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diff --git a/old/mug6w10h.html b/old/mug6w10h.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4eb8103 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/mug6w10h.html @@ -0,0 +1,8293 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html> +<head> +<title>PERSONAL MEMOIRS U. S. GRANT</title> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> +<style type="text/css"> +<!-- +body {background:#faebd7; margin:10%; text-align:justify} +h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 {color:brown} +blockquote {font-size:"13pt"} +P {font-size:"14pt"} +--> +</style> +</head> +<body> + + +<h2>MEMOIRS OF GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Illustrated, V6</h2> +<pre> +The Project Gutenberg EBook Memoirs of General Grant, Illustrated, v6 +#9 in our series by Ulysses S. Grant + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**EBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These EBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers***** + + +Title: The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Illustrated, Volume 6. + +Author: Ulysses S. Grant + + +Release Date: June, 2004 [Etext #5865] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on September 15, 2002] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + + + + + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MEMOIRS OF GENERAL GRANT, V6 *** + + + + +This eBook was produced by David Widger [widger@cecomet.net] + +</pre> +<br><hr> +<br><br><br><br><br><br> + + +<center><h1>PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT</h1></center> + +<center><h3>by Ulysses S. Grant</h3></center> + +<br><br> + + <center><h3>Volume 6.</h3></center> + +<br><br> + +<center><img alt="bookcover.jpg (180K)" src="bookcover.jpg" height="918" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br><br><br> + +<center><img alt="spines.jpg (117K)" src="spines.jpg" height="1477" width="637"> +</center> +<br><br><br><br> + + +<center><img alt="titlepage.jpg (21K)" src="titlepage.jpg" height="977" width="617"> +</center> +<br><br><br><br> + + +<center><a name="dedication"></a><img alt="dedication.jpg (20K)" src="dedication.jpg" height="516" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br><br><br> + + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><h2>CONTENTS</h2></center> + +<center><h3>Volume 6.</h3></center> +<br> + +<blockquote> + +<p><a href="#ch62">CHAPTER LXII.</a> +SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY +ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND +THOMAS--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE +CAROLINAS.</p> + +<p><a href="#ch63">CHAPTER LXIII.</a> +ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE +COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE +PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE +PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE--THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK +ROAD.</p> + +<p><a href="#ch64">CHAPTER LXIV.</a> +INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE +POTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE +FORKS--PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE +PETERSBURG.</p> + +<p><a href="#ch65">CHAPTER LXV.</a> +THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN +PETERSBURG--THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT +TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.</p> + +<p><a href="#ch66">CHAPTER LXVI.</a> +BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT +FARMVILLE--CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS +THE ENEMY.</p> + +<p><a href="#ch67">CHAPTER LXVII.</a> +NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S +HOUSE--THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH +LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.</p> + +<p><a href="#ch68">CHAPTER LXVIII.</a> +MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND +SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT +WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT +JOHNSON'S POLICY.</p> + +<p><a href="#ch69">CHAPTER LXIX.</a> +SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE +OF MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON +DAVIS--GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.</p> + +<p><a href="#ch70">CHAPTER LXX.</a> +THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S +ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF +LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.</p> + +<p><a href="#conclusion">CONCLUSION</a></p> + +<p><a href="#appendix">APPENDIX</a></p> + + + + + + +</blockquote> +<br><br><br><br> + +<center><h2>MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS</h2></center> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +<a href="#b407">MAP OF SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH</a> +<a href="#b441">MAP OF PETERSBURG AND FIVE FORKS</a> +<a href="#b457">MAP OF THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN</a> +<a href="#b471">MAP OF JETERSVILLE AND SAILOR'S CREEK</a> +<a href="#b475">MAP OF HIGH BRIDGE AND FARMVILLE</a> +<a href="#b487">MAP OF APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE</a> + +<a href="#b489">ETCHING OF MCLEAN'S HOUSE AT APPOMATTOX WHERE + GENERAL LEE'S SURRENDER TOOK PLACE</a> + +<a href="#b497a">FAC-SIMILE OF THE ORIGINAL TERMS OF LEE'S SURRENDER + AS WRITTEN BY GENERAL GRANT</a> + +<a href="#b520">MAP OF THE DEFENCES OF THE CITY OF MOBILE</a> +<a href="#b632">MAP OF THE SEAT OF WAR-1861 TO 1865</a> + +</pre> +</blockquote> + + + + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="ch62"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXII.</h2></center> + +<center><h3>SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY +ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND +THOMAS--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE +CAROLINAS.</h3></center> +<br> + +<p>When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the +North, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to +see him. Among others who went was the Secretary of War, who +seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign. Mr. Draper, +the collector of customs of New York, who was with Mr. Stanton's +party, was put in charge of the public property that had been +abandoned and captured. Savannah was then turned over to +General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his +own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the +future. I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac +(General Barnard) with letters to General Sherman. He remained +some time with the general, and when he returned brought back +letters, one of which contained suggestions from Sherman as to +what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should +have started upon his march northward.</p> + +<p>I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea +originally of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or +even to North Carolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable +for anything except such an army as he had, and I should not have +thought of ordering such a move. I had, therefore, made +preparations to collect transports to carry Sherman and his army +around to the James River by water, and so informed him. On +receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for +the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect +the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north +through the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this; +for if successful, it promised every advantage. His march +through Georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of +transportation in that State, and had completely cut the enemy +off from all sources of supply to the west of it. If North and +South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for +feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison at +Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw +supplies, to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and, +although that section of the country was fertile, it was already +well exhausted of both forage and food. I approved Sherman's +suggestion therefore at once.</p> + +<p>The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load +the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long +distance. Sherman would now have to march through a country +furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been +operating in during his march to the sea. Besides, he was +confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly +superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous +march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now +become of such vast importance to the very existence of the +Confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be +expected in order to save it.</p> + +<p>Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to +start with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who +commanded that part of the navy on the South Carolina and +Georgia coast, and General Foster, commanding the troops, to +take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he +(Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of Charleston.</p> + +<p>This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea +coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop +his onward progress. He also wrote me a letter, making +suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of +his movement farther north. This letter was brought to City +Point by General Barnard at a time when I happened to be going +to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of January. I +cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate with +Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than +by giving my reply to this letter.</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., +<br>Jan. 21, 1865.</p> + +<p>MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, +<br>Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.</p> + +<p>GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received +at City Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me, +however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you +on all points of recommendation. As I arrived here at one P.M., +and must leave at six P.M., having in the meantime spent over +three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I must be +brief. Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign +into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, +Md., with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will reach the +seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as +railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The +corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was induced to do +this because I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off +before spring. His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness +that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your +campaigns. The command of the advance of the pursuit was left +to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind. When Hood +had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, +Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from +whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He +is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, +but he is not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops +fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. This report and +a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use +his surplus troops elsewhere.</p> + +<p>Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to +Selma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to +know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes +he would select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been +ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, +towards Montgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move from +the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to +Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will have a moving +column of twenty thousand men.</p> + +<p>Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force +there of eight thousand effective. At New Bern about half the +number. It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also +has fallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the +17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort +Caswell, and that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.</p> + +<p>If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he +will be sent to New Bern. In either event, all the surplus +forces at the two points will move to the interior toward +Goldsboro' in co-operation with your movements. From either +point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here +abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads.</p> + +<p>There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army +south. Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, +if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort +Fisher having overtaken about two thousand.</p> + +<p>All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in +communication with them. They will be so instructed. From +about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much +more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, +should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps +of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the +troops about Richmond.</p> + +<p>To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the +Gulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it +doubtful. A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will +co-operate with you from New Bern or Wilmington, or both. You +can call for reinforcements.</p> + +<p>This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will +return with any message you may have for me. If there is +anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on +ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me +know it.</p> + +<p>Yours truly, +<br>U. S. GRANT, +<br>Lieut.-General.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving +him the news of the battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at +the result, although, like myself, he had been very much +disappointed at Thomas for permitting Hood to cross the +Tennessee River and nearly the whole State of Tennessee, and +come to Nashville to be attacked there. He, however, as I had +done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.</p> + +<p>On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to +Sherman and his army passed by Congress were approved.</p> + +<p>Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up, +commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from +the river, and taking up all obstructions. He had then +intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small +garrison. By the middle of January all his work was done, +except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement +with.</p> + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="b407"></a><img alt="b407.jpg (149K)" src="b407.jpg" height="388" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<center><a href="b407.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center> +<br><br> + +<p>He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going +along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads +farther east, threatening Charleston. He commenced the advance +by moving his right wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to +Pocotaligo by water. This column, in moving north, threatened +Charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that +they would have a force visit Charleston. South Carolina had +done so much to prepare the public mind of the South for +secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision +of the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, +that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and +also largely entertained by people of the South, that the State +of South Carolina, and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in +particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them. In fact, +nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the +radical portion of the people from condemning the movement, +because Charleston had been left out. To pass into the interior +would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its +possession by the navy and Foster's troops. It is so situated +between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have +held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold +out. Sherman therefore passed it by.</p> + +<p>By the first of February all preparations were completed for the +final march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective; +Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or +neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be +determined upon. The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the +left from about Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns +taking a pretty direct route for Columbia. The cavalry, +however, were to threaten Charleston on the right, and Augusta +on the left.</p> + +<p>On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which +Sherman had received before starting out on his march. We +already had New Bern and had soon Wilmington, whose fall +followed that of Fort Fisher; as did other points on the sea +coast, where the National troops were now in readiness to +co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had passed +Fayetteville.</p> + +<p>On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New +Orleans, to move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, +for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc. On the +8th of February I ordered Sheridan, who was in the Valley of +Virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit +and strike the canal west of Richmond at or about Lynchburg; and +on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as soon as the +roads would permit, saying: "As soon as it is possible to +travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching +Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could +destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be +of no further use to the rebellion. * * * This additional raid, +with one starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering +about four or five thousand cavalry; one from Eastport, +Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile Bay, with +about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter pushing +for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a large +army eating out the vitals of South Carolina--is all that will +be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I +would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish +this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last."</p> + +<p>On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had +received his orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was +extremely anxious to hear of his being in Alabama. I notified +him, also, that I had sent Grierson to take command of his +cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. I further suggested +that Forrest was probably in Mississippi, and if he was there, he +would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it +would be difficult to get by. I still further informed him that +Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into Mississippi +on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter. This +force did not get off however.</p> + +<p>All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's +march, the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the +West from leaving there. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be +got off in time. I had some time before depleted Thomas's army +to reinforce Canby, for the reason that Thomas had failed to +start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and +to have the troops where they might do something. Canby seemed +to be equally deliberate in all of his movements. I ordered him +to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under +another officer. General Granger had got down to New Orleans, +in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put him +in command of troops. In spite of this he asked the War +Department to assign Granger to the command of a corps.</p> + +<p>Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the +cause in that quarter, I said to Canby: "I am in receipt of a +dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for +a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of +railroad. I have directed that none be sent. Thomas's army has +been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where +they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the +enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea of repairing +railroads, it could have been done much better from the North, +where we already had the troops. I expected your movements to +be co-operative with Sherman's last. This has now entirely +failed. I wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly +and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine +shops, etc., not to build them. Take Mobile and hold it, and +push your forces to the interior--to Montgomery and to Selma. +Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for +carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such +positions as can be supplied by water. By this means alone you +can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the +interior can be kept broken."</p> + +<p>Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to +render any service in the direction for which they were designed.</p> + +<p>The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's +troops and Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand +men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as +I was sure would be the case, to retard Sherman's movements. +Everything possible was being done to raise troops in the +South. Lee dispatched against Sherman the troops which had been +sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including those of the other +defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after +deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to +fourteen thousand men. After Thomas's victory at Nashville what +remained, of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as +rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; +and, finally, General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest +commanders of the South though not in favor with the +administration (or at least with Mr. Davis), was put in command +of all the troops in North and South Carolina.</p> + +<p>Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January, +but before sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him +down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as I could give +fuller directions after being on the ground than I could very +well have given without. We soon returned, and the troops were +sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both New Bern and Wilmington +are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite at +Goldsboro. Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the +mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to +secure the Wilmington and Charlotteville Railroad. This column +took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross +over to the island south of the city of Wilmington. A large +body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them. They +succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of February. I took the +precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in case he should be +forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching North +Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was +liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected +march. I also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a +great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in +Virginia. The gauge of the North Carolina railroads being the +same as the Virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars +and locomotives were ready for use there without any change.</p> + +<p>On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to +Thomas to move south to Alabama and Georgia. (I had previously +reduced his force by sending a portion of it to Terry.) I +directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send Stoneman +through East Tennessee, and push him well down toward Columbia, +South Carolina, in support of Sherman. Thomas did not get +Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I had supposed +he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of his being +in Louisville, Kentucky. I immediately changed the order, and +directed Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however, +on the 12th of March, he did push down through the north-western +end of South Carolina, creating some consternation. I also +ordered Thomas to send the 4th corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and +to destroy no more roads east of that. I also directed him to +concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with a view to a probable +movement of his army through that way toward Lynchburg.</p> + +<p>Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah. +Sherman's march was without much incident until he entered +Columbia, on the 17th of February. He was detained in his +progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild +the bridges. There was constant skirmishing and fighting between +the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the +advance of the infantry. Four days, also, were lost in making +complete the destruction of the most important railroads south +of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, +and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. A +formidable river had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in +the face of a small garrison under General Wade Hampton. There +was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high +water in the stream. Hampton left as Sherman approached, and +the city was found to be on fire.</p> + +<p>There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in +discussions of the question as to who set Columbia on fire. +Sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and Hampton denies +it on the part of the Confederates. One thing is certain: as +soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to +extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the +limited means at hand. In any case, the example set by the +Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg, Pa., a town +which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act +of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible +for the conflict then raging, not imperative.</p> + +<p>The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took +possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the +National forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making +terms for the protection of property, etc. Sherman paid no +attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took +the town without making any conditions whatever with its +citizens. He then, however, co-operated with the mayor in +extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were +rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. When he +left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to +be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some +arrangement could be made for their future supplies. He +remained in Columbia until the roads, public buildings, +workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were +destroyed. While at Columbia, Sherman learned for the first +time that what remained of Hood's army was confronting him, +under the command of General Beauregard.</p> + +<p>Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster +garrisoned the place. Wilmington was captured on the 22d. +Columbia and Cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure +from invasion that the wealthy people of Charleston and Augusta +had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to +be stored. Among the goods sent there were valuable carpets, +tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture. I am afraid +much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops. There +was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery, +small-arms and fixed ammunition. These, of course were among +the articles destroyed. While here, Sherman also learned of +Johnston's restoration to command. The latter was given, as +already stated, all troops in North and South Carolina. After +the completion of the destruction of public property about +Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his march and reached Cheraw +without any special opposition and without incident to relate. +The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the +way. Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, on +the 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced +straight for Fayetteville. Hardee and Hampton were there, and +barely escaped. Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of +March. He had dispatched scouts from Cheraw with letters to +General Terry, at Wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with +some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he +enumerated. The scouts got through successfully, and a boat was +sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman had asked +as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, those +stores did not contain clothing.</p> + +<p>Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for +Goldsboro. The march, now, had to be made with great caution, +for he was approaching Lee's army and nearing the country that +still remained open to the enemy. Besides, he was confronting +all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that +point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what +remained of Hood's army. Frantic appeals were made to the +people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe. I +presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all over 35,000 +or 40,000 men. The people had grown tired of the war, and +desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous +than the voluntary accessions.</p> + +<p>There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between +Johnston's troops and Sherman's, with some loss; and at +Bentonville on the 19th and 21st of March, but Johnston withdrew +from the contest before the morning of the 22d. Sherman's loss +in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was +about sixteen hundred. Sherman's troops at last reached +Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and +there his men were destined to have a long rest. Schofield was +there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to +Wilmington.</p> + +<p>Sherman was no longer in danger. He had Johnston confronting +him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers +and morale. He had Lee to the north of him with a force largely +superior; but I was holding Lee with a still greater force, and +had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce Johnston, +Sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from Schofield and +Terry, would have been able to hold the Confederates at bay for +an indefinite period. He was near the sea-shore with his back +to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. He had a railroad to +both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughly +protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country +and deepen as they approach the sea. Then, too, Sherman knew +that if Lee should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and +Johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted +to make a stand. With the loss of their capital, it is doubtful +whether Lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it +reached North Carolina. Johnston's army was demoralized by +constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive +movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on +duty. The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like +their brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man +is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as +to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter +how just he deems it.</p> + + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="ch63"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXIII.</h2></center> + +<center><h3>ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE +COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE +PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE +PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE--THE LINE OF BATTLE OF +WHITE OAK ROAD.</h3></center> +<br> + +<p>On the last of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the +so-called Confederate States presented themselves on our lines +around Petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my +headquarters at City Point. They proved to be Alexander H. +Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, Judge Campbell, +Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunt, formerly United +States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate.</p> + +<p>It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at +once conducted them to the steam Mary Martin, a Hudson River +boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of +passengers. I at once communicated by telegraph with Washington +and informed the Secretary of War and the President of the +arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to +negotiate terms of peace between he United States and, as they +termed it, the Confederate Government. I was instructed to +retain them at City Point, until the President, or some one whom +he would designate, should come to meet them. They remained +several days as guests on board the boat. I saw them quite +frequently, though I have no recollection of having had any +conversation whatever with them on the subject of their +mission. It was something I had nothing to do with, and I +therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. For +my own part I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, +that they were the representatives of a GOVERNMENT. There had +been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything +of the kind. As long as they remained there, however, our +relations were pleasant and I found them all very agreeable +gentlemen. I directed the captain to furnish them with the best +the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every +way possible. No guard was placed over them and no restriction +was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked +that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them. They +were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did +so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters.</p> + +<p>I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but +knew them well by reputation and through their public services, +and I had been a particular admirer of Mr. Stephens. I had +always supposed that he was a very small man, but when I saw him +in the dusk of the evening I was very much surprised to find so +large a man as he seemed to be. When he got down on to the boat +I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a +manufacture that had been introduced into the South during the +rebellion. The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I +had ever seen, even in Canada. The overcoat extended nearly to +his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of +being an average-sized man. He took this off when he reached +the cabin of the boat, and I was struck with the apparent change +in size, in the coat and out of it.</p> + +<p>After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a +dispatch from Washington, directing me to send the commissioners +to Hampton Roads to meet the President and a member of the +cabinet. Mr. Lincoln met them there and had an interview of +short duration. It was not a great while after they met that +the President visited me at City Point. He spoke of his having +met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there +would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they +would recognize, first: that the Union as a whole must be +forever preserved, and second: that slavery must be abolished. +If they were willing to concede these two points, then he was +ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand +them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them +to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us +in the Union and be one people. He always showed a generous and +kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I never heard him +abuse an enemy. Some of the cruel things said about President +Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to the +heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful +disposition and I saw a great deal of him at City Point, for he +seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the +capital.</p> + +<p>Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln. It was on +the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the +peace commissioners at Hampton Roads. After a little +conversation, he asked me if I had seen that overcoat of +Stephens's. I replied that I had. "Well," said he, "did you +see him take it off?" I said yes. "Well," said he, "didn't you +think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you +did see?" Long afterwards I told this story to the Confederate +General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate. He +repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens +laughed immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln.</p> + +<p>The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace +commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for +two or three little incidents. On one occasion during this +period, while I was visiting Washington City for the purpose of +conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under +General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to +the south, got in east of us. Before their presence was known, +they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were +grazing in that section. It was a fair capture, and they were +sufficiently needed by the Confederates. It was only +retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a +time, when out of supplies taking what the Confederate army +otherwise would have gotten. As appears in this book, on one +single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which +were crossing the Mississippi River near Port Hudson on their +way from Texas to supply the Confederate army in the East.</p> + +<p>One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the +rebellion was the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that +the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would +try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I +was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to +hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket +line. He had his railroad by the way of Danville south, and I +was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and +ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him +for his immediate defence. I knew he could move much more +lightly and more rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start, +he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to +fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another +year.</p> + +<p>I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it +was possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where +they were. There is no doubt that Richmond would have been +evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it +was the capital of the so-called Confederacy, and the fact of +evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very +demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army. When it was +evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy at once +began to crumble and fade away. Then, too, desertions were +taking place, not only among those who were with General Lee in +the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole +Confederacy. I remember that in a conversation with me on one +occasion long prior to this, General Butler remarked that the +Confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for +their army; possibly adding, though I am not certain as to this, +"unless they should arm the slave."</p> + +<p>The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied +man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they +had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from +fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men +from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves. The +latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate +danger, and especially those in the rear. General Butler, in +alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus +"robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which I +afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.</p> + +<p>It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits +they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout +the entire army, by desertions alone. Then by casualties of +war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much +heavier. It was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how +long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going +on. Of course long before their army would be thus reduced to +nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able +to capture theirs. Then too I knew from the great number of +desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly +and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as +earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which +they were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent. Many of +them were making application to be sent North where they might +get employment until the war was over, when they could return to +their Southern homes.</p> + +<p>For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for +the time to come when I could commence the spring campaign, +which I thoroughly believed would close the war.</p> + +<p>There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and +which detained me. One was the fact that the winter had been +one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery +and teams. It was necessary to wait until they had dried +sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery +necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's +country. The other consideration was that General Sheridan with +the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was operating on the north +side of the James River, having come down from the Shenandoah. It +was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me, and I was +therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the +James River.</p> + +<p>Let us now take account of what he was doing.</p> + +<p>On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan. He had met Early +between Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing +nearly his entire command. Early and some of his officers +escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the +woods.</p> + +<p>On the 12th I heard from him again. He had turned east, to come +to White House. He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because +the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very +much swollen. He had a pontoon train with him, but it would not +reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of +water, which he would have to get over in going south as first +ordered.</p> + +<p>I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the +depot there open until he arrived. We had intended to abandon +it because the James River had now become our base of supplies.</p> + +<p>Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into +two divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin. +General Merritt was acting as chief of cavalry. Sheridan moved +very light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a +larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very +little else besides ammunition. They stopped at Charlottesville +and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward Lynchburg. He +also sent a division along the James River Canal to destroy +locks, culverts etc. All mills and factories along the lines of +march of his troops were destroyed also.</p> + +<p>Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a +march to White House was now somewhat hazardous. He determined +therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he +was as near to Richmond as it was possible to get, or until +attacked. He did this, destroying the canal as far as +Goochland, and the railroad to a point as near Richmond as he +could get. On the 10th he was at Columbia. Negroes had joined +his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they +assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads +and the canal. His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when +he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage. +He had captured most of Early's horses and picked up a good many +others on the road. When he reached Ashland he was assailed by +the enemy in force. He resisted their assault with part of his +command, moved quickly across the South and North Anna, going +north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.</p> + +<p>The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to +the time he could get away from Goldsboro where he then was. +Supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a +long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained +in the country through which he would pass. I had to arrange, +therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the +neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, the earliest day +at which he supposed he could be ready.</p> + +<p>Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he +could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined +to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing +so. I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any +time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who was on his +way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both +his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the +execution of the plans which I had in mind. However, having +arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to +make my plans.</p> + +<p>Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night +before I was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into +North Carolina to join with Johnston in attempting to crush out +Sherman, I had, as early as the 1st of the month of March, given +instructions to the troops around Petersburg to keep a sharp +lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their +notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken.</p> + +<p>It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and +General Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in +and about and Petersburg, and they both agreed places were no +longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as +possible. They, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition +of the roads which would make it possible to move.</p> + +<p>General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider +opening to enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater +security than he would have in the way the two armies were +situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines +around Petersburg. The night of the 24th of March was fixed upon +for this assault, and General Gordon was assigned to the +execution of the plan. The point between Fort Stedman and +Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was +selected as the point of his attack. The attack was to be made +at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher +ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments, +then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of +our army, and force me to contract my lines. Lee hoped this +would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of +escape. The plan was well conceived and the execution of it very +well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our +line.</p> + +<p>Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the +point at which they were to make their charge, and got +possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of +the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced +the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than +fifty yards. For some time before the deserters had been coming +in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and +this the Confederate general knew. Taking advantage of this +knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through +to ours as if to desert. When they got to our lines they at once +took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In +the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great +security. This plan was to have been executed and much damage +done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce +Gordon had to be brought from the north side of the James River +and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they +were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be +nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.</p> + +<p>The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the +enemy passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery +No. 10. Then turning to the right and left they captured the +fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them. +Continuing the charge, they also carried batteries Eleven and +Twelve to our left, which they turned toward City Point.</p> + +<p>Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in +his line cut him off from all communication with his +headquarters. Parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when +this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to Meade's +headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed +command himself and with commendable promptitude made all +preparations to drive the enemy back. General Tidball gathered +a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear +of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground +between the lines very thoroughly. Hartranft was soon out with +his division, as also was Willcox. Hartranft to the right of +the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly +drove them back into Fort Stedman. On the other side they were +driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and +batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by Willcox early in the +morning.</p> + +<p>Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and +batteries, and communication was once more established. The +artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was +impossible for the Confederates to retreat, and equally +impossible for reinforcements to join them. They all, +therefore, fell captives into our hands. This effort of Lee's +cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing, +wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.</p> + +<p>After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates, +our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched +picket line, which they strengthened and held. This, in turn, +gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came +to be made a few days later.</p> + +<p>The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack +(24th of March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence +on the 29th. Ord, with three divisions of infantry and +Mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the +27th, from the north side of the James River and take his place +on our extreme left, thirty miles away. He left Weitzel with +the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda Hundred and +the north of the James River. The engineer brigade was to be +left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about +Petersburg. [See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan, +March 24th, Appendix.]</p> + +<p>Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then +on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. They were +directed on the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position +in their places, to cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west +toward Five Forks, the object being to get into a position from +which we could strike the South Side Railroad and ultimately the +Danville Railroad. There was considerable fighting in taking up +these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the Army +of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses +were quite severe.</p> + +<p>This was what was known as the Battle of White Oak Road.</p> + + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="ch64"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXIV.</h2></center> + +<center><h3>INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE +POTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE +FORKS--PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE +PETERSBURG.</h3></center> +<br> + +<p>Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March. His +horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their +shoes. A few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the +animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for +moving. Immediately on General Sheridan's arrival at City Point +I prepared his instructions for the move which I had decided +upon. The movement was to commence on the 29th of the month.</p> + +<p>After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked +out of my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with +him by himself--not in the presence of anybody else, even of a +member of my staff. In preparing his instructions I +contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing +Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and Richmond and +terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. But +the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at the +prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never +terminate except by compromise. Knowing that unless my plan +proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous +defeat, I provided in these instructions that in a certain event +he was to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and his base of +supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of +the Danville Railroad, or near it, across the Roanoke, get in the +rear of Johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with +Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these combined forces +to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already had +received, to act in cooperation with the armies around +Petersburg and Richmond.</p> + +<p>I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed +somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut +loose again from the Army of the Potomac, and place himself +between the two main armies of the enemy. I said to him: +"General, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely +as a blind;" and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore +described. I told him that, as a matter of fact, I intended to +close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should +go no farther. His face at once brightened up, and slapping his +hand on his leg he said: "I am glad to hear it, and we can do +it."</p> + +<p>Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks +until he got further instructions from me.</p> + +<p>One day, after the movement I am about to describe had +commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far +to the rear, south, Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters +were then established, at Dabney's Mills. He met some of my +staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the +prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would +prove the final and successful effort. Although my +chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our +position about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he +asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had +been saying to them. Sheridan felt a little modest about giving +his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came +in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered important +news, and suggested that I send for him. I did so, and was glad +to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. Knowing +as I did from experience, of what great value that feeling of +confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a movement +at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after +I had started out the roads were still very heavy. Orders were +given accordingly.</p> + +<p>Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having +been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was +dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could +move. On that date I moved out with all the army available +after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about +Petersburg. It soon set in raining again however, and in a very +short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and +almost so for cavalry. Sometimes a horse or mule would be +standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot +would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all +his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of +the quicksands so common in that part of Virginia and other +southern States. It became necessary therefore to build +corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our +artillery upon. The army had become so accustomed to this kind +of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very +rapidly. The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient +progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan +with his cavalry over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then +come up by the road leading north-west to Five Forks, thus +menacing the right of Lee's line.</p> + +<p>This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to +the west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, +or Five Forks. The column moving detached from the army still in +the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces +in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank. +Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but +Humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between +him and Five Forks.</p> + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="b441"></a><img alt="b441.jpg (171K)" src="b441.jpg" height="394" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<center><a href="b441.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center> +<br><br> + +<p>My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get +on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken +their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the +centre might be successfully made. General Wright's corps had +been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order +as soon as information reached me of Sheridan's success. He was +to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get.</p> + +<p>It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to +be to get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville +Railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on +the 29th. These roads were so important to his very existence +while he remained in Richmond and Petersburg, and of such vital +importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he +would make most strenuous efforts to defend them. He did on the +30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks. He +also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other +divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in +readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on +call. He came over himself to superintend in person the defence +of his right flank.</p> + +<p>Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the +30th, and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks. He +had only his cavalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel +cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. He gradually drove +them back however until in the neighborhood of Five Forks. Here +he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been +contending with, and was forced to give way.</p> + +<p>In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken +place and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie +gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to his +assistance. I replied to him that it was impossible to send +Wright's corps because that corps was already in line close up +to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper +time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d +(Humphreys's) and 5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left +and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the +left flank of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send +Warren.</p> + +<p>Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that +night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in +communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to +him. He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not +starting until after 5 o'clock next morning. When he did move +it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run +he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he +regarded it as not fordable. Sheridan of course knew of his +coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as +possible, sent orders to him to hasten. He was also hastened or +at least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade. He now +felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his +orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in +flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that +Sheridan determined to move forward without him. However, +Ayres's division of Warren's corps reached him in time to be in +the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder +of the 5th corps and fighting directly under Sheridan.</p> + +<p>Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the +whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until +late in the afternoon. Griffin's division in backing to get out +of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching +away from the fighting. This did not continue long, however; the +division was brought back and with Ayres's division did most +excellent service during the day. Crawford's division of the +same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders +were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it +finally got to where it could be of material assistance. Once +there it did very excellent service.</p> + +<p>Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little +later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his +designed assault upon Five Forks itself. He was very impatient +to make the assault and have it all over before night, because +the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac +during the night. Unless the assault was made and was +successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie +Court-House, or even further than that for the night.</p> + +<p>It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get +Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent +staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing +that general to report to him, but they were unable to find +him. At all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer to +him. Finally he went himself. He issued an order relieving +Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the 5th corps. +The troops were then brought up and the assault successfully +made.</p> + +<p>I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory movements in +the battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach +Sheridan in time, that I was very much afraid that at the last +moment he would fail Sheridan. He was a man of fine +intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could +make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under +difficulties where he was forced to act. But I had before +discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very +prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just +before us. He could see every danger at a glance before he had +encountered it. He would not only make preparations to meet the +danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding +officer what others should do while he was executing his move.</p> + +<p>I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his +attention to these defects, and to say that as much as I liked +General Warren, now was not a time when we could let our +personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and +if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate. It +was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed Warren. I was +very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that I +had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field +of duty.</p> + +<p>It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the +parapets of the enemy. The two armies were mingled together +there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question +which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. Soon, +however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six +thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large +quantities, falling into our hands. The flying troops were +pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under +Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.</p> + +<p>This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when +Sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of +the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned, +sending the 5th corps across Hatcher's Run to just south-west of +Petersburg, and facing them toward it. Merritt, with the +cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of Five Forks.</p> + +<p>This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the +1st of April. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and +Parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. I also ordered +the 2d corps, General Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army +of the James, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to +take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their +front.</p> + +<p>I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day; +in fact I had reported to him during the day and evening as I +got news, because he was so much interested in the movements +taking place that I wanted to relieve his mind as much as I +could. I notified Weitzel on the north side of the James River, +directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take +advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly +enter the city of Richmond.</p> + +<p>I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks +as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate +effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a +single die. It was for this reason that I had ordered the +assault to take place at once, as soon as I had received the +news of the capture of Five Forks. The corps commanders, +however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see +to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. But +we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the +whole line including that north of the James River, until it was +light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the +morning.</p> + +<p>At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved out as directed, +brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a +heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching +directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves +inside of the enemy's line. Parke, who was on the right, swept +down to the right and captured a very considerable length of +line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near +the inner line which closely enveloped the city of Petersburg +that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very +serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the +defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in +this.</p> + +<p>Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run, +sweeping everything before him. The enemy had traverses in rear +of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a +stand, from one to another, as Wright moved on; but the latter +met no serious obstacle. As you proceed to the left the outer +line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and +along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearly two miles apart. +Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of +artillery and some prisoners--Wright about three thousand of +them.</p> + +<p>In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the +instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or +very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched +picket-lines in their front; and before Wright got up to that +point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's +intrenchments. The second corps soon followed; and the outer +works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops, +never to be wrenched from them again. When Wright reached +Hatcher's Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side +Railroad just outside of the city.</p> + +<p>My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills. As soon as I +received the news of Wright's success, I sent dispatches +announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the +troops at Bermuda Hundred and those on the north side of the +James, and to the President at City Point. Further dispatches +kept coming in, and as they did I sent the additional news to +these points. Finding at length that they were all in, I +mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. +When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as +Wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out. I was soon +joined inside by General Meade and his staff.</p> + +<p>Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost +ground. Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but +repulsed every effort. Before noon Longstreet was ordered up +from the north side of the James River thus bringing the bulk of +Lee's army around to the support of his extreme right. As soon +as I learned this I notified Weitzel and directed him to keep up +close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda +Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break +to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for this would +separate Richmond and Petersburg.</p> + +<p>Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to +Petersburg, coming in on our left. This gave us a continuous +line from the Appomattox River below the city to the same river +above. At eleven o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I +reinforced Parke with two brigades from City Point. With this +additional force he completed his captured works for better +defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his +flank. He also carried in and made an abatis between himself +and the enemy. Lee brought additional troops and artillery +against Parke even after this was done, and made several +assaults with very heavy losses.</p> + +<p>The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to +Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and +Fort Whitworth. We thought it had now become necessary to carry +them by assault. About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was +assaulted by Foster's division of the 24th corps (Gibbon's), +supported by two brigades from Ord's command. The battle was +desperate and the National troops were repulsed several times; +but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in Fort +Whitworth evacuated the place. The guns of Fort Gregg were +turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer +with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.</p> + +<p>I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan. In +moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the +intersection of the White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road. The +enemy fell back to Sutherland Station on the South Side Road and +were followed by Miles. This position, naturally a strong and +defensible one, was also strongly intrenched. Sheridan now came +up and Miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which +Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys had got through the outer +works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over +Miles, who commanded a division in his corps. I had sent an +order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards +Petersburg. This order he now got, and started off, thus +leaving Miles alone. The latter made two assaults, both of +which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards.</p> + +<p>Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed +Humphreys to send a division back to his relief. He went +himself.</p> + +<p>Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent +Merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate +cavalry that had assembled there. Merritt drove them north to +the Appomattox River. Sheridan then took the enemy at +Sutherland Station on the reverse side from where Miles was, and +the two together captured the place, with a large number of +prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder, +portions of three Confederate corps, to flight. Sheridan +followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was +stopped. Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he +with Sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault. I cannot +explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to +City Point that evening:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG, +<br>April 2, 1865.--4.40 P.M.</p> + +<p>COLONEL T. S. BOWERS, +<br>City Point.</p> + +<p>We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few +hours will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to +the river above. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such part of +them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either +designedly on their part or because they could not help it. +Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them. Miles's +division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak Road to +Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met +them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not knowing +whether Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was +sent with another division from here. The whole captures since +the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve +thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. I do not +know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * * I +think the President might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow.</p> + +<p>U. S. GRANT, +<br>Lieutenant-General.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the +river above to the river below. I ordered a bombardment to be +commenced the next morning at five A.M., to be followed by an +assault at six o'clock; but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early +in the morning.</p> + + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="ch65"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXV.</h2></center> + +<center><h3>THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN +PETERSBURG--THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY-- +VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.</h3></center> +<br> + +<p>General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d +and took a position under cover of a house which protected us +from the enemy's musketry which was flying thick and fast +there. As we would occasionally look around the corner we could +see the streets and the Appomattox bottom, presumably near the +bridge, packed with the Confederate army. I did not have +artillery brought up, because I was sure Lee was trying to make +his escape, and I wanted to push immediately in pursuit. At all +events I had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass +of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon.</p> + +<p>Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man +came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of +Northern Virginia. He said that Lee had for some time been at +work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he +would throw himself when forced out of Petersburg, and fight his +final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his +troops from Richmond, and falling back into this prepared work. +This statement was made to General Meade and myself when we were +together. I had already given orders for the movement up the +south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading off Lee; +but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he +thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move +against Lee in his new position. I knew that Lee was no fool, +as he would have been to have put himself and his army between +two formidable streams like the James and Appomattox rivers, and +between two such armies as those of the Potomac and the James. +Then these streams coming together as they did to the east of +him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have +him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of +reinforcement. It would only have been a question of days, and +not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him +by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to +surrender his army. Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war +to deceive your antagonist. My judgment was that Lee would +necessarily have to evacuate Richmond, and that the only course +for him to pursue would be to follow the Danville Road. +Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south +of Lee, and I told Meade this. He suggested that if Lee was +going that way we would follow him. My reply was that we did +not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut +him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (Meade) +believed him to be in at that time, I wanted nothing better; +that when we got in possession of the Danville Railroad, at its +crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still found him between +the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close +him up. That we would then have all the advantage we could +possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg, +even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer +officer.</p> + +<p>I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so +as to start them out on the Danville Road early in the morning, +supposing that Lee would be gone during the night. During the +night I strengthened Sheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps.</p> + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="b457"></a><img alt="b457.jpg (133K)" src="b457.jpg" height="391" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<center><a href="b457.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center> +<br><br> + +<p>Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond, +during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it +would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he +could hold out that long. Davis was at church when he received +Lee's dispatch. The congregation was dismissed with the notice +that there would be no evening service. The rebel government +left Richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d.</p> + +<p>At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court +House, his object being to get away, join Johnston if possible, +and to try to crush Sherman before I could get there. As soon +as I was sure of this I notified Sheridan and directed him to +move out on the Danville Railroad to the south side of the +Appomattox River as speedily as possible. He replied that he +already had some of his command nine miles out. I then ordered +the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the +same road in the morning. Parke's corps followed by the same +road, and the Army of the James was directed to follow the road +which ran alongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke's +Station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they +proceeded. That road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling +stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the +rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the +whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our +cars and locomotives.</p> + +<p>Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some +days. I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only +while I felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be +successful, yet it might not prove so; and then I would have +only added another to the many disappointments he had been +suffering for the past three years. But when we started out he +saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us Godspeed, +remained there to hear the result.</p> + +<p>The next morning after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed +Mr. Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while I +would await his arrival. I had started all the troops out early +in the morning, so that after the National army left Petersburg +there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the +streets. There was absolutely no one there, except my staff +officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. We had +selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until +the President arrived.</p> + +<p>About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm +congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and +to the army which had accomplished it, was: "Do you know, +general, that I have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days +that you intended to do something like this." Our movements +having been successful up to this point, I no longer had any +object in concealing from the President all my movements, and +the objects I had in view. He remained for some days near City +Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by +telegraph.</p> + +<p>Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join +me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee's +army. I told him that I had been very anxious to have the +Eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted +all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive +them from their capital. The Western armies had been in the +main successful until they had conquered all the territory from +the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, and were +now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, asking +admittance. I said to him that if the Western armies should be +even upon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the +credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians +and non-combatants from the section of country which those +troops hailed from. It might lead to disagreeable bickerings +between members of Congress of the East and those of the West in +some of their debates. Western members might be throwing it up +to the members of the East that in the suppression of the +rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to +accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but +had to wait until the Western armies had conquered all the +territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them +capture the only army they had been engaged with.</p> + +<p>Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it +before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care +where the aid came from so the work was done.</p> + +<p>The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four +years' record in the suppression of the rebellion. The army it +had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which +was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the United +States. Its loss would be the loss of the cause. Every energy, +therefore, was put forth by the Confederacy to protect and +maintain their capital. Everything else would go if it went. +Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its +position, no matter what territory was wrested from the South in +another quarter.</p> + +<p>I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between +the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has +been none between the politicians. Possibly I am the only one +who thought of the liability of such a state of things in +advance.</p> + +<p>When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his +horse and started on his return to City Point, while I and my +staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in +advance. Up to this time I had not received the report of the +capture of Richmond.</p> + +<p>Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a dispatch from +General Weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession +of Richmond at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, +the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places. +The city was in the most utter confusion. The authorities had +taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, +and to throw out the provisions which the Confederate government +had left, for the people to gather up. The city had been +deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any +notice whatever that they were about to leave. In fact, up to +the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to +believe that Lee had gained an important victory somewhere +around Petersburg.</p> + +<p>Weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in +Lee's army, there being still a great many men and even officers +in the town. The city was on fire. Our troops were directed to +extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. +The fire had been started by some one connected with the +retreating army. All authorities deny that it was authorized, +and I presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving +what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it +was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of +their enemy. Be that as it may, the National troops found the +city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them.</p> + +<p>The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great many of them, +were cut off from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued +by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away +caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten +their loads, and pushed along up the Appomattox River until +finally they took water and crossed over.</p> + +<p>I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join +the command, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine +miles out. We had still time to march as much farther, and time +was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to +the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was +impossible to get on. Then, again, our cavalry had struck some +of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that +the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they +appeared. This caused further delay.</p> + +<p>General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which +were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into +bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing +out the road, so that when they did start they would be +uninterrupted. Humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of +rations. They did not succeed in getting them up through the +night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, were so +elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a +victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations +to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. So +the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning.</p> + +<p>Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven +them north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were +forced to cross.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations +up from Danville for his famishing army, and that they were to +meet him at Farmville. This showed that Lee had already +abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to Danville, +but had determined to go farther west, by the way of +Farmville. I notified Sheridan of this and directed him to get +possession of the road before the supplies could reach Lee. He +responded that he had already sent Crook's division to get upon +the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face north +and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought +Crook must be there now. The bulk of the army moved directly +for Jetersville by two roads.</p> + +<p>After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that +Crook was on the Danville Road, I immediately ordered Meade to +make a forced march with the Army of the Potomac, and to send +Parke's corps across from the road they were on to the South +Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of the Army of the James and +to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went +along.</p> + +<p>Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in the telegraph +office, they found a dispatch from Lee, ordering two hundred +thousand rations from Danville. The dispatch had not been sent, +but Sheridan sent a special messenger with it to Burkesville and +had it forwarded from there. In the meantime, however, +dispatches from other sources had reached Danville, and they +knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that +they sent no further supplies from that quarter.</p> + +<p>At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off +between the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on +and the Appomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in +flank. They picked up a great many prisoners and forced the +abandonment of some property.</p> + +<p>Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his +advance north of Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect +forage. The country was very poor and afforded but very +little. His foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were +picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the Army +of Northern Virginia.</p> + +<p>Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of +Jetersville, and Sheridan notified me of the situation. I again +ordered Meade up with all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one +corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting Lee's entire +army. Meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward +with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able +to be out of bed. Humphreys moved at two, and Wright at three +o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I have said, the +wagons being far in the rear.</p> + +<p>I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side +Railroad. On the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of +the progress Meade was making, and suggested that he might now +attack Lee. We had now no other objective than the Confederate +armies, and I was anxious to close the thing up at once.</p> + +<p>On the 5th I marched again with Ord's command until within about +ten miles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I +then received from Sheridan the following dispatch:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p>"The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Court House, and +on this side of it. General Davies, whom I sent out to +Painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces +of artillery and some wagons. We can capture the Army of +Northern Virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, +and then advance upon it. My cavalry was at Burkesville +yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, last +night. General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person. They +are out of rations, or nearly so. They were advancing up the +railroad towards Burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them +at this point."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p>It now became a life and death struggle with Lee to get south to +his provisions.</p> + +<p>Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards +Farmville, moved Davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. +Davies found the movement had already commenced. He attacked +and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the +west, capturing and burning 180 wagons. He also captured five +pieces of artillery. The Confederate infantry then moved +against him and probably would have handled him very roughly, +but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow +Davies, and they came to his relief in time. A sharp engagement +took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the +enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed.</p> + +<p>Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o'clock in the +afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. The head of +Humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterwards. Sheridan +stationed the troops as they came up, at Meade's request, the +latter still being very sick. He extended two divisions of this +corps off to the west of the road to the left of Griffin's corps, +and one division to the right. The cavalry by this time had also +come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, +Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the +enemy intended to escape. He wanted to attack, feeling that if +time was given, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented +this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up.</p> + +<p>At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed +to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he +wished I was there myself. The letter was dated Amelia Court +House, April 5th, and signed by Colonel Taylor. It was to his +mother, and showed the demoralization of the Confederate army. +Sheridan's note also gave me the information as here related of +the movements of that day. I received a second message from +Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the +importance of my presence. This was brought to me by a scout in +gray uniform. It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in +tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. This was a +precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he +could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into +his mouth, chew it. It would cause no surprise at all to see a +Confederate soldier chewing tobacco. It was nearly night when +this letter was received. I gave Ord directions to continue his +march to Burkesville and there intrench himself for the night, +and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between +there and Farmville.</p> + +<p>I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of +cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade's +army. The distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being +dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of +direct roads. However, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock +in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the +sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where +Sheridan was bivouacked. We talked over the situation for some +little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee was +trying to do, and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to +the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of +escaping us and putting us in rear of him.</p> + +<p>We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters about +midnight. I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow +the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders +would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no +doubt that Lee was moving right then. Meade changed his orders +at once. They were now given for an advance on Amelia Court +House, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay; +that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to +the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther +to the left.</p> + + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="ch66"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXVI.</h2></center> + +<center><h3>BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE +--CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.></h3></center> +<br> + +<p>The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the +south-west from the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville +Railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly. Sailor's +Creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into +the Appomattox between the High Bridge and Jetersville. Near +the High Bridge the stage road from Petersburg to Lynchburg +crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge. The railroad +runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles +west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of +it. The roads coming up from the south-east to Farmville cross +the Appomattox River there on a bridge and run on the north +side, leaving the Lynchburg and Petersburg Railroad well to the +left.</p> + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="b471"></a><img alt="b471.jpg (144K)" src="b471.jpg" height="390" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<center><a href="b471.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center> +<br><br> + +<p>Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of +all the roads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to +move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop +because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. In +this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his +provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army.</p> + +<p>As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the night before, and +our army in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered +them. There was a good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek +was reached. Our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which +was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left. A +severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners, +and many men also were killed and wounded. There was as much +gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in these little +engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, +notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week.</p> + +<p>The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a heavy +engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry +were all brought into action. Our men on the right, as they +were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and +upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the +lay of the country. Our firing was also very much more rapid, +because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing +as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired. The +enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in +captures. Some six general officers fell into our hands in this +engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. This +engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the +6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall, +when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had +overtaken them.</p> + +<p>When the move towards Amelia Court House had commenced that +morning, I ordered Wright's corps, which was on the extreme +right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the +place of Griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to +move by and place itself on the right. The object of this +movement was to get the 6th corps, Wright's, next to the +cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and +so efficiently in the valley of Virginia.</p> + +<p>The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan's +direct command until after the surrender.</p> + +<p>Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads +southward between Burkesville and the High Bridge. On the +morning of the 6th he sent Colonel Washburn with two infantry +regiments with instructions to destroy High Bridge and to return +rapidly to Burkesville Station; and he prepared himself to resist +the enemy there. Soon after Washburn had started Ord became a +little alarmed as to his safety and sent Colonel Read, of his +staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring +him back. Very shortly after this he heard that the head of +Lee's column had got up to the road between him and where +Washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the +reinforcements could not get through. Read, however, had got +through ahead of the enemy. He rode on to Farmville and was on +his way back again when he found his return cut off, and +Washburn confronting apparently the advance of Lee's army. Read +drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of +less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along +their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the +same enthusiasm that he himself felt. He then gave the order to +charge. This little band made several charges, of course +unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than +equal to their own entire number. Colonel Read fell mortally +wounded, and then Washburn; and at the close of the conflict +nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and +file had been either killed or wounded. The remainder then +surrendered. The Confederates took this to be only the advance +of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to +intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked +the progress of a strong detachment of the Confederate army.</p> + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="b475"></a><img alt="b475.jpg (119K)" src="b475.jpg" height="389" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<center><a href="b475.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center> +<br><br> + +<p>This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains +following. Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road +bridge near the High Bridge, and attempted to destroy it. He +did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway +when Humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the +rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being +burned up. Humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and +followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at +Farmville with the one from Petersburg. Here Lee held a +position which was very strong, naturally, besides being +intrenched. Humphreys was alone, confronting him all through +the day, and in a very hazardous position. He put on a bold +face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not +assaulted in return.</p> + +<p>Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward's +Court House, along with the 5th corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in +between Griffin and the Appomattox. Crook's division of cavalry +and Wright's corps pushed on west of Farmville. When the +cavalry reached Farmville they found that some of the +Confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their +trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in +time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although +they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did +not get them for some time. These troops retreated to the north +side of the Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying +the bridge after them. Considerable fighting ensued there +between Wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the +Confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and +drove them away. Wright built a foot-bridge for his men to +march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads +to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night. I had stopped +the night before at Burkesville Junction. Our troops were then +pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital +there, and Ord's command was extended from that point towards +Farmville.</p> + +<p>Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular +army, who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one +of the prisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when +we had got across the James River he knew their cause was lost, +and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms +they could while they still had a right to claim concessions. +The authorities thought differently, however. Now the cause was +lost and they had no right to claim anything. He said further, +that for every man that was killed after this in the war +somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better +than murder. He was not sure that Lee would consent to +surrender his army without being able to consult with the +President, but he hoped he would.</p> + +<p>I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the +day. Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the +south. Meade was back towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys +confronting Lee as before stated. After having gone into +bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House, Sheridan learned that +seven trains of provisions and forage were at Appomattox, and +determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march +was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army could +secure them. He wrote me a note telling me this. This fact, +together with the incident related the night before by Dr. +Smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with General +Lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. I therefore +wrote to him on this day, as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., +<br>5 P.M., April 7, 1865.</p> + +<p>GENERAL R. E. LEE +<br>Commanding C. S. A.</p> + +<p>The result of the last week must convince you of the +hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of +Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and +regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of +any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of +that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of +Northern Virginia.</p> + +<p>U. S. GRANT, +<br>Lieut.-General.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +April 7, 1865.</p> + +<p>GENERAL: I have received your note of this day. Though not +entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of +further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, +I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and +therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you +will offer on condition of its surrender.</p> + +<p>R. E. LEE, +<br>General.</p> + +<p>LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, +<br>Commanding Armies of the U. S.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + + +<p> +This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving +another letter and wrote him as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +April 8, 1865.</p> + +<p>GENERAL R. E. LEE, +<br>Commanding C. S. A.</p> + +<p>Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking +the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army +of Northern Virginia is just received. In reply I would say +that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I +would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers +surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again +against the Government of the United States until properly +exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet +any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point +agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the +terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia +will be received.</p> + +<p>U. S. GRANT, +<br>Lieut.-General.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +Lee's army was rapidly crumbling. Many of his soldiers had +enlisted from that part of the State where they now were, and +were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their +homes. I know that I occupied a hotel almost destitute of +furniture at Farmville, which had probably been used as a +Confederate hospital. The next morning when I came out I found +a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he +was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a +regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. He said +that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only +man of the regiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped +out, and now wanted to surrender himself. I told him to stay +there and he would not be molested. That was one regiment which +had been eliminated from Lee's force by this crumbling process.</p> + +<p>Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved +with alacrity and without any straggling. They began to see the +end of what they had been fighting four years for. Nothing +seemed to fatigue them. They were ready to move without rations +and travel without rest until the end. Straggling had entirely +ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front. The +infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could.</p> + +<p>Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of +Appomattox Station, which is about five miles south-west of the +Court House, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to +the rear. They got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded +partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the +movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the +trains. The other four were held by Custer.</p> + +<p>The head of Lee's column came marching up there on the morning +of the 9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union +soldiers near. The Confederates were surprised to find our +cavalry had possession of the trains. However, they were +desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. In the +melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains, +but not in getting anything from it. Custer then ordered the +other trains run back on the road towards Farmville, and the +fight continued.</p> + +<p>So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's army were +engaged. Soon, however, Lee's men were brought up from the +rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our +cavalry. But our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by +the time the enemy got up they found Griffin's corps and the Army +of the James confronting them. A sharp engagement ensued, but +Lee quickly set up a white flag.</p> + + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="ch67"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXVII.</h2></center> + +<center><h3>NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S +HOUSE--THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH +LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.</h3></center> +<br> + +<p>On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of +Lee. I was suffering very severely with a sick headache, +[The old name for what we now call a Migraine Headache. D.W.] +and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the +main body of the army. I spent the night in bathing my feet in +hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists +and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning. +During the night I received Lee's answer to my letter of the +8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following +morning. [See Appendix.] But it was for a different purpose from that of +surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., +<br>April 9, 1865.</p> + +<p>GENERAL R. E. LEE, +<br>Commanding C. S. A.</p> + +<p>Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to +treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M. +to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, +that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole +North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace +can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their +arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands +of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet +destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be +settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, +etc.,</p> + +<p>U. S. GRANT, +<br>Lieutenant-General.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering +with the headache, to get to the head of the column. I was not +more than two or three miles from Appomattox Court House at the +time, but to go direct I would have to pass through Lee's army, +or a portion of it. I had therefore to move south in order to +get upon a road coming up from another direction.</p> + +<p>When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I +was in this way moving towards Appomattox Court House, and +consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be +informed of what Lee had done. Lee, therefore, sent a flag to +the rear to advise Meade and one to the front to Sheridan, +saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of +having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and +asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could be +communicated with. As they had heard nothing of this until the +fighting had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of +these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending +hostilities at all. They were afraid it was not in good faith, +and we had the Army of Northern Virginia where it could not +escape except by some deception. They, however, finally +consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give +an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if +possible. It was found that, from the route I had taken, they +would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an +answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should +pass through the rebel lines.</p> + +<p>Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this +message through his lines to me.</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +April 9, 1865.</p> + +<p>GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the +picket-line whither I had come to meet you and ascertain +definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of +yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now +request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in +your letter of yesterday for that purpose.</p> + +<p>R. E. LEE, General.</p> + +<p>LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT +<br>Commanding U. S. Armies.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +When the officer reached me I was still suffering with the sick +headache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was +cured. I wrote the following note in reply and hastened on:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +April 9, 1865.</p> + +<p>GENERAL R. E. LEE, +<br>Commanding C. S. Armies.</p> + +<p>Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 A.M.) received, +in consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and +Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road. I am at +this writing about four miles west of Walker's Church and will +push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice +sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take +place will meet me.</p> + +<p>U. S. GRANT, +<br>Lieutenant-General.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="b487"></a><img alt="b487.jpg (124K)" src="b487.jpg" height="1054" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<br><br> + +<p> +I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his +troops drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army +near by. They were very much excited, and expressed their view +that this was all a ruse employed to enable the Confederates to +get away. They said they believed that Johnston was marching up +from North Carolina now, and Lee was moving to join him; and they +would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if I +would only let them go in. But I had no doubt about the good +faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. I +found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox Court +House, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff officers, +awaiting my arrival. The head of his column was occupying a +hill, on a portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a +little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which +Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south.</p> + +<p>Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I +will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree.</p> + +<p>Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told +until they are believed to be true. The war of the rebellion +was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree +is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact. +As I have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the +hill occupied by the Confederate forces. Running diagonally up +the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near +one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that +side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little +embankment. General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that +when he first met General Lee he was sitting upon this +embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting +against the tree. The story had no other foundation than +that. Like many other stories, it would be very good if it was +only true.</p> + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="b489"></a><img alt="b489.jpg (61K)" src="b489.jpg" height="574" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<center><a href="b489.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center> +<br><br> + +<p>I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him +in the Mexican War; but did not suppose, owing to the difference +in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while I would +more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief +of staff of General Scott in the Mexican War.</p> + +<p>When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the +result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough +garb. I was without a sword, as I usually was when on horseback +on the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the +shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who I was. +When I went into the house I found General Lee. We greeted each +other, and after shaking hands took our seats. I had my staff +with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the +whole of the interview.</p> + +<p>What General Lee's feelings were I do not know. As he was a man +of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to +say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, +or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it. +Whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my +observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant +on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed. I felt +like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who +had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a +cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for +which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the +least excuse. I do not question, however, the sincerity of the +great mass of those who were opposed to us.</p> + +<p>General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely +new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely +the sword which had been presented by the State of Virginia; at +all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that +would ordinarily be worn in the field. In my rough traveling +suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a +lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted very strangely with a +man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form. +But this was not a matter that I thought of until afterwards.</p> + +<p>We soon fell into a conversation about old army times. He +remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and I +told him that as a matter of course I remembered him perfectly, +but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about +sixteen years' difference in our ages), I had thought it very +likely that I had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be +remembered by him after such a long interval. Our conversation +grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the object of our +meeting. After the conversation had run on in this style for +some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our +meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the +purpose of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his +army. I said that I meant merely that his army should lay down +their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of +the war unless duly and properly exchanged. He said that he had +so understood my letter.</p> + +<p>Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters +foreign to the subject which had brought us together. This +continued for some little time, when General Lee again +interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that +the terms I proposed to give his army ought to be written out. I +called to General Parker, secretary on my staff, for writing +materials, and commenced writing out the following terms:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,</p> + +<p>Ap 19th, 1865.</p> + +<p>GEN. R. E. LEE, +<br>Comd'g C. S. A.</p> + +<p>GEN: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of +the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of +N. Va. on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers +and men to be made in duplicate. One copy to be given to an +officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such +officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give +their individual paroles not to take up arms against the +Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and +each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the +men of their commands. The arms, artillery and public property +to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer +appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the +side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or +baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to +return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States +authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in +force where they may reside.</p> + +<p>Very respectfully, +<br><br>U. S. GRANT, +<br>Lt. Gen.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word +that I should make use of in writing the terms. I only knew +what was in my mind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that +there could be no mistaking it. As I wrote on, the thought +occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses +and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to +us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call +upon them to deliver their side arms.</p> + +<p>No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and +myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred +subjects. He appeared to have no objections to the terms first +proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to +wait until they were in writing to make it. When he read over +that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private +property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, I +thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army.</p> + +<p>Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked +to me again that their army was organized a little differently +from the army of the United States (still maintaining by +implication that we were two countries); that in their army the +cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked +if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses +were to be permitted to retain them. I told him that as the +terms were written they would not; that only the officers were +permitted to take their private property. He then, after +reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was +clear.</p> + +<p>I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last +battle of the war--I sincerely hoped so; and I said further I +took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers. +The whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it +was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to +carry themselves and their families through the next winter +without the aid of the horses they were then riding. The United +States did not want them and I would, therefore, instruct the +officers I left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to +let every man of the Confederate army who claimed to own a horse +or mule take the animal to his home. Lee remarked again that +this would have a happy effect.</p> + +<p>He then sat down and wrote out the following letter:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, +<br>April 9, 1865.</p> + +<p>GENERAL:--I received your letter of this date containing the +terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as +proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those +expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I +will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the +stipulations into effect.</p> + +<p>R. E. LEE, General. +<br>LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union +generals present were severally presented to General Lee.</p> + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="b497a"></a><img alt="b497a.jpg (107K)" src="b497a.jpg" height="844" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<center><a href="b497a.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center> +<br> + +<center><a name="b497b"></a><img alt="b497b.jpg (125K)" src="b497b.jpg" height="833" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<center><a href="b497b.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center> +<br><br> + + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<br>[NOTE.--The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrender +inserted at this place, was copied from the original document +furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S. +Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant's staff at the time +of the surrender. + +<br><br>Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's manifold +order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations +and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of +General Grant. After such alteration it was handed to General +Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to +General Grant. The original was then transcribed by General +Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General +Lee. + +<br><br>The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the +original document and all interlineations and erasures. + +<br><br>There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and +Lee each signed the articles of surrender. The document in the +form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor +of McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and +General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and +handed it to General Grant.] +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p>The much talked of surrendering of Lee's sword and my handing it +back, this and much more that has been said about it is the +purest romance. The word sword or side arms was not mentioned +by either of us until I wrote it in the terms. There was no +premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment I +wrote it down. If I had happened to omit it, and General Lee +had called my attention to it, I should have put it in the terms +precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers +retaining their horses.</p> + +<p>General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his +leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for +want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men +had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and +that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. I told him +"certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations. His +answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and I authorized him to +send his own commissary and quartermaster to Appomattox Station, +two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains +we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. As for forage, we +had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that.</p> + +<p>Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were designated by me to +carry into effect the paroling of Lee's troops before they +should start for their homes--General Lee leaving Generals +Longstreet, Gordon and Pendleton for them to confer with in +order to facilitate this work. Lee and I then separated as +cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all +went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox.</p> + +<p>Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Washington as +follows:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +HEADQUARTERS APPOMATTOX C. H., VA., +<br>April 9th, 1865, 4.30 P.M.</p> + +<p>HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, +<br>Washington.</p> + +<p>General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this +afternoon on terms proposed by myself. The accompanying +additional correspondence will show the conditions fully.</p> + +<p>U. S. GRANT, +<br>Lieut.-General.</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men +commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the +victory. I at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. The +Confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult +over their downfall.</p> + +<p>I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to +putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now +deemed other useless outlay of money. Before leaving, however, +I thought I would like to see General Lee again; so next +morning I rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters, +preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag.</p> + +<p>Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. We +had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very +pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of +which Lee said to me that the South was a big country and that +we might have to march over it three or four times before the +war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as +they could no longer resist us. He expressed it as his earnest +hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more +loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the +result. I then suggested to General Lee that there was not a +man in the Confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the +whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise +the surrender of all the armies I had no doubt his advice would +be followed with alacrity. But Lee said, that he could not do +that without consulting the President first. I knew there was +no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was +right.</p> + +<p>I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom +seemed to have a great desire to go inside the Confederate +lines. They finally asked permission of Lee to do so for the +purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the +permission was granted. They went over, had a very pleasant +time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with +them when they returned.</p> + +<p>When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I +returned to the house of Mr. McLean. Here the officers of both +armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as +much as though they had been friends separated for a long time +while fighting battles under the same flag. For the time being +it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped +their minds. After an hour pleasantly passed in this way I set +out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, +for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by +this time been repaired.</p> + + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="ch68"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXVIII.</h2></center> + +<center><h3>MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND +SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT +WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT +JOHNSON'S POLICY.</h3></center> +<br> + +<p>After the fall of Petersburg, and when the armies of the Potomac +and the James were in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale +of the National troops had greatly improved. There was no more +straggling, no more rear guards. The men who in former times +had been falling back, were now, as I have already stated, +striving to get to the front. For the first time in four weary +years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they +could return to their homes with their country saved. On the +other hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly +depressed. Their despondency increased with each returning day, +and especially after the battle of Sailor's Creek. They threw +away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out +of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of +reaching their homes. I have already instanced the case of the +entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I met at +Farmville. As a result of these and other influences, when Lee +finally surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28,356 +officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were +without arms. It was probably this latter fact which gave rise +to the statement sometimes made, North and South, that Lee +surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official +figures show. As a matter of official record, and in addition +to the number paroled as given above, we captured between March +29th and the date of surrender 19,132 Confederates, to say +nothing of Lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, +during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his +headlong and determined flight. The same record shows the +number of cannon, including those at Appomattox, to have been +689 between the dates named.</p> + +<p>There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the +number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important +battles, fought between the sections, the South magnifying the +number of Union troops engaged and belittling their own. +Northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same +error. I have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal +to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight the South had made +and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with +their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the +twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants. I will add to +their argument. We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who +volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million +belonging to the South.</p> + +<p>But the South had rebelled against the National government. It +was not bound by any constitutional restrictions. The whole +South was a military camp. The occupation of the colored people +was to furnish supplies for the army. Conscription was resorted +to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to +forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in +the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of State +and intended National government. The old and physically +disabled furnished a good portion of these. The slaves, the +non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in +the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to +age. Children from the age of eight years could and did handle +the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the +plough. The four million of colored non-combatants were equal +to more than three times their number in the North, age for age +and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support +armies. Women did not work in the fields in the North, and +children attended school.</p> + +<p>The arts of peace were carried on in the North. Towns and +cities grew during the war. Inventions were made in all kinds +of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the +shop, and in the field. In the South no opposition was allowed +to the government which had been set up and which would have +become real and respected if the rebellion had been +successful. No rear had to be protected. All the troops in +service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of +ground threatened with invasion. The press of the South, like +the people who remained at home, were loyal to the Southern +cause.</p> + +<p>In the North, the country, the towns and the cities presented +about the same appearance they do in time of peace. The furnace +was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were +cultivated, not only to supply the population of the North and +the troops invading the South, but to ship abroad to pay a part +of the expense of the war. In the North the press was free up +to the point of open treason. The citizen could entertain his +views and express them. Troops were necessary in the Northern +States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army being +released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by +fire our Northern cities. Plans were formed by Northern and +Southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water +supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from +infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers +--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. The +copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel +successes, and belittled those of the Union army. It was, with +a large following, an auxiliary to the Confederate army. The +North would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of +these men in the Confederate ranks and the rest of their kind +thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentiment was in the South, +than we were as the battle was fought.</p> + +<p>As I have said, the whole South was a military camp. The +colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and +worked in the field and took care of the families while the +able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause +destined to defeat. The cause was popular, and was +enthusiastically supported by the young men. The conscription +took all of them. Before the war was over, further +conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of +age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty +as senior reserves. It would have been an offence, directly +after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any +able-bodied man in the South, who was between the ages of +fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had +been in the Confederate army. He would assert that he had, or +account for his absence from the ranks. Under such +circumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such a +superiority of force in every battle fought. I know they did +not.</p> + +<p>During 1862 and '3, John H. Morgan, a partisan officer, of no +military education, but possessed of courage and endurance, +operated in the rear of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and +Tennessee. He had no base of supplies to protect, but was at +home wherever he went. The army operating against the South, on +the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the +North, from which all supplies had to come to the front. Every +foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient +distances apart. These guards could not render assistance beyond +the points where stationed. Morgan Was foot-loose and could +operate where, his information--always correct--led him to +believe he could do the greatest damage. During the time he was +operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several +times the number he ever had under his command at any one +time. He destroyed many millions of property in addition. +Places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by +him. Forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held +from the National front quite as many men as could be spared for +offensive operations. It is safe to say that more than half the +National army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were +on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their +bearing arms. Then, again, large forces were employed where no +Confederate army confronted them. I deem it safe to say that +there were no large engagements where the National numbers +compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment +occupied by the enemy.</p> + +<p>While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to +Richmond in company with Admiral Porter, and on board his +flagship. He found the people of that city in great +consternation. The leading citizens among the people who had +remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should +be done to relieve them from suspense. General Weitzel was not +then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring +villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the +conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the +Confederate capital. The President sent for him, and, on his +arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, Admiral +Porter and a leading citizen of Virginia being also present. +After this interview the President wrote an order in about these +words, which I quote from memory: "General Weitzel is authorized +to permit the body calling itself the Legislature of Virginia to +meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops from the +Confederate armies."</p> + +<p>Immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out +a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. This +call, however, went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had +contemplated, as he did not say the "Legislature of Virginia" +but "the body which called itself the Legislature of Virginia." +Mr. Stanton saw the call as published in the Northern papers the +very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order +authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, or any other body, +and this notwithstanding the fact that the President was nearer +the spot than he was.</p> + +<p>This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton. He was a man who never +questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time +what he wanted to do. He was an able constitutional lawyer and +jurist; but the Constitution was not an impediment to him while +the war lasted. In this latter particular I entirely agree with +the view he evidently held. The Constitution was not framed with +a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5. While it did not +authorize rebellion it made no provision against it. Yet the +right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the +right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an +individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. The +Constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so +far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of +the war.</p> + +<p>Those in rebellion against the government of the United States +were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, +except the acts of their Congress, which was loyal and devoted +to the cause for which the South was then fighting. It would be +a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion +against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that +the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the Union +intact, should be restrained by a Constitution prepared by our +ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of +the confederation of the States.</p> + +<p>After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my +staff and a few others directly to Burkesville Station on my way +to Washington. The road from Burkesville back having been newly +repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track +frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the +second day when I reached City Point. As soon as possible I +took a dispatch-boat thence to Washington City.</p> + +<p>While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing the +necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating +with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of +troops, etc. But by the 14th I was pretty well through with +this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then +in Burlington, New Jersey, attending school. Mrs. Grant was +with me in Washington at the time, and we were invited by +President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on +the evening of that day. I replied to the President's verbal +invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would +take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very +anxious to get away and visit my children, and if I could get +through my work during the day I should do so. I did get +through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending +Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not be at the theatre.</p> + +<p>At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on +Broad Street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the +Delaware River, and then ferried to Camden, at which point they +took the cars again. When I reached the ferry, on the east side +of the City of Philadelphia, I found people awaiting my arrival +there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of +the President and Mr. Seward, and of the probable assassination +of the Vice President, Mr. Johnson, and requesting my immediate +return.</p> + +<p>It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that +overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially +the assassination of the President. I knew his goodness of +heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to +have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the +people of the United States enter again upon the full privileges +of citizenship with equality among all. I knew also the feeling +that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation +against the Southern people, and I feared that his course +towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling +citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a +long while. I felt that reconstruction had been set back, no +telling how far.</p> + +<p>I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to +Washington City; but Mrs. Grant was with me; it was after +midnight and Burlington was but an hour away. Finding that I +could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as +they would be ready to take me from the Philadelphia station, I +went up with her and returned immediately by the same special +train. The joy that I had witnessed among the people in the +street and in public places in Washington when I left there, had +been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of +mourning. I have stated what I believed then the effect of this +would be, and my judgment now is that I was right. I believe the +South would have been saved from very much of the hardness of +feeling that was engendered by Mr. Johnson's course towards them +during the first few months of his administration. Be this as it +may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for +the entire nation.</p> + +<p>Mr. Johnson's course towards the South did engender bitterness +of feeling. His denunciations of treason and his ever-ready +remark, "Treason is a crime and must be made odious," was +repeated to all those men of the South who came to him to get +some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at +something with the feeling that what they obtained would be +secure to them. He uttered his denunciations with great +vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of +safety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond +endurance.</p> + +<p>The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or +ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and +judgment of those over whom he presides; and the Southerners who +read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have +come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the +Northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the +assassination of Mr. Lincoln, I believe the great majority of +the Northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have +been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be +the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against +their government. They believed, I have no doubt, as I did, +that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy.</p> + +<p>The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back +into the Union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the +nation. Naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality +with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they +would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens +they would be from the beginning. They surely would not make +good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their +necks.</p> + +<p>I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at +that time were in favor of negro suffrage. They supposed that +it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that +there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could +prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the +full right would be conferred; but Mr. Johnson, after a complete +revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the South not only as +an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to +consideration of any of our citizens. This was more than the +people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union were +prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. The +Southerners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr. +Johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact South, and +such sympathy and support as they could get from the North, they +felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and +already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled +to do so.</p> + +<p>Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one hand, and +receiving the support of the South on the other, drove Congress, +which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one +measure and then another to restrict his power. There being a +solid South on one side that was in accord with the political +party in the North which had sympathized with the rebellion, it +finally, in the judgment of Congress and of the majority of the +legislatures of the States, became necessary to enfranchise the +negro, in all his ignorance. In this work, I shall not discuss +the question of how far the policy of Congress in this +particular proved a wise one. It became an absolute necessity, +however, because of the foolhardiness of the President and the +blindness of the Southern people to their own interest. As to +myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the +least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, I +gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the +people, I favored immediate enfranchisement.</p> + + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="ch69"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXIX.</h2></center> + +<center><h3>SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE +OF MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON +DAVIS--GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.</h3></center> +<br> + +<p>When I left Appomattox I ordered General Meade to proceed +leisurely back to Burkesville Station with the Army of the +Potomac and the Army of the James, and to go into camp there +until further orders from me. General Johnston, as has been +stated before, was in North Carolina confronting General +Sherman. It could not be known positively, of course, whether +Johnston would surrender on the news of Lee's surrender, though +I supposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was +the natural point from which to move to attack him. The army +which I could have sent against him was superior to his, and +that with which Sherman confronted him was also superior; and +between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or +driven away. With the loss of their capital and the Army of +Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether Johnston's men would +have the spirit to stand. My belief was that he would make no +such attempt; but I adopted this course as a precaution against +what might happen, however improbable.</p> + +<p>Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, I sent a +messenger to North Carolina by boat with dispatches to General +Sherman, informing him of the surrender of Lee and his army; +also of the terms which I had given him; and I authorized +Sherman to give the same terms to Johnston if the latter chose +to accept them. The country is familiar with the terms that +Sherman agreed to CONDITIONALLY, because they embraced a +political question as well as a military one and he would +therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to +them definitely.</p> + +<p>General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting +there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what +Mr. Lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them +at Hampton Roads, viz.: that before he could enter into +negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points: +one being that the Union should be preserved, and the other that +slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede +these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank +piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the +terms upon which we would live together. He had also seen +notices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Richmond, +and had read in the same papers that while there he had +authorized the convening of the Legislature of Virginia.</p> + +<p>Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had +made with general Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes +of the President of the United States. But seeing that he was +going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms +were only conditional. They signed them with this +understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be +sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the proper +authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, +then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities. As +the world knows, Sherman, from being one of the most popular +generals of the land (Congress having even gone so far as to +propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the +purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the +President and Secretary of War in very bitter terms. Some +people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor--a most +preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much +service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in +granting such terms as he did to Johnston and his army. If +Sherman had taken authority to send Johnston with his army home, +with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own States, +without submitting the question to the authorities at +Washington, the suspicions against him might have some +foundation. But the feeling against Sherman died out very +rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the +fullest confidence of the American people.</p> + +<p>When, some days after my return to Washington, President Johnson +and the Secretary of war received the terms which General Sherman +had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately +called and I was sent for. There seemed to be the greatest +consternation, lest Sherman would commit the government to terms +which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no +right to grant. A message went out directing the troops in the +South not to obey General Sherman. I was ordered to proceed at +once to North Carolina and take charge of matter there myself. +Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon as +possible. I repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly +as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of +my presence.</p> + +<p>When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters, and we were at +once closeted together. I showed him the instruction and orders +under which I visited him. I told him that I wanted him to +notify General Johnston that the terms which they had +conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in Washington, +and that he was authorized to offer the same terms I had given +General Lee. I sent Sherman to do this himself. I did not wish +the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so +I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender +solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I was +anywhere near the field. As soon as possible I started to get +away, to leave Sherman quite free and untrammelled.</p> + +<p>At Goldsboro', on my way back, I met a mail, containing the last +newspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement +in the North over the terms Sherman had given Johnston; and +harsh orders that had been promulgated by the President and +Secretary of War. I knew that Sherman must see these papers, +and I fully realized what great indignation they would cause +him, though I do not think his feelings could have been more +excited than were my own. But like the true and loyal soldier +that he was, he carried out the instructions I had given him, +obtained the surrender of Johnston's army, and settled down in +his camp about Raleigh, to await final orders.</p> + +<p>There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could +not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to +the judgment of their respective commanders. With these it was +impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of Lee and +Johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their +judgment as to what was best to do.</p> + +<p>The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from +the commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off: one under +Canby himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman +from East Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, +starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March. They +were all eminently successful, but without any good result. +Indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost +at a time when we would have liked to spare them. The war was +practically over before their victories were gained. They were +so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any +troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the +armies which were gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a +surrender. The only possible good that we may have experienced +from these raids was by Stoneman's getting near Lynchburg about +the time the armies of the Potomac and the James were closing in +on Lee at Appomattox.</p> + +<p>Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike +the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. He got upon that road, +destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road +useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg. His +approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we +were at Appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of +there. He then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of +Johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on +between Sherman and Johnston for the latter's surrender. In +this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of +stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners +were the trophies of his success.</p> + +<p>Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March. The city of +Mobile was protected by two forts, besides other +intrenchments--Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and +Fort Blakely, north of the city. These forts were invested. On +the night of the 8th of April, the National troops having carried +the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort was evacuated; and +on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was carried +by assault, with a considerable loss to us. On the 11th the city +was evacuated.</p> + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="b520"></a><img alt="b520.jpg (98K)" src="b520.jpg" height="467" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<center><a href="b520.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center> +<br><br> + +<p>I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent +against Mobile when its possession by us would have been of +great advantage. It finally cost lives to take it when its +possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it +would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any +bloodshed whatever.</p> + +<p>Wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well +armed. He was an energetic officer and accomplished his work +rapidly. Forrest was in his front, but with neither his +old-time army nor his old-time prestige. He now had principally +conscripts. His conscripts were generally old men and boys. He +had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even +retard materially the progress of Wilson's cavalry. Selma fell +on the 2d of April, with a large number of prisoners and a large +quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of +by the victors. Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Point fell in +quick succession. These were all important points to the enemy +by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, +and because of their manufactories of war material. They were +fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting +before they were captured. Macon surrendered on the 21st of +April. Here news was received of the negotiations for the +surrender of Johnston's army. Wilson belonged to the military +division commanded by Sherman, and of course was bound by his +terms. This stopped all fighting.</p> + +<p>General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate +officer still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on +the 4th of May he surrendered everything within the limits of +this extensive command. General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the +trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no +other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war.</p> + +<p>Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president +of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. +This occurred at Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May. For +myself, and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would +have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in escaping, +but for one reason: I feared that if not captured, he might get +into the trans-Mississippi region and there set up a more +contracted confederacy. The young men now out of homes and out +of employment might have rallied under his standard and +protracted the war yet another year. The Northern people were +tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which +would be a further mortgage upon their homes.</p> + +<p>Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, because he +did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment. He knew +there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the +ex-Confederate president, for high treason. He thought blood +enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a +nation. At all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide +whether more should be shed or not. But his own life was +sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president +of the Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government +which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy.</p> + +<p>All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best +interest of all concerned. This reflection does not, however, +abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely +loss of so good and great a man as Abraham Lincoln.</p> + +<p>He would have proven the best friend the South could have had, +and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling +brought out by reconstruction under a President who at first +wished to revenge himself upon Southern men of better social +standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, +and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the +proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantly out +of all their difficulties.</p> + +<p>The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction +period to stay the hands of the President is too fresh in the +minds of the people to be told now. Much of it, no doubt, was +unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would +serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality +could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained. +These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a dead +letter" upon the statute books of the United States, no one +taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought.</p> + +<p>Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing +when he was captured. I cannot settle this question from +personal knowledge of the facts; but I have been under the +belief, from information given to me by General Wilson shortly +after the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that he was +surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a +gentleman's dressing gown. Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted +to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be +accomplished provided it might be done successfully. If +captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner. He represented all +there was of that hostility to the government which had caused +four years of the bloodiest war--and the most costly in other +respects of which history makes any record. Every one supposed +he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be +executed. Had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise +it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his +admirers.</p> + +<p>As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as +my remarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling +somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to +him, that I give my estimate of him as a soldier. The same +remark will apply also in the case of General Canby. I had been +at West Point with Thomas one year, and had known him later in +the old army. He was a man of commanding appearance, slow and +deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave. He +possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. He +gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost +their love. This implies a very valuable quality. It is a +quality which calls out the most efficient services of the +troops serving under the commander possessing it.</p> + +<p>Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. +He could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. He +was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. I do +not believe that he could ever have conducted Sherman's army +from Chattanooga to Atlanta against the defences and the +commander guarding that line in 1864. On the other hand, if it +had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried to +hold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer +could have done it better.</p> + +<p>Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has +received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played +in the great tragedy of 1861-5.</p> + +<p>General Canby was an officer of great merit. He was naturally +studious, and inclined to the law. There have been in the army +but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in +reading and digesting every act of Congress and every regulation +for the government of the army as he. His knowledge gained in +this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in +which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time +of his being assigned to the Military Division of the Gulf. He +was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and +learning. I presume his feelings when first called upon to +command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat +like my own when marching a regiment against General Thomas +Harris in Missouri in 1861. Neither of us would have felt the +slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else +commanding. Had Canby been in other engagements afterwards, he +would, I have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising +from a sense of the responsibility. He was afterwards killed in +the lava beds of Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile +Modoc Indians. His character was as pure as his talent and +learning were great. His services were valuable during the war, +but principally as a bureau officer. I have no idea that it was +from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but +because of his superior efficiency there.</p> + + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="ch70"></a><center><h2>CHAPTER LXX.</h2></center> + +<center><h3>THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S +ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF +LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.</h3></center> +<br> + +<p>Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there +would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in +North Carolina and Virginia were ordered to march immediately to +the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out. Suitable +garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the South +to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the +government of the several States, and to insure security to the +lives and property of all classes. I do not know how far this +was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time, that +such a course should be pursued. I think now that these +garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely +required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as +was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could +terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind +of the people as to what should be done.</p> + +<p>Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on +the south side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there +put them in camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the +situation was there.</p> + +<p>It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon +him. Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and +had issued orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from +obeying his, Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the papers on his +return, containing this order of Halleck, and very justly felt +indignant at the outrage. On his arrival at Fortress Monroe +returning from Savannah, Sherman received an invitation from +Halleck to come to Richmond and be his guest. This he +indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore, that he +had seen his order. He also stated that he was coming up to +take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would +probably be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he +(Sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person +might do through indignation for the treatment he had +received. Very soon after that, Sherman received orders from me +to proceed to Washington City, and to go into camp on the south +side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops.</p> + +<p>There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from +Goldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington +City. The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been +engaged in all the battles of the West and had marched from the +Mississippi through the Southern States to the sea, from there +to Goldsboro, and thence to Washington City, had passed over +many of the battle-fields of the Army of the Potomac, thus +having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, +the entire theatre of the four years' war for the preservation +of the Union.</p> + +<p>The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to the sea and north to +Goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was +anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally +magnificent in the way it was conducted. It had an important +bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, +that of closing the war. All the States east of the Mississippi +River up to the State of Georgia, had felt the hardships of the +war. Georgia, and South Carolina, and almost all of North +Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the +Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts. Their +newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success, +that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the +Yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from +pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out +for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with +honor to themselves.</p> + +<p>Even during this march of Sherman's the newspapers in his front +were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a +mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, +panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for +protection against the Southern people. As the army was seen +marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people +became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs. In +turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to +submit without compromise.</p> + +<p>Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was +calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great +storehouse of Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate +armies. As the troops advanced north from Savannah, the +destruction of the railroads in South Carolina and the southern +part of North Carolina, further cut off their resources and left +the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina dependent for +supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much +exhausted of food and forage.</p> + +<p>In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and +the other from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina, +arrived and went into camp near the Capital, as directed. The +troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in +their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever +been in their lives. I doubt whether an equal body of men of any +nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever +gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great +battle.</p> + +<p>The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the +officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of +the nations of Europe are taken from a class of people who are +not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the +contest in which they are called upon to take part. Our armies +were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what +they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as +soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation +was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal +to men who fought merely because they were brave and because +they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.</p> + +<p>There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the +time these troops were in camp before starting North.</p> + +<p>I remember one little incident which I will relate as an +anecdote characteristic of Mr. Lincoln. It occurred a day after +I reached Washington, and about the time General Meade reached +Burkesville with the army. Governor Smith of Virginia had left +Richmond with the Confederate States government, and had gone to +Danville. Supposing I was necessarily with the army at +Burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me +that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State of Virginia, +he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond to +Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the +functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal +authorities. I give this letter only in substance. He also +inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the +duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted +to leave the country and go abroad without interference. General +Meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets +with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought +in without informing the officer who brought it that I was not +present. He read the letter and telegraphed me its contents. +Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, I +repeated its contents to him. Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was +asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of Governor +Smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would +be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position +was like that of a certain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in +Springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of +considerable promise, and very much liked. Unfortunately he had +acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that +the habit was growing on him. These friends determined to make +an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to +abstain from all alcoholic drinks. They asked Pat to join them +in signing the pledge, and he consented. He had been so long +out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he +resorted to soda-water as a substitute. After a few days this +began to grow distasteful to him. So holding the glass behind +him, he said: "Doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in +that unbeknownst to myself."</p> + +<p>I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave +me, but I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform +the duties of his office. I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had +been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent +any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. He would +have been equally willing to permit the return of the same +expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their +choice.</p> + +<p>On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general +for a grand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman's +and Meade's armies. The review commenced on the 23d and lasted +two days. Meade's army occupied over six hours of the first day +in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the +President's house. Sherman witnessed this review from the grand +stand which was occupied by the President and his cabinet. Here +he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that +had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the Secretary of +War, by refusing to take his extended hand.</p> + +<p>Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the +Potomac. During the night of the 23d he crossed over and +bivouacked not far from the Capitol. Promptly at ten o'clock on +the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in +review. Sherman's army made a different appearance from that of +the Army of the Potomac. The latter had been operating where +they received directly from the North full supplies of food and +clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the +review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and +orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but +without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies +in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's +army was not so well-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but +their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance +of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, +either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any +climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp. They exhibited +also some of the order of march through Georgia where the "sweet +potatoes sprung up from the ground" as Sherman's army went +marching through. In the rear of a company there would be a +captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, +captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the +men. Negro families who had followed the army would sometimes +come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children +packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it.</p> + +<p>The sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two +successive days, from the Capitol to the Treasury Building, +could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of +companies. The National flag was flying from almost every house +and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the +door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and +poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from +which to get a view of the grand armies. The city was about as +full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually +is on inauguration day when a new President takes his seat.</p> + +<p>It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln +and the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great +conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government. +There is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind, +as to the characteristics of the President. With Mr. Stanton the +case is different. They were the very opposite of each other in +almost every particular, except that each possessed great +ability. Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by making them +feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. He preferred yielding +his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having +his own way. It distressed him to disappoint others. In matters +of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least +offensive way. Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority +to command, unless resisted. He cared nothing for the feeling +of others. In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to +disappoint than to gratify. He felt no hesitation in assuming +the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising +with him. If his act was not sustained, he would change it--if +he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so.</p> + +<p>It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the +complement of each other. The Secretary was required to prevent +the President's being imposed upon. The President was required +in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not +done to others. I do not know that this view of these two men +is still entertained by the majority of the people. It is not a +correct view, however, in my estimation. Mr. Lincoln did not +require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public +trust.</p> + +<p>Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his +generals in making and executing their plans. The Secretary was +very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering +with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to +defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the +Confederate capital. He could see our weakness, but he could not +see that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would not have been +in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field. These +characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly +after Early came so near getting into the capital.</p> + +<p>Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during +the war between the States, and who attracted much public +attention, but of whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given +any estimate, are Meade, Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and +Hooker. There were others of great merit, such as Griffin, +Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie. Of those first named, Burnside +at one time had command of the Army of the Potomac, and later of +the Army of the Ohio. Hooker also commanded the Army of the +Potomac for a short time.</p> + +<p>General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to +his usefulness that were beyond his control. He had been an +officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently +had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years +of age. He never had, I believe, a command of less than a +brigade. He saw clearly and distinctly the position of the +enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own +position. His first idea was to take advantage of the lay of +the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we +wanted to move afterwards. He was subordinate to his superiors +in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which +changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed +if the plan had been his own. He was brave and conscientious, +and commanded the respect of all who knew him. He was +unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at +times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most +offensive manner. No one saw this fault more plainly than he +himself, and no one regretted it more. This made it unpleasant +at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him +even with information. In spite of this defect he was a most +valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his +country.</p> + +<p>General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and +respected. He was not, however, fitted to command an army. No +one knew this better than himself. He always admitted his +blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what +they were entitled to. It was hardly his fault that he was ever +assigned to a separate command.</p> + +<p>Of Hooker I saw but little during the war. I had known him very +well before, however. Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his +achievement in bringing his command around the point of Lookout +Mountain and into Chattanooga Valley was brilliant. I +nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. He was not +subordinate to his superiors. He was ambitious to the extent of +caring nothing for the rights of others. His disposition was, +when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of +the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his +standard all he could of his juniors.</p> + +<p>Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general +officers who did not exercise a separate command. He commanded +a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never +mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he +was responsible. He was a man of very conspicuous personal +appearance. Tall, well-formed and, at the time of which I now +write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that +would attract the attention of an army as he passed. His genial +disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his +presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for +him the confidence of troops serving under him. No matter how +hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander +was looking after them.</p> + +<p>Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity +of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from +personal observation. I had known him in Mexico when both of us +were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that +either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He +stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man. +He was brave and conscientious. His ambition was not great, and +he seemed to dread responsibility. He was willing to do any +amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct. +He declined the command of the Army of the Potomac once, if not +oftener.</p> + +<p>General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer +without a military education. His way was won without political +influence up to an important separate command--the expedition +against Fort Fisher, in January, 1865. His success there was +most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in +the regular army and of major-general of volunteers. He is a man +who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of +their wants and their dues. As a commander, he won their +confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of +perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed +at any given time.</p> + +<p>Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders, +but came into that position so near to the close of the war as +not to attract public attention. All three served as such, in +the last campaign of the armies of the Potomac and the James, +which culminated at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th of April, +1865. The sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention +to the exclusion of almost everything else. I regarded Mackenzie +as the most promising young officer in the army. Graduating at +West Point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had +won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. This +he did upon his own merit and without influence.</p> + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="conclusion"></a><center><h2>CONCLUSION.</h2></center> +<br><br> + +<p>The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United +Status will have to be attributed to slavery. For some years +before the war began it was a trite saying among some +politicians that "A state half slave and half free cannot +exist." All must become slave or all free, or the state will go +down. I took no part myself in any such view of the case at the +time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, I +have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.</p> + +<p>Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for +its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours +where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by +an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would +naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for +its protection. Hence the people of the South were dependent +upon keeping control of the general government to secure the +perpetuation of their favorite institution. They were enabled +to maintain this control long after the States where slavery +existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the +assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout +the Northern States. They saw their power waning, and this led +them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the +Northern States by enacting such laws as the Fugitive Slave +Law. By this law every Northern man was obliged, when properly +summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a +Southern man. Northern marshals became slave-catchers, and +Northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection +of the institution.</p> + +<p>This was a degradation which the North would not permit any +longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws +from the statute books. Prior to the time of these +encroachments the great majority of the people of the North had +no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not +forced to have it themselves. But they were not willing to play +the role of police for the South in the protection of this +particular institution.</p> + +<p>In the early days of the country, before we had railroads, +telegraphs and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any +sort--the States were each almost a separate nationality. At +that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no +disturbance to the public mind. But the country grew, rapid +transit was established, and trade and commerce between the +States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of +the National government became more felt and recognized and, +therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution.</p> + +<p>It is probably well that we had the war when we did. We are +better off now than we would have been without it, and have made +more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made. The +civilized nations of Europe have been stimulated into unusual +activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough +acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become +common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the +privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who +knew anything about other people. Then, too, our republican +institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out +of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that +our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the +slightest strain was brought upon it. Now it has shown itself +capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever +made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most +formidable in war of any nationality.</p> + +<p>But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the +necessity of avoiding wars in the future.</p> + +<p>The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles +shows the lack of conscience of communities where the +responsibility does not come upon a single individual. Seeing a +nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better +part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population, +wealth and intelligence, the European nations thought it would +be well to give us a check. We might, possibly, after a while +threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their +institutions. Hence, England was constantly finding fault with +the administration at Washington because we were not able to +keep up an effective blockade. She also joined, at first, with +France and Spain in setting up an Austrian prince upon the +throne in Mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that +Mexico had of being treated as an independent power. It is true +they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only +pretexts which can always be found when wanted.</p> + +<p>Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that +protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would +have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had +forced loans from them. Under pretence of protecting their +citizens, these nations seized upon Mexico as a foothold for +establishing a European monarchy upon our continent, thus +threatening our peace at home. I, myself, regarded this as a +direct act of war against the United States by the powers +engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the United +States would treat it as such when their hands were free to +strike. I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lincoln and the +Secretary of War, but never heard any special views from them to +enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. I +inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were unwilling +to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our +hands.</p> + +<p>All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the +armed intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince +upon the throne of Mexico; but the governing people of these +countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles +in our way. After the surrender of Lee, therefore, entertaining +the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan with a corps to the +Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling +the French from Mexico. These troops got off before they could +be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan +distributed them up and down the river, much to the +consternation of the troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering +on that stream. This soon led to a request from France that we +should withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande and to +negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. Finally Bazaine was +withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government. From +that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able to +maintain her independence without aid from us.</p> + +<p>France is the traditional ally and friend of the United +States. I did not blame France for her part in the scheme to +erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the Mexican Republic. That +was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or +merit. He had succeeded in stealing the government of his +country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and +instincts of his people. He tried to play the part of the first +Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. He sought by +new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal +failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own +overthrow.</p> + +<p>Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was +an expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her +people. It was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon +III. The beginning was when he landed troops on this +continent. Failing here, the prestige of his name--all the +prestige he ever had--was gone. He must achieve a success or +fall. He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia--and fell.</p> + +<p>I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I +recognize his great genius. His work, too, has left its impress +for good on the face of Europe. The third Napoleon could have no +claim to having done a good or just act.</p> + +<p>To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared +for war. There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, +such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but, +growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we +may become the envy of nations which led us in all these +particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for +it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made +to crush us out. Now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we +seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on +as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an +invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time +until we could prepare for them.</p> + +<p>We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be +put in the finest possible condition. Neither of these cost much +when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in +return. Money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our +security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very +material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the +meantime. Money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among +our own people, and all goes back again among the people. The +work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a +feeling of security.</p> + +<p>England's course towards the United States during the rebellion +exasperated the people of this country very much against the +mother country. I regretted it. England and the United States +are natural allies, and should be the best of friends. They +speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties. We +together, or even either separately, are better qualified than +any other people to establish commerce between all the +nationalities of the world.</p> + +<p>England governs her own colonies, and particularly those +embracing the people of different races from her own, better +than any other nation. She is just to the conquered, but +rigid. She makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of +labor to the laborer. She does not seem to look upon the +colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work +for the support and aggrandizement of the home government.</p> + +<p>The hostility of England to the United States during our +rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent. It was the +hostility of the leaders of one political party. I am told that +there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get +up in England a demonstration in favor of secession, while these +were constantly being gotten up in favor of the Union, or, as +they called it, in favor of the North. Even in Manchester, +which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from +her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the +North at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.</p> + +<p>It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may +come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery +before. The condition of the colored man within our borders may +become a source of anxiety, to say the least. But he was brought +to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as +having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our +citizens. It was looking to a settlement of this question that +led me to urge the annexation of Santo Domingo during the time I +was President of the United States.</p> + +<p>Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the +administration, but by all the people, almost without price. The +island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of +supporting fifteen millions of people. The products of the soil +are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated +as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the +cost of their passage. I took it that the colored people would +go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states +governed by their own race. They would still be States of the +Union, and under the protection of the General Government; but +the citizens would be almost wholly colored.</p> + +<p>By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, +territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. +It was seen that the volunteers of the Mexican war largely +composed the pioneers to settle up the Pacific coast country. +Their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus +for the population of the important points of the territory +acquired by that war. After our rebellion, when so many young +men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they +were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of +the villages, but wanted larger fields. The mines of the +mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that +rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were +there. This territory, the geography of which was not known to +us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any +portion of our country. Railroads traverse it in every +direction, north, south, east, and west. The mines are +worked. The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich +agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys. This is +the work of the volunteer. It is probable that the Indians +would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for +the war. We must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always +evils unmixed with some good.</p> + +<p>Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were +satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth. In fact an +immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against +coming to want should they move among entire strangers. So much +was the country divided into small communities that localized +idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section +a person was from by hearing him speak. Before, new territories +were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with +others; people who, when the country began to settle up around +them, would push out farther from civilization. Their guns +furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of +the soil, their bread and vegetables. All the streams abounded +with fish. Trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the +States once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they +could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store +goods. Occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter +into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three +pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if +anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.</p> + +<p>Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the +settlements of these frontiersmen. This is all changed now. The +war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise. The feeling +now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to +enable him to get up in the world. There is now such a +commingling of the people that particular idioms and +pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the +country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea"; +railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; +maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now +furnished the student of geography.</p> + +<p>The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We +have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity +at home, and the respect of other nations. Our experience ought +to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the +latter.</p> + +<p>I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be +great harmony between the Federal and Confederate. I cannot +stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; +but I feel it within me that it is to be so. The universally +kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed +that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of +the answer to "Let us have peace."</p> + +<p>The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a +section of the country, nor to a division of the people. They +came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all +denominations--the Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and +from the various societies of the land--scientific, educational, +religious or otherwise. Politics did not enter into the matter +at all.</p> + +<p>I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should +be given because I was the object of it. But the war between +the States was a very bloody and a very costly war. One side or +the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life +before it could be brought to an end. I commanded the whole of +the mighty host engaged on the victorious side. I was, no +matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that +side of the controversy. It is a significant and gratifying +fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this +spontaneous move. I hope the good feeling inaugurated may +continue to the end.</p> + + + +<br><br><br><br> +<a name="appendix"></a><center><h2>APPENDIX</h2></center> +<br><br> + +<center><h3>REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES +ARMIES 1864-65.</h3></center> +<br><br><br> +<p>HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., +<br>July 22, 1865.</p> + +<p>HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.</p> + +<p>SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the +operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of +my appointment to command the same.</p> + +<p>From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with +the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops +that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and +weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The +resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far +inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast +territory, with a population hostile to the government, to +garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to +protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.</p> + +<p>The armies in the East and West acted independently and without +concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, +enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines +of communication for transporting troops from East to West, +reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough +large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go +to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of +their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength +and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages +and the enemy's superior position.</p> + +<p>From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could +be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the +people, both North and South, until the military power of the +rebellion was entirely broken.</p> + +<p>I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of +troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; +preventing him from using the same force at different seasons +against first one and then another of our armies, and the +possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary +supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer +continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his +resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there +should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the +loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws +of the land.</p> + +<p>These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given +and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have +been better in conception and execution is for the people, who +mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the +pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done +has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in +what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole +country.</p> + +<p>At the date when this report begins, the situation of the +contending forces was about as follows: The Mississippi River +was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, +Missouri, to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held, +thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi, +north of that stream. A few points in Southern Louisiana, not +remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small +garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the +balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas +was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an +army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, +that could have been brought into the field had there been +sufficient opposition to have brought them out. The let-alone +policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little +more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one +time. But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of +guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the +Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the +population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to +keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal +people to the west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we +held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston +rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of +Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, a small foothold had been +obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from +incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West +Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the +exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area +about the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk +and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the +Potomac lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the +enemy. Along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at +Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, in North Carolina; Beaufort, +Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port +Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in +Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession, +while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. The +accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman +and other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the +territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and +at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are +the lines which it was proposed to occupy.</p> + +<p>Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a +large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary +to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our +armies. In the South, a reign of military despotism prevailed, +which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier; +and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts +for collecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the +enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field.</p> + +<p>The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the +Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and +J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded +by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from +Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending +Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. +The army under Johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position +at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a +place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the +armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. In addition to these +armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in North-east +Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah +Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern +part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, +and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.</p> + +<p>These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, +were the main objective points of the campaign.</p> + +<p>Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of +the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the +armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the +Alleghanies and the Department of Arkansas, west of the +Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating +against Johnston.</p> + +<p>Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the +Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision +of the movements of all our armies.</p> + +<p>General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, +to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's +country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could +upon their war resources. If the enemy in his front showed +signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his +ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him, +if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do so. More +specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that +I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was +satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the +fullest extent possible.</p> + +<p>Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River +against Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous +to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of +March, of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken +at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the +taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time +than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from +their command, he would send them back at the time specified by +General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main +object of the Red River expedition, for this force was necessary +to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his expedition +prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River +with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the +balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, +commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, +unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; +that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against +Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be +obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that +New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an +expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a +real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), +instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.</p> + +<p>On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification +and directions, he was instructed as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that +you turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and +the navy.</p> + +<p>"2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of +your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four +thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to +fortifying their positions. At least one-half of the force +required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.</p> + +<p>"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force +to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten +thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would +then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until +active operations can again be resumed west of the river. +According to your last return, this would give you a force of +over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against +Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from +Missouri. If however, you think the force here stated too small +to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession +of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of +your present command for operations against Mobile. With these +and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no +time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon +Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to +Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with +which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with +the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of +approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should +be your base; but, from your long service in the Gulf +Department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended +that your movements shall be co-operative with movements +elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now +add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at +once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and +start at the earliest possible moment.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br>"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his +objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For +his movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the +Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, +moving by his left. Each presented advantages over the other, +with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee would be +cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a +raid. But if we took this route, all we did would have to be +done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it +separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how +to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could +be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the +York or James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take +the lower route.</p> + +<p>The following letter of instruction was addressed to +Major-General B. F. Butler:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall +commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to +have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far +as this object can be accomplished.</p> + +<p>"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three +large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute +necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the +enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be +practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the +enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such +movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the +country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to +guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a +part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's +army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our +attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable +to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of +covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of +covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to +unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, +therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems +practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present +base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect +all the forces from your command that can be spared from +garrison duty--I should say not less than twenty thousand +effective men--to operate on the south side of James River, +Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already +have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina, +under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person. +Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to +command the troops sent into the field from your own department.</p> + +<p>"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress +Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, +or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive +notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of +them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to +deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.</p> + +<p>"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much +force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and +concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as +you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this +time for your further movements.</p> + +<p>"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond +is to be your objective point, and that there is to be +co-operation between your force and the Army of the +Potomac--must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of +your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you +advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his +intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, +and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.</p> + +<p>"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your +direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your +cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, +about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense +advantage.</p> + +<p>"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest +practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may +give for the execution of this order.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On +the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army +and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him +to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved +from Culpeper. The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as +it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of +April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper +and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back +into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his +(General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be +certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, +so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I +would form the junction there; that circumstances might make +this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion +to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he +could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to +move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least +detain as large a force there as possible.</p> + +<p>In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and +Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily +kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate +operations, and also those kept in the background for the +protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and +the armies operating against them.</p> + +<p>A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, +was so held for the protection of West Virginia, and the +frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops +could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the +North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, +they could act directly to their front, and give better +protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement +they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the +protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he +would lose them. General Sigel was therefore directed to +organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move +from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and +Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. +Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own +request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to +give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one +under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten +thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven +thousand men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between +Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery +advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as could be made +available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah +Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would +take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down +the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, +destroying the New River Bridge and the salt-works, at +Saltville, Va.</p> + +<p>Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations +were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in +readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a +general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May.</p> + +<p>My first object being to break the military power of the +rebellion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made +me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement +against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, +unless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this +desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my +determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to +retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large +force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of +Richmond. It was well understood, by both Generals Butler and +Meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention +to put both their armies south of the James River, in case of +failure to destroy Lee without it.</p> + +<p>Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at +Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent +importance of getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying +railroad communication as far south as possible. Believing, +however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it +was reinforced, I made that the objective point of his +operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to move +simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with +safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to +the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from +the north of James River.</p> + +<p>I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I +tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent +command of the Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that +army were all through him, and were general in their nature, +leaving all the details and the execution to him. The campaigns +that followed proved him to be the right man in the right +place. His commanding always in the presence of an officer +superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public +attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he +would otherwise have received.</p> + +<p>The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the +morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and +orders of Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before +night, the whole army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth +corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's +Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in +advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about +four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. The +average distance travelled by the troops that day was about +twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it +removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had +entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an +active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how +so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, +and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth, +Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy +outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged +furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight +as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, +considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the +roads, was done with commendable promptness.</p> + +<p>General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the +Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at +the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, +holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move +until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was +secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was +received. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of +the 4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was +leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some +of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, +crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering +that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was +composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the +accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.</p> + +<p>The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock +on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury +until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same +position that they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark, +the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, +capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable +confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was +personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon +reformed it and restored order. On the morning of the 7th, +reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his +intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of +the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the +two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further +maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his +advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind +his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my whole +force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued +for a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th, the +march was commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth +corps moving on the most direct road. But the enemy having +become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, +was enabled to reach there first. On the 8th, General Warren +met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and +delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at +Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the main +force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable +fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning +of the 9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the +enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, +and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without +decisive results. Among the killed on the 9th was that able and +distinguished soldier Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding the +sixth army corps. Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in +command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was +made on the enemy in position. The second corps, Major-General +Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing +most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of +artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the +advantage gained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, +16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting +the arrival of reinforcements from Washington. Deeming it +impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at +Spottsylvania Court House, orders were issued on the 15th with a +view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at twelve +o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the afternoon of the +19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right +flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. +This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of +the 21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having +the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was +enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of us, and took +position behind it. The fifth corps reached the North Anna on +the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps. +The second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the +second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between +that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing the +same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon +after getting into position he was violently attacked, but +repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. On the 25th, General +Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on which +he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at +Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large +supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; +recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to +Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's +cavalry at Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around +Richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by +assault), recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at +Meadow Bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to +Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he communicated with +General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the +whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy +to guard our trains.</p> + +<p>General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in +pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore +having joined him with the tenth corps. At the same time he +sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of +West Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a +foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under General +Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of +Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th, he occupied, without +opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement +being a complete surprise. On the 6th, he was in position with +his main army, and commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a +reconnoissance against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, +destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the 9th he +telegraphed as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, +<br>May 9, 1864.</p> + +<p>"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.</p> + +<p>"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one +thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the +Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy, and have safely, brought +them to their present position. These were colored cavalry, and +are now holding our advance pickets towards Richmond.</p> + +<p>"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the +same day with our movement up James River, forced the Black +Water, burned the railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below +Petersburg, cutting into Beauregard's force at that point.</p> + +<p>"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles +of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we +can hold out against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up +the supplies.</p> + +<p>"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south +by the cutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which +reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and +wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and +well-contested fight.</p> + +<p>"General Grant will not be troubled with any further +reinforcements to Lee from Beauregard's force.</p> + +<p>"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a +portion of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, +or Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from +the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of +Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to +collect his loose forces in North and South Carolina, and bring +them to the defence of those places. On the 16th, the enemy +attacked General Butler in his position in front of Drury's +Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments +between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy +intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, +the city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, +therefore, though in a position of great security, was as +completely shut off from further operations directly against +Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It +required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it +there.</p> + +<p>On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a +raid against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at +Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula Stations, destroying them, the +railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together +with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, +crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at Wilson's, +Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying the +road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, +which he reached on the 18th.</p> + +<p>On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General +Butler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an +iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. +W. Wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, +the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and +armament captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk, and the +Miami disabled.</p> + +<p>The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically +sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to +bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the +south by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac. In addition +to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less +than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the +scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of +Virginia.</p> + +<p>The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was +difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, +therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough +only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, +I directed that they be sent forward, under command of +Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac.</p> + +<p>On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by +Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the +Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of +Major-General Meade's command.</p> + +<p>Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than +either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th +to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town +to turn the enemy's position by his right.</p> + +<p>Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under +Sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the +Pamunkey River at Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and +on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but +successful engagement with the enemy at Hawes's Shop. On the +29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the +Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and developed the +enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the evening +of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was +repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately +ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted +in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.</p> + +<p>On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the +railroad bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the +enemy's cavalry. General Sheridan, on the same day, reached +Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and +General Smith's command, which had just arrived, via White +House, from General Butler's army.</p> + +<p>On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the +6th corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps +being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. +This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line +of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of +General Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated +assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, +but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. That night +he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, +but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position +for an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted +the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his +position. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the +enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light. It was +the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which +did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own +losses. I would not be understood as saying that all previous +attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as +much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy +severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete +overthrow of the rebellion.</p> + +<p>From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, +it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between +him and the city. I was still in a condition to either move by +his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or +continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the +James. While the former might have been better as a covering +for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me +that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of +Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long, +vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to +guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, +and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication +on the south side of the James. My idea, from the start, had +been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond, if possible. Then, +after destroying his lines of communication north of the James +River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee +in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After +the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy +deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army +he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind +breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of +them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire +behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was +willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I had +designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue +to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking +advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present +themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville +and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection +between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and +when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south +side of the James River, by the enemy's right flank, where I +felt I could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the +canal.</p> + +<p>On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, +got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, +with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near +Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the +work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of +the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions.</p> + +<p>On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, +under General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to +capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and +common bridges across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the +works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the +town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore, finding the +works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault +impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting +one.</p> + +<p>Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I +sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's +command by water, via the White House, to reach there in advance +of the Army of the Potomac. This was for the express purpose of +securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our +intention, could reinforce the place.</p> + +<p>The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the +evening of the 12th. One division of cavalry, under General +Wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long +Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings +of the other corps. The advance corps reached James River, at +Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of +the 13th.</p> + +<p>During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern +Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had +fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell +to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing +the vantage ground of either. The Southern press and people, +with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding +that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New +York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only +defended their Capital and Southern territory. Hence, Antietam, +Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were +by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for +them. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which +could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard +fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North +Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our +side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him +as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His +losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that +we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking +party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The +details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the +part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in +the report of Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports +accompanying it.</p> + +<p>During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the +James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting +base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded +country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to +conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot, +therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary +departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under +the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, +Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all +the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but +little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.</p> + +<p>The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under +General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who +had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his +forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to +General Averell. They crossed the mountains by separate routes. +Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near +Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and +Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges +and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with +Crook at Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the +Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, +after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and +retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the operations of +General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command, +and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him. His +instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to +Major-General H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA. +<br>"May 20, 1864.</p> +<br> +<br>***************************************** +<br> +<p> "The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as +are brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On +the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General +Hunter to move in that direction; reach Staunton and +Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much +opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he +will be doing good service. * * *</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."</p> + + +<br><br><br><br> +<p> +"JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.</p> + +<p>"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he +should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal +should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. +Completing this, he could find his way back to his original +base, or from about Gordonsville join this army.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up +the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at +Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated +him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred +men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small +arms. On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with +Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct +on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he reached and invested +on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was very successful; +and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance +stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, +no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point. The +destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very +great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee +sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached +Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on +the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition +to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, +this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his +return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his +troops for several weeks from the defence of the North.</p> + +<p>Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of +Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been +in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the +enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If +it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James +River Canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg +and the force sent for its defence. I have never taken +exception to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now +disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted +within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions +and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his +movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the +commendation of his country.</p> + +<p>To return to the Army of the Potomac: The 2d corps commenced +crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by +ferry-boats at Wilcox's Landing. The laying of the pontoon- +bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the +crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward +by both bridge and ferry.</p> + +<p>After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to +Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate +capture of Petersburg.</p> + +<p>The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him +to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the +troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he +then held. I told him that I would return at once to the Army +of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to +Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we +could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy +could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as +directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg +before daylight next morning, but for some reason that I have +never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready +to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part +of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines +north-east of Petersburg from the Appomattox River, for a +distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces +of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about seven +P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no +other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had +reinforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The +night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to +further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the +2d corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the +service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to +the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the +position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But +instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into +Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of +his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.</p> + +<p>By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. +An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by +the troops under Smith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required +until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position. +The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with +but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and +resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works +of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously +captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over +four hundred prisoners.</p> + +<p>The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and +persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only +resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which +he could not be dislodged. The advantages of position gained by +us were very great. The army then proceeded to envelop +Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far as possible +without attacking fortifications.</p> + +<p>On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a +part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, +no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the place +of those withdrawn before we could discover it. General Butler, +taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad +between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was apprised of +the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions +of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking +at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to report to +General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was +notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of +his present line urged upon him.</p> + +<p>About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced +back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. +General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on +the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong +picket-line the enemy's works. But instead of putting these +divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them +to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. +Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy +attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.</p> + +<p>On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was +effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the +north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by +pontoon-bridge with Bermuda Hundred.</p> + +<p>On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition +against the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House +just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled +it to retire. The result of this expedition was, that General +Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the +morning of the 11th of June, whom he attacked, and after an +obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. He +left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about +four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On the 12th +he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa Court +House. This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advanced +in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced +by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles +from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault. On +the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the +enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by +infantry. Night closed the contest. Not having sufficient +ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being +without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), +and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command +to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return +march, reaching White House at the time before stated. After +breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the James +River, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. He +commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan, without +further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.</p> + +<p>On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of +the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry +of the Army of the James moved against the enemy's railroads +south of Richmond. Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's +Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and +the South Side road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near +Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the +enemy's cavalry. He reached Burkesville Station on the +afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville +Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, +where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which +he could not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, +and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon +Railroad crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe but not +decisive engagement. Thence he made a detour from his left with +a view of reaching Reams's Station (supposing it to be in our +possession). At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, +supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of +his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, General +Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made +his way into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of +his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming +in safely on our left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this +expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. It +severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several +weeks.</p> + +<p>With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond +to the Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his +army in the Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to +take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from +Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of +the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the +night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and two divisions of the +cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank +of the James River and joined the force General Butler had +there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched +position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the +28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market +Road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in +heavy force. The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in +considerable loss to both sides. The first object of this move +having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by +the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made, +by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back +there. One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night +of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th +corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be +foot-loose in the assault to be made. The other two divisions +of the 2d corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the +night of the 29th and moved in front of Petersburg. On the +morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was +sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the +advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps, +immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, +and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a +detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to +advance promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I +have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have +fallen. Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the +time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from +his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this +point for its defence. The captured line thus held being +untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, +but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what +promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.</p> + +<p>Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter +was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus +laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and +Pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that +valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, +General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was directed +to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to +Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by +reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was +experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore, +to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For +this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating +against Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then +fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf +Department, under orders issued immediately after the +ascertainment of the result of the Red River expedition. The +garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up +of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments +from the invalid corps. One division under command of General +Ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the +remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under General Wright, +were subsequently sent to Washington. On the 3d of July the +enemy approached Martinsburg. General Sigel, who was in command +of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at +Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, +crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards +Frederick City. General Wallace, with Rickett's division and +his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, +pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the +enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the +railroad bridge. His force was not sufficient to insure +success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it +resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and +thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with +two division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th +corps, before him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, +his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the +10th. On the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of +Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. A +severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and +eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was probably +greater. He commenced retreating during the night. Learning +the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by +telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th, +the assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of +all the troops that could be made available to operate in the +field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside +of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to +the last moment. General Wright commenced the pursuit on the +13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snicker's Ferry, on +the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th, +General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel +army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and +several hundred prisoners.</p> + +<p>Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or +Richmond, I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to +the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be +used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops +sent by him into the valley; and that Hunter should remain in +the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy +and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I +felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact +would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave +Washington. Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the +order to return to the James.</p> + +<p>About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again +advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, +then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's +Ferry. The rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding +party into Pennsylvania which on the 30th burned Chambersburg, +and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards +Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and +with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West +Virginia. From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires +were frequently down between Washington and City Point, making +it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. It +took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches +through and return answers would be received showing a +different state of facts from those on which they were based, +causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must +have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and +rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they +otherwise would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident +to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of +all the forces in the Department of West Virginia, Washington, +Susquehanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended.</p> + +<p>On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in +person to Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, +with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces +against Early. At this time the enemy was concentrated in the +neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under General +Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of +the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy +Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I +hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces +at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. +Therefore, on the 4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's +command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. On +arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I +issued to him the following instructions:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, +<br>August 5, 1864--8 P.M.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in +the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards +and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in +this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be +saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has +moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following +him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south +of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is +ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the +Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a +competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the +raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a +force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington +via Rockville may be taken into account.</p> + +<p>"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of +the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and +horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further +orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. One +brigade will probably start to-morrow. In pushing up the +Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go +first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to +invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and +stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be +consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings +should be destroyed--they should rather be protected; but the +people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist +among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we +are determined to stop them at all hazards.</p> + +<p>"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do +this you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your +course by the course he takes.</p> + +<p>"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving +regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in +the country through which you march.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance +reached Halltown that night.</p> + +<p>General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a +willingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have +General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by +the morning train, with orders to take general command of all +the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at +Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of +instructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan +arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with +him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned +to City Point by way of Washington.</p> + +<p>On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments +of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted +into the "Middle Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan +was assigned to temporary command of the same.</p> + +<p>Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and +Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The +first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.</p> + +<p>His operations during the month of August and the fore part of +September were both of an offensive and defensive character, +resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, +in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement +took place. The two armies lay in such a position--the enemy on +the west bank of the Opequon Creek covering Winchester, and our +forces in front of Berryville--that either could bring on a +battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy +the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances +before another army could be interposed to check him. Under +these circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to +be taken. Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, +and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by +the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the +importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from +continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the +risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an +attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's +feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City +Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters, +to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. I met +him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each +army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and +expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but +two words of instructions necessary--Go in! For the +conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were +kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him if he could get out his +teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing +Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could before daylight +on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add, +that the result was such that I have never since deemed it +necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.</p> + +<p>Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked +General Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a +most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in +the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire +position from Opequon Creek to Winchester, capturing several +thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. The enemy +rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, +where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the +20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through +Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After +stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and +provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg, and +took position on the north side of Cedar Creek.</p> + +<p>Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again +returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry +encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, +with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and +fifty prisoners. On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the +mountains which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded +the North Fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under +cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left +flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole +line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much +confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and +Newtown. At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at +Winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field, +arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the +enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in +turn with great vigor. The enemy was defeated with great +slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and +the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of his +army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of +Staunton and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus +ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the +Shenandoah Valley. I was now enabled to return the 6th corps to +the Army of the Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan's +army to the Army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia, +to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus +enable him to move without detaching from his force for that +purpose.</p> + +<p>Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy +had detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early +in the Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the 2d corps and +Gregg's division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a +force of General Butler's army, on the night of the 13th of +August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, +to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to +draw back those sent. In this move we captured six pieces of +artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that +were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one +division (Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone.</p> + +<p>The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist +this movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was +moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the Weldon +Railroad. During the day he had considerable fighting. To +regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and +desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great +loss. On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of +the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the +front at Petersburg. On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's +division of cavalry, while at Reams's Station destroying the +railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of +our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the +hands of the enemy.</p> + +<p>By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from +the City Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad, +enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the +army in front of Petersburg.</p> + +<p>The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled +the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few +troops north of the James for the defence of Richmond. On the +night of the 28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the +18th corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's +army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced +on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong +fortifications and intrenchments below Chaffin's Farm, known as +Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the +New Market Road and intrenchments. This success was followed up +by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of +the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with +heavy loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to +the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the +enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. The position +captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond, that I +determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate +attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for +which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th, General Meade +sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy's +line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of +troops to the north side. In this reconnoissance we captured +and held the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the +afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained +were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall +back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. +Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the +enemy with great loss.</p> + +<p>On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north +of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, +wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight +or nine pieces. This he followed up by an attack on our +intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe +slaughter. On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by +General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new +works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to +us.</p> + +<p>On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient +men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right +flank. The 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th +corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, +forced a passage of Hatcher's Run, and moved up the south side +of it towards the South Side Railroad, until the 2d corps and +part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Road where it +crosses Hatcher's Run. At this point we were six miles distant +from the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement +to reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end +of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself +for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and +shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified +line. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon +receiving a report that General Warren had connected with +General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I +left the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap +between Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as +reported, and made a desperate attack on General Hancock's right +and rear. General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet +it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, +and withdrew that night to his old position.</p> + +<p>In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration +on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the +Williamsburg Road, and also on the York River Railroad. In the +former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in +carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces +withdrawn to their former positions.</p> + +<p>From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and +Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the +defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements +for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent +his detaching any considerable force to send south. By the 7th +of February, our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the +Weldon Railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.</p> + +<p>General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with +the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, +respectively, by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon +Johnston's army at Dalton; but finding the enemy's position at +Buzzard's Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, +General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, while +Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the +north. This movement was successful. Johnston, finding his +retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified +position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of +May 15th. A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy +retreated south. Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken +near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. The next +morning, however, he had again disappeared. He was vigorously +pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on the 19th, but during +the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah. While these +operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's division +of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts +and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. General +Sherman, having give his army a few days' rest at this point, +again put it in motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of +turning the difficult pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of +the 25th, the advance, under General Hooker, had a severe battle +with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope Church, near +Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point. The +most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General +McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.</p> + +<p>On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position +at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of +Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the +two last-named places, and concentrate his army on Kenesaw, +where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson made a +determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of the 2d of +July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and +on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence +of this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the +Chattahoochee.</p> + +<p>General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men +rest and get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed +his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large +portion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to +Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston +in command of the rebel army, and assuming the +offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon +Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and +determined of which was on the 22d of July. About one P.M. of +this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson +was killed. General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the Army +of the Tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was +superseded by Major-General Howard, on the 26th, with the same +success and ability that had characterized him in the command of +a corps or division.</p> + +<p>In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. +Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General +Sherman, after securing his line of communications across the +Chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left +flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy +from his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and after +defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and +Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of +September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.</p> + +<p>About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, +attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was +repulsed at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it +proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and +was finally driven south of the Tennessee. The damage done by +this raid was repaired in a few days.</p> + +<p>During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau +joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, +having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery +Railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also +made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the +remaining Railroad communication with Atlanta. The first two +were successful the latter, disastrous.</p> + +<p>General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was +prompt, skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank +movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever +be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history.</p> + +<p>His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, +accompanying it, give the details of that most successful +campaign.</p> + +<p>He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a +single-track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was +operating. This passed the entire distance through a hostile +country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The +cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in Northern +Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far +enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreat +disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the +possibility of further use. To guard against this danger, +Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to +operate against Forrest in West Tennessee. He directed General +Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier-General S. D. +Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On the morning +of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown, +Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and +confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, +hotly pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was +defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of communications. +The persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted +him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. In the +meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the Army +of the Tennessee that had been sent by General Sherman to General +Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return from Red River, where +they had done most excellent service. He was directed by +General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against +Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which has +characterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July, +he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him +badly. The fighting continued through three days. Our loss was +small compared with that of the enemy. Having accomplished the +object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis.</p> + +<p>During the months of March and April this same force under +Forrest annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it +captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th +attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois +Volunteers. Colonel H., having but a small force, withdrew to +the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and +drove him from the place.</p> + +<p>On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel +General Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to +surrender, but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th +New Jersey Volunteers, that being placed there by his Government +with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from +it, surrender was out of the question.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, +Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and +the 1st Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major +Booth. The garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in +the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and, +after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and +merciless massacre of the garrison.</p> + +<p>On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared +before Paducah, but was again driven off.</p> + +<p>Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's +operations, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted +of these was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thousand +cavalry, he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter +part of May. On the 11th of June they attacked and captured +Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th he was +overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy +loss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious +guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, +Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General +Gillem.</p> + +<p>In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the +Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements +of the troops sent by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, +I am unable to give the date of its starting. The troops under +General Smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a +detachment of the 17th army corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of +March, and reached the designated point on Red River one day +earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel forces +at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the +14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying +the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed +forward to Fort de Russy, which had been left with a weak +garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred +and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many +small-arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15th he pushed +forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. On +the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's +Hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten +prisoners and four pieces of artillery.</p> + +<p>On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the +rebel General Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th, General Banks +had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to +Grand Ecore. On the morning of April 6th he moved from Grand +Ecore. On the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the +enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the field. On the +same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond +Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the 8th, +at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and +defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and +an immense amount of transportation and stores. During the +night, General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another +battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great +loss. During the night, General Banks continued his retrograde +movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he +reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious difficulty arose +in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied the +expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much +since they passed up as to prevent their return. At the +suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under +his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the +channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids +in safety.</p> + +<p>The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after +considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached +Morganzia and Point Coupee near the end of the month. The +disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of +the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans +of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of +Mobile.</p> + +<p>On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with +the 7th army corps, to cooperate with General Banks's +expedition on the Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the +28th. On the 16th of April, after driving the enemy before him, +he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in Washita County, by General +Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe +skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele +reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of April.</p> + +<p>On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks +on Red River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's +Mill, in Dallas County, General Steele determined to fall back +to the Arkansas River. He left Camden on the 26th of April, and +reached Little Rock on the 2d of May. On the 30th of April, the +enemy attacked him while crossing Saline River at Jenkins's +Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. Our loss was +about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.</p> + +<p>Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the +"Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore +directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies +operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his +command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the +positions and lines of communications he then occupied.</p> + +<p>Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, +General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy +that was collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith +met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of +June. Our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded.</p> + +<p>In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General +Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to +co-operate with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile +Bay. On the 8th of August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the +combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and +abandoned.</p> + +<p>On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe +bombardment, surrendered on the 23d. The total captures +amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, +and one hundred and four pieces of artillery.</p> + +<p>About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel +General Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had +reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. +J. Smith's command, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman, +was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same +time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This +made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and +no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and +drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in +Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of +September, Price attacked Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to +retreat, and thence moved north to the Missouri River, and +continued up that river towards Kansas. General Curtis, +commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such +forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while +General Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.</p> + +<p>The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, +with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large +number of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern +Arkansas. The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam +over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable +mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force +may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not +have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before +the latter reached Pilot Knob.</p> + +<p>September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the +Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the +garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which +capitulated on the 24th. Soon after the surrender two regiments +of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were +compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the railroad +westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, +skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the +same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near +Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the 30th, one column +of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville, +and summoned the surrender of the garrison. Receiving an answer +in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until +next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received +the same reply as on the night before. He withdrew in the +direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned, and +attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without +success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but +was handsomely repulsed.</p> + +<p>Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the +morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning +of the 3d he moved towards Mount Pleasant. While these +operations were going on, every exertion was made by General +Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could +recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to +Corinth, Mississippi.</p> + +<p>In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to +destroy the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy +on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from +Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position +around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge +him. During the night he withdrew his command and returned to +Kentucky.</p> + +<p>General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his +armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations +for refitting and supplying them for future service. The great +length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, +which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest.</p> + +<p>During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, +Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon +became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the +enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them. He +exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been +beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the +defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against +the army that had so often defeated it.</p> + +<p>In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon +reported to the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's +right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, +and moved north on it.</p> + +<p>General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the +remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, +Alabama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the +roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General +Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, +with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as +follows:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA +<br>"October 10--noon.</p> + +<p>"Dispatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing +Coosa River, twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes +over the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan +of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas +with the troops now in Tennessee to defend the State? He will +have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach +Nashville.</p> + +<p>"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. +<br><br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this +dispatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:</p> + +<p>"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's +should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get +Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be +instructed to hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get +Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the +Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in +final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to +be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the +city of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a +letter of mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch +of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in +which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington, +and of the situation in Virginia, etc.</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,</p> + +<p>"October 11, 1864--11 A.M.</p> + +<p>"Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if +Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using +the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply +his base on the Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If +he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting +north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do +not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked +by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as +are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for +Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater +damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If +there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, +but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be +able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your +movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until +the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such +lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from +going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, +you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than +heretofore.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<br><br><br><br> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"KINGSTON, GEORGIA, +<br>"October 11--11 A.M.</p> + +<p>"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and +Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He +threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to +follow. I hold Atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong +detachments along my line. This reduces my active force to a +comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the +defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold +cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would +infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the +country from Chattanooga to Atlanta including the latter city +send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective +army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood +may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be +forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I +would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means +to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in +war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, +Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee.</p> + +<p>"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.</p> + +<p>"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. +<br><br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<br><br><br><br> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, +<br>"October 11,1864--11.30 P.M.</p> + +<p>"Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the +trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the +Tennessee River firmly, you may make it, destroying all the +railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br>"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + + +<p> +It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting +through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern +railroads, leading east and west, through Georgia, to +effectually sever the east from the west. In other words, cut +the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once +by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River. General +Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.</p> + +<p>General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his +proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime +to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward +from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th +corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and the 23d corps, +Major-General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga to +report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed +in command of all the troops of his military division, save the +four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with +through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, +there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line +of the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would +be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore +readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast.</p> + +<p>Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of +November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and +Macon. His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. +Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the +country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own +might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, +instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, +however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the +only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the +Mississippi River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the +whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice.</p> + +<p>How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met +with, the condition of the country through which the armies +passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River, +and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are all +clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report.</p> + +<p>Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two +expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from +Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the +enemy's lines of communication with Mobile and detain troops in +that field. General Foster, commanding Department of the South, +also sent an expedition, via Broad River, to destroy the railroad +between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg, +under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (colonel +3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of +November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad bridge +and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles +of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of +stores. The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable +results. The expedition from the Department of the South, under +the immediate command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, +consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a +brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad River and debarked at +Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it moved to +strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about three +miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a +strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe +fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and +forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night +General Hatch withdrew. On the 6th of December General Foster +obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah +Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and Tulifinny rivers.</p> + +<p>Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move +northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain +doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both +armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he +seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October, the advance of +Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but +failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and +succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment +on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the +28th, Forrest reached the Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured +a gunboat and three transports. On the 2d of November he planted +batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of +the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. On +the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was +replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats +becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, +to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a +million and a half dollars' worth of store and property on the +levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the +enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee +River, above Johnsonville, moving towards Clifton, and +subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th, General +Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached +Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to +Pulaski, and was put in command of all the troopers there, with +instruction to watch the movements of Hood and retard his +advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival +of General A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until +General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.</p> + +<p>On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General +Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards +Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and +gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. The enemy +coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield, +at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during +the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance +repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven +hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and +three thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six +general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our +entire loss was two thousand three hundred. This was the first +serious opposition the enemy met with, and I am satisfied was +the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night, +General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This left the +field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily +abandoned--so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought +together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment +of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.</p> + +<p>As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the +Tennessee River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, +General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the +troops of General A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops +as he could spare. The advance of this reinforcement reached +Nashville on the 30th of November.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked +Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated +and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in +our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, +including four general officers.</p> + +<p>Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it +appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was +increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of +cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood +would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. +After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately +assuming the offensive, I started West to superintend matters +there in person. Reaching Washington City, I received General +Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the +result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. +All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet +satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the +appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to +fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given +him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which +delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it +impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final +defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a +vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.</p> + +<p>After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued +by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to +abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his +transportation. On the 28th of December our advanced forces +ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side +of the river.</p> + +<p>About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee +and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army +transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit +by his main force at the Tennessee River. A small force of +cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania +Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance, +capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's +pontoon-bridge. The details of these operations will be found +clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.</p> + +<p>A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, +started from Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he +surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, +Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, destroyed the +railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for +Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large +amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he +attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and +destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the +south-west, he struck the Mississippi Central Railroad at +Winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at +Bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at Grenada, +arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.</p> + +<p>During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a +force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On +the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near +Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred +prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated +to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to +near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General +Ammen. Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman +concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near +Bean's Station to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or +drive him into Virginia--destroy the salt-works at Saltville, +and the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without +endangering his command. On the 12th of December he commenced +his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces +wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, under +Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to +Wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred +and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its +stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. +Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, +consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, +that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to +attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge +gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the +extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, +and captured eight pieces of artillery. Having thus +successfully executed his instructions, he returned General +Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.</p> + +<p>Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast +port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from +abroad, and send cotton and other products out by +blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic +value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the +harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature +of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required +watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the +land north of New Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for +the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of +blockade-runners.</p> + +<p>To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation +of a land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately +commenced the assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. +Porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for +concentration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted +the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal North; +and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely +of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the +expedition became a subject of common discussion in the +newspapers both North and South. The enemy, thus warned, +prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the +expedition until the later part of November, when, being again +called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, +I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, +in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we +had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and +the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men +was regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not +definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by +the 6th of December, if not before. Learning, on the 30th of +November, that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most +of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost +importance that the expedition should reach its destination +before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to make +all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who +had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy +might not be detained one moment.</p> + +<p>On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General +Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If +successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington +itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if +advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the +enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The +directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the +expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of +where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be +taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting +a landing on the main land between Cape Fear River and the +Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such +landing be effected while the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and +the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the +troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the +navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in +our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of +Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of +land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops +immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to +capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise. If time is +consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the +second will become a matter of after consideration.</p> + +<p>"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer +immediately in command of the troops.</p> + +<p>"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a +landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the +armies operating against Richmond without delay.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were +taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they +were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and +instructions should go through him. They were so sent, but +General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never +received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their +existence, until he read General Butler's published official +report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my indorsement and +papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General Butler's +accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off +from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General +Weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in +command. I rather formed the idea that General Butler was +actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of +the powder-boat. The expedition was detained several days at +Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.</p> + +<p>The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without +any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon +General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.</p> + +<p>The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and +arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort +Fisher, on the evening of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on +the evening of the 18th, having put in at Beaufort to get +ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it +difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being +about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to +replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the +return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The +powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the +return of General Butler from Beaufort; but it would seem, from +the notice taken of it in the Southern newspapers, that the +enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion +until they were informed by the Northern press.</p> + +<p>On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a +reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up +towards the fort. But before receiving a full report of the +result of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct +violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation +of the troops and the return of the expedition. The +re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th.</p> + +<p>On the return of the expedition officers and men among them +Brevet Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. +Curtis, First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York +Volunteers, First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and +Second-Lieutenant George Simpson, 142d New York Volunteers +voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly +into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken +without much loss.</p> + +<p>Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch +from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral +Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, +and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the +place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was, that +when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so +also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of +December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would +send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This +time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. +Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it +consisted of the same that composed the former, with the +addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five +hundred, and a small siege train. The latter it was never found +necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the +expedition the following instructions:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL: The expedition intrusted to your command has been +fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., +and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then +proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet +lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself +and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic +Blockading Squadron.</p> + +<p>"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete +understanding should exist between yourself and the naval +commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral +Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each +branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of +action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid down +in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that +you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he +proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is +consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to +be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on +which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against +that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving +your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces +sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If +such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will +not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another +plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.</p> + +<p>"My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought +to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the +balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot +invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or +reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy.</p> + +<p>"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort +Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other +supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.</p> + +<p>"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is +assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or +such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for +orders.</p> + +<p>"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back +to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further +instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.</p> + +<p>"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops +to Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops +will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels +until you are heard from. Should you require them, they will be +sent to you.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + + +<p> +Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet +brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was +assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.</p> + +<p>It will be seen that these instructions did not differ +materially from those given for the first expedition, and that +in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. +This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the +commanding officer.</p> + +<p>The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the +6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, +where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until +the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its +destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet, the +disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the +13th, and by three o'clock P.M. was completed without loss. On +the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred +yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession +of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that +might be made from the fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the +fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by +the navy fire. In the afternoon of the 15th the fort was +assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with +its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by the +combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important +successes of the war. Our loss was: killed, one hundred and +ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On the 16th and the +17th the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works +on Smith's Island, which were immediately occupied by us. This +gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.</p> + +<p>At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and +Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of +Virginia and North Carolina.</p> + +<p>The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the +force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now +threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation +for General Thomas's surplus troops--fields from which they +would co-operate with other movements. General Thomas was +therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold +his communications at Eastport, in readiness for orders. On the +7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of +the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General +Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as +possible. This direction was promptly complied with, and the +advance of the corps reached Washington on the 23d of the same +month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and New Bern. On the +26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's command and a +division of cavalry to report to General Canby. By the 7th of +February the whole force was en route for its destination.</p> + +<p>The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military +department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and +placed under the orders of Major-General Sherman. The following +instructions were given him:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:-- ******** Your movements are intended as +co-operative with Sherman's through the States of South and +North Carolina. The first point to be attained is to secure +Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objective point, +moving either from Wilmington or New Bern, or both, as you deem +best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will +advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place +with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road +behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the +first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his +march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on +his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine +which of the two points, Wilmington or New Bern, you can best +use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will +commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for +sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of +these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the +interior as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer +has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the +subject of securing supplies for his army. You will learn what +steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions +accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary.</p> + +<p>"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective +departments in the field with me at City Point. Communicate +with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary +at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which +point you can communicate by telegraph.</p> + +<p>"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of +those required for your own command.</p> + +<p>"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your +imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the +interior to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own +judgment without waiting for instructions. You will report, +however, what you purpose doing. The details for carrying out +these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, +however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to +the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for +in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the +28th of February; this limits your time very materially.</p> + +<p>"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, +it can be supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad +men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will +go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed +you by telegraph.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, +accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for +myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with +General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.</p> + +<p>Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his army +entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, +the Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several +months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and +regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important +operation towards closing the rebellion--I sent orders to +General Sherman on the 6th of December, that after establishing +a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all +his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with +the balance of his command.</p> + +<p>On the 18th of December, having received information of the +defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and +that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean +transportation, it would take over two months to transport +Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as +much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, +I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to +what would be best to do. A few days after this I received a +communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, +acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing +me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he +could get transportation. Also that he had expected, upon +reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South +Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me; but +that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of +Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the +middle of January. The confidence he manifested in this letter +of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without +waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him, on +the 28th of December, to make preparations to start as he +proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and +South Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond +as soon as he could.</p> + +<p>On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had +ordered the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, +east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we +had at Fort Fisher, about eight thousand men; at New Bern, about +four thousand; that if Wilmington was captured, General Schofield +would go there; if not, he would be sent to New Bern; that, in +either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to +the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his +movement; that from either point railroad communication could be +run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders +as he came into communication with them.</p> + +<p>In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to +reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy +under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the +Cape Fear River. Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the +west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, +the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it.</p> + +<p>After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington +on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards +Goldsboro' during the night. Preparations were at once made for +a movement on Goldsboro' in two columns--one from Wilmington, and +the other from New Bern--and to repair the railroad leading there +from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape +Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The +column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March, at Wise's +Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred +prisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our +intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell +back during the night. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed +and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. +The column from Wilmington reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse +River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on the 22d.</p> + +<p>By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in +motion from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on +the 17th; thence moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via +Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March, +opening up communication with General Schofield by way of Cape +Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro'. He +met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a severe fight +defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in this +engagement was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much +greater. On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under +Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing +three guns and driving it back upon the main body. General +Slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of +Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the +defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which +were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the enemy +retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our +hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place +had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the +Neuse River ten miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General +Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), +thus forming a junction with the columns from New Bern and +Wilmington.</p> + +<p>Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of +Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the +night of the 17th of February, and occupied by our forces on the +18th.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was +directed to send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, +from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down +towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military +resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to East +Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our +prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this +latter, however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's +movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all +the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution +of this. General Stoneman was so late in making his start on +this expedition (and Sherman having passed out of the State of +South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed General +Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of +last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he +could. This would keep him between our garrisons in East +Tennessee and the enemy. I regarded it not impossible that in +the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond, he might fall +back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid north through East +Tennessee. On the 14th of February the following communication +was sent to General Thomas:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.</p> + +<p>"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against +Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of +about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The +cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. +It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will +move from there eastward, in co-operation. Hood's army has been +terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in +Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by +the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a +large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so +asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel +Congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it +had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This +being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will +attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance +from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore, +that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, +and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be +threefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as +possible, to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the +enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to +destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. +Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the +expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as +the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion +should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go +where, according to the information he may receive, he will best +secure the objects named above.</p> + +<p>"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know +what number of men you can put into the field. If not more than +five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be +sufficient. It is not desirable that you should start this +expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or +four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will +start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If +you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, +you can act on the information received.</p> + +<p>"To insure success your cavalry should go with as little +wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for +supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, +or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns +taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight +horses.</p> + +<p>"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force +you think you will be able to send under these directions.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon +after the 20th as he could get it off.</p> + +<p>I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement +of the armies operating against Richmond, that all +communications with the city, north of James River, should be +cut off. The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from +the Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent +from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce Sherman, if practicable, +whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the +enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, +if successful. would accomplish the first at least, and possibly +the latter of the objects. I therefore telegraphed General +Sheridan as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865--1 P.M.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:--As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will +have no difficulty about reaching Lychburg with a cavalry force +alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in +every direction, so as to be of no further use to the +rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look +after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might +get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the +streams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and +join General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about +starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or +give thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or +eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, then +thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight +thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, +Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out +the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to +leave mothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise +you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston +was evacuated on Tuesday 1st.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, +inquiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him +definite information as to the points he might be expected to +move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer, the +following telegram was sent him:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of +opposition he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, +he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit +out for a new start. I think, however, all danger for the +necessity of going to that point has passed. I believe he has +passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way to +Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided +in your after movements by the information you obtain. Before +you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him +moving from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy +strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with +railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or +New Bern.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + + +<p> +General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, +with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand +each. On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which the +enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the +Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d, +the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed on +to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an +intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to +make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the +position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven +pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two +hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen +battle-flags, were captured. The prisoners, under an escort of +fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester. Thence he +marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad +and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here +he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond +and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north +and south forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of +his trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea +of capturing Lynchburg. On the morning of the 6th, dividing his +force into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it +marched up the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every +lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. From here a +force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to +obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that +place, but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The +enemy also burned the bridge across the river at +Hardwicksville. The other column moved down the railroad +towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Court House, +sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting +with the column at New Market. The river being very high, his +pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having +destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river +and get on the South Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroy +it to Appomattox Court House, the only thing left for him was to +return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House. +Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market he took up +his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond, +destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever +practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, +concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he +rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his +whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him +at White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th. An +infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White +House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a +direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he +crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges +and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of +the Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.</p> + +<p>Previous to this the following communication was sent to General +Thomas:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, +<br>March 7, 1865--9.30 A.M.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repair +the railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to +Bull's Gap and fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could +always be got forward as required. With Bull's Gap fortified, +you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be +prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make +a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina. I do not +think Stoneman should break the road until he gets into +Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may +be caught west of that.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was +moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending +it under General Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large +and well-appointed cavalry expeditions--one from Middle +Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson against the enemy's +vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, under +Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--and assembling the +remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence +offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's +cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James +were confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of +Richmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, +reinforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; +General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign +against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the +Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in +the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion +or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.</p> + +<p>After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter +roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At +this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear +that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and +Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, and before he +was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an +effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March, General Sheridan moved +from White House, crossed the James River at Jones's Landing, and +formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in front of +Petersburg on the 27th. During this move, General Ord sent +forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.</p> + +<p>On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general +movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, +<br>March 24, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against +Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of +turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg, +and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, +which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and +destroy the South Side and Danville railroads. Two corps of the +Army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking +the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest where the present +line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards +Dinwiddie Court House.</p> + +<p>"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now +under General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon +Road and the Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter +before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column +before reaching Stony Creek. General Sheridan will then move +independently, under other instructions which will be given +him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the +Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military +Division not required for guarding property belonging to their +arm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be +added to the defences of City Point. Major-General Parke will +be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines +about Petersburg and City Point, subject of course to orders +from the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The 9th army +corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so +long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If, however, +the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the +left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the +position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon +Road. All troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in +readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be +designated when the order is given.</p> + +<p>"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one +colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present +lines, and march for the present left of the Army of the +Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until further +orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left +column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the +right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel will be +left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army +of the James.</p> + +<p>"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence +on the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind +the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the +absence of the main army. A cavalry expedition, from General +Ord's command, will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there +on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the +purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if +accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from +three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should, +however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared +from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry +crosses the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at +Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon +Road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the +triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The +railroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of +carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation +of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke. +All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks +and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as +possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of +days' supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will +direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient +supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in +passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in +wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will +carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The +densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making +the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with +the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, +at the option of the army commanders.</p> + +<p>"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into +operation may be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th +corps should be massed as much as possible. While I would not +now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, +they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy +weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In +case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could +follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the +army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations +issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General +Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at +all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A +success north of the James should be followed up with great +promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found +that the enemy has detached largely. In that case it may be +regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local +reserves principally for the defence of Richmond. Preparations +may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James, +except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a +break is made in the lines of the enemy.</p> + +<p>"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating +against Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, +as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in +the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl +everything against the moving column, and return. It cannot be +impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the +trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of +it. The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does +so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a +weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly enjoined +upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, +those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding +officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move +promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also +enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when +other parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would +urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines +in front of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River +towards our left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the +line to the right and left of it, established themselves and +turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either +flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when +the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and +wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. Our loss was +sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and +five hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered the +other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective +fronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's +strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th +corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. The enemy +made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without +success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight +hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven +missing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.</p> + +<p>General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about +Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them +perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and +stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously +written me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed +for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his +command to bear against Lee's army, in co-operation with our +forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg. General Sherman +proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by +turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or +thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and +Danville Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, +or join the armies operating against Richmond, as might be +deemed best. This plan he was directed to carry into execution, +if he received no further directions in the meantime. I +explained to him the movement I had ordered to commence on the +29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirely +successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy +the Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the +enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid +concentration of Lee's and Johnston's armies.</p> + +<p>I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the +report that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was +firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be +the signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a +long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the +summer, might become necessary. By moving out I would put the +army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the +destruction of the Danville Road, retard the concentration of the +two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon +much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore +determined not to delay the movement ordered.</p> + +<p>On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions +of the 24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one +division of the 25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, +and MacKenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance +of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned +him near Hatcher's Run on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th +the following instructions were given to General Sheridan:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at +three A.M. to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about nine A.M., +having but about three miles to march to reach the point +designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after +the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House. Move your cavalry at +as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any +particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads +in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to +or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as +soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in +his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. +Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be +attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and +with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as +circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will +probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, +and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched +line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road. If you +find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side +Road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some +extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you +reach the Danville Road, which I would like you to strike as +near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on +that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the +South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like +manner.</p> + +<p>"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, +which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may +return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you +may go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should +you select the latter course, get the information to me as early +as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the +cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our +infantry line extended to the Quaker Road, near its intersection +with the Boydton Plank Road. The position of the troops from +left to right was as follows: Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, +Wright, Parke.</p> + +<p>Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the +capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was +made. I therefore addressed the following communication to +General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to +cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he +received notice from me to do so:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to +Dinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the +Jerusalem Plank Road to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can +be used advantageously. After getting into line south of +Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. +General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker Road +intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing +about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was +pushing on when last heard from.</p> + +<p>"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, +before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose +and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning push +around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. The +movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your +action. We will act all together as one army here, until it is +seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal-officer at +Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a cavalry +column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg, +taking forty minutes to pass.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain +fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled +vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. +During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court House +towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in full force. +General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton +Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of getting +across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front +and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he +was, and fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his +front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. +Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their +fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's +lines. The two latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting +us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I +conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated +if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined, +therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce +General Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him +to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the +other corps assault the enemy's lines. The result of the +offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted +Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. The enemy's +intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the +lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some +points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. +Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys's +corps, to report to General Sheridan; but the condition of the +roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the 31st, +General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the +White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, +he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which +was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on +the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, +forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A +division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the +enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the White +Oak Road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his +cavalry got possession of the Five Forks; but the enemy, after +the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry, +defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards +Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed great +generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on +the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, +he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough +to take charge of the horses. This compelled the enemy to +deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made +his progress slow. At this juncture he dispatched to me what had +taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie +Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and one division of +the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon +after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could +hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two +divisions of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so +ordered at once. Thus the operations of the day necessitated +the sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of +Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended +movements. On the morning of the 1st of April, General +Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on +Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried +his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and +between five and six thousand prisoners.</p> + +<p>About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles +Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th +corps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some +apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his +lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan +before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position +and open the way for retreat. To guard against this, General +Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, +and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in +the morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's +lines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, +sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's +Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was +closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command, +until he met the other division of General Ord's that had +succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's Run. +Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and +closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, +while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and +joined General Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in +carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, +but was unable to carry his inner line. General Sheridan being +advised of the condition of affairs, returned General Miles to +his proper command. On reaching the enemy's lines immediately +surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by +a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the +most salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materially +shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the +city. The enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to +Sutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by Miles's +division. A severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his +right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General +Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station towards Petersburg, +and a division sent by General Meade from the front of +Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in +our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by +the main road along the Appomattox River. During the night of +the 2d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and +retreated towards Danville. On the morning of the 3d pursuit +was commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the Danville Road, +keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the +2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville, along +the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along that road +behind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville +Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia +Court House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the +arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day. +General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the +following communication:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to +reach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was +up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, +and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to +reduce this number one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, +and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go +there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, +and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and +Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike +for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able +to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only +strategic points to strike at.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was +moving west of Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan +moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to +General Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, +followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed +hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and +several pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from +Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry +and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General +Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance +met the head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically +attacked and detained until General Read was killed and his small +force overpowered. This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, +and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his +force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched +himself. In the afternoon, General Sheridan struck the enemy +south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery +and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th +corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was +made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand +prisoners, among whom were many general officers. The movements +of the 2d corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly to +the day's success.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, +except one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's +Court House; the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one +division of cavalry, on Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High +Bridge Road. It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to +the north side of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit, +that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at High +Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately +crossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed +at Farmville to its support.</p> + +<p>Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly +hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from +Farmville:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"April 7, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of the +hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of +Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and +regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of +any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of +that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of +Northern Virginia.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"GENERAL R. E. LEE."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at +Farmville the following:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"April 7, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not +entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of +further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, +I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and +therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you +will offer on condition of its surrender.</p> + +<p>"R. E. LEE, General. +<br><br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +To this I immediately replied:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"April 8, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same +date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender +of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I +would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one +condition I would insist upon--namely, That the men and officers +surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again +against the Government of the United States until properly +exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet +any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point +agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the +terms upon which the surrender of the Army of the Northern +Virginia will be received.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"GENERAL R. E. LEE."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General +Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, +with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox +Station, followed by General Ord's command and the 5th corps. +During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fighting +with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general +engagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the +railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and +captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and +four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During +this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight +received the following communication from General Lee:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +April 8, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In +mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of +the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your +proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has +arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the +restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired +to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, +therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army of +Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the +Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the +restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten +A.M. to-morrow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the +picket-lines of the two armies.</p> + +<p>"R. E. LEE, General. +<br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as +follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the +Appomattox:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"April 9, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received. I have no +authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed +for ten A.M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, +however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with +yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The +terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the +South laying down their arms they will hasten that most +desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of +millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that +all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another +life, I subscribe myself, etc.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"GENERAL R. E. LEE."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th +corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a +desperate effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was +at once thrown in. Soon after a white flag was received, +requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for +a surrender.</p> + +<p>Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the +following from General Lee:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +"April 9, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on the +picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain +definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of +yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now +ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your +letter of yesterday, for that purpose.</p> + +<p>"R. E. LEE, General. +<br><br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of +which is set forth in the following correspondence:</p> + +<blockquote><blockquote> +<p> +APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you +of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the +Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls +of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to +be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be +retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The +officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms +against the Government of the United States until properly +exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like +parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and +public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the +officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace +the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or +baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to +return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States +authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in +force where they may reside.</p> + +<p>"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. +<br><br>"GENERAL R. E. LEE."</p> + + +<br><br><br><br> + + +<p> +"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.</p> + +<p>"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing +the terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as +proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those +expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are +accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to +carry the stipulations into effect.</p> + +<p>"R. E. LEE, General. +<br>"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."</p> +</blockquote></blockquote> + +<p> +The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under +Griffin, and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at +Appomattox Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered +army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. +The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity +of Burkesville.</p> + +<p>General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused +his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the +armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring +peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance +officers.</p> + +<p>On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved +directly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and +through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the +morning of the 13th. The day preceding, news of the surrender +of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.</p> + +<p>On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman +and General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement +for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for +peace, subject to the approval of the President. This agreement +was disapproved by the President on the 21st, which disapproval, +together with your instructions, was communicated to General +Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, +North Carolina, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at once +given by him to General Johnston for the termination of the truce +that had been entered into. On the 25th another meeting between +them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which +terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army +upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.</p> + +<p>The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got +off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North +Carolina, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, +and Big Lick. The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to +within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important +bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it +between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro', +on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and destroyed +the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between +Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies +along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he +attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under General +Gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one +thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed +large amounts of army stores. At this place he destroyed +fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte. +Thence he moved to Slatersville.</p> + +<p>General Canby, who had been directed in January to make +preparations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and +the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of +March. The 16th corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, +moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River; the 13th corps, +under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and +joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving thence on +Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General +Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading +from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and +partially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of +Spanish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of +April. During the night the enemy evacuated the fort. Fort +Blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners +captured; our loss was considerable. These successes +practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to +approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the +city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on +the morning of the 12th.</p> + +<p>The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, +consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was +delayed by rains until March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, +Alabama. On the 1st of April, General Wilson encountered the +enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove him in +confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and +destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba River. On the 2d +he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended +by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, +destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, +vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand +prisoners. On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On +the 10th he crossed the Alabama River, and after sending +information of his operations to General Canby, marched on +Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy +having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five +steamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct +on Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places +were assaulted and captured on the 16th. At the former place we +got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, +destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many +factories, and much other public property. At the latter place +we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed +nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the 20th he +took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one +thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by +General Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis +was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and +succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11th.</p> + +<p>On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to +General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the +Mississippi.</p> + +<p>A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy +under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put +in motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for +its immediate command; but on the 26th day of May, and before +they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered +his entire command to Major-General Canby. This surrender did +not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel +President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of +first disbanding most of his army and permitting an +indiscriminate plunder of public property.</p> + +<p>Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against +the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, +carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the United +States, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them +some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the +disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for +troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.</p> + +<p>There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and +movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most +of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which +contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not +mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the +reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief +dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have +not as yet been officially reported.</p> + +<p>For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would +respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of +departments in which they have occurred.</p> + +<p>It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and +the East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there +is no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was +possible for men to do in battle they have done. The Western +armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, and +received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal +army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of the East +commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the +Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of +their old antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The +splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories +removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately +experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and +recrimination that might have followed had either section failed +in its duty. All have a proud record, and all sections can well +congratulate themselves and each other for having done their +full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of +territory belonging to the United States. Let them hope for +perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, +however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of +valor.</p> + +<p> I have the honor to be, +<br> Very respectfully, your obedient servant, +<br> U. S. GRANT, +<br> Lieutenant-General.</p> + +<p>THE END</p> + + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="b632"></a><img alt="b632.jpg (215K)" src="b632.jpg" height="451" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> +<center><a href="b632.jpg" target="_blank"><img alt="Full Size" src="none"></a></center> +<br><br> +<br><br> + + + + +<center><h2>FOOTNOTE</h2> +</center> +<center><h3>ORGANIZATION CHARTS--UNION AND CONFEDERATE</h3> +</center> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864. + +[COMPILED.] + +LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief. + +MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac. + + +MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps. + + First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow. + First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles. + Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth. + Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank. + Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke. + + Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon. + First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb. + Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen. + Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll. + + Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney. + First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward. + Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays. + + Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott. + First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister. + Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster. + + Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball. + + +MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps. + + First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin. + First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres. + Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. + Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett. + + Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson. + First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard. + Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter. + Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison. + + Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford. + First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless. + Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher. + + Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth. + First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler. + Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice. + Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone + + Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright. + + +MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps. + + First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright. + First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown. + Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton. + Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell. + Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler. + + Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty. + First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton. + Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant. + Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill. + Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis. + + Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts. + First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris. + Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour. + + Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins + + +MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps. + + First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert. + First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer. + Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin. + Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt + + Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg. + First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr. + Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg. + + Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson. + First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr. + Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman. + + +MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps. + + First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson. + First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth. + Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure. + + Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter. + First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss. + Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin. + + Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox. + First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft. + Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ. + + Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero. + First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried. + Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas. + + Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall. + + +BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery. + + Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton. + First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching. + Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins. + First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson. + Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom. + Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh. + + +GENERAL HEADQUARTERS....... + Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick. + Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham. + + + + + +CONFEDERATE ARMY. + +Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by +GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834. + + First Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding. + +MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S Division. + Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a) + Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's " + " Eppa Hunton's " + " Wm. R. Terry's " + +MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b) + Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade + " E. M. Law's (c) " + " John Bratton's " + +MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d) + Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade + " B. G. Humphreys' " + " Goode Bryan's " + " Kershaw's (Old) " + + + Second Army Corps: MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding + +MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S Division. + Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e) + " John Pegram 's " (f) + " Gordon's " (g) + Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's " + +MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON'S Division. + Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h) + Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h) + " Geo H. Stewart's " (h) + " L. A. Stafford's " (e) + +MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division. + Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i) + " Geo. Dole's " (k) + " S. D. Ramseur's Brigade. + " C. A. Battle's " + " R. D. Johnston's " (f) + + + Third Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding. + +MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l) + Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade. + Mahone's " + Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's " (m) + " A. R. Wright's " + " Joseph Finegan's " + +MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division. + Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n) + " James H. Lane's " + " Sam'l McCowan's " + " Alfred M. Scale's " + +MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o) + Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade. + " John R. Cooke's " + " D. McRae's " + " J. J. Archer's " + " H. H. Walker's " + + _unattached_: 5th Alabama Battalion. + + + Cavalry Corps: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p) + +MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE'S Division + Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade + " L. L. Lomax's " + +MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division. + Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade. + " P. M. B. Young's " + " Thomas L. Rosser's " + +MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division. + Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade. + " J. R. Chambliss's " + + + Artillery Reserve: BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding. + +BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER'S DIVISION.* + Cabell's Battalion. + Manly's Battery. + 1st Co. Richmond Howitzers. + Carleton's Battery. + Calloway's Battery. + + Haskell's Battalion. + Branch's Battery. + Nelson's " + Garden's " + Rowan " + + Huger's Battalion. + Smith's Battery. + Moody " + Woolfolk " + Parker's " + Taylor's " + Fickling's " + Martin's " + + Gibb's Battalion. + Davidson's Battery. + Dickenson's " + Otey's " + + +BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG'S DIVISION. + + Braxton's Battalion. + Lee Battery. + 1st Md. Artillery. + Stafford " + Alleghany " + + Cutshaw's Battalion. + Charlotteville Artillery. + Staunton " + Courtney " + + Carter's Battalion. + Morris Artillery. + Orange " + King William Artillery. + Jeff Davis " + + Nelson's Battalion. + Amherst Artillery. + Milledge " + Fluvauna " + + Brown's Battalion. + Powhatan Artillery. + 2d Richmond Howitzers. + 3d " " + Rockbridge Artillery. + Salem Flying Artillery. + + +COL R. L.WALKER'S DIVISION. + + Cutt's Battalion. + Ross's Battery. + Patterson's Battery. + Irwin Artillery. + + Richardson's Battalion. + Lewis Artillery. + Donaldsonville Artillery. + Norfolk Light " + Huger " + + Mclntosh 's Battalion. + Johnson's Battery. + Hardaway Artillery. + Danville " + 2d Rockbridge Artillery. + + Pegram's Battalion. + Peedee Artillery. + Fredericksburg Artillery. + Letcher " + Purcell Battery. + Crenshaw's Battery. + + Poague's Battalion. + Madison Artillery. + Albemarle " + Brooke " + Charlotte " + + +NOTE. +(a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at +above date. +(b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also +contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by +Colonel P. D. Bowles. +(d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not +indicated. + +Organization of the Army of the Valley District. +(e) Constituting York's Brigade. +(f) In Ramseur's Division. +(g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and +containing 12th Georgia Battalion. +(h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's +Division. +(i) Grimes' Brigade. +(k) Cook's " + +(l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty; +name not indicated. +(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding. +(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four +brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not +indicated. +(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's, +Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade. + +*But one general officer reported present for duty in the +artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original. + +</pre> +</blockquote> + + +<br><br><br><br> +<center><a name="backcover1"></a><img alt="backcover1.jpg (184K)" src="backcover1.jpg" height="980" width="650"> +</center> +<br><br> + + +<br><br> +<hr> +<br><br> +<br><br> +<br><br> + + +<pre> +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MEMOIRS OF GENERAL GRANT, V6 *** + +******* This file should be named mug6w10h.html or mug6w10h.zip ******* + +Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks get a new NUMBER, mug6w11h.html +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, mug6w10ha.html + +This eBook was produced by David Widger [widger@cecomet.net] + +Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US +unless a copyright notice is included. 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