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Dodge + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +Project Gutenberg's The Campaign of Chancellorsville, by Theodore A. Dodge + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Campaign of Chancellorsville + +Author: Theodore A. Dodge + +Release Date: March 25, 2009 [EBook #5715] +Last Updated: January 26, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE *** + + + + +Produced by Ken Reeder, and David Widger + + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE + </h1> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h2> + by Theodore A. Dodge + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <p> + To the members of The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, of + whose researches into the history of our Civil War the following pages + form but a modest part, this volume is, with Sincere Regard, Dedicated by + the author. + </p> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <div class="mynote"> + <p> + Transcriber's Note: + </p> + <p> + Errata and other transcription notes are included as an appendix + </p> + <p> + As companion to this etext, I recommend maps available on the Internet + from the History Department of the U. S. Military Academy + </p> + <br /> + </div> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <blockquote> + <p class="toc"> + <big><b>CONTENTS</b></big> + </p> + <p> + <br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0001"> <b>THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.</b> + </a><br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> I. </a> INTRODUCTION + <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> II. </a> CONDITION OF + THE COMBATANTS <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0004"> III. </a> HOOKER + AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0005"> IV. + </a> THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA <br /><br /> <a + href="#link2H_4_0006"> V. </a> DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK <br /><br /> + <a href="#link2H_4_0007"> VI. </a> THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID + <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0008"> VII. </a> THE FEINT BY + THE LEFT WING <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0009"> VIII. </a> THE + REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0010"> IX. + </a> LEE'S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS <br /><br /> <a + href="#link2H_4_0011"> X. </a> HOOKER'S ADVANCE FRIDAY <br /><br /> + <a href="#link2H_4_0012"> XI. </a> THE POSITION AT + CHANCELLORSVILLE <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0013"> XII. </a> JACKSON'S + MARCH, AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0014"> XIII. + </a> HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES <br /><br /> <a + href="#link2H_4_0015"> XIV. </a> POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH + CORPS <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0016"> XV. </a> THE + SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0017"> XVI. </a> JACKSON'S + ATTACK <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0018"> XVII. </a> THE + CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0019"> + XVIII. </a> HOOKER'S PARRY <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0020"> + XIX. </a> THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK <br /><br /> <a + href="#link2H_4_0021"> XX. </a> STONEWALL JACKSON <br /><br /> + <a href="#link2H_4_0022"> XXI. </a> THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW + <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0023"> XXII. </a> THE FIGHT AT + FAIRVIEW <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0024"> XXIII. </a> THE + LEFT CENTRE <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0025"> XXIV. </a> THE + NEW LINES <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0026"> XXV. </a> SUNDAY'S + MISCARRIAGE <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0027"> XXVI. </a> SEDGWICK'S + CHANGE OF ORDERS <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0028"> XXVII. </a> SEDGWICK'S + ASSAULT <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0029"> XXVIII. </a> SEDGWICK + MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0030"> XXIX. </a> SALEM + CHURCH <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0031"> XXX. </a> SEDGWICK + IN DIFFICULTY <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0032"> XXXI. </a> SEDGWICK + WITHDRAWS <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0033"> XXXII. </a> HOOKER'S + CRITICISMS <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0034"> XXXIII. </a> HOOKER'S + FURTHER PLANS <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0035"> XXXIV. </a> THE + ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0036"> + XXXV. </a> OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS <br /><br /> <a + href="#link2H_4_0037"> XXXVI. </a> HOOKER'S RESUME OF THE + CAMPAIGN <br /><br /> <a href="#link2H_4_0038"> XXXVII. </a> SOME + RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE <br /><br /> <br /> <a href="#link2H_APPE"> + APPENDIX. </a> + </p> + </blockquote> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_4_0001" id="link2H_4_0001"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h1> + THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. + </h1> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + I. INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + It must seem to the casual reader of the history of the war of 1861-65, + that enough has already been written upon the campaign of + Chancellorsville. And there are numerous brilliant essays, in the + histories now before the public, which give a coup-d'oeil more or less + accurate of this ten-days' passage of arms. But none of these spread + before the reader facts sufficiently detailed to illustrate the particular + theory advanced by each to account for the defeat of the Army of the + Potomac on this field. + </p> + <p> + The stigma besmirching the character of the Eleventh Corps, and of Howard, + its then commanding general, for a panic and rout in but a small degree + owing to them; the unjust strictures passed upon Sedgwick for his failure + to execute a practically impossible order; the truly remarkable blunders + into which Gen. Hooker allowed himself to lapse, in endeavoring to explain + away his responsibility for the disaster; the bare fact, indeed, that the + Army of the Potomac was here beaten by Lee, with one-half its force; and + the very partial publication, thus far, of the details of the campaign, + and the causes of our defeat,—may stand as excuse for one more + attempt to make plain its operations to the survivors of the one hundred + and eighty thousand men who there bore arms, and to the few who harbor + some interest in the subject as mere history. + </p> + <p> + To say that Gen. Hooker lapsed into blunders in explaining his share in + this defeat, is to use a form of words purposely tempered to the memory of + a gallant soldier, who, whatever his shortcomings, has done his country + signal service; and to avoid the imputation of baldly throwing down the + gauntlet of ungracious criticism. All reference to Gen. Hooker's skill or + conduct in this, one of the best conceived and most fatally mismanaged of + the many unsuccessful advances of the Army of the Potomac, is made with + sincere appreciation of his many admirable qualities, frankly, and + untinged by bitterness. But it must be remembered, that Gen. Hooker has + left himself on record as the author of many harsh reflections upon his + subordinates; and that to mete out even justice to all requires + unvarnished truth. + </p> + <p> + The most uncalled-for slur upon the conduct of his lieutenants probably + occurs in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. + Before withdrawing from the south side of the Rappahannock, after the + decisive events of the battle-field had cooped up the army between the + river and its intrenchments, Hooker called together all his corps + commanders, and requested their several opinions as to the advisability of + attack or retreat. Whatever discussion may have then been had, it was + generally understood, in after-days, that all but one of these generals + had expressed himself freely for an immediate advance. In referring to + this understanding, while denying its correctness, Hooker used the + following language:— + </p> + <p> + "So far as my experience extends, there are in all armies officers more + valiant after the fight than while it is pending; and, when a truthful + history of the Rebellion shall be written, it will be found that the Army + of the Potomac is not an exception." + </p> + <p> + Merely to characterize as ungenerous this aspersion upon the courage of + such men as then served under Hooker, savors of error on the side of + leniency. And, inasmuch as these words strike, as it were, the keynote of + all the statements which Hooker has vouchsafed with reference to these + events, they might be assumed fairly to open the door to unsparing + criticism. But it is hoped that this course has been avoided; and that + what censure is dealt out to Gen. Hooker in the succeeding pages will be + accepted, even by his advocates, in the kindly spirit in which it is + meant, and in which every soldier of the beloved old Army of the Potomac + must uniformly refer to every other. + </p> + <p> + There is, moreover, no work on Chancellorsville which results from + research into all records now accessible. + </p> + <p> + The work of Allan and Hotchkiss, of 1867, than which nothing can be more + even-handed, or more admirable as far as it goes, adopts generally the + statements made in the reports of the Confederate generals: and these are + necessarily one-sided; reports of general officers concerning their own + operations invariably are. Allan and Hotchkiss wrote with only the + Richmond records before them, in addition to such information from the + Federal standpoint as may be found in general orders, the evidence given + before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and newspaper + correspondence. At that time many of the Federal reports were not to be + had: such as were at the War Department were hardly accessible. Reports + had been duly made by all superior officers engaged in and surviving this + campaign, excepting only the general in command; but, strange to say, not + only did Gen. Hooker refrain from making a report, but he retained in his + personal possession many of the records of the Army of the Potomac + covering the period of his command, and it is only since his death that + these records have been in part recovered by the Secretary of War. Some + are still missing, but they probably contain no important matter not fully + given elsewhere. + </p> + <p> + Although Hooker testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: + "Without an exception I forwarded to that office"—the War Department—"all + the reports and returns and information concerning the army, and furnished + them promptly, and, as I think, as no other army commander has done," his + memory had at the moment played him traitor, for a considerable part of + these records were not disposed of as stated. It should be remarked, + however, that Hooker is not singular in this leaning towards the meum in + the matter of records. + </p> + <p> + The sources relied on for the facts herein given are the reports of the + officers engaged, both Federal and Confederate, added to many private + notes, memoranda, and maps, made by them; the testimony before the + Committee on the Conduct of the War, which included Hooker's examination; + and the maps made by the Engineer Department of the United-States Army, + and those of Capt. Hotchkiss. + </p> + <p> + This latter officer was the topographical engineer of the Second Corps of + the Army of Northern Virginia, and made his surveys by order of Gen. Lee + immediately after the campaign. They are of the greatest assistance and + value. + </p> + <p> + Eighteen years have elapsed since North and South crossed swords upon this + memorable field; and it would seem that all Americans can now contemplate + with unruffled heart the errors under which "the Army of the Potomac was + here beaten without ever being fought," as well as boast with equal pride, + not only of the abundant courage displayed by either side, but of the calm + skill with which Gen. Lee wrested victory from a situation desperately + compromised, and of the genius of that greatest of his lieutenants, Thomas + J. Jackson, who here sealed with his blood his fidelity to the cause he + loved so well. + </p> + <p> + It has been said that this campaign furnishes as much material for the + psychological as for the military student. And certainly nothing less than + a careful analysis of Hooker's character can explain the abnormal + condition into which his mental and physical energy sank during the second + act of this drama. He began with really masterly moves, speedily placing + his wary adversary at the saddest disadvantage. But, having attained this + height, his power seemed to pass away as from an over-tasked mind. With + twice the weight of arm, and as keen a blade, he appeared quite unable to + parry a single lunge of Lee's, quite unable to thrust himself. He allowed + his corps commanders to be beaten in detail, with no apparent effort to + aid them from his abundant resources, the while his opponent was demanding + from every man in his command the last ounce of his strength. And he + finally retired, dazed and weary, across the river he had so ably and + boastingly placed behind him ten days before, against the opinion of + nearly all his subordinates; for in this case the conditions were so plain + that even an informal council of war advised a fight. + </p> + <p> + With character-study, however, this sketch has nothing to do. It is + confined to describing events, and suggesting queries for the curious in + military history. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS. + </h2> + <p> + The first two years of civil strife had closed. The American people, which + so far had shown more aptness at learning than skill in waging war, may be + said to have passed through its apprenticeship in arms. The broad plan of + operations, intelligently but rudely conceived at the outset by the + greater spirits among our commanders, began to be more clearly grasped. + The political strategy of both contestants made Virginia the field on + which the left wing of the Federal armies pivoted, while the right swung + farther and farther south and east, and the Confederates gallantly + struggled for every foot of territory, yielding only to the inexorable. + This right wing had already possession of the Mississippi as far south as + Vicksburg, around which place Grant was preparing to tighten his coils; it + had occupied the line of the Tennessee River, and had rendered useless to + the Confederates the railroad from Memphis to Chattanooga, which had been + the great central artery between Richmond and the trans-Mississippi + States. The Southern partisans, with Morgan and Forrest as typical chiefs, + had up to this period played, in the West especially, a very important + part. They as much exceeded our cavalry in enterprise as they had + advantage over it in knowledge of the country and in assistance from its + population. They had on more than one occasion tapped the too long and + slender lines of operation of our foremost armies. They had sent Grant to + the right-about from his first march on Vicksburg, thus neutralizing + Sherman's attempt at Chickasaw Bayou. They had compelled Buell to forfeit + his hardly-earned footing, and to fall back from the Tennessee River to + Louisville at the double-quick in order to beat Bragg in the race towards + the gate of the Northern States, which disaster was happily soon retrieved + by the latter's bloody check before Murfreesborough. Yet, despite these + back-sets, the general course of events showed that Providence remained on + the side of the heaviest battalions; and the spring of 1863 saw our armies + extended from the pivot midway between the rival capitals in a more or + less irregular line, and interrupted by the Alleghany Mountains, to + Vicksburg and the Father of Waters. + </p> + <p> + Great as was the importance of success in Virginia, the Confederates had + appreciated the fact as had not the political soldiers at the head of the + Federal department of war. Our resources always enabled us to keep more + men, and more and better material, on this battle-ground, than the + Confederates could do; but this strength was constantly offset by the + ability of the Southern generals, and their independence of action, as + opposed to the frequent unskilfulness of ours, who were not only never + long in command, but were then tied hand and foot to some ideal plan for + insuring the safety of Washington. The political conditions under which + the Army of the Potomac had so far constantly acted had never allowed it + to do justice to its numbers, mobility, or courage; while Mr. Lincoln, who + actually assumed the powers of commander-in-chief, technically intrusted + to him by the Constitution, was swayed to and fro by his own fears for the + safety of his capital, and by political schemes and military obtuseness at + his elbow. + </p> + <p> + Whether the tedious delays and deferred success, occasioned by these + circumstances, were not eventually a benefit, in that they enabled the + country to bring forth in the fulness of time the conditions leading to + the extinguishment of slavery, which an earlier close of the war might not + have seen; not to mention the better appreciation by either combatant of + the value of the other, which a struggle to the bitter end alone could + generate,—is a question for the political student. But it will + always remain in doubt whether the practical exhaustion of the resources + of the South was not a condition precedent to ending the war,—whether, + in sooth, the "last ditch" was not actually reached when Lee surrendered + at Appomattox. + </p> + <p> + In the West, merit had by this time brought to the surface the generals + who later led us to successful victories. Their distance from the central + controlling power resulted in their being let alone to work out their own + salvation. Opposed to them had been some excellent but not the best of the + Confederate leaders; while Virginia boasted the elite of the Southern + troops, the strongest of the captains, and the most daring of the + lieutenants, developed by the war. + </p> + <p> + Since the Russian campaign of Bonaparte, no such vast forces had been + under arms. To command these required not only the divine military spark, + but hardly-acquired experience. And the mimic war which the elements of + European army life always affords had been wanting to educate our + generals. It is not wonderful, then, that two years of fruitless + campaigning was needed to teach our leaders how to utilize on such + difficult terrain material equally vast in extent and uncouth in quality. + For, however apt the American to learn the trade of war,—or any + other,—it is a moot-point whether his independence of character is + compatible with the perfect soldier, as typified in Friedrich's regiments, + or the Old Guard. + </p> + <p> + But ability, native or acquired, forced its way to the front; and the + requisite experience was gradually gained, for the school was one where + the trade was quickly taught. Said Gen. Meade on one occasion, "The art of + war must be acquired like any other. Either an officer must learn it at + the academy, or he must learn it by experience in the field. Provided he + has learned it, I don't care whether he is a West-Pointer, or not." + </p> + <p> + In the East, then, the army had been led by McDowell, McClellan, Pope, and + Burnside, to victory and defeat equally fruitless. The one experiment so + far tried, of giving the Army of the Potomac a leader from the West, + culminating in the disaster of the second Bull Run, was not apt to be + repeated within the year. That soldier of equal merit and modesty, whom + the Army of the Potomac had been gradually educating as its future and + permanent leader, was still unpretentiously commanding a corps, and + learning by the successes and failures of his superiors. And who shall say + that the results accomplished by Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan, and + Meade, were not largely due to their good fortune in not being too early + thrust to the front? "For," as says Swinton, "it was inevitable that the + first leaders should be sacrificed to the nation's ignorance of war." + </p> + <p> + In the South, the signs of exhaustion had not yet become grave. The + conscription act, passed in April, 1862, had kept the ranks full. The hope + of foreign intervention, though distant, was by no means wholly abandoned. + Financial matters had not yet assumed an entirely desperate complexion. + Nor had the belief in the royalty of cotton received its coup de grace. + The vigor and courage of the Confederacy were unabated, and the unity of + parties in the one object of resistance to invasion doubled its effective + strength. Perhaps this moment was the flood-tide of Southern enthusiasm + and confidence; which, after the Pennsylvania campaign, began to ebb. It + is not intended to convey the idea that the South was prosperous. On the + contrary, those who read the signs aright, saw and predicted its + approaching decline. But, as far as its power of resistance went, it was + at its highest when compared with the momentarily lessened aggressiveness + of the North. For the anti-war party was doing its best to tie the hands + of the administration; and, while this in no wise lessened the flow of men + and material to the front, it produced a grave effect upon the moral + strength which our chiefs were able to infuse into their method of + conducting the war. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + III. HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. + </h2> + <p> + The unfortunate course of events during the early winter of 1862-63 had + resulted in a grievous loss of morale in the Army of the Potomac. The + useless slaughter of Marye's Heights was, after a few weeks, succeeded by + that most huge of all strategic jokes, the Mud March; and Gen. Burnside + retired from a position he had never sought, to the satisfaction, and, be + it said to his credit, with the warm personal regard, of all. Sumner, whom + the weight of years had robbed of strength, but not of gallantry, was + relieved at his own request; Franklin was shelved. Hooker thus became + senior general officer, and succeeded to the command. + </p> + <p> + No man enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac. He + had forced himself upon its notice. From Bull Run, after which action he + is said to have remarked to Mr. Lincoln that he knew more than any one on + that field; through Williamsburg, where he so gallantly held his own + against odds during the entire day, and with exhausted ammunition, until + relieved by Kearney; before Richmond; during the Seven Days; in the + railroad-cutting at Manassas; at Antietam, where he forced the fighting + with so much determination, if not wisdom, on the Union right; up to + Fredericksburg, where, after a personal protest to his commanding officer, + he went in and fought his troops "until he thought he had lost as many men + as he was ordered to lose,"—Hooker's character as man and soldier + had been marked. His commands so far had been limited; and he had a frank, + manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was in constant motion + about the army while it lay in camp; his appearance always attracted + attention; and he was as well known to almost every regiment as its own + commander. He was a representative man. + </p> + <p> + It is not astonishing that Mr. Lincoln, or the Washington + pseudo-strategists who were his military advisers, could not distinguish, + in selecting a chief who should be capable of leading the Army of the + Potomac to victory, between the gallant corps-commander, who achieves + brilliant results under limited responsibility, and the leader, upon whose + sole resources of mind and courage devolve not only the instruction for + health, equipment, rationing, march, or attack, of each of his + subordinates, but the graver weight of prompt and correct decision and + immediate action under every one of the kaleidoscopic changes of a + campaign or a battle-field. It required more knowledge of the requisites + of war, as well as a broader judgment of character, than Mr. Lincoln had + had opportunity to form of the several soldiers of the army, to insure a + happy choice. + </p> + <p> + And, doubtless, Hooker's self-assertiveness, success as a brigade, + division, and corps commander, and decided appearance of large ability, + shared equally in procuring his appointment. No one will deny Hooker's + capacity in certain directions, or up to a given test. His whole career + shows an exceptional power in "riding to orders." But he sadly lacked that + rare combination of qualities and reserve power necessary to lead a + hundred and twenty-five thousand men against such a foe as Lee. + </p> + <p> + Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot in Hooker's character than the + odd pride he took in Mr. Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him at the + time of his appointment, here following:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D.C., + Jan. 26, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. +</pre> + <p> + General,—I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. + Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient + reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some + things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you + to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe + you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You + have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if not an indispensable, + quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good + rather than harm; but I think that during Gen. Burnside's command of the + army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as + you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most + meritorious and honorable brother-officer. I have heard, in such way as to + believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government + needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, + that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success + can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I + will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost + of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done or will do + for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse + into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence + from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to + put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get + any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware + of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance + go forward, and give us victories. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Yours very truly, + A. LINCOLN. +</pre> + <p> + Hooker was appointed Jan. 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnest + words, took leave of the army. + </p> + <p> + The troops received their new chief with a heartiness and confidence, + which, since McClellan's re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hooker was + to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of this + weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary changes he at once + began to make,—for Hooker never lacked the power of organization,—were + accepted with alacrity; and a spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded + speedily to what had been almost a defiant obedience. + </p> + <p> + The army was in a lamentably low state of efficiency. Politics mingled + with camp duties; and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with + an entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the Potomac to + accomplish any thing, were pronounced. Desertions occurred at the rate of + two hundred a day, facilitated by relatives, who sent from home civilian + clothing to soldiers at the front. Hooker states that he found 2,922 + officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as absent on the rolls of the + army, a large proportion from causes unknown. Sharp and efficient measures + were at once adopted, which speedily checked this alarming depletion of + the ranks. Furloughs in reasonable quantity were allowed to deserving men + and a limited number of officers. Work was found for the rank and file in + drill and outpost duty sufficient to prevent idle habits. The commissariat + was closely watched, and fresh rations more frequently issued, which much + improved the health of the army. The system of picket-duty was more + thoroughly developed, and so vigilantly carried out as to impress its + importance upon, as well as teach its details to, the troops. + </p> + <p> + The cavalry, hitherto distributed by regiments throughout the army, was + now consolidated into one corps, and from this time became a valuable + element in the service, for it daily grew in efficiency. And such + opportunities of doing field-work as a body were afforded it as + circumstances allowed. + </p> + <p> + The grand divisions of Burnside were abolished, and the army divided into + seven infantry corps. + </p> + <p> + The testimony of all general officers of the Army of the Potomac concurs + in awarding the highest praise to Hooker for the manner in which he + improved the condition of the troops during the three months he was in + command prior to Chancellorsville. Himself says before the Committee on + the Conduct of the War: "During the season of preparation the army made + rapid strides in discipline, instruction and morale, and early in April + was in a condition to inspire the highest expectations." And Swinton well + sums up: "Under Hooker's influence the tone of the army underwent a change + which would appear astonishing had not its elastic vitality been so often + proved." + </p> + <p> + On the 30th of April the Army of the Potomac, exclusive of provost-guard, + consisted of about a hundred and thirty thousand men under the colors,—"for + duty equipped," according to the morning report,—distributed among + the several army corps as follows:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + { Wadsworth, } + 1st Corps, Gen. Reynolds.. { Robinson, } 16,908 + { Doubleday, } +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + { Hancock, } + 2d Corps, Gen. Couch .. { Gibbon, } 16,893 + { French, } +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + { Birney, } + 3d Corps, Gen. Sickles.. { Berry, } 18,721 + { Whipple, } + + { Griffin, } + 5th Corps, Gen. Meade.. { Humphreys, } 15,724 + { Sykes, } + + { Brooks, } + 6th Corps, Gen. Sedgwick.. { Howe, } 23,667 + { Newton, } + + { Devens, } + 11th Corps, Gen. Howard.. { Schurz, } 12,977 + { Steinwehr, } + + 12th Corps, Gen. Slocum.. { Williams, } 13,450 + { Geary, } + + { Pleasonton, } + Cavalry Corps, Gen. Stoneman. { Gregg, } 11,541 + { Averell, } + { Buford, Reserve Brigade,} + + Artillery, Gen. Hunt, about 400 guns. Artillery reserve 1,610 + ———- + Total. . . . . . . . . 131,491 +</pre> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IV. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. + </h2> + <p> + While the Army of the Potomac lay about Falmouth, awaiting orders to move, + Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from Banks's Ford + above, to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck) below Fredericksburg, a line some + fifteen miles in length as the crow flies. The crests of the hills on + which lay the Army of Northern Virginia were from three-quarters of a mile + to a mile and a half back from, and substantially parallel to, the river. + Rifle-pits commanded every available crossing, which, being few and + difficult, were easily guarded. Continuous lines of infantry parapets, + broken by battery epaulements located for sweeping the wide approaches + from the river, extended the whole distance; while abattis strengthened + every place which the nature of the ground allowed an attacking column to + pass. + </p> + <p> + The roads by which the various detachments of the army could + intercommunicate for concentration upon any given point were numerous and + well kept up, and were familiar to all commanding and staff officers. + </p> + <p> + Lee's forces numbered about sixty thousand men, for duty, distributed in + the following organizations. As the brigades nearly equalled our divisions + in size, they are given by name. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + { Mahone's brigade. } + { Posey's " } + { Anderson's { Wilcox's " } + { division. { Perry's " } + { { Wright's " } + Part of Longstreet's { } 17,000 + 1st Corps { { Kershaw's " } + { McLaws' { Semmes's " } + { division. { Wofford's " } + { Barksdale's " } + + { Heth's " } + { Pender's " } + { A. P. Hill's { Archer's " } 11,000 + { division. { McGowan's " } + { { Lane's " } + { { Thomas's " } + { + { { Ramseur's " } + { D. H. Hill's { Rodes's " } + { division. { Dole's " } 9,000 + { { Iverson's " } + { { Colquitt's " } + Jackson's 2d Corps. { + { { Colston's " } + { Trimble's { Jones's " } 6,000 + { division. { Nichols's " } + { { Paxton's " } + { + { { Gordon's " } + { Early's { Hays's " } 7,400 + { division. { Smith's " } + { { Hoke's " } + + Stuart's Cavalry { Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade . . 1,800 + division { W. H. F. Lee's ". . . 900 + + Artillery, 170 pieces. . . . . . . . 5,000 + ——— + Total. . . . . . . . . 58,100 +</pre> + <p> + Hotchkiss and Allan state that there may have been three to five thousand + more men in line at the time of Hooker's attack. + </p> + <p> + As will be noticed from the table, only part of Longstreet's corps was + present. The main body had been sent, about Feb. 1, under command of its + chief, to operate in the region between Petersburg and Suffolk, where our + forces under Peck were making a demonstration. This detail reduced Lee's + army by nearly one-quarter. + </p> + <p> + During the winter, Lee's forces had been distributed as follows:— + </p> + <p> + The old battle-ground of Dec. 13 was occupied by the First Corps; while + Jackson with his Second Corps held Hamilton's Crossing, and extended his + lines down to Port Royal. Stuart's cavalry division prolonged the left to + Beverly Ford on the upper Rappahannock, and scoured the country as far as + the Pamunkey region. Hampton's brigade of cavalry had been sent to the + rear to recruit, and Fitz Lee's had taken its place at Culpeper, from + which point it extended so as to touch Lee's left flank at Banks's Ford. + The brigade of W. H. F. Lee was on the Confederate right. Stuart retained + command of the entire force, but had his headquarters at Culpeper. + </p> + <p> + The supplies of the army were received by the Fredericksburg and Richmond + Railroad from the capital, and from the depots on the Virginia Central. + Lee had been assiduous in re-organizing his forces, in collecting an + abundance of supplies, in checking desertions, and in procuring + re-enforcements. And the vigor with which the conscription was pushed + swelled his strength so materially that in three months Jackson's corps + alone shows an increase from a force of twenty-five thousand up to + thirty-three thousand men "for duty." The staff of the army was created a + separate organization. The cavalry had already been successfully + consolidated. And now the artillery was embodied in a special organization + under Gen. Pendleton, and an engineer regiment put on foot. + </p> + <p> + The morale of the Army of Northern Virginia could not be finer. The forced + retreat of McClellan from before Richmond; the driving of Pope from his + vaunted positions in its front; the Maryland campaign with its deliberate + withdrawal from an army of twice its strength; finally the bloody check to + Burnside,—had furnished a succession of triumphs which would lend + any troops self-confidence and high courage. But, in addition to all this, + the average of the men of this army were older and more hardened soldiers + than those of the Army of the Potomac. The early conscription acts of the + Confederacy had made it difficult for men once inured to the steady + bearing and rough life of the soldier, and to the hard fare of camp-life, + to withdraw from the ranks. + </p> + <p> + In Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War + occurs this tribute to the Confederate infantry: "Our artillery had always + been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, except in + discipline; and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, never did + equal Lee's army. With a rank and file vastly inferior to our own, + intellectually and physically, that army has, by discipline alone, + acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency, unsurpassed, in my + judgment, in ancient or modern times. We have not been able to rival it, + nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel + armies." + </p> + <p> + The cavalry force was small, but energetic and enterprising to a degree as + yet by no means equalled by our own. The artillery was neither as good, + nor as well equipped or served, as ours, but was commanded with + intelligence, and able to give a good account of itself. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0006" id="link2H_4_0006"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + V. DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK. + </h2> + <p> + An attack of Lee's position in front, even had Burnside's experience not + demonstrated its folly, seemed to promise great loss of life without + corresponding success. + </p> + <p> + To turn his right flank required the moving of pontoon trains and + artillery over the worst of roads for at least twenty miles, through a + country cut up by a multitude of streams running across the route to be + taken, and emptying into either the Potomac or Rappahannock; all requiring + more or less bridging. + </p> + <p> + Lee's spy system was excellent. It has been claimed in Southern reports, + that his staff had deciphered our signal code by watching a station at + Stafford. And Butterfield admits this in one of his despatches of May 3. + He would speedily ascertain any such movement, and could create formidable + intrenchments on one side the river, as fast as we could build or repair + roads on which to move down, upon the other. Moreover, there was a + thousand feet of stream to bridge at the first available place below + Skenker's Neck. + </p> + <p> + There remained nothing to do but to turn Lee's left flank; and this could + only be accomplished by stratagem, for Lee had strengthened every part of + the river by which Hooker could attempt a passage. + </p> + <p> + But this problem was, despite its difficulties, still possible of + solution; and Hooker set himself to work to elucidate it. + </p> + <p> + So soon as he had matured his plan, which he elaborated with the greatest + care, but kept perfectly secret from every one until the movements + themselves developed it, although making use of the knowledge and skill of + all his generals both before and during its initiation, he speedily + prepared for its vigorous execution. In May, the term of service of some + twenty-two thousand nine-months and two-years men would expire. These men + he must seek to utilize in the campaign. + </p> + <p> + The first intimation of a forward movement received by the army at large, + apart from the Cavalry Corps, had been a circular of April 13, notifying + commanding officers to have their troops supplied with eight days' + rations, and a hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition, sixty to be carried + by the soldiers, and the balance on the pack-mules. + </p> + <p> + After the battle of Fredericksburg, the army had returned to substantially + the same positions and quarters occupied before; and here the men had + housed themselves for the winter. The Mud March had broken up these + cantonments; but after a few days' absence the several regiments returned + to their old camps, and the same huts had generally been re-occupied by + the same men. But when Fighting Joe Hooker's orders to march were issued, + no one dreamed of any thing but victory; and the Army of the Potomac + burned its ships. Nothing was left standing but the mud walls from which + the shelter-tent roofs had been stripped, and an occasional chimney. Many + of the men (though contrary to orders) set fire to what was left, and the + animus non revertendi was as universal as the full confidence that now + there lay before the Army of the Potomac a certain road, whatever might + bar the path, to the long-wished-for goal of Richmond. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VI. THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID. + </h2> + <p> + Hooker proposed to open his flank attack by cutting Lee's communications. + Accordingly, on April 12, Gen. Stoneman, commanding the Cavalry Corps, + received orders to march at seven A.M. next day, with his whole force + except one brigade. He was to ascend the Rappahannock, keeping well out of + view, and masking his movement with numerous small detachments,—alleging + a chase of Jones's guerillas in the Shenandoah valley, as his objective. + The river was to be crossed west of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. At + Culpeper he was to destroy or disperse Fitz Lee's brigade of some two + thousand cavalry, and at Gordonsville the infantry provost-guard; thence + to push down the Virginia Central to the Fredericksburg and Richmond + Railroad, destroying every thing along the road. As the enemy would + probably retreat by the latter route, he was to select strong points on + the roads parallel to it, intrench, and hold his ground as obstinately as + possible. If Lee retreated towards Gordonsville, he was to harass him day + and night. The Confederates had but five thousand sabres to oppose him. + "Let your watchword be, Fight! and let all your orders be, Fight, Fight, + FIGHT!" exclaimed enthusiastic Joe Hooker in this order. The primary + object was to keep the Confederates from retreating to Richmond; and + Stoneman was to rely on Hooker's being up with him in six days, or before + his supplies were exhausted. If possible, he was to detach at the most + available points parties to destroy every thing in the direction of + Charlottesville, and of the Pamunkey. + </p> + <p> + The Cavalry Corps, except Pleasonton's brigade, which accompanied Hooker's + headquarters during this movement, left on the 13th. On the 15th Stoneman + threw a division across the river at Rappahannock station, where the + Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses the river. But a sudden rise in + consequence of heavy rains obliged this division to return by swimming the + horses. Gen. Lee says, referring to this check, that "their efforts to + establish themselves on the south side of the river were successfully + resisted by Stuart." But the rise in the river was the actual cause. There + was no crossing of swords. + </p> + <p> + At the time the cavalry marched, an infantry brigade and a battery were + sent to Kelley's Ford, and a regiment to United-States Ford, to hold these + crossings against scouting parties, or any counter-demonstration on the + part of the enemy. + </p> + <p> + The river did not fall so that Stoneman could pass at that point until the + 27th, when it was too late to accomplish valuable results under the orders + of the 12th; for the whole army was now on the march. Between the 15th and + 27th the cavalry, under instructions from Hooker, remained in camp along + the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. + </p> + <p> + It has, however, never been satisfactorily explained why it might not have + crossed higher up, and have utilized these precious two weeks. It could + not have been of less use than it was, and might possibly have been able + to call Stuart's entire force away from Lee's army. Nor was it impossible, + in part at least, to do the work cut out for it. Even to threaten Lee's + communications would have seriously affected the singleness of purpose he + displayed in this campaign. + </p> + <p> + But the operations of Stoneman, as they had no effect whatever upon the + manoeuvres of either Lee or Hooker, may be treated of separately, as a + matter almost apart from the one under consideration. + </p> + <p> + And thus, in the failure of the cavalry raid, miscarried the first effort + of this ill-fated campaign. + </p> + <p> + It is not often that the danger of detaching the entire cavalry force of + an army, for service at a distance from its infantry corps, is illustrated + in so marked a manner as it was on this occasion. Hooker left himself but + a small brigade, of four regiments and a horse-battery, to do the scouting + for an army of over one hundred thousand men. Had he retained a sufficient + force to march with the main body, there would no doubt have been at least + a brigade of it, instead of a few scouts, sent out to near Old Wilderness + Tavern and along the Orange plank road to the junction of the Brock road. + Jackson's movements would then have been fully known. + </p> + <p> + The bulk of the cavalry of an army should be with the infantry corps when + in the presence of the enemy. For cavalry are the antennae of an army. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0008" id="link2H_4_0008"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING. + </h2> + <p> + Gen. Hooker's plan embraced, besides a cavalry raid to sever the enemy's + communications, a demonstration in force on the left to draw the enemy's + attention, and the throwing of the main body of his forces across the + river on the right. + </p> + <p> + As early as April 21, Doubleday of the First Corps had been sent down the + river to Port Conway with some thirty-five hundred men, to light + camp-fires, and make demonstrations with pontoons, after doing which he + returned to camp. On the 23d Col. Morrow, with the Twenty-fourth Michigan, + went down, and crossed the river to Port Royal in boats. + </p> + <p> + These demonstrations had been intended to co-operate with Stoneman's raid, + which at these dates should have been well on Lee's rear, and to unsettle + Lee's firm footing preparatory to the heavy blows Hooker was preparing to + deliver; but, as Stoneman was delayed, these movements failed of much of + their intended effect. Nevertheless, Jackson's corps was drawn down to the + vicinity, and remained there some days. + </p> + <p> + On Monday, April 27, Hooker issues his orders to the First, Third, and + Sixth Corps, to place themselves in position, ready to cross; the First at + Pollock's Mills Creek, and the Sixth at Franklin's Crossing, by 3.30 A.M., + on Wednesday; and the Third at a place enabling it to cross in support of + either of the others at 4.30 A.M. The troops to remain concealed until the + movement begins. Artillery to be posted by Gen. Hunt, Chief of Artillery + of the army, to protect the crossing. Gen. Benham to have two bridges laid + by 3.30 A.M. at each crossing. Troops, as needed, to be detailed to aid + his engineer brigade. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Sedgwick to command the three corps, and make a demonstration in full + force on Wednesday morning to secure the telegraph road. Should any + considerable force be detached to meet the movement of the right wing, + Sedgwick is to carry the works at all hazards. Should the enemy retreat + towards Richmond, he is to pursue on the Bowling-Green road, fighting + wherever he reaches them, while Hooker will pursue on parallel roads more + to the west. + </p> + <p> + This order was punctually obeyed. Gen. Hunt placed forty-two guns at + Franklin's, forty at Pollock's Mill, and sixteen at Traveller's Rest, a + mile below, a number more being held in reserve. Those in position were so + disposed as to "enfilade the rifle-pits, crush the fire of the enemy's + works on the hill, cover the throwing of the bridges, and protect the + crossing of the troops." (Hunt.) + </p> + <p> + These three corps camped that night without fires, and the pontoons were + carried to the river by hand to insure secrecy. + </p> + <p> + At daybreak, Wednesday, Russell's brigade crossed in boats at Franklin's + with little opposition. The bridges were then constructed; and Brooks's + division passed over with a battery, and established itself strongly on + the south side. + </p> + <p> + At the lower crossing, Reynolds's attempts to throw the bridges early in + the morning were defeated by sharpshooters and a supporting regiment. But + about half-past eight, the fog, which had been quite dense, lifted; and + under fire of the artillery the Confederates were driven away, and the + crossing made by Wadsworth. + </p> + <p> + During Wednesday and Thursday the entire command was held in readiness to + force a passage at any time, the bridge-heads being held by Brooks and + Wadsworth respectively. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0009" id="link2H_4_0009"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING. + </h2> + <p> + Hooker was a master of logistics. The forethought and excellent judgment + displayed in all orders under which these preliminary moves of the + army-corps were made, as well as the high condition to which he had + brought the army, cannot elicit higher praise than to state the fact, + that, with the exception of the Cavalry Corps, all orders issued were + carried out au pied de la lettre, and that each body of troops was on hand + at the hour and place prescribed. This eulogy must, however, be confined + to orders given prior to the time when the fighting began. + </p> + <p> + On April 26 the commanding officers of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were + directed to march Monday morning, the 27th, towards Kelley's Ford, on the + Rappahannock,—some fifteen miles above its junction with the + Rapidan,—Howard leading. + </p> + <p> + As much secrecy as possible was enjoined, and the men were not to be + allowed to go down to the river. Eight days' rations to be carried in the + haversacks. Each corps to take a battery and two ambulances to a division, + the pack-train for small ammunition, and a few wagons for forage only. The + rest of the trains to be parked in the vicinity of Banks's Ford out of + sight. A sufficient detail, to be made from the troops whose term was + about to expire, to be left behind to guard camp, and do provost duty. + </p> + <p> + Meade was ordered to march the Fifth Corps in connection with the Eleventh + and Twelfth, and equipped in similar manner. + </p> + <p> + The three corps to be in camp at Kelley's Ford, in positions indicated, by + four P.M. on Tuesday. + </p> + <p> + The first day's march was to the vicinity of Hartwood Church. Next day, at + four A.M., the head of the column was in motion; and at four P.M. the + three corps were in camp at Kelley's Ford. + </p> + <p> + At six P.M. the pontoon-bridge was begun, under charge of Capt. Comstock + of the engineers, by a detail mostly from the Eleventh Corps. Some four + hundred men of Buschbeck's brigade crossed in boats, and attacked the + enemy's pickets, which retired after firing a single shot. About ten P.M. + the bridge was finished, and the troops crossed; the Eleventh Corps during + the night, and the Twelfth Corps next morning. The Seventeenth + Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment was sent out as flankers to prevent the + Confederate scouting-parties from annoying the column. In this they failed + of entire success; as the rear of the Eleventh Corps was, during the day, + shelled by a Confederate battery belonging to Stuart's horse artillery, + and the Twelfth Corps had some slight skirmishing in its front with + cavalry detachments from the same command. + </p> + <p> + As soon as Hooker had seen to the execution of his first orders, he + transferred his headquarters to Morrisville, five miles north of Kelley's + Ford, and superintended the execution of the crossing and advance. Urging + Meade to equal celerity and secrecy in uncovering United-States Ford, he + instructed Slocum, should Meade's crossing at Ely's be resisted, to push a + column on the south side of the Rapidan to open the latter ford. + </p> + <p> + At Germania Ford, on the Rapidan, previously seized by an advance party of + three or four smart marching regiments, a small body of one hundred and + twenty-five Confederate infantry, guarding the supplies for the rebuilding + of the bridge, then in progress, was captured. + </p> + <p> + The cavalry and artillery crossed at once by the ford, as well as a + portion of the infantry, the latter wading almost to the armpits. But the + construction of the bridge was soon temporarily completed by Gens. Geary + and Kane; and the rest of the troops and the pack-mules passed safely, by + the light of huge bonfires lighted on the banks. The men were in the + highest possible spirits, and testified to their enjoyment of the march by + the utmost hilarity. + </p> + <p> + At daylight the Twelfth Corps led the column, Geary in advance. Near the + Wilderness, the head of column was attacked from the south by some cavalry + and a couple of guns. Stuart had come up from Raccoon Ford the day + previous. But a slight demonstration cleared the road; and Stuart retired, + sending part of his force to Fredericksburg, and accompanying the rest to + Spotsylvania Court House. + </p> + <p> + About two P.M., Thursday, these two corps, under command of Slocum, + reached Chancellorsville, and found a portion of the Fifth Corps already + in position there. The Twelfth Corps was deployed south of the plank road, + with left at the Chancellor House, and the right near Wilderness Church, + which line the Eleventh Corps prolonged to the vicinity of Hunting Creek. + </p> + <p> + The Fifth Corps had marched to Kelley's Ford, and crossed in rear of the + Twelfth Corps. From here, Sykes's and Griffin's divisions marched towards + Ely's Ford, preceded by Col. Devin's Sixth New York Cavalry, which + surprised the pickets at that place. The troops crossed by wading. + Humphreys remained behind to cover the passage of the trains, and after + followed the column. + </p> + <p> + On crossing the Rapidan, Sykes was pushed towards United-States Ford, to + dislodge the Confederate force there, by thus taking in reverse their + position, while Griffin marched to Chancellorsville. The whole corps soon + after united at the latter place, and was located with its right joining + Slocum, and the left extending towards the river, facing Mine Run. + </p> + <p> + A skirmish of no particular moment had occurred between Griffin and + Anderson, as the former reached Chancellorsville. Anderson had been + retiring before the Federal advance, on the plank road towards + Fredericksburg. His rear guard made a short stand at the crossroads, but + withdrew after a few rounds; and Anderson took up a position near Mine + Road, where numerous ravines, perpendicular to the river, afforded + excellent successive lines of defence. + </p> + <p> + On reaching Chancellorsville, Slocum took command of the three corps there + assembled. He was ordered to ascertain, by a cavalry party, whether the + enemy were detaching any considerable force from Fredericksburg to meet + his column. If not, an advance at all hazards was to be made, and a + position on the plank road which would uncover Banks's Ford to be secured. + If the enemy were in strong force, Slocum was to select a position, and + compel his attack. Not a moment was to be lost until the troops were + concentrated at Chancellorsville. "From that moment all will be ours," + said Hooker. + </p> + <p> + The inconsistency of these orders can be explained only by marked + ignorance of the country. To secure a position which would uncover Banks's + Ford was certainly a great desideratum; but the possession of + Chancellorsville was far from accomplishing this end, as we shall see. + </p> + <p> + So admirably planned and executed were all orders up to this time, that on + Thursday, by two P.M., three corps of nearly forty thousand men were + concentrated on Lee's flank, while the latter was still unaware of the + presence of any considerable Federal force in this vicinity. + </p> + <p> + On Monday Couch had been ordered to march two divisions of his (Second) + corps to Banks' Ford, but to keep back from the river, and to show no more + than the usual pickets. One brigade and a battery to be sent to + United-States Ford, there to relieve an equal detail of the Eleventh + Corps, which would rejoin its command. All their artillery to move with + these two divisions, and to be ready to cover a forced crossing. The + division whose camps at Falmouth were most easily seen by the enemy from + across the river (it happened to be Gibbon's) to be left in camp to do + picket and provost duty. The Third Corps would be available in case the + enemy himself attempted a crossing. Gibbon to be ready to join the command + at any time. + </p> + <p> + On Thursday, as soon as Anderson withdrew Mahone's and Posey's brigades + from United-States Ford, which he did when Meade's crossing at Ely's had + flanked that position, Couch, whose bridge was all ready to throw, was + ordered to cross, and march in support towards the heaviest firing. This + he did, with French and Hancock, and reached Chancellorsville the same + evening. + </p> + <p> + Swinton, rather grandiloquently, says, "To have marched a column of fifty + thousand men, laden with sixty pounds of baggage and encumbered with + artillery and trains, thirty-seven miles in two days; to have bridged and + crossed two streams, guarded by a vigilant enemy, with the loss of half a + dozen men, one wagon, and two mules,—is an achievement which has few + parallels, and which well deserves to rank with Prince Eugene's famous + passage of the Adige." + </p> + <p> + However exaggerated this praise may be, Hooker nevertheless deserves high + encomiums on his management of the campaign so far. Leaving Stoneman's + delay out of the question, nothing had gone wrong or been mismanaged up to + the present moment. But soon Hooker makes his first mistake. + </p> + <p> + At 12.30 on Thursday, the Third Corps, which lay near Franklin's Crossing, + on the north side of the river, received orders to proceed by the shortest + route, and concealed from the enemy, to United-States Ford, to be across + the river by seven A.M., Friday; in pursuance of which order, Sickles + immediately started, in three columns, following the ravines to Hamet's, + at the intersection of the Warrenton pike and United-States Ford road. + Here he bivouacked for the night. At five A.M. Friday he marched to the + ford, and passed it with the head of his column at seven A.M., Birney + leading, Whipple and Berry in the rear. Leaving Mott's brigade and a + battery to protect the trains at the ford, he then pushed on, and reported + at Chancellorsville at nine A.M. Under Hooker's orders he massed his corps + near the junction of the roads to Ely's and United-States Fords, in the + open near Bullock's, sending a brigade and a battery to Dowdall's Tavern. + </p> + <p> + Hooker, meanwhile, had arrived at Chancellorsville, and taken command. He + at once issued this characteristic order:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., April 30, 1863. +</pre> + <p> + GENERAL ORDERS, No. 47. + </p> + <p> + It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the commanding general announces to + the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that + our enemy must ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences, and + give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. + </p> + <p> + The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been a + succession of splendid achievements. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + By command of Major-Gen. Hooker. + S. WILLIAMS, + Assistant Adjutant-General. +</pre> + <p> + Pleasonton, during Thursday, pushed out towards Fredericksburg and + Spotsylvania Court House to observe the enemy. + </p> + <p> + Fitz Hugh Lee had bivouacked this evening at Todd's Tavern. Stuart, with + his staff, had started towards Fredericksburg to report the condition of + affairs to Gen. Lee. It was a bright moonlight night. A mile or two on the + road he ran against a party of Federal horsemen, the advance of the Sixth + New York Cavalry, under Lieut.-Col. McVicar. Sending back for the Fifth + Virginia Cavalry, Lee attacked the Federal troopers, leading in person at + the head of his staff; but, being repulsed, he sent for the entire brigade + to come up, with which he drove back McVicar's detachment. + </p> + <p> + The combat lasted some time, and was interesting as being a night affair, + in which the naked weapon was freely used. Its result was to prevent + Pleasonton from reaching Spotsylvania Court House, where he might have + destroyed a considerable amount of stores. + </p> + <p> + The position on Thursday evening was then substantially this. At + Hamilton's Crossing there was no change. Each party was keenly scanning + the movements of the other, seeking to divine his purpose. Sedgwick and + Reynolds were thus holding the bulk of Lee's army at and near + Fredericksburg. Hooker, with four corps, and Sickles close by, lay at + Chancellorsville, with only Anderson's small force in his front, and with + his best chances hourly slipping away. For Lee, by this time aware of the + real situation, hesitated not a moment in the measures to be taken to meet + the attack of his powerful enemy. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0010" id="link2H_4_0010"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IX. LEE'S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS. + </h2> + <p> + Let us now turn to Lee, and see what he has been doing while Hooker thus + discovered check. + </p> + <p> + Pollard says: "Lee calmly watched this" (Sedgwick's) "movement, as well as + the one higher up the river under Hooker, until he had penetrated the + enemy's design, and seen the necessity of making a rapid division of his + own forces, to confront him on two different fields, and risking the + result of fighting him in detail." + </p> + <p> + Lossing states Lee's object as twofold: to retain Banks's Ford, so as to + divide Hooker's army, and to keep his right wing in the Wilderness. + </p> + <p> + Let us listen to Lee himself. In his report he says he was convinced on + Thursday, as Sedgwick continued inactive, that the main attack would be + made on his flank and rear. "The strength of the force which had crossed, + and its apparent indisposition to attack, indicated that the principal + effort of the enemy would be made in some other quarter." + </p> + <p> + He states that on April 14 he was informed that Federal cavalry was + concentrating on the upper Rappahannock. On the 21st, that small bodies of + infantry had appeared at Kelley's Ford. These movements, and the + demonstrations at Port Royal, "were evidently intended to conceal the + designs of the enemy," who was about to resume active operations. + </p> + <p> + The Federal pontoon bridges and troops below Fredericksburg "were + effectually protected from our artillery by the depth of the river's bed + and the narrowness of the stream, while the batteries on the other side + completely commanded the wide plain between our lines and the river." + </p> + <p> + "As at the first battle of Fredericksburg, it was thought best to select + positions with a view to resist the advance of the enemy, rather than + incur the heavy loss that would attend any attempt to prevent his + crossing." + </p> + <p> + At the time of Hooker's flank movement, there were between the + Rappahannock and Rapidan no troops excepting some twenty-seven hundred + cavalry under Stuart, forming Lee's extreme left. But Stuart made up for + his small numbers by his promptness in conveying to his chief information + of every movement and of the size of every column during Hooker's passage + of the rivers. And the capture of a few prisoners from each of the Fifth, + Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps enabled him and his superior to gauge the + dimensions of the approaching army with fair accuracy. + </p> + <p> + But until Thursday night the plan of Hooker's attack was not sufficiently + developed to warrant decisive action on the part of Lee. + </p> + <p> + Of the bulk of the Confederate forces, Early's division was ahead at + Hamilton's Crossing, intrenched in an almost impregnable position. On + Wednesday, April 29, the rest of Jackson's corps was moved up from below, + where Doubleday's and Morrow's demonstrations had until now kept it. + </p> + <p> + A. P. Hill's and Trimble's divisions were in the second and third lines on + this wing; while Anderson and McLaws, the only troops of Longstreet's + corps left with the Army of Northern Virginia, held the intrenchments + along the river above Fredericksburg. Barksdale was in the town. Pendleton + with the reserve artillery was at Massaponax. + </p> + <p> + When, from Sedgwick's inactivity and the information received from Stuart, + Lee, on Wednesday afternoon, had been led to suspect that the main attack + might be from the columns crossing above, he had immediately ordered + Anderson to occupy Chancellorsville with Wright's brigade, and with Mahone + and Posey from United-States Ford, so soon as that position was + compromised, leaving a few companies there to dispute its possession as + long as possible. + </p> + <p> + We have seen how Anderson engaged Meade near Chancellorsville as the + latter advanced, and then retired to a position near Mine-Run road. Here + was the crest of a hill running substantially north and south. Gen. Lee + had already selected this line; and Col. Smith, his chief engineer, had + drawn up a plan of intrenchments. Anderson detailed men, who, during the + night, threw up some strong field-works. + </p> + <p> + Late Thursday night Lee appears first fully to have matured his plan for + parrying Hooker's thrust. + </p> + <p> + Barksdale's brigade was left at Fredericksburg, where during the winter it + had been doing picket-duty, to form the left of the line remaining to + oppose Sedgwick. Part of Pendleton's reserve artillery was near by; while + Early, commanding this entire body, held Hamilton's Crossing. He had a + force of eighty-five hundred muskets, and thirty pieces of artillery. + </p> + <p> + The rest of his army Lee at once took well in hand, and moved out to meet + the Army of the Potomac. McLaws was hurried forward to sustain the line + taken up by Anderson. He arrived on the ground by daylight of Friday, and + went into position in rifle-pits on the right about Smith's Hill. + </p> + <p> + Jackson, equally alert, but having a longer distance to march from the + extreme right along the military road, arrived about eight A.M., took + command, and, as was his wont, ordered an immediate advance, throwing + Owens's regiment of cavalry forward to reconnoitre. + </p> + <p> + Posey and Wright followed Owens on the plank road, with Alexander's + battalion of artillery. Mahone, and Jordan's battery detached from + Alexander, marched abreast of his right, on the pike. + </p> + <p> + McLaws followed Mahone, and Wilcox and Perry were called from Banks's Ford + to sustain this column, which McLaws directed; while Jackson, following on + the plank road, watched the operations of the left. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0011" id="link2H_4_0011"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + X. HOOKER'S ADVANCE FRIDAY. + </h2> + <p> + So far the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac had been at Falmouth, + where still remained Gen. Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff. The last + order from this point had been on Thursday to Gen. Sedgwick, who was + therein notified that headquarters would be that night at + Chancellorsville; that an advance would be made Friday morning along the + plank road (meaning probably the pike) towards Fredericksburg, to uncover + Banks's Ford, thus making a shorter communication through Butterfield, who + would still remain at Falmouth. This order substantially recapitulates + former instructions, and is full of the flash and vim of an active mind, + till then intent on its work and abreast of the situation. It urges on + Sedgwick co-operation with the right wing, and the most vigorous pushing + of the enemy. It impresses on him that both wings will be within easy + communication, and ready to spring to one another's assistance. + </p> + <p> + Slower than his adversary, and failing to follow up with vigor his + advantage already gained, Hooker assumes command in person, and + reconnoitres the ground between himself and Fredericksburg. He then orders + Meade, with Griffin, followed by Humphreys, and with three batteries, to + march along the river road to some commanding point between Mott and Colin + Runs; his advance to be masked by throwing out small parties, and his + command to be in position by two P.M., while Sykes's division, supported + by Hancock's division of the Second Corps, march out the turnpike to a + corresponding distance, each force then deploying towards the other, and + engaging the enemy supposed to be in that vicinity. + </p> + <p> + A third column, consisting of the Twelfth Corps, he orders to march by the + plank road, and to be massed near Tabernacle Church, masked in like + manner; to be in position by midday, so that the Eleventh Corps can move + up to take position a mile in its rear as reserve, by two P.M. + </p> + <p> + French's division of the Second Corps, and one battery, are ordered to + Todd's Tavern, from which detachments are to be thrown out on the various + roads. + </p> + <p> + The unemployed troops are massed at Chancellorsville, out of the roads. + Pleasonton holds his cavalry brigade there in readiness to move. Hooker + announces his headquarters at Tabernacle Church as soon as the movement + opens. + </p> + <p> + Immediately after (11.30 A.M., Friday,) Sedgwick is directed to threaten + an attack at one P.M., in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing, to + ascertain whether the enemy is hugging his defences in full force. A corps + is to be used with proper supports, but nothing more than a demonstration + to be made. If certain that the enemy is there in force, Sedgwick is to + make no attack. + </p> + <p> + Sedgwick did not receive this order until about five P. M., but + nevertheless made a display in force of Reynolds's corps, with Newton and + Brooks in support. But a countermand was soon received, and the troops + withdrawn. + </p> + <p> + As Hooker supposed his enemy to be in line somewhere midway between + Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, the purpose of these orders to + Sedgwick is not plain. Meade, Sykes, and Slocum were ordered to attack the + enemy when met. Sedgwick could aid such an attack by pushing the force in + his front at Hamilton's. But a mere demonstration to find out whether the + heights were strongly held could have no effect upon the real advance, nor + procure Hooker any timely information. + </p> + <p> + The movement of the three columns out of the Wilderness begins at eleven + A.M. It is in accordance with the declared plans of Hooker, and with sound + policy. For Chancellorsville is of all places the worst in which to + deliver or accept a general engagement, and every mile's advance towards + Fredericksburg brings the army into more open ground. + </p> + <p> + Meade, with Griffin and Humphreys, advances on the river road to within a + short distance of Banks's Ford, near Decker's farm. He can easily seize + the ford, the possession of which lessens the distance between the wings + by six miles. It is the objective Hooker has had in view ever since the + movement began. He is preparing to deploy towards Sykes. + </p> + <p> + Sykes,—to quote Warren,—"on gaining the ridge about a mile and + a quarter from Chancellorsville, found the enemy advancing, and driving + back our cavalry. This small force resisted handsomely, riding up and + firing almost in the faces of the Eleventh Virginia Infantry, which formed + the enemy's advance. Gen. Sykes moved forward in double-quick time, + attacked the enemy vigorously, and drove him back with loss, till he had + gained the position assigned him." + </p> + <p> + This is a crest in front of the heavy forest, and in range of Anderson's + rifle-pits. The Federal skirmishers are the Seventeenth United-States + Infantry, supported by Burbank's brigade. + </p> + <p> + McLaws is in his front, and deploys across the pike, Semmes on the left of + the road, Mahone, Perry, and Wofford on the right. Jordan's battery is + posted on the Mine road. + </p> + <p> + Sykes brings up Weed's battery, and opens on Semmes, and drives in his + skirmishers, but can make no serious impression on his line. McLaws sends + word to Jackson that Sykes is attacking in force, and that the country is + favorable for a flank attack. + </p> + <p> + Jackson orders Kershaw through the woods to join Semmes's left, and sends + Wilcox up the Mine road to extend the Confederate right, and head off a + Federal advance from this direction. + </p> + <p> + Sykes thus finds himself overlapped on both flanks. He throws Ayres's + regular brigade out on his left, and the One Hundred and Forty-sixth New + York on his right. His position is difficult, but he determines to hold it + as long as possible. + </p> + <p> + It is noon. No sounds are heard from the parallel columns. Sykes has to + make his line very thin, but holds his ground. If supported, he can + maintain himself. + </p> + <p> + But at this juncture he receives orders to fall back on Chancellorsville, + and slowly retires to McGee's; later to his old position, Hancock taking + his place in the front line; and he next morning at daylight is also + withdrawn, and takes up the line he retains until Sunday morning. + </p> + <p> + Slocum, in like manner on the plank road, meets Posey and Wright, and a + small affair occurs. But Wright is sent along the unfinished railroad, and + outflanks him. He is also at this moment ordered to retire. + </p> + <p> + Meade has had similar orders, and has likewise withdrawn; and Wilcox is + sent to Banks's Ford to hold it. + </p> + <p> + Wright continues his movement along the railroad, as far as Welford's or + Catherine's Furnace, when, finding himself beyond communication with his + superior, he, in connection with Stuart, who has been holding this point, + determines to feel the Union line. Two regiments and a battery are thrown + in along the road to Dowdall's Tavern, preceded by skirmishers. Our + pickets fall back, and through the dense wood the Confederates reach our + line. But they are warmly received, and retire. This is six P.M. Wright + now joins his division. + </p> + <p> + Lee has arrived, and assumes command. + </p> + <p> + Jackson's divisions, thus following up our retiring columns, by nightfall + occupy a line from Mine road to Welford's Furnace. A regiment of cavalry + is on the Mine road, and another on the river road as outposts. Stuart + remains at the Furnace. McLaws occupies the crest east of Big-Meadow + Swamp, and Anderson prolongs his lines westwardly. + </p> + <p> + Let us now examine into these operations of Friday. + </p> + <p> + This movement towards Fredericksburg was not a sudden idea of Hooker's, + but the result of a carefully studied plan. In his order of April 3, to + Sedgwick, he says that he proposes to assume the initiative, advance along + the plank road, and uncover Banks's Ford, and at once throw bridges + across. Gen. Butterfield, in a communication to Sedgwick of April 30, + says, "He (Hooker) expected when he left here, if he met with no serious + opposition, to be on the heights west of Fredericksburg to-morrow noon or + shortly after, and, if opposed strongly, to-morrow night." In his + testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker says, + "The problem was, to throw a sufficient force of infantry across at + Kelley's Ford, descend the Rappahannock, and knock away the enemy's + forces, holding the United-States and Banks's Ford, by attacking them in + the rear, and as soon as these fords were opened, to re-enforce the + marching column sufficiently for them to continue the march upon the flank + of the rebel army until his whole force was routed, and, if successful, + his retreat intercepted. Simultaneous with this movement on the right, the + left was to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and threaten the + enemy in that quarter, including his depot of supplies, to prevent his + detaching an overwhelming force to his left." + </p> + <p> + Hooker, moreover, not only told Hunt that he expected to fight near + Banks's Ford, but instructed him to get all his artillery to that point + from below, where it had been massed to cover Sedgwick's crossing. + </p> + <p> + There was every reason why the army should be got out of the Wilderness, + in the midst of which lies Chancellorsville. This is, of all places in + that section, the least fit for an engagement in which the general + commanding expects to secure the best tactical results. But out towards + Fredericksburg the ground opens, showing a large number of clearings, + woods of less density, and a field suited to the operations of all arms. + </p> + <p> + Every thing should have been done to get the two wings within easier + communication; and more than all, having once surprised the enemy, and + advanced against him, a retreat should have been made from imperative + reasons alone. + </p> + <p> + Hooker explains this falling back in after-days, before the Committee on + the Conduct of the War, thus: "They"—the forces on the turnpike and + plank road—"had proceeded but a short distance when the head of the + column emerged from the heavy forest, and discovered the enemy to be + advancing in line of battle. Nearly all the Twelfth Corps had emerged from + the forest at that moment" (this is a very imperfect statement of the + facts); "but, as the passage-way through the forest was narrow, I was + satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough to resist + the advance of Gen. Lee, and was apprehensive of being whipped in detail." + And in another place, "When I marched out on the morning of the 1st of May + I could get but few troops into position: the column had to march through + narrow roads, and could not be thrown forward fast enough to prevent their + being overwhelmed by the enemy in his advance. On assuming my position, + Lee advanced on me in that manner, and was soon repulsed, the column + thrown back in confusion into the open ground. It could not live there. + The roads through the forest were not unlike bridges to pass. A mile or + more in advance of the position I had would have placed me beyond the + forest, where, with my superior forces, the enemy would in all probability + have been beaten." + </p> + <p> + This was not a valid conclusion from the actual facts. Listen to his + subordinates' statements. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Humphreys testifies before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, + with reference to this falling-back: "It was totally unexpected to me: I + thought it was part of the plan to attack him as quickly as possible. We + had surprised them, and were strong enough to attack them." "After Friday + I was apprehensive we should not have the success we had expected." "I + think it was a mistake to fight a defensive battle after surprising the + enemy." "I think we should have attacked the enemy immediately." "I must + give my opinion, since you ask me; for I have an opinion, as a military + man, from the general facts I know, and that I suppose I am obliged to + express. My opinion is that we should not have been withdrawn, called + back, on Friday afternoon. We had advanced along the road to + Fredericksburg to attack the enemy: the troops were in fine spirits, and + we wanted to fight a battle. I think we ought to have fought the enemy + there. They came out, and attacked one division of the corps I belonged + to, just at the time we returned to Chancellorsville. What caused Gen. + Hooker to return after advancing some miles on this general position, + which was about perpendicular to the plank road leading to Fredericksburg, + I am not able to say, because, being only a division commander, the facts + were not stated to me. But I have heard it said that he received some + erroneous information about the enemy's advancing on his flank from the + direction of Orange Court House. It was my opinion, we should have + attacked the enemy, instead of withdrawing, and awaiting an attack from + the enemy." + </p> + <p> + He also testifies, that, after the troops were ordered back to + Chancellorsville, they were for many hours massed there in considerable + confusion, until, after a deal of counter-marching, they were got into + place. + </p> + <p> + Pleasonton states that the retreat from open ground "produced among the + soldiers a feeling of uncertainty." + </p> + <p> + Hancock testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "I + consider the mistake in the matter was in even stopping at + Chancellorsville.... I believe, if all... had pushed right down to Banks's + Ford, the whole movement would have been a perfect success. But I have no + doubt that we ought to have held our advance positions, and still kept + pushing on, and attempt to make a junction with Gen. Sedgwick." + </p> + <p> + Gen. Warren, whose whole testimony and report are the clearest and most + useful of all the evidence obtainable from any single source, on this + campaign, suggested to Couch, who was supporting Sykes on Friday, when the + latter was attacked by Jackson, to delay carrying out Hooker's orders to + retire, while he (Warren) galloped back to headquarters to explain the + importance of holding the position, which was formidable and had great + tactical advantages. Hooker yielded; but, before Warren could get back to + the front, the previous orders had been obeyed, and the position lost. He + says: "I never should have stopped at Chancellorsville. I should have + advanced and fought the enemy, instead of waiting for him to attack me. + The character of the country was the great reason for advancing." + </p> + <p> + And it is thought that every one engaged in this campaign with the Army of + the Potomac will remember the feeling of confusion and uncertainty + engendered by the withdrawal from Jackson's front on this unlucky day. + </p> + <p> + A council of general officers was held at Chancellorsville on Friday + evening, in which many were still strongly in favor of making the advance + again. Warren says: "I was in favor of advancing, and urged it with more + zeal than convincing argument." But Hooker held to his own opinion. He + could not appreciate the weakness of assuming the defensive in the midst + of the elan of a successful advance. + </p> + <p> + It is not difficult to state what Hooker should have done. He had a + definite plan, which was to uncover and use Banks's Ford. He should have + gone on in the execution of this plan until arrested by superior force, or + until something occurred to show that his plan was inexpedient. To retire + from an enemy whom you have gone out to attack, and whom you have already + placed at a disadvantage, before striking a blow, is weak generalship + indeed. + </p> + <p> + Hooker had arrived at Chancellorsville at noon Thursday. Lee was still in + Fredericksburg. The troops were able to march many miles farther without + undue taxing. They should have been pushed out that afternoon to the open + ground and to Banks's Ford. To fail in this, was the first great error of + the campaign. There had not been a moment's delay allowed from the time + the troops reached the river until they were massed at Chancellorsville, + and the proposed movement nearly completed. One continued pressure, never + let up, had constantly been exerted by the headquarters of the army. The + troops had been kept in constant movement towards Banks's Ford. Hooker had + all but reached his goal. Suddenly occurred a useless, unexplained pause + of twenty-four hours. And it was during this unlucky gap of time that Lee + occupied the ground which Hooker's cavalry could have seized, and which + should have been held at all hazards. + </p> + <p> + Nor is this error excusable from ignorance of the terrain. For Hooker had + shown his knowledge of the importance of celerity; and his own declared + plan made Banks's Ford, still a half-dozen miles distant, his one + objective. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the + War, he thus refers to his plan: "As soon as Couch's divisions and Sykes's + corps came up, I directed an advance for the purpose, in the first + instance, of driving the enemy away from Banks's Ford, which was six miles + down the river, in order that we might be in closer communication with the + left wing of the army." And if the troops had needed repose, a few hours + would have sufficed; and, the succeeding night being clear moonlight, a + forward movement was then entirely feasible. + </p> + <p> + Dating from this delay of Thursday, every thing seemed to go wrong. + </p> + <p> + More curious still is Hooker's conduct on Friday, when his three columns + came into presence of the enemy. What every one would have expected of + Fighting Joe was, that at this supreme moment his energy would have risen + to its highest pitch. It was a slight task to hold the enemy for a few + hours. Before ordering the columns back, Hooker should have gone in person + to Sykes's front. Here he would have shortly ascertained that Jackson was + moving around his right. What easier than to leave a strong enough force + at the edge of the Wilderness, and to move by his left towards Banks's + Ford, where he already had Meade's heavy column? This would have kept his + line of communication with United-States Ford open, and, while uncovering + Banks's Ford, would at the same time turn Jackson's right. It is not as if + such a movement carried him away from his base, or uncovered his + communications. It was the direct way to preserve both. + </p> + <p> + But at this point Hooker faltered. Fighting Joe had reached the + culminating desire of his life. He had come face to face with his foe, and + had a hundred and twenty thousand eager and well-disciplined men at his + back. He had come to fight, and he—retreated without crossing + swords. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0012" id="link2H_4_0012"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XI. THE POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE. + </h2> + <p> + The position at Chancellorsville was good for neither attack nor defence. + The ground was not open enough for artillery, except down the few roads, + and across an occasional clearing. Cavalry was useless. Infantry could not + advance steadily in line. The ground was such in Hooker's front, that Lee + could manoeuvre or mass his troops unseen by him. Our own troops were so + located, that to re-enforce any portion of the line, which might be + attacked, with sufficient speed, was impossible. + </p> + <p> + Anderson (as has been stated) had been ordered by Lee to hold + Chancellorsville; but after examination of the ground, and consultation + with Mahone and Posey, he concluded to transcend his instructions, and + retired to the junction of Mine Road and the turnpike. He assumed that the + superiority of this latter ground would excuse his failure to hold his + position in the Wilderness. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Hancock says: "I consider that the position at Chancellorsville was + not a good one. It was a flat country, and had no local military + advantages." + </p> + <p> + And the testimony of all our general officers is strongly to the same + effect. + </p> + <p> + The position to which Hooker retired was the same which the troops, + wearied with their march of Thursday, had taken up without any expectation + of fighting a battle there. Hooker had desired to contract his lines + somewhat after Friday's check; but the feeling that farther retreat would + still more dishearten the men, already wondering at this unexplained + withdrawal, and the assurance of the generals on the right that they could + hold it against any force the enemy could bring against their front, + decided him in favor of leaving the line as it was, and of strengthening + it by breastworks and abattis. + </p> + <p> + Having established his troops in position, Hooker further strengthened his + right wing at Chancellorsville to the detriment of his left below + Fredericksburg; and at 1.55 A.M., Saturday, ordered all the bridges at + Franklin's Crossing, and below, to be taken up, and Reynolds's corps to + march at once, with pack-train, to report at headquarters. + </p> + <p> + This corps reached him Saturday night, and was deployed upon the extreme + right of the new position then being taken up by the army. + </p> + <p> + The line as now established lay as follows:— + </p> + <p> + Meade held the left, extending from a small bluff near Scott's Dam on the + Rappahannock, and covering the roads on the river, along a crest between + Mine and Mineral Spring Runs towards and within a short mile of + Chancellorsville. + </p> + <p> + This crest was, however, commanded from several points on the east, and, + according to the Confederate authorities, appeared to have been carelessly + chosen. Meade's front, except at the extreme river-flank, was covered by + impenetrable woods. The Mine road intersected his left flank, and the + River road was parallel to and a mile in his front. + </p> + <p> + Couch joined Meade's right, and extended southerly to Chancellorsville, + with Hancock thrown out on his front, and facing east, astride the River + road, and up to and across the old turnpike; his line being formed south + of this road and of the Chancellor clearing. The division of French, of + Couch's corps, was held in reserve along the United-States Ford road. + </p> + <p> + From here to Dowdall's Tavern the line made a southerly sweep outwards, + like a bent bow, of which the plank road was the string. + </p> + <p> + As far as Hazel Grove, at the centre of the bow, Slocum's Twelfth Corps + held the line, Geary's division joining on to Couch, and Williams on the + right. From Slocum's right to the extreme right of the army, the Eleventh + Corps had at first been posted; but Hooker determined on Saturday morning + that the line was too thin here, and thrust Birney's division of the Third + Corps in between Slocum and Howard. The rest of the Third Corps was in + reserve, massed in columns of battalions, in Bullock's clearing, north of + the Chancellor house, with its batteries at the fork of the roads leading + to the United-States and Ely's Fords. + </p> + <p> + Towards sunset of Friday, Birney had advanced a strong line of + skirmishers, and seized a commanding position in his front. Birney's line + then lay along the crest facing Scott's Run from Dowdall's to Slocum's + right. + </p> + <p> + Pleasonton's cavalry brigade was massed at headquarters, ready for duty at + any point. + </p> + <p> + Howard held the line, from Dowdall's Tavern (Melzi Chancellor's) to beyond + Talley's farm on the old pike, with his right flank substantially in the + air, and with two roads, the main thoroughfares from east to west, + striking in on his right, parallel to his position. + </p> + <p> + As will be noticed from the map, the right, being along the pike, was + slightly refused from the rest of the line, considering the latter as + properly lying along the road to headquarters. From Dowdall's west, the + rise along the pike was considerable, and at Talley's the crest was high. + The whole corps lay on the watershed of the small tributaries of the + Rappahannock and Mattapony Rivers. + </p> + <p> + As a position to resist a southerly attack, it was as good as the + Wilderness afforded; although the extreme right rested on no obstacle + which superiority in numbers could not overcome. And a heavy force, massed + in the clearing at Dowdall's as a point d'appui, was indispensable to + safety, inasmuch as the conformation of the ground afforded nothing for + this flank to lean upon. + </p> + <p> + Having forfeited the moral superiority gained by his advance, having + withdrawn to his intrenchments at Chancellorsville, and decided, after + surprising his enemy, upon fighting a defensive battle, Hooker, early on + Saturday morning, examined his lines, and made sundry changes in the + forces under his command. + </p> + <p> + The position he occupied, according to Gen. Lee, was one of great natural + strength, on ground covered with dense forest and tangled under-growth, + behind breastworks of logs and an impenetrable abattis, and approached by + few roads, all easily swept by artillery. And, while it is true that the + position was difficult to carry by direct assault, full compensation + existed in other tactical advantages to the army taking the offensive. It + is not probable that Lee, in Hooker's place, would have selected such + ground. "Once in the wood, it was difficult to tell any thing at one + hundred yards. Troops could not march without inextricable confusion." + Despite which fact, however, the density of these very woods was the main + cause of Lee's success. + </p> + <p> + In this position, Hooker awaited the assault of his vigorous opponent. As + in all defensive battles, he was at certain disadvantages, and peculiarly + so in this case, owing to the terrain he had chosen, or been forced to + choose by Friday's easily accepted check. There were no debouches for + throwing forces upon Lee, should he wish to assume the offensive. There + was no ground for manoeuvring. The woods were like a heavy curtain in his + front. His left wing was placed so as to be of absolutely no value. His + right flank was in the air. One of the roads on which he must depend for + retreat was readily assailable by the enemy. And he had in his rear a + treacherous river, which after a few hours' rain might become impassable, + with but a single road and ford secured to him with reasonable certainty. + </p> + <p> + And, prone as we had always been to act upon unwarrantable over-estimates + of the strength of our adversaries, Hooker had not this reason to allege + for having retired to await Lee's attack. For he had just received + excellent information from Richmond, to the effect that Lee's rations + amounted to fifty-nine thousand daily; and we have seen that he told + Slocum, on Thursday, that his column of nearly forty thousand men was much + stronger than any force Lee could detach against him. Hooker acknowledges + as much in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, + when, in answer to the question, "What portion of the enemy lay between + you and Gen. Sedgwick?" he replied:— + </p> + <p> + "Lee's army at Fredericksburg numbered sixty thousand, not including the + artillery, cavalry, and the forces stationed up the river, occupying the + posts at Culpeper and Gordonsville. I think my information on this point + was reliable, as I had made use of unusual means to ascertain. The enemy + left eight thousand men to occupy the lines about Fredericksburg; Jackson + marched off to my right with twenty-five thousand; and Lee had the balance + between me and Sedgwick." + </p> + <p> + It will be well to remember this acknowledgment, when we come to deal with + Hooker's theories of the force in his own front on Sunday and Monday. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0013" id="link2H_4_0013"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XII. JACKSON'S MARCH, AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE. + </h2> + <p> + Lee and Jackson spent Friday night under some pine-trees, on the plank + road, at the point where the Confederate line crosses it. Lee saw that it + was impossible for him to expect to carry the Federal lines by direct + assault, and his report states that he ordered a cavalry reconnoissance + towards our right flank to ascertain its position. There is, however, no + mention of such a body having felt our lines on the right, in any of the + Federal reports. + </p> + <p> + It is not improbable that Lee received information, crude but useful, + about this portion of our army, from some women belonging to Dowdall's + Tavern. When the Eleventh Corps occupied the place on Thursday, a watch + was kept upon the family living there. But in the interval between the + corps breaking camp to move out to Slocum's support on Friday morning, and + its return to the old position, some of the women had disappeared. This + fact was specially noted by Gen. Howard. + </p> + <p> + However the information was procured, the Federal right was doubtless + ascertained to rest on high ground, where it was capable of making a + stubborn resistance towards the south. But Lee well knew that its position + was approached from the west by two broad roads, and reasoned justly that + Hooker, in canvassing the events of Friday, would most probably look for + an attack on his left or front. + </p> + <p> + Seated on a couple of cracker-boxes, the relics of an issue of Federal + rations the day before, the two Confederate chieftains discussed the + situation. Jackson, with characteristic restless energy, suggested a + movement with his entire corps around Hooker's right flank, to seize + United-States Ford, or fall unawares upon the Army of the Potomac. This + hazardous suggestion, which Lee in his report does not mention as + Jackson's, but which is universally ascribed to him by Confederate + authorities, was one as much fraught with danger as it was spiced with + dash, and decidedly bears the Jacksonian flavor. It gave "the great + flanker" twenty-two thousand men (according to Col. A. S. Pendleton, his + assistant adjutant-general, but twenty-six thousand by morning report) + with which to make a march which must at best take all day, constantly + exposing his own flank to the Federal assault. It separated for a still + longer time the two wings of the Confederate army; leaving Lee with only + Anderson's and McLaws's divisions,—some seventeen thousand men,—with + which to resist the attack of thrice that number, which Hooker, should he + divine this division of forces, could throw against him, the while he kept + Jackson busy with the troops on his own right flank. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, Hooker had shown clear intention of fighting a + defensive battle; and perhaps Lee measured his man better than the Army of + the Potomac had done. And he knew Jackson too. Should Hooker remain quiet + during the day, either voluntarily or by Lee's engrossing his attention by + constant activity in his front, the stratagem might succeed. And in case + of failure, each wing had open ground and good roads for retreat, to form + a junction towards Gordonsville. + </p> + <p> + Moreover, nothing better presented itself; and though, in the presence of + a more active foe, Lee would never have hazarded so much, the very + aggressiveness of the manoeuvre, and the success of Jackson's former flank + attacks, commended it to Lee, and he gave his lieutenant orders to proceed + to its immediate execution. + </p> + <p> + For this division of his forces in the presence of an enemy of twice his + strength, Lee is not entitled to commendation. It is justifiable only—if + at all—by the danger of the situation, which required a desperate + remedy, and peculiarly by the success which attended it. Had it resulted + disastrously, as it ought to have done, it would have been a serious blow + to Lee's military prestige. The "nothing venture, nothing have" principle + applies to it better than any maxim of tactics. + </p> + <p> + Before daybreak Jackson sends two of his aides, in company with some local + guides, to find a practicable road, by which he may, with the greatest + speed and all possible secrecy, gain the position he aims at on Hooker's + right and rear, and immediately sets his corps in motion, with Rodes, + commanding D. H. Hill's division, in the advance, and A. P. Hill bringing + up the rear. + </p> + <p> + Jackson's route lay through the woods, along the road on which rested + Lee's line. His corps, since Friday's manoeuvres, was on the left; and, as + he withdrew his troops at dawn, Lee deployed to the left to fill the gap, + first placing Wright where Jackson had been on the west of the plank road, + and later, when Wright was ordered to oppose Sickles at the Furnace, + Mahone's brigade. + </p> + <p> + This wood-road led to Welford's or Catherine's Furnace, from which place a + better one, called the Furnace road, zigzagged over to join the Brock (or + Brook) road, the latter running northerly into Y-shaped branches, each of + which intersected the pike a couple of miles apart. + </p> + <p> + Jackson was obliged to make some repairs to the road as he advanced, for + the passage of his artillery and trains. In many places the bottom, none + too reliable at any time, was so soft with the recent rains, that it had + to be corduroyed to pull the guns through. But these men were used to + marches of unequalled severity, and their love for their leader made no + work too hard when "Old Jack" shared it with them. And although they had + already been marching and fighting continuously for thirty hours, this + circuit of well-nigh fifteen miles was cheerfully done, with an alacrity + nothing but willing and courageous hearts, and a blind belief that they + were outwitting their enemy, could impart. + </p> + <p> + His progress was masked by Stuart, who interposed his cavalry between + Jackson and the Union lines, and constantly felt of our skirmishers and + pickets as he slowly kept abreast with the marching column. + </p> + <p> + At the Furnace comes in another road, which, a short distance above, forks + so as to lead to Dowdall's Tavern on the left, and to touch the Union + lines by several other branches on the right. It was this road down which + Wright and Stuart had advanced the evening before in their attack on our + lines. + </p> + <p> + Here, in passing Lewis's Creek (Scott's Run) and some elevated ground near + by, the column of Jackson had to file in full view of the Union troops, + barely a mile and a half away. The movement was thus fully observed by us, + hundreds of field-glasses pointing steadily at his columns. + </p> + <p> + It seems somewhat strange that Jackson should have made this march, + intended to be quite disguised, across the Furnace-clearing. For there was + another equally short route, making a bend southward through the woods, + and, though possibly not so good as the one pursued, subsequently found + available for the passage of Jackson's trains, when driven from the + Furnace by Sickles. It is probably explained, however, by the fact that + this route, selected during the night, was unfamiliar to Jackson, and that + his aides and guides had not thought of the point where the troops were + thus put en evidence. And Jackson may not have been with the head of the + column. + </p> + <p> + So early as eight o'clock Birney of the Third Corps, whose division had + been thrust in between Howard and Slocum, reported to Sickles that a + movement in considerable force was being made in our front. Sickles + conveyed the information to Hooker, who instructed him to investigate the + matter in person. Sickles pushed out Clark's rifled battery, with a + sufficient support, to shell the passing column. This, says Sickles, + obliged it to abandon the road. It was observed that the column was a + large one, and had a heavy train. Sickles considered it either a movement + for attack on our right, or else one in retreat. If the former, he + surmised at the time that he had arrested it; if the latter, that the + column had taken a more available route. + </p> + <p> + It was while Rodes was filing past the Furnace that the first attack by + Clark's battery was made; and Col. Best, with the Twenty-third Georgia + Regiment, was sent out beyond the Furnace to hold the road. Best + subsequently took position in and about the Furnace buildings, and placed + some troops in the railroad cutting south. + </p> + <p> + Sickles, meanwhile, had again reported to Hooker, and been instructed to + strengthen his reconnoissance. But it was noon before this order was + given, and he was then advised to push out with great caution. He asked + for the whole of Birney's division, and another one in support. With these + he thought to get possession of the road on which the enemy was moving, + and, if it was a retreat, cut him off; if a flank movement, thrust himself + in between the two bodies of the enemy. Hooker accorded this request; and + Birney was advanced a mile and a half through the woods, bridging two or + three arms of Scott's Run, and some marshy ground, and making his way with + great difficulty. Two regiments of Berdan's sharpshooters were thrown out + in front, and the Twentieth Indiana Infantry led Birney's division. + Considerable opposition was encountered, say the reports of these + regiments; but after some skirmishing, Berdan managed to surround Best's + command, and captured nearly the entire force. + </p> + <p> + Why Birney advanced through the woods is not readily understood; for there + was a good road close by his position, leading to the Furnace, by using + which many hours could have been saved. + </p> + <p> + From the prisoners of the Twenty-third Georgia, and some others + intercepted, it was clearly ascertained, by two P.M., that Jackson was + moving towards our right flank, with, as the prisoners stated, some forty + thousand men. + </p> + <p> + These facts Sickles also reported to Hooker, requesting Pleasonton's + cavalry, and his own third division, to cooperate in a flank attack, which + he seems to have assumed he could make on Jackson. Hooker ordered Whipple + up into supporting distance to Birney, with instructions to connect the + latter with Slocum; and directed Williams (Slocum's right division) to + cover the left of the advancing column, and if necessary attack the enemy + there. Howard received instructions from Capt. Moore, who had been + announced in general orders as on Hooker's staff, to cover Birney's right; + and he detached his reserve brigade, the best and largest in the Eleventh + Corps, commanded by Barlow, and led it out in person to its position. + </p> + <p> + Hooker subsequently denied having sent Capt. Moore to Howard, alleging the + order to have emanated from Sickles; but, as Capt. Moore was on Hooker's + staff, Howard certainly could do no less than he did, supposing the order + to be by authority from headquarters. + </p> + <p> + Sickles now imagined that every thing promised the most brilliant success. + He was preparing to make his attack, as he supposed,—to judge, at + least, from what he says,—on Jackson's flank. "McLaws's opposition + had all but ceased," says he; "and it was evident that in a few moments + five or six regiments would be cut off, and fall into our hands." + </p> + <p> + But Sickles had been deceived by a simple rear-guard of the enemy; while + Jackson, by a long circuit, was not only far beyond his reach, but in + position to crush Howard, and cut off Sickles from communication with the + rest of the army. + </p> + <p> + Pleasonton, whom Hooker had sent out to Sickles's aid, held his three + regiments and Martin's horse-battery, in the clearing at Scott's Run, + being unable to operate to any advantage on the ground occupied by Birney. + Three or four other Third-Corps batteries were also here for a similar + reason. + </p> + <p> + When Sickles's attack, leading to the capture of the Twenty-third Georgia, + was made, Col. Brown's battalion of Confederate artillery happened to be + within reach, and was speedily ordered up by Jackson, and placed on a + cleared eminence south of the railroad cutting. Here, gathering a few + detached companies in support, he opened smartly upon Sickles. The latter, + bearing in mind his orders impressing caution in his advance, was for the + moment checked, long enough, at all events, to enable Jackson's trains to + get out of reach by the lower road. + </p> + <p> + Birney had barely reached the Furnace when Brown's fire became quite + annoying. He accordingly placed Livingstone's, and afterwards Randolph's, + batteries in position, and spent some time in silencing the Confederate + guns; after accomplishing which, he threw forward his skirmishers, and + occupied Welford's house, while Graham, with four regiments, got + possession of the railroad cutting. + </p> + <p> + By this time Jackson's troops had passed a couple of miles beyond the + Furnace; but on hearing of Sickles's attack, and the capture of an entire + regiment, Archer, who commanded the rear brigade, promptly retraced his + steps with his own and Thomas's brigades, and supported Brown's excellent + work. So soon as the trains had got well along, these two brigades + rejoined their command; and their work as rear-guard was undertaken by + Posey, and subsequently by Wright, whom Anderson ordered out, and threw + across his own left flank to engage the attention of Sickles's column. + </p> + <p> + Jackson's divisions were well out of reach, a half-dozen miles from + Sickles, before this officer was ready for an advance in force. Jackson + had marched on, or parallel to, the Brock road. When he reached the Orange + plank road, he was shown an eminence from which he could observe the + position of the Union lines. Riding up alone, so as not to attract + attention, after—as Cooke affirms—driving the Federal cavalry + from the spot, he examined our position carefully; and, seeing that he was + not yet abreast of our flank on this road, he ordered his troops farther + along the Brock road to the old turnpike. + </p> + <p> + But he sent Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry, supported by Paxton, along the plank + road, to hold it in case his designs were prematurely discovered and met. + </p> + <p> + By four P.M. he had reached the right and rear of the Union line; while + Hooker complacently viewed the situation from his comfortable headquarters + at the Chancellor house, apparently in a semi-torpid state, retaining just + enough activity to initiate manoeuvres, which, under the circumstances, + were the most unfortunate possible. + </p> + <p> + For not only had he robbed his right corps of Barlow's brigade, the only + general reserve of the "key of his position," as himself has called it, + and despatched Birney two miles into the woods, supported by Whipple, and + protected on the left by Williams; but about five P.M. he ordered Geary + from his position on Slocum's left, to move forward, and make an attack + down the plank road. This order Geary carried out in person with several + regiments. He had a smart skirmish with the enemy, and was considerably + advanced, when, about sundown, he was suddenly ordered to return to his + position. + </p> + <p> + Hooker's right flank, of less than ten thousand men, was thus isolated + from the rest of the army, with no supports within two miles. + </p> + <p> + And yet the full evidence of Jackson's whereabouts was before him. There + had been a constant feeling of the Union lines (by Stuart's cavalry and + some infantry skirmishers) all day, gradually working from east to west. + This fact was noticed by many officers, and is particularly referred to by + Pleasonton, Warren, and Howard. Jackson's columns and trains had been + strongly reconnoitred, their force estimated, and their direction noted. + The question as to what might be the objective of such a movement, had + been the main topic of discussion during the day throughout the right of + the army. + </p> + <p> + At noon a cavalry picket on the plank road was driven in, and gave notice + of the passing of a heavy column a mile beyond our lines. About 3.30 P.M. + the leading divisions of Jackson's corps, arriving on the old turnpike, + sent a party forward to feel our lines, and a ten-minutes' skirmish + resulted, when the Confederate party withdrew. There had been a number of + minor attacks on our outlying pickets, some of them occurring when Gen. + Howard was present. All these facts were successively reported to + headquarters. + </p> + <p> + About the same time two men, sent out as spies, came in, and reported the + enemy crossing the plank road on our right, in heavy columns. These men + were despatched by Howard to Hooker, with instructions to the officer + accompanying them to see that Hooker promptly received their information. + On the other hand, a half-hour before Jackson's attack came, Howard sent a + couple of companies of cavalry out the plank road to reconnoitre. These + men, from negligence or cowardice, failed to go far enough to ascertain + the presence of Jackson, and returned and reported all quiet. This report + was, however, not forwarded to Hooker. + </p> + <p> + There was not an officer or man in the Eleventh Corps that afternoon who + did not discuss the possibility of an attack in force on our right, and + wonder how the small body thrown across the road on the extreme flank + could meet it. And yet familiar with all the facts related, for that they + were reported to him there is too much cumulative evidence to doubt, and + having inspected the line so that he was conversant with its situation, + Hooker allowed the key of his position to depend upon a half-brigade and + two guns, facing the enemy, while the balance of the wing, absolutely in + the air, turned its back upon the general whose attack was never equalled + for its terrible momentum during our war, or excelled in any, and whose + crushing blows had caused the brave old Army of the Potomac more than once + to stagger. + </p> + <p> + Moreover, the "key of the position" was confided to a corps which was not + properly part of the Army of the Potomac, and untried as yet. For not only + had the Eleventh Corps, as a corps, seen no active service, but the most + of its regiments were made up of raw troops, and the elements of which the + corps was composed were to a degree incongruous. Of itself this fact + should have caused Hooker to devote serious attention to his right flank. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0014" id="link2H_4_0014"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XIII. HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES. + </h2> + <p> + Hooker and Sickles have both stated that the plan of the former was to + allow this movement of Jackson's to develop itself: if it was a retreat, + to attack the column at the proper time; if a tactical flank movement, to + allow it to be completed, and then thrust himself between the two wings of + Lee's army, and beat them in detail. This admirable generalization lacked + the necessary concomitant of intelligent and speedy execution. + </p> + <p> + Now, Hooker had his choice between two theories of this movement of + Jackson. It was a retreat from his front, either because Lee deemed + himself compromised, or for the purpose of making new strategic + combinations; or it was the massing of troops for a flank attack. It could + mean nothing else. Let us, then, do Hooker all the justice the situation + will allow. + </p> + <p> + All that had occurred during the day was fairly explainable on the former + hypothesis. If Jackson was passing towards Culpeper, he would naturally + send flanking parties out every road leading from the one his own columns + were pursuing, towards our lines, for strictly defensive purposes. The + several attacks of the day might have thus occurred. This assumption was + quite justifiable. + </p> + <p> + And this was the theory of Howard. He knew that Hooker had all the + information obtained along the entire line, from prisoners and scouts. He + naturally concluded, that if there was any reasonable supposition that an + attack from the west was intended, Hooker would in some way have notified + him. But, far from doing this, Hooker had inspected and approved his + position, and had ordered Howard's reserve away. To be sure, early in the + morning, Hooker had told him to guard against an attack on the right: but + since then circumstances had absolutely changed; Barlow had been taken + from him, and he conjectured that the danger of attack had passed. How + could he assume otherwise? + </p> + <p> + Had he suspected an attack down the pike, had he received half an hour's + warning, he could, and naturally would, assuming the responsibility of a + corps commander, have changed front to rear so as to occupy with his corps + the line along the east side of the Dowdall's clearing, which he had + already intrenched, and where he had his reserve artillery. He did not do + so; and it is more easy to say that he was to blame, than to show good + cause for the stigma cast upon him for the result of this day. + </p> + <p> + However much Hooker's after-wit may have prompted him to deny it, his + despatch of 4.10 P.M., to Sedgwick, shows conclusively that he himself had + adopted this theory of a retreat. "We know that the enemy is flying," says + he, "trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles's divisions are among + them." + </p> + <p> + And it is kinder to Hooker's memory to assume that he did not apprehend a + flank attack on this evening. If he did, his neglect of his position was + criminal. Let us glance at the map. + </p> + <p> + We know how the Eleventh Corps lay, its reserve removed, with which it + might have protected a change of front, should this become necessary, and + itself facing southerly. What was on its left, to move up to its support + in case of an attack down the pike? Absolutely not a regiment between + Dowdall's and Chancellorsville, and near the latter place only one + division available. This was Berry's, still luckily massed in the open + north of headquarters. And to Sickles's very deliberate movement alone is + due the fact that Berry was still there when the attack on Howard burst; + for Sickles had bespoken Berry's division in support of his own advance + just at this juncture. + </p> + <p> + Birney, who was the prop of Howard's immediate left, had been advanced + nearly two miles through the thickets to the south to attack an imaginary + enemy. Whipple had followed him. Of Slocum's corps, Williams had been sent + out "two or three miles," to sweep the ground in his front, and Geary + despatched down the plank road "for the purpose of cutting off the train + of the enemy, who was supposed to be in retreat towards Gordonsville." To + oppose the attack of a column of not far from twenty-five thousand men, + there was thus left a brigade front of four small regiments, and the flank + of a corps of eight thousand men more, without reserves, and with no + available force whatever for its support, should it be overwhelmed. + </p> + <p> + Is any criticism needed upon this situation? And who should be responsible + for it? + </p> + <p> + In a defensive battle it is all-important that the general in command + should hold his troops well in hand, especially when the movements of the + enemy can be concealed by the terrain. The enemy is allowed his choice of + massing for an attack on any given point: so that the ability to + concentrate reserve troops on any threatened point is an indispensable + element of safety. It may be assumed that Hooker was, at the moment of + Jackson's attack, actually taking the offensive. But on this hypothesis, + the feebleness of his advance is still more worthy of criticism. For + Jackson was first attacked by Sickles as early as nine A.M.; and it was + six P.M. before the latter was ready to move upon the enemy in force. Such + tardiness as this could never win a battle. + </p> + <p> + While all this had been transpiring on the right, Lee, to keep his + opponent busy, and prevent his sending re-enforcements to the flank + Jackson was thus threatening, had been continually tapping at the lines in + his front. But, owing to the small force left with him, he confined this + work to Hooker's centre, where he rightly divined his headquarters to be. + About seven A.M. the clearing at Chancellorsville was shelled by some of + Anderson's batteries, obliging the trains there parked to go to the rear + into the woods. + </p> + <p> + Hancock states that the enemy frequently opened with artillery, and made + infantry assaults on his advanced line of rifle-pits, but was always + handsomely repulsed. "During the sharp contests of that day, the enemy was + never able to reach my principal line of battle, so stoutly and + successfully did Col. Miles (who commanded the advanced line) contest the + ground." + </p> + <p> + Col. Miles says his line was constantly engaged skirmishing with the enemy + during the day. At about three P.M. the Confederates massed troops in two + columns, one on each side the road, flanked by a line some eight hundred + yards long, in the woods. An impetuous charge was made to within twenty + yards of the abattis, but it was baffled by our sturdy front. + </p> + <p> + Sickles, then still in reserve, had made a reconnoissance early on + Saturday, in Hancock's front, with the Eleventh Massachusetts and + Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, covered by some sharpshooters; had + driven in the enemy's pickets, and found him, to all appearances, in + force. This was Anderson's line. + </p> + <p> + The Twelfth Corps had also made a reconnoissance down the plank road later + in the day, but with no immediate results. + </p> + <p> + All that was accomplished was a mere feeling of the other's lines by + either force. Hooker vainly endeavored to ascertain Lee's strength at + various places in his front. Lee, to good purpose, strove to amuse Hooker + by his bustle and stir, to deceive him as to the weakness of his force, + and to gain time. + </p> + <p> + During the afternoon of Saturday, Hooker had a rare chance of redeeming + his error made, the day before, in withdrawing from the open country to + the Wilderness, and of dealing a fatal blow to his antagonist. He knew + that Jackson, with twenty-five thousand men, was struggling through + difficult roads towards his right. Whatever his object, the division of + Lee's forces was a fact. He knew that there could be left in his front not + more than an equal number. It was actually less than eighteen thousand + men; but Hooker, with his knowledge of Lee's strength, could not estimate + it at more than twenty-five thousand by any calculation he could make. + Himself had over seventy thousand men in line, and ready to mass on any + given point. He ought to have known that Lee was too astute a tactician + seriously to attack him in front, while Jackson was manoeuvring to gain + his right. And all Lee's conduct during the day was palpable evidence that + he was seeking to gain time. + </p> + <p> + However much Hooker may have believed that Jackson was retreating, he was + bound to guard against the possibility of an attack, knowing as he did + Jackson's whereabouts and habit of rapid mystery. Had he thrown the entire + Eleventh Corps en potence to his main line, as above indicated, to arrest + or retard an attack if made; had he drawn troops from Meade on the extreme + left, where half an hour's reconnoitring would have shown that nothing was + in his front, and from Couch's reserves in the centre; had he thrown heavy + columns out where Birney was, to prevent the re-union of Jackson and Lee, + and to make a determined attack upon the latter's left while Hancock + pressed him in front,—half the vigor displayed in the early days of + this movement would have crushed the Army of Northern Virginia beyond + recovery for this campaign. Lee's only salvation would have lain in + instant withdrawal from our front, and a retreat towards Gordonsville to + re-unite with his lieutenant. + </p> + <p> + However he might have disposed his forces for an attack on Saturday + afternoon, he could have committed no mistake as great as the half-way + measures which have been narrated. And if the heavy fighting of Sunday had + been done the day before with any thing like the dispositions suggested, + it could have scarcely failed of brilliant success for the Army of the + Potomac. + </p> + <p> + But six o'clock came: Hooker still lay listlessly awaiting an attack, with + his forces disjointedly lodged, and with no common purpose of action; and + Jackson had gathered for his mighty blow. + </p> + <p> + It is but fair to give weight to every circumstance which shall moderate + the censure attributable to Hooker for his defeat in this campaign. Early + in the morning, after his inspection of the lines on the right, which was + made with thoroughness, and after receipt of the first news of the + movement of troops across our front, Hooker issued the following circular:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 2, 1863, 9.30 A.M. +</pre> + <p> + MAJOR-GEN. SLOCUM AND MAJOR-GEN. HOWARD. + </p> + <p> + I am directed by the major-general commanding to say that the disposition + you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the + enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to + examine the ground, and determine upon the positions you will take in that + event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he + advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet + this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong + enough. No artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up; and there + appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the + general's opinion, as favorably posted as might be. + </p> + <p> + We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. + Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be, + in order to obtain timely information of their approach. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + JAMES H. VAN ALEN, + Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. +</pre> + <p> + Although addressed to Slocum as well as Howard, this order scarcely + applied with much force to the former, who occupied the right centre of + the army, with Birney lying between him and the Eleventh Corps. Howard + carried out his part of these instructions as well as circumstances + allowed. He posted Barlow's brigade, his largest and best, on the + Buschbeck line, in position for a general reserve for the corps, and took + advantage of the ground in a manner calculated to strengthen his flank, + and to enable it to cover a change of front if necessary; he placed his + reserve artillery on the right of the rifle-pits running across the road + at Dowdall's; he located several regiments on Dowdall's clearing so as to + wheel to the west or south as might be required; Major Hoffman was set to + work, and spent the entire day locating and supervising the construction + of field-works; and generally, Howard disposed the forces under his + command after a fashion calculated to oppose a stubborn resistance to + attacks down the pike, should they be made. + </p> + <p> + Later on in the day, we have seen how Hooker's aide, Capt. Moore, ordered + this brigade of Barlow's away from its all-important position. We have + seen Hooker's dispositions of the Third and Twelfth Corps. We have seen + Hooker's 4.10 P.M. order to Sedgwick. No room is left to doubt that + Hooker's opinion, if he had any, underwent a change after issuing these + instructions, and that he gave up the idea of an attack upon the right. + His dispositions certainly resulted in convincing Howard that he had done + so. + </p> + <p> + But suppose Hooker still remained of the same opinion during the + afternoon, was the issue of this circular in the morning enough? If he + supposed it probable that the enemy would strike our right, was it not the + duty of the commanding general, at least to see that the threatened flank + was properly protected,—that the above order was carried out as he + intended it should be? No attack sufficient to engross his attention had + been made, or was particularly threatened elsewhere; and a ten-minutes' + gallop would bring him from headquarters to the questionable position. He + had some excellent staff-officers—Gen. Warren among others—who + could have done this duty; but there is no evidence of any one having been + sent. Gen. Howard, in fact, states that no inspection by, or by the order + of, Gen. Hooker was made during the day, after the one in the early + morning. + </p> + <p> + It may be alleged that Hooker had desired to draw in the extended right + the evening before, and had yielded only to the claim that that position + could be held against any attack coming from the front. This is true. But + when half his enemy's forces, after this disposition was made, are moved + to and massed on his right, and have actually placed themselves where they + can take his line in reverse, is it still fair to urge this plea? Hooker + claims that his "instructions were utterly and criminally disregarded." + But inasmuch as common-sense, not to quote military routine, must hold him + accountable for the removal of Barlow (for how can a general shelter + himself from the consequences of the acts of his subordinates, when these + acts are in pursuance of orders received from his own aide-de-camp?), and + himself acknowledges the disposition made of Sickles and Slocum, can the + facts be fairly said to sustain the charge? There was, moreover, so much + bitterness exhibited after this campaign, that, had the facts in the + slenderest degree warranted such action, formal charges would assuredly + have been brought against Howard and his division commanders, on the + demand alike of the commander-in-chief and a disappointed public. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0015" id="link2H_4_0015"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS. + </h2> + <p> + Gen. Howard states that he located his command, both with reference to an + attack from the south, and from the west along the old turnpike and the + plank road. The whole corps lies on a ridge along which runs the turnpike, + and which is the watershed of the small tributaries of the Rappahannock + and Mattapony Rivers. This ridge is terminated on the right by some high + and easily-defended ground near Talley's. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Devens, with the first division, holds the extreme right. He has less + than four thousand men under his command. Von Gilsa's brigade has, until + this morning, been half a mile farther out the pike, and across the road; + but on receipt of Hooker's 9.30 order has been withdrawn, and now lies + with two regiments astride and north of the pike, some distance beyond + Talley's, the rest skirting the south of it. His right regiment leans upon + that portion of the Brock road which is the prolongation of the eastern + branch, and which, after crossing the plank road and pike, bears + north-westerly, and loses itself in the woods where formerly was an old + mill. McLean's brigade prolongs von Gilsa's line towards Schurz. + Dieckman's battery has two pieces trained westerly down the pike, and four + on Devens's left, covering, near Talley's Hill, the approaches from the + plank road. Devens has the Twenty-fifth and Seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteers + as a reserve, near the pike. + </p> + <p> + Schurz's (third) division continues this line on the edge of the woods to + Dowdall's. His front hugs the eastern side of the clearing between the + pike and the plank road, thence along the latter to the fork. + Schimmelpfennig's brigade is on the right, adjoining Devens; + Krzyzanowski's on the left. Three regiments of the former are on the line, + and two in reserve: the latter has two regiments on the line, and two in + reserve. On Schurz's right wing, the troops are shut in between thick + woods and their rifle-pits, with no room whatever to manoeuvre or deploy. + This condition likewise applies to many of the regiments in Devens's line. + The pike is the means of inter-communication, running back of the woods in + their rear. Dilger's battery is placed near Dowdall's, at the intersection + of the roads. + </p> + <p> + Steinwehr considers himself the reserve division. He is more or less + massed near Dowdall's. Buschbeck's brigade is in the clearing south of the + road, but has made a line of rifle-pits across the road, facing west, at + the edge of the open ground. Two regiments are deployed, and two are in + reserve. His other brigade, Barlow's, has been sent out nearly two miles, + to protect Birney's right, leaving no general reserve whatever for the + corps. Wiederich's battery is on Steinwehr's right and left, trained + south. + </p> + <p> + Three batteries are in reserve on the line of Buschbeck's rifle-pits + running north and south. Barlow had been, as above stated, massed as a + general reserve of the corps on Buschbeck's right,—the only reserve + the corps could boast, and a most necessary one. + </p> + <p> + Two companies, and some cavalry and artillery, have been sent to the point + where the Ely's Ford road crosses Hunting Creek. + </p> + <p> + Devens states that his pickets were kept out a proper distance, and that + he had constant scouting-parties moving beyond them. In his report he + recapitulates the various attacks made during the day. Shortly after noon, + cavalry attacked his skirmishers, but drew off. This was Stuart protecting + Jackson's flank, and feeling for our lines. Then two men, sent out from + Schimmelpfennig's front, came in through his, and were despatched to + Hooker with their report that the enemy was in great force on our flank. + Later, Lieut. Davis, of Devens's staff, with a cavalry scout, was fired + upon by Confederate horse. Then von Gilsa's skirmishers were attacked by + infantry,—again Stuart seeking to ascertain our position: after + which the pickets were pushed farther out. Cavalry was afterwards sent + out, and returned with information that some Confederate troopers, and + part of a battery, were in the woods on our right. + </p> + <p> + But all this seems to have been explained as a retreat. "The unvarying + report was, that the enemy is crossing the plank road, and moving towards + Culpeper." + </p> + <p> + The ground about Dowdall's is a clearing of undulating fields, closed on + three sides, and open to the west. As you stand east of the fork of the + roads, you can see a considerable distance down the plank road, leading to + Orange Court House. The pike bears off to the right, and runs up hill for + half a mile, to the eminence at Talley's. + </p> + <p> + The dispositions recited were substantially the same as those made when + the corps arrived here on Thursday. They were, early Saturday morning, + inspected by Hooker in person, and pronounced satisfactory. As he rode + along the line with Howard, and with each division commander in + succession, he was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm. His exclamation + to Howard, several times repeated, as he examined the position,—his + mind full of the idea of a front attack, but failing to seize the danger + of the two roads from the west,—was: "How strong! How strong!" + </p> + <p> + An hour or two later, having ascertained the Confederate movement across + our front, he had sent his circular to Howard and Slocum. Later still, as + if certain that the enemy was on the retreat, he depleted Howard's line by + the withdrawal of Barlow, and made dispositions which created the gap of + nigh two miles on Howard's left. + </p> + <p> + Howard, during the day, frequently inspected the line, and all + dispositions were approved by him. + </p> + <p> + And, when Barlow was ordered out to the front, both Howard and Steinwehr + accompanied him. They returned to Dowdall's Tavern just as Jackson + launched his columns upon the Eleventh Corps. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0016" id="link2H_4_0016"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XV. THE SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK. + </h2> + <p> + It is now six o'clock of Saturday, May 2, 1863, a lovely spring evening. + The Eleventh Corps lies quietly in position. Supper-time is at hand. Arms + are stacked on the line; and the men, some with accoutrements hung upon + the stacks, some wearing their cartridge-boxes, are mostly at the fires + cooking their rations, careless of the future, in the highest spirits and + most vigorous condition. Despite the general talk during the entire + afternoon, among officers and rank and file alike, of a possible attack + down the pike, all but a few are happily unsuspicious of the thunder-cloud + gathering on their flank. There is a general feeling that it is too late + to get up much of a fight to-day. + </p> + <p> + The breastworks are not very substantial. They are hastily run up out of + rails from the fences, logs from barns in the vicinity, and newly felled + trees. The ditch skirting the road has been deepened for this temporary + purpose. Abattis, to a fair extent, has been laid in front. But the whole + position faces to the south, and is good for naught else. + </p> + <p> + Nor were our men in those days as clever with the spade as we afterwards + became. This is clearly shown in the defences. + </p> + <p> + There is some carelessness apparent. Ambulances are close by the line. + Ammunition-wagons and the train of pack-mules are mixed up with the + regiments. Even a drove of beeves is herded in the open close by. All + these properly belong well to the rear. Officers' servants and camp-gear + are spread abroad in the vicinity of each command, rather more comfortably + ensconced than the immediate presence of the enemy may warrant. + </p> + <p> + The ground in the vicinity is largely clearing. But dense woods cover the + approaches, except in some few directions southerly. Down the roads no + great distance can be seen; perhaps a short mile on the plank road, not + many hundred yards on the turnpike. + </p> + <p> + Little Wilderness Church, in the rear of the position, looks deserted and + out of place. Little did its worshippers on last sabbath day imagine what + a conflict would rage about its walls before they again could meet within + its peaceful precincts. + </p> + <p> + There may be some absence of vigilance on the part of the pickets and + scouts; though it is not traceable in the reports, nor do any of the + officers concerned remember such. But the advanced line is not intrenched + as Miles's line in front of Hancock has been. Less care, rather than more + carelessness, is all that can be observed on this score. + </p> + <p> + Meanwhile Jackson has ranged his corps, with the utmost precaution and + secrecy, in three lines, at right angles to the pike, and extending about + a mile on either side. All orders are given in a low tone. Cheering as + "Old Jack" passes along is expressly prohibited. + </p> + <p> + Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill's division, leads, with Iverson's and Rodes's + brigades to the left of the road, and Doles's and Colquitt's to the right. + Rodes's orders to his brigades are to push on steadily, to let nothing + delay or retard them. Should the resistance at Talley's Hill, which Rodes + expects, render necessary the use of artillery, the line is to check its + advance until this eminence is carried. But to press on, and let no + obstacle stand in the way, is the watchword. + </p> + <p> + Two hundred yards in rear of the first line, Colston, commanding Trimble's + division, ranges his brigades, Nichols and Jones on the left, and Colston + on the right of the road; Ramseur in support. + </p> + <p> + A. P. Hill's division is not yet all up; but, as part reaches the line, it + is formed in support of Colston, the balance following in column on the + pike. + </p> + <p> + The second and third lines are ordered to re-enforce the first as occasion + requires. + </p> + <p> + Two pieces of Stuart's horse-artillery accompany the first line on the + pike. + </p> + <p> + The regiments in the centre of the line appear to have been formed in + columns with intervals, each brigade advancing in line of columns by + regiment. The troops are not preceded by any skirmishers. The line on the + wings is probably not so much massed. It is subsequently testified by many + in the Eleventh Corps, that the centre of the line appears to advance en + echiquier, the front companies of each line of columns firing while the + rear columns are advancing through the intervals. + </p> + <p> + The march through the woods up to Dowdall's clearing has not disturbed the + lines so materially as to prevent the general execution of such a + manoeuvre. + </p> + <p> + But the Confederate reports show that the regiments were all in line and + not in column. The appearance of columns was due to the fact that the + second and third lines, under Colston and A. P. Hill, were already + pressing up close in the rear of the first under Rodes, thus making a mass + nine deep. The intervals between regiments were accidental, occasioned by + the swaying of the line to and fro as it forced its way through the + underbrush. + </p> + <p> + It is perhaps no more than fair to say that whatever laxity was apparent + at this hour in the Eleventh Corps was by no means incompatible with a + readiness to give a good account of itself if an attack should be made + upon its front. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0017" id="link2H_4_0017"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XVI. JACKSON'S ATTACK. + </h2> + <p> + Such is the situation at six P.M. Now Jackson gives the order to advance; + and a heavy column of twenty-two thousand men, the best infantry in + existence, as tough, hardy, and full of elan, as they are ill-fed, + ill-clothed, and ill-looking, descends upon the Eleventh Corps, whose only + ready force is four regiments, the section of a battery, and a weak line + of pickets. + </p> + <p> + The game, in which these woods still abound, startled at the unusual + visitors, fly in the advance of Jackson's line towards and across the + Dowdall clearing, and many a mouth waters, as fur and feather in tempting + variety rush past; while several head of deer speedily clear the dangerous + ground, before the bead of willing rifles can be drawn upon them. + </p> + <p> + This sudden appearance of game causes as much jollity as wonder. All are + far from imagining its cause. + </p> + <p> + The next sound is that of bugles giving the command, and enabling the + advancing troops to preserve some kind of alignment. At this the wary + prick up their ears. Surprise stares on every face. Immediately follows a + crash of musketry as Rodes sweeps away our skirmish line as it were a + cobweb. Then comes the long and heavy roll of veteran infantry fire, as he + falls upon Devens's line. + </p> + <p> + The resistance which this division can make is as nothing against the + weighty assault of a line moving by battalions in mass. Many of the + regiments do their duty well. Some barely fire a shot. This is frankly + acknowledged in many of the reports. What can be expected of new troops, + taken by surprise, and attacked in front, flank, and rear, at once? Devens + is wounded, but remains in the saddle, nor turns over the command to + McLean until he has reached the Buschbeck line. He has lost one-quarter of + his four thousand men, and nearly all his superior officers, in a brief + ten minutes. + </p> + <p> + Schurz's division is roused by the heavy firing on the right, in which + even inexperienced ears detect something more than a mere repetition of + the picket-fight of three hours gone. Its commanding officers are at once + alert. Regimental field and staff are in the saddle, and the men behind + the stacks, leaving canteens, haversacks, cups with the steaming evening + coffee, and rations at the fires. Arms are taken. Regiments are confusedly + marched and counter-marched into the most available positions, to meet an + emergency which some one should have anticipated and provided for. The + absence of Barlow is now fatal. + </p> + <p> + On comes Jackson, pursuing the wreck of the First division. Some of + Schurz's regiments break before Devens has passed to the rear. Others + stand firm until the victorious Confederates are upon them with their yell + of triumph, then steadily fall back, turning and firing at intervals; but + nowhere a line which can for more than a brief space retard such an onset. + </p> + <p> + Down the road towards Chancellorsville, through the woods, up every side + road and forest path, pours a stream of fugitives. Ambulances and oxen, + pack-mules and ammunition-wagons, officers' spare horses mounted by + runaway negro servants, every species of the impedimenta of camp-life, + commissary sergeants on all-too-slow mules, teamsters on still-harnessed + team-horses, quartermasters whose duties are not at the front, riderless + steeds, clerks with armfuls of official papers, non-combatants of all + kinds, mixed with frighted soldiers whom no sense of honor can arrest, + strive to find shelter from the murderous fire. + </p> + <p> + No organization is left in the Eleventh Corps but one brigade of + Steinwehr's division. Buschbeck has been speedily formed by a change of + front, before Devens and Schurz have left the field, in the line of + intrenchments built across the road at Dowdall's at the edge of the + clearing. No sooner in place than a scattering fire by the men is opened + upon friends and foes alike. Dilger's battery trains some of its guns down + the road. The reserve artillery is already in position at the north of + this line, and uses spherical case with rapidity. Howard and his staff are + in the thickest of the fray, endeavoring to stem the tide. As well oppose + resistance to an avalanche. + </p> + <p> + Buschbeck's line stubbornly holds on. An occasional squad, still clinging + to the colors of its regiment, joins itself to him, ashamed of falling + thus disgracefully to the rear. Officers make frantic exertions to rally + their men; useless effort. In little less than half an hour this last + stand has been swept away, and the Eleventh Corps is in confused retreat + down the pike towards headquarters, or in whatever direction affords an + outlet from the remorseless hail. + </p> + <p> + The general confusion which reigned can scarcely be more accurately + described than by detailing the experience of a single regiment. The One + Hundred and Nineteenth New York Volunteers was in Schurz's division. It + was commanded by an officer of German birth, but long since an American + citizen. No more gallant, intelligent man wore uniform, or one better + fitted for a pattern soldier. Well read in military matters, he had never + yet been under fire, and was nervously anxious to win his spurs. The + regiment was a good one; but only three or four officers, and a small + percentage of enlisted men, had seen service. + </p> + <p> + This regiment faced south on the pike just west of the fork in the roads. + Under arms in an instant, when the firing was heard on the right, it was + soon ordered by one of Schurz's aides to throw itself across the fork, and + hold it at all hazards. But the suddenness of the attack had momentarily + robbed Col. Peissner of his steadiness, for he was a good drill-master. + Instead of facing to the right, counter-marching, filing to the left + across the road, and coming to a front,—the simplest if longest + movement being the best in times of such excitement,—he faced to the + left because his left was nearest to the fork, filed to the left, and + then, instead of coming on the left by file into line, he moved astride + the roads, and ordered "Front!" This brought the regiment in line with its + back to the enemy. The men instinctively came each to an about-face, and + the file closers broke through to the now rear. There was no time to + correct the error. The regiment, which would have fought well under proper + circumstances, from the start lost confidence in its officers and itself. + Still it held its ground until it had burned almost twenty rounds, and + until the Confederate line was within fifty yards in its face, and had + quite outflanked it. Then the raking volleys of such a front as Jackson + was wont to present, and, more than all, the fire of Buschbeck's brigade + in its immediate rear, broke it; and it melted away, leaving only a + platoon's strength around the colors, to continue for a brief space the + struggle behind the Buschbeck line, while the rest fled down the road, or + through the woods away from the deadly fire. This regiment lost its entire + color-guard, and nearly one-half of its complement killed or wounded. + </p> + <p> + There is much discrepancy as to the time during which the Eleventh Corps + made resistance to Jackson's advance. All reliable authorities put the + time of the attack as six P.M. When the last gun was fired at the + Buschbeck rifle-pits, it was dusk, at that season about quarter past + seven. It seems reasonably settled, therefore, that the corps retarded the + Confederate advance over about a mile of ground for exceeding an hour. How + much more can be expected of ten thousand raw troops telescoped by + twenty-five thousand veterans? + </p> + <p> + Rodes, now quite mixed with Colston's line, still pressed on, and between + Hooker's headquarters and his elated foe there was scarce an organized + regiment. Hooker's fatal inability to grasp the situation, and his + ordering an advance of all troops on Howard's left as far as the Second + Corps, had made him almost defenceless. The troops which should have been + available to stem this adverse tide were blindly groping in the woods, two + miles in front,—in pursuit of Jackson. + </p> + <p> + One cannot but wonder just where Sickles expected to find Jackson. There + can be little doubt that he did think he was about to strike Jackson's + flank. His testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War + constantly refers to this belief; and he says that he "was about to open + his attack in full force," was holding Pleasonton's cavalry in hand, + desiring to lead the attack with his infantry, when the news of the + disaster to the Eleventh Corps was brought to him; and that every thing + seemed to indicate the most brilliant success from thus throwing himself + upon Jackson's flank and rear. He refers to McLaws being in his front, but + this is an error. McLaws was on Lee's right flank, three miles away. It + was with Archer of Jackson's corps, and with Posey and Wright of + Anderson's division, that he had to do. + </p> + <p> + The reports are by no means clear as to the details of these movements. + Birney states in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the + War, that he found that he and Barlow "had got into the midst of the rebel + army, the supports on the left not having come up." He therefore formed + his command into a huge square, with the artillery in the centre, holding + the road over which Jackson had passed. "The fire upon his left flank from + musketry was galling." This came from Anderson's brigades. + </p> + <p> + Hayman, Graham and Ward were pushed out along the road, and "found the + enemy in some force on three sides." This apparently shows that Birney,—who + had the immediate command of the troops in front,—was quite + uncertain of what was before him, or just what he was expected to do. + </p> + <p> + This much is, however, clear: Jackson's small rearguard had succeeded in + holding the road which he had traversed, at some point near Welford's; and + here this force remained until Jackson was well along towards the plank + road. Then Anderson in his turn made a diversion on the other side of + Birney, which kept the latter busy for at least a couple of hours. + </p> + <p> + Sickles's orders were to advance cautiously. This was Hooker's doing. + Hence exception cannot fairly be taken to either Birney's or Sickles's + conduct for lack of energy. But the latter must have singularly underrated + Jackson's methods, if he thought he could strike him at a given point, so + many hours after his passage. For Jackson was first observed near the + Furnace about eight A.M., and Sickles was just getting ready to attack him + in this same place at six P.M. + </p> + <p> + The errors of judgment on this entire day can scarcely be attributed to + any one but the general commanding. He was the one to whom all reports + were sent. He had knowledge of every thing transpiring. He it was who was + responsible for some sensible interpretation of the information brought + him, and for corresponding action in the premises. + </p> + <p> + So much for Sickles's advance. It could not well have been more ill-timed + and useless. But his gallant work of the coming night and morrow, when + Hooker left him almost alone to resist the fierce assaults of our + victorious and elated foe, was ample compensation for his subordinate + share in the triviality and fatal issue of Saturday's manoeuvring. Nor can + blame fall upon him in as full measure as upon Hooker; although he seems + illy to have construed what was transpiring in his front, and what he + reported may have seriously misled his chief. + </p> + <p> + Perhaps no officers, during our Civil War, were placed in a more + lamentably awkward position than Devens, and in a less degree Schurz, on + this occasion. Having been fully convinced by the events of the afternoon + that an attack down the pike was highly probable, having carefully + reported all these events to his immediate commander, Devens was left + without inspection, counsel, or help. He might have gone in person to + Howard, but he did not dare leave his division. He might have sent + messages which more urgently represented his own anxiety. But when the + blow came, he did all that was possible, and remained, wounded, in + command, and assisted in re-organizing some relics of his division behind + the Buschbeck works. + </p> + <p> + Schurz was with Howard a good part of the day, and his opinions were + expressed to that officer. To Schurz's personal bearing here, or on any + other occasion, no possible exception can be taken. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0018" id="link2H_4_0018"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XVII. THE CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS. + </h2> + <p> + There can be no attempt to gainsay that the Eleventh Corps, on this + luckless Saturday, did not do its whole duty. That it was panic-stricken, + and that it decamped from a field where as a corps it had not fought, is + undeniable. But portions of the corps did fight, and the entire corps + would doubtless have fought well under favorable circumstances. It is but + fair, after casting upon the corps the aspersion of flight from before the + enemy, to do it what justice is possible, and to palliate the bad conduct + of the whole by bearing testimony to the good conduct of some of its + parts. + </p> + <p> + It has been called a German corps. This is not quite exact. Of nearly + thirteen thousand men in the corps, only forty-five hundred were Germans. + But it must be admitted that so many officers high in rank were of that + nationality, that the general tendency and feeling were decidedly unlike + the rest of the army. Moreover, there is not wanting testimony to show + that there were some who wore shoulder-straps in the corps who gave + evidence of having taken up the profession of arms to make money, and not + to fight. + </p> + <p> + The artillery of the corps did well. Those general officers who most + severely rebuke the conduct of the corps, all say a word in favor of the + service of the guns. Dilger, on the road, just at Buschbeck's line, fired + with his own hands from his last gun a round of canister when the + Confederates were within a dozen yards. Most of the guns had been well + served, but had been sent to the rear in time to save them from capture. + </p> + <p> + The reserve artillery did its duty, nor limbered up until the Confederate + line had outflanked its position, rendered it useless, and jeopardized its + safety. + </p> + <p> + All the guns that were saved were put into action an hour later, and did + effective service on the Fairview crest, in company with the artillery of + the Third and Twelfth Corps. + </p> + <p> + At the time of the attack, which was made by Jackson without an advance of + skirmishers, Devens's reserve regiments were ordered up to support von + Gilsa. There appears to have been something like a stand attempted; but + the left wing of the Confederate line speedily enveloped von Gilsa's + front, and showed in rear of his right flank, when his regiments melted + away. + </p> + <p> + Devens states in his report that a new line might have been formed on Gen. + Schurz's division, if the latter had maintained his ground, but + acknowledges that the falling-back of his own troops "must undoubtedly + have added to the difficulties encountered by the command of that + officer." + </p> + <p> + Schurz's report is very clear and good. This is partly attributable to the + avalanche of abuse precipitated upon his division by the press, which + called forth his detailed explanation, and an official request for + permission to publish his report. There existed a general understanding + that Schurz held the extreme right; and the newspapermen, to all + appearance, took pleasure in holding a German responsible, in their early + letters, for the origin of the panic. This error, together with the fact + of his having discussed the situation during the day with Gen. Howard, and + of his having remained of the opinion that an attack on our right was + probable, accounts for the care exhibited in his statements. That he did + harbor such fears is proved by his having, of his own motion, after the + attack of three o'clock, placed the Fifty-Eighth New York, Eighty-Second + Ohio, and Twenty-Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, near Hawkins's farm, in the + north part of the Dowdall clearing, and facing west. Still Schurz's report + is only a careful summary of facts otherwise substantiated. He deals no + more in his own opinions than a division commander has a right to do. + </p> + <p> + Schurz states that he strongly advised that the entire corps should take + up the Buschbeck line, not considering the woods a reliable point d'appui. + For they were thick enough to screen the manoeuvring of the enemy, but + not, as the event showed, to prevent his marching through them to the + attack. + </p> + <p> + When the onset came, it was impossible quickly to change front. Schurz's + regiments were all hemmed in between the rifle-pits before them and the + woods in their rear. Still, more than half of the regiments of this + division appear to have maintained their credit, and the testimony would + tend to show that the men burned from five to thirty rounds each. But + without avail. They were telescoped. Their defences were rendered useless. + The enemy was on both sides of and perpendicular to them. It is an open + question whether, at that time, any two divisions of the army could have + changed front and made a good defence under these circumstances. Later in + the war our soldiers were more habituated, particularly in the West, to + fighting on either side of their breastworks. But these were raw troops. + And this was not the first, nor was it the last, panic in the Army of the + Potomac. But the corps had, as ill-luck willed it, nothing in its rear to + repair or conceal its discomfiture. + </p> + <p> + Buschbeck's brigade had better opportunities, and acted correspondingly + better. It had time to occupy the rifle-pits facing west before the enemy + had completed the destruction of the first and third divisions. + Buschbeck's stand covered a full half-hour. He was re-enforced by many + fragments of broken regiments, holding together under such officers as had + escaped utter demoralization. The troops remained behind these works until + outflanked on right and left, for Jackson's front of over two miles easily + enveloped any line our little force could form. + </p> + <p> + During the early part of the attack, Colquitt's brigade ran across the + pickets of Devens's and Schurz's south front, which there had been no time + to call in. Instead of joining in the advance, Colquitt remained to engage + these latter, deeming it essential to protect Jackson's right. This was + the nucleus of one of the many detached engagements of this day. Several + bodies of Union troops thus isolated were captured en masse. + </p> + <p> + The reports of the officers concerned, as a rule, possess the merit of + frankness. As an instance, Col. Hartung, of the Seventy-Fourth New York, + relates that he had no opportunity to fire a shot until after he arrived + behind the Buschbeck intrenchments. The facts would appear to be given in + an even-handed way, in all the reports rendered. + </p> + <p> + Little remains to be said. The Eleventh Corps was panic-stricken, and did + run, instead of retreating. It was a mere disorganized mass in a half-hour + from the beginning of the attack, with but a few isolated regiments, and + one brigade, retaining a semblance of orderliness. + </p> + <p> + But was it so much the misbehavior of the troops as the faultiness of the + position they occupied? + </p> + <p> + The corps was got together again before Sunday morning, in a condition to + do good service. Had it been tested, it would, in all probability, have + fought well. + </p> + <p> + The loss of the corps was one-quarter of its effective. + </p> + <p> + Some time after the battle of Chancellorsville, a motion was made to break + up the Eleventh Corps, and distribute its regiments among the others; but + it was not done. Hooker then remarked that he would yet make that corps + fight, and be proud of its name. And it subsequently did sterling service. + Gen. Thomas remarked, in congratulating Hooker on his victory at Lookout + Mountain, that "the bayonet-charge of Howard's troops, made up the side of + a steep and difficult hill, over two hundred feet high, completely routing + and driving the enemy from his barricades on its top,... will rank with + the most distinguished feats of arms of this war." And it is asserted that + this encomium was well earned, and that no portion of it need be set down + to encouragement. + </p> + <p> + In their evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker + and Sickles both testify that the panic of the Eleventh Corps produced a + gap in the line, and that this was the main cause of disaster on this + field. But the fatal gap was made long before the Eleventh Corps was + attacked. It was Hooker's giddy blunder in ordering away, two miles in + their front, the entire line from Dowdall's to Chancellorsville, that made + it. + </p> + <p> + This was the gap which enabled Jackson to push his advance to within a few + hundred yards of Chancellorsville before he could be arrested. This was + what made it possible for him to join his right to Lee's left wing next + day. Had Hooker but kept his troops in hand, so as to have moved up Birney + sharply in support, to have thrown forward Berry and Whipple if required, + the Confederate advance would, in all human probability, have been checked + at Dowdall's; Lee and Jackson would still have been separated by a + distance of two miles; and of this perilous division excellent advantage + could have yet been taken at daylight Sunday by the Army of the Potomac. + </p> + <p> + Hooker's testimony includes the following attempt to disembarrass himself + of the onus of the faulty position of the Eleventh Corps and its + consequences: "No pickets appear to have been thrown out; and I have + reason to suppose that no effort was made by the commander of the corps on + the right to follow up and keep himself advised of Jackson's movements, + although made in broad daylight, and with his full knowledge. In this way + the Eleventh Corps was lost to me, and more than that, because its bad + conduct impaired the confidence that the corps of the army had in one + another. I observed this fact during the night, from the firing on the + picket-lines, as well as from the general manner of the troops, if a gun + was fired by the enemy: after that, the whole line would let off their + pieces. The men seemed to be nervous; and during the coming-in of the + Eleventh Corps I was fearful, at one time, that the whole army would be + thrown into confusion by it. Some of my staff-officers killed half a dozen + of the men in trying to arrest their flight." + </p> + <p> + It is not intended, by what has been said, to exonerate Howard at the + expense of Hooker. To Howard will always be imputed, and justly, a certain + part of the blame; for there were, during the afternoon, enough + indications of a probable attack down the pike to make a prudent + corps-commander either assume the responsibility of a change of front,—as + it could advantageously be made on the Buschbeck line prolonged,—or + else, at least, so strongly urge the facts on his superior that no blame + could cling to his own skirts. But neither can Hooker's larger share of + blame he shifted off his own to Howard's shoulders. While it may be said + that the latter did not exhibit the activity which the questionable aspect + of affairs demanded,—for he did not personally inspect his lines + after the early morning hours,—it is equally true that the commander + of the army utterly neglected his right wing, though he had every + circumstance relating to its danger reported to him. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0019" id="link2H_4_0019"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XVIII. HOOKER'S PARRY. + </h2> + <p> + The position of the Army of the Potomac is critical in the extreme. But + several circumstances come to the rescue. It is almost dark. The rebel + lines have become inextricably mixed. Colston, who has gradually moved up + to Rodes's support, is so completely huddled together with this latter's + command, that there is no organization left. Still Jackson's veterans + press on, determined to crush our army beyond recovery, and drive it from + United-States Ford. Stuart has in fact, at his own suggestion, got orders + to move his cavalry division in that direction, and occupy the road to + Ely's. A. P. Hill's division is still intact in rear of the two leading + lines, now shuffled into one quite unmanageable mass, but still + instinctively pushing forward. + </p> + <p> + So faulty have Hooker's dispositions been, in advancing his entire right + centre without filling the gap, that the only available troops to throw + into the breach, after the rapid destruction of the Eleventh Corps, are + Berry's division of the old Third. These hardened soldiers are still in + reserve on the clearing, north of headquarters. It is fortunate, indeed, + that they are still there; for Sickles has just asked for their detail to + join his own column out in the woods, and an hour ago Berry would + certainly have been sent. + </p> + <p> + This division is at once thrown across the pike on the first crest below + Fairview, west of Chancellorsville. The artillery of the Eleventh Corps is + in part re-assembled. Capt. Best, chief of artillery of the Twelfth Corps, + has already trained his guns upon the advancing Confederate columns, to + protect the new line. But Berry is almost alone. Hays's brigade of the + Second Corps, on his right, is his only support. The Excelsior brigade is + rapidly pushed into the woods, north of the plank road; the Fourth + Excelsior and the First Massachusetts south. Carr's brigade is kept in + second line, one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. The men, with the + instinctive pride of self-reliance, move up with the steadiness of + veterans on drill, regardless of the stream of fugitives breaking through + their intervals. + </p> + <p> + The flight of the Eleventh Corps has stampeded part of the Third Corps + artillery. But it is re-assembled in short order, and at once thrown into + service. Capt. Best manages by seven P.M. to get thirty-four guns into + line on the crest, well served. Himself is omnipresent. Dimick's and + Winslow's batteries under Osborn, Berry's chief of artillery, join this + line on the hill, leaving a section of Dimick on the road. And such part + of the disjecta membra of the Eleventh Corps as retains semblance of + organization is gathered in support of the guns. Capt. Best has begun to + fire solid shot over the heads of Berry's men into the woods beyond; and, + as Gen. Lee says, the Confederate advance is checked in front of this + crest by the vigorous opposition encountered. + </p> + <p> + Hurried orders are despatched to Geary to withdraw his attack, and + re-occupy his breastworks. This he straightway accomplishes. Similar + orders are carried to Williams. But, before the latter can retrace his + steps, Jackson's columns have reached the right of his late position. + Anderson also advances against him; so that Williams is obliged to move + cautiously by his left, and change front when he arrives where his line + had lately joined Geary's and, being unable to take up his old post, he + goes into position, and prolongs Berry, south of the pike. It is long + after dark before he ascertains his bearings, and succeeds in massing his + division where it is needed. + </p> + <p> + Anxious as Jackson is to press on,—"Give me one hour more of + daylight, and I will have United-States Ford!" cries he,—he finds + that he must re-establish order in his scattered forces before he can + launch this night attack upon our newly formed but stubbornly maintained + lines. + </p> + <p> + Nor is the darkness the most potent influence toward this end. Illy as + Sickles's advance has resulted thus far, it is now a sovereign element in + the salvation of the Army of the Potomac. His force at the Furnace, + Birney, Whipple, Barlow, and Pleasonton, amounts to fifteen thousand men, + and over forty guns. None of these officers are the men to stand about + idle. No sooner has Sickles been persuaded by a second courier,—the + first he would not credit,—that the Eleventh Corps has been + destroyed, and that Jackson is in his rear, than he comprehends that now, + indeed, the time has come to batter Jackson's flank. He orders his column + to the right about, and moves up with all speed to the clearing, where + Pleasonton has held his cavalry, near Birney's old front. + </p> + <p> + Howard, upon being attacked, had sent hurriedly for a cavalry regiment. + Pleasonton, having received orders to send him one, instructed Major Huey, + commanding the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, to march to Dowdall's and + report to Howard. Huey set out by the wood road which leads through Hazel + Grove into the plank road. From the testimony of the persons chiefly + concerned it would appear that, at the time this order was given by + Pleasonton to Huey, there was at Hazel Grove, where the cavalry regiments + were drawn up, no sign whatever of the disaster to Howard. There were no + fugitives nor any confusion. Nor does the evidence show that Pleasonton + ordered any charge on the enemy: it rather shows that Huey was not + directed to go at urgent speed. And he must have been very deliberate in + his movement, for by the time the cavalry had reached the vicinity of the + plank road, Jackson had demolished the Eleventh Corps, and had advanced so + far that the head of this cavalry column, marching by twos, suddenly came + upon the Confederate lines. The officers in the lead at once gave the + order to charge, and right gallantly did these intrepid horsemen ride down + into the seething mass of exultant Confederate infantry. The shock was + nobly given and home, but was, of course, in the woods and against such + odds, of no great effect. Thirty men and three officers, including Major + Keenan, were killed. Only one Confederate report—Iverson's—mentions + this charge. Its effect was local only. + </p> + <p> + Three batteries of Whipple's division had remained in the Hazel Grove + clearing while the infantry had advanced towards the Furnace. When the + rout of the Eleventh Corps became clear, these eighteen guns were ordered + in battery, facing about north-west, by their commander, Capt. Huntington, + and kept up a heavy fire upon the woods through which Jackson was pushing + his way. Pleasonton, for his part, trained Martin's horse-battery in the + same direction. Other guns were later added to these, and all expended a + good deal of ammunition on the enemy's lines. But there was no fighting at + Hazel Grove rising to the distinction of a battle. The importance given to + it by Sickles and Pleasonton is not borne out by the facts. There was no + Federal loss, to speak of; nor do the Confederate reports make any comment + upon this phase of the battle. They probably supposed these guns to be an + extension of the line of batteries at Fairview. As such they were, without + question, of no inconsiderable use. + </p> + <p> + Meanwhile Birney, sending word to Barlow that they run danger of being cut + off, and detailing the Twentieth Indiana and Sixty-third Pennsylvania + Volunteers as rearguard, rejoins Sickles and Pleasonton in the clearing, + and both move up to sustain his flank. + </p> + <p> + So soon as Jackson's guns gave Lee the intimation of his assault, the + latter advanced upon the Union line with sufficient vigor to prevent + Hooker from sending re-enforcements to his right. The attack was sharp; + and a general inclination to the left was ordered, to connect with + Jackson's right as the latter brought his columns nearer. "These orders + were well executed, our troops advancing up to the enemy's intrenchments, + while several batteries played with good effect upon his lines until + prevented by increasing darkness." (Lee.) + </p> + <p> + McLaws reports: "My orders were to hold my position, not to engage + seriously, but to press strongly so soon as it was discovered that Gen. + Jackson had attacked... when I ordered an advance along the whole line to + engage with the skirmishers, which were largely re-enforced, and to + threaten, but not attack seriously; in doing which Gen. Wofford became so + seriously engaged, that I directed him to withdraw, which was done in good + order, his men in good spirits, after driving the enemy to their + intrenchments." + </p> + <p> + The movement of Anderson towards the left made a gap of considerable + distance in the Confederate line "but the skirmishers of Gen. Semmes, the + entire Tenth Georgia, were perfectly reliable, and kept the enemy to his + intrenchments." + </p> + <p> + These accounts vary in no wise from those of the Union generals, who held + their positions in front of both Anderson and McLaws, and kept inside + their field-works. + </p> + <p> + Meade, whose line on the left of the army was not disturbed, sent Sykes's + division, so soon as the Eleventh Corps rout became known to him, to the + junction of the roads to Ely's and United-States Fords, to hold that point + at all hazards, and form a new right flank. This was done with Sykes's + accustomed energy. Nor was he reached by Jackson's line, and before + morning Reynolds fell in upon his right. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0020" id="link2H_4_0020"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XIX. THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK. + </h2> + <p> + When his troops had been summarily brought to a standstill by Berry's firm + ranks and the heavy artillery fire, Jackson determined to withdraw his + first and second lines to Dowdall's clearing to reform, and ordered A. P. + Hill forward to relieve them. + </p> + <p> + While this manoeuvre, rendered extremely difficult by the nature of the + woods in which the fighting had been done, but which Hooker was in no + condition to interfere with, was in progress, Sickles and Pleasonton, + whose position was considerably compromised, sought measures to + re-establish communication with the headquarters of the army. + </p> + <p> + Sickles despatched Col. Hart, with a cavalry escort, to Hooker, bearing a + detailed statement of his situation. This officer experienced no little + difficulty in reaching Chancellorsville. The roads being in possession of + the enemy, he was forced to make his way through the woods and ravines. + But after the lapse of a number of hours he succeeded in his mission, and + brought back word to hold on to the position gained. Sickles had so + advised, and had, moreover, requested permission to make a night attack, + to recover some guns, caissons, and Whipple's ammunition-train, which had + been left in the woods in Sickles's front, and to enable him to join his + right to Slocum's new line, thrown out in prolongation of Berry. + </p> + <p> + It will be observed that Sickles was now facing northerly, and that his + rear had no obstacle on which to rest, so as to save him from the attack + of Lee, had the latter been aware of the weakness of his position. + </p> + <p> + In view of this fact, a move was made somewhat to his right, where a crest + was occupied near Hazel Grove. Here, says Pleasonton, "with the support of + Gen. Sickles's corps we could have defeated the whole rebel army." It was + clearly a strong position; for it is thus referred to by Stuart, after our + troops had been next day withdrawn: "As the sun lifted the mist that + shrouded the field, it was discovered that the ridge on the extreme right + was a fine position for concentrating artillery. I immediately ordered + thirty pieces to that point. The effect of this fire upon the enemy's + batteries was superb." Its possession by the Confederates did, in fact, + notably contribute to the loss of the new lines at Chancellorsville in + Sunday morning's action. + </p> + <p> + From this position, at precisely midnight, Sickles made a determined + onslaught upon the Confederate right. It was clear, full moonlight, and + operations could be almost as well conducted as during the daytime, in + these woods. + </p> + <p> + Birney stationed Ward in the first line, and Hays in the second, one + hundred yards in the rear. The regiments moved by the right of companies, + with pieces uncapped, and strict orders to rely solely upon the bayonet. + On the road from the Furnace north, parallel to which the columns moved, + the Fortieth New York, Seventeenth Maine, and Sixty-Third Pennsylvania + Volunteers pushed in, in columns of companies at full distance. + </p> + <p> + Berry had been notified to sustain this attack by a movement forward from + his lines, if it should strike him as advisable. + </p> + <p> + The attack was made with consummate gallantry. Sickles states that he + drove the enemy back to our original lines, enabling us for the moment to + re-occupy the Eleventh Corps rifle-pits, and to re-capture several pieces + of artillery, despite the fire of some twenty Confederate guns which had + been massed at Dowdall's. + </p> + <p> + Thus attacked in flank, though the Confederate right had been refused at + the time of Pleasonton's fight, and still remained so, Hill's line replied + by a front movement of his left on Berry, without being able, however, to + break the latter's line. + </p> + <p> + Slocum states that he was not aware that this advance was to be made by + Sickles across his front. Imagining it to be a movement by the enemy on + Williams, he ordered fire to be opened on all troops that appeared, and + fears "that our losses must have been severe from our own fire." Williams, + however, does not think so much damage was done, and alleges that he + himself understood what the movement was, without, however, quoting the + source of his information. + </p> + <p> + The Confederate reports state that this attack was met and repulsed by the + Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-third North-Carolina regiments, with + small difficulty or loss. + </p> + <p> + It is, however, probable that these as much underrate the vigor and effect + of the attack, as Sickles may overstate it. It is not impossible that some + portion of the Eleventh Corps position was actually reached by these + columns. The road down which the movement was made strikes the plank road + but a short distance east of the position of Buschbeck's line. This ground + was not held in force by Jackson's corps at the moment, and it was not + difficult for Sickles to possess himself temporarily of some portion of + that position. But it must have been a momentary occupation. + </p> + <p> + Birney retired to Hazel Grove after this sally, having recovered part of + Whipple's train, and one or two guns. + </p> + <p> + There can be found in the Confederate and Union reports alike, numerous + statements which are not sustained by other testimony. As a sample, Gen. + Lane of A. P. Hill's division states that a Lieut. Emack and four men + captured an entire Pennsylvania regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Smith. The + nearest approach to this is found in the capture of Col. Mathews and two + hundred men of the One Hundred and Twenty-Eighth Pennsylvania, while + Williams was moving by his left to regain his old ground. But it is highly + probable that it required more than five men to effect the capture. + </p> + <p> + A wise rebuke of careless statements in official reports is found in the + following indorsements on a report made of the operations of the One + Hundred and Fourteenth Pennsylvania:— + </p> + <p> + In forwarding this report, which I do merely as a matter of duty, it is + incumbent upon me to say that it is a complete romance from beginning to + end. Col. Collis has had his attention called to these errors, but has + refused to correct them. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + CHAS. K. GRAHAM, + Brigadier General. + + HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION THIRD CORPS, + May 17, 1863. +</pre> + <p> + This paper is forwarded with attention called to Brig.-Gen. Graham's + indorsement. The officer is under arrest on charges of misbehavior before + the enemy. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + D. B. BIRNEY, + Brigadier General commanding Division. +</pre> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0021" id="link2H_4_0021"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XX. STONEWALL JACKSON. + </h2> + <p> + It is probable that the wounding of Jackson at this juncture was the most + effectual cause of the Confederate check on Saturday night. It occurred + just after Jackson had concluded to withdraw his first and second lines to + Dowdall's, there to re-form, and was making dispositions to move up A. P. + Hill to relieve them. Orders had been issued to the troops not to fire + unless at Union cavalry appearing in their front. Jackson, with some + staff-officers and orderlies, had ridden out beyond his lines, as was his + wont, to reconnoitre. On his return he was fired at by his own men, being + mistaken in the gloom for a Federal scout. Endeavoring to enter at another + place, a similar error was made, this time killing some of the party, and + wounding Jackson in several places. He was carried to the rear. A few days + after, he died of pneumonia brought on by his injury, which aggravated a + cold he was suffering from at the time. + </p> + <p> + A. P. Hill was wounded somewhat later that night. + </p> + <p> + After the disabling of these two officers, Stuart was sent for, and + promptly assumed command. With Col. Alexander, chief artillery officer + present for duty, (Gen. Crutchfield being wounded,) he spent the night + rectifying the Confederate lines, and selecting positions for his + batteries. It had been Jackson's plan to push forward at night, to secure + the speediest results of his victory. But Stuart, after the attacks upon + his right by Sickles and Pleasonton, and having in view the disorganized + condition of his troops, thought wise to defer a general assault until + daylight. Having submitted the facts to Jackson, and received word from + this officer to use his own discretion in the matter, he decided to afford + his troops a few hours of rest. They were accordingly halted in line, and + lay upon their arms, an ample force of skirmishers thrown out in front. + </p> + <p> + No better place than this will be found in which to say a few words about + the remarkable man who planned and led this movement about Hooker's flank,—a + manoeuvre which must have been condemned as foolhardy if unsuccessful, but + whose triumph wove a final wreath to crown his dying brows. + </p> + <p> + Thomas J. Jackson entered West Point a poor boy, essentially a son of the + people. He was a classmate of McClellan, Foster, Reno, Stoneman, Couch, + Gibbon, and many other noted soldiers, as well those arrayed against as + those serving beside him. His standing in his class was far from high; and + such as he had was obtained by hard, persistent work, and not by apparent + ability. He was known as a simple, honest, unaffected fellow, rough, and + the reverse of social; but he commanded his companions sincere respect by + his rugged honesty, the while his uncouth bearing earned him many a jeer. + </p> + <p> + He was graduated in 1846, and went to Mexico as second lieutenant of the + First United-States Artillery. He was promoted to be first lieutenant "for + gallant and meritorious services at Vera Cruz." Twice mentioned in Scott's + reports, and repeatedly referred to by Worth and Pillow for gallantry + while with Magruder's battery, he emerged from that eventful campaign with + fair fame and abundant training. + </p> + <p> + We find him shortly afterwards professor at the Virginia Military + Institute of Lexington. Here he was known as a rigid Presbyterian, and a + "fatalist," if it be fatalism to believe that "what will be will be,"—Jackson's + constant motto. + </p> + <p> + Tall, gaunt, awkward, grave, brief, and business-like in all he did, + Jackson passed for odd, "queer,"—insane almost, he was thought by + some,—rather than a man of uncommon reserve power. + </p> + <p> + It was only when on parade, or when teaching artillery practice, that he + brightened up; and then scarcely to lose his uncouth habit, but only to + show by the light in his eye, and his wrapt attention in his work, where + lay his happiest tendencies. + </p> + <p> + His history during the war is too well known to need to be more than + briefly referred to. He was made colonel of volunteers, and sent to + Harper's Ferry in May, 1861, and shortly after promoted to a brigade. He + accompanied Joe Johnston in his retreat down the valley. At Bull Run, + where his brigade was one of the earliest in the war to use the bayonet, + he earned his soubriquet of "Stonewall" at the lips of Gen. Bee. But in + the mouths of his soldiers his pet name was "Old Jack," and the term was a + talisman which never failed to inflame the heart of every man who bore + arms under his banner. + </p> + <p> + Jackson possessed that peculiar magnetism which stirs the blood of + soldiers to boiling-point. Few leaders have ever equalled him in his + control of troops. His men had no questions to ask when "Old Jack" led the + way. They believed in him as did he in his star; and the impossible only + arrested the vigor of their onset, or put a term to their arduous marches. + </p> + <p> + His campaign in the valley against Fremont and Shields requires no praise. + And his movement about McClellan's flank at Mechanicsville, and his still + more sterling manoeuvre in Pope's campaign, need only to be called to + mind. + </p> + <p> + In the field he was patient, hard-working, careless of self, and full of + forethought for his men; though no one could call for and get from troops + such excessive work, on the march or in action. No one could ask them to + forego rations, rest, often the barest necessaries of life, and yet + cheerfully yield him their utmost efforts, as could "Old Jack." + </p> + <p> + He habitually rode an old sorrel horse, leaning forward in a most + unmilitary seat, and wore a sun-browned cap, dingy gray uniform, and a + stock, into which he would settle his chin in a queer way, as he moved + along with abstracted look. He paid little heed to camp comforts, and + slept on the march, or by snatches under trees, as he might find occasion; + often begging a cup of bean-coffee and a bit of hard bread from his men, + as he passed them in their bivouacs, He was too uncertain in his + movements, and careless of self, for any of his military family to be able + to look after his physical welfare. In fact, a cold occasioned by lending + his cloak to one of his staff, a night or two before Chancellorsville, was + the primary cause of the pneumonia, which, setting in upon his exhausting + wounds, terminated his life. + </p> + <p> + Jackson was himself a bad disciplinarian. Nor had he even average powers + of organization. He was in the field quite careless of the minutiae of + drill. But he had a singularly happy faculty for choosing men to do his + work for him. He was a very close calculator of all his movements. He + worked out his manoeuvres to the barest mathematical chances, and insisted + upon the unerring execution of what he prescribed; and above all be + believed in mystery. Of his entire command, he alone knew what work he had + cut out for his corps to do. And this was carried so far that it is said + the men were often forbidden to ask the names of the places through which + they marched. "Mystery," said Jackson, "mystery is the secret of success + in war, as in all transactions of human life." + </p> + <p> + Jackson was a professing member of the Presbyterian Church, and what is + known as a praying man. By this is meant, that, while he never + intentionally paraded or obtruded upon his associates his belief in the + practical and immediate effect of prayer, he made no effort to hide his + faith or practice from the eyes of the world. In action, while the whole + man was wrought up to the culminating pitch of enthusiasm, and while every + fibre of his mind and heart was strained towards the achievement of his + purpose, his hand would often be instinctively raised upwards; and those + who knew him best, believed this to be a sign that his trust in the help + of a Higher Power was ever present. + </p> + <p> + Jackson was remarkable as a fighter. In this he stands with but one or two + peers. Few men in the world's history have ever got so great results from + armed men as he was able to do. But to judge rightly of his actual + military strength is not so easy as to award this praise. Unless a general + has commanded large armies, it is difficult to judge of how far he may be + found wanting if tried in that balance. In the detached commands which he + enjoyed, in the Valley and elsewhere, his strategic ability was marked: + but these commands were always more or less limited; and, unlike Lee or + Johnston, Jackson did not live long enough to rise to the command of a + large army upon an extended and independent field of operations. + </p> + <p> + In Gen. Lee, Jackson reposed an implicit faith. "He is the only man I + would follow blindfold," said Jackson. And Lee's confidence in his + lieutenant's ability to carry out any scheme he set his hand to, was + equally pronounced. Honestly, though with too much modesty, did Lee say: + "Could I have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good of the + country, to have been disabled in your stead." + </p> + <p> + But, illy as Lee could spare Jackson, less still could the Army of + Northern Virginia spare Robert E. Lee, the greatest in adversity of the + soldiers of our civil war. Still, after Jackson's death, it is certain + that Lee found no one who could attempt the bold manoeuvres on the field + of battle, or the hazardous strategic marches, which have illumined the + name of Jackson to all posterity. + </p> + <p> + It is not improbable that had Jackson lived, and risen to larger commands, + he would have been found equal to the full exigencies of the situation. + Whatever he was called upon to do, under limited but independent scope, + seems to testify to the fact that he was far from having reached his + limit. Whatever he did was thoroughly done; and he never appears to have + been taxed to the term of his powers, in any operation which he undertook. + </p> + <p> + Honesty, singleness of purpose, true courage, rare ability, suffice to + account for Jackson's military success. But those alone who have served + under his eye know to what depths that rarer, stranger power of his has + sounded them: they only can testify to the full measure of the strength of + Stonewall Jackson. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0022" id="link2H_4_0022"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXI. THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW. + </h2> + <p> + Gen. Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War + comprises almost every thing which has been officially put forth by him + with reference to this campaign. It therefore stands in lieu of a report + of operations, and it may be profitable to continue to quote from it to + some extent. His alleged intention of withdrawing from Chancellorsville is + thus explained. After setting forth that on the demolition of the Eleventh + Corps, the previous evening, he threw Berry into the gap to arrest + Jackson, "and if possible to seize, and at all hazards hold, the high + ground abandoned by that corps," he says:— + </p> + <p> + "Gen. Berry, after going perhaps three-quarters of a mile, reported that + the enemy was already in possession of the ground commanding my position, + and that he had been compelled to establish his line in the valley on the + Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as this was + communicated to me, I directed Gens. Warren and Comstock to trace out a + new line which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night, + as I would not be able to hold the one I then occupied after the enemy + should renew the attack the next morning." + </p> + <p> + "The position" at Dowdall's "was the most commanding one in the vicinity. + In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with his artillery to + enfilade the lines held by the Twelfth and Second Corps." "To wrest this + position from the enemy after his batteries were established upon it, + would have required slender columns of infantry, which he could destroy as + fast as they were thrown upon it." Slender columns of infantry were at + this time among Hooker's pet ideas. + </p> + <p> + "Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as + practicable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate with the + movement which had been ordered to be made on our left." + </p> + <p> + "The attack was renewed by the enemy about seven o'clock in the morning, + and was bravely resisted by the limited number of troops I could bring + into action until eleven o'clock, when orders were given for the army to + establish itself on the new line. This it did in good order. The position + I abandoned was one that I had held at a disadvantage; and I kept the + troops on it as long as I did, only for the purpose of enabling me to hear + of the approach of the force under Gen. Sedgwick." Thus much Hooker. + </p> + <p> + The position of both armies shortly after daybreak was substantially that + to which the operation of Saturday had led. + </p> + <p> + The crest at Fairview was crowned by eight batteries of the Third and + Twelfth Corps, supported by Whipple's Second brigade (Bowman's), in front + to the left, forming, as it were, a third line of infantry. + </p> + <p> + In advance of the artillery some five hundred yards, (a good half-mile + from the Chancellor House,) lay the Federal line of battle, on a crest + less high than Fairview, but still commanding the tangled woods in its + front to a limited distance, and with lower ground in its rear, deepening + to a ravine on the south of the plank road. Berry's division held this + line north of the plank road, occupying the ground it had fought over + since dusk of the evening before. Supporting it somewhat later was + Whipple's First brigade (Franklin's). Berdan's sharpshooters formed a + movable skirmish-line; while another, and heavier, was thrown out by Berry + from his own troops. + </p> + <p> + A section of Dimick's battery was trained down the road. + </p> + <p> + Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps was to the south of the plank + road, both he and Berry substantially in one line, and perpendicular to + it; while Mott's brigade was massed in rear of Williams's right. + </p> + <p> + Near Williams's left flank, but almost at right angles to it, came Geary's + division, in the same intrenched line he had defended the day before; and + on his left again, the Second Corps, which had not materially changed its + position since Friday. + </p> + <p> + The angle thus formed by Geary and Williams, looked out towards cleared + fields, and rising ground, surmounted by some farm-buildings on a high + crest, about six hundred yards from Fairview. + </p> + <p> + At this farm, called Hazel Grove, during the night, and until just before + daybreak, holding a position which could have been utilized as an almost + impregnable point d'appui, and which, so long as it was held, practically + prevented, in the approaching battle, a junction of Lee's severed wings, + had lain Birney's and Whipple's divisions. This point they had occupied, + (as already described,) late the evening before, after Sickles and + Pleasonton had finished their brush with Jackson's right brigades. But + Hooker was blind to the fact that the possession of this height would + enable either himself or his enemy to enfilade the other's lines; and + before daybreak the entire force was ordered to move back to + Chancellorsville. In order to do this, the intervening swamp had to be + bridged, and the troops handled with extreme care. When all but Graham had + been withdrawn, a smart attack was made upon his brigade by Archer of + Hill's command, who charged up and captured the Hazel Grove height; but it + was with no serious Federal loss, except a gun and caisson stalled in the + swamp. Sickles drew in his line by the right, and was directed to place + his two divisions so as to strengthen the new line at Fairview. + </p> + <p> + Reynolds's corps had arrived the evening before, and, after somewhat blind + instructions, had been placed along the east of Hunting Run, from the + Rapidan to the junction of Ely's and United-States Ford roads, in a + location where the least advantage could be gained from his fresh and + eager troops, and where, in fact, the corps was not called into action at + all, restless however Reynolds may have been under his enforced + inactivity. + </p> + <p> + The Eleventh Corps had gone to the extreme left, where it had relieved + Meade; Sykes was already formed on Reynolds's left, (having rapidly moved + to the cross roads at dusk on Saturday;) while Meade with the rest of his + corps, so soon as Howard had relieved him, went into position to support + this entire line on the extreme right of the Army of the Potomac. Thus + three strong army corps henceforth disappear from effective usefulness in + the campaign. + </p> + <p> + The Confederate position opposite Fairview had been entirely rectified + during the night to prepare for the expected contest. The division of A. + P. Hill was now in the front line, perpendicular to the road, Archer on + the extreme right, and McGowan, Lane, Pender, and Thomas, extending + towards the left; the two latter on the north of the road. Heth was in + reserve, behind Lane and Pender. Archer and McGowan were half refused from + the general line at daylight, so as to face, and if possible drive Sickles + from Hazel Grove. Archer was taking measures with a view to forcing a + connection with Anderson; while the latter sent Perry by the Catharpen + road, and Posey direct, towards the Furnace, with like purpose. + </p> + <p> + Colston was drawn up in second line with Trimble's division; while Rodes, + who had led the van in the attack on Howard of last evening, now made the + third. The artillery of the corps was disposed mainly on the right of the + line, occupying, shortly after daylight, the Hazel-Grove crest, and at + Melzi Chancellor's, in the clearing, where the Eleventh Corps had met its + disaster. + </p> + <p> + There was thus opposed to the Federal right centre, (Berry's, Whipple's, + and Birney's divisions of the Third Corps, and Williams's of the Twelfth,) + consisting of about twenty-two thousand men, the whole of Jackson's corps, + now reduced to about the same effective; while Anderson, on the left of + the plank road, feeling out towards the Furnace, and McLaws on the right, + with seventeen thousand men between them, confronted our left centre, + consisting of Geary of the Twelfth, and Hancock of the Second Corps, + numbering not much above twelve thousand for duty. + </p> + <p> + Owing to Hooker's ill-fitting dispositions, and lack of ability to + concentrate, the fight of Sunday morning was thus narrowed to a contest in + which the Federals were outnumbered, with the prestige of Confederate + success to offset our intrenchments. + </p> + <p> + The right and left wings proper of the Union army comprised the bulk and + freshest part of the forces, having opposite to them no enemy whatever, + unless a couple of cavalry regiments scouting on the Mine and River roads. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Warren, who was much in Hooker's confidence, thus explains his + understanding of the situation Saturday night: "The position of the Third + Corps and our cavalry on the right flank of Jackson's cavalry" (? corps), + "cut off, it seemed, all direct communication with Gen. Lee's right. No + thought of retreating during the night was entertained on our side; and, + unless the enemy did, the next day promised a decisive battle. By our + leaving sufficient force in front of the right wing of the enemy to hold + our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our force was to be thrown upon + his left at dawn of day, with every prospect of annihilating it. To render + this success more complete, Gen. Sedgwick, with the Sixth Corps, (about + twenty thousand strong,) was to leave his position in front of the enemy's + lines at Fredericksburg, and fall upon Gen. Lee's rear at daylight." + </p> + <p> + This summarizes an excellent plan, weak only in the fact that it was + impracticable to expect Sedgwick to gain Lee's rear by daylight. The + balance was well enough, and, vigorously carried out, could, even if + unassisted by Sedgwick, scarcely fail of success. + </p> + <p> + To examine into its manner of execution. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0023" id="link2H_4_0023"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXII. THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW. + </h2> + <p> + At the earliest dawn, while Rodes was issuing rations to his men, who had + been many hours without food, the indefatigable Stuart gave orders for a + slight advance of his right, to reduce the angle of refusal or Archer and + McGowan; for at this moment it was ascertained that Sickles was being + withdrawn from Hazel Grove. By some error, Stuart's order was interpreted + as a command for the anticipated general attack, and the advancing columns + soon provoked the fire of the expectant Federals. + </p> + <p> + Seeing that the men were ready for their work, rations or no rations, + Stuart wisely refrained from recalling them; and Berry and Williams + betimes felt the shock of the strong line of A. P. Hill, which Alexander + seconded by opening with his artillery in full action. The Confederates + forged ahead with the watchword, "Charge, and remember Jackson!" And this + appeal was one to nerve all hearts to the desperate task before them. + </p> + <p> + Hotchkiss thus describes the field of operations of this morning: "The + first line of works occupied by the Federal troops had been thrown up in + the night, and was very formidable. The engineer division of the Union + Army consisted of near four thousand men, and these had been unremittingly + engaged in its construction. A vast number of trees had been felled, and + formed into a heavy rampart, all approach to which was rendered extremely + difficult by an abattis of limbs and brushwood. On the south side of the + road this line is situated upon a ridge, on the Chancellorsville side of + Lewis Creek, one of the numerous head-waters of the Mattapony. It is + intersected by the smaller branches of this creek, and the ravines in + which they run. These ravines extended behind the Federal lines, almost to + the plank road, and afforded excellent positions for successive stands. In + the morning, Sickles extended to the west of the creek, and held the + elevated plateau at Hazel Grove. This is the most commanding point, except + Fairview, in the vicinity. On the north of the plank road, the ground is + more level. The line thus crossed several small branches, the origin of + some small tributaries of the Rappahannock, but the ravines on that side + are not considerable. From the ridge occupied by the first line, the + ground falls away to the east, until the valley of another branch of Lewis + Creek is reached. The depression here is considerable, and gives an abrupt + slope to the Fairview hill, which rises directly from it on the eastern + side. From the first line of the creek, extends on both sides of the road + a dense forest. From the latter point to Fairview heights, and to + Chancellorsville, on the south side of the road, the country is cleared. + This clearing is bounded on the south by a drain, which runs from near + Chancellorsville, between Fairview and the works occupied by Slocum. It + extends some distance on the north of the road. + </p> + <p> + "Behind the front line of works, there were some defences in the valley + near the creek, not constituting a connecting line, however; and these in + turn were succeeded by the second main line of works, which covered the + Fairview heights, and were more strongly constructed even than the first." + </p> + <p> + It was at just the time of Rodes's assault, that Birney had received + orders to withdraw from his cardinal position at the angle made by Geary + and Williams, and to form as a second and third line near the plank road, + a duty there was an abundance of troops to fill. He retired, and ployed + into brigade columns by regiments, immediately beyond the crest of + Fairview hill. Here, placing batteries in position, he shelled the field + from which he had just withdrawn. This crest, however, Archer speedily + occupied; and on its summit Stuart, with better foresight than Hooker, + posted some thirty guns under Walker, which enfiladed our lines with + murderous effect during the remainder of the combat of Sunday, and + contributed largely to our defeat. + </p> + <p> + The attack of the Confederates was made, "as Jackson usually did, in heavy + columns" (Sickles), and was vigorous and effective. According to their own + accounts, the onset was met with equal cheerful gallantry. While Archer + occupied Hazel Grove, McGowan and Lane assaulted the works held by + Williams, carried them with an impetuous rush, and pushed our troops well + back. This rapid success was largely owing to a serious breach made in the + Union line by the decampment of the Third Maryland Volunteers, a full + regiment of Knipe's brigade, which held the right of Williams's division + on the plank road. The regiment was composed of new men, no match for + Jackson's veterans. They stood as well as raw troops can, in the face of + such an onslaught; but after a loss of about a hundred men, they yielded + ground, and were too green to rally. Into the gap thus made, quickly + poured a stream of Lane's men, thus taking both Berry's and Williams's + lines in reverse. The Second Brigade was compelled to change front to meet + this new attack: Mott was instantly thrown forward to fill the interval; + and after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle he regained the lost ground, + and captured eight stands of colors and about a thousand prisoners. This + separated Archer from the main line, and took in their turn McGowan and + Lane in reverse, precipitately driving them back, and enabling our columns + to regain the ground lost by the fierceness of the Confederate inroad. + This sally in reverse likewise carried back Lane and Heth, the entire + corps having suffered severely from the excellent service of the Federal + guns. But the effect on Williams's division of this alternating gain and + loss, had been to cause it to waver; while having for an instant captured + our works, was encouragement to our foes. + </p> + <p> + On the north of the road, Pender and Thomas had at first won equal fortune + against Berry's works, but their success had been equally short-lived. For + the falling-back of Jackson's right, and the cheering of the Union line as + its fire advanced in hot pursuit, gave at the same moment notice to the + Confederate left that it was compromised, and to our own brave boys the + news of their comrades' fortune. Pender and Thomas were slowly but surely + forced back, under a withering fire, beyond the breastworks they had won. + A second time did these veterans rally for the charge, and a second time + did they penetrate a part of our defences; only, however, to be taken in + flank again by Berry's right brigade, and tumbled back to their + starting-point. But their onset had shown so great determination, that + Ward was despatched to sustain Berry's right, lest he should be eventually + over-matched. + </p> + <p> + The Federal line on the north of the plank road had thus doggedly resisted + the most determined attacks of Jackson's men, and had lost no ground. And + so hard pressed indeed was Pender by gallant Berry's legions, that + Colquitt's brigade was sent to his relief. Pender's men had early expended + all their ammunition, word whereof was sent to Stuart, but merely to evoke + renewal of that stubborn officer's orders to hold their ground with the + bayonet, and at all hazards. And such orders as these were wont to be + obeyed by these hardened warriors. + </p> + <p> + The three Confederate lines of attack had soon, as on yesternight, become + one, as each pushed forward to sustain the other. The enemy "pressed + forward in crowds rather than in any regular formation" (Sickles); but the + momentum of these splendid troops was well-nigh irresistible. Nichols's + brigade of Trimble's division, and Iverson's and Rodes's of Rodes's + division, pressed forward to sustain the first line on the north of the + road, and repel the flank attack, constantly renewed by Berry. Another + advance of the entire line was ordered. Rodes led his old brigade in + person. The Confederates seemed determined, for Jackson's sake, to carry + and hold the works which they had twice gained, and out of which they had + been twice driven; for, with "Old Jack" at their head, they had never + shown a sterner front. + </p> + <p> + Now came the most grievous loss of this morning's conflict. Gallant Berry, + the life of his division, always in the hottest of the fire, reckless of + safety, had fallen mortally wounded, before Ward's brigade could reach his + line. Gen. Revere assumed command, and, almost before the renewal of the + Confederate attack, "heedless of their murmurs," says Sickles's report, + "shamefully led to the rear the whole of the Second Brigade, and portions + of two others, thus subjecting these proud soldiers, for the first time, + to the humiliation of being marched to the rear while their comrades were + under fire. Gen. Revere was promptly recalled with his troops, and at once + relieved of command." Revere certainly gives no satisfactory explanation + of his conduct; but he appears to have marched over to the vicinity of + French of the Second Corps, upon the White House clearing, and reported to + him with a large portion of his troops. Revere was subsequently + courtmartialled for this misbehavior, and was sentenced to dismissal; but + the sentence was revoked by the President, and he was allowed to resign. + </p> + <p> + Col. Stevens was speedily put in command in Revere's stead; but he, too, + soon fell, leaving the gallant division without a leader, nearly half of + its number off the field, and the remainder decimated by the bloody + contest of the past four hours. Moreover, Gen. Hays, whose brigade of + French's division had been detached in support of Berry, where it had done + most gallant work, was at the same time wounded and captured by the enemy. + </p> + <p> + It was near eight o'clock. The artillery was quite out of ammunition, + except canister, which could not be used with safety over the heads of our + troops. Our outer lines of breastworks had been captured, and were held by + the enemy. So much as was left of Berry's division was in absolute need of + re-forming. Its supports were in equally bad plight. The death of Berry, + and the present location of our lines in the low ground back of the crest + just lost, where the undergrowth was so tangled and the bottom so marshy, + that Ward, when he marched to Berry's relief, had failed to find him, + obliged the Federals to fall back to the Fairview heights, and form a new + line at the western edge of the Chancellor clearing, where the artillery + had been so ably sustaining the struggle now steadily in progress since + daylight. Sickles himself supervised the withdrawal of the line, and its + being deployed on its new position. + </p> + <p> + The receding of the right of the line also necessitated the falling-back + of Williams. The latter officer had, moreover, been for some time quite + short of ammunition; and though Graham had filled the place of a part of + his line, and had held it for nearly two hours, repeatedly using the + bayonet, Williams was obliged to give way before Stuart's last assault. + But Graham was not the man readily to accept defeat; and, as Williams's + line melted away, he found himself isolated, and in great danger of being + surrounded. Gen. Birney fortunately became aware of the danger before it + was too late; and, hastily gathering a portion of Hayman's brigade, he + gallantly led them to the charge in person; and, under cover of this + opportune diversion, Graham contrived to withdraw in good order, holding + McGowan severely in check. + </p> + <p> + The Union troops now establish their second line near Fairview. The + Confederates' progress is arrested for the nonce. It is somewhat after + eight A.M. A lull, premonitory only of a still fiercer tempest, + supervenes. + </p> + <p> + But the lull is of short duration. Re-forming their ranks as well as may + be on the south of the road, the Confederates again assault the Union + second line, on the crest at Fairview. But the height is not readily + carried. The slope is wooded, and affords good cover for an assault. But + the artillery on the summit can now use its canister; and the Union troops + have been rallied and re-formed in good order. The onset is met and driven + back, amid the cheers of the victorious Federals. + </p> + <p> + Nor are Stuart's men easily discouraged. Failure only seems to invigorate + these intrepid legions to fresh endeavors. Colston's and Jones's brigades, + with Paxton's, Ramseur's, and Doles' of the third line, have re-enforced + the first, and passed it, and now attack Williams with redoubled fury in + his Fairview breastworks, while Birney sustains him with his last man and + cartridge. The Confederate troops take all advantage possible of the + numerous ravines in our front; but the batteries at Fairview pour a heavy + and destructive fire of shell and case into their columns as they press + on. Every inch of ground is contested by our divisions, which hold their + footing at Fairview with unflinching tenacity. + </p> + <p> + Meanwhile Doles, moving under cover of a hill which protects him from the + Federal batteries, and up a little branch coming from the rear of + Fairview, takes in reverse the left of Williams's line, which has become + somewhat separated from Geary, (whose position is thus fast becoming + untenable,) moves up, and deploys upon the open ground at + Chancellorsville. But he finds great difficulty in maintaining his + footing, and would have at once been driven back, when Paxton's (old + Stonewall) brigade comes up to his support on the double-quick. Jackson's + spirit for a while seems to carry all before it; the charge of these two + brigades against our batteries fairly bristles with audacity; but our guns + are too well served, and the gallant lines are once again decimated and + hustled back to the foot of the crest. + </p> + <p> + The seizure of Hazel Grove, from which Sickles had retired, had now begun + to tell against us. It had enabled the Confederates not only to form the + necessary junction of their hitherto separated wings, but to enfilade our + lines in both directions. The artillery under Walker, Carter, Pegram, and + Jones, was admirably served, and much better posted than our own guns at + Fairview. For this height absolutely commanded the angle made by the lines + of Geary and Williams, and every shot went crashing through heavy masses + of troops. Our severest losses during this day from artillery-fire + emanated from this source, not to speak of the grievous effect upon the + morale of our men from the enfilading missiles. + </p> + <p> + About eight A.M., French, one of whose brigades, (Hays's,) had been + detached in support of Berry, and who was in the rifle-pits on the Ely's + Ford road near White House, facing east, perceiving how hotly the conflict + was raging in his rear, on the right of the Third Corps line, and having + no enemy in his own front, assumed the responsibility of placing four + regiments of Carroll's brigade in line on the clearing, facing + substantially west, and formed his Third Brigade on their right, + supporting the left batteries of the Fifth Corps. This was a complete + about-face. + </p> + <p> + Soon after taking up this position, Hooker ordered him forward into the + woods, to hold Colquitt and Thomas in check, who were advancing beyond the + right of Sickles's position at Fairview, and compromising the withdrawal + to the new lines which was already determined upon. Says French: "In a + moment the order was given. The men divested themselves of all but their + fighting equipment, and the battalions marched in line across the plain + with a steady pace, receiving at the verge of the woods the enemy's fire. + It was returned with great effect, followed up by an impetuous charge.... + The enemy, at first panic-stricken by the sudden attack on his flank, + broke to the right in masses, leaving in our hands several hundred + prisoners, and abandoning a regiment of one of our corps in the same + situation." + </p> + <p> + But French had not driven back his antagonist to any considerable distance + before himself was outflanked on his right by a diversion of Pender's. To + meet this new phase of the combat, he despatched an aide to Couch for + re-enforcements; and soon Tyler's brigade appeared, and went in on his + right. This fight of French and Tyler effectually repelled the danger + menacing the White House clearing. It was, however, a small affair + compared to the heavy fighting in front of Fairview. And, the yielding of + Chancellorsville to the enemy about eleven A.M. having rendered untenable + the position of these brigades, they were gradually withdrawn somewhat + before noon. + </p> + <p> + Still Jackson's lines, the three now one confused mass, but with + unwavering purpose, returned again and again to the assault. Our regiments + had become entirely depleted of ammunition; and, though Birney was ordered + to throw in his last man to Williams's support, it was too late to prevent + the latter from once more yielding ground. + </p> + <p> + For, having resisted the pressure of Stuart's right for nearly four hours, + his troops having been for some time with empty cartridge-boxes, + twenty-four hours without food, and having passed several nights without + sleep, while intrenching, Williams now felt that he could no longer hold + his ground. The enemy was still pressing on, and the mule-train of small + ammunition could not be got up under the heavy fire. His artillery had + also exhausted its supplies; Sickles was in similar plight; Jackson's men, + better used to the bayonet, and possessing the momentum of success, still + kept up their vigorous blows. Williams's line therefore slowly fell to the + rear, still endeavoring to lean on Sickles's left. + </p> + <p> + Sickles, who had kept Hooker informed of the condition of affairs as they + transpired, and had repeatedly requested support, now sent a more urgent + communication to him, asking for additional troops. Major Tremaine reached + headquarters just after the accident to Hooker, and received no + satisfaction. Nor had a second appeal better results. What should and + could easily have been done at an earlier moment by Hooker,—to wit, + re-enforce the right centre (where the enemy was all too plainly using his + full strength and making the key of the field), from the large force of + disposable troops on the right and left,—it was now too late to + order. + </p> + <p> + Before nine A.M., Sickles, having looked in vain for re-enforcements, + deemed it necessary to withdraw his lines back of Fairview crest. Himself + re-formed the divisions, except that portion withdrawn by Revere, and led + them to the rear, where the front line occupied the late artillery + breastworks. Ammunition was at once re-distributed. + </p> + <p> + We had doubtless inflicted heavy losses upon the Confederates. "Their + formation for attack was entirely broken up, and from my headquarters they + presented to the eye the appearance of a crowd, without definite + formation; and if another corps had been available at the moment to have + relieved me, or even to have supported me, my judgment was that not only + would that attack of the enemy have been triumphantly repulsed, but that + we could have advanced on them, and carried the day." (Sickles.) + </p> + <p> + On the Chancellorsville open occurred another sanguinary struggle. Stuart + still pressed on with his elated troops, although his men were beginning + to show signs of severe exhaustion. Franklin's and Mott's brigades, says + Sickles, "made stern resistance to the impulsive assaults of the enemy, + and brilliant charges in return worthy of the Old Guard." + </p> + <p> + But, though jaded and bleeding from this prolonged and + stubbornly-contested battle, Jackson's columns had by no means relaxed + their efforts. The blows they could give were feebler, but they were + continued with the wonderful pertinacity their chief had taught them; and + nothing but the Chancellor clearing, and with it the road to + Fredericksburg, would satisfy their purpose. + </p> + <p> + And a half-hour later, Sickles, finding himself unsupported on right and + left, though not heavily pressed by the enemy, retired to + Chancellorsville, and re-formed on the right of Hancock, while portions of + three batteries held their ground, half way between Chancellorsville and + Fairview, and fired their last rounds, finally retiring after nearly all + their horses and half their men had been shot, but still without the loss + of a gun. + </p> + <p> + With characteristic gallantry, Sickles now proposed to regain the Fairview + crest with his corps, attacking the enemy with the bayonet; and he thinks + it could have been done. But, Hooker having been temporarily disabled, his + successor or executive, Couch, did not think fit to license the attempt. + And shortly after, Hooker recovered strength sufficient to order the + withdrawal to the new lines at White House; and Chancellorsville was + reluctantly given up to the enemy, who had won it so fairly and at such + fearful sacrifice. + </p> + <p> + In retiring from the Chancellor clearing, Sickles states that he took, + instead of losing, prisoners and material. This appears to be true, and + shows how Stuart had fought his columns to the utmost of their strength, + in driving us from our morning's position. He says: "At the conclusion of + the battle of Sunday, Capt. Seeley's battery, which was the last battery + that fired a shot in the battle of Chancellorsville, had forty-five horses + killed, and in the neighborhood of forty men killed and wounded;" but "he + withdrew so entirely at his leisure, that he carried off all the harness + from his dead horses, loading his cannoneers with it." "As I said before, + if another corps, or even ten thousand men, had been available at the + close of the battle of Chancellorsville, on that part of the field where I + was engaged, I believe the battle would have resulted in our favor." Such + is the testimony of Hooker's warmest supporter. And there is abundant + evidence on the Confederate side to confirm this assumption. + </p> + <p> + The losses of the Third Corps in the battle of Sunday seem to have been + the bulk of that day's casualties. + </p> + <p> + There can be no limit to the praise earned by the mettlesome veterans of + Jackson's corps, in the deadly fight at Fairview. They had continuously + marched and fought, with little sleep and less rations, since Thursday + morning. Their ammunition had been sparse, and they had been obliged to + rely frequently upon the bayonet alone. They had fought under + circumstances which rendered all attempts to preserve organization + impossible. They had charged through tangled woods against + well-constructed field-works, and in the teeth of destructive + artillery-fire, and had captured the works again and again. Never had + infantry better earned the right to rank with the best which ever bore + arms, than this gallant twenty thousand,—one man in every four of + whom lay bleeding on the field. + </p> + <p> + Nor can the same meed of praise be withheld from our own brave legions. + Our losses had been heavier than those of the enemy. Generals and + regimental commanders had fallen in equal proportions. Our forces had, + owing to the extraordinary combinations of the general in command, been + outnumbered by the enemy wherever engaged. While we had received the early + assaults behind breastworks, we had constantly been obliged to recapture + them, as they were successively wrenched from our grasp,—and we had + done it. Added to the prestige of success, and the flush of the charge, + the massing of columns upon a line of only uniform strength had enabled + the Confederates to repeatedly capture portions of our intrenchments, and, + thus taking the left and right in reverse, to drive back our entire line. + But our divisions had as often done the same. And well may the soldiers + who were engaged in this bloody encounter of Sunday, May 3, 1863, call to + mind with equal pride that each met a foeman worthy of his steel. + </p> + <p> + Say Hotchkiss and Allan: "The resistance of the Federal army had been + stubborn. Numbers, weight of artillery, and strength of position, had been + in its favor. Against it told heavily the loss of morale due to the + disaster of the previous day." + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0024" id="link2H_4_0024"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXIII. THE LEFT CENTRE. + </h2> + <p> + While the bulk of the fighting had thus been done by the right centre, + Anderson was steadily forcing his way towards Chancellorsville. He had + Wright's, Posey's, and Perry's brigades on the left of the plank road, and + Mahone's on the right, and was under orders to press on to the Chancellor + clearing as soon as he could join his left to Jackson's right. He speaks + in his report as if he had little fighting to do to reach his destination. + Nor does Geary, who was in his front, mention any heavy work until about + nine A.M.; for Geary's position was jeopardized by the enfilading fire of + Stuart's batteries on the Hazel-Grove hill, and by the advance of Stuart's + line of battle, which found his right flank in the air. He could scarcely + be expected to make a stubborn contest under these conditions. + </p> + <p> + While thus hemmed in, Geary "obeyed an order to retire, and form my + command at right angles with the former line of battle, the right resting + at or near the Brick House," (Chancellorsville). While in the execution of + this order, Hooker seems to have changed his purpose, and in person + ordered him back to his original stand, "to hold it at all hazards." + </p> + <p> + In some manner, accounted for by the prevalent confusion, Greene's and + Kane's brigades had, during this change of front, become separated from + the command, and had retired to a line of defence north of the Chancellor + House. But on regaining the old breastworks, Geary found two regiments of + Greene's brigade still holding them. + </p> + <p> + Now ensued a thorough-going struggle for the possession of these + breastworks, and they were tenaciously hung to by Geary with his small + force, until Wright had advanced far beyond his flank, and had reached the + Chancellor clearing; when, on instructions from Slocum, he withdrew from + the unequal strife, and subsequently took up a position on the left of the + Eleventh Corps. + </p> + <p> + Anderson now moved his division forward, and occupied the edge of the + clearing, where the Union forces were still making a last stand about + headquarters. + </p> + <p> + McLaws, meanwhile, in Couch's front, fought mainly his skirmishers and + artillery. Hancock strengthened Miles's outpost line, who "held it nobly + against repeated assaults." + </p> + <p> + While this is transacting, Couch orders Hancock to move up to the + United-States Ford road, which he imagines to be threatened by the enemy; + but the order is countermanded when scarcely begun. There is assuredly a + sufficiency of troops there. + </p> + <p> + But Hancock is soon obliged to face about to ward off the advance of the + enemy, now irregularly showing his line of battle upon the + Chancellorsville clearing, while Sickles and Williams slowly and sullenly + retire from before him. + </p> + <p> + The enemy is gradually forcing his way towards headquarters. Hancock's + artillery helps keep him in check for a limited period; but the batteries + of Stuart, Anderson, and McLaws, all directing a converging fire on the + Chancellor House, make it, under the discouraging circumstances, difficult + for him to maintain any footing. + </p> + <p> + When Couch had temporarily assumed command, Hancock, before Geary was + forced from his intrenchments by Anderson, disposed the Second Corps, with + its eighteen pieces of artillery, in two lines, facing respectively east + and west, about one mile apart. But Geary's relinquishment of the + rifle-pits allowed the flanks of both the lines to be exposed, and + prevented these dispositions from answering their purpose. Hancock clung + to his ground, however, until the enemy had reached within a few hundred + yards. Then the order for all troops to be withdrawn within the new lines + was promulgated, and the removal of the wounded from the Chancellor House + was speedily completed,—the shelling by the enemy having set it on + fire some time before. + </p> + <p> + Hancock's artillery at the Chancellor House certainly suffered severely; + for, during this brief engagement, Leppien's battery lost all its horses, + officers, and cannoneers, and the guns had to be removed by an infantry + detail, by hand. + </p> + <p> + The Confederate army now occupied itself in refitting its shattered ranks + upon the plain. Its organization had been torn to shreds, during the + stubborn conflict of the morning, in the tangled woods and marshy ravines + of the Wilderness; but this had its full compensation in the possession of + the prize for which it had contended. A new line of battle was formed on + the plank road west of Chancellorsville, and on the turnpike east. Rodes + leaned his right on the Chancellor House, and Pender swung round to + conform to the Federal position. Anderson and McLaws lay east of Colston, + who held the old pike, but were soon after replaced by Heth, with part of + A. P. Hill's corps. + </p> + <p> + In the woods, where Berry had made his gallant stand opposite the fierce + assaults of Jackson, and where lay by thousands the mingled dead and + wounded foes, there broke out about noon a fire in the dry and inflammable + underbrush. The Confederates detailed a large force, and labored bravely + to extinguish the flames, equally exhibiting their humanity to suffering + friend and foe; but the fire was hard to control, and many wounded + perished in the flames. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0025" id="link2H_4_0025"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXIV. THE NEW LINES. + </h2> + <p> + The new lines, prepared by Gens. Warren and Comstock, in which the Army of + the Potomac might seek refuge from its weaker but more active foe, lay as + follows:— + </p> + <p> + Birney describes the position as a flattened cone. The apex touched + Bullock's, (White House or Chandler's,) where the Mineral-Spring road, + along which the left wing of the army had lain, crosses the road from + Chancellorsville to Ely's Ford. + </p> + <p> + Bullock's lies on a commanding plateau, with open ground in its front, + well covered by our artillery. This clearing is north of and larger than + the Chancellor open, and communicates with it. The position of the troops + on the left was not materially changed, but embraced the corps of Howard + and Slocum. The right lay in advance of and along the road to Ely's, with + Big Hunting Run in its front, and was still held by Reynolds. At the apex + were Sickles and Couch. + </p> + <p> + The position was almost impregnable, and covered in full safety the line + of retreat to United-States Ford, the road to which comes into the Ely's + Ford road a half-mile west of Bullock's. + </p> + <p> + To these lines the Second, Third, and Twelfth Corps retired, unmolested by + the enemy, and filed into the positions assigned to each division. + </p> + <p> + Only slight changes had been made in the situation of Meade since he took + up his lines on the left of the army. He had, with wise forethought, sent + Sykes at the double-quick, after the rout of the Eleventh Corps, to seize + the cross-roads to Ely's and United-States Fords. Here Sykes now occupied + the woods along the road from Bullock's to connect with Reynolds's left. + </p> + <p> + Before daylight Sunday morning, Humphreys, relieved by a division of the + Eleventh Corps, had moved to the right, and massed his division in rear of + Griffin, who had preceded him on the line, and had later moved to Geary's + left, on the Ely's Ford road. At nine A.M., he had sent Tyler's brigade to + support Gen. French, and with the other had held the edge of + Chancellorsville clearing, while the Third and Twelfth Corps retired to + the new lines. + </p> + <p> + And, when French returned to these lines, he fell in on Griffin's left. + </p> + <p> + About noon of Sunday, then, the patient and in no wise discouraged Union + Army lay as described, while in its front stood the weary Army of Northern + Virginia, with ranks thinned and leaders gone, but with the pride of + success, hardly fought for and nobly earned, to reward it for all the + dangers and hardships of the past few days. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Lee, having got his forces into a passable state of re-organization, + began to reconnoitre the Federal position, with a view to another assault + upon it. It was his belief that one more hearty effort would drive Hooker + across the river; and he was ready to make it, at whatever cost. But, + while engaged in the preparation for such an attempt, he received news + from Fredericksburg which caused him to look anxiously in that direction. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0026" id="link2H_4_0026"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXV. SUNDAY'S MISCARRIAGE. + </h2> + <p> + The operations of Sunday morning, in common with many of our battles, + furnish scarcely more than a narrative of isolated combats, having more or + less remote or immediate effect upon each other. + </p> + <p> + The difficulty of the ground over which our armies were constantly called + upon to manoeuvre explains "why the numerous bloody battles fought between + the armies of the Union and of the secessionists should have been so + indecisive. A proper understanding of the country, too, will help to + relieve the Americans from the charge, so frequently made at home and + abroad, of want of generalship in handling troops in battle,—battles + that had to be fought out hand to hand in forests, where artillery and + cavalry could play no part; where the troops could not be seen by those + controlling their movements; where the echoes and reverberations of sound + from tree to tree were enough to appall the strongest hearts engaged, and + yet the noise would often be scarcely heard beyond the immediate scene of + strife. Thus the generals on either side, shut out from sight and from + hearing, had to trust to the unyielding bravery of their men till couriers + from the different parts of the field, often extending for miles, brought + word which way the conflict was resulting, before sending the needed + support. We should not wonder that such battles often terminated from the + mutual exhaustion of both contending forces, but rather, that, in all + these struggles of Americans against Americans, no panic on either side + gave victory to the other, like that which the French under Moreau gained + over the Austrians in the Black Forest." (Warren.) + </p> + <p> + The Confederates had their general plan of action, viz., to drive their + opponents from the Chancellor House, in order to re-unite their right and + left wings, and to obtain possession of the direct road to Fredericksburg, + where lay Early and Barksdale. To accomplish this end, they attacked the + centre of Hooker's army,—the right centre particularly,—which + blocked their way towards both objects. + </p> + <p> + It had been no difficult task to divine their purpose. Indeed, it is + abundantly shown that Hooker understood it, in his testimony already + quoted. But, if he needed evidence of the enemy's plans, he had acquired + full knowledge, shortly after dawn, that the bulk of Stuart's corps was + still confronting Sickles and Williams, where they had fought the evening + before; and that Anderson and McLaws had not materially changed their + position in front of Geary and Hancock. He could have ascertained, by an + early morning reconnoissance, (indeed, his corps-commanders did so on + their own responsibility,) that there was no enemy whatsoever confronting + his right and left flanks, where three corps, the First, Fifth, and + Eleventh, lay chafing with eagerness to engage the foe. And the obvious + thing to do was to leave a curtain of troops to hold these flanks, which + were protected by almost insuperable natural obstacles, as well as + formidable intrenchments, and hold the superfluous troops well in hand, as + a central reserve, in the vicinity of headquarters, to be launched against + the attacking columns of the enemy, wherever occasion demanded. + </p> + <p> + Hooker still had in line at Chancellorsville, counting out his losses of + Saturday, over eighty-five thousand men. Lee had not exceeding half the + number. But every musket borne by the Army of Northern Virginia was put to + good use; every round of ammunition was made to tell its story. On the + other hand, of the effective of the Army of the Potomac, barely a quarter + was fought au fond, while at least one-half the force for duty was given + no opportunity to burn a cartridge, to aid in checking the onset of the + elated champions of the South. + </p> + <p> + Almost any course would have been preferable to Hooker's inertness. There + was a variety of opportune diversions to make. Reynolds, with his fresh + and eager corps, held the new right, protected in his front by Hunting + Run. It would have been easy at any time to project a strong column from + his front, and take Stuart's line of battle in reverse. Indeed, a short + march of three miles by the Ely's Ford, Haden's Ford, and Greenwood Gold + Mines roads, none of which were held by the enemy, would have enabled + Reynolds to strike Stuart in rear of his left flank, or seize Dowdall's + clearing by a coup de main, and absolutely negative all Stuart's efforts + in front of Fairview. Or an advance through the forest would have + accomplished the same end. To be sure, the ground was difficult, and cut + up by many brooks and ravines; but such ground had been, in this campaign, + no obstacle to the Confederates. Nor would it have been to Reynolds, had + he been given orders to execute such a manoeuvre. Gen. Doubleday states in + his testimony: "The action raged with the greatest fury near us on our + left." "I thought that the simple advance of our corps would take the + enemy in flank, and would be very beneficial in its results. Gen. Reynolds + once or twice contemplated making this advance on his own responsibility. + Col. Stone made a reconnoissance, showing it to be practicable." + </p> + <p> + The same thing applies to the Eleventh and portions of the Fifth Corps on + the left. A heavy column could have been despatched by the Mine and River + roads to attack McLaws's right flank. Barely three miles would have + sufficed, over good roads, to bring such a column into operating distance + of McLaws. It may be said that the Eleventh Corps was not fit for such + work, after its defeat of Saturday night. But testimony is abundant to + show that the corps was fully able to do good service early on Sunday + morning, and eager to wipe off the stain with which its flight from + Dowdall's had blotted its new and cherished colors. But, if Hooker was + apprehensive of trusting these men so soon again, he could scarcely deem + them incapable of holding the intrenchments; and this left Meade available + for the work proposed. + </p> + <p> + Instead, then, of relying upon the material ready to his hand, Hooker + conceived that his salvation lay in the efforts of his flying wing under + Sedgwick, some fifteen miles away. He fain would call on Hercules instead + of putting his own shoulder to the wheel. His calculations were that + Sedgwick, whom he supposed to be at Franklin's and Pollock's crossings, + three or four miles below Fredericksburg, could mobilize his corps, pass + the river, capture the heights, where in December a few Southern brigades + had held the entire Army of the Potomac at bay, march a dozen miles, and + fall upon Lee's rear, all in the brief space of four or five hours. And it + was this plan he chose to put into execution, deeming others equal to the + performance of impossibilities, while himself could not compass the + easiest problems under his own eye. + </p> + <p> + To measure the work thus cut out for Sedgwick, by the rule of the + performances of the wing immediately commanded by Gen. Hooker, would be + but fair. But Sedgwick's execution of his orders must stand on its own + merits. And his movements are fully detailed elsewhere. + </p> + <p> + An excuse often urged in palliation of Hooker's sluggishness, is that he + was on Sunday morning severely disabled. Hooker was standing, between nine + and ten A.M., on the porch of the Chancellor House, listening to the heavy + firing at the Fairview crest, when a shell struck and dislodged one of the + pillars beside him, which toppled over, struck and stunned him; and he was + doubtless for a couple of hours incapacitated for work. + </p> + <p> + But the accident was of no great moment. Hooker does not appear to have + entirely turned over the command to Couch, his superior corps-commander, + but to have merely used him as his mouthpiece, retaining the general + direction of affairs himself. + </p> + <p> + And this furnishes no real apology. Hooker's thorough inability to grasp + the situation, and handle the conditions arising from the responsibility + of so large a command, dates from Thursday noon, or at latest Friday + morning. And from this time his enervation was steadily on the increase. + For the defeat of the Army of the Potomac in Sunday morning's conflict was + already a settled fact, when Hooker failed at early dawn so to dispose his + forces as to sustain Sickles and Williams if over-matched, or to broach + some counter-manoeuvre to draw the enemy's attention to his own safety. + </p> + <p> + It is an ungracious task to heap so much blame upon any one man. But the + odium of this defeat has for years been borne by those who are guiltless + of the outcome of the campaign of Chancellorsville; and the prime source + of this fallacy has been Hooker's ever-ready self-exculpation by + misinterpreted facts and unwarranted conclusions, while his subordinates + have held their peace. And this is not alone for the purpose of + vindicating the fair fame of the Army of the Potomac and its + corps-commanders, but truth calls for no less. And it is desired to + reiterate what has already been said,—that it is in all appreciation + of Hooker's splendid qualities as a lieutenant, that his inactivity in + this campaign is dwelt upon. No testimony need be given to sustain + Hooker's courage: no man ever showed more. No better general ever + commanded an army corps in our service: this is abundantly vouched for. + But Hooker could not lead an hundred thousand men; and, unlike his + predecessor, he was unable to confess it. Perhaps he did not own it to + himself. Certainly his every explanation of this campaign involved the + shifting of the onus of his defeat to the shoulders of his subordinates,—principally + Howard and Sedgwick. And the fullest estimation of Hooker's brilliant + conduct on other fields, is in no wise incompatible with the freest + censure for the disasters of this unhappy week. For truth awards praise + and blame with equal hand; and truth in this case does ample justice to + the brave old army, ample justice to Hooker's noble aides. + </p> + <p> + The plan summarized by Warren probably reflected accurately the intentions + of his chief, as conceived in his tent on Saturday night. It was + self-evident that Anderson and McLaws could be readily held in check, so + long as Jackson's corps was kept sundered from them. Indeed, they would + have necessarily remained on the defensive so long as isolated. Instead, + then, of leaving the Third Corps, and one division of the Twelfth, to + confront Jackson's magnificent infantry, had Hooker withdrawn an entire + additional corps, (he could have taken two,) and thrown these troops in + heavy masses at dawn on Stuart, while Birney retained Hazel Grove, and + employed his artillery upon the enemy's flank; even the dauntless men, + whose victories had so often caused them to deem themselves invincible, + must have been crushed by the blows inflicted. + </p> + <p> + But there is nothing at all, on this day, in the remotest degree + resembling tactical combination. And, long before the resistance of our + brave troops had ceased, all chances of successful parrying of Lee's + skilful thrusts had passed away. + </p> + <p> + Hooker's testimony is to the effect that he was merely lighting on Sunday + morning to retain possession of the road by which Sedgwick was to join + him, and that his retiring to the lines at Bullock's was predetermined. + </p> + <p> + The following extract from the records of the Committee on the Conduct of + the War, illustrates both this statement, and Hooker's method of + exculpating himself by crimination of subordinates. "Question to Gen. + Hooker.—Then I understand you to say, that, not hearing from Gen. + Sedgwick by eleven o'clock, you withdrew your troops from the position + they held at the time you ordered Gen. Sedgwick to join you. + </p> + <p> + "Answer.—Yes, sir; not wishing to hold it longer at the disadvantage + I was under. I may add here, that there is a vast difference in + corps-commanders, and that it is the commander that gives tone and + character to his corps. Some of our corps-commanders, and also officers of + other rank, appear to be unwilling to go into a fight." + </p> + <p> + But, apart from the innuendo, all this bears the stamp of an + after-thought. If an army was ever driven from its position by fair + fighting, our troops were driven from Chancellorsville. And it would seem, + that, if there was any reasonable doubt on Saturday night that the Army of + the Potomac could hold its own next day, it would have been wiser to have + at once withdrawn to the new lines, while waiting for the arrival of + Sedgwick. For here the position was almost unassailable, and the troops + better massed; and, if Lee had made an unsuccessful assault, Hooker would + have been in better condition to make a sortie upon the arrival of the + Sixth Corps in his vicinity, than after the bloody and disheartening work + at Fairview. + </p> + <p> + Still the inactivity of Hooker, when Sedgwick did eventually arrive within + serviceable distance, is so entire a puzzle to the student of this + campaign, that speculation upon what he did then actually assume as facts, + or how he might have acted under any other given conditions, becomes + almost fruitless. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0027" id="link2H_4_0027"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXVI. SEDGWICK'S CHANGE OF ORDERS. + </h2> + <p> + Let us return to the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, where + operations now demanded Lee's undivided skill. This was properly the left + wing of the army, which, under Sedgwick, had made the demonstration below + Fredericksburg, to enable the right wing, under Hooker, to cross the river + above, and establish itself at Chancellorsville. It had consisted of three + corps; but, so soon as the demonstration had effected its purpose, it will + be remembered that Hooker withdrew from Sedgwick's command both the First + and Third Corps, leaving him with his own, the Sixth, to guard the + crossings of the river; while Gibbon's division of the Second Corps did + provost duty at the camp at Falmouth, and held itself in readiness to move + in any direction at a moment's notice. + </p> + <p> + From this time on, the Sixth Corps may be more properly considered as a + detached command, than as the left wing of the Army of the Potomac. + </p> + <p> + And, beyond some demonstrations in aid of Hooker's manoeuvring, Sedgwick + had been called on to perform no actual service up to the evening of May + 2. + </p> + <p> + On May 1, a demonstration in support of Hooker's advance from + Chancellorsville had been ordered, and speedily countermanded, on account + of the despatch having reached Sedgwick later than the hour set for his + advance. + </p> + <p> + On the forenoon of May 2, Hooker had given Sedgwick discretionary + instructions to attack the enemy in his front, "if an opportunity presents + itself with a reasonable expectation of success." + </p> + <p> + Then came the despatch of 4.10 P.M., May 2, already quoted, and received + by Sedgwick just before dark:— + </p> + <p> + "The general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick cross the river as soon + as indications will permit; capture Fredericksburg with every thing in it, + and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know the enemy is flying, trying to + save his trains: two of Sickles's divisions are among them." + </p> + <p> + This despatch was immediately followed by another: "The major-general + commanding directs you to pursue the enemy by the Bowling-Green road." + </p> + <p> + In pursuance of these and previous orders, Sedgwick transferred the + balance of the Sixth Corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, one + division being already there to guard the bridge-head. Sedgwick's orders + of May 1 contemplated the removal of the pontoons before his advance on + the Bowling-Green road, as he would be able to leave no sufficient force + to guard them. But these orders were received so late as daylight on the + 2d; and the withdrawal of the bridges could not well be accomplished in + the full view of the enemy, without prematurely developing our plans. + </p> + <p> + The order to pursue by the Bowling-Green road having been again repeated, + Sedgwick put his command under arms, advanced his lines, and forced the + enemy—Early's right—from that road and back into the woods. + This was late in the evening of Saturday. + </p> + <p> + On the same night, after the crushing of the Eleventh Corps, we have seen + how Hooker came to the conclusion that he could utilize Sedgwick in his + operations at Chancellorsville. He accordingly sent him the following + order, first by telegraph through Gen. Butterfield, at the same time by an + aide-de-camp, and later by Gen. Warren:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + May 2, 1863, 9 P.M. +GEN. BUTTERFIELD, +</pre> + <p> + The major-general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick crosses the + Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this order, and at once + take up his line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect + with us, and he will attack and destroy any force he may fall in with on + the road. He will leave all his trains behind, except the pack-train of + small ammunition, and march to be in our vicinity at daylight. He will + probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by Gen. Lee, and + between us we will use him up. Send word to Gen. Gibbon to take possession + of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail. Deliver this by your swiftest + messenger. Send word that it is delivered to Gen. Sedgwick. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + J. H. VAN ALEN, + Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. +(Copy sent Gen. Sedgwick ten P.M.) +</pre> + <p> + At eleven P.M., when this order of ten o'clock was received, Sedgwick had + his troops placed, and his dispositions taken, to carry out the orders to + pursue, on the Bowling-Green road, an enemy indicated to him as in rapid + retreat from Hooker's front; and was actually in bivouac along that road, + while a strong picket-line was still engaged skirmishing with the force in + his front. By this time the vanguard of his columns had proceeded a + distance variously given as from one to three miles below the bridges in + this direction; probably near the Bernard House, not much beyond Deep + Creek. + </p> + <p> + It is to be presumed that the aide who bore the despatch, and reached + Sedgwick later than the telegram, gave some verbal explanation of this + sudden change of Hooker's purpose; but the order itself was of a nature to + excite considerable surprise, if not to create a feeling of uncertainty. + </p> + <p> + Sedgwick changed his dispositions as speedily as possible, and sent out + his orders to his subordinates within fifteen minutes after receipt of + Hooker's despatch; but it was considerably after midnight before he could + actually get his command faced about, and start the new head of column + toward Fredericksburg. + </p> + <p> + Knowing the town to be occupied by the Confederates, Sedgwick was obliged + to proceed with reasonable caution the five or six miles which separated + his command from Fredericksburg. And the enemy appears to have been + sufficiently on the alert to take immediate measures to check his progress + as effectually as it could with the troops at hand. + </p> + <p> + Fredericksburg and the heights beyond were held by Early's division and + Barksdale's brigade, with an adequate supply of artillery,—in all + some eighty-five hundred men. Sedgwick speaks, in his testimony before the + Committee on the Conduct of the War, as if he understood at this time that + Early controlled a force as large as his own; but he had been advised by + Butterfield that the force was judged to be much smaller than it actually + was. + </p> + <p> + In his report, Early does not mention Sedgwick's advance on the + Bowling-Green road, nor is it probable that Sedgwick had done more than to + advance a strong skirmish-line beyond his column in that direction. + Early's line lay, in fact, upon the heights back of the road, his right at + Hamilton's Crossing, and with no considerable force on the road itself. So + that Sedgwick's advance was skirmishing with scouting-parties, sent out to + impede his march. + </p> + <p> + Early had received general instructions from Lee, in case Sedgwick should + remove from his front, to leave a small force to hold the position, and + proceed up the river to join the forces at Chancellorsville. About eleven + A.M. on the 2d, this order was repeated, but by error in delivery (says + Lee) made unconditional. Early, therefore, left Hays and one regiment of + Barksdale at Fredericksburg, and, sending part of Pendleton's artillery to + the rear, at once began to move his command along the plank road to join + his chief. + </p> + <p> + As this manoeuvre was in progress, his attention was called to the early + movements of Sedgwick, and, sending to Lee information on this point, he + received in reply a correction of the misdelivered order. He therefore + about-faced, and returned to his position at a rapid gait. + </p> + <p> + It is doubtful whether by daylight, and without any considerable + opposition, Sedgwick could have marched the fifteen miles to + Chancellorsville in the few hours allotted him. Nor is it claimed by + Hooker that it was possible for Sedgwick to obey the order of ten P.M. + literally; for it was issued under the supposition that Sedgwick was still + on the north bank of the river. But Hooker does allege that Sedgwick took + no pains to keep him informed of what he was doing; whence his incorrect + assumption. To recross the river for the purpose of again crossing at + Fredericksburg would have been a lame interpretation of the speedy + execution of the order urged upon Sedgwick. He accordingly shifted his + command, and, in a very short time after receiving the despatch, began to + move by the flank on the Bowling-Green road towards Fredericksburg, + Newton's division in the advance, Howe following, while Brooks still held + the bridge-head. + </p> + <p> + It was a very foggy night; which circumstance, added to the fact that + Sedgwick was, in common with all our generals, only imperfectly familiar + with the lay of the land, and that the enemy, active and well-informed, + enveloped him with a curtain of light troops, to harass his movement in + whatever direction, materially contributed to the delay which ensued. + </p> + <p> + And Sedgwick appears to have encountered Early's pickets, and to have done + some skirmishing with the head of his column, immediately after passing + west of Franklin's Crossing, which, moreover, gave rise to some + picket-firing all along the line, as far as Deep Run, where Bartlett + confronted the enemy. As the outskirts of the town were entered, four + regiments of Wheaton's and Shaler's brigades were sent forward against the + rifle-pits of the enemy, and a gallant assault was made by them. But it + was repulsed, with some loss, by the Confederates, who, as on Dec. 13, + patiently lay behind the stone wall and rifle-pits, and reserved their + fire until our column was within twenty yards. Then the regiments behind + the stone wall, followed by the guns and infantry on the heights, opened a + fire equally sudden and heavy, and drove our columns back upon the main + body. The assault had been resolute, as the casualties testify, "one + regiment alone losing sixty-four men in as many seconds" (Wheaton); but + the darkness, and uncertainty of our officers with regard to the position, + made its failure almost a foregone conclusion. This was about daylight. + "The force displayed by the enemy was sufficient to show that the + intrenchments could not be carried except at great cost." (Sedgwick.) + </p> + <p> + The officer by whom the order to Sedgwick had been sent, Capt. + Raderitzchin, had not been regularly appointed in orders, but was merely a + volunteer aide-de-camp on Gen. Hooker's staff. + </p> + <p> + Shortly after he had been despatched, Gen. Warren requested leave himself + to carry a duplicate of the order to Sedgwick, (Capt. Raderitzchin being + "a rather inexperienced, headlong young man,") for Warren feared the "bad + effect such an impossible order would have on Gen. Sedgwick and his + commanders, when delivered by him." And, knowing Warren to be more + familiar with the country than any other available officer, Hooker + detached him on this duty, with instructions again to impress upon + Sedgwick the urgent nature of the orders. Warren, with an aide, left + headquarters about midnight, and reached Sedgwick before dawn. + </p> + <p> + As daylight approached, Warren thought he could see that only two + field-pieces were on Marye's heights, and that no infantry was holding the + rifle-pits to our right of it. But the stone-wall breastworks were held in + sufficient force, as was demonstrated by the repulse of the early assault + of Shaler and Wheaton. + </p> + <p> + And Warren was somewhat in error. Barksdale, who occupied Fredericksburg, + had been closely scanning these movements of Sedgwick's. He had some + fourteen hundred men under his command. Six field-pieces were placed near + the Marye house. Several full batteries were on Lee's hill, and near + Howison's. And, so soon as Fredericksburg was occupied by our forces, + Early sent Hays to re-enforce Barksdale; one regiment of his brigade + remaining on Barksdale's right, and the balance proceeding to Stansbury's. + </p> + <p> + For, at daylight on Sunday, Early had received word from Barksdale, whose + lines at Fredericksburg were nearly two miles in length, that the Union + forces had thrown a bridge across the river opposite the Lacy house; and + immediately despatched his most available brigade to sustain him. + </p> + <p> + Early's line, however, was thin. Our own was quite two and a half miles in + length, with some twenty-two thousand men; and Early's eighty-five hundred + overlapped both our flanks. But his position sufficiently counterbalanced + this inequality. Moreover his artillery was well protected, while the + Union batteries were quite without cover, and in Gibbon's attempted + advance, his guns suffered considerable damage. + </p> + <p> + Brooks's division was still on the left of the Federal line, near the + bridge-heads. Howe occupied the centre, opposite the forces on the + heights, to our left of Hazel Run. Newton held the right as far as the + Telegraph road in Fredericksburg. + </p> + <p> + Gibbon's division had been ordered by Butterfield to cross to + Fredericksburg, and second Sedgwick's movement on the right. Gibbon states + that he was delayed by the opposition of the enemy to his laying the + bridge opposite the Lacy house, but this was not considerable. He appears + to have used reasonable diligence, though he did not get his bridge thrown + until daylight. Then he may have been somewhat tardy in getting his + twenty-five hundred men across. And, by the time he got his bridge thrown, + Sedgwick had possession of the town. + </p> + <p> + It was seven A.M. when Gibbon had crossed the river with his division, and + filed into position on Sedgwick's right. Gibbon had meanwhile reported in + person to Sedgwick, who ordered him to attempt to turn the enemy's left at + Marye's, while Howe should open a similar movement on his right at Hazel + Run. Gens. Warren and Gibbon at once rode forward to make a + reconnoissance, but could discover no particular force of the enemy in our + front. Just here are two canals skirting the slope of the hill, and + parallel to the river, which supply power to the factories in the town. + The generals passed the first canal, and found the bridge across it + intact. The planks of the second canal-bridge had been removed, but the + structure itself was still sound. + </p> + <p> + Gibbon at once ordered these planks to be replaced from the nearest + houses. But, before this order could be carried out, Warren states that he + saw the enemy marching his infantry into the breastworks on the hill, + followed by a battery. This was Hays, coming to Barksdale's relief. But + the breastworks contained a fair complement before. + </p> + <p> + Gibbon's attempt was rendered nugatory by the bridge over the second canal + being commanded from the heights, the guns on which opened upon our + columns with shrapnel, while the gunners were completely protected by + their epaulements. And a further attempt by Gibbon to cross the canal by + the bridge near Falmouth, was anticipated by the enemy extending his line + to our right. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Warren states that Gen. Gibbon "made a very considerable + demonstration, and acted very handsomely with the small force he had,—not + more than two thousand men. But so much time was taken, that the enemy got + more troops in front of him than he could master." + </p> + <p> + Gen. Howe had been simultaneously directed to move on the left of Hazel + Run, and turn the enemy's right; but he found the works in his front + beset, and the character of the stream between him and Newton precluded + any movement of his division to the right. + </p> + <p> + By the time, then, that Sedgwick had full possession of the town, and + Gibbon and Howe had returned from their abortive attempt to turn the + enemy's flanks, the sun was some two hours high. As the works could not be + captured by surprise, Sedgwick was reduced to the alternative of + assaulting them in regular form. + </p> + <p> + It is not improbable that an earlier attack by Gibbon on Marye's heights, + might have carried them with little loss, and with so much less expense of + time that Sedgwick could have pushed beyond Salem Church, without being + seriously impeded by troops sent against him by Gen. Lee. + </p> + <p> + And, as the allegation of all-but criminal delay on the part of Gen. + Sedgwick is one of the cardinal points of Hooker's self-defence on the + score of this campaign, we must examine this charge carefully. + </p> + <p> + Sedgwick asserts with truth, that all despatches to him assumed that he + had but a handful of men in his front, and that the conclusions as to what + he could accomplish, were founded upon utterly mistaken premises. Himself + was well aware that the enemy extended beyond both his right and left, and + the corps knew by experience the nature of the intrenchments on the + heights. + </p> + <p> + Moreover, what had misled Butterfield into supposing, and informing + Sedgwick, as he did, that the Fredericksburg heights had been abandoned, + was a balloon observation of Early's march to join Lee under the mistaken + orders above alluded to. The enemy was found to be alert wherever Sedgwick + tapped him, and his familiarity with every inch of the ground enabled him + to magnify his own forces, and make every man tell; while Sedgwick was + groping his way through the darkness, knowing his enemy's ability to lure + him into an ambuscade, and taking his precautions accordingly. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0028" id="link2H_4_0028"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXVII. SEDGWICK'S ASSAULT. + </h2> + <p> + Now, when Sedgwick had concluded upon a general assault, he can scarcely + be blamed for over-caution in his preparations for it. Four months before, + a mere handful of the enemy had successfully held these defences against + half the Army of the Potomac; and an attack without careful dispositions + seemed to be mere waste of life. It would appear to be almost + supererogatory to defend Sedgwick against reasonable time consumed in + these precautions. + </p> + <p> + There had been a more or less continuous artillery-fire, during the entire + morning, from our batteries stationed on either side of the river. This + was now redoubled to prepare for the assault. Newton's batteries + concentrated their fire on the stone wall, until our troops had neared it, + when they directed it upon the crest beyond; while like action was + effected to sustain Howe. + </p> + <p> + Instructions were issued to the latter, who at once proceeded to form + three storming columns under Gen. Neill, Col. Grant, and Col. Seaver, and + supported them by the fire of his division artillery. + </p> + <p> + Sedgwick at the same time ordered out from Newton's division two other + columns, one under Col. Spear, consisting of two regiments, supported by + two more under Gen. Shaler, and one under Col. Johns of equal size, to + move on the plank road, and to the right of it, flanked by a line under + Col. Burnham, with four regiments, on the left of the plank road. This + line advanced manfully at a double-quick against the rifle-pits, neither + halting nor firing a shot, despite the heavy fire they encountered, until + they had driven the enemy from their lower line of works, while the + columns pressed boldly forward to the crest, and carried the works in + their rear. All the guns and many prisoners were captured. This was a + mettlesome assault, and as successful as it was brief and determined. + </p> + <p> + Howe's columns, in whose front the Confederate skirmishers occupied the + railroad-cutting and embankment, while Hays and two regiments of Barksdale + were on Lee's and adjacent hills, as soon as the firing on his right was + heard, moved to the assault with the bayonet; Neill and Grant pressing + straight for Cemetery hill, which, though warmly received, they carried + without any check. They then faced to the right, and, with Seaver + sustaining their left, carried the works on Marye's heights, capturing + guns and prisoners wholesale. + </p> + <p> + A stand was subsequently attempted by the Confederates on several + successive crests, but without avail. + </p> + <p> + The loss of the Sixth Corps in the assault on the Fredericksburg heights + was not far from a thousand men, including Cols. Spear and Johns, + commanding two of the storming columns. + </p> + <p> + The assault of Howe falls in no wise behind the one made by Newton. The + speedy success of both stands out in curious contrast to the deadly work + of Dec. 13. "So rapid had been the final movement on Marye's hill, that + Hays and Wilcox, to whom application had been made for succor, had not + time to march troops from Taylor's and Stansbury's to Barksdale's aid." + (Hotchkiss and Allan.) + </p> + <p> + The Confederates were now cut in two: Wilcox and Hays were left north of + the plank road, but Hays retreated round the head of Sedgwick's column, + and rejoined Early. Wilcox, who, on hearing of Sedgwick's manoeuvres + Sunday morning, had hurried with a portion of his force to Barksdale's + assistance at Taylor's, but had arrived too late to participate in the + action, on ascertaining Sedgwick's purpose, retired slowly down the plank + road, and skirmished with the latter's head of column. And he made so + determined a stand near Guest's, that considerable time was consumed in + brushing it away before Sedgwick could hold on his course. + </p> + <p> + Early appears to deem the carrying of the Fredericksburg heights to + require an excuse on his part. He says in his report about our preliminary + assaults: "All his efforts to attack the left of my line were thwarted, + and one attack on Marye's hill was repulsed. The enemy, however, sent a + flag of truce to Col. Griffin, of the Eighteenth Mississippi Regiment, who + occupied the works at the foot of Marye's hill with his own and the + Twenty-first Mississippi Regiment, which was received by him imperfectly; + and it had barely returned before heavy columns were advanced against the + position, and the trenches were carried, and the hill taken." "After this + the artillery on Lee's hill, and the rest of Barksdale's infantry, with + one of Hays's regiments, fell back on the Telegraph road; Hays with the + remainder being compelled to fall back upon the plank road as he was on + the left." Later, "a line was formed across the Telegraph road, at Cox's + house, about two miles back of Lee's hill." + </p> + <p> + Barksdale says, "With several batteries under the command of Gen. + Pendleton, and a single brigade of infantry, I had a front of not less + than three miles to defend, extending from Taylor's hill on the left, to + the foot of the hills in the rear of the Howison house." + </p> + <p> + Gen. Wilcox, he goes on to state, from Banks's Ford, had come up with + three regiments as far as Taylor's, and Gen. Hays was also in that + vicinity; but "the distance from town to the points assailed was so short, + the attack so suddenly made, and the difficulty of removing troops from + one part of the line to another was so great, that it was utterly + impossible for either Gen. Wilcox or Gen. Hays to reach the scene of + action in time to afford any assistance whatever. It will then be seen + that Marye's hill was defended by but one small regiment, three companies, + and four pieces of artillery." + </p> + <p> + Barksdale further states that, "upon the pretext of taking care of their + wounded, the enemy asked a flag of truce, after the second assault at + Marye's hill, which was granted by Col. Griffin; and thus the weakness of + our force at that point was discovered." + </p> + <p> + The bulk of Early's division was holding the heights from Hazel Run to + Hamilton's Crossing; and the sudden assault on the Confederate positions + at Marye's, and the hills to the west, gave him no opportunity of + sustaining his forces there. But it is not established that any unfair use + was made of the flag of truce mentioned by Barksdale. + </p> + <p> + The loss in this assault seems heavy, when the small force of Confederates + is considered. The artillery could not do much damage, inasmuch as the + guns could not be sufficiently depressed, but the infantry fire was very + telling; and, as already stated, both colonels commanding the assaulting + columns on the right were among the casualties. + </p> + <p> + The enemy's line being thus cut in twain, sundering those at Banks's Ford + and on the left of the Confederate line from Early at Hamilton's Crossing, + it would now have been easy for Sedgwick to have dispersed Early's forces, + and to have destroyed the depots at the latter place. But orders precluded + anything but an immediate advance. + </p> + <p> + The question whether Sedgwick could have complied with his instructions, + so as to reach Hooker in season to relieve him from a part of Lee's + pressure on Sunday morning, is answered by determining whether it was + feasible to carry the Fredericksburg heights before or at daylight. If + this could have been done, it is not unreasonable to assume that he could + have left a rear-guard, to occupy Early's attention and forestall attacks + on his marching column, and have reached, with the bulk of his corps, the + vicinity of Chancellorsville by the time the Federals were hardest + pressed, say ten A.M., and most needed a diversion in their favor. + </p> + <p> + Not that Hooker's salvation in any measure depended on Sedgwick's so + doing. Hooker had the power in his own hand, if he would only use it. But + it should be determined whether Hooker had any legitimate ground for + fault-finding. + </p> + <p> + Putting aside the question of time, Sedgwick's whole manoeuvre is good + enough. It was as well executed as any work done in this campaign, and + would have given abundant satisfaction had not so much more been required + of him. But, remembering that time was of the essence of his orders, it + may be as well to quote the criticism of Warren— + </p> + <p> + "It takes some men just as long to clear away a little force as it does a + large one. It depends entirely upon the man, how long a certain force will + stop him." + </p> + <p> + "The enemy had left about one division, perhaps ten thousand or twelve + thousand men, at Fredericksburg, to watch him. They established a kind of + picket-line around his division, so that he could not move any thing + without their knowing it. Just as soon as Gen. Sedgwick began to move, a + little random fire began, and that was kept up till daylight. At daylight, + the head of Gen. Sedgwick's troops had got into Fredericksburg. I think + some little attempt had been made to move forward a skirmish-line, but + that had been repulsed. The enemy had considerable artillery in position." + </p> + <p> + "My opinion was, that, under the circumstances, the most vigorous effort + possible ought to have been made, without regard to circumstances, because + the order was peremptory." But this statement is qualified, when, in his + examination before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, to a question + as to whether, in his opinion, Gen. Sedgwick's vigorous and energetic + attempt to comply with Hooker's order would have led to a different result + of the battle, Warren answered: "Yes, sir! and I will go further, and say + that I think there might have been more fighting done at the other end of + the line. I do not believe that if Gen. Sedgwick had done all he could, + and there had not been harder fighting on the other end of the line, we + would have succeeded." + </p> + <p> + If, at eleven P.M., when Sedgwick received the order, he had immediately + marched, regardless of what was in his front, straight through the town, + and up the heights beyond, paying no heed whatever to the darkness of the + night, but pushing on his men as best he might, it is not improbable that + he could have gained the farther side of this obstacle by daylight. But is + it not also probable that his corps would have been in questionable + condition for either a march or a fight? It would be extravagant to expect + that the organization of the corps could be preserved in any kind of form, + however slight the opposition. And, as daylight came on, the troops would + have scarcely been in condition to offer brilliant resistance to the + attack, which Early, fully apprised of all their movements, would have + been in position to make upon their flank and rear. + </p> + <p> + Keeping in view all the facts,—that Sedgwick was on unknown ground, + with an enemy in his front, familiar with every inch of it and with + Sedgwick's every movement; that he had intrenchments to carry where a few + months before one man had been more than a match for ten; that the night + was dark and foggy; and that he was taken unawares by this order,—it + seems that to expect him to carry the heights before daylight, savors of + exorbitance. + </p> + <p> + But it may fairly be acknowledged, that more delay can be discovered in + some of the operations of this night and morning, than the most rigorous + construction of the orders would warrant. After the repulse of Wheaton and + Shaler, a heavier column should at once have been thrown against the + works. Nor ought it to have taken so long, under the stringency of the + instructions, to ascertain that Gibbon would be stopped by the canal, and + Howe by Hazel Run; or perhaps to organize the assaulting columns, after + ascertaining that these flank attacks were fruitless. + </p> + <p> + All this, however, in no wise whatsoever shifts any part of the + responsibility for the loss of this campaign, from Hooker's to Sedgwick's + shoulders. The order of ten P.M. was ill-calculated and impracticable. + Hooker had no business to count on Sedgwick's corps as an element in his + problem of Sunday at Chancellorsville. + </p> + <p> + Sedgwick's movements towards his chief were certainly more rapid than + those of Sickles on Saturday, and no one has undertaken to criticise the + latter. Nor would Lee be lightly accused of tardiness for not attacking + Sedgwick in force until Monday at six P.M., as will shortly be detailed, + when he had despatched his advance towards him shortly after noon on + Sunday, and had but a half-dozen miles to march. And yet Lee, precious as + every moment was to him, consumed all these hours in preparing to assault + Sedgwick's position in front of Banks's Ford. + </p> + <p> + In order to do justice to all sources of information, and show how + unreliable our knowledge often was, it may be well to quote from Gen. + Butterfield's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. + "From the best information I had at the time the order came, there was not + over a brigade of the enemy in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. This + information was confirmed afterwards by prisoners taken on Sunday by Gen. + Sedgwick. They told me they were left there with orders, that, if they did + not receive re-enforcements by a certain time, to withdraw; that they did + withdraw about eleven o'clock on Saturday night, but met re-enforcements + coming up, and turned back and re-occupied the works. The statement may + have been false, or may have been true." It was clearly Early's march + under his mistaken instructions, which the prisoners referred to. "If + true, it would show that a bold movement of Gen. Sedgwick's command on + Saturday night, would have taken Marye's heights, and put him well on the + road towards Gen. Hooker before daylight." To the question whether the + order could have been actually carried out: "There was a force of the + enemy there, but in my judgment not sufficient to have prevented the + movement, if made with a determined attack. Night attacks are dangerous, + and should be made only with very disciplined troops. But it seemed to me + at the time that the order could have been executed." + </p> + <p> + Gibbon, on the contrary, is of opinion that the strict execution of the + order was impracticable, but that probably an assault could have been made + at daylight instead of at eleven A.M. He recollects being very impatient + that morning about the delay,—not, however, being more specific in + his testimony. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0029" id="link2H_4_0029"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER. + </h2> + <p> + So soon as Sedgwick had reduced the only formidable works in his front, he + made dispositions to push out on the plank road. Gibbon was left in + Fredericksburg to prevent the enemy from crossing to the north side of the + river, and to shield the bridges. + </p> + <p> + "Gen. Brooks's division was now given the advance, and he was farthest in + the rear, not having got moved from the crossing-place." Brooks had so + extensive a force in his front, that he was constrained to withdraw with + extreme caution. "This necessarily consumed a considerable time, and + before it was completed the sound of the cannonading at Chancellorsville + had ceased." (Warren.) + </p> + <p> + This postponement of an immediate advance might well, under the stringency + of the orders, have been avoided, by pushing on with the then leading + division. Not that it would have been of any ultimate assistance to Hooker + at Chancellorsville. At the time the storming columns assaulted Marye's + heights, Hooker had already been driven into his lines at White House. And + though none of his strictures upon Sedgwick's tardiness, as affecting his + own situation, will bear the test of examination, time will not be + considered wholly ill-spent in determining where Sedgwick might have been + more expeditious. It no doubt accords with military precedents, to + alternate in honoring the successive divisions of a corps with the post of + danger; but it may often be highly improper to arrest an urgent progress + in order to accommodate this principle. And it was certainly inexpedient + in this case, despite the fact that Newton and Howe had fought their + divisions, while Brooks had not yet been under fire. + </p> + <p> + "The country being open, Gen. Brooks's division was formed in a column of + brigade-fronts, with an extended line of skirmishers in the front and + flank in advance, and the artillery on the road." (Warren.) The New Jersey + brigade marched on the right, and Bartlett's brigade on the left, of the + road. This disposition was adopted that the enemy might be attacked as + soon as met, without waiting for deployment, and to avoid the usual + manoeuvres necessary to open an action from close column, or from an + extended order of march. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Newton followed, marching by the flank along the road. This "greatly + extended the column, made it liable to an enfilading fire, and put it out + of support, in a measure, of the division in advance." (Warren.) Howe + brought up the rear. + </p> + <p> + Meanwhile Wilcox, having arrested Sedgwick at Guest's, as long as his + slender force enabled him to do, moved across country to the River road + near Taylor's. But Sedgwick's cautious advance gave him the opportunity of + sending back what cavalry he had, some fifty men, to skirmish along the + plank road, while he himself moved his infantry and artillery by + cross-roads to the toll-house, one-half mile east of Salem Church. Here he + took up an admirable position, and made a handsome resistance to Sedgwick, + until, ascertaining that McLaws had reached the crest at that place, he + withdrew to the position assigned him in the line of battle now formed by + that officer. + </p> + <p> + When Early perceived that Sedgwick was marching his corps up the plank + road, instead, as he expected, of attacking him, and endeavoring to reach + the depots at Hamilton's, he concentrated at Cox's all his forces, now + including Hays, who had rejoined him by a circuit, and sent word to + McLaws, whom he ascertained to be advancing to meet Sedgwick, that he + would on the morrow attack Marye's heights with his right, and extend his + left over to join the main line. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0030" id="link2H_4_0030"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXIX. SALEM CHURCH. + </h2> + <p> + It was about noon before Lee became aware that Sedgwick had captured his + stronghold at Fredericksburg, and was where he could sever his + communications, or fall upon his rear at Chancellorsville. Both Lee and + Early (the former taking his cue from his lieutenant) state that at first + Sedgwick advanced down the Telegraph road, with an assumed purpose to + destroy the line in Lee's rear, but that he was checked by Early. The + nature, however, of Sedgwick's orders precluded his doing this, and there + is no mention of such a purpose among any of the reports. And it was not + long before Lee heard that Sedgwick was marching out towards the + battle-ground in the Wilderness, with only Wilcox in his front. + </p> + <p> + McLaws, with his own three brigades, and one of Anderson's, was + accordingly pushed forward at a rapid gait to sustain Wilcox; while + Anderson, with the balance of his division, and fourteen rifled guns, was + sent to the junction of the River road and Mine road to hold that + important position. McLaws arrived about two P.M., and found Wilcox + skirmishing, a trifle beyond Salem Church. He was drawn back a few hundred + yards, while Kershaw and Wofford were thrown out upon Wilcox's right, and + Semmes and Mahone on his left. Wofford arrived somewhat late, as he had + been temporarily left at the junction of the Mine and plank roads to guard + them. McLaws's guns were concentrated on the road, but were soon withdrawn + for lack of ammunition. + </p> + <p> + Some troops were thrown into Salem Church, and into a schoolhouse near by, + in front of the woods, forming a salient; but the main Confederate line + was withdrawn some three hundred yards within the wood, where a clearing + lay at their back. + </p> + <p> + When Sedgwick's column reached the summit along the road, about a mile + from Salem Church, Wilcox's cavalry skirmishers were met, and a section of + artillery opened with solid shot from a point near the church, where + Wilcox was hurrying his forces into line. The intervening ground was quite + open on both sides the road. The heights at Salem Church are not + considerable; but a ravine running north and south across its front, and + as far as the Rappahannock, furnishes an excellent line of defence, and + the woods come up to its edge at this point, and enclose the road. + </p> + <p> + Brooks was pushed in to attack the enemy, the main part of his division + being on the left of the road, while Newton filed in upon his right, so + soon as his regiments could be got up. Disposing his batteries (Rigby, + Parsons, and Williston) along a crest at right angles to the road, not far + from the toll-gate, where good shelter existed for the caissons and + limbers, Brooks sharply advanced his lines under a telling fire, and, + passing the undergrowth, penetrated the edge of the woods where lay Wilcox + and Semmes and Mahone. Wilcox's skirmishers and part of his line gave way + before Brooks's sturdy onset, which created no little confusion; but + Wilcox and Semmes in person headed some reserve regiments, and led them to + the charge. An obstinate combat ensues. Bartlett has captured the + schoolhouse east of the church, advances, and again breaks for a moment + the Confederate line. Wilcox throws in an Alabama regiment, which delivers + a fire at close quarters, and makes a counter-charge, while the rest of + his brigade rallies on its colors, and again presses forward. The church + and the schoolhouse are fought for with desperation, but only after a + heroic defence can the Confederates recapture them. Bartlett withdraws + with a loss of two-fifths of his brigade, after the most stubborn contest. + The line on the north of the road is likewise forced back. A series of + wavering combats, over this entire ground, continues for the better part + of an hour; but the enemy has the upper hand, and forces our line back + towards the toll-house. + </p> + <p> + Though obstinately fighting for a foothold near the church, Brooks had + thus been unable to maintain it, and he has fallen back with a loss of + nearly fifteen hundred men. Reaching his guns, where Newton has meanwhile + formed in support of his right, and where part of Howe's division later + falls in upon his left, the enemy, which has vigorously followed up his + retreat, is met with a storm of grape and canister at short range, the + distance of our batteries from the woods being not much over five hundred + yards. So admirably served are the guns, as McLaws states, that it is + impossible to make head against this new line; and the Confederates + sullenly retire to their position near the church, which they had so + successfully held against our gallant assaults, followed, but not + seriously engaged, by a new line of Brooks's and Newton's regiments. + </p> + <p> + Wheaton's brigade manages to hold on in a somewhat advanced position on + the right, where Mahone had been re-enforced from Wofford's line; but our + left, after the second unsuccessful attempt to wrest more advanced ground + from the enemy, definitely retires to a line a short mile from Salem + Church. + </p> + <p> + The Confederate artillery had been out of ammunition, and unable to engage + seriously in this conflict. Their fighting had been confined to the + infantry regiments. But our own guns had borne a considerable share in the + day's work, and had earned their laurels well. + </p> + <p> + It was now dark, and both lines bivouacked in line of battle. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Russell was placed in command of our front line. + </p> + <p> + The Union wounded were sent to Fredericksburg. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Warren, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, passes the + following comment upon this action:— + </p> + <p> + "Gen. Sedgwick carried the heights at Fredericksburg, and then moved on + about three miles farther, and had a fight at Salem heights, but could not + carry them. I think that by fighting the battle at Salem heights + differently, we might have won that place also." + </p> + <p> + "Gen. Brooks carried Salem heights, but not being closely enough supported + by other troops, he could not hold the heights. It was just one of those + wavering things that a moment settles. If we had been stronger at that + moment, we would have won; not being so, they won." + </p> + <p> + It is probable, that, had Brooks's attack been delayed until Newton and + Howe could reach the scene, their support might have enabled him to keep + possession of the ground he came so near to holding single-handed. But it + was a dashing fight, deserving only praise; and it is doubtful whether the + capture of Salem heights would have materially altered the event. It was + the eccentric handling of the Chancellorsville wing which determined the + result of this campaign. Sedgwick's corps could effect nothing by its own + unaided efforts. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0031" id="link2H_4_0031"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXX. SEDGWICK IN DIFFICULTY. + </h2> + <p> + So soon as Wilcox had retired from Banks's Ford to oppose Sedgwick's + advance towards Chancellorsville, Gen. Benham threw a pontoon bridge, and + established communications with the Sixth Corps. Warren, who up to this + time had remained with Sedgwick, now returned to headquarters, reaching + Hooker at eleven and, as a result of conference with him, telegraphed + Sedgwick as follows:— + </p> + <p> + "I find every thing snug here. We contracted the line a little, and + repulsed the last assault with ease. Gen. Hooker wishes them to attack him + to-morrow, if they will. He does not desire you to attack again in force + unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far away for + him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up + communication with Gen. Benham at Banks's Ford and Fredericksburg. You can + go to either place if you think best. To cross at Banks's Ford would bring + you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than + falling back to Fredericksburg." + </p> + <p> + And later:— + </p> + <p> + "I have reported your situation to Gen. Hooker. I find that we contracted + our lines here somewhat during the morning, and repulsed the enemy's last + assault with ease. The troops are in good position. Gen. Hooker says you + are separated from him so far that he cannot advise you how to act. You + need not try to force the position you attacked at five P.M. Look to the + safety of your corps. You can retire, if necessary, by way of + Fredericksburg or Banks's Ford: the latter would enable you to join us + more readily." + </p> + <p> + The former communication reached Sedgwick about four P.M. next day, and + was the only one which up till then he had received. Warren, in his + testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, rather + apologizes for the want of clear directions in this despatch, on the score + of being greatly exhausted; but its tenor doubtless reflects the ideas of + Gen. Hooker at the time, and is, indeed, in his evidence, fathered by + Hooker as his own creation. It shows conclusively that there was then no + idea of retiring across the river. + </p> + <p> + And it is peculiarly noteworthy, that, at this time, Hooker does not, in + tone or by implication, reflect in the remotest degree upon Sedgwick, + either for tardiness or anything else. Hooker was wont to speak his mind + plainly. Indeed, his bluntness in criticism was one of his pet failings. + And had he then felt that Sedgwick had been lacking in good-will, ability, + or conduct, it is strange that there should not be some apparent + expression of it. It was only when he was driven to extremity in + explaining the causes of his defeat, that his after-wit suggested Sedgwick + as an available scapegoat. + </p> + <p> + During the night, Lee came to the conclusion that he must absolutely rid + himself of Sedgwick, before he could again assault Hooker's defences. And, + trusting to what he had already seen, in this campaign, of his opponent's + lack of enterprise, he detailed Anderson's remaining three brigades to the + forces opposing Sedgwick's wing, leaving only Jackson's corps, now + numbering some nineteen thousand men, to keep Hooker, with his eighty + thousand, penned up behind his breastworks, while himself repaired to the + battle-ground of Monday at Salem Church, with the intention of driving + Sedgwick across the river, so that he might again concentrate all his + powers upon our forces near Chancellorsville. + </p> + <p> + By daylight Monday morning, Early advanced from his position at Cox's, and + with very little difficulty recaptured the heights, held by only a few of + Gibbon's men. Barksdale was again posted in the trenches, and instructed + to keep Gibbon in check. Early meanwhile moved out to join McLaws, feeling + our position with Smith's brigade, and ascertaining the left of our line + to lie near Taylor's, and to extend from there down to the plank road. + </p> + <p> + At an early hour on Monday morning, it came to Sedgwick's knowledge, that + the Confederates had re-occupied the heights in his rear, and cut him off + from Fredericksburg, thus leaving him only Banks's Ford as a possible + outlet in case of disaster. An attempt was made by Early to throw a force + about Howe's left, and seize the approaches to the ford; but it was timely + met, and repulsed by our men, who captured in this affair two hundred + prisoners and a battle-flag. And, to forestall any serious movement to cut + him off from Banks's Ford, Sedgwick had already formed Howe's division in + line to the rear, extending, as we have seen, from the river to the plank + road. + </p> + <p> + In his report, and particularly in his testimony before the Committee on + the Conduct of the War, Howe speaks as if he had received from Sedgwick + only general—in fact, vague—and rare instructions, as to the + dispositions to be made of his division; and that all his particular + manoeuvres were originated and completed on his own responsibility, upon + information, or mere hints, from headquarters of the corps. His line, over + two miles long, was covered by less than six thousand men. + </p> + <p> + The despatch from Warren reached Sedgwick while matters were in this + condition. To retire to Fredericksburg was impossible; to retire across + Banks's Ford, except by night, equally so, unless he chose to hazard a + disastrous attack from the superior force in his front. For Sedgwick had + scarce twenty thousand men left to confront Lee's twenty-five thousand, + and imagined the odds to be far greater. Our line was formed with the left + on the river, midway between Fredericksburg and Banks's Ford, running + southerly to beyond the plank road, following this on the south side for + nearly two miles, and then turning north to the crest which Wheaton had + held the night before. This was a long, weak position, depending upon no + natural obstacles; but it was, under the circumstances, well defended by a + skilful disposition of the artillery, under charge of Col. Tompkins. Gen. + Newton's division held the right of this line, facing west; Gen. Brooks + had Russell's brigade, also posted so as to face west, on the left of + Newton, while Bartlett and Torbert faced south, the former resting his + left somewhere near Howe's right brigade. This portion of the line was, on + Monday afternoon, re-enforced by Wheaton's brigade of Newton's division, + withdrawn from the extreme right; and here it rendered effective service + at the time the attack was made on Howe, and captured a number of + prisoners. The bulk of Howe's division lay facing east, from near Guest's + house to the river. The whole line of battle may be characterized, + therefore, as a rough convex order,—or, to describe it more + accurately, lay on three sides of a square, of which the Rappahannock + formed the fourth. This line protected our pontoon-bridges at Scott's Dam, + a mile below Banks's Ford. + </p> + <p> + No doubt Sedgwick determined wisely in preferring to accept battle where + he lay, if it should be forced upon him, to retiring to Banks's Ford, and + attempting a crossing in retreat by daylight. + </p> + <p> + Under these harassing conditions, Sedgwick determined to hold on till + night, and then cross the river; having specially in view Hooker's caution + to look well to the safety of his corps, coupled with the information that + he could not expect to relieve him, and was too far away to direct him + with intelligence. + </p> + <p> + Subsequent despatches instructed Sedgwick to hold on where he was, till + Tuesday morning. These despatches are quoted at length on a later page. + </p> + <p> + Having re-occupied Fredericksburg heights, in front of which Hall's + brigade of Gibbon's division was deployed as a skirmish-line, and + occasionally exchanged a few shots with the enemy, Early communicated with + McLaws, and proposed an immediate joint assault upon Sedgwick; but McLaws, + not deeming himself strong enough to attack Sedgwick with the troops Early + and he could muster, preferred to await the arrival of Anderson, whom he + knew to be rapidly pushing to join the forces at Salem Church. + </p> + <p> + Anderson, who, prior to the receipt of his new orders, had been making + preparations for a demonstration against Hooker's left at + Chancellorsville, and had there amused himself by shelling a park of + supply-wagons across the river, broke up from his position at the crossing + of the Mine and River roads, headed east, and arrived about eleven A.M. at + the battle-ground of Sunday afternoon. In an hour he was got into line on + Early's left, while McLaws retained the crest he had so stubbornly + defended against Brooks. + </p> + <p> + Lee now had in front of Sedgwick a force outnumbering the Sixth Corps by + one-quarter, with open communications to Fredericksburg. + </p> + <p> + The general instructions issued by Lee, after a preliminary + reconnoissance, were to push in Sedgwick's centre by a vigorous assault; + and, while preparations were making for this evolution, a slight touch of + the line was kept up, by the activity of the Confederate pickets in our + front. + </p> + <p> + "Some delay occurred in getting the troops into position, owing to the + broken and irregular nature of the ground, and the difficulty of + ascertaining the disposition of the enemy's forces." (Lee.) But more or + less steady skirmishing had been kept up all day,—to cover the + disposition of the Confederate line, and if possible accurately to + ascertain the position and relative strength of the ground held by + Sedgwick's divisions. + </p> + <p> + Not until six were Lee's preparations completed to his satisfaction; but + about that hour, at a given signal, the firing of three guns, a general + advance was made by the Confederate forces. Early, on the right of the + line, pushed in, with Hoke on the left of his division, from the hill on + which Downman's house stands, and below it, Gordon on the right, up the + hills near the intrenchments, and Hays in the centre. + </p> + <p> + On Early's left came Anderson, whose brigades extended—in order, + Wright, Posey, Perry—to a point nearly as far as, but not joining, + McLaws's right at about Shed's farm; Mahone of Anderson's division + remained on McLaws's extreme left, where he had been placed on account of + his familiarity with the country in that vicinity; and Wilcox occupied his + ground of Sunday. + </p> + <p> + Alexander established his batteries on a prominent hill, to command the + Union artillery, which was posted in a manner to enfilade McLaws's line. + It was Alexander's opening fire which was the signal for the general + assault. + </p> + <p> + The attack on the corner held by Brooks, was not very heavy, and was held + in check chiefly by his skirmish-line and artillery. "The speedy approach + of darkness prevented Gen. McLaws from perceiving the success of the + attack until the enemy began to re-cross the river." "His right brigades, + under Kershaw and Wofford, advanced through the woods in the direction of + the firing, but the retreat was so rapid, that they could only join in the + pursuit. A dense fog settled over the field, increasing the obscurity, and + rendering great caution necessary to avoid collision between our own + troops. Their movements were consequently slow." (Lee.) + </p> + <p> + Early's assault on Howe was made in echelon of battalions, and columns, + and was hardy in the extreme. It was growing dark as the attack began, and + Hays's and Hoke's brigades (says Early) were thrown into some confusion by + coming in contact, after they crossed the plank road, below Guest's house. + Barksdale remained at Marye's hill, with Smith on his left in reserve. + </p> + <p> + The weakness of Howe's long line, obliged that officer carefully to study + his ground, and make arrangements for ready withdrawal to an interior + line, if overmatched by the enemy; and he stationed his reserves + accordingly. To the rear of the centre of his first line, held by Gen. + Neill's brigade, and two regiments of Grant's, was a small covering of + woods; here a portion of his reserves, and sufficient artillery, were + concentrated. The main assault was made upon his left by Hoke and Hays. + Their first onset was resolutely broken by Howe's firm front, though made + with easy contempt of danger. The simultaneous attack upon his right was + by no means so severe. It was speedily dashed back, and, by suddenly + advancing this wing, Howe succeeded in capturing nearly all the Eighth + Louisiana Regiment; but the gap produced by the over-advance of our eager + troops, was shortly perceived by Gordon's brigade, which was enabled to + move down a ravine in rear of Howe's right, and compelled its hasty + withdrawal. + </p> + <p> + Meanwhile Neill's brigade, on Howe's left, was overpowered by Early's + fierce and repeated onslaughts; but no wise disordered, though we had lost + nearly a thousand men, it fell slowly and steadily back to the previously + selected rallying-point, where, on being followed up by Hoke and Hays, the + Vermont brigade, two regiments of Newton's division and Butler's regular + battery, sent to Howe's support by Sedgwick, opened upon them so sharp a + fire, that they retired in headlong confusion, largely increased by the + approaching darkness. This terminated the fight on the left, and Howe's + line was no further molested during the night. + </p> + <p> + Howe is clearly mistaken in alleging that his division was attacked by + McLaws, Anderson, and Early. The position of these divisions has been laid + down. It is one of those frequent assertions, made in the best of faith, + but emanating solely from the recollection of the fierceness of a recent + combat and from unreliable evidence. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0032" id="link2H_4_0032"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXXI. SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS. + </h2> + <p> + Foreseeing from the vigor of Lee's attack the necessity of contracting his + lines, as soon as it was dark, Newton's and Brooks's divisions and the + Light Brigade (Col. Burnham's), were ordered to fall rapidly back upon + Banks's Ford, where they took position on the heights in the vicinity, and + in Wilcox's rifle-pits. Howe was then quietly withdrawn, and disposed on + Newton's right. + </p> + <p> + In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Gen. Howe + appears to think that he was unfairly dealt with by Sedgwick; in fact, + that his division was intentionally left behind to be sacrificed. But this + opinion is scarcely justified by the condition of affairs and subsequent + events. + </p> + <p> + Following are the important despatches which passed, during the latter + part of these operations, between Hooker and Sedgwick:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, + May 4, 1863, 9 A.M. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. +</pre> + <p> + I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my + communication with Banks's Ford. The enemy are in possession of the + heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and + are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday morning was + twenty-two thousand men. I do not know my losses, but they were large, + probably five thousand men. I cannot use the cavalry. It depends upon the + condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. + Howe reports the enemy advancing upon Fredericksburg. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BANKS'S FORD, VA., + May 4, 1863, 9.45 A.M. +GEN. HOOKER. +</pre> + <p> + The enemy are pressing me. I am taking position to cross the river + wherever (? whenever) necessary. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + J. SEDGWICK, Major-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + May 4, 1863, 10.30 A.M. +GEN. SEDGWICK, Commanding Sixth Corps. +</pre> + <p> + The commanding general directs that in the event you fall back, you + reserve, if practicable, a position on the Fredericksburg side of the + Rappahannock, which you can hold securely until to-morrow P.M. Please let + the commanding general have your opinion in regard to this by telegraph + from Banks's Ford as soon as possible. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + S. WILLIAMS, + Assistant Adjutant-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 4, 1863, 11 A.M. +MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK. +</pre> + <p> + The major-general commanding directs me to say that he does not wish you + to cross the river at Banks's Ford unless you are compelled to do so. The + batteries at Banks's Ford command the position. If it is practicable for + you to maintain a position south side of Rappahannock, near Banks's Ford, + you will do so. It is very important that we retain position at Banks's + Ford. Gen. Tyler commands the reserve artillery there. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + J. H. VAN ALEN, + Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + SIXTH CORPS, May 4, 1863, 11 A.M. +MAJOR-GEN. BUTTERFIELD AND GEN. HOOKER. +</pre> + <p> + I hold the same position. The enemy are pressing me hard. If I can hold + until night, I shall cross at Banks's Ford, under instructions from Gen. + Hooker, given by Brig.-Gen. Warren. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS, May 4, 1863, 11.15 A.M. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. +</pre> + <p> + The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad for such + attack. It was assumed for attack, and not for defence. It is not + improbable that bridges at Banks's Ford may be sacrificed. Can you help me + strongly if I am attacked? + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. +</pre> + <p> + P. S.—My bridges are two miles from me. I am compelled to cover them + above and below from attack, with the additional assistance of Gen. + Benham's brigade alone. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + J. S. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 4, 1863, 11.50 A.M. +MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK. +</pre> + <p> + If the necessary information shall be obtained to-day, and if it shall be + of the character he anticipates, it is the intention of the general to + advance to-morrow. In this event the position of your corps on the south + side of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the general could desire. + It is for this reason he desires that your troops may not cross the + Rappahannock. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + J. H. VAN ALEN, + Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + May 4, 1863, 1.20 P.M. +GEN. SEDGWICK, Commanding Sixth Corps. +</pre> + <p> + I expect to advance to-morrow morning, which will be likely to relieve + you. You must not count on much assistance without I hear heavy firing. + Tell Gen. Benham to put down the other bridge if you desire it. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + J. HOOKER, Major-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, + May 4, 1863, 1.40 P.M. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. +</pre> + <p> + I occupy the same position as yesterday when Gen. Warren left me. I have + no means of judging enemy's force about me—deserters say forty + thousand. I shall take a position near Banks's Ford, and near the Taylor + house, at the suggestion of Gen. Warren; officers have already gone to + select a position. It is believed that the heights of Fredericksburg are + occupied by two divisions of the enemy. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + May 4, 1863. (Hour not stated.) +MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK, Banks's Ford, Va. +</pre> + <p> + It is of vital importance that you should take a commanding position near + Fredericksburg, which you can hold to a certainty till to-morrow. Please + advise me what you can do in this respect. I enclose substance of a + communication sent last night. Its suggestions are highly important, and + meet my full approval. There are positions on your side commanded by our + batteries on the other side I think you could take and hold. The general + would recommend as one such position the ground on which Dr. Taylor's is + situated. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + GEN. HOOKER (?) +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + May 4, 1863, 2.15 P.M. +</pre> + <p> + GEN. HOOKER. + </p> + <p> + I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank of the + Rappahannock until to-morrow. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + BANKS'S FORD, VA., + May 4, 1863, 11.50 P.M. (Received 1 A.M., May 5.) +</pre> + <p> + GEN. HOOKER, + </p> + <p> + United-States Ford. + </p> + <p> + My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns from the north + side of Banks's Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I would + withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopard it + by retaining it here? An immediate reply is indispensable, or I may feel + obliged to withdraw. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + BANKS'S FORD, VA., + May 5, 1863. (Received 1 A.M.) +GEN. HOOKER. +</pre> + <p> + I shall hold my position as ordered on south of Rappahannock. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + SEDGWICK. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS, + May 5, 1863, 1 A.M. (Received 2 A.M.) +GEN. SEDGWICK. +</pre> + <p> + Despatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river, and prevent any + force crossing. Acknowledge this. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + By command of Major-Gen. Hooker. + DANL. BUTTERFIELD +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS, + May 5, 1863, 1.20 A.M. +GEN. SEDGWICK. +</pre> + <p> + Yours received saying you should hold position. Order to withdraw + countermanded. Acknowledge both. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + GEN. HOOKER +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + BANKS'S FORD, VA., + May 5, 1863, 2 P.M. (should be 2 A.M.). +MAJOR-GEN. BUTTERFIELD. +</pre> + <p> + Gen. Hooker's order received. Will withdraw my forces immediately. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, + May 5, 1863, 7 A.M. +</pre> + <p> + GEN. BUTTERFIELD. + </p> + <p> + I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night, and am in + camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges have been taken up. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. +</pre> + <p> + These despatches explain themselves, if read, as is indispensable, with + the hours of sending and receipt kept well in mind. No fault can be + imputed to either Hooker or Sedgwick, in that the intention of the one + could not be executed by the other. The apparent cross-purpose of the + despatches is explained by the difficulty of communication between + headquarters and the Sixth Corps. + </p> + <p> + The order to withdraw, though sent by Hooker before the receipt of + Sedgwick's despatch saying he would hold the corps south of the river, was + received by Sedgwick long before the countermand, which was exceptionally + delayed, and was at once, under the urgent circumstances, put into course + of execution. + </p> + <p> + As soon as the enemy ascertained that Sedgwick was crossing, Alexander's + artillery began dropping shells in the neighborhood of the bridges and + river banks; and Gen. Wilcox, with his own and Kershaw's brigades, + followed up Sedgwick's movements to the crossing, and used his artillery + freely. + </p> + <p> + When the last column had almost filed upon the bridge, Sedgwick was taken + aback by the receipt of Hooker's despatch of 1.20 A.M., countermanding the + order to withdraw as above quoted. + </p> + <p> + The main portion, however, being already upon the left bank, the corps + could not now re-cross, except by forcing the passage, as the Confederates + absolutely commanded the bridge and approaches, and with a heavy body of + troops. And, as Lee was fully satisfied to have got rid of Sedgwick, upon + conditions which left him free to turn with the bulk of his army upon + Hooker, it was not likely that Sedgwick could in any event have + successfully attempted it. The situation left him no choice but to go into + camp near by. An adequate force was sent to watch the ford, and guard the + river. + </p> + <p> + The losses of the Sixth Corps during these two days' engagements were + 4,925 men. Sedgwick captured, according to his report, five flags, fifteen + guns (nine of which were brought off), and fourteen hundred prisoners, and + lost no material. These captures are not conceded by the Confederate + authorities, some of whom claim that Sedgwick decamped in such confusion + as to leave the ground strewed with arms, accoutrements, and material of + all kinds. But it is probable, on comparison of all facts, and the due + weighing of all testimony, that substantially nothing was lost by the + Sixth Corps, except a part of the weapons of the dead and wounded. + </p> + <p> + Gibbon's division, about the same time, crossed to the north bank of the + river, and the pontoon bridge at Lacy's was taken up. Warren says, "Gen. + Sedgwick was attacked very heavily on Monday, fought all day, and + retreated across the river that night. We lay quiet at Chancellorsville + pretty nearly all day." This Warren plainly esteems a poor sample of + generalship, and he does not understand why Hooker did not order an + assault. "I think it very probable we could have succeeded if it had been + made." "Gen. Hooker appeared very much exhausted,"—"'tired' would + express it." + </p> + <p> + Lee's one object having been to drive Sedgwick across the river, so as to + be relieved of the troublesome insecurity of his rear, he could now again + turn his undivided attention to his chief enemy, who lay listlessly + expectant at Chancellorsville, and apparently oblivious of his maxim + enjoined upon Stoneman, "that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every + thing in war." + </p> + <p> + Early and Barksdale were left, as before, to hold the Confederate lines at + and near Fredericksburg, while McLaws and Anderson were at once ordered + back to the old battle-field. "They reached their destination during the + afternoon (Tuesday, 5th) in the midst of a violent storm, which continued + throughout the night, and most of the following day." (Lee.) + </p> + <p> + Wilcox and Wright lay that night in bivouac on the Catherine road; Mahone, + Posey, and Perry, along the plank road. + </p> + <p> + Kershaw was sent to relieve Heth at the crossing of the River and Mine + roads, and the latter rejoined his division. + </p> + <p> + The night of Tuesday Lee spent in preparations to assault Hooker's + position at daylight on Wednesday. The Confederate scouts had been by no + means idle; and the position occupied by Hooker, in most of its details, + was familiar to the Southern commander. He was thus able to develop his + plans with greater ease than a less familiarity with the terrain would + have yielded. He was satisfied that one more vigorous blow would disable + his antagonist for this campaign, and he was unwilling to delay in + striking it. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0033" id="link2H_4_0033"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXXII. HOOKER'S CRITICISMS. + </h2> + <p> + Let us now examine into Hooker's various criticisms upon Sedgwick's + conduct. + </p> + <p> + Hooker, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, + baldly accuses Sedgwick of neglecting to keep him advised of his + movements, the inference being that he was debarred thereby from + intelligently using him; and states that when he sent Sedgwick the + despatch to join him at Chancellorsville, "it was written under the + impression that his corps was on the north side of the Rappahannock." But + could Hooker rationally assume this to be the case when he had, five hours + before, ordered Sedgwick to cross and pursue a flying enemy, and well knew + that he had a portion of his forces already guarding the bridge-heads on + the Fredericksburg side? + </p> + <p> + "The night was so bright that... no special difficulty was apprehended in + executing the order." In the vicinity of Fredericksburg, shortly after + midnight, a fog appears to have arisen from the river, which considerably + impeded the movements of the Sixth Corps. This Hooker knew from Sedgwick's + report, which he was bound to believe, unless evidence existed to show the + contrary. "As will be seen, the order was peremptory, and would have + justified him in losing every man of his command in its execution." + </p> + <p> + Hooker also states that Warren was sent to Sedgwick on account of his + familiarity with the ground, and to impress upon the latter the necessity + of strict compliance with the order. + </p> + <p> + "I supposed, and am still of the opinion, that, if Gen. Sedgwick's men had + shouldered arms and advanced at the time named, he would have encountered + less resistance and suffered less loss; but, as it was, it was late when + he went into Fredericksburg, and before he was in readiness to attack the + heights in rear of the town, which was about eleven o'clock A.M. on the + 3d, the enemy had observed his movement, and concentrated almost their + entire force at that point to oppose him." "He had the whole force of the + enemy there to run against in carrying the heights beyond Fredericksburg, + but he carried them with ease; and, by his movements after that, I think + no one would infer that he was confident in himself, and the enemy took + advantage of it. I knew Gen. Sedgwick very well: he was a classmate of + mine, and I had been through a great deal of service with him. He was a + perfectly brave man, and a good one; but when it came to manoeuvring + troops, or judging of positions for them, in my judgment he was not able + or expert. Had Gen. Reynolds been left with that independent command, I + have no doubt the result would have been very different." "When the attack + was made, it had to be upon the greater part of the enemy's force left on + the right: nevertheless the troops advanced, carried the heights without + heavy loss, and leisurely took up their line of march on the plank road, + advancing two or three miles that day." + </p> + <p> + Now, this is scarcely a fair statement of facts. And yet they were all + spread before Hooker, in the reports of the Sixth Corps and of Gibbon. No + doubt Sedgwick was bound, as far as was humanly possible, to obey that + order; but, as in "losing every man in his command" in its execution, he + would scarcely have been of great eventual utility to his chief, he did + the only wise thing, in exercising ordinary discretion as to the method of + attacking the enemy in his path. Hooker's assumption that Sedgwick was on + the north side of the Rappahannock was his own, and not Sedgwick's fault. + Hooker might certainly have supposed that Sedgwick had obeyed his previous + orders, in part at least. + </p> + <p> + Sedgwick testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "I have + understood that evidence has appeared before the Committee censuring me + very much for not being at Chancellorsville at daylight, in accordance + with the order of Gen. Hooker. I now affirm that it was impossible to have + made the movement, if there had not been a rebel soldier in front of me." + </p> + <p> + "I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes time in taking the heights + of Fredericksburg." + </p> + <p> + Sedgwick did "shoulder arms and advance" as soon as he received the order; + but the reports show plainly enough that he encountered annoying + opposition so soon as he struck the outskirts of the town; that he threw + forward assaulting columns at once; and that these fought as well as the + conditions warranted, but were repulsed. + </p> + <p> + It is not intended to convey the impression that there was no loss of time + on Sedgwick's part. On the contrary, he might certainly have been more + active in some of his movements. No doubt there were other general + officers who would have been. But it is no exaggeration to insist that his + dispositions were fully as speedy as those of any other portion of the + army in this campaign. + </p> + <p> + Hooker not only alleges that "in his judgment, Gen. Sedgwick did not obey + the spirit of his order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it," but + quotes Warren as saying that Sedgwick "would not have moved at all if he + [Warren] had not been there; and that, when he did move, it was not with + sufficient confidence or ability on his part to manoeuvre his troops." It + is very doubtful whether Warren ever put his opinion in so strong a way as + thus quoted by Hooker from memory. His report does speak of Gibbon's + slowness in coming up, and of his thus losing the chance of crossing the + canals and taking the breastworks before the Confederates filed into them. + But beyond a word to the effect that giving the advance to Brooks's + division, after the capture of the heights, "necessarily consumed a + considerable time," Warren does not in his report particularly criticise + Sedgwick's movements. And in another place he does speak of the order of + ten P.M. as an "impossible" one. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Warren's testimony on this subject is of the highest importance, as + representing Gen. Hooker in person. As before stated, he carried a + duplicate of Hooker's order of ten P.M., to Sedgwick, with instructions + from the general to urge upon Sedgwick the importance of the utmost + celerity. Moreover, Warren knew the country better than any one else, and + was more generally conversant with Hooker's plans, ideas, and methods, + being constantly at his side. "Gen. Sedgwick was ordered to be in his + position by daylight: of course that implied, if he could be there." + </p> + <p> + "If Sedgwick had got to Chancellorsville by daylight, I think we ought to + have destroyed Lee's army. But it would depend a great deal upon how hard + the other part of the army fought; for Gen. Sedgwick, with his twenty + thousand men, was in great danger of being destroyed if he became + isolated." + </p> + <p> + Moreover, Hooker in this testimony says: "Early in the campaign I had come + to the conclusion that with the arms now in use it would be impossible to + carry works by an assault in front, provided they were properly + constructed and properly manned;" and refers to the Fredericksburg assault + of Dec. 13, to illustrate this position, saying that they (the enemy) + "could destroy men faster than I could throw them on the works;" and, "I + do not know of an instance when rifle-pits, properly constructed and + properly manned, have been taken by front assaults alone." + </p> + <p> + And yet his order to Sedgwick was (as he construes it), blindly to throw + himself into this impossible situation, and lose every man in his command + rather than not make the attempt at once, and without waiting properly to + dispose his men, or feel the enemy. + </p> + <p> + As to the leisurely marching of two or three miles on Sunday, we have seen + how Brooks's march was summarily arrested at Salem Church, and how his + attempt to force a passage, cost him alone some fifteen hundred men. + </p> + <p> + There is a good deal of evidence difficult to deal with in this movement + of the Sixth Corps. The report of Gen. Howe, written immediately after the + campaign, states facts dispassionately, and is to the point and nothing + more. This is as it should be in the report of a general to his superior. + It has but one error of consequence, viz., the assumption that the three + divisions of Anderson, McLaws, and Early, all under command of Gen. Lee, + attacked his line, leaving no force in front of Brooks and Newton. It was + Early alone, or Early assisted by a brigade of Anderson, who attacked + Howe. + </p> + <p> + But his testimony a year later, before the Committee on the Conduct of the + War, cannot be commended as dispassionate, and contains serious errors. + Gen. Howe states that the order to advance towards Chancellorsville was + received "just after dark, say eight o'clock," whereas it was not sent + until nine P.M. from Chancellorsville, and ten P.M. from Falmouth; nor did + Sedgwick receive it until eleven P.M. Howe evidently remembered the order + to pursue by the Bowling-Green road, as the one to march to + Chancellorsville,—when speaking of time of delivery. The deductions + Gen. Howe makes from errors like this are necessarily somewhat warped. But + let us give all due weight to the testimony of an able soldier. He states + that his attack on Marye's heights was made on a mere notice from + Sedgwick, that he was about to attack, and desired Howe to assist; that he + received on Sunday evening a bare intimation only from Sedgwick, that the + left of the corps must be protected, and that he consequently moved his + own left round to the river; and later, that Sedgwick sent him word to + strengthen his position for defence; but complains that Sedgwick did not + properly look after his division. "Not receiving any instruction or + assistance from Gen. Sedgwick, I felt that we were left to take care of + ourselves. It seemed to me, from the movements or arrangements made during + the day, that there was a want of appreciation or a misunderstanding of + the position which we held." Sedgwick's entire confidence in Howe's + ability to handle his division, upon general instructions of the object to + be attained, might account fully for a large part of this apparent + vagueness. But Howe does not look at it in this light. His opinion was, + that no necessity existed for the Sixth Corps to fall back across the + river. + </p> + <p> + Gen. Howe's testimony is very positive as to the possibility of the Sixth + Corps complying with Hooker's order as given. He thinks a night attack + could have been made on the Fredericksburg heights, and that they could + have been speedily carried, and the corps have been well on the road to + Chancellorsville long before daylight. He also is of opinion that Brooks's + division could have forced its way beyond Salem Church, with proper + support. But we also know how gallant an attempt Brooks made to do this + very thing, and how hard he struggled before yielding to failure. + </p> + <p> + It is in no wise intended to begrudge Gen. Howe his opinion; but he has + certainly arrived at some of his conclusions, from premises founded on + errors of fact. + </p> + <p> + The testimony of Col. Johns, which follows Gen. Howe's before the + Committee on the Conduct of the War, bears only the weight to which the + report of the commander of a brigade is entitled, whose duties allowed him + to have but a partial view of the general features of the march. Though + his opinion agrees with Gen. Howe's, he, too, mistakes the hour of the + urgent order; and it is difficult to see why he was summoned before the + Committee, unless as a partisan. + </p> + <p> + "My object" (continues Hooker) "in ordering Gen. Sedgwick forward at the + time named, was to relieve me from the position in which I found myself at + Chancellorsville on the night of the 2d of May." This statement is not + only characteristic of Hooker's illogical method, but disingenuous to the + degree of mockery. For this position, it will be remembered, was a + strongly intrenched line, held by eighty thousand men, well armed and + equipped, having in their front less than half their number of + Confederates. In view of Hooker's above-quoted opinion about rifle-pits; + of the fact that in his testimony he says: "Throughout the Rebellion I + have acted on the principle that if I had as large a force as the enemy, I + had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter;" of the fact that the + enemy in his front had been cut in two, and would so remain if he only + kept the salient, just seized by Sickles and Pleasonton, at the angle + south-west of Fairview, well manned; and of the fact that he had unused + reserves greater in number than the entire force of the enemy,—is it + not remarkable that, in Hooker's opinion, nothing short of a countermarch + of three miles by the Sixth Corps, the capture of formidable and + sufficiently manned intrenchments, (the work of the Army of Northern + Virginia during an entire half year,) and an advance of nearly twelve + miles,—all of which was to be accomplished between eleven and + daylight of a day in May,—could operate to "relieve him from the + position in which he found himself on the night of the 2d of May"? + </p> + <p> + "I was of the opinion, that if a portion of the army advanced on Lee's + rear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, Lee + would take the road Jackson had marched over on the morning of the 2d, and + thus open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, severed from + his depot, would have to retire by way of Gordonsville." Well enough, but + was Sedgwick's corps the only one to accomplish this? Where were Reynolds, + and Meade, and Howard, forsooth? + </p> + <p> + There is no particular criticism by Hooker upon Sedgwick's authority to + withdraw to the north side of the river, or upon the necessity for his so + doing. And we have seen how hard-pressed and overmatched Sedgwick had + really been, and that he only withdrew when good military reasons existed, + and the latest-received despatch of his superior advised him to do so. But + Hooker states that "my desire was to have Gen. Sedgwick retain a position + on the south side of the river, in order that I might leave a sufficient + force to hold the position I was in, and with the balance of my force + re-cross the river, march down to Banks's Ford, and turn the enemy's + position in my front by so doing. In this, too, I was thwarted, because + the messenger who bore the despatch to Sedgwick to withdraw and cover + Banks's Ford, reached Sedgwick before the one who bore the order + countermanding the withdrawal." + </p> + <p> + Hooker had indicated to Sedgwick that he wished him to take and hold a + position at Taylor's, the point where the Fredericksburg heights approach + the river, above the town, and terminate. But as these heights were by + that time held by Early, and there were no pontoon-bridges there, the + proposal was one Sedgwick knew could not be seriously entertained, with + two-thirds of Lee's whole army surrounding his one corps, though he did + reconnoitre the ground in a vain effort to carry out his chief's + suggestions. + </p> + <p> + But was it not simpler for Hooker, who had now only Jackson's corps in his + front,—some eighteen thousand men to eighty thousand,—to move + upon his enemy, "attack and destroy him," and himself fall upon Lee's + rear, while Sedgwick kept him occupied at Banks's Ford? And Hooker had all + Sunday afternoon and night, and all day Monday, to ponder and arrange for + attempting this simplest of manoeuvres. + </p> + <p> + It is hard to understand how the man, who could cut out such a gigantic + piece of work for his lieutenant, as Hooker did for Sedgwick, could lack + the enterprise to execute so trivial a tactical movement as the one + indicated. From the stirring words, "Let your watchword be Fight, and let + all your orders be Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" of April 12, to the inertia and + daze of the 4th of May, is indeed a bewildering step. And yet Hooker, to + judge from his testimony, seems to have fully satisfied himself that he + did all that was to be expected of an active and intelligent commander. + </p> + <p> + The impression that an attack should have been made, prevailed among many + of his subordinates. Gen. Wadsworth thus testified before the Committee on + the Conduct of the War: "Question.—Can you tell why it was not + ordered to attack the enemy at the time Gen. Sickles with his Third Corps + was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day, when + you heard the sound of Gen. Sedgwick's engagement with the enemy? Answer.—I + have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered to re-cross the + river, so far as I could judge of the temper and spirit of the officers + and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive. I do not know + why we were withdrawn then; I think we should not have withdrawn. I think + the enemy were whipped; although they had gained certain advantages, they + were so severely handled that they were weaker than we were." + </p> + <p> + "Question.—Is it your opinion as a military man, that, if our army + had been ordered to take the offensive vigorously, we would have gained a + victory there? Answer.—I think we should have taken the offensive + when the enemy attacked Gen. Sedgwick." + </p> + <p> + Again Hooker: "During the 3d and 4th, reconnoissances were made on the + right," (i. e., at Chancellorsville,) "from one end of the line to the + other, to feel the enemy's strength, and find a way and place to attack + him successfully; but it was ascertained that it could only be made on him + behind his defences, and with slender columns, which I believed he could + destroy as fast as they could be thrown on to his works. Subsequent + campaigns have only confirmed the opinion I then ascertained." + </p> + <p> + Now, Hooker, at the time of giving this testimony, (March 11, 1865), had + had nearly two years in which to become familiar with the true state of + facts. He must have known these facts from the reports of his + subordinates, if not from the accounts of the action in the Southern + press. He must have known that all day Monday, he had only Jackson's corps + opposed to him. He must have known that these troops had time enough to + erect none but very ordinary intrenchments. And yet he excuses himself + from not attacking his opponents, when he outnumbered them four to one. + Would not his testimony tell better for him, if he had said that at the + time he supposed he had more than eighteen thousand men before him? It is + a thankless task to pursue criticism upon such capricious and revocatory + evidence. + </p> + <p> + Sickles also, in his testimony, states that from our new lines we felt the + enemy everywhere in his front, and that Gen. Griffin with his entire + division made a reconnoissance, and developed the enemy in great force on + our right flank. This work of reconnoitring can scarcely have been done + with great thoroughness, for we know to a certainty what force Lee left + behind. It would be well to say little about it. But it is not strange + that the purposelessness of the commander should result in half-hearted + work by the subordinates. + </p> + <p> + The following extract from the evidence of Gen. Sedgwick before the + Committee on the Conduct of the War, compared with Hooker's and the actual + facts, shows palpably who is in the right. + </p> + <p> + "At nine A.M., May 4, I sent this despatch to Gen. Hooker: 'I am occupying + the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with + Banks's Ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg + in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to + drive us back. My strength yesterday, A.M., was twenty-two thousand men: I + do not know my losses, but they were large, probably five thousand men. I + can't use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your + force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing + from Fredericksburg.' + </p> + <p> + "Question.—When you were in the position on the 4th, to which you + have referred, were you where you could have co-operated with the army at + Chancellorsville in an attack upon the enemy? + </p> + <p> + "Answer.—I could not proceed in that direction. I think Gen. Hooker + might have probably relieved me if he had made an attack at that time. I + think I had a much larger force of the enemy around me than Gen. Hooker + had in front of him. There were two divisions of the enemy on the heights + of Fredericksburg, which was in my rear; and they would have attacked me + the moment I undertook to proceed towards Chancellorsville. About one A.M. + of May 5, Gen. Hooker telegraphed me to cross the river, and take up the + bridges. This is the despatch: 'Despatch this moment received. Withdraw; + cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge receipt.' + </p> + <p> + "This was immediately done: as the last of the column was crossing, + between three and four o'clock, the orders to cross were countermanded, + and I was directed to hold a position on the south bank. The despatch was + dated 1.20 A.M., and was received at 3.20, as follows:— + </p> + <p> + "'Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdraw + countermanded. Acknowledge both.' + </p> + <p> + "In explanation of this I should say that I had telegraphed to Gen. Hooker + that I could hold the position. He received it after he had ordered me to + cross over. But, receiving his despatch to cross, I had commenced the + movement; and, as I have said, I had very nearly taken my force over, when + the order to cross was countermanded. To return at that time was wholly + impracticable, and I telegraphed that fact to Gen. Hooker." + </p> + <p> + To place in juxtaposition Hooker's testimony and Sedgwick's, in no wise + militates against the latter. + </p> + <p> + There is one broad criticism which may fairly he passed upon Sedgwick's + withdrawal across the Rappahannock. It is that, with the knowledge that + his remaining in position might be of some assistance to his chief, + instead of exhibiting a perhaps undue anxiety to place himself beyond + danger, he could with his nineteen thousand men, by dint of stubborn + flghting, have held the intrenchments at Banks's Ford, against even Lee + with his twenty-four thousand. + </p> + <p> + But if he attempted this course, and was beaten, Lee could have destroyed + his corps. And this risk he was bound to weigh, as he did, with the + advantages Hooker could probably derive from his holding on. Moreover, to + demand thus much of Sedgwick, is to hold him to a defence, which, in this + campaign, no other officer of the Army of the Potomac was able to make. + </p> + <p> + Not but what, under equally pressing conditions, other generals have, or + himself, if he had not received instructions to withdraw, might have, + accomplished so much. But if we assume, that having an eye to the numbers + and losses of his corps, and to his instructions, as well as to the + character and strength of the enemy opposed to him, Sedgwick was bound to + dispute further the possession of Banks's Ford, in order to lend a + questionable aid to Hooker, how lamentable will appear by comparison the + conduct of the other corps of the Army of the Potomac, under the general + commanding, bottled up behind their defences at Chancellorsville! + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0034" id="link2H_4_0034"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXXIII. HOOKER'S FURTHER PLANS. + </h2> + <p> + Hooker states: "Gen. Warren represented to me that Gen. Sedgwick had said + he could do no more; then it was I wanted him to take some position, and + hold it, that I might turn the enemy in my immediate front. I proposed to + leave troops enough where I was, to occupy the enemy there, and throw the + rest of my force down the river, and re-enforce Sedgwick; then the whole + of Lee's army, except that which had been left in front of Sedgwick, would + be thrown off the road to Richmond, and my army would be on it. + </p> + <p> + "As soon as I heard that Gen. Sedgwick had re-crossed the river, seeing no + object in maintaining my position where I was, and believing it would be + more to my advantage to hazard an engagement with the enemy at Franklin's + Crossing, where I had elbow-room, than where I was, the army on the right + was directed to re-cross the river, and did so on the night between the + 5th and 6th of May." + </p> + <p> + Now, the Franklin's Crossing plan, or its equivalent, had been tried by + Burnside, in December, with a loss of twelve thousand men; and it had been + fully canvassed and condemned as impracticable, before beginning the + Chancellorsville manoeuvre. To resuscitate it can therefore serve no + purpose but as an idle excuse. And the argument of elbow-room, if made, is + the one Hooker should have used against withdrawing from the open country + he had reached, to the Wilderness, on Friday, May 1. + </p> + <p> + "Being resolved on re-crossing the river on the night between the 4th and + 5th, I called the corps commanders together, not as a council of war, but + to ascertain how they felt in regard to making what I considered a + desperate move against the enemy in our front." Be it remembered that the + "desperate move" was one of eighty thousand men, with twenty thousand more + (Sedgwick) close at hand as a reserve, against at the outside forty-five + thousand men, if Early should be ordered up to re-enforce Lee. And Hooker + knew the force of Lee, or had as good authority for knowing it as he had + for most of the facts he assumed, in condemning Sedgwick. Moreover, from + the statements of prisoners we had taken, very nearly an exact estimate + could be made of the then numbers of the Army of Northern Virginia. + </p> + <p> + All the corps commanders were present at this conference, except Slocum, + who afterwards came in. All were in favor of an advance, except Sickles; + while Couch wavered, fearing that no advance could be made to advantage + under Hooker. Hancock, (testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of + the War,) says: "I understood from him" (Couch) "always that he was in + favor of fighting then." Hooker claims Couch to have been for retreat; but + the testimony of the generals present, as far as available, goes to show + the council to have been substantially as will now be narrated. + </p> + <p> + Hooker retired for a while, to allow free expression of opinion; and, with + one exception, all present manifested a desire for another attack, in full + force,—Howard, Meade, and Reynolds being especially urgent to this + purpose. The one dissentient voice was Sickles; and he expressed himself, + confessedly, more from a political than a strategic standpoint. He allowed + the military reasons to be sound for an advance, and modestly refrained + from putting his opinion against that of men trained to the profession of + arms; though all allowed his right to a valid judgment. But he claimed, + with some reason, that the political horizon was dark; that success by the + Army of the Potomac was secondary to the avoidance of disaster. If, he + alleged, this army should be destroyed, it would be the last one the + country would raise. Washington might be captured; and the effect of this + loss upon the country, and upon Europe, was to be greatly dreaded. The + enemies of the administration were strong, and daily gaining ground. It + was necessary that the Army of the Potomac should not run the risk of + destruction. It was the last hold of the Republican party in Virginia. + Better re-cross and recuperate, and then attempt another campaign, than + run any serious risk now. These grounds largely influenced him in agreeing + with the general-in-chief's determination to retire across the river. But + there were other reasons, which Sickles states in his testimony. The + rations with which the men had started had given out, and there had been + no considerable issue since. Singularly enough, too, (for Hooker was, as a + rule, unusually careful in such matters,) there had been no provision made + for supplying the troops against a possible advance; and yet, from Sunday + noon till Tuesday night, we had lain still behind our intrenchments, with + communications open, and with all facilities at hand to prepare for a + ten-days' absence from our base. This circumstance wears the look of + almost a predetermination to accept defeat. + </p> + <p> + Now, at the last moment, difficulties began to arise in bringing over + supplies. The river had rapidly risen from the effects of the storm. Parts + of the bridges had been carried away by the torrent. The ends of the + others were under water, and their entire structure was liable at any + moment to give way. It was not certain that Lee, fully aware of these + circumstances, would, for the moment, accept battle, as he might judge it + better to lure the Army of the Potomac away from the possibility of + victualling. Perhaps Sedgwick would be unable to cross again so as to join + the right wing. The Eleventh Corps might not be in condition to count on + for heavy service. The Richmond papers, received almost daily through + channels more or less irregular, showed that communications were still + open, and that the operations of the Cavalry Corps had not succeeded in + interrupting them in any serious manner. On the coming Sunday, the time of + service of thirty-eight regiments was up. Many of these conditions could + have been eliminated from the problem, if measures had been seasonably + taken; but they now became critical elements in the decision to be made. + And Hooker, despite his well-earned reputation as a fighting man, was + unable to arrive at any other than the conclusion which Falstaff so + cautiously enunciated, from beneath his shield, at the battle of + Shrewsbury, that "the better part of valor is discretion." + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0035" id="link2H_4_0035"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXXIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES. + </h2> + <p> + Orders were accordingly issued with a view to re-crossing the river; and + during the 5th, Gen. Warren and Capt. Comstock of the engineers prepared a + new and shorter line, in the rear of the one then held by the army, to + secure it against any attempt by the enemy to interrupt the retreat. Capt. + Comstock supervised the labor on the west side, and Gen. Warren on the + east, of the United-States Ford road. "A continuous cover and abattis was + constructed from the Rappahannock at Scott's Dam, around to the mouth of + Hunting Run on the Rapidan. The roads were put in good order, and a third + bridge laid. A heavy rain set in about 4.30 P.M., and lasted till late at + night. The movement to re-cross was begun by the artillery, as per order, + at 7.30 and was suddenly interrupted by a rise in the river so great as to + submerge the banks at the ends of the bridges on the north bank, and the + velocity of the current threatened to sweep them away." "The upper bridge + was speedily taken up, and used to piece out the ends of the other two, + and the passage was again made practicable. Considerable delays, however, + resulted from this cause." "No troops took up position in the new line + except the rearguard, composed of the Fifth Corps, under Gen. Meade, which + was done about daylight on the 6th." "The proper dispositions were made + for holding this line till all but the rearguard was past the river; and + then it quietly withdrew, no enemy pursuing." (Warren.) The last of the + army re-crossed about eight A.M., May 6. + </p> + <p> + Testimony of Gen. Henry J. Hunt:— + </p> + <p> + "A storm arose soon after. Just before sunset, the general and his staff + re-crossed the river to the north side. I separated from him in order to + see to the destruction of some works of the enemy on the south side of the + river, which perfectly commanded our bridges. Whilst I was looking after + them, in the darkness, to see that they had been destroyed as directed, an + engineer officer reported to me that our bridges had been carried away, or + were being carried away, by the flood. I found the chief engineer, Capt. + Comstock; and we proceeded together to examine the bridges, and we found + that they were all utterly impassable. I then proceeded to Gen. Meade's + camp, and reported the condition of affairs to him. All communication with + Gen. Hooker being cut off, Gen. Meade called the corps commanders + together; and, as the result of that conference, I believe, by order of + Gen. Couch at any rate, I was directed to stop the movement of the + artillery, which was withdrawn from the lines, and let them resume their + positions, thus suspending the crossing. On my return to the bridges, I + found that one had been re-established, and the batteries that were down + there had commenced re-crossing the river. I then sought Gen. Hooker up, + on the north side of the river, and proposed to him to postpone the + movement for one day, as it was certain we could not all cross over in a + night. I stated to him that I doubted whether we could more than get the + artillery, which was ordered to cross first, over before daylight: he + refused to postpone the movement, and it proceeded. No opposition was made + by the enemy, nor was the movement disturbed, except by the attempt to + place batteries on the points from which our bridges could be reached, and + to command which I had already posted the necessary batteries on my own + responsibility. A cannonade ensued, and they were driven off with loss, + and one of their caissons exploded: we lost three or four men killed, and + a few horses, in this affair. That is about all that I remember." + </p> + <p> + Gen. Barnes's brigade assisted in taking up the bridges; and all were + safely withdrawn by four P.M. on Wednesday, under superintendence of Major + Spaulding of the engineer brigade. + </p> + <p> + All who participated in this retreat will remember the precarious position + of the masses of troops, huddled together at the bridge-heads as in a + cul-de-sac, during this eventful night, and the long-drawn breath of + relief as the hours after dawn passed, and no further disposition to + attack was manifested by Lee. This general was doubtless profoundly + grateful that the Army of the Potomac should retire across the + Rappahannock, and leave his troops to the hard-earned rest they needed so + much more than ourselves; but little thanks are due to Hooker, who was, it + seems, on the north side of the river during these critical moments, that + the casualties of the campaign were not doubled by a final assault on the + part of Lee, while we lay in this perilous situation, and the unmolested + retreat turned into another passage of the Beresina. Providentially, the + artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia had expended almost its last + round of ammunition previous to this time. + </p> + <p> + But several hospitals of wounded, in care of a number of medical officers + and stewards, were left behind, to be removed a few days later under a + flag of truce. + </p> + <p> + The respective losses of the two armies are thus officially given:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + FEDERAL LOSS. + + General Headquarters and Engineers... 9 + First Corps ........ 299 + Second Corps........ 1,923 + Third Corps ........ 4,119 + Fifth Corps ........ 700 + Sixth Corps ........ 4,610 + Eleventh Corps........ 2,412 + Twelfth Corps........ 2,822 + Pleasonton's Brigade...... 202 + Cavalry Corps under Stoneman.... 189 + ——— + 17,285 + + CONFEDERATE LOSS. + + Jackson's Corps,— + Early's division....... 851 + A. P. Hill's division...... 2,583 + Trimble's (Colston) division.... 1,868 + D. H. Hill's (Rodes) division.... 2,178 + + Longstreet's Corps,— Anderson's division...... 1,180 + McLaws's division ...... 1,379 + Artillery......... 227 + Cavalry......... 11 + ——— + 10,277 + Prisoners......... 2,000 + ——— + 12,277 +</pre> + <p> + Both armies now returned to their ancient encampments, elation as general + on one side as disappointment was profound upon the other. + </p> + <p> + Hooker says in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the + War: "I lost under those operations" (viz., the Chancellorsville campaign) + "one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one ambulance. Of + course, many of the Eleventh Corps lost their arms and knapsacks." + </p> + <p> + The Confederates, however, claim to have captured nineteen thousand five + hundred stand of small arms, seventeen colors, and much ammunition. And, + while acknowledging a loss of eight guns, it is asserted by them that they + captured thirteen. + </p> + <p> + The orders issued to the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern + Virginia by their respective commanders, on the return of the forces to + the shelter of their old camps, need no comment. They are characteristic + to a degree. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + May 6, 1863. +GENERAL ORDERS NO. 49. +</pre> + <p> + The major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on + the achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all + that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is + sufficient to say that they were of a character not to be foreseen or + prevented by human sagacity or resources. + </p> + <p> + In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a + general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of + its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to the principles it + represents. + </p> + <p> + By fighting at a disadvantage we would have been recreant to our trust, to + ourselves, to our cause, and to our country. Profoundly loyal, and + conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or decline + battle whenever its interests or honor may command it. + </p> + <p> + By the celerity and secrecy of our movements, our advance and passage of + the river were undisputed; and, on our withdrawal, not a rebel dared to + follow us. The events of the last week may well cause the heart of every + officer and soldier of the army to swell with pride. + </p> + <p> + We have added new laurels to our former renown. We have made long marches, + crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments; and whenever we + have fought, we have inflicted heavier blows than those we have received. + </p> + <p> + We have taken from the enemy five thousand prisoners, and fifteen colors, + captured seven pieces of artillery, and placed hors du combat eighteen + thousand of our foe's chosen troops. + </p> + <p> + We have destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores, damaged + his communications, captured prisoners within the fortifications of his + capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation. + </p> + <p> + We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave + companions; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have + fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitration of battle. + </p> + <p> + By command of Major-Gen. Hooker. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + S. WILLIAMS, + Assistant Adjutant-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, + May 7, 1863. +</pre> + <p> + With heartfelt gratification, the general commanding expresses to the army + his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men during the + arduous operations in which they have just been engaged. + </p> + <p> + Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, + strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on + the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and, by the valor that + has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety + beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles you to the + praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon to + return our grateful thanks to the only Giver of victory, for the signal + deliverance He has wrought. + </p> + <p> + It is therefore earnestly recommended that the troops unite, on Sunday + next, in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due unto His name. + </p> + <p> + Let us not forget in our rejoicing the brave soldiers who have fallen in + defence of their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolve + to emulate their noble example. + </p> + <p> + The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one to + whose bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success. + </p> + <p> + The following letter from the President of the Confederate States is + communicated to the army as an expression of his appreciation of their + success:— + </p> + <p> + "I have received your despatch, and reverently unite with you in giving + praise to God for the success with which he has crowned our arms. In the + name of the people, I offer my cordial thanks to yourself and the troops + under your command, for this addition to the unprecedented series of great + victories which our army has achieved. The universal rejoicing produced by + this happy result will be mingled with a general regret for the good and + the brave who are numbered among the killed and the wounded." + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + R. E. LEE, General. +</pre> + <p> + The following is equally characteristic:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 13, 1863. +To his Excellency, President of the United States. +</pre> + <p> + Is it asking too much to inquire your opinion of my Order No. 49? If so, + do not answer me. + </p> + <p> + Jackson is dead, and Lee beats McClellan in his untruthful bulletins. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + JOSEPH HOOKER, + Major-General Commanding. +</pre> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0036" id="link2H_4_0036"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXXV. OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS. + </h2> + <p> + As was briefly related in the early part of this work, Hooker issued + orders to Gen. Stoneman, the commanding-officer of the Cavalry Corps of + the Army of the Potomac, on the 12th of April, to move the succeeding day + for the purpose of cutting the communications of the enemy. The order read + as follows:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., April 12, 1863. +Commanding Officer, Cavalry Corps. +</pre> + <p> + I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that you will + march at seven o'clock A.M., on the 13th inst., with all your available + force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the enemy's position + on his left, and of throwing your command between him and Richmond, + isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat, and inflicting on + him every possible injury which will tend to his discomfiture and defeat. + </p> + <p> + To accomplish this, the general suggests that you ascend the Rappahannock + by the different routes, keeping well out of the view of the enemy, and + throwing out well to the front and flank small parties to mask your + movement, and to cut off all communication with the enemy, by the people + in their interest living on this side of the river. To divert suspicion it + may not be amiss to have word given out that you are in pursuit of Jones's + guerillas, as they are operating extensively in the Shenandoah Valley, in + the direction of Winchester. He further suggests that you select for your + place of crossing the Rappahannock, some point to the west of the + Alexandria and Orange Railroad, which can only be determined by the + circumstances as they are found on the arrival of your advance. + </p> + <p> + In the vicinity of Culpeper, you will be likely to run against Fitz Hugh + Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, which it + is expected you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to your + advance, or detriment to any considerable number of your command. + </p> + <p> + At Gordonsville, the enemy have a small provost-guard of infantry, which + it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without delaying your + forward movement. From there it is expected that you will push forward to + the Aquia and Richmond Railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of Saxton's + Junction, destroying along your whole route the railroad-bridges, trains + of cars, depots of provisions, lines of telegraphic communication, etc. + The general directs that you go prepared with all the means necessary to + accomplish this work effectually. + </p> + <p> + As the line of the railroad from Aquia to Richmond presents the shortest + one for the enemy to retire on, it is most probable that he will avail + himself of it, and the usually travelled highways on each side of it, for + this purpose; in which event you will select the strongest positions, such + as the banks of streams, commanding heights, etc., in order to check or + prevent it; and, if unsuccessful, you will fall upon his flanks, attack + his artillery and trains, and harass him until he is exhausted and out of + supplies. + </p> + <p> + Moments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit. + </p> + <p> + If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will endeavor + to hold your force in his front, and harass him day and night, on the + march, and in camp, unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from his column + large slices, the general desires that you will not fail to take small + ones. Let your watchword be Fight, and let all your orders be Fight, + Fight, FIGHT; bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the general as + the rebel carcasses. It is not in the power of the rebels to oppose you + with more than five thousand sabres, and those badly mounted, and, after + they leave Culpeper, without forage and rations. Keep them from Richmond, + and sooner or later they must fall into our hands. + </p> + <p> + The general desires you to understand that he considers the primary object + of your movement the cutting of the enemy's communication with Richmond by + the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those lines; and he + wishes to make every thing subservient to that object. He desires that you + will keep yourself informed of the enemy's whereabouts, and attack him + wherever you find him. + </p> + <p> + If, in your operations, an opportunity should present itself for you to + detach a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, and destroy + depots of supplies said to be there, or along the line of the Aquia + Railroad, in the direction of Richmond, to destroy bridges, etc., or the + crossings of the Pamunkey, in the direction of West Point, destroying the + ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the crossing, they will all + greatly contribute to our complete success. + </p> + <p> + You may rely upon the general's being in communication with you before + your supplies are exhausted. + </p> + <p> + Let him hear from you as often as necessary and practicable. + </p> + <p> + A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at eight o'clock for + Kelly's Ford, with one battery, and a regiment to the United-States Ford + and Banks's Ford, to threaten and hold those places. + </p> + <p> + It devolves upon you, general, to take the initiative in the forward + movement of this grand army; and on you and your noble command must + depend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear + in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every thing in war, + and especially is it the case with the command you have, and the + enterprise on which you are about to embark. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + S. WILLIAMS, + Assistant Adjutant-General. +</pre> + <p> + In pursuance of which order, the corps broke camp near Belle-Plain, and + encamped on the evening of April 13, beyond Morrisville. On April 14, it + moved down to the vicinity of the bridge at Rappahannock station, which, + after a slight skirmish by Gregg, was taken possession of. Beverly Ford, + some miles above, was also examined, and the north bank occupied. + Preparations for an early move on the morning of the 14th were made. Gen. + Buford, commanding the cavalry reserve, remained at Kelly's Ford during + the 14th, in order to draw the attention of the Confederates to that + point, and indulged in a little artillery skirmish. + </p> + <p> + During the night a heavy rain set in, and before morning the river was no + longer fordable by the artillery and pack-trains. + </p> + <p> + As is well known, it takes no great rainfall to swell the Rappahannock and + Rapidan rivers, and their tributaries, to the proportion of torrents. Nor + are more than a few hours necessary to raise these rivers and runs, and + even the dry ravines, to an impassable depth. Gregg mentions in his report + that a small stream, which, on the 13th, could be crossed at one step, had + swelled to such a flood, that when, on the 15th, a regiment was obliged to + cross it, there were lost one man and two horses by drowning. + </p> + <p> + So that, after crossing one division, Stoneman found that it would + probably be isolated on account of the impracticability of crossing the + rest of the corps, and consequently ordered its immediate return. And this + was accomplished none too soon, by swimming the horses. + </p> + <p> + On reporting all these facts to Hooker, Stoneman was ordered to go into + camp, where he remained, along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, until + the 27th. + </p> + <p> + The following letter is of interest, in this connection, as showing how + keen Mr. Lincoln's intuitions occasionally were. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + EXECUTIVE MANSION, + WASHINGTON, D.C., April 15, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. +</pre> + <p> + It is now 10.15 P.M. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning, + and a few moments later your despatch of this evening. The latter gives me + considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to be + calculated upon. Gen. S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the + expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of which + were unusually fair weather, and all three without hinderance from the + enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. To reach + his point he still has sixty to go, another river (the Rapidan) to cross; + and will he be hindered by the enemy? By arithmetic, how many days will it + take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be done, but I + greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often. I am very + anxious. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Yours truly, + A. LINCOLN. +</pre> + <p> + On the 28th, Stoneman received the following additional orders:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + MORRISVILLE, VA., April 28, 1863. +Commanding Officer Cavalry Corps. +</pre> + <p> + I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that the + instructions communicated for your government on the 12th instant, are so + far modified as to require you to cross the Rappahannock at such points as + you may determine between Kelly's and Rappahannock Fords, and for a + portion of your force to move in the direction of Raccoon Ford and Louisa + Court House, while the remainder is engaged carrying into execution that + part of your original instructions, which relates to the enemy's forces + and positions on the line of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, and the + line itself; the operations of this column to be considered as masking the + column which is directed to move, by forced marches, to strike and destroy + the line of the Aquia and Richmond Railroad. + </p> + <p> + You are further directed to determine on some point for the columns to + unite; and it is recommended that it be on the Pamunkey, or near that + line, as you will then be in position with your full force to cut off the + retreat of the enemy by his shortest line. In all other respects your + instructions, as before referred to, will remain the same. + </p> + <p> + You will direct all your force to cross to-night, or, if that shall not be + practicable, to be brought to the river, and have it all thrown over + before eight o'clock to-morrow morning. If the fords should be too deep + for your pack-animals and artillery, they will be crossed over the bridge + at Kelly's Ford. + </p> + <p> + You will please furnish the officers in command of these two columns with + a copy of this, and of your original instructions. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + WM. L. CANDLER, + Captain and Aide-de-Camp. +</pre> + <p> + These two orders would appear to be specific enough. The first is not + modified by the second to any great extent; and the primary object of both + is unmistakably to interrupt, by a bold stroke, Lee's main communications + with Richmond by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. + </p> + <p> + The point on which the two columns, spoken of in the order of April 28, + were to unite, was suggested as somewhere on the Pamunkey; and the one + column was to go at once about its work, while the other masked its march, + and after joined it. + </p> + <p> + Under these orders, Stoneman proceeded to get the corps together,—the + distance of many outlying pickets delaying him almost a day,—and + finally crossed the Rappahannock by five P.M. of the 29th, a portion of + his troops using Kelly's Ford, in connection with Slocum's column. + </p> + <p> + He then assembled his division and brigade commanders, spread his maps + before them, and made them acquainted with his orders and plans. + </p> + <p> + Averell, with his own division, Davis's brigade of Pleasonton's division, + and Tidball's battery, was instructed to push for Culpeper Court House; + while Stoneman, with Gregg's division, Buford's reserve brigade, and + Robertson's battery, moved on Stevensburg. + </p> + <p> + It was expected that Averell would reach Brandy Station the same night + (29th), driving before him the enemy, who was in very small force in his + front. And when Stoneman got well on his way, he despatched Capt. + Drummond, with a squadron, from beyond Rocky Run, by crossroads, to Brandy + Station, to bring intelligence of Averell's movements. The latter had, + however, not reached that place. And, learning later in the evening that + he had leisurely gone into camp, close by the place where the forces had + crossed, Stoneman sent him word that he must turn the enemy in his front + over to him, while himself pushed on towards Richmond. + </p> + <p> + This order read as follows:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, + April 30, 1863. +BRIG.-GEN. AVERELL, Commanding, etc. +</pre> + <p> + The major-general commanding directs me to say that we have been delayed + by high water, etc., and that he desires you to push the enemy as + vigorously as possible, keeping him fully occupied, and, if possible, + drive him in the direction of Rapidan Station. He turns the enemy over to + you. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + A. J. ALEXANDER, + Assistant Adjutant-General. +</pre> + <p> + And Hooker justly claims that it was an entire misinterpretation of his + instructions, which were to have Averell join Stoneman's column, so soon + as he had masked the latter's movement towards the Aquia and Richmond + Railroad. + </p> + <p> + On May 3, Averell, who had done nothing but skirmish for a couple of days + with a force of about one-fifth his own, and had then retired to Ely's + Ford, and gone into camp, was relieved, and Pleasonton placed in command + of his division. + </p> + <p> + The pack-mules and lead-horses of Stoneman's column were left with the + main army, till the expected junction should be made by its advance south + of the Rappahannock. Stoneman had with him but five or six days' rations; + but he relied upon Hooker's assurance that he would be up with him before + these rations were exhausted. Every officer and man, the generals and + their staffs setting the example, took with them only what they could + carry on their horses. Nor, despite the cold drenching rain, which fell + plentifully, were any camp-fires lighted the first few nights. Stoneman + seems to have been abundantly ambitious of doing his work thoroughly, and + issued stirring orders to his subordinates, calling upon them for every + exertion which they were capable of making. + </p> + <p> + On reaching Raccoon Ford, over the Rapidan, Stoneman found it guarded by + the Confederate cavalry. He therefore sent Buford to a point six miles + below, where he was able to cross, and, marching up the south bank, to + uncover Raccoon Ford. The main body was then put over. + </p> + <p> + Stoneman's column was in the saddle by two A.M. of the 31st. But it proved + to be too foggy to push on: he had as yet no guides, and he was obliged to + wait for daylight. + </p> + <p> + He then hurried Gregg on to Louisa Court House, which place was reached + during the night of May 1, and details were speedily set to work tearing + up the railroads. Buford was sent by way of the North Anna to the same + point; and at ten A.M., May 2, the entire force was at Louisa. + </p> + <p> + From here a squadron was despatched towards Gordonsville, to ascertain the + meaning of the movement of several trains of troops, which had passed up + from Richmond in that direction the evening previous. Parties were also + sent out to Tolersville and Frederickshall Stations, to destroy whatever + material could be found there. Still another destroyed Carr's Bridge on + the North Anna. + </p> + <p> + The balance of the force was set to work to break up the Virginia Central; + and for a distance of eighteen miles the telegraph, stations, tanks, and + cars were burned, and the rails torn up, and bent and twisted over + bonfires. + </p> + <p> + The command then marched for Yanceyville, on the South Anna, and, arriving + at Thompson's Cross-roads at ten P.M. of May 2, headquarters were + established at this point. + </p> + <p> + Here Stoneman seems to have become entirely oblivious of his instructions, + and to have substituted for them ideas originating in his own brain. He + assembled his officers, and informed them that "we had dropped like a + shell in that region of country, and he intended to burst it in every + direction." + </p> + <p> + Instead, therefore, of pressing with his main force for some point on the + Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, and destroying it thoroughly, as he + was particularly instructed to do, that being the one great object to be + achieved, he contented himself with sending Kilpatrick with the Second + New-York Cavalry, and Davis with the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, to operate, + the former against the railroad-bridges over the Chickahominy, and the + latter at Ashland and Atlee; and also despatched Wyndham, of the First + New-Jersey Cavalry, to strike Columbia, and destroy the canal-aqueduct + over the Rivanna river, and if possible make a dash at the railroad-bridge + over the Appomattox; while two regiments under Gregg were to follow down + the South Anna to destroy its bridges, followed by the Fifth United-States + Cavalry to see that the destruction was complete. + </p> + <p> + These parties were directed to rally on Stoneman, who was thus left with + five hundred men of Buford's reserve, or else to push through to + Gloucester Point, or Yorktown, as circumstances should dictate. + </p> + <p> + In pursuance of these orders, Gregg's column, which, on May 2, had burned + the depots at Orange Court House, on May 3, moved down the South Anna, as + far as the bridge where the Fredericksburg Railroad crosses the stream, + and attempted to destroy it; but finding it protected by some infantry, + and a couple of guns, he seems to have decided not to attack this force, + and fell back upon the reserve. On the 5th, he destroyed the bridge at + Yanceyville. + </p> + <p> + Kilpatrick marched some distance by daylight on the 3d, kept himself + hidden through the day, marched again at nightfall, and reached Hungary + Station at daylight the 4th. Here he destroyed the depot, and several + miles of road, passed the Virginia Central at Meadow's Bridge, which he + likewise burned, with all cars and material he could find in the vicinity, + and camped at night in the rear of Hanover. + </p> + <p> + On the 5th, he pushed into Gloucester Point, destroying on the way a train + of fifty-six wagons, and some twenty thousand bushels of corn in depots. + He captured thirty prisoners, but paroled them. + </p> + <p> + Capt. Merritt with the Second United-States Cavalry, demolished a number + of bridges and fords on the South Anna, and reached Ashland Station; but + was unable to destroy the bridge at this place, which was guarded by an + infantry force with part of a battery. + </p> + <p> + Col. Davis, on May 3, also reached Ashland, burned the trestle south of + the town, and tore up the telegraph-line. He captured and destroyed some + wagon-trains, containing about a hundred wagons, fired the depot and some + material at Hanover, and bivouacked seven miles from Richmond. He was, + however, precluded by his orders from trying to enter the capital, though + he seems to have had a good opportunity for so doing. + </p> + <p> + On May 4, at Tunstall, on the York and Richmond Railroad, he met some + resistance from a force of Confederate infantry with a battery; but, + retracing his steps, he turned up in due season at Gloucester Point. + </p> + <p> + Col. Wyndham moved on to Columbia, where he rendered useless a large + amount of stores, a number of canal-boats, and several bridges over the + James-River canal. For lack of blasting-materials he was unable to destroy + the aqueduct over the Rivanna river. It was solid enough to have delayed + him at least forty-eight hours. The bridge over the James river to Elk + Island he burned, and damaged the locks and gates of the canal as far as + possible. He returned to Thompson's Cross-roads the same day with W. H. + Fitz Lee at his heels. + </p> + <p> + Capt. Harrison, with a part of Buford's reserves, had, on May 4, somewhat + of a skirmish with the enemy at Fleming's Cross-roads; but without effect + upon the movements of the command. And another squadron crossed sabres + with the enemy at Shannon's. + </p> + <p> + Such prisoners as were captured by any of the parties, were paroled at the + time. A considerable number captured by Stoneman were sent to Richmond in + one party, with word that the Union cavalry was following close upon them. + </p> + <p> + To quote Stoneman's own reasons, the six days' rations with which he left + camp, having now been consumed, (though it would seem that there had been + ample opportunity to collect as much more as was necessary from the stores + destroyed); Hooker not having come up as expected; vague rumors having + reached him of the defeat of the Army of the Potomac; having accomplished, + as he deemed, all that he was sent to do; Averell having been withdrawn, + thus leaving Lee ready to attack him,—Stoneman sent Buford with six + hundred and fifty picked men to the vicinity of Gordonsville, and a small + party out the Bowling-Green road, and marched his main body to Orange + Court House. + </p> + <p> + At noon of the 6th, he assembled his entire command at Orange Springs; + thence marched to Raccoon Ford, and crossed on the 7th. + </p> + <p> + On the 8th, the command crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's, having to + swim about twenty yards. + </p> + <p> + Leaving Buford to guard the river from the railroad to Falmouth, he then + returned to camp. + </p> + <p> + During the latter part of the time occupied by these movements, the roads + had been in very bad order from the heavy rains of the 5th. + </p> + <p> + Hotchkiss and Allen say, with reference to this raid: "This failure is the + more surprising from the fact that Gen. Lee had but two regiments of + cavalry, those under W. H. Fitz Lee, to oppose to the large force under + Stoneman, consisting of ten or eleven thousand men. The whole country in + rear of the Confederate Army, up to the very fortifications of Richmond, + was open to the invader. Nearly all the transportation of that army was + collected at Guineas depot, eighteen miles from Chancellorsville, with + little or no guard, and might have been destroyed by one-fourth of + Stoneman's force." + </p> + <p> + And further:— + </p> + <p> + "Such was the condition of the railroads and the scarcity of supplies in + the country, that the Confederate commander could never accumulate more + than a few days' rations ahead at Fredericksburg. To have interrupted his + communications for any length of time, would have imperilled his army, or + forced him to retreat." + </p> + <p> + They also claim that this column seized all the property that could be of + use, found in their line of march. "The citizens were in many cases + entirely stripped of the necessaries of life." + </p> + <p> + Stoneman certainly misconceived his orders. These were plainly enough to + throw his main body in Lee's rear, so as substantially to cut his + communications by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. To accomplish + this, he was to mask his movement by a body of troops, which should keep + whatever Confederate cavalry there might be in the vicinity of Orange + Court House and Gordonsvile, busy, until his main column was beyond their + reach, and then should rejoin him; and to select a rallying point on the + Pamunkey, so as to be near the important scene of operations. Every thing + was to be subordinate to cutting the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. + </p> + <p> + If Stoneman had properly digested his orders, and had pushed night and day + for any available point on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, he + might have reached it by Sunday. A thorough destruction of Lee's line of + supply and retreat, would no doubt have so decidedly affected his + strength, actual and moral, as to have seriously changed the vigor of his + operations against both Hooker and Sedgwick. + </p> + <p> + Stoneman barely had time, from the lateness of his date of starting, to + accomplish great results before Hooker was substantially beaten; but it + would appear that he could have materially contributed to lessen the + disastrous nature of the defeat, if no more. + </p> + <p> + His movements were characterized by great weakness. He did not seem to + understand, that safety as well as success depended upon moving with a + body large enough to accomplish results. Instead of this, he sent, to + perform the most important work, bodies so small as to be unable to + destroy bridges, when guarded by a few companies of infantry and a couple + of guns. + </p> + <p> + And the damage done appears to have all been repaired by the time the + raiders got back to camp. + </p> + <p> + Hooker's criticism in this instance is quite just: "On the 4th, the + cavalry column, under Gen. Stoneman, commenced its return. One party of + it, under Gen. Kilpatrick, crossed the Aquia and Richmond Railroad; and + the fact that on the 5th, the cars carried the rebel wounded and our + prisoners over the road to Richmond, will show to what extent the enemy's + communications had been interrupted. An examination of the instructions + Gen. Stoneman received, in connection with the official report of his + operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer ever made a + greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever accomplished + less in so doing. The effect of throwing his body of cavalry in the rear + of the enemy, and on his communications, at the time it was in his power + to have done it, can readily be estimated. But instead, that important arm + of the army became crippled to an extent which seriously embarrassed me in + my subsequent operations. Soon after, Gen. Stoneman applied for and + obtained a sick-leave; and I requested that it might be indefinitely + extended to him. It is charitable to suppose that Gens. Stoneman and + Averell did not read their orders, and determined to carry on operations + in conformity with their own views and inclinations." + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0037" id="link2H_4_0037"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXXVI. HOOKER'S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN. + </h2> + <p> + Nearly two years after this campaign, in his testimony before the + Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker thus speaks about the general + result of the movement:— + </p> + <p> + "I may say here, the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated with + the battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole + loss in the battle of Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen + thousand." + </p> + <p> + "I said that Chancellorsville had been called a disaster. I lost under + those operations, one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one + ambulance." "In my opinion, there is nothing to regret in regard to + Chancellorsville, except to accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The + troops lost no honor, except one corps, and we lost no more men than the + enemy; but expectation was high, the army in splendid condition, and great + results were expected from it. It was at a time, too, when the nation + required a victory." "I would like to speak somewhat further of this + matter of Chancellorsville. It has been the desire and aim of some of Gen. + McClellan's admirers, and I do not know but of others, to circulate + erroneous impressions in regard to it. When I returned from + Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no battle; in fact, I had more + men than I could use; and I fought no general battle, for the reason that + I could not get my men in position to do so; probably not more than three + or three and a half corps, on the right, were engaged in that fight." + </p> + <p> + And he repeats his understanding of his manoeuvring as follows: "My + impression was, that Lee would have been compelled to move out on the same + road that Jackson had moved on, and pass over to my right. I should add in + my testimony that before leaving Falmouth, to make this move, I had a + million and a half of rations on board lighters, and had gunboats in + readiness to tow them up to points on the Pamunkey River, in order to + replenish my provisions, to enable me to reach Richmond before the enemy + could, in case I succeeded in throwing him off that line of retreat. When + I gave the order to Gen. Sedgwick, I expected that Lee would be whipped by + manoeuvre. I supposed that he would be compelled to march off on the same + line that Jackson had. He would have been thrown on the Culpeper and + Gordonsville road, placing me fifty or sixty miles nearer Richmond than + himself." + </p> + <p> + Criticism upon such an eccentric summing-up of the results of the campaign + of Chancellorsville, is too unprofitable a task to reward the attempt. But + assuredly the commander of the gallant Army of the Potomac stands alone in + his measure of the importance of the movement, or of the disastrous nature + of the defeat. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0038" id="link2H_4_0038"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE. + </h2> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 5, 1863. +To the Commanding Officer, Confederate Forces, Chancellorsville, Va. +</pre> + <p> + I would most respectfully request the privilege of sending a burial-party + on the field of Chancellorsville, to bury the dead, and care for the + wounded officers and soldiers of my command. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Very respectfully, etc., + JOSEPH HOOKER, + Major-General Commanding. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, + May 6, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. J. HOOKER, Commanding Army of the Potomac. +</pre> + <p> + General,—I have had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday, + requesting permission to send a burial-party to attend to your dead and + wounded on the battle-field of Chancellorsville. I regret that their + position is such, being immediately within our lines, that the necessities + of war forbid my compliance with your request, which, under other + circumstances, it would give me pleasure to grant. I will accord to your + dead and wounded the same attention which I bestow upon my own; but, if + there is any thing which your medical director here requires which we + cannot provide, he shall have my permission to receive from you such + medical supplies as you may think proper to furnish. Consideration for + your wounded prompts me to add, that, from what I learn, their comfort + would be greatly promoted by additional medical attendance and medical + supplies. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + I have the honor to be, + Respectfully, your obedient servant, + R. E. LEE, General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + May 6, 1863, 4.30 P.M. +HIS EXCELLENCY A. LINCOLN, President of the United States. +</pre> + <p> + Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegrams of + eleven A.M. and 12.30. The army had previously re-crossed the river, and + was on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies with + it, I deemed this advisable. Above, I saw no way of giving the enemy a + general battle with the prospect of success which I desire. Not to exceed + three corps, all told, of my troops have been engaged. For the whole to go + in, there is a better place nearer at hand. Will write you at length + to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of the cavalry have at length + turned up. One portion did nothing. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., + May 7, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. +</pre> + <p> + My dear Sir,—The recent movement of your army is ended without + effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important breakings of the + enemy's communications. What next? If possible I would be very glad of + another movement early enough to give us some benefit from the fact of the + enemy's communication being broken; but neither for this reason or any + other do I wish any thing done in desperation or rashness. An early + movement would also help to supersede the bad moral effect of the recent + one, which is said to be considerably injurious. Have you already in your + mind a plan wholly or partially formed? If you have, prosecute it without + interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I, + incompetent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan + for the army. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Yours, as ever, + A. LINCOLN. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 7, 1863. +</pre> + <p> + His Excellency, President of the United States. + </p> + <p> + I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of this date, and in + answer have to state that I do not deem it expedient to suspend operations + on this line, from the reverse we have experienced in endeavoring to + extricate the army from its present position. If in the first effort we + failed, it was not for want of strength or conduct of the small number of + troops actually engaged, but from a cause which could not be foreseen, and + could not be provided against. After its occurrence the chances of success + were so much lessened, that I felt another plan might be adopted in place + of that we were engaged in, which would be more certain in its results. At + all events, a failure would not involve a disaster, while in the other + case it was certain to follow the absence of success. I may add that this + consideration almost wholly determined me in ordering the army to return + to its old camp. As to the best time for renewing our advance upon the + enemy, I can only decide after an opportunity has been afforded to learn + the feeling of the troops. They should not be discouraged or depressed, + for it is no fault of theirs (if I may except one corps) that our last + efforts were not crowned with glorious victory. I suppose details are not + wanted of me at this time. I have decided in my own mind the plan to be + adopted in our next effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It + has this to recommend it: it will be one in which the operations of all + the corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within my personal + supervision. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Very respectfully, etc., + JOSEPH HOOKER, + Major-General Commanding. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, + May 7, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER, Commanding Army of the Potomac. +</pre> + <p> + General,—The reasons that prevented me from complying with your + request with reference to your wounded no longer existing, I have the + honor to inform you that you can extend to them such attentions as they + may require. All persons whom it may be necessary to send within my lines + for this purpose will remain until the wounded are finally disposed of. + The burial of your dead has already been provided for. + </p> + <p> + I have directed that those of your wounded who desire it, shall be paroled + and transferred within your lines, should you be willing to receive them; + those in the vicinity of Chancellorsville at the United-States Mine Ford, + and those on the battlefield of Salem Church at Banks's Ford or + Fredericksburg. As your wounded generally occupy the few houses in the + vicinity of the late battle-field, the transportation of this army cannot + be employed in conveying them to the river until my own wounded have been + removed to a place of shelter. As soon as this can be accomplished, I will + cause such of your wounded as may desire to be paroled, to be delivered at + the points above indicated, upon being advised of your willingness to + receive them. In the mean time they shall have such care as is given to my + own. + </p> + <p> + I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter of yesterday in case the + original may not have reached you. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + R. E. LEE, General. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 7, 1863, 8 P.M. +GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Confederate Forces at Fredericksburg, Va. +</pre> + <p> + I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two communications of + May 6 and 7 this moment. If agreeable to you, I would like to send medical + supplies and attendance to my wounded, and, at such times as the state of + the stream will permit, send ambulances for them via the fords designated + in your communications, viz., United-States and Banks's Fords. I will, + with your consent, send parties to those fords with supplies at an early + hour to-morrow. The swollen state of the Rappahannock probably preventing + the crossing of any vehicles with supplies, I shall have to depend upon + you for transportation for them. I will receive the wounded at the points + named as soon as it can be done. I will send an officer to + Chancellorsville, with your consent, to arrange the details, which, + judging from your letter, with the state of the river, cannot now be + determined by correspondence. Upon an intimation from you as to any + deficiency in your immediate necessities of medical supplies of your own, + by reason of their use for my wounded or other causes, I shall with + pleasure replace them. I would be obliged for approximate information + concerning the number of wounded, that a sufficient amount of supplies may + be forwarded. I would be under obligations for an early reply. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Very respectfully, etc., + JOSEPH HOOKER, + Major-General Commanding. +(Copy furnished medical director.) +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 9, 1863. +GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of Northern Virginia. +</pre> + <p> + The relatives and friends of several of the officers of this army who fell + in the recent battles, have visited my headquarters with the view, if + possible, of proceeding to the battle-fields to recover the bodies of + those near to them. I therefore have the honor to ask whether any person + will be permitted to visit the battle-fields for the purpose indicated, or + whether any arrangement can be made for sending to the lines of this army + the bodies of such of our fallen officers as may have friends here seeking + for them. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Very respectfully, etc., + JOSEPH HOOKER, + Major-General Commanding. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, + May 10, 1863. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> +MAJOR-GEN. JOSEPH HOOKER, + +Commanding United-States Forces on the Rappahannock. +</pre> + <p> + General,—In reply to your communication of the 9th inst., I have the + honor to state that it will give me pleasure to afford every facility to + relatives and friends of officers killed in the late battles, to recover + their bodies; but I have no means of identifying them, or of ascertaining + the fields on which they fell. If you will have me informed, I will cause + search to be made. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + R. E. LEE, General. +</pre> + <p> + <a name="link2H_APPE" id="link2H_APPE"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + APPENDIX. + </h2> + <p> + In February and March, 1886, there was delivered at the Lowell Institute, + in Boston, a series of lectures upon the late civil war, by the following + gentlemen:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Feb. 16. Introduction. Gen. Charles Devens of Boston. + Feb. 19. Pope's Campaign. Col. Jed. Hotchkiss of Staunton, Va. + Feb. 23. Antietam. Gen. George H. Gordon of Boston. + Feb. 26. Chancellorsville. Col. Theodore A. Dodge, U. S. Army. + March 2. Stonewall Jackson. Col. W. Allan of McDonough, Md. + March 5. Gettysburg. Gen. Francis A. Walker of Boston. + March 9. The Northern Volunteer. Col. T. L. Livermore of Boston. + March 12. The Southern Volunteer. Major H. Kyd Douglas of Hagerstown, Md. + March 16. Chattanooga. Gen. William F. Smith of Wilmington, Del. + March 19. The Wilderness. John C. Ropes, Esq., of Boston. + March 23. Franklin and Nashville. Col. Henry Stone of Boston. + March 26. The Last Campaign. Col. Fred. C. Newhall of Philadelphia. +</pre> + <p> + These lecturers were well equipped for their task. Earnest study of their + respective subjects had been attested by numerous volumes published by + them relating to the war. The desire to have the truth told was apparent + in the presence of three Confederate officers among the number; and the + special feature of the course seemed to be, that not only was the truth + spoken in the most unvarnished manner, but that it was listened to with + marked approval by overflowing audiences. + </p> + <p> + Perhaps the most invidious subject fell to my lot. What I said was merely + a summary of the foregoing pages. But one point in my lecture aroused the + ire of some of Gen. Hooker's partisans, and was made the subject of + attacks so bitter that virulence degenerated into puerility. The occasion + of this rodomontade was a meeting of Third-Corps veterans, and its outcome + was a series of resolutions aimed at the person who had dared to reflect + on Gen. Hooker's capacity, and to refer to the question of Gen. Hooker's + habitual use of stimulants. The public mention of my name was as + sedulously avoided as a reference to his satanic majesty is wont to be in + the society of the superstitious; but the exuberance of the attack must + have afforded unbounded satisfaction to its authors, as it very apparently + did to the audience. + </p> + <p> + Following are the resolutions, which are of mild flavor compared to their + accompanying seasoning of speeches:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + RESOLUTIONS. +</pre> + <p> + The veterans of the Third Army Corps assembled here to-day, soldiers who + served under Gen. Joseph Hooker in his division, corps, and army, + re-affirm their lifelong affection for their old commander, their + admiration for his brilliant achievements as one of the prominent generals + of our armies, and protest against the recent revival of unjust assaults + made on his conduct at Chancellorsville. Whether, after <i>one of the most + noted tactical victories of modern times</i>, having placed the Army of + the Potomac across the Rappahannock River on the flank of Lee, he might + have gained a still farther advanced position; whether the failure of the + cavalry to fully accomplish what was expected of it; whether the disaster + to the Eleventh Corps and the delay in the advance of the Sixth Corps,—are + to be attributed to errors of judgment of Gen. Hooker or of the + subordinate commanders, are points which will be discussed again and again + with profit to the military student. But we, who witnessed his successful + generalship at Williamsburg, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Second Bull Run, and + Antietam, have no language at our command strong enough to express our + contempt for any one who, twenty years after the war, affirms that on any + occasion in battle, with the lives of his men and the cause of his country + in his keeping, Gen. Hooker was incapacitated for performing his whole + duty as an officer by either the use of liquor or by the want of it. + </p> + <p> + We protest against oft-repeated statements that "Fighting Joe Hooker," + while one of the bravest and ablest division commanders in the army, was + possibly equal to handling a corps, but proved a failure as an independent + commander. Assigned to the Army of the Potomac in January, 1863, after the + disaster at Fredericksburg and the failure of oft-repeated campaigns, our + army demoralized by defeat, desertions, and dissensions, Gen. Hooker + re-organized his forces, stopped desertions, brought back to their colors + thousands of absentees, and in three months revived confidence, + re-established discipline, and enabled his army to take the field + unsurpassed in loyalty, courage, and efficiency, as was shown at + Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. We say Chancellorsville because, although + not a victory for us, the campaign <i>inflicted on the enemy losses at + least equal to our own</i>; and we say also Gettysburg because that + victory was won by the army Hooker had re-organized, and led with such + matchless skill from Falmouth to the eve of the battle. + </p> + <p> + Whatever ambition he may have had to command armies, it did not prevent + his cheerfully serving his country under junior officers, giving them + faithful support, and his record shows no instance of his removal from + command by his superiors. + </p> + <p> + Here in his native State, amid the homes of so many of his old brigade, + the survivors of the Third Army Corps, all witnesses of his genius, valor, + and devotion to duty, indorse his record as a soldier, as a gentleman, and + as a patriot, and sincerely believe that history will assign to Major-Gen. + Joseph Hooker a place among the greatest commanders of the late civil war. + </p> + <p> + The italics are mine. "One of the most noted tactical victories of modern + times," applied to Chancellorsville, is refreshing. Equally so is the + exultant claim that "we inflicted on the enemy losses at least equal to + our own." The infliction of loss on the enemy has always been understood + by military men to be an incident rather than the object of war. + </p> + <p> + The following reply in "The Boston Herald" of April 11, 1886, explains + itself:— + </p> + <p> + TO THE EDITOR OF THE HERALD. + </p> + <p> + In the call for the meeting of the Third Corps Gettysburg Re-union + Association, held at Music Hall on Fast Day, was the following clause:— + </p> + <p> + "Loyalty to the memory of our beloved commander, Major-Gen. Joseph Hooker, + makes it a duty, on this occasion, to protest against unjust and + uncalled-for criticisms on his military record as commander of the Army of + the Potomac." + </p> + <p> + It having been intimated to me by some old brother officers of the Third + Corps, that my late Lowell lecture on Chancellorsville was the occasion of + this proposed protest, I wrote to the chairman of the committee which + called the meeting, asking for an opportunity to reply to this protest, + within such bounds as even-handedness and the purposes of the meeting + would allow. The committee answered that it could not see the propriety of + turning the occasion into a public debate, and referred me to the press. I + do not object to their decision, made, no doubt, upon what appeared to + them sufficient grounds; but as the occasion was turned into a public + debate—one-sided, to be sure—I ask you for space, to reply in + your valued columns. + </p> + <p> + As an old Third-Corps man, I attended the meeting at Music Hall. The + treasurer did not object to selling me a ticket to the dinner. I expected + to hear some new facts about Hooker and Chancellorsville. I expected to + hear some new deductions from old facts. I do not consider myself beyond + making an occasional lapse even in a carefully prepared piece of work, and + am always open to correction. But, to my surprise (with the exception of a + conjecture that Lee's object in his march into Pennsylvania was to wreck + the anthracite-coal industry), there was not one single fact or statement + laid before the meeting, or the company at dinner, which has not already + been, in its minutest details, canvassed and argued at a length covering + hundreds of pages in the volumes on Chancellorsville, by Hotchkiss and + Allen, Swinton, Bates, the Comte de Paris, Doubleday, and myself, not to + speak of numberless and valuable brochures by others. The bulk of the time + devoted to talking on this occasion was used in denunciation of the wretch—in + other words, myself—who alleged that Joseph Hooker was drunk at + Chancellorsville, or at any other time. This denunciation began with a + devout curse in the chaplain's prayer, culminated in a set of fierce + resolutions, and ended with the last after-dinner speech. + </p> + <p> + One thing particularly struck me. There was no one, of all who spoke, who + began to say as many things in favor of Joseph Hooker as I for years have + done; and not in fleeting words, but printed chapters. There was plenty of + eulogy, in nine-tenths of which I joined with all my heart. But it was of + the soldiers'-talk order,—cheering and honest and loyal, appealing + to the sentiments rather than the intelligence. What I have said of Hooker + has been solid praise of his soldierly worth, shown to be borne out by the + facts. Barring, in all I say, the five fighting days at Chancellorsville, + I have yet to find the man who has publicly, and in print, eulogized + Hooker as I have done; and no one among the veterans gathered together + Fast Day applauded with more sincerity than I, all the tributes to his + memory. For though, as some one remarked, it is true that I "fought mit + Sigel," and decamped from Chancellorsville with the Eleventh Corps; it is + also true that I passed through the fiery ordeal of the Seven Days, and + fought my way across the railroad-cutting at Manassas, side by side with + Joseph Hooker, under the gallant leadership of that other hero Philip + Kearney. It was very evident that but few of the speakers, as well as + auditors, had themselves heard or read what I actually said. The result of + "coaching" for the occasion by some wire-puller was painfully apparent. + Let us see what was said. I give the entire paragraph from my Lowell + lecture:— + </p> + <p> + "It has been surmised that Hooker, during this campaign, was incapacitated + by a habit of which, at times, he had been the victim. There is, rather, + evidence that he was prostrated by too much abstemiousness, when a + reasonable use of stimulants might have kept his nervous system at its + normal tension. It was certainly not the use of alcohol, during this time, + which lay at the root of his indecision." + </p> + <p> + If that is an accusation that Hooker was then drunk, if it does not rather + lean toward an exculpation from the charge of drunkenness, then I can + neither write nor read the English language. As is well known, the + question of Hooker's sudden and unaccountable loss of power, during the + fighting half of this campaign, coupled with the question of drunkenness, + has been bandied to and fro for years. The mention alone of + Chancellorsville has been enough, ever since that day, to provoke a query + on this very subject, among civilians and soldiers alike. In a lecture on + the subject, I deemed it judicious to lay this ghost as well as might be. + Had I believed that Hooker was intoxicated at Chancellorsville, I should + not have been deterred by the fear of opposition from saying so. Hooker's + over-anxious friends have now turned into a public scandal what was + generally understood as an exoneration, by intentionally distorting what + was said into an implication that Hooker was so besotted as to be + incapable of command. What I have written of his marching the army to this + field and to the field of Gettysburg is a full answer to such unnecessary + perversion. Let these would-be friends of Hooker remember that this + calumny is of their own making, not mine. I am as sorry for it, as they + ought to be. If the contempt expressed in the resolutions they passed had + been silent, instead of boisterous, Hooker's memory would have suffered + far less damage. + </p> + <p> + Gens. Sickles and Butterfield are doubtless good witnesses, though they + sedulously refrained from any testimony on the subject, contenting + themselves with declamation. But they are not the only good witnesses. + After the loss of a leg at Gettysburg, I was ordered to duty in the War + Department, where I served in charge of one or other bureau for seven + years. I have heard this Hooker question discussed in all its bearings, in + the office of the Secretary of War or Adjutant-General, by nearly every + leading officer of the army, hundreds of whom had known Hooker from West + Point up. I have had abundant opportunity of forming an opinion, and I + have expressed it. Let him who garbles its meaning, bear the blame. + </p> + <p> + This action by many veterans of the Third Corps—even though procured + by design from their thoughtless and open soldier's nature—is, + however, much more sweeping and important. To the world at large it is a + general condemnation of every thing which can be said in criticism of + Hooker. It will reach far and wide, and in this light I desire to say what + I do. The resolutions passed at the meeting explicitly protest against the + statement that Hooker proved a failure as an independent commander. This + needs notice at greater length than the question of sobriety or + drunkenness. Few have studied the details of the campaign of + Chancellorsville as carefully as I; but one other author has spread the + facts so fully before the reading public. No part of my recent criticism + before the Lowell Institute was new. It was embodied at much greater + length four years ago, in my "History of Chancellorsville;" the reception + of which volume by press, public, and soldiers, has been its own best + excuse. Gen. Hooker, though making no report, has put on record his + explanation of this campaign. Before the Committee on the Conduct of the + War, he stated his views as follows: "I may say here, the battle of + Chancellorsville has been associated with the battle of Fredericksburg, + and has been called a disaster. My whole loss in the battle of + Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen thousand.... In my opinion, + there is nothing to regret in regard to Chancellorsville, except to + accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The troops lost no honor, except one + corps, and we lost no more men than the enemy; but expectation was high, + the army in splendid condition, and greater results were expected from it. + When I returned from Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no battle; + in fact, I had more men than I could use, and I fought no general battle, + for the reason that I could not get my men in position to do so." + </p> + <p> + To speak thus of a passage of arms lasting a week and costing seventeen + thousand men is, to say the least, abnormal. + </p> + <p> + In trying to shift the onus of failure from his own shoulders he said: + "Some of our corps commanders, and also officers of other rank, appear to + be unwilling to go into a fight.... So far as my experience extends, there + are in all armies officers more valiant after the fight than while it is + pending, and when a truthful history of the Rebellion shall be written, it + will be found that the Army of the Potomac is not an exception." + </p> + <p> + This slur is cast upon men like Reynolds, Meade, Couch, Sedgwick, Slocum, + Howard, Hancock, Humphreys, Sykes, Warren, Birney, Whipple, Wright, + Griffin, and many others equally gallant. To call it ungenerous, is a mild + phrase. It certainly does open the door to unsparing criticism. Hooker + also concisely stated his military rule of action: "Throughout the + Rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had as large a force as + the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter." And in + his initial orders to Stoneman, in opening the campaign, came the true + ring of the always gallant corps commander, "Let your watchword be + 'Fight!' and let all your orders be, 'Fight, fight, fight!'" + </p> + <p> + I might here say that the only attempt, on Fast Day, to exculpate Hooker + for the disaster of Chancellorsville was not of an order which can be + answered. When one speaker asks, "If Gen. Hooker tells us that it was wise + to withdraw across the river, is not that enough for you and me, my + comrades?" I can only say that history is not so easily satisfied. To + another speaker, who states that when Hooker had planted himself in Lee's + flank by crossing the river, Lee ought, by all the rules of war, to have + retreated, but when he didn't he upset all Hooker's calculations; that + when Jackson made his "extra hazardous" march around Hooker's flank, he + ought, by all rules of war, to have been destroyed, but when he was not he + upset all Hooker's calculations, and that therefore Hooker was forced to + retreat,—it is quite beyond my ability to reply. When Gen. Sickles + throws the blame upon Howard for the defeat of the Eleventh Corps, by + reading the 9.30 A.M. order, without saying one word about Hooker's + actions, change of plans, and despatches from that hour till the attack at + 6 P.M., he makes any thinking man question seriously the sincerity of what + he calls history. When Gen. Butterfield indulges in innuendoes against + Gen. Meade, whose chief of staff he was, and insults his memory in the + effort to exculpate the Third Corps from a charge no one has ever made, or + thought of making, against it, the fair-minded can only wonder why he goes + out of his way to call any one to task for criticising Hooker. Not one + word was spoken on Fast Day which does not find its full and entire answer + in the already published works on Chancellorsville. It was all a mere + re-hash, and poorly cooked at that. To rely on the four reasons given by + the Committee on the Conduct of the War as a purgation of Hooker from + responsibility for our defeat at Chancellorsville, simply deserves no + notice. It is all of a piece with the discussion of the Third-Corps fight + at Gettysburg on July 2. No one ever doubted that the Third Corps fought, + as they always did, like heroes that day. What has been alleged is merely + that Sickles did not occupy and protect Little Round Top, as he would have + done if he had had the military coup d'oeil. + </p> + <p> + Now, I desire to compare with Hooker's recorded words, and the utterances + of Fast Day, the actual performance, and see what "loyalty to Hooker," as + voted in Music Hall, means. Chancellorsville bristles with points of + criticism, and there are some few points of possible disagreement. Of the + latter the principal ones upon which Hooker's formal apologists rely, are + the destruction of the Eleventh Corps through Howard's alleged + carelessness, and the failure of Sedgwick to perform the herculean task + assigned to him in coming to Hooker's support. Allowing, for the moment, + that Howard and Sedgwick were entirely at fault, and eliminating these two + questions entirely from the issue, let us see what Hooker himself did, + bearing in mind that he has officially acknowledged that he knew, + substantially, the number of Lee's army, and bearing also in mind that the + following are facts which can be disputed only by denying the truth and + accuracy of all the reports, Federal and Confederate, taken as a body; and + these happen to dovetail into each other in one so consistent whole, that + they leave to the careful student none but entirely insignificant items + open to doubt. + </p> + <p> + From Saturday at 8 A.M. till Sunday noon, some twenty-eight hours, Hooker + with seventy-five thousand, and, after the arrival of the First Corps, + nearly ninety thousand men, lay between the separated wings of Lee's army + of twenty-four thousand and seventeen thousand men respectively, being all + the while cognizant of the facts. Had ever a general a better chance to + whip his enemy in detail? And yet we were badly beaten in this fight. Now, + if loyalty to Hooker requires us to believe that his conduct of this + campaign was even respectable, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, + respectably led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, two + to one. Will the soldiers of the ever-faithful army accept this as an + explanation of our defeat? + </p> + <p> + Again: from Sunday noon till Monday at 9 A.M., twenty-one hours, Hooker, + with over eighty thousand men, was held in the White House lines by a + force of twenty-seven thousand. If loyalty to Hooker requires us to + believe that this was even respectable generalship, it follows that the + Army of the Potomac, well led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern + Virginia, three to one. Shall we accept this as an explanation of our + defeat? + </p> + <p> + Again: from Monday at 9 A.M. till Tuesday at 4 P.M., thirty-one hours, + against the advice of all his corps commanders except Sickles and Couch + (the latter agreeing to retreat only because he felt that the army would + be defeated under Hooker whatever they might do), Hooker, with eighty + thousand men, was held in the White House lines by a force of nineteen + thousand, while the rest turned upon and demolished Sedgwick. If loyalty + to Hooker requires us to believe that this was even respectable + generalship, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, well led, could be + defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, four to one. Shall we accept + this as an explanation of our defeat? + </p> + <p> + If there is in the world's military history a parallel to this + extraordinary generalship, for which any one who has even pretended to + study the art of war is able to find an excuse, I have failed to find such + an instance in the course of many years' reading, and shall be happy to + have it pointed out to me. Hooker's wound cannot be alleged in + extenuation. If he was disabled, his duty was to turn the command over to + Couch, the next in rank. If he did not do this, he was responsible for + what followed. And he retained the command himself, only using Couch as + his mouthpiece. + </p> + <p> + I have always maintained, that, man for man, the Army of the Potomac was + at any time the equal of the Army of Northern Virginia, and that, man for + man, the old Third Corps has proved itself good for Jackson's in its + palmiest days. When, therefore, the Army of the Potomac was, as here, + defeated or bottled up by one-half, one-third, or one-quarter its force of + the enemy, my loyalty to that army demands that I seek a reason other than + Hooker's alleged lack of heart of his subordinate officers. And this + reason is only to be found in Hooker's inability to handle so many men. + All the resolutions in the world, passed under a furore of misstatement + and misconception, even by such a noble body of men as Third-Corps + veterans, will not re-habilitate Joseph Hooker's military character during + these five days, nor make him other than a morally and intellectually + impotent man from May 1 to May 5, 1863. Loyalty to Hooker, so-called, is + disloyalty to the grand old army, disloyalty to the seventeen thousand men + who fell, disloyalty to every comrade who fought at Chancellorsville. I + begrudge no man the desire to blanket facts and smother truth in order to + turn a galling defeat into a respectable campaign; I begrudge no man his + acceptance of Hooker's theory that Chancellorsville was not a disaster; I + begrudge no one his faith in Hooker as a successful battle-field commander + of the Army of the Potomac. But let it be well understood that this faith + of necessity implies the fact that the Army of the Potomac was unable or + unwilling to fight one-quarter its number of Lee's troops. I prefer my + faith in the stanch, patient army, in its noble rank and file, in its + gallant officers, from company to corps; and I refuse to accept Hooker's + insult to his subordinates as any explanation for allowing the Army of the + Potomac to "be here defeated without ever being fought." + </p> + <p> + The Army of the Potomac was better than its commanders from first to last. + It was, beyond speaking, superior to its commander during the fighting + days at Chancellorsville. As a corps commander, Joseph Hooker will always + be a type and household word. In logistics, even as commander of the Army + of the Potomac, he deserves high praise. But when it comes to fighting the + army at Chancellorsville, let whoso will keep his loyalty to Hooker, + without protest from me. I claim for myself and the bulk of my comrades + the right, equally without protest, sneers, or resolutions, to express my + loyalty to the rank and file, my loyalty to the officers, and my loyalty + to the army as a whole. And I claim, moreover, the right, without protest, + sneers, or resolutions, to show that on this field it was the general + commanding, and not the army, whose lapses caused defeat. Not that I + object to these Fast-Day resolutions. I believe that I can still struggle + onward in life, even under the contempt of their authors. But partisanship + in matters of history is a boomerang which always flies back to whack its + thrower. And Fast Day's performance was baldly partisan. + </p> + <p> + I am satisfied to abide the verdict of all soldiers, of all citizens, who + ever studied the facts of this campaign. What ever the action of any + meeting of old soldiers may be under partial knowledge of facts, under the + influence of heated or sectional discussion, or under the whipping-in of a + member of Hooker's staff, I do not believe that with the issue squarely + put before them, and the facts plainly stated, any but a very + inconsiderable fraction, and that not the most intelligent one, of the men + of the Army of the Potomac, will give their suffrage to what has been + suddenly discovered to be loyalty due to Gen. Joseph Hooker, as against + loyalty to the Army of the Potomac. + </p> + <p> + The recent course of lectures at the Lowell Institute was intended to be a + purely military one. There was no intention of bringing politics or + sectional pride into the discussion, and it was thought that the lectures + could to-day be delivered without rousing a breath of ancient animosity. + If there was any campaign during our civil war which was especially, in a + military sense, a glorious one for the rebels, and an ignominious one for + us, it was Chancellorsville. It is indeed a pity that the skill of the one + side and the errors of the other cannot be once again pointed out, that + the true and only possible explanation of Hooker's one hundred and thirty + thousand men being defeated by Lee's sixty thousand cannot be once again + stated, without eliciting from a body of veterans of the old Third Corps a + set of condemnatory resolutions. There has been some very heated criticism + of the recent lectures, and not a little fault-finding with the lecturers. + I presume that none of the gentlemen who participated in the course would + feel like denying the inference, so often suggested, that the censors + might have done much better than they were able to do. Such censors + generally can. These dozen lecturers have all been earnest students of our + civil war, as is abundantly testified by the twenty odd volumes on the + subject published by them since the reports of operations became + available; and they keenly feel that modesty which is always bred of + study. Such as they had, they were glad to give the public; nor do they in + any wise shrink from generous disagreement or courteous criticism. I + submit, however, that some of the carping which has been indulged in is + scarcely apt to lead to the correction of errors, or the elucidation of + truth. It is passing strange, that, at this late day, one may not + criticise the military operations without arousing the evil spirit of the + war. Can we not aim at truth, rather than self-gratulation, which will + live no longer than we do? Criticism has always been indulged in, always + will be. If a Frederick may be dissected by a Lloyd, if a Napoleon may be + sat on in judgment by a Lanfrey, may not the merest tyro in the art of war + he pardoned for reviewing Hooker? The gallant soldier who helped make + history rarely writes history. The same spirit which sent him to the front + in 1861 generally keeps him busy to-day with the material interests of the + country. Despite the certainly novel fling of Fast Day at one who went + into service as a mere boy, it remains a fact that rank, without the + devoted study of years and a single eye to truth, will not enable any one + to write history. It was proven beyond a peradventure on Fast Day, that + the command of a corps, let alone a division, will not of itself breed a + historian. Partisanship never will. + </p> + <p> + Truth will get written some day. I myself prefer to write as an American, + forgetting North and South, and to pass down to those who will write + better than any of us, as one who tried to speak the truth, whomsoever it + struck. It is not I who criticise, who condemn Joseph Hooker: it is the + maxims of every master, of every authority on the art of war. Not one of + Hooker's apologists can turn to the history of a master's achievements, or + to a volume of any accepted authority, without finding his pet commander + condemned, in every action, and on every page, for the faults of the + fighting days at Chancellorsville. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> +It was assumed on Fast Day that one should criticise only what he saw. +I have never understood that Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman +Empire" is any the less good because he did not live in the first few +centuries of the Christian era, or that Jomini could write any less +well of Frederick than of Napoleon. Service certainly helps a man in his +researches or work, but it only helps. The best critic may be one who +never served. I think I was the first officer to whom the Secretary of +War permitted free use of the rebel archives for study. I have had good +opportunities. How I have used them, I leave to others to say. It is +easy to capture a meeting of honest-hearted veterans by such lamentable +prestidigitation as was exhibited on Fast Day, and to pass any +resolutions desired, by appealing to their enthusiasm. I prefer to be +judged by the sober after-thought of men who are neither partisans, +nor ready to warp facts or make partial statements to sustain their +theories. + + THEODORE A. DODGE. +BOSTON, April 10, 1886. +</pre> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0040" id="link2H_4_0040"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <div class="mynote"> + <h2> + Transcriber's Appendix: Transcription notes: + </h2> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + The first edition of this book was published in 1881. The author's + appendix was added in the second edition, in 1886, which is the source + for this etext. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + The following modifications were applied while transcribing the + printed book to e-text: + + chapter 4 + - table on p 19, fixed typo ("McGown", should be "McGowan") + + chapter 12 + - p 71, para 1, fixed typo ("inititate") + + chapter 18 + - p 111, para 1, fixed typo ("Pleasanton") + + chapter 27 + - p 180, para 1, fixed "the the" + + Limitations imposed by converting to plain ASCII: + - The words "manoeuvre", "manoeuvres" and "manoeuvring" are printed in + the book using the "oe" ligature. The term "coup d'oeil" was also + printed with the "oe" ligature, "minutiae" was printed using the "ae" + ligature, and several other French terms (such as "elan" and "echelon") + were printed with accented vowels. However, this does not seem enough + to merit an 8-bit text. + - Italics were printed for various non-English words and phrases, and + occasionally for emphasis. For the most part, these were simply + converted to plain text. However, I did use underscores to denote + two italicized phrases in the author's appendix, where the use of + italics was more significant. +</pre> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + I did not modify: + - The phrases "on each side the road", "on both sides the road" + - The first paragraph of chapter 22 contains the phrase + "angle of refusal or Archer and McGowan" + I believe "or" is incorrect and should be probably "for" or "of", but + I don't know which. "or" is printed in both the 1881 and 1886 editions, + so I left it as is. +</pre> + <br /> + </div> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Campaign of Chancellorsville, by +Theodore A. 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