _l'Année Terrible_ must have come back to -his mind during these still more terrible four years. His attitude now -is but the continuation and fulfilment of the policy he advocated then. -Thereupon, five years devoted to service on the Municipal Council of -Paris and to gratuitous ministrations as a doctor to the poor of one of -the poorest districts of the French metropolis: a continuous endeavour -to realise, in some degree, by political action, the practical ends -for which the Communards had so unfortunately and injudiciously -striven. Then political work again on the floor of the Assembly at one -of the most stirring periods of French history: supporting Gambetta -vigorously in his fight as the head of the Republican Party against -the dangerous reactionism of the Duc de Broglie and Marshal MacMahon, -and opposing and denouncing the fiery orator whom he succeeded as -the leader of the Left, when that statesman adopted trimming and -opportunism as his political creed. - -The long fight against colonisation by conquest, the exposure of -shameless traffic in decorations, the support and overthrow of -Boulanger, the Panama scandal, the denunciation of the alliance with -despotic Russia, the advocacy of a close understanding with England. -In each and all of these matters Clemenceau was well to the front. -Then came the crash of exclusion from political life, due to the many -enemies he had made by his inconvenient honesty and bitter tongue -and pen. Once more, after the display of almost unequalled skill and -courage as a journalist, exceptionally manifested in the championship -of Dreyfus, a return to political life and unexpected acceptance of -office. - -From first to last Clemenceau has been a stalwart Republican and a -thoroughgoing democratic politician of the advanced Left, with strong -tendencies to Socialism. These tendencies I begged him more than once -to turn into actual realities and to join, or at least to act in -complete harmony with, the Socialists. This seemed possible towards -the close of the Dreyfus affair. But I must admit here that, much as -I regret that Socialism has never enjoyed the full advantage of his -services, Clemenceau, as an avowed member of the Socialist Party, could -not have played the glorious part for France as a whole which he has -played since the beginning of the war. It was far more important, at -such a desperate crisis, to carry with him the overwhelming majority of -his countrymen, including even the reactionaries, than to act with a -minority that has shown itself at variance with the real sentiments of -the Republic, when France was fighting for her existence. - -That Clemenceau has, at one time or another, made great mistakes is -beyond dispute. It could not be otherwise with a man of his character -and temperament. But this, as he himself truly writes me, is "all of -the past." At no moment, in any case, has he ever failed to do his best -for the greatness, the glory, the dignity of France as they presented -themselves to his mind. This is incontestable. In the following pages -I have endeavoured not to write a biography of the statesman who has -been constantly in public life for more than fifty years, but to give -a study of the growth of a commanding personality, who is an honour to -his country, and of the surroundings in which his great faculties were -developed. - -[Illustration: page of letter] - -[Illustration: page of letter] - -[Illustration: page of letter] - - - - - [Translation] - - - Le Président du Conseil, Ministere de la Guerre. Paris, July 1st, 1918. - - Dear Mr. Hyndman, - - I can really only thank you for your too flattering letter, inspired - by our old friendship. I have nothing to say about myself, except - that I am doing my best, with the feeling that it will never be - enough. France is making incredible sacrifices every day. No effort - will be considered too high a price to ensure the triumph of a nobler - humanity. Success is certain when all free peoples are in array - against the last convulsions of savagery. - - In so vast a drama, my dear friend, my personality does not count. - Whether I was right or wrong at this time or that interests me no - longer, since it all belongs to the past. I have kept nothing of what - I have said or written. It is impossible for me to furnish you with - details or to mention anyone who would be able to do so. I can but - express to you my gratitude for your friendly intention. I desire only - to witness the day of the great victory, then I shall be rewarded far - beyond my merits, especially if you add thereto the continuance of - your fraternal feelings towards myself. - - Very affectionately yours, - - G. CLEMENCEAU. - - - [_This letter was written seventeen days before the commencement of - the great Franco-British offensive._] - - - - - CHAPTER I - - EARLY LIFE - - -We are all accustomed to think of La Vendée as that Province of France -which is most deeply imbued with tradition, legend and religion. Even -in this period of almost universal scepticism and free thought, the -peasants of La Vendée keep tight hold of their ancient ideas, in which -the pagan superstitions of long ago are curiously interwoven with the -fading Catholicism of to-day. Nowhere in France are the ceremonies of -the Church more devoutly observed; nowhere, in spite of the spread -of modern education, are the people as a whole more attached to the -creed of their forefathers. Here whole crowds of genuine believers can -still display that fervour of religious enthusiasm which moved masses -of their countrymen to such heroic self-sacrifice for a losing and -hopeless cause more than four generations since. Even men who have -little sympathy with either theological or social conventions of the -past are stirred by the simple piety of these people, uplifted for the -moment out of the sordid and monotonous surroundings of their daily -toil by the collective inspiration of a common faith. - -Here, too, in the Bocage of La Vendée amid the heather and the forest, -interspersed with acres of carefully tilled soil, the fays and -talismans and spirits of days gone by delightedly do dwell. But below -all this vesture of fancy and fable we find the least pleasing features -of the life of the small proprietors and labourers on the land and -fishermen by the sea. Their feelings of human sympathy are stunted, and -even their family relations are, in too many instances, rendered brutal -by their ever-present greed for gain. The land is a harsh taskmaster, -when its cultivation is carried on under such conditions as prevail in -that portion of France which abuts on the Bay of Biscay. The result is -a harsh people, whose narrow individualism and whole-hearted worship -of property in its least attractive guise seem quite at variance with -any form of sentiment, and still more remote from the ideals of poesy -or the dreams of supernatural agencies which affect the imagination. -But there is the contrast and such are the people of the Bocage of La -Vendée. - -Here, on September 28th, 1841, at the village of Mouilleron-en-Pareds, -near Fontenay le Comte, on the Bay of Biscay, Georges Benjamin -Clemenceau was born. His family came of an old stock of La Vendée who -had owned land in the province for generations. His father was a doctor -as well as a landowner; but his practice, I judge, from what his son -told me, was confined to gratuitous services rendered to the peasants -of the neighbourhood. M. le Dr. Clemenceau, however, was scarcely -the sort of man whom one would expect to find in a remote village of -such a conservative, not to say reactionary, district as La Vendée. A -thorough-going materialist and convinced Republican, he was the leader -of the local party of extreme Radicals. - -But he seems to have been a great deal more than that. Science, which -took with him the place of supernatural religion, neither hardened -his heart nor cramped his appreciation of art and poetry. Philosopher -and philanthropist, an amateur of painting and sculpture, inflexibly -devoted to his political principles, yet ever ready to recognise -ability and originality wherever they appeared, this very exceptional -medical man and country squire had necessarily a great influence upon -his eldest son, who inherited from his father many of the qualities -and opinions which led him to high distinction throughout his career. -Hatred of injustice, love of freedom and independence of every kind, -brought the elder Clemenceau into conflict with the men of the Second -Empire, who clapped him in prison after the _coup d'état_ of December -1851. Liberty in every shape was, in fact, an essential part of -this stalwart old Jacobin's political creed, while in the domain of -physiology and general science he was a convinced evolutionist long -before that conception of the inevitable development of the universe -became part of the common thought of the time. - -With all this the young Clemenceau was brought into close contact from -his earliest years. A thoroughly sound physique, strengthened by the -invigorating air of the Biscayan coast, laid the foundations of that -indefatigable energy and alertness of disposition which have enabled -him to pass triumphantly through periods of overwork and disappointment -that would have broken down the health of any man with a less sound -constitution. Georges Clemenceau owed much to the begettings and -surroundings, to the vigorous country life and the rarefied mental -atmosphere in which his earlier years were passed. Seldom is it -possible to trace the natural process of cause and effect from father -to son as it is in this case. From the wilds of La Vendée and the rough -sea-coast of Brittany circumstances of the home and of the family life -provided France with the ablest Radical leader she has ever possessed. - -At first, it appeared little likely that this would be so. Clemenceau, -entering upon his father's profession, with the benefit of the paternal -knowledge and full of the inculcated readiness to probe all the facts -of life to the bottom, took up his medical studies as a serious -business, after having gone through the ordinary curriculum of a school -at Nantes. It was in the hospital of that city that he first entered -as a qualified student. After a short stay there he went off to Paris, -in 1860, at the age of nineteen, to "walk the hospitals," as we phrase -it, in the same capacity. It was a plunge into active life taken at a -period in the history of France which was much more critical than it -seemed. - -The year which saw Clemenceau's arrival in Paris saw also the Second -Empire at the height of its fame and influence. As we look back to -the great stir of 1848, which, so far as Paris and France were -concerned, was brought about by the almost inconceivable fatuity of -Louis Philippe, we marvel at the strange turn of events which got rid -of Orleanist King Log in order to replace him by a Napoleonist King -Stork. But we may wonder still more at the lack of foresight, capacity -and tact of Louis Philippe himself, who had been in his youth the -democrat Citoyen Egalité, and an excellent general, with all the hard -experience of his family misfortune and personal sufferings in exile as -a full-grown man, possessed, too, of a thorough knowledge of the world -and an adequate acquaintance with modern thought in several departments -of science and literature. Yet, enjoying all these qualifications for a -successful ruler, Louis Philippe failed to understand that a democratic -monarchy, and a democratic monarchy alone, could preserve France from a -republic or a military dictatorship. This was astounding. He refused to -agree to the democratic vote claimed by the people, and then ran away. -So the House of Orleans joined the House of Bourbon in the array of -discrowned Heads of the Blood Royal. The short-lived Republic of 1848 -existed just long enough to scare the bourgeoisie by the installation -of the National Workshops, which might well have succeeded but for -their unintelligent opposition, and the peasantry by the fear of -general Communism, into a demand for a ruler who would preserve them -from those whom they considered the maniacs or plunderers of Paris. - -It is one of the ironies of history that the French Revolution which -promulgated ideas of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity that shook -the whole civilised world should have been unable to furnish France -herself with a democratic republic for well-nigh a hundred years after -the overthrow of Louis XVI. For scarcely had the Republic of 1848, -with Louis Blanc, Ledru Rollin, Albert, and others as its leaders, -been founded than the Buonapartist intrigues were successful. Louis -Napoleon, who just before had been the laughing-stock of Europe, -with his tame eagle at Boulogne that would persist in perching on a -post instead of on his head, with his queer theories of Imperialist -democracy and his close association with the Italian Carbonari, was -elected President of the French Republic. - -This was the outcome of an overwhelming plebiscite in his favour. There -could be no doubt about the voice of France on this occasion. Paris may -possibly have been genuinely Republican at that time. The Provinces, -whose antagonism to Paris and the Parisians was very marked, then and -later, were undoubtedly Buonapartist. From President to Emperor was -no long step. Louis Napoleon, though a man of no great capacity, did -at any rate believe in himself, in his democratic Imperialism and his -destiny. The set of adventurers and swindlers around him believed only -in full purses and ample opportunities for gratifying their taste -for luxury and debauchery. Having obtained control of the army by -the bribery of some and the imprisonment of others of the Republican -generals, all was ready for the infamous butchery of peaceful citizens -which cowed Paris and established the Empire at the same time. Once -more the plebiscite was resorted to with equal success on the part of -the conspirators. The hero of the _coup d'état_, with his familiar -coterie of Morny, Flahault, Persigny, Canrobert and other rogues and -murderers of less degree, became Napoleon III and master of Paris and -of France in December, 1852. - -The French threw their votes almost solid in favour of the Empire, -and thus tacitly condoned the hideous crime committed when it was -established. Whenever the Emperor's right to his throne was challenged -he could point triumphantly to that crushing vote of the democracy -constituting him the duly elected Emperor of the French and hereditary -representative--however doubtful his parentage--of that extraordinary -Corsican genius who, when Chateaubriand and other detractors sneered at -his origin, boldly declared, "_Moi je suis ancêtre._" - -From that day to this, democrats and Republicans have had a profound -distrust of the vote of the mass of the people as recorded under a -plébiscite, or a referendum, of the entire male population. This lack -of confidence in the judgment of the majority, when appealed to on -political issues, though natural under the circumstances, is obviously -quite illogical on the part of men who declare their belief in popular -government. It amounts to a permanent claim for the highly educated -and well-to-do sections of an intellectual oligarchy, on the ground -that they must know better what is good for the people than the people -know for themselves. This might conceivably be true, if no pecuniary -interests or arrogance of social superiority were involved. But as -this state of things cannot be attained until production for profit, -payment of wages and private property cease to exist, democrats and -Republicans place themselves in a doubtful position when they denounce -a reference to the entire population as necessarily harmful. All that -can be safely admitted is that so long as the mass of men and women -are economically dependent, socially unfree and very imperfectly -educated, the possibility of their being able to secure good government -by a plébiscite is very remote. But this applies as well to universal -suffrage used to obtain parliamentary elections, and the argument -against reposing any trust in the mass of the people may thus be -pushed to the point of abrogating the vote altogether save for a small -minority. And this would land us in the position of beginning with an -autocracy or aristocracy and ending there. - -At the time I am speaking of it is indisputable that a considerable -majority of intelligent and educated Frenchmen were Republicans. -What they meant by a Republic comprised many different shades of -organised democracy. But Republic, as Republic, in opposition and -contradistinction to Monarchy or Empire, was a name to conjure with -among all the most distinguished Frenchmen of the time. How did it come -about, then, that this minority, which should have been able to lead -the people, was distrusted and voted down by the very same populace -whose rights of self-government they themselves were championing -on behalf of their countrymen? There was nothing in the form of a -Republic, as was shown little more than twenty years afterwards, which -was of necessity at variance with the interests or the sentiments of -Frenchmen. Even the antagonism between Paris and the Provinces, already -referred to, was not so marked as to account for the fact that twice in -succession Louis Napoleon should have obtained an overwhelming personal -vote in his favour as the man to be trusted, above all other Frenchmen, -to control the destinies of France. - -It is by no means certain that Paris herself was hostile, before the -_coup d'état_, to the Napoleonic régime with its traditions not only -of military glory but of capable civic administration. For the double -plébiscite was more than a vote of acquiescence: it was a vote of -enthusiasm: first for Louis Napoleon as President, and then for Louis -Napoleon as Emperor. It is not pleasing to have to admit this; but -the truth seems to be that, as Aristotle pointed out more than two -thousand years ago, great masses of men are much more easily led by a -personality than they are roused by a principle. That the plébiscite -had been carefully worked up by assiduous propaganda; that many of the -ignorant peasants believed they were voting for the Napoleon of their -childhood in spite of the impossible; that there was a great deal of -bribery and not a little stuffing of the ballot boxes by officials -with a keen sense of favours to come; that the army was imbued with -Napoleonic sympathies and helped to spread the spurious ideals of -Imperialism--all this may be perfectly true. Yet, when all is said and -every allowance is made, the fact remains that, even so, the success of -the Napoleonic plébiscites is imperfectly explained. The main features -of the vote were obvious: The French people were sick of hereditary -monarchy: the Republican leaders were out of touch with the people: the -ideals of the past overshadowed the hopes of the future: Napoleon was a -name to conjure with: the Republicans had no name on their side to put -against it: the "blessed word" Republic had no hold upon the peasantry -of rural France. So plébiscite meant one-man rule. That is not to say, -as so many argue nowadays, that the complete vote of the democracy on -such an issue must of necessity be wrong; but it does affirm that a -thoroughly educated, responsible democracy, accustomed to be appealed -to directly on all matters of importance, is a necessity before we -can have any certainty that the people will go right. Even if they -go wrong, as in this case of Napoleon III, it is better in the long -run that they should learn by their own errors than that the blunders -of the dominant classes should be forced upon them. Great social and -political problems can rarely be solved even by the greatest genius. -And the genius himself, supposing him to exist, cannot rely upon -providing his country with a successor. On the whole, consequently, -it is less dangerous to human progress that we should risk such a -reactionary vote as that which seated Napoleon III at the Tuileries -than give no peaceful outlet whatever to popular opinion. - -But the democrats and republicans, radicals and socialists of Paris, -who saw all their most cherished ideals crushed by the voice of the -people whom they were anxious to lead to higher things, and beheld a -travesty of Napoleonic Imperialism suppressing all freedom of political -thought and writing, were not disposed to philosophise about the -excuses for a popular decision which led to such unpleasant results -for them. They had welcomed the abdication of Louis Philippe and the -installation of the Republic as the beginning of a new era not only for -Paris but for all France, after the reactionary clericalism of Louis -XVIII and Charles X, followed by the chilly middle-class rule of the -Orleanist monarch. But now a pinchbeck Napoleonism, with much sterner -repression, weighed upon all that was most progressive and brilliant in -the capital city. It was a bitter disappointment, not to be softened by -the reflection that France herself was still far from the economic and -social stage where their aspirations could be realised. - -Thus Napoleon III was master of France and, feeling that war was -advisable in order to strengthen his position at home, gladly joined -with Great Britain in a joint campaign against Russia. This was wholly -unnecessary, as has since been clearly shown. But, by promoting a -better feeling between France and England than had previously existed, -some good came out of the evil brought about by the treacherous -suppression of the Emperor Nicholas's agreement with the English -Cabinet. The foolish bolstering up of Ottoman incapacity and corruption -at Constantinople when the Western Powers could easily have enforced a -more reasonable rule was a miserable result of the whole war. But that -the Crimean adventure helped to consolidate the position of the Emperor -there is no doubt. - -When also the affair of the Orsini bomb, thrown by one of his old -Carbonari fellow-conspirators, impelled Louis Napoleon into the Italian -campaign which won for Italy Lombardy and for France Savoy and Nice, -the French people felt that their gain in glory and in territory had -made them once more the first nation in Europe. Magenta and Solferino -were names to conjure with. The Army had confidence in the Emperor -and his generals. So the prospect for republicans and the Republic -eight years after the _coup d'état_ was less promising than it had -been since the great revolution. Napoleon III was generally regarded -as the principal figure in Europe. He was delivering those New Year -proclamations which men awaited with bated breath as deciding the -question of peace or war for the ensuing twelvemonth. His Empress -dominated the world of fashion as her consort did the world of -politics. Every effort was made to render the Court as brilliant as -possible, and to attract to it some of the old nobility, who were, as a -whole, little inclined to recognise by their presence the power of the -man whom they both despised and hated. But the Second Empire was for a -time a success in spite of the reactionists and the republicans alike. - - - - - CHAPTER II - - PARIS UNDER THE EMPIRE - - -Paris of the early sixties was a very different city from the Paris of -to-day. It was still in great part the Paris of the old time, on both -banks of the Seine. Its Haussmannisation had barely begun. The Palais -Royal retained much of its ancient celebrity for the cuisine of its -restaurants and the brilliancy of its shops. But to get to it direct -from what is now the Place de l'Opéra was a voyage of discovery. You -went upstairs and downstairs, through narrow, dirty streets, until, -after missing your way several times, you at last found yourself in the -garden dear to the orators of the French Revolution, and since devoted -to nursemaids and their babes. Much of Central Paris was in the same -unregenerate state. Even portions of famous streets not far from the -Grands Boulevards, which were then still French, could scarcely be -described as models of cleanliness. The smells that arose from below -and the water of doubtful origin that might descend upon the unwary -passerby from above suggested a general lack of sanitary control which -was fully confirmed in more remote districts. - -Napoleon III was a man of mediocre ability. His _entourage_ was -extravagantly disreputable. But he and his did clear out and clean -up Paris. The new quarters since built owe their existence in the -first instance to the initiative of the Emperor's chief edile, Baron -Haussmann, and his compeers. The great broad streets which now traverse -the slums of old time were due to the same energetic impulse. Whether -such spacious avenues and boulevards were constructed in order to -facilitate the operations of artillery and enable the new mitrailleurs -more conveniently to massacre the "mob," whether the architecture -is artistic or monotonous, Clemenceau the doctor must for once be -at variance with Clemenceau the man of politics, and admit that the -monarch who, as will be seen, imprisoned him in 1862, did some good -work for Paris during his reign of repression. At any rate Napoleonic -rule at this period represented general prosperity. Business was good -and the profiteers were doing well. The bourgeoisie felt secure and -international financiers enjoyed a good time. Nearly all the great -banking and financial institutions of Paris had their origin in the -decade 1860-1870. Law and order, in short, was based upon comfort and -accumulation for the well-to-do. - -But the peasantry and the workers of the cities were also considered in -some degree, and the reconstruction of the capital provided, directly -and indirectly, both then and later, for what were looked upon as "the -dangerous classes"--men and women, that is to say, who thought that the -wage-slave epoch meant little better for them and their children than -penal servitude for life. Constant work and decent pay softened the -class antagonism, conciliating the proletariat without upsetting the -middle class or bourgeoisie. Such a policy, following upon two fairly -successful wars, was not devoid of dexterity. A curbed or satisfied -Paris meant internal peace for all France. Neither the miserable -fiasco in Mexico nor the idiotic abandonment of Austria to Prussia -had yet shaken the external stability of the Empire. Napoleon III and -his Vice-Emperor Rouher were still great statesmen. There was little -or nothing to show on the surface that the whole edifice was even -then tottering to its fall. The keen satire of Rochefort, of the Duc -d'Aumale, and the full-blooded denunciations of Victor Hugo failed to -produce much effect. Some genuine and capable opponents were beguiled -into serving the Government under the impression that the Empire -might be permanent, and in this way alone could they also serve their -country. Nor can we wonder at such backsliding. - -Such was the Paris, such the France that saw the young medical student, -Georges Clemenceau, enter upon his preparation for active life as -doctor and physiologist. He devoted himself earnestly to his studies in -the libraries, to his work in the hospitals, and to careful observation -of the social maladies he saw around him, which made a deep and -permanent impression on his mind. But, determined as he was to master -the principles and practice of his profession, the bright, active and -vivacious republican from La Vendée brought with him to Paris too clear -a conception of his rights and duties as a democrat to be able to avoid -the coteries of revolt who maintained the traditions of radicalism in -spite of systematic espionage and police persecution. Clemenceau shared -his father's opinions in favour of free speech and a free press. - -That was dangerous in those days. _La Ville Lumière_ was obliged -to hide its light under a bushel. Friends of democracy and -anti-imperialistic speakers and writers were compelled, in order -to reach their public, to adopt a style of suppressed irony not -at all to the taste of the vivacious republican recruit from -Mouilleron-en-Pareds. Then, as ever thereafter, he spoke the truth -that was in him, regardless of consequences. In this course he had -the approbation and support of his father's friend, Etienne Arago, -brother of the famous astronomer. Arago the politician was also a -playwright, an ardent republican who had taken his full share in all -the agitations of the previous period, an active and useful member of -the Republican Government of 1848 as Postmaster-General, and a vigorous -opponent of the policy of Louis Napoleon. He was sent into exile prior -to the _coup d'état_. Both then and nearly a generation later this -stalwart anti-Imperialist was exceedingly popular with the Parisians, -and, having returned to Paris, was able to aid Clemenceau in forming a -correct judgment of the situation, at a time when a less clear-sighted -observer might have striven to cool his young friend's enthusiasm. - -As it was, Clemenceau contributed to some of the Radical fly-sheets -and then fêted the 24th of February. No date dear to the memory of -Republicans could be publicly toasted without conveying a reflection -upon the Empire, and as all important events in French history, from -July 14th onwards, are duly calendared according to the month and -day of the month, Clemenceau's crime in celebrating February 24th by -speech and writing was obvious. He therefore fell foul of the Imperial -police. The magistrate could admit no point in his favour, and there -was in fact no defence. Consequently Georges Clemenceau, _interne de -l'hôpital_, had the opportunity given him of reflecting for two months -upon the advantages and drawbacks of his political creed, during a -period of Buonapartist supremacy, in the prison of Mazas. This was in -1862. - -Three years later he took his doctor's degree. His formal essay on -this occasion gained him considerable reputation. It was entitled _De -la Génération des Éléments Anatomiques_, and proved not only that he -had worked hard on the lines of his profession but that he was capable -of taking an original view of the subjects he had mastered. This -work has been throughout the basis of Clemenceau's medical, social, -political and literary career. I got the book not long ago from the -London Library, and on the title-page of this first edition I read in -the author's own bold handwriting, "_A Monsieur J. Stuart Mill hommage -respectueux de l'auteur G. Clemenceau_": a tribute to that eclectic -philosopher and thinker which he followed up shortly afterwards by -translating Mill's study of Auguste Comte and Positivism into French. -Clemenceau was no great admirer of Comte, and specially disapproved -of the attempt of some of that author's pupils and followers to -limit investigation and cultivate agnosticism on matters which they -considered fell without the bounds of their master's theories and -categories. - -"We are not of those," writes Clemenceau, "who admit with the -Positivist that science can give us no information on the enigma of -things." This seems scarcely just to the modern Positivists, for -although Comte himself wished to restrict mankind from the study of -astronomy, for example, outside of the solar system, they have been as -ready as the rest of the world to take advantage of discoveries beyond -that system which throw light upon some of the difficult material -problems nearer at hand. And Clemenceau, too, appears to fall into the -line of reasoning with which he reproaches Comte; for, as will be seen -later, he views nature as a mass of matter evolving and differentiating -and organising and vivifying itself with the interminable antagonisms -and mutual devourings of the various forms of existence on this -planet, and possibly on other worlds of the infinitely little, and -then, when the great suns die out, disappearing and beginning all over -again as two of these huge extinguished luminaries collide in space. -This material philosophy, when carried to its ultimate issue, still -answers no question and furnishes no clue to the strange inexplicable -movement of the universe in which man is but a sentient and partially -intelligent automaton. What explanation does this give of any of the -problems of social or individual ethic, or of the impulse which led -Clemenceau the doctor to treat his patients in Montmartre gratuitously, -instead of building up a valuable practice in a rich quarter? and urged -Clemenceau the politician to pass the greater part of his life in an -uphill fight against the domination of the sordid minority and the -timid acquiescence of the apathetic masses rather than accept the high -positions which were pressed upon him time after time? - -Such reflections would be out of place at this point, but for the fact -that Clemenceau has invariably contended that his career has been all -of a piece, maintaining that the vigorous young physiologist and doctor -of twenty-four and twenty-five held the same opinions and was moved -by the same aspirations that have guided the mature man throughout. -Whether heredity and surroundings fully account in every particular for -all that he has said, done and achieved is a question which Clemenceau -also might decline to answer with the definiteness he considers -desirable in general philosophy. But that his doctor's thesis of 1865 -did in the main give the scientific basis of his material creed can -scarcely be disputed. - -The following year, 1866, was the year of the Prusso-Italian war -against Austria. The success of Prussia, which would quite probably -have been a failure but for the incredible fatuity of the Imperial -clique at Vienna, was one of the chief causes, unnoted at the time, -of the downfall of Napoleon III. Few now care to recall the manner in -which the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Benedek, was compelled -to abandon his entire strategy in deference to the pusillanimous orders -of the Emperor, or how Benedek, with a loyalty to the House of Hapsburg -which it has never at any period deserved, took upon himself the blame -of defeats for which Francis Joseph, not himself, was responsible. -But Louis Napoleon was equally blind to his own interests and those -of France when he stood aside and allowed the most ambitious and most -unscrupulous power in the world to become the virtual master of Central -Europe. It was a strange choice of evils that lay before the Radical -and Republican parties in all countries during this war. None could -wish to see upheld, still less strengthened, the wretched rule of -reactionary, tyrannous and priest-ridden Austria; yet none could look -favourably on the growth of Prussian power. - -The further conquest by Italy of her own territory and the annexation -of Venice to the Italian crown were therefore universally acclaimed. -But those who knew Prussia and its military system, and watched the -nefarious policy which had crushed Denmark as a stage on the road -to the crushing of Austria, even thus early began to doubt whether -the substitution of Prussia for Austria in the leadership of the -old Germanic Bund might not speedily lead to a still more dangerous -situation. Either this did not suggest itself to Napoleon III and his -advisers, or they thought that Austria might win, or, at worst, that -a bitterly contested campaign would enable France to interpose at -the critical moment as a decisive arbiter in the struggle. Probably -the last was the real calculation. It was falsified by the rapid and -smashing Prussian victories of Königgratz and Sadowa, and Napoleon -could do nothing but accept the decisions of the battlefield. But from -this moment the Second Empire was in serious danger, and any far-seeing -statesman would have set to work immediately to bring the French army -up to the highest possible point of efficiency and prepare the way for -alliances that might help the Empire, should help be needed in the -near future. Neither Louis Napoleon nor his councillors and generals, -however, understood what the overthrow of Austria meant for France. -They turned a deaf ear then and afterwards to the warnings of their -ablest agents abroad, and thus drifted into the crisis which four years -later found them without an ally and overwhelmed them. - - - - - CHAPTER III - - DOWNFALL AND RECONSTRUCTION - - -Early in 1866, Clemenceau, after a visit to England, crossed the -Atlantic for a somewhat prolonged stay in the United States. He could -scarcely have chosen a better time for making acquaintance with America -and the Americans. The United States had but just emerged from the -Civil War, which, notwithstanding the furious bitterness evoked on both -sides during the struggle, eventually consolidated the Great Republic -as nothing else could; though, owing to the behaviour of "society" -in England, the tone of our leading statesmen and the action of the -_Alabama_, the feeling against Great Britain was naturally very strong. -This animosity--it was no less--of course did not extend to the young -French physician of republican views who had already suffered for his -opinions in Paris, and whose sympathies were with the North against the -South throughout. He was well received in the Eastern States, and wrote -several letters to the _Temps_ on the industrial and social conditions -of America which were then of value, and still serve to show how marked -is the contrast between the self-contained nation of fifty years -ago and the Anglo-Saxon world power that has successfully tried her -strength in the international struggle against Germanic infamy to-day. -What is not so easy to comprehend is M. le Dr. Clemenceau, as we know -him, acting as professor of French in a young ladies' college at the -village of Stanford, in the neighbourhood of New York. His record in -that capacity is amusingly described by one of his friends[A] in a -bright little sketch of his early experiences. - -"An admirable horseman, the young Frenchman accompanied the still -younger American misses in their rides. There were free and delightful -little tours on horseback, charming excursions along the shady roads -which traverse the gay landscape of Connecticut. Such years carried -with them for Clemenceau ineffaceable memories of a period during -which his temperament accomplished the task of gaining strength and -acquiring refinement. At the same time that he enriched his mind with -solid conceptions of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, and perfected his general -cultivation, he took his first lessons in the delicacies of American -flirtation. It was in the course of these pleasing jaunts, where -the fresh laughter of these young ladies echoed through the bright -scenery, that it was his lot to become betrothed to one of them, Miss -Mary Plummer. Henceforth, in consequence of the sound, independent -and many-sided education which he had, so to say, imposed upon -himself, Clemenceau had completed the last stage of his intellectual -development. He was ripe to play great parts. For the rest, events were -not destined long to delay the throwing into full relief his versatile, -intrepid and powerful characteristics." - -And so Clemenceau, thus prepared to meet what the future might have -in store for him, returned to Paris. There are cities in the history -of the human race which have taken unto themselves a personality, not -only for their own inhabitants, but for succeeding ages, and for the -world at large. Babylon, Athens, Jerusalem, Rome, Bagdad, Florence, -each and all convey to the mind a conception of chic individuality and -collective achievement which brings them within the range of our own -knowledge, admiration and respect, which raises them also to the level -of ideals of culture for men living in far different civilisations. -They are still oases of brightness and greenery amid the wilderness -of unconscious growth. The wars of old time, the cruelty of long-past -days, the records of brutality and lust are forgotten: only the memory -of greatness or beauty remains. - - "Terror by night, the flaming battle-call, - Fire on the roof-tree, dreadful blood and woe!-- - They cease for tears, yet joyful, knowing all - Is over, long ago. - - Knowing, the melancholy hands of Time - Weave a slow veil of beauty o'er the place - Of blood-stained memory and bitter crime - Till horror fades in grace. - - The mournful grace of long-forgotten woe - And long-appeased sorrows of the dead, - The deeper silence of those streams that flow - Where ancient highways led." - -Among the great cities of the past which is still the present Paris -takes her undisputed place. In youth, in maturity, in age, the charm -of intellectual and artistic Paris ever affects not merely her own -citizens, but the strangers within her gates. And the young Vendéen -Clemenceau was from the first a Parisian of Parisians. The attraction -of Paris for him was permanent. From his arrival in 1860 until the -present time practically his whole life has been spent in the French -capital. Many years afterwards he gave expression to the influence -Paris had upon him. Paris for Clemenceau is the sun of the world of -science and letters, the source of light and heat from whose centre art -and thought radiate through space. "Intuition and suggestion spreading -out in all directions awake dormant energy, sweep on from contact to -contact, are passed on, dispersed, and finally exhausted in the inertia -of material objects. Here is the radiance of humanity, more or less -powerful, more or less durable as time and place may decree." - -It is this impatience of Paris with results already achieved, this -desire to reach out and to embrace new forms in all departments of -human achievement, which give the French city her position as an -indispensable entity in the cosmos of modern life. "Boldness and -boldness and boldness again" was Danton's prescription for the orator, -and it might be taken as the motto of intellectual and artistic Paris. -There is no hesitation, no contentment, no waiting by the wayside. New -ideas and new conceptions must ever be replacing the old. Experience -may teach what to avoid: experiment alone can teach what to attempt. -And this not incidentally or as a passing phase of endeavour, but as a -principle to be applied in every region of human effort. "The Rights -of Man," "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," "Property is robbery" are -as thought-provoking (though they solve no problem) in the domain -of sociology as Pasteur's achievements in physiology and medicine. -Whatever changes the future may have in store for us, we who are not -Frenchmen cannot dispense with the leadership and inspiration that come -to us from Paris. - -On his return to France from America Clemenceau renewed his -acquaintance and friendship with those who shared his political -and social opinions, especially Etienne Arago, now an old man, and -practised as a doctor in the working-class district of Montmartre. -Here, by his gratuitous medical advice to the people and his steady -adherence to his democratic principles, he gained an amount of -popularity and personal devotion from the men and women of Montmartre -which, in conjunction with Arago's advice and support, prepared the way -for the positions which he afterwards attained. Meanwhile the Second -Empire was going slowly downhill. The change which had already taken -place was not generally recognised. Nevertheless, the failure of the -ill-fated Mexican Expedition with its Catholic support, its sordid -financial muddling and the degrading system of plunder carried on in -Mexico itself by Marshal Bazaine, the effect on Paris of the murder of -Victor Noir by a member of the Buonaparte family, and the Government's -growing incapacity to handle domestic and foreign affairs all told -against the prestige of Napoleon. Only a successful diplomatic stroke -or a victorious war could rehabilitate the credit of the Empire. The -time had gone by for either. Bismarck's disgraceful forgery at Ems was -as unnecessary as it was flagitious. Sooner or later the Second Empire -would have collapsed from its own incompetence. But that waiting game -did not suit the grim statesman of Berlin. He knew that the French army -by itself could not hold its own against the Prussian and other German -forces; he felt convinced also that Austria would not move without -much clearer assurances of success than Napoleon could supply; while -Italy was still tied to her Ally of 1866, and England was devoted to -a policy of profitable non-intervention. So Napoleon was half driven, -half tricked into a hopeless campaign, and every calculation on which -Bismarck relied was verified by the results. Nay, the plébiscite which -Louis Napoleon risked eighteen years after the _coup d'état_ went -entirely in his favour, and it was in reality quite unnecessary, from -the point of view of internal politics, that any risk of war should -be run. The Empress, however, has always had the discredit of not -having been of that opinion. Hence steps were taken which played into -Bismarck's hands. - -At first, as I have heard Clemenceau say himself, it was almost -impossible for a patriotic Republican to desire victory for the -French armies. That would only have meant a new life for the decadent -Empire. Sad, therefore, as was the long succession of disasters, and -terrible the devastation wrought by German ruthlessness, not until -the culminating defeat of Sedan, the surrender of Napoleon and the -decree of Imperial overthrow pronounced by the people of Paris, could -men feel that French soldiers were really fighting for their country. -Thenceforward the struggle was between democratic and progressive -France and autocratic and reactionary Prussia. The Empire for whose -humiliation the King of Prussia had gone to war existed no longer. A -Republic was at once declared in its place. Any fair-minded enemy would -directly have offered the easiest possible terms for peace to the new -France. But that was not the view of Prussia. France, not merely the -Second Empire, was to be defeated and crushed down, because she stood -in the way of that permanent policy of aggression and aggrandisement -to which the House of Hohenzollern, with its Junker supporters, has -always been devoted. This was the moment when England should have -interfered decisively on the side of her old rival. It was not only -our interest but our duty to do so, and the whole nation would have -enthusiastically supported the statesmen who had given it a vigorous -lead in the right direction. Unfortunately Queen Victoria, then as -ever bitterly pro-German, was utterly unscrupulous in enforcing her -views upon her Government: the men then in office were essentially -courtiers, who combined servility at home with pusillanimity abroad: -the _laissez-faire_ school of parasitical commercialism which regards -the accumulation of wealth for the few as the highest aspiration of -humanity held the trading classes in its grip. Consequently, the -monarch and the ruling class of the day thought it was cheaper, and -therefore better, to leave France to her fate, and make a good cash -profit out of the business, rather than courageously to withstand the -beginnings of evil and uphold the French Republic against the brutality -and greed of Berlin. It is sad, nearly fifty years later, to reflect -upon the results of this mistaken and cowardly policy. The war was -continued, owing chiefly to English indifference, until France lay at -the feet of the conquerors. - -No sooner did the news of the defeat and surrender of Sedan reach -Paris than a general shout for the overthrow of the Empire went up -from the people throughout the French capital. The collapse of the -Second Empire was in fact even more sudden and dramatic than its rise. -The whole imperial machinery fell with a crash. There was not a man -in Paris among the friends of the Emperor in good fortune who had the -courage and capacity to come to the front in the time of his distress. -The bigoted Catholic Empress, against whom Parisians cherished an -animosity scarcely less bitter than that which their forbears felt for -Marie Antoinette, was with difficulty got safely out of the city, and -Paris at once took control of her own destinies. A Republic having -been proclaimed, Republicans, Radicals and Socialists, harried and -proscribed the day before, rushed to the front the day after, and -forthwith became masters of the city. Clemenceau as one of them was -immediately chosen Mayor of Montmartre, at the instance of his old -friend Etienne Arago. - -It was a period for action, not for argument, or reflection, or -propaganda. Clemenceau understood that. In his capacity as Mayor of -Montmartre, by no means an easy district to manage, he exhibited -marvellous energy, as well as sound judgment, in every department of -public affairs. Everything had to be reorganised at once. There was -no time to respect the inevitable details of democratic authorisation -and delay. Clemenceau with his natural rapidity of decision was the -very man for the post. Patriotic and revolutionary excitement seethed -all round him. Society seemed already to be in the melting-pot. -The enthusiasm evoked by eloquent orations in favour of Socialism -was accompanied by the discharges of cannon and the rumbling of -ammunition-wagons. But public business had to be carried on all the -same. Clemenceau was indefatigable and ubiquitous. He prevented the -priests from intriguing in the municipal schools, he established purely -secular education, hurried on the arming of the battalions and kept a -sharp eye on the defences of the city. Simultaneously he set on foot a -series of establishments for giving warmth, food and general help to -the number of people who had sought refuge on the heights. He acted -throughout practically as municipal dictator, raising, arming and -drilling recruits for the new republican army, as well as organising -and administering all the local services. - -It was a fine piece of work. Having been so closely in touch with the -bulk of the population of Montmartre, he was able to act entirely in -their interests and with their concurrence throughout. They therefore -warmly supported him against the reactionists and religionists who, -then as always, were his most virulent enemies. It was no easy task to -maintain order and carry out systematic organisation at this juncture. -The downfall of the Empire occurred on September 4th, the Republic, -with General Trochu--the man of the undisclosed strategical "plan"--as -President and Jules Favre as Vice-President, being declared the same -day. On September 19th Paris was invested by the Germans. Seeing that -there were then no fewer than 400,000 armed men, at various stages of -training, in the capital, with many powerful forts at their disposal, -while the Germans could spare at the beginning of the siege no more -than 120,000 men for the attack, the French having still several armies -in the field, successful resistance by the Republic seemed by no means -hopeless. Paris might even have had her share in turning the tide of -victory. Clemenceau was of that opinion. - -But it was not to be. France failed to produce a great general, and the -"bagman Marshal," as Bazaine was called in Mexico, by shutting himself -up with 175,000 men in Metz, rendered final defeat certain; though if -Marshal MacMahon's advice had been followed, and if General Trochu had -later sufficiently organised the forces at his disposal in Paris to -break through the German lines, a stouter fight might have been fought. -As it was, one French army after another was defeated in the field, -and Paris and Metz were forced to surrender by literal starvation. On -January 28th, 1871, an armistice was signed between Bismarck and Jules -Favre and the revictualling of the famine-stricken Parisians began, the -siege having lasted a little over four months. A National Assembly was -summoned to decide the terms of a definite peace or in what manner it -might be possible to continue the war. - -So well satisfied were the voters of Montmartre with the conduct of -their Mayor during all this trying time that they decided to send him -as their representative to Bordeaux and polled just upon 100,000 votes -in his favour. To Bordeaux, therefore, Clemenceau went, on February -12th, as deputy for one of the most radical and revolutionary districts -of Paris. Though neither then nor later an avowed Socialist, no -Socialist could have done more for practical democratic and Socialist -measures than Clemenceau had done. That, of course, was the reason why -he was elected by so advanced a constituency. - -He found himself strangely out of his element when he took his seat -in the National Assembly. Perhaps no more reactionary body had ever -met in France. The majority of the members were thorough-going -Conservatives who at heart were eager to restore the monarchy. They -were royalists but slightly disguised, dug up out of their seclusion, -from all parts of the country, who thought their time had come to -revenge themselves not so much upon the Buonapartists who had governed -France for twenty years as upon Paris and the Parisians who had chased -Charles X and Louis Philippe out of France. They well knew that the -capital would never consent to the restoration of the candidate of -either of the Bourbon factions. These fitting champions of a worn-out -Legitimism or Orleanism were old men in a hurry to resuscitate the -dead and galvanise the past into fresh life. Their very heads betrayed -their own antiquity. So much so that a favourite pastime of young -ladies of pleasure in the Galleries, who had flocked to Bordeaux, -was what was irreverently called "bald-headed loo." This consisted -in betting upon the number of flies that would settle within a given -period upon a devoted deputy's hairless occiput. Unfortunately these -ancient gentlemen found in M. Thiers a leader who could scarcely have -been surpassed for ingenuity and unscrupulousness. He deliberately -traded upon prejudices, and his main political assets were the fear -and distrust which he awakened in one set of his countrymen against -another. In modern as in ancient society there is an economic and -almost a personal antagonism between country and town. - -The man of the Provinces, living always in the rural districts, the -tiller, the producer, the indefatigable toiler, the parsimonious -accumulator of small gains, the respecter of ancestral traditions and -the devotee of old-world methods and well-tried means of gaining a poor -livelihood, profoundly affected likewise by his inherited religion, -has, in most cases, a deep-seated contempt, strangely enough not -wholly divorced from fear, for the man of the town, and especially -for the man of Paris. This animosity, which has by no means wholly -disappeared to-day, was keenly in evidence forty and fifty years ago. -There is an economic cause at the bottom of the antipathy, but this -does not account for its many-sided manifestation. The countryman -naturally desires to sell his produce at as high a price as possible. -It is for him almost a matter of life and death to do so. The townsman, -on his side, the artisan or labourer or even the _rentier_ of the great -cities, is naturally anxious to obtain the necessaries of life which he -gets from the rural districts at as low a rate as he may be able to buy -them having regard to his wages or his income. Hence any expenditure -which tends to benefit the country is regarded with suspicion by the -townsman and contrariwise as between town and country, except such -outlay as cheapens the cost of transportation, where both have an -identical interest. - -But this general divergence of economic advantage, which has existed -for many centuries does not wholly account for the ill-feeling which -too often appears. There is a psychological side to the matter as well. -Thus the peasant, even when he is getting satisfactory prices for his -wares, despises his own customers when they pay too much for small -luxuries which they could easily do without. Moreover, he considers -the cleverness of his fellow-countrymen of the city, their readiness -to change their opinions and adopt new ideas, their doubts as to the -super-sanctity of that individual property, property which is the small -landowner's god, as evidences of a dangerous disposition to upset all -that ought to be most solemnly upheld. The townsman, on the other -hand, too often looks down upon the peasant and the rural provincial -generally as an ignorant, short-sighted, narrow-minded, grasping -creature, full of prejudices and eaten up with superstition, who, out -of sheer obstinacy, stands immovably in the way of reforms that might, -and in many cases certainly would, benefit them both. - -It is the task and the duty of the true statesman to bridge over these -differences as far as possible, to try to harmonise interests and -assuage feelings which under existing conditions are apt to conflict -with one another. Thus only can the whole country be well and truly -served. M. Thiers pursued precisely the contrary course. In order to -foster reaction and to strengthen the position of the bourgeoisie, he -and his supporters set to work deliberately to excite the hatred of the -country-folk against their brethren of the towns. They were willing to -accept the Republic only on the distinct understanding that it should -be, as Zola expressed it, a bourgeoised sham. The bogey of the social -revolution was stuck up daily to frighten the timid property-owners. -Above all, Paris was pointed out as the danger spot of order-respecting -France. Paris ought to be muzzled and kept under even more strictly by -the self-respecting Republic than by the Empire. That way alone lay -safety. Thus the dislike of the provincials for the capital was fanned -to so fierce a heat that the very title of capital was denied to her. -As a result of this unpatriotic and traitorous policy Paris herself -was unfortunately forced to the conviction that the reactionists of -Bordeaux were determined to deprive her of all her rights, and that the -great city which founded the Republic would be made to suffer dearly -for her presumption. Nearly all that followed was in reality due to -this sinister policy of provocation, adopted and carried out by M. -Thiers and his bigoted followers. - -Clemenceau's position was a difficult one. Knowing both peasants and -Parisians intimately well, he saw clearly the very dangerous situation -which must inevitably be created by such tactics of exasperation. As -one of the deputies of Radical Republican Paris, he did his utmost -at Bordeaux to maintain the independence of his constituents and to -resist the fatal action of the majority. As the son of a landowner in -La Vendée, he understood clearly the views of the provincials and how -necessary it was that they should be thoroughly informed as to the -aims of the Parisians. But Paris had first claim on his services. He -therefore associated himself with Louis Blanc, voted with him against -the preliminaries of peace and in favour of the continuance of the war. -There was a strong opinion at this time that many of the Buonapartists -in high military command, as well as in important civil posts, were -traitors to the Republic and had acted, as Bazaine unquestionably -did, in the interest of the Imperial prisoner instead of on behalf -of France. These factionists too were hostile to Paris, and a demand -was made, in which Clemenceau joined, for a full investigation of the -conduct of such men during the siege. Unfortunately, affairs in the -capital were now becoming so critical and the probability of another -revolution there seemed so great that Clemenceau felt his duties as -Mayor of Montmartre were still more urgent than his votes and speeches -at Bordeaux, as deputy for that district. Consequently, after less than -a month's stay at Bordeaux, he returned to Paris on the evening of -March 5th. The Commune of Paris was set on foot within a fortnight of -that date, on March 18th, 1871. - - - - - CHAPTER IV - - THE COMMUNE - - -Unquestionably, the revolt was brought about by the ill-judged and -arbitrary conduct of the agents of the National Assembly. To attempt -to seize the guns of the National Guard as a preliminary to disarming -the only Citizen force which the capital had at its disposal was as -illegal as it was provocative. It was virtually a declaration of civil -war by the reactionaries in control of the national forces. The people -of Paris were in no humour to put up with such high-handed action on -the part of men who, they knew, were opposed even to the Republic which -they nominally served. They resisted the attempt and captured the -generals, Lecomte and Thomas, who had ordered the step to be taken. - -So far they were quite within their rights, and Clemenceau at first -sympathised wholly with the Federals. The Parisians had undergone -terrible privations during the siege, they were exasperated by the -denunciations that poured in upon them from the provinces, they saw -no hope for their recently won liberties unless they themselves were -in a position to defend them, they had grave doubts whether they had -not been betrayed within and without during the siege itself. It is no -wonder that, under such circumstances, they should resent, by force of -arms, any attempt to deprive them of the means of effective resistance -to reactionary repression. - -There was also nothing in the establishment of the Commune itself which -was other than a perfectly legitimate effort to organise the city -afresh, after the old system had proved utterly incompetent. But the -attempt to disarm the population of Montmartre roused passions which -it was impossible to quell. Clemenceau, as Mayor of the district, did -all that one man could do to save the two generals, Lecomte and Clément -Thomas, from being killed. With his sound judgment he saw at once that, -whether their execution was justifiable or not, it would be regarded as -murder by many Republicans whom the cooler heads in Paris desired to -conciliate. As was proved afterwards, he exerted all his power to check -even the semblance of injustice. But his final intervention to prevent -the tragedy of the Château Rouge came too late, and Lecomte and Thomas, -who had not hesitated to risk the massacre of innocent citizens on -behalf of a policy of repression, were regarded as the first victims of -an infuriated mob. - -The outcome of Clemenceau's own endeavours to save these misguided -militarists was that he himself became "suspect" to the heads of the -Central Committee of the Commune sitting at the Hôtel de Ville, which -had taken control of all Paris. He was the duly elected and extremely -popular Radical-Socialist--to use a later designation--Mayor of perhaps -the most advanced arrondissement in the capital, he had been sent to -Bordeaux by a great majority of his constituents to sit on the extreme -left, and, in that capacity, had stoutly defended the rights of Paris; -he was strongly in favour of most of the claims made by the leaders of -the Commune. But all this went for nothing. The new Committee wanted -their own man at Montmartre, and Clemenceau was not that man. - -So Mayor of Montmartre he ceased to be, but earnest democrat and -devoted friend of the people he remained. Unfortunately, having a wider -outlook than most of those who had suddenly come to the front, he could -not believe that mere possession of the capital meant attainment of -the control of France by the Parisians, or the freeing of his country -from German occupation. For once he advocated prudence and suggested -compromise. A reasonable arrangement between the administrators of -Paris with their municipal forces and the National Assembly with -its regular army seemed to Clemenceau a practical necessity of -the situation. He therefore urged this policy incessantly upon the -Communists. It was an unlucky experience. Pyat, Vermorel and others so -strongly resented his moderate counsels that they issued an order for -his arrest, with a view to his hasty, if judicial, removal. Failing to -lay hold upon Clemenceau himself, they captured a speaking likeness of -the Radical doctor in the person of a young Brazilian. Him they were -about to shoot, when they discovered that their proposed victim was -the wrong man. Possibly these personal adventures in revolutionary -democracy under the Commune may have influenced Clemenceau's views -about Socialism in practical affairs in after life. - -It is highly creditable to Clemenceau that a few years later one of his -greatest speeches was delivered in the National Assembly to obtain, the -liberation and the recall from exile of the very same men who would -gladly have silenced him for good and all when they were in power. -However, he escaped their well-meant attentions, and, leaving Paris, -went on a tour of vigorous Radical propaganda through the Provinces. - -This was a most important self-imposed mission. Clemenceau, as he -showed by his vote at Bordeaux, was strongly in favour of continuing -the war and bitterly opposed to any surrender whatever. At the same -time he was a thoroughgoing Republican who did not forget that the mass -of Frenchmen must have voted for the Empire a few months before, or -Napoleon's plébiscite, of course, could not have been so successful, -even with the whole of the official machinery in the hands of the -Imperialists. Differing from Gambetta afterwards on many points, the -coming leader of the advanced Radicals was at this period entirely at -one with the man who had not despaired of France when all seemed lost. -But in order to carry on the war with any hope of success and to keep -the flag of the Republic flying, it was essential that the people of -the provincial towns and the peasants should be kept in touch with -Paris and be convinced that the only chance of safety and freedom -lay in sinking all internecine differences for the sake of unity. No -man, not even Gambetta himself, was better qualified for this service. -Throughout his tour he kept the independence, welfare and freedom of -France as a whole high above all other considerations. But the risks he -ran were not trifling. The local reactionists were by no means ready -to accept his views. The police was set upon his trail, with great -inconvenience to himself. But at no period of his life has Clemenceau -considered his personal safety of any account. He had set himself to -accomplish certain work which he deemed to be necessary, and he carried -it through without reference to the dangers around him. Nor must the -success of this propaganda be measured by its immediate results. The -great thing in those days of defeat and despair was to keep up the -national spirit and to declare that, though the French armies might -be beaten again and again, the France of the great Revolution and -the Republic should never be crushed down. Believing, as Clemenceau -did, in the religion of patriotism and the sacred watchwords of the -eighteenth-century upheaval, he spoke with a sincerity that gave to his -utterances the value of the highest oratory. The speeches produced a -permanent impression on those who heard them, and their effect was felt -for many years afterwards. - -But this was quite as objectionable to Thiers and the case-hardened -reactionists as his previous conduct had been to Pyat and the -extremists of the Commune. Men of ability and judgment are apt to be -caught between two fires when prejudice and passion take control on -both sides. It was, in fact, little short of a miracle that the future -Prime Minister of France did not complete his services to his country -by dying in the ditch under the wall of Père-la-Chaise at the early age -of thirty-one. - -Few movements have been more grotesquely misrepresented than the -Commune of Paris. For many a long year afterwards almost the whole of -the propertied classes in Europe spoke of the Communists as if they had -been a gang of scoundrels and incendiaries, without a single redeeming -quality; while Socialists naturally enough refused to listen to -virulent abuse of men most of whom they well knew were inspired by the -highest ideals and sacrificed themselves for what they believed to be -the good of mankind. At the beginning Paris assuredly had no intention -whatever of courting a struggle with the supporters of the Republic at -Bordeaux, however reactionary they might be. Such men as Delescluze, -Courbet, Beslay, Jourde, Camélinat, Vaillant, Longuet, to speak only -of a few, were no mere hot-headed revolutionaries regardless of all -the facts around them. Paris was admirably administered under their -short rule--never nearly so well, according to the testimony of two -quite conservative Englishmen who were there at the time. One of these -was the famous Oxford sculler and athlete, E. B. Michell, an English -barrister and a French _avocat_; the other was my late brother, Hugh, -a Magdalen man like Michell. They both knew Paris well, and both were -of the same opinion as to the municipal management under the Commune. -Michell in an article in _Fraser's Magazine_, then an important review, -wrote as follows: - - "It is extremely important that the serious lesson which the world - may read in the history of the Revolution should not be weakened in - its significance or interest by any ill-grounded contempt either - for the acts of the Communal leaders or for the sincerity of their - motives. We have seen that the army on which the Revolutionists - relied, and by means of which they climbed to power, was not, as - certain French statesmen pretended, and some English papers would - have had us believe, a 'mere handful of disorderly rebels,' but - a compact force, well drilled, well organised, and valiant when - fighting for a cause that they really had at heart. It is equally - false and unfair to regard the Communal Assembly as a crew of - unintelligent and mischievous conspirators, guided by no definite - or reasonable principle, and seeking only their own aggrandisement - and the destruction of all the recognised laws of order. Yet it is - certain that such an idea respecting the Commune is very generally - entertained by ordinary English readers. It may be shown that the - policy of this Government, though defaced by many gross abuses and - errors, had much in it to deserve the consideration, and even to - extort the admiration, of an intelligent and practical statesman. . . . - - "Foreign writers have delighted to represent the purposes of the - Commune as vague and unintelligible. Even in Paris and at Versailles - writers and talkers affected at first to be ignorant of the real - projects and principles entertained by the Revolutionists. But the - Commune of 1871 has itself destroyed all possibility of mistake upon - the subject. It has put to itself and answered the question in the - most explicit terms. The _Journal Officiel_ (of Paris) contained, on - April 20th, a document worthy of the most careful perusal. It appears - in the form of a declaration to the French people, and explains fully - enough the main principles and the chief objects which animated the - men of the Commune. Without bestowing on this address the ecstatic - eulogies to which certain Utopian philosophers have deemed it - entitled, we may credit it as being a straightforward, manly, and not - altogether unpractical _exposé_ of the ideas of modern Communists. - - ". . . 'It is the duty of the Commune to confirm and determine the - aspirations and wishes of the people of Paris; to explain, in its - true character, the movement of March 18th--a movement which has been - up to this time misunderstood, misconstrued, and calumniated by the - politicians at Versailles. Once more Paris labours and suffers for - the whole of France, for whom she is preparing, by her battles and - her devoted sacrifices, an intellectual, moral, administrative, and - economic regeneration, an era of glory and prosperity. - - "'What does she demand? - - "'The recognition and consolidation of the Republic as the only form - of government compatible with the rights of the people and the regular - and free development of society; the absolute independence of the - Commune and its extension to every locality in France; the assurance - by this means to each person of his rights in their integrity, to - every Frenchman the full exercise of his faculties and capacities as - a man, a citizen, and an artificer. The independence of the Commune - will have but one limit--the equal right of independence to be enjoyed - by the other Communes who shall adhere to the contract. It is the - association of these Communes that must secure the unity of France. - - "'The inherent rights of the Commune are these: The right of voting - the Communal budget of receipts and expenditure, of regulating and - reforming the system of taxation, and of directing local services; the - right to organise its own magistracy, the internal police and public - education; to administer the property belonging to the Commune; the - right of choosing by election or competition, with responsibility and - a permanent right of control and revocation, the communal magistrates - and officials of all sorts; the right of individual liberty under an - absolute guarantee, liberty of conscience and liberty of labour; the - right of permanent intervention by the citizens in communal affairs by - means of the free manifestation of their ideas, and a free defence of - their own interests, guarantees being given for such manifestations - by the Commune, which is alone charged with the duty of guarding and - securing the free and just right of meeting and of publicity; the - right of organising the urban defences and the National Guard, which - is to elect its own chiefs, and alone provide for the maintenance of - order in the cities. - - "'Paris desires no more than this, with the condition, of course, - that she shall find in the Grand Central Administration, composed - of delegates from the Federal Communes, the practical recognition - and realisation of the same principles. To insure, however, her own - independence, and as a natural result of her own freedom of action, - Paris reserves to herself the liberty of effecting as she may think - fit, in her own sphere, those administrative and economic reforms - which her population shall demand, of creating such institutions as - are proper for developing and extending education, labour, commerce, - and credit; of popularising the enjoyment of power and property in - accordance with the necessities of the hour, the wish of all persons - interested, and the data furnished by experience. Our enemies deceive - themselves or deceive the country when they accuse Paris of desiring - to impose its will or its supremacy upon the rest of the nation, and - of aspiring to a Dictatorship which would amount to a veritable attack - against the independence and sovereignty of other Communes. They - deceive themselves or the country when they accuse Paris of seeking - the destruction of French unity as established by the Revolution. - The unity which has hitherto been imposed upon us by the Empire, - the Monarchy, and the Parliamentary Government is nothing but a - centralisation, despotic, unintelligent, arbitrary, and burdensome. - Political unity as desired by Paris is a voluntary association of - each local initiative, a free and spontaneous co-operation of all - individual energies with one common object--the well-being, liberty, - and security of all. The Communal Revolution initiated by the people - on the 18th of March inaugurated a new political era, experimental, - positive, and scientific. It was the end of the old official and - clerical world, of military and bureaucratic _régime_, of jobbing in - monopolies and privileges, to which the working class owed its state - of servitude, and our country its misfortunes and disasters.'" - -The two Englishmen, coming straight to my house from Paris, gave me a -favourable account of the administration of municipal Paris, especially -at the time when Cluseret held command. - -Others who were there at the same time were similarly impressed. Paris -ceased even to be the Corinth of Europe, since all prostitutes had been -ordered out of the city. The leaders set an example of moderation in -their style of living, which was the more remarkable as they had no -authority but their own sense of propriety to limit their expenditure. -How little they regarded themselves as relieved from the ordinary rules -of the strictest bourgeois social order is apparent, also, from the -fact that Jourde and Beslay, who were responsible for the finances of -the Commune, actually borrowed £40,000 from the Rothschilds in order -to carry on the ordinary business of the Municipality. Yet at the -time not less than £60,000,000 in gold, apart from a huge store of -silver, was lying at their mercy in the Bank of France; enough, as some -cynically said, if judiciously used, to have bought up all M. Thiers' -Government and his army to boot. The fact that the Communists left -these vast accumulations untouched proves conclusively that they were -the least predatory, some might say the least effective, revolutionists -who ever held subversive opinions. In all directions they showed the -same spirit. Every department was managed as economically and capably -as they could organise it. But always on the most approved bourgeois -lines. Many of the reforms they introduced, notably those by Camélinat -at the Mint, are still maintained. - -How, then, did it come about that people of this character and capacity -were regarded almost universally as desperate enemies of society, -from the moment when they came to the front in their own city? It is -the old story of the hatred of the materialist property-owner and -profiteer for the idealist who is eager at once to realise the new -period of public possession and co-operative well-being. The fact -that such an indomitable anarchist-communist as the famous Blanqui, -who spent the greater part of his life in prison, took an active part -in the Commune and that others of like views were associated with -the rising scared all the "respectable" classes, who regarded any -attack upon the existing economic and social forms as a crime of the -worst description. A tale current at the time puts the matter in a -humorous shape. A number of communists, when arrested, were put in -gaol with a still larger number of common malefactors. These latter -greatly resented this intrusion, boycotted the political prisoners, -and, it is said, would have gone so far as to attack their unwelcome -companions but for the intervention of the warders. Asked why they -exhibited such animosity towards men who had done them no harm, the -ordinary criminals took quite a conservative, bourgeois view of their -relations to the new-comers. "We," they said, "have some of us taken -things which belonged to other people; but we have never thought for a -moment of abolishing the right of property in itself. Not having enough -ourselves, we wanted more and laid hands upon what we could get. But -these men would take everything and leave nothing for us." So even the -gaol-birds embraced the bourgeois ethic of individual ownership. - -Moreover, the International Working Men's Association had been founded -in London in 1864, just seven years before. Although the late Professor -Beesly, certainly as far from a violent revolutionist as any man could -be, took the chair at the first meeting and English trade unionists -of the most sober character constituted the bulk of the members in -London, the terror which this organisation inspired in the dominant -minority all over Europe was very far indeed in excess of the power -which it could at any time exercise. But the names of Marx, the learned -German-Jew philosopher, and Bakunin, the Russian peasant-anarchist, -were words of dread to the comfortable classes in those days. Marx -with Engels had written the celebrated "Communist Manifesto," at the -last period of European disturbance, in 1848, analysing the historic -development and approaching downfall of the entire wage-earning system, -with a ruthless disregard for the feelings of the bourgeoisie. Its -conclusion appealing to the "Workers of the World" to unite was not -unnaturally regarded as a direct incitement to combined revolt. Though, -therefore, few had read the Manifesto this appeal had echoed far and -wide, and the organisation of the International itself was credited -with the intention to use the Commune of Paris as the starting-point -for a world-wide conflagration. Thus the movement in Paris, which -at first had no other object than to secure the stability of the -democratic Republic, was regarded as an incendiary revolt, and the -brutal outrages of M. Thiers, aided by the mistakes of the Communists -themselves, gradually forced extremists to the front. Some were like -Delescluze, noble enthusiasts who knew success was impossible, and -courted death for their ideal as sowing the seed of success for their -great cause of the universal Co-operative Commonwealth in the near -future; others were such as Félix Pyat, a furious subversionist of the -most ruffianly type, who mixed up personal malignity and individual -hatred with his every action, and brought discredit on his own -comrades. Victory for the Socialist ideals, with the Germans containing -one side of Paris and the Versailles troops attacking the other, -was impossible--would have been impossible even if the Communists -had suppressed their truly fraternal hatreds and had developed a -military genius. They did neither. Cluseret showed some inkling of -the necessities of the case, but Dombrowski, Rossel and other leaders -exhibited no capacity. The wonderful thing about it all was that during -the crisis, which lasted two months, Paris was so well administered. -The sacrifice of the hostages and the tactics of incendiarism pursued -at last, not by the Communist leaders, but by the Anarchist mob broken -loose from all control, have hidden from the public at large, who read -only the prejudiced accounts of the capitalist press, the real truth -about the Commune of Paris. - -But whatever may have been done in resistance to the invasion of M. -Thiers' army of reaction, nothing could possibly justify the horrible -vengeance wreaked upon the people of Paris by the soldiery and their -chiefs. It was a martyrdom of the great city. The _coup d'état_ of -Louis Napoleon was child's play to the hideous butchery ordered and -rejoiced in by Thiers, Gallifet and their subordinates. There was not -even a pretence of justice in the whole massacre. Thousands of unarmed -and innocent men and women were slaughtered in cold blood because -Paris was feared by the bloodthirsty clique who regarded her rightly -as the main obstacle to their reactionary policy. It was but too -clear evidence that, when the rights of property are supposed to be -imperilled, all sense of decency or humanity will be outraged by the -dominant minority as it was by the slave-owners of old or the nobles -of the feudal times. - -But the Commune itself, as matters stood, was as hopeless an attempt to -"make twelve o'clock at eleven" as has ever been seen on the planet. -John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry was not more certainly foredoomed -to failure than was the uprising of the Communists of Paris in 1871. -But the Socialists of Europe, like the abolitionists, have celebrated -the Commune and deified its martyrs for many a long year. The brave -and unselfish champions of the proletariat who then laid down their -lives in the hope that their deaths might hasten on the coming of a -better day hold the same position in the minds of Socialists that John -Brown held among the friends of the negro prior to the great American -Civil War. It was an outburst of noble enthusiasm on their part to -face certain failure for the "solidarity of the human race." But those -who watched what happened then and afterwards can scarcely escape from -the conclusion that the loss of so many of its ablest leaders, and the -great discouragement engendered by the horrors of defeat, threw back -Socialism itself in France fully twenty years. - -Recent experience in several directions has shown the world that -enthusiasm and idealism for the great cause of human progress, and the -co-ordination of social forces in the interest of the revolutionary -majority of mankind, cannot of themselves change the course of events. -Unless the stage in economic development has been reached where a new -order has already been evolved out of the previous outworn system, it -is impossible to realise the ideals of the new period by any sudden -attack. Men imbued with the highest conceptions of the future and -personally quite honest in their conduct may utterly fail to apply -plain common sense to the facts of the present. Dublin, Petrograd and -Helsingfors, nearly forty years later, did but enforce the teachings of -the Commune of Paris. - - - - - CHAPTER V - - CLEMENCEAU THE RADICAL - - -All this Clemenceau, though not himself a Socialist, saw by intuition. -His powers of organisation and capacity for inspiring confidence among -the people might have been of the greatest service to Paris at that -critical juncture in her history--might even have averted the crash -which laid so large a portion of the buildings of the great city in -ruins and led to the infamous scenes already referred to. This was not -to be, and Clemenceau was fortunate to escape the fate of many who were -as little guilty of terrorism or arson as himself. - -The trial of the men responsible for the death of Generals Lecomte -and Thomas was held on November 29th, 1871. Clemenceau himself was -accused of not having done enough to save their lives. He was in no -wise responsible for what had occurred, was strongly opposed to their -execution, and, as has been seen, did all that he could do to prevent -the two assailants of his own friends and fellow-citizens from being -killed. That, however, was no security that he would have escaped -condemnation if the evidence in his favour had not been so conclusive -that even the prejudiced court could not decide against him. He was -completely cleared from the charge by the evidence of Colonel Langlois, -and given full credit for his efforts on behalf of the militarists who -certainly could be reckoned among his most bitter enemies. Scarcely, -however, was his life relieved from jeopardy under the law than he was -compelled to risk it, or so he thought, on the duelling ground. Here -Clemenceau was quite at home. He used his remarkable skill in handling -the pistol with moderation and judgment, being content to wound his -adversary, Commandant Poussages, in the leg. None the less, the result -of his encounter was that he was fined and committed to prison for a -fortnight as a lesson to him not to act in accordance with the French -code of honour in future. - -But the truth is, M. Thiers did not wish to make a peaceful settlement -with the people of the capital of France. Conciliation itself was -branded as a crime as much by the political leaders and military chiefs -on his side as it was by the Communist extremists on the other. The -Versaillais aimed at the conquest of Paris by force of arms: they did -not desire to enter peacefully by force of agreement. And having won, -Paris was treated by the Republican Government as a conquered city. All -sorts of exceptional laws, such as Napoleon III himself never enacted, -were registered against the liberties of her inhabitants, and she was -deprived of her fair share of representation in the National Assembly. -The capital of France was a criminal city. - -Clemenceau on March 21st, 1871, had brought into the National Assembly -at Versailles a measure which established the Municipal Council of -Paris with 80 members. This was a valuable service to the capital and -one of which the man himself was destined to take advantage. For, -having failed to bring about a reasonable compromise between the -Versailles chiefs and the leaders of the Commune, and having also lost -his seat for Montmartre in the Assembly as well as the Mayoralty of -that district, he gave up general politics and after the fall of the -Commune accepted his election as Municipal Councillor for Clignancourt. -He devoted the next five years of his life to his doctor's work, giving -gratuitous advice as before to her poor around him, and to constant -attendance as a Municipal Councillor, where he was the leader of the -radical section. He thus gained a knowledge of Parisian life and the -needs of Parisians which no other experience could have given him. - -As one of the municipal representatives he never ceased to protest -against the shameful legislation which deprived Paris of its rights. -But he did more. The man who is regarded by many, even to-day, as -essentially a political destroyer with no idea of a constructive policy -in any department made himself master of the details of municipal -administration and was a most valued colleague of all who, acting on -the extreme left of the Council, endeavoured, while upholding the -dignity of the city against the repressive policy of the Government, to -improve the management of city affairs in every department. In this he -was as successful as the circumstances of the time permitted. He became -in turn Secretary, Vice-President and President of the Council. - -Though this portion of Clemenceau's career is little known, the -continuous unrecognised municipal service he rendered to Paris during -those eventful years gave him a hold not only upon Montmartre but -upon the whole city which has been of great service to him at other -times. He had, in fact, become a thorough Parisian from the age of -nineteen onwards, which can by no means always be said of men who -have afterwards taken a leading part in French politics. It is very -difficult to say what qualities are those which entitle a man to this -distinguished appellation. I have myself known Frenchmen able, witty, -brilliant and original, good speakers and clever writers, who somehow -never seemed to be at home with Parisians and Parisian audiences. -Critical and cynical, though at times enthusiastic and idealist, the -Parisian crowd takes no man at his own valuation and is no less fickle -than crowds in cities generally are. But Clemenceau has never failed -to be on good terms with them. I attribute this to the fact that in -addition to his other higher qualities, which impress all people of -intelligence, Clemenceau has in him a vein of sheer humorous mischief -that savours of the Parisian _gamin_ rather than of the hard-working -student from La Vendée. There is something in common between him and -the young rogues of the Parisian streets who are not at all averse from -enjoying life at the cost of poking fun at other people and even at -themselves. This spirit of Paris early got hold of Clemenceau and he of -it. - -However this may be, on February 26th, 1876, he was again elected -deputy to the National Assembly. He now began the active and continuous -political life which had been broken off at its commencement by the -second revolution followed by the gruesome tragedy just recounted. - -That he had never lost his sympathy for the men and women of the -Commune, little reason as he personally had for good feeling towards -them, was, proved by his delivery of his speech in favour of the -Amnesty of the Communists, some of whom had been so eager to get -rid of him for good and all when they had been in power for a short -time themselves. The speech at once put Clemenceau among the first -Parliamentary orators of the day. At this time a man of such capacity -was greatly needed on the extreme left. Others, who had lost much of -their energy and fervour in the long struggle against repression, -were little inclined to run further risks for the sake of a really -democratic Republic, still less for a set of people who in their -misguided efforts for complete freedom had endangered the establishment -of any Republic at all. They were content with what they had done -before and with the positions they occupied then. It was greatly to -Clemenceau's credit that he did not hesitate a moment as to the line he -should take. Popular or unpopular, fair play and freedom for all were -his watchwords. - -When the Amnesty question came up again in 1879 Clemenceau's speech in -favour of the release of the indefatigable Communist Blanqui was, like -his appeal for the amnesty of the members of the Commune generally, -very creditable to him, for it was an unpopular move and gained him -little useful political support from any party. Perhaps no man in -the whole history of the revolutionary movement ever devoted himself -so entirely and with such relentless determination to the spread of -subversive doctrines as Auguste Blanqui. He began early and finished -late. He was first imprisoned at the age of twenty-one and spent more -than half of his seventy-six years of existence in gaol or exile. He -was a strong believer in organised violence as a means of bringing -about the realisation of his communist ideals. Insurrection against -the successive French Governments he regarded as a duty. It was a duty -which he faithfully fulfilled. In 1827 he was an active fighter in the -insurrection of the Rue St. Denis. It was suppressed and Blanqui was -wounded. He was one of the leaders of the successful rising against -Charles X in 1830, in which he was again wounded. In the reign of -Louis Philippe, which followed the failure to establish a Republic, he -speedily went to work again. Insurrection, conspiracy, establishment of -illegal societies, accumulation of weapons and explosives for organised -attacks, attempts to constitute a communist republic, were followed by -the usual penalties, and after his participation in the insurrection -of the Montagnards, by condemnation to death commuted to imprisonment -for life. Such was Blanqui's career up to 1848. Then the revolution -of that year set him free again. No sooner was he released than he -began afresh, forming a revolutionary combination which led to another -three days of insurrection, with the result that he was sentenced to a -further ten years of imprisonment. In 1858, under the Second Empire, -he returned to Paris, his birthplace, but was soon ejected and passed -eight years more in exile. In 1870 and 1871 Blanqui took part in the -overthrow of Napoleon III, and in the Commune which followed, was -captured by the Versaillais troops and sentenced to transportation to -New Caledonia, after the Communards had offered to exchange for him the -Archbishop of Paris, then held by them as a hostage. Instead of being -shipped off to New Caledonia he was imprisoned at Clairvaux, where he -remained until 1880, when he was elected, while still in gaol, deputy -for Bordeaux, was not allowed to take his seat but was released, and -died in Paris in 1881. - -This brief summary gives but a poor idea of Blanqui's activities and -sufferings. At the period when Clemenceau pleaded for his release he -was still, at seventy-one, the most dangerous revolutionary leader in -France. From the first and throughout he was absolutely uncompromising -in his adherence to his communist theories, and, being at the same time -of dictatorial tendencies, he was an extremely difficult man to work -with. None the less Blanqui represented the highest type of educated -anarchist. He never considered himself for a moment. So long as he was -able to keep the flag of revolution flying, and thus to prepare the -way, by constant attempts at direct action, for the period when the -people would be strong enough and well-organised enough to achieve -victory for themselves, he was satisfied. A leader of his knowledge and -capacity must have known and did know that his views could not possibly -be accepted and acted upon, even if scientifically correct for a later -date, at the stage of evolution which France had reached in his day. -But, like Raspail, Delescluze, Amilcare Cipriani, Sophie Perovskaia, -and more than one of the French dynamitical anarchists, he deliberately -sacrificed his whole career, as he also risked his life time after -time, in desperate efforts to uplift the mass of the people from -their state of economic and social degradation. Nothing daunted him. -His courage was of that exceptional quality which is strengthened by -defeat. Even his bitterest enemies respected his devotion to his cause, -his disregard of danger and the spirit he maintained, in spite of years -upon years of confinement. He hated and despised the bourgeoisie, with -their capitalist wage-earning, profit-making system, even more than he -did monarchy and aristocracy. He revolted against the slow processes -of social evolution, as he did against the inherited wrongs of class -repression. No weapon of agitation came amiss to him. Journalist, -pamphleteer, author, orator, organiser, conspirator, he covered in his -own person the whole of the ground open to a convinced revolutionist. -The suppressive order of to-day must be smashed up to give an outlet -to the liberative order of to-morrow. Such a programme was in direct -opposition to the ideas of Clemenceau, who, individualist as he is, -has always regarded political action and trade organisation of a -peaceful nature as the best means of attaining thorough reform and -social reconstruction without running the risk of provoking monarchist -or imperialist repression. Blanqui to him was an idealist who, by -his very honesty and singleness of purpose, played into the hands of -reaction, when he spent so much of his life as he lived outside of a -prison in one broken but relentless effort to overthrow the existing -society of inequality and wage-slavery by the same forcible methods -that capitalist society itself uses to maintain the system in being. -On the other hand, the right to freedom of person and freedom of -expression was erected by the Radical leader into something not far -from an intellectual religion. On this ground, therefore, he argued -strongly in favour of Blanqui's release, though quite possibly, and -indeed probably, Blanqui's freedom, had it been secured, would have -been vigorously used against Clemenceau and his party--whom the great -Anarchist-Communist would have regarded as mere trimmers--to the -advantage of the reactionists themselves. But in this case as in that -of the amnesty to the Communists, the Clemenceau of the Rights of Man -and Liberty, Equality and Fraternity overcame Clemenceau the practical -politician. That he failed to get Blanqui out of prison could only have -been expected, having regard to the character of the Assembly to which -his appeal is addressed. - -His Amnesty speech made a fine beginning for Clemenceau's active -Parliamentary life. It put him on a very different level from that -occupied by the mere political adventurers and intriguers whose main -objects were either to help on the reconstitution of some form of -monarchy or to secure for themselves posts under the Republic of much -the same kind as existed under the Empire. Men who but yesterday had -been champions of a genuine Republic in which the interests of the -majority of the French people should be considered first, foremost and -all the time had now become mere plotters for reaction, or opportunists -anxious never to find an opportunity. They were Republicans in name -but not in spirit. They were convinced that the most important portion -of their policy consisted henceforth not in organising the factor of -democracy for general progress but in reassuring their conservative -opponents and the propertied classes generally, from the plutocrat to -the peasant proprietor, that the Republic meant only a convenient form -of government, in which all classes should agree harmoniously together -to stand at ease for the next few generations. Their arguments in -favour of such a scheme of permanent repose were unfortunately only -too striking. They had but to recall the downfall of the Commune and -to point to the ruins of fine public buildings to appeal effectively -to the feelings of a large and influential portion of the people. -Enthusiasm had become suspect, idealism the antechamber to violent -mania, even Radicalism a vain thing. - -Gambetta himself, regarded in England as the most eloquent and capable -leader of the Republican party, invented an excuse for the existence -of the Republic which he had taken an active part in creating, by the -formula, "It is that which divides us the least." Indifference on -every important question except colonial expansion became the highest -political wisdom. It was, in fact, hesitating opportunism and cowardly -compromise which then dominated France. Such tactics evoked no loyalty -and solved no problem. The old became cynical, the young contemptuous. -To attack such flabby consistency in doing nothing seemed as bootless -an enterprise as entering into conflict with a feather-bed. The early -years of the French Republic constituted a period of apathy led, -with one or two exceptions, by mediocrity. Even the scathing sarcasm -and biting irony of Rochefort failed to produce any serious effect -upon the smug stolidity of the rest-and-be-thankful representatives -of the French middle class. Hence arose "a divorce between politics -and thought," and men of capacity became disgusted with the form of -government itself. All this played directly into the hands of reaction -and was preparing the way for a series of attempts against the Republic. - -It was at this unhopeful period of stagnation, compromise and -mediocrity that Clemenceau came to the front as leader of the -Left in the National Assembly. He at once showed that he had every -qualification for this important position--never more important than -when there was a conspiracy afoot to prove to the world that there -was no Radical Left at all. At the time he entered the Assembly in -1876 Clemenceau was thirty-five years of age, with an irreproachable -past behind him and the full confidence of the Republicans of Paris -around him. In his work in Montmartre and on the Municipal Council the -people had come to know what manner of man he was. Without their steady -support it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for him to -carry on the uphill fight he fought for so many years. His principles -upon every subject of public policy were from the first clear and well -defined. - -Freedom of person, of speech and of the press were cardinal points -in his programme. He demanded that Paris should be released from -all exceptional measures of repression inflicted by the so-called -Conservatives upon the whole of the inhabitants of the capital as -revenge for the rash action of a small number of fanatical idealists -and as a means of keeping down any agitation against their own -corruption and incompetence. He claimed also that no perpetual -disability, in the shape of imprisonment and exile, should attach to -the members of the Commune of Paris, and he called for the fullest -pardon and freedom even for the irreconcilable Anarchist, Blanqui. -On questions of political rights, universal secular education, the -separation of Church and State, the generous treatment of the rank and -file of the army, the prevention of the intrigues of the Catholics, -and the expulsion of the Jesuits, Clemenceau took the line of an -out-and-out democrat. So, likewise, in regard to the treatment of the -working classes. Though not really a Socialist, the Radical leader -recognised clearly the infinite hardships suffered by the wage-earners -under the capitalist system, and proposed and supported palliative -legislation to lessen and redress their wrongs. In foreign affairs -he was a man of peace, never forgetting the outrages committed by -the German armies in the war nor the territory seized and the huge -indemnity exacted by the German Government at the peace; but hoping -always that the friendly development of the peoples of both France and -Germany might avert further antagonism and eventually lead to a full -understanding which would assuage the hatreds of the past and lay the -foundations of mutual good feeling in the future. To colonisation by -conquest and colonial adventures generally Clemenceau was steadfastly -opposed. The entire policy of expansion he regarded as injurious to the -true interests of the country, diverting to doubtful enterprises abroad -resources which were required for the development of Republican France -at home. Such colonial schemes also were apt to create difficulties and -even to risk wars with other nations which could in no wise benefit the -people, while they might strengthen the financiers whose malefic power -was already too great. - -Such in brief was the general policy which Clemenceau set himself to -formulate and put to the front on behalf of the only party which at -that moment could exercise any serious influence in the political -world. The whole programme was closely knit together, and for -many years stood the brunt of the bitterest Parliamentary warfare -conceivable. It was a conflict of ideas that Clemenceau entered upon. -He conducted it throughout on the most approved principle of all -warfare: Never fail to attack in order to defend. The advice of the -American banker, "David Harum," might have been enunciated as the motto -of Georges Clemenceau the French statesman: "Do unto others as they -would do unto you, and do it _first_." - -But the main point of all, that which assured and confirmed and -strengthened his leadership under the most difficult and dangerous -circumstances, was his resolute opposition to compromise. This was -contrary to all the ideas of political strategy and tactics which then -prevailed in France. "Men became Ministers solely on condition that -they refused when in power to do that which they had promised when -in opposition"--quite the English method, in fact. He himself never -failed to denounce nominal Republicans who set themselves stubbornly -against reform and progress in every shape, as mere reactionists in -disguise. They were, in fact, the staunch buttresses of that bourgeois -Republic of which Clemenceau not long afterwards said to me, "_La -République, mon ami, c'est l'Empire républicanisé_." It was indeed a -republicanised Empire which best suited the leading French politicians -of that day. For at first bourgeois domination of the narrowest and -meanest kind, leading, so the reactionaries hoped, to the restoration -of the monarchy, had its will of Paris and all that Paris at its best -stood for. As we look back upon that period of pettifoggery in high -places, the wonder is that the Royalists were not successful. If they -had had a king worth fighting for they might have been; for more than -one President was certainly not unfavourable to the monarchy or empire. -Prime Ministers were similarly tainted with reaction, and the army was -none too loyal to the Republic. - - - - - CHAPTER VI - - FROM GAMBETTA TO CLEMENCEAU - - -Medici, Mazarin, Riquetti-Mirabeau, Buonaparte, Gambetta--these names -recall the great influence which Italians have had upon French affairs. -Few, if any, nations have allowed persons of foreign extraction to lead -them as France permitted the five recorded above. Much, too, as these -Italians were affected by their French surroundings, there is something -in them all quite different from what we regard as distinctively French -intelligence and general capacity. Possibly that gave them their power -of control. They had that faculty of detachment, of looking at the -situation from without, which is so invaluable to anyone who has to -play a great part in the world. Some of them could so far survey, as -well as enter into, the peculiarities of the French mind that they -could play upon its weaknesses as well as call forth its strength. -Yet, with all their genius, the four men named failed to accomplish -what they set out to achieve, and none left behind him amid his own -immediate followers those who were capable of carrying on his work. - -Léon Gambetta had but fourteen years of active political life, and -during only eleven of those years was he in a position to make himself -seriously felt. But what an amazing career this was of the grocer's boy -of Cahors who stirred all France to enthusiastic support or ferocious -denunciation between 1871 and 1882! When William Morris died, the -doctor who attended him was asked what he died of. "He died of being -William Morris," was the reply. Although Gambetta's death was due to a -pistol-shot received under circumstances never fully explained, it may -be said that he also died of being Léon Gambetta. For his inner fires -had burnt the man out. He crowded all the excitement and passions of a -long lifetime into those stormy eleven years, and without some account -of him and his efforts for the foundation of the Republic the story of -Clemenceau is not complete. - -Born in 1848 and enabled to come to Paris by the touching -self-sacrifice of a maiden aunt who believed that her nephew's -confidence in his destiny to do great things would be realised, -Gambetta was soon regarded as a leader among the young men of the -Quartier Latin, who were in full revolt against the Empire. He -distinguished himself by his easy-going, rough-and-tumble mode of life, -his carelessness about study of the law which was to be his means of -earning a livelihood, and his perfervid eloquence in the political -circles which he frequented. Lawyer, journalist, bohemian orator of -the clubs, strongly anti-Imperialist, he had much personal magnetism, -but was not generally recognised as a man of exceptional ability. The -few cases he had had in the Courts did not give him any considerable -standing. Such was Gambetta when a number of Republican journalists -were arrested on November 12th, 1868, for starting a subscription to -erect a monument to M. Baudin, the Republican deputy who had been shot -down in cold blood during Louis Napoleon's massacre of the people -of Paris on December 2nd, 1851--seventeen years before. Among these -prisoners was the famous Delescluze, then editor of the _Réveil_. His -counsel was Léon Gambetta. Gambetta's speech was not merely a defence -of his client, it was a scathing indictment of the Empire, from its -foundation on the ruin of the Republic of 1848 by the _coup d'état_ -onwards. "Who," the advocate asked, "were the men who 'saved' France -at the cost of the death or transportation or exile of all her most -eminent citizens? They were, to quote Corneille, 'un tas d'hommes -perdus de dettes et de crimes.' These are the sort of people who for -centuries have slashed down institutions and laws. Against them the -human conscience is powerless, in spite of the sublime march-past of -the martyrs who protest in the name of religion destroyed, of morality -outraged, of equity crushed under the jackboot of the soldier. This is -not salvation: it is assassination." And this was no longer a press -prosecution: it was the Emperor and his set of scoundrels who were now -on their trial before the people of France and Europe. - -The speech gave Gambetta great popularity and the opening into public -life he desired. The cause itself was lost before the trial began. -Delescluze was fined and imprisoned. "You may condemn us, but you can -neither dishonour us nor overthrow us," cried Gambetta. From that time -forward he was regarded as a new force on the side of the Republic. -His behaviour in the Corps Législatif, to which he was soon afterwards -elected, justified this opinion. When the disasters of the Empire came -Gambetta was one of the first to cry for Napoleon's abdication and the -establishment of the Republic, taking an active part in the foundation -of the new order in Paris. It may be said that he worked side by side, -though never hand in hand, with Clemenceau. - -But those scenes of the downfall of the Empire in the capital, dramatic -and exciting as they were, could bear no comparison with his bold -escape from beleaguered Paris in a balloon and the magnificent effort -he made to rouse the Provinces against the invaders. He failed to turn -the tide of German victories, but he prevented the shameful surrender -without a fight for the French Republic which many would have been glad -to accept, and he, more than any other man, kept the flag flying, when -Legitimists, Orleanists and Buonapartists were all doing their utmost -to set on foot a reactionary government against the best interests -of France. All this is part of the common history of the time. But -we are apt, in looking back over that period of his activities, to -underrate the almost superhuman energy he displayed, to attach too much -importance to the mistakes he inevitably made, and to forget that his -own countrymen were among his worst enemies in the work he undertook. -Also, if the Empire had left the Republic one single really first-rate -general at the disposal of France, the result might have been very -different from what it was. There is such a thing as luck in human -affairs, and luck was dead against Gambetta. All the more credit to him -for never losing heart even in the face of continuous disasters and -even betrayals. First as leading member of the Government of Defence, -and then as virtual Dictator of France, Gambetta bridged over for the -time being the bitter antagonism which separated Paris, the besieged -seat of government, from the rest of France. Immediately on his arrival -at Tours he created a new National Government out of the unpromising -elements gathered together almost accidentally there. The fall of Metz -and the threatened starvation of Paris, which might lead to surrender -at any moment, made Gambetta's own position desperate. The Paris -Government, which apparently looked only to Paris, had failed to make -a resolute effort to break through the lines of the German investment -before Metz fell, and then lost heart altogether, refusing even to -listen to any remonstrance from outside against a humiliating peace. -Gambetta never gave way. Arrived at Bordeaux, he stuck to his text -of carrying on the war, having in the meantime vigorously denounced -the Government in Paris for its weakness. He and his fellow-delegates -were deaf to the counsels of despair brought red-hot by members of the -Government; but at last, overwhelmed by circumstances he could not -control, the young Dictator resigned. After Paris had surrendered there -was really no further hope, and those who voted in the new Assembly, as -did Louis Blanc, Clemenceau and others, for the continuance of the war, -did so more by way of protest against the apathy which pervaded the -whole Assembly, and because foreign intervention in favour of France -and against Germany seemed possible even thus late in the day, than -because they saw at the moment any prospect of success. - -Thus France lay prostrate at the feet of Germany, but at least Gambetta -and the Republicans who acted with him showed their confidence that she -would rise again. They were not responsible for the collapse of the -French nation: undismayed by defeat they believed in Republican France -of the near future. - -Gambetta had created new armies out of disarray and disorder, and -he had also aroused a fresh spirit which rose superior to disaster. -The victory of the Republic in years to come over all the forces of -reaction was largely due to the work done during Gambetta's four months -of dictatorship. - -Universal Suffrage, General Secular Education, No Second Chamber, -the Republican form of Government: those were the principal measures -advocated by the extreme Left of the National Assembly, and these were -advocated by Gambetta both at Bordeaux and when he took his seat at -Versailles as one of the Deputies for Paris. But the Royalists were -still in a majority, and were determined to take every advantage of -their position while power still remained in their hands. Their object -was to render Republicanism hateful. The object of their opponents -was to show that no other form of government was possible and to -prevent any other form from being established. Now that the Republic -has been maintained for more than forty-seven years, under all sorts -of difficult and dangerous circumstances, the obstacles which stood -in its way at the start are sometimes under-estimated. Continuous -agitation was needed to keep the country fully alive to the intrigues -of the Royalists and Catholics. It was essential to put the misdeeds of -the Empire and the real objects of the monarchists constantly before -the public. No man in France was better qualified for this work than -Gambetta, and he did it well, so well that the whole reactionary party -was infuriated against him. There was no opportunism about him at -this period, beyond the necessary adaptation of means to ends under -circumstances which rendered immediate success impossible. - -M. Thiers, in consequence of his horrible suppression of the Commune, -was by far the most powerful public man in the country. He was acting, -though a Constitutional Monarchist, as trustee for a provisional form -of government which could not be distinguished from a conservative -Republic. The longer this continued the better the chance of obtaining -a Government which would not be conservative. It was of great -importance, therefore, to keep M. Thiers on the Republican side, and -this was made easier by the action of M. Thiers' own old friends. -So antagonistic was their attitude to the former Minister of Louis -Philippe that, even when Gambetta supported the ex-Mayor of Lyons, -a fervid Radical, M. Barodet, against M. Thiers' eminent friend and -coadjutor M. de Rémusat, as representative of Paris, and the former won -by 40,000 votes, Thiers never wavered in his decision to keep away from -any direct connection with the monarchists. They therefore determined -to upset the President, did so by a majority of 26 votes in the -Assembly, and elected a President of their own in the person of Marshal -MacMahon. This was on May 24th, 1873. - -Reaction had won at Versailles. It remained to be seen whether it would -win in the country. A "Ministry of Combat" for reaction, headed by -the Duc de Broglie, was formed, and a Ministry of Combat it certainly -proved to be. They were allowed no peace by their opponents, who -never ceased to attack them all round, and they met these persistent -assaults by attempts secretly to cajole and suborn public opinion. So -the great combat went on. The majority remained a majority and rejected -the Republic. It was useless. But in his anxiety to win speedily -in conjunction with M. Thiers, Gambetta himself and his followers -practised that very opportunism which he had previously denounced. A -non-democratic Senate, which had always been opposed by Republicans, -was enacted as an essential part of the Republican Constitution, and on -February 25th, 1875, the French Republic was firmly established as the -legal form of government by the very same majority that, in the hope of -rendering any such disaster to monarchy impossible, had made Marshal -MacMahon President and the Duc de Broglie Premier. - -But it was a truncated Republic that Gambetta had thus obtained. What -he had gained by political compromise he had lost in the enthusiasm -of principle. A leader who desires to achieve great reforms must -always keep in close touch with the fanatics of his party. They alone -can be relied upon in periods of crisis, they alone refuse to regard -politics merely as a remunerative profession. The compromise--for men -of principle compromise spells surrender--of February 25th, 1875, was -destined to be fatal to the democratic parliamentary dictatorship -which Gambetta might have achieved by common consent of his party, had -he pursued his original policy of democratic Republicanism through -and through. He stunted the growth of his own progeny by helping to -establish a Republicanised Empire. No doubt this averted friction for -the time being, but it slackened the rate of progress, placed obstacles -in the path of democracy, and destroyed public enthusiasm. By one of -the strange ironies of political life, however, it so chanced that, -nearly thirty years later, Clemenceau himself owed his return to -Parliament to the institution of that same Senate the creation of which -he had always resolutely opposed. - -But during these years of reconstruction from 1871 to 1875 Clemenceau -had been excluded from the Assembly and actively engaged in the work -of the Municipal Council of Paris. There he did admirable service in -consolidating the organisation of Parisian municipal life to which he -had been instrumental in giving expression in legal shape as Deputy for -Montmartre. Paris had become the bugbear of all the reactionists and -law-and-order men. The capital was constantly referred to by them as if -the last acts of despair of the irresponsible extremists of the Commune -were the habitual diversions of the Parisian populace when allowed -free play for the realisation of their own aspirations. The Parisians, -in fact, according to these persons, were burning with the desire -to destroy their own city in order to avenge themselves upon their -provincial detractors and enemies. It was important to show, therefore, -not only that Paris could manage her own affairs coolly and capably, -but also that she could take a progressive line of her own which might -give the lead to other French cities in more than one direction. This -was precisely what the Municipal Council did, and Clemenceau, by his -constant attendance and the continuous pressure he exerted as an active -member of the Left of that body, prevented the Council from being used -at any time as a centre of reactionist intrigue. By this means also he -strengthened his personal influence in his own democratic district as -well as in Paris as a whole. He took care likewise all the world should -know that on the matter of the full restitution of Parisian rights and -the return of the Assembly to the capital he was as determined as ever, -and that in the affairs of general politics he was and always would be -a thoroughgoing Radical Republican. Thus he was building up for himself -outside the Chamber a reputation as a capable municipal administrator -as well as a fearless champion of the public rights of the great city -he had made his home. At the same time his local popularity, due to his -thorough knowledge of social conditions and his advocacy of municipal -improvements of every kind, added to his gratuitous service as doctor -of the poor, gave him an indisputable claim upon the votes of the -people when, after having become President of the Municipal Council, he -should decide to offer himself for re-election to the Assembly. - -And from February 25th, 1875, onwards, matters were taking such a turn -that the presence of a thoroughly well-informed, determined, active -and fearless representative of Paris became necessary. A leader was -wanted on the extreme Left who should loyally support the moderate -Republicans when they were going forward and have the courage to -attack them when they seemed inclined to hesitate or go back. The -success of the conservative compromise in the constitution of the -Republic had strengthened the belief of the reactionary majority in -the Assembly in their own power under the new conditions. Gambetta's -own moderation deceived them as to the real position in the country. -They began to think that the Republicans were afraid not only of how -they would fare in the elections to the newly constituted Senate, but -that the result of the General Elections which must shortly be held -would be unfavourable to their cause. The Prime Minister, M. Buffet, -aided and abetted by the President, MacMahon, who never forgot that -the members of the Right were his real friends, made full use of the -Exceptional Laws and the State of Siege, which was still in force, to -show the Republicans plainly what a reactionary majority would mean. -The "Conservatives" and Imperialists had things all their own way. -Democracy became a byword and Radicalism a vain thing. - -With the Ministry at their command and the President in their hands, -they needed only to obtain the control of the Senate to have the people -of France entirely at their mercy. Then, with the army favourable, -with whole cohorts of anti-Republican officials at their service, they -might postpone the General Elections, maintain the state of siege -permanently, and prepare everything for a monarchical restoration or a -Buonapartist plébiscite. _L'Empire républicanisé_ indeed! - -M. Buffet, within a few months of the declaration of the Republic as -the real form of government of France, spoke quite in this sense. -Happily the forces of reaction fell out among themselves. They could -not trust one another in any sharing of the booty which might fall -to the general lot. Therefore, when the time came for nomination and -election of the seventy-five members of the Senate to be elected by the -Assembly, their intestine differences lost them the battle: one portion -of their motley group even went over to the enemy. So the Republicans -actually obtained a majority by the votes of their opponents. In -this way the danger of the Senate as a whole being used against the -Republic was averted and the Radicals had secured the first point in -the political game. Yet, in spite of this preliminary success, the -reactionists had a majority of the Senate of 300 when the limited -votes of the country had been polled. But the Republicans in revenge -gained a surprising majority at the General Elections for the National -Assembly, such a majority that it might have been thought any further -serious effort on the part of the anti-Republicans would be impossible -and even that Gambetta's previous policy of opportunism was unnecessary. - -It was at this election of 1876 that Clemenceau was returned again for -the 18th Electoral District of Paris to the National Assembly as a -thoroughgoing Radical Republican, and took his seat on the extreme Left -under the leadership of Gambetta. - -Marshal MacMahon, the President, was a good honest soldier who -served his country as well as he knew how, but was quite incapable -of understanding the new forces that were coming into action around -him. The Parisians were never tired of inventing humorous scenes in -which he invariably figured as the well-meaning pantaloon. Everybody -trusted his honour, but all the world doubted his intelligence. He was -by nature, upbringing and surroundings a conservative in the widest -sense of the word. Radical Republicanism was to him the accursed thing -which would bring about another Commune of Paris, if its partisans -were given free rein. Although, therefore, incapable of plotting -directly for the overthrow of the Constitution he had pledged himself -to uphold, he was liable to yield to influences the full tendency of -which he did not discern. Thus it happened that he allowed himself -unconsciously to become the tool of the highly educated and clever -Duc de Broglie, who was undoubtedly a monarchist and, what was still -worse, a statesman imbued with the ideals of clericalism and of the -Jesuits--precisely those powers which the growing spirit of democracy -and Republicanism most feared. It was this growing spirit and its -expression in the National Assembly that the Prime Minister, M. Jules -Simon, who succeeded de Broglie had to recognise and deal with. -Gambetta was still the leader of the Republican Party, and with him for -this struggle were all the more advanced men, including Clemenceau, who -afterwards stoutly opposed his policy of opportunism and compromise. -M. Jules Simon, finding the majority of the Assembly in favour of -steady progress towards the Left, was quite unable to check the -movement in this direction or to refuse the legislation to which the -Republican demands of necessity impelled him. The President could not -see that an extremely moderate man, such as Jules Simon undoubtedly -was, would not have taken this course unless he had been convinced -that the Republic had to be in some degree republicanised if serious -trouble were to be averted. In short, Marshal MacMahon felt that the -floodgates of revolution were being opened, and forthwith knocked -down the lock-keeper. In other words, he sent for M. Jules Simon and -talked to him in such a manner as gave the Premier no option but to -resign. Resign he did. Thereupon France was thrown into that turmoil of -peaceful civil war ever afterwards known as the _Coup du Seize Mai_. -The Duc de Broglie, with a trusty phalanx of seasoned reactionaries -and devotees of priestcraft, again took office, regardless of the fact -that the majority of the Chamber was solid against them all. Even -with the most strenuous support of the President of the Republic, -the de Broglie Ministry never had a chance from the first. They were -in a hopeless minority, and their attempt to govern, on the basis of -MacMahon's reputation and the support of the priests, could not but -result in failure, unless the Marshal himself were prepared to risk a -_coup d'état_. This the Duc de Broglie and his followers were ready to -attempt, but it was useless to embark upon anything of the kind so long -as the President held back. - -Then came the famous division, following up a most violent discussion, -which for many a long year formed a landmark in the history of the -Republic. Three hundred and sixty-three Republicans declared against -the President's Ministry of reaction and all its works. But Marshal -MacMahon still would not understand that in his mistaken attempt to -override the National Assembly in order to save France from what he -believed would be an Anarchist revolution, he himself, with his group -of monarchists and clericals, was steadily impelling the country into -civil war. The action taken against Gambetta, then at the height of his -vigour and influence, for declaring in his famous phrase that, in view -of the attitude of the Chamber, the President must either "give in or -get out," made matters still worse. The President's manifestoes to the -Assembly and the country also only confirmed the growing impression -that a sinister plot was afoot against the Republic itself, in the -interest of the Orleanists. - -This was a much more serious matter than appeared on the surface. -In the six years which had passed since the withdrawal of the -German armies and the suppression of the Commune, France had become -accustomed to the Republic and to the use of universal suffrage as a -democratic instrument of organisation. Great as were its drawbacks in -many respects, the Republic was, as Gambetta phrased it, the form of -government which divided Frenchmen the least. The people, who comprised -not only the enlightened Radical Republicans of the cities, but the -easily frightened small bourgeoisie and the peasantry, could now make -the Assembly and the Senate do what they pleased. They were not as yet -prepared to push those institutions very fast or very far, but they -were unquestionably moving forward and were in no mind whatever to -go back either to Napoleonism, Orleanism or Legitimism. France as a -Republic was becoming the France of them all. - -When, therefore, the 363 deputies who voted against the Duc -de Broglie's rococo restoration policy and Marshal MacMahon's -constitutional autocracy stood firmly together, sinking all differences -in the one determination to safeguard and consolidate the Republic, -there could be no real doubt as to the result. Those 363 stalwarts -issued a vigorous appeal to the country, and the issue was joined in -earnest at the General Elections. Gambetta, meanwhile, was the hero of -the hour, straining every nerve for victory, exhausting himself by his -furious eloquence, and the other advanced leaders did their full share -of the fighting. In all this political warfare Clemenceau was as active -and energetic as the fiery tribune himself, and as one of the framers -and signatories of the great Republican appeal identified himself -permanently with the document which recorded, as events proved, the -decision of France to be and to remain a Republic. - -Although it did not seem so at the time, the President played -completely into the hands of the Republicans by the Message he sent -to the Assembly and the Senate just before the prorogation he had so -autocratically decreed. Here is a portion of it:-- - - "Frenchmen,--You are about to vote. The violence of the opposition - has dispelled all illusions. . . . The conflict is between order and - disorder. You have already announced you will not by hostile elections - plunge the country into an unknown future of crises and conflicts. You - will vote for the candidates whom I recommend to your suffrages. Go - without fear to the poll. - - (Signed) "MARÉCHAL MACMAHON." - -The elections followed. It is difficult to exaggerate the advantage -which is given in a French General Election to the party in power at -the time. An unscrupulous Minister of the Interior has at his disposal -all sorts of devices and machinery for helping his own side to victory. -He can bring pressure of every kind to bear upon individuals directly -or indirectly dependent on the Government of the day, and the whole -official caste may be enlisted on behalf of the administration in -control. This is the case ordinarily and in quiet times. But here was -a direct stand-up fight between Reaction and Clericalism on the one -side and Republicanism and Secularism--for that was at stake too--on -the other. Both Marshal MacMahon and the Duc de Broglie honestly -believed that they were doing their very utmost to preserve France -from rapine and ruin. Every Radical Republican of the old school or -the new was to them a bloody-minded Communard in disguise, veiling -his instincts for plunder with eloquent appeals for patriotism and -humanity. It is easy for the fanatics of conservatism and reaction thus -to delude themselves. And once self-deceived they lose no chance of -imposing their own wise and sober views upon the misguided people! So -it happened in this case. Never were the powers of the Government in -office strained to the same extent as in these elections of 1877--the -elections which followed on the "_Seize Mai_" stroke of MacMahon. Not -an opportunity for coercing, cajoling and intimidating the voters was -missed. In every urban district and rural village throughout France -the State, the Church, the Municipality, the Commune were used to -the fullest extent possible to obtain a vote favourable to the de -Broglie Ministry. Swarms of priests and Jesuits buzzed around the -constituencies, and promises of an easy time of it in this life and -the next if things went the right way were made in profusion. If the -Republic could be beaten by the forces of reaction it would be beaten -now! Gambetta had predicted that the 363 would return to the Assembly -as 400. This was not to be. But in view of the tremendous efforts made -to stem the tide of progress, not only by promises, but by serious -threats wherever threats might tell, the wonder is the Republicans were -so successful as they proved to be. In spite of all that the President -and the Prime Minister and the Catholic Church and the Jesuits--who -were fighting for the right to remain in France--and the curés and -the State functionaries, and all that the agencies of aristocratic, -monarchist and Buonapartist--more particularly Buonapartist--corruption -could do, the Republicans returned to the Chamber with a substantial -majority of upwards of 100 votes. This victory was universally -recognised not only in France but throughout Europe as irrefragable -evidence that the French people had finally decided for a Republic, and -had dealt at the same time a serious blow to the Church. - -But, obvious as this was to everybody else, the respectable old -soldier who had been a party to all this reactionary turmoil was still -unconvinced of the error of his ways! He repeated the formula of the -Malakoff fortress: _J'y suis, j'y reste_. But the Republicans were more -tenacious than the Russians. They resolved to dislodge him, political -Marshal though he was. A resolution was passed by the Assembly to -inquire into corrupt practices during the election. It was a challenge -to battle, and signed by such men as Albert Grévy, H. Brisson, Jules -Ferry, Léon Gambetta, Floquet, Louis Blanc and Clemenceau. - -A great debate, lasting several days, followed, in which de Broglie -defended himself in a high-handed manner against the fervid -denunciations of Gambetta. A Committee of Inquiry was nominated and -the arena of the struggle changed to the Senate, which presently, as -might have been expected from its reactionary character, gave a small -vote of confidence in the Marshal and his Ministers. Nevertheless the -feeling in the country was such that even MacMahon could not hold on. -De Broglie resigned, and the Marshal evolved--almost from the depths of -his inner consciousness--an "extra-Parliamentary Cabinet" which might -have been called "The Cabinet of Men of No Account." But these were so -unknown and so incompetent that all France made fun of them; and the -will of the old Marshal, which nothing else could conquer, was broken -by ridicule. In December, 1877, the President of the Republic saw that -unless he appealed to the army, as the Buonapartists vigorously incited -him to do, an appeal which more than probably the army itself would -have rejected, there was no course open to him but the alternative -which Gambetta had pointed out as being the Marshal's inevitable -destiny if he kept within the limits of law and order--to give in or -get out. The old soldier of the Empire gave in, and did his country -a service by accepting the rebuff which he had courted: a moderate -Republican Ministry under the Premiership of M. Dufaure took office. -MacMahon himself remained President of the Republic until January, -1879 (when he was succeeded by Jules Grévy), but his reactionary -power was broken and France entered on a moderately peaceful era of -recognised Republicanism. Gambetta was the acknowledged leader of -the Republican majority; and Clemenceau, after this first taste of -victory, now began that fine career of destructive, anti-opportunist -Radicalism and semi-Socialist democracy which made him for many -years the most redoubtable politician and orator in the Republic. -The Radical-Socialist Clemenceau stood next in succession to the -Opportunist Gambetta. - - - - - CHAPTER VII - - THE TIGER - - -When a political leader in the course of some fifteen years of -Parlamentary life has upset, or has helped to upset, no fewer than -eighteen administrations and has always refused to take office himself, -that leader is likely to have created a few enemies. When, in addition -to these feats of destruction, he has during the same period secured -the nomination and election of three Presidents of the Republic and -has thus proved an insuperable obstacle to the realisation of the -legitimate ambitions of the most important public men in France who -were not elected, it is clear that personal popularity was not the -object he had in view. It is impossible for the ordinary politician -or journalist to judge fairly a man of this sort. Politics in modern -Europe is an interesting game and, quite frequently, a remunerative -profession. Party interests sap all principle and the attainment of -personal aims and ambitions in and out of Parliament is, as a rule, -quite incompatible with common honesty. Instead of Court intrigues and -backstair cabals there are nowadays lobby "transactions" and convenient -sales of titles and positions arranged, for value received, at private -meetings. That is as far as democracy has got yet. It is all an -understood business, often complicated with more flagitious pecuniary -dealings outside. - -Republican Government, or Constitutional Government, means, therefore, -the success or failure of vote-catching and advantage-grabbing schemes, -quite irrespective, from the public point of view, of the merits of the -proposals which are put forward. Honest enthusiasts, who really wish -to get something done for the benefit of the present or the coming -generation, are only useful in so far as they act as stokers-up of -public opinion for the profit of the political promoter of this or that -faction. Steam is needed to drive the machine of State. Men of real -convictions furnish that steam. But they are fools for their pains, all -the same. Half the amount of energy used in the right direction would -gain for them place, pelf, and possibly power, which is all that any -man of common sense goes into politics for. Anybody who carries high -principle and serious endeavour into political life is not playing the -game. Everybody around him wants to know what on earth he is driving -at. The only conceivable object of turning a Ministry out is to get -in. To turn a Government out in order to keep out yourself is an -unintelligible and therefore dangerous form of political mania, or a -persistent manifestation of original sin. - -Clemenceau was found guilty on both counts. But he was the ablest -public man in all France. Moreover, he was successful in the diabolical -combinations he set on foot. The thing was uncanny. That he should -begin by overthrowing other politicians was all in the way of business. -But that he should go on at it, time after time, for year after year, -while other and inferior men took the posts he had opened for them, was -not to be explained by any known theory of human motives. If he had -been a cranky religionist, now, that would conceivably have met the -case. He might have been "possessed" from on high or from below. But -Clemenceau was and is a free-thinker of free-thinkers: neither Heaven -nor Hell has anything to say to him. Clearly it is a case of malignant -atavism: Clemenceau has thrown back to his animal ancestry. What is -the totem of the tribe which has entered into him, whose instinct of -depredation pervades his every political action? We have it! He is of -the jungle, jungly. His spring is terrific. His crashing attack fatal. -He looks as formidable as he is. In short, he is a Tiger, and there you -are. That accounts for everything! - -When Clemenceau was re-elected Deputy for the 18th Arrondissement -to the National Assembly, on October 14th, 1877, and took the active -part in the renewed struggle with Marshal MacMahon already spoken of, -Gambetta was the leader at the height of his power and influence, with -a solid Republican majority of more than a hundred votes. But from -this period he became steadily more and more Opportunist, which gained -him great credit in Great Britain, and Clemenceau was thenceforth the -recognised leader of the advanced Left. MacMahon having resigned, M. -Grévy was elected President with the support of Gambetta. - -From the first Clemenceau had vigorously opposed the establishment -of a Second Chamber in the shape of a Senate divorced from a direct -popular vote. This was a step calculated to hamper progress at every -turn, and at critical moments to intensify those very antagonisms which -it was Gambetta's intention, no doubt, to compose entirely, or at any -rate to mitigate. Clemenceau did not view the matter from Gambetta's -point of view. The Monarchists and Buonapartists were the domestic -enemy, as the Germans had been and might be again the foreign enemy. -The only sound policy for strengthening the Republic to resist both -was to favour those measures political and social which would make -that Republic, which they had established with so much difficulty and -at such great cost, a genuinely democratic Republic. Any surrender to -the reactionists and the clericals must inevitably dishearten those -parties, now shown to be the majority of the whole French people, who -were for the Republic and the Republic alone. Opportunism also gave -the anti-democrats and intriguers a false notion of their own power, -virtually helped them to carry on their underground agitations for a -change of the new constitution, and provided them in the undemocratic -Senate with a political force that might be turned to their own purpose. - -It was more important all through, thought Clemenceau, to inspire -your own side with confidence than to placate your opponents by -half-measures. It was, in fact, not enough to eject officials who were -known to be hostile to the Republic; it was still more essential to -give such shape to the political forms and so vivify political opinion -that even the most unscrupulous officials could not turn them to the -account of reaction. Both steps were necessary to carry out a thorough -democratic programme. In fact, the whole scheme of administration in -France could not be permanently improved merely by substituting one set -of bureaucrats for another. Much more drastic measures of a peaceful -character were indispensable, and these Opportunism thwarted. Gambetta -may not have given up his desire to carry these Radical measures in -1877 and 1878: he still retained and expressed his old opinions upon -clericalism and its sinister influence. But he was no longer the -vehement champion of the advanced party at Versailles, and the position -which he had abandoned Clemenceau took up and pushed further to the -front. - -There was no matter on which the lines of cleavage between the -Republicans and the reactionists were more definitely and clearly drawn -than on the question of the Amnesty of the Communists. No man in the -Assembly was stronger in favour of their complete amnesty by law than -Clemenceau. This he showed in 1876, and in his powerful advocacy of the -release of the great agitator and conspirator Blanqui in 1879. Every -reactionary and trimming man of moderate views was bitterly opposed to -a policy of justice towards the victims of the wholesale measures of -repression formulated by M. Thiers and so frightfully carried out by -General Gallifet and the Versailles troops in 1871. Even when measures -of partial amnesty were passed, their application was nullified as -far as possible by Ministers. It was part of an organised policy -to frighten the bourgeoisie and peasants into another Empire. The -reprisals of the Bloody Week and the transportations to Cayenne and New -Caledonia had not by any means fully satisfied the enemies alike of the -Commune and the Republic. So Clemenceau and his friends never ceased -their attacks upon M. Waddington and others who took the rancorous -conservative view of unceasing persecution of the men and women who, -after all, were the first to declare the Republic. M. Waddington, as -Premier, got a resolution passed by the Chamber in his favour. But this -did not silence either Clemenceau's friends or himself. Here, in fact, -was a crucial case of his power of getting rid of an obnoxious Ministry -even in the face of a Ministerial majority. The Tiger showed his -claws and made ready to spring. But first he gave fair warning of his -intentions. Nothing could be plainer than this: "Why has the Minister -of Justice demanded a partial amnesty? Because he is anxious that the -country should not forget the horrors of the Commune. But then, if you -do not wish it to forget the horrors of the Commune, why do you desire -that those who have been condemned should forget the horrors of its -repression? Because for eight long years we have kept under cover the -abominable facts at our disposal, you have thought yourselves in a -position to trample on us! You say: We shall not forget the hostages -and the conflagrations. Very well. I who speak here tell you: If you -forget nothing, your opponents will remember too." - -The speech from which that passage is an excerpt was regarded as -a distinct menace on Clemenceau's part. It was followed up by the -extreme Left with a series of interruptions, interrogations and -denunciations which ended in the retirement of M. Waddington. He had -his majority but he had no Clemenceau. So out went Waddington and his -colleagues. In came M. Freycinet--"the white mouse." "We have had," -said Clemenceau's organ, _La Justice_, "in the Waddington cabinet a -Dufaure cabinet without M. Dufaure. To-day we have a Waddington cabinet -without M. Waddington. It is a botch upon a botch." A nice welcome for -M. Freycinet! A pleasing congratulation for the President, M. Grévy! -The administration was regarded as a political monstrosity. It had two -heads, M. Freycinet and M. Jules Ferry, one looking to the right and -the other to the left. The friends of Freycinet could not stand Ferry: -the friends of Ferry abhorred Freycinet. This new political marriage -not only began but went on with mutual aversion. It stood at the -mercy, therefore, of Clemenceau, who was less inclined to be merciful -since the Premier declared himself bitterly hostile to the plenary -amnesty proposed by the famous old Republican, M. Louis Blanc. Also on -account of clerical tendencies. Out goes Freycinet, therefore, in his -turn, and in comes M. Jules Ferry, with various clerical, educational -and other troubles of his own hatching to clear up. Ministries, in -short, were going in and out on the dial of Presidential favour like -the figures of a Dutch clock. Clemenceau was getting his claws well -into the various political personages all the time. As none of them -had any blood to lose in the shape of principles there was no great -harm done--except to the Republic! It was the perpetual immolation -of a sawdust brigade. A keen critic of the period said of the Ferry -Ministry--which was beaten on its proposal to postpone on behalf of -education the reform of the magistracy and all that this carried with -it in regard to the amnesty--that it wished to die before it lived. -Down it went for the moment, and returned to place out of breath and -half-ruined. But there the Ministry still was, and that by itself was -something in those days of political topsy-turveydom, with Clemenceau -and his party ever ready to assert themselves. - -Thus the Republic stumbled rather than marched on, from the date -of Marshal MacMahon's resignation and the installation of M. Grévy -as President up to the period of the declaration of July 14th, in -remembrance of July 14th, 1789, and the Fall of the Bastille, as the -fête day of the Republic after the passage of a practically complete -amnesty. This was really a great triumph for all Republicans, as it put -the Republic in its true historic relation to the past, the present -and the future. With such a national fête day, with the certainty that -Republicans, if they chose to keep united, could always command a large -majority in the Assembly, the elections of 1881 might well have been -a first step towards a thorough political and social reorganisation -of the Republic. Unfortunately there were several causes of disunion. -President of the Assembly though he was, and therefore excluded by -his position as well as by M. Grévy's prejudice against him from -coming into immediate competition with M. Ferry for the Premiership, -Gambetta was actively supporting the _scrutin de liste_, or political -appeal to the whole country, against _scrutin d'arrondissement_, or -local elections. This was regarded as a bid on his part for a clear -Parliamentary dictatorship. Already on October 20th, 1880, Clemenceau -had denounced the hero of the dictatorship of despair of 1871, fine as -his effort had then been, as aiming at personal power ten years later. -A victory at the polls gained through _scrutin de liste_ would probably -ensure him success in this venture. - -Nevertheless, in spite of open and secret opposition, Gambetta had -sufficient influence to carry the _scrutin de liste_ through the -National Assembly. But with the curious irony of fate he was defeated -by a majority of 32 in the Senate which he himself had been so largely -instrumental in forcing upon the Republic! This was on June 9th, 1881. -Three months before, M. Barodet had brought forward a resolution -backed by 64 deputies which, if carried, would have abolished the -equality of rights between the Senate and the National Assembly, would -have withdrawn the right of the former to dissolve Parliament, would -have made the Chamber permanent like the Senate, would have modified -the system of election of the second House; would have prevented the -re-enactment of the _scrutin de liste_ by again making the electoral -law for the deputies part of the Constitution; and lastly would have -summoned a Constituent Assembly in order to carry out these reforms. -This whole project was discussed in the Assembly on May 31st. There -was no mistake about Clemenceau's attitude. He formulated a vigorous -indictment against the Constitution of 1875 and attacked the Senate -with great violence. The Constitution of 1875 was, he declared, a -powerful weapon of war expressly forged for use against the Republic. -The Senate with its anti-democratic method of election was a permanent -danger to the State. It was not in any sense an element of stability -but an element of resistance. "What is the use of talking of a brake -on the machine or a weight to counterbalance popular opinion? Does not -universal suffrage provide its own brake, its own regulator?" This -time, however, Clemenceau missed his _coup_. M. Barodet's motion was -rejected and the conservative Republic rumbled on comfortably, though -Clemenceau shortly afterwards very nearly toppled M. Ferry's Cabinet -over, the Ministers only securing a vote in their favour by a majority -of 13 made up by their own votes. - -Looking back to that period when the whole Constitution seemed almost -certain to go into the melting-pot and come out again in a thoroughly -democratic shape, it is remarkable to notice how, in spite of the -efforts of Clemenceau, M. Naquet and other democrats, the Republic of -compromise has steadily adhered to its old machinery. Why the cumbrous -and often reactionary Senate, elected in such wise as to exclude -democratic influence, should have been maintained for more than forty -years is difficult to explain. But nations, as our own belated and -unmanageable Constitution proves, when once they have become accustomed -to a form of government, are very slow indeed to adapt it to rapidly -changing economic and social developments. This, it may be said, -suits the English turn of mind with its queer addiction to perpetual -compromise. But the French are logical and apparently restless. Yet -their Constitution remains an unintelligible muddle. Their real -conservatism overrides their revolutionary tendencies except in periods -of great perturbation. Thus the Opportunist Republic of Gambetta, -which ought to have been a mere makeshift, has held on, with partial -revision, for more than forty years. Fear of the monarchists on one -side and of the Communists, afterwards the Socialists, on the other has -kept Humpty-Dumpty up on his wall. - -The elections of 1881, conducted as they were amid much excitement, -gave the Republicans of all parties a crushing majority--a majority in -the Assembly greatly out of proportion even to the total vote. There -were five millions of votes for Republicans against 1,700,000 for -the various sections of monarchists. The Republican deputies in the -Chamber, however, numbered 467 to only 90 "conservatives." According -to the returns, this was a victory for the Government and its chief, -M. Jules Ferry, especially as the Prime Minister had arrived at some -understanding with Gambetta, who at this time had become extremely -unpopular with the democracy of Paris. But those who were of this -opinion reckoned without the question of Tunis and, above all, without -taking account of the difficulty of facing the criticisms of the -irreconcilable Clemenceau. Clemenceau had always opposed a policy of -colonial adventure. This of Tunis was from his point of view not only -adventurous but dangerous. Tunis had been offered to France in an -indefinite way at the Peace-with-Honour Congress of Berlin in 1878. -But the policy of expansion pushed on by financial intrigues did not -take shape at once. When it did it was serious enough, for France not -only had to deal with troubles in Algeria itself, with the natural -opposition of the Bey of Tunis to French interference and annexation, -but Italy took umbrage at the advance, regarding Tunis as specially -her business, Turkey was by no means favourable, and there was even -a possibility that Germany might stir up trouble for purposes of her -own. Moreover the whole business had been extremely ill-managed, not -only by the Government itself but by M. Albert Grévy, the brother of -the President, who was the Governor-General of Algeria. This personage, -on account of his Presidential connections, could neither be censured -nor replaced. So credits were asked for, troops were moved, a railway -concession granted--everything as usual, in short, when annexation is -being prepared. - -Clemenceau quite rightly denounced the whole mischievous business as -the policy of intriguers and plutocrats, and demanded an inquiry into -the affair from the first. He did not measure his phrases at all. -French blood and French money, sadly needed at home, were being wasted -abroad. M. Ferry, to do him justice, fought hard for his policy of -colonisation by force of arms. His attacks upon the extremists who -criticised him did not lack point or bitterness. Discharged officials -from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and returned Communards from -Noumea who composed the public meetings and irregular assizes that -condemned him, M. Ferry, "as is fitting, kicked aside with his boot." -As to Clemenceau, if he had allowed matters to take their own course -in Tunis, what a tornado of malediction would have raged around them -from that orator! "I can hear even now the philippics of the honourable -M. Clemenceau." Clemenceau did not get the inquiry he demanded. But -on November 10th M. Ferry retired, so badly had he been mauled in -the fray. It was a win, that is to say, for Clemenceau, who by his -speech on November 9th again overthrew the Government in spite of the -cordial support of Gambetta. What made this victory of Clemenceau and -the extreme Left the more astounding was the fact that the Treaty -concluding the "first pacification" of Tunis had been confirmed on May -23rd by a majority of 430 to 1. Clemenceau was that one. Six months -later, therefore, he had his revenge. The _expédition de vacances_, -which had developed into a _guerre de conquête_, cost M. Jules Ferry -his Premiership, notwithstanding this unheard-of majority. The Tiger at -work indeed! - -So now at last, in spite of M. Grévy's ungrateful conduct towards him, -in spite likewise of the rejection of the _scrutin de liste_, Gambetta -became President of the Council instead of President of the Chamber. -He was still at this time in the eyes of all foreigners the most -eminent living French statesman. In England particularly his accession -to office was received with jubilation in official circles. It meant, -so said Liberals like Sir Charles Dilke, who were then in power, a -permanently close understanding between France and England, a joint -settlement of the troublesome and at times even threatening Egyptian -question, as well as a fair probability of the arrangement of other -thorny problems between the two countries. But in order to accomplish -all this Gambetta must carry the Assembly, the Senate and the bulk of -his countrymen with him, and control a solid Republican party, even -if Clemenceau and his squadrons still hung upon his flank. Gambetta, -however, had shaken the confidence of the country. It was no longer -Clemenceau and his friends only who accused him of aiming at supreme -dictatorial power. The public in general suspected him too. Nor did -his immediate friends, either old or young, do much to destroy this -unfortunate impression. - -Truth to tell, Gambetta was not the man he had been a few years -before. He looked fat, even bloated, unhealthy and sensual. His -magnificent frame had undergone deterioration. A brilliant French -journalist cruelly comparing him to Vitellius, as a man of gluttony -and debauchery combined, summed up his career against that of the -extraordinary Roman general and Emperor who had played so many parts -successfully, as soldier in the field and as courtier in the palace, -and wound up in derision of Gambetta with the terrible phrase, "_Je -te demande pardon, César!_" And over against this self-indulgent and -fiery man of genius was a very different personage, who had taken up -the rôle which had once been that of the great tribune of the French -people. Spare, alert, vigorous, always in training, despising ease and -never taken by surprise; equal, as he had just shown, to fighting a -lone hand victoriously, yet never despising help in his battles even -from the most unexpected quarters--what chance had Gambetta against -such a terrible opponent as Clemenceau? None whatever. Down he went, -after a Premiership of but sixty-six days. Many believe that, finding -the situation too complicated, and relying still upon obtaining the -_scrutin de liste_ later--as indeed came about some time after his -death--Gambetta deliberately rode for a fall. Certain it is that M. -Spüller, who had Gambetta's complete confidence, gave this explanation -of his intentions three weeks before his defeat in the Assembly. - -Gambetta, with all his great reputation, being overthrown, straightway -his old Secretary of 1871, de Freycinet, came again to the front. -The affairs of Egypt, always with Clemenceau's genial assistance, -made short work of him. The Anglo-French Condominium having fallen -through and England having thought proper to suppress a people "rightly -struggling to be free," de Freycinet was anxious to reassert the claims -of France in Egypt after a fashion which threatened unpleasantness -with Great Britain. Whatever Clemenceau may have thought privately -of English policy at this juncture, he would have none of that. His -arguments convinced the Assembly that French intervention in Egypt -against England would be dangerous and unsuccessful. France, said -Clemenceau, had neither England's advantages nor England's direct -interests in Egypt. France is a continental, not a great sea power. Her -apprehensions are from the East. Do nothing which may drive England -into the arms of Germany. - -What was much worse, the same colonial expansion which had been carried -out in Tunis was now followed up in Tonquin, Annam and Madagascar, at -great expense and to little or no advantage. Clemenceau still opposed -this entire policy on principle. Ferry thought France would recompense -herself for the disasters of 1870-71 by these adventures: Clemenceau -was absolutely convinced to the contrary. "Why risk £20,000,000 on -remote expeditions when we have our entire industrial mechanism to -create, when we lack schools and country roads? To build up vanquished -France again we must not waste her blood and treasure on useless -enterprises. But there are much higher reasons even than these for -abstaining from such wars of depredation. It is all an abuse, pure and -simple, of the power which scientific civilisation has over primitive -civilisation to lay hold upon man as man, to torture him, to squeeze -everything he has in him out of him for the profit of a civilisation -which itself is a sham." There could be no sounder sense, no higher -morality, no truer statesmanship than that. Clemenceau had aspirations -that France should lead the world, not by unjustifiable conquests -over semi-civilised populations, but by displaying at home those -great qualities which she undoubtedly possesses. His attacks were -inspired, therefore, not by personal animosity against Jules Ferry or -any other politician, but against a megalomania that was harmful to -his country and the world. Unfortunately, Clemenceau could not, this -time, persuade the Assembly or his countrymen to recognise the dangers -and disadvantages of expansion by conquest in the Far East, until the -disaster of Lang Son and the demand for additional credits enabled him -to push the perils of such a policy right home. Then M. Ferry was once -more discharged, practically at Clemenceau's behest. - -So matters went on, Clemenceau striving his utmost, in opposition, to -enforce the genuine democratic policy of abstention from Imperialism -abroad and strengthening of the forces of the Republic at home which -the successive Opportunist Administrations in power refused to -accept. In each and every case, Tunis, Tonquin, Annam, Madagascar -and Egypt, he considered first, foremost and all the time what would -most benefit Frenchmen in France, and refused to be led astray by any -will-o'-the-wisps of Eastern origin, however gloriously they might -disport themselves under the sun of finance. But now came a still more -awkward matter close at home. There are not the same facilities for -shutting down inquiries into the financial peccadilloes or corrupt -malversations of public men in France as there are in England. Monetary -scandals will out, though political blunderings may be glossed over, as -in the cases of the Duc de Broglie, M. Jules Ferry and M. Albert Grévy. -The President, M. Grévy, was very unfortunate in his relations. His -brother, the Governor-General of Algeria, had shown himself dreadfully -incompetent in that capacity. But M. de Freycinet, M. Jules Ferry and -the whole Ministerial set had entered into a conspiracy of silence and -misrepresentation, throwing the blame of his mistakes upon anybody but -the Governor-General himself, in order to uphold the dignity of the -President quite uninjured. Now, however, the President's son-in-law, -M. Wilson, was found out in very ignoble transactions. He was actually -detected in the flagitious practice of trading in decorations, the -Legion of Honour and the like, not for what are considered on this -side of the Channel as perfectly legitimate purposes, the furtherance, -namely, of Party gains or Ministerial advantages, but in order to -increase his own income. The thing became a public scandal. Those -who could not afford to buy the envied distinctions were specially -incensed. But out of regard for the President, out of consideration -for their personal advancement in the future, because when you start -this sort of thing you never know how far it will go, because other -Ministers in and out of office had had relations of their own addicted -to similar trading in other directions--for all these reasons, good and -bad, nobody cared to take the matter up seriously. - -Nobody, that is to say, except that tiger Clemenceau. He actually -thought that the honour of the Republic was at stake in the business: -was of opinion that a President should be more careful than other -people in keeping the doubtful characters of men and women of his -own household under restraint. And he not only thought but spoke and -acted. M. Rouvier, who was then Premier, felt himself bound to stand -by the President and exculpated him from any share in the affair. -This made matters worse. For M. Grévy, when the whole transaction was -fully debated, could not withstand the pressure of public opinion -against him; Clemenceau carried his point and the President resigned. -Thereupon M. Rouvier thought it incumbent upon him to retire too, -though Clemenceau took pains to tell him that this was a concern -purely personal to the President and not a political issue at all. -There was consequently a Presidential Election and a new Ministry at -the same time. So great was Clemenceau's influence at this juncture -that although three of the most prominent politicians in the Republic -were eager for the post, he, out of fear of the election of the -irrepressible expansionist M. Ferry, persuaded the electors to favour -the appointment of the able and cool but popularly almost unknown -M. Sadi-Carnot--who turned out, it may be said, quite an admirable -President up to his outrageous assassination. - -By this time Clemenceau had fully justified his claim to the -distinction of being the most formidable and relentless political -antagonist known in French public life since the great Revolution. -As he would never take office himself and was moved by few personal -animosities, he stood outside the lists of competers for place. He -had definite Radical Republican principles and during all these years -he acted up to them. He was throughout opposed, as I have said, to -compromise. He fought it continuously all along the line. Moreover, he -had a profound contempt for politicians who were merely politicians. -"I have combated," he said, "ideas, not persons. In my fight against -Republicans I have always respected my party. In the heat of the -conflict I have never lost sight of the objects we had in common, and I -have appealed for the solidarity of the whole against the common enemy -of all." - -As, also, he triumphantly declared in a famous oration against those -who were engaged in sneering at Parliamentary Government and the -tyranny of words, he was ever in favour of the greatest freedom of -speech, and even stood up for the commonplace debates which often -must have terribly bored him. "Well, then, since I must tell you so, -these discussions which astonish you are an honour to us all. They -prove conclusively our ardour in defence of ideas which we think right -and beneficial. These discussions have their drawbacks: silence has -more. Yes, glory to the country where men speak, shame on the country -where men hold their tongues. If you think to ban under the name of -parliamentarism the rule of open discussion, mind this, it is the -representative system, it is the Republic itself against whom you are -raising your hand." - -A great Parliamentarian, a great political Radical was Clemenceau the -Tiger of 1877 to 1893. He, more than any other man, prevented the -Republic from altogether deteriorating and kept alive the spirit of the -great French Revolution in the minds and in the hearts of men. - - - - - CHAPTER VIII - - THE RISE AND FALL OF BOULANGER - - -The relations of Clemenceau to General Boulanger form an important -though comparatively brief episode in the career of the French -statesman. Boulanger was Clemenceau's cousin, and in his dealings with -this ambitious man he did not show that remarkable skill and judgment -of character which distinguished him in regard to Carnot and Loubet, -whose high qualities Clemenceau was the first to recognise and make use -of in the interest of the Republic. Boulanger was a good soldier in the -lower grades of his profession, and owed his first important promotion -to the Duc d'Aumale. This patronage he acknowledged with profound -gratitude and even servility at the time; but repaid later, when he -turned Radical, by what was nothing short of treacherous persecution of -the Orleanist Prince. Boulanger went even so far as to deny that he had -ever expressed his obligations to the Duke for aid in his profession, a -statement to which the publication of his own letters at once gave the -lie. - -The General was, in fact, vain, ostentatious and unscrupulous. But -having gained popularity among the rank and file of the French army -by his good management of the men under his command and his sympathy -with their grievances, he was appointed Director of Infantry, and -in that capacity introduced several measures of military reform and -suggested more. A little later, circumstances led him into close -political harmony with the Radicals and their leader. At this juncture -Clemenceau seems to have convinced himself that good use could be made -of the general, who owed his first great advance to Orleanist favour, -without any danger to the Republic. Having, as usual, upset another -short-lived Cabinet, Clemenceau therefore exercised his influence to -secure his relation the post of War Minister in the new Administration -of M. Freycinet. This was in January 1886. At first he was true to his -Radical friends and carried out the programme of army reforms agreed -upon between himself and Clemenceau, thus justifying that statesman's -choice and support. The general treatment of the French conscript was -taken in hand. His food was improved, his barrack discipline rendered -less harsh, his relations to his officers made more human, his spirit -raised by better prospects of a future career. All this was good -service to the country at a critical time and should have redounded -to the credit of the Radical Party far more than to Boulanger's own -glorification. This, however, was not the case. All the credit was -given to the General himself. Hence immense personal influence from one -end of the country to the other. - -Practically every family in France was beneficially affected, directly -or indirectly, by Boulanger's measures of military reform, and thanked -the brave General for what had been done. Not a young man in the army, -or out of it, but felt that his lot, when drawn for service or actually -serving, had been made better by the War Minister himself. So it ever -is and always has been. The individual who gives practical expression -to the ideas which are forced upon him by others is the one who is -regarded as the real benefactor: the real workers, as in this instance -Clemenceau and his friends, are forgotten. - -One of the incidents which helped to enhance Boulanger's great -popularity was what was known as the Schnäbele affair. This person -was a French commissary who crossed the French frontier into -Alsace-Lorraine to carry out some local business with a similar German -official which concerned both countries. He was arrested by the German -military authorities as not being in possession of a passport. This -action may possibly have been technically justifiable, but certainly -was a high-handed proceeding conducted in a high-handed way. At that -time France was constantly feeling that she was in an inferior position -to Germany, and her statesmen were slow to resent small injuries, -knowing well that France was still in no position to make head against -the great German military power, still less to avenge the crushing -defeats of 1870-71. When, therefore, Boulanger took a firm stand in -the matter and upheld in a very proper way the dignity of France, the -whole country felt a sense of relief. France, then, was no longer a -negligible quantity in Europe. M. de Bismarck could not always have -his way, and Boulanger stood forth as the man who understood the real -spirit of his countrymen. That was the sentiment which did much to -strengthen the General against his opponents when he began to carry out -a purely personal policy. He had inspired the whole nation with a sense -of its own greatness. - -He was then the most popular man in the country. He stood out to the -people at large as a patriotic figure with sound democratic sympathies -and an eminent soldier who might lead to victory the armies of France. - -Thenceforth Boulanger gradually became a personage round whom every -kind of social and reactionary influence and intrigues of every -sort were concentrated. To capture the imposing figure on the black -horse, to fill him with grandiose ideas of the splendid part he could -play, if only he would look at the real greatness and glory of his -country through glasses less tinted with red than those of his Radical -associates, to inspire him with conceptions of national unity and -sanctified religious patriotism which should bring France, the France -of the grand old days, once more into being, with himself as its noble -leader--this was the work which the fine ladies of the Boulevard St. -Germain, hand in hand with the Catholic Church, its priests and the -cultivated reactionaries generally, set themselves to accomplish. -From this time onwards the _mot d'ordre_ to back Boulanger went round -the _salons_. Legitimists, Orleanists and Buonapartists were, on this -matter, temporarily at one. Each section hoped at the proper moment -to use the possible dictator for the attainment of its own ends. -Thus Boulanger was diverted from the Radical camp and weaned from -Radical ideas even during his period as War Minister in M. Freycinet's -Cabinet. So subtle is the influence of "society" and ecclesiastical -surroundings upon some natures, so powerful the effect of refined -and charming conversation and genial flattery delicately conveyed, -that men of far stronger character than Boulanger have now and then -succumbed to it. Only devotion to principle or ruthless personal -ambition can hold its own against such a combination of insidious -forces dexterously employed--and women of the world and Jesuits are -both very dexterous--when once the individual to be artistically -trepanned permits himself to be experimented upon. Boulanger, though -not devoid of cleverness, was at bottom that dangerous description of -designing good fellow who all the time means well; and he fell a victim -to the delightful women and clever adventurers around him. He himself -was probably not aware that he had passed over to the enemy until the -irresistible logic of events and his changed relations with his old -friends proved to him how far he had gone. - -M. Rouvier, a shrewd and cynical politician of the financial school, -saw through the General, understood how dangerous he might become, and -refused to accept the ex-Minister of War into the Cabinet he formed on -the fall of Freycinet. But Boulanger had now so far established himself -personally that neither a political check nor even general ridicule -affected his career. Even his duel with M. Floquet, a farce in which -General Boulanger made himself the clown, could not shake him. Floquet -was a well-known Radical of those days, who had been a fellow-member -of the League of the Rights of Man with Clemenceau at the time of the -Commune. Boulanger was a soldier, accustomed to the use of arms all -his life, and reported to be a good fencer. Floquet, quite unlike his -old friend of years before, scarcely knew which end of his weapon to -present to his opponent, so inexperienced was he in this sort of lethal -exercise. When, therefore, the duel between the two men was arranged, -the only point discussed was how small an injury would Boulanger, in -his generosity, deign to inflict upon his Radical antagonist, in order -that the seconds might declare that "honour is satisfied." No doubt -Clemenceau himself, who acted as one of Floquet's seconds on this -occasion, took that view of the matter. - -What actually occurred was quite ludicrous. Floquet, duly instructed -thereto by his own friends, stood, good harmless bourgeois as he was, -like a waxwork figure, with his rapier stuck out at arm's length -straight in front of him. No science there. But there was still less on -the other side. Boulanger, to the amazement of Clemenceau and everybody -on the ground, in what appeared to be a sudden stroke of madness, -immediately rushed at Floquet and his rigid skewer and, without any -such elaborate foolishness as the laws of fence enjoin, carefully -spitted his own throat on the point of Floquet's weapon. Honour was -thus satisfied and ridicule began. But ridicule did not kill. - -No sooner was Boulanger cured of his self-inflicted wound than he went -on much as he did before. Having ceased to be Minister for War, he -was sent down to command an army corps at Clermont-Ferrand. According -to all discipline, and regulations duly to be observed by generals at -large, this kept the man appointed out of Paris. Not so Boulanger. He -visited the capital at least twice. Thereupon he was deprived of his -command and his name was removed from the Army List. That, by the rules -of war and politics, ought to have finished him. But it didn't. The -Radicals and Republicans had still no idea what an ugly Frankenstein -they had created for themselves. True, Clemenceau had declared -definitely against his own protégé the moment he saw the line he was -taking; but he underrated entirely the position to which Boulanger had -attained, not only among the reactionaries but in the hearts and minds -of the French people. For Boulanger, now gifted with a free hand, went -into the political arena at once, and was a candidate simultaneously -for the Nord and the Dordogne: provincial districts with, of course, a -totally different sort of electorate from that of the capital, where -the _brav' Général_ with his fine figure on horseback was already the -hero of the Parisians. He was elected and sat for the Nord. - -Still Clemenceau, far-seeing and sagacious as he generally is in -his judgment of political events and personal character, failed -to appreciate what his cousin had drifted into rather than had -deliberately worked for. Nor perhaps did he estimate highly enough -either the cleverness or the unscrupulousness of the men and women -who were backing him. Certain it is that, although Boulangism was now -becoming a powerful political cult, Clemenceau and other advanced men, -such as my old friend Paul Brousse, President of the Paris Municipal -Council, were still of opinion that Boulanger was going down rather -than up. It was a mistake that might have cost not only the Radicals -but the French Republic as a whole very dear. For the General had the -qualities of his defects. Agreeable, good-natured, frank, accessible -and friendly to all who approached him, with enough ability to gauge -fairly well what was going on around him, loving display for its own -sake, and ever ready to pose in dignified and pleasing attitude, before -a populace by no means averse from well-managed advertisement, while -not apparently bent upon forcing his own will or dictatorship upon the -country--Boulanger, both before and after his election for the Nord, -was much more formidable than he looked to those who only measured his -power from the standpoint of wide intelligence. This the rather because -there was no lack of money to push his pretensions to high place. - -Boulanger came to the front also at a time when the bourgeois Republic -(owing to the weakness, incapacity and instability of the bourgeois -politicians themselves) was discredited and was believed to be -tottering. Clemenceau's own unceasing campaign against widespread -abuses and incapable Ministers was largely responsible for this. There -was a general sense of insecurity and unsettlement, engendered by the -fall of Administration after Administration, due to political or -financial proceedings of doubtful character, exposed and denounced -by Clemenceau and the Radicals themselves. Some of the Radicals and -intellectuals even now supported Boulanger as an alternative to -perpetual upsets. Disgusted with lawyers, professional politicians -and place-hunters of high and low degree, the people likewise were -again on the look-out for a saviour of France who should secure for -them democracy without corruption, and honest leadership devoid of -Socialism. The old story, in fact. - -At this particular moment, too, the organised forces in Paris, the army -and the gendarmerie, were Boulangists almost to a man. The danger, -therefore, of the Boulangist agitation now being carried on alike -in Paris and in the Departments seemed to a looker-on to be growing -more serious every day. This, however, continued not to be the view -of Clemenceau and his party. They thought, in spite of the voting in -the Nord and the Dordogne and the apparent popularity of the General -in Paris, that the whole thing would prove a mere flash in the pan; -that the good sense and Republican conservatism of the French people -would display itself when peril really threatened the Republic; and -that Boulanger would be even less successful than the Duc de Broglie. -Then came the General Elections. Boulanger was candidate for Paris. -Once more the obvious evidence of his great popularity was overlooked -by the Clemenceau group, the Boulangist fervour went on unrecognised, -and it seemed that it might depend upon the General himself at any -moment--as indeed proved to be the case--whether he should follow in -the footsteps of Louis Napoleon and accomplish a successful _coup -d'état_, or fall permanently into the background. But up to the last -moment his opponents could not believe that a general with no great -military career behind him, a citizen with no great name to conjure -with, a politician with no great programme to attract voters, could win -Paris or become master of France. - -The crisis really was the more acute since there was no rival -personality, no Republican of admitted ability and distinction ready -to stake his reputation against Boulanger. Though Clemenceau, as -the preparations for the election proceeded and Boulanger's growing -strength became manifest, now did his utmost to stem the tide, there -was no doubt that, failing a really powerful opponent, Boulanger would -hold the winning place at the close of the poll. He took up a bold -position. He was the hero of the hour. The whole contest was admirably -stage-managed and advertised on his side. He rode through the city on -his black horse, a fine figure of a man, full of confidence of victory, -the halo of a coming well-earned triumph around him. It was universally -felt that the previous votes of the provinces would be quite eclipsed -by the vote of the capital. Parisians, peasants and miners, small -owners and proletariat would for once be together. - -This was the unshaken opinion of his friends and followers, who seemed -in those exciting days to have with them the great majority of the -people. On the other side a wave of incapacity was actually flooding -the intelligence of his opponents. Instead of putting forward a really -representative man, either Republican or Socialist, with a fine -democratic record behind him, they made an absolutely contemptible -choice for their champion. One Jacques, an obscure liquor-dealer, whom -nobody ever heard of before the election, or gave a thought to after -it, was chosen to fight for Paris against the General. This man had -never done or said or written anything that anybody could remember, -or would remember if he could. If no Radical Republican was ready to -stand, Joffrin, an old member of the Commune and a skilled artisan most -loyal to his principles, always returning at once to his trade when -he failed to be elected for the National Assembly, would have been a -far better and more worthy candidate in every way. The election then -would have been a conflict between the enthusiasm of social revolution -and the fervour of chauvinist reaction. As it was, the Boulangists -could say and did say with truth that the General would represent the -citizens of Paris much more genuinely than Jacques. The result of this -error of tactics could, have been foreseen from the first. General -Boulanger won by a heavy majority. - -That evening saw the crisis of the whole Boulangist agitation. Such -a victory at such a time called for immediate and decisive action. -That was the universal opinion. A political triumph so dramatic and so -conclusive could only find a fitting climax in the victor proclaiming -himself to be a Cromwell, a Monk or a Napoleon. Nothing less was hoped -for by the reactionists: nothing less was feared by the Republicans. -The figures of the poll were welcomed with enthusiastic cheering all -along the boulevards, and the Boulangist anthem, "_En revenant de la -Revue_," was played from one end of Paris to the other. The ball was -at the General's feet. He might have failed to win his goal, but all -Paris expected he would make a good try for it. This meant that the -very same night he should either go straight to the Elysée himself or -make some bold stroke for which he had prepared beforehand, that would -fire the imagination of the people. Such was the prevailing impression. -The General celebrated his election for the City of Paris at dinner at -Durand's famous restaurant, surrounded by his intimate supporters. The -excitement outside was tremendous. Hour after hour passed. Nothing was -done, nothing apparently had been made ready. The strain of waiting -became almost unbearable. The crowd gradually got weary of anticipating -the opening of a drama whose prologue had so roused their expectations. -At last, instead of staying to watch the first scenes of a revolution, -they took themselves off quietly to bed. Boulanger's chance of -obtaining supremacy was gone. - -It was always said that, backed by the Radicals, and supported by -the President, the Minister of the Interior, M. Constans, a most -resolute and unscrupulous man, who was himself in the crowd outside -the restaurant, was the main cause of this miserable fiasco. Strong -precautions had been taken against any attempt at violence. Powerful -forces whose loyalty to the Republic was beyond question had been -substituted for brigades of known Boulangist tendencies. That M. -Constans would not, under the conditions, have stuck at trifles was -well known. He was kept at a distance from France for years afterwards, -on account of his ugly character, in the capacity of French Ambassador -at Constantinople, a city where at that time such a trifling peccadillo -as murder was scarcely noticed. So Boulanger knew what to expect. -Moreover, Clemenceau and the Radical Republicans, as well as Jaurès and -Socialists of every shade of opinion, had become thoroughly alarmed by -what they had heard and seen during the election, and would not have -given way without a fight to the death. The jubilant group at Durand's, -intimidated by these assumed facts, and Boulanger with his lack of -determination and easy self-indulgence, let the opportunity slip. - -All sorts of excuses and explanations were made for the hesitation of -the General to provoke civil war. But on that one night he should have -made his position secure or have died in the attempt. Success was, so -far as a foreigner on the spot could judge, quite possible. It might -even have been achieved without any forcible action. There was no -certainty that, when the move decided upon was actually made, either -troops or the people would have sided against the hero of the day. But -that hero failed to rise to the level of the occasion, and the result -was fatal to the immediate prospects of himself and his followers. -A warrant was issued for his arrest and he ran away from Paris. He -now became an object of pity rather than of alarm. He was condemned -in his absence, and not long afterwards his suicide on the grave of -his mistress, in Brussels, ended his career. Thus the estimate which -Clemenceau had formed of his permanent influence was justified. But it -was a narrow escape. The three pretenders who had come to France to -watch the final development soon found their way across the frontier. -Nevertheless, General Boulanger, with all his weakness and hesitation, -was for many months the most dangerous enemy the Republic ever faced. -His downfall helped also to add to the number of Clemenceau's bitter -enemies, and was partly instrumental in bringing about the political -disaster which befell him later. For the Radicals who had been deceived -by Boulanger cherished animosity against the Radical leader for reasons -which, though quite incompatible, were decisive for them. - - - - - CHAPTER IX - - PANAMA AND DRAGUIGNAN - - -The great Panama Canal Affair was only one of many financial scandals -which seriously damaged the good fame of the French Republic founded -upon the fall of the Empire, and consecrated by the collapse of the -Commune of Paris. But this Panama scandal was by far the most important -and most nefarious, alike in respect to the amount of money involved, -the position and character of the people mixed up in it, and the wide -ramifications of wholesale corruption throughout the political world -that were in the end revealed. - -M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, the originator and organiser of the Suez -Canal, was a man of quite exceptional ability, energy and force -of character. He carried through his great project in the face of -obstacles, political and financial, that would certainly have broken -the heart and frustrated the purpose of a weaker personality. At no -period did he show any disposition to keep the canal under harmful -restrictions, and the Khedive Ismail Pasha, though a Turk of no -scruples, who backed him throughout, also took a very wide view of the -services which the canal would render to the world at large. It was -to be neutral and open under the same conditions to the ships of all -nations. Unfortunately, England, whose commerce has chiefly benefited -by the canal, bitterly opposed its construction, going so far at one -time as actually to prohibit the Khedive from carrying on the canal -works in his own territory, thus occasioning considerable delay. As -it happened, however, this delay itself was turned by de Lesseps to -the advantage of the Canal Company, as he used the time to create new -engines for excavation which in the end expedited the completion of the -waterway. - -The result of this ignorant British opposition was that the finance -of the great enterprise was chiefly provided in France, and, when the -canal was first opened in 1869, it was considered, as in fact it was, -a triumph of French sagacity and foresight over the obstructionist -jealousy of England. This view was accompanied also by natural -jubilation at the consequent increase of French influence in Egypt -itself. Count Ferdinand de Lesseps, therefore, became a great French -hero who, by his capacity, persistence and diplomacy, had not only -gained glory for France and extended her power, but had also furnished -his countrymen with an excellent investment for their savings, on -which British commerce was paying the interest. His popularity in -France was well earned and unbounded. The work of de Lesseps was, in -fact, regarded as the one great and indisputable success of the French -Empire. Anything which he took in hand thereafter was certain to prove -of great value to the country and an assured benefit to those who -followed his financial lead. He was also a lucky man. He and his set -had won against heavy odds. - -It is true the cost of the Suez Canal had been more than double his -original estimate, even up to the time when it was first opened, and -many millions sterling had been expended since; it was likewise the -fact that his great idea had taken fully ten years to realise in the -shape of a completed enterprise. But this was the larger tribute to -his foresight and power of overcoming obstacles due either to natural -causes or to the malignity of enemies. Thus Ferdinand de Lesseps, ten -years after the Suez Canal had been made available for shipping between -the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, held an unequalled position in the -eyes of French engineers, French bankers and, what was more important, -French investors. - -Early in the year 1879 M. de Lesseps, following the course adopted -by him in the case of the isthmus of Suez, called a Congress of the -nations to consider the entire project of a Panama Canal. There was -nothing new in the matter. The line of the canal had been surveyed -by a capable French engineer nearly forty years before. The Congress -estimated the actual cost of the construction of the canal at about -£25,000,000, or a little more than the highest sum thought sufficient -by the English engineer of the Panama Railroad. But the mere figures -are of little importance. That they were quite insufficient, as the -business was managed, has since been abundantly proved. But at first -there is no reason to believe that de Lesseps was other than quite -straightforward. He had bought the concession for the canal from -Mr. Buonaparte Wyse, who had acquired it from the United States of -Colombia, through whose territory the canal as surveyed ran. That -this concession itself had previously been found very difficult to -finance in any shape was a matter of common knowledge; that also the -canal, when constructed, might prove far less valuable in every way -than was calculated for world commerce was the opinion of many skilled -engineers. But then the same things had been said about Suez. So the -French public rushed in to subscribe the money required for the French -Company immediately formed by M. de Lesseps to exploit the concession. - -The great name of de Lesseps covered the whole risk and rendered -criticism quite useless. But the management of the excavation was -wildly incapable and inconceivably extravagant. It was very soon -discovered that the original estimates were absurdly at variance -with the cost of the real work to be done. The entire enterprise, as -undertaken in 1884, was entered upon possibly in good faith, but in -a wholly irresponsible and ignorant manner. In spite of warnings as -to the certainty of encountering exceptional obstacles, no steps were -taken to provide against contingencies, to inform the shareholders -as to the position, or to revise the plans in accordance with the -facts. The canal was inspected by M. Rousseau at the end of 1885. This -engineer gave a most unfavourable report in regard to the excavations -and constructions already carried out at vast expense, and the -enormous additional sum needed to give any chance of completing the -works. Instead of honestly facing this most unpromising situation and -disclosing to the shareholders the real state of the case, or declaring -that at least three times the amount would be required to bring the -project to a satisfactory conclusion, and calling for this huge sum -at once, the directors resorted to all the worst tactics of the -unscrupulous promoter. This part of the matter went into the hands of -M. Jacques Reinach and M. Cornelius Herz, names and persons afterwards -covered with obloquy in connection with the whole affair. They set to -work systematically, and were restrained by no inconvenient scruples. -Strong political influence in both Chambers was needed in order to -obtain the passing of the Panama Lottery Bill. Strong political -influence was bought, though the Bill itself was not carried. From -1885-86 onwards this wholesale bribery was continued on an enormous -scale. - -The company was as careless of men's lives as it was of shareholders' -money. Labourers from all parts of the world had been gathered -together in what was then a deadly climate, without proper sanitation -or reasonable medical attendance. Some time prior to the financial -troubles it was known that such anarchy and horror prevailed on -the Isthmus that intervention by the French Government, or even by -an international commission, was called for. Nothing but the great -reputation of de Lesseps could possibly have upheld such a state of -things, or have obtained more and still more money to perpetuate the -chaos. Even when the truth as to the frightful mortality of the men -employed and the incredible waste, due to incompetence and corruption, -must have been known to the President of the Company (M. de Lesseps -himself) and his fellow-directors, when, likewise, they must have been -convinced that the company was drifting into a hopeless position, they -still appealed to their countrymen for more and more and more money -to throw into the bottomless quagmire at Panama, and sink of French -savings in Paris, to which the whole company had been reduced. - -By the year 1888 no less than 1,400,000,000 francs had been expended in -one way or another, while not one-third of the necessary work had been -done. Of that £55,000,000 nominal amount not a few millions sterling -found their way into the pockets of deputies, senators, and even -Academicians, to say nothing of commissions and brokerages of more or -less legitimate character. - -Politicians in France are no worse than politicians in other countries. -But the proportion of well-to-do men among them is less than elsewhere. -There was consequently a margin of them always on the look-out for an -opportunity of adding to their income, and this margin was much larger -in the National Assembly before payment of members than it is to-day. -For such men the Panama finance was a glorious opportunity. Nobody -could suspect de Lesseps of being consciously a party to a fraud. To -make a French venture like the Panama a great success, in spite of -all difficulties, was a patriotic service. To receive good pay for -doing good work was a happy combination of circumstances none the less -gratifying that, the work being honestly done, remuneration followed or -preceded in hard cash. The extent to which this form of corruption was -carried and the high level in the political world to which streams from -the Panama Pactolus were forced up is only partially known even now. -But so wide was the flow and so deep the stream that, when the outcry -against the Company began in earnest, statesmen whose personal honour -had never been challenged were afflicted with such alarm, on the facts -being laid before them, that they did their very utmost to suppress -full investigation. - -This, however, was not easy to accomplish. For there were no fewer -than 800,000 French investors in the Panama Company. All of these were -voters and all had friends. It became a question, therefore, whether it -was more dangerous to the Republic and its statesmen--for personal as -well as political considerations came in--to compel full publicity, or -to hush the whole thing up as far as possible. Meanwhile, the public, -and important journals not suspected of Panamism, took the whole thing -down from the Cabinet and the Bureaux into the street. - -For the opponents of the Republic it was a fine opening. That enormous -sums out of the £55,000,000 subscribed had been paid away to senators, -deputies and Academicians, for services rendered, was certain. Who -had got the money, and under what conditions? Imputations of the most -sinister character were made all round. Paris rang with accusations -of fraud. That more than a hundred deputies were concerned in Panama -corruption is a matter of common knowledge. One who was in a position -to know all the facts declared that more than a hundred who were mixed -up in other nefarious transactions used Panama to divert attention from -their own malfeasances. However that may be, public opinion, excited by -the clamour and denunciations of eight hundred thousand shareholders -and electors, clove to Panama. It became an instrument of political -warfare as well as of personal delation. The obvious determination of -Presidents Carnot and Loubet to prevent a clear statement from being -issued and the Directors prosecuted only rendered the sufferers more -determined to get at the facts and wreak vengeance on somebody. - -There were two views as to Count de Lesseps--to give him his title, -which had its value in the Affair--and his conduct in the Panama Canal -Company. There were those who held that de Lesseps, beginning as an -enthusiast, and believing himself perhaps to be inspired in everything -he undertook, no sooner found that his carelessness, in disregarding -real natural difficulties and in organising the excavations on the -spot, must result in failure, unless he could obtain unlimited -resources, and doubtful of ultimate success even then, began at once -to display the worst side of his character. The successful adventurer -became, by degrees, the desperate gambler with the savings of his -countrymen. Instead of regarding himself as the trustee of the people -who, on the strength of his reputation and character, had risked their -money, he deliberately shut his eyes to the real facts. He resorted to -all the tricks of an unscrupulous charlatan, misrepresented the truth -in every respect and had no thought for any other consideration than -to get in more funds. For this purpose he paraded the country, making -the utmost use of his personal and social advantages, and losing no -opportunity for unworthy advertisement. All this time he knew perfectly -well that his enterprise was doomed. Consequently, there was little -to choose between de Lesseps and Reinach, Herz and the rest of them, -except that he was perhaps the greatest criminal of all. Such was the -view of the promoter-in-chief taken by lawyers and men of business who -looked upon the whole matter as a venture standing by itself, to be -judged by the ordinary rules of financial probity. - -On the other side a capable and influential minority regarded -de Lesseps as an enthusiast, a man of high character and noble -conceptions, quite devoid of the power of strict analysis of any matter -presented to him, and destitute of common sense. His financial methods -and commercial obliquities were due to his overweening confidence in -his own judgment and faith in his good fortune to pull him through -against all probabilities. The one great success he had achieved -rendered him a man not to be argued with or considered on the plane of -ordinary mortals. He saw the object he was aiming at, felt convinced -he would accomplish it, regarded all who differed from him as ignorant -or malignant, and went straight ahead to get money, not for his own -purposes but in order to carry out the second magnificent scheme to -which he had committed himself. Corruption and malversation by others -were no concern of his. - -President Sadi-Carnot, a cold, silent, upright man, little given to -allow his feelings to inflame him at any time, warmly took this view of -de Lesseps' character. M. Carnot had been brought into close contact -with de Lesseps on another of his vast projects. The President, like -many others, refused to look at the Panama matter from the point of -view of fraud or imposture. Money was for de Lesseps always a means, -never an end. When the whole matter was brought before him, and one of -the legal personages whose duty it was to investigate the whole of the -facts came to a very harsh conclusion as to de Lesseps' responsibility -for the waste, corruption and malversation, M. Carnot said with some -vivacity: "No, no; M. de Lesseps is not a man of bad faith. I should -rather consider him punctilious. Only his natural vehemence carries -him away; he is a bad reasoner, and has no power of calculation. Hence -many regrettable acts on his part, done without any intention of -injuring anybody. I knew him well, having seen him very close, when his -imagination suggested to him the scheme for excavating an inland sea in -Africa. A commission of engineers, of whom I was one, was appointed to -hear him and study his proposal. We had no difficulty in showing that -the whole thing was a pure chimera. He seemed very much astonished, and -we saw that we had not convinced him. Take it from me as a certainty -that he would have spent millions upon millions to create his sea, and -that with the best of good faith in the world." - -This was probably the truth, so far as de Lesseps himself was -personally concerned. Promoters, discoverers and inventors of genius -are men of mighty faith in their respective enterprises. As a great -anarchist once said of his own special nostrum for regenerating -humanity at a blow: "All is moral that helps it, all is immoral that -hinders it." So with de Lesseps. All was moral that got in money to -construct his canal: all was immoral that checked the flow of cash -to the Isthmus. But an enthusiast of this temper, "without power of -calculation," is a very dangerous man, not only to the subscribers -to his shares, but to the Republican politicians who confined their -enthusiasm to the acquisition of hard cash for use not in Panama but in -Paris. - -In 1888 the Panama Canal Company collapsed, and the thing was put into -liquidation. But that was not the end of it. All sorts of schemes were -afoot for carrying on the works and completing the canal before the -concession expired in 1893. Although, however, from the date of the -breakdown onwards--when it was stated that fully £70,000,000 would be -needed in addition to the amount already expended or frittered away to -carry out the canal--most virulent attacks were continually made upon -prominent politicians and financiers, as well as upon the Directors of -the Company, neither the political nor the legal consequences of the -disaster were felt to the full extent until four years later. Judicial -investigations, it is true, were going on. But it was an open secret -that, in spite of the losses and complaints of the shareholders, and -the strong desire of the public that the whole vast transaction should -be exposed in every detail, the anxiety of men in high place was to -calm down natural feeling in the matter. What made this attitude more -suspicious was the fact that the Government had certainly not shown -itself unfavourable to the scheme, but on the contrary had helped it, -even when the gravest doubts had been thrown upon its practicability, -at a cost vastly exceeding anything contemplated by the Company. In -fact, an atmosphere of general distrust pervaded Paris and the whole -of France. Yet Panama still had its friends, and it was believed that -somehow or other the affair would be tided over. - -But there was a good deal more to come. Things, in fact, now took -that dramatic turn which seems the rule in France with affairs which -directly or indirectly influence high politics and high finance. There -were people who believed that the entire enterprise could be set on -its legs, although parts of the recent excavations were deteriorating -and some of them had been covered already with luxuriant tropical -growths which one imaginative critic spoke of as "forests." Either the -Government, they thought, could be forced to take up the enterprise -itself, or at any rate would think it best, in view of what had -already been done, to support de Lesseps in a fresh scheme, should the -concession be renewed. This, no doubt, was the opinion of M. Gauthier, -who urged the Government in the Assembly to appoint a commission to -prepare plans for the completion of the Canal. This, he declared, was -the only means of safeguarding the interests of the shareholders and -the many hundreds of millions of francs sunk by poor French investors -in this great enterprise. - -Such a daring proposal necessarily raised the whole question of the -responsibility for the serious engineering and financial fiasco. The -Government was at once charged from several quarters, not as being -answerable for past mistakes in supporting the Panama Company, but with -present obliquity in screening and protecting delinquents who should -long since have been brought to justice. One deputy vehemently declared -that the only reason why no adequate action was taken was that "men -possessed of great names and high positions" checked any attempt to -handle the scandal boldly. Other deputies declaimed with equal warmth -against throwing good money after bad. Meanwhile rumours floated round -the Chamber as to the number of deputies who had put their services at -the disposal of the Company for money received. Later, this accusation -took definite shape as a formal accusation that fifty deputies had -received among them the sum of £120,000. Senators and Academicians were -in the same galley. Exaggeration was imputed, but the figures were -proved afterwards to be less than the truth. Then everybody concerning -whose position there could be the slightest doubt was accused of having -"touched." - -Even MM. Rouvier and Floquet were taunted with having accepted large -sums. The Chamber passed a resolution "calling for prompt and vigorous -action against all who have incurred responsibilities in the Panama -affair." This might mean anything or nothing. It was pointed out, -however, by a high authority that a judicial inquiry was proceeding all -the time. But the public became impatient because nothing was done to -stop the campaign of vilification on the one hand or to prosecute the -Directors on the other; though de Lesseps was being denounced daily in -the press as a fraudulent adventurer. Excitement ran very high. The -shareholders and some of the deputies cried aloud for justice. - -Matters being thus exceptionally perturbed, Baron Jacques Reinach, -the chief agent in the manipulation of political corruption, committed -suicide by apoplexy. That was the gruesome explanation given in the -press of this financier's sudden death. His fellow Semite, Cornelius -Herz, survived the tragedy. Just at this moment, when everybody thought -that something must be done, the Panama Concession was extended for a -year. The Panamists took heart again and believed all would blow over. -So the ups and downs of public expectation went on. - -Then, quite suddenly and without any general notification, all the -Directors of the Panama Canal Company, Count Ferdinand de Lesseps, -M. C. de Lesseps, M. Fontane, M. Eiffel and M. Cottu were formally -charged in court with having resorted to fraudulent methods in order to -engender confidence in chimerical schemes, and with obtaining credits -on imaginary facts, squandering the money of the shareholders and -lending themselves to most nefarious practices. A terrible indictment! - -By this time all who cherished a political or personal grudge against -any public man of note had no better or surer means of discrediting -him than by imputing to him some connection with the Panama affair. -Mud of that sort was warranted to stick. Never was there a greater -scandal. Never were people more credulous. Never did political feeling -run higher, and never certainly was there a keener anxiety to connect -leading Republicans with the seamy side of the concern. The more -that could be done in this way the better for the Conservatives and -anti-Republicans who still constituted a very formidable combination -in Parliament and in the press. It was not likely, therefore, that -Clemenceau would be able to escape criticism and calumny if he had been -in any way connected with men some of whom were then rightly regarded -as malefactors. - -In a time of so much excitement it was easy to mix up truth and fiction -to an extent which would render it extremely difficult for Clemenceau -to clear the public mind of allegations made against him, however false -they might be. All Clemenceau's enemies, and he had not a few, took -advantage of the situation to try and overwhelm him with obloquy. Now -was the opportunity to pay off many old scores; and they set to work -to do it with whole-souled zest and vitriolic acrimony. Circumstances -aided them. They did not stick at trifles in their efforts to crush -the Radical leader who had fought the good fight against reaction and -Imperialism with such vigour and success for so many long years. M. -Clemenceau was at this time editor of _La Justice_, a journal founded -by himself and written by men of ability, most of whom are still his -friends. The tone of the paper and the style of the contributions were -no more calculated to bring over recruits from his adversaries than -were his speeches and tactics in the Assembly. He was ever a fighter -with tongue and with pen. Though he wrote little, if anything, in _La -Justice_ himself, the inspiration came from its editor. One thing he -lacked, and always has lacked--money. If now they could only get hold -of evidence that Clemenceau was contaminated with Panama, the worst foe -of French obscurantism would be put out of action and his influence -permanently destroyed. So they calculated. And not without good reason, -as afterwards appeared. - -Cornelius Herz, the co-corrupter of political impeccables, with -Jacques Reinach, his "apoplectic" fellow-Jew, had subscribed £1,000 -to _La Justice_ in its early days. What could be better? A Semite of -Semites, a Panamist of Panamists, he it was who with sinister features -and corrupt record stood forth as the dexterous wire-puller of the -malignant marionette, Georges Clemenceau. If _La Justice_ had been -tainted with the accursed thing, Clemenceau had had his share, and -the lion's share, too, in this wretched swindle. Did anybody really -care what a journal of small circulation like _La Justice_ published -or stood for? Certainly not. But Clemenceau, the terrible leader of -the Left, the upsetter of Ministries, the creator of Presidents, -the overthrower of the Church and the enemy of all religion, here -was a man worth buying; and beyond all question Clemenceau had been -bought--bought by Reinach and Herz, whose tool, therefore, he was and -had been! The calumnies were credible; for if senators and Academicians -had succumbed to the wiles of the serpents of Old Jewry, why should -not the Aristides of Draguignan have fallen a victim to the astute -de Lesseps and his "_entourage du Ghetto_"? Nor did this wind up the -indictment. There was more to come. A group of rascals of the Titus -Oates type were set to work, to put incriminating facts on record in -writing, behind the scenes. They forged the endorsement as well as the -bill. Documents of this character proved to the complete satisfaction -of all who wished to believe it that Clemenceau was corrupt. The very -fact that he was known not to be well-off strengthened the case against -him. The empty sack could not stand upright! The _Petit Journal_, a -paper of great circulation, was foremost in all this business, and its -editor, M. Judet, distinguished himself by his exquisite malignity amid -the crowd of Clemenceau's detractors. - -It was an ugly experience. Panama was dinned into Clemenceau's ears -daily. And there was enough to go upon to make the attacks most -galling. Herz had been a large subscriber to the funds of Clemenceau's -organ. Moreover, Reinach and Herz had called upon him, though not -he upon them. That was quite enough. The assailants did not stop to -inquire when Herz ceased to have anything to do with _La Justice_, -neither did they investigate who sent Reinach and Herz to the Radical -leader, nor what passed between Clemenceau and the two Jewish -financiers. They were only too glad to be able to take the whole thing -for granted and to strengthen any weak links in the chain of evidence -by the suborned perjuries of M. Norton and his colleagues. - -So it went on. The fact that first the murdered President Carnot, -who could not believe that de Lesseps was worse than a misguided -enthusiast, and then President Loubet, who wished to deal with the -entire matter in a thoroughly judicial fashion, had owed their -positions to Clemenceau's nomination and support rendered the hunting -down of their political friend a delightful pastime for the whole -reactionary combination. Things had come to such a pass that the -common opinion grew that there was "something in it." People actually -believed that Clemenceau really had wrecked his entire career and ruled -himself out of public life by taking bribes like the hundred other -deputies, when he had refused to accept time after time positions which -would have given him control of the national treasury and of France. - -Clemenceau was quite unmoved by the storm of detraction which raged -around him. He bided his time with a coolness that could scarcely -have been expected from a man of his character. At length his chance -came. The whole affair was brought up again before the National -Assembly. Clemenceau rose to defend himself against this long campaign -of successful misrepresentation. So great had been the effect of the -attacks upon him that rarely, if ever, has a favourite orator stood -up to address a more hostile audience. It seemed as if he had not a -single friend in the whole House. Not a sound of greeting was heard. -He was met with cold and obviously hostile silence. Clemenceau dealt -in his most telling manner with his own personal conduct throughout. -He completely immolated his accusers and dissipated their calumnies. -When he sat down, the whole Assembly, which had received him as if -persuaded of his guilt, cheered him enthusiastically as a much wronged -man. A greater triumph could hardly be. The condemnation in open court -of the forgers, whose nefarious malpractices had built up the edifice -of calumny and misrepresentation upon which Clemenceau's enemies relied -for the proof of their case, cleared the atmosphere so far as his -personal integrity was concerned. - -But, unfortunately for Clemenceau, there were other charges against -him from which he could not hope to clear himself, and would not have -cleared himself if he could. Now all his political crimes were recited -against him at once. He had been the means of bringing to naught M. -Jules Ferry's great schemes of colonial expansion in the East. He had -opposed running the risk of war for the sake of Egypt. He had been -largely instrumental in causing the failure of General Boulanger, whom -not only reactionists but many vigorous Radicals admired and believed -in. He had never lost a chance of pointing to the danger of priestly -influence and the anti-Republican attitude of the heads of the Catholic -Church. By his action in favour of the strikers at Carmaux, whom he -went down himself specially to encourage and support, he had alienated -a large section of the bourgeoisie. - -Not the least weighty of the charges brought against him, and one which -perhaps had as much effect as any in bringing about the crushing result -of the poll, was that Clemenceau had steadily opposed the alliance with -Russia. This was regarded as still further and more conclusive evidence -of downright treachery to France. Those were the days when France felt -the need for an ally who could give her powerful military support, and -her people were not disposed to inquire too closely into the character -of the Czar's Government. Clemenceau regarded the connection as -immoral, injurious, calculated to reduce France's democratic influence -and to lessen the probability of a close _Entente_ with England. But -Clemenceau's adversaries had no concern whatever with the Radical -leader's reasons for his action, which all democrats and Socialists, -at any rate, must have cordially approved. All they wanted was another -ugly weapon wherewith to discredit and defeat the man who, though he -had not gone so far as the extreme Socialists desired, had done enough -to hinder and rout reactionaries with their monarchist or Buonapartist -restorations. At the moment Clemenceau's anti-Czarist policy injured -him as a politician, but it certainly did him great credit as a man. - -But, worse than all, he had steadily pursued his policy of a lifetime -as a close and constant friend of England and of the English _Entente_. -That was still more criminal than Panamism or anti-Imperialism. For -England at that time was, and to a large extent naturally, very -unpopular in France. Clemenceau, therefore, was overwhelmed with -charges of being in the pay of Great Britain and working for Great -Britain as well as for Panama. Broken English was used to hurl insults -at him, which lost none of their fervour by being uttered in a foreign -tongue. He had escaped from the obloquy of Panama, but it should go -hard if one or other of these counts did not ruin him. The political -warfare became more bitter than ever. His persecutors were relentless: -_la politique n'a pas d'entrailles_. - -It was at this time that I begged Clemenceau to make some terms with -the Socialists, who were gaining ground rapidly and appeared to be -the coming party in France. His recent tactics had been decidedly -favourable to Socialist views. And again I express my surprise that -Clemenceau, while holding fast to his opinions as to the necessity for -maintaining "law and order" in every sense, should never have seen his -way to adopting the definite Socialist view as to the necessary and -indeed inevitable policy of collective social progress. But his strong -personal individualism has prevented him from embracing our principles. - -The statesman may quite honestly accept the theories of economists -and sociologists, while compelled to adapt their application to the -circumstances of his time. No really capable Socialist who has taken -an active part in public life has ever attempted to do anything else. -In France the Guesdists, who are certainly the most thoroughgoing -Marxists in the country, have always proceeded on these lines in their -municipal, and not unfrequently in their State, policy. Jaurès was a -specially fine example of the opportunist in public affairs; so much -so that he was taunted by more extreme men with being a Ministerialist -before he was a Minister. Vaillant the Blanquist, in theory at least an -advocate of a physical force revolution where possible, was in favour -of an eight-hour law, compensation for injury to workmen, and so on. -One and all, that is to say, were ready to use the social and political -forms of to-day in order to prepare the way for the complete revolution -tomorrow. All Clemenceau's speeches and writings, before and after the -Panama crash and its consequences to him, contain many passages which -every convinced Socialist would accept. I always felt, nevertheless, -that I was arguing with a man deaf of both ears when I put forward my -well-meant suggestions. Socialism, Clemenceau then declared--this, -of course, was now nearly a generation ago--would never become an -effective political power in France. France, and above all rural -France, which is the real France, constituting the bulk of Frenchmen, -is and will always remain steadfastly individualist--"founded on -property, property, property." That was their guiding principle in -every relation in life, and, he added, "I have seen them close at -every stage of existence from birth to death. It is as useless to base -any practical policy upon Socialist principles as it is chimerical to -repose any confidence in Socialist votes." "But," I urged, "extremes -meet: the Catholics and Socialists, both of whom are your opponents, -may combine with the men whose minds have been poisoned by the Panamist -and Anglophobe imputations of the _Petit Journal_ and turn you out -of your constituency in the Var for which you now sit as deputy." He -laughed at the very idea of such a defeat. - -But the persistence and malignity of monarchists and men of God of the -Catholic persuasion are hard to beat. Socialists with an anarchist -twist in their mental conceptions are not far behind them. So the -fight for the constituency of Draguignan, which Clemenceau had chosen -in preference to a Paris district at the previous election, developed -into a personal tussle unequalled in bitterness at that period. Every -incident of the candidate's life was turned to his discredit. The -Panama scandal and his relations with Semitic masters of corrupt -practices were only a portion of an atheist record unparalleled for -infamy. All the Ministries he had destroyed, all the true lovers of -France whom he had gibbeted, all the patriotic colonial policies he had -frustrated were brought up against him, embroidered with every flaming -design the modern votaries of the Inquisition could invent! He had been -guilty, in fact, of the unpardonable offence of making too many enemies -at once. What might have been counted to him for righteousness by one -faction was blazoned forth as the blackest iniquity by another. His -anti-Imperialism with his friendly attitude to the strikers incensed -the reactionaries. His refusal to make common cause with them in an -out-and-out programme against bourgeois Republicanism infuriated the -extremists. All his energy, all his oratory, all his genuine love for -and services to France in days gone by went for nothing. The friends of -Jules Ferry, too, were eager for their revenge. Clemenceau had thought -his loss of the seat was impossible. Nevertheless the impossible -occurred. He was thrown out of Draguignan at this General Election of -1893, and after more than seventeen years of arduous and extremely -useful service was compelled to retire from Parliamentary life. It was -a complete break in his career. - -Clemenceau at this period was fifty-two, and still in the prime -of a vigorous life. He looked what he was, active, alert, capable -and highly intelligent. His face was an index to his character. It -gave an impression of almost barbarous energy, which induced his -Socialist detractors, long afterwards, to speak and write of him as -"The Kalmuck." But this was merely caricature. Refinement, mental -brilliancy, deep reflection and high cultivation shone out from his -animated features. A teetotaller, abstemious in his habits, and -always in training, Clemenceau, with his rapidity of perception, -quickness of retort and mastery of irony combined with trenchant wit, -was a formidable opponent indeed. Add to this that he was invariably -well-informed--_très bien documenté_--in the matters of which he -treated. It is quite inconceivable that he should refer to or deal -with any speech, or convention, or treaty which he had not thoroughly -studied. It was hopeless to catch Clemenceau tripping on any matter of -fact or political engagement. Moreover, as remarked before, his rule in -politics was based upon the soundest principle in all warfare: Never -fail to attack in order to defend. - -As an orator he was and is destitute of those telling gestures, -modifications of tone and carefully turned phrases which we associate -with the highest class of French public speaking. His voice rarely -rises above the conversational level and, as a rule, he is quiet and -unemotional in his manner. But the directness of his assaults and the -dynamitical force of his short periods gain rather than lose on that -account; while his power of logical, connected argument, marshalling -with ease such facts and quotations as he needs, has never been -surpassed. His famous Parliamentary encounter with my friend and -comrade Jean Jaurès was a remarkable example of his controversial -ability. My sympathies were, of course, entirely with the eloquent -and able champion of Socialism, whose power of holding even a hostile -audience was extraordinary, as was shown in that same National -Assembly many a time. I was of opinion then, and I believe now, that -Jaurès had much the stronger case. He spoke then, as he always did, -with eloquence, fervour and sincerity. As an oratorical display it -was admirable. But I am bound to admit that, as a mere question of -immediate political dialectics, the Radical Premier got the better -of the fray. It is possible, of course, that had Jaurès followed -Clemenceau instead of having preceded him, that might have made a -difference. But Jaurès's style, with its poetic elevation and long and -imposing periods, was not so well suited as that of Clemenceau to a -personal debate on immediate practical issues before such an audience -as the French National Assembly. - -In private conversation Clemenceau is the most delightful yet -unartificial talker I ever had the pleasure of listening to. Others -who possess great gifts in this direction are apt to work up their -effects so that you can hear, as it were, the clank of the machinery -as their pyrotechnic monologues appeal to your sense of cleverness -while they balk your desire for spontaneity. There is none of this -with Clemenceau. He takes his fair share in any discussion and leaves -nothing unsaid which, from his point of view, can elucidate or brighten -up the friendly discussion. Never was any man less of a brilliant bore. - -Another quality he possesses, which proved exceedingly useful to him -at more than one stage of his adventurous career. Clemenceau was, -and possibly is even to-day, at the age of seventy-seven, the most -dangerous duellist in France. A left-handed swordsman and a perfect -pistol-shot, no one who valued the integrity of his carcase was -disposed to encounter with either rapier or pistol the leader of the -extreme Left. Even the reactionary fire-eater, Paul de Cassagnac, who -himself had killed three men, shrank from meeting his quietus from -Clemenceau. His power of work also is extraordinary. In this he was -only equalled by Jaurès. Even an English barrister of exceptional -physique, striving to make his mark or endeavouring to keep the place -already won, could scarcely surpass the inexhaustible energy and -endurance of either of these great Frenchmen. It is doubtful whether -the generation of younger men keep abreast with the pace set by their -elders in this respect. Both Jaurès and Vaillant complained to me more -than once that, to use an English expression, the younger deputies did -not "last over the course," and thus frequently lost in the Committees -what they had gained in the set debates. Certainly, few of the French -politicians of to-day, at half Clemenceau's age, would care to attempt -to do the work which he is doing now, day after day, with all the -anxiety and responsibility that now rest upon his shoulders. - -What perhaps is still more noteworthy, especially from the English -point of view, Clemenceau has never at any period of his career been a -well-to-do man. His complete independence of monetary considerations, -at a time when place-hunting had been brought to a fine art in French -politics, gave him an influence all the greater by consequence of -its rarity. Politicians whom he could have easily eclipsed in the -race for well-paid positions, or the acquisition of wealth, became -Prime Ministers, and rich people, while Clemenceau remained what he -had always been, the leader of the most difficult party to control, -without the means which have usually been considered indispensable for -such a thankless post. Only once did he offer himself as the candidate -for a well-paid office--the Presidentship of the Chamber--to which -his experience and services fully entitled him. He was then beaten by -one vote. Honourable and dignified as is the chairmanship of such an -Assembly, it was well for France, in the long run, that the recorder of -that single vote should have allowed what he believed to be a personal -grievance to influence his natural inclination to support Clemenceau. - - - - - CHAPTER X - - PHILOSOPHER AND JOURNALIST - - -Rarely has a politician received a heavier blow than this which fell -upon Clemenceau in 1893. Ordinarily, a man of his intellectual eminence -and remarkable political faculties has no difficulty, if he loses one -seat in the National Assembly of any country, in speedily getting -another. Not so with Clemenceau. His very success as leader of the -advanced Left and the proof that, though always a comparatively poor -man, he had remained thoroughly honest amid all the intrigues and -financial scandals around him told against him. He interfered with -too many ambitions, was a stumbling-block in the way of too many high -policies, to be able to command his return for another constituency. -The same interests and jealousies which had combined against him at -Draguignan would have attacked him with redoubled fury elsewhere. -Persistent determination to carry really thorough democratic reforms in -every department, combined with very high ability, relentless disregard -of personal claims, complete indifference to mere party considerations -and perfect honesty are qualities so inconvenient to modern politicians -of every shade of opinion that the wonder is Clemenceau had held his -position so long as he did. To have destroyed no fewer than eighteen -more or less reactionary administrations, while always refusing to form -a Cabinet himself, was a title to the highest esteem from the mass of -his countrymen: it was a diabolical record from the point of view of -the Ministers whom he had displaced and the cliques by whom they had -been surrounded. Not a French statesman but felt that his reputation -and his hold upon office were more secure now that Clemenceau's -masterly combinations and dynamitical oratory were safely excluded -from the National Assembly. So Clemenceau, at this critical period -of his life and career, could rely upon no organised political force -strong enough to encounter and overcome the persistent hostility of his -enemies. - -A weaker man would have felt this exclusion less and have been -discouraged more. After seventeen years of such valuable work as -Clemenceau had done, to be, to all appearance, boycotted from the -Assembly for an indefinite period was a strange experience. I wrote -him myself a letter of sympathy, and in his reply he expressed his -special bitterness at the attitude of the Socialists towards him. This -hostility might have been easily averted without any sacrifice of -principle on Clemenceau's part. But Clemenceau, defeated and driven out -of his rightful place in active French politics, did not hesitate for -a moment as to the course he would pursue. He had left the National -Assembly as the first Parliamentarian in France: he at once turned -round and at the age of fifty-two became her first journalist. Nothing -in his long life of stress and strain is more remarkable than the -success he then achieved and the vigour with which he devoted himself -to his new vocation. - -It is no easy matter, especially in France, for a publicist and -journalist to discover a fresh method of bringing his opinions to -bear upon the public. Yet this is what Clemenceau did. He applied his -humanist-materialist philosophy to the everyday incidents of French -life. That philosophy is a strange compound of physical determinism -and the ethical revolt against universal cruelty involved in the -unregulated struggle for existence. The fight for life is inevitable. -So far, throughout historic times it has been a long campaign in -which the usurping minority have always won. Wholesale butchery and -cannibalism by conquering tribes have been transformed first into -slavery, then into serfdom, lastly into the wage-earning system of our -own time. In each and every case the many have been at the mercy of the -dominating few. There is little or no effective attempt made to remedy -the evils arising out of such a state of things. The struggle for -mere subsistence still goes on below, and those who revolt against it -or endeavour seriously to ameliorate it by strikes or combinations are -treated as misdemeanants or criminals. Mining capitalists, industrial -capitalists, railway capitalists, landowners large and small have the -law, the judges, the magistrates, the police and all the reactionary -forces on their side. Hence the grossest injustice and the most -abominable oppression of the poor. - -Therefore the State ought to intervene, not in order to repress the -aspirations and punish the attempts of the wage-earning class to obtain -better conditions of life for themselves and their children, but to -protect this most important portion of the community in every possible -way: to secure for them shorter hours of labour, thorough education, -full opportunity for legitimate combination, boards of arbitration to -avert strikes, fair play at the hands of the courts and the police. -The State, in fact, is to act as a national conscience and perpetual -trustee for the poor. Note that the struggle for existence, the fight -for subsistence must go on--Clemenceau has never contemplated the -possibility of a human scheme of co-operation by which competition -would be wholly eliminated--but its harsher features ought to be -reduced. There is no complete overthrow of mutual destruction, and -no condition of universal fellowship is in view. Only the mind and -heart of the community must be changed; men must survey modern society -from the point of view of humane guidance and prepare the material -development and economic arrangements which shall by degrees render -individual injustice and cruelty as unheard-of as now is anthropophagy. - -At the back of all this lies a picturesque pessimism and what nowadays -is frequently spoken of as a philosophy of despair. No sooner has this -planet, its solar system, its galaxy of suns and worlds reached its -full development than they all begin to traverse the downward path -which leads slowly and inevitably to decay and eventual destruction, -until the entire process unconsciously and inevitably begins over -again. Infinity oppresses us all: the cosmos with its interminable -repetitions eludes conception by the human intelligence. Yet we live -and strive and feel and hope and have our conceptions of justice and -sympathy and duty which come we know not whence and pass onwards we -know not whither. Man as a highly organised individual entity becomes -superior to the mere matter of which his mind is a function, because as -an individual he can rise up out of himself and criticise and reflect -upon that which, without any such power of conception, surrounds, -upholds and then immolates him. "The universe crushes me," wrote -Pascal, "yet I am superior to the universe, because I know that it is -crushing me and the universe knows nothing about it at all." Strange -to find Clemenceau quoting and agreeing with an intelligence so wholly -different from his own as Pascal's! - -Then, fate, necessity, the Nemesis of Monism working on to its foreseen -but uncontrollable destiny, dominates the cosmos and through the cosmos -that infinitesimally small but sentient and critical microbe man, who -creates an individual ethic out of this determinist material evolution. -Francis Newman, the brother of the famous John Henry the Cardinal, -said that it is as impossible for man to comprehend matter developing -and reproducing itself from all time as it is for him to conceive of -an omnipotent deity superintending the matter he has created in its -evolution from all time. We are therefore driven back, whether we like -it or not, upon the ancient and never-ending discussion of free-will -and predestination in a non-theological form which leaves in the main -all the psychologic phenomena untouched, including Clemenceau's own -social morality that impels him to champion the cause of the oppressed. -Beyond the demand for justice in the abstract and freedom in the -abstract applied as a test to each special case as it arises, there -is no guiding theory in Clemenceau's philosophy. The recognition of -the struggle for existence among human beings, as among plants and -animals, does not imply any conscious co-ordination of effort, arising -out of the growth of society, in order to do away with the antagonism -engendered by life itself. So with all his humanism Clemenceau will -not accept the theories of scientific Socialism which could give an -unshakable foundation to his own views of life. That is the weakness -which runs through all his books and articles. His own individuality is -so powerful that he simply cannot grasp the possibility of anything but -individual effort, personal suasion and isolated measures of reform. - -Nevertheless, we come upon a passage which, written obviously in -perfect good faith, would, within its limits, be accepted as a -fair statement of Socialism from an outsider: "Socialism is social -beneficence in action, it is the intervention of all on behalf of -the victim of the murderous vitality of the few. To contend, as the -economists do, that we ought to oppose social altruism in its efforts -is to misrepresent and seriously calumniate mankind. To complain that -collective action will degrade the individual by some limitation of -liberty is to argue in favour of the liberty of the stronger which -is called oppressive. Is it not, on the contrary, to strengthen the -individual by restraining and controlling every man who injures another -man as does the employer of to-day when left to the bare exigences -of competition? . . . . Follow the _laissez-faire_ policy for the -individual, says the anti-social economist, and speedily a whole -regiment of devotees will rush to the succour of the vanquished. We -always wait, but see nothing save the terrible condition of humanity -which ever remains. . . . . Against this anarchy it is man's glory to -revolt. He claims the right to soften, to control fatality if he cannot -escape from it. How?" - -And then Clemenceau, whom in active life none would accuse of undue -sentiment, goes off into a series of moral reflections and the need -for perpetual moral preachments which really lead us nowhither; -though, some pages further on, he quotes Karl Marx, who speaks of -the unemployed as the inevitable "army of reserve" due not to human -immorality but to the necessary functioning of the unregulated -competitive capitalism of our period. Yet the great French Radical -shrinks from the organised social collective action and revolution -needed to lift us out of this anarchy of oppression. He turns to the -individual himself and his hard lot under the domination of fate. He -has a justifiable tilt at free-will and personal responsibility. Thus:-- - -"But what is absurd, contradictory, idiotic is the responsibility -of the creature before the creator. I say to God, 'If you are not -satisfied with me, you had only to make me otherwise,' and I defy him -to answer me." And then, quoting from "Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead," -he cites Minos as discussing with a new-comer who is brought before him -for punishment: - -"All that I did in life," says Sostrates, "was it done by me -voluntarily, or was not my destiny registered beforehand by Fate?" - -"Evidently by Fate," answers Minos. - -"Punish Fate, then," is the reply. - -"Let him go free," says Minos to Mercury, "and see to it that he -teaches the other dead to question us in like manner." - -"Substitute Fate for Jehovah or by the laws of the Universe, and tell -me," puts in Clemenceau, "when the pot owes his bill to the potter." -All this and the farewell benediction which the author vouchsafes to -the human plaything of all these pre-ordered decisions of society do -not get us much further, even though after so many mischances he may -live on only to appreciate more thoroughly "the sublime indifference of -things eternal." That is not very consolatory by way of a materialist -viaticum. But it is the best Clemenceau can give. - -None the less it is easy to comprehend why this sort of philosophy, -illustrated and punctuated by the keenest criticism and sarcasm on -the wrongs and injustice of our existing society, produced a great -effect. The commonest incidents of everyday life were made the text -for vitriolic sermonising on the shortcomings of statesmen and judges, -priests and police, industrial capitalists and mine-owners. Here and -there, also, a description of working-class life is given, so accurate, -so vivid, so telling that administrators of the easiest conscience were -led to feel uncomfortable at the kind of social system with which they -had been hitherto satisfied. With no phase of French life is Clemenceau -better acquainted than with the habits and customs of the French -peasantry. Thus we have a description of the peasant tacked on to a -nice little story of a poor fellow who, strolling along the highway on -a hot day and feeling thirsty, plucks a few cherries from the branch -of a cherry-tree which overhangs the road. The small proprietor is -on the look-out for such petty depredations and at once kills the -atrocious malefactor who had thus plundered him. The cherry-eater "had -despoiled him of two-ha'porth of fruit!" It justified prompt execution -of the thief by the owner. That such small robbery did not at once -give the latter the power of life and death over the thief is a point -of view that the peasant can never take. Why? Because of the penal -servitude for life to which he is condemned by the very conditions of -his existence, and the greed for property driven into him from birth to -death. It is the outcome of private ownership: the result of the fatal -saying, "This is mine." - -"The peasant is the man of one idea, of a sole and solitary love. -Bowed, he knows only the earth. His activity has but one end and -object: the soil. To acquire it, to own it, that is his life, harsh -and rapacious. He speaks of _my_ land, _my_ field, _my_ stones, _my_ -thistles. To till, to manure, to sow the land, to mow, to uproot, to -prime, to cut what comes from the land, that is the eternal object of -his entire physical or intellectual effort. Amusement for him: not a -bit of it. He has no other resource than to console himself for the -disappointment of to-day with the hope of to-morrow. He is at war with -the seasons, the elements, the sun, rain, hail, wind, frost. He fights -against the neighbouring intruder, the invading cattle, the birds, the -caterpillars, the parasites, the thousand-and-one unknown phenomena -which, without any apparent reason, bring down upon him all sorts of -unlooked-for ills. - -"Then has he risen at dawn for nothing, badly fed, badly clothed, -sweating in the sun, shivering in the wind and the rain, exhausting his -energies against things which resist his utmost efforts? Do sowing, -manuring, labour and the pouring out of life all, too, go for nothing, -without rest, without leisure, without any thought but this: I toiled -and suffered yesterday, I shall toil and suffer to-morrow? And all this -is balanced by no pleasures but drunkenness and lust. No theatres, no -books, no shows, no enjoyments of any kind. Hard to others, hard to -himself, everything is hard around him." - -Such is the peasant of Western France. Though the peasant of the -South is of a livelier and happier disposition on the surface, both -are at bottom the same. And France is still in the main rural France -as Clemenceau himself impressed upon me many years ago. That is the -influence which holds in check the advanced proletariat of the towns -and mining districts. They can see nothing outside private property, -property, property: yet it is this very unregulated individual -ownership which forces them to fight out their existence against the -hardships of nature with inefficient tools, insufficient manure and no -adequate arrangements for marketing the produce they have for sale. -High prices and a few advantages gained have somewhat ameliorated the -lot of the peasant, but it is still a hard, depressing existence which -cannot be made really human and happy for the great majority under the -conditions of to-day. The only boon the peasant has is that he is not -under the direct sway of the capitalist exploiter. What that means in -the mines Clemenceau had an opportunity of seeing very close, as a -member of the Commission appointed to examine into the coal-mines of -Anzin in 1884. He tells of his experience ten years later in one of the -pits he descended. "Never go down a coal-mine," wrote Lord Chesterfield -to his son. "You can always say you have been below, and nobody can -contradict you." Clemenceau did not follow this cynical advice. He -went down, "and after having waded through water, bent double, for -hundreds upon hundreds of yards through dripping scales which hang -from the upper stratum, I crawled on hands and knees to a nice little -vein _twenty inches thick_. On this seam human beings were at work, -lying on their side, bringing down coal which fell on their faces and -replacing it continuously by timber in order not to be crushed by the -upper surface. You must not neglect this part of the work!" He was -not allowed to talk with the men themselves, and when they came to -interview him secretly they implored him not to let the manager or the -employers know, or they would be discharged at once! The old story of -miners in every country which even the strongest Trade Unions are as -yet scarcely able to cope with, though the tyranny in French mines has -been checked since the time Clemenceau wrote. These and similar cases -of oppression on the part of the capitalist class caused Clemenceau to -support Socialists more and more in their demands for limitation of -the then unrestricted powers of individual employers and "anonymous" -companies. So, too, individualist as he was, he wrote article after -article in defence of the right of the men to strike against grievous -oppression, holding that the combination of the workers was more than -sufficiently handicapped by the fact that they were bound to imperil -their own subsistence as well as the maintenance of their wives and -children by going on strike at all. This argument he applied to all -strikes in organised industries. - -But Clemenceau naturally found himself drawn into bitter antagonism -to the doctrine of _laissez-faire_ and the law of supply and demand. -"You say all must bow down to them. I contend all must revolt against -them." "The individual struggle for existence is only a great -_laissez-faire_! Far from being liberty, it is the triumph of violence, -it is barbarism itself. The man who mastered the first slave founded -a new system . . . so completely that after some ages of this rule a -physiocrat overlooking it all would have sagely pronounced: Slavery is -the law of human societies. This with the same amount of truth as he -says to-day: The law of supply and demand is an immutable ordinance. -And, for all that, the supreme irony of fate has decreed that the -first slave-driver was at the same time the first sower of the seed of -liberty, of justice. For by enslaving men he created a social relation, -a relation different from that enjoined by the primitive form of the -struggle for existence: kill, eat, destroy. Henceforth man was bound to -man. The social body was formed." Man had to discover the law governing -the new relation, and he found it at last in the first flashes of -justice and liberty. "What, then, is this your _laissez-faire_, your -law of supply and demand, but the pure and simple expression of force? -Right overcomes force: that is the principle of civilisation. Your law -once formulated, let us set to work against barbarism!" - -All that is telling criticism; though to-day it reads a bit antiquated -in view of the revolt everywhere against both these catch-phrases and -the anarchist chaos which they connote. But here again Clemenceau, -with all his acuteness and brilliancy, displays the need for a guiding -historic and economic theory--the sociologic theory which scientific -Socialism supplies. It was not justice or liberty which created -slavery, or destroyed slavery, but economic development and social -necessity. The cult of abstraction leads to social revolt but not to -material revolution. - -Holding the opinions he did, it was inevitable that Clemenceau should -put the case of the Anarchists such as Vaillant, Henry, Ravachot. -They were the victims of a system. They could not rise as a portion -of a collective attack against the unjust class dominion and economic -servitude which crushed them and their fellows down into interminable -toil with no reward for their lifelong sufferings. So they made war -as individuals for anarchy. _Vive l'Anarchie!_ were the last words of -Henry. The man was a fanatic. "The crime seems to me odious. I make no -excuse for it," says Clemenceau, but he objects to the capital penalty. -"Henry's crime was that of a savage. The deed of society seems to -me a loathsome vengeance." Clemenceau compares, too, the anarchists -of dynamite to the would-be assassin Damien, so hideously tortured -before death. "My motive," said he, "was the misery which exists in -three-quarters of the kingdom. I acted alone, because I thought alone." -The anarchist, asked by his mother why he had, become an anarchist, -answered, "Because I saw the suffering of the great majority of human -beings." Vaillant, Henry, Caserio and their like are overmastered by -the same idea as Damien. They kill members of the king caste of our -society of to-day in order to scare the bourgeoisie into justice. There -is no arguing with honest fanatics of this type. Whether society is -justified in guillotining or hanging them is another matter. That their -method is futile, as all history shows, gives society the right if it -so chooses to regard it also as criminal. - -The above is all argument and criticism put with almost savage vigour. -But Clemenceau used likewise the lighter touch of French irony. Thus -a wretched family of father, mother and six children, tramping along -the high road near Paris, found some coal which had dropped from a -wagon long since out of sight. They pick up these bits of chance fuel -as a godsend. They have gleaned after the reapers. Straightway, the -story of Boaz and Ruth occurs to Clemenceau, of Boaz and his descendant -of Nazareth, who is the God of Europe to-day. The Hebrew Boaz, the -landowner of old, gladly leaves the wheat-ears to be gleaned by Ruth -and marries her into the bargain. The Christian Boaz, the coal-owner of -our time, gets the males of the distressed family of coal-gleaners six -days' imprisonment. Such is progress through the centuries! The moral -of the whole story is brilliantly touched in. - -So again in his comment on the catastrophe at the Charity Bazaar. It -was the rank and religiosity of the persons burnt alive which rendered -the tragedy so much more terrible than if the crowd thus incinerated -had only consisted of common people! It was the cream of French piety -that was there sacrificed. Quite an ecclesiastical and political -propaganda was developed from their ashes. The spirit of class made -these accidental victims of gross carelessness martyrs of Christian -heroism. Yet "if I go to dance at a charity ball, paying twenty francs -for my ticket, and expire on the spot, I am not on that account a -hero. . . . These gatherings are not exactly places of torture. -People laugh, flirt, and amuse themselves, it is an opportunity -to display fine dresses, and the charity sale has supplemented the -Opéra Comique for marriage-provoking interviews superintended by good -grandmothers. . . . Here is class distinction in action. Observe these -aristocratic young gentlemen beating with their canes and kicking their -frightened womenkind in their cowardly attempt to get out of danger. -Then see the servants rushing in to save them! Look also at the workmen -by chance on the spot risking their lives with true heroism, the -plumber Piquet, who saved twenty people and, though much burnt himself, -went back to his work-shop without a word." The contrast is striking. -It is not drawn by a Socialist. - -Then the criticism on the German fête in commemoration of the victory -of Sedan. "William II is obliged to keep his people in training, to -militarise them unceasingly, body and soul. . . . In spite of the -handsome protests of most of the Socialist leaders, we may be sure that -it is in very truth the soul of Germany whose innermost exultation -is manifested in these numberless jubilations which have beflagged -every village in the Empire. . . . It is the curse of the triumphs of -brute force to leave room in the soul of the conqueror for nothing but -a blind faith in settlement by violence." Then follows a prophetic -summary of what must be the inevitable consequence of this consecration -of brutal dominion inspired by the hateful instincts of barbarism, -which together prepare to use in Central Europe the most efficient -means of murder at the disposal of scientific civilisation. The ethics -of the nation are being deliberately corrupted for the realisation of -the Imperial policy! - -Thus Clemenceau, like others of us who knew the old Germany well, and -had watched its sad hypnotisation by the spirit of ruthless militarism, -foresaw what was coming more than twenty-five years ago. And thus -anticipating and reflecting, he chanced to see on one of the monuments -of Paris illumined by the sun, "The German Empire falls." It was dated -1805! "Short years pass. What remains of these follies? If law and -right outraged, reason flouted, wisdom contemned must blight our hopes, -as your warlike demonstrations too clearly prognosticate, then for you, -men of Germany, the inscription of the Carrousel is patient and bides -its time. - -"And yet two great rival peoples worthy to understand one another could -nobly make ready a nobler destiny." - -There you have the statesman and idealist as well as the clear-sighted -journalist. Clemenceau saw the storm-cloud ever menacing and ready -to break upon France. He warned his countrymen of their danger, bade -them prepare to meet it, but hoped continuously that his forecasts -might prove wholly erroneous. Jaurès unfortunately, with all his vast -ability, was too idealist and far too credulous. Hence his great -influence was thrown against the due preparation of his own country; he -did his utmost to support the anti-navy men even in Great Britain, and -only began to recognise how completely mistaken he had been just before -he was assassinated by the modern Ravaillac of religionist reaction. To -anticipate fraternity in a world of conflict is to help the aggressor -and to court disaster. This Clemenceau the Radical knew: to this the -French Socialists shut their minds. - -It was natural that the Vendéen by birth, the Parisian by adoption, -should feel himself drawn rather to the ideals of the French capital, -which in matters of intelligence and art is also the capital of Europe, -rather than to the narrow spirit of the Breton countryside which he has -so vigorously sketched. In his writings as in his political activities -this preference, this admiration find forcible expression. From the -days of Julian the great Pagan Emperor down to the French Revolution -and thence onwards, Clemenceau briefly traces the development of the -City by the Seine, the French Renaissance and the University of Paris, -by the influence of the writings of Montaigne--"this city in right of -which I am a Frenchman"--and Rabelais: this meeting-place of Europe, -this Central Commune of the planet proposed by Clootz, the Prussian -idealist, becomes in the words of the same foreign enthusiast "a -magnificent Assembly of the peoples of the West." We may forgive the -French statesman his unbounded enthusiasm for the Paris where he has -spent the whole of his active life. "One phrase alone, 'The Rights of -Man,' has uplifted all heads. Lafayette brings back from America the -victory that France sent thither and straightway the great battle is -joined between Paris of the French Revolution and the coalition of -things of the past." "True, we have measured - - _A la hauteur des bonds la profondeur des chutes_, - -"but at least we have striven, and we abate not a jot of our generous -ambitions. Thus decrees the tradition of Paris . . . that Paris which now -as ever holds in her hands the key to supreme victory." - - - - - CHAPTER XI - - CLEMENCEAU AS A WRITER - - -M. Clemenceau had a ready pen as well as a very bitter one, and he did -not confine himself to articles on politics and sociology. Besides _La -Mêlée Sociale_, of which I have given some account in the previous -chapter, he published the following books in order within eight years: -_Le Grand Pan_, a volume of descriptive essays; _Les Plus Forts_, a -novel; _Au Fil des Jours_, and _Les Embuscades de la Vie_, which were, -in the main, collections of sketches and tales. At the same time he -did a great deal of ordinary journalism, including his articles on the -Dreyfus case, which make in themselves four good-sized volumes. - -_Le Grand Pan_ followed close upon _La Mêlée Sociale_, and came as -a delightful surprise to M. Clemenceau's readers, a piece of pure -literature. In this book he no longer writes as a citizen of Paris, a -man of the boulevards and pavements, but as one country-born and bred, -knowing the hills and the sea. Although he describes his own Vendéen -scenery with loving familiarity, making the "_Marais_," the "_Bocage_" -and the "_Plaine_" live before us, he does not cling to them with the -monotonous affection of some French writers, who are, as it were, dyed -in their own local colour. Without elaboration, without the detailed -building-up of a scene which is the careful habit of some others, he -conveys in two or three lines the _feeling_ of a countryside and that -elusive but immutable thing, the character of a landscape. This belongs -really to the poet's art, and gives, I cannot tell why, a deeper -impression, a far more lasting pleasure than all the abundance and -detail of prose. Clemenceau's neighbour, and almost fellow-countryman, -Renan, had this gift. All the grey waters of the rocky Armorican shore -seem to sweep through the first lines of his essay on the Celtic -Spirit; and the influence of Renan is marked in _Le Grand Pan_. The -first article, which gives the book its title, sets the reader's fancy -sailing among the Greek Isles, steered by poetry and tradition, in -the light of the golden and the silver age. Clemenceau, like Heine, -mourns for the overthrow of the Greek gods in the welter of quarrelling -priesthoods and fierce Asian ugliness that flooded the Mediterranean -world. "Pan, Pan is dead!" But in the Renaissance--"the tumultuous -pageant of Art hurrying to meet the classic gods reborn"--he welcomes -the magnificent restoration of the ancient and eternal Powers. And -he claims for the nineteenth century the honour of beholding another -re-birth of the gods of Nature in the development of science, and the -labour that has brought some of the secrets of earth within our ken. - -But science, as we know, has revealed the horrors as well as the -wonders of earth. It troubles us; man has shed rivers of needless -blood, but we shrink from recognising Nature as she is, "red in -tooth and claw." It did not trouble the ancient Greeks; their -gods, developing from the rough deities of place or tribe into the -embodiments of the natural forces of matter or of mind, were outside -human ethic, although they were cast in human form. They might take the -shape of mortals, but only Euripides and a few other hypersensitive -moralists thought of blaming the gods when, as often happened, they -fell below the standards of human conduct. But we are creatures of -another era; and man, criticising and even condemning the Powers that -rule his little day, has, for good or ill, reached out to a level that -is above the gods, whose plaything he still remains. - -And there is another change. Man--_some_ men, that is to say--have -taken the animals into their protection and fellowship: and M. -Clemenceau is truly one of these. Not only those charming, kindly -essays, _La Main et la Patte_ and _Les Parents Pauvres_, in _Le Grand -Pan_, but the history of the two pigeons in the _Embuscades de la Vie_, -and a hundred little touches and incidents throughout Clemenceau's -books show him to be a man of most generous sympathies, looking at -animal life from a far higher and finer point of view than the majority -of his countrymen. - -There is much else in _Le Grand Pan_ that it would be pleasant to dwell -upon: a delicate classic spirit, a certain ironic grace, humour and -mockery, but everywhere and above all keen indignation at needless -human suffering and a sympathy which is poles apart from sentiment, for -human pain. M. Clemenceau might well be called "a soldier of pity," -as, in one of the Near Eastern languages, the members of his first -profession, the doctors, are termed. But I must pass on. _Le Grand Pan_ -is, as it deserves to be, the best known of M. Clemenceau's books, -and no one who has overlooked it can form a complete idea of this -remarkable man. - -It is said that anyone who has the power of setting down his -impressions on paper can write at least one good novel, if he -tries, for he will draw with varying degrees of truth or malice -the individuals he has met, liked, or suffered from, and the main -circumstances of his life. What a Homeric novel M. Clemenceau might -have written if he had followed these lines! But _Les Plus Forts_ is -unfortunately no such overflow of personal impressions and memories; -it is merely what used to be called "a novel with a purpose." That is -to say, it is one of the many works of fiction which not only record -the adventures of certain imaginary yet typical characters, but also -contain severe criticism of contemporary social conditions and life. -Such novels were much more common in England during the nineteenth -century than in France. In English fiction the sequence is unbroken -from _Sandford and Merton_ to the earlier works of Mrs. Humphry Ward's -venerable pen. But in 1898 there were still not many French novels -concerned with the serious discussion of social conditions, and M. -Clemenceau's early work stands out among these for sincerity and -simplicity of intent. However, in spite of the excellent irony of some -passages--notably the description of the Vicomtesse de Fourchamps' -career--_Les Plus Forts_ is to modern readers a trifle tedious and a -little naive. It is of the same calibre as Mr. Shaw's two first novels, -but less eccentric and not so amusing. M. Clemenceau himself would -probably write upon it "_Péché de jeunesse_," and pass on. Yet it -deserves more attention than that; for _Les Plus Forts_ unconsciously -reveals the central weakness of its author's criticism of modern life. -The situation is a good one, although the actors are not so much -characters as types. - -Henri de Puymaufray, a ruined French gentleman, who has lost the -world and found a kind of Radicalism, and Dominique Harlé, a rich -paper manufacturer, live side by side in the country as friendly -enemies or, rather, close but inimical friends. Their views of life -are as the poles asunder, but for the purposes of the story they -must be constantly meeting in conversational intimacy; and they have -each an almost superhuman power of expressing themselves and their -attitude towards the world they live in. The chief link between them -is Harlé's supposed daughter and only child, Claude, whose real father -is Puymaufray. Both these elderly gentlemen are deeply concerned -about Claude's future; each wishing, as parents and guardians often -do, to make the child's career the completion of their own ambitions -and hopes. Here Harlé has the advantage; he knows what he wants, that -is, money and power, and he means his daughter to have plenty of -both. He is the ordinary capitalist, with a strain of politician and -Cabinet-maker, who ends by founding a popular journal that outdoes -Harmsworth in expressing the "Lowest Common Factor of the Mind." -Society, the Church, and a particularly offensive form of charity all -serve him to increase his own power and the stability of his class. All -is for the best in the best of bourgeois worlds. Such is the theory -of life which he puts before his supposed daughter, together with a -_prétendant_ who will carry out his aims. Unhappily, Puymaufray has -nothing positive to set against this very solid and prosperous creed. -He and Deschars, the young traveller whom he wishes to give Claude -for a husband, can only talk pages of Radicalism in which the words -"pity" and "love" would recur even more frequently if M. Clemenceau's -fine sense of fitness did not prevail. What do they really want Claude -to do? The best they can offer her appears to be a life of retired and -gentle philanthropy, inspired by a dim sense of human brotherhood, -which might, under very favourable circumstances, deepen into a sort of -Socialist mood. - -But "mere emotional Socialism cuts no ice." This has often been said, -and means that a vague fraternal purpose and a perception of the deep -injustice of our present social system, even when sharpened with the -most destructive satire, will never change this world for the better, -unless they lead up to some theory of construction that is based on -economic facts. Pity and brotherhood may move individuals to acts of -benevolence, but they cannot alone recast the fabric of society, or -even bring about fundamental collective reforms. Besides, when young -people are asked to give up certain definite things, such as money, -pleasure and power, they must see something more than mere renouncement -ahead. They must be shown the fiery vision of an immortal city whose -foundations they may hope to build. Clemenceau's own knowledge of human -nature works against his two heroes, and he says: - -"Deschars was the child of his time. He had gone about the world as -a disinterested beholder, and he returned from voyaging without any -keen desire for noble action. . . . Perhaps, if he had been living and -working for some great human object, Deschars would have carried Claude -away by the very authority of his purpose, without a word. . . ." - -And Madame de Fourchamps observes: - -"It is very lucky for the poor that there are rich people to give them -bread." - -To which Claude replies: - -"My father's factory provides these workmen with a livelihood; where -would they be without him?" - -Then, instead of a few plain words on labour-value, Puymaufray can only -reply: - -"Well, they give him something in exchange, don't they?" - -The old capitalist fallacies here uttered in their crudest form -cannot be refuted by mere injunctions to pity and goodwill; and even -the magnificent words Liberty, Equality, Fraternity are no adequate -reply. To the successful profiteer and all who acquiesce in his -domination they mean: Liberty of Enterprise, Equality of Opportunity, -and Fraternity among Exploiters. Facts and the march of events alone -can persuade Dominique Harlé and his like to use their ingenuity in -serving their fellow-creatures, and not in profiting by them. And only -collective action, guided by some knowledge of the direction in which -our civilisation is tending, can hasten the march of events. - -It is remarkable how greatly the "novel with a purpose" has developed -during the last twenty years in England and, to a less extent, in -France. The characters are creatures of their conditions; and it -is these conditions, not the characters, that do the talking. Some -novels to-day are such careful and withal highly interesting guides -to the sociology of England towards the end of the black Industrial -Age that we cannot wonder if their authors take themselves too -seriously as politicians and reformers. Yet these works show, after -all, the same defect as _Les Plus Forts_, they have no constructive -theory of life to set against the very well-defined, solid, and still -apparently effective system which they criticise. All their most ironic -descriptions, their most penetrating satire are negative, and, in the -end, the utterances of men "wandering between two worlds, one dead, one -powerless to be born." - -_Au Fil des Jours_ is an interesting collection of pieces in which the -author has not made up his mind whether he will write short stories or -articles upon social conditions. There is no harm in that; some people -may even say that M. Clemenceau has produced a new variety of readable -matter; but, curiously enough, the substance of the story is often -so telling that one quarrels with the writer for not having put it -into the best shape. Take one of the pieces in _Au Fil des Jours_--_La -Roulotte_. Briefly, a weary old gipsy drives in a covered donkey-cart -into a country hamlet, and stops by the riverside, where all the -gossips are washing. He is received with hostile and watchful silence, -because gipsies are always the scapegoats in a peasant district, and -anything and everything that may be lost, stolen or strayed--even if -it turns up again--is always laid to their account. In the night he -dies, unnoticed; and, after some further time has passed, the villagers -inspect his cart. Finding him there, dead, with a very small grandson -living, they fetch the local constable and the mayor. The arm of -the Law begins to function, the child is sent to the workhouse, the -moribund donkey is "taken care of" by one of the villagers, and the -dilapidated old cart, which only contained a few rags, is left by the -riverside. - -But the French peasant knows how to turn every little thing to profit: -nothing is useless in his eyes. Gradually handy fragments of the -donkey-cart begin to disappear. Bits of the iron fittings vanish, the -tilt-props go, a shaft follows, one wheel after another slips away and -is no more seen. In fact, the donkey-cart, as such, disappears from -mortal sight. Then, one fine day, a gipsy-woman comes swinging along -the road, where she had followed the traces of the donkey-cart, and -asks for news of her old father and her little boy. The authorities of -the village tell her of the old gipsy's death and burial: they do not -require her to pay for his obsequies only because they see it would -be no use. She goes to fetch the child from the workhouse, and then -asks for the donkey and cart. The former, they tell her, died in the -hands of the villager who "took care of him" (and sold his skin for a -fair sum). She accepts this loss with resignation; but the cart, as -she says, cannot have died: where is her father's "_roulotte_"?--Ah, -well, nobody in the village knows anything about _that_! It _was_ here, -no doubt, since the old gipsy died in it--but since then----The Law, -once more represented by mayor and constables, can only shrug its -shoulders in the finest French manner and disclaim all responsibility -for a vagabond's goods. But the gipsy-woman persists: she begins even -to clamour for her rights. "_Rights, indeed!_" The village, hitherto -indifferent, becomes hostile; and the old cry that meets the gipsy -everywhere is raised, for someone on the edge of the crowd calls -out, "Thief!" It is a mere expression of disapproval, not a direct -accusation, but the whole village takes it up joyfully: "Thief! Thief!" -So the gipsy-woman, who, as it chanced, has stolen nothing, is hounded -out of the commune with sticks and stones and objurgations by those who -had themselves appropriated her old donkey-cart piecemeal. "A bit of -rusty iron whizzed past her as she crossed the bridge. It may once have -served as her donkey's shoe." - -Such is the tale: a sample of many in _Au Fil des Jours_. Irony and -realism are not wanting, nor yet the grimly picturesque, but the -reader is left thinking: "What a little gem this would be if it were -told by Maupassant, or some other master of the _conte_!" Certainly -M. Clemenceau has something else to do than tell _contes_! But his -literary material is so fine that it is his own fault if we expect -the very best of him. As it is, he does not take the trouble to cut -the story out clearly from the matrix of thought and memories which -enfolded it in his own mind. The effect on the reader is, one might -say, a little vague and murmurous, like some tale half-heard in a crowd. - -It is a strange thing that the countryside, Nature, the pure and -never-failing spring of inspiration for poetry and human delight, -should turn so different a countenance towards those who live with her, -year out and year in, winning sustenance for us all from her broad -and often ungenial breast. Our Mother Earth is an iron taskmaster to -the tillers of the soil grinding out their youth and strength, bowing -their eyes to their labour, so that all her beauty passes them by -unseen. Either Nature keeps her charms jealously for the untroubled -mind and the leisured eye, or else all the beauty that we see in her is -borrowed, a glamour lent by some immaterial force--not ours, perhaps, -but certainly not her own. Be this as it may, in the _Embuscades de la -Vie_ M. Clemenceau beholds and describes the careless, endless, natural -beauty amid which the peasant-lives that he sketches for us are set; -but these themselves are often as ugly as bare stone, and the men and -women are hard and close-fisted with one another mainly because the -earth is so grudging to them. These stories are the most clear-cut of -all Clemenceau's essays in fiction. They are not exactly _contes_, -either: they are the discoveries, one might say, of Clemenceau in -his ancestral character as the descendant of a line of doctors and -landowners who worked for generations among the small bourgeois and the -tillers of the soil. How he knows them! and--if French fiction is to -be believed--how unchangeable they are! Since the bourgeois gained his -freedom in the great Revolution by using the arm of the sans-culotte, -what a grip he has kept upon his possession! and how much dearer to him -his property is than anything else in the world! Clemenceau does but -take up the theme of Balzac and others when he describes provincial -France and its twin gods, money and the land--money which compels -loveless marriages, envy, fawning, bitterness, perpetual small cheating -or endless insect-like toil; and the land, in whose service men work -themselves and their kindred to the bone, and grudge a pittance to old -age. - -The bourgeoisie and their customs vary with their nationality, but -peasant life is much the same all over Europe. Clemenceau found similar -traits of life and character in Galicia to those of La Vendée; and -others will tell us that from Ireland to Russia, from the Baltic to -the Black Sea, the peasant and the small farmer conduct their lives -upon the same lines: hard work, dependence upon the seasons, family -authority, tribal feuds, and a meticulous social system of comment and -convention, under which the individual finds himself far less free than -in the unhampered, unnoticed life of the towns. - -Yet many of the "ambushes of life" are to be found in the cities; and -about a third of these tales are laid in the towns and among the -well-to-do middle class. M. Clemenceau's satire plays freely upon -the "marriage of convention," by which two families agree, after a -certain amount of haggling and mutual sharp practice, to bind two young -strangers together in the closest of relationship, for time, and also, -we are told, for eternity, in the interest of property alone. Still, -human nature adapts itself to anything, and even such marriages have -their compensations, as our author lightly and ironically points out. -Being a genuine sociologist, he does not handle these tales of the -bourgeoisie and their vagaries within what is, after all, an artificial -and exclusive form of existence, as seriously as he does the great -plain outlines of peasant life. - -Whether he writes of town or country, of _Fleur de Froment_ and _Six -Sous_, or of a _ménage à trois_; whether he calls up a Greek courtesan -to theorise about her profession, or describes a long-standing bitter, -and motiveless peasant feud, his style is always fluent and charming, -vivid with irony, and graceful with poetic thought. Yet the defect as -well as the merit of M. Clemenceau's fiction and essay-writing is just -this admirable, unvarying ease and fluency. One feels that he writes -with perfect unconsciousness, as the thoughts come into his head. -And, after a while, the ungrateful reader is inclined to ask for some -kind of selection in the feast before him, where all is good, very -good, even, but nothing is _excellent_. Like a far greater writer, -Clemenceau--on paper at least--"has no peaks in him." His literature -was an admirable "by-product" of his almost limitless capacities; his -actions and not his writings are the achievements of his life. - - - - - CHAPTER XII - - CLEMENCEAU AND THE DREYFUS AFFAIR - - -In December, 1894, Captain Dreyfus, a member of the General Staff, was -found guilty of treason by a Court Martial. The Court was unanimous. -He was condemned to be sent to the Ile du Diable, there to expiate -his offence by the prolonged torture of imprisonment and solitary -confinement, in a tropical climate. It was a terrible punishment. But -the offence of betraying France to Germany, committed by an officer -entrusted with the military secrets of the Republic, was a terrible one -too. It seemed so incredible, especially as Captain Dreyfus was a man -of considerable means, that up to the last moment the gravest doubt -as to the possibility of his having committed such a crime prevailed. -When, however, the Court declared against him as one man, and without -the slightest hesitation, there could no longer be any question of the -correctness of the decision. For the trial had lasted four whole days, -and Dreyfus had been defended by one of the ablest advocates at the -Paris Bar. "What need have we of further witness?" - -That was the universal feeling. Nearly a quarter of a century before, -Marshal Bazaine had betrayed France to her mortal enemy, and had -escaped the penalty which was his due. Common soldiers were frequently -condemned to death and executed for impulsive actions against their -superiors. High time an example should be made of a man of higher -rank. Dreyfus was lucky not to be shot out of hand. That an Alsatian, -a rich man, a soldier sworn to defend his country, an officer employed -in a confidential post, should thus sell his nation to Germany was -frightful. The thing was more than infamous. No punishment could be -too bad for him. Permanent solitary confinement under a blazing sun is -worse than immediate death. All the better. His fate will encourage the -others. - -And Captain Dreyfus was a Jew. That made the matter worse. Powerful as -they are in politics and finance, Jews are not popular in France. By -Catholics and sworn anti-Semites they are believed to be capable of -anything. Even by men of open mind they are regarded with distrust as -citizens of no country, a set of Asiatic marauders encamped for the -time being in the West, whose God is a queer compound of Jahveh, Moloch -and Mammon. There was thus the bitterest race and religious prejudice -eager to confirm the judgment of the Court Martial. The case was -decided. Dreyfus was sent off to the Island of the Devil. - -Clemenceau shared the general opinion. He accepted the statement of -the president of the Court Martial that "there are interests superior -to all personal interests." And these were the interests which forbade -that the court martial should be held in public, or that the secret -evidence of treason should be disclosed. Given the honour, good -faith, capacity and freedom from prejudice of the judges, this was a -reasonable contention on the part of the chief officer of the Court. -But there was that to come out, in this very Dreyfus case, which should -throw grave doubt upon the advisability of any sittings behind closed -doors of any court that deals with matters into which professional, -personal or political considerations may be imported. Secrecy is -invariably harmful to democracy and injurious to fair play. - -Three years later Clemenceau began to understand what lay behind this -veil of obscurity which he then allowed to be thrown over the whole of -the Dreyfus proceedings. He took upon himself the full burden of his -own mistake. When he had distinguished his fine career by the vigorous -and sustained effort in favour of justice to the victim, he reprinted -at full length his articles denouncing the man about whom he had been -misled. "I cannot claim," he writes, "credit for having from the first -instinctively felt the iniquity. I believed Dreyfus to be guilty, and -I said so in scathing terms. It seemed to me impossible that officers -should lightly inflict such a sentence on one of themselves. I imagined -there had been some desperate imprudence. I considered the punishment -terrible, but I excused it on the ground of devotion to patriotism." -Nothing was farther from Clemenceau's thoughts, even at the close of -1897, than that Dreyfus should after all be not guilty. He laughed -at Bernard Lazare when he said so. Meeting M. Ranc by accident, this -politician and journalist confirmed the opinion of Lazare and declared -that Dreyfus was innocent. Again Clemenceau smiled incredulously, -and was recommended to go at once and see M. Scheurer-Kestner, -Vice-President of the Senate, the famous Alsatian whose high qualities -he many years afterwards proclaimed in a funeral oration. - -The editor of _l'Aurore_ called upon that courageous and indefatigable -champion of Dreyfus; and comparison of the handwriting of Esterhazy, -the chief witness against the captain, with that of the _bordereau_ -attributed to Dreyfus and decisive of his guilt, convinced Clemenceau, -not that Dreyfus was innocent, but that the judgment had been quite -irregular. Therefore he resolved to begin a campaign for a revision -of the case. He did not share Scheurer-Kestner's view as to the -enormous difficulty and danger of such an undertaking. Trouble and -misrepresentation he anticipated. Bitter opposition from the members -of the court and of the General Staff--Yes. Virulent misrepresentation -due to priestly hatred--Yes. Unceasing malignity of anti-Semites--Yes. -Strong political objection to any reopening of a "_chose jugée_," on -public grounds--Yes. But, in spite of all, the truth in modern France -would easily and triumphantly prevail! "Events showed me how very far -out I was in my calculations." - -As on more than one occasion in his stormy life, therefore, Clemenceau -underrated the strength of the enemy. He had to contend against a -combination of some of the strongest interests and passions that -can affect human life and sentiment. There had been from the very -commencement a bitter feeling among some of the most powerful sections -of French society against the Republic. As was shown in the rise -of Boulanger, Clemenceau, by exposing the drawbacks of successive -Republican Governments, had done much to strengthen this feeling -among its opponents and to weaken the loyalty of its supporters. -There was, in fact, nothing in the Republic itself to be enthusiastic -about. It was essentially a bourgeois Republic, living on in a welter -of bourgeois scandals, unbalanced by any great policy at home, any -great military successes abroad, or any great personalities at the -head of affairs. The glories of France were dimmed: the financiers of -France--especially the Jew financiers--were more influential than ever. -All this helped the party of reaction. - -Religion, too, had come in to fortify finance and build up the -anti-Semite group. The Catholics, to whom Jews and Free-Masons are -the red flags of the political and social bull ring, had not very -long before challenged the former to deadly combat in that Field of -the Cloth of Gold on which, to use the phrase of one of their less -enlightened competitors, they "do seem a sort of inspired." It is -possible that had the Catholic Union Générale listened to the advice -of their ablest and coolest brain, who was, be it said, neither a -Frenchman nor a Catholic, the great financial combination of the -Church, with all its sanctified funds of the faithful behind it, might -have won. Even as it was, it drove a Rothschild to commit suicide, -which was regarded as a great feat at the time. - -But M. Bontoux was too ambitious, he did not possess the real financial -faculty, his first successes turned such head as he possessed. The -Jews, therefore, were able to work their will upon the whole of his -projects and groups, and the devout Catholic investors of Paris, Vienna -and other places had the intolerable mortification of seeing their -savings swept into the coffers of the infidel. This had happened some -years before the Dreyfus case. But losers have long memories, and here -was a sore monetary grievance superadded to the previous religious -hatred of the Hebrew. - -Dreyfus was a Jew. Nay, more, he came of financial Jews who had had -their pickings out of the collapse of the Union Générale as well as out -of the guano and other concessions malignantly obtained in the Catholic -Republic of Peru. Monstrous that a man of that race and name should -be an officer in the French Army at all! Still more outrageous that -he should be placed by his ability and family influence in a position -of military importance, and entrusted with serious military secrets! -Something must be done. - -Now the persons forming the most powerful coterie in the higher circles -of the French Army at this time were not only men who had been educated -at the famous military academy of St. Cyr and imbued with an _esprit -de corps_ cultivated from their school-days upwards, but they were -officers who believed heartily, if not in the religion, at any rate in -the beneficent secular persuasion of the Catholic Church. They were, -as was clearly shown, greatly influenced by the Jesuits, who saw the -enormous advantage of keeping in close touch with the chiefs of the -army. - -Then there were the monarchists and Buonapartists, male and female, of -every light and shade, who were eagerly on the look-out for any stroke -that might discredit the new studious but scientific and unbelieving -class of officers, whom the exigencies of modern warfare were making -more and more essential to military efficiency. Their interest was to -keep as far as possible the main higher organisation and patronage of -the army and the General Staff a close borough and out of the hands of -these new men. - -All this formed a formidable phalanx of organised enmity against any -officer who might not suit the prejudices or, at a critical moment, -might be dangerous to the plans of people who, differ as they might in -other matters, were at one in disliking capable soldiers who were not -of their particular set. And here was Dreyfus, who embodied in his own -person all their most cherished hatreds, who could be made the means of -striking a blow at all similar intruders upon their preserve, in such -wise as greatly to injure all their enemies at once. Unfortunately for -him, Dreyfus was at the same time an able officer--so much the more -dangerous, therefore--and personally not an agreeable man. Not even -their best friends would deny to clever Jews the virtue of arrogance. -Dreyfus was arrogant. He was not a grateful person to his superiors or -to his equals. They all wanted to get rid of him on their own account, -and their friends outside were ready enough to embitter them against -him because he was a Jew. - -This is not to say that there was an elaborate plot afoot among all -who were brought in contact with Dreyfus, or that, when the charge -against him was formulated, there was a deliberate intention, on the -part of the members of the Court Martial, to find him guilty, no matter -what happened. But it is now quite certain that, from the first, the -idea that he was a spy was agreeable to his fellow-officers in the -Ministry of War; and, being satisfied as to his responsibility for the -crime that they wished to believe him guilty of, they did not stick -at trifles, in the matter of procedure and testimony, which might -relieve their consciences and justify their judgment. Knowing, then, -the powerful combination which would oppose to the death any revision -of Dreyfus's trial, Scheurer-Kestner, resolute and self-sacrificing as -he was, might well take a less sanguine view than Clemenceau of the -probabilities of certain victory as soon as the truth was made known. - -But when once he began to doubt whether Dreyfus had had fair play, -Clemenceau immediately showed those qualities of personal and -political courage, persistence, disregard of popularity, and power -of concentrating all his forces upon the immediate matter in hand, -indifferent to the numbers and strength of his opponents, which had -gained him so high a place in the estimation of all democrats and -lovers of fair play long before. "If there are manifest probabilities -of error, the case must be revised." That was his view. But the -National Army and the National Religion, as bitter opponents of justice -put it, were one and indivisible on this matter. Militarism and -Jesuitism together, backed by the high society of reaction and a large -section of the bourgeoisie, constituted a stalwart array in favour of -the perpetuation of injustice. There was literally scarce a crime of -which this combination was not capable rather than admit that by any -possibility a Court Martial on a Jew captain could go wrong. - -The Minister of War, General Billot, the Prime Ministers Méline and -Brisson, generals of high standing such as Mercier, Boisdeffre, Gonse, -Zurlinden and others, officers of lower rank and persons connected -with them, were gradually mixed up with and defended such a series -of attempted murders, ordered suicides, wholesale forgeries, defence -and decoration of exposed spies, perjury, misrepresentation and false -imprisonment that the marvel is how France survived such a tornado of -turpitude. Clemenceau little knew what it would all lead to when, by no -means claiming that Dreyfus was innocent, he and Scheurer-Kestner and -Zola and Jaurès, and all honest Radicals and Socialists, demanded that, -even if Dreyfus were guilty, he could not have been _legally_ condemned -on false evidence and forged documents: the latter never having been -communicated to his counsel. It was on this ground that Clemenceau -demanded a revision of the trial. - -But quite early in the fray the defenders of the Court Martial became -desperate in their determination that the matter should never be -thoroughly investigated. The honour of the army was at stake. Colonel -Picquart, a man of the highest credit and capacity, comes to the -conclusion in the course of his official inspection of documents -at headquarters that the incriminating paper on which Dreyfus was -condemned, but which he was never allowed to see, was not in his -handwriting at all, but in that of Major Esterhazy, an officer disliked -and distrusted by all fellow-officers with whom he had served. -Picquart, in fact, suspected that Esterhazy was a Prussian spy and -that he forged the _bordereau_ which convinced the Court Martial of -Dreyfus's guilt. But before this, in 1894 when the story leaked out -that an officer having relations with the General Staff was suspected -of treachery, it was not Dreyfus whose name was first mentioned. His -old comrades said with one accord, "It must be Esterhazy: we thought -so." Esterhazy, however, soon made himself necessary to the army chiefs -and their Catholics. If his character was blasted publicly, down -these gentry would come, and with them the whole of the proceedings -against Dreyfus. They therefore suggested to Picquart that he should -simply hold his tongue. "_You_ are not at l'Ile du Diable," they said. -But Picquart would persist, so they sent him off to Tunis. However, -thanks to Scheurer-Kestner and others, the truth began to come out, -and Picquart still refused to be silenced. So instead of dealing with -Esterhazy, they arrested his accuser and gave the Major a certificate -of the very highest character. - -As it began, so it went on. Clemenceau's daily articles and attacks -drove the militarists, the Catholics, the anti-Semites, and the -reactionaries generally, into a fury. Colonel Henry, Colonel Paty du -Clam, the Jesuit Father du Lac, the editors and contributors of the -_Figaro_, the _Echo de Paris_ (the special organ of the Staff), the -_Gaulois_ were in a permanent conspiracy with the generals named above, -and the General Staff itself, to prevent the truth from being known. It -was all of no use. Picquart under lock and key was more effective than -Picquart at large. Slowly but surely men of open mind became convinced -that, little as they wished to believe it, something was wrong. But -these were always the minority. Few could grasp the fact that an -innocent man was being put in chains on the Ile du Diable, virtually -because there was an agitation in favour of his re-trial in Paris. - -Then came Zola's terrible letter in the _Aurore_, which Clemenceau had -suggested, and gave up his daily article in order to give place to. -He also supplied the title "_J'Accuse_." Zola summed up the whole -evidence relentlessly against the General Staff and its tools and -forgers, Esterhazy, Henry, Paty du Clam and the rest of them. - -Such an indictment, formulated by a novelist who was universally -recognised as one of the leading men of letters in Europe, quite -outside of the political arena, would have attracted attention at -any time. In the midst of a period when all feelings and minds were -wrought up to the highest point of tension, it came as a direct and -heavy blow at the whole of the military party. It is difficult to -realise to-day the sensation produced. It had all the effect of a -combined attack of horse, foot and artillery for which preparation -had been made long before by a successful bombardment. There was no -effective answer possible in words. This the military cliques and -their friends at once saw and acted upon. They abandoned discussion -and forced Zola and _l'Aurore_ into court on a charge of treason and -libel. The action stirred all Europe and riveted attention throughout -the civilised world. This was due not merely to Zola's great reputation -and popularity, to the political position held by Clemenceau, to the -enthralling interest of the Dreyfus affair itself, to the excitement of -the life-and-death struggle between freedom and reaction, but to the -fact that behind all this lay the never-dying hostility of Germany to -France. - -All this was too much for the criminal champions of "the honour of -the Army." _L'Aurore_ and Zola must be prosecuted. They were. And -Clemenceau conducted his own defence. It was a crucial case, and the -famous advocate Labori had previously done his best for Zola, pointing -out that the whole drama turned on the prisoner then suffering at the -Ile du Diable: perhaps the most infamous criminal, perhaps a martyr, -the victim of human fallibility. He had shown, however, that "all the -powers for Justice are combined _against_ Justice," and had called for -the revision of a great case. - -"After the jury have adjudicated, public opinion and France herself -will judge you," said Clemenceau himself. "You have been told that a -document was privately communicated to the Court. Do you understand -what that means? It means that a man is tried, is condemned, is covered -with ignominy, his own name, that of his wife, of his children, of his -father, of all his connections eternally blasted, on the faith of a -document he had never been shown. Gentlemen, who among you would not -revolt at the very idea of being condemned under such conditions? Who -among you would not adjure us to demand justice for you if, brought -before a tribunal, after a mockery of investigation, after a purely -formal discussion, the judges, meeting out of your presence, decided -on your honour and your life, condemning you, without appeal, on a -document of whose very existence you were kept in ignorance? Who among -you would quietly submit to such a decision? If this has been done, I -tell you your one duty above all others is that such a case should be -re-tried." - -That was the main point, as Clemenceau saw even more clearly than -M. Labori. No man, guilty or innocent, could be justly condemned -and sentenced on the strength of a written document the purport and -even the existence of which had been deliberately concealed from the -prisoner and his counsel. It scarcely needed further argument, not -even the direct proof which was forthcoming that Colonel Sandherr, -the president of the Court Martial, had a bitter and unreasoning -prejudice against Jews. If the validity of the document had been beyond -all possibility of question; if witnesses whose good faith had been -unquestionable had seen Dreyfus write it with their own eyes: even -then the trial was legally vitiated by the fact that it had not been -shown to the accused. But if the document was forged----? All the other -points, serious as some of them were, counted little by the side of -this. - -That, therefore, Clemenceau dealt with most persistently. That, -therefore, the General Staff, with its coterie of Jesuits, anti-Semites -and spies, was determined to cover up. The generals who bore witness in -the case against Zola and _l'Aurore_ showed by their threats and their -admissions they knew that it was they themselves and the members of -the secret Court Martial who were really on their trial at the bar of -public opinion. - -It was in this sense that Clemenceau closed his memorable defence. -He declared against the forger of the _bordereau_, the Prussian spy, -Esterhazy, who was sheltered and honoured by the chiefs of the French -Army. "Yes, it is we," he cried, amid derisive shouts and howls in -court, "it is we who are the defenders of the army, when we call upon -you to drive Esterhazy out of it. The conscious or unconscious enemies -of the army are those who propose to cashier Picquart and retain -Esterhazy. Gentlemen of the jury, a general has come here to talk to -you about your children. Tell me now which of them would like to find -himself in Esterhazy's battalion? Tell me, would you hand over your -sons to this officer to lead against the enemy? The very question is -enough. Who does not know the answer before it is given? - -"Gentlemen of the jury, I have done. We have passed through terrible -experiences in this century. We have known glory and disaster in every -form, we are even at this moment face to face with the unknown. Fears -and hopes encompass us around. Grasp the opportunity as we ourselves -have grasped it. Be masters of your own destinies. A people sitting in -judgment on itself is a noble thing. A stirring scene also is a people -deciding on its own future. Your task, gentlemen of the jury, is to -pronounce a verdict less upon us than upon yourselves. We are appearing -before you. You will appear before history." - - - - - CHAPTER XIII - - THE DREYFUS AFFAIR (II) - - -This trial of Zola and _l'Aurore_ was the greatest crisis in the long -succession of crises which centred themselves round Dreyfus. The more -serious the evidence against the conduct of the Court Martial and the -honour of the army, the more truculent became the attitude of the -militarists, Catholics, anti-Semites and their following. Passion -swept away every vestige of judgment or reason. There was no pretence -of fair play to the defendants. Inside the Court, which was packed -to overflowing, inarticulate roars came from the audience when any -telling argument or conclusive piece of testimony was put in on the -side of truth and justice. Outside, an infuriated mob of reactionists -demanded the lives of the accused. The smell of blood was in the air. -The likelihood of organised massacre grew more obvious every day. -Clemenceau told me himself--and he does not know what fear is--that if -Zola had been acquitted, instead of being condemned, the Dreyfusards -present would have been slaughtered in court. - -How determined the whole unscrupulous and desperate clique were to -carry their defence of injustice to the last ditch was displayed when -M. Brisson, the President of the Republic, himself a man credited with -austere probity and cool courage, was forced by them to authorise -proceedings against Colonel Picquart, because he had offered the -highest personage in France to help him to discover the truth. Picquart -was therefore to be victimised still further: likewise for the honour -of the army! He was duly incarcerated and degraded. France herself was -being found guilty and cashiered by the persecution of this high-minded -and courageous colonel. Esterhazy runs away when his treachery and -forgeries are finally exposed. Clemenceau and the Dreyfusards are -willing that he should have a safe-conduct back again, if his coming -will help to manifest the truth. A very different attitude towards -a culprit convicted, not by a secret Court Martial, but by his own -public actions and admissions. Yet General Gonse and the General Staff -were ready at first to aid and support Colonel Picquart in exposing -Major Esterhazy, as only a German spy, in constant communication and -collusion with Colonel Schwartzkopfen, acting on behalf of the German -Army and the German Government. Esterhazy was no direct agent of the -French Staff! When, however, it was discovered that Colonel Picquart's -investigations went far to clear Captain Dreyfus altogether, and proved -that he had at any rate been condemned on a forged document, _then_ -Picquart himself was to be treated as a criminal, unless he suppressed -the truth at once, and held his tongue for ever. - -And so this extraordinary case was now being tried in the open street -before the public of France and of the world--for every civilised -nation followed the changes and chances of Dreyfus's martyrdom--and so -day after day, week after week, month after month, year after year, -Clemenceau, Scheurer-Kestner, Jaurès and the Socialists fought on for -a re-trial. The highest Court of judicature in France, worthy of its -history, accorded the right of appeal. A sense of doubt was beginning -to creep through the community. Thereupon, the Generals, their Church, -their Press, their Mob, _their_ Army, began afresh a very devil dance -of organised forgery, calumny, perjury, vituperation, attempted murder -and concomitant infamies. - -Looking back at that period of desperate antagonism, it seems strange -that open conflict should have been averted. It was no fault of the -General Staff and its myrmidons that it did not break out. That such a -result of their campaign of injustice and provocation would have been -welcomed by many of the chiefs of the French Army is beyond question. -At more than one juncture the outlook was so threatening that two, if -not three, pretenders to the throne of France were in the country at -the same time. Things did not take the turn they expected, and they -went off again. All this was known, of course, to Clemenceau, who was -also well aware that a great deal more lay behind the Dreyfus affair -than the guilt or innocence of Dreyfus. Nor did the fact by any means -escape him that those semi-occult ecclesiastical influences which had -been against him all his life, not for personal reasons, but because -he was a Radical, a free-thinker and a champion of free speech, a free -press, secular and gratuitous education, and separation of Church and -State--that those hidden powers were at work behind the General Staff -in the Dreyfus case in the hope of gaining ground on a side issue which -they were losing steadily on the main field of battle. - -This it was which made the collision between the two opposing forces so -critical an event for France. This, too, accounted for the desperation -of the losing party. - -The Jesuits of the Dreyfus affair had none of the diabolical far-seeing -coolness of the type represented by the Père Rodin in Eugène Sue's -_Wandering Jew_. They were infuriated fanatics whose unreasoning -anxiety to torture and burn their heretic opponents was reflected in -the blundering mendacity and undisguised hatred of their tools of the -military Staff. Hence, in the long run, they delivered themselves into -the hands of the Frenchmen of the future--Zola, Jaurès, Picquart and -Clemenceau. Clemenceau's daily articles, which constituted the most -formidable barrage on behalf of Dreyfus, make up five closely printed -volumes. They are full of life and fire; but they are full also of -crushing argument enforced with irony and sarcasm and illustrated by -telling references to recent history. Abuse and misrepresentation could -not permanently hold their own in a discussion thus conducted. Forgery -and perjury when brought home to the real criminals necessarily made -their case worse. Nothing is more surprising than the lack of dexterity -and acumen on the part of the reactionary forces. They forgot that a -bludgeon is a poor weapon against a rapier in the hand of an expert. - -Thus it came about that after a long contest, whose interest, even for -outsiders, was maintained throughout by tragical incidents such as the -suicide of Colonel Henry--the forger for _esprit de corps_ as Esterhazy -was the forger for money and power--the attempted poisoning of Picquart -and the attack upon Labori, a re-trial was forced from the Government -of the day. The names of the chief opponents are already forgotten, -such minor actors and apologists of injustice, forgers and spies on the -"right side" were never remembered. Who now cares whether the _petit -bleu_ was written by Schwartzkopfen or not? Who can recall what Major -Lauth did or bore witness to? The trail of the serpent is over them -all. That is what the world bears in mind to-day. The broad features -of the drama are recorded on the cinema film of history. The faces and -characters of the villains of the piece are already blotted out. Only -the heroes of the conflict remain. And of these heroes Clemenceau might -fairly claim to be the chief. The re-trial at Rennes was, when all is -said, mainly his work. - -What a re-trial it was! The Court was still a Court Martial. The -president of the court, Colonel Jouaust, was still a violently -prejudiced officer. The judges behind him were all inspired by that -fatal _esprit de corps_ which accepts and acts upon the Jesuit motto -that the end justifies the means, where the interests of a particular -set of men are concerned. In fact, the combination in favour of -military injustice remained what it had been throughout: a body -resolved that, come what might, the victim of the forged document and -other criminal acts should not be formally acquitted, even if monstrous -illegality at the first trial forced a revision. - -Nearly five years had now elapsed from the date of Dreyfus's original -condemnation, when, released from his imprisonment, he stood at the -Bar after that long period of physical and moral torture. Clemenceau -is not a man of sentiment: he had long doubted whether Dreyfus was -really innocent: even the outrageous proceedings at the first Court -Martial had failed to convince him that there might not be something -behind the forged _bordereau_, concealed from the prisoner, which -could in a degree justify his judges: not until the close of the case -against Zola and _l'Aurore_ was his mind made up that, "consciously -or unconsciously," a terrible crime had been committed. But now, with -Dreyfus himself present, with all the old witnesses contradicting, more -directly than ever, one another's testimony, yet allowed incredible -licence of exposition and explanation by the Court; with the evidence -of General Gonse, General Mercier, Roget, Cinquet, Gribelin, Lauth and -Junck cut to ribands by the questions of Dreyfus's advocates; with -Colonel Picquart brought up short by Colonel Jouaust, who had allowed -all sorts of long-winded and irreconcilable accounts to be given -by his favourites subject to no interruption--with all this almost -inconceivable unfairness going on all day and every day through the -Rennes Court Martial, Clemenceau seems to have been really affected, -not only by the injustice done, but by the personal sufferings which -the prisoner on trial had undergone and was undergoing. - -Colonel Jouaust's interruption of Colonel Picquart's closely knit but -passionless statement by the exclamation "_Encore!_" was destined -to become famous. It summed up in one word the whole tone of the -prosecuting judges on the Bench. Yet as the case proceeded and the -criticisms of Clemenceau and his coadjutors became still more scathing -than they had been before, it was difficult to see how even a suborned -court could avoid a verdict of acquittal. But this Court dared not -be just. There was too much at stake. The whole of the chiefs of the -army had taken sides against the prisoner. They were there to secure -condemnation of Dreyfus again at all costs. The Court, headed by -Colonel Jouaust, was forced to do the same. It was the "Honour of the -Army" backed by Esterhazy, Henry and Sandherr against the character of -one miserable Jew. There could be no hesitation under such conditions. -Dreyfus was found "Guilty, with extenuating circumstances." -Extenuating circumstances in the dealings of a spy and a traitor who, -not being in any pressing pecuniary need whatever, had deliberately -and infamously sold France to the enemy! Not one of the five judges -who rendered this verdict could really have believed Dreyfus to be -guilty. France was more dishonoured by this decision than if the Court -had definitely declared against the whole weight of the evidence that -Dreyfus was a traitor. - -Dreyfus was thereafter "pardoned" and released. That special plot of -the anti-Republican clerico-military syndicate of Father du Lac, to -use Clemenceau's phraseology, had after all miscarried. As the result -of incredible efforts Dreyfus was at last a free man. The world could -judge of the character of his accusers and of his champions. It did -judge, and that verdict has never been revised. A gross injustice had -been partly remedied but could never be fully obliterated. That Dreyfus -was innocent the world at large had no doubt. - -Yet, strange to say, there are still men, who certainly had no feeling -against Dreyfus but quite the contrary, who were not convinced. I have -heard this view expressed from several quarters, but the opinions of -two personal friends of the most different character and career made a -considerable impression upon me at the time. The first was my friend, -the late George Henty, well known as a special correspondent and author -of exceedingly successful books for boys. Henty was a thorough-going -Tory, but he had no doubt that Dreyfus was a terribly ill-used man and -the victim of a foul plot--until he went over to France to watch the -re-trial by court martial at Rennes. He returned in quite a different -frame of mind. He knew I was entirely favourable to Dreyfus, as he -himself had been when he crossed the Channel. Meeting him by accident, -I asked him his opinion: "All I can tell you, Hyndman, is that I -watched the man carefully throughout and he made a very bad impression -upon me indeed. The longer I looked at him the worse I felt about him. -I don't deny for a moment that his first trial was abominably conducted -and that he was entitled to fair play. I daresay I may be all wrong, -the weight of the evidence might have overborne me as a juryman. But, -as it was, I felt that if I myself had been one of the jury I should -have given a verdict against him. The man looked and spoke like a spy, -and if he isn't a spy," Henty went on in his impulsive way, "I'll -be damned if he oughtn't to be one." That, of course, is simply the -statement of an impressionable Englishman, who, however, understood -what was going on. - -The other anti-Dreyfusard was a very different personality. It was the -famous German Social-Democrat Wilhelm Liebknecht. I knew him well. -A man of a cooler temper or a more judicial mind I never met. As I -have mentioned elsewhere, he and Jaurès, the great French Socialist -leader and orator, were staying with me together in Queen Anne's -Gate, just after the Rennes Court Martial. Jaurès had done immense -service in the Dreyfus matter, second only to that of Clemenceau. He -had studied the evidence thoroughly on both sides. Like Clemenceau, -he had been forced to the conclusion that such methods of defence -would never have been used, unless they had been necessary to cover -up the unjust condemnation of an innocent man, who was known to his -judges to _be_ innocent shortly after he had been shipped off to his -place of punishment. Jaurès's articles in _La Petite République_ had -helped Dreyfus greatly in one way, though in another they told against -him, as the Socialists themselves were unfairly charged with being -anti-patriots and even in German pay. There seemed no possibility -that he could be mistaken. Liebknecht was just as strong on the other -side. He was confident that Dreyfus was a traitor. One of his main -contentions rested on the statement that there existed an honourable -understanding, never broken under any circumstances, between civilised -Governments that, should a man be wrongfully accused of being a spy and -be brought to trial for that offence, the foreign Government which he -was supposed to be serving should notify the other Government concerned -that it had got hold of the wrong man. Now the German Government -had never done this in any way, at any period of the Dreyfus affair. -Of this Liebknecht affirmed he was absolutely certain. Statements as -to Dreyfus's innocence had been made by German military officers; -but the German Government itself, which knew everything, had never -moved. Therefore, urged Liebknecht, Dreyfus was a spy. But the German -Socialist leader gave his own view too. "Have either of you," he asked -Jaurès and myself, "read carefully through the verbatim report of the -re-trial at Rennes?" I admitted I had not. Jaurès said he had. "Well," -Liebknecht went on, "I was where I was in a position to read the whole -of the pleading and the evidence day by day and word by word. For I was -in prison the whole of the time, and the study of the verbatim report -was my daily avocation. I am as certain as I can be of anything of the -kind that Dreyfus had disclosed secrets to our Government. He may have -done so in order to secure more important information in return. That -is possible. But communicate French secrets to Germany, in my opinion, -he unquestionably did." - -We debated the matter fully several times. Nothing Jaurès or I could -say shook Liebknecht's conviction. Nor was it shaken to the day of -his death. I have heard since, on good authority, that more than one -of those who had risked much for Dreyfus never spoke to him again -after the Rennes re-trial. That may easily have arisen from personal -causes, for Dreyfus was not an agreeable man. But I have no ground for -believing that Clemenceau ever saw reason to waver in his opinion in -the slightest degree. - -I recall this now, when the lapse of years has calmed down all -excitement and many of the chief actors are dead, to show how, apart -from the mass of sheer prejudice and unscrupulous rascality which -had to be faced and overcome, there was also an element of honest -intellectual doubt among the anti-Dreyfusards. The presence of this -element in the background made Clemenceau's task more difficult than it -would otherwise have been. Even at the present time there may be found -capable observers who lived through the whole conflict, certainly -not sympathetic to militarism, Catholicism or anti-Semitism, who are -still ready to argue that Dreyfus may have been ill-used but that he -deserved the fate to which he was originally condemned! This, however, -may be said with perfect truth, that the victory of his opponents over -Clemenceau, Jaurès, Zola and all they represented would have been a -disaster to France, whatever view may be taken of Dreyfus himself. - -In 1906 the first report of the Committee appointed to examine into the -whole of the Dreyfus case was presented. It exonerated Dreyfus from all -blame, declared him to have been the victim of a conspiracy based upon -perjury and forgery. This report secured the complete annulment of the -condemnation at Rennes and restored him to his position in the army, -after years of martyrdom. - - - - - CHAPTER XIV - - AS ADMINISTRATOR - - -At this time Clemenceau, owing to his apparently resolute determination -not to take office, no matter how many Ministries he might successfully -bring to naught, had got into a backwater. He had become permanently -Senator for the Department of the Var in 1902, a startling, almost -incomprehensible move when his continued furious opposition to that -body is remembered. However, having thus made unto himself friends of -the mammon of unrighteousness, he found their "eternal habitations" a -not unpleasing dwelling-place. His position as publicist and journalist -was assured and nothing could shake it; his criticisms by speech and -pen were as telling and vigorous as ever. But at sixty-five years of -age he was still a free-lance, a force which all parties were obliged -to consider but with which no Ministry could come to terms. It was a -strange position. So his countrymen thought. Those who most admired -his ability and his career saw no outlet for his marvellous energy -that would be permanently beneficial to the country in a constructive -sense. Perhaps no politician of any nation ever so persistently refused -to "range himself" as did Clemenceau for thirty-five years of stormy -public life. He revelled in opposition: he rejoiced in overthrow. He -was on the side of the people, but he would not help them to realise -their aspirations in practical life. He was a political philosopher -compact of incompatibilities. As an individualist he was a stalwart -champion of individual freedom: as a man of affairs he advocated the -use of State power to limit the anarchic domination of personal power. - -There was no understanding such a man. He would remain a brilliant -Frenchman of whom all were proud until the end, when he would be buried -with public honours as the champion Ishmaelite of his age. "When -I saw he doubted about everything, I decided that I needed nobody -to keep me ignorant," wrote Voltaire. Much the same idea prevailed -about Clemenceau. He was the universal sceptic: the man whose sole -intellectual enjoyment was to point out the limitless incapacity of -others with epigrammatic zeal. I myself, who had watched him closely, -was afraid that he would allow all opportunities for displaying his -really great faculties in a ministerial capacity to slip by and leave -to his friends only the mournful task of writing his epitaph: "Here -lies Clemenceau the destroyer who could have been a creator." - -But this was all nonsense. "_Ce jeune homme_"--Clemenceau will die -young--"_d'un si beau passé_" had also before him _un bel avenir_. -Nothing is certain with Clemenceau but the unforeseen. At the very -time when people had made up their minds that he was a back number, he -had a brand-new volume of his adventures ready for the press. After a -few conversations with M. Rouvier and then with M. Sarrien, he became -Minister of the Interior in the latter's Cabinet. He took office for -the first time on March 12th, 1906, at a very stirring epoch. - -It is difficult to exaggerate the impression produced by this step -on the part of M. Clemenceau. His accession to M. Sarrien's Cabinet -eclipsed in interest every other political event. Here was the great -political leader and organiser of opposition, the Radical of Radicals, -the man who had declined the challenge alike of friends and of enemies -to take office, time after time, at last seated in a ministerial chair. -All his past rose up around him. The destroyer of opportunism: the Guy -Earl of Warwick of ministries: the universal critic; the immolator -of Jules Perry and many another statesman; the one Frenchman who had -maintained the ideals of the French Revolution against all comers--this -terrible champion of democracy _à outrance_ now placed himself in the -official hierarchy, whence he had so often ousted others. His victims -of yesterday could be his critics of to-day. How would this terrible -upsetter of Cabinets act as a Minister himself? That was what all the -world waited with impatience to see. They had not days, but only hours -to wait. - -That was the time when, M. Delcassé having been forced to resign -from the Foreign Office, almost, it may be said, at the dictation of -Germany, the Morocco affair was still in a very dangerous condition, -threatening the peace of France and of Europe. But even the critical -negotiations at Algeciras were for the moment overshadowed by a -terrific colliery disaster in the Courrières-Lens district, causing -the death of more miners than had ever been killed before by a similar -catastrophe. This horrible incident occurred but a few days before -Clemenceau became Minister of the Interior, and it fell within the -immediate sphere of his official duties. - -The mines where the accident occurred had long been regarded as very -dangerous, fire-damp being known to pervade them from time to time, -and the miners throughout the coal regions had long held that the -owners had never taken proper precautions to ensure the safety of the -men. They went down the pits day after day, not only to work on very -difficult and narrow seams, but at the hourly risk of their lives. -Owing to the great social and political influence of the mine-owners -it was practically impossible to get anything done, and the general -treatment of the men employed was worse than is usual even in those -districts in our own and other countries where coal magnates are -masters. The pitmen under such conditions were less cared for and more -harshly treated than animals, probably because they were less costly -and could be more easily replaced. - -Three days before the main explosion there had been an outburst of -fire-damp at a small adjacent mine, whose workings were in direct -communication with the larger pits. This alone ought to have been taken -as a serious warning to the engineers in control. But markets were -good, coal was in great demand, the "hands" were there to take risks. -So this minor difficulty was dealt with in a cheap and convenient -way, and the extraction of coal went on upon a large scale from the -imperilled shafts as it did before. Meanwhile the dangerous gases were -all the time oozing in from the smaller pit to the larger ones. For -three days this went steadily on, and nothing whatever was done, either -in the way of taking further precautions where the original danger -began, or of testing the character of the air in the bigger mines to -which the other pit had access. - -On Saturday, March 10th, no fewer than 1,800 men went down the shafts -into the mines. A full account of what actually took place could never -be given. All that was learned from the survivors was that the miners -working with bare lights in these dangerous pits suddenly encountered -an influx of fire-damp. Explosion after explosion took place. The -unfortunate men below, threatened at once with suffocation or being -burned alive, rushed in headlong disorder for the cages which would -lift them to the surface. Horrible scenes inevitably took place. Those -in front were pressed on by those behind, who, as one of them expressed -it, were breathing burning air. For the majority there was and there -could be no hope. Out of the 1,800 miners who went down in the morning, -more than 1,150 were either stifled by the gas or burnt alive. The -heroism displayed by the pitmen themselves, in their partially -successful endeavours to rescue their entombed comrades, was the only -bright feature in the whole of this frightful disaster. Some of these -fine fellows went down to what seemed certain death, and others worked -at excavation until almost dead themselves in their efforts to save a -few from the general fate. No wonder that the feeling throughout the -neighbourhood was desperately bitter. - -The war, sad to say, has much modified our general conception of -the value of human life, even when unnecessarily thrown away. But -sacrifices for a great cause on the battlefield or on the ocean, -however serious, are made as a rule for high ideals. They differ widely -from the loss of life deliberately occasioned by capitalist neglect or -greed. Thus a mining accident on a large scale, or a conflagration -in a peaceful city, produces a stronger impression on the public mind -than the loss of ten or twenty times the number of soldiers or sailors -in a world-wide struggle. Among the widows and children and relations -and comrades of the victims on the spot the exasperation against the -employers was still greater. Class hatred and personal hatred were -excited to a very high pitch. - -This was the more natural for two reasons. First, the company on whose -property the immolation of so many pitmen had occurred, and to whose -mismanagement and cold-blooded indifference the avoidable explosions -were due, had made enormous, almost incredible profits. From dividends -of fifty per cent. in 1863 their returns had risen to profits of 1,000 -per cent. in 1905. Yet they could not spare the comparatively small sum -necessary to safeguard the lives of the men who obtained this wealth -for the shareholders. Secondly, the Germans, who rendered assistance -in the attempts to rescue the Frenchmen still in the workings below, -openly proclaimed that it was quite impossible--as indeed was the -truth--that such an accident on such a scale should have occurred in -Germany. That the Empire in Germany should be far more careful of -the lives and limbs of the miners than the Republic in France, and -that huge profits should have been made still huger by the refusal of -the French coal-owners to adopt the ordinary precautions enforced by -law on the other side of the frontier--these considerations, driven -home by the results of the great catastrophe, rendered the situation -exceedingly perilous from every point of view. A strike for increased -wages seemed a very poor outcome of the horrors inflicted upon the -actual producers of the coal under such conditions. - -Clemenceau was perhaps the best man in the country to deal with the -miners at such a juncture. A Socialist of mining experience would -possibly have taken more decidedly the side of the men, but he would -not have been able to carry with him to the same extent the support of -the Chambers. And Clemenceau had gone very far already on collectivist -lines. Not many years before, in an article on "The Right to Strike," -he had put the case of the men very strongly indeed. In a vehement -protest against the theory of supply and demand, as applied to the -human beings compelled to sell labour power as a commodity, and the -political economy of the profiteers based upon subsistence wages -for the workers--all being for the best in the best of possible -worlds--Clemenceau set forth how the system worked in practice:-- - -"The State _gives_ to some sleek, well-set-up bourgeois immense -coal-fields below ground. These fine fellows turn to men less well -dressed than themselves, but who are men all the same, men with the -same wants, the same feelings, the same capacity for enjoyment and -suffering, and say: 'We will grant you subsistence; sink us some pits -in the earth; go below and bring us up coal, which we will sell at a -good price.' - -"Agreed. The pits are sunk, the coal comes out of the earth. - -"But, observe, those comfortable bourgeois for their outlay of _five -hundred francs_ (£20) have now a bit of paper which is worth _forty -thousand francs_ (£1,600). - -"The miners, who watch what is going on, think this a good deal, and, -as they have got nothing by way of profit, they protest and ask for a -share. - -"'That, my friend, is impossible. The price of coal has fallen this -year, the price of man must come down in proportion. All I could do for -you is to reduce your wages. You object to that. All right; down the -shaft you go: don't let us talk about it any more.' - -"But the men won't go down. - -"'You don't make money this year. All right. But when you made huge -profits, did you give us even the crumbs from your banquet?' - -"'I wasn't a shareholder then; it was my father.' - -"'_My_ father, like myself, was a miner. He died of consumption, his -lungs choked with coal-dust. Now it is my turn to cough and spit black. -And my wife, looking at her babes, asks herself whether I shall live -long enough for them to be old enough, before my death, to go down into -the mine which will kill them in turn. If I crack up too soon, misery, -ruin, beggary, wholesale wretchedness for wife and children.' - -"They don't come to terms. The strike begins. - -"Economists argue, to begin with, that the State has no right to -interfere in the relations between miners and mine-owners. The -mine-owner is at home on his own property. Certain securities for life -and limb may be demanded, nothing more. But no sooner does a strike -begin than the State, which five minutes ago had no right to interfere, -is called upon to bring in horse, foot and artillery on the side of the -coal-owners. Then the miners have no rights left, and the judges decide -against them on shameless pretexts and condemn them to prison, when -they cannot bear false witness in support of the police and military." - -Such were Clemenceau's views on the right to strike and the grievances -of the men, before he accepted the post of Minister of the Interior and -began to deal with the troublous state of things at Courrières-Lens, -where the terrible accident had occurred and a strike had been entered -upon, while the entire district was in a state of mind bordering upon -anarchist revolt. - -The first step he took was as bold and as remarkable an act as any -in the whole of his adventurous life. He went down at once to Lens -himself. Arrived there, he walked straight off, without any escort -whatever, to meet and confer with the committee of the miners -themselves. Courageous and honourable as this was, it failed at first -to impress the strike committee. This was natural enough. They were -lamenting the wholesale butchery of their comrades and were incensed -against the employers who, with hundreds upon hundreds of dead pitmen -below, would not deal fairly with the survivors. Clemenceau therefore -met with a very cool reception. But he was nothing daunted, and began -to address them. Gradually, he convinced the committee that he meant -fairly by the men, and that he had not come down, alone and unarmed as -he was, with any intention of suppressing the strike, but, so far as -he could, to see that they had the fairest of fair play, according to -their rights under the law. - -Thereupon, the committee agreed that Clemenceau should go with them -to speak to a mass meeting of the miners. It was a doubtful venture, -but Clemenceau went. In the course of his speech he reassured the men -upon the attitude of the Government as represented by himself. He -told them plainly: "You are entitled to strike. You will be protected -by the law in doing all which the law permits. Your rights are equal -to the rights of President or Ministers. But the rights of others -must not be attacked. The mines must not be destroyed. For the first -time, you will see no soldiers in the street during the strike. True, -soldiers have been placed in the mines, but solely to protect them, -not in any way to injure you. On the other hand, you must not resort -to violence yourselves. The strike can be carried on peacefully and -without interference. Respect the mines upon which you depend for your -livelihood." - -This was quite plain, and Clemenceau adhered to his own programme as -he had formulated it. But the difficulty was apparent from the first, -and it is a difficulty which must always recur when a great strike -is organised. If the State claims the right to intervene, in order -to protect the laws and liberties of those who wish to work for the -employers, in spite of the strike and the decisions of the strikers, -antagonism to such action is practically certain beforehand. For, -in this case, as the strikers say, the State is using the forces of -the military and the police in order to protect "blacklegs" who, by -offering their labour to the employers at such a time of acute class -war, act in the interests of the coal-owners and against the mass of -the workers. Socialists argue that the strikers are sound in their -contention, and that by assuring to non-strikers the right to work the -Government practically nullifies the right to strike. When, therefore, -in this typical Courrières case, the strikers as a whole remained out, -notwithstanding certain insufficient offers by the coal-owners, and a -minority of non-strikers claimed the help of the law, with support -of the State army, to weaken by their surrender the position of the -majority of their fellow-workers in the same industry, then the ethics -of the dispute between sections of the miners could not be so easily -determined as M. Clemenceau from his individualist training assumed. - -If the employers were in the wrong, as it appears they were, then to -call out the military to protect those miners who showed themselves -ready to make immediate terms with injustice was, however good the -intention, to take sides against the main body of the men. So it -seemed to these latter. When, therefore, the soldiers defended the -non-strikers, the strikers assailed the military, who had not attacked -them. Clemenceau accordingly decided that the strikers had broken the -law, as undoubtedly they had, by stoning and injuring the servants of -the State, who were upholding the law as it stood. The truth is that, -so long as these antagonistic sections exist among the working class, -and persist in fighting one another, it is practically impossible for -the State not to intervene in order to keep the peace. There may be -no sympathy with blacklegs, but the Minister of the Interior could -scarcely be blamed for protecting them against an infuriated mob, which -would probably have killed them, or for insisting upon the release of -those whom the strikers had seized. That the temper of the crowd had -become highly dangerous was apparent a little later, when the Socialist -Mayor was knocked down as he was trying to calm them. - -All this rendered M. Clemenceau's second and third visits to the scene -of class warfare far more stormy than the first. Owing to the horror -and hatred created by the avoidable holocaust in the Courrières mines, -and the further discovery that engineers appointed by the State had -played into the hands of the employers, the situation got worse from -day to day. The strike itself was not only an effort to get more wages, -but a declaration of hostility to the mine-owners, and those of the -miners' own class who showed any tenderness towards them, or were ready -to take work under them. Their own leaders and representatives had -no longer any influence with the men or control over them. M. Basly, -the deputy who acted throughout for the miners, had as little power -over the strikers as anybody else. The whole movement was taking an -anarchist turn. Also, agents were at work among them both from the -reactionary and the revolutionary side whose main object, for very -different reasons, was to foster disturbance and influence passion. -Foreign emissaries likewise were said to be at work. - -Clemenceau's task was therefore an exceedingly hard one. He had ever -in mind the old eighteenth-century watchword which, from his point of -view, is the foundation of the French Republic--Liberty, Equality and -Fraternity. And the greatest of these is liberty! He throughout forgot, -or overlooked, that, even according to his own pronouncements, liberty -in any real sense is impossible for the weaker--the majority who own no -property--against the stronger--"Les Plus Forts," the minority who own -all the property. This triune fetish Clemenceau, with all his keenness -of criticism, might be said to worship: yet to worship in a more or -less reasonable way. He could not shut his eyes to the truth that, for -men and women whose livelihood was at the mercy of capitalists, there -could be no real liberty, dominated as the workers were by their daily -compulsion to obtain the wherewithal for the necessaries of life. The -only way by which even partial justice could be secured, under the -system of payment of wages, was combination among the wage-earners. -Hence he recognises the liberty to strike. But he was equally -determined, as he puts it, to defend the liberty of those who would not -strike. It was logical: it was in harmony with the law; but it was a -virtual help to the employers none the less. - -On the occasion of his second visit he enforced his view in his usual -emphatic way. Three miners who would not join the strike were being -paraded through the town by the strikers with an insulting placard hung -around their necks: "_Nous sommes des poires cuites; des faux frères._" -Clemenceau insisted that they should be released, and succeeded in -freeing them. The very fact, however, that it was possible for the -strikers to act in this way, without protest, showed how small was the -minority and how strong the feeling against these claimants of the -liberty of taking the other side. Clemenceau likewise acted with vigour -against all who were guilty of any violence. But the strikes still -spread. - -Speaking at Lyons on May 3rd, he explained the difficulties of the -situation:--"My position is between the political demagogues of the -Church, the clericals and the reactionaries on one side, who tried -hard to hound on the troops I was forced to call in to fire upon -the strikers, who greatly provoked them. This the ecclesiastics and -restorationists did with the hope of fomenting a revolt against the -Republic--a revolt supported by certain military chiefs, inspired by -the clericals and their shameless lack of discipline." The Separation -of Church and State was being decided while all this was going on. -"Their object was to bring about a massacre in the interest of the -Catholic Church and the monarchy. This plot was frustrated. Butchery -was avoided. - -"On the other side, I am accused by the revolutionary Socialists of -indulging in brutal military oppression because I suppress anarchist -rioting. This though no striker was killed or wounded. I acted for -tranquillity, while the monarchists fostered disturbances. They wanted -a Government of the Republic which should rely for support solely -on the Right. The anarchists helped the monarchists, who had agents -throughout the perturbed districts, by denouncing the Republic and -excusing mob violence. Yet how stood the case? Was it I who organised -a campaign of panic? Was it I who was responsible for the original -explosion and strike? Was it I who brought about the state of things -which resulted in general disturbance and might have tended towards -another _coup d'état_? Nothing of the sort. I was suddenly called upon -to deal with unexpected troubles. I acted for the maintenance of the -Republic, and kept the peace under the law." - -By taking office at the time when he did it was at once apparent -that Clemenceau had brought himself into the full whirlpool of strike -difficulties which then arose. He was called upon to solve in everyday -life, as a man committed to a policy of justice to the workers, -problems which, at critical moments, are almost insoluble under the -capitalist system of wage-earning and production for profit. Has any -section of the community the right to hold up the life of a nation -or a great city in order to secure advantages for itself? At first -sight the answer would undoubtedly be "No." But if the conditions of -existence for those who act in this way are admittedly such as ought -not to continue in any civilised country, it is not possible to reply -so confidently in the negative. Neither can the "No" be repeated with -certainty when employers, or the State itself, are guilty of a direct -breach of faith towards the workers, unless, by ceasing to carry -out their duties, they actually imperil the welfare of the entire -collectivity of which they form a part. In short, all depends upon the -circumstances, which have to be considered most carefully in each case. -It fell to Clemenceau's lot to decide in what might almost be taken as -the test incident--the strike of the electrical engineers and workers -of Paris. - -There seems to be something in M. Clemenceau's horoscope which has -decreed that his career shall be diversified and rendered interesting -by a series of dramatic events. This strike of the electricians of -Paris was certainly one of them. - -Scene: Cabinet of the Minister of the Interior. The Minister, M. -Clemenceau, at work at his desk and dictating to his secretary. -Everything going on quite nicely. No sign of more than ordinary -pressure. Electric light functioning as usual for the benefit of the -Radical leader as well as for Parisians of every degree. Hey presto! -Darkness falls upon the bureau of the Minister. Very provoking. What -is the matter? Corridors and other bureaux suffering the like eclipse. -Evidently something wrong at the main. Candles obtained, lamps got out -from dusty cupboards, oil hunted up. Ancient forms of illumination -applied. Darkness thus made visible. Telephones set going. All Paris -obscured. A city of two or three millions of inhabitants suddenly -deprived of light. What has happened? The entire electrical service -disorganised until to-morrow by the sudden and unexpected strike of the -whole of the skilled men in the electrical supply department. Lovers -of darkness because their deeds are evil likely to have a good time. -Business arrested, fathers and mothers of families perturbed. Dangers -of every sort threatened. Apaches and other cut-throats preparing for -action in the to them providential enactment of endless gloom. - -Such is the baleful news borne over the telephone wires to the much -troubled Minister of the Interior, with his wax tapers and old-world -lamps glimmering around him. How preserve his Paris, his _ville -lumière_, from the depredations of the miscreants engendered by the -social system of the day, when light fails to disclose their approach? -How protect the savings of the conscientious bourgeois and the diamonds -of the high-placed _horizontale_ from removal and conveyance under -cover of the night? To surrender to the strikers is to admit their -right as a few to blackmail the many. It is to sanctify the action of -the despoiling minority above by giving way to the organised minority -below. Immediate decision is essential. Night is upon us, when no man -can work, save the man who communises movable property to his own use. -Light is a necessary of security for property, nay, even for life. The -State must come in to fulfil the functions which the Creator neglected -to provide for when He divided the night from the day. The sapper is -the man to supplement the deficiencies of Providence and to mitigate -the social revolution by electrical engineers. _Rien n'est sacré pour -un sapeur!_ No sooner thought of but acted upon. M. Clemenceau, as -Minister of the Interior and trustee for the well-being of the citizens -of Paris, calls upon the State engineers under military control to -light up Paris afresh. The thing is done. Paris sees more clearly and -breathes more freely. Society itself has the right to live. - -But stay a moment: here is M. Jaurès. He has a word to say. What are -you doing, M. Clemenceau? You are outraging all your own principles. -You are interfering with that very right to strike which you yourself -have declared to be sacred. You are using the military discipline of -the comrades of the men out on strike against the electrical companies, -to render their protest nugatory, by employing the sappers against -them. You have, in fact, called out the powers of the State to crush -the workers in a particular industry. If you were true to yourself, -you would convert the electrical supply of Paris now in the hands of -greedy monopolists into a public service, and give the strikers every -satisfaction. That is the only real solution of social anarchy. - -To him Clemenceau: "But this was not merely a strike or a limited -liability class war against employers. It was a bitter fight between -two irreconcilable antagonists against inoffensive passers-by. The -people of Paris, for whom I am concerned, had nothing to do with the -matter. I myself knew nothing about the decision to strike till my own -work was rendered impossible by the sudden infliction of darkness upon -me by these resuscitated Joshuas. Not only was the general security -threatened, as I have declared, but the lives of your own clients, -Jaurès, were threatened by immersion in a flood below ground. The -inundation of the Metropolitan (the Underground Railway) had already -begun. The workers of Paris who used that means of communication in -order to return to their work would most certainty have been drowned -owing to the suspension of electrical pumps and lifts, had not the -sappers and the firemen, both of them sets of public functionaries, -rushed at once to the rescue. Were the workmen of Paris engaged in -other departments to be allowed to perish, with the State standing -by, wringing its hands in hopeless ineptitude, while the electrical -engineers got the better of their masters in a dispute about wages? -This was a practical question which I had to decide at once. I decided -in favour of the inoffensive people of Paris and against the electrical -engineers on strike." - -Taking a wide view of the whole question, I hold Jaurès's opinion -to be the right one. But Clemenceau had to deal with an immediate -practical difficulty of a very serious kind indeed. The lights went -out at six o'clock. Night was coming on. No time could be lost in -negotiating with the engineers. Still less was nightfall the period -when a public service could be instituted in hot haste. The matter -was settled in that form and for that occasion. But none the less -the real point at issue was not thus easily disposed of. Clemenceau -was right in preventing Paris from being left all night in darkness. -Jaurès was right in claiming that the State should have a more definite -and consistent policy than that of dealing with differences between -wage-earners and employers by such hand-to-mouth methods. - -It was just at this point that, notwithstanding all adverse criticisms -in regard to the instability of Ministries, and the scenes of apparent -disorder which sometimes arise, the French National Assembly displayed -its immense superiority to the Parliaments of other countries when -serious matters of principle were involved. The desire to get to the -bottom of a really dangerous question, to hear the arguments on both -sides taken, as far as possible, out of the narrow limits of personal -or party politics, puts the French Assembly on a very high level. -From the point of view of economic development France is far behind -Great Britain, America and Germany. The great factory industry and the -legislation growing out of it are not nearly so far advanced. But, in -the wish and endeavour to investigate the principles upon which the -future regulation of society must proceed, France gives the lead. - -This openness of mind and anxiety to let both views have fair play -have grown under the Republic in a wonderful way. Where else in the -world would men of all parties and all sections allow the two chief -orators of the Left--Jaurès, the Socialist leader of the opposition, -Clemenceau, the Individualist Minister--to debate out at length, -in two long sittings, the issues between genuine Socialism and -that nondescript reformist Collectivism which goes by the name of -Socialistic Radicalism: the latter really meaning, to Socialists, -capitalism palliated by State bureaucracy. - -This was indeed a great oratorical duel, and those who contend that -oratory has lost its significance and virtue in modern times would -have to admit that they were wrong, not only in this particular case, -but in regard to other speeches delivered by the two chief disputants -afterwards. The debate itself was a contrast between styles just as it -was a conflict of principles. Jaurès was an orator of great power and -wonderful capacity for stirring the emotions. His voice, his face, his -gestures, his method of argument and fusing of forcible contentions -into one compact whole made so great an impression that he could -capture a large audience with the same ease, even on subjects remote -from the immediate matter of his address--as once he held the Assembly -entranced by a long digression on music in the course of a fine speech -on the tendencies of the time. - -If it might be urged that he occasionally used too many words to -express his meaning, this was easily forgiven by his countrymen, on -account of his admirable turn of phrase and his understanding use of -the modulations of the French language. However prejudiced his hearers -might be against him (and his personal appearance was not such as to -disarm an opponent), they had only to listen to Jaurès for ten minutes -to feel interested in what he had to say. From this to admiration and -excitement was no long step. Short, stout and somewhat cumbrous in -figure, wearing trousers nearly halfway up his calves, with a broad, -humorous, rather coarse face, his eyes full of expression and not -wanting in fun, troubled with a curious twitching on the right cheek -which affected his eye with a sort of wink, Jaurès was certainly not -the personality anyone would have fixed upon as the greatest master -of idealist and economic Socialist oratory in France, and perhaps -in Europe. But his sincerity, his eloquence soon overcame these -drawbacks on the platform and in the tribune, just as his bonhomie -and good-fellowship did in private life. He had been a Professor -of Literature in the University of Toulouse, and was a man of wide -cultivation. But his learning never made him pedantic, nor did his -great success turn his head. Gifted with extraordinary vitality, his -powers of work were quite phenomenal. To say that he "toiled like -a galley-slave," for the cause to which he devoted himself, was no -exaggeration. Yet he was always fresh, always in good spirits, always -ready to contribute wit and vivacity to any company in which he found -himself. Add to this much practical good sense in the conduct of his -party and the affairs of the world, and all must admit that in Jaurès -the Socialist party of France had a worthy chief and Clemenceau a -worthy antagonist. The galleries, like the Assembly itself, were always -crowded when either orator was expected to address the House. - -Jaurès dealt with the development of society from the chaos of -conflicting classes and mutual antagonisms to the co-ordination of -common effort for the common good. This can and should be a peaceful -social evolution. Property for all means a universal share, not only in -politics, but in the production and the distribution of wealth. This -could not be obtained under the conditions of to-day, where those who -possessed no property but the labour in their bodies were at the mercy -of the classes who possessed all else; where only by strikes in which -the State took the side of the employers could the wage-earners obtain -an infinitesimal portion of their rights. By collectivism, leading up -to Socialism and general co-operation, every individual would have a -direct interest in and be benefited by the general social increase of -wealth, due to the growing powers of man to produce what is useful and -beneficial to all. - -Socialism substitutes order for anarchy, joint action of every member -of society for the mutual antagonism which is now the rule. Legal -expropriation with compensation will gradually put the community -in control of its own resources. Our task is to convince the small -proprietor and the small bourgeoisie that they will benefit by the -coming transformation. Incessant social reform on Socialist lines would -lead to the realisation of Socialist ideals in a practical shape. Such -strikes as that at Courrières, followed by the military intervention -of the State, at M. Clemenceau's direction, and repression of the -strikers, displayed the injustice of the existing system and proclaimed -the necessity for accepting the higher view of social duty by which all -would benefit and none would suffer. - -The speech thus briefly summarised was delivered at two sittings of the -Chamber, and was listened to with profound attention by those present, -the great majority of whom were directly opposed to Socialist views. No -higher tribute could have been paid. - -Clemenceau rose to reply to the Socialist leader a few days later. -Twenty years had passed over his head since I last described his -personal appearance, his vigorous individuality and his incisive, -clear-cut, witty conversation and oratory. Time had affected him -little. He was still the same energetic and determined but ordinarily -cool political fighter that he had shown himself in the eighties of -the last century. His head was now bald, and his moustache grey, but -his eyes looked out from under the heavy white eyebrows with all the -old fire, and the alertness of his frame was apparent in his every -movement. Though many years older than his Socialist challenger, there -was nothing to choose between them in regard to physical and mental -vigour. Jaurès had been eloquent and persuasive; he brought in the -ideals and the strategy of the future to illuminate the sad truths -of the present. He relied upon the history of the past and the hopes -of humanity ahead to constitute a policy of preparation for coming -generations of Frenchmen, while applying the principles he advocated, -as far as possible, to the events of the day. Clemenceau confined his -answer, which also extended over two sittings of the Chamber, to the -matters immediately in hand and the criticisms on his method of dealing -with them. This sense of practicality, not devoid of sympathy with the -disinherited classes of our day, gave the Minister of the Interior a -great advantage and precisely suited his style. The interval between -the two speeches also told in favour of Clemenceau. The ring of -Jaurès's fine sentences had died down in the meantime. His glorious -aspirations were discounted hour by hour by the continuance of the -conflict, whose existence he himself could not but admit, which formed, -in fact, part of his case, and in a way strengthened his indictment. -Yet this had to be dealt with all the same. - -Clemenceau began his oration with a glowing tribute to Jaurès's passion -for social justice. But his magnificent eloquence has eliminated the -whole of the bad side of life. He rises to the empyrean, whence he -surveys creation through a roseate atmosphere which is raised far above -plain facts. "For myself, I am compelled to remain in the valley where -all the events which Jaurès leaves out of his picture are actually -taking place. That accounts for the difference in our perspective. -I am accused of attacking the workers and of doing worse than other -Governments. I have never attacked the workers, I have never done -them wrong. The duty of the Government is to maintain tranquillity. -This I have done without injury to the toilers, though I had to face -85,000 strikers in the Pas de Calais and 115,000 in Paris--the largest -number ever known on strike at the same time in France. I went down to -Courrières to ensure liberty. We have all of us here to go through our -education in Liberty. Education is not a matter of words, but of deeds. -Those deeds form part of the education. The working classes become -worthy of taking over the responsibility of Government for themselves -when their own deeds are in accordance with the law. If speeches alone -could teach administration, the Sermon on the Mount would have dictated -practical politics for centuries. - -"In these disturbances my orders, issued through the highest police -authorities, were precise. Maintain, I said, Liberty to strike, liberty -to work. Soldiers to be called in only in case of actual violence. -But the miners themselves infringed the liberties of others. They -indulged in the anarchical wrecking of houses belonging to men of -their own class. I have here photographs of the destruction wrought. -Were Monsieur Jaurès Minister of the Interior--misfortune comes so -suddenly--he himself would send down troops to stop wholesale pillage. -Yet, if he did, he would in turn be denounced, by the anarchist heads -of the General Confederation of Labour, as the enemy of the class -whose cause he now champions. I challenge M. Jaurès to say what he -would do under such circumstances as I have had to face"--the orator -pauses and waits. There is dead silence. No answer. "By not replying, -you have replied. There have, I repeat, been no dead or wounded among -the working class. On May 1st, when general disorders were openly -threatened, I took precautions against organised outbreak. No trouble -arose." - -The Republic, he continued, was a rule of freedom for the individual, -so far as it could be secured under existing conditions. Those -conditions and the law itself might work injustice, but it was then -the duty of the State, and the Minister who had to translate its -functions into action, to mitigate such harshness by protecting the -weaker side. Soldiers had been sent down to Courrières not to attack -the strikers--no attack had been made upon them--but to prevent the -strikers themselves from destroying the mines and inflicting illegal -punishments upon those of their class who did not agree with them. When -this was done, the strikers molested the soldiers, who never fired a -shot. The lieutenant in command was assailed, though his sabre remained -all the time in its sheath. The right of men to work on terms they -themselves are willing to accept could not be contested as the law now -stood. "But, says M. Jaurès, by assuring non-strikers the right to -work, I myself am violating the right to strike, which I have declared -to be the inalienable privilege of the wage-earners. But then, I ask, -what are the non-strikers to do? They also have wives and children -who demand to be fed. What law justifies me in preventing them from -working? Republicanism means the right of the individual to combine -with others to resist oppression and obtain advantages. This freedom -is admitted. It does not include the freedom to oppress others, still -less to assault servants of the State, who are acting in order to -safeguard the law as it stands. When the Socialists of M. Jaurès's -school begin to deal with facts, and not with ideals at present all in -the air, what sort of programme do they formulate? - -"Here we have it. An eight-hours working day for all trades. The -right of State Employees to form Trade Unions and to strike. -Proportional Representation. A progressive Income Tax, and so on. A -nice little programme, but a bourgeois programme all the same. No -idealism, no Socialism there! M. Jaurès, however, claims the immediate -Nationalisation and Socialisation of all departments of industry, -including the land. But such unification of society is in reality the -Catholicisation of Society. There is a definite programme of Radical -Reforms, nevertheless, constituting an advance towards a Socialist -policy. They are formulated by the bourgeoisie, but Socialists threaten -to vote against the Budget, which is necessary in order to carry out -some of their own proposals. Take Old Age Pensions. These need money. -The Socialists refuse the required funds. Yet Socialists are for the -Republic. So far we cordially agree. So far I, of necessity, work -with them. But if they at the same time denounce Republicans as the -enemies of the workers and secure a majority of votes in that sense, -then that is to vote for the defeat of the Republic. If Socialists -would work with the Radicals, in order to attain the ends they have in -common, none would be more glad than I. But if such common action is -impossible, then let each work on in their own way." - -It was said at the time that at the close of the debate, when -Clemenceau was leaving the Assembly, he remarked to Jaurès, "After all, -Jaurès, you are not the good God." To which Jaurès replied: "And you -are not even the Devil." - -I have dealt with this famous controversy at some length, without -attempting to give the speeches in full, because, although the -discussion led to no decision at the moment, it certainly brought -before the public of France and even the public opinion of Europe -the direct theoretical and practical difference between Socialism and -well-meaning Radicalism, in an intelligible manner, as nothing else -would. The effect upon French politics within the next few months, in -spite of further desperate outbreaks in 1907, was also remarkable. -Jaurès's speech did much to consolidate the Socialist Party as a -unified section of the Chamber; and Clemenceau himself was so far -influenced by it and by the trend of events that, as will be seen, -it affected his policy as Prime Minister in the formation of his own -Cabinet shortly afterwards. Looking at the matter from the Socialist -point of view, therefore, Jaurès was building better than his opponents -in the Chamber knew, and Socialists had no reason to regret the -apparent victory of his formidable antagonist at the time. In fact, as -Bernard Shaw said in regard to a very different debate under widely -different circumstances in London more than thirty years before: "The -Socialist was playing at longer bowls than you know." - -It is this power of detachment, this recognition that theory and -sentiment play a great part in the moulding of public character and -public opinion, even in the practical affairs of everyday life, that -renders France--independent, idealist, revolutionist, conservative -and thrifty France--so essential a factor in the discussion of the -world-problems of to-day. France alone among the nations rises above -the smoke of class warfare; and though her own social and economic -conditions are not themselves ready for the definite solution of social -problems, she indicates the route which may be most safely followed -by countries more economically advanced. Both Jaurès and Clemenceau, -therefore, rendered good service to mankind when they used their utmost -efforts to place before the peoples and the students of all nations -the views of the Socialist, with his outlook on the future, and the -Radical, with his policy of the present based on the traditions of -the past. Jaurès, in the prime of his manhood and the fullness of -his fame, was torn from the useful and noble work which lay well -within his power and his intelligence by the murderous revolver of a -reactionary assassin: a loss indeed to his party, his country, and the -world at large! His antagonist, Clemenceau, still works on as nearly -an octogenarian, with all the vigour and energy of his fiery youth, -on behalf of that France, who, to-day, as for many a long year past, -has been the mistress and the goddess of the materialist democrat and -Radical champion of the people. - -On October 23rd, after six months of service as Minister of the -Interior, Clemenceau was called back from Carlsbad, whither he went -every year before the war to conjure attacks of gout (which might at -least, in all reason, have spared a lifelong teetotaller), in order -to form a Cabinet of his own in place of M. Sarrien. That Cabinet was -remarkable from many points of view. Comments upon its constitution -and significance may be reserved for a wider survey. Suffice it to say -here that Clemenceau himself, in addition to holding the Presidency of -the Council as Prime Minister, remained Minister of the Interior, thus -declaring his intention not to shirk any of the responsibility he had -taken upon himself or the animosity he had incurred in his dealings -with strikes and other social questions. - -France was passing through a very difficult period. Whatever view a -thoroughgoing Socialist may take as to the need for a wider general -policy than that adopted by Clemenceau, it is not easy to see how, the -French people being unprepared to accept a purely Labour or Socialist -Government, the Republic could have been peacefully maintained, but -for the cool determination of the Radical Republican at the head -of affairs. Scarcely a day passed without some fresh economic and -social conflicts that called for prompt action. These, however, arose -in provinces and cities and under conditions where the antagonism -between wage-earners and employers, between capital and labour, in -the ordinary way offered no exceptional features for the statesman. -But in the spring and summer of 1907 a more complicated and dangerous -uprising, which developed into little short of an attempt at an -Anarchist-communist, anti-Republican revolution, broke out in the South -of France among the wine-growers. - -The peasants of the districts round Narbonne and Montpellier, together -with many of the inhabitants of those towns, who were themselves -dependent upon the wine industry, made, in fact, a desperate local -attack upon the existing Government of France. Disaffection had -been growing for a long time and was due to a series of economic -and agricultural troubles among the wine-growers, which successive -Ministries had not understood, far less attempted to cope with. It had -its direct origin in a natural cause. This cause was the appearance in -the Bordeaux country of the deadly enemy of all _vignerons_, large and -small--the much-dreaded phylloxera. The vineyards of the Gironde were -devastated and the famous clarets shipped from Bordeaux ceased to be -the product of Bordeaux grapes. Thereupon the inferior vintages of the -Midi came into abnormal demand. But the wine-producers of the West were -not wholly defeated, even while the phylloxera continued his ravages -and no method of checking the mischief had been discovered. There are -ways and means of meeting even such a calamity. - -"Would your lordship like madeira served with that course?" said a -butler to a well-known bishop who was giving a dinner, in days long -before the war, to a number of his clergy. "Madeira!" was the reply, in -great surprise. "Why, I have not a single bottle in my cellar." "Oh, -yes, my lord, you have. _Monseigneur oublie peut-être que je suis de -Cette._" Madeira, so the story goes, was duly served. But Cette is not -the only town in France where the art of blending and refining wine -for foreign and even home palates has been brought to a high pitch. At -any rate, during the phylloxera period, Australian, Algerian, Spanish -and other wines, which previously had been regarded contemptuously by -foreign and French consumers of claret, were, it was alleged, imported -at Bordeaux in great quantity and came out again with the old familiar -Bordeaux labels and duly impressed corks. - -Thus adulteration, which John Bright declared was a legitimate form -of competition, made its appearance in a widely different industry -from his own, to the detriment, even thus early in the struggle, of -the legitimate growers of more acid but more genuine beverages in the -South. Adulteration became a war-cry among the peasants, who felt -themselves defrauded. Republicans of great commercial reputation and -high standing in finance were accused, rightly or wrongly, of being -deeply and profitably concerned in this nefarious traffic. That was -all bad enough. But, at last, a remedy for the vineyard plague was -discovered and widely used, with the aid of the Government, partly by -chemical applications to the vines, partly by bringing in new stocks -from without. Then followed exceptionally good vintages in the Bordeaux -country, while the adulteration, falsification, manipulation of other -wines with sugar and the like continued. Hence an abnormal glut of wine -of every degree, with a corresponding fall in price. - -The peasants, whose views of the admirable law of supply and demand -were very crude, only discovered that the more wine they produced the -less money could they get for it! To produce for the consumer, at a -loss to themselves, at once struck them as an unfair dispensation in -the order of the market, since it affected the sales of their wines. -Obviously, they said, the Government was to blame. How could they pay -taxes when wine was fetching a derisory price? Why should they borrow -to pay taxes when wine was fetching a derisory price? Let Government -take short order with the adulterators and big producers out there in -the West, who were preventing the hard-working toilers on the soil in -the South from disposing of their sole saleable product at a profit. -A Republic which couldn't protect the backbone of the nation, the -Southern wine-growers, to wit, was of no use to them. And the people -of the South, as M. Clemenceau knows very well, for he is Senator for -the Var, are a vivacious and an excitable folk. But their vivacity -and excitement had already been worked up to a high pitch by gradual -exasperation before M. Clemenceau himself took office. It was his hard -fate to meet the full fury of the storm as Premier of France. - -No trifling storm it was. The whole countryside, in the late spring and -summer, was aflame. Commune after commune, district after district, -took part in the agitation. Peasants and _prolétaires_ made common -cause against the authorities. Taxes should not be paid. Tax-gatherers -should appear at their peril. The Government was an unjust Government, -and should be defied. And it was so. Meetings were held in every town -and village. Capable representatives and leaders, of whom a M. Albert -was the chief, were chosen by the men themselves. Attempts to confer -with the people as a whole resulted in failure. The old story was told -again. The reactionaries of the Right took the side of the people, and -shouted against "adulteration," because they were victims of a chaotic -economic system, because also they objected to the use of troops, who -belonged to and were paid by the whole people, in order to maintain -that system in full vigour. What was to be done? Things got worse -and worse. The Minister of the Interior felt obliged to call out the -troops in order to prevent downright ruin being wrought in Narbonne, -Montpellier and St. Béziers. There were killed and wounded on both -sides. Hence a serious ministerial crisis was threatened which, as -matters stood, could scarcely fail to tell in favour of reaction and -against the only Republic then possible. - -The facts were beyond dispute. In consequence of the causes and results -summarised, the temper of the people became unmanageable. There were -terrible riots of a wholly anarchist character. The doors of public -buildings were soaked with kerosene and then set on fire. At Narbonne, -Montpellier and St. Béziers attacks were made on peaceful citizens -at dead of night by uncontrolled mobs of armed men recruited from -the worst members of the population. Soldiers on the spot refused to -fire in reply to revolver shots aimed at them. The provocations to -the troops, who were brought in solely to maintain order, were almost -intolerable, but they were borne with heroic calm. At first they fired -in the air. Then they fired in earnest, and there were killed and -wounded on both sides. Hence there was the greatest excitement in the -Chamber and unrest throughout Paris, where the wildest rumours were -spread. - -Everything pointed to a serious political upset when Clemenceau rose to -give an account of the circumstances and to defend the action of the -Government. This is, in brief, what he said: "I did my best to avoid -sending troops, and directed that they should not be used except in -case of absolute necessity. But can a Government allow a wine-growers' -committee to forbid the villagers to pay taxes? Can it quietly permit -tax-collectors to be molested when they arrive in the communes? Can -it look on with indifference while 300 mayors of communes declare -a general strike and hold up the entire business of the community? -Everywhere the committees of the wine-growers took upon themselves -to give their orders in place of the constituted authority, and were -obeyed. Soldiers who mutinied against their officers were applauded -and a large sum was raised for their compensation. No Government could -stand that. Citizens were bound to pay their taxes. No Minister can -deny that. I could have resigned. I do not want office. But I felt it -my duty to remain when the troops were attacked." - -After this speech the ministerial crisis ended. The difficulties on -the spot slowly calmed down, owing largely to the good sense and -loyalty to the Republic of M. Albert and other leaders of the men. But -the Socialists have never forgiven M. Clemenceau for calling in the -military at Courrières and Narbonne, and particularly for the bloodshed -at the latter town. This has been a great misfortune for both sides, -the rather that both could plead justification for the course they -took. The Socialists contended that the troubles arose in the North -and in the South from causes whose development the Government ought to -have watched and whose results it should have foreseen. The State ought -to have made ready, and introduced adequate legislation to encounter -and overcome these troubles by peaceful methods, which all governments -have, or ought to have, at their command. Clemenceau could and did -answer that he was in no wise to be held responsible personally for -outbreaks which had arisen from circumstances over which he had no -control, and that all he had to do was to prevent any mistakes that -had been made from leading to violent action that must harm innocent -persons and injure the Republic. The split between Radicals and -Socialists remains unbridged to this day. - -Yet in the Senate on more than one occasion in 1906 Clemenceau, -interrupting a speaker, declared: "I claim to be a Socialist!" And -again, "When I accepted the offer to form a Government I conceived -the idea of governing in a Socialist sense. Years ago I offered to -co-operate with M. Jules Guesde to carry Socialist measures on which -we mutually agreed." This has never been denied. It ought to have been -possible to come to terms on palliative measures at least. - -For the strike difficulties did not end in 1906 and 1907, nor did -Clemenceau change his policy in dealing with them. Non-strikers were -always to be protected against strikers: anything in the shape of -violence on the part of strikers, no matter how great the provocation, -was to be repressed by the forces of the State. Also civil servants, -being the servants of the State, were not to be allowed to combine -in trade unions against the State as employer. Still less could -Clemenceau allow them the right to strike against the State. They then -became, as he expressed it, "rebellious bureaucrats," allied with -those who would like to destroy "_la Patrie_." To them the amnesty -granted to the rebellious wine-growers and rural anarchists of the -South must be denied. Civil servants in revolt and the bigots of -anti-militarism--Hervé was at this time an ardent peace-at-any-price -man and fanatical anti-militarist--were guilty of a crime against their -country; and with such criminals the Government was engaged in battle. - -Once more an actual strike close to Paris gave point to all these -declarations, and put Clemenceau and his Government again at variance -with the Socialists by the acute difference of principle which was -then accentuated in practice. This was at Vigneux, when there was a -strike of the workers in the sand-pits. Clemenceau, who was still -Minister of the Interior as well as Prime Minister, used the gendarmes -to protect the non-strikers or blacklegs still working in the pits. As -a result, there was open conflict between the two sides. Two of the men -on strike were killed, and several of the gendarmes were injured. This -aroused great indignation against the Government among the organised -workers. They felt that the right to strike became illusory, if, at -any moment, the Ministry could turn the scale against the strikers, no -matter how great their grievances or how just their claims might be, by -bringing in the State to uphold the minority of the men in standing by -the masters. - -In practice, as has often been found in England, such intervention on -behalf of the blacklegs means that the strike may be broken in the -interest of the capitalists. The deputies of the places where the -strikes took place interviewed Clemenceau on the matter. It is clear -that the antagonism went very deep. In answer to a bitter attack -Clemenceau again defended his action in the Chamber. The question was -one not of mere opinion, but of justice. "When the workers are in -the wrong they must be told the truth about it. The Government will -never approve of anarchy." ("You are anarchy enthroned yourself," -cried Jaurès.) "My programme is Social Reform under the law against -grievances, and Social Order under the law against the revolutionists." -Finally, the National Assembly passed a vote of confidence in -Clemenceau as against the Socialists. That, of course, was to be -expected. - -I have given a fairly detailed account of these affrays--they were no -less--between Clemenceau and the Socialists because they are of great -importance, not only as explaining the vehement hostility which has -since existed between them, but because the points at issue affect -every civilised country to a greater or less degree. Capital and -labour, capitalists and wage-earners, are at variance everywhere. Their -antagonism can no more be averted or bridged over than could the class -struggle between land and slave-owners and their chattel slaves, or -the nobles and their serfs. Only the slow process of social evolution -leading up to revolution can solve the problem. Meanwhile, combination -on the one side is met by combination on the other. Outside political -action, which is ineffective until the workers themselves understand -how to use it, there is no weapon for the wage-earners or wage-slaves -but the strike. They suffer, even when they win, far more than the -capitalists or employers, who are only deprived of the right to make -profits out of their hands, while those same hands are undergoing the -pangs of hunger and every sort of privation, not only for themselves -but for their wives and children. - -Arbitration, when the social conditions have reached the stage where -this is feasible, may postpone the crucial battle and smooth over the -matter temporarily; but it can do no more than that. A step towards -this arbitration was made under M. Millerand's measure declaring -strikes illegal unless decreed by a majority of the employees upon -a referendum, and the enactment of an arbitration clause. But when -strikes actually take place and the men's blood is up, then comes the -real tug-of-war. - -Should the State--obviously the capitalist State to-day--interfere to -keep order and maintain the right to work for non-strikers, or should -it refrain from interference altogether? When Jaurès and the Socialists -were challenged to say what they would do under the circumstances, -they failed to answer, as already recorded. This put them in a weak -position. An opposition must have a policy which it would be prepared -to act upon if it took office. Socialism, however desirable, could -not be realised all at once. But it was open to Clemenceau, as to any -other Minister entrusted with full powers by the State, _to bring at -least as much pressure to bear upon the capitalists and employers -as upon the strikers_, and to insist that they should yield to the -demands of the men and continue to work the mines, out of which, by the -purchase of the labour-power of the pitmen, they had derived such huge -profits. This course was not adopted by the Minister of the Interior, -nor does it seem to have been demanded by Jaurès. The troubles in the -wine districts arose from different economic causes, and had to be -dealt with in a different way. But the truth is that, in periods of -transition, no Government can go right. It was Clemenceau's lot to have -to govern at such a period of transition. - - - - - CHAPTER XV - - STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF CLEMENCEAU - - -Strikes and anarchist troubles, however, formidable as they were in the -North and in the South, were by no means the only serious difficulties -which Clemenceau had to cope with, first as Minister of the Interior -and then as Premier. The danger from Germany, as he well knew, was -ever present. Anxious as France was to avoid misunderstandings which -might easily lead to war, eager as the Radical leader might be to -enlarge upon the folly and wickedness of strife between two contiguous -civilised peoples, who could do so much for one another, it was always -possible for the German Government to put the Republic in such a -position that the alternative of humiliation or hostilities must be -faced. Less than a year before Clemenceau accepted office, the German -Kaiser himself had taken a most provocative step in Morocco, the object -of which can now be clearly seen. Germany had no real interests in -Morocco worthy of the name. Several years later the German Minister of -Foreign Affairs pooh-poohed the idea that Germany, distant from Morocco -as she was, with only 200 Germans in the country, and not more than -£200,000 worth of yearly commerce, all told, with the inhabitants, -could be concerned about political matters in that Mohammedan kingdom. - -With France the case was very different. Algeria was adjacent to the -territories of the Sultan of Morocco, and, if the wild tribes on the -frontier were stirred up against the infidel, the most important French -colony was threatened with serious disturbance. It was all-important -for France, therefore, that there should be a government at Fez strong -enough and enlightened enough to keep peace on the border. Clemenceau, -who had always been so stern an opponent of colonial adventures, and -had overthrown several Cabinets which he considered were prone to -encourage harmful exploits, had himself spoken out very plainly about -Morocco. Long before capitalist interests were involved on any large -scale the French ownership of Algeria necessitated a definite Moroccan -policy. This again brought with it the obligation of constant pressure -upon the Sultan to induce him to consider French interests. These -interests could be harmonised with those of Spain and Great Britain, -and were so settled by special agreements in April, 1904, just a year -before the German Emperor's _coup de théâtre_ startled the world. -France's special interests in Morocco were thus recognised all round, -and Germany, far from raising any objection, expressly disclaimed any -desire to interfere, so long as "the open door" was left for German -goods. But the general antagonism between France and Germany was a -matter of common knowledge. - -It was natural, therefore, that the Sultan of Morocco, alarmed lest -French attempts to introduce "order" and "good government" into his -realm might end, as it had always done elsewhere, by destroying his -independence, should appeal to the Kaiser, who had proclaimed his -sympathy for the Moslem, to help him against the less sympathetic -infidel. For a long time these appeals fell upon deaf ears. Even when -the Kaiser visited Gibraltar, after an interview with the King of -Spain, he refused pressing invitations to cross the Straits and meet -envoys of the Moroccan potentate at Tangier. This was in March, 1904. -But in March, 1905, when everything looked peaceful, the Kaiser went to -Tangier in the _Hohenzollern_, landed with an imposing suite, met the -uncle of the Sultan, who came as a special envoy to the German Emperor, -and addressed him in the following terms:-- - -"I am to-day paying my visit to the Sultan in his quality of -independent sovereign. I hope that under the sovereignty of the Sultan -a free Morocco will remain open to the peaceful competition of all -nations, without monopoly and without annexation, on the footing of -absolute equality. The object of my visit to Tangier is to make known -that I have decided to do all in my power to effectually safeguard -the interests of Germany in Morocco. Since I consider the Sultan an -absolutely free sovereign, it is with him that I desire to come to an -understanding on suitable measures for safeguarding these interests. As -to the reforms that the Sultan intends to make, it seems to me that he -must proceed with much caution, having regard to the religious feelings -of the population, so that public order may not be disturbed." - -Such was the declaration of the German Emperor. What gave special -point to his address was the fact that at that very moment a French -delegation was at the capital, Fez, in order to obtain necessary -reforms from the Sultan, and was meeting week after week the most -obstinate resistance from him and his Government. It was obviously open -support of the Sultan in his refusal to accept French representations, -and a declaration of hostility to France on the part of the Kaiser. -Nothing more arrogant or offensive can well be imagined. France, from -the Socialist point of view, was wrong in her attempt to instruct the -Sultan how to deal with a state of things which undoubtedly threatened -the peace of Algeria, but the Kaiser's intervention after such a -fashion was wholly unwarrantable, and threatened the peace of the world. - -What was the meaning of this extraordinary display of Imperial -diplomacy and Prussian direct action? There were statesmen--Sir Charles -Dilke was one--who believed that the German Emperor was really devoted -to peace, and that no war could take place in Europe so long as he -lived. There was a general feeling in England to the same effect, -largely engineered by Lord Haldane and others of like nature, whose -spiritual or political home was in Germany. But all can see now that -this was an illusion. The only difference between the Kaiser and the -most aggressive and bloodthirsty Junker or pan-German was as to the -time and season when the tremendous Central European and partially -Mohammedan combination that he had formed should commence the attack. -William II wished to wait until the road had been so completely -prepared for the aggressive advance that victory on every side would -be practically certain. The Junker party, with which the Crown Prince -identified himself, were in a hurry, and the Emperor could only keep -them in good humour by these periodical outbursts which enabled him to -pose as the dictator of Europe. - -All through, the Kaiser's real ambition was that which he occasionally -disclosed in a well-known drawing-room in Berlin. He would not die -happy unless he had ridden at the head of the Teutonic armies as the -Charlemagne of modern Europe. But this megalomania was only indulged -in with his intimates. Elsewhere he stood forth as the rival of his -uncle as the Prince of Peace. According to him, therefore, it was M. -Delcassé who forced him to act in this peremptory way at Tangier; and -efforts were made to convince all the Governments in Europe that the -French Minister of Foreign Affairs had tried to boycott Germany out -of Morocco. France, rather than take up the challenge, got rid of M. -Delcassé. Thus the Emperor displayed his power for the appeasement of -his Junkers, established a permanent source of difficulty on the flank -of France, and gave the Mohammedan world to understand once more that -Germany, not England, was the champion of Islam. - -Meanwhile, German political, financial and commercial influence of -every kind was making astounding advances, not only in France itself, -but also in every country that might at the critical moment be able -to help either France or Russia; while German armaments, military and -naval, and German alliances for war were being worked up to the point -which, if carried on for ten, or perhaps even for five years more, -would have rendered the German power almost, if not quite, irresistible -by any combination that could have been made in time against it. The -Kaiser, in short, was playing a successful game of world-peace in -order to make sure of playing at the right moment a successful game -of world-war. Desperate as the conflict has been, it may have been -fortunate for mankind that the Junkers, his son and the General Staff -forced the Emperor's hand. - -When, consequently, Clemenceau took the lead in French affairs, he -soon found that the sacrifice of M. Delcassé, the friend of Edward -VII, to the pretended German injury had been made in vain. There was -no intention whatever, either then or later, of coming to a really -permanent settlement of outstanding grievances against France, although -the position in Morocco was eventually used to gain great advantages in -other parts of Africa. Germany was, in fact, a permanent menace to the -peace of Europe and the world; but those who said so, and adduced plain -facts to justify their contentions, were unfortunately denounced both -by capitalists and Socialists in every country as fomenters of war. -This insidious propaganda, which tended to the advantage of Germany in -every respect, was already going on in 1906, when M. Clemenceau joined -M. Sarrien's Cabinet, and when he formed a Cabinet of his own. This was -publicly recognised. - -This is what M. Clemenceau said at Hyères, after some furious attacks -had been made upon France in the German official newspapers; no German -newspapers being allowed to print comments on foreign affairs without -the consent of the Foreign Office: "No peace is possible without -force. When I took office I myself was persuaded that all European -nations were of one mind in wishing for peace. But almost immediately, -without any provocation whatever from us, a storm of calumny and -misrepresentation broke out upon us, and we were compelled to ask -ourselves, 'Are we prepared?'" - -On October 23rd of the same year, M. Sarrien resigned, and M. -Clemenceau formed his Cabinet. It comprised, among others, Messrs. -Pichon (Foreign Affairs), Caillaux (Finance), Colonel Picquart (War), -Briand (Justice and Education), Viviani (Labour), and Donmergue -(Commerce). A more peaceful Cabinet could hardly be. M. Pichon, who -took the place from which M. Delcassé had been forced to resign -because he too strongly opposed German influence in Morocco and -refused a European Conference on the subject as wholly unnecessary, -was an old friend and co-worker with Clemenceau on _La Justice_, and -had gone into diplomacy at Clemenceau's suggestion. He had since held -positions in the East and in Tunis, and he and Clemenceau were believed -to be entirely at one in abjuring all adventurous colonial policy. M. -Caillaux, at the head of the Department of Finance--people are apt to -forget that M. Caillaux, now in gaol under serious accusation, was -thus trusted by Clemenceau--was certainly not opposed to Germany, but -even at that time was favourable to a close understanding with that -power. Colonel Picquart, who now received his reward for having, though -personally an anti-Semite, destroyed all his own professional prospects -in his zeal to obtain justice for the Jew Dreyfus, was certainly as -pacific a War Minister as could have been appointed. But what was more -significant still, M. Briand, himself a Socialist, and the hero of the -great inquiry into the separation of Church and State which had now -become inevitable, was placed in a position to carry that important -measure to its final vote and settlement; and M. Viviani, likewise a -Socialist, became head of the new department, the Ministry of Labour. -When I saw these two men, Briand, whom I remembered well as a vehement -anarchist, and Viviani, who was a vigorous Socialist speaker and -writer, in the Cabinet of which Clemenceau was the chief, I could not -but recall the conversation I had with the French Premier sixteen years -before. - -Seated comfortably in his delightful library, surrounded by splendid -Japanese works of art, of which at that time he was an ardent -collector, M. Clemenceau had spoken very freely indeed. Of course, he -knew quite well that I was no mere interviewer for Press purposes, -and, indeed, I have always made it a rule to keep such conversations, -except perhaps for permitted indiscretions here and there, entirely -to myself. There is no need for me to enlarge upon his quick and -almost abrupt delivery, his apt remarks and illustrations, his bright, -clever, vigorous face and gestures. I put it to him that Socialism was -the basis of the coming political party in France and that, vehement -individualist as he might be himself, it was impossible for him to -resist permanently the current of the time, or to remain merely a -supremely powerful critic and organiser of overthrow. Sooner or later -he must succumb to the inevitable and take his seat as President of -Council, and to do this with any hope of success or usefulness he would -have to rely in an increasing degree upon Socialist and semi-Socialist -support. - -To this Clemenceau answered that he was quite contented with his -existing position; that he had no wish to enter upon office with its -responsibilities and corrupting influence; while, as to Socialism, that -could never make way in France in his day. - -"Looking only at the towns," he said, "you may think otherwise, though -even there I consider the progress of Socialism is overrated. But the -towns do not govern France. The overwhelming majority of French voters -are country voters. France means rural France, and the peasantry of -France will never be Socialists. Nobody can know them better than my -family and I know them. Landed proprietors ourselves--my father's -passion for buying land to pay him three per cent. with borrowed money -for which he had to pay four per cent. would have finally ruined him, -but that our wholesome French law permits gentle interference in such -a case--we have ever lived with and among the peasantry. We have -been doctors from generation to generation, and have doctored them -gratuitously, as I did myself, both in country and in town. I have seen -them very close, in birth and in death, in sickness and in health, -in betrothal and in marriage, in poverty and in well-being, and all -the time their one idea is property; to possess, to own, to provide -a good portion for the daughter, to secure a good and well _dot_-ed -wife for the son. Always _property_, ownership, possession, work, -thrift, acquisition, individual gain. Socialism can never take root -in such a soil as this. North or south, it is just the same. Preach -nationalisation of the land in a French village, and you would barely -escape with your life, if the peasants understood what you meant. Come -with me for a few weeks' trip through rural France, and you will soon -understand the hopelessness of Socialism here. It will encounter a -personal fanaticism stronger than its own. Your Socialists are men of -the town; they do not understand the men and women of the country." - -Now the same M. Clemenceau, after a long struggle side by side with -the Socialist Party, first in the Dreyfus case and then in the -anti-Clericalist and Separation of Church and State movement, finds -that events have moved so fast, in a comparatively short space of time, -that he is practically compelled to take two active Socialists into his -own Cabinet. This, too, in spite of the fact that his action in calling -in the troops at Courrières and insisting upon liberty for non-strikers -or black-legs had turned the Socialist Party, as a party, definitely -against him. No more significant proof of the advance of Socialist -influence could well have been given. That it was entirely on the side -of peace and a good understanding with Germany cannot be disputed. - -But this did not make the Morocco affair itself any less complicated -or threatening. Notwithstanding the Conference which Germany succeeded -in having convoked at Algeciras, and the settlement arrived at in -April, 1906, after a sitting of more than three months, the condition -of Morocco itself had not improved. The fact that the Conference gave -France the preference in the scheme of reforms proposed and in the -political management of Morocco, against the efforts of Germany and -Austria, suited neither the Sultan nor the Kaiser. Troubles arose -of a serious character. The French considered themselves forced to -intervene. The old antagonism broke out afresh. So much so that the -French Premier spoke with more than his usual frankness in an interview -with a German newspaper in November:-- - -"The Germans have one great fault. They show us extreme courtesy to-day -and marked rudeness the day after. Before this Morocco affair, feeling -in France had much improved. Many of us thought an understanding with -Germany very desirable, and I freely admit your Emperor did a good deal -to engender this feeling. Then, although we had dismissed Delcassé, -the German press attacked us. It went so far as to declare that you -were to extort from us the milliards of francs necessary to finance an -Anglo-German war. . . . I do not want to have any war, and if we desire -no war we necessarily wish to be on good terms with our neighbours. -If, also, our relations are unsatisfactory, we are anxious to improve -them. Such is my frame of mind. Moreover, if I have a chance of doing -so, I shall be glad to act on these lines. Of course it is imperatively -necessary for us to be always strong and ready for all eventualities. -That, however, does not mean that we want war: quite the contrary. To -wish for war would mean that we were mad. We could not possibly carry -on a war policy. If we did, Parliament would soon turn us out, as it -did Delcassé." - -Nothing could be clearer than that. And what made the pronouncement -more important even than the strong but sober language used was the -fact that, after as before the Conference of Algeciras, there was -really a great disposition among certain sections in France to come -to terms with Germany, rather than to strengthen the understanding -with England. The expression of this opinion could be frequently heard -among the people. It was fostered, even in the face of the German press -campaign against the Clemenceau Administration, by powerful financial -interests and by Clerical reactionary elements which were at this time -less hostile to Germany than to England. - -Throughout, however, Clemenceau stood for the _Entente_ with the -latter power as the only sound policy for his country. In this respect -he was at one with the old statement of Gambetta that a breach of -the alliance with England would be fatal to France. For Clemenceau, -therefore, who had more than once in his career suffered so severely -for his friendship for England, to state that an understanding with -Germany had been seriously contemplated was a striking testimony to -the immediate tendency of the time at that juncture. Whether the whole -of this fitful friendliness on the side of Germany was simulated -in order to foster that remarkable policy of steady infiltration of -German interests, German management, and German goods into France, -with far other than peaceful aims, is a question which can be much -more confidently answered now than at the period when this peaceful -offensive was going on. Enough to say that the Clemenceau Ministry was -not, at first, at all averse from a permanent arrangement for peace -with Germany, so long as English animosity was not aroused. - -It must be admitted, nevertheless, that French policy in Morocco was, -in the long run, quite contrary to the views on colonial affairs which -Clemenceau had so strongly expressed and acted upon hitherto. Whatever -excuse may be made on account of the proximity of Morocco to Algeria, -and the necessity for France to protect her own countrymen and secure -peace on the border, the truth remains that the French Republic was -allowed by her statesmen to drift into what was virtually a national -and capitalist domination of that independent country, backed up by a -powerful French army. Clemenceau in his defence of these aggressions -recites those familiar apologies for that sort of patriotism which -consists in love of another people's country and the determination to -seize it, which we Englishmen have become so accustomed to in our own -case. If we didn't take it, somebody else would. If we leave matters as -they are, endless disturbances will occur and will spread to our own -territory. A protectorate must be established. - -But a protectorate must have a powerful armed force behind it, or there -can be no real protection. National capital is being invested under -our peaceful penetration for the benefit of the protected people. -The rights of investors must be safe-guarded. Our countrymen--in -this instance Frenchmen--have been molested and even murdered by the -barbarous folk whom we have been called upon to civilise. Such outrages -cannot be permitted to go unpunished. Towns bombarded. Villages burnt. -Peace re-established. More troops. "Security of life and property" -ensured by a much larger army and the foundation of civilised -Courts. Protection develops insensibly into possession. The familiar -progression of grab is, in short, complete. - -That is pretty much what went on with Morocco, whose entire -independence as a sovereign State had only just been internationally -acknowledged. What is more, it went on under M. Clemenceau's own -Government, consisting of the same peaceful politicians enumerated -above. No doubt the action of Germany against France and French -interests, on the one side, and the support by England of France and -French interests, on the other, hastened the acceptance of the "white -man's burden" which her capitalists and financiers were so eager to -undertake; if only to upset the schemes of the Brothers Mannesmann -in the troublous Mohammedan Sultanate. But it is strange to find -Clemenceau in this galley. For, unjustifiable as were the proceedings -of Germany at the beginning and all through, it is now obvious that -France, by her own policy, put arguments into the mouth of the -peace-at-any-price and pro-German advocates; that also she played the -game of the Kaiser and his unscrupulous agent Dr. Rosen. This worthy -had been in the employment of Prince Radolin, who thus described him: -"He is a Levantine Jew whose sole capacity is intriguing to increase -his own importance." It was disgraceful of Germany to make use of such -a man to stir up Morocco against France. But it was certainly most -unwise, as well as contrary to international comity, for France to put -herself in the wrong by an aggressive policy in that State. Especially -was this the case when such a terrible menace still overhung her -Eastern frontier, and, as events proved, not a man could be spared for -adventures in Morocco or elsewhere. - -The war between rival Sultans and the attack upon the French settlers -at Casablanca could not justify such a complete change of front. -Jaurès, in fact, was in the right when he denounced the advance of -General Amadé with a strong French army as a filibustering expedition, -dangerous in itself and provocative towards Germany. But Clemenceau -supported his Foreign Minister, Pichon, in the occupation of -Casablanca, which had been heavily bombarded beforehand, and, on -February 25th, declared that France did not intend to evacuate Morocco, -neither did she mean to conquer that country. He had, he averred, no -secrets, and, as in the matter of the anarchist rising in the South, -said he was ready to resign. This was evidence of impatience, which was -harmful at such a critical period in French home and foreign affairs. -It looked as if Clemenceau had been so accustomed to turn out French -Governments that he could not discriminate even in favour of his own! -But the Chamber gave him a strong vote of confidence, and he remained -at his post. - -There were two important developments in foreign affairs going on -during this year, 1908, of which the difficulties in Morocco, serious -as they were, constituted only a side issue. The one was open and -above-board: the other was known only to those who kept very closely in -touch with German politics. - -The first was the rapid improvement in the relations between France -and Great Britain, for which Clemenceau himself and King Edward VII -were chiefly responsible. We are now so accustomed to regard the -_Entente_ as part and parcel of English foreign policy that it is not -easy to understand how bitter the feeling was against Great Britain -which led important Frenchmen to take the view of an agreement with -Germany spoken of above. English domination in Egypt, to the practical -exclusion of French influence and control even over the Suez Canal; -English conventions with Japan, checking, as was thought, that -legitimate French expansion in Asia by which M. Jules Ferry had hoped -to counterbalance the defeats of 1870-71; English settlement of the -irritating Newfoundland Fisheries question; English truculence and -unfairness in the infamous Boer War; English antagonism to Russia, -France's trusted ally and heavy debtor--all these things stood in the -way of any cordial understanding. It may well be that only Clemenceau's -strong personal influence, supported by his nominee President -Fallières, prevented steps being taken which would have been fatal to -the revival of genuine good feeling between the Western Powers. The -following passage in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_ does no more than -justice to Clemenceau's services in this direction: - -"M. Clemenceau, who only late in life came into office and attained -it when a better understanding with England was progressing, had been -throughout his long career, of all public men in all political groups, -the most consistent friend of England. His presence at the head of -affairs was a guarantee of amicable Anglo-French relations, so far as -they could be protected by statesmanship." This tribute in a permanent -work of reference is thoroughly well deserved. - -Happily, too, his efforts had been earnestly supported long before, -and even quietly during, the Boer War, by Edward VII, as Prince -of Wales and as King. But this very connection between the French -Radical statesman and the English monarch was the subject of most -virulent attacks. It was, in fact, made the groundwork of an elaborate -accusation of treachery against Clemenceau, who was represented as -the mere tool of Edward VII in promoting the permanent effacement -of France. The King was an English Machiavelli, constantly plotting -to recover for the British Empire, at the expense of France, that -world-wide prestige which the miserable Boer War and the rise of -German power on land and sea, in trade and in finance, had seriously -jeopardised. A book by the well-known M. Flourens, written at this -time to uphold that thesis, went through no fewer than five editions. -Here is the pleasing picture of the late King presented for the -contemplation of the Parisian populace by this virulent penman: - -"Edouard VII montait sur le trône à l'age où, si l'on consulte les -statistiques, 75% des rois sont déjà descendus dans la tombe. Il -sortait d'une longue oisiveté pour entrer dans la vie active a l'époque -où, dans toutes les carrières et fonctions publiques, les hommes font -valoir leurs droits à la retraite. - -"S'il y avait un conseil de revision pour les rois, comme il y en a un -pour les conscrits, il eût été déclaré impropre au service. - -"L'obésité déformait son corps, alourdissait sa marche, semblait, -sous le développement des tissus adipeux, paralyser toute activité -physique, toute force intellectuelle. Sa figure, contractée par la -douleur, trahissait, par moment, les souffrances qu'une volonté de fer -s'efforcait de maîtriser, pour dissimuler aux yeux de ses sujets la -maladie qui, à cet instant même, menaçait sa vie. - -"A voir sa corpulence maladive, on ne pouvait s'empêcher de se rappeler -les paroles que Shakespeare met dans la bouche d'un de ses ancêtres, à -l'adresse du fameux Falstaff, le compagnon dissolu des égarements de sa -jeunesse: 'Songe à travailler, a diminuer ton ventre et a grossir ton -mérite--quitte ta vie dissolue! Regarde la tombe, elle ouvre, pour toi, -une bouche trois fois plus large que pour les autres hommes!' - -"De tous côtés, les lanceurs de prédictions, depuis le fameux archange -Gabriel jusqu'à la non moins fameuse Mme. de Thèbes, s'accordaient pour -entourer son avènement des plus sinistres prévisions, pour annoncer -sa fin prochaine et l'imminence d'une nouvelle vacance du trône -d'Angleterre. - -"Symptôme plus grave! Les oracles de la science n'étaient pas moins -menaçants que les prophéties des devins. Deux fois, les pompes de son -couronnement durent être décommandées, deux fois les fêtes ajournées -et les lampions éteints. Les hôtes princiers, convoqués a grands frais -de tous les points du globe, pour participer à ces réjouissances, -attendirent, dans l'angoisse, l'annonce d'une cérémonie plus lugubre. - -"La volonté d'Edouard VII triumpha de toutes ces résistances. Il -déclara avec une indomptable énergie que, coûte que coûte, il était -décidé a ne pas descendre dans la tombe avant d'avoir posé sur sa tête, -avec tout l'éclat, avec toute la solennité traditionnels, aux yeux -des représentants émerveillés de tout son vaste empire, aux yeux de -l'Univers jaloux, la couronne de ses Pères, sa double couronne de Roi -et d'Empereur, que les mains avides de la mort semblaient vouloir lui -disputer." - -His account of Edward VII reads curiously to-day, the more so when we -recall the fact that M. Emile Flourens was at one time French Minister -of Foreign Affairs, and that, at the moment when the book first -appeared, the King was frequently in Paris, and on good terms with -Republicans of all sections. - -After pointing out how scrupulously he had as Prince of Wales -suppressed his political opinions, during his mother's lifetime, even -when his power, had he exerted it, might have been advantageous to his -country, the French critic gives him full credit for having made the -best of his life in many ways. He had travelled all over the world, -had studied humanity and society in all shapes, had "warmed both hands -before the fire of life" in every quarter of the globe. But, though -his features as a private personage were familiar to everybody, he -remained a sphinx, mysterious and unfathomable, even to his friends, in -public affairs. He was well known to Parisians everywhere, and was as -popular in working-class centres as in the most aristocratic _salons_. -Paris was, in fact, the only city where he was at his ease and at home, -where, in fact, he was himself. By far the most sympathetic Briton to -Parisians who ever was in Paris, he exercised a real influence over -all classes. They were kept carefully informed as to his tastes, his -manners, his intimates, his vices and his debts, and were the more -friendly to him on account of them. The warmest partisans of his -accession, however, were his creditors, who were mortally afraid that -his habits would not give him the opportunity for discharging his -liabilities out of his mother's accumulations. - -The description of the position of the British Empire at the close of -the Boer War was less flattering even than the personal sketch of its -King and Emperor. "At this moment the astounded peoples had felt the -Britannic colossus totter on its foundation, this colossus with feet -of clay which weighs down too credulous nations by its bluff, by its -arrogance, by rapine, by insatiable rapacity, which already grips the -entire globe like a gigantic cuttle-fish and sucks its marrow through -the numberless tentacles of its commerce, until the day when it shall -subjugate the whole planet to its domination--always provided that it -does not encounter on its way another still more powerful octopus of -destruction which will attack and destroy it." - -Needless to say that this challenger of the British supremacy was the -rising power of Germany. As an Englishman I admit the infamy of the -Boer War, and recognise that our rule in India and Ireland has been -anything but what it ought to have been. M. Clemenceau knew all that as -well as we British anti-Imperialists do. But even in 1907-8 much had -happened since 1900. Democracy was slowly making way in Great Britain -likewise, and freedom for others would surely follow emancipation -for herself. It was not to be expected that all Frenchmen should see -or understand this. A nation which has under its flag a fourth of -the population and more than a seventh of the habitable surface of -the world can scarcely expect that another colonial country, whose -colonies the British have largely appropriated, in the East and in -the West, will admit the "manifest destiny" of the Union Jack to wave -of undisputed right over still more territory. There was a good deal -to be said, and a good deal was said, about British greed and British -unscrupulousness: nor could the truth of many of the imputations be -honestly denied. - -It called, therefore, for all Edward VII's extraordinary knowledge -of Paris, his bonhomie, shrewd common sense, and uncanny power of -"creating an atmosphere" to overcome the prejudice thus created against -himself as a master of intrigue, and Clemenceau as his willing tool. -Matters went so far that at one moment the King's reception in his -favourite capital seemed likely to be hostile, and might have been so, -but for the admirable conduct of the high-minded, conservative patriot, -M. Déroulède. But, luckily for France, Great Britain and the world -at large, these difficulties had been overcome; and almost the only -good feature in the trouble with Morocco was the vigorous diplomatic -help France received from England--a good feature because it helped to -wipe away the bitter memories of the past from the minds of the French -people. The extremely cordial reception of President Fallières and M. -Clemenceau in London, and the King's own exceptional courtesy at all -times to M. Delcassé, whom the French public regarded as the victim of -German dictatorial demands, tended in the same direction. All the world -could see that Clemenceau's Administration had so far strengthened the -Anglo-French _Entente_ as to have brought it almost to the point of an -alliance: nor thereafter was the Triple Entente with Russia, as opposed -to the Triple Alliance, very far off. - -At this same time, however, matters were going so fast in Germany -towards an open breach that the only wonder is that the truth of -the situation was not disclosed, and that Germany, quite ready, and -determined to be more ready, for war at any moment, was allowed to -continue her policy of pretended peace. - -England and, to a large extent, France still believed in the pacific -intentions of the Fatherland. Yet a meeting was held in Berlin of the -heads of all the departments directly or indirectly connected with -war, at which the Kaiser delivered a speech which could only mean one -thing: that Germany and her Allies would enter upon war so soon as -the opportunity presented itself, and the preparations, including the -completion of the Kiel Canal (or perhaps before that great work had -been accomplished), gave promise of a short and decisive campaign. -Rumours of this address reached those who were kept informed as to -what was being contemplated by the Kaiser, his Militarist Junker -_entourage_ and the Federal Council. Unfortunately, when the statement -was challenged, a strong denial was issued, and the pacifists and -pro-Germans, honest and dishonest, laughed at the whole story as a -baseless scare. - -How far it was baseless could be learnt from deeds that spoke much -louder than words. Even thus early great accumulations of munitions of -war were being made at Cologne, and the military sidings and railway -equipments, which could only serve for warlike and not commercial -purposes, were being completed. Six years before the war, all the work -necessary for an aggressive descent on the West and for the passage -through Belgium had been done. - -Europe was comfortably seated over a powder magazine. M. Clemenceau -might well discuss in London, when he came over to Sir Henry -Campbell-Bannerman's funeral, as Premier of France, how many hundred -thousand men, fully equipped for war, England could land within a -fortnight in North-Eastern France, should a sudden and unprovoked -attack be made. But he got no satisfactory answer. - -It is evident, therefore, that what with strikes, anarchist outbreaks, -the troubles in Morocco, the menacing attitude of Germany--who, -as Clemenceau put it, said, "Choose between England and us"--and -the attempts to form an enduring compact with England, Clemenceau -as President of Council, with all his energy, determination and -versatility, had enough on his hands to occupy all his thoughts. But -this did not exhaust the catalogue of his labours during his term of -premiership. - - - - - CHAPTER XVI - - END OF CLEMENCEAU'S MINISTRY - - -It is easy to be tolerant of the Catholic Church and Catholics in -a Protestant country; though even in Great Britain, and of course -only too sadly in the North of Ireland, there are times when the -bitterness inherited from the past makes itself felt, on slight -provocation, in the present. At such times of sectarian outburst we -get some idea ourselves of what religious hatred really means, and -can form a conception of the truly fraternal eagerness to immolate -the erring brethren, nominally of the same Christian creed, which -animated the true believers of different shades of faith, whether -Orthodox or Arian, Catholic or Huguenot, in days gone by. Those who -chance to remember what Catholicism was in Italy, the Papal States, -or Naples, two generations ago--the Church then claiming for itself -rights of jurisdiction and sanctuary, outside the common law--those -who understand what has gone on in Spain quite recently, can also -appreciate the feeling of Frenchmen who, within the memory of their -fellow-citizens still living, and even themselves in some degree under -the Empire, had suffered from Clerical interference and repression, -when the chance of getting rid of State ecclesiasticism was presented -to them at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Church had -entirely lost touch with the temper of the time. Though it may have -been impossible for the Vatican to accept the brilliant suggestion that -the great men of science should all be canonised and the discoverers -of our day should receive the red hat, as secular Cardinals, there was -no apparent reason why a form of supernaturalism which had lived -into and out of two forms of human slavery, and was passing through a -third, should have been unable to adapt itself in some degree to modern -thought. A creed which, in its most successful period, had conveniently -absorbed ancestor-worship as part of its theological propaganda in -China, need not, one would have thought, have found it indispensably -necessary to the salvation of its votaries to cleave to all the old -heresies, inculcated in days when criticism of the incomprehensible and -unbelievable involved the unpleasant possibility of being tortured to -death, or burnt alive. - -Nor certainly could its worst enemy have predicted that the -infallibility of the Pope would be invented and thrust upon the -faithful, as a doctrine whose acceptance was essential to their -spiritual welfare, in a period when it was being proved every day -and in all departments of human knowledge that what was universally -believed to be a certainty yesterday is discounted as a fallacy -to-morrow. Nothing in all the long controversy about the Separation -of Church and State in France produced a greater or more permanent -effect upon intelligent Frenchmen than this preposterous claim of -Papal infallibility. Explain it away, whittle down its significance by -any amount of Jesuitical sophistry, and still this declaration that -a mere man could never be mistaken, because he was the Vicegerent -of God, shook the whole framework of Catholic domination, so far as -any participation of the State in the matter was concerned. And the -career and character of many of the Pope's predecessors rendered the -dogma more utterly preposterous to all who had even a smattering of -the history of the Vatican than might otherwise have been the case. -That John XXIII should have been infallible threw a strange light upon -Catholic morality in its highest grades. Yet if Pius infallible, why -not John? - -What, however, had more practical effect in turning the scale of public -opinion against the Papacy, its nominees and believers as servants and -paid employees of the State, was the fact that in all the practical -affairs of French life the Catholic Church, as represented by its -ecclesiastical hierarchy, had taken the wrong side. Theoretical or -theological difficulties would never have upset the regard of the -French people for the National Church. But, time after time, the -Clerical party ranged itself with the reactionists, throwing over all -its wisest counsellors, whose devotion to the Church had never been -questioned, when they advised standing by the cause of the people, and -relied solely upon the judgment of bigoted Jesuits. Zola, whom these -creatures hated, showed in his "Germinal," thoroughgoing materialist -as he was, what a noble part a priest of the Church could play, when -the young ecclesiastic stands between the strikers who form part of his -flock and the soldiers who are about to fire upon them. Individuals -might thus rise up to and above the level of their creed, but the -Church in France, as a whole, was represented by men of God who were -a good deal worse than men of Belial. Nor was this all. They pursued -a policy of relentless obscurantism. Their object was not to develop -education but to stunt its growth: not to teach the truth but to foster -lies. So manifest was the determination to take no high view of their -duties that such a man as the venerable Dr. Leplay, a Catholic of -Catholics whose religious convictions did not prevent him from becoming -a master of the theories of Marx, lamented that his Church was proving -itself wholly incompetent to cope with or to stem what, as a Christian, -he recognised was the rising tide of infidelity. - -Of this infidelity, the free-thinker and champion of secularism, -Clemenceau, was a type and a prominent example. He saw the Church -as a pernicious influence. His feeling towards it was even more -vehement than that of Voltaire or Gambetta. "_Écrasez l'infâme!_" "_Le -cléricalisme voilà l'ennemi!_" If thought was to be free, if Frenchmen -were to be emancipated from superstition and intolerance, the power of -the Catholic Church must be weakened and, if possible, destroyed. For -him, in this matter, compromise was impossible. His begettings, his -surroundings, his education, his profession, his political life all -made him relentless on this point. Behind the Duc de Broglie, behind -the persecutor of Dreyfus, behind the pretender Boulanger, behind -reaction in all its forms hid the sinister figure of the unscrupulous -power, working _perinde ac cadaver_ against all that was noblest in -France, against all that was highest in the ideals of the Republic. And -if Clemenceau knew well that under all circumstances and at every turn -of events the Catholic Church was the enemy of France and of himself, -the Church had no doubt at all that Clemenceau was its most formidable -foe in French political life. - -Long before and after his defeat in the Var, in 1893, the Catholics -never hesitated to join with their enemies, if only this combination -would help them to overthrow Clemenceau. Whatever differences the -French Premier might have with the Socialists on strikes and social -affairs generally, on the matter of the separation of Church and -State they were heartily at one. In fact, Clemenceau was even more -uncompromising than they. The whole texture of his thought revolted -against showing any consideration for a Church which, from his point -of view, had been for centuries the chief and most formidable enemy of -progress in France and the most capable organiser of attacks upon all -democratic and Republican ideals. - -The greatest names in French history are the names of those whom the -Catholic Church has persecuted or martyred. Its leaders would resort to -the same tactics now, and have only failed to do so because the power -has slipped from their hands as the truths of science and the wider -conceptions of human destiny have permeated the minds of the masses. -There was no likelihood that, as Prime Minister, Clemenceau, the -free-thinker and materialist, would be inclined to modify his opinions -in favour of what might be regarded as statesmanlike concessions -to the Right on ecclesiastical matters. The danger lay in the other -direction. It was one of the remarkable incidents, in connection with -his first tenure of the Presidency of the Council, that the final -settlement of this important question of the relations of Church -and State should come when he himself was at the head of the French -Government. - -When M. Briand's measure for the complete laicisation of the Church so -far as the State was concerned was introduced into the Chamber, he -pointed out in his report that the proposal for complete separation -was not dictated by hatred or political prejudice, nor did it involve -anything at all approaching to the change in the relations of property -when, at the time of the French Revolution, the Church owned one-third -of the total wealth of France. This Act was the assertion of definite -principles which were necessary in order to secure for the State full -mastery in its own country. Freedom of worship for all. No State -payment to ministers of any creed. Equitable management of Church -property taken over by the towns and Communes. - -The Bill, after considerable debate in the National Assembly, was -passed by a large majority. In the Senate M. Clemenceau denounced -the settlement as too favourable to the clergy. His criticism was -as mordant as usual. But he neither proposed an amendment nor voted -against the Bill, which passed the Senate without even the alteration -of a word, by a greater proportional majority than it did in the Lower -House. - -This, it might have been thought, would have been the end of the -matter for Clemenceau. He had done his full share towards putting -the Catholic Church out of action, and might have been contented, as -Premier, with any further settlement that M. Briand, the member of his -own Cabinet responsible for this important measure, and M. Jaurès, the -powerful leader of the Socialist Party, might come to in regard to -the properties of the Church, about which there had been much bitter -feeling. But Clemenceau has the defects of his qualities. The Pope -had refused to permit his clergy to avail themselves of the excellent -terms French Republicans, Radicals and Socialists had been ready to -accord to them. He had issued two Encyclicals which could certainly be -read as intended to stir up trouble in the Republic--which, in fact, -had brought about some disorder. When, therefore, everything seemed -arranged on this prickly question of valuations and appropriations, -Clemenceau could not resist the temptation to show the unsatisfactory -nature of the entire business to him. It was one of those moments of -impulse when "the Tiger" could not refrain from giving free play to -his propensities, at the expense of his own kith and kin, failing the -presence of his enemies to maul. It was thought that the Ministry must -come down; for both M. Briand and M. Jaurès took this outburst amiss. -But a conversation in the lobby brought the great irreconcilable very -sensibly to a compromise, and Clemenceau failed to give the Catholics -the malicious enjoyment they anticipated. It was a strange ebullition -which exhibited the perennial youth of this statesman of the unexpected. - -In other directions than social affairs and Morocco, where he -unfortunately relied upon the Right more than upon the Left in the -Assembly for the support of his Administration, Clemenceau proved that -his claim to act as the advocate of reform as well as the upholder of -order was no pretence. - -Whatever may have been its alleged deficiencies in some respects, -Clemenceau's first Ministry was by far the most Radical Government -that had held office under the Republic. And the boldness and decision -which he and his Cabinet displayed in dealing with what they regarded -as Anarchist action--it is fair, perhaps, to recall that Briand himself -had first achieved fame as an Anarchist--on the part of the workers, -they also put in force, when high-placed officers, with a powerful -political backing, tried to impose their will upon the State. Thus the -navy, as has too often happened in French annals, had been allowed to -drift into a condition which was actually dangerous, in view of what -was going on in the German dockyards, and the probable combination -of the Austrian and Italian fleets, with German help, in the -Mediterranean. At the same time, admirals were in the habit of acting -pretty much as they saw fit in regard to the fleets and vessels under -their control. Consequently, important men-of-war had been wrecked -time after time, and more than one serious accident had occurred. In -almost every case also, so powerful was the _esprit de corps_, in the -wrong sense, that the officers in command at the time were exonerated -from blame. There was, therefore, a strong public opinion in favour of -something being done to improve both the fleet itself and the spirit -which animated its commanders. Admiral Germinat, a popular officer -with, as appears, a genuine loyalty to his profession and a desire to -remedy its defects, thought proper to write a very strong letter to -a local service newspaper, making a fierce attack upon the general -management of the navy, without having given any notice of his views -either to the Minister of Marine or the Prime Minister. - -Thereupon, M. Clemenceau at once put him on the retired list. -Immediately a great hubbub arose. The very same people who had approved -of Clemenceau's policy, in regard to those whom they called anarchist -workmen, were now in full cry after the President of Council, for -daring to deal thus drastically with a man who, however his good -intentions may have been and however distinguished his career, was -beyond all question an anarchist admiral. The matter became a question -of the day. It was brought up in the Senate amid all sorts of threats -to the stability of the Government. M. Clemenceau, as usual, took up -the challenge boldly himself. His speech was so crushing that the whole -indictment against the Ministry collapsed. The evidence of indiscipline -on the Admiral's part, not only on this occasion but on several others, -and the declaration that Admiral Germinat would not be excluded from -the navy, when he had purged his offence and when his services would be -advantageous to the country, settled the matter and strengthened the -Ministry. - -By acquiring the Chemin de Fer de l'Ouest and combining it with other -Government railways, the Ministry made the first important step towards -nationalisation of railways. Clemenceau defended this measure on -grounds that would be, and were, accepted by Socialists; but events -have shown in this particular case that a good deal more is needed than -the establishment of another department of State bureaucracy to render -the railways a national property really beneficial to the community. -As carried out in practice, the acquisition of the Chemin de Fer de -l'Ouest has rather set back than advanced the general policy of railway -nationalisation in France. - -A more important measure was that introduced by M. Caillaux and, -amazing to say, passed through the Assembly, for a graduated -income-tax. How this majority was obtained has always been one of -the puzzles of that period. There is no country in the world where a -tax upon incomes is more unpopular than in France, and from that day -to this, in spite of the desperate need for funds which has arisen, -this tax has never yet become law. But it was a genuine financial -reform and creditable to the Government. The Socialists supported it, -though in itself it is only a palliative measure of justice in purely -bourgeois finance. From this period dates the close alliance between -the Socialists as revolutionaries and M. Caillaux as the adventurous -financier and director of the Société Générale, which later produced -such strange results in French politics, and intensified Socialist -hatred for M. Clemenceau. But at this time M. Caillaux, with the full -concurrence and support of the Prime Minister, was attacking all the -bourgeois interests in their tenderest place. The wonder is that such -a policy did not involve the immediate fall of the Ministry. Quite -possibly, had Clemenceau remained in office, it might have become a -permanent feature in French finance. Boldness and boldness and boldness -again is sometimes as successful in politics as it is in oratory. -Although, therefore, to attack pecuniary "interests" of a large section -of the nation is a far more hazardous enterprise than to denounce -eminent persons or to overthrow Ministries, this move might then have -been successful if well followed up. - -On March 8th, in this year 1909, Clemenceau unveiled a statue to -the Radical Minister Floquet, with whom he had worked for many -years. The revolutionary Socialists announced their intention of -demonstrating against him on this occasion. They objected to him and -his administration on account of the expedition to Morocco--in which -Clemenceau had certainly run counter to all his previous policy on -colonial affairs--on account of cosmopolitan finance, Russian loans -and the shooting down of workmen on strike. It was the last that -occasioned the bitterest feeling against him, and this was really not -surprising. - -Clemenceau had made the workers' liberty to strike in combination -secure, but he did not use the power of the State against the -employers, who, in the mines especially, could on his own showing be -considered only as profiteering trustees under the State. Also, he -refused to all Government servants the right to combine or to strike. -This disinclination to take the capitalists by the throat, while using -the official power to restrain the workers, had a great deal more to do -with the menacing attitude of the Socialists than Morocco or finance. -However, there was no disturbance. Clemenceau took advantage of the -occasion to deliver a speech which was in effect a powerful defence -of the idealist Republicanism of the eighteenth century against the -revolutionary Socialism of the twentieth. - -The French Revolution is deified by nearly all advanced Frenchmen. -Its glorification is as much the theme of Jaurès and Vaillant as of -Gambetta and Clemenceau. Bourgeois revolution as it turned out to be, -owing to economic causes which neither individualists nor collectivists -could control, orators of the Revolution overlook facts and cleave to -ideals. Thus Clemenceau told his audience that the French Revolution -was a prodigious tragedy, which seemed to have been the work of -demi-gods, of huge Titans who had risen up from far below to wreak -Promethean vengeance on the Olympians of every grade. The French -Revolution was the inevitable culmination of the deadly struggle -between the growing forces of liberty and the worn-out forces of -autocracy without an autocrat. Yet, said he, the Revolution itself was -made by men and women inspired with the noblest ideals, but educated, -in their own despite, by the Church to methods of domination, condemned -also by the desperate resistance of immeasurable powers to prompt and -pitiless action followed by corresponding deeds of brutal reaction. -The people who had just shed torrents of blood for the freedom of the -world passed, without audible protest, from Robespierre to Napoleon. -Yet the Revolution is all of a piece. The Republic moves steadily on -as one indissoluble, vivifying force. Compare the France of the panic -of 1875 with the France of to-day. Her position is the result of -understandings and alliances and friendships based on the authority -of her armed force. France has resumed her position in Europe, in -spite of a few weak and mean-spirited Frenchmen, whose opposition only -strengthened the patriotic enthusiasm of the nation at large. The -history of the Republican Party had been one long consecration of the -watchwords of the French Revolution. Liberty of the Press. Liberty -of public meeting. Liberty of association. Liberty of trade unions. -Liberty of minds by public schools. Liberty of thought and religion. -Liberty of secular instruction. Liberty of State and worship. Laws had -been passed for relief of the sick. A day of rest had been prescribed -for all. Workmen's compensation for injury had been made imperative. -The Income Tax had been passed by the Assembly. "The Revolution is in -effect one and indivisible, and, with unbroken persistence, the work of -the Republic goes on." A fine record! So argued Clemenceau. - -Notwithstanding all the mistakes which Socialists so bitterly resented, -this was a great victory for the Republicans and for the Administration -of which Clemenceau was the head. Not the least important claim to -national recognition of good service done was the establishment of -the Ministry of Labour, over which Viviani, the well-known Socialist, -presided. The pressure of events, as well as the pressure of the -Socialists themselves, might well have pushed the Radical-Socialist -Premier farther along the Socialist path. - -Unfortunately for the Prime Minister, and, from more than one point -of view, for the nation, M. Clemenceau had another of those strange -fits of impatience and irascibility which he had exhibited more than -once before. The political antagonism between M. Clemenceau and -M. Delcassé was of long standing, and was intensified by personal -bitterness. During his tenure of the office of Minister for Foreign -Affairs, a position which he had held for seven years, in successive -Administrations of widely different character, M. Delcassé had been -subjected to vehement attacks by the leader of the Radical Left. His -policy in relation to Morocco had been specially obnoxious to M. -Clemenceau. That policy M. Clemenceau had most severely criticised -at the time when M. Delcassé was stoutly resisting that extension -of German influence in Morocco which led to the Foreign Minister's -downfall and the Conference of Algeciras, that M. Delcassé had refused -to accept. The relations between the two statesmen could scarcely have -been worse; but hitherto the Radical leader had carried all before him. - -Now came a dramatic climax to the long struggle. A debate arose in -the French Assembly on the condition of the navy. It was admittedly -not what it ought to have been. M. Picard, the Minister of Marine, -made a conciliatory reply to interpellations on the subject of -promised immediate reforms and even complete reconstitution. But this -was not enough for M. Delcassé. The Assembly was not hostile to M. -Clemenceau, and certainly had no desire to oust his Administration; -yet M. Delcassé's direct attack upon the Premier brought the whole -debate down to the level of a personal question. Nevertheless, what he -said was quite legitimate criticism. M. Clemenceau had been a member -of the Commission of Inquiry on the Navy, and could not get rid of -his responsibility for the present state of things. The great critic -of everybody and everything was open to exposure himself. He who had -enjoyed twenty-five years of running amuck at the whole political -world was now being called to account in person as an administrator. -So far M. Delcassé. Clemenceau retorted that M. Delcassé had himself -been on the Naval Commission of 1904. He was full of great policies -here, there and everywhere. What had they resulted in? The humiliation -of France and the Conference of Algeciras. Clemenceau was evidently -much incensed. The fact that he had been obliged, as he thought, by -Germany's action, to follow M. Delcassé's Moroccan tactics rendered -the position exceptionally awkward. It raised the whole question of -M. Delcassé's foreign policy. This gave him a great advantage when -it came to direct political warfare. For M. Delcassé was considered, -even by those who opposed him, as the victim of German hatred, since -he had refused to surrender to German threats and was sacrificed -simply because France dared not face a war. So when he recounted his -agreement with Spain, his agreement with Italy, his agreement--"too -long delayed"--with England, his mediation in the Spanish-American War -and his Treaties of Arbitration, the Assembly went with him. Then, too, -his assaults upon Clemenceau raised the fighting spirit on Delcassé's -side. The feeling was: "This time Clemenceau is getting as good as he -brings." The Prime Minister has not done his duty either as President -of the Inquiry or as President of Council. "I say to him as he said to -Jules Ferry: 'Get out. We won't discuss with you the great interests of -this nation.'" - -Very good sword-play. But had Clemenceau kept cool, as he certainly -would have done on the duel ground, there might have been no harm -done. However, he burst out into furious denunciation, exasperated by -the ringing cheers which greeted his opponent's conclusion. It was M. -Delcassé's fault that France had to go to Algeciras. M. Delcassé would -have carried things with a high hand. "But the army was not ready, -the navy was not ready. I have not humiliated France: M. Delcassé -has humiliated her." A purely personal note, disclosing facts that -were the more bitter to the Assembly inasmuch that they were true. It -was indecent--that was the sensation that ran round the House--for -a Premier thus to expose the weakness of his country on a personal -issue, no matter what provocation he may have received. The hostile -vote, therefore, was given against Clemenceau himself, not against his -Government, and he promptly resigned. - -Had he desired to bring about his own overthrow he would have acted -precisely as he did; and some thought that this was his intention. -It was an unworthy conclusion to a Premiership which, whatever its -shortcomings, had done extremely good work for the Republic, and to -a Government which had lasted longer than any French Administration -since the downfall of the Empire. The character and leadership of the -Ministry under M. Briand, which succeeded Clemenceau's Cabinet, proved -that only by his own fault had he ensured his official downfall. - -As usual, he turned round at once to other work, and accepted an -engagement to speak throughout South America, publishing a pleasant -record of his experiences in an agreeably written book. The Prime -Minister of yesterday was the genial lecturer the day after. - - NOTE.--It was said at the time that M. Briand's intrigues in the - lobbies were the real cause of Clemenceau's defeat and resignation. - Lately this has been confirmed to me on good authority. At any rate, - M. Briand benefited. It was he who succeeded his chief. - - H. M. H. - - - - - CHAPTER XVII - - CLEMENCEAU AND GERMANY - - -Clemenceau flung himself out of office in an unreasonable fit of -temper. A man of his time of life, at sixty-eight years of age, with -his record behind him, had no right to have any personal temper -at all, when the destinies of his country had been placed in his -hands. Probably he would admit this himself to-day. But, during his -exceptionally strenuous period of office, he had, as we have seen, more -than once shown an impulsiveness and even an irritability that were not -consonant with his general disposition. Throughout, there appeared to -be an inclination on his part to take opposition and criticism too much -to heart. As if, in fact, the great Radical overthrower of opportunism -was annoyed at being compelled, as all administrations must be, to -adopt to some extent a policy of opportunism himself. His outburst -against all compromise with the Church was one instance of this. -His uncalled-for resignation on account of M. Delcassé's attack was -another. This might well have been the end of his official experiences. -Certainly no one would have ventured to predict that eight years later -would come the crowning achievement of his remarkable career. His own -remark on leaving office was not calculated to encourage his personal -adherents or to give his country confidence in his leadership. "I came -in with an umbrella, I go out with a stick," was all very well as the -epigram of a journalist: it was too flippant a remark for a serious -statesman such as Clemenceau had shown himself to be. But the time was -not far off when all his main policy, as man of affairs, politician, -and as publicist would be overwhelmingly justified. As we have seen, -Clemenceau was all his life strongly opposed to colonial expansion. -His action with regard to Morocco, apparently so contrary to this, -arose from an even stronger motive, his desire to build up French -defence against Germany on every side. - -But his general distrust of colonisation by conquest in Egypt, China, -Madagascar, and elsewhere had been based upon France's need for using -all her strength and all her resources to build up the power of the -French Republic within the limits of France. This is true of all -nations at a period when the power of man over nature is increasing -so rapidly in every department: perhaps, properly understood, in -agriculture most of all, when science is capably applied to production -on the land. That is to say, that even in countries such as England, -where the cry of over-population is so frequently raised, and where the -cult of colonisation and emigration has been exalted to the position of -a fetish, it would be far better to devote attention to the creation -of wealth at home than to the development of waste lands, however -fertile, abroad. Concentration of population, given adequate regulation -of employment in the interests of the whole people, and attention to -the requirements of space, air and health, is not only devoid of danger -but is an element in national prosperity--"nothing being more plain -than that men in proper labour and employment are capable of earning -more than a living," as John Bellers wrote more than two hundred years -ago; and "a nation wherein are eight millions of people is more than -twice as rich as the same scope of land wherein are but four," as Petty -wisely stated, about the same date. - -If this was so obviously true at the end of the seventeenth century, it -is tenfold, not to say a hundredfold, more certain in the twentieth, -having regard to the marvellous discoveries and inventions since made -and still but partially applied in every direction. But France is the -land where such considerations are most decisive in dealing with the -basis of national polity. France has enormous advantages in regard -to soil, climate, the industrious habits and skill of her people, -and the consequent monopoly on the world market of whole branches -of commerce, where taste and luxury have to be gratified. Moreover, -she possesses a source of income unparalleled in Europe and scarcely -worth noting elsewhere, except in the case of Italy. I calculate that -France receives, one year with another, from visitors who come thither, -merely to see and to spend, an amount, by way of profit, of not less -than seventy millions sterling. This large sum alone, if used for -enhancing the productiveness of the French soil and French industry -generally, would immensely benefit the people in every respect. French -thrift, again, had piled up out of the products of industry immense -pecuniary accumulations. There could have been no better investment of -these funds possible than the improvement of the defences of France -against invasion, the completion of her railway and canal system, -the development of her mines, so greatly coveted by her aggressive -neighbour, the concentration of her military and naval forces at home, -instead of scattering any portion of them abroad, the expenditure -upon thorough education and scientific agricultural and industrial -experiments. All this even Imperialist Frenchmen can see now. - -So with regard to Russia. The alliance of the French Republic with the -Empire of Russia gave France, apparently, a better position in Europe, -the pusillanimous and short-sighted English statesmen having rejected -an alliance which was afterwards forced upon Great Britain when wholly -unprepared for war. Here also Clemenceau's views were justified by -the event. The close connection between a democratic Republic and an -autocratic Empire put France in an unenviable moral position before -the world. More materially serious than this ill-fated combination, -ethically, was the necessity imposed upon the French of lending -continually to Russia, until the total amount of the Russian loans held -in France amounted to many hundreds of millions sterling. - -Such huge sums, again, would have been far more advantageously spent -at home than in building strategical and other railways, and financing -gold and other mines, in the vast Muscovite Empire. Financiers gained -largely by these loans. But the peasants and small bourgeoisie -of France were unknowingly dependent for their interest upon a -poverty-stricken agricultural population, which could not possibly -continue to pay the large sum due yearly on this amount to their -Western creditors without utter ruin. Thus unsound finance followed -hard on the heels of more than doubtful policy, and France was the -weaker and the poorer for both. - -This was all the more fatal to real French interests, inasmuch that, -at the same time, the home population of the Republic was slowly -decreasing, while the population of her threatening rival, Germany, -was steadily growing, and the wealth of the German Empire, both -agricultural and mineral, was likewise rapidly expanding with every -decade. Consequently, the position of France was becoming more and -more precarious, and the relative strength on the two sides of the -frontier less and less favourable to the Republic. It must be admitted, -under such circumstances, that those who favoured a Russian alliance, -in spite of all its manifest drawbacks, had a great deal to say for -themselves. But that Great Britain should have failed to see that -the declension of French power was a peril to herself, long before -the _Entente_ was brought about by Edward VII, and that a pacific -understanding alone was not sufficient to ensure the maintenance of -peace, is a truly marvellous instance of the blindness of British -statesmanship! Only the phenomenal good luck that has so far attended -the United Kingdom hindered our governing classes from landing this -country, as well as the French, in overwhelming disaster. How narrow -the escape was is not yet fully understood. - -Clemenceau was at all times in favour of an Anglo-French offensive and -defensive alliance, and he clung to this policy in the face of the most -serious discouragement from abroad and, as has been seen, at the cost -of vitriolic misrepresentation and hatred at home. It was in vain, -however, that for many years he preached this political doctrine. Even -when the relations between the two countries were greatly improved, the -very proper Liberal and Radical and Labour dislike in England of the -entanglement with Czarist Russia rendered the close combination which -seemed so essential to all who, like Clemenceau himself, knew what was -really going on in Germany, exceedingly difficult to bring about. - -The terrific war has thrown into high relief facts always discernible -except by those who would not see. Here Clemenceau's own bitter -experience of the war of 1870-71, and his yearly visits to Austria, -enabled him to form a clearer conception of the real policy of Germany -and the ruthless brutality which underlies modern Teutonic culture -than any of his contemporaries. It is no longer doubted that the -Franco-German war was welcomed by Prince Bismarck, and made inevitable -by him, in order to crush France and ensure German military supremacy -in Europe. Bismarck himself made no secret of the manner in which he -had deceived Benedetti at Ems by a forged telegram; and the refusal of -the Germans to make a reasonable peace with France immediately after -Sedan was conclusive evidence of what was really intended. During the -campaign, also, the Germans resorted to the same hideous methods of -warfare on land, on a smaller scale, which have horrified the entire -civilised world, on land and on sea, during the great war which -commenced forty-four years later. - -All this Clemenceau himself saw. While, therefore, in his speeches -and writings, he never shut out the possibility that the people of -Germany, rising superior to their militarist rulers, might come to -terms for permanent peace with the people of France, he at the same -time cherished no illusions whatever as to the policy of those military -rulers, and the small probability that German Social-Democracy would be -able to thwart the designs of the German aggressionists. Unfortunately, -in France, as in Great Britain, a considerable section of all classes, -but especially of the working class, represented by Labour Unions and -Socialists, would not believe that at the end of the nineteenth and -beginning of the twentieth century any great civilised power could -be harbouring such designs as those attributed to Germany. Vaillant, -for example, who, like Clemenceau, had seen the horrors inflicted upon -France in the war of 1870, was vehement on that side. So enamoured was -he of peace that he never lost a chance of assuring Germany that under -no circumstances would the French Republic go to war. He advocated a -general strike, in all countries affected, should a rupture of peace be -threatened; entirely regardless of the fact that the Social-Democrats -themselves had declared that such a strike was absolutely impossible in -Germany itself. - -The same with Jaurès. Not only did this great Socialist believe that -peace might be maintained by concessions to Germany; but, although -in favour of "the Armed Nation" for France herself, for the purpose -of defending her against a German invasion, he actually came over to -London and addressed a great meeting, called by anarchist-pacifists who -were all strongly in favour of the reduction of the British fleet. That -fleet which, as Bebel himself put it, was the only counterbalance in -Europe for Germany herself against Prussian militarism and Junkerdom, -Jaurès spoke of with regret as a provocation to war! Germany could, in -fact, always rely in all countries upon a large number of perfectly -honest pro-Germans, and a lesser proportion who had purely financial -considerations in view, to oppose any policy which was directed -against the spread of German domination. This was the mania of -anarchist-pacifism and anti-patriotism which Clemenceau, both in and -out of office, did his utmost to expose and resist. Honesty of purpose -could be no excuse whatever for fatuity of action. - -Clemenceau, therefore, from the moment when he gave up the Premiership, -lost no chance of inculcating the need for vigorous preparation. France -must be ready to meet a German assault by land and by sea. When the -time came she was not ready on either element, and without the help in -finance, in munitions, in clothing, and by arms, on land and on the -ocean, at once given by England--whom Clemenceau always upheld as the -friend of the Republic--France would have been overrun and crushed, -before she could possibly have obtained aid from elsewhere. In spite of -the Franco-German agreement of 1909, the danger of such an attack in -1911 was very great: so much so that war was then commonly expected, -and was only averted because Germany thought she would be in a more -commanding position to carry out her predetermined policy three or -four years later. The Franco-German Convention relating to Morocco, of -November 4th, 1911, after the Agadir difficulty, was no better than a -pretence. It was not intended, in good faith, to ensure a permanent -peace, so far as Germany was concerned. This Clemenceau felt sure of, -though the treaty was by no means unfavourable to France. He was ready -to make all sacrifices, however mortifying, provided only a genuine -treaty of peace and understanding between the two peoples could be -secured. But this must not be done blindly. It must be an integral part -of a serious national policy. - -Therefore, speaking in the Senate on the 12th February, 1912, in -opposition to the treaty with Germany about Morocco, he went on: "We -shall make every effort to give fresh proofs of our goodwill--we have -given enough and to spare already during the past forty years--in order -that the consequences of this treaty may fructify under conditions -worthy of the dignity of the two peoples; but we must know what the -other party to the treaty is about, what are his intentions, what he -thinks, says, proposes to do, and what signs of goodwill _he_ likewise -has vouchsafed. That is the question we must have the courage to ask -ourselves. This question I deal with at my own risk and peril, without -being concerned as to what I have to say, because I have at heart no -bad feeling, no hatred, to use the right word, towards the German -people. I want no provocation; firmly resolved as I am to do nothing -to sacrifice a vestige, however trifling, of our capacity to win if -attacked, I am equally convinced that peace is not only desirable -but necessary for the development of French ideas in the domain of -civilisation. . . . The German people won two great victories which -changed the equilibrium of Europe, in 1866 and in 1870. . . . _We -then knew, we had the actual proof in our hands, that, if the enemy -had occupied Paris, the capital of France would have been reduced -to ashes._ Prince Bismarck, in reply to the expostulations of Jules -Favre, declared that the German troops must enter at one of the gates, -'because I do not wish, when I get home, that a man who has lost a -leg or an arm should be able to say to his comrades, pointing to me: -That fellow you see there is the man who prevented me from entering -Paris.' When Jules Favre said that the German Army had glory enough -without that, M. Bismarck retorted, 'Glory! we don't use that word.' -The German, so far as I can judge of him, is above all the worshipper -of force, and rarely misses an opportunity of saying so; but where he -differs from the Latin is that his first thought is to make use of this -force. As the vast economic development of the Empire is a perpetual -temptation in this respect, he wants the French to understand that -behind every German trader there stands an army of five millions of -men. That is at the bottom of the whole thing." Moreover, he continued, -having pocketed a fine indemnity last time, Germany is greedy for a -much bigger one now. "Even quite lately the German Press has never -wearied of proclaiming that France shall pay out of her milliards -the cost of building the new German fleet. That is the frame of mind -of Germany, that is the truth which clearly appears in your treaty: -Germany thinks first and foremost of using to advantage her glory and -her force. - -"But this is not all. She has conquered her unity by force, by iron, -by blood; she has so fervently yearned for this unity--nothing more -natural--that now she wants to apply it; she wishes to spread her -surplus population over the world. She finds herself compelled, -therefore, by a fatality from which she cannot escape, to exercise -pressure upon her neighbours which will compel them to give her the -economic outlets she needs. . . . There is always land for an owner who -wishes to round off his estate. There are always nations to be attacked -by a warrior-nation which would conquer other peoples. I am not here -for the purpose of criticising the German people, I am trying to -describe their state of mind towards us. . . . - -"And now what of us, the French people? The people of France are -a people of idealism, of criticism, of indiscipline, of wars, of -revolutions. Our character is ill adapted for continuous action; -doubtless the French people have magnificent impulses, but, as the poet -says, their height has ever been measured by the depth of their fall." - -After a survey of "the terrible year" and its results, the orator -recounts what difficult work it was that Frenchmen had to carry out -after the collapse. It was not only that they had to change their -Government, but this Government must be taught how to govern itself. - -"That has created a hard situation for us. We are absorbed in this -great task. We hope to bring it to a successful conclusion. The -intervention of public opinion to-day in its own affairs, calmly, -soberly, without a word of braggadocio, that is one of the best signs -that France has yet given. - -"The work we have done must be judged not by what we see but by the -ideas, the spirit that we have breathed into the heart of all French -citizens." - -After giving conclusive proof that in 1875, in the Schnäbele affair, as -well as at Tangier, Morocco and Casablanca, Germany's policy had been -to wound, weaken and irritate France, Clemenceau wound up as follows: - -"In all good faith we desire peace, we are eager for peace because we -need it in order to build up our country. But if war is forced upon -us we shall be there! The difficulty between Germany and ourselves -is this: Germany believes the logical consequence of her victory is -domination. We do not believe that the logical consequence of our -defeat is vassalage. We are peaceful but we are not subjugated. We do -not countersign the decree of abdication and downfall issued by our -neighbours. We come of a great history and we mean to continue to be -worthy of it. The dead have created the living: the living will remain -faithful to the dead." - -This great speech was prophetic. Clemenceau knew what were the real -intentions of Germany. It was this fact that made him so bitter -against all who, honest, patriotic and self-sacrificing as they might -be, were in favour of weakening France in the hour of her greatest -danger. His warning against the financiers who were so solicitous that -foreign policy should be guided by manipulators of loans, interest -and discounts was also specially appropriate at a time when German -influence was becoming dominant in many of the banks and pecuniary -coteries of Paris. Such warnings were also timely in view of the -strange hallucinations--or worse--which then dominated English -politicians. - -For it was in this same year that Lord Haldane, having reduced the -English artillery, full of sublime confidence in the rulers of Germany, -returned from Berlin to tell us through Mr. Asquith and Viscount Grey -that never were the relations between Germany and England better! -It was in this same year, too, that Mr. Lloyd George and the whole -Radical Party were convinced that Great Britain might safely reduce her -armaments on land and on sea, and the Unionists themselves scarcely -dared to take up the challenge. It was in this same year, again, that -nearly all the leaders of the Labour Party convinced themselves that -the Germans had the best of good feeling towards France and England. -Having been most artistically and hospitably "put through" in the -Fatherland, they returned to England brimful of zeal against all who, -knowing Germany and Germans well for some fifty years, could not take -the asseverations of the Kaiser, or of his trusted friend Lord Haldane, -at their face value: a value which this legal nobleman admitted a few -years later he knew at the time to be illusory, and not in accordance -with what he then declared to be the truth. - -Clemenceau did not condescend to such shameless falsification. Whatever -mistakes he made, from the Socialist and anti-Imperialist point of -view, in matters of domestic importance, or concerning Morocco, where -the danger of France from the other side of the frontier had to be -considered, whether in office or out of it, he treated his countrymen -with the utmost frankness. - -So time passed on. The preparations of Germany were becoming more -and more complete. The influence of the pan-German Junkers and their -flamboyant young Crown Prince was becoming so powerful that the Kaiser -felt his hand being forced before success in "the great design" -appeared quite so certain as he would like it to be. The German army -was largely increased, powerful war-vessels were being added to the -navy. A policy was being pursued which roused fears of aggression. -All through 1913 and the first months of 1914 Clemenceau in his new -paper, _L'Homme Libre_, continued day after day his warnings and his -injunctions to all Frenchmen. He had no mercy for those who unceasingly -preached fraternity and disarmament for France when Germany, more -powerful and increasingly more populous, was arming to the teeth. - -"Such fraternity," he said, at the unveiling of Scheurer-Kestner's -statue, "is of the Cain and Abel kind. Against the armed peace and -armed fraternity with which Germany is threatening us nothing short -of the most perfect military education and military organisation can -be of any avail. All Europe knows, and Germany herself has no doubt -whatever, that we are solely on the defensive. Her fury for the -leadership of Europe decrees for her a policy of extermination against -France. Therefore prepare, prepare, prepare. Here you see 870,000 men -in the active army of Germany on a peace footing, better trained, -better equipped, better organised than ours, as opposed to 480,000 -Frenchmen on our side. Doesn't that convince you? And Alsace-Lorraine -at the mercy of such creatures as Schadt and Förstner? Observe, -Germany has great projects in all parts of the world. It would be -childish for us to complain. What is intolerable is her pretension to -keep Europe in perpetual terror of a general war, instead of general -international discussion of her claims. Every Frenchman must remember -that, if Germany's increasing armaments do impel her to war, the loss -of the conflict would mean for us the subjugation of our race, nay, -even the termination of our history. Meanwhile, with Alsace-Lorraine -before me and the statue of Scheurer-Kestner now unveiled, I claim for -us the right never to forget. To be or not to be, that is for us the -question of the hour. Gambetta, after Sedan, called upon all Frenchmen -in their day of deepest depression to rise to the level of their duty. -He consecrated once again Republicans as the party of patriotic pride. -France must live. Live we will!" - -Unfortunately, one of the chief reasons why France was unready to -meet the onrush of the modern Huns was that the Socialists were all -bemused with their own fatuous notion that the German Social-Democracy -could stop the war. Instead, therefore, of investigating the truth of -Clemenceau's statements, they merely denounced him as a chauvinist and -an enemy of the people, and twaddled on about a general strike on both -sides of the Rhine. As an old Socialist myself, who, as a member of -the International Socialist Bureau, had discussed the whole question -at length with Liebknecht, Bebel, Singer, Kautsky and others, I knew -that, as they themselves explained to me, there was little or no hope -of anything of the sort being done when war was once declared. I viewed -this whole propaganda, therefore, with grave alarm, and Bebel himself -warned the French that the Social-Democrats would march with the rest. -If an opportunity came something might be done, but----Since then -the old leaders had died and the new chiefs, as we all see now, were -Imperialists to a man. Thus Clemenceau's prognostications and warnings -were only too completely justified. Prince Lichnowsky's revelations -conclusively prove this, and the German Social-Democrats have been at -pains to confirm it. On March 11th, 1914, Clemenceau stated precisely -what they would do. - -How anxious, how eager, the French were at the critical moment to avoid -even the slightest cause of offence is shown by the fact that all their -troops were withdrawn fully eight miles back along the German frontier, -a portion of French territory which the Germans made haste to seize. -Even before this, every effort was made to provoke the French troops -by petty raids across the frontier, and at last the Germans declared -that the French had sent aeroplanes to drop bombs on Nuremberg--a -statement which the Germans themselves now admit to have been a pure -fabrication. But the facts of the invasion of Belgium and France are -too well known to call for recital here. - -Clemenceau did what might have been expected of him. He appealed to -all Frenchmen of every shade of opinion to sink all minor differences -in one solid combination for the defence of the country. Day after -day, this powerful journalist and orator laboured to encourage -his countrymen and to denounce unceasingly all who, honestly or -dishonestly, stood in the way of the vigorous and successful -prosecution of the war which should free France for ever from yet -other attempts by Germany to destroy her as an independent nation. -The memory of the dark days of 1870 was obliterated by the horrors of -1914 onwards. In good and bad fortune the Radical leader kept the same -resolute attitude and used the like stirring language. _L'Homme Libre_, -defaced and then suppressed by the Censor, was succeeded by _L'Homme -Enchaîné_. Ever the same policy of relentless warfare, against the -enemy at the front, and the traitors at the rear, was steadily pursued. -Ministry might come, Ministry might go, but still Clemenceau was at his -post, save when illness compelled him to quit his work for a short time. - -Nor did he waver in his views as to the general strategy to be pursued. -Without making any pretence to military knowledge, but well advised by -experts on military affairs, and firmly convinced that whatever success -Germany might achieve elsewhere she would never be satisfied unless -France was crushed, he persistently opposed diversion of strength from -the Western front. _There_ this terrific struggle for world-domination -would eventually be decided. The civilisation of the West must be -subdued to German culture, France and England must be brought under -German control, before the great programme of Eastern expansion for the -Teutonic Empire could be entered upon with the certainty of success. -These were the opinions he held as to Germany's real objects. - -Therefore, in opposition to the views of important personages in Great -Britain and in Allied countries, Clemenceau withstood any frittering -away of force on tempting adventures, away from the main field of -warfare. This not because he confined himself to the narrow programme -of freeing France from the invaders, but because the waste of troops -on wild-cat enterprises weakened the general strength of the Allies at -the crucial point of the whole struggle. In that decision his judgment -was at one with the ablest British strategists, and the event has -shown that he did not underrate the importance of the warfare on the -Western front. There alone, especially after the collapse of Russia, -was it possible to deliver a crushing blow at the German power. There -alone could all the forces of the Allies of the West be effectively -concentrated for the final blow. - - - - - CHAPTER XVIII - - THE GREAT WAR - - -The events of the great war, from 1914 onwards, are too recent and -too deeply graven on all our minds to call for lengthy recital or -criticism. What many, if not most, people believed to be outside the -limits of calculation occurred. The German armies commenced their -campaign by outraging the neutrality of Belgium, which, in 1870, even -Bismarck had respected. In a few days they crashed down the great -Belgian fortresses, which capable experts had calculated would check -the Teutonic advance for at least a month, with howitzers specially -constructed and tested for that purpose; soon they exhausted the -resources of barbarism in torturing, butchering and shooting down -unarmed men, women and children whose country they had solemnly sworn -to safeguard; and they devastated and destroyed homes, beautiful -buildings, and great libraries, which even a Turcoman horde might -have spared, and extorted tremendous ransom and blood-money from the -defenceless inhabitants. - -That accomplished, this torrent of ruffianism and infamy poured in upon -France with almost irresistible fury. The horrors of 1870-71 were far -outdone. The defeats of Mons, Charleroi and Metz, the impossibility -that their opponents should resist such overwhelming odds, made the -Germans believe that for the second time in half a century they would -force Paris to surrender. Then they were prepared to wreak upon the -great city, the social capital of Europe, the full vengeance of -destruction. - -It is not easy, even for those who remember what occurred in the -terrible year of the downfall of the Second Empire, and the prostration -of the French Republic before the German invaders, to imagine what -were the feelings of all Frenchmen who went through that period of -martyrdom for their country when they saw a still worse storm of -brutality and hatred breaking out upon them--when, too, more rapidly -than before, Amiens was in danger and Paris seriously threatened. -Clemenceau, with his devotion to France and almost worship of the city -where he had spent his whole manhood, was more hardly hit than perhaps -any of his countrymen. He had experienced the horrors of the former -invasion; and though, when France was at its lowest, he never despaired -of the Republic, no ordinary man of seventy-three could possess the -resource and resilience of a man of thirty. - -Yet Clemenceau showed little loss of vigour compared with his former -self. No Englishman has ever undergone what he underwent at that -period. Undoubtedly, when the news came to us of the great retreat of -August, 1914, our heartfelt sympathy went out to our own men. We were -all likewise full of admiration for our French comrades who still held -the Franco-British line unbroken. But at least our hearths and homes -were kept in safety for us--the raids of aircraft excepted--by the -magnificent courage of our sailors in the North Sea and of our soldiers -who freely gave their lives to protect us from the enemy. If we would -fully appreciate what was happening to France and Belgium, in spite -of all their efforts, we must imagine the county of Durham completely -occupied by the German hordes, Yorkshire overrun and the chance of -saving London from the enemy dependent upon the result of a battle to -be fought in the neighbourhood of Cambridge. It would be well if we -could display at such a crisis in England the same cool courage that -the Parisians did; if we had generals at our disposal such as Joffre -and Foch and Gallieni; and statesmen in reserve such as Clemenceau. -That was how things looked prior to the first battle of the Marne, -which checked the early flood of German invasion and removed for the -time being the necessity for retiring from Amiens and Epernay and -moving the seat of government from Paris. - -During the whole of this trying period Clemenceau never lost heart -for a moment, nor his head either; and day after day in his journal -he surveyed the whole situation without fear, devoid of illusion, -yet confident always that France and her Allies could not be beaten -to their knees. When things looked worst and Paris was being drained -of her population by order, in preparation for a siege, and when the -Government was about to be removed to Bordeaux, this is how Clemenceau -wrote, recalling the past to cheer his countrymen in the present: - -"The seat of government at Bordeaux is a new phase of the war which -must follow its course: a renewal of the war in the Provinces, as in -the days of the Gambettas, of the Freycinets. The same struggle against -the same German invasion, with the capital of France reduced to the -simple condition of a fortress, with France herself--provincial France, -as we say--taking in hand her own defence outside the traditional lines -of political and administrative concentration in which she has lived. - -"How men and times have changed! . . . And now after full -four-and-forty years I find myself again at Bordeaux, before the -theatre I had not seen since 1871, looking for men who had undergone -the misery of survival and failing to find them. Who now remembers that -Jules Simon on his arrival had in his pocket an order for the arrest -of Gambetta? In the Provinces, as in Paris, foreign war and civil war -were being carried on. I only recall these terrible memories of past -dissensions to enhance the value of the magnificent consolation that -uplifts our hearts at the spectacle of the truly fraternal union of all -the Frenchmen of to-day. Gambetta maintained the war against invasion -in the midst of the most cruel attacks of a merciless opposition. -Compare this with the present attitude of all parties in the presence -of a Government from which all only demand that every means should be -used with the maximum of efficiency." Nor does the writer hesitate -even at this moment of trial to criticise the shortcomings of his -countrymen. As opposed to the persistent preparations of Germany, -Frenchmen, he says, have been too careless, too light-hearted, too apt -to rely upon the inspiration and enthusiasm of the moment to repair -their neglect, "while an implacable enemy was sharpening his sword -against us with unwearying zeal." And this had been proved to be the -truth years before; while so lately as November 22nd, 1913, the French -Ambassador in Berlin, M. Jules Cambon, had solemnly warned M. Pichon, -then as now French Minister for Foreign Affairs, "For some time past -hostility against us is more marked, and the Emperor has ceased to be a -partisan of peace." - -The man who used his pen to tell Frenchmen disagreeable truths in -this wise and followed them up by giving chapter and verse from the -French Yellow Book, with the text of the threatening conversations -of the Emperor and General von Moltke with the King of the Belgians, -may be granted the credit of entirely disregarding his own political -interests, at least. - -So also when the Anglo-French forces had won the great seven days' -battle on the Marne, Clemenceau at once uttered a note of warning -against undue confidence and excessive elation. "Let us be very careful -not to believe that we can reckon upon an uninterrupted series of -successes up to the final destruction of the aggressor. The curtain -falls on the horrible scenes of foreign invasion in Belgium and -France. A mortal blow has been inflicted upon the invincible Kaiser -who had never fought a battle. . . . But it would be sheer madness to -imagine that we have nearly finished with an enemy who will shortly -obtain fresh forces, vast forces even, from his uninvaded territory. -A great part of his military resources are still untouched. Automatic -discipline will soon reassert itself. The struggle will last very long -yet and be full of unforeseen dangers. The stake is too heavy for the -German Empire to decide suddenly to give up the game. Remember your -mistakes of the past, rejoice soberly in your victory of the present, -make ready now for still heavier trials in the future." Such was the -counsel of Clemenceau to Frenchmen on September 15th, 1914. Above all, -"Leave nothing you can help to chance. Our military leaders have just -victoriously undergone racking anxieties. It is for us to show our -confidence in them by giving them credit for the patience and firmness -which they will desperately need." - -Similarly in regard to the magnificent series of defensive victories -at Verdun, of which Clemenceau gives a fine picturesque account. -After justly glorifying the prowess of the heroic French soldiery, -whose chances of victory at the commencement of those long weeks -of unceasing battle seemed small indeed; after bitter sarcasms on -the miserable Crown Prince with his premature jubilations over his -supreme carefully stage-managed "triumph"; after a terrible picture -of masses of the German troops marching through a hurricane to what -they were assured was certain victory and then their dead bodies -literally kept erect by the pressure of their dead comrades as a mass -of corpses--after all this, and his legitimate pride in the hardly won -victory, Clemenceau goes on to remind his countrymen again that this -is not the end. "Verdun is the greatest drama of resistance. But all, -All must at once set to work to make ready for a thorough offensive: a -complete offensive that needs no interpretation. For this we must have -_preparation_. For this we must have _science_. For this we must have -_method_. For this we must have _manœuvres_. Keep those words well in -mind, for nothing can be worse than to forget them. Never too soon: -never too late. What would be the cost to us, in our turn, of a _coup -manqué_?" - -That is the tone throughout. But here and there in _L'Homme Enchaîné_ -we find Clemenceau the controversialist in a lighter, but not less -telling, style. I give an extract from his scathing attack on the -Danish littérateur, M. Brandès, in the original:-- - -"Oui, retenez-le, lecteur, la crainte de M. Brandès dans les -circonstances actuelles est que l'Allemagne puisse être humiliée! Le -Danemark a été humilié par le _peuple de seigneurs_ qu'est la race -allemande. La France aussi, je crois, et la Belgique même; peut-être -Brandès le reconnaitra-t-il. Il n'a pas protesté. Il refuse même de -s'expliquer a cet égard, alléguant que son silence (assez prolixe) -est d'or--d'un or qui ne résisterait pas à la pierre de touche. Mais -sa crainte suprême est que les machinateurs du plus grand attentat -contre la civilisation, contre l'indépendance des peuples, contre la -dignité de l'espèce humaine, les auteurs des épouvantables forfaits -dont saignent encore la Belgique et la France n'éprouvent une -_humiliation_."[B] Brandès among the neutrals is of the same type as -Romain Rolland and Bertrand Russell among the belligerents. All their -sympathies are reserved for the criminals. And there are others, who -are actually eager to embrace the murderers as their "German friends"! - -In quite another style is his tribute to Garibaldi when his son -Ricciotti--two of whose own sons had fallen fighting for France against -the Germans--was himself visiting Paris:-- - -"Garibaldi was one of those magicians who give their commands to the -peoples. These are the true performers of miracles. For they take no -account of human powers when the spirit of superhumanity impels them -to adventures of rash madness which for them prove to be evidence of -supreme sanity. - -"Those who know, or think they know, talk. But words are not life. -Living humanity instinctively gives its devotion to men who rise up, in -historic episodes whose law is to us unknown, to accomplish in their -heroic simplicity precisely those very feats which 'reason' had never -anticipated. To achieve this miracle calls for the man. It requires -also the historic moment. The hour struck, and Garibaldi was there. -But of that hour he himself was to a marvellous degree the mild yet -imperious expression. Obviously inspired with an idea, he refused to -see obstacles or to recognise impossibilities. 'I shall go through with -it,' and through he went. That seems simple enough to-day. How was it -no one was found to do it before him? He went through with it, handing -over the crown to royal supplicants, and then hid himself in his island -to avoid the annoyance of his glory. - -"He had given freedom. Let freedom do its work." - -During the whole of the struggle, even when the military situation -looked most desperate for the future of his country, Clemenceau never -lost confidence. His faith in France and her steadfast ally Great -Britain never wavered. That was a great service he then rendered to -France and civilisation. But he did more. At a time when on the other -side of the Channel, as in Great Britain, in Italy, and in Russia, -the national spirit was clouded by deep suspicion of enemy influence, -bribery and corruption in high places, with almost criminal weakness, -when strength and determination were essential to success, Clemenceau -did not hesitate to denounce treachery where he believed it to exist. -Nothing like his courage in this respect has, unfortunately, been -shown by statesmen in any other of the Allied countries. The fact -that fomenters of reaction were, for their own ends, engaged on the -like task of exposing the men who were unworthy of the Republic did -not deter him, bitterly opposed as he was to the Royalist clique of -which M. Léon Daudet was the chief spokesman, from demanding thorough -investigation and the punishment of traitors, if traitors there were, -in their midst. The time has not yet come to estimate the full value of -the work he thus did, or the dangers from which, by his frankness, he -saved the Republic. - -But already we can form a judgment of the perils which surrounded -France in 1917. The feeling of depression and distrust was growing. The -organisation of the forces of the Allies was inferior to that of the -enemy. The effect of the collapse of Russia was becoming more serious -each day. Great Britain, which had rendered France quite invaluable -aid in all departments, had accepted Mr. Lloyd George's personal -strategy, which consisted in breaking through to the Rhine frontier by -way of Jerusalem and Jericho, owing to the apparent hopelessness of a -favourable decision on the West front. The French Government itself, -alarmed at the enormous sacrifices France was making in every way, -discouraged at the progress of the defeatist movement which weakened -the position of Socialists in the Cabinet, and alarmed at the manner in -which German agents and German spies, whom they were afraid to arrest, -pervaded almost every department--the French Government, itself shaken -daily by attacks from the Right and from the Left, felt incapable of -dealing with the situation as a whole. There was, for a moment, a -sensation in Paris not far removed from despair. - -At this juncture a cry arose for Clemenceau. For many years he had -predicted the German attack. For more than a full generation he had -adjured his fellow-Frenchmen to prepare vigorously for the defence -of _la Patrie_. That he feared nobody all were well aware. Of his -patriotism there was no doubt. Then, as more than forty years before, -he never despaired of the Republic. Old as he was, whatever his defects -of temper, whatever his shortcomings in other respects, the one man -for such a crisis was Georges Clemenceau. Office was thus forced upon -him, and, as he stated, he accepted power strongly against his will. -At seventy-six, and approaching seventy-seven, not the most ambitious -politician would be eager to take upon himself the responsibility of -coping with such difficulties as Clemenceau was called upon to face. -It was hard enough to undertake as Minister of War the onerous work of -that exhausting department. - -But still more trying was the necessity imposed upon him of dealing -with the traitors of various degree who had been trading upon the -lives and sacrifices of the men at the front. Probably no other French -statesman would have dared to enter upon this dangerous and difficult -task. The suspected men were highly placed, both politically and -financially. They were surrounded by influential cliques and coteries, -in Parliament and in the Press, to whom it was almost a matter of life -and death to prevent disclosures which would inevitably be made, if the -various cases were brought into court. It was even doubtful whether he -would get the support of the Assembly, the Senate, or the Presidents of -Council who preceded him, if he decided to push things to extremity, -as, in view of his own criticisms and denunciations, he was bound to -do. Should such misfortune occur or should the malefactors be indicted -and acquitted, all that Clemenceau had been saying against them would -turn to the advantage of the domestic enemy. It was a great risk to run. - -There was also another obstacle in the way of Clemenceau's acceptance -of the Premiership. The relations between himself and M. Poincaré, -the President of the Republic, had been anything but good. M. -Clemenceau had energetically championed the claim of M. Pams for the -Presidency. M. Pams had been, in fact, M. Clemenceau's candidate, as -MM. Sadi-Carnot, Loubet and Fallières had been before him. This time -he did not win. The fight was fierce, the personal animosity between -the parties very keen, and M. Poincaré's victory was asserted to have -been achieved by intrigue of a doubtful character. The war had called -a truce to individual rancour, and the _union sacrée_ was supposed -to inspire all hearts. Still it was by no means certain that trouble -would not come from that quarter. A President of Council with a hostile -President of the Republic over against him must find the difficulty of -the post at such a time immensely increased. - -Then there were the Socialists to consider. True, they had taken -office in the Cabinet of M. Briand, whose policy towards strikers of -anarchist methods had been even more stern than that of M. Clemenceau. -But they regarded Clemenceau as an unforgivable enemy. The calling in -of the military at Courrières, at Narbonne, Montpellier and St. Béziers -had never been forgotten. Clemenceau for them was the Tiger crossed -with the Kalmuck. It was far more important, the French Socialists -apparently thought, to hamper Clemenceau and prevent him from forming -an administration than it was to beat the German armies and clear -France of the Boches. Such, at any rate, was the opinion of a minority, -which afterwards became the majority, of the party. Therefore, even -Socialists who thoroughly sympathised with Clemenceau in his policy -towards Germany, and had previously taken part in a Cabinet pledged to -carry on the war "_jusqu'au bout_," would have nothing to do with a -Clemenceau Administration. The upshot of these fatuous, anti-patriotic -and anti-Socialist tactics on their part will be seen later. Yet the -knowledge that the Socialists as a whole would give him at best a -lukewarm support, and at worst would vigorously oppose him, was not an -encouraging factor in the general calculation of what might occur. - -Neither could high finance be relied upon. The great bankers, great -brokers, and great money institutions as a whole, were heartily sick of -the war. They wanted peace with Germany on almost any terms, if only -they could get back to business and begin to recoup their losses during -more than three years of war. Nor, apart from downright treachery of -which he held positive proof, could the proposed new Premier close his -eyes to the fact that German influence had so subtly and thoroughly -pervaded the French money market that many Frenchmen were still looking -at the economic problems of France through spectacles made and tinted -in Germany. - -There was consequently a combination possible which might drive -Clemenceau headlong out of office at any moment, if he entered upon his -second attempt to control French affairs at such a desperately critical -stage of the war. - -But the formidable old Radical leader did not hesitate. Sceptic as he -might be in all else, one entity he did believe in: the unshakable -greatness of France: one Frenchman he could rely upon--himself. - - - - - CHAPTER XIX - - THE ENEMY WITHIN - - -During the whole of the war, as for many years before the Germans -began their great campaign of aggression, every country with which the -Fatherland might in any way be concerned was permeated with German -agents and German spies. Great Britain was one of the nations specially -favoured in this respect. The ramifications of their systematic -interpenetration of the social, political, financial, commercial -and even journalistic departments of our public life have never yet -been fully exposed; nor, certainly, have the very important personages -who conducted this sinister propaganda been dealt with. Even when the -Defence of the Realm Act is ended and the Censorship is abrogated, it -is doubtful if the full truth will ever be generally known, so powerful -are the influences directly interested in its suppression. - -In the United States of America, where similar work was done upon an -enormous scale and at vast expense, under circumstances still more -favourable to success than in this island, the American Government -acted with a decision and a vigour that are not yet understood. Even -so, the amount of mischief done was very great, and, for the first two -years of the war at least, the German efforts were largely successful. -That a duly accredited Ambassador to a friendly power should have been -at the head of this vast conspiracy in America, as Count Bernstorff -unquestionably was, introduces a new and most dangerous precedent into -the comity of international relations. Italy, in like manner, suffered -very seriously from German intrigues. The history of the carefully -organised disaster upon the Isonzo has yet to be written. That it was -the result of well-arranged collaboration between clerical organisers -of treachery, inspired by Austria, German agents, with unlimited -financial backing, who had sympathisers in high place, and honest -and dishonest fanatics of the pacifist persuasion, does not admit of -question. Certain it is that in this one case alone German underground -machinations were responsible for the crushing defeat of an army of -500,000 men, holding a position where 50,000 good troops could have -held a million at bay.[C] - -But if Great Britain, the United States, and Italy were thus -honeycombed with secret service agents from Germany, the nation which -the Kaiser, his Chief of Staff and the Junkers were most anxious to -crush down beyond the possibility of recovery was still more imperilled -by astute German infiltration. Up to the crisis of Agadir in 1911, -French finance was, to an ever increasing extent, manipulated by German -Jews, who made it their special business to become more Parisian than -the Parisians themselves. They were consequently regarded with favour -by people whose patriotism was beyond question. Scarcely a great -French finance institution but had close relations in some form with -Germans, whose continuous attention to business and excellent general -information rendered them valuable coadjutors for the French, who, as -a rule, are not very exactly informed on foreign matters. Very few saw -any danger in this. It seemed, indeed, a natural result of the great -growth of German trade, as well as of the position which Germans had -acquired as capable managers of the growing French factory industry in -the North-Eastern provinces. - -This latter point is of importance. So long as any industry remains in -the old form, where individual skill, meticulous attention to detail, -and close observance of quality are the rule, the French are second -to none in their methods. But when the next stage is reached, and -machine production reigns on a very large scale, with its concomitant -standardisation of output, then the French seem to fail for lack of -the thorough organising faculty of the German or the American. Hence -in many directions the highly educated, methodical, progressive -foreigner from across the frontier had begun to take the place of the -more conservative Frenchman. This process could be observed in the -department of motor-cars, where the French, who were undoubtedly the -pioneers, had begun to fall behind upon the world market in the time -just anterior to the war. Not only the Americans, but the Germans, and -even Italy, showed more capacity to gauge the necessities of the coming -period than France in their output of cars. - -But, in addition to this, Frenchmen, the most thrifty people in the -world, are disinclined to use their savings in the development of their -own country. In literature, in science, in art, they display great -faculties of initiative. In the matter of investment they prefer to -rely upon others. Even the underground railways of their metropolis -were started by a foreigner: the French investors only coming in to buy -the debentures of companies which they might just as well have started -themselves. They complained that the Germans were making vast profits -out of "their own" iron mines of Lorraine which had been taken from -France in an undeveloped state in 1871; yet they failed to exploit the -still richer deposits in Briey, of which the Germans were so envious -that the desire to possess them was one of the minor causes of the war. -Similar instances of neglected opportunities could be pointed out in -many districts. - -This indifference of the thrifty French investors to the possibility -of enriching their own country by the use at home of the money capital -obtained from their own savings, and the profits derived from visitors, -astonished lookers-on. Clemenceau denounced the folly of financial wars -of conquest in semi-civilised countries when France needed her own -resources for the improvement of her own soil and what underlay it, as -well as to make adequate preparation for war. But the loans to foreign -nations and foreign banks were economically as prejudicial to her real -interests as the injurious colonial policy. That was proved only too -clearly, even in the field of military preparation when, in August and -September, 1914, tens of thousands of men, unsupplied with clothing and -equipment, were to be seen in and around Paris. England had to provide -them with what they required. - -In such a state of affairs, where neglect of consideration as to the -purposes of loans was the rule, so long as the interest seemed quite -secure, German banks could and did act with great advantage. They -borrowed French savings at a low rate and employed them for profitable -objects, or for their own more complete war preparations on economical -terms. After the shock of Agadir, when war at one period seemed -certain, the French called in most of their loans and thenceforward -were rather more cautious. But, in the meantime, and even afterwards, -France's savings had been used to strengthen her bitterest enemy. -And this was the end the Germans kept constantly in view when they -borrowed. France, in fact, built up German credit against herself, at -the same time that Germany was able to estimate exactly the economic -power of her destined victim, and to investigate, without appearing to -do so, the weak points in French preparation for defence. The German -banks and their French friends played together the same game, in a -different way, that the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank did in -London and the Banca Commerciale in Italy. The whole formed part of the -vast economic octopus scheme, in finance and in industry, which went -hand in hand with the co-ordination of military effort destined for -attack. - -It is easy to discern how all this peaceful financial manipulation -played into the hands of the German Government and fostered German -influence in Paris and in France. There was nothing which could be -reasonably objected to, under the conditions of to-day, if Holland, or -Belgium, had been the nation concerned. But with Germany it was quite -different. - -Not only was French money being used on German account, but, under -cover of quite legitimate finance and apparently genuine newspaper -enterprise, most nefarious schemes were hatched in peace whose full -utility to the enemy would only be disclosed in war. Taking no account -even of the actual operations of bribery, which we now know were -carried on upon a very large scale, everybody who was directly or -indirectly interested in the various forms of parasitical Franco-German -finance had personally excellent reasons for pooh-poohing distrust of -the friendly nation on the other side of the frontier. Thus the most -pressing warnings addressed to the French Government might be rendered -almost useless--as, in fact, they were--by influence brought to bear -from quarters that were pecuniarily above suspicion. An atmosphere -favourable to German propaganda was created which covered up and -favoured the sinister plans of men and women who were actually in -German pay. This went on long before the war, and was continued in -still more dangerous shape after the war had begun. - -Then there were the honest pacifists, who regarded all war, even -defensive war, as disastrous to the workers. Whether Germany won or -France won in any conflict, the capitalists and the capitalists alone -were the real enemy. Two such different men as Edouard Vaillant and -Gustave Hervé held this opinion; and both at great international -Socialist congresses declared that every effort should be made to -prevent France from coming to an actual struggle with Germany, no -matter what the provocation might be. When, however, they saw what -the policy of the Kaiser and his Junker militarists really meant they -changed their minds. So, in the early days of the war, did the majority -of French Socialists; and several of their principal men, including -Jules Guesde, the leader of the Marxists, and Albert Thomas, joined M. -Briand's Cabinet. - -But there was always an active section left which in all good faith -stood to their views that under the capitalist system nothing could -justify the workers of one country in killing the workers of another. -They had no interest in their own nation which was worth defending -in the field. The past of France was for them a record of class -oppression, the present of France the continuance of chattel slavery in -disguise, the future of France no better than the permanence of penal -servitude for life as wage-slaves to the bourgeoisie. German domination -could be no worse for them than the economic tyranny of their own -capitalist countrymen. - -This form of social fanaticism now exists in every European nation. -It is as bitter and, given the opportunity, as unscrupulous and cruel -as any form of religious intolerance that ever exercised control. -Economic theory entirely obscures history and facts with such men. -Not even the awful horrors of the German invasion, horrors quite -unprecedented in modern warfare and systematically practised in -order to engender terror, and destroy the means of creating wealth, -could convert Socialists of this school. As a Socialist I understand -their fanaticism, though I despise their judgment. Capitalism under -the control of home employers and financiers is bad, but it can be -controlled by educated workers. Capitalism in victorious alliance with -foreign Junkerdom would have made France uninhabitable for Frenchmen, -and would have thrown back democratic Socialism for at least two -generations throughout Europe. - -Nevertheless, this furious minority, in conjunction with Socialists of -political intrigue, among whom Jean Longuet (son of Charles Longuet -the member of the Commune and grandson of Karl Marx) was the leader, -became eventually the majority, owing to the weakness of the heads of -the patriotic section. This success laid the French Socialist Party -open to the charge of being not only anti-patriotic but definitely -pro-German. It led to the retirement of forty-one Deputies from the -"unified" combination. The violent animosity of the main body to -Clemenceau at the time when he was forced into office, and the refusal -of Socialists to accept portfolios in his Cabinet, when the cause of -the Allies was at its lowest point, from November, 1917, to July, -1918, looked to outsiders a miserable policy for the party, not to be -explained by the devotion of its members to MM. Malvy and Caillaux.[D] -Personal malevolence and political pusillanimity together were the -imputations made against those who thus declined to serve France in -her utmost need. Happily for Europe, their strength was not equal to -their ill-will, and Clemenceau, after his first month of power, was -able to treat them as a negligible quantity. So they remain to-day. -A very great opportunity of serving the workers of their country has -been missed: that the bitterest enemy of France and of freedom has not -been greatly helped in her war for universal domination is no fault of -theirs. - -During the first three years and more of the war, however, a conspiracy -was being conducted which, aided unfortunately by much of apathy and -ineptitude on the part of successive French Governments, and supported -unintentionally or intentionally by one of the leading statesmen of -France, went near to wrecking the fortunes of the Republic. That this -fateful plot failed to achieve the full success which the Germans -anticipated from it is due to Clemenceau. Sordid monetary sympathy with -the enemy is difficult to forgive: Socialist fanaticism and Socialist -intrigues which must tell to the disadvantage of the nation are hard -to reconcile with common honesty; but downright infamous treachery, -bribery, corruption, and wholesale attempts to organise defeat put all -who are guilty of them outside the law. Yet matters had come to such a -pass that all these various forms of treason to France, to the Allies, -and to soldiers at the front could be carried on with impunity. - -Though the guilty persons were well known and their German plots were -scarcely concealed, none of the Ministers responsible for the public -safety dared arrest them. Journals that were obviously published in the -interest of the enemy were allowed to spread false information as they -pleased, and to attack all statesmen and politicians who were honestly -trying to serve France with vitriolic misrepresentation. Day after -day this went on. Day after day, as the situation without grew more -precarious, the chiefs of this criminal endeavour to bring France to -ruin grew bolder in their well-paid treachery. The people of Paris and -the soldiery in the trenches, whose minds also German agents strove to -debauch with plausible lies, were becoming hopeless of justice being -done. Ministry succeeded Ministry and still the traitors were treated -with consideration by the Minister of the Interior, M. Malvy, and other -men in high place. - -Beyond question the man officially responsible for all this shameful -laxity, at one of the most trying crises of the whole war, was M. -Malvy, who enjoyed the whole-souled support of the Socialist Party, -on account of creditable behaviour towards the workers, altogether -outside of questions arising from the war. But his conduct in regard -to traitors and pro-Germans had become so weak as to be capable of the -worst interpretation. - -On July 24th, 1917, Clemenceau declared that he utterly distrusted -M. Malvy. It was known even thus early that this Minister had shown -deplorable incapacity in his dealings with men who are known to have -been actual traitors. He had, in fact, decided not to arrest persons -enumerated in what was called "List B," that is to say, men and women -more than suspected of criminal intrigue against France. Had not -Almereyda himself assured M. Malvy, as Minister of the Interior, that -he and all other Anarchists and anti-patriotic agitators would really -desist from their sinister proceedings? This was enough. Without -taking any steps against them, or even obtaining any security for the -fulfilment of this promise in the air, M. Malvy left these miscreants -alone to do what they pleased. So things went on as before; though, as -has since been proved, several of these active agitators for peace, -disaffection and surrender were paid agents of the German Government. - -When, therefore, a resolution of confidence in M. Ribot's -Administration was proposed in the Senate, Clemenceau voted for the -resolution, but made special exception in the case of M. Malvy, in whom -he declared he had no confidence whatever. Later, Clemenceau boldly -accused M. Ribot and his whole Administration of being themselves -all responsible for the existence of the treacherous German Bonnet -Rouge and Bolo conspiracy. Most unfortunately, notwithstanding the -universal distrust thus awakened and spreading from Paris throughout -France, Republican Ministers, who ought to have been the first to move -to safeguard the interests of France and her Republic, against the -dangerous plots of men known to be immersed in abominable dealings with -the enemy, failed altogether in their duty. They left it to avowed -Royalists and reactionaries to lead the attack upon persons guilty of -these crimes. What, consequently, ought to have been done at once, -legally and thoroughly, by men who had received political power by vote -of the French people, and were trustees for the defence of the country, -against the foreign enemy from without and the domestic enemy within, -was left largely to be accomplished by M. Léon Daudet and M. Barrès. - -These men made no secret of the fact that they were actuated by motives -entirely antagonistic to the democratic policy of the Allies and -hostile to the only form of government possible in France. This did -not render their indictment less crushing when the facts were fully -disclosed, but it certainly weakened the force of the attack. What -is more, it gave a large and, later, apparently the largest section -of the Socialist Party the excuse, which they were eager to grasp, -for supporting M. Malvy, and more particularly their friend M. Joseph -Caillaux, against what they were pleased to denounce as abominable -detraction. - -Newspapers to-day are credited, perhaps, with more political influence -than they really possess. But it is clear that if nearly the whole -of the important press of a country can be captured by a particular -faction, and only such news is allowed to be published as suits the -convenience of the Government in power, the people at large have no -means of correcting the false impressions of events thus thrust upon -them. That is an extreme case, which has, so far, been realised, in -practice, in only one country. But the German agents who were so -active in Paris were fully alive to the advantages of such a policy -of purchase and manipulation of the press for their own ends. They -made efforts to secure a control of the majority of the shares in some -of the most influential journals of Paris. How far this process was -surreptitiously carried will never be known: not far enough, certainly, -to affect the tone of the organs they were anxious to manipulate. - -But enough was done to show the great danger which would have resulted -to the community, had a newspaper trust been successfully created on -the scale contemplated, but fortunately never carried out, by the -infamous Bolo Pasha and his associates. Their own journal, _Le Bonnet -Rouge_, even when increased during the war from a weekly to a daily -issue, was not by any means sufficient for their needs, although that -traitorous sheet alone was able to do a great deal of mischief. But -their control was extended to the _Journal_, a paper, prior to the -war, of considerable circulation and influence. Their attempts to -expand further were in full swing when, thanks to the work of MM. Léon -Daudet and Barrès in the _Action_ _Française_, and still more to that -of their bitter opponent Clemenceau in _l'Homme Enchaîné_ and in the -Senate, the French Government was forced to arrest the proprietors of -the _Bonnet Rouge_ and put them on their trial as traitors. It was -known that M. Caillaux and M. Paix-Séailles--the latter connected -with M. Painlevé's Cabinet and the repository of anti-French -confidences--had contributed considerable sums to the support of the -incriminated paper. - -When M. Almereyda, one of the most important persons connected with the -_Bonnet Rouge_ (to whose columns a leading Socialist was a contributor) -died suddenly in prison, the editor of that journal telegraphed to M. -Caillaux concerning the lamentable departure of "our friend." As these -facts were accompanied by other revelations still more compromising, -public opinion became greatly excited. There could be no doubt that -the conspiracy was more than a mere anti-patriotic newspaper intrigue -of financial origin, or an attempt of discredited politicians to -float themselves back into office on the wave of discouragement and -defeatism: it was an endeavour, supported throughout by German funds, -to destroy French confidence in order to ensure French destruction. -A complete exposure of the whole plot, in which M. Caillaux and Bolo -Pasha were alleged to be the leading figures, was threatened in -the course of the _Bonnet Rouge_ trial. Eleven members of the Army -Committee of the Senate were appointed to consider M. Caillaux's -connection with M. Almereyda and the _Bonnet Rouge_. - -M. Caillaux has been by far the most formidable advocate of a German -peace from the first. That an ex-Premier of France should take up such -a position would seem almost incredible, but that Signor Giolitti in -Italy and Lord Lansdowne in England have pursued the same course in a -less objectionable way. The political relations between Clemenceau and -M. Caillaux in the years prior to the war had not been unfriendly. M. -Caillaux had been Finance Minister in Clemenceau's Cabinet in 1907, and -they had both worked together for M. Pams against M. Poincaré in the -contest for the Presidency. But two more different personalities it -would be difficult to find. - -M. Caillaux is a financier of financiers. His whole career has been -associated with the dexterous manipulation and acquisition of money -in all its forms. Clemenceau never had anything to do with finance in -his fife, and wealth is the last thing anybody could accuse him of -possessing. Clemenceau, though no sentimentalist, makes an exception -in his view of life where Frenchmen, France and Paris are concerned. -With Caillaux audacious cynicism in everything is the key-note of -his character all through. Moreover, the one is very simple in his -habits, and the other is devoted to ostentation and display. Caillaux's -cynicism is as remarkable as that of Henry Labouchere, though more -malignant. When he carried the Income Tax through the Assembly and was -upbraided for having made himself the champion of such a measure, he -claimed that, though he had obtained for his measure a majority in the -Assembly, he had used such arguments as would destroy it in the country. - -Whatever may be the truth of that story, it is certain that the -result has been as predicted. So in the course of the Agadir affair. -M. Caillaux, as Prime Minister during the whole of the proceedings, -was reluctant, and perhaps rightly so, to assert the claims of -France with vigour. He was, in fact, quite lukewarm on behalf of his -country, the representatives of other nations doing more for France, -it is said, than she, or her Premier, did for herself. No sooner, -however, was the business settled than M. Caillaux, the judicious but -unavowed anti-expansionist, claimed that he had secured Morocco for -France! However this may be, M. Caillaux has always favoured a close -political and financial understanding with Germany, as by far the more -advantageous policy for France, in opposition to a similar _entente_ -with England: a view which, of course, he was quite entitled to take -and act upon, though its success in practice must have reduced France -to the position of a mere satellite of the Fatherland. Before the war -it was possibly a justifiable, though scarcely a far-seeing, policy. - -The war itself rather strengthened than weakened his tendency in this -direction. Having comfortably recovered from the unpleasing effect -of the murder of M. Calmette of the _Figaro_, for which crime his -wife was acquitted, he used all his influence, in and out of France, -to bring about a peace with Germany, which could with difficulty be -distinguished from complete surrender, as soon as possible. This while -the German armies were in actual occupation of more than a fifth of his -devastated country, that fifth being the richest part of France. His -interviews with Signer Giolitti, a vehement partisan of Germany, and -certain strange intrigues in Rome and elsewhere, could only be regarded -as the more suspicious from the fact that he travelled with a passport -made out in a fictitious name. Altogether M. Caillaux's proceedings at -home and abroad, in Europe and in South America, gave the impression -that he was pursuing a policy of his own which was diametrically -opposed to the welfare of his countrymen. - -Some who have watched closely M. Caillaux's career from his youth up -are of opinion that the man is mad. But there is certainly method -in his madness. Whatever the defects to which the high priests of -international financial brotherhood may plead guilty, they never -admit lunatics into their Teutono-Hebraic Holy of Holies. Access to -the interior of that sanctuary is reserved for the very elect of the -artists in pecuniary conveyance. But it is precisely within this -innermost circle of glorified Mammon that M. Joseph Caillaux is most -at home and most influential. And these people, so ensconced in their -golden temple, were the ones most anxious to bring the war to an end no -matter what became of France. This, as has been well said, was a civil -war for Jews; but for the Jews of the great international of Mammon -it was civil war and hari-kari at one and the same time. So there was -weeping and wail in Frankfurt-am-Main, there was wringing of hands in -Berlin on the Spree, and the Parisian devotees of the golden calf were -not less profuse in their lamentations. - -As a matter of fact, international finance was, and is, the most -pacifist of all the Internationals, and M. Joseph Caillaux as director -of the _Société Générale_, a portion of the great _Banque de Paris et -Pays Bas_, represented its view perfectly. But that he is not devoid -of political as well as financial astuteness is apparent from the -extraordinary success he has achieved in securing close intimacy and -friendship with the French Socialists. This has assured him the support -not only of Jean Longuet and his friends, with whom he was specially -bound up, but also of _L'Humanité_, with Renaudel, Sembat, Thomas and -others connected with that useful journal. It has, indeed, been very -difficult to understand the bitter hatred which the Socialists of -France have manifested towards the thoroughgoing patriot Clemenceau, -and their persistent championship of pro-Germans such as Caillaux -and Malvy. But the dry-rot of pro-Germanic pacifism has infected a -large proportion of the younger school of international Socialists -in every country. With Socialism, as with commerce and finance, the -German policy of unscrupulous penetration has been pursued with great -success. Honest fanatics as well as self-seeking intriguers have fallen -victims to their wiles. Caillaux was equally fortunate in capturing -both sections. Even the rougher type of German agents, such as Bolo and -Duval, were not without their friends in the Socialist camp. - -The investigation of his conduct before the Army Committee of the -Senate was, in effect, an informal trial of M. Caillaux, M. Malvy's -case having already been remitted by the same body for definite -adjudication by the High Court. Naturally, M. Caillaux and his friends -strained every nerve, first to prevent Clemenceau from being forced -into office by public opinion; and then, when his assumption of -the Premiership became inevitable, to upset his Ministry while its -members were scarcely warm in their seats. The French Socialist Party, -unfortunately, aided M. Caillaux and his friends in their attacks, -after having declined the Premier's offer of seats in his Cabinet. -Shortly afterwards Clemenceau himself was summoned to appear as a -witness before the Committee of the Senate on this serious indictment. -It is difficult for us to imagine the sensation which this produced. -Here was M. Caillaux, who had been Prime Minister of France only a -few short years before, who had previously been Clemenceau's intimate -colleague, openly charged with the despicable crime of trading France -away to the enemy. - -No wonder a great many thoroughly patriotic Frenchmen could not -believe, even in the face of the evidence, that a statesman of M. -Caillaux's ability, with a great future before him after the war, could -be guilty of such actions as those which were imputed to him. But his -old colleague who had just taken office was in possession of documents -which threw an ugly shadow upon all M. Caillaux's recent proceedings. -As usual Clemenceau went straight to the point. The Government had not -furnished the members of the Committee with mere surmises or doubts -cast upon the general conduct of the incriminated person. There were -printed statements already at their disposal of the gravest character. -With three notorious persons M. Caillaux had intimate connections. -One of them, when arrested, had died suspiciously in prison: the two -others were still under arrest upon most serious charges. If this were -the case of a common citizen he would have been brought at once before -a magistrate. The whole country was crying out for the truth in this -Caillaux case as well as in the Malvy affair. - -This happened soon after Clemenceau had accepted office. A month later, -M. Caillaux being in the meantime protected against arrest by his -position as deputy, Clemenceau repeated that if all the probabilities -accumulated against Caillaux had been formulated against any private -person his fate would have been practically decided already. "The -Government has undertaken responsibilities. The Chamber must likewise -shoulder responsibilities. If the Chamber refuses to sanction the -prosecution of M. Caillaux, the Government will not remain in office." - -M. Caillaux's admitted conferences with well-known defeatists in Italy -were of such a nature that Baron Sonnino, the Italian Minister for -Foreign Affairs, had himself informed the French Government that he -was inclined to expel Caillaux forthwith. No doubt he would have done -so, but for the fact that M. Caillaux had been, and might possibly -still be again, an important personage in French and European affairs. -Throughout, Clemenceau promised that the public should have the full -truth. He kept his word. The delays in bringing M. Caillaux to a -definite judgment have not been due to him. M. Caillaux's immunity as -deputy was suspended. He was arrested and imprisoned on January 15th, -1918. Four days later came the partial disclosure of the documents -found in his private safe in Florence. - -That such papers should ever have been left by a man of M. Caillaux's -intelligence where they might quite conceivably be attached, and -that he should have carefully put in writing the names of men whom -he hoped to use for the purpose of furthering a _coup d'état_, do -unquestionably support the theory that he is subject to intermittent -fits of madness. His extraordinary proceedings at Buenos Aires, where, -according to the United States representative in the Argentine capital, -he entered into a series of most compromising negotiations with the -German von Luxburg, were no good evidence of the permanent sanity of -this successful and experienced man of affairs. But "madness in great -ones must not unwatched go." His object was avowed in that remote city: -to make peace with Germany at any price, for the purpose of reviving -international finance. All these statements coming in succession, and -accompanied by the formulation of the cases against M. Malvy, Bolo -Pasha, with Duval and others of the _Bonnet Rouge_ clique, at length -roused furious public indignation, which the actions of M. Humbert, the -senator and owner of the _Journal_, the paper that Bolo had in effect -bought, further inflamed. Who could be regarded as entirely free from -treacherous designs, when such a crushing indictment as that officially -formulated against Caillaux could be accepted as correct?--when a -Minister of the Interior could be publicly charged with criminal -weakness towards persons more than suspected of high treason of -the most sordid type?--and when a man of Bolo Pasha's career and -associations evidently exercised great influence, not to say authority? - -The revelations at the trials of the accused persons, and the ugly -evidence submitted not only made matters look worse for M. Caillaux, -but roused general amazement that such deadly intrigues should have -been allowed to go so far under the very eyes of the authorities. The -career of Bolo Pasha, the direct agent-in-chief of the main conspiracy, -was well known. The men with whom he was on terms of close intimacy -were suspected persons, long before any action was taken. The secret -service department was well aware that he had huge sums of money -at his disposal that were very, very far in excess of any that he -could command from his private resources. The origin of his title of -dishonour from the Khedive could not have escaped notice. Yet he, a -born Frenchman, all whose begettings and belongings were a matter of -record, pursued his shameless policy in the interest of Germany with -apparent certainty of immunity from interference. - -It was this very same certainty of immunity that made all but a few -afraid to speak out. Bolo, in fact, was a privileged person, until -there was a statesman at the head of affairs who not only did not -fear to take the heavy responsibility of the arrest and imprisonment -of M. Caillaux, but was also determined that the proceedings in the -other cases already commenced should be pushed to their inevitable -conclusion. "The unseen hand" in France, therefore, was no longer -unseen. Yet so wide was the reach of the octopus tentacles, directed by -underground agency, that even to this day not a few innocent, as well -as guilty, people are in mortal fear lest disclosures may be made which -will in some or other way implicate them. For the trial of M. Caillaux -has yet to come. - -The two really dramatic episodes in all this gradual exposure of infamy -were the arrest and imprisonment of M. Caillaux, upon the suspension -of his privileges as deputy, and the public trial of Bolo Pasha. After -what had happened since August, 1914, it seemed almost impossible that -any Minister, however powerful he might be, would venture to go to the -full extent of what was indispensably necessary with M. Caillaux. A -man who had been Prime Minister of France, who in that capacity had -gathered round him groups of politicians whose members looked to him to -ensure their personal success in the future, was formidably entrenched -both in the Senate and in the Assembly. To incur the personal enmity -of such a capable statesman and such a master of intrigue as Joseph -Caillaux was more than any of the previous Ministries had dared to -risk. There were too many political reasons against it. Even the most -honest of the Socialist Ministers themselves seem to have felt that. -All the time, likewise, an influential portion of the Press vigorously -supported the ex-Premier. They carried the war into the enemy's camp by -denouncing his critics either as unscrupulous and lying reactionaries, -who were endeavouring to ruin a really progressive statesman, as men -imbued with such lust for slaughter and eagerness for revenge that they -had lost all grip of the actual situation, or as malignant intriguers -behind the scenes whose one object was to blacken the character -of an opponent who stood in the way of their schemes for personal -aggrandisement. - -Furthermore, M. Caillaux, holding the eminent position already referred -to in the world of finance, had the whole-souled and entire-pocket -backing of the French and German-Jew international money-lords. These -magnates of plutocracy, marvellous to relate, found themselves on -this issue hand in glove with the most active international French -Socialists. Nobody who was in the least afraid of political cliques, -of journalistic coteries, of financial syndicates, or of Socialist -rancour, could put Caillaux under lock and key. And the military -outlook lent itself to the encouragement of the leading advocate of -surrender and his acolytes. The word was assiduously passed round that, -now Russia was out of the fray, a drawn battle was the very best that -the Entente could hope for. - -France was bled white, Great Britain was war-weary and her workers -were discontented, Italy--think of Caporetto--while, as to the United -States, America was a long way off, President Wilson was still "too -proud to fight" in earnest, American troops could never be transported -in sufficient numbers across the Atlantic, and, to say nothing of -dangers from submarines, there was not enough shipping afloat to do -it. All pointed, therefore, to prompt "peace by negotiation," and -what better man could there be to negotiate such a peace than M. -Joseph Caillaux? It was because he was the one political personage -in France who could secure fair terms for his distressful country, -at this terrible crisis, that he was so persistently attacked by the -Chauvinists as a pro-German and accused of the most sordid treachery by -men who envied him his power at the international Council Table! - -Such was the situation. So long as M. Caillaux was at large, and able -to direct the whole of the forces of defeatism, no genuinely patriotic -Ministry could be successfully formed, or, if formed by some fortuitous -concurrence of circumstances, could last for three months. Treachery -breeds treachery as loyalty engenders loyalty. When Clemenceau took -office, therefore, everything depended upon what he did with Caillaux. -Paris and all France held their breath as they awaited the event. -Patriots were doubtful: defeatists were hopeful: soldiers were on the -look-out for a man. - -On January 15th, then, M. Caillaux was arrested and put in prison -by Clemenceau and his Ministry. All the predictions of upheaval and -disaster, indulged in by M. Caillaux's friends, were falsified. The -country breathed more freely. Thenceforward, France knew whom to back. -But, supposing that M. Caillaux had still been within the precincts of -Parliament and carrying on his political plots when the terrible news -came of the disasters of Cambrai and St. Quentin, and when the German -armies were within cannon-shot of Paris--how then? Those who knew -best how things stood believe themselves that counsels of despair and -pusillanimity might have prevailed, to the ruin of the country. - -No such fateful issue as that involved in Caillaux's arrest hung upon -the result of the trial of Bolo Pasha. But Bolo's whole career was a -tragical farce, to which even Alphonse Daudet could scarcely have done -full justice. Bolo was a Frenchman of the Midi: a Tartarin with the -tendencies of a financial Vautrin: a fine specimen of the flamboyant -and unscrupulous international adventurer. His first experience in the -domain of extraction was as a dentist in the country of his birth. A -handsome, blond young man of fine appearance and manners and methods of -address attractive to women, he soon found that the drawing of teeth -and other less skilled professions led to the receipt of no emoluments -worthy of his talents. To take in a well-to-do partner and decamp with -his wife and the firm's cash-box was more in the way of business. - -So satisfactory was this first adventure that he extended his field -of operations, and several ladies had the advantage of paying for his -attentions in the shape of all the money of which they chanced to be -possessed. Somehow or other he found himself in the Champagne country -during the wine-growers' riots, and continued to have a good time in -the district while they were going on. But in 1905 the claret region -proved more lucrative. For in Bordeaux the charm of his disposition -produced so great an effect upon the widow of a rich merchant of that -city that she succumbed to his attractions and married him. This -provided Bolo with the means for setting on foot all sorts of financial -enterprises in Europe and America. He thus became a promoter of the -open-hearted and sanguine type, found his way into "society" of the -kind which opens its arms to such men, had sufficient influence to -become a chevalier of the Legion of Honour, and by 1914 had lost all -his wife's money and more into the bargain--was, in fact, in very -serious financial straits from which he saw no way of extricating -himself. Certain Egyptian friends he had made, who later obtained for -him his title of Pasha from the Khedive, were not then in a position to -help him. - -But Bolo without money meant a German agent in search of a job. It -proved easy to get it. He notified the Germans through the Egyptians -that he could do good service in France if only he were provided with -plenty of funds. He was so furnished with hundreds of thousands of -pounds. _L'Homme Libre_ said of him that he revelled in the prestige -of having money, to such an extent that he believed that money was -everything. Rather, perhaps, he had become so accustomed to indulge -in pleasures and political and financial intrigues of every sort that -he would run any risk rather than give up the game. So it was that he -carried on the dangerous policy, if such it could be called, sketched -above. - -About his guilt there could be no doubt. That he had been closely -connected with people in high places as well as in low, and possessed -considerable personal magnetism, was clear. All this came out in court, -where persons of every grade, from Ministers and Senators to Levantine -rogues and Parisian courtesans, passed in and passed out like figures -on a cinema film. Bolo, of course, denied every charge, and posed as a -financier of high degree, but he was condemned to death, and his appeal -against the sentence was fruitless, though he pretended he could make -harrowing disclosures. He met his death bravely on April 10th. His fate -was a heavy blow to other spies and conspirators. - -There was an interpellation on the Bolo trial, a month before his -execution that led to a powerful speech by Clemenceau, in which he -declared that he was first for liberty, next for war, and finally for -the sacrifice of everything to secure victory. He then made a vigorous -appeal to the Socialists to join with the rest of the country in -supporting his Government in a supreme effort to free France from the -invader. "It is a great misfortune that my administration should be -denounced by Renaudel"--then editor of _L'Humanité_--"as a danger to -the workers. My hands are to the full as hardened by toil as those of -Renaudel and Albert Thomas, good bourgeois citizens as they are, like -myself. I have in my pocket a paper in which Renaudel is stigmatised -as Clemenceau's orderly; nay, adding insult to injury, he is held -up to public obloquy as _Monsieur_ Renaudel." Then, addressing the -Socialist group, he declared with vehemence: "We have done you no harm, -but my methods are not yours. You will not defeat Prussian Junkerdom -by baa-ing around about peace." The appeal was quite bootless. On a -division confidence in the Clemenceau Government was voted by 400 to -75. The Socialists were the 75. The vote was a direct outcome of the -sordid and gruesome Bolo case. - - - SUMMARY OF EVENTS RELATING TO TREACHERY IN PARIS, - JULY, 1917, TO JULY, 1918. - - _July, 1917._--Clemenceau attacks M. Malvy, then Minister of the - Interior, for ruinous weakness towards traitors. - - Assails the Ribot Ministry as responsible for the propaganda of the - pro-German journal _Le Bonnet Rouge_. - - It was shown later that this newspaper had received State support to - the extent of £4,000 a year. - - _August, 1917._--M. Almereyda (_alias_ Vigo), connected with Bolo - Pasha, M. Caillaux and the _Bonnet Rouge_, arrested and dies in prison. - - M. Malvy "explains" the Almereyda affair. - - _September, 1917._--M. Malvy resigns. - - _October, 1917._--Debate in Chamber upon M. Léon Daudet's charge of - treason against Malvy. - - Captain Bouchardon begins investigation. - - Proprietors of _Bonnet Rouge_ arrested. - - _November, 1917._--Revelations by Clemenceau in _l'Homme Enchaîné_, - which had been going on for a twelvemonth, take effect on public. - - _Bonnet Rouge_ trial. - - Revelations concerning M. Paix-Séailles's document about French troops - at Salonika to have been published in _Bonnet Rouge_. Paix-Séailles in - M. Painlevé's _entourage_. - - Clemenceau exposes Caillaux's intrigues with Almereyda, the _Bonnet - Rouge_, the defeatists in Italy, and comments on the large subsidies - to the _Bonnet Rouge_ which enabled it to become a daily instead of a - weekly sheet. - - Clemenceau forms Ministry. - - _December, 1917._--Clemenceau examined before Committee of Senate on - Caillaux affair. - - Clemenceau declares if Parliament would not sanction prosecution of - Caillaux his Ministry would resign. - - Caillaux's immunity as deputy suspended by vote. - - _January, 1918._--Captain Bouchardon's report on Bolo Pasha published. - - Traces Bolo's career from 1914, his intrigues with Germany through - ex-Khedive of Egypt and other Egyptians. Receipt by Bolo of £400,000 - from Deutsche Bank. - - Bolo buys shares in _Journal_, and tries to buy shares also in the - _Figaro_ and the _Temps_. - - M. Caillaux arrested. - - His private safe brought from Florence containing strange papers - relating, among other things, to a suggested _coup d'état_. - - United States agent at Buenos Aires reveals series of negotiations - between M. Caillaux and the German representative, Count Luxburg, - having for object the conclusion of a German peace. - - M. Malvy arraigned before the High Court of the Senate. - - _February, 1918._--Trial of Bolo begun. Caillaux, Humbert and others - incriminated. - - U.S.A. secret service shows that large sums passed from Count - Bernstorff, German Ambassador in Washington, to Bolo for the purposes - of German propaganda. - - Bolo found guilty and condemned to be shot on February 16th. - - M. Malvy's case before the High Court extended. - - _March, 1918._--Bolo appeals. - - Bolo case discussed in Chamber. Socialists attack Clemenceau. Vote of - confidence in Clemenceau's Ministry 400 to 75. - - Terrible military disasters at Cambrai and St. Quentin due to heavy - German attack on positions weakened by withdrawal of British troops. - - _April, 1918._--Bolo shot. - - Caillaux in gaol. - - Malvy trial continued. - - _May, 1918._--Caillaux "explains" his connection with _Le Bonnet - Rouge_. - - _June, 1918._--Committee report on M. Malvy's case and fix date of - trial. - - _July, 1918._--M. Malvy found guilty of undue laxity towards traitors - and condemned to exile from France. - - French Socialists infuriated at M. Malvy's expulsion. - - - - - CHAPTER XX - - "LA VICTOIRE INTÉGRALE" - - -In the endeavour to give a connected statement of the very dangerous -German offensive, conducted by their spies and agents in Paris, at the -most critical period of the whole war, I have been obliged to some -extent to anticipate events in order to show Clemenceau's share in the -exposure of this organised treachery. By 1917, as already recorded, -anti-patriotic and pro-German intrigues in Paris and France had become -more and more harmful to that "sacred unity" which had been constituted -to present an unbroken front to the enemy. After the miserable -breakdown of Russia, largely due to the Bolshevik outbreak fostered -by German intrigue and subsidised by German money, the position was -exceedingly dangerous. German troops withdrawn from the Eastern front -were poured into France and Flanders by hundreds of thousands, and the -Allied armies were hard put to it to hold their own. At this time, -when it was all-important to maintain the spirit of the French army, -the enemy offensive in Paris and throughout France became more and -more active. What made the situation exceptionally critical was the -fact that the rank and file of the French soldiery began to feel that, -however desperately they might fight at the front, they were being -systematically betrayed in the rear. While, therefore, Clemenceau, in -his capacity as Senator and President of the Inter-Allied Parliamentary -Committee, voiced the great and growing discontent of the country with -the lack of real statesmanship displayed in the conduct of the war, he -also fulminated against the weakness of the wobbling Ministers who, -knowing that defeatism and treachery were fermenting all round them, -took no effective steps to counteract this pernicious propaganda. - -The notorious _Bonnet Rouge_ group, however, with M. Joseph Caillaux, -Bolo Pasha, Almereyda and others in close touch with M. Jean Longuet -and his pacifist friends of the Socialist Party, were allowed to carry -on their virulent anti-French campaign in the Press and in other -directions practically unchecked. It might even have been thought that -these persons had the sympathy and support of members of the Government. - -Thus, when M. Painlevé took office on M. Ribot's resignation in August, -1917, the outlook was dark all round. The position of the Allied armies -was by no means satisfactory: the state of affairs in Paris itself was -not such as to engender confidence: Mr. Lloyd George's headlong speech -of depreciation on his return from Italy had undone all the good of the -unanimous resolution passed by the Inter-Allied Parliamentary Committee -of which Clemenceau was President, declaring that no peace could be -accepted which did not secure the realisation of national claims and -the complete triumph of justice all along the line. In short, a fit -of despondency, almost deepening into despair, had come over Allied -statesmen. Notwithstanding distrust, however, war-weariness was not -spreading among the soldiers and sailors. But among the politicians -it was, and German "peace offensives" were being welcomed in quarters -which were supposed to be resolute for "_la victoire intégrale_." M. -Painlevé's administration was scarcely hoisted into the saddle before -it was ignominiously thrown out again. The instability of successive -French Ministries was becoming a danger which extended far beyond -the limits of France. The unification of the Allied command and the -concentration of effort on the Western front had become imperative. -The arrest of all those against whom there was serious suspicion of -treason, no matter how highly they might be placed, was a necessity of -the moment. Vigorous support for the generals and armies engaged in -resisting the reinforced enemy was called for from every quarter. So -the President, M. Poincaré, found himself in a dilemma. But none of -the leading politicians who had been prominent since the war began was -prepared to take the responsibility of forming an administration and -then acting upon the lines which the situation demanded. - -It was at this crisis, perhaps the most dangerous that France has had -to face in all her long history, that the President asked Clemenceau to -become the Prime Minister. He was then seventy-six years of age and had -withdrawn from all those conferences and discussions behind the scenes -which, under ordinary circumstances, invariably precede the acceptance -of office. The Socialists declared that, no matter what Clemenceau's -policy might be, they could not serve under him as President of -Council. Clemenceau could not rely upon support from M. Poincaré, and -on every ground he was much disinclined to come to the front under -existing conditions. But his duty to France and its Republic outweighed -all other considerations, and this old statesman shouldered the burden -which far younger men declined to take up. - -The Socialists went quite wild against him--to the lasting injury, as -I hold, of their party and their cause--the Radicals and Republicans -themselves were more than doubtful of the possibility of his success. -Many politicians and journalists of the Right doubted whether they -could make common cause with the man who above all other things stood -for the permanence of Republicanism and was the bitter enemy of -Clericalism in every shape. Shrewd judges of public opinion stated that -his Ministry could not last three months. - -But courage, frankness and good faith, backed by relentless -determination, and the genius that blazes up in the day of difficulty, -go far. The whole French people suddenly called to mind that this -old Radical of the Bocage of La Vendée, this Parisian of Parisians -for nearly sixty years, whatever mistakes he may have made in -opposition or in office, had invariably stood up for the greatness, -the glory, the dignity of France; that he had voted at Bordeaux for -the continuance of the war when France lay at the feet of the ruthless -conqueror and Gambotta was striving to organise his countrymen for -resistance to the death; that from those dark days of 1871 onwards he -had always vehemently adjured his countrymen to make ready to resist -coming invasion; that from August 1914 he had never failed to keep a -stout heart himself and to do his utmost to encourage his countrymen -even when the outlook was blackest for the Allies; that he had ever -been the relentless denouncer of weakness and vacillation, as he -had also been the unceasing opponent of pacifism, pro-Germanism and -treachery of every kind; that now, therefore, when _la Patrie_ was in -desperate danger, when Paris might yet be at the mercy of the enemy, -of whose hideous ruffianism they had had such bitter experience, -Georges Clemenceau was the one man to take control of democratic and -Republican France in the interest of every section of the population. -These stirring memories of the past rose up behind Clemenceau in the -present.[E] - -Thus it was that the new Prime Minister, coming down from the Senate to -read his Declaration to the National Assembly, as the French custom is, -was certain beforehand of a cordial reception from the great majority -of the Deputies. What might happen afterwards depended upon himself and -his Ministry: what should occur on this his first appearance in the -tribune after nearly eight years of absence depended on themselves. -They took good care that, at the start at least, he should have no -doubt as to their goodwill. Only the Socialist minority abstained. - -The Declaration itself was worthy of the occasion, and it was a -stirring scene when the veteran of the Radical Party, the Tiger of the -old days, rose to deliver it to the House, which was crowded on the -floor and in the galleries with deputies and strangers eager to hear -what he had to say:-- - -"Gentlemen, we have taken up the duty of government in order to carry -on the war with renewed energy and to obtain a better result from our -concentrated efforts. We are here with but one idea in our minds, the -war and nothing but the war. The confidence we ask you to give us -should be the expression of confidence in yourselves. . . . Never has -France felt more keenly the need for living and growing in the ideal -of power used on behalf of human rectitude, the resolve to see justice -done between citizens and peoples able to emancipate themselves. The -watchword of all our Governments since the war began has been victory -for the sake of justice. That frank policy we shall uphold. We have -great soldiers with a great history led by men who have been tested and -have been inspired to deeds of the highest devotion worthy of their -ancestral renown. The immortal fatherland of our common humanity, -overmastering the exultation of victory, will follow, on the lines of -its destiny, the noble aspiration for peace, through them and through -us all. Frenchmen impelled by us into the conflict have special claims -upon us. We owe them everything without reserve. Everything for France: -everything for the triumph of right. One simple duty is imposed upon -us, to stand by the soldier, to live, suffer and fight with him, and to -throw aside everything that is not for our country. The rights on our -front, the duties in our rear must be merged in one. Every zone must be -the army zone. If men there are who must cherish the hatreds of bygone -days, sweep them away. - -"All civilised nations are now arrayed in the like battle against -modern forms of ancient barbarisms. Our Allies and ourselves together -constitute a solid barrier which shall not be surmounted. Throughout -the Allied front, at all times and in all places, there is nothing -but solid brotherhood, the surest basis for the coming world. . . . The -silent soldiers of the factory, the old peasants working, bent over -their soil, the vigorous women who toil, the children who help in -their weakness--these likewise are our _poilus_ who in times to come, -recalling the great things done, will be able to say with the men in -the trenches, 'I, too, was there.' . . . Mistakes have been made. Think -no more about them save only to remedy them. - -"But, alas! there have also been crimes, crimes against France which -demand prompt punishment. We solemnly pledge ourselves, before you and -before the country, that justice shall be done with the full rigour of -the law. Personal considerations or political passion shall neither -divert us from fulfilling this duty nor induce us to go beyond it. -Too many such crimes have cost us the blood of our soldiers. Weakness -would mean complicity. There shall be no weakness as there shall be no -violence. Accused persons shall all be brought before courts-martial. -The soldier of justice shall make common cause with the soldier in -the field. No more pacifist plots: no more German intrigues. Neither -treason nor semi-treason. War, nothing but war. Our country shall not -be placed between two fires. Our country shall learn that she is really -defended. - - * * * * * - -"The day will come when from Paris to the smallest village of France -storms of cheers will welcome our victorious colours tattered by -shell-fire and drenched with blood and tears--the glorious memorials -of our great dead. It is for us to hasten the coming of that day, that -glorious day, which will fitly take its place beside so many others in -our history. These are our unshakable resolves, gentlemen: we ask you -to give them the sanction of your approval." - -Such is a free summary of a Ministerial pronouncement that will ever -be memorable in the annals of France and of mankind. It swept the -Chamber away as the recital marched on. But organised attacks upon the -President of the Council at once followed. Now came the supreme test -of the mental and physical efficiency of this wonderful old man whose -youth is so amazing. He could read a telling manifesto with vigour -and effect. Would he be able to reply with equal power to a series of -interrogations in an atmosphere to which he had been a stranger for so -many years? Questions, by no means all of them friendly, poured in upon -Clemenceau from every part of the Chamber. From his attitude towards -Caillaux and Malvy to his view of the League of Nations and his policy -in regard to negotiations with the enemy, no point was missed that -might embarrass or irritate the statesman who had undertaken to stand -in the gap. He showed immediately that he was fully capable of taking -his own part. The fervour of the new France was heard in every phrase -of his crushing reply: - -"You do not expect me to talk of personal matters. I am not here for -that. Still, I have heard enough to understand that the criticisms upon -me should make me modest. I feel humble for the mistakes I have already -made and for those which I am likely to make. I do not think I can -be accused of having sought power. But I am in power. I hope it will -not be a misfortune for my country. You tell me I have made mistakes. -Perhaps you do not know the worst of them. I am here because these are -terrible times when those who through all the struggle have loved their -country more than they knew see the hopes of the nation centred on -them. I am here through the pressure of public opinion, and I am almost -afraid of what it will demand of me, of what it expects of me. - -"I have been asked to explain myself in regard to war aims, and as to -the idea of a League of Nations. I have replied in my declaration, 'We -must conquer for the sake of justice.' That is clear. We live in a -time when words have great power, but they have not the power to set -free. The word 'justice' is as old as mankind. Do you imagine that the -formula of a League of Nations is going to solve everything? - -"There is a committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even now -preparing a scheme for a League of Nations. Among its members are the -most authoritative exponents of international law. I undertake that -immediately their labours are finished I will table the outcome of it -in this Chamber, if I am still Prime Minister--which does not seem -likely." (Laughter and cheers.) - -"I am not unfavourable to arbitration. It was I who sent M. Léon -Bourgeois to The Hague, where a series of conventions were agreed upon -which Germany is now engaged in violating. Many believe that a miracle -will bring about a League of Nations. I do not myself think that a -League of Nations will be one of the results of this war. If to-morrow -you proposed to me that Germany should be included in a League of -Nations, I should not consent. What guarantees do you offer me? -Germany's signature? Go and ask the Belgians what they think of that. - -"You never weary of saying that the first thing is for Germany herself -to destroy German militarism, but she is far from destroying it; she -still holds it fast. - -"M. Forgeot wants to make war, but while we are making war he wants -us to talk about peace. Personally, I believe that when you are doing -things you should talk as little as possible. Do M. Forgeot's ideas -come within the range of practical politics? Do people believe that -the men in the trenches and the women in the factories do not think of -peace? Our thoughts are theirs. They are fighting to obtain some decent -security of life; and when you ask me my war aims, I reply that my war -aim is victory in full." (Loud cheers and Socialist interruption.) - -"I understand your aspirations, some of which I share, but do not let -us make mistakes about war. All these men want peace. But if, while -they are fighting, the rumour goes round that delegates of one or other -belligerent country are discussing terms of peace--that yesterday we -were on the eve of peace, that next day there was a break-off--then -we are condemned to flounder about in mud and in blood for years -still. That is the way to disarm and discourage us all. For these -reasons, I am not in favour of Conferences where citizens of different -belligerent countries discuss peace which the Governments alone are -able to decide. I want to make war. This means that for the moment we -must silence all factious discussion. Is there a man who has been more -of a party man than I? I see to-day that I have been far too much of a -party man. My programme is a military and economic programme. We have -got Allies, to whom we owe loyalty and fidelity, which must override -every other consideration. - -"We have not yet achieved victory. We have come to a cruel phase of -the war. A time of privation is at hand, a time when our spirit must -rise to greater heights yet. Do not, then, speak of peace. We all want -peace, we are making great sacrifices to obtain peace, but we must get -rid of old animosities and turn solidly against the enemy. Leave all -other questions alone. - -"There is one on which, however, I must touch. Scandals have been -spoken of. Do you think we can have three years of war without -Germany trying to keep spies busy in our midst? I complained that our -look-out was insufficient, and events have too clearly shown that I -was right. I am told to tell you the truth. You shall have it. But we -must distinguish between crimes and accusations. As the examination -proceeds facts will be disclosed which will have their effect. How -can you expect me to mention names or reveal fragments of truth? -Certain people have been guilty of indiscretion, want of reflection, -or weakness. It is not I but the judge who has to decide. You shall -have the truth. In what form? If there is any revelation of a political -nature to make there is a political tribunal in this country to make -it. It shall judge. Just as civil justice must do its work during war -time, so must political justice." (A voice: "Caillaux!") "I mention no -name. A journalist has freedom as to what he may say, it is his own -responsibility; but the head of the Government has a quite different -task. I am here to put the law in motion if political acts have been -committed which are subject to a jurisdiction beyond the ordinary -tribunals. - -"Those facts will be brought before the tribunal, but I refuse here to -accuse any man. - -"Justice is our weapon against treason, and where treason is concerned -there can be no possibility of pardon. In any case, you have got -a Government which will try to _govern_ in the strict, but high, -idealistic sense of the word. Where I differ from you, gentlemen of -the Extreme Left, is when you want to bring abstract conceptions into -the field of hard facts. That is impossible. We shall try to govern -honestly and in a Republican spirit. You are not obliged to think we -shall succeed. But we shall do our best. If we make mistakes, others -have done so before us, others will do so after us. If at last we see -before us the long-awaited dawn of victory, I hope--if it is only -to complete the beauty of the picture--that you will pass a vote of -censure upon me, and I shall go happy away! I know you will not do -that; but allow me to point out, as I have a right to tell you, that -you have almost passed a vote of censure on me already before listening -to my Ministerial programme. I challenge you to say that we have made -any attempt to deceive you. If we get painful news, our hearts will -bleed, but we shall tell that news to you here. We have never given -anybody the right to suppose that we constitute a peril to any class of -citizen or a danger to the national defence. If you think the contrary, -prove it, and I will leave the House. But if you believe that what we -want above all is the welfare of France, give us your confidence, and -we will endeavour to be worthy of it." - -His deeds have been on a level with his words. Bolo and Duval shot: -Caillaux in gaol: Malvy exiled by decree of the Senate: the _Bonnet -Rouge_ gang tried and condemned: the wretched intrigue in Switzerland -with the poor German tool, Austria exposed and crushed: a new spirit -breathed into all public affairs: the army reassured by his perpetual -presence under fire and his unfailing resolve at the War Office that -the splendid capacity and intrepidity of all ranks at the front shall -not be sacrificed by treachery or cowardice at the rear: the Higher -Command brimful of enthusiasm and confidence, due to the appointment of -the military genius Foch as generalissimo of the United Allied Armies -and the reinstatement of General Mangin at the head of his _corps -d'armée_: the Allies, like France herself, convinced that they have at -last discovered a man. Such was the stirring work that Clemenceau had -been doing since he took office. - -So to-day Clemenceau is still democratic dictator of the French -Republic as no man has been for more than a century. When the enemy -was arrayed in overwhelming numbers close to Amiens and within a few -miles of Calais, when the German War Lords were decreeing the permanent -subjugation of the territories they occupied in the West and in the -East, when the long-range guns were bombarding the capital and the -removal of the seat of government to the provinces was again being -considered, the great French nation felt more confident of its future -than at any moment since the victories won around Verdun. To every -question Clemenceau's answer invariably was, "Je fais la guerre. Je -fais la guerre. Je fais la guerre." - -Those who doubted were convinced: those who were doubtful saw their -aspirations realised: those who had never wavered cheered for victory -right ahead. - -On June 6th, 1918, the French Socialist group in the Chamber of -Deputies made another of those attacks upon the National Administration -which, sad to say, have done so much to discredit the whole Socialist -Party, and even the Socialist cause, throughout Europe and the world. -Pacifism and Bolshevism together--that is to say, an unholy combination -between anti-nationalism and anarchism, have indeed shaken the -influence of democratic Socialism to its foundations, just at the time -when a sound, sober and constructive Socialist policy, in harmony with -the aspirations of the mass of the people in every Allied country, -might have led mankind peacefully along the road to the new period of -national and international co-operation. The Socialist Deputies in the -Chamber held Clemenceau's Ministry, which they had done their very -utmost to discredit and weaken, directly responsible for the serious -military reverses recently undergone by the French and Allied armies. -They insisted, therefore, upon Clemenceau's appearance in the tribune. -But when they had got him in front of them their great object evidently -was not to let him speak. There this old statesman stood, exposed to -interruptions which were in the worst of bad taste. At last he thought -the opportunity for which his enemies clamoured had come, and began to -address the Assembly. But no sooner had he opened his mouth than he was -forced to give way to M. Marcel Cachin. Only then was he enabled to get -a hearing, and this is a summary of what he said:-- - -"I regret that, our country being in such great danger, a unanimous -vote of confidence cannot be accorded to us. But, when all is said, -the opposition of the Socialists does not in the least enfeeble the -Government. For four long years our troops have held their own at the -front with a line which was being steadily worn down. Now a huge body -of German soldiers fresh from Russia and in good heart come forward to -assail us. Some retreat was inevitable. From the moment when Russia -thought that peace could be obtained by the simple expression of wishes -to that end we all knew that, sooner or later, the enemy would be able -to release a million of men to fall upon us. That meant that such a -retirement as we have witnessed must of necessity follow. Our men have -kept their line unbroken against odds of five to one. They have often -gone sleepless for three days and even four days in succession. But -our great soldiers have had great leaders, and our army as a whole has -proved itself to be greater than even we could expect. - -"The duties we have to perform here are, in contrast to their heroism, -tame and even petty. All we have to do is to keep cool and hold on. The -Germans are nothing like so clever as they believe themselves to be. -They have but a single device. They throw their entire weight into one -general assault, and push their advantage to the utmost. True they -have forced back our lines of defence. But final success is that alone -which matters, and that success for us is certain. The Government you -see before you took office with the firm resolve never to surrender. So -long as we stand here our country will be defended to the last. Give -way we never shall. - -"Germany has once more staked her all on one great blow, thinking -to cow us into abandoning the conflict. Her armies have tried this -desperate game before. They tried it on the Marne, they tried it on the -Yser, they tried it at Verdun, they tried it elsewhere. But they never -have succeeded, and they never shall. Our Allies to-day are the leading -nations of the world. They have one and all pledged themselves to fight -on till victory is within our grasp. The men who have already fallen -have not fallen in vain. By their death they have once more made French -history a great and noble record. It is now for the living to finish -the glorious work done by the dead." - -This great speech raised the overwhelming majority of the Assembly -to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. Nearly all present felt that the -destinies of France hung in the balance, and that any vote given which -might tend to discourage the men at the front at such a time was a -direct service rendered to the enemy whose bombs were even then falling -in the heart of Paris. The vote of confidence in Clemenceau and his -Ministry was carried by 377 votes to 110; and of these 110 more than a -third were convinced shortly afterwards that the course they had then -taken in order to preserve the unity of their forces as factionists was -unworthy of their dignity as men. - -Then, too, when the tide turned and the German hordes, after fresh -glorious battles of the Marne and of the Somme, were in headlong -retreat, Clemenceau, unelated by victory as he was undiscouraged by -defeat, repeated again: "Je fais la guerre. Je fais la guerre. Je fais -la guerre." Not until the German armies were finally vanquished would -the Republican statesman talk of making peace. On both sides of the -Atlantic, therefore, as on both sides of the Channel, knowing Great -Britain and the United States by personal experience and able to gauge -the cold resolution of the one and the inexhaustible resources and -determination of the other, speaking and writing English well, he is -now, as he has been throughout this tremendous war, a tower of strength -to the forces of democracy and a very present help to all who are -resolved to break down German militarism for evermore. - - - - - CHAPTER XXI - - CONCLUSION - - -"Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council and Minister of War, and -Marshal Foch, General-in-Chief of the Allied armies, have well deserved -the gratitude of the country." - -That is the Resolution which, by the unanimous vote of the Senate -of the French Republic, will be placed in a conspicuous position in -every Town Hall and in the Council Chamber of every commune throughout -France. The Senators of France are not easily roused to enthusiasm. -What they thus unanimously voted, in the absence of Clemenceau, amid -general acclamation, is a fine recognition of his pre-eminent service -as well as of his indefatigable devotion to duty at the most desperate -crisis in the long and glorious history of his country. Nothing like -it has ever been known. The reward is unprecedented: the work done has -surpassed every record. - -It is well that the great statesman should be honoured in advance of -the great military commander. Marshal Foch has accomplished marvels in -more than four years of continuous activity, from the first battle of -the Marne to the signing of the armistice of unconditional surrender. -All Europe and the civilised world are indebted to him for his masterly -strategy and successful manœuvres. But France owes most to Clemenceau. - -Towards the close of this historic sitting Clemenceau himself entered -the Senate. He received an astounding welcome. Everyone present rose -to greet him. Men who but yesterday were his enemies, and are still -his opponents, rushed forward with the rest to applaud him, to shake -hands with him, to thank him, to embrace him. The excitement was so -overwhelming that Clemenceau, for the first time in his life, broke -down. Tears coursed down his cheeks and for some moments he was unable -to speak. When he did he, as always, refused to take the credit and -the glory of the overthrow of the Germans and their confederates to -himself. In victory in November, as when he was confronting difficulty -and danger in March and July, his first and his last thoughts were of -France. The spirit of France, the citizens of France, the soldiers and -sailors of France: these were they who in comradeship with the Allies -had achieved the great victory over the last convulsions of savagery. -He had been more than fully rewarded for all he had done by witnessing -the expulsion of the foreigner and the liberation of the territory. -His task had merely been to give full expression to the courage and -determination of his countrymen. - -Clemenceau spoke not only as a French statesman, as the veteran -upholder of the French Republic, but as one who remembered well the -horrors and defeats of 1870-71, now followed, forty-eight years later, -by the horrors and the triumphs of 1918. The Senators who heard him -and acclaimed him felt that Clemenceau was addressing them as the man -who had embodied in himself, for all those long years, the soul of the -France of the Great Revolution, and now at last was able to show what -he really was. - -This moving reception in the Senate had been preceded by an almost -equally glowing display of enthusiasm in the Chamber of Deputies. -There too--with the exception of a mere handful of Socialists whose -extraordinary devotion to Caillaux and Malvy blinds them to the genius -of their countryman--the whole Assembly rose up to welcome and cheer -him. Clemenceau, speaking there, also, under strong emotion, after two -stirring orations from M. Deschanel and M. Pichon, assured the Deputies -that the armistice which would be granted to Germany could only be on -the lines of those accorded to Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. -Marshal Foch would decide the details, which now all the world knows. - -But, after having dealt with the armistice implored by Germany, -Clemenceau went back to the past and said: "When I remember that I -entered the National Assembly of Bordeaux in 1871, and was--I am the -last of them--one of the signers of the protests against the annexation -of Alsace-Lorraine . . . it is impossible for me, now peace is certain -and our victory assured, to leave the tribune without paying homage to -those who were the initiators and first workers in the immense task -which is being completed at this moment. - -"I wish to speak of Gambetta" (the whole House rises with prolonged -cheering) "--of him who, defending the territory under circumstances -which rendered victory impossible, never despaired. With him and with -Chanzy I voted for the continuation of the war, and in truth, when I -think of what has happened in these fifty years, I ask myself whether -the war has not continued all the time. May our thoughts go back to -them; and when these terrible iron doors that Germany has closed -against us shall be opened, let us say to them: 'Pass in first. You -showed us the way.'" - -The French Premier went on to speak of the problems of peace, which -could only be solved, like the problems of war, by national unity for -the common cause, "for the Republic which we made in peace, which we -have upheld in war, the Republic which has saved us during the war." He -appealed "First for solidarity with the Allies, and then for solidarity -among the French." This was needful for the maintenance of peace and -the future of their common humanity. Humanity's great crusade was -inspired not by the thought of God but of France. "_Ce n'est pas Dieu, -c'est la France qui le veut._" - -The Deputies rose again and again. It would have been strange if they -had not. - -But fine though these speeches were, and impressive as was the Prime -Minister's adjuration that, since the problems of peace were harder -than those of war, they must prove their worth in both fields--it -was Clemenceau's personal influence that gave them their special -value. Undoubtedly the splendid fighting of the French and British -and American troops and the admirable skill of their commanders had -produced that dramatic change from the days of depression from March -to July to the period of continuous triumph from July to November. -This Clemenceau never allows us for one moment to forget. But he it -was who had breathed new life into the whole combination, military -and civilian, at the front and in the factories. No man of his time -of life, perhaps no man of any age, ever carried on continuously such -exhausting toil, physical and mental, as that which this marvellous old -statesman of seventy-seven undertook and carried though from November -1917 to November 1918. - -His energy and power of work were those of a vigorous young man in -the height of training. Starting for the front in a motor-car at four -or five o'clock in the morning at least three times a week, he kept -in touch with generals, officers and soldiers all along the lines -to an extent that would have seemed incredible if it had not been -actually done. Once at the front he walked about under fire as if he -had come out for the pleasure of risking his life with the _poilus_ -who were fighting for La Patrie. Marshal Foch and Higher Command were -in constant fear for him. But he knew what he was about. Valuable as -his own life might be to the country, to court death was a higher duty -than to take care of himself, if by this seeming indifference he made -Frenchmen all along the trenches feel that he and they were one. He -succeeded. Fortune favoured him throughout. Then having discoursed -with the Marshal and his generals, having saluted and talked with the -officers, he chatted with the rank and file of the soldiery and rushed -back to Paris, arriving at the Ministry of War at ten or eleven o'clock -at night, ready to attend to such pressing business as demanded his -personal care. And all the time cheerful, alert, confident, showing, -when things looked dark, as when the great advance began, that the -Prime Minister of the Republic never for one moment doubted the Germans -would be hurled back over the frontier and France would again take her -rightful place in the world. - -And that is not all. Clemenceau's influence in the Council Chamber of -the Allies was and is supreme. The old gaiety of heart remains, but -the soundness of judgment and determination to accept no compromise -of principle are more marked than ever. Many dangerous intrigues -during the past few months, of which the world has heard little, were -snuffed clean out by Clemenceau's force of character and overwhelming -personality. The French Prime Minister wanted final victory for France -and her Allies. Nothing short of this would satisfy him. There was -no personal loyalty he wished to build up, no political object that -he desired to attain, no section or party that he felt himself bound -to propitiate. Therefore the other Ministers of the Allies found -themselves at the table with a statesman who was something more than an -individual representative of his nation. He was the human embodiment of -a cause. What that meant and still means will only be known when the -dust of conflict has passed from us and the whole truth of Clemenceau's -policy can be told. - -For my part I have done my best as an old and convinced -Social-Democrat, and on some important points his opponent, to give -a frank and unbiassed study of Clemenceau's fine career. His very -mistakes serve only to throw into higher relief his sterling character -and the genius which has enabled him to command success. Read aright, -his actions do all hang together, and constitute one complete whole. -Comprising within himself the brilliant yet thorough capacity of his -French countrymen, he has risen when close upon eighty to the height of -the terribly responsible position he was forced to fill. - -Therefore his efforts have been crowned with complete victory. Having -forgotten himself in his work, the man Clemenceau will never be -forgotten. He will stand out in history as the great statesman of the -Great War. - -And now that he and we have won--our aid, as none knows or -appreciates better, having been absolutely indispensable to the -French triumph--Clemenceau feels so deeply that France as a whole -has shared in the great awakening that, having himself appointed the -devout Catholic Marshal Foch generalissimo of the Allied armies, he, -of all men, joined in the _Te Deum_ of Thanksgiving in the Cathedral -of Lille! The work he has done, the risks he has run, the unshakable -determination he has displayed, have raised him high above all petty -considerations of politics, creeds, classes, or conditions. Therefore -he is the hero of France after her desperate struggle for national -existence. - - - - - INDEX - - - Adulteration, John Bright on, 194 - - Albert, 16 - - Amadé, General, 212 - - Arago, Etienne, 9, 24, 32, 35 - - Armistice of 1871, 36 - - Aumale, Duc d', and Boulanger, 95 - - - Bakunin, 50 - - Barodet, 69, 86, 87 - - Barrès, M., 265 - - Basly, M., miners' agent, 180 - - Bazaine, Marshal, 32, 36, 40 - - Bebel and Jaurès on the Fleet, 238 - - ---- and the Social-Democrats, 244 - - Beesly, Prof., 50 - - Bellers, John, 234 - - Benedek, Marshal, 27 - - Berlin, brutality and greed of, 34 - - Beslay, 45, 49 - - Billot, General, 157 - - Bismarck--the forgery at Ems, 33 - - Blanc, Louis, 16, 39, 78, 85 - - Blanqui, 49, 56, 58, 59, 61 - - "Blessed word," the, 19 - - Boer War, the, 216, 217 - - Boisdeffre, General, 157 - - Bolo Pasha, 273-280 - - _Bonnet Rouge_, arrest of proprietors, 267 - - Bordeaux, the Government at, 249 - - Boulanger, General, 10 - - Boulanger, General, and Army reforms, 96 - - ----, as War Minister, 96 - - ----, candidate for Paris, 101 - - ----, deprived of his command, 99 - - ----, downfall, its effect on the influence of Clemenceau, 105 - - ----, elected for the Nord, 100 - - ----, enters politics, a candidate for the Nord and the Dordogne, 99 - - ----, fails to profit by his success, 103 - - ----, flight and suicide, 104 - - ----, his duel with M. Floquet, 98 - - ----, his popularity after the affair Schnäbele, 97 - - ----, his relations with the Duc d'Aumale, 95 - - ----, his visits to Paris, 99 - - ----, posted to the command of army corps at Clermont-Ferrand, 99 - - ----, returned for Paris by a heavy majority, 103 - - ----, rides through Paris on his black charger, 102 - - ----, the pet of the _Salons_ 97 - - Bourbon, House of, 16 - - Brandès, M., Clemenceau's attack on, 251 - - Briand, M., 206 - - ----, as an anarchist, 225 - - Bright, John, on adulteration, 194 - - Brisson, M., 78, 157, 162 - - British statesmanship, blindness of, 236 - - Broglie, Duc de, 10, 73, 74, 78, 101 - - Brousse, Paul, 100 - - Brown, John, and the American Civil War, 52 - - Buffet, 72 - - Butchery of peaceful citizens, 17 - - - Caillaux, M., 206 - - ----, and a German peace, 267-269 - - ----, and Italian defeatists, 272 - - ----, and the Income tax, 268 - - ----, before the Army Committee of the Senate, 270 - - ----, the financier, and the Income tax, 227 - - Calmette, M., the murder of, 269 - - Cambon, Jules, warns M. Pichon in 1913, 250 - - Camélinat, 45, 49 - - Canrobert, 17 - - Carnot, M. Sadi-, 93, 118 - - ----, President, supports Lesseps 112, 113 - - Carrousel, the inscription on the, 138, 139 - - Casablanca, French settlers at, 212 - - Caserio, the anarchist, 137 - - Cassagnac, Paul de, 125 - - Charles X, 20 - - Chateaubriand, 17 - - Church and State, conflict between, 220-224 - - Cipriani, 58 - - Cinquet, M., 166 - - Citoyen Egalité, 16 - - Clemenceau, a Premier, asks England how many hundred thousand men she -could land in North-Eastern France in case of a sudden war, 219 - - ---- and Boulanger, 95 - - ---- and Boulangism, 100 - - ---- and Morocco, 202 - - ---- and strikes, 198-201 - - ---- and the coal miners, 135 - - ---- and the doctrine of _laissez-faire_ 135 - - ---- and the _Entente_, 120 - - ---- and the story of Boaz and Ruth, 137 - - ---- and the strikers at Carmaux, 120 - - ---- and the wine-growers' agitation, 195-197 - - ----'s anti-Czarist policy, 120 - - ----'s appeal to Frenchmen, 245 - - ---- as a conversationalist, 124 - - ---- as a duellist, 125 - - ---- as an orator, 123, 124 - - ---- as doctor at Montmartre, 32 - - ---- as Mayor of Montmartre, 35 - - ---- as Minister of the Interior, 172 - - ---- as municipal dictator, 35 - - ---- as one of M. Floquet's seconds at the duel with Boulanger, 99 - - ---- as professor of French at Stanford, U.S.A., 29 - - ---- as Senator for Var, 171 - - ---- at Nantes as a student, 15 - - ----'s attitude in the matter of M. Wilson's trading in decorations, 93 - - ----'s attitude towards the Catholics, 61 - - ----, author's conversation with, 207 - - ---- becomes "suspect" and ceases to be Mayor of Montmartre, 42 - - ----'s betrothal to Mary Plummer, 30 - - ---- calls up the State engineers and re-lights Paris, 183 - - ----, charges against him, 119, 120 - - ----'s contempt for politicians as politicians, 94 - - ----'s criticism on the German fête of Sedan, 138 - - ----'s criticism on the catastrophe of the Charity Bazaar, 137 - - ---- defends himself in the National Assembly, 119 - - ---- denounces M. Ribot, 265 - - ----'s disregard of monetary considerations, 125 - - ----'s distrust of colonisation by conquest, 234 - - ----, Dreyfus affair, 151-170 - - ----'s duel with Commandant Poussages, 53 - - ----, efforts of his enemies to connect him with the Panama scandal, 117 - - ----, failure to attain Presidentship of Chamber, 126 - - ----, fight for Draguignan, 122 - - ----, freedom of speech, 94 - - ----, French intervention in Egypt, 91 - - ----, French peasantry, knowledge of, 133 - - ----, his reception by the miners at Lens, 177 - - ---- in America, 29 - - ---- in prison of Mazas, 25 - - ----'s individualism antipathetic to Socialist view of collective social -progress, 121 - - ----'s influence in council chamber of the Allies, 299 - - ---- introduces measure to establish Municipal Council of Paris, 54 - - ----'s knowledge of Parisian life, 54 - - ----, letters to the _Temps_, 29 - - ----, literary works, 141 - - ----, love of animals, 142 - - ----, love of Paris, 139, 140 - - ---- on French intervention in Egypt, 91 - - ---- on the "Right to Strike," 174 - - ----, opponent of Gambetta, 90 - - ---- opposed to colonial adventure, 88 - - ---- opposed to colonisation by conquest, 62 - - ---- opposed to execution of Generals Lecomte and Thomas, 42 - - ----'s opposition to M. Ferry and his support of M. Sadi-Carnot, 93 - - ----'s powerful personality, 131 - - ----'s power of work, 125 - - ----'s reply to Jaurès, 189 - - ---- retires from parliamentary life after defeat at Draguignan, 123 - - ----'s sense of humour, 55 - - ----'s speech at Hyères, 206 - - ----'s speech at Lyons on the miners' strike, 181 - - ----'s speech in favour of amnesty of Communists, 56 - - ----'s speech in the National Assembly, 43 - - ----'s statement of Socialism, 131 - - ---- the Tiger, 81 - - ----, the universal sceptic, 172 - - ----, tour of propaganda, 43 - - ---- turns journalist, 128 - - ---- turns lecturer, 232 - - ----'s view of Boulangist agitation, 101 - - ----'s warning after the battle of the Marne, 250 - - ----, 1870-71, the war of, 237 - - Cluseret, 48, 51 - - Commune, administration of the, 45 - - ----, establishment of the, 41 - - "Communist Manifesto," the, 50 - - Comte, Auguste, 25, 26 - - Constans, M., said to be the cause of the Boulanger fiasco, 103 - - "Co-operative Commonwealth," 51 - - Cottu, M., indictment of, 116 - - Courbet, 45 - - Courrières-Lens colliery disaster, the, 173 - - - Damiens, the assassin, 136 - - d'Aumale, Duc, 23 - - Daudet, M. Léon, 265 - - Delcassé, M., 173 - - ---- and Clemenceau, antagonism between, 229-231 - - ---- and the Kaiser, 205 - - ----, King Edward's courtesy to, 218 - - Declaration, Clemenceau's, 284-290 - - Delescluze, 45, 51, 58 - - Déroulède, M., saves a situation, 217 - - Dilke, Sir Charles, 89, 204 - - Dombrowski, 51 - - Doumergue, M., 206 - - Dreyfus, 10 - - Dufaure, 78, 84 - - - Edward VII, King, 213 - - Eiffel, M., indictment of, 116 - - Electrical engineers' strike in Paris, 182 - - _Encyclopædia Britannica_: tribute to M. Clemenceau, 214 - - Engels, 50 - - England's opposition to construction of Suez Canal, 106 - - Esterhazy, Major, 157-162 - - - Fallières, M., 213 - - ---- and M. Clemenceau in London, 218 - - Favre, Jules, 36 - - Ferry, Jules, 78, 84, 87, 88, 89, 92, 213 - - ---- and colonial expansion, 119 - - Fez, French delegation at, 204 - - Flahault, 17 - - Floquet, 78, 115 - - ----, duel with Gen. Boulanger, 98 - - Flourens, M., his pen-picture of King Edward, 214-216 - - Foch, Marshal, 295 - - Fontane, M., indictment of, 116 - - Fontenay le Comte, 14 - - Foreign affairs in 1908, 213 - - France and England, a better feeling between, 21 - - ---- and Great Britain, relations between, 213 - - ----, the wealth of, 234, 235 - - Francis Joseph, 27 - - Franco-German agreement of 1909, 239 - - ---- convention of 1911, 239-241 - - _Fraser's Magazine_, extract from, 45 - - French Revolution, 16 - - Freycinet, M., 84, 96 - - - Gallifet, 51 - - Gambetta, 10, 43, 44, 60, 64-79, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90, 210 - - Gauthier, M., urges the Government to complete Panama Canal, 114 - - Germany and Morocco, 202 - - ----, preparations of, 243 - - Germinat, Admiral, and the Navy, 226 - - Gonse, General, 157, 163, 166 - - Grévy, Albert, 78, 82, 84, 85, 86, 88, 92, 93 - - Gribelin, M., 166 - - Guesde, Jules, 261 - - Guesdists, the, 121 - - - Haldane, Lord, 204 - - ----, "sublime confidence" in Germany, 242 - - "Harum, David," his motto, 62 - - Haussmann, Baron, 22 - - Henry, Colonel, 158, 165 - - ----, the anarchist, 136, 137 - - Henty, George, 167 - - Herz, M. Cornelius, and his part in the Panama scandal, 109, 116, 117, 118 - - Hugo, Victor, 23 - - Humbert, M., 272 - - Hyndman, Hugh, 45 - - - Income tax, a graduated, 227 - - Infiltration, German, and France, 258-260 - - Interpenetration, German, 257 - - Ismail Pasha, Khedive, 106 - - Italian campaign, the, 21 - - Italian Carbonari, 17 - - - Jacques, a liquor dealer, chosen to fight Paris against the General, 102 - - Jaurès and peace, 238 - - ----, 124, 125, 139, 157, 163, 164, 168, 169, 170, 183-192, 212 - - ---- in public affairs, 121 - - Jouaust, Colonel, 165, 166 - - Jourde, 45, 49 - - Judet, M., one of Clemenceau's detractors, 118 - - Junck, M., 166 - - Junker party and the Crown Prince, 205 - - _Justice, La_ 84 - - - Kaiser, the, and preparations for the war, 218 - - ----, and the King of Spain, 203 - - ----, and the Sultan of Morocco, 203 - - King Edward and Clemenceau, 214-217 - - - Labori, M., 160 - - Labour, Minstry of, and M. Viviani, 229 - - Lac, Father du, 158 - - Langlois, Colonel, 53 - - Lauth, Major 165, 166 - - Le Blond, Maurice, 29 - - Lecomte, General, 41, 42, 53 - - Lesseps, M. Ferdinand, 106-107 - - ----, Count Ferdinand de, indictment of, 116 - - ----, Count de, 115 - - ----, Count, two estimates of his character, 111, 112 - - ----, M. C. de, indictment of, 116 - - Lichnowsky's, Prince, revelations, 244 - - Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 168, 169 - - Longuet, 45, 262 - - Lottery Bill, the Panama, 109 - - Loubet, President, 118 - - Louis XVI, 16 - - ---- XVIII, 20 - - ---- Philippe, 16, 20 - - - MacMahon, Marshal, 10, 36, 69, 72-78, 82, 85 - - Madeira wine and a story about Cette, 191 - - Malvy, M., and pro-Germans, 264 - - Mannesmann, Brothers, 212 - - Marx, 50, 131 - - Marxists, the, 121 - - Méline, M., 157 - - Mercier, General, 157, 166 - - Michel, E. B., 45 - - Mill, John Stuart, a dedication to, 25 - - Montagnards, insurrection of the, 57 - - Morny, 17 - - Morocco affair, the, 173 - - ----, French policy in, 211 - - Mouilleron-en-Pareds, 14 - - - Napoleon III, 20, 22, 23, 33 - - ----, chief cause of downfall of, 27 - - ----, loss of prestige, 32 - - ----, Louis, 16, 17, 19, 21, 27, 28 - - ----, the Court of, 21 - - Naquet, 87 - - Narbonne and Montpellier, disaffection among the wine-growers, 194 - - National workshops, 16 - - Nicholas, Emperor, 21 - - 1918, June, the Socialists and Clemenceau, 291-293 - - Noir, Victor, murder of, 32 - - Norton, M., 118 - - "Novel with a purpose," the, 146 - - - Orleans, House of, 16 - - Orsini bomb, the, 21 - - - Painlevé, M., 282 - - Panama Canal, a congress of nations called by Lesseps, 107 - - ---- and financial corruption, 110 - - ---- and opponents of the Republic, 111 - - ----, collapse of the company, 113 - - ----, horrors on the Isthmus, 109 - - ----, indictment of directors, 116 - - ---- scandal, accusation of deputies, senators, and academicians, 115 - - ---- scandal, Presidents Carnot and Loubet's attitude, 111 - - ---- scandal, the, 10 - - Paris and the Provinces, 19 - - Paty du Clam, Colonel, 158 - - Peace as desired by Socialist leaders, 238 - - Perovskaia, Sophie, 58 - - Persigny, 17 - - Phylloxera ravages in the Bordeaux vineyards, 194 - - Pichon, M., 206, 213 - - Picquart, Colonel, 157, 162, 164, 166, 206 - - Plébiscite, the, 17, 19, 20, 33 - - Poincaré and Clemenceau, relations between, 255 - - Population, concentration of, John Bellers on, 234 - - ----, Petty on the same, _ibid._ - - Pyat, 43, 44, 51 - - - Radolin, Prince, 212 - - Railways, the nationalisation of, 226 - - Raspail, 58 - - Ravachol, the anarchist, 136 - - Reinach, M. Jacques, and his part in the Panama Scandal, 109 - - ----, the tragedy of his death, 116, 117, 118 - - Rémusat, de, 69 - - Republic of 1848, 16 - - Retreat, the great, of August 1914, 248 - - Revolution, the French, Clemenceau on, 228 - - Ribot, M., denounced by Clemenceau, 265 - - Rochefort, 23 - - Roget, M., 166 - - Rollin, Ledru, 16 - - Rosen, Dr., 212 - - Rossel, 51 - - Rouher, 23 - - Rousseau, M., reports unfavourably on Panama Canal, 108 - - Rouvier, M., 115, 172 - - ----, defends the President in the Wilson affair, 93 - - ----, refuses to accept Boulanger as War Minister, 98 - - Russia, campaign against, 21 - - - Sarrien, M., 172, 193, 206 - - Scheurer-Kestner, 157-163 - - Schnäbele affair, the, Boulanger's part in it, 96, 97 - - Second Empire, the, 15 - - Shaw, Bernard, 192 - - Simon, Jules, 73, 74 - - Social-Democracy, German, and the war, 244 - - Socialist demonstration against Clemenceau at unveiling of statue to -M. Floquet, 227 - - ---- Party, the, anti-patriotic, 262-3 - - Sonnino, Baron, and Caillaux, 272 - - Spüller, 90 - - Suez Canal, the, 106 - - - Thiers, 9, 37, 39, 44, 50, 51, 54, 68, 69 - - Thomas, Albert, 261 - - ----, General, 41, 42, 53 - - Trochu, General, 36 - - Tunis, the question of, 88 - - - "_Utrinque paratus_," 9 - - - Vaillant, 45, 125 - - ---- and Hervé, and the war, 261 - - ---- and peace, 238 - - ----, the anarchist, 136, 137 - - ----, Edouard, the Blanquist, 121 - - Vendée, La, 13, 14, 15 - - Venice, the annexation of, 27 - - Verdun, Clemenceau on the victories at, 251 - - Vermorel, 43 - - Victoria, Queen, 34 - - _Ville Lumière, La_, 24 - - Viviani, M., 206, 229 - - - Waddington, 83, 84 - - Ward, Mrs. Humphry, 8 - - Wilson, trading in decorations, 92 - - Wine, adulteration of, 194 - - Working Men's Association, the International, 50 - - Wyse, Buonaparte, sells concession for Panama canal scheme to Lesseps, 108 - - - Zola, 157-160 - - ----, the trial of, 162, 164 - - Zurlinden, General, 157 - - - - - WORKS BY GEORGES CLEMENCEAU. - - - _De la Génération des Éléments Anatomiques._ 8vo. Paris: Baillière et - fils. 1865. - - _Notions d'Anatomie et de Physiologie Générale. De la Génération des - Éléments Anatomiques._ Précédée d'une introduction par M. Charles - Robin. 8vo. Paris: Germer Baillière. 1867. - - J. Stuart Mill: _Auguste Comte et le Positivisme_. 18mo. Paris: Germer - Baillière. 1868. Alcau. 1893. - - _L'Amnistie devant le Parlement._ Discours Chambre des Députés, 16 - Mai, 1876. 18mo. Paris: Imp. Wittersheim. 1876. - - _Affaires Egyptiennes._ Discours Chambre des Députés, 19 and 20 - Juillet, 1882. 18mo. Paris: Imp. Wittersheim. 1882. - - _Discours prononcé au Cirque Fernando le 25 Mai, 1884._ (Account of - Clemenceau's stewardship.) 18mo. Paris: Imp. Schiller. 1884. - - _Affaire du Tonkin._ Discours Chambre des Députés, 27 Nov., 1884. - 18mo. Paris: Imp. Schiller. 1884. - - _Politique Coloniale._ Discours Chambre des Députés, 30 Juillet, 1884. - 18mo. Paris: Imp. Schiller. 1885. - - _Discours prononcé à Draguignan, 13 Septembre 1885._ 18mo. Paris: Imp. - Schiller. 1885. - - _La Mêlée Sociale._ 18mo. Paris: Charpentier et Fasquelle. 1895. - - _Le Grand Pan._ 18mo. Paris: Charpentier et Fasquelle. 1896. - - _Les Plus Forts._ Roman contemporain. 18mo. Paris: Fasquelle. 1898. - - _Au Pied du Mont Sinai._ 4to. Paris: Floury. 1898. - - _L'Iniquité._ Notes sur l'affaire Dreyfus. 18mo. Paris: Stock. 1899. - - _Fils des Jours._ Paris: Stock. 1899. - - _Le Voile du Bonheur._ Pièce en un acte. 18mo. Paris: Fasquelle. 1901. - - _La Honte._ 18mo. Paris: Stock. 1903. - - _Aux Embuscades de la Vie._ Dans la foi, dans l'ordre établi, dans - l'amour. 18mo. Paris: Fasquelle. 1903. - - _L'Enseignement dans le Droit Républicain._ Discours au Sénat. 18mo. - Paris: Fasquelle. 1904. - - _Figures de la Vendée._ Paris: Hessèle. 1904. - - _La France devant l'Allemagne._ Imp. 8vo. Payot. 1918. - - * * * * * - -The above is a list of Clemenceau's most important works. His speeches -in the Chamber of Deputies from 1876 up to 1893, and in the Senate, -since 1902, will be found in the _Journal Officiel_ and the _Annales -du Sénat_. There are several studies of Clemenceau and his career: the -most recent is _Clemenceau_ (8vo, Paris--Charpentier, 1918), of which -M. Georges Lecomte is the author. But he has been disinclined to have -any detailed personal biography published. Though he must be well aware -of the eminent part he has played in the history of his own country -and of Europe, he has always preferred to speak of himself, and to be -spoken of, as only one of the people of the France whom he has so well -served. - - - - - FOOTNOTES: - - -[A] M. Maurice Le Blond. - -[B] "Yes, bear in mind, reader, Monsieur Brandès's fear under existing -conditions is that Germany may be humiliated! Denmark has been -humiliated by the people of supermen who constitute the German race. -France, also, I take it, and even Belgium: perhaps Brandès will admit -that? He has not protested. He even refuses to explain himself on this -point, declaring that his silence (prolix enough) is golden--that sort -of gold which won't stand the touchstone. But his overmastering dread -is that the organisers of the greatest crime against civilisation, -against the independence of the peoples, against the dignity of the -human species, the authors of the appalling atrocities from which -Belgium and France are still bleeding, may not themselves undergo -_humiliation_." - -[C] I happen to know the configuration of this district well, having -walked all over it in 1866, after I went up into the Tyrol with -Garibaldi. - -[D] Since the extreme pacifist and anti-nationalist section of -Socialists captured the French Socialist Party a body of the French -Socialist Deputies have constituted a group of their own in the -Assembly. They number in all forty-one and they have a well-edited and -well-written daily journal, _La France Libre_, which represents their -views. Among their leading members are the Citizens Varenne, De la -Porte, Compère Morel, Albert Thomas and others. They are thoroughly -sound Socialists in all domestic affairs, but they cannot accept the -views of those who are now led by Jean Longuet and Marcel Cachin on -questions affecting the independence and welfare of France as a nation. -Their opinions are, in fact, much the same as those which have been -so vigorously and successfully championed by the National Socialist -Party in Great Britain. It seems a pity that none of their party have -seen their way to accept the positions in the Cabinet offered by M. -Clemenceau. The results of the General Election in Great Britain may -give them encouragement to do so. - -[E] CLEMENCEAU'S MINISTRY. - - CLEMENCEAU, Prime Minister and Minister for War. - PICHON, Foreign Affairs. - PAMS, Interior. - KLOTZ, Finance. - LEYGUES, Marine } - CLEMENTEL, Commerce } - CLAVALLE, Public Works } Members of late Ministry. - LOUCHEUR, Munitions } - COLLIARD, Labour } - BORET, Supplies and Agriculture. - - - - - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Clemenceau, by H. M. Hyndman - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CLEMENCEAU *** - -***** This file should be named 60036-0.txt or 60036-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/0/0/3/60036/ - -Produced by David T. 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