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<h2>MEMOIRS OF GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Illustrated, V6</h2>
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Title: The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Illustrated, Volume 6.

Author: Ulysses S. Grant


Release Date: June, 2004  [Etext #5865]
[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule]
[This file was first posted on September 15, 2002]

Edition: 10

Language: English

Character set encoding: ASCII





*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MEMOIRS OF GENERAL GRANT, V6 ***




This eBook was produced by David Widger [widger@cecomet.net]

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<center><h1>PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF &nbsp;U. S. GRANT</h1></center>

<center><h3>by Ulysses S. Grant</h3></center>

<br><br>

            <center><h3>Volume 6.</h3></center>

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<center><img alt="titlepage.jpg (21K)" src="titlepage.jpg" height="977" width="617">
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<center><a name="dedication"></a><img alt="dedication.jpg (20K)" src="dedication.jpg" height="516" width="650">
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<br><br><br><br>
<center><h2>CONTENTS</h2></center>

<center><h3>Volume 6.</h3></center>
<br>

<blockquote>

<p><a href="#ch62">CHAPTER LXII.</a>
SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY
ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND
THOMAS--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE
CAROLINAS.</p>

<p><a href="#ch63">CHAPTER LXIII.</a>
ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE
COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE
PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE
PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE--THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK
ROAD.</p>

<p><a href="#ch64">CHAPTER LXIV.</a>
INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE
FORKS--PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE
PETERSBURG.</p>

<p><a href="#ch65">CHAPTER LXV.</a>
THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN
PETERSBURG--THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT
TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.</p>

<p><a href="#ch66">CHAPTER LXVI.</a>
BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT
FARMVILLE--CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS
THE ENEMY.</p>

<p><a href="#ch67">CHAPTER LXVII.</a>
NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S
HOUSE--THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH
LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.</p>

<p><a href="#ch68">CHAPTER LXVIII.</a>
MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND
SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT
WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT
JOHNSON'S POLICY.</p>

<p><a href="#ch69">CHAPTER LXIX.</a>
SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE
OF MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON
DAVIS--GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.</p>

<p><a href="#ch70">CHAPTER LXX.</a>
THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S
ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF
LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.</p>

<p><a href="#conclusion">CONCLUSION</a></p>

<p><a href="#appendix">APPENDIX</a></p>






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<center><h2>MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS</h2></center>

<blockquote>
<pre>
<a href="#b407">MAP OF SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH</a> 
<a href="#b441">MAP OF PETERSBURG AND FIVE FORKS</a> 
<a href="#b457">MAP OF THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN</a> 
<a href="#b471">MAP OF JETERSVILLE AND SAILOR'S CREEK</a> 
<a href="#b475">MAP OF HIGH BRIDGE AND FARMVILLE</a> 
<a href="#b487">MAP OF APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE</a>
 
<a href="#b489">ETCHING OF MCLEAN'S HOUSE AT APPOMATTOX WHERE
     GENERAL LEE'S SURRENDER TOOK PLACE</a>

<a href="#b497a">FAC-SIMILE OF THE ORIGINAL TERMS OF LEE'S SURRENDER 
     AS WRITTEN BY GENERAL GRANT</a> 

<a href="#b520">MAP OF THE DEFENCES OF THE CITY OF MOBILE</a> 
<a href="#b632">MAP OF THE SEAT OF WAR-1861 TO 1865</a>

</pre>
</blockquote>





<br><br><br><br>
<a name="ch62"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXII.</h2></center>

<center><h3>SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY
ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND
THOMAS--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE
CAROLINAS.</h3></center>
<br>

<p>When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the
North, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to
see him.  Among others who went was the Secretary of War, who
seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign.  Mr. Draper,
the collector of customs of New York, who was with Mr. Stanton's
party, was put in charge of the public property that had been
abandoned and captured.  Savannah was then turned over to
General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his
own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the
future.  I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac
(General Barnard) with letters to General Sherman.  He remained
some time with the general, and when he returned brought back
letters, one of which contained suggestions from Sherman as to
what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should
have started upon his march northward.</p>

<p>I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea
originally of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or
even to North Carolina.  The season was bad, the roads impassable
for anything except such an army as he had, and I should not have
thought of ordering such a move.  I had, therefore, made
preparations to collect transports to carry Sherman and his army
around to the James River by water, and so informed him.  On
receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for
the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect
the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north
through the Carolinas.  I was only too happy to approve this;
for if successful, it promised every advantage.  His march
through Georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of
transportation in that State, and had completely cut the enemy
off from all sources of supply to the west of it.  If North and
South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for
feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison at
Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw
supplies, to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and,
although that section of the country was fertile, it was already
well exhausted of both forage and food.  I approved Sherman's
suggestion therefore at once.</p>

<p>The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load
the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long
distance.  Sherman would now have to march through a country
furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been
operating in during his march to the sea.  Besides, he was
confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly
superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous
march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now
become of such vast importance to the very existence of the
Confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be
expected in order to save it.</p>

<p>Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to
start with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who
commanded that part of the navy on the South Carolina and
Georgia coast, and General Foster, commanding the troops, to
take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he
(Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of Charleston.</p>

<p>This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea
coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop
his onward progress.  He also wrote me a letter, making
suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of
his movement farther north.  This letter was brought to City
Point by General Barnard at a time when I happened to be going
to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of January.  I
cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate with
Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than
by giving my reply to this letter.</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
<br>Jan. 21, 1865.</p>

<p>MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
<br>Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.</p>

<p>GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received
at City Point, and read with interest.  Not having them with me,
however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you
on all points of recommendation.  As I arrived here at one P.M.,
and must leave at six P.M., having in the meantime spent over
three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I must be
brief.  Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign
into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis,
Md., with his corps.  The advance (six thousand) will reach the
seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as
railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati.  The
corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men.  I was induced to do
this because I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off
before spring.  His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness
that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your
campaigns.  The command of the advance of the pursuit was left
to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind.  When Hood
had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it,
Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from
whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He
is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty,
but he is not good on a pursuit.  He also reported his troops
fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up.  This report and
a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use
his surplus troops elsewhere.</p>

<p>Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to
Selma under an energetic leader.  He has been telegraphed to, to
know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes
he would select.  No reply is yet received.  Canby has been
ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior,
towards Montgomery and Selma.  Thomas's forces will move from
the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to
Canby.  Without further reinforcements Canby will have a moving
column of twenty thousand men.</p>

<p>Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured.  We have a force
there of eight thousand effective.  At New Bern about half the
number.  It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also
has fallen.  I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the
17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort
Caswell, and that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.</p>

<p>If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there.  If not, he
will be sent to New Bern.  In either event, all the surplus
forces at the two points will move to the interior toward
Goldsboro' in co-operation with your movements.  From either
point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here
abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads.</p>

<p>There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army
south.  Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you,
if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort
Fisher having overtaken about two thousand.</p>

<p>All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in
communication with them.  They will be so instructed.  From
about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much
more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in.  In the meantime,
should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps
of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the
troops about Richmond.</p>

<p>To resume:  Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the
Gulf.  A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it
doubtful.  A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will
co-operate with you from New Bern or Wilmington, or both.  You
can call for reinforcements.</p>

<p>This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will
return with any message you may have for me.  If there is
anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on
ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me
know it.</p>

<p>Yours truly,
<br>U. S. GRANT,
<br>Lieut.-General.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving
him the news of the battle of Nashville.  He was much pleased at
the result, although, like myself, he had been very much
disappointed at Thomas for permitting Hood to cross the
Tennessee River and nearly the whole State of Tennessee, and
come to Nashville to be attacked there.  He, however, as I had
done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.</p>

<p>On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to
Sherman and his army passed by Congress were approved.</p>

<p>Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up,
commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from
the river, and taking up all obstructions.  He had then
intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small
garrison.  By the middle of January all his work was done,
except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement
with.</p>

<br><br><br><br>
<center><a name="b407"></a><img alt="b407.jpg (149K)" src="b407.jpg" height="388" width="650">
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<p>He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going
along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads
farther east, threatening Charleston.  He commenced the advance
by moving his right wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to
Pocotaligo by water.  This column, in moving north, threatened
Charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that
they would have a force visit Charleston.  South Carolina had
done so much to prepare the public mind of the South for
secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision
of the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it,
that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and
also largely entertained by people of the South, that the State
of South Carolina, and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in
particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them.  In fact,
nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the
radical portion of the people from condemning the movement,
because Charleston had been left out.  To pass into the interior
would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its
possession by the navy and Foster's troops.  It is so situated
between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have
held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold
out.  Sherman therefore passed it by.</p>

<p>By the first of February all preparations were completed for the
final march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective;
Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or
neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be
determined upon.  The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the
left from about Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns
taking a pretty direct route for Columbia.  The cavalry,
however, were to threaten Charleston on the right, and Augusta
on the left.</p>

<p>On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which
Sherman had received before starting out on his march.  We
already had New Bern and had soon Wilmington, whose fall
followed that of Fort Fisher; as did other points on the sea
coast, where the National troops were now in readiness to
co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had passed
Fayetteville.</p>

<p>On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New
Orleans, to move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama,
for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc.  On the
8th of February I ordered Sheridan, who was in the Valley of
Virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit
and strike the canal west of Richmond at or about Lynchburg; and
on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as soon as the
roads would permit, saying:  "As soon as it is possible to
travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching
Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone.  From there you could
destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be
of no further use to the rebellion. * * * This additional raid,
with one starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering
about four or five thousand cavalry; one from Eastport,
Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile Bay, with
about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter pushing
for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a large
army eating out the vitals of South Carolina--is all that will
be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon.  I
would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish
this.  Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last."</p>

<p>On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had
received his orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was
extremely anxious to hear of his being in Alabama.  I notified
him, also, that I had sent Grierson to take command of his
cavalry, he being a very efficient officer.  I further suggested
that Forrest was probably in Mississippi, and if he was there, he
would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it
would be difficult to get by.  I still further informed him that
Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into Mississippi
on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter.  This
force did not get off however.</p>

<p>All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's
march, the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the
West from leaving there.  But neither Canby nor Thomas could be
got off in time.  I had some time before depleted Thomas's army
to reinforce Canby, for the reason that Thomas had failed to
start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and
to have the troops where they might do something.  Canby seemed
to be equally deliberate in all of his movements.  I ordered him
to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under
another officer.  General Granger had got down to New Orleans,
in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put him
in command of troops.  In spite of this he asked the War
Department to assign Granger to the command of a corps.</p>

<p>Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the
cause in that quarter, I said to Canby:  "I am in receipt of a
dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for
a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of
railroad.  I have directed that none be sent.  Thomas's army has
been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where
they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the
enemy had in the West.  If there had been any idea of repairing
railroads, it could have been done much better from the North,
where we already had the troops.  I expected your movements to
be co-operative with Sherman's last.  This has now entirely
failed.  I wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly
and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine
shops, etc., not to build them.  Take Mobile and hold it, and
push your forces to the interior--to Montgomery and to Selma.
Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for
carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such
positions as can be supplied by water.  By this means alone you
can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the
interior can be kept broken."</p>

<p>Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to
render any service in the direction for which they were designed.</p>

<p>The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's
troops and Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand
men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as
I was sure would be the case, to retard Sherman's movements.
Everything possible was being done to raise troops in the
South.  Lee dispatched against Sherman the troops which had been
sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including those of the other
defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after
deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to
fourteen thousand men.  After Thomas's victory at Nashville what
remained, of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as
rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces;
and, finally, General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest
commanders of the South though not in favor with the
administration (or at least with Mr. Davis), was put in command
of all the troops in North and South Carolina.</p>

<p>Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January,
but before sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him
down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as I could give
fuller directions after being on the ground than I could very
well have given without.  We soon returned, and the troops were
sent by sea to Cape Fear River.  Both New Bern and Wilmington
are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite at
Goldsboro.  Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the
mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to
secure the Wilmington and Charlotteville Railroad.  This column
took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross
over to the island south of the city of Wilmington.  A large
body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them.  They
succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of February.  I took the
precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in case he should be
forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching North
Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was
liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected
march.  I also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a
great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in
Virginia.  The gauge of the North Carolina railroads being the
same as the Virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars
and locomotives were ready for use there without any change.</p>

<p>On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to
Thomas to move south to Alabama and Georgia.  (I had previously
reduced his force by sending a portion of it to Terry.)  I
directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send Stoneman
through East Tennessee, and push him well down toward Columbia,
South Carolina, in support of Sherman.  Thomas did not get
Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I had supposed
he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of his being
in Louisville, Kentucky.  I immediately changed the order, and
directed Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg.  Finally, however,
on the 12th of March, he did push down through the north-western
end of South Carolina, creating some consternation.  I also
ordered Thomas to send the 4th corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and
to destroy no more roads east of that.  I also directed him to
concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with a view to a probable
movement of his army through that way toward Lynchburg.</p>

<p>Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah.
Sherman's march was without much incident until he entered
Columbia, on the 17th of February.  He was detained in his
progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild
the bridges.  There was constant skirmishing and fighting between
the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the
advance of the infantry.  Four days, also, were lost in making
complete the destruction of the most important railroads south
of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water,
and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road.  A
formidable river had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in
the face of a small garrison under General Wade Hampton.  There
was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high
water in the stream.  Hampton left as Sherman approached, and
the city was found to be on fire.</p>

<p>There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in
discussions of the question as to who set Columbia on fire.
Sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and Hampton denies
it on the part of the Confederates.  One thing is certain:  as
soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to
extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the
limited means at hand.  In any case, the example set by the
Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg, Pa., a town
which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act
of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible
for the conflict then raging, not imperative.</p>

<p>The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took
possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the
National forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making
terms for the protection of property, etc.  Sherman paid no
attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took
the town without making any conditions whatever with its
citizens.  He then, however, co-operated with the mayor in
extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were
rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes.  When he
left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to
be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some
arrangement could be made for their future supplies.  He
remained in Columbia until the roads, public buildings,
workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were
destroyed.  While at Columbia, Sherman learned for the first
time that what remained of Hood's army was confronting him,
under the command of General Beauregard.</p>

<p>Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster
garrisoned the place.  Wilmington was captured on the 22d.
Columbia and Cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure
from invasion that the wealthy people of Charleston and Augusta
had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to
be stored.  Among the goods sent there were valuable carpets,
tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture.  I am afraid
much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops.  There
was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery,
small-arms and fixed ammunition.  These, of course were among
the articles destroyed.  While here, Sherman also learned of
Johnston's restoration to command.  The latter was given, as
already stated, all troops in North and South Carolina.  After
the completion of the destruction of public property about
Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his march and reached Cheraw
without any special opposition and without incident to relate.
The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the
way.  Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, on
the 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced
straight for Fayetteville.  Hardee and Hampton were there, and
barely escaped.  Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of
March.  He had dispatched scouts from Cheraw with letters to
General Terry, at Wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with
some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he
enumerated.  The scouts got through successfully, and a boat was
sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman had asked
as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, those
stores did not contain clothing.</p>

<p>Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for
Goldsboro.  The march, now, had to be made with great caution,
for he was approaching Lee's army and nearing the country that
still remained open to the enemy.  Besides, he was confronting
all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that
point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what
remained of Hood's army.  Frantic appeals were made to the
people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe.  I
presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all over 35,000
or 40,000 men.  The people had grown tired of the war, and
desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous
than the voluntary accessions.</p>

<p>There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between
Johnston's troops and Sherman's, with some loss; and at
Bentonville on the 19th and 21st of March, but Johnston withdrew
from the contest before the morning of the 22d.  Sherman's loss
in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was
about sixteen hundred.  Sherman's troops at last reached
Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and
there his men were destined to have a long rest.  Schofield was
there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to
Wilmington.</p>

<p>Sherman was no longer in danger.  He had Johnston confronting
him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers
and morale.  He had Lee to the north of him with a force largely
superior; but I was holding Lee with a still greater force, and
had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce Johnston,
Sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from Schofield and
Terry, would have been able to hold the Confederates at bay for
an indefinite period.  He was near the sea-shore with his back
to it, and our navy occupied the harbors.  He had a railroad to
both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughly
protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country
and deepen as they approach the sea.  Then, too, Sherman knew
that if Lee should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and
Johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted
to make a stand.  With the loss of their capital, it is doubtful
whether Lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it
reached North Carolina.  Johnston's army was demoralized by
constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive
movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on
duty.  The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like
their brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man
is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as
to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter
how just he deems it.</p>



<br><br><br><br>
<a name="ch63"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXIII.</h2></center>

<center><h3>ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE
COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE
PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE
PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE--THE LINE OF BATTLE OF
WHITE OAK ROAD.</h3></center>
<br>

<p>On the last of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the
so-called Confederate States presented themselves on our lines
around Petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my
headquarters at City Point.  They proved to be Alexander H.
Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, Judge Campbell,
Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunt, formerly United
States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate.</p>

<p>It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at
once conducted them to the steam Mary Martin, a Hudson River
boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of
passengers.  I at once communicated by telegraph with Washington
and informed the Secretary of War and the President of the
arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to
negotiate terms of peace between he United States and, as they
termed it, the Confederate Government.  I was instructed to
retain them at City Point, until the President, or some one whom
he would designate, should come to meet them.  They remained
several days as guests on board the boat.  I saw them quite
frequently, though I have no recollection of having had any
conversation whatever with them on the subject of their
mission.  It was something I had nothing to do with, and I
therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject.  For
my own part I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit,
that they were the representatives of a GOVERNMENT.  There had
been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything
of the kind.  As long as they remained there, however, our
relations were pleasant and I found them all very agreeable
gentlemen.  I directed the captain to furnish them with the best
the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every
way possible.  No guard was placed over them and no restriction
was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked
that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them.  They
were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did
so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters.</p>

<p>I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but
knew them well by reputation and through their public services,
and I had been a particular admirer of Mr. Stephens.  I had
always supposed that he was a very small man, but when I saw him
in the dusk of the evening I was very much surprised to find so
large a man as he seemed to be.  When he got down on to the boat
I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a
manufacture that had been introduced into the South during the
rebellion.  The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I
had ever seen, even in Canada.  The overcoat extended nearly to
his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of
being an average-sized man.  He took this off when he reached
the cabin of the boat, and I was struck with the apparent change
in size, in the coat and out of it.</p>

<p>After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a
dispatch from Washington, directing me to send the commissioners
to Hampton Roads to meet the President and a member of the
cabinet.  Mr. Lincoln met them there and had an interview of
short duration.  It was not a great while after they met that
the President visited me at City Point.  He spoke of his having
met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there
would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they
would recognize, first:  that the Union as a whole must be
forever preserved, and second:  that slavery must be abolished.
If they were willing to concede these two points, then he was
ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand
them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them
to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us
in the Union and be one people.  He always showed a generous and
kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I never heard him
abuse an enemy.  Some of the cruel things said about President
Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to the
heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful
disposition and I saw a great deal of him at City Point, for he
seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the
capital.</p>

<p>Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln.  It was on
the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the
peace commissioners at Hampton Roads.  After a little
conversation, he asked me if I had seen that overcoat of
Stephens's.  I replied that I had.  "Well," said he, "did you
see him take it off?"  I said yes.  "Well," said he, "didn't you
think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you
did see?"  Long afterwards I told this story to the Confederate
General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate.  He
repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens
laughed immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln.</p>

<p>The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace
commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for
two or three little incidents.  On one occasion during this
period, while I was visiting Washington City for the purpose of
conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under
General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to
the south, got in east of us.  Before their presence was known,
they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were
grazing in that section.  It was a fair capture, and they were
sufficiently needed by the Confederates.  It was only
retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a
time, when out of supplies taking what the Confederate army
otherwise would have gotten.  As appears in this book, on one
single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which
were crossing the Mississippi River near Port Hudson on their
way from Texas to supply the Confederate army in the East.</p>

<p>One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the
rebellion was the last few weeks before Petersburg.  I felt that
the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would
try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I
was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to
hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket
line.  He had his railroad by the way of Danville south, and I
was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and
ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him
for his immediate defence.  I knew he could move much more
lightly and more rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start,
he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to
fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another
year.</p>

<p>I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it
was possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where
they were.  There is no doubt that Richmond would have been
evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it
was the capital of the so-called Confederacy, and the fact of
evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very
demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army.  When it was
evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy at once
began to crumble and fade away.  Then, too, desertions were
taking place, not only among those who were with General Lee in
the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole
Confederacy.  I remember that in a conversation with me on one
occasion long prior to this, General Butler remarked that the
Confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for
their army; possibly adding, though I am not certain as to this,
"unless they should arm the slave."</p>

<p>The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied
man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they
had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from
fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men
from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves.  The
latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate
danger, and especially those in the rear.  General Butler, in
alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus
"robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which I
afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.</p>

<p>It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits
they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout
the entire army, by desertions alone.  Then by casualties of
war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much
heavier.  It was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how
long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going
on.  Of course long before their army would be thus reduced to
nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able
to capture theirs.  Then too I knew from the great number of
desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly
and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as
earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which
they were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent.  Many of
them were making application to be sent North where they might
get employment until the war was over, when they could return to
their Southern homes.</p>

<p>For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for
the time to come when I could commence the spring campaign,
which I thoroughly believed would close the war.</p>

<p>There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and
which detained me.  One was the fact that the winter had been
one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery
and teams.  It was necessary to wait until they had dried
sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery
necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's
country.  The other consideration was that General Sheridan with
the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was operating on the north
side of the James River, having come down from the Shenandoah. It
was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me, and I was
therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the
James River.</p>

<p>Let us now take account of what he was doing.</p>

<p>On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan.  He had met Early
between Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing
nearly his entire command.  Early and some of his officers
escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the
woods.</p>

<p>On the 12th I heard from him again.  He had turned east, to come
to White House.  He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because
the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very
much swollen.  He had a pontoon train with him, but it would not
reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of
water, which he would have to get over in going south as first
ordered.</p>

<p>I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the
depot there open until he arrived.  We had intended to abandon
it because the James River had now become our base of supplies.</p>

<p>Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into
two divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin.
General Merritt was acting as chief of cavalry.  Sheridan moved
very light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a
larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very
little else besides ammunition.  They stopped at Charlottesville
and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward Lynchburg.  He
also sent a division along the James River Canal to destroy
locks, culverts etc.  All mills and factories along the lines of
march of his troops were destroyed also.</p>

<p>Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a
march to White House was now somewhat hazardous.  He determined
therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he
was as near to Richmond as it was possible to get, or until
attacked.  He did this, destroying the canal as far as
Goochland, and the railroad to a point as near Richmond as he
could get.  On the 10th he was at Columbia.  Negroes had joined
his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they
assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads
and the canal.  His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when
he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage.
He had captured most of Early's horses and picked up a good many
others on the road.  When he reached Ashland he was assailed by
the enemy in force.  He resisted their assault with part of his
command, moved quickly across the South and North Anna, going
north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.</p>

<p>The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to
the time he could get away from Goldsboro where he then was.
Supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a
long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained
in the country through which he would pass.  I had to arrange,
therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the
neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, the earliest day
at which he supposed he could be ready.</p>

<p>Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he
could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined
to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing
so.  I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any
time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who was on his
way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both
his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the
execution of the plans which I had in mind.  However, having
arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to
make my plans.</p>

<p>Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night
before I was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into
North Carolina to join with Johnston in attempting to crush out
Sherman, I had, as early as the 1st of the month of March, given
instructions to the troops around Petersburg to keep a sharp
lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their
notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken.</p>

<p>It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and
General Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in
and about and Petersburg, and they both agreed places were no
longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as
possible.  They, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition
of the roads which would make it possible to move.</p>

<p>General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider
opening to enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater
security than he would have in the way the two armies were
situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines
around Petersburg.  The night of the 24th of March was fixed upon
for this assault, and General Gordon was assigned to the
execution of the plan.  The point between Fort Stedman and
Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was
selected as the point of his attack.  The attack was to be made
at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher
ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments,
then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of
our army, and force me to contract my lines.  Lee hoped this
would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of
escape.  The plan was well conceived and the execution of it very
well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our
line.</p>

<p>Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the
point at which they were to make their charge, and got
possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of
the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced
the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than
fifty yards.  For some time before the deserters had been coming
in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and
this the Confederate general knew.  Taking advantage of this
knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through
to ours as if to desert.  When they got to our lines they at once
took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In
the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great
security.  This plan was to have been executed and much damage
done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce
Gordon had to be brought from the north side of the James River
and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they
were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be
nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.</p>

<p>The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the
enemy passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery
No. 10.  Then turning to the right and left they captured the
fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them.
Continuing the charge, they also carried batteries Eleven and
Twelve to our left, which they turned toward City Point.</p>

<p>Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in
his line cut him off from all communication with his
headquarters.  Parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when
this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to Meade's
headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed
command himself and with commendable promptitude made all
preparations to drive the enemy back.  General Tidball gathered
a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear
of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground
between the lines very thoroughly.  Hartranft was soon out with
his division, as also was Willcox.  Hartranft to the right of
the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly
drove them back into Fort Stedman.  On the other side they were
driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and
batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by Willcox early in the
morning.</p>

<p>Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and
batteries, and communication was once more established.  The
artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was
impossible for the Confederates to retreat, and equally
impossible for reinforcements to join them.  They all,
therefore, fell captives into our hands.  This effort of Lee's
cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing,
wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.</p>

<p>After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates,
our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched
picket line, which they strengthened and held.  This, in turn,
gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came
to be made a few days later.</p>

<p>The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack
(24th of March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence
on the 29th.  Ord, with three divisions of infantry and
Mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the
27th, from the north side of the James River and take his place
on our extreme left, thirty miles away.  He left Weitzel with
the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda Hundred and
the north of the James River.  The engineer brigade was to be
left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about
Petersburg. [See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan,
March 24th, Appendix.]</p>

<p>Ord was at his place promptly.  Humphreys and Warren were then
on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps.  They were
directed on the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position
in their places, to cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west
toward Five Forks, the object being to get into a position from
which we could strike the South Side Railroad and ultimately the
Danville Railroad.  There was considerable fighting in taking up
these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the Army
of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses
were quite severe.</p>

<p>This was what was known as the Battle of White Oak Road.</p>



<br><br><br><br>
<a name="ch64"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXIV.</h2></center>

<center><h3>INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE
FORKS--PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE
PETERSBURG.</h3></center>
<br>

<p>Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March.  His
horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their
shoes.  A few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the
animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for
moving.  Immediately on General Sheridan's arrival at City Point
I prepared his instructions for the move which I had decided
upon.  The movement was to commence on the 29th of the month.</p>

<p>After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked
out of my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with
him by himself--not in the presence of anybody else, even of a
member of my staff.  In preparing his instructions I
contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing
Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and Richmond and
terminating the contest before separating from the enemy.  But
the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at the
prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never
terminate except by compromise.  Knowing that unless my plan
proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous
defeat, I provided in these instructions that in a certain event
he was to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and his base of
supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of
the Danville Railroad, or near it, across the Roanoke, get in the
rear of Johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with
Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these combined forces
to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already had
received, to act in cooperation with the armies around
Petersburg and Richmond.</p>

<p>I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed
somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut
loose again from the Army of the Potomac, and place himself
between the two main armies of the enemy.  I said to him:
"General, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely
as a blind;" and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore
described.  I told him that, as a matter of fact, I intended to
close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should
go no farther.  His face at once brightened up, and slapping his
hand on his leg he said:  "I am glad to hear it, and we can do
it."</p>

<p>Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks
until he got further instructions from me.</p>

<p>One day, after the movement I am about to describe had
commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far
to the rear, south, Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters
were then established, at Dabney's Mills.  He met some of my
staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the
prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would
prove the final and successful effort.  Although my
chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our
position about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he
asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had
been saying to them.  Sheridan felt a little modest about giving
his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came
in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered important
news, and suggested that I send for him.  I did so, and was glad
to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. Knowing
as I did from experience, of what great value that feeling of
confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a movement
at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after
I had started out the roads were still very heavy.  Orders were
given accordingly.</p>

<p>Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having
been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was
dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could
move.  On that date I moved out with all the army available
after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about
Petersburg.  It soon set in raining again however, and in a very
short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and
almost so for cavalry.  Sometimes a horse or mule would be
standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot
would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all
his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of
the quicksands so common in that part of Virginia and other
southern States.  It became necessary therefore to build
corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our
artillery upon.  The army had become so accustomed to this kind
of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very
rapidly.  The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient
progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan
with his cavalry over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then
come up by the road leading north-west to Five Forks, thus
menacing the right of Lee's line.</p>

<p>This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to
the west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right,
or Five Forks.  The column moving detached from the army still in
the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small.  The forces
in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank.
Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but
Humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between
him and Five Forks.</p>

<br><br><br><br>
<center><a name="b441"></a><img alt="b441.jpg (171K)" src="b441.jpg" height="394" width="650">
</center>
<br><br>
<center><a href="b441.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center>
<br><br>

<p>My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get
on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken
their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the
centre might be successfully made.  General Wright's corps had
been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order
as soon as information reached me of Sheridan's success.  He was
to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get.</p>

<p>It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to
be to get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville
Railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on
the 29th.  These roads were so important to his very existence
while he remained in Richmond and Petersburg, and of such vital
importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he
would make most strenuous efforts to defend them.  He did on the
30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks.  He
also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other
divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in
readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on
call.  He came over himself to superintend in person the defence
of his right flank.</p>

<p>Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the
30th, and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks.  He
had only his cavalry with him.  Soon encountering the rebel
cavalry he met with a very stout resistance.  He gradually drove
them back however until in the neighborhood of Five Forks.  Here
he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been
contending with, and was forced to give way.</p>

<p>In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken
place and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie
gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to his
assistance.  I replied to him that it was impossible to send
Wright's corps because that corps was already in line close up
to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper
time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d
(Humphreys's) and 5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left
and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the
left flank of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send
Warren.</p>

<p>Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that
night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in
communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to
him.  He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not
starting until after 5 o'clock next morning.  When he did move
it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run
he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he
regarded it as not fordable.  Sheridan of course knew of his
coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as
possible, sent orders to him to hasten.  He was also hastened or
at least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade.  He now
felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his
orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in
flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that
Sheridan determined to move forward without him.  However,
Ayres's division of Warren's corps reached him in time to be in
the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder
of the 5th corps and fighting directly under Sheridan.</p>

<p>Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the
whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until
late in the afternoon.  Griffin's division in backing to get out
of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching
away from the fighting.  This did not continue long, however; the
division was brought back and with Ayres's division did most
excellent service during the day.  Crawford's division of the
same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders
were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it
finally got to where it could be of material assistance.  Once
there it did very excellent service.</p>

<p>Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little
later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his
designed assault upon Five Forks itself.  He was very impatient
to make the assault and have it all over before night, because
the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac
during the night.  Unless the assault was made and was
successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie
Court-House, or even further than that for the night.</p>

<p>It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get
Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren.  He sent
staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing
that general to report to him, but they were unable to find
him.  At all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer to
him.  Finally he went himself.  He issued an order relieving
Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the 5th corps.
The troops were then brought up and the assault successfully
made.</p>

<p>I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory movements in
the battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach
Sheridan in time, that I was very much afraid that at the last
moment he would fail Sheridan.  He was a man of fine
intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could
make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under
difficulties where he was forced to act.  But I had before
discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very
prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just
before us.  He could see every danger at a glance before he had
encountered it.  He would not only make preparations to meet the
danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding
officer what others should do while he was executing his move.</p>

<p>I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his
attention to these defects, and to say that as much as I liked
General Warren, now was not a time when we could let our
personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and
if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate.  It
was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed Warren.  I was
very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that I
had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field
of duty.</p>

<p>It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the
parapets of the enemy.  The two armies were mingled together
there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question
which one was going to demand the surrender of the other.  Soon,
however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six
thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large
quantities, falling into our hands.  The flying troops were
pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under
Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.</p>

<p>This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when
Sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of
the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned,
sending the 5th corps across Hatcher's Run to just south-west of
Petersburg, and facing them toward it.  Merritt, with the
cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of Five Forks.</p>

<p>This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the
1st of April.  I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and
Parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d.  I also ordered
the 2d corps, General Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army
of the James, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to
take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their
front.</p>

<p>I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day;
in fact I had reported to him during the day and evening as I
got news, because he was so much interested in the movements
taking place that I wanted to relieve his mind as much as I
could.  I notified Weitzel on the north side of the James River,
directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take
advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly
enter the city of Richmond.</p>

<p>I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks
as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate
effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a
single die.  It was for this reason that I had ordered the
assault to take place at once, as soon as I had received the
news of the capture of Five Forks.  The corps commanders,
however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see
to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. But
we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the
whole line including that north of the James River, until it was
light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the
morning.</p>

<p>At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved out as directed,
brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a
heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching
directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves
inside of the enemy's line.  Parke, who was on the right, swept
down to the right and captured a very considerable length of
line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near
the inner line which closely enveloped the city of Petersburg
that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very
serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the
defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in
this.</p>

<p>Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run,
sweeping everything before him.  The enemy had traverses in rear
of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a
stand, from one to another, as Wright moved on; but the latter
met no serious obstacle.  As you proceed to the left the outer
line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and
along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearly two miles apart.
Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of
artillery and some prisoners--Wright about three thousand of
them.</p>

<p>In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the
instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or
very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched
picket-lines in their front; and before Wright got up to that
point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's
intrenchments.  The second corps soon followed; and the outer
works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops,
never to be wrenched from them again.  When Wright reached
Hatcher's Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side
Railroad just outside of the city.</p>

<p>My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills.  As soon as I
received the news of Wright's success, I sent dispatches
announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the
troops at Bermuda Hundred and those on the north side of the
James, and to the President at City Point.  Further dispatches
kept coming in, and as they did I sent the additional news to
these points.  Finding at length that they were all in, I
mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works.
When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as
Wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out.  I was soon
joined inside by General Meade and his staff.</p>

<p>Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost
ground.  Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but
repulsed every effort.  Before noon Longstreet was ordered up
from the north side of the James River thus bringing the bulk of
Lee's army around to the support of his extreme right.  As soon
as I learned this I notified Weitzel and directed him to keep up
close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda
Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break
to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for this would
separate Richmond and Petersburg.</p>

<p>Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to
Petersburg, coming in on our left.  This gave us a continuous
line from the Appomattox River below the city to the same river
above.  At eleven o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I
reinforced Parke with two brigades from City Point.  With this
additional force he completed his captured works for better
defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his
flank.  He also carried in and made an abatis between himself
and the enemy.  Lee brought additional troops and artillery
against Parke even after this was done, and made several
assaults with very heavy losses.</p>

<p>The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to
Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and
Fort Whitworth.  We thought it had now become necessary to carry
them by assault.  About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was
assaulted by Foster's division of the 24th corps (Gibbon's),
supported by two brigades from Ord's command.  The battle was
desperate and the National troops were repulsed several times;
but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in Fort
Whitworth evacuated the place.  The guns of Fort Gregg were
turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer
with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.</p>

<p>I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan.  In
moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the
intersection of the White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road.  The
enemy fell back to Sutherland Station on the South Side Road and
were followed by Miles.  This position, naturally a strong and
defensible one, was also strongly intrenched.  Sheridan now came
up and Miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which
Sheridan gave.  By this time Humphreys had got through the outer
works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over
Miles, who commanded a division in his corps.  I had sent an
order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards
Petersburg.  This order he now got, and started off, thus
leaving Miles alone.  The latter made two assaults, both of
which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards.</p>

<p>Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed
Humphreys to send a division back to his relief.  He went
himself.</p>

<p>Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent
Merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate
cavalry that had assembled there.  Merritt drove them north to
the Appomattox River.  Sheridan then took the enemy at
Sutherland Station on the reverse side from where Miles was, and
the two together captured the place, with a large number of
prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder,
portions of three Confederate corps, to flight.  Sheridan
followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was
stopped.  Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he
with Sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault.  I cannot
explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to
City Point that evening:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG,
<br>April 2, 1865.--4.40 P.M.</p>

<p>COLONEL T. S. BOWERS,
<br>City Point.</p>

<p>We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few
hours will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to
the river above.  Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such part of
them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either
designedly on their part or because they could not help it.
Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them.  Miles's
division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak Road to
Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met
them, and at last accounts was engaged with them.  Not knowing
whether Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was
sent with another division from here.  The whole captures since
the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve
thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery.  I do not
know the number of men and guns accurately however.  * * *  I
think the President might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow.</p>

<p>U. S. GRANT,
<br>Lieutenant-General.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the
river above to the river below.  I ordered a bombardment to be
commenced the next morning at five A.M., to be followed by an
assault at six o'clock; but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early
in the morning.</p>



<br><br><br><br>
<a name="ch65"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXV.</h2></center>

<center><h3>THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN
PETERSBURG--THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--
VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.</h3></center>
<br>

<p>General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d
and took a position under cover of a house which protected us
from the enemy's musketry which was flying thick and fast
there.  As we would occasionally look around the corner we could
see the streets and the Appomattox bottom, presumably near the
bridge, packed with the Confederate army.  I did not have
artillery brought up, because I was sure Lee was trying to make
his escape, and I wanted to push immediately in pursuit.  At all
events I had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass
of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon.</p>

<p>Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man
came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of
Northern Virginia.  He said that Lee had for some time been at
work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he
would throw himself when forced out of Petersburg, and fight his
final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his
troops from Richmond, and falling back into this prepared work.
This statement was made to General Meade and myself when we were
together.  I had already given orders for the movement up the
south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading off Lee;
but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he
thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move
against Lee in his new position.  I knew that Lee was no fool,
as he would have been to have put himself and his army between
two formidable streams like the James and Appomattox rivers, and
between two such armies as those of the Potomac and the James.
Then these streams coming together as they did to the east of
him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have
him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of
reinforcement.  It would only have been a question of days, and
not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him
by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to
surrender his army.  Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war
to deceive your antagonist.  My judgment was that Lee would
necessarily have to evacuate Richmond, and that the only course
for him to pursue would be to follow the Danville Road.
Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south
of Lee, and I told Meade this.  He suggested that if Lee was
going that way we would follow him.  My reply was that we did
not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut
him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (Meade)
believed him to be in at that time, I wanted nothing better;
that when we got in possession of the Danville Railroad, at its
crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still found him between
the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close
him up.  That we would then have all the advantage we could
possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg,
even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer
officer.</p>

<p>I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so
as to start them out on the Danville Road early in the morning,
supposing that Lee would be gone during the night.  During the
night I strengthened Sheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps.</p>

<br><br><br><br>
<center><a name="b457"></a><img alt="b457.jpg (133K)" src="b457.jpg" height="391" width="650">
</center>
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<br><br>

<p>Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond,
during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it
would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he
could hold out that long.  Davis was at church when he received
Lee's dispatch.  The congregation was dismissed with the notice
that there would be no evening service.  The rebel government
left Richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d.</p>

<p>At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court
House, his object being to get away, join Johnston if possible,
and to try to crush Sherman before I could get there.  As soon
as I was sure of this I notified Sheridan and directed him to
move out on the Danville Railroad to the south side of the
Appomattox River as speedily as possible.  He replied that he
already had some of his command nine miles out.  I then ordered
the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the
same road in the morning.  Parke's corps followed by the same
road, and the Army of the James was directed to follow the road
which ran alongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke's
Station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they
proceeded.  That road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling
stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the
rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the
whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our
cars and locomotives.</p>

<p>Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some
days.  I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only
while I felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be
successful, yet it might not prove so; and then I would have
only added another to the many disappointments he had been
suffering for the past three years.  But when we started out he
saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us Godspeed,
remained there to hear the result.</p>

<p>The next morning after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed
Mr. Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while I
would await his arrival.  I had started all the troops out early
in the morning, so that after the National army left Petersburg
there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the
streets.  There was absolutely no one there, except my staff
officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry.  We had
selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until
the President arrived.</p>

<p>About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm
congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and
to the army which had accomplished it, was:  "Do you know,
general, that I have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days
that you intended to do something like this."  Our movements
having been successful up to this point, I no longer had any
object in concealing from the President all my movements, and
the objects I had in view.  He remained for some days near City
Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by
telegraph.</p>

<p>Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join
me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee's
army.  I told him that I had been very anxious to have the
Eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted
all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive
them from their capital.  The Western armies had been in the
main successful until they had conquered all the territory from
the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, and were
now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, asking
admittance.  I said to him that if the Western armies should be
even upon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the
credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians
and non-combatants from the section of country which those
troops hailed from.  It might lead to disagreeable bickerings
between members of Congress of the East and those of the West in
some of their debates.  Western members might be throwing it up
to the members of the East that in the suppression of the
rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to
accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but
had to wait until the Western armies had conquered all the
territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them
capture the only army they had been engaged with.</p>

<p>Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it
before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care
where the aid came from so the work was done.</p>

<p>The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four
years' record in the suppression of the rebellion.  The army it
had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which
was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the United
States.  Its loss would be the loss of the cause.  Every energy,
therefore, was put forth by the Confederacy to protect and
maintain their capital.  Everything else would go if it went.
Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its
position, no matter what territory was wrested from the South in
another quarter.</p>

<p>I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between
the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has
been none between the politicians.  Possibly I am the only one
who thought of the liability of such a state of things in
advance.</p>

<p>When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his
horse and started on his return to City Point, while I and my
staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in
advance.  Up to this time I had not received the report of the
capture of Richmond.</p>

<p>Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a dispatch from
General Weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession
of Richmond at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day,
the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places.
The city was in the most utter confusion.  The authorities had
taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter,
and to throw out the provisions which the Confederate government
had left, for the people to gather up.  The city had been
deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any
notice whatever that they were about to leave.  In fact, up to
the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to
believe that Lee had gained an important victory somewhere
around Petersburg.</p>

<p>Weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in
Lee's army, there being still a great many men and even officers
in the town.  The city was on fire.  Our troops were directed to
extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing.
The fire had been started by some one connected with the
retreating army.  All authorities deny that it was authorized,
and I presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving
what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it
was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of
their enemy.  Be that as it may, the National troops found the
city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them.</p>

<p>The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great many of them,
were cut off from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued
by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away
caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten
their loads, and pushed along up the Appomattox River until
finally they took water and crossed over.</p>

<p>I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join
the command, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine
miles out.  We had still time to march as much farther, and time
was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to
the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was
impossible to get on.  Then, again, our cavalry had struck some
of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that
the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they
appeared.  This caused further delay.</p>

<p>General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which
were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into
bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing
out the road, so that when they did start they would be
uninterrupted.  Humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of
rations.  They did not succeed in getting them up through the
night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, were so
elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a
victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations
to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them.  So
the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning.</p>

<p>Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven
them north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were
forced to cross.</p>

<p>On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations
up from Danville for his famishing army, and that they were to
meet him at Farmville.  This showed that Lee had already
abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to Danville,
but had determined to go farther west, by the way of
Farmville.  I notified Sheridan of this and directed him to get
possession of the road before the supplies could reach Lee.  He
responded that he had already sent Crook's division to get upon
the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face north
and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought
Crook must be there now.  The bulk of the army moved directly
for Jetersville by two roads.</p>

<p>After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that
Crook was on the Danville Road, I immediately ordered Meade to
make a forced march with the Army of the Potomac, and to send
Parke's corps across from the road they were on to the South
Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of the Army of the James and
to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went
along.</p>

<p>Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in the telegraph
office, they found a dispatch from Lee, ordering two hundred
thousand rations from Danville.  The dispatch had not been sent,
but Sheridan sent a special messenger with it to Burkesville and
had it forwarded from there.  In the meantime, however,
dispatches from other sources had reached Danville, and they
knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that
they sent no further supplies from that quarter.</p>

<p>At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off
between the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on
and the Appomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in
flank.  They picked up a great many prisoners and forced the
abandonment of some property.</p>

<p>Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his
advance north of Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect
forage.  The country was very poor and afforded but very
little.  His foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were
picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the Army
of Northern Virginia.</p>

<p>Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of
Jetersville, and Sheridan notified me of the situation.  I again
ordered Meade up with all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one
corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting Lee's entire
army.  Meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward
with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able
to be out of bed.  Humphreys moved at two, and Wright at three
o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I have said, the
wagons being far in the rear.</p>

<p>I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side
Railroad.  On the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of
the progress Meade was making, and suggested that he might now
attack Lee.  We had now no other objective than the Confederate
armies, and I was anxious to close the thing up at once.</p>

<p>On the 5th I marched again with Ord's command until within about
ten miles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I
then received from Sheridan the following dispatch:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>"The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Court House, and
on this side of it.  General Davies, whom I sent out to
Painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces
of artillery and some wagons.  We can capture the Army of
Northern Virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point,
and then advance upon it.  My cavalry was at Burkesville
yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, last
night.  General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person.  They
are out of rations, or nearly so.  They were advancing up the
railroad towards Burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them
at this point."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>It now became a life and death struggle with Lee to get south to
his provisions.</p>

<p>Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards
Farmville, moved Davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him.
Davies found the movement had already commenced.  He attacked
and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the
west, capturing and burning 180 wagons.  He also captured five
pieces of artillery.  The Confederate infantry then moved
against him and probably would have handled him very roughly,
but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow
Davies, and they came to his relief in time.  A sharp engagement
took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the
enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed.</p>

<p>Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o'clock in the
afternoon, but in advance of all his troops.  The head of
Humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterwards. Sheridan
stationed the troops as they came up, at Meade's request, the
latter still being very sick.  He extended two divisions of this
corps off to the west of the road to the left of Griffin's corps,
and one division to the right.  The cavalry by this time had also
come up, and they were put still farther off to the left,
Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the
enemy intended to escape.  He wanted to attack, feeling that if
time was given, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented
this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up.</p>

<p>At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed
to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he
wished I was there myself.  The letter was dated Amelia Court
House, April 5th, and signed by Colonel Taylor.  It was to his
mother, and showed the demoralization of the Confederate army.
Sheridan's note also gave me the information as here related of
the movements of that day.  I received a second message from
Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the
importance of my presence.  This was brought to me by a scout in
gray uniform.  It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in
tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in.  This was a
precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he
could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into
his mouth, chew it.  It would cause no surprise at all to see a
Confederate soldier chewing tobacco.  It was nearly night when
this letter was received.  I gave Ord directions to continue his
march to Burkesville and there intrench himself for the night,
and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between
there and Farmville.</p>

<p>I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of
cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade's
army.  The distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being
dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of
direct roads.  However, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock
in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the
sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where
Sheridan was bivouacked.  We talked over the situation for some
little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee was
trying to do, and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to
the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of
escaping us and putting us in rear of him.</p>

<p>We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters about
midnight.  I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow
the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders
would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no
doubt that Lee was moving right then.  Meade changed his orders
at once.  They were now given for an advance on Amelia Court
House, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay;
that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to
the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther
to the left.</p>



<br><br><br><br>
<a name="ch66"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXVI.</h2></center>

<center><h3>BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE
--CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.></h3></center>
<br>

<p>The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the
south-west from the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville
Railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly.  Sailor's
Creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into
the Appomattox between the High Bridge and Jetersville.  Near
the High Bridge the stage road from Petersburg to Lynchburg
crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge.  The railroad
runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles
west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of
it.  The roads coming up from the south-east to Farmville cross
the Appomattox River there on a bridge and run on the north
side, leaving the Lynchburg and Petersburg Railroad well to the
left.</p>

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<p>Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of
all the roads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to
move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop
because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear.  In
this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his
provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army.</p>

<p>As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the night before, and
our army in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered
them.  There was a good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek
was reached.  Our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which
was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left.  A
severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners,
and many men also were killed and wounded.  There was as much
gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in these little
engagements as was displayed at any time during the war,
notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week.</p>

<p>The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a heavy
engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry
were all brought into action.  Our men on the right, as they
were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and
upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the
lay of the country.  Our firing was also very much more rapid,
because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing
as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired.  The
enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in
captures.  Some six general officers fell into our hands in this
engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners.  This
engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the
6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall,
when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had
overtaken them.</p>

<p>When the move towards Amelia Court House had commenced that
morning, I ordered Wright's corps, which was on the extreme
right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the
place of Griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to
move by and place itself on the right.  The object of this
movement was to get the 6th corps, Wright's, next to the
cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and
so efficiently in the valley of Virginia.</p>

<p>The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan's
direct command until after the surrender.</p>

<p>Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads
southward between Burkesville and the High Bridge.  On the
morning of the 6th he sent Colonel Washburn with two infantry
regiments with instructions to destroy High Bridge and to return
rapidly to Burkesville Station; and he prepared himself to resist
the enemy there.  Soon after Washburn had started Ord became a
little alarmed as to his safety and sent Colonel Read, of his
staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring
him back.  Very shortly after this he heard that the head of
Lee's column had got up to the road between him and where
Washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the
reinforcements could not get through.  Read, however, had got
through ahead of the enemy.  He rode on to Farmville and was on
his way back again when he found his return cut off, and
Washburn confronting apparently the advance of Lee's army.  Read
drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of
less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along
their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the
same enthusiasm that he himself felt.  He then gave the order to
charge.  This little band made several charges, of course
unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than
equal to their own entire number.  Colonel Read fell mortally
wounded, and then Washburn; and at the close of the conflict
nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and
file had been either killed or wounded.  The remainder then
surrendered.  The Confederates took this to be only the advance
of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to
intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked
the progress of a strong detachment of the Confederate army.</p>

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<p>This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains
following.  Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road
bridge near the High Bridge, and attempted to destroy it.  He
did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway
when Humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the
rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being
burned up.  Humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and
followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at
Farmville with the one from Petersburg.  Here Lee held a
position which was very strong, naturally, besides being
intrenched.  Humphreys was alone, confronting him all through
the day, and in a very hazardous position.  He put on a bold
face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not
assaulted in return.</p>

<p>Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward's
Court House, along with the 5th corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in
between Griffin and the Appomattox.  Crook's division of cavalry
and Wright's corps pushed on west of Farmville.  When the
cavalry reached Farmville they found that some of the
Confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their
trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in
time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although
they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did
not get them for some time.  These troops retreated to the north
side of the Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying
the bridge after them.  Considerable fighting ensued there
between Wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the
Confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and
drove them away.  Wright built a foot-bridge for his men to
march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads
to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night.  I had stopped
the night before at Burkesville Junction.  Our troops were then
pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital
there, and Ord's command was extended from that point towards
Farmville.</p>

<p>Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular
army, who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one
of the prisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when
we had got across the James River he knew their cause was lost,
and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms
they could while they still had a right to claim concessions.
The authorities thought differently, however.  Now the cause was
lost and they had no right to claim anything.  He said further,
that for every man that was killed after this in the war
somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better
than murder.  He was not sure that Lee would consent to
surrender his army without being able to consult with the
President, but he hoped he would.</p>

<p>I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the
day.  Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the
south.  Meade was back towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys
confronting Lee as before stated.  After having gone into
bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House, Sheridan learned that
seven trains of provisions and forage were at Appomattox, and
determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march
was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army could
secure them.  He wrote me a note telling me this.  This fact,
together with the incident related the night before by Dr.
Smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with General
Lee on the subject of the surrender of his army.  I therefore
wrote to him on this day, as follows:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.,
<br>5 P.M., April 7, 1865.</p>

<p>GENERAL R. E. LEE
<br>Commanding C. S. A.</p>

<p>The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of
Northern Virginia in this struggle.  I feel that it is so, and
regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of
any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of
that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of
Northern Virginia.</p>

<p>U. S. GRANT,
<br>Lieut.-General.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
April 7, 1865.</p>

<p>GENERAL:  I have received your note of this day.  Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of
further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia,
I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and
therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you
will offer on condition of its surrender.</p>

<p>R. E. LEE,
<br>General.</p>

<p>LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
<br>Commanding Armies of the U. S.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>


<p>
This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving
another letter and wrote him as follows:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
April 8, 1865.</p>

<p>GENERAL R. E. LEE,
<br>Commanding C. S. A.</p>

<p>Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking
the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army
of Northern Virginia is just received.  In reply I would say
that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I
would insist upon, namely:  that the men and officers
surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again
against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged.  I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet
any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point
agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the
terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia
will be received.</p>

<p>U. S. GRANT,
<br>Lieut.-General.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
Lee's army was rapidly crumbling.  Many of his soldiers had
enlisted from that part of the State where they now were, and
were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their
homes.  I know that I occupied a hotel almost destitute of
furniture at Farmville, which had probably been used as a
Confederate hospital.  The next morning when I came out I found
a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he
was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a
regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood.  He said
that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only
man of the regiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped
out, and now wanted to surrender himself.  I told him to stay
there and he would not be molested.  That was one regiment which
had been eliminated from Lee's force by this crumbling process.</p>

<p>Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved
with alacrity and without any straggling.  They began to see the
end of what they had been fighting four years for.  Nothing
seemed to fatigue them.  They were ready to move without rations
and travel without rest until the end.  Straggling had entirely
ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front.  The
infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could.</p>

<p>Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of
Appomattox Station, which is about five miles south-west of the
Court House, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to
the rear.  They got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded
partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the
movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the
trains.  The other four were held by Custer.</p>

<p>The head of Lee's column came marching up there on the morning
of the 9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union
soldiers near.  The Confederates were surprised to find our
cavalry had possession of the trains.  However, they were
desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them.  In the
melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains,
but not in getting anything from it.  Custer then ordered the
other trains run back on the road towards Farmville, and the
fight continued.</p>

<p>So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's army were
engaged.  Soon, however, Lee's men were brought up from the
rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our
cavalry.  But our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by
the time the enemy got up they found Griffin's corps and the Army
of the James confronting them.  A sharp engagement ensued, but
Lee quickly set up a white flag.</p>



<br><br><br><br>
<a name="ch67"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXVII.</h2></center>

<center><h3>NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S
HOUSE--THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH
LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.</h3></center>
<br>

<p>On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of
Lee.  I was suffering very severely with a sick headache,
[The old name for what we now call a Migraine Headache.  D.W.]
and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the
main body of the army.  I spent the night in bathing my feet in
hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists
and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning.
During the night I received Lee's answer to my letter of the
8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following
morning. [See Appendix.]  But it was for a different purpose from that of
surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.,
<br>April 9, 1865.</p>

<p>GENERAL R. E. LEE,
<br>Commanding C. S. A.</p>

<p>Your note of yesterday is received.  As I have no authority to
treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M.
to-day could lead to no good.  I will state, however, General,
that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole
North entertains the same feeling.  The terms upon which peace
can be had are well understood.  By the South laying down their
arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands
of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet
destroyed.  Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be
settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself,
etc.,</p>

<p>U. S. GRANT,
<br>Lieutenant-General.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering
with the headache, to get to the head of the column.  I was not
more than two or three miles from Appomattox Court House at the
time, but to go direct I would have to pass through Lee's army,
or a portion of it.  I had therefore to move south in order to
get upon a road coming up from another direction.</p>

<p>When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I
was in this way moving towards Appomattox Court House, and
consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be
informed of what Lee had done.  Lee, therefore, sent a flag to
the rear to advise Meade and one to the front to Sheridan,
saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of
having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and
asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could be
communicated with.  As they had heard nothing of this until the
fighting had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of
these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending
hostilities at all.  They were afraid it was not in good faith,
and we had the Army of Northern Virginia where it could not
escape except by some deception.  They, however, finally
consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give
an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if
possible.  It was found that, from the route I had taken, they
would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an
answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should
pass through the rebel lines.</p>

<p>Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this
message through his lines to me.</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
April 9, 1865.</p>

<p>GENERAL:  I received your note of this morning on the
picket-line whither I had come to meet you and ascertain
definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of
yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army.  I now
request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in
your letter of yesterday for that purpose.</p>

<p>R. E. LEE, General.</p>

<p>LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT
<br>Commanding U. S. Armies.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
When the officer reached me I was still suffering with the sick
headache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was
cured.  I wrote the following note in reply and hastened on:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
April 9, 1865.</p>

<p>GENERAL R. E. LEE,
<br>Commanding C. S. Armies.</p>

<p>Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 A.M.) received,
in consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and
Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road.  I am at
this writing about four miles west of Walker's Church and will
push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice
sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take
place will meet me.</p>

<p>U. S. GRANT,
<br>Lieutenant-General.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>


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<p>
I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his
troops drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army
near by.  They were very much excited, and expressed their view
that this was all a ruse employed to enable the Confederates to
get away.  They said they believed that Johnston was marching up
from North Carolina now, and Lee was moving to join him; and they
would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if I
would only let them go in.  But I had no doubt about the good
faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was.  I
found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox Court
House, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff officers,
awaiting my arrival.  The head of his column was occupying a
hill, on a portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a
little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which
Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south.</p>

<p>Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I
will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree.</p>

<p>Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told
until they are believed to be true.  The war of the rebellion
was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree
is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact.
As I have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the
hill occupied by the Confederate forces.  Running diagonally up
the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near
one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that
side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little
embankment.  General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that
when he first met General Lee he was sitting upon this
embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting
against the tree.  The story had no other foundation than
that.  Like many other stories, it would be very good if it was
only true.</p>

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<p>I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him
in the Mexican War; but did not suppose, owing to the difference
in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while I would
more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief
of staff of General Scott in the Mexican War.</p>

<p>When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the
result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough
garb.  I was without a sword, as I usually was when on horseback
on the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the
shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who I was.
When I went into the house I found General Lee.  We greeted each
other, and after shaking hands took our seats.  I had my staff
with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the
whole of the interview.</p>

<p>What General Lee's feelings were I do not know.  As he was a man
of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to
say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come,
or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it.
Whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my
observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant
on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed.  I felt
like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who
had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a
cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for
which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the
least excuse.  I do not question, however, the sincerity of the
great mass of those who were opposed to us.</p>

<p>General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely
new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely
the sword which had been presented by the State of Virginia; at
all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that
would ordinarily be worn in the field.  In my rough traveling
suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a
lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted very strangely with a
man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form.
But this was not a matter that I thought of until afterwards.</p>

<p>We soon fell into a conversation about old army times.  He
remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and I
told him that as a matter of course I remembered him perfectly,
but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about
sixteen years' difference in our ages), I had thought it very
likely that I had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be
remembered by him after such a long interval.  Our conversation
grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the object of our
meeting.  After the conversation had run on in this style for
some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our
meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the
purpose of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his
army.  I said that I meant merely that his army should lay down
their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of
the war unless duly and properly exchanged.  He said that he had
so understood my letter.</p>

<p>Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters
foreign to the subject which had brought us together.  This
continued for some little time, when General Lee again
interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that
the terms I proposed to give his army ought to be written out. I
called to General Parker, secretary on my staff, for writing
materials, and commenced writing out the following terms:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,</p>

<p>Ap 19th, 1865.</p>

<p>GEN. R. E. LEE,
<br>Comd'g C. S. A.</p>

<p>GEN:  In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of
the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of
N. Va. on the following terms, to wit:  Rolls of all the officers
and men to be made in duplicate.  One copy to be given to an
officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such
officer or officers as you may designate.  The officers to give
their individual paroles not to take up arms against the
Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and
each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the
men of their commands.  The arms, artillery and public property
to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer
appointed by me to receive them.  This will not embrace the
side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or
baggage.  This done, each officer and man will be allowed to
return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States
authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in
force where they may reside.</p>

<p>Very respectfully,
<br><br>U. S. GRANT,
<br>Lt. Gen.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word
that I should make use of in writing the terms.  I only knew
what was in my mind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that
there could be no mistaking it.  As I wrote on, the thought
occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses
and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to
us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call
upon them to deliver their side arms.</p>

<p>No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and
myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred
subjects.  He appeared to have no objections to the terms first
proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to
wait until they were in writing to make it.  When he read over
that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private
property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, I
thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army.</p>

<p>Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked
to me again that their army was organized a little differently
from the army of the United States (still maintaining by
implication that we were two countries); that in their army the
cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked
if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses
were to be permitted to retain them.  I told him that as the
terms were written they would not; that only the officers were
permitted to take their private property.  He then, after
reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was
clear.</p>

<p>I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last
battle of the war--I sincerely hoped so; and I said further I
took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers.
The whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it
was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to
carry themselves and their families through the next winter
without the aid of the horses they were then riding.  The United
States did not want them and I would, therefore, instruct the
officers I left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to
let every man of the Confederate army who claimed to own a horse
or mule take the animal to his home.  Lee remarked again that
this would have a happy effect.</p>

<p>He then sat down and wrote out the following letter:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
<br>April 9, 1865.</p>

<p>GENERAL:--I received your letter of this date containing the
terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as
proposed by you.  As they are substantially the same as those
expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted.  I
will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the
stipulations into effect.</p>

<p>R. E. LEE, General.
<br>LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union
generals present were severally presented to General Lee.</p>

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<blockquote><blockquote>
<br>[NOTE.--The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrender
inserted at this place, was copied from the original document
furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S.
Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant's staff at the time
of the surrender.

<br><br>Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's manifold
order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations
and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of
General Grant.  After such alteration it was handed to General
Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to
General Grant.  The original was then transcribed by General
Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General
Lee.

<br><br>The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the
original document and all interlineations and erasures.

<br><br>There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and
Lee each signed the articles of surrender.  The document in the
form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor
of McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and
General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and
handed it to General Grant.]
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>The much talked of surrendering of Lee's sword and my handing it
back, this and much more that has been said about it is the
purest romance.  The word sword or side arms was not mentioned
by either of us until I wrote it in the terms.  There was no
premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment I
wrote it down.  If I had happened to omit it, and General Lee
had called my attention to it, I should have put it in the terms
precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers
retaining their horses.</p>

<p>General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his
leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for
want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men
had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and
that he would have to ask me for rations and forage.  I told him
"certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations.  His
answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and I authorized him to
send his own commissary and quartermaster to Appomattox Station,
two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains
we had stopped, all the provisions wanted.  As for forage, we
had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that.</p>

<p>Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were designated by me to
carry into effect the paroling of Lee's troops before they
should start for their homes--General Lee leaving Generals
Longstreet, Gordon and Pendleton for them to confer with in
order to facilitate this work.  Lee and I then separated as
cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all
went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox.</p>

<p>Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Washington as
follows:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
HEADQUARTERS APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,
<br>April 9th, 1865, 4.30 P.M.</p>

<p>HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War,
<br>Washington.</p>

<p>General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this
afternoon on terms proposed by myself.  The accompanying
additional correspondence will show the conditions fully.</p>

<p>U. S. GRANT,
<br>Lieut.-General.</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men
commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the
victory.  I at once sent word, however, to have it stopped.  The
Confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult
over their downfall.</p>

<p>I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to
putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now
deemed other useless outlay of money.  Before leaving, however,
I thought I would like to see General Lee again; so next
morning I rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters,
preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag.</p>

<p>Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me.  We
had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very
pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of
which Lee said to me that the South was a big country and that
we might have to march over it three or four times before the
war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as
they could no longer resist us.  He expressed it as his earnest
hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more
loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the
result.  I then suggested to General Lee that there was not a
man in the Confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the
whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise
the surrender of all the armies I had no doubt his advice would
be followed with alacrity.  But Lee said, that he could not do
that without consulting the President first.  I knew there was
no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was
right.</p>

<p>I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom
seemed to have a great desire to go inside the Confederate
lines.  They finally asked permission of Lee to do so for the
purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the
permission was granted.  They went over, had a very pleasant
time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with
them when they returned.</p>

<p>When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I
returned to the house of Mr. McLean.  Here the officers of both
armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as
much as though they had been friends separated for a long time
while fighting battles under the same flag.  For the time being
it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped
their minds.  After an hour pleasantly passed in this way I set
out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort,
for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by
this time been repaired.</p>



<br><br><br><br>
<a name="ch68"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXVIII.</h2></center>

<center><h3>MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND
SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT
WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT
JOHNSON'S POLICY.</h3></center>
<br>

<p>After the fall of Petersburg, and when the armies of the Potomac
and the James were in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale
of the National troops had greatly improved.  There was no more
straggling, no more rear guards.  The men who in former times
had been falling back, were now, as I have already stated,
striving to get to the front.  For the first time in four weary
years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they
could return to their homes with their country saved.  On the
other hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly
depressed.  Their despondency increased with each returning day,
and especially after the battle of Sailor's Creek.  They threw
away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out
of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of
reaching their homes.  I have already instanced the case of the
entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I met at
Farmville.  As a result of these and other influences, when Lee
finally surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28,356
officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were
without arms.  It was probably this latter fact which gave rise
to the statement sometimes made, North and South, that Lee
surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official
figures show.  As a matter of official record, and in addition
to the number paroled as given above, we captured between March
29th and the date of surrender 19,132 Confederates, to say
nothing of Lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing,
during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his
headlong and determined flight.  The same record shows the
number of cannon, including those at Appomattox, to have been
689 between the dates named.</p>

<p>There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the
number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important
battles, fought between the sections, the South magnifying the
number of Union troops engaged and belittling their own.
Northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same
error.  I have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal
to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight the South had made
and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with
their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the
twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants.  I will add to
their argument.  We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who
volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million
belonging to the South.</p>

<p>But the South had rebelled against the National government.  It
was not bound by any constitutional restrictions.  The whole
South was a military camp.  The occupation of the colored people
was to furnish supplies for the army.  Conscription was resorted
to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to
forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in
the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of State
and intended National government.  The old and physically
disabled furnished a good portion of these.  The slaves, the
non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in
the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to
age.  Children from the age of eight years could and did handle
the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the
plough.  The four million of colored non-combatants were equal
to more than three times their number in the North, age for age
and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support
armies.  Women did not work in the fields in the North, and
children attended school.</p>

<p>The arts of peace were carried on in the North.  Towns and
cities grew during the war.  Inventions were made in all kinds
of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the
shop, and in the field.  In the South no opposition was allowed
to the government which had been set up and which would have
become real and respected if the rebellion had been
successful.  No rear had to be protected.  All the troops in
service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of
ground threatened with invasion.  The press of the South, like
the people who remained at home, were loyal to the Southern
cause.</p>

<p>In the North, the country, the towns and the cities presented
about the same appearance they do in time of peace.  The furnace
was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were
cultivated, not only to supply the population of the North and
the troops invading the South, but to ship abroad to pay a part
of the expense of the war.  In the North the press was free up
to the point of open treason.  The citizen could entertain his
views and express them.  Troops were necessary in the Northern
States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army being
released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by
fire our Northern cities.  Plans were formed by Northern and
Southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water
supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from
infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers
--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives.  The
copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel
successes, and belittled those of the Union army.  It was, with
a large following, an auxiliary to the Confederate army.  The
North would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of
these men in the Confederate ranks and the rest of their kind
thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentiment was in the South,
than we were as the battle was fought.</p>

<p>As I have said, the whole South was a military camp.  The
colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and
worked in the field and took care of the families while the
able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause
destined to defeat.  The cause was popular, and was
enthusiastically supported by the young men.  The conscription
took all of them.  Before the war was over, further
conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of
age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty
as senior reserves.  It would have been an offence, directly
after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any
able-bodied man in the South, who was between the ages of
fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had
been in the Confederate army.  He would assert that he had, or
account for his absence from the ranks.  Under such
circumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such a
superiority of force in every battle fought.  I know they did
not.</p>

<p>During 1862 and '3, John H. Morgan, a partisan officer, of no
military education, but possessed of courage and endurance,
operated in the rear of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and
Tennessee.  He had no base of supplies to protect, but was at
home wherever he went.  The army operating against the South, on
the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the
North, from which all supplies had to come to the front.  Every
foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient
distances apart.  These guards could not render assistance beyond
the points where stationed.  Morgan Was foot-loose and could
operate where, his information--always correct--led him to
believe he could do the greatest damage.  During the time he was
operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several
times the number he ever had under his command at any one
time.  He destroyed many millions of property in addition.
Places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by
him.  Forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held
from the National front quite as many men as could be spared for
offensive operations.  It is safe to say that more than half the
National army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were
on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their
bearing arms.  Then, again, large forces were employed where no
Confederate army confronted them.  I deem it safe to say that
there were no large engagements where the National numbers
compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment
occupied by the enemy.</p>

<p>While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to
Richmond in company with Admiral Porter, and on board his
flagship.  He found the people of that city in great
consternation.  The leading citizens among the people who had
remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should
be done to relieve them from suspense.  General Weitzel was not
then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring
villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the
conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the
Confederate capital.  The President sent for him, and, on his
arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, Admiral
Porter and a leading citizen of Virginia being also present.
After this interview the President wrote an order in about these
words, which I quote from memory:  "General Weitzel is authorized
to permit the body calling itself the Legislature of Virginia to
meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops from the
Confederate armies."</p>

<p>Immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out
a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers.  This
call, however, went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had
contemplated, as he did not say the "Legislature of Virginia"
but "the body which called itself the Legislature of Virginia."
Mr. Stanton saw the call as published in the Northern papers the
very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order
authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, or any other body,
and this notwithstanding the fact that the President was nearer
the spot than he was.</p>

<p>This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton.  He was a man who never
questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time
what he wanted to do.  He was an able constitutional lawyer and
jurist; but the Constitution was not an impediment to him while
the war lasted.  In this latter particular I entirely agree with
the view he evidently held.  The Constitution was not framed with
a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5.  While it did not
authorize rebellion it made no provision against it.  Yet the
right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the
right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an
individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy.  The
Constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so
far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of
the war.</p>

<p>Those in rebellion against the government of the United States
were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other,
except the acts of their Congress, which was loyal and devoted
to the cause for which the South was then fighting.  It would be
a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion
against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that
the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the Union
intact, should be restrained by a Constitution prepared by our
ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of
the confederation of the States.</p>

<p>After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my
staff and a few others directly to Burkesville Station on my way
to Washington.  The road from Burkesville back having been newly
repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track
frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the
second day when I reached City Point.  As soon as possible I
took a dispatch-boat thence to Washington City.</p>

<p>While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing the
necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating
with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of
troops, etc.  But by the 14th I was pretty well through with
this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then
in Burlington, New Jersey, attending school.  Mrs. Grant was
with me in Washington at the time, and we were invited by
President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on
the evening of that day.  I replied to the President's verbal
invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would
take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very
anxious to get away and visit my children, and if I could get
through my work during the day I should do so.  I did get
through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending
Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not be at the theatre.</p>

<p>At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on
Broad Street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the
Delaware River, and then ferried to Camden, at which point they
took the cars again.  When I reached the ferry, on the east side
of the City of Philadelphia, I found people awaiting my arrival
there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of
the President and Mr. Seward, and of the probable assassination
of the Vice President, Mr. Johnson, and requesting my immediate
return.</p>

<p>It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that
overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially
the assassination of the President.  I knew his goodness of
heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to
have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the
people of the United States enter again upon the full privileges
of citizenship with equality among all.  I knew also the feeling
that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation
against the Southern people, and I feared that his course
towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling
citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a
long while.  I felt that reconstruction had been set back, no
telling how far.</p>

<p>I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to
Washington City; but Mrs. Grant was with me; it was after
midnight and Burlington was but an hour away.  Finding that I
could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as
they would be ready to take me from the Philadelphia station, I
went up with her and returned immediately by the same special
train.  The joy that I had witnessed among the people in the
street and in public places in Washington when I left there, had
been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of
mourning.  I have stated what I believed then the effect of this
would be, and my judgment now is that I was right.  I believe the
South would have been saved from very much of the hardness of
feeling that was engendered by Mr. Johnson's course towards them
during the first few months of his administration.  Be this as it
may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for
the entire nation.</p>

<p>Mr. Johnson's course towards the South did engender bitterness
of feeling.  His denunciations of treason and his ever-ready
remark, "Treason is a crime and must be made odious," was
repeated to all those men of the South who came to him to get
some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at
something with the feeling that what they obtained would be
secure to them.  He uttered his denunciations with great
vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of
safety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond
endurance.</p>

<p>The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or
ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and
judgment of those over whom he presides; and the Southerners who
read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have
come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the
Northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the
assassination of Mr. Lincoln, I believe the great majority of
the Northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have
been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be
the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against
their government.  They believed, I have no doubt, as I did,
that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy.</p>

<p>The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back
into the Union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the
nation.  Naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality
with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they
would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens
they would be from the beginning.  They surely would not make
good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their
necks.</p>

<p>I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at
that time were in favor of negro suffrage.  They supposed that
it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that
there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could
prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the
full right would be conferred; but Mr. Johnson, after a complete
revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the South not only as
an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to
consideration of any of our citizens.  This was more than the
people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union were
prepared for, and they became more radical in their views.  The
Southerners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr.
Johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact South, and
such sympathy and support as they could get from the North, they
felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and
already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled
to do so.</p>

<p>Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one hand, and
receiving the support of the South on the other, drove Congress,
which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one
measure and then another to restrict his power.  There being a
solid South on one side that was in accord with the political
party in the North which had sympathized with the rebellion, it
finally, in the judgment of Congress and of the majority of the
legislatures of the States, became necessary to enfranchise the
negro, in all his ignorance.  In this work, I shall not discuss
the question of how far the policy of Congress in this
particular proved a wise one.  It became an absolute necessity,
however, because of the foolhardiness of the President and the
blindness of the Southern people to their own interest.  As to
myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the
least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, I
gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the
people, I favored immediate enfranchisement.</p>



<br><br><br><br>
<a name="ch69"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXIX.</h2></center>

<center><h3>SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE
OF MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON
DAVIS--GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.</h3></center>
<br>

<p>When I left Appomattox I ordered General Meade to proceed
leisurely back to Burkesville Station with the Army of the
Potomac and the Army of the James, and to go into camp there
until further orders from me.  General Johnston, as has been
stated before, was in North Carolina confronting General
Sherman.  It could not be known positively, of course, whether
Johnston would surrender on the news of Lee's surrender, though
I supposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was
the natural point from which to move to attack him.  The army
which I could have sent against him was superior to his, and
that with which Sherman confronted him was also superior; and
between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or
driven away.  With the loss of their capital and the Army of
Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether Johnston's men would
have the spirit to stand.  My belief was that he would make no
such attempt; but I adopted this course as a precaution against
what might happen, however improbable.</p>

<p>Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, I sent a
messenger to North Carolina by boat with dispatches to General
Sherman, informing him of the surrender of Lee and his army;
also of the terms which I had given him; and I authorized
Sherman to give the same terms to Johnston if the latter chose
to accept them.  The country is familiar with the terms that
Sherman agreed to CONDITIONALLY, because they embraced a
political question as well as a military one and he would
therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to
them definitely.</p>

<p>General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting
there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what
Mr. Lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them
at Hampton Roads, viz.:  that before he could enter into
negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points:
one being that the Union should be preserved, and the other that
slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede
these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank
piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the
terms upon which we would live together.  He had also seen
notices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Richmond,
and had read in the same papers that while there he had
authorized the convening of the Legislature of Virginia.</p>

<p>Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had
made with general Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes
of the President of the United States.  But seeing that he was
going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms
were only conditional.  They signed them with this
understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be
sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the proper
authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved,
then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities.  As
the world knows, Sherman, from being one of the most popular
generals of the land (Congress having even gone so far as to
propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the
purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the
President and Secretary of War in very bitter terms.  Some
people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor--a most
preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much
service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in
granting such terms as he did to Johnston and his army.  If
Sherman had taken authority to send Johnston with his army home,
with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own States,
without submitting the question to the authorities at
Washington, the suspicions against him might have some
foundation.  But the feeling against Sherman died out very
rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the
fullest confidence of the American people.</p>

<p>When, some days after my return to Washington, President Johnson
and the Secretary of war received the terms which General Sherman
had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately
called and I was sent for.  There seemed to be the greatest
consternation, lest Sherman would commit the government to terms
which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no
right to grant.  A message went out directing the troops in the
South not to obey General Sherman.  I was ordered to proceed at
once to North Carolina and take charge of matter there myself.
Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon as
possible.  I repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly
as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of
my presence.</p>

<p>When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters, and we were at
once closeted together.  I showed him the instruction and orders
under which I visited him.  I told him that I wanted him to
notify General Johnston that the terms which they had
conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in Washington,
and that he was authorized to offer the same terms I had given
General Lee.  I sent Sherman to do this himself.  I did not wish
the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so
I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender
solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I was
anywhere near the field.  As soon as possible I started to get
away, to leave Sherman quite free and untrammelled.</p>

<p>At Goldsboro', on my way back, I met a mail, containing the last
newspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement
in the North over the terms Sherman had given Johnston; and
harsh orders that had been promulgated by the President and
Secretary of War.  I knew that Sherman must see these papers,
and I fully realized what great indignation they would cause
him, though I do not think his feelings could have been more
excited than were my own.  But like the true and loyal soldier
that he was, he carried out the instructions I had given him,
obtained the surrender of Johnston's army, and settled down in
his camp about Raleigh, to await final orders.</p>

<p>There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could
not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to
the judgment of their respective commanders.  With these it was
impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of Lee and
Johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their
judgment as to what was best to do.</p>

<p>The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from
the commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off:  one under
Canby himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman
from East Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson,
starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March.  They
were all eminently successful, but without any good result.
Indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost
at a time when we would have liked to spare them. The war was
practically over before their victories were gained.  They were
so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any
troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the
armies which were gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a
surrender.  The only possible good that we may have experienced
from these raids was by Stoneman's getting near Lynchburg about
the time the armies of the Potomac and the James were closing in
on Lee at Appomattox.</p>

<p>Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike
the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.  He got upon that road,
destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road
useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg.  His
approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we
were at Appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of
there.  He then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of
Johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on
between Sherman and Johnston for the latter's surrender.  In
this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of
stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners
were the trophies of his success.</p>

<p>Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March.  The city of
Mobile was protected by two forts, besides other
intrenchments--Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and
Fort Blakely, north of the city.  These forts were invested.  On
the night of the 8th of April, the National troops having carried
the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort was evacuated; and
on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was carried
by assault, with a considerable loss to us.  On the 11th the city
was evacuated.</p>

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<p>I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent
against Mobile when its possession by us would have been of
great advantage.  It finally cost lives to take it when its
possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it
would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any
bloodshed whatever.</p>

<p>Wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well
armed.  He was an energetic officer and accomplished his work
rapidly.  Forrest was in his front, but with neither his
old-time army nor his old-time prestige.  He now had principally
conscripts.  His conscripts were generally old men and boys.  He
had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even
retard materially the progress of Wilson's cavalry.  Selma fell
on the 2d of April, with a large number of prisoners and a large
quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of
by the victors.  Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Point fell in
quick succession.  These were all important points to the enemy
by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies,
and because of their manufactories of war material.  They were
fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting
before they were captured.  Macon surrendered on the 21st of
April.  Here news was received of the negotiations for the
surrender of Johnston's army.  Wilson belonged to the military
division commanded by Sherman, and of course was bound by his
terms.  This stopped all fighting.</p>

<p>General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate
officer still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on
the 4th of May he surrendered everything within the limits of
this extensive command.  General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the
trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no
other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war.</p>

<p>Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president
of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country.
This occurred at Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May.  For
myself, and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would
have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in escaping,
but for one reason:  I feared that if not captured, he might get
into the trans-Mississippi region and there set up a more
contracted confederacy.  The young men now out of homes and out
of employment might have rallied under his standard and
protracted the war yet another year.  The Northern people were
tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which
would be a further mortgage upon their homes.</p>

<p>Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, because he
did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment.  He knew
there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the
ex-Confederate president, for high treason.  He thought blood
enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a
nation.  At all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide
whether more should be shed or not.  But his own life was
sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president
of the Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government
which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy.</p>

<p>All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best
interest of all concerned.  This reflection does not, however,
abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely
loss of so good and great a man as Abraham Lincoln.</p>

<p>He would have proven the best friend the South could have had,
and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling
brought out by reconstruction under a President who at first
wished to revenge himself upon Southern men of better social
standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition,
and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the
proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantly out
of all their difficulties.</p>

<p>The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction
period to stay the hands of the President is too fresh in the
minds of the people to be told now.  Much of it, no doubt, was
unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would
serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality
could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained.
These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a dead
letter" upon the statute books of the United States, no one
taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought.</p>

<p>Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing
when he was captured.  I cannot settle this question from
personal knowledge of the facts; but I have been under the
belief, from information given to me by General Wilson shortly
after the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that he was
surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a
gentleman's dressing gown.  Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted
to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be
accomplished provided it might be done successfully.  If
captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner.  He represented all
there was of that hostility to the government which had caused
four years of the bloodiest war--and the most costly in other
respects of which history makes any record.  Every one supposed
he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be
executed.  Had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise
it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his
admirers.</p>

<p>As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as
my remarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling
somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to
him, that I give my estimate of him as a soldier.  The same
remark will apply also in the case of General Canby.  I had been
at West Point with Thomas one year, and had known him later in
the old army.  He was a man of commanding appearance, slow and
deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave.  He
possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree.  He
gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost
their love.  This implies a very valuable quality.  It is a
quality which calls out the most efficient services of the
troops serving under the commander possessing it.</p>

<p>Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good.
He could not be driven from a point he was given to hold.  He
was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action.  I do
not believe that he could ever have conducted Sherman's army
from Chattanooga to Atlanta against the defences and the
commander guarding that line in 1864.  On the other hand, if it
had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried to
hold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer
could have done it better.</p>

<p>Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has
received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played
in the great tragedy of 1861-5.</p>

<p>General Canby was an officer of great merit.  He was naturally
studious, and inclined to the law.  There have been in the army
but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in
reading and digesting every act of Congress and every regulation
for the government of the army as he.  His knowledge gained in
this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in
which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time
of his being assigned to the Military Division of the Gulf.  He
was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and
learning.  I presume his feelings when first called upon to
command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat
like my own when marching a regiment against General Thomas
Harris in Missouri in 1861.  Neither of us would have felt the
slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else
commanding.  Had Canby been in other engagements afterwards, he
would, I have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising
from a sense of the responsibility.  He was afterwards killed in
the lava beds of Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile
Modoc Indians.  His character was as pure as his talent and
learning were great.  His services were valuable during the war,
but principally as a bureau officer.  I have no idea that it was
from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but
because of his superior efficiency there.</p>



<br><br><br><br>
<a name="ch70"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXX.</h2></center>

<center><h3>THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S
ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF
LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.</h3></center>
<br>

<p>Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there
would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in
North Carolina and Virginia were ordered to march immediately to
the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out.  Suitable
garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the South
to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the
government of the several States, and to insure security to the
lives and property of all classes.  I do not know how far this
was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time, that
such a course should be pursued.  I think now that these
garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely
required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as
was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could
terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind
of the people as to what should be done.</p>

<p>Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on
the south side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there
put them in camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the
situation was there.</p>

<p>It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon
him.  Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and
had issued orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from
obeying his, Sherman's, orders.  Sherman met the papers on his
return, containing this order of Halleck, and very justly felt
indignant at the outrage.  On his arrival at Fortress Monroe
returning from Savannah, Sherman received an invitation from
Halleck to come to Richmond and be his guest.  This he
indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore, that he
had seen his order.  He also stated that he was coming up to
take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would
probably be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he
(Sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person
might do through indignation for the treatment he had
received.  Very soon after that, Sherman received orders from me
to proceed to Washington City, and to go into camp on the south
side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops.</p>

<p>There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from
Goldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington
City.  The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been
engaged in all the battles of the West and had marched from the
Mississippi through the Southern States to the sea, from there
to Goldsboro, and thence to Washington City, had passed over
many of the battle-fields of the Army of the Potomac, thus
having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops,
the entire theatre of the four years' war for the preservation
of the Union.</p>

<p>The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to the sea and north to
Goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was
anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally
magnificent in the way it was conducted.  It had an important
bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view,
that of closing the war.  All the States east of the Mississippi
River up to the State of Georgia, had felt the hardships of the
war.  Georgia, and South Carolina, and almost all of North
Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the
Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts.  Their
newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success,
that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the
Yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from
pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out
for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with
honor to themselves.</p>

<p>Even during this march of Sherman's the newspapers in his front
were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a
mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening,
panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for
protection against the Southern people.  As the army was seen
marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people
became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs.  In
turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to
submit without compromise.</p>

<p>Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was
calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great
storehouse of Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate
armies.  As the troops advanced north from Savannah, the
destruction of the railroads in South Carolina and the southern
part of North Carolina, further cut off their resources and left
the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina dependent for
supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much
exhausted of food and forage.</p>

<p>In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and
the other from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina,
arrived and went into camp near the Capital, as directed.  The
troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in
their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever
been in their lives.  I doubt whether an equal body of men of any
nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever
gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great
battle.</p>

<p>The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the
officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of
the nations of Europe are taken from a class of people who are
not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the
contest in which they are called upon to take part.  Our armies
were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what
they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as
soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation
was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal
to men who fought merely because they were brave and because
they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.</p>

<p>There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the
time these troops were in camp before starting North.</p>

<p>I remember one little incident which I will relate as an
anecdote characteristic of Mr. Lincoln.  It occurred a day after
I reached Washington, and about the time General Meade reached
Burkesville with the army.  Governor Smith of Virginia had left
Richmond with the Confederate States government, and had gone to
Danville.  Supposing I was necessarily with the army at
Burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me
that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State of Virginia,
he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond to
Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the
functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal
authorities.  I give this letter only in substance.  He also
inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the
duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted
to leave the country and go abroad without interference.  General
Meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets
with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought
in without informing the officer who brought it that I was not
present.  He read the letter and telegraphed me its contents.
Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, I
repeated its contents to him.  Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was
asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of Governor
Smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would
be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position
was like that of a certain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in
Springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of
considerable promise, and very much liked.  Unfortunately he had
acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that
the habit was growing on him.  These friends determined to make
an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to
abstain from all alcoholic drinks.  They asked Pat to join them
in signing the pledge, and he consented.  He had been so long
out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he
resorted to soda-water as a substitute.  After a few days this
began to grow distasteful to him.  So holding the glass behind
him, he said:  "Doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in
that unbeknownst to myself."</p>

<p>I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave
me, but I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform
the duties of his office.  I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had
been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent
any one from leaving the country who desired to do so.  He would
have been equally willing to permit the return of the same
expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their
choice.</p>

<p>On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general
for a grand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman's
and Meade's armies.  The review commenced on the 23d and lasted
two days.  Meade's army occupied over six hours of the first day
in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the
President's house.  Sherman witnessed this review from the grand
stand which was occupied by the President and his cabinet.  Here
he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that
had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the Secretary of
War, by refusing to take his extended hand.</p>

<p>Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the
Potomac.  During the night of the 23d he crossed over and
bivouacked not far from the Capitol.  Promptly at ten o'clock on
the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in
review.  Sherman's army made a different appearance from that of
the Army of the Potomac.  The latter had been operating where
they received directly from the North full supplies of food and
clothing regularly:  the review of this army therefore was the
review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and
orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but
without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies
in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's
army was not so well-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but
their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance
of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships,
either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any
climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp.  They exhibited
also some of the order of march through Georgia where the "sweet
potatoes sprung up from the ground" as Sherman's army went
marching through.  In the rear of a company there would be a
captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils,
captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the
men.  Negro families who had followed the army would sometimes
come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children
packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it.</p>

<p>The sight was varied and grand:  nearly all day for two
successive days, from the Capitol to the Treasury Building,
could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of
companies.  The National flag was flying from almost every house
and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the
door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and
poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from
which to get a view of the grand armies.  The city was about as
full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually
is on inauguration day when a new President takes his seat.</p>

<p>It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln
and the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great
conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government.
There is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind,
as to the characteristics of the President.  With Mr. Stanton the
case is different.  They were the very opposite of each other in
almost every particular, except that each possessed great
ability.  Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by making them
feel that it was a pleasure to serve him.  He preferred yielding
his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having
his own way.  It distressed him to disappoint others.  In matters
of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least
offensive way.  Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority
to command, unless resisted.  He cared nothing for the feeling
of others.  In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to
disappoint than to gratify.  He felt no hesitation in assuming
the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising
with him.  If his act was not sustained, he would change it--if
he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so.</p>

<p>It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the
complement of each other.  The Secretary was required to prevent
the President's being imposed upon.  The President was required
in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not
done to others.  I do not know that this view of these two men
is still entertained by the majority of the people.  It is not a
correct view, however, in my estimation.  Mr. Lincoln did not
require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public
trust.</p>

<p>Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his
generals in making and executing their plans.  The Secretary was
very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering
with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to
defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the
Confederate capital.  He could see our weakness, but he could not
see that the enemy was in danger.  The enemy would not have been
in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field.  These
characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly
after Early came so near getting into the capital.</p>

<p>Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during
the war between the States, and who attracted much public
attention, but of whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given
any estimate, are Meade, Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and
Hooker.  There were others of great merit, such as Griffin,
Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie.  Of those first named, Burnside
at one time had command of the Army of the Potomac, and later of
the Army of the Ohio.  Hooker also commanded the Army of the
Potomac for a short time.</p>

<p>General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to
his usefulness that were beyond his control.  He had been an
officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently
had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years
of age.  He never had, I believe, a command of less than a
brigade.  He saw clearly and distinctly the position of the
enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own
position.  His first idea was to take advantage of the lay of
the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we
wanted to move afterwards.  He was subordinate to his superiors
in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which
changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed
if the plan had been his own.  He was brave and conscientious,
and commanded the respect of all who knew him.  He was
unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at
times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most
offensive manner.  No one saw this fault more plainly than he
himself, and no one regretted it more.  This made it unpleasant
at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him
even with information.  In spite of this defect he was a most
valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his
country.</p>

<p>General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and
respected.  He was not, however, fitted to command an army.  No
one knew this better than himself.  He always admitted his
blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what
they were entitled to.  It was hardly his fault that he was ever
assigned to a separate command.</p>

<p>Of Hooker I saw but little during the war.  I had known him very
well before, however.  Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his
achievement in bringing his command around the point of Lookout
Mountain and into Chattanooga Valley was brilliant.  I
nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man.  He was not
subordinate to his superiors.  He was ambitious to the extent of
caring nothing for the rights of others.  His disposition was,
when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of
the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his
standard all he could of his juniors.</p>

<p>Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general
officers who did not exercise a separate command.  He commanded
a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never
mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he
was responsible.  He was a man of very conspicuous personal
appearance.  Tall, well-formed and, at the time of which I now
write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that
would attract the attention of an army as he passed.  His genial
disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his
presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for
him the confidence of troops serving under him.  No matter how
hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander
was looking after them.</p>

<p>Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity
of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from
personal observation.  I had known him in Mexico when both of us
were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that
either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He
stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man.
He was brave and conscientious.  His ambition was not great, and
he seemed to dread responsibility.  He was willing to do any
amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct.
He declined the command of the Army of the Potomac once, if not
oftener.</p>

<p>General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer
without a military education.  His way was won without political
influence up to an important separate command--the expedition
against Fort Fisher, in January, 1865.  His success there was
most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in
the regular army and of major-general of volunteers.  He is a man
who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of
their wants and their dues.  As a commander, he won their
confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of
perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed
at any given time.</p>

<p>Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders,
but came into that position so near to the close of the war as
not to attract public attention.  All three served as such, in
the last campaign of the armies of the Potomac and the James,
which culminated at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th of April,
1865.  The sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention
to the exclusion of almost everything else.  I regarded Mackenzie
as the most promising young officer in the army.  Graduating at
West Point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had
won his way up to the command of a corps before its close.  This
he did upon his own merit and without influence.</p>


<br><br><br><br>
<a name="conclusion"></a><center><h2>CONCLUSION.</h2></center>
<br><br>

<p>The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United
Status will have to be attributed to slavery.  For some years
before the war began it was a trite saying among some
politicians that "A state half slave and half free cannot
exist."  All must become slave or all free, or the state will go
down.  I took no part myself in any such view of the case at the
time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, I
have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.</p>

<p>Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for
its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours
where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by
an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would
naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for
its protection.  Hence the people of the South were dependent
upon keeping control of the general government to secure the
perpetuation of their favorite institution.  They were enabled
to maintain this control long after the States where slavery
existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the
assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout
the Northern States.  They saw their power waning, and this led
them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the
Northern States by enacting such laws as the Fugitive Slave
Law.  By this law every Northern man was obliged, when properly
summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a
Southern man.  Northern marshals became slave-catchers, and
Northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection
of the institution.</p>

<p>This was a degradation which the North would not permit any
longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws
from the statute books.  Prior to the time of these
encroachments the great majority of the people of the North had
no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not
forced to have it themselves.  But they were not willing to play
the role of police for the South in the protection of this
particular institution.</p>

<p>In the early days of the country, before we had railroads,
telegraphs and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any
sort--the States were each almost a separate nationality.  At
that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no
disturbance to the public mind.  But the country grew, rapid
transit was established, and trade and commerce between the
States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of
the National government became more felt and recognized and,
therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution.</p>

<p>It is probably well that we had the war when we did.  We are
better off now than we would have been without it, and have made
more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made.  The
civilized nations of Europe have been stimulated into unusual
activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough
acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become
common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the
privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who
knew anything about other people.  Then, too, our republican
institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out
of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that
our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the
slightest strain was brought upon it.  Now it has shown itself
capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever
made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most
formidable in war of any nationality.</p>

<p>But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the
necessity of avoiding wars in the future.</p>

<p>The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles
shows the lack of conscience of communities where the
responsibility does not come upon a single individual.  Seeing a
nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better
part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population,
wealth and intelligence, the European nations thought it would
be well to give us a check.  We might, possibly, after a while
threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their
institutions.  Hence, England was constantly finding fault with
the administration at Washington because we were not able to
keep up an effective blockade.  She also joined, at first, with
France and Spain in setting up an Austrian prince upon the
throne in Mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that
Mexico had of being treated as an independent power.  It is true
they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only
pretexts which can always be found when wanted.</p>

<p>Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that
protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would
have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had
forced loans from them.  Under pretence of protecting their
citizens, these nations seized upon Mexico as a foothold for
establishing a European monarchy upon our continent, thus
threatening our peace at home.  I, myself, regarded this as a
direct act of war against the United States by the powers
engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the United
States would treat it as such when their hands were free to
strike.  I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lincoln and the
Secretary of War, but never heard any special views from them to
enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it.  I
inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were unwilling
to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our
hands.</p>

<p>All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the
armed intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince
upon the throne of Mexico; but the governing people of these
countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles
in our way.  After the surrender of Lee, therefore, entertaining
the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan with a corps to the
Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling
the French from Mexico.  These troops got off before they could
be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan
distributed them up and down the river, much to the
consternation of the troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering
on that stream.  This soon led to a request from France that we
should withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande and to
negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs.  Finally Bazaine was
withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government.  From
that day the empire began to totter.  Mexico was then able to
maintain her independence without aid from us.</p>

<p>France is the traditional ally and friend of the United
States.  I did not blame France for her part in the scheme to
erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the Mexican Republic.  That
was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or
merit.  He had succeeded in stealing the government of his
country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and
instincts of his people.  He tried to play the part of the first
Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role.  He sought by
new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal
failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own
overthrow.</p>

<p>Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was
an expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her
people.  It was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon
III.  The beginning was when he landed troops on this
continent.  Failing here, the prestige of his name--all the
prestige he ever had--was gone.  He must achieve a success or
fall.  He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia--and fell.</p>

<p>I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I
recognize his great genius.  His work, too, has left its impress
for good on the face of Europe.  The third Napoleon could have no
claim to having done a good or just act.</p>

<p>To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared
for war.  There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict,
such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but,
growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we
may become the envy of nations which led us in all these
particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for
it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made
to crush us out.  Now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we
seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on
as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an
invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time
until we could prepare for them.</p>

<p>We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be
put in the finest possible condition.  Neither of these cost much
when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in
return.  Money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our
security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very
material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the
meantime.  Money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among
our own people, and all goes back again among the people.  The
work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a
feeling of security.</p>

<p>England's course towards the United States during the rebellion
exasperated the people of this country very much against the
mother country.  I regretted it.  England and the United States
are natural allies, and should be the best of friends.  They
speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties.  We
together, or even either separately, are better qualified than
any other people to establish commerce between all the
nationalities of the world.</p>

<p>England governs her own colonies, and particularly those
embracing the people of different races from her own, better
than any other nation.  She is just to the conquered, but
rigid.  She makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of
labor to the laborer.  She does not seem to look upon the
colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work
for the support and aggrandizement of the home government.</p>

<p>The hostility of England to the United States during our
rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent.  It was the
hostility of the leaders of one political party.  I am told that
there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get
up in England a demonstration in favor of secession, while these
were constantly being gotten up in favor of the Union, or, as
they called it, in favor of the North.  Even in Manchester,
which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from
her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the
North at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.</p>

<p>It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may
come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery
before.  The condition of the colored man within our borders may
become a source of anxiety, to say the least.  But he was brought
to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as
having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our
citizens.  It was looking to a settlement of this question that
led me to urge the annexation of Santo Domingo during the time I
was President of the United States.</p>

<p>Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the
administration, but by all the people, almost without price. The
island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of
supporting fifteen millions of people.  The products of the soil
are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated
as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the
cost of their passage.  I took it that the colored people would
go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states
governed by their own race.  They would still be States of the
Union, and under the protection of the General Government; but
the citizens would be almost wholly colored.</p>

<p>By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen,
territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed.
It was seen that the volunteers of the Mexican war largely
composed the pioneers to settle up the Pacific coast country.
Their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus
for the population of the important points of the territory
acquired by that war.  After our rebellion, when so many young
men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they
were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of
the villages, but wanted larger fields.  The mines of the
mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that
rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were
there.  This territory, the geography of which was not known to
us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any
portion of our country.  Railroads traverse it in every
direction, north, south, east, and west.  The mines are
worked.  The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich
agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys.  This is
the work of the volunteer.  It is probable that the Indians
would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for
the war.  We must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always
evils unmixed with some good.</p>

<p>Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were
satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth.  In fact an
immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against
coming to want should they move among entire strangers.  So much
was the country divided into small communities that localized
idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section
a person was from by hearing him speak.  Before, new territories
were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with
others; people who, when the country began to settle up around
them, would push out farther from civilization.  Their guns
furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of
the soil, their bread and vegetables.  All the streams abounded
with fish.  Trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the
States once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they
could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store
goods.  Occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter
into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three
pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if
anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.</p>

<p>Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the
settlements of these frontiersmen.  This is all changed now. The
war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise.  The feeling
now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to
enable him to get up in the world.  There is now such a
commingling of the people that particular idioms and
pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the
country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea";
railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior;
maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now
furnished the student of geography.</p>

<p>The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We
have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity
at home, and the respect of other nations.  Our experience ought
to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the
latter.</p>

<p>I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be
great harmony between the Federal and Confederate.  I cannot
stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy;
but I feel it within me that it is to be so.  The universally
kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed
that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of
the answer to "Let us have peace."</p>

<p>The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a
section of the country, nor to a division of the people.  They
came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all
denominations--the Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and
from the various societies of the land--scientific, educational,
religious or otherwise.  Politics did not enter into the matter
at all.</p>

<p>I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should
be given because I was the object of it.  But the war between
the States was a very bloody and a very costly war.  One side or
the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life
before it could be brought to an end.  I commanded the whole of
the mighty host engaged on the victorious side.  I was, no
matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that
side of the controversy.  It is a significant and gratifying
fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this
spontaneous move.  I hope the good feeling inaugurated may
continue to the end.</p>



<br><br><br><br>
<a name="appendix"></a><center><h2>APPENDIX</h2></center>
<br><br>

<center><h3>REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES
ARMIES 1864-65.</h3></center>
<br><br><br>
<p>HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
<br>July 22, 1865.</p>

<p>HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.</p>

<p>SIR:  I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of
my appointment to command the same.</p>

<p>From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with
the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops
that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and
weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war.  The
resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far
inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast
territory, with a population hostile to the government, to
garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to
protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.</p>

<p>The armies in the East and West acted independently and without
concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together,
enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines
of communication for transporting troops from East to West,
reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough
large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go
to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of
their armies.  It was a question whether our numerical strength
and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages
and the enemy's superior position.</p>

<p>From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could
be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the
people, both North and South, until the military power of the
rebellion was entirely broken.</p>

<p>I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of
troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy;
preventing him from using the same force at different seasons
against first one and then another of our armies, and the
possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary
supplies for carrying on resistance.  Second, to hammer
continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his
resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there
should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the
loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws
of the land.</p>

<p>These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given
and campaigns made to carry them out.  Whether they might have
been better in conception and execution is for the people, who
mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the
pecuniary cost, to say.  All I can say is, that what I have done
has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in
what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole
country.</p>

<p>At the date when this report begins, the situation of the
contending forces was about as follows:  The Mississippi River
was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops, from St.  Louis,
Missouri, to its mouth.  The line of the Arkansas was also held,
thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi,
north of that stream.  A few points in Southern Louisiana, not
remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small
garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande.  All the
balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas
was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an
army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men,
that could have been brought into the field had there been
sufficient opposition to have brought them out.  The let-alone
policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little
more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one
time.  But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of
guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the
Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the
population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to
keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal
people to the west of it.  To the east of the Mississippi we
held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston
rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of
Tennessee.  South of Chattanooga, a small foothold had been
obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from
incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West
Virginia was substantially within our lines.  Virginia, with the
exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area
about the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk
and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the
Potomac lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the
enemy.  Along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at
Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, in North Carolina; Beaufort,
Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port
Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in
Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession,
while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy.  The
accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman
and other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the
territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and
at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are
the lines which it was proposed to occupy.</p>

<p>Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a
large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary
to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our
armies.  In the South, a reign of military despotism prevailed,
which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier;
and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts
for collecting deserters and returning them.  This enabled the
enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field.</p>

<p>The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the
Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and
J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals.  The army commanded
by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from
Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending
Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac.
The army under Johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position
at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a
place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the
armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman.  In addition to these
armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in North-east
Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah
Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern
part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons,
and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.</p>

<p>These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them,
were the main objective points of the campaign.</p>

<p>Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of
the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the
armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the
Alleghanies and the Department of Arkansas, west of the
Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating
against Johnston.</p>

<p>Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the
Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision
of the movements of all our armies.</p>

<p>General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army,
to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's
country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could
upon their war resources.  If the enemy in his front showed
signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his
ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him,
if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do so.  More
specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that
I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was
satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the
fullest extent possible.</p>

<p>Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River
against Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous
to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of
March, of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken
at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the
taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time
than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from
their command, he would send them back at the time specified by
General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main
object of the Red River expedition, for this force was necessary
to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his expedition
prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River
with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the
balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans,
commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory,
unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held;
that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against
Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be
obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that
New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an
expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a
real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks),
instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.</p>

<p>On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification
and directions, he was instructed as follows:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"1st.  If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that
you turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and
the navy.</p>

<p>"2d.  That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of
your hold upon the Rio Grande.  This can be held with four
thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to
fortifying their positions.  At least one-half of the force
required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.</p>

<p>"3d.  By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force
to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten
thousand men, if not to a less number.  Six thousand more would
then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until
active operations can again be resumed west of the river.
According to your last return, this would give you a force of
over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against
Mobile.  To this I expect to add five thousand men from
Missouri.  If however, you think the force here stated too small
to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession
of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of
your present command for operations against Mobile.  With these
and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no
time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon
Mobile.  Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to
Admiral Farragut.  This gives him a strong naval fleet with
which to co-operate.  You can make your own arrangements with
the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of
approach.  My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should
be your base; but, from your long service in the Gulf
Department, you will know best about the matter.  It is intended
that your movements shall be co-operative with movements
elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon.  All I would now
add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at
once.  Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and
start at the earliest possible moment.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br>"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his
objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also.  For
his movement two plans presented themselves:  One to cross the
Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above,
moving by his left.  Each presented advantages over the other,
with corresponding objections.  By crossing above, Lee would be
cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a
raid.  But if we took this route, all we did would have to be
done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it
separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how
to cooperate.  If we took the other route, Brandy Station could
be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the
York or James rivers.  Of these, however, it was decided to take
the lower route.</p>

<p>The following letter of instruction was addressed to
Major-General B. F. Butler:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall
commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to
have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far
as this object can be accomplished.</p>

<p>"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three
large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute
necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the
enemy.  But, generally speaking, concentration can be
practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the
enemy's country from the territory they have to guard.  By such
movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the
country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to
guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a
part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's
army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our
attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable
to unite all the force we can against them.  The necessity of
covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of
covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to
unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose,
therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems
practicable:  The Army of the Potomac will act from its present
base, Lee's army being the objective point.  You will collect
all the forces from your command that can be spared from
garrison duty--I should say not less than twenty thousand
effective men--to operate on the south side of James River,
Richmond being your objective point.  To the force you already
have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina,
under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.
Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to
command the troops sent into the field from your own department.</p>

<p>"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress
Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant,
or as soon thereafter as practicable.  Should you not receive
notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of
them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to
deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.</p>

<p>"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much
force as possible.  Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and
concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as
you can.  From City Point directions cannot be given at this
time for your further movements.</p>

<p>"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond
is to be your objective point, and that there is to be
co-operation between your force and the Army of the
Potomac--must be your guide.  This indicates the necessity of
your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you
advance.  Then, should the enemy be forced into his
intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow,
and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.</p>

<p>"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your
direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your
cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford,
about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense
advantage.</p>

<p>"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest
practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may
give for the execution of this order.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On
the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army
and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him
to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved
from Culpeper.  The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as
it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of
April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper
and Richmond, if he would stand.  Should he, however, fall back
into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his
(General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be
certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side,
so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I
would form the junction there; that circumstances might make
this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion
to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he
could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to
move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least
detain as large a force there as possible.</p>

<p>In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and
Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily
kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate
operations, and also those kept in the background for the
protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and
the armies operating against them.</p>

<p>A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel,
was so held for the protection of West Virginia, and the
frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania.  Whilst these troops
could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the
North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy,
they could act directly to their front, and give better
protection than if lying idle in garrison.  By such a movement
they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the
protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he
would lose them.  General Sigel was therefore directed to
organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move
from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and
Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.
Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own
request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to
give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one
under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten
thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven
thousand men.  The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between
Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery
advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as could be made
available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah
Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would
take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down
the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could,
destroying the New River Bridge and the salt-works, at
Saltville, Va.</p>

<p>Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations
were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in
readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a
general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May.</p>

<p>My first object being to break the military power of the
rebellion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made
me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement
against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else,
unless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this
desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my
determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to
retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large
force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of
Richmond.  It was well understood, by both Generals Butler and
Meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention
to put both their armies south of the James River, in case of
failure to destroy Lee without it.</p>

<p>Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at
Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent
importance of getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying
railroad communication as far south as possible.  Believing,
however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it
was reinforced, I made that the objective point of his
operations.  As the Army of the Potomac was to move
simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with
safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to
the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from
the north of James River.</p>

<p>I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I
tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent
command of the Army of the Potomac.  My instructions for that
army were all through him, and were general in their nature,
leaving all the details and the execution to him.  The campaigns
that followed proved him to be the right man in the right
place.  His commanding always in the presence of an officer
superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public
attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he
would otherwise have received.</p>

<p>The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the
morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and
orders of Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions.  Before
night, the whole army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth
corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's
Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in
advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about
four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition.  The
average distance travelled by the troops that day was about
twelve miles.  This I regarded as a great success, and it
removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had
entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an
active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how
so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country,
and protected.  Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth,
Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy
outside his intrenchments near Mine Run.  The battle raged
furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight
as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which,
considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the
roads, was done with commendable promptness.</p>

<p>General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the
Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at
the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad,
holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move
until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was
secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was
received.  This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of
the 4th.  By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was
leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some
of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles,
crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers.  Considering
that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was
composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the
accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.</p>

<p>The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock
on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury
until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same
position that they had on the evening of the 5th.  After dark,
the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank,
capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable
confusion.  But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was
personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon
reformed it and restored order.  On the morning of the 7th,
reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his
intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of
the battle-field.  From this it was evident to my mind that the
two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further
maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his
advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind
his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my whole
force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued
for a movement by his right flank.  On the night of the 7th, the
march was commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth
corps moving on the most direct road.  But the enemy having
become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line,
was enabled to reach there first.  On the 8th, General Warren
met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and
delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at
Spottsylvania.  This force was steadily driven back on the main
force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable
fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides.  On the morning
of the 9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the
enemy's lines of communication with Richmond.  The 9th, 10th,
and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without
decisive results.  Among the killed on the 9th was that able and
distinguished soldier Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding the
sixth army corps.  Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in
command.  Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was
made on the enemy in position.  The second corps, Major-General
Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing
most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of
artillery.  But the resistance was so obstinate that the
advantage gained did not prove decisive.  The 13th, 14th, 15th,
16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting
the arrival of reinforcements from Washington.  Deeming it
impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at
Spottsylvania Court House, orders were issued on the 15th with a
view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at twelve
o'clock on the night of the 19th.  Late in the afternoon of the
19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right
flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss.
This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of
the 21st, when it was commenced.  But the enemy again, having
the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was
enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of us, and took
position behind it.  The fifth corps reached the North Anna on
the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps.
The second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the
second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between
that and Jericho Ford.  General Warren effected a crossing the
same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon
after getting into position he was violently attacked, but
repulsed the enemy with great slaughter.  On the 25th, General
Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on which
he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at
Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large
supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track;
recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to
Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's
cavalry at Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around
Richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by
assault), recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at
Meadow Bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to
Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he communicated with
General Butler.  This raid had the effect of drawing off the
whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy
to guard our trains.</p>

<p>General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in
pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore
having joined him with the tenth corps.  At the same time he
sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of
West Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a
foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under General
Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of
Petersburg and Richmond.  On the 5th, he occupied, without
opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement
being a complete surprise.  On the 6th, he was in position with
his main army, and commenced intrenching.  On the 7th he made a
reconnoissance against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad,
destroying a portion of it after some fighting.  On the 9th he
telegraphed as follows:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING,
<br>May 9, 1864.</p>

<p>"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.</p>

<p>"Our operations may be summed up in a few words.  With one
thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the
Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy, and have safely, brought
them to their present position.  These were colored cavalry, and
are now holding our advance pickets towards Richmond.</p>

<p>"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the
same day with our movement up James River, forced the Black
Water, burned the railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below
Petersburg, cutting into Beauregard's force at that point.</p>

<p>"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles
of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we
can hold out against the whole of Lee's army.  I have ordered up
the supplies.</p>

<p>"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south
by the cutting of the railroads by Kautz.  That portion which
reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and
wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and
well-contested fight.</p>

<p>"General Grant will not be troubled with any further
reinforcements to Lee from Beauregard's force.</p>

<p>"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a
portion of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff,
or Fort Darling, with small loss.  The time thus consumed from
the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of
Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to
collect his loose forces in North and South Carolina, and bring
them to the defence of those places.  On the 16th, the enemy
attacked General Butler in his position in front of Drury's
Bluff.  He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments
between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy
intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads,
the city, and all that was valuable to him.  His army,
therefore, though in a position of great security, was as
completely shut off from further operations directly against
Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked.  It
required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it
there.</p>

<p>On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a
raid against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at
Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula Stations, destroying them, the
railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together
with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence,
crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at Wilson's,
Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying the
road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point,
which he reached on the 18th.</p>

<p>On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General
Butler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an
iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H.
W. Wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting,
the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and
armament captured.  The gunboat Smithfield was sunk, and the
Miami disabled.</p>

<p>The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically
sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to
bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the
south by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac. In addition
to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less
than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the
scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of
Virginia.</p>

<p>The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was
difficult to operate from against the enemy.  I determined,
therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough
only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d,
I directed that they be sent forward, under command of
Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac.</p>

<p>On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by
Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the
Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of
Major-General Meade's command.</p>

<p>Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than
either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th
to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town
to turn the enemy's position by his right.</p>

<p>Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under
Sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the
Pamunkey River at Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and
on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but
successful engagement with the enemy at Hawes's Shop.  On the
29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the
Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and developed the
enemy's position north of the Chickahominy.  Late on the evening
of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was
repulsed with very considerable loss.  An attack was immediately
ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted
in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.</p>

<p>On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the
railroad bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the
enemy's cavalry.  General Sheridan, on the same day, reached
Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and
General Smith's command, which had just arrived, via White
House, from General Butler's army.</p>

<p>On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the
6th corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps
being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders.
This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line
of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of
General Smith.  During the attack the enemy made repeated
assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack,
but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.  That night
he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day,
but failed.  The 2d was spent in getting troops into position
for an attack on the 3d.  On the 3d of June we again assaulted
the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his
position.  In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the
enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light.  It was
the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which
did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own
losses.  I would not be understood as saying that all previous
attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as
much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy
severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete
overthrow of the rebellion.</p>

<p>From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond,
it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between
him and the city.  I was still in a condition to either move by
his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or
continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the
James.  While the former might have been better as a covering
for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me
that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of
Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long,
vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to
guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army,
and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication
on the south side of the James.  My idea, from the start, had
been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond, if possible.  Then,
after destroying his lines of communication north of the James
River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee
in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.  After
the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy
deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army
he then had.  He acted purely on the defensive, behind
breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of
them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire
behind them.  Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was
willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I had
designed north of Richmond.  I therefore determined to continue
to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking
advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present
themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville
and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection
between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and
when the cavalry  got well off, to move the army to the south
side of the James River, by the enemy's right flank, where I
felt I could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the
canal.</p>

<p>On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan,
got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad,
with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near
Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the
work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of
the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions.</p>

<p>On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry,
under General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to
capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and
common bridges across the Appomattox.  The cavalry carried the
works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the
town, but were forced to retire.  General Gillmore, finding the
works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault
impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting
one.</p>

<p>Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I
sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's
command by water, via the White House, to reach there in advance
of the Army of the Potomac.  This was for the express purpose of
securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our
intention, could reinforce the place.</p>

<p>The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the
evening of the 12th.  One division of cavalry, under General
Wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long
Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings
of the other corps.  The advance corps reached James River, at
Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of
the 13th.</p>

<p>During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern
Virginia had been confronting each other.  In that time they had
fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell
to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing
the vantage ground of either.  The Southern press and people,
with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding
that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New
York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only
defended their Capital and Southern territory.  Hence, Antietam,
Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were
by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for
them.  Their army believed this.  It produced a morale which
could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard
fighting.  The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North
Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our
side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him
as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive.  His
losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that
we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking
party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field.  The
details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the
part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in
the report of Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports
accompanying it.</p>

<p>During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the
James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting
base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded
country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to
conveniently discharge vessels.  Too much credit cannot,
therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary
departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under
the general supervision of the chief quartermaster,
Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all
the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but
little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.</p>

<p>The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under
General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May.  General Crook, who
had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his
forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to
General Averell.  They crossed the mountains by separate routes.
Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near
Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and
Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges
and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with
Crook at Union on the 15th.  General Sigel moved up the
Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and,
after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and
retired behind Cedar Creek.  Not regarding the operations of
General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command,
and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him.  His
instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to
Major-General H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA.
<br>"May 20, 1864.</p>
<br>
<br>*****************************************
<br>
<p> "The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as
are brought over the branch road running through Staunton.  On
the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General
Hunter to move in that direction; reach Staunton and
Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much
opposition.  If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he
will be doing good service.  * * *</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."</p>


<br><br><br><br>
<p>
"JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.</p>

<p>"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he
should do so, living on the country.  The railroads and canal
should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks.
Completing this, he could find his way back to his original
base, or from about Gordonsville join this army.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up
the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at
Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated
him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred
men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small
arms.  On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with
Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct
on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he reached and invested
on the 16th day of June.  Up to this time he was very successful;
and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance
stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would,
no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point.  The
destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very
great.  To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee
sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached
Lynchburg a short time before Hunter.  After some skirmishing on
the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition
to give battle, retired from before the place.  Unfortunately,
this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his
return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his
troops for several weeks from the defence of the North.</p>

<p>Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of
Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been
in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the
enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it.  If
it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James
River Canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg
and the force sent for its defence.  I have never taken
exception to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now
disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted
within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions
and the interests of the service.  The promptitude of his
movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the
commendation of his country.</p>

<p>To return to the Army of the Potomac:  The 2d corps commenced
crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by
ferry-boats at Wilcox's Landing.  The laying of the pontoon-
bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the
crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward
by both bridge and ferry.</p>

<p>After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to
Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate
capture of Petersburg.</p>

<p>The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him
to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the
troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he
then held.  I told him that I would return at once to the Army
of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to
Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we
could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy
could bring troops against us.  General Smith got off as
directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg
before daylight next morning, but for some reason that I have
never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready
to assault his main lines until near sundown.  Then, with a part
of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines
north-east of Petersburg from the Appomattox River, for a
distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces
of artillery and three hundred prisoners.  This was about seven
P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no
other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had
reinforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The
night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to
further operations.  General Hancock, with two divisions of the
2d corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the
service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to
the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the
position of affairs, and what to do with the troops.  But
instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into
Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of
his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.</p>

<p>By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force.
An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by
the troops under Smith and the 2d and 9th corps.  It required
until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position.
The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with
but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and
resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works
of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously
captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over
four hundred prisoners.</p>

<p>The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and
persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only
resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which
he could not be dislodged.  The advantages of position gained by
us were very great.  The army then proceeded to envelop
Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far as possible
without attacking fortifications.</p>

<p>On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a
part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting,
no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the place
of those withdrawn before we could discover it.  General Butler,
taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad
between Petersburg and Richmond.  As soon as I was apprised of
the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions
of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking
at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to report to
General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was
notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of
his present line urged upon him.</p>

<p>About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced
back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning.
General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on
the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong
picket-line the enemy's works.  But instead of putting these
divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them
to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line.
Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy
attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.</p>

<p>On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was
effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the
north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by
pontoon-bridge with Bermuda Hundred.</p>

<p>On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition
against the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House
just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled
it to retire.  The result of this expedition was, that General
Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the
morning of the 11th of June, whom he attacked, and after an
obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout.  He
left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about
four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses.  On the 12th
he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa Court
House.  This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advanced
in the direction of Gordonsville.  He found the enemy reinforced
by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles
from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault.  On
the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the
enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by
infantry.  Night closed the contest.  Not having sufficient
ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being
without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing),
and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command
to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return
march, reaching White House at the time before stated.  After
breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the James
River, which he reached safely after heavy fighting.  He
commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan, without
further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.</p>

<p>On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of
the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry
of the Army of the James moved against the enemy's railroads
south of Richmond.  Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's
Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and
the South Side road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near
Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the
enemy's cavalry.  He reached Burkesville Station on the
afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville
Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles,
where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which
he could not dislodge him.  He then commenced his return march,
and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon
Railroad crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe but not
decisive engagement.  Thence he made a detour from his left with
a view of reaching Reams's Station (supposing it to be in our
possession).  At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry,
supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of
his artillery and trains.  In this last encounter, General
Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made
his way into our lines.  General Wilson, with the remainder of
his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming
in safely on our left and rear.  The damage to the enemy in this
expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained.  It
severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several
weeks.</p>

<p>With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond
to the Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his
army in the Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to
take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from
Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of
the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the
night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and two divisions of the
cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank
of the James River and joined the force General Butler had
there.  On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched
position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery.  On the
28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market
Road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in
heavy force.  The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in
considerable loss to both sides.  The first object of this move
having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by
the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made,
by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back
there.  One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night
of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th
corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be
foot-loose in the assault to be made.  The other two divisions
of the 2d corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the
night of the 29th and moved in front of Petersburg.  On the
morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was
sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the
advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps,
immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,
and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a
detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to
advance promptly to the ridge beyond.  Had they done this, I
have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have
fallen.  Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the
time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from
his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this
point for its defence.  The captured line thus held being
untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn,
but not without heavy loss.  Thus terminated in disaster what
promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.</p>

<p>Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter
was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus
laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and
Pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that
valley.  As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained,
General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was directed
to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to
Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by
reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was
experienced in getting there.  It became necessary, therefore,
to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy.  For
this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating
against Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then
fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf
Department, under orders issued immediately after the
ascertainment of the result of the Red River expedition.  The
garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up
of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments
from the invalid corps.  One division under command of General
Ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the
remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under General Wright,
were subsequently sent to Washington.  On the 3d of July the
enemy approached Martinsburg.  General Sigel, who was in command
of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at
Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry,
crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards
Frederick City.  General Wallace, with Rickett's division and
his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops,
pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the
enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the
railroad bridge.  His force was not sufficient to insure
success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it
resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and
thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with
two division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th
corps, before him.  From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington,
his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the
10th.  On the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of
Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force.  A
severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and
eighty in killed and wounded.  The enemy's loss was probably
greater.  He commenced retreating during the night.  Learning
the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by
telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th,
the assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of
all the troops that could be made available to operate in the
field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside
of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to
the last moment.  General Wright commenced the pursuit on the
13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snicker's Ferry, on
the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th,
General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel
army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and
several hundred prisoners.</p>

<p>Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or
Richmond, I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to
the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be
used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops
sent by him into the valley; and that Hunter should remain in
the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy
and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible.  I
felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact
would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave
Washington.  Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the
order to return to the James.</p>

<p>About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again
advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps,
then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's
Ferry.  The rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding
party into Pennsylvania which on the 30th burned Chambersburg,
and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards
Cumberland.  They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and
with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West
Virginia.  From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires
were frequently down between Washington and City Point, making
it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat.  It
took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches
through and return answers would be received showing a
different state of facts from those on which they were based,
causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must
have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and
rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they
otherwise would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident
to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of
all the forces in the Department of West Virginia, Washington,
Susquehanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended.</p>

<p>On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in
person to Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington,
with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces
against Early.  At this time the enemy was concentrated in the
neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under General
Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy
Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania.  From where I was, I
hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces
at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington.
Therefore, on the 4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's
command, and determine for myself what was best to be done.  On
arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I
issued to him the following instructions:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND,
<br>August 5, 1864--8 P.M.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in
the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards
and garrisons for public property as may be necessary.  Use, in
this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be
saved.  From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has
moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following
him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south
of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so.  If it is
ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the
Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a
competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the
raiders, and drive them to their homes.  In detaching such a
force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington
via Rockville may be taken into account.</p>

<p>"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of
the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and
horses.  These will be instructed, in the absence of further
orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac.  One
brigade will probably start to-morrow.  In pushing up the
Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go
first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to
invite the enemy to return.  Take all provisions, forage, and
stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be
consumed, destroy.  It is not desirable that the buildings
should be destroyed--they should rather be protected; but the
people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist
among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we
are determined to stop them at all hazards.</p>

<p>"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do
this you want to keep him always in sight.  Be guided in your
course by the course he takes.</p>

<p>"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving
regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in
the country through which you march.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance
reached Halltown that night.</p>

<p>General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a
willingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have
General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by
the morning train, with orders to take general command of all
the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at
Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of
instructions.  I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan
arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with
him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned
to City Point by way of Washington.</p>

<p>On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments
of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted
into the "Middle Military Division," and  Major-General Sheridan
was assigned to temporary command of the same.</p>

<p>Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and
Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The
first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.</p>

<p>His operations during the month of August and the fore part of
September were both of an offensive and defensive character,
resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry,
in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement
took place.  The two armies lay in such a position--the enemy on
the west bank of the Opequon Creek covering Winchester, and our
forces in front of Berryville--that either could bring on a
battle at any time.  Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy
the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances
before another army could be interposed to check him.  Under
these circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to
be taken.  Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,
and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by
the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the
importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from
continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the
risk should be taken.  But fearing to telegraph the order for an
attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's
feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City
Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters,
to decide, after conference with him, what should be done.  I met
him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each
army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and
expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but
two words of instructions necessary--Go in!  For the
conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were
kept at Harper's Ferry.  I asked him if he could get out his
teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing
Tuesday morning.  His reply was, that he could before daylight
on Monday.  He was off promptly to time, and I may here add,
that the result was such that I have never since deemed it
necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.</p>

<p>Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked
General Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a
most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in
the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire
position from Opequon Creek to Winchester, capturing several
thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery.  The enemy
rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill,
where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the
20th [22d].  Sheridan pursued him with great energy through
Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge.  After
stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and
provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg, and
took position on the north side of Cedar Creek.</p>

<p>Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again
returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry
encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated,
with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and
fifty prisoners.  On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the
mountains which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded
the North Fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under
cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left
flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole
line.  Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much
confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and
Newtown.  At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at
Winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field,
arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the
enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in
turn with great vigor.  The enemy was defeated with great
slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and
the trophies he had captured in the morning.  The wreck of his
army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of
Staunton and Lynchburg.  Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus
ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the
Shenandoah Valley.  I was now enabled to return the 6th corps to
the Army of the Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan's
army to the Army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia,
to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus
enable him to move without detaching from his force for that
purpose.</p>

<p>Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy
had detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early
in the Shenandoah Valley.  I therefore sent the 2d corps and
Gregg's division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a
force of General Butler's army, on the night of the 13th of
August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James,
to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to
draw back those sent.  In this move we captured six pieces of
artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that
were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one
division (Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone.</p>

<p>The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist
this movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was
moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the Weldon
Railroad.  During the day he had considerable fighting.  To
regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and
desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great
loss.  On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of
the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the
front at Petersburg.  On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's
division of cavalry, while at Reams's Station destroying the
railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of
our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the
hands of the enemy.</p>

<p>By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from
the City Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad,
enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the
army in front of Petersburg.</p>

<p>The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled
the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few
troops north of the James for the defence of Richmond.  On the
night of the 28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the
18th corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's
army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced
on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong
fortifications and intrenchments below Chaffin's Farm, known as
Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the
New Market Road and intrenchments.  This success was followed up
by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of
the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with
heavy loss.  Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to
the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the
enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further.  The position
captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond, that I
determined to hold it.  The enemy made several desperate
attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for
which he paid dearly.  On the morning of the 30th, General Meade
sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy's
line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of
troops to the north side.  In this reconnoissance we captured
and held the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church.  In the
afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained
were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall
back until supported by the forces holding the captured works.
Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the
enemy with great loss.</p>

<p>On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north
of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight
or nine pieces.  This he followed up by an attack on our
intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe
slaughter.  On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by
General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new
works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to
us.</p>

<p>On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient
men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right
flank.  The 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th
corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank,
forced a passage of Hatcher's Run, and moved up the south side
of it towards the South Side Railroad, until the 2d corps and
part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Road where it
crosses Hatcher's Run.  At this point we were six miles distant
from the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement
to reach and hold.  But finding that we had not reached the end
of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself
for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and
shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified
line.  Orders were given accordingly.  Immediately upon
receiving a report that General Warren had connected with
General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters.  Soon after I
left the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap
between Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as
reported, and made a desperate attack on General Hancock's right
and rear.  General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet
it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works,
and withdrew that night to his old position.</p>

<p>In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration
on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the
Williamsburg Road, and also on the York River Railroad.  In the
former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in
carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces
withdrawn to their former positions.</p>

<p>From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and
Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the
defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements
for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent
his detaching any considerable force to send south.  By the 7th
of February, our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the
Weldon Railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.</p>

<p>General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with
the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded,
respectively, by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon
Johnston's army at Dalton; but finding the enemy's position at
Buzzard's Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted,
General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, while
Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the
north.  This movement was successful.  Johnston, finding his
retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified
position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of
May 15th.  A heavy battle ensued.  During the night the enemy
retreated south.  Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken
near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed.  The next
morning, however, he had again disappeared.  He was vigorously
pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on the 19th, but during
the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah.  While these
operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's division
of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts
and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries.  General
Sherman, having give his army a few days' rest at this point,
again put it in motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of
turning the difficult pass at Allatoona.  On the afternoon of
the 25th, the advance, under General Hooker, had a severe battle
with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope Church, near
Dallas.  Several sharp encounters occurred at this point.  The
most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General
McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.</p>

<p>On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position
at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of
Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains.  He was forced to yield the
two last-named places, and concentrate his army on Kenesaw,
where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson made a
determined but unsuccessful assault.  On the night of the 2d of
July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and
on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence
of this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the
Chattahoochee.</p>

<p>General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men
rest and get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed
his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large
portion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to
Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston
in command of the rebel army, and assuming the
offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon
Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and
determined of which was on the 22d of July.  About one P.M. of
this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson
was killed.  General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the Army
of the Tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was
superseded by Major-General Howard, on the 26th, with the same
success and ability that had characterized him in the command of
a corps or division.</p>

<p>In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss.
Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General
Sherman, after securing his line of communications across the
Chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left
flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy
from his fortifications.  In this he succeeded, and after
defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and
Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of
September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.</p>

<p>About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler,
attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was
repulsed at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it
proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and
was finally driven south of the Tennessee.  The damage done by
this raid was repaired in a few days.</p>

<p>During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau
joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur,
having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery
Railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also
made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the
remaining Railroad communication with Atlanta.  The first two
were successful the latter, disastrous.</p>

<p>General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was
prompt, skilful, and brilliant.  The history of his flank
movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever
be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history.</p>

<p>His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders,
accompanying it, give the details of that most successful
campaign.</p>

<p>He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a
single-track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was
operating.  This passed the entire distance through a hostile
country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The
cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in Northern
Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far
enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreat
disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the
possibility of further use.  To guard against this danger,
Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to
operate against Forrest in West Tennessee.  He directed General
Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier-General S. D.
Sturgis in command of this force to attack him.  On the morning
of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown,
Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and
confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles,
hotly pursued by the enemy.  By this, however, the enemy was
defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of communications.
The persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted
him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary.  In the
meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the Army
of the Tennessee that had been sent by General Sherman to General
Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return from Red River, where
they had done most excellent service.  He was directed by
General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against
Forrest.  This he did with the promptness and effect which has
characterized his whole military career.  On the 14th of July,
he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him
badly.  The fighting continued through three days.  Our loss was
small compared with that of the enemy.  Having accomplished the
object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis.</p>

<p>During the months of March and April this same force under
Forrest annoyed us considerably.  On the 24th of March it
captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th
attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois
Volunteers.  Colonel H., having but a small force, withdrew to
the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and
drove him from the place.</p>

<p>On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel
General Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to
surrender, but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th
New Jersey Volunteers, that being placed there by his Government
with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from
it, surrender was out of the question.</p>

<p>On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow,
Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and
the 1st Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major
Booth.  The garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in
the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and,
after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and
merciless massacre of the garrison.</p>

<p>On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared
before Paducah, but was again driven off.</p>

<p>Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's
operations, were also very active in Kentucky.  The most noted
of these was Morgan.  With a force of from two to three thousand
cavalry, he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter
part of May.  On the 11th of June they attacked and captured
Cynthiana, with its entire garrison.  On the 12th he was
overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy
loss, and was finally driven out of the State.  This notorious
guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville,
Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General
Gillem.</p>

<p>In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the
Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements
of the troops sent by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith,
I am unable to give the date of its starting.  The troops under
General Smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a
detachment of the 17th army corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of
March, and reached the designated point on Red River one day
earlier than that appointed by General Banks.  The rebel forces
at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the
14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying
the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed
forward to Fort de Russy, which had been left with a weak
garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred
and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many
small-arms.  Our loss was but slight.  On the 15th he pushed
forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th.  On
the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's
Hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten
prisoners and four pieces of artillery.</p>

<p>On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the
rebel General Taylor, at Cane River.  By the 26th, General Banks
had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to
Grand Ecore.  On the morning of April 6th he moved from Grand
Ecore.  On the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the
enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the field.  On the
same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond
Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat.  On the 8th,
at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and
defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and
an immense amount of transportation and stores.  During the
night, General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another
battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great
loss.  During the night, General Banks continued his retrograde
movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he
reached on the 27th of April.  Here a serious difficulty arose
in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied the
expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much
since they passed up as to prevent their return.  At the
suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under
his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the
channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids
in safety.</p>

<p>The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after
considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached
Morganzia and Point Coupee near the end of the month.  The
disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of
the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans
of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of
Mobile.</p>

<p>On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with
the 7th army corps, to  cooperate with General Banks's
expedition on the Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the
28th.  On the 16th of April, after driving the enemy before him,
he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in Washita County, by General
Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith.  After several severe
skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele
reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of April.</p>

<p>On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks
on Red River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's
Mill, in Dallas County, General Steele determined to fall back
to the Arkansas River.  He left Camden on the 26th of April, and
reached Little Rock on the 2d of May.  On the 30th of April, the
enemy attacked him while crossing Saline River at Jenkins's
Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss.  Our loss was
about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.</p>

<p>Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the
"Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore
directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies
operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his
command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the
positions and lines of communications he then occupied.</p>

<p>Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman,
General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy
that was collecting near the Mississippi River.  General Smith
met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of
June.  Our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded.</p>

<p>In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General
Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to
co-operate with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile
Bay.  On the 8th of August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the
combined naval and land forces.  Fort Powell was blown up and
abandoned.</p>

<p>On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe
bombardment, surrendered on the 23d.  The total captures
amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners,
and one hundred and four pieces of artillery.</p>

<p>About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel
General Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had
reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A.
J. Smith's command, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman,
was ordered to Missouri.  A cavalry force was also, at the same
time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow.  This
made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and
no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and
drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in
Arkansas, would cut off his retreat.  On the 26th day of
September, Price attacked Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to
retreat, and thence moved north to the Missouri River, and
continued up that river towards Kansas.  General Curtis,
commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such
forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while
General Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.</p>

<p>The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated,
with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large
number of prisoners.  He made a precipitate retreat to Northern
Arkansas.  The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam
over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable
mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force
may be used.  There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not
have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before
the latter reached Pilot Knob.</p>

<p>September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the
Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the
garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which
capitulated on the 24th.  Soon after the surrender two regiments
of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were
compelled to surrender.  Forrest destroyed the railroad
westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle,
skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the
same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near
Tullahoma and Dechard.  On the morning of the 30th, one column
of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville,
and summoned the surrender of the garrison.  Receiving an answer
in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until
next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received
the same reply as on the night before.  He withdrew in the
direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned, and
attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without
success.  On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but
was handsomely repulsed.</p>

<p>Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the
morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack.  On the morning
of the 3d he moved towards Mount Pleasant.  While these
operations were going on, every exertion was made by General
Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could
recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to
Corinth, Mississippi.</p>

<p>In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to
destroy the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy
on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from
Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position
around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge
him.  During the night he withdrew his command and returned to
Kentucky.</p>

<p>General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his
armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations
for refitting and supplying them for future service.  The great
length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however,
which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest.</p>

<p>During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon,
Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon
became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the
enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them.  He
exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been
beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the
defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against
the army that had so often defeated it.</p>

<p>In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon
reported to the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's
right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty,
and moved north on it.</p>

<p>General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the
remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden,
Alabama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the
roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General
Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place,
with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as
follows:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA
<br>"October 10--noon.</p>

<p>"Dispatch about Wilson just received.  Hood is now crossing
Coosa River, twelve miles below Rome, bound west.  If he passes
over the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan
of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas
with the troops now in Tennessee to defend the State?  He will
have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach
Nashville.</p>

<p>"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
<br><br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this
dispatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:</p>

<p>"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's
should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get
Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be
instructed to hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get
Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the
Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in
final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to
be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the
city of Savannah is in our possession."  This was in reply to a
letter of mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch
of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in
which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington,
and of the situation in Virginia, etc.</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,</p>

<p>"October 11, 1864--11 A.M.</p>

<p>"Your dispatch of October 10th received.  Does it not look as if
Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using
the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply
his base on the Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur?  If
he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting
north of the Tennessee River.  If you were to cut loose, I do
not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked
by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as
are still left at home.  Hood would probably strike for
Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater
damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south.  If
there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that,
but I must trust to your own judgment.  I find I shall not be
able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your
movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until
the fall of Richmond takes place.  I am afraid Thomas, with such
lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from
going north.  With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry,
you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than
heretofore.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<br><br><br><br>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"KINGSTON, GEORGIA,
<br>"October 11--11 A.M.</p>

<p>"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and
Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome.  He
threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to
follow.  I hold Atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong
detachments along my line.  This reduces my active force to a
comparatively small army.  We cannot remain here on the
defensive.  With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold
cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads.  I would
infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the
country from Chattanooga to Atlanta including the latter city
send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective
army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood
may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be
forced to follow me.  Instead of my being on the defensive, I
would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means
to do, he would have to guess at my plans.  The difference in
war is full twenty-five per cent.  I can make Savannah,
Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee.</p>

<p>"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.</p>

<p>"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
<br><br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<br><br><br><br>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
<br>"October 11,1864--11.30 P.M.</p>

<p>"Your dispatch of to-day received.  If you are satisfied the
trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the
Tennessee River firmly, you may make it, destroying all the
railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br>"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>


<p>
It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting
through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern
railroads, leading east and west, through Georgia, to
effectually sever the east from the west.  In other words, cut
the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once
by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River.  General
Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.</p>

<p>General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his
proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime
to watch Hood.  Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward
from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th
corps,  Major-General Stanley commanding, and the 23d corps,
Major-General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga to
report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed
in command of all the troops of his military division, save the
four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with
through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal,
there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line
of the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would
be able to concentrate and beat him in battle.  It was therefore
readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast.</p>

<p>Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of
November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and
Macon.  His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed.
Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the
country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own
might compel him to head for such point as he could reach,
instead of such as he might prefer.  The blindness of the enemy,
however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the
only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the
Mississippi River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the
whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice.</p>

<p>How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met
with, the condition of the country through which the armies
passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River,
and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are all
clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report.</p>

<p>Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two
expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from
Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the
enemy's lines of communication with Mobile and detain troops in
that field.  General Foster, commanding Department of the South,
also sent an expedition, via Broad River, to destroy the railroad
between Charleston and Savannah.  The expedition from Vicksburg,
under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (colonel
3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of
November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad bridge
and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles
of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of
stores.  The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable
results.  The expedition from the Department of the South, under
the immediate command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch,
consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a
brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad River and debarked at
Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it moved to
strike the railroad at Grahamsville.  At Honey Hill, about three
miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a
strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe
fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and
forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing.  During the night
General Hatch withdrew.  On the 6th of December General Foster
obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah
Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and Tulifinny rivers.</p>

<p>Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move
northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain
doom.  At all events, had I had the power to command both
armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he
seemed to be acting.  On the 26th of October, the advance of
Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but
failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and
succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment
on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Florence.  On the
28th, Forrest reached the Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured
a gunboat and three transports.  On the 2d of November he planted
batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of
the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports.  On
the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was
replied to from the gunboats and the garrison.  The gunboats
becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports,
to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.  About a
million and a half dollars' worth of store and property on the
levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire.  On the 5th the
enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee
River, above Johnsonville, moving towards Clifton, and
subsequently joined Hood.  On the night of the 5th, General
Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached
Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to
Pulaski, and was put in command of all the troopers there, with
instruction to watch the movements of Hood and retard his
advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival
of General A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until
General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.</p>

<p>On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance.  General
Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards
Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and
gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements.  The enemy
coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield,
at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during
the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance
repulsed.  His loss in this battle was one thousand seven
hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and
three thousand eight hundred wounded.  Among his losses were six
general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured.  Our
entire loss was two thousand three hundred.  This was the first
serious opposition the enemy met with, and I am satisfied was
the fatal blow to all his expectations.  During the night,
General Schofield fell back towards Nashville.  This left the
field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily
abandoned--so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought
together.  The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment
of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.</p>

<p>As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the
Tennessee River, and that Price was going out of Missouri,
General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the
troops of General A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops
as he could spare.  The advance of this reinforcement reached
Nashville on the 30th of November.</p>

<p>On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked
Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated
and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in
our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners,
including four general officers.</p>

<p>Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it
appeared to me, the unnecessary delay.  This impatience was
increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of
cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky.  I feared Hood
would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there.
After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately
assuming the offensive, I started West to superintend matters
there in person.  Reaching Washington City, I received General
Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the
result as far as the battle had progressed.  I was delighted.
All fears and apprehensions were dispelled.  I am not yet
satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the
appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to
fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given
him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which
delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it
impracticable to attack earlier than he did.  But his final
defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a
vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.</p>

<p>After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued
by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to
abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his
transportation.  On the 28th of December our advanced forces
ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side
of the river.</p>

<p>About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee
and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army
transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit
by his main force at the Tennessee River.  A small force of
cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania
Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance,
capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's
pontoon-bridge.  The details of these operations will be found
clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.</p>

<p>A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson,
started from Memphis on the 21st of December.  On the 25th he
surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona,
Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, destroyed the
railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for
Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large
amounts of public stores.  On the morning of the 28th he
attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and
destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the
south-west, he struck the Mississippi Central Railroad at
Winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at
Bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at Grenada,
arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.</p>

<p>During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a
force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee.  On
the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near
Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred
prisoners.  Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated
to Knoxville.  Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to
near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General
Ammen.  Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman
concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near
Bean's Station to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or
drive him into Virginia--destroy the salt-works at Saltville,
and the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without
endangering his command.  On the 12th of December he commenced
his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces
wherever he met them.  On the 16th he struck the enemy, under
Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to
Wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred
and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its
stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there.
Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge,
consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville,
that had started in pursuit.  He at once made arrangements to
attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge
gone.  He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the
extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores,
and captured eight pieces of artillery.  Having thus
successfully executed his instructions, he returned General
Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.</p>

<p>Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast
port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from
abroad, and send cotton and other products out by
blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic
value.  The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the
harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect.  The nature
of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required
watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the
land north of New Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for
the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of
blockade-runners.</p>

<p>To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation
of a land force, which I agreed to furnish.  Immediately
commenced the assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D.
Porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for
concentration upon one given point.  This necessarily attracted
the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal North;
and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely
of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the
expedition became a subject of common discussion in the
newspapers both North and South.  The enemy, thus warned,
prepared to meet it.  This caused a postponement of the
expedition until the later part of November, when, being again
called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself,
in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we
had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and
the time of starting.  A force of six thousand five hundred men
was regarded as sufficient.  The time of starting was not
definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by
the 6th of December, if not before.  Learning, on the 30th of
November, that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most
of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost
importance that the expedition should reach its destination
before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to make
all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who
had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy
might not be detained one moment.</p>

<p>On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:  The first object of the expedition under General
Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington.  If
successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington
itself.  There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if
advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the
enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia.  The
directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the
expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of
where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be
taken.  The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting
a landing on the main land between Cape Fear River and the
Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river.  Should such
landing be effected while the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and
the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the
troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the
navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places.  These in
our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of
Wilmington would be sealed.  Should Fort Fisher and the point of
land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops
immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to
capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise.  If time is
consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the
second will become a matter of after consideration.</p>

<p>"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer
immediately in command of the troops.</p>

<p>"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a
landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the
armies operating against Richmond without delay.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were
taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they
were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and
instructions should go through him.  They were so sent, but
General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never
received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their
existence, until he read General Butler's published official
report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my indorsement and
papers accompanying it.  I had no idea of General Butler's
accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off
from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General
Weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in
command.  I rather formed the idea that General Butler was
actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of
the powder-boat.  The expedition was detained several days at
Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.</p>

<p>The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without
any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon
General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.</p>

<p>The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and
arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort
Fisher, on the evening of the 15th.  Admiral Porter arrived on
the evening of the 18th, having put in at Beaufort to get
ammunition for the monitors.  The sea becoming rough, making it
difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being
about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to
replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the
return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th.  The
powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the
return of General Butler from Beaufort; but it would seem, from
the notice taken of it in the Southern newspapers, that the
enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion
until they were informed by the Northern press.</p>

<p>On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a
reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up
towards the fort.  But before receiving a full report of the
result of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct
violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation
of the troops and the return of the expedition.  The
re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th.</p>

<p>On the return of the expedition officers and men among them
Brevet Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M.
Curtis, First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York
Volunteers, First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and
Second-Lieutenant George Simpson, 142d New York Volunteers
voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly
into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken
without much loss.</p>

<p>Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch
from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral
Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher,
and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the
place could be taken.  The natural supposition with me was, that
when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so
also.  Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of
December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would
send a force and make another attempt to take the place.  This
time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H.
Terry to command the expedition.  The troops composing it
consisted of the same that composed the former, with the
addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five
hundred, and a small siege train.  The latter it was never found
necessary to land.  I communicated direct to the commander of the
expedition the following instructions:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:  The expedition intrusted to your command has been
fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C.,
and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls.  You will then
proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet
lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself
and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic
Blockading Squadron.</p>

<p>"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete
understanding should exist between yourself and the naval
commander.  I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral
Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each
branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of
action.  It would be well to have the whole programme laid down
in writing.  I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that
you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he
proposes.  I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is
consistent with your own responsibilities.  The first object to
be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on
which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against
that fort.  You want to look to the practicability of receiving
your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces
sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If
such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will
not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another
plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.</p>

<p>"My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought
to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the
balance of it operates on the outside.  Land forces cannot
invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or
reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy.</p>

<p>"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort
Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required.  All other
supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.</p>

<p>"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is
assured.  When you find they can be spared, order them back, or
such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for
orders.</p>

<p>"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back
to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further
instructions.  You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.</p>

<p>"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops
to Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels.  These troops
will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels
until you are heard from.  Should you require them, they will be
sent to you.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>


<p>
Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet
brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was
assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.</p>

<p>It will be seen that these instructions did not differ
materially from those given for the first expedition, and that
in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher.
This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the
commanding officer.</p>

<p>The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the
6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th,
where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until
the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its
destination that evening.  Under cover of the fleet, the
disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the
13th, and by three o'clock P.M. was completed without loss.  On
the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred
yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession
of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that
might be made from the fort.  This reconnoissance disclosed the
fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by
the navy fire.  In the afternoon of the 15th the fort was
assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with
its entire garrison and armament.  Thus was secured, by the
combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important
successes of the war.  Our loss was:  killed, one hundred and
ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six.  On the 16th and the
17th the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works
on Smith's Island, which were immediately occupied by us.  This
gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.</p>

<p>At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and
Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of
Virginia and North Carolina.</p>

<p>The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the
force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now
threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation
for General Thomas's surplus troops--fields from which they
would co-operate with other movements.  General Thomas was
therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold
his communications at Eastport, in readiness for orders.  On the
7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of
the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General
Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as
possible.  This direction was promptly complied with, and the
advance of the corps reached Washington on the 23d of the same
month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and New Bern.  On the
26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's command and a
division of cavalry to report to General Canby.  By the 7th of
February the whole force was en route for its destination.</p>

<p>The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military
department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and
placed under the orders of Major-General Sherman.  The following
instructions were given him:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:-- ******** Your movements are intended as
co-operative with Sherman's through the States of South and
North Carolina.  The first point to be attained is to secure
Wilmington.  Goldsboro' will then be your objective point,
moving either from Wilmington or New Bern, or both, as you deem
best.  Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will
advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place
with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road
behind you.  The enterprise under you has two objects:  the
first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his
march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on
his line of march.  As soon, therefore, as you can determine
which of the two points, Wilmington or New Bern, you can best
use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will
commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for
sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals.  You will get of
these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the
interior as you may be able to occupy.  I believe General Palmer
has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the
subject of securing supplies for his army.  You will learn what
steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions
accordingly.  A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary.</p>

<p>"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective
departments in the field with me at City Point.  Communicate
with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary
at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which
point you can communicate by telegraph.</p>

<p>"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of
those required for your own command.</p>

<p>"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your
imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the
interior to aid Sherman.  In such case you will act on your own
judgment without waiting for instructions.  You will report,
however, what you purpose doing.  The details for carrying out
these instructions are necessarily left to you.  I would urge,
however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to
the importance of it, prompt action.  Sherman may be looked for
in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the
28th of February; this limits your time very materially.</p>

<p>"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington,
it can be supplied from Washington.  A large force of railroad
men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will
go to Fort Fisher in a day or two.  On this point I have informed
you by telegraph.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher,
accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for
myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with
General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.</p>

<p>Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his army
entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee,
the Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several
months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and
regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important
operation towards closing the rebellion--I sent orders to
General Sherman on the 6th of December, that after establishing
a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all
his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with
the balance of his command.</p>

<p>On the 18th of December, having received information of the
defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and
that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean
transportation, it would take over two months to transport
Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as
much towards the desired result by operating from where he was,
I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to
what would be best to do.  A few days after this I received a
communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December,
acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing
me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he
could get transportation.  Also that he had expected, upon
reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South
Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me; but
that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of
Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the
middle of January.  The confidence he manifested in this letter
of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without
waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him, on
the 28th of December, to make preparations to start as he
proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and
South Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond
as soon as he could.</p>

<p>On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had
ordered the 23d corps,  Major-General Schofield commanding,
east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we
had at Fort Fisher, about eight thousand men; at New Bern, about
four thousand; that if Wilmington was captured, General Schofield
would go there; if not, he would be sent to New Bern; that, in
either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to
the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his
movement; that from either point railroad communication could be
run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders
as he came into communication with them.</p>

<p>In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to
reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy
under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the
Cape Fear River.  Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the
west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th,
the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it.</p>

<p>After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington
on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards
Goldsboro' during the night.  Preparations were at once made for
a movement on Goldsboro' in two columns--one from Wilmington, and
the other from New Bern--and to repair the railroad leading there
from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape
Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became necessary.  The
column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March, at Wise's
Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred
prisoners.  On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our
intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell
back during the night.  On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed
and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered.
The column from Wilmington reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse
River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on the 22d.</p>

<p>By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in
motion from Savannah.  He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on
the 17th; thence moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via
Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March,
opening up communication with General Schofield by way of Cape
Fear River.  On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro'.  He
met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a severe fight
defeated and compelled it to retreat.  Our loss in this
engagement was about six hundred.  The enemy's loss was much
greater.  On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under
Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing
three guns and driving it back upon the main body.  General
Slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of
Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the
defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which
were pushed forward.  On the night of the 21st the enemy
retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our
hands.  From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place
had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the
Neuse River ten miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General
Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d),
thus forming a junction with the columns from New Bern and
Wilmington.</p>

<p>Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of
Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the
night of the 17th of February, and occupied by our forces on the
18th.</p>

<p>On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was
directed to send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman,
from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down
towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military
resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to East
Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our
prisoners there, if possible.  Of the feasibility of this
latter, however, General Stoneman was to judge.  Sherman's
movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all
the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution
of this.  General Stoneman was so late in making his start on
this expedition (and Sherman having passed out of the State of
South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed General
Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of
last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he
could.  This would keep him between our garrisons in East
Tennessee and the enemy.  I regarded it not impossible that in
the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond, he might fall
back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid north through East
Tennessee.  On the 14th of February the following communication
was sent to General Thomas:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.</p>

<p>"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against
Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of
about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command.  The
cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg.
It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will
move from there eastward, in co-operation.  Hood's army has been
terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in
Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by
the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman.  (I take it a
large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn.  It is so
asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel
Congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it
had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.)  This
being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will
attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance
from your standpoint easy.  I think it advisable, therefore,
that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare,
and hold it in readiness to go south.  The object would be
threefold:  first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as
possible, to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the
enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to
destroy or capture their forces brought into the field.
Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the
expedition against.  This, however, would not be so important as
the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama.  Discretion
should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go
where, according to the information he may receive, he will best
secure the objects named above.</p>

<p>"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know
what number of men you can put into the field.  If not more than
five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be
sufficient.  It is not desirable that you should start this
expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or
four days out, or even a week.  I do not know when it will
start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn.  If
you should hear through other sources before hearing from me,
you can act on the information received.</p>

<p>"To insure success your cavalry should go with as little
wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for
supplies.  I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery,
or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns
taken.  No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight
horses.</p>

<p>"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force
you think you will be able to send under these directions.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon
after the 20th as he could get it off.</p>

<p>I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement
of the armies operating against Richmond, that all
communications with the city, north of James River, should be
cut off.  The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from
the Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent
from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce Sherman, if practicable,
whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the
enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which,
if successful. would accomplish the first at least, and possibly
the latter of the objects.  I therefore telegraphed General
Sheridan as follows:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865--1 P.M.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:--As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will
have no difficulty about reaching Lychburg with a cavalry force
alone.  From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in
every direction, so as to be of no further use to the
rebellion.  Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look
after Mosby's gang.  From Lynchburg, if information you might
get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the
streams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and
join General Sherman.  This additional raid, with one now about
starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or
give thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or
eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, then
thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight
thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa,
Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out
the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to
leave mothing for the rebellion to stand upon.  I would advise
you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this.  Charleston
was evacuated on Tuesday 1st.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan,
inquiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him
definite information as to the points he might be expected to
move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina.  In answer, the
following telegram was sent him:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of
opposition he meets with from the enemy.  If strongly opposed,
he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit
out for a new start.  I think, however, all danger for the
necessity of going to that point has passed.  I believe he has
passed Charlotte.  He may take Fayetteville on his way to
Goldsboro'.  If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided
in your after movements by the information you obtain.  Before
you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him
moving from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy
strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with
railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or
New Bern.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>


<p>
General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February,
with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand
each.  On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which the
enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the
Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d,
the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'.  Thence he pushed on
to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an
intrenched position, under General Early.  Without stopping to
make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the
position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven
pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two
hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen
battle-flags, were captured.  The prisoners, under an escort of
fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester.  Thence he
marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad
and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d.  Here
he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond
and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north
and south forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of
his trains.  This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea
of capturing Lynchburg.  On the morning of the 6th, dividing his
force into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it
marched up the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every
lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.  From here a
force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to
obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that
place, but failed.  The enemy burned it on our approach.  The
enemy also burned the bridge across the river at
Hardwicksville.  The other column moved down the railroad
towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Court House,
sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting
with the column at New Market.  The river being very high, his
pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having
destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river
and get on the South Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroy
it to Appomattox Court House, the only thing left for him was to
return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House.
Fortunately, he chose the latter.  From New Market he took up
his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,
destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever
practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland,
concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the 10th.  Here he
rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his
whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him
at White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th.  An
infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White
House, and supplies were forwarded.  Moving from Columbia in a
direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he
crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges
and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of
the Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.</p>

<p>Previous to this the following communication was sent to General
Thomas:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
<br>March 7, 1865--9.30 A.M.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repair
the railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to
Bull's Gap and fortify there.  Supplies at Knoxville could
always be got forward as required.  With Bull's Gap fortified,
you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be
prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make
a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina.  I do not
think Stoneman should break the road until he gets into
Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may
be caught west of that.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was
moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending
it under General Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large
and well-appointed cavalry expeditions--one from Middle
Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson against the enemy's
vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, under
Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--and assembling the
remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence
offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's
cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James
were confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of
Richmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies,
reinforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro';
General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign
against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the
Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in
the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion
or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.</p>

<p>After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter
roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House.  At
this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear
that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and
Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, and before he
was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an
effectual pursuit.  On the 24th of March, General Sheridan moved
from White House, crossed the James River at Jones's Landing, and
formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in front of
Petersburg on the 27th.  During this move, General Ord sent
forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.</p>

<p>On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general
movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
<br>March 24, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:  On the 29th instant the armies operating against
Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of
turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg,
and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan,
which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and
destroy the South Side and Danville railroads.  Two corps of the
Army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking
the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest where the present
line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards
Dinwiddie Court House.</p>

<p>"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now
under General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon
Road and the Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter
before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column
before reaching Stony Creek.  General Sheridan will then move
independently, under other instructions which will be given
him.  All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the
Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military
Division not required for guarding property belonging to their
arm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be
added to the defences of City Point.  Major-General Parke will
be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines
about Petersburg and City Point, subject of course to orders
from the commander of the Army of the Potomac.  The 9th army
corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so
long as the whole line now occupied by us is held.  If, however,
the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the
left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the
position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon
Road.  All troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in
readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be
designated when the order is given.</p>

<p>"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one
colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present
lines, and march for the present left of the Army of the
Potomac.  In the absence of further orders, or until further
orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left
column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the
right column.  During the movement Major-General Weitzel will be
left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army
of the James.</p>

<p>"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence
on the night of the 27th instant.  General Ord will leave behind
the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the
absence of the main army.  A cavalry expedition, from General
Ord's command, will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there
on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the
purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford.  This, if
accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from
three to five hundred men will be sufficient.  They should,
however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared
from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry
crosses the Blackwater.  The crossing should probably be at
Uniten.  Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon
Road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the
triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston.  The
railroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of
carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation
of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke.
All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks
and eight days' in wagons.  To avoid as much hauling as
possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of
days' supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will
direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient
supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in
passing.  Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in
wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will
carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies.  The
densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making
the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with
the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division,
at the option of the army commanders.</p>

<p>"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into
operation may be commenced at once.  The reserves of the 9th
corps should be massed as much as possible.  While I would not
now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them,
they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy
weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders.  In
case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could
follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the
army.  To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations
issued to them, same as the balance of the army.  General
Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at
all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so.  A
success north of the James should be followed up with great
promptness.  An attack will not be feasible unless it is found
that the enemy has detached largely.  In that case it may be
regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local
reserves principally for the defence of Richmond.  Preparations
may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James,
except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a
break is made in the lines of the enemy.</p>

<p>"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating
against Richmond is left behind.  The enemy, knowing this, may,
as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in
the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl
everything against the moving column, and return.  It cannot be
impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the
trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of
it.  The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does
so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a
weakening of his lines.  I would have it particularly enjoined
upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy,
those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding
officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move
promptly, and notify the commander of their action.  I would also
enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when
other parts of their corps are engaged.  In like manner, I would
urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines
in front of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River
towards our left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the
line to the right and left of it, established themselves and
turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either
flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when
the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and
wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners.  Our loss was
sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and
five hundred and six missing.  General Meade at once ordered the
other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective
fronts.  Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's
strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th
corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners.  The enemy
made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without
success.  Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight
hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven
missing.  The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.</p>

<p>General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about
Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them
perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and
stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously
written me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed
for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his
command to bear against Lee's army, in co-operation with our
forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.  General Sherman
proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by
turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or
thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and
Danville Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville,
or join the armies operating against Richmond, as might be
deemed best.  This plan he was directed to carry into execution,
if he received no further directions in the meantime.  I
explained to him the movement I had ordered to commence on the
29th of March.  That if it should not prove as entirely
successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy
the Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the
enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid
concentration of Lee's and Johnston's armies.</p>

<p>I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the
report that the enemy had retreated the night before.  I was
firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be
the signal for Lee to leave.  With Johnston and him combined, a
long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the
summer, might become necessary.  By moving out I would put the
army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the
destruction of the Danville Road, retard the concentration of the
two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon
much material that he might otherwise save.  I therefore
determined not to delay the movement ordered.</p>

<p>On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions
of the 24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one
division of the 25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding,
and MacKenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance
of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned
him near Hatcher's Run on the morning of the 29th.  On the 28th
the following instructions were given to General Sheridan:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at
three A.M. to-morrow morning.  The 2d moves at about nine A.M.,
having but about three miles to march to reach the point
designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after
the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House.  Move your cavalry at
as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any
particular road or roads.  You may go out by the nearest roads
in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to
or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as
soon as you can.  It is not the intention to attack the enemy in
his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible.
Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be
attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and
with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as
circumstances will dictate.  I shall be on the field, and will
probably be able to communicate with you.  Should I not do so,
and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched
line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road.  If you
find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side
Road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some
extent.  I would not advise much detention, however, until you
reach the Danville Road, which I would like you to strike as
near to the Appomattox as possible.  Make your destruction on
that road as complete as possible.  You can then pass on to the
South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like
manner.</p>

<p>"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads,
which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may
return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you
may go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman.  Should
you select the latter course, get the information to me as early
as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced.  At night the
cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our
infantry line extended to the Quaker Road, near its intersection
with the Boydton Plank Road.  The position of the troops from
left to right was as follows:  Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord,
Wright, Parke.</p>

<p>Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the
capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was
made.  I therefore addressed the following communication to
General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to
cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he
received notice from me to do so:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to
Dinwiddie.  We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the
Jerusalem Plank Road to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can
be used advantageously.  After getting into line south of
Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position.
General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker Road
intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing
about one hundred men.  Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was
pushing on when last heard from.</p>

<p>"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so,
before going back.  I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose
and go after the enemy's roads at present.  In the morning push
around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear.  The
movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your
action.  We will act all together as one army here, until it is
seen what can be done with the enemy.  The signal-officer at
Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a cavalry
column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,
taking forty minutes to pass.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain
fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled
vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them.
During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court House
towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in full force.
General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton
Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of getting
across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front
and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he
was, and fortify.  General Humphreys drove the enemy from his
front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills.
Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their
fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's
lines.  The two latter reported favorably.  The enemy confronting
us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I
conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated
if my estimate of his forces was correct.  I determined,
therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce
General Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him
to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the
other corps assault the enemy's lines.  The result of the
offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted
Fort Stedman, particularly favored this.  The enemy's
intrenched  picket-line captured by us at that time threw the
lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some
points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other.
Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys's
corps, to report to General Sheridan; but the condition of the
roads prevented immediate movement.  On the morning of the 31st,
General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the
White Oak Road, and was directed to do so.  To accomplish this,
he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which
was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on
the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn,
forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked.  A
division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the
enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the White
Oak Road gained.  Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his
cavalry got possession of the Five Forks; but the enemy, after
the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry,
defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards
Dinwiddie Court House.  Here General Sheridan displayed great
generalship.  Instead of retreating with his whole command on
the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered,
he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough
to take charge of the horses.  This compelled the enemy to
deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made
his progress slow.  At this juncture he dispatched to me what had
taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie
Court House.  General Mackenzie's cavalry and one division of
the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.  Soon
after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could
hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two
divisions of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so
ordered at once.  Thus the operations of the day necessitated
the sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of
Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended
movements.  On the morning of the 1st of April, General
Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on
Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried
his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and
between five and six thousand prisoners.</p>

<p>About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles
Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th
corps.  The report of this reached me after nightfall.  Some
apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his
lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan
before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position
and open the way for retreat.  To guard against this, General
Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,
and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in
the morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's
lines.  General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps,
sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's
Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners.  He was
closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command,
until he met the other division of General Ord's that had
succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's Run.
Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and
closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg,
while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and
joined General Wright on the left.  General Parke succeeded in
carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners,
but was unable to carry his inner line.  General Sheridan being
advised of the condition of affairs, returned General Miles to
his proper command.  On reaching the enemy's lines immediately
surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by
a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the
most salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materially
shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the
city.  The enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to
Sutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by Miles's
division.  A severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his
right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General
Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station towards Petersburg,
and a division sent by General Meade from the front of
Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in
our hands his guns and many prisoners.  This force retreated by
the main road along the Appomattox River.  During the night of
the 2d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and
retreated towards Danville.  On the morning of the 3d pursuit
was commenced.  General Sheridan pushed for the Danville Road,
keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the
2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville, along
the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along that road
behind him.  On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville
Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia
Court House.  He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the
arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day.
General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.</p>

<p>On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the
following communication:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:  All indications now are that Lee will attempt to
reach Danville with the remnant of his force.  Sheridan, who was
up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot,
and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized.  We hope to
reduce this number one-half.  I shall push on to Burkesville,
and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go
there.  If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are,
and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and
Johnston's armies.  Whether it will be better for you to strike
for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able
to judge when you receive this.  Rebel armies now are the only
strategic points to strike at.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was
moving west of Jetersville, towards Danville.  General Sheridan
moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to
General Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank,
followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed
hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and
several pieces of artillery.  General Ord advanced from
Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry
and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General
Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges.  This advance
met the head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically
attacked and detained until General Read was killed and his small
force overpowered.  This caused a delay in the enemy's movements,
and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his
force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched
himself.  In the afternoon, General Sheridan struck the enemy
south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery
and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th
corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was
made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand
prisoners, among whom were many general officers.  The movements
of the 2d corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly to
the day's success.</p>

<p>On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry,
except one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's
Court House; the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one
division of cavalry, on Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High
Bridge Road.  It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to
the north side of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit,
that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at High
Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately
crossed over.  The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed
at Farmville to its support.</p>

<p>Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly
hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from
Farmville:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"April 7, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of
Northern Virginia in this struggle.  I feel that it is so, and
regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of
any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of
that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of
Northern Virginia.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"GENERAL R. E. LEE."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at
Farmville the following:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"April 7, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:  I have received your note of this date.  Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of
further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia,
I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and
therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you
will offer on condition of its surrender.</p>

<p>"R. E. LEE, General.
<br><br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
To this I immediately replied:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"April 8, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same
date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender
of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received.  In reply, I
would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one
condition I would insist upon--namely, That the men and officers
surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again
against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged.  I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet
any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point
agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the
terms upon which the surrender of the Army of the Northern
Virginia will be received.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"GENERAL R. E. LEE."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General
Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan,
with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox
Station, followed by General Ord's command and the 5th corps.
During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fighting
with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general
engagement.  Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the
railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and
captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and
four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army.  During
this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight
received the following communication from General Lee:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
April 8, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day.  In
mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of
the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your
proposition.  To be frank, I do not think the emergency has
arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the
restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired
to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.  I cannot,
therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the
Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the
restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten
A.M. to-morrow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the
picket-lines of the two armies.</p>

<p>"R. E. LEE, General.
<br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as
follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the
Appomattox:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"April 9, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received.  I have no
authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed
for ten A.M. to-day could lead to no good.  I will state,
however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with
yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling.  The
terms upon which peace can be had are well understood.  By the
South laying down their arms they will hasten that most
desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of
millions of property not yet destroyed.  Seriously hoping that
all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another
life, I subscribe myself, etc.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"GENERAL R. E. LEE."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th
corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a
desperate effort to break through our cavalry.  The infantry was
at once thrown in.  Soon after a white flag was received,
requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for
a surrender.</p>

<p>Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the
following from General Lee:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
"April 9, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on the
picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain
definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of
yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army.  I now
ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your
letter of yesterday, for that purpose.</p>

<p>"R. E. LEE, General.
<br><br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of
which is set forth in the following correspondence:</p>

<blockquote><blockquote>
<p>
APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:  In accordance with the substance of my letter to you
of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the
Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit:  Rolls
of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to
be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be
retained by such officer or officers as you may designate.  The
officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms
against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like
parole for the men of their commands.  The arms, artillery, and
public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the
officers appointed by me to receive them.  This will not embrace
the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or
baggage.  This done, each officer and man will be allowed to
return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States
authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in
force where they may reside.</p>

<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
<br><br>"GENERAL R. E. LEE."</p>


<br><br><br><br>


<p>
"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.</p>

<p>"GENERAL:  I have received your letter of this date containing
the terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as
proposed by you.  As they are substantially the same as those
expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are
accepted.  I will proceed to designate the proper officers to
carry the stipulations into effect.</p>

<p>"R. E. LEE, General.
<br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."</p>
</blockquote></blockquote>

<p>
The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under
Griffin, and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at
Appomattox Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered
army was completed, and to take charge of the public property.
The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity
of Burkesville.</p>

<p>General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused
his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the
armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring
peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance
officers.</p>

<p>On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved
directly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and
through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the
morning of the 13th.  The day preceding, news of the surrender
of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.</p>

<p>On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman
and General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement
for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for
peace, subject to the approval of the President.  This agreement
was disapproved by the President on the 21st, which disapproval,
together with your instructions, was communicated to General
Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh,
North Carolina, in obedience to your orders.  Notice was at once
given by him to General Johnston for the termination of the truce
that had been entered into.  On the 25th another meeting between
them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which
terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army
upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.</p>

<p>The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got
off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North
Carolina, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg,
and Big Lick.  The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to
within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important
bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it
between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro',
on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and destroyed
the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between
Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies
along it, and captured four hundred prisoners.  At Salisbury he
attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under General
Gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one
thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed
large amounts of army stores.  At this place he destroyed
fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.
Thence he moved to Slatersville.</p>

<p>General Canby, who had been directed in January to make
preparations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and
the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of
March.  The 16th corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding,
moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River; the 13th corps,
under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and
joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving thence on
Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General
Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading
from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and
partially invested Fort Blakely.  After a severe bombardment of
Spanish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of
April.  During the night the enemy evacuated the fort.  Fort
Blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners
captured; our loss was considerable.  These successes
practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to
approach Mobile from the north.  On the night of the 11th the
city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on
the morning of the 12th.</p>

<p>The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson,
consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was
delayed by rains until March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw,
Alabama.  On the 1st of April, General Wilson encountered the
enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove him in
confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and
destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba River.  On the 2d
he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended
by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,
destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops,
vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand
prisoners.  On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa.  On
the 10th he crossed the Alabama River, and after sending
information of his operations to General Canby, marched on
Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy
having abandoned it.  At this place many stores and five
steamboats fell into our hands.  Thence a force marched direct
on Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places
were assaulted and captured on the 16th.  At the former place we
got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns,
destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many
factories, and much other public property.  At the latter place
we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed
nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars.  On the 20th he
took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one
thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by
General Howell Cobb.  General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis
was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and
succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11th.</p>

<p>On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to
General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the
Mississippi.</p>

<p>A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy
under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put
in motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for
its immediate command; but on the 26th day of May, and before
they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered
his entire command to Major-General Canby.  This surrender did
not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel
President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of
first disbanding most of his army and permitting an
indiscriminate plunder of public property.</p>

<p>Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against
the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico,
carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the United
States, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them
some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the
disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for
troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.</p>

<p>There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and
movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most
of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which
contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not
mentioned.  Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the
reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief
dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have
not as yet been officially reported.</p>

<p>For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would
respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of
departments in which they have occurred.</p>

<p>It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and
the East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there
is no difference in their fighting qualities.  All that it was
possible for men to do in battle they have done.  The Western
armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, and
received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal
army opposed to them in North Carolina.  The armies of the East
commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the
Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of
their old antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia.  The
splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories
removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately
experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and
recrimination that might have followed had either section failed
in its duty.  All have a proud record, and all sections can well
congratulate themselves and each other for having done their
full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of
territory belonging to the United States.  Let them hope for
perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood,
however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of
valor.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;I have the honor to be,
<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;U. S. GRANT,
<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Lieutenant-General.</p>

<p>THE END</p>


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<center><h2>FOOTNOTE</h2>
</center>
<center><h3>ORGANIZATION CHARTS--UNION AND CONFEDERATE</h3>
</center>

<blockquote>
<pre>
UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

[COMPILED.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.


MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.
          First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.
          Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.
          Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.
          Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.
          Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

     Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

     Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.
          First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.
          Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.

          Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.


MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.
          Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.
          First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.
          Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.
          First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.
          Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

     Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.
          Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.
          Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

          Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.


MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.
          First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.
          Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.
          Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.
          Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.
          Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

          Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins


MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.
          Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.
          Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.
          Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.
          First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.
          Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.


MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.
          First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.
          Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.
          First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.
          Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.
          First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.
          Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.

     Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.
          First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.
          Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.

          Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.


BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

     Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.
          First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.
          Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.
          First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.
          Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.
          Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.......
          Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.
          Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.





CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by
GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

    First Army Corps:  LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a)
     Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's      "
          "     Eppa Hunton's      "
          "     Wm. R. Terry's     "

MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b)
     Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade
           "    E. M. Law's (c)     "
           "    John Bratton's      "

MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d)
     Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade
           "    B. G. Humphreys'   "
           "    Goode Bryan's      "
           "    Kershaw's (Old)    "


    Second Army Corps:  MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e)
         "      John Pegram 's   "   (f)
         "      Gordon's         "   (g)
     Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's     "

MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON'S Division.
     Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)
     Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h)
         "      Geo H. Stewart's "  (h)
         "      L. A. Stafford's "  (e)

MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division.
     Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i)
         "      Geo. Dole's      "   (k)
         "      S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.
         "      C. A. Battle's   "
         "      R. D. Johnston's " (f)


    Third Army Corps:  LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l)
     Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade.
                Mahone's             "
     Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's       "  (m)
        "       A. R. Wright's       "
        "       Joseph Finegan's     "

MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n)
        "       James H. Lane's   "
        "       Sam'l McCowan's   "
        "       Alfred M. Scale's "

MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o)
     Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade.
        "       John R. Cooke's  "
        "       D. McRae's       "
        "       J. J. Archer's   "
        "       H. H. Walker's   "

           _unattached_:  5th Alabama Battalion.


  Cavalry Corps:  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE'S Division
     Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade
        "      L. L. Lomax's      "

MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade.
        "       P. M. B. Young's   "
        "       Thomas L. Rosser's "

MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade.
        "      J. R. Chambliss's    "


  Artillery Reserve:  BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER'S DIVISION.*
     Cabell's Battalion.
          Manly's Battery.
          1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.
          Carleton's Battery.
          Calloway's Battery.

     Haskell's Battalion.
          Branch's Battery.
          Nelson's    "
          Garden's    "
          Rowan       "

     Huger's Battalion.
          Smith's Battery.
          Moody      "
          Woolfolk   "
          Parker's   "
          Taylor's   "
          Fickling's "
          Martin's   "

     Gibb's Battalion.
          Davidson's Battery.
          Dickenson's   "
          Otey's        "


BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG'S DIVISION.

     Braxton's Battalion.
          Lee Battery.
          1st Md. Artillery.
          Stafford    "
          Alleghany   "

     Cutshaw's Battalion.
          Charlotteville Artillery.
          Staunton           "
          Courtney           "

     Carter's Battalion.
          Morris Artillery.
          Orange      "
          King William Artillery.
          Jeff Davis        "

    Nelson's Battalion.
          Amherst Artillery.
          Milledge     "
          Fluvauna     "

     Brown's Battalion.
          Powhatan Artillery.
          2d Richmond Howitzers.
          3d    "         "
          Rockbridge Artillery.
          Salem Flying Artillery.


COL R. L.WALKER'S DIVISION.

     Cutt's Battalion.
          Ross's Battery.
          Patterson's Battery.
          Irwin Artillery.

     Richardson's Battalion.
          Lewis Artillery.
          Donaldsonville Artillery.
          Norfolk Light       "
          Huger               "

     Mclntosh 's Battalion.
          Johnson's Battery.
          Hardaway Artillery.
          Danville      "
          2d Rockbridge Artillery.

     Pegram's Battalion.
          Peedee Artillery.
          Fredericksburg Artillery.
          Letcher             "
          Purcell Battery.
          Crenshaw's Battery.

     Poague's Battalion.
          Madison Artillery.
          Albemarle    "
          Brooke       "
          Charlotte    "


NOTE.
(a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at
above date.
(b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also
contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by
Colonel P. D. Bowles.
(d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not
indicated.

Organization of the Army of the Valley District.
(e) Constituting York's Brigade.
(f) In Ramseur's Division.
(g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and
containing 12th Georgia Battalion.
(h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's
Division.
(i) Grimes' Brigade.
(k) Cook's    "

(l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty;
name not indicated.
(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.
(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four
brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not
indicated.
(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's,
Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade.

*But one general officer reported present for duty in the
artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.

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