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diff --git a/old/cchan10.txt b/old/cchan10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..81e658c --- /dev/null +++ b/old/cchan10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8094 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Campaign of Chancellorsville +by Theodore A. Dodge + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: The Campaign of Chancellorsville + +Author: Theodore A. Dodge + +Release Date: May, 2004 [EBook #5715] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on August 14, 2002] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE *** + + + + +This etext was produced by Ken Reeder <kreeder@mailsnare.net> + + + + +Errata and other transcription notes are included as an appendix + +As companion to this etext, I recommend maps available on the Internet +from the History Department of the U. S. Military Academy: + http://www.dean.usma.edu/history + http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/ACivilWarPages/ACWToC.htm + + + + +THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE + +by Theodore A. Dodge + + + +To the members of The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, +of whose researches into the history of our Civil War the following +pages form but a modest part, this volume is, with Sincere Regard, +Dedicated by the author. + + + +CONTENTS. + + I. INTRODUCTION + II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS + III. HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC + IV. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA + V. DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK + VI. THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID + VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING + VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING + IX. LEE'S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS + X. HOOKER'S ADVANCE FRIDAY + XI. POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE + XII. JACKSON'S MARCH AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE + XIII. HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES + XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS + XV. SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK + XVI. JACKSON'S ATTACK + XVII. CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS + XVIII. HOOKER'S PARRY + XIX. THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK + XX. STONEWALL JACKSON + XXI. POSTION AT FAIRVIEW + XXII. THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW + XXIII. THE LEFT CENTRE + XXIV. THE NEW LINES + XXV. SUNDAY'S MISCARRIAGE + XXVI. SEDGWICK'S CHANGE OF ORDERS + XXVII. SEDGWICK'S ASSAULT + XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARD HOOKER + XXIX. SALEM CHURCH + XXX. SEDGWICK IN DIFFICULTY + XXXI. SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS + XXXII. HOOKER'S CRITICISMS + XXXIII. HOOKER'S FURTHER PLANS + XXXIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES + XXXV. OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS + XXXVI. HOOKER'S RESUME + XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE + APPENDIX. + + + + +THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. + +I. + +INTRODUCTION. + + +It must seem to the casual reader of the history of the war of 1861-65, +that enough has already been written upon the campaign of Chancellorsville. +And there are numerous brilliant essays, in the histories now before the +public, which give a coup-d'oeil more or less accurate of this ten-days' +passage of arms. But none of these spread before the reader facts +sufficiently detailed to illustrate the particular theory advanced by +each to account for the defeat of the Army of the Potomac on this field. + +The stigma besmirching the character of the Eleventh Corps, and of +Howard, its then commanding general, for a panic and rout in but a small +degree owing to them; the unjust strictures passed upon Sedgwick for his +failure to execute a practically impossible order; the truly remarkable +blunders into which Gen. Hooker allowed himself to lapse, in endeavoring +to explain away his responsibility for the disaster; the bare fact, +indeed, that the Army of the Potomac was here beaten by Lee, with +one-half its force; and the very partial publication, thus far, of the +details of the campaign, and the causes of our defeat,--may stand as +excuse for one more attempt to make plain its operations to the +survivors of the one hundred and eighty thousand men who there bore arms, +and to the few who harbor some interest in the subject as mere history. + +To say that Gen. Hooker lapsed into blunders in explaining his share in +this defeat, is to use a form of words purposely tempered to the memory +of a gallant soldier, who, whatever his shortcomings, has done his +country signal service; and to avoid the imputation of baldly throwing +down the gauntlet of ungracious criticism. All reference to Gen. Hooker's +skill or conduct in this, one of the best conceived and most fatally +mismanaged of the many unsuccessful advances of the Army of the Potomac, +is made with sincere appreciation of his many admirable qualities, +frankly, and untinged by bitterness. But it must be remembered, +that Gen. Hooker has left himself on record as the author of many harsh +reflections upon his subordinates; and that to mete out even justice to +all requires unvarnished truth. + +The most uncalled-for slur upon the conduct of his lieutenants probably +occurs in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. +Before withdrawing from the south side of the Rappahannock, after the +decisive events of the battle-field had cooped up the army between the +river and its intrenchments, Hooker called together all his corps +commanders, and requested their several opinions as to the advisability +of attack or retreat. Whatever discussion may have then been had, +it was generally understood, in after-days, that all but one of these +generals had expressed himself freely for an immediate advance. In +referring to this understanding, while denying its correctness, Hooker +used the following language:-- + +"So far as my experience extends, there are in all armies officers more +valiant after the fight than while it is pending; and, when a truthful +history of the Rebellion shall be written, it will be found that the +Army of the Potomac is not an exception." + +Merely to characterize as ungenerous this aspersion upon the courage of +such men as then served under Hooker, savors of error on the side of +leniency. And, inasmuch as these words strike, as it were, the keynote +of all the statements which Hooker has vouchsafed with reference to +these events, they might be assumed fairly to open the door to unsparing +criticism. But it is hoped that this course has been avoided; and that +what censure is dealt out to Gen. Hooker in the succeeding pages will be +accepted, even by his advocates, in the kindly spirit in which it is +meant, and in which every soldier of the beloved old Army of the Potomac +must uniformly refer to every other. + +There is, moreover, no work on Chancellorsville which results from +research into all records now accessible. + +The work of Allan and Hotchkiss, of 1867, than which nothing can be more +even-handed, or more admirable as far as it goes, adopts generally the +statements made in the reports of the Confederate generals: and these +are necessarily one-sided; reports of general officers concerning their +own operations invariably are. Allan and Hotchkiss wrote with only the +Richmond records before them, in addition to such information from the +Federal standpoint as may be found in general orders, the evidence given +before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and newspaper +correspondence. At that time many of the Federal reports were not to be +had: such as were at the War Department were hardly accessible. Reports +had been duly made by all superior officers engaged in and surviving +this campaign, excepting only the general in command; but, strange to +say, not only did Gen. Hooker refrain from making a report, but he +retained in his personal possession many of the records of the Army of +the Potomac covering the period of his command, and it is only since his +death that these records have been in part recovered by the Secretary of +War. Some are still missing, but they probably contain no important +matter not fully given elsewhere. + +Although Hooker testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the +War: "Without an exception I forwarded to that office"--the War +Department--"all the reports and returns and information concerning the +army, and furnished them promptly, and, as I think, as no other army +commander has done," his memory had at the moment played him traitor, +for a considerable part of these records were not disposed of as stated. +It should be remarked, however, that Hooker is not singular in this +leaning towards the meum in the matter of records. + +The sources relied on for the facts herein given are the reports of the +officers engaged, both Federal and Confederate, added to many private +notes, memoranda, and maps, made by them; the testimony before the +Committee on the Conduct of the War, which included Hooker's +examination; and the maps made by the Engineer Department of the +United-States Army, and those of Capt. Hotchkiss. + +This latter officer was the topographical engineer of the Second Corps +of the Army of Northern Virginia, and made his surveys by order of +Gen. Lee immediately after the campaign. They are of the greatest +assistance and value. + +Eighteen years have elapsed since North and South crossed swords upon +this memorable field; and it would seem that all Americans can now +contemplate with unruffled heart the errors under which "the Army of the +Potomac was here beaten without ever being fought," as well as boast +with equal pride, not only of the abundant courage displayed by either +side, but of the calm skill with which Gen. Lee wrested victory from a +situation desperately compromised, and of the genius of that greatest of +his lieutenants, Thomas J. Jackson, who here sealed with his blood his +fidelity to the cause he loved so well. + +It has been said that this campaign furnishes as much material for the +psychological as for the military student. And certainly nothing less +than a careful analysis of Hooker's character can explain the abnormal +condition into which his mental and physical energy sank during the +second act of this drama. He began with really masterly moves, speedily +placing his wary adversary at the saddest disadvantage. But, having +attained this height, his power seemed to pass away as from an +over-tasked mind. With twice the weight of arm, and as keen a blade, +he appeared quite unable to parry a single lunge of Lee's, quite unable +to thrust himself. He allowed his corps commanders to be beaten in +detail, with no apparent effort to aid them from his abundant resources, +the while his opponent was demanding from every man in his command the +last ounce of his strength. And he finally retired, dazed and weary, +across the river he had so ably and boastingly placed behind him ten +days before, against the opinion of nearly all his subordinates; for in +this case the conditions were so plain that even an informal council of +war advised a fight. + +With character-study, however, this sketch has nothing to do. It is +confined to describing events, and suggesting queries for the curious in +military history. + + + + +II. + +CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS. + + +The first two years of civil strife had closed. The American people, +which so far had shown more aptness at learning than skill in waging war, +may be said to have passed through its apprenticeship in arms. The +broad plan of operations, intelligently but rudely conceived at the +outset by the greater spirits among our commanders, began to be more +clearly grasped. The political strategy of both contestants made +Virginia the field on which the left wing of the Federal armies pivoted, +while the right swung farther and farther south and east, and the +Confederates gallantly struggled for every foot of territory, yielding +only to the inexorable. This right wing had already possession of the +Mississippi as far south as Vicksburg, around which place Grant was +preparing to tighten his coils; it had occupied the line of the +Tennessee River, and had rendered useless to the Confederates the +railroad from Memphis to Chattanooga, which had been the great central +artery between Richmond and the trans-Mississippi States. The Southern +partisans, with Morgan and Forrest as typical chiefs, had up to this +period played, in the West especially, a very important part. They as +much exceeded our cavalry in enterprise as they had advantage over it in +knowledge of the country and in assistance from its population. They +had on more than one occasion tapped the too long and slender lines of +operation of our foremost armies. They had sent Grant to the right- +about from his first march on Vicksburg, thus neutralizing Sherman's +attempt at Chickasaw Bayou. They had compelled Buell to forfeit his +hardly-earned footing, and to fall back from the Tennessee River to +Louisville at the double-quick in order to beat Bragg in the race +towards the gate of the Northern States, which disaster was happily soon +retrieved by the latter's bloody check before Murfreesborough. Yet, +despite these back-sets, the general course of events showed that +Providence remained on the side of the heaviest battalions; and the +spring of 1863 saw our armies extended from the pivot midway between the +rival capitals in a more or less irregular line, and interrupted by the +Alleghany Mountains, to Vicksburg and the Father of Waters. + +Great as was the importance of success in Virginia, the Confederates had +appreciated the fact as had not the political soldiers at the head of +the Federal department of war. Our resources always enabled us to keep +more men, and more and better material, on this battle-ground, than the +Confederates could do; but this strength was constantly offset by the +ability of the Southern generals, and their independence of action, +as opposed to the frequent unskilfulness of ours, who were not only +never long in command, but were then tied hand and foot to some ideal +plan for insuring the safety of Washington. The political conditions +under which the Army of the Potomac had so far constantly acted had +never allowed it to do justice to its numbers, mobility, or courage; +while Mr. Lincoln, who actually assumed the powers of commander-in-chief, +technically intrusted to him by the Constitution, was swayed to and fro +by his own fears for the safety of his capital, and by political schemes +and military obtuseness at his elbow. + +Whether the tedious delays and deferred success, occasioned by these +circumstances, were not eventually a benefit, in that they enabled the +country to bring forth in the fulness of time the conditions leading to +the extinguishment of slavery, which an earlier close of the war might +not have seen; not to mention the better appreciation by either +combatant of the value of the other, which a struggle to the bitter end +alone could generate,--is a question for the political student. But it +will always remain in doubt whether the practical exhaustion of the +resources of the South was not a condition precedent to ending the +war,--whether, in sooth, the "last ditch" was not actually reached when +Lee surrendered at Appomattox. + +In the West, merit had by this time brought to the surface the generals +who later led us to successful victories. Their distance from the +central controlling power resulted in their being let alone to work out +their own salvation. Opposed to them had been some excellent but not +the best of the Confederate leaders; while Virginia boasted the elite of +the Southern troops, the strongest of the captains, and the most daring +of the lieutenants, developed by the war. + +Since the Russian campaign of Bonaparte, no such vast forces had been +under arms. To command these required not only the divine military +spark, but hardly-acquired experience. And the mimic war which the +elements of European army life always affords had been wanting to +educate our generals. It is not wonderful, then, that two years of +fruitless campaigning was needed to teach our leaders how to utilize on +such difficult terrain material equally vast in extent and uncouth in +quality. For, however apt the American to learn the trade of war,--or +any other,--it is a moot-point whether his independence of character is +compatible with the perfect soldier, as typified in Friedrich's +regiments, or the Old Guard. + +But ability, native or acquired, forced its way to the front; and the +requisite experience was gradually gained, for the school was one where +the trade was quickly taught. Said Gen. Meade on one occasion, "The art +of war must be acquired like any other. Either an officer must learn it +at the academy, or he must learn it by experience in the field. +Provided he has learned it, I don't care whether he is a West-Pointer, +or not." + +In the East, then, the army had been led by McDowell, McClellan, Pope, +and Burnside, to victory and defeat equally fruitless. The one +experiment so far tried, of giving the Army of the Potomac a leader from +the West, culminating in the disaster of the second Bull Run, was not +apt to be repeated within the year. That soldier of equal merit and +modesty, whom the Army of the Potomac had been gradually educating as +its future and permanent leader, was still unpretentiously commanding a +corps, and learning by the successes and failures of his superiors. +And who shall say that the results accomplished by Grant, Sherman, +Thomas, Sheridan, and Meade, were not largely due to their good fortune +in not being too early thrust to the front? "For," as says Swinton, +"it was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the +nation's ignorance of war." + +In the South, the signs of exhaustion had not yet become grave. The +conscription act, passed in April, 1862, had kept the ranks full. +The hope of foreign intervention, though distant, was by no means wholly +abandoned. Financial matters had not yet assumed an entirely desperate +complexion. Nor had the belief in the royalty of cotton received its +coup de grace. The vigor and courage of the Confederacy were unabated, +and the unity of parties in the one object of resistance to invasion +doubled its effective strength. Perhaps this moment was the flood-tide +of Southern enthusiasm and confidence; which, after the Pennsylvania +campaign, began to ebb. It is not intended to convey the idea that the +South was prosperous. On the contrary, those who read the signs aright, +saw and predicted its approaching decline. But, as far as its power of +resistance went, it was at its highest when compared with the +momentarily lessened aggressiveness of the North. For the anti-war +party was doing its best to tie the hands of the administration; and, +while this in no wise lessened the flow of men and material to the front, +it produced a grave effect upon the moral strength which our chiefs were +able to infuse into their method of conducting the war. + + + + +III. + +HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. + + +The unfortunate course of events during the early winter of 1862-63 had +resulted in a grievous loss of morale in the Army of the Potomac. +The useless slaughter of Marye's Heights was, after a few weeks, +succeeded by that most huge of all strategic jokes, the Mud March; and +Gen. Burnside retired from a position he had never sought, to the +satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the warm personal +regard, of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years had robbed of strength, +but not of gallantry, was relieved at his own request; Franklin was +shelved. Hooker thus became senior general officer, and succeeded to +the command. + +No man enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac. +He had forced himself upon its notice. From Bull Run, after which +action he is said to have remarked to Mr. Lincoln that he knew more than +any one on that field; through Williamsburg, where he so gallantly held +his own against odds during the entire day, and with exhausted +ammunition, until relieved by Kearney; before Richmond; during the Seven +Days; in the railroad-cutting at Manassas; at Antietam, where he forced +the fighting with so much determination, if not wisdom, on the Union +right; up to Fredericksburg, where, after a personal protest to his +commanding officer, he went in and fought his troops "until he thought +he had lost as many men as he was ordered to lose,"--Hooker's character +as man and soldier had been marked. His commands so far had been +limited; and he had a frank, manly way of winning the hearts of his +soldiers. He was in constant motion about the army while it lay in +camp; his appearance always attracted attention; and he was as well +known to almost every regiment as its own commander. He was a +representative man. + +It is not astonishing that Mr. Lincoln, or the Washington pseudo- +strategists who were his military advisers, could not distinguish, +in selecting a chief who should be capable of leading the Army of the +Potomac to victory, between the gallant corps-commander, who achieves +brilliant results under limited responsibility, and the leader, upon +whose sole resources of mind and courage devolve not only the +instruction for health, equipment, rationing, march, or attack, of each +of his subordinates, but the graver weight of prompt and correct +decision and immediate action under every one of the kaleidoscopic +changes of a campaign or a battle-field. It required more knowledge of +the requisites of war, as well as a broader judgment of character, +than Mr. Lincoln had had opportunity to form of the several soldiers of +the army, to insure a happy choice. + +And, doubtless, Hooker's self-assertiveness, success as a brigade, +division, and corps commander, and decided appearance of large ability, +shared equally in procuring his appointment. No one will deny Hooker's +capacity in certain directions, or up to a given test. His whole career +shows an exceptional power in "riding to orders." But he sadly lacked +that rare combination of qualities and reserve power necessary to lead a +hundred and twenty-five thousand men against such a foe as Lee. + +Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot in Hooker's character than the +odd pride he took in Mr. Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him at +the time of his appointment, here following:-- + + + EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D.C., + Jan. 26, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. + +General,--I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. +Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient +reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some +things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe +you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also +believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are +right. You have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if not an +indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable +bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during Gen. Burnside's +command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and +thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to +the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother-officer. +I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying that +both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was +not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. +Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now +ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. +The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is +neither more nor less than it has done or will do for all commanders. +I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse into the army, +of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, +will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it +down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any +good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware +of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless +vigilance go forward, and give us victories. + + Yours very truly, + A. LINCOLN. + + +Hooker was appointed Jan. 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnest +words, took leave of the army. + +The troops received their new chief with a heartiness and confidence, +which, since McClellan's re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hooker +was to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of this +weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary changes he at once +began to make,--for Hooker never lacked the power of organization,--were +accepted with alacrity; and a spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded +speedily to what had been almost a defiant obedience. + +The army was in a lamentably low state of efficiency. Politics mingled +with camp duties; and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with +an entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the Potomac +to accomplish any thing, were pronounced. Desertions occurred at the +rate of two hundred a day, facilitated by relatives, who sent from home +civilian clothing to soldiers at the front. Hooker states that he found +2,922 officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as absent on the rolls +of the army, a large proportion from causes unknown. Sharp and +efficient measures were at once adopted, which speedily checked this +alarming depletion of the ranks. Furloughs in reasonable quantity were +allowed to deserving men and a limited number of officers. Work was +found for the rank and file in drill and outpost duty sufficient to +prevent idle habits. The commissariat was closely watched, and fresh +rations more frequently issued, which much improved the health of the +army. The system of picket-duty was more thoroughly developed, and so +vigilantly carried out as to impress its importance upon, as well as +teach its details to, the troops. + +The cavalry, hitherto distributed by regiments throughout the army, +was now consolidated into one corps, and from this time became a +valuable element in the service, for it daily grew in efficiency. +And such opportunities of doing field-work as a body were afforded it as +circumstances allowed. + +The grand divisions of Burnside were abolished, and the army divided +into seven infantry corps. + +The testimony of all general officers of the Army of the Potomac concurs +in awarding the highest praise to Hooker for the manner in which he +improved the condition of the troops during the three months he was in +command prior to Chancellorsville. Himself says before the Committee on +the Conduct of the War: "During the season of preparation the army made +rapid strides in discipline, instruction and morale, and early in April +was in a condition to inspire the highest expectations." And Swinton +well sums up: "Under Hooker's influence the tone of the army underwent a +change which would appear astonishing had not its elastic vitality been +so often proved." + +On the 30th of April the Army of the Potomac, exclusive of provost-guard, +consisted of about a hundred and thirty thousand men under the +colors,--"for duty equipped," according to the morning report,-- +distributed among the several army corps as follows:-- + + { Wadsworth, } + 1st Corps, Gen. Reynolds. . { Robinson, } 16,908 + { Doubleday, } + + + { Hancock, } + 2d Corps, Gen. Couch . . { Gibbon, } 16,893 + { French, } + + + { Birney, } + 3d Corps, Gen. Sickles . . { Berry, } 18,721 + { Whipple, } + + { Griffin, } + 5th Corps, Gen. Meade . . { Humphreys, } 15,724 + { Sykes, } + + { Brooks, } + 6th Corps, Gen. Sedgwick. . { Howe, } 23,667 + { Newton, } + + { Devens, } + 11th Corps, Gen. Howard . . { Schurz, } 12,977 + { Steinwehr, } + + 12th Corps, Gen. Slocum . . { Williams, } 13,450 + { Geary, } + + { Pleasonton, } + Cavalry Corps, Gen. Stoneman. { Gregg, } 11,541 + { Averell, } + { Buford, Reserve Brigade,} + + Artillery, Gen. Hunt, about 400 guns. Artillery reserve 1,610 + ------- + Total . . . . . . . . . 131,491 + + + + +IV. + +THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. + + +While the Army of the Potomac lay about Falmouth, awaiting orders to +move, Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from Banks's +Ford above, to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck) below Fredericksburg, +a line some fifteen miles in length as the crow flies. The crests of +the hills on which lay the Army of Northern Virginia were from +three-quarters of a mile to a mile and a half back from, and +substantially parallel to, the river. Rifle-pits commanded every +available crossing, which, being few and difficult, were easily guarded. +Continuous lines of infantry parapets, broken by battery epaulements +located for sweeping the wide approaches from the river, extended the +whole distance; while abattis strengthened every place which the nature +of the ground allowed an attacking column to pass. + +The roads by which the various detachments of the army could +intercommunicate for concentration upon any given point were numerous +and well kept up, and were familiar to all commanding and staff officers. + +Lee's forces numbered about sixty thousand men, for duty, distributed in +the following organizations. As the brigades nearly equalled our +divisions in size, they are given by name. + + + { Mahone's brigade. } + { Posey's " } + { Anderson's { Wilcox's " } + { division. { Perry's " } + { { Wright's " } + Part of Longstreet's { } 17,000 + 1st Corps { { Kershaw's " } + { McLaws' { Semmes's " } + { division. { Wofford's " } + { Barksdale's " } + + { Heth's " } + { Pender's " } + { A. P. Hill's { Archer's " } 11,000 + { division. { McGowan's " } + { { Lane's " } + { { Thomas's " } + { + { { Ramseur's " } + { D. H. Hill's { Rodes's " } + { division. { Dole's " } 9,000 + { { Iverson's " } + { { Colquitt's " } + Jackson's 2d Corps. { + { { Colston's " } + { Trimble's { Jones's " } 6,000 + { division. { Nichols's " } + { { Paxton's " } + { + { { Gordon's " } + { Early's { Hays's " } 7,400 + { division. { Smith's " } + { { Hoke's " } + + Stuart's Cavalry { Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade . . 1,800 + division { W. H. F. Lee's " . . . 900 + +Artillery, 170 pieces. . . . . . . . 5,000 + ------ + Total . . . . . . . . . 58,100 + +Hotchkiss and Allan state that there may have been three to five +thousand more men in line at the time of Hooker's attack. + +As will be noticed from the table, only part of Longstreet's corps was +present. The main body had been sent, about Feb. 1, under command of +its chief, to operate in the region between Petersburg and Suffolk, +where our forces under Peck were making a demonstration. This detail +reduced Lee's army by nearly one-quarter. + +During the winter, Lee's forces had been distributed as follows:-- + +The old battle-ground of Dec. 13 was occupied by the First Corps; while +Jackson with his Second Corps held Hamilton's Crossing, and extended his +lines down to Port Royal. Stuart's cavalry division prolonged the left +to Beverly Ford on the upper Rappahannock, and scoured the country as +far as the Pamunkey region. Hampton's brigade of cavalry had been sent +to the rear to recruit, and Fitz Lee's had taken its place at Culpeper, +from which point it extended so as to touch Lee's left flank at Banks's +Ford. The brigade of W. H. F. Lee was on the Confederate right. +Stuart retained command of the entire force, but had his headquarters at +Culpeper. + +The supplies of the army were received by the Fredericksburg and +Richmond Railroad from the capital, and from the depots on the Virginia +Central. Lee had been assiduous in re-organizing his forces, in +collecting an abundance of supplies, in checking desertions, and in +procuring re-enforcements. And the vigor with which the conscription +was pushed swelled his strength so materially that in three months +Jackson's corps alone shows an increase from a force of twenty-five +thousand up to thirty-three thousand men "for duty." The staff of the +army was created a separate organization. The cavalry had already been +successfully consolidated. And now the artillery was embodied in a +special organization under Gen. Pendleton, and an engineer regiment put +on foot. + +The morale of the Army of Northern Virginia could not be finer. The +forced retreat of McClellan from before Richmond; the driving of Pope +from his vaunted positions in its front; the Maryland campaign with its +deliberate withdrawal from an army of twice its strength; finally the +bloody check to Burnside,--had furnished a succession of triumphs which +would lend any troops self-confidence and high courage. But, in +addition to all this, the average of the men of this army were older and +more hardened soldiers than those of the Army of the Potomac. The early +conscription acts of the Confederacy had made it difficult for men once +inured to the steady bearing and rough life of the soldier, and to the +hard fare of camp-life, to withdraw from the ranks. + +In Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War +occurs this tribute to the Confederate infantry: "Our artillery had +always been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, +except in discipline; and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, +never did equal Lee's army. With a rank and file vastly inferior to our +own, intellectually and physically, that army has, by discipline alone, +acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency, unsurpassed, in my +judgment, in ancient or modern times. We have not been able to rival it, +nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel +armies." + +The cavalry force was small, but energetic and enterprising to a degree +as yet by no means equalled by our own. The artillery was neither as +good, nor as well equipped or served, as ours, but was commanded with +intelligence, and able to give a good account of itself. + + + + +V. + +DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK. + + +An attack of Lee's position in front, even had Burnside's experience not +demonstrated its folly, seemed to promise great loss of life without +corresponding success. + +To turn his right flank required the moving of pontoon trains and +artillery over the worst of roads for at least twenty miles, through a +country cut up by a multitude of streams running across the route to be +taken, and emptying into either the Potomac or Rappahannock; all +requiring more or less bridging. + +Lee's spy system was excellent. It has been claimed in Southern reports, +that his staff had deciphered our signal code by watching a station at +Stafford. And Butterfield admits this in one of his despatches of May 3. +He would speedily ascertain any such movement, and could create +formidable intrenchments on one side the river, as fast as we could +build or repair roads on which to move down, upon the other. Moreover, +there was a thousand feet of stream to bridge at the first available +place below Skenker's Neck. + +There remained nothing to do but to turn Lee's left flank; and this +could only be accomplished by stratagem, for Lee had strengthened every +part of the river by which Hooker could attempt a passage. + +But this problem was, despite its difficulties, still possible of +solution; and Hooker set himself to work to elucidate it. + +So soon as he had matured his plan, which he elaborated with the +greatest care, but kept perfectly secret from every one until the +movements themselves developed it, although making use of the knowledge +and skill of all his generals both before and during its initiation, +he speedily prepared for its vigorous execution. In May, the term of +service of some twenty-two thousand nine-months and two-years men would +expire. These men he must seek to utilize in the campaign. + +The first intimation of a forward movement received by the army at large, +apart from the Cavalry Corps, had been a circular of April 13, notifying +commanding officers to have their troops supplied with eight days' +rations, and a hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition, sixty to be +carried by the soldiers, and the balance on the pack-mules. + +After the battle of Fredericksburg, the army had returned to +substantially the same positions and quarters occupied before; and here +the men had housed themselves for the winter. The Mud March had broken +up these cantonments; but after a few days' absence the several +regiments returned to their old camps, and the same huts had generally +been re-occupied by the same men. But when Fighting Joe Hooker's orders +to march were issued, no one dreamed of any thing but victory; and the +Army of the Potomac burned its ships. Nothing was left standing but the +mud walls from which the shelter-tent roofs had been stripped, and an +occasional chimney. Many of the men (though contrary to orders) set +fire to what was left, and the animus non revertendi was as universal as +the full confidence that now there lay before the Army of the Potomac a +certain road, whatever might bar the path, to the long-wished-for goal +of Richmond. + + + + +VI. + +THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID. + + +Hooker proposed to open his flank attack by cutting Lee's communications. +Accordingly, on April 12, Gen. Stoneman, commanding the Cavalry Corps, +received orders to march at seven A.M. next day, with his whole force +except one brigade. He was to ascend the Rappahannock, keeping well out +of view, and masking his movement with numerous small detachments,-- +alleging a chase of Jones's guerillas in the Shenandoah valley, as his +objective. The river was to be crossed west of the Orange and Alexandria +Railroad. At Culpeper he was to destroy or disperse Fitz Lee's brigade +of some two thousand cavalry, and at Gordonsville the infantry +provost-guard; thence to push down the Virginia Central to the +Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying every thing along the +road. As the enemy would probably retreat by the latter route, +he was to select strong points on the roads parallel to it, intrench, +and hold his ground as obstinately as possible. If Lee retreated towards +Gordonsville, he was to harass him day and night. The Confederates had +but five thousand sabres to oppose him. "Let your watchword be, Fight! +and let all your orders be, Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" exclaimed enthusiastic +Joe Hooker in this order. The primary object was to keep the Confederates +from retreating to Richmond; and Stoneman was to rely on Hooker's being +up with him in six days, or before his supplies were exhausted. +If possible, he was to detach at the most available points parties to +destroy every thing in the direction of Charlottesville, and of the +Pamunkey. + +The Cavalry Corps, except Pleasonton's brigade, which accompanied +Hooker's headquarters during this movement, left on the 13th. On the +15th Stoneman threw a division across the river at Rappahannock station, +where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses the river. But a +sudden rise in consequence of heavy rains obliged this division to +return by swimming the horses. Gen. Lee says, referring to this check, +that "their efforts to establish themselves on the south side of the +river were successfully resisted by Stuart." But the rise in the river +was the actual cause. There was no crossing of swords. + +At the time the cavalry marched, an infantry brigade and a battery were +sent to Kelley's Ford, and a regiment to United-States Ford, to hold +these crossings against scouting parties, or any counter-demonstration +on the part of the enemy. + +The river did not fall so that Stoneman could pass at that point until +the 27th, when it was too late to accomplish valuable results under the +orders of the 12th; for the whole army was now on the march. Between +the 15th and 27th the cavalry, under instructions from Hooker, remained +in camp along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. + +It has, however, never been satisfactorily explained why it might not +have crossed higher up, and have utilized these precious two weeks. +It could not have been of less use than it was, and might possibly have +been able to call Stuart's entire force away from Lee's army. Nor was +it impossible, in part at least, to do the work cut out for it. Even to +threaten Lee's communications would have seriously affected the +singleness of purpose he displayed in this campaign. + +But the operations of Stoneman, as they had no effect whatever upon the +manoeuvres of either Lee or Hooker, may be treated of separately, +as a matter almost apart from the one under consideration. + +And thus, in the failure of the cavalry raid, miscarried the first +effort of this ill-fated campaign. + +It is not often that the danger of detaching the entire cavalry force of +an army, for service at a distance from its infantry corps, is +illustrated in so marked a manner as it was on this occasion. Hooker +left himself but a small brigade, of four regiments and a horse-battery, +to do the scouting for an army of over one hundred thousand men. +Had be retained a sufficient force to march with the main body, there +would no doubt have been at least a brigade of it, instead of a few +scouts, sent out to near Old Wilderness Tavern and along the Orange +plank road to the junction of the Brock road. Jackson's movements would +then have been fully known. + +The bulk of the cavalry of an army should be with the infantry corps +when in the presence of the enemy. For cavalry are the antennae of an +army. + + + + +VII. + +THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING. + + +Gen. Hooker's plan embraced, besides a cavalry raid to sever the enemy's +communications, a demonstration in force on the left to draw the enemy's +attention, and the throwing of the main body of his forces across the +river on the right. + +As early as April 21, Doubleday of the First Corps had been sent down +the river to Port Conway with some thirty-five hundred men, to light +camp-fires, and make demonstrations with pontoons, after doing which he +returned to camp. On the 23d Col. Morrow, with the Twenty-fourth +Michigan, went down, and crossed the river to Port Royal in boats. + +These demonstrations had been intended to co-operate with Stoneman's +raid, which at these dates should have been well on Lee's rear, and to +unsettle Lee's firm footing preparatory to the heavy blows Hooker was +preparing to deliver; but, as Stoneman was delayed, these movements +failed of much of their intended effect. Nevertheless, Jackson's corps +was drawn down to the vicinity, and remained there some days. + +On Monday, April 27, Hooker issues his orders to the First, Third, +and Sixth Corps, to place themselves in position, ready to cross; the +First at Pollock's Mills Creek, and the Sixth at Franklin's Crossing, +by 3.30 A.M., on Wednesday; and the Third at a place enabling it to +cross in support of either of the others at 4.30 A.M. The troops to +remain concealed until the movement begins. Artillery to be posted by +Gen. Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the army, to protect the crossing. +Gen. Benham to have two bridges laid by 3.30 A.M. at each crossing. +Troops, as needed, to be detailed to aid his engineer brigade. + +Gen. Sedgwick to command the three corps, and make a demonstration in +full force on Wednesday morning to secure the telegraph road. Should +any considerable force be detached to meet the movement of the right +wing, Sedgwick is to carry the works at all hazards. Should the enemy +retreat towards Richmond, he is to pursue on the Bowling-Green road, +fighting wherever he reaches them, while Hooker will pursue on parallel +roads more to the west. + +This order was punctually obeyed. Gen. Hunt placed forty-two guns at +Franklin's, forty at Pollock's Mill, and sixteen at Traveller's Rest, +a mile below, a number more being held in reserve. Those in position +were so disposed as to "enfilade the rifle-pits, crush the fire of the +enemy's works on the hill, cover the throwing of the bridges, and +protect the crossing of the troops." (Hunt.) + +These three corps camped that night without fires, and the pontoons were +carried to the river by hand to insure secrecy. + +At daybreak, Wednesday, Russell's brigade crossed in boats at Franklin's +with little opposition. The bridges were then constructed; and Brooks's +division passed over with a battery, and established itself strongly on +the south side. + +At the lower crossing, Reynolds's attempts to throw the bridges early in +the morning were defeated by sharpshooters and a supporting regiment. +But about half-past eight, the fog, which had been quite dense, lifted; +and under fire of the artillery the Confederates were driven away, +and the crossing made by Wadsworth. + +During Wednesday and Thursday the entire command was held in readiness +to force a passage at any time, the bridge-heads being held by Brooks +and Wadsworth respectively. + + + + +VIII. + +THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING. + + +Hooker was a master of logistics. The forethought and excellent +judgment displayed in all orders under which these preliminary moves of +the army-corps were made, as well as the high condition to which he had +brought the army, cannot elicit higher praise than to state the fact, +that, with the exception of the Cavalry Corps, all orders issued were +carried out au pied de la lettre, and that each body of troops was on +hand at the hour and place prescribed. This eulogy must, however, +be confined to orders given prior to the time when the fighting began. + +On April 26 the commanding officers of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps +were directed to march Monday morning, the 27th, towards Kelley's Ford, +on the Rappahannock,--some fifteen miles above its junction with the +Rapidan,--Howard leading. + +As much secrecy as possible was enjoined, and the men were not to be +allowed to go down to the river. Eight days' rations to be carried in +the haversacks. Each corps to take a battery and two ambulances to a +division, the pack-train for small ammunition, and a few wagons for +forage only. The rest of the trains to be parked in the vicinity of +Banks's Ford out of sight. A sufficient detail, to be made from the +troops whose term was about to expire, to be left behind to guard camp, +and do provost duty. + +Meade was ordered to march the Fifth Corps in connection with the +Eleventh and Twelfth, and equipped in similar manner. + +The three corps to be in camp at Kelley's Ford, in positions indicated, +by four P.M. on Tuesday. + +The first day's march was to the vicinity of Hartwood Church. Next day, +at four A.M., the head of the column was in motion; and at four P.M. the +three corps were in camp at Kelley's Ford. + +At six P.M. the pontoon-bridge was begun, under charge of Capt. Comstock +of the engineers, by a detail mostly from the Eleventh Corps. Some four +hundred men of Buschbeck's brigade crossed in boats, and attacked the +enemy's pickets, which retired after firing a single shot. About ten +P.M. the bridge was finished, and the troops crossed; the Eleventh Corps +during the night, and the Twelfth Corps next morning. The Seventeenth +Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment was sent out as flankers to prevent the +Confederate scouting-parties from annoying the column. In this they +failed of entire success; as the rear of the Eleventh Corps was, during +the day, shelled by a Confederate battery belonging to Stuart's horse +artillery, and the Twelfth Corps had some slight skirmishing in its +front with cavalry detachments from the same command. + +As soon as Hooker had seen to the execution of his first orders, he +transferred his headquarters to Morrisville, five miles north of +Kelley's Ford, and superintended the execution of the crossing and +advance. Urging Meade to equal celerity and secrecy in uncovering +United-States Ford, he instructed Slocum, should Meade's crossing at +Ely's be resisted, to push a column on the south side of the Rapidan to +open the latter ford. + +At Germania Ford, on the Rapidan, previously seized by an advance party +of three or four smart marching regiments, a small body of one hundred +and twenty-five Confederate infantry, guarding the supplies for the +rebuilding of the bridge, then in progress, was captured. + +The cavalry and artillery crossed at once by the ford, as well as a +portion of the infantry, the latter wading almost to the armpits. +But the construction of the bridge was soon temporarily completed by +Gens. Geary and Kane; and the rest of the troops and the pack-mules +passed safely, by the light of huge bonfires lighted on the banks. +The men were in the highest possible spirits, and testified to their +enjoyment of the march by the utmost hilarity. + +At daylight the Twelfth Corps led the column, Geary in advance. Near +the Wilderness, the head of column was attacked from the south by some +cavalry and a couple of guns. Stuart had come up from Raccoon Ford the +day previous. But a slight demonstration cleared the road; and Stuart +retired, sending part of his force to Fredericksburg, and accompanying +the rest to Spotsylvania Court House. + +About two P.M., Thursday, these two corps, under command of Slocum, +reached Chancellorsville, and found a portion of the Fifth Corps already +in position there. The Twelfth Corps was deployed south of the plank +road, with left at the Chancellor House, and the right near Wilderness +Church, which line the Eleventh Corps prolonged to the vicinity of +Hunting Creek. + +The Fifth Corps had marched to Kelley's Ford, and crossed in rear of the +Twelfth Corps. From here, Sykes's and Griffin's divisions marched +towards Ely's Ford, preceded by Col. Devin's Sixth New York Cavalry, +which surprised the pickets at that place. The troops crossed by +wading. Humphreys remained behind to cover the passage of the trains, +and after followed the column. + +On crossing the Rapidan, Sykes was pushed towards United-States Ford, +to dislodge the Confederate force there, by thus taking in reverse their +position, while Griffin marched to Chancellorsville. The whole corps +soon after united at the latter place, and was located with its right +joining Slocum, and the left extending towards the river, facing Mine +Run. + +A skirmish of no particular moment had occurred between Griffin and +Anderson, as the former reached Chancellorsville. Anderson had been +retiring before the Federal advance, on the plank road towards +Fredericksburg. His rear guard made a short stand at the crossroads, +but withdrew after a few rounds; and Anderson took up a position near +Mine Road, where numerous ravines, perpendicular to the river, afforded +excellent successive lines of defence. + +On reaching Chancellorsville, Slocum took command of the three corps +there assembled. He was ordered to ascertain, by a cavalry party, +whether the enemy were detaching any considerable force from +Fredericksburg to meet his column. If not, an advance at all hazards +was to be made, and a position on the plank road which would uncover +Banks's Ford to be secured. If the enemy were in strong force, Slocum +was to select a position, and compel his attack. Not a moment was to be +lost until the troops were concentrated at Chancellorsville. "From that +moment all will be ours," said Hooker. + +The inconsistency of these orders can be explained only by marked +ignorance of the country. To secure a position which would uncover +Banks's Ford was certainly a great desideratum; but the possession of +Chancellorsville was far from accomplishing this end, as we shall see. + +So admirably planned and executed were all orders up to this time, +that on Thursday, by two P.M., three corps of nearly forty thousand men +were concentrated on Lee's flank, while the latter was still unaware of +the presence of any considerable Federal force in this vicinity. + +On Monday Couch had been ordered to march two divisions of his (Second) +corps to Banks' Ford, but to keep back from the river, and to show no +more than the usual pickets. One brigade and a battery to be sent to +United-States Ford, there to relieve an equal detail of the Eleventh +Corps, which would rejoin its command. All their artillery to move with +these two divisions, and to be ready to cover a forced crossing. +The division whose camps at Falmouth were most easily seen by the enemy +from across the river (it happened to be Gibbon's) to be left in camp to +do picket and provost duty. The Third Corps would be available in case +the enemy himself attempted a crossing. Gibbon to be ready to join the +command at any time. + +On Thursday, as soon as Anderson withdrew Mahone's and Posey's brigades +from United-States Ford, which he did when Meade's crossing at Ely's had +flanked that position, Couch, whose bridge was all ready to throw, +was ordered to cross, and march in support towards the heaviest firing. +This he did, with French and Hancock, and reached Chancellorsville the +same evening. + +Swinton, rather grandiloquently, says, "To have marched a column of +fifty thousand men, laden with sixty pounds of baggage and encumbered +with artillery and trains, thirty-seven miles in two days; to have +bridged and crossed two streams, guarded by a vigilant enemy, with the +loss of half a dozen men, one wagon, and two mules,--is an achievement +which has few parallels, and which well deserves to rank with Prince +Eugene's famous passage of the Adige." + +However exaggerated this praise may be, Hooker nevertheless deserves +high encomiums on his management of the campaign so far. Leaving +Stoneman's delay out of the question, nothing had gone wrong or been +mismanaged up to the present moment. But soon Hooker makes his first +mistake. + +At 12.30 on Thursday, the Third Corps, which lay near Franklin's +Crossing, on the north side of the river, received orders to proceed by +the shortest route, and concealed from the enemy, to United-States Ford, +to be across the river by seven A.M., Friday; in pursuance of which +order, Sickles immediately started, in three columns, following the +ravines to Hamet's, at the intersection of the Warrenton pike and +United-States Ford road. Here he bivouacked for the night. At five +A.M. Friday he marched to the ford, and passed it with the head of his +column at seven A.M., Birney leading, Whipple and Berry in the rear. +Leaving Mott's brigade and a battery to protect the trains at the ford, +he then pushed on, and reported at Chancellorsville at nine A.M. +Under Hooker's orders he massed his corps near the junction of the roads +to Ely's and United-States Fords, in the open near Bullock's, sending a +brigade and a battery to Dowdall's Tavern. + +Hooker, meanwhile, had arrived at Chancellorsville, and taken command. +He at once issued this characteristic order:-- + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., April 30, 1863. + +GENERAL ORDERS, No. 47. + +It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the commanding general announces +to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined +that our enemy must ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his +defences, and give us battle on our own ground, where certain +destruction awaits him. + +The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been a +succession of splendid achievements. + + By command of Major-Gen. Hooker. + S. WILLIAMS, + Assistant Adjutant-General. + + +Pleasonton, during Thursday, pushed out towards Fredericksburg and +Spotsylvania Court House to observe the enemy. + +Fitz Hugh Lee had bivouacked this evening at Todd's Tavern. Stuart, +with his staff, had started towards Fredericksburg to report the +condition of affairs to Gen. Lee. It was a bright moonlight night. +A mile or two on the road he ran against a party of Federal horsemen, +the advance of the Sixth New York Cavalry, under Lieut.-Col. McVicar. +Sending back for the Fifth Virginia Cavalry, Lee attacked the Federal +troopers, leading in person at the head of his staff; but, being +repulsed, he sent for the entire brigade to come up, with which he drove +back McVicar's detachment. + +The combat lasted some time, and was interesting as being a night affair, +in which the naked weapon was freely used. Its result was to prevent +Pleasonton from reaching Spotsylvania Court House, where he might have +destroyed a considerable amount of stores. + +The position on Thursday evening was then substantially this. At +Hamilton's Crossing there was no change. Each party was keenly scanning +the movements of the other, seeking to divine his purpose. Sedgwick and +Reynolds were thus holding the bulk of Lee's army at and near +Fredericksburg. Hooker, with four corps, and Sickles close by, lay at +Chancellorsville, with only Anderson's small force in his front, and +with his best chances hourly slipping away. For Lee, by this time aware +of the real situation, hesitated not a moment in the measures to be +taken to meet the attack of his powerful enemy. + + + + +IX. + +LEE'S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS. + + +Let us now turn to Lee, and see what he has been doing while Hooker thus +discovered check. + +Pollard says: "Lee calmly watched this" (Sedgwick's) "movement, as well +as the one higher up the river under Hooker, until he had penetrated the +enemy's design, and seen the necessity of making a rapid division of his +own forces, to confront him on two different fields, and risking the +result of fighting him in detail." + +Lossing states Lee's object as twofold: to retain Banks's Ford, so as to +divide Hooker's army, and to keep his right wing in the Wilderness. + +Let us listen to Lee himself. In his report he says he was convinced on +Thursday, as Sedgwick continued inactive, that the main attack would be +made on his flank and rear. "The strength of the force which had +crossed, and its apparent indisposition to attack, indicated that the +principal effort of the enemy would be made in some other quarter." + +He states that on April 14 he was informed that Federal cavalry was +concentrating on the upper Rappahannock. On the 21st, that small bodies +of infantry had appeared at Kelley's Ford. These movements, and the +demonstrations at Port Royal, "were evidently intended to conceal the +designs of the enemy," who was about to resume active operations. + +The Federal pontoon bridges and troops below Fredericksburg "were +effectually protected from our artillery by the depth of the river's bed +and the narrowness of the stream, while the batteries on the other side +completely commanded the wide plain between our lines and the river." + +"As at the first battle of Fredericksburg, it was thought best to select +positions with a view to resist the advance of the enemy, rather than +incur the heavy loss that would attend any attempt to prevent his +crossing." + +At the time of Hooker's flank movement, there were between the +Rappahannock and Rapidan no troops excepting some twenty-seven hundred +cavalry under Stuart, forming Lee's extreme left. But Stuart made up +for his small numbers by his promptness in conveying to his chief +information of every movement and of the size of every column during +Hooker's passage of the rivers. And the capture of a few prisoners from +each of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps enabled him and his +superior to gauge the dimensions of the approaching army with fair +accuracy. + +But until Thursday night the plan of Hooker's attack was not +sufficiently developed to warrant decisive action on the part of Lee. + +Of the bulk of the Confederate forces, Early's division was ahead at +Hamilton's Crossing, intrenched in an almost impregnable position. +On Wednesday, April 29, the rest of Jackson's corps was moved up from +below, where Doubleday's and Morrow's demonstrations had until now kept +it. + +A. P. Hill's and Trimble's divisions were in the second and third lines +on this wing; while Anderson and McLaws, the only troops of Longstreet's +corps left with the Army of Northern Virginia, held the intrenchments +along the river above Fredericksburg. Barksdale was in the town. +Pendleton with the reserve artillery was at Massaponax. + +When, from Sedgwick's inactivity and the information received from +Stuart, Lee, on Wednesday afternoon, had been led to suspect that the +main attack might be from the columns crossing above, he had immediately +ordered Anderson to occupy Chancellorsville with Wright's brigade, +and with Mahone and Posey from United-States Ford, so soon as that +position was compromised, leaving a few companies there to dispute its +possession as long as possible. + +We have seen how Anderson engaged Meade near Chancellorsville as the +latter advanced, and then retired to a position near Mine-Run road. +Here was the crest of a hill running substantially north and south. +Gen. Lee had already selected this line; and Col. Smith, his chief +engineer, had drawn up a plan of intrenchments. Anderson detailed men, +who, during the night, threw up some strong field-works. + +Late Thursday night Lee appears first fully to have matured his plan for +parrying Hooker's thrust. + +Barksdale's brigade was left at Fredericksburg, where during the winter +it had been doing picket-duty, to form the left of the line remaining to +oppose Sedgwick. Part of Pendleton's reserve artillery was near by; +while Early, commanding this entire body, held Hamilton's Crossing. +He had a force of eighty-five hundred muskets, and thirty pieces of +artillery. + +The rest of his army Lee at once took well in hand, and moved out to +meet the Army of the Potomac. McLaws was hurried forward to sustain the +line taken up by Anderson. He arrived on the ground by daylight of +Friday, and went into position in rifle-pits on the right about Smith's +Hill. + +Jackson, equally alert, but having a longer distance to march from the +extreme right along the military road, arrived about eight A.M., took +command, and, as was his wont, ordered an immediate advance, throwing +Owens's regiment of cavalry forward to reconnoitre. + +Posey and Wright followed Owens on the plank road, with Alexander's +battalion of artillery. Mahone, and Jordan's battery detached from +Alexander, marched abreast of his right, on the pike. + +McLaws followed Mahone, and Wilcox and Perry were called from Banks's +Ford to sustain this column, which McLaws directed; while Jackson, +following on the plank road, watched the operations of the left. + + + + +X. + +HOOKER'S ADVANCE FRIDAY. + + +So far the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac had been at Falmouth, +where still remained Gen. Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff. The +last order from this point had been on Thursday to Gen. Sedgwick, +who was therein notified that headquarters would be that night at +Chancellorsville; that an advance would be made Friday morning along the +plank road (meaning probably the pike) towards Fredericksburg, to +uncover Banks's Ford, thus making a shorter communication through +Butterfield, who would still remain at Falmouth. This order +substantially recapitulates former instructions, and is full of the +flash and vim of an active mind, till then intent on its work and +abreast of the situation. It urges on Sedgwick co-operation with the +right wing, and the most vigorous pushing of the enemy. It impresses on +him that both wings will be within easy communication, and ready to +spring to one another's assistance. + +Slower than his adversary, and failing to follow up with vigor his +advantage already gained, Hooker assumes command in person, and +reconnoitres the ground between himself and Fredericksburg. He then +orders Meade, with Griffin, followed by Humphreys, and with three +batteries, to march along the river road to some commanding point +between Mott and Colin Runs; his advance to be masked by throwing out +small parties, and his command to be in position by two P.M., while +Sykes's division, supported by Hancock's division of the Second Corps, +march out the turnpike to a corresponding distance, each force then +deploying towards the other, and engaging the enemy supposed to be in +that vicinity. + +A third column, consisting of the Twelfth Corps, he orders to march by +the plank road, and to be massed near Tabernacle Church, masked in like +manner; to be in position by midday, so that the Eleventh Corps can move +up to take position a mile in its rear as reserve, by two P.M. + +French's division of the Second Corps, and one battery, are ordered to +Todd's Tavern, from which detachments are to be thrown out on the +various roads. + +The unemployed troops are massed at Chancellorsville, out of the roads. +Pleasonton holds his cavalry brigade there in readiness to move. +Hooker announces his headquarters at Tabernacle Church as soon as the +movement opens. + +Immediately after (11.30 A.M., Friday,) Sedgwick is directed to threaten +an attack at one P.M., in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing, to +ascertain whether the enemy is hugging his defences in full force. +A corps is to be used with proper supports, but nothing more than a +demonstration to be made. If certain that the enemy is there in force, +Sedgwick is to make no attack. + +Sedgwick did not receive this order until about five P. M., but +nevertheless made a display in force of Reynolds's corps, with Newton +and Brooks in support. But a countermand was soon received, and the +troops withdrawn. + +As Hooker supposed his enemy to be in line somewhere midway between +Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, the purpose of these orders to +Sedgwick is not plain. Meade, Sykes, and Slocum were ordered to attack +the enemy when met. Sedgwick could aid such an attack by pushing the +force in his front at Hamilton's. But a mere demonstration to find out +whether the heights were strongly held could have no effect upon the +real advance, nor procure Hooker any timely information. + +The movement of the three columns out of the Wilderness begins at eleven +A.M. It is in accordance with the declared plans of Hooker, and with +sound policy. For Chancellorsville is of all places the worst in which +to deliver or accept a general engagement, and every mile's advance +towards Fredericksburg brings the army into more open ground. + +Meade, with Griffin and Humphreys, advances on the river road to within +a short distance of Banks's Ford, near Decker's farm. He can easily +seize the ford, the possession of which lessens the distance between the +wings by six miles. It is the objective Hooker has had in view ever +since the movement began. He is preparing to deploy towards Sykes. + +Sykes,--to quote Warren,--"on gaining the ridge about a mile and a +quarter from Chancellorsville, found the enemy advancing, and driving +back our cavalry. This small force resisted handsomely, riding up and +firing almost in the faces of the Eleventh Virginia Infantry, which +formed the enemy's advance. Gen. Sykes moved forward in double-quick +time, attacked the enemy vigorously, and drove him back with loss, +till he had gained the position assigned him." + +This is a crest in front of the heavy forest, and in range of Anderson's +rifle-pits. The Federal skirmishers are the Seventeenth United-States +Infantry, supported by Burbank's brigade. + +McLaws is in his front, and deploys across the pike, Semmes on the left +of the road, Mahone, Perry, and Wofford on the right. Jordan's battery +is posted on the Mine road. + +Sykes brings up Weed's battery, and opens on Semmes, and drives in his +skirmishers, but can make no serious impression on his line. McLaws +sends word to Jackson that Sykes is attacking in force, and that the +country is favorable for a flank attack. + +Jackson orders Kershaw through the woods to join Semmes's left, and +sends Wilcox up the Mine road to extend the Confederate right, and head +off a Federal advance from this direction. + +Sykes thus finds himself overlapped on both flanks. He throws Ayres's +regular brigade out on his left, and the One Hundred and Forty-sixth New +York on his right. His position is difficult, but he determines to hold +it as long as possible. + +It is noon. No sounds are heard from the parallel columns. Sykes has +to make his line very thin, but holds his ground. If supported, he can +maintain himself. + +But at this juncture he receives orders to fall back on Chancellorsville, +and slowly retires to McGee's; later to his old position, Hancock taking +his place in the front line; and he next morning at daylight is also +withdrawn, and takes up the line he retains until Sunday morning. + +Slocum, in like manner on the plank road, meets Posey and Wright, +and a small affair occurs. But Wright is sent along the unfinished +railroad, and outflanks him. He is also at this moment ordered to +retire. + +Meade has had similar orders, and has likewise withdrawn; and Wilcox is +sent to Banks's Ford to hold it. + +Wright continues his movement along the railroad, as far as Welford's or +Catherine's Furnace, when, finding himself beyond communication with his +superior, he, in connection with Stuart, who has been holding this point, +determines to feel the Union line. Two regiments and a battery are +thrown in along the road to Dowdall's Tavern, preceded by skirmishers. +Our pickets fall back, and through the dense wood the Confederates reach +our line. But they are warmly received, and retire. This is six P.M. +Wright now joins his division. + +Lee has arrived, and assumes command. + +Jackson's divisions, thus following up our retiring columns, by +nightfall occupy a line from Mine road to Welford's Furnace. A regiment +of cavalry is on the Mine road, and another on the river road as +outposts. Stuart remains at the Furnace. McLaws occupies the crest +east of Big-Meadow Swamp, and Anderson prolongs his lines westwardly. + +Let us now examine into these operations of Friday. + +This movement towards Fredericksburg was not a sudden idea of Hooker's, +but the result of a carefully studied plan. In his order of April 3, +to Sedgwick, he says that he proposes to assume the initiative, advance +along the plank road, and uncover Banks's Ford, and at once throw +bridges across. Gen. Butterfield, in a communication to Sedgwick of +April 30, says, "He (Hooker) expected when he left here, if he met with +no serious opposition, to be on the heights west of Fredericksburg +to-morrow noon or shortly after, and, if opposed strongly, to-morrow +night." In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, +Hooker says, "The problem was, to throw a sufficient force of infantry +across at Kelley's Ford, descend the Rappahannock, and knock away the +enemy's forces, holding the United-States and Banks's Ford, by attacking +them in the rear, and as soon as these fords were opened, to re-enforce +the marching column sufficiently for them to continue the march upon the +flank of the rebel army until his whole force was routed, and, if +successful, his retreat intercepted. Simultaneous with this movement on +the right, the left was to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, +and threaten the enemy in that quarter, including his depot of supplies, +to prevent his detaching an overwhelming force to his left." + +Hooker, moreover, not only told Hunt that he expected to fight near +Banks's Ford, but instructed him to get all his artillery to that point +from below, where it had been massed to cover Sedgwick's crossing. + +There was every reason why the army should be got out of the Wilderness, +in the midst of which lies Chancellorsville. This is, of all places in +that section, the least fit for an engagement in which the general +commanding expects to secure the best tactical results. But out towards +Fredericksburg the ground opens, showing a large number of clearings, +woods of less density, and a field suited to the operations of all arms. + +Every thing should have been done to get the two wings within easier +communication; and more than all, having once surprised the enemy, +and advanced against him, a retreat should have been made from +imperative reasons alone. + +Hooker explains this falling back in after-days, before the Committee on +the Conduct of the War, thus: "They"--the forces on the turnpike and +plank road--"had proceeded but a short distance when the head of the +column emerged from the heavy forest, and discovered the enemy to be +advancing in line of battle. Nearly all the Twelfth Corps had emerged +from the forest at that moment" (this is a very imperfect statement of +the facts); "but, as the passage-way through the forest was narrow, +I was satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough to +resist the advance of Gen. Lee, and was apprehensive of being whipped in +detail." And in another place, "When I marched out on the morning of +the 1st of May I could get but few troops into position: the column had +to march through narrow roads, and could not be thrown forward fast +enough to prevent their being overwhelmed by the enemy in his advance. +On assuming my position, Lee advanced on me in that manner, and was soon +repulsed, the column thrown back in confusion into the open ground. +It could not live there. The roads through the forest were not unlike +bridges to pass. A mile or more in advance of the position I had would +have placed me beyond the forest, where, with my superior forces, +the enemy would in all probability have been beaten." + +This was not a valid conclusion from the actual facts. Listen to his +subordinates' statements. + +Gen. Humphreys testifies before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, +with reference to this falling-back: "It was totally unexpected to me: I +thought it was part of the plan to attack him as quickly as possible. +We had surprised them, and were strong enough to attack them." "After +Friday I was apprehensive we should not have the success we had +expected." "I think it was a mistake to fight a defensive battle after +surprising the enemy." "I think we should have attacked the enemy +immediately." "I must give my opinion, since you ask me; for I have an +opinion, as a military man, from the general facts I know, and that I +suppose I am obliged to express. My opinion is that we should not have +been withdrawn, called back, on Friday afternoon. We had advanced along +the road to Fredericksburg to attack the enemy: the troops were in fine +spirits, and we wanted to fight a battle. I think we ought to have +fought the enemy there. They came out, and attacked one division of the +corps I belonged to, just at the time we returned to Chancellorsville. +What caused Gen. Hooker to return after advancing some miles on this +general position, which was about perpendicular to the plank road +leading to Fredericksburg, I am not able to say, because, being only a +division commander, the facts were not stated to me. But I have heard +it said that he received some erroneous information about the enemy's +advancing on his flank from the direction of Orange Court House. +It was my opinion, we should have attacked the enemy, instead of +withdrawing, and awaiting an attack from the enemy." + +He also testifies, that, after the troops were ordered back to +Chancellorsville, they were for many hours massed there in considerable +confusion, until, after a deal of counter-marching, they were got into +place. + +Pleasonton states that the retreat from open ground "produced among the +soldiers a feeling of uncertainty." + +Hancock testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "I +consider the mistake in the matter was in even stopping at +Chancellorsville. . . . I believe, if all . . . had pushed right down +to Banks's Ford, the whole movement would have been a perfect success. +But I have no doubt that we ought to have held our advance positions, +and still kept pushing on, and attempt to make a junction with +Gen. Sedgwick." + +Gen. Warren, whose whole testimony and report are the clearest and most +useful of all the evidence obtainable from any single source, on this +campaign, suggested to Couch, who was supporting Sykes on Friday, +when the latter was attacked by Jackson, to delay carrying out Hooker's +orders to retire, while he (Warren) galloped back to headquarters to +explain the importance of holding the position, which was formidable and +had great tactical advantages. Hooker yielded; but, before Warren could +get back to the front, the previous orders had been obeyed, and the +position lost. He says: "I never should have stopped at Chancellorsville. +I should have advanced and fought the enemy, instead of waiting for him +to attack me. The character of the country was the great reason for +advancing." + +And it is thought that every one engaged in this campaign with the Army +of the Potomac will remember the feeling of confusion and uncertainty +engendered by the withdrawal from Jackson's front on this unlucky day. + +A council of general officers was held at Chancellorsville on Friday +evening, in which many were still strongly in favor of making the +advance again. Warren says: "I was in favor of advancing, and urged it +with more zeal than convincing argument." But Hooker held to his own +opinion. He could not appreciate the weakness of assuming the defensive +in the midst of the elan of a successful advance. + +It is not difficult to state what Hooker should have done. He had a +definite plan, which was to uncover and use Banks's Ford. He should +have gone on in the execution of this plan until arrested by superior +force, or until something occurred to show that his plan was +inexpedient. To retire from an enemy whom you have gone out to attack, +and whom you have already placed at a disadvantage, before striking a +blow, is weak generalship indeed. + +Hooker had arrived at Chancellorsville at noon Thursday. Lee was still +in Fredericksburg. The troops were able to march many miles farther +without undue taxing. They should have been pushed out that afternoon +to the open ground and to Banks's Ford. To fail in this, was the first +great error of the campaign. There had not been a moment's delay +allowed from the time the troops reached the river until they were +massed at Chancellorsville, and the proposed movement nearly completed. +One continued pressure, never let up, had constantly been exerted by the +headquarters of the army. The troops had been kept in constant movement +towards Banks's Ford. Hooker had all but reached his goal. Suddenly +occurred a useless, unexplained pause of twenty-four hours. And it was +during this unlucky gap of time that Lee occupied the ground which +Hooker's cavalry could have seized, and which should have been held at +all hazards. + +Nor is this error excusable from ignorance of the terrain. For Hooker +had shown his knowledge of the importance of celerity; and his own +declared plan made Banks's Ford, still a half-dozen miles distant, +his one objective. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct +of the War, he thus refers to his plan: "As soon as Couch's divisions +and Sykes's corps came up, I directed an advance for the purpose, +in the first instance, of driving the enemy away from Banks's Ford, +which was six miles down the river, in order that we might be in closer +communication with the left wing of the army." And if the troops had +needed repose, a few hours would have sufficed; and, the succeeding +night being clear moonlight, a forward movement was then entirely +feasible. + +Dating from this delay of Thursday, every thing seemed to go wrong. + +More curious still is Hooker's conduct on Friday, when his three columns +came into presence of the enemy. What every one would have expected of +Fighting Joe was, that at this supreme moment his energy would have +risen to its highest pitch. It was a slight task to hold the enemy for +a few hours. Before ordering the columns back, Hooker should have gone +in person to Sykes's front. Here he would have shortly ascertained that +Jackson was moving around his right. What easier than to leave a strong +enough force at the edge of the Wilderness, and to move by his left +towards Banks's Ford, where he already had Meade's heavy column? +This would have kept his line of communication with United-States Ford +open, and, while uncovering Banks's Ford, would at the same time turn +Jackson's right. It is not as if such a movement carried him away from +his base, or uncovered his communications. It was the direct way to +preserve both. + +But at this point Hooker faltered. Fighting Joe had reached the +culminating desire of his life. He had come face to face with his foe, +and had a hundred and twenty thousand eager and well-disciplined men at +his back. He had come to fight, and he--retreated without crossing +swords. + + + + +XI. + +THE POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE. + + +The position at Chancellorsville was good for neither attack nor +defence. The ground was not open enough for artillery, except down the +few roads, and across an occasional clearing. Cavalry was useless. +Infantry could not advance steadily in line. The ground was such in +Hooker's front, that Lee could manoeuvre or mass his troops unseen by +him. Our own troops were so located, that to re-enforce any portion of +the line, which might be attacked, with sufficient speed, was impossible. + +Anderson (as has been stated) had been ordered by Lee to hold +Chancellorsville; but after examination of the ground, and consultation +with Mahone and Posey, he concluded to transcend his instructions, +and retired to the junction of Mine Road and the turnpike. He assumed +that the superiority of this latter ground would excuse his failure to +hold his position in the Wilderness. + +Gen. Hancock says: "I consider that the position at Chancellorsville was +not a good one. It was a flat country, and had no local military +advantages." + +And the testimony of all our general officers is strongly to the same +effect. + +The position to which Hooker retired was the same which the troops, +wearied with their march of Thursday, had taken up without any +expectation of fighting a battle there. Hooker had desired to contract +his lines somewhat after Friday's check; but the feeling that farther +retreat would still more dishearten the men, already wondering at this +unexplained withdrawal, and the assurance of the generals on the right +that they could hold it against any force the enemy could bring against +their front, decided him in favor of leaving the line as it was, and of +strengthening it by breastworks and abattis. + +Having established his troops in position, Hooker further strengthened +his right wing at Chancellorsville to the detriment of his left below +Fredericksburg; and at 1.55 A.M., Saturday, ordered all the bridges at +Franklin's Crossing, and below, to be taken up, and Reynolds's corps to +march at once, with pack-train, to report at headquarters. + +This corps reached him Saturday night, and was deployed upon the extreme +right of the new position then being taken up by the army. + +The line as now established lay as follows:-- + +Meade held the left, extending from a small bluff near Scott's Dam on +the Rappahannock, and covering the roads on the river, along a crest +between Mine and Mineral Spring Runs towards and within a short mile of +Chancellorsville. + +This crest was, however, commanded from several points on the east, and, +according to the Confederate authorities, appeared to have been +carelessly chosen. Meade's front, except at the extreme river-flank, +was covered by impenetrable woods. The Mine road intersected his left +flank, and the River road was parallel to and a mile in his front. + +Couch joined Meade's right, and extended southerly to Chancellorsville, +with Hancock thrown out on his front, and facing east, astride the River +road, and up to and across the old turnpike; his line being formed south +of this road and of the Chancellor clearing. The division of French, +of Couch's corps, was held in reserve along the United-States Ford road. + +From here to Dowdall's Tavern the line made a southerly sweep outwards, +like a bent bow, of which the plank road was the string. + +As far as Hazel Grove, at the centre of the bow, Slocum's Twelfth Corps +held the line, Geary's division joining on to Couch, and Williams on the +right. From Slocum's right to the extreme right of the army, the +Eleventh Corps had at first been posted; but Hooker determined on +Saturday morning that the line was too thin here, and thrust Birney's +division of the Third Corps in between Slocum and Howard. The rest of +the Third Corps was in reserve, massed in columns of battalions, in +Bullock's clearing, north of the Chancellor house, with its batteries at +the fork of the roads leading to the United-States and Ely's Fords. + +Towards sunset of Friday, Birney had advanced a strong line of +skirmishers, and seized a commanding position in his front. Birney's +line then lay along the crest facing Scott's Run from Dowdall's to +Slocum's right. + +Pleasonton's cavalry brigade was massed at headquarters, ready for duty +at any point. + +Howard held the line, from Dowdall's Tavern (Melzi Chancellor's) to +beyond Talley's farm on the old pike, with his right flank substantially +in the air, and with two roads, the main thoroughfares from east to west, +striking in on his right, parallel to his position. + +As will be noticed from the map, the right, being along the pike, +was slightly refused from the rest of the line, considering the latter +as properly lying along the road to headquarters. From Dowdall's west, +the rise along the pike was considerable, and at Talley's the crest was +high. The whole corps lay on the watershed of the small tributaries of +the Rappahannock and Mattapony Rivers. + +As a position to resist a southerly attack, it was as good as the +Wilderness afforded; although the extreme right rested on no obstacle +which superiority in numbers could not overcome. And a heavy force, +massed in the clearing at Dowdall's as a point d'appui, was +indispensable to safety, inasmuch as the conformation of the ground +afforded nothing for this flank to lean upon. + +Having forfeited the moral superiority gained by his advance, having +withdrawn to his intrenchments at Chancellorsville, and decided, after +surprising his enemy, upon fighting a defensive battle, Hooker, early on +Saturday morning, examined his lines, and made sundry changes in the +forces under his command. + +The position he occupied, according to Gen. Lee, was one of great +natural strength, on ground covered with dense forest and tangled +under-growth, behind breastworks of logs and an impenetrable abattis, +and approached by few roads, all easily swept by artillery. And, +while it is true that the position was difficult to carry by direct +assault, full compensation existed in other tactical advantages to the +army taking the offensive. It is not probable that Lee, in Hooker's +place, would have selected such ground. "Once in the wood, it was +difficult to tell any thing at one hundred yards. Troops could not +march without inextricable confusion." Despite which fact, however, +the density of these very woods was the main cause of Lee's success. + +In this position, Hooker awaited the assault of his vigorous opponent. +As in all defensive battles, he was at certain disadvantages, and +peculiarly so in this case, owing to the terrain he had chosen, or been +forced to choose by Friday's easily accepted check. There were no +debouches for throwing forces upon Lee, should he wish to assume the +offensive. There was no ground for manoeuvring. The woods were like a +heavy curtain in his front. His left wing was placed so as to be of +absolutely no value. His right flank was in the air. One of the roads +on which he must depend for retreat was readily assailable by the enemy. +And he had in his rear a treacherous river, which after a few hours' +rain might become impassable, with but a single road and ford secured to +him with reasonable certainty. + +And, prone as we had always been to act upon unwarrantable over- +estimates of the strength of our adversaries, Hooker had not this reason +to allege for having retired to await Lee's attack. For he had just +received excellent information from Richmond, to the effect that Lee's +rations amounted to fifty-nine thousand daily; and we have seen that he +told Slocum, on Thursday, that his column of nearly forty thousand men +was much stronger than any force Lee could detach against him. Hooker +acknowledges as much in his testimony before the Committee on the +Conduct of the War, when, in answer to the question, "What portion of +the enemy lay between you and Gen. Sedgwick?" he replied:-- + +"Lee's army at Fredericksburg numbered sixty thousand, not including the +artillery, cavalry, and the forces stationed up the river, occupying the +posts at Culpeper and Gordonsville. I think my information on this +point was reliable, as I had made use of unusual means to ascertain. +The enemy left eight thousand men to occupy the lines about +Fredericksburg; Jackson marched off to my right with twenty-five +thousand; and Lee had the balance between me and Sedgwick." + +It will be well to remember this acknowledgment, when we come to deal +with Hooker's theories of the force in his own front on Sunday and +Monday. + + + + +XII. + +JACKSON'S MARCH, AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE. + + +Lee and Jackson spent Friday night under some pine-trees, on the plank +road, at the point where the Confederate line crosses it. Lee saw that +it was impossible for him to expect to carry the Federal lines by direct +assault, and his report states that he ordered a cavalry reconnoissance +towards our right flank to ascertain its position. There is, however, +no mention of such a body having felt our lines on the right, in any of +the Federal reports. + +It is not improbable that Lee received information, crude but useful, +about this portion of our army, from some women belonging to Dowdall's +Tavern. When the Eleventh Corps occupied the place on Thursday, a watch +was kept upon the family living there. But in the interval between the +corps breaking camp to move out to Slocum's support on Friday morning, +and its return to the old position, some of the women had disappeared. +This fact was specially noted by Gen. Howard. + +However the information was procured, the Federal right was doubtless +ascertained to rest on high ground, where it was capable of making a +stubborn resistance towards the south. But Lee well knew that its +position was approached from the west by two broad roads, and reasoned +justly that Hooker, in canvassing the events of Friday, would most +probably look for an attack on his left or front. + +Seated on a couple of cracker-boxes, the relics of an issue of Federal +rations the day before, the two Confederate chieftains discussed the +situation. Jackson, with characteristic restless energy, suggested a +movement with his entire corps around Hooker's right flank, to seize +United-States Ford, or fall unawares upon the Army of the Potomac. +This hazardous suggestion, which Lee in his report does not mention as +Jackson's, but which is universally ascribed to him by Confederate +authorities, was one as much fraught with danger as it was spiced with +dash, and decidedly bears the Jacksonian flavor. It gave "the great +flanker" twenty-two thousand men (according to Col. A. S. Pendleton, +his assistant adjutant-general, but twenty-six thousand by morning +report) with which to make a march which must at best take all day, +constantly exposing his own flank to the Federal assault. It separated +for a still longer time the two wings of the Confederate army; leaving +Lee with only Anderson's and McLaws's divisions,--some seventeen +thousand men,--with which to resist the attack of thrice that number, +which Hooker, should he divine this division of forces, could throw +against him, the while he kept Jackson busy with the troops on his own +right flank. + +On the other hand, Hooker had shown clear intention of fighting a +defensive battle; and perhaps Lee measured his man better than the Army +of the Potomac had done. And he knew Jackson too. Should Hooker remain +quiet during the day, either voluntarily or by Lee's engrossing his +attention by constant activity in his front, the stratagem might +succeed. And in case of failure, each wing had open ground and good +roads for retreat, to form a junction towards Gordonsville. + +Moreover, nothing better presented itself; and though, in the presence +of a more active foe, Lee would never have hazarded so much, the very +aggressiveness of the manoeuvre, and the success of Jackson's former +flank attacks, commended it to Lee, and he gave his lieutenant orders to +proceed to its immediate execution. + +For this division of his forces in the presence of an enemy of twice his +strength, Lee is not entitled to commendation. It is justifiable +only--if at all--by the danger of the situation, which required a +desperate remedy, and peculiarly by the success which attended it. +Had it resulted disastrously, as it ought to have done, it would have +been a serious blow to Lee's military prestige. The "nothing venture, +nothing have" principle applies to it better than any maxim of tactics. + +Before daybreak Jackson sends two of his aides, in company with some +local guides, to find a practicable road, by which he may, with the +greatest speed and all possible secrecy, gain the position he aims at on +Hooker's right and rear, and immediately sets his corps in motion, +with Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill's division, in the advance, and +A. P. Hill bringing up the rear. + +Jackson's route lay through the woods, along the road on which rested +Lee's line. His corps, since Friday's manoeuvres, was on the left; and, +as he withdrew his troops at dawn, Lee deployed to the left to fill the +gap, first placing Wright where Jackson had been on the west of the +plank road, and later, when Wright was ordered to oppose Sickles at the +Furnace, Mahone's brigade. + +This wood-road led to Welford's or Catherine's Furnace, from which place +a better one, called the Furnace road, zigzagged over to join the Brock +(or Brook) road, the latter running northerly into Y-shaped branches, +each of which intersected the pike a couple of miles apart. + +Jackson was obliged to make some repairs to the road as he advanced, +for the passage of his artillery and trains. In many places the bottom, +none too reliable at any time, was so soft with the recent rains, +that it had to be corduroyed to pull the guns through. But these men +were used to marches of unequalled severity, and their love for their +leader made no work too hard when "Old Jack" shared it with them. +And although they had already been marching and fighting continuously +for thirty hours, this circuit of well-nigh fifteen miles was cheerfully +done, with an alacrity nothing but willing and courageous hearts, +and a blind belief that they were outwitting their enemy, could impart. + +His progress was masked by Stuart, who interposed his cavalry between +Jackson and the Union lines, and constantly felt of our skirmishers and +pickets as he slowly kept abreast with the marching column. + +At the Furnace comes in another road, which, a short distance above, +forks so as to lead to Dowdall's Tavern on the left, and to touch the +Union lines by several other branches on the right. It was this road +down which Wright and Stuart had advanced the evening before in their +attack on our lines. + +Here, in passing Lewis's Creek (Scott's Run) and some elevated ground +near by, the column of Jackson had to file in full view of the Union +troops, barely a mile and a half away. The movement was thus fully +observed by us, hundreds of field-glasses pointing steadily at his +columns. + +It seems somewhat strange that Jackson should have made this march, +intended to be quite disguised, across the Furnace-clearing. For there +was another equally short route, making a bend southward through the +woods, and, though possibly not so good as the one pursued, subsequently +found available for the passage of Jackson's trains, when driven from +the Furnace by Sickles. It is probably explained, however, by the fact +that this route, selected during the night, was unfamiliar to Jackson, +and that his aides and guides had not thought of the point where the +troops were thus put en evidence. And Jackson may not have been with +the head of the column. + +So early as eight o'clock Birney of the Third Corps, whose division had +been thrust in between Howard and Slocum, reported to Sickles that a +movement in considerable force was being made in our front. Sickles +conveyed the information to Hooker, who instructed him to investigate +the matter in person. Sickles pushed out Clark's rifled battery, +with a sufficient support, to shell the passing column. This, says +Sickles, obliged it to abandon the road. It was observed that the +column was a large one, and had a heavy train. Sickles considered it +either a movement for attack on our right, or else one in retreat. +If the former, he surmised at the time that he had arrested it; if the +latter, that the column had taken a more available route. + +It was while Rodes was filing past the Furnace that the first attack by +Clark's battery was made; and Col. Best, with the Twenty-third Georgia +Regiment, was sent out beyond the Furnace to hold the road. Best +subsequently took position in and about the Furnace buildings, and +placed some troops in the railroad cutting south. + +Sickles, meanwhile, had again reported to Hooker, and been instructed to +strengthen his reconnoissance. But it was noon before this order was +given, and he was then advised to push out with great caution. He asked +for the whole of Birney's division, and another one in support. With +these he thought to get possession of the road on which the enemy was +moving, and, if it was a retreat, cut him off; if a flank movement, +thrust himself in between the two bodies of the enemy. Hooker accorded +this request; and Birney was advanced a mile and a half through the +woods, bridging two or three arms of Scott's Run, and some marshy ground, +and making his way with great difficulty. Two regiments of Berdan's +sharpshooters were thrown out in front, and the Twentieth Indiana +Infantry led Birney's division. Considerable opposition was encountered, +say the reports of these regiments; but after some skirmishing, Berdan +managed to surround Best's command, and captured nearly the entire force. + +Why Birney advanced through the woods is not readily understood; for +there was a good road close by his position, leading to the Furnace, +by using which many hours could have been saved. + +From the prisoners of the Twenty-third Georgia, and some others +intercepted, it was clearly ascertained, by two P.M., that Jackson was +moving towards our right flank, with, as the prisoners stated, some +forty thousand men. + +These facts Sickles also reported to Hooker, requesting Pleasonton's +cavalry, and his own third division, to cooperate in a flank attack, +which he seems to have assumed he could make on Jackson. Hooker ordered +Whipple up into supporting distance to Birney, with instructions to +connect the latter with Slocum; and directed Williams (Slocum's right +division) to cover the left of the advancing column, and if necessary +attack the enemy there. Howard received instructions from Capt. Moore, +who had been announced in general orders as on Hooker's staff, to cover +Birney's right; and he detached his reserve brigade, the best and +largest in the Eleventh Corps, commanded by Barlow, and led it out in +person to its position. + +Hooker subsequently denied having sent Capt. Moore to Howard, alleging +the order to have emanated from Sickles; but, as Capt. Moore was on +Hooker's staff, Howard certainly could do no less than he did, supposing +the order to be by authority from headquarters. + +Sickles now imagined that every thing promised the most brilliant +success. He was preparing to make his attack, as he supposed,--to judge, +at least, from what he says,--on Jackson's flank. "McLaws's opposition +had all but ceased," says he; "and it was evident that in a few moments +five or six regiments would be cut off, and fall into our hands." + +But Sickles had been deceived by a simple rear-guard of the enemy; while +Jackson, by a long circuit, was not only far beyond his reach, but in +position to crush Howard, and cut off Sickles from communication with +the rest of the army. + +Pleasonton, whom Hooker had sent out to Sickles's aid, held his three +regiments and Martin's horse-battery, in the clearing at Scott's Run, +being unable to operate to any advantage on the ground occupied by +Birney. Three or four other Third-Corps batteries were also here for a +similar reason. + +When Sickles's attack, leading to the capture of the Twenty-third +Georgia, was made, Col. Brown's battalion of Confederate artillery +happened to be within reach, and was speedily ordered up by Jackson, +and placed on a cleared eminence south of the railroad cutting. Here, +gathering a few detached companies in support, he opened smartly upon +Sickles. The latter, bearing in mind his orders impressing caution in +his advance, was for the moment checked, long enough, at all events, +to enable Jackson's trains to get out of reach by the lower road. + +Birney had barely reached the Furnace when Brown's fire became quite +annoying. He accordingly placed Livingstone's, and afterwards +Randolph's, batteries in position, and spent some time in silencing the +Confederate guns; after accomplishing which, he threw forward his +skirmishers, and occupied Welford's house, while Graham, with four +regiments, got possession of the railroad cutting. + +By this time Jackson's troops had passed a couple of miles beyond the +Furnace; but on hearing of Sickles's attack, and the capture of an +entire regiment, Archer, who commanded the rear brigade, promptly +retraced his steps with his own and Thomas's brigades, and supported +Brown's excellent work. So soon as the trains had got well along, +these two brigades rejoined their command; and their work as rear-guard +was undertaken by Posey, and subsequently by Wright, whom Anderson +ordered out, and threw across his own left flank to engage the attention +of Sickles's column. + +Jackson's divisions were well out of reach, a half-dozen miles from +Sickles, before this officer was ready for an advance in force. Jackson +had marched on, or parallel to, the Brock road. When he reached the +Orange plank road, he was shown an eminence from which he could observe +the position of the Union lines. Riding up alone, so as not to attract +attention, after--as Cooke affirms--driving the Federal cavalry from the +spot, he examined our position carefully; and, seeing that he was not +yet abreast of our flank on this road, he ordered his troops farther +along the Brock road to the old turnpike. + +But he sent Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry, supported by Paxton, along the +plank road, to hold it in case his designs were prematurely discovered +and met. + +By four P.M. he had reached the right and rear of the Union line; while +Hooker complacently viewed the situation from his comfortable +headquarters at the Chancellor house, apparently in a semi-torpid state, +retaining just enough activity to initiate manoeuvres, which, under the +circumstances, were the most unfortunate possible. + +For not only had he robbed his right corps of Barlow's brigade, the only +general reserve of the "key of his position," as himself has called it, +and despatched Birney two miles into the woods, supported by Whipple, +and protected on the left by Williams; but about five P.M. he ordered +Geary from his position on Slocum's left, to move forward, and make an +attack down the plank road. This order Geary carried out in person with +several regiments. He had a smart skirmish with the enemy, and was +considerably advanced, when, about sundown, he was suddenly ordered to +return to his position. + +Hooker's right flank, of less than ten thousand men, was thus isolated +from the rest of the army, with no supports within two miles. + +And yet the full evidence of Jackson's whereabouts was before him. +There had been a constant feeling of the Union lines (by Stuart's +cavalry and some infantry skirmishers) all day, gradually working from +east to west. This fact was noticed by many officers, and is +particularly referred to by Pleasonton, Warren, and Howard. Jackson's +columns and trains had been strongly reconnoitred, their force estimated, +and their direction noted. The question as to what might be the +objective of such a movement, had been the main topic of discussion +during the day throughout the right of the army. + +At noon a cavalry picket on the plank road was driven in, and gave +notice of the passing of a heavy column a mile beyond our lines. +About 3.30 P.M. the leading divisions of Jackson's corps, arriving on +the old turnpike, sent a party forward to feel our lines, and a +ten-minutes' skirmish resulted, when the Confederate party withdrew. +There had been a number of minor attacks on our outlying pickets, +some of them occurring when Gen. Howard was present. All these facts +were successively reported to headquarters. + +About the same time two men, sent out as spies, came in, and reported +the enemy crossing the plank road on our right, in heavy columns. +These men were despatched by Howard to Hooker, with instructions to the +officer accompanying them to see that Hooker promptly received their +information. On the other hand, a half-hour before Jackson's attack +came, Howard sent a couple of companies of cavalry out the plank road to +reconnoitre. These men, from negligence or cowardice, failed to go far +enough to ascertain the presence of Jackson, and returned and reported +all quiet. This report was, however, not forwarded to Hooker. + +There was not an officer or man in the Eleventh Corps that afternoon who +did not discuss the possibility of an attack in force on our right, +and wonder how the small body thrown across the road on the extreme +flank could meet it. And yet familiar with all the facts related, +for that they were reported to him there is too much cumulative evidence +to doubt, and having inspected the line so that he was conversant with +its situation, Hooker allowed the key of his position to depend upon a +half-brigade and two guns, facing the enemy, while the balance of the +wing, absolutely in the air, turned its back upon the general whose +attack was never equalled for its terrible momentum during our war, +or excelled in any, and whose crushing blows had caused the brave old +Army of the Potomac more than once to stagger. + +Moreover, the "key of the position" was confided to a corps which was +not properly part of the Army of the Potomac, and untried as yet. +For not only had the Eleventh Corps, as a corps, seen no active service, +but the most of its regiments were made up of raw troops, and the +elements of which the corps was composed were to a degree incongruous. +Of itself this fact should have caused Hooker to devote serious +attention to his right flank. + + + + +XIII. + +HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES. + + +Hooker and Sickles have both stated that the plan of the former was to +allow this movement of Jackson's to develop itself: if it was a retreat, +to attack the column at the proper time; if a tactical flank movement, +to allow it to be completed, and then thrust himself between the two +wings of Lee's army, and beat them in detail. This admirable +generalization lacked the necessary concomitant of intelligent and +speedy execution. + +Now, Hooker had his choice between two theories of this movement of +Jackson. It was a retreat from his front, either because Lee deemed +himself compromised, or for the purpose of making new strategic +combinations; or it was the massing of troops for a flank attack. +It could mean nothing else. Let us, then, do Hooker all the justice the +situation will allow. + +All that had occurred during the day was fairly explainable on the +former hypothesis. If Jackson was passing towards Culpeper, he would +naturally send flanking parties out every road leading from the one his +own columns were pursuing, towards our lines, for strictly defensive +purposes. The several attacks of the day might have thus occurred. +This assumption was quite justifiable. + +And this was the theory of Howard. He knew that Hooker had all the +information obtained along the entire line, from prisoners and scouts. +He naturally concluded, that if there was any reasonable supposition +that an attack from the west was intended, Hooker would in some way have +notified him. But, far from doing this, Hooker had inspected and +approved his position, and had ordered Howard's reserve away. To be +sure, early in the morning, Hooker had told him to guard against an +attack on the right: but since then circumstances had absolutely +changed; Barlow had been taken from him, and he conjectured that the +danger of attack had passed. How could he assume otherwise? + +Had he suspected an attack down the pike, had he received half an hour's +warning, he could, and naturally would, assuming the responsibility of a +corps commander, have changed front to rear so as to occupy with his +corps the line along the east side of the Dowdall's clearing, which he +had already intrenched, and where he had his reserve artillery. He did +not do so; and it is more easy to say that he was to blame, than to show +good cause for the stigma cast upon him for the result of this day. + +However much Hooker's after-wit may have prompted him to deny it, +his despatch of 4.10 P.M., to Sedgwick, shows conclusively that he +himself had adopted this theory of a retreat. "We know that the enemy +is flying," says he, "trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles's +divisions are among them." + +And it is kinder to Hooker's memory to assume that he did not apprehend +a flank attack on this evening. If he did, his neglect of his position +was criminal. Let us glance at the map. + +We know how the Eleventh Corps lay, its reserve removed, with which it +might have protected a change of front, should this become necessary, +and itself facing southerly. What was on its left, to move up to its +support in case of an attack down the pike? Absolutely not a regiment +between Dowdall's and Chancellorsville, and near the latter place only +one division available. This was Berry's, still luckily massed in the +open north of headquarters. And to Sickles's very deliberate movement +alone is due the fact that Berry was still there when the attack on +Howard burst; for Sickles had bespoken Berry's division in support of +his own advance just at this juncture. + +Birney, who was the prop of Howard's immediate left, had been advanced +nearly two miles through the thickets to the south to attack an +imaginary enemy. Whipple had followed him. Of Slocum's corps, Williams +had been sent out "two or three miles," to sweep the ground in his front, +and Geary despatched down the plank road "for the purpose of cutting off +the train of the enemy, who was supposed to be in retreat towards +Gordonsville." To oppose the attack of a column of not far from +twenty-five thousand men, there was thus left a brigade front of four +small regiments, and the flank of a corps of eight thousand men more, +without reserves, and with no available force whatever for its support, +should it be overwhelmed. + +Is any criticism needed upon this situation? And who should be +responsible for it? + +In a defensive battle it is all-important that the general in command +should hold his troops well in hand, especially when the movements of +the enemy can be concealed by the terrain. The enemy is allowed his +choice of massing for an attack on any given point: so that the ability +to concentrate reserve troops on any threatened point is an +indispensable element of safety. It may be assumed that Hooker was, +at the moment of Jackson's attack, actually taking the offensive. +But on this hypothesis, the feebleness of his advance is still more +worthy of criticism. For Jackson was first attacked by Sickles as early +as nine A.M.; and it was six P.M. before the latter was ready to move +upon the enemy in force. Such tardiness as this could never win a +battle. + +While all this had been transpiring on the right, Lee, to keep his +opponent busy, and prevent his sending re-enforcements to the flank +Jackson was thus threatening, had been continually tapping at the lines +in his front. But, owing to the small force left with him, he confined +this work to Hooker's centre, where he rightly divined his headquarters +to be. About seven A.M. the clearing at Chancellorsville was shelled by +some of Anderson's batteries, obliging the trains there parked to go to +the rear into the woods. + +Hancock states that the enemy frequently opened with artillery, and made +infantry assaults on his advanced line of rifle-pits, but was always +handsomely repulsed. "During the sharp contests of that day, the enemy +was never able to reach my principal line of battle, so stoutly and +successfully did Col. Miles (who commanded the advanced line) contest +the ground." + +Col. Miles says his line was constantly engaged skirmishing with the +enemy during the day. At about three P.M. the Confederates massed +troops in two columns, one on each side the road, flanked by a line some +eight hundred yards long, in the woods. An impetuous charge was made to +within twenty yards of the abattis, but it was baffled by our sturdy +front. + +Sickles, then still in reserve, had made a reconnoissance early on +Saturday, in Hancock's front, with the Eleventh Massachusetts and +Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, covered by some sharpshooters; had +driven in the enemy's pickets, and found him, to all appearances, +in force. This was Anderson's line. + +The Twelfth Corps had also made a reconnoissance down the plank road +later in the day, but with no immediate results. + +All that was accomplished was a mere feeling of the other's lines by +either force. Hooker vainly endeavored to ascertain Lee's strength at +various places in his front. Lee, to good purpose, strove to amuse +Hooker by his bustle and stir, to deceive him as to the weakness of his +force, and to gain time. + +During the afternoon of Saturday, Hooker had a rare chance of redeeming +his error made, the day before, in withdrawing from the open country to +the Wilderness, and of dealing a fatal blow to his antagonist. He knew +that Jackson, with twenty-five thousand men, was struggling through +difficult roads towards his right. Whatever his object, the division of +Lee's forces was a fact. He knew that there could be left in his front +not more than an equal number. It was actually less than eighteen +thousand men; but Hooker, with his knowledge of Lee's strength, could +not estimate it at more than twenty-five thousand by any calculation he +could make. Himself had over seventy thousand men in line, and ready to +mass on any given point. He ought to have known that Lee was too astute +a tactician seriously to attack him in front, while Jackson was +manoeuvring to gain his right. And all Lee's conduct during the day was +palpable evidence that he was seeking to gain time. + +However much Hooker may have believed that Jackson was retreating, +he was bound to guard against the possibility of an attack, knowing as +he did Jackson's whereabouts and habit of rapid mystery. Had he thrown +the entire Eleventh Corps en potence to his main line, as above +indicated, to arrest or retard an attack if made; had he drawn troops +from Meade on the extreme left, where half an hour's reconnoitring would +have shown that nothing was in his front, and from Couch's reserves in +the centre; had he thrown heavy columns out where Birney was, to prevent +the re-union of Jackson and Lee, and to make a determined attack upon +the latter's left while Hancock pressed him in front,--half the vigor +displayed in the early days of this movement would have crushed the Army +of Northern Virginia beyond recovery for this campaign. Lee's only +salvation would have lain in instant withdrawal from our front, and a +retreat towards Gordonsville to re-unite with his lieutenant. + +However he might have disposed his forces for an attack on Saturday +afternoon, he could have committed no mistake as great as the half-way +measures which have been narrated. And if the heavy fighting of Sunday +had been done the day before with any thing like the dispositions +suggested, it could have scarcely failed of brilliant success for the +Army of the Potomac. + +But six o'clock came: Hooker still lay listlessly awaiting an attack, +with his forces disjointedly lodged, and with no common purpose of +action; and Jackson had gathered for his mighty blow. + +It is but fair to give weight to every circumstance which shall moderate +the censure attributable to Hooker for his defeat in this campaign. +Early in the morning, after his inspection of the lines on the right, +which was made with thoroughness, and after receipt of the first news of +the movement of troops across our front, Hooker issued the following +circular:-- + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 2, 1863, 9.30 A.M. + +MAJOR-GEN. SLOCUM AND MAJOR-GEN. HOWARD. + +I am directed by the major-general commanding to say that the +disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front +attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, +he wishes you to examine the ground, and determine upon the positions +you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him +in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy +reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line +does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defences worth +naming have been thrown up; and there appears to be a scarcity of troops +at that point, and not, in the general's opinion, as favorably posted as +might be. + +We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. +Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be, +in order to obtain timely information of their approach. + + JAMES H. VAN ALEN, + Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. + + +Although addressed to Slocum as well as Howard, this order scarcely +applied with much force to the former, who occupied the right centre of +the army, with Birney lying between him and the Eleventh Corps. Howard +carried out his part of these instructions as well as circumstances +allowed. He posted Barlow's brigade, his largest and best, on the +Buschbeck line, in position for a general reserve for the corps, and +took advantage of the ground in a manner calculated to strengthen his +flank, and to enable it to cover a change of front if necessary; he +placed his reserve artillery on the right of the rifle-pits running +across the road at Dowdall's; he located several regiments on Dowdall's +clearing so as to wheel to the west or south as might be required; Major +Hoffman was set to work, and spent the entire day locating and +supervising the construction of field-works; and generally, Howard +disposed the forces under his command after a fashion calculated to +oppose a stubborn resistance to attacks down the pike, should they be +made. + +Later on in the day, we have seen how Hooker's aide, Capt. Moore, +ordered this brigade of Barlow's away from its all-important position. +We have seen Hooker's dispositions of the Third and Twelfth Corps. +We have seen Hooker's 4.10 P.M. order to Sedgwick. No room is left to +doubt that Hooker's opinion, if he had any, underwent a change after +issuing these instructions, and that he gave up the idea of an attack +upon the right. His dispositions certainly resulted in convincing +Howard that he had done so. + +But suppose Hooker still remained of the same opinion during the +afternoon, was the issue of this circular in the morning enough? +If he supposed it probable that the enemy would strike our right, +was it not the duty of the commanding general, at least to see that the +threatened flank was properly protected,--that the above order was +carried out as he intended it should be? No attack sufficient to +engross his attention had been made, or was particularly threatened +elsewhere; and a ten-minutes' gallop would bring him from headquarters +to the questionable position. He had some excellent staff-officers-- +Gen. Warren among others--who could have done this duty; but there is no +evidence of any one having been sent. Gen. Howard, in fact, states that +no inspection by, or by the order of, Gen. Hooker was made during the +day, after the one in the early morning. + +It may be alleged that Hooker had desired to draw in the extended right +the evening before, and had yielded only to the claim that that position +could be held against any attack coming from the front. This is true. +But when half his enemy's forces, after this disposition was made, +are moved to and massed on his right, and have actually placed +themselves where they can take his line in reverse, is it still fair to +urge this plea? Hooker claims that his "instructions were utterly and +criminally disregarded." But inasmuch as common-sense, not to quote +military routine, must hold him accountable for the removal of Barlow +(for how can a general shelter himself from the consequences of the acts +of his subordinates, when these acts are in pursuance of orders received +from his own aide-de-camp?), and himself acknowledges the disposition +made of Sickles and Slocum, can the facts be fairly said to sustain the +charge? There was, moreover, so much bitterness exhibited after this +campaign, that, had the facts in the slenderest degree warranted such +action, formal charges would assuredly have been brought against Howard +and his division commanders, on the demand alike of the commander-in- +chief and a disappointed public. + + + + +XIV. + +POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS. + + +Gen. Howard states that he located his command, both with reference to +an attack from the south, and from the west along the old turnpike and +the plank road. The whole corps lies on a ridge along which runs the +turnpike, and which is the watershed of the small tributaries of the +Rappahannock and Mattapony Rivers. This ridge is terminated on the +right by some high and easily-defended ground near Talley's. + +Gen. Devens, with the first division, holds the extreme right. He has +less than four thousand men under his command. Von Gilsa's brigade has, +until this morning, been half a mile farther out the pike, and across +the road; but on receipt of Hooker's 9.30 order has been withdrawn, +and now lies with two regiments astride and north of the pike, some +distance beyond Talley's, the rest skirting the south of it. His right +regiment leans upon that portion of the Brock road which is the +prolongation of the eastern branch, and which, after crossing the plank +road and pike, bears north-westerly, and loses itself in the woods where +formerly was an old mill. McLean's brigade prolongs von Gilsa's line +towards Schurz. Dieckman's battery has two pieces trained westerly down +the pike, and four on Devens's left, covering, near Talley's Hill, +the approaches from the plank road. Devens has the Twenty-fifth and +Seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteers as a reserve, near the pike. + +Schurz's (third) division continues this line on the edge of the woods +to Dowdall's. His front hugs the eastern side of the clearing between +the pike and the plank road, thence along the latter to the fork. +Schimmelpfennig's brigade is on the right, adjoining Devens; +Krzyzanowski's on the left. Three regiments of the former are on the +line, and two in reserve: the latter has two regiments on the line, +and two in reserve. On Schurz's right wing, the troops are shut in +between thick woods and their rifle-pits, with no room whatever to +manoeuvre or deploy. This condition likewise applies to many of the +regiments in Devens's line. The pike is the means of inter-communication, +running back of the woods in their rear. Dilger's battery is placed +near Dowdall's, at the intersection of the roads. + +Steinwehr considers himself the reserve division. He is more or less +massed near Dowdall's. Buschbeck's brigade is in the clearing south of +the road, but has made a line of rifle-pits across the road, facing west, +at the edge of the open ground. Two regiments are deployed, and two are +in reserve. His other brigade, Barlow's, has been sent out nearly two +miles, to protect Birney's right, leaving no general reserve whatever +for the corps. Wiederich's battery is on Steinwehr's right and left, +trained south. + +Three batteries are in reserve on the line of Buschbeck's rifle-pits +running north and south. Barlow had been, as above stated, massed as a +general reserve of the corps on Buschbeck's right,--the only reserve the +corps could boast, and a most necessary one. + +Two companies, and some cavalry and artillery, have been sent to the +point where the Ely's Ford road crosses Hunting Creek. + +Devens states that his pickets were kept out a proper distance, and that +he had constant scouting-parties moving beyond them. In his report he +recapitulates the various attacks made during the day. Shortly after +noon, cavalry attacked his skirmishers, but drew off. This was Stuart +protecting Jackson's flank, and feeling for our lines. Then two men, +sent out from Schimmelpfennig's front, came in through his, and were +despatched to Hooker with their report that the enemy was in great force +on our flank. Later, Lieut. Davis, of Devens's staff, with a cavalry +scout, was fired upon by Confederate horse. Then von Gilsa's +skirmishers were attacked by infantry,--again Stuart seeking to +ascertain our position: after which the pickets were pushed farther out. +Cavalry was afterwards sent out, and returned with information that some +Confederate troopers, and part of a battery, were in the woods on our +right. + +But all this seems to have been explained as a retreat. "The unvarying +report was, that the enemy is crossing the plank road, and moving +towards Culpeper." + +The ground about Dowdall's is a clearing of undulating fields, closed on +three sides, and open to the west. As you stand east of the fork of the +roads, you can see a considerable distance down the plank road, leading +to Orange Court House. The pike bears off to the right, and runs up +hill for half a mile, to the eminence at Talley's. + +The dispositions recited were substantially the same as those made when +the corps arrived here on Thursday. They were, early Saturday morning, +inspected by Hooker in person, and pronounced satisfactory. As he rode +along the line with Howard, and with each division commander in +succession, he was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm. His +exclamation to Howard, several times repeated, as he examined the +position,--his mind full of the idea of a front attack, but failing to +seize the danger of the two roads from the west,--was: "How strong! +How strong!" + +An hour or two later, having ascertained the Confederate movement across +our front, he had sent his circular to Howard and Slocum. Later still, +as if certain that the enemy was on the retreat, he depleted Howard's +line by the withdrawal of Barlow, and made dispositions which created +the gap of nigh two miles on Howard's left. + +Howard, during the day, frequently inspected the line, and all +dispositions were approved by him. + +And, when Barlow was ordered out to the front, both Howard and Steinwehr +accompanied him. They returned to Dowdall's Tavern just as Jackson +launched his columns upon the Eleventh Corps. + + + + +XV. + +THE SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK. + + +It is now six o'clock of Saturday, May 2, 1863, a lovely spring evening. +The Eleventh Corps lies quietly in position. Supper-time is at hand. +Arms are stacked on the line; and the men, some with accoutrements hung +upon the stacks, some wearing their cartridge-boxes, are mostly at the +fires cooking their rations, careless of the future, in the highest +spirits and most vigorous condition. Despite the general talk during +the entire afternoon, among officers and rank and file alike, of a +possible attack down the pike, all but a few are happily unsuspicious of +the thunder-cloud gathering on their flank. There is a general feeling +that it is too late to get up much of a fight to-day. + +The breastworks are not very substantial. They are hastily run up out +of rails from the fences, logs from barns in the vicinity, and newly +felled trees. The ditch skirting the road has been deepened for this +temporary purpose. Abattis, to a fair extent, has been laid in front. +But the whole position faces to the south, and is good for naught else. + +Nor were our men in those days as clever with the spade as we afterwards +became. This is clearly shown in the defences. + +There is some carelessness apparent. Ambulances are close by the line. +Ammunition-wagons and the train of pack-mules are mixed up with the +regiments. Even a drove of beeves is herded in the open close by. +All these properly belong well to the rear. Officers' servants and +camp-gear are spread abroad in the vicinity of each command, rather more +comfortably ensconced than the immediate presence of the enemy may +warrant. + +The ground in the vicinity is largely clearing. But dense woods cover +the approaches, except in some few directions southerly. Down the roads +no great distance can be seen; perhaps a short mile on the plank road, +not many hundred yards on the turnpike. + +Little Wilderness Church, in the rear of the position, looks deserted +and out of place. Little did its worshippers on last sabbath day +imagine what a conflict would rage about its walls before they again +could meet within its peaceful precincts. + +There may be some absence of vigilance on the part of the pickets and +scouts; though it is not traceable in the reports, nor do any of the +officers concerned remember such. But the advanced line is not +intrenched as Miles's line in front of Hancock has been. Less care, +rather than more carelessness, is all that can be observed on this score. + +Meanwhile Jackson has ranged his corps, with the utmost precaution and +secrecy, in three lines, at right angles to the pike, and extending +about a mile on either side. All orders are given in a low tone. +Cheering as "Old Jack" passes along is expressly prohibited. + +Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill's division, leads, with Iverson's and +Rodes's brigades to the left of the road, and Doles's and Colquitt's to +the right. Rodes's orders to his brigades are to push on steadily, +to let nothing delay or retard them. Should the resistance at Talley's +Hill, which Rodes expects, render necessary the use of artillery, +the line is to check its advance until this eminence is carried. +But to press on, and let no obstacle stand in the way, is the watchword. + +Two hundred yards in rear of the first line, Colston, commanding +Trimble's division, ranges his brigades, Nichols and Jones on the left, +and Colston on the right of the road; Ramseur in support. + +A. P. Hill's division is not yet all up; but, as part reaches the line, +it is formed in support of Colston, the balance following in column on +the pike. + +The second and third lines are ordered to re-enforce the first as +occasion requires. + +Two pieces of Stuart's horse-artillery accompany the first line on the +pike. + +The regiments in the centre of the line appear to have been formed in +columns with intervals, each brigade advancing in line of columns by +regiment. The troops are not preceded by any skirmishers. The line on +the wings is probably not so much massed. It is subsequently testified +by many in the Eleventh Corps, that the centre of the line appears to +advance en echiquier, the front companies of each line of columns firing +while the rear columns are advancing through the intervals. + +The march through the woods up to Dowdall's clearing has not disturbed +the lines so materially as to prevent the general execution of such a +manoeuvre. + +But the Confederate reports show that the regiments were all in line and +not in column. The appearance of columns was due to the fact that the +second and third lines, under Colston and A. P. Hill, were already +pressing up close in the rear of the first under Rodes, thus making a +mass nine deep. The intervals between regiments were accidental, +occasioned by the swaying of the line to and fro as it forced its way +through the underbrush. + +It is perhaps no more than fair to say that whatever laxity was apparent +at this hour in the Eleventh Corps was by no means incompatible with a +readiness to give a good account of itself if an attack should be made +upon its front. + + + + +XVI. + +JACKSON'S ATTACK. + + +Such is the situation at six P.M. Now Jackson gives the order to +advance; and a heavy column of twenty-two thousand men, the best +infantry in existence, as tough, hardy, and full of elan, as they are +ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-looking, descends upon the Eleventh Corps, +whose only ready force is four regiments, the section of a battery, +and a weak line of pickets. + +The game, in which these woods still abound, startled at the unusual +visitors, fly in the advance of Jackson's line towards and across the +Dowdall clearing, and many a mouth waters, as fur and feather in +tempting variety rush past; while several head of deer speedily clear +the dangerous ground, before the bead of willing rifles can be drawn +upon them. + +This sudden appearance of game causes as much jollity as wonder. +All are far from imagining its cause. + +The next sound is that of bugles giving the command, and enabling the +advancing troops to preserve some kind of alignment. At this the wary +prick up their ears. Surprise stares on every face. Immediately +follows a crash of musketry as Rodes sweeps away our skirmish line as it +were a cobweb. Then comes the long and heavy roll of veteran infantry +fire, as he falls upon Devens's line. + +The resistance which this division can make is as nothing against the +weighty assault of a line moving by battalions in mass. Many of the +regiments do their duty well. Some barely fire a shot. This is frankly +acknowledged in many of the reports. What can be expected of new troops, +taken by surprise, and attacked in front, flank, and rear, at once? +Devens is wounded, but remains in the saddle, nor turns over the command +to McLean until he has reached the Buschbeck line. He has lost +one-quarter of his four thousand men, and nearly all his superior +officers, in a brief ten minutes. + +Schurz's division is roused by the heavy firing on the right, in which +even inexperienced ears detect something more than a mere repetition of +the picket-fight of three hours gone. Its commanding officers are at +once alert. Regimental field and staff are in the saddle, and the men +behind the stacks, leaving canteens, haversacks, cups with the steaming +evening coffee, and rations at the fires. Arms are taken. Regiments +are confusedly marched and counter-marched into the most available +positions, to meet an emergency which some one should have anticipated +and provided for. The absence of Barlow is now fatal. + +On comes Jackson, pursuing the wreck of the First division. Some of +Schurz's regiments break before Devens has passed to the rear. Others +stand firm until the victorious Confederates are upon them with their +yell of triumph, then steadily fall back, turning and firing at +intervals; but nowhere a line which can for more than a brief space +retard such an onset. + +Down the road towards Chancellorsville, through the woods, up every side +road and forest path, pours a stream of fugitives. Ambulances and oxen, +pack-mules and ammunition-wagons, officers' spare horses mounted by +runaway negro servants, every species of the impedimenta of camp-life, +commissary sergeants on all-too-slow mules, teamsters on still-harnessed +team-horses, quartermasters whose duties are not at the front, riderless +steeds, clerks with armfuls of official papers, non-combatants of all +kinds, mixed with frighted soldiers whom no sense of honor can arrest, +strive to find shelter from the murderous fire. + +No organization is left in the Eleventh Corps but one brigade of +Steinwehr's division. Buschbeck has been speedily formed by a change of +front, before Devens and Schurz have left the field, in the line of +intrenchments built across the road at Dowdall's at the edge of the +clearing. No sooner in place than a scattering fire by the men is +opened upon friends and foes alike. Dilger's battery trains some of its +guns down the road. The reserve artillery is already in position at the +north of this line, and uses spherical case with rapidity. Howard and +his staff are in the thickest of the fray, endeavoring to stem the tide. +As well oppose resistance to an avalanche. + +Buschbeck's line stubbornly holds on. An occasional squad, still +clinging to the colors of its regiment, joins itself to him, ashamed of +falling thus disgracefully to the rear. Officers make frantic exertions +to rally their men; useless effort. In little less than half an hour +this last stand has been swept away, and the Eleventh Corps is in +confused retreat down the pike towards headquarters, or in whatever +direction affords an outlet from the remorseless hail. + +The general confusion which reigned can scarcely be more accurately +described than by detailing the experience of a single regiment. +The One Hundred and Nineteenth New York Volunteers was in Schurz's +division. It was commanded by an officer of German birth, but long +since an American citizen. No more gallant, intelligent man wore +uniform, or one better fitted for a pattern soldier. Well read in +military matters, he had never yet been under fire, and was nervously +anxious to win his spurs. The regiment was a good one; but only three +or four officers, and a small percentage of enlisted men, had seen +service. + +This regiment faced south on the pike just west of the fork in the +roads. Under arms in an instant, when the firing was heard on the right, +it was soon ordered by one of Schurz's aides to throw itself across the +fork, and hold it at all hazards. But the suddenness of the attack had +momentarily robbed Col. Peissner of his steadiness, for he was a good +drill-master. Instead of facing to the right, counter-marching, filing +to the left across the road, and coming to a front,--the simplest if +longest movement being the best in times of such excitement,--he faced +to the left because his left was nearest to the fork, filed to the left, +and then, instead of coming on the left by file into line, he moved +astride the roads, and ordered "Front!" This brought the regiment in +line with its back to the enemy. The men instinctively came each to an +about-face, and the file closers broke through to the now rear. There +was no time to correct the error. The regiment, which would have fought +well under proper circumstances, from the start lost confidence in its +officers and itself. Still it held its ground until it had burned +almost twenty rounds, and until the Confederate line was within fifty +yards in its face, and had quite outflanked it. Then the raking volleys +of such a front as Jackson was wont to present, and, more than all, +the fire of Buschbeck's brigade in its immediate rear, broke it; and it +melted away, leaving only a platoon's strength around the colors, +to continue for a brief space the struggle behind the Buschbeck line, +while the rest fled down the road, or through the woods away from the +deadly fire. This regiment lost its entire color-guard, and nearly +one-half of its complement killed or wounded. + +There is much discrepancy as to the time during which the Eleventh Corps +made resistance to Jackson's advance. All reliable authorities put the +time of the attack as six P.M. When the last gun was fired at the +Buschbeck rifle-pits, it was dusk, at that season about quarter past +seven. It seems reasonably settled, therefore, that the corps retarded +the Confederate advance over about a mile of ground for exceeding an +hour. How much more can be expected of ten thousand raw troops +telescoped by twenty-five thousand veterans? + +Rodes, now quite mixed with Colston's line, still pressed on, and +between Hooker's headquarters and his elated foe there was scarce an +organized regiment. Hooker's fatal inability to grasp the situation, +and his ordering an advance of all troops on Howard's left as far as the +Second Corps, had made him almost defenceless. The troops which should +have been available to stem this adverse tide were blindly groping in +the woods, two miles in front,--in pursuit of Jackson. + +One cannot but wonder just where Sickles expected to find Jackson. +There can be little doubt that he did think he was about to strike +Jackson's flank. His testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of +the War constantly refers to this belief; and he says that he "was about +to open his attack in full force," was holding Pleasonton's cavalry in +hand, desiring to lead the attack with his infantry, when the news of +the disaster to the Eleventh Corps was brought to him; and that every +thing seemed to indicate the most brilliant success from thus throwing +himself upon Jackson's flank and rear. He refers to McLaws being in his +front, but this is an error. McLaws was on Lee's right flank, three +miles away. It was with Archer of Jackson's corps, and with Posey and +Wright of Anderson's division, that he had to do. + +The reports are by no means clear as to the details of these movements. +Birney states in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of +the War, that he found that he and Barlow "had got into the midst of the +rebel army, the supports on the left not having come up." He therefore +formed his command into a huge square, with the artillery in the centre, +holding the road over which Jackson had passed. "The fire upon his left +flank from musketry was galling." This came from Anderson's brigades. + +Hayman, Graham and Ward were pushed out along the road, and "found the +enemy in some force on three sides." This apparently shows that +Birney,--who had the immediate command of the troops in front,--was +quite uncertain of what was before him, or just what he was expected to +do. + +This much is, however, clear: Jackson's small rearguard had succeeded in +holding the road which he had traversed, at some point near Welford's; +and here this force remained until Jackson was well along towards the +plank road. Then Anderson in his turn made a diversion on the other +side of Birney, which kept the latter busy for at least a couple of +hours. + +Sickles's orders were to advance cautiously. This was Hooker's doing. +Hence exception cannot fairly be taken to either Birney's or Sickles's +conduct for lack of energy. But the latter must have singularly +underrated Jackson's methods, if he thought he could strike him at a +given point, so many hours after his passage. For Jackson was first +observed near the Furnace about eight A.M., and Sickles was just getting +ready to attack him in this same place at six P.M. + +The errors of judgment on this entire day can scarcely be attributed to +any one but the general commanding. He was the one to whom all reports +were sent. He had knowledge of every thing transpiring. He it was who +was responsible for some sensible interpretation of the information +brought him, and for corresponding action in the premises. + +So much for Sickles's advance. It could not well have been more +ill-timed and useless. But his gallant work of the coming night and +morrow, when Hooker left him almost alone to resist the fierce assaults +of our victorious and elated foe, was ample compensation for his +subordinate share in the triviality and fatal issue of Saturday's +manoeuvring. Nor can blame fall upon him in as full measure as upon +Hooker; although he seems illy to have construed what was transpiring in +his front, and what he reported may have seriously misled his chief. + +Perhaps no officers, during our Civil War, were placed in a more +lamentably awkward position than Devens, and in a less degree Schurz, +on this occasion. Having been fully convinced by the events of the +afternoon that an attack down the pike was highly probable, having +carefully reported all these events to his immediate commander, Devens +was left without inspection, counsel, or help. He might have gone in +person to Howard, but he did not dare leave his division. He might have +sent messages which more urgently represented his own anxiety. But when +the blow came, he did all that was possible, and remained, wounded, +in command, and assisted in re-organizing some relics of his division +behind the Buschbeck works. + +Schurz was with Howard a good part of the day, and his opinions were +expressed to that officer. To Schurz's personal bearing here, or on any +other occasion, no possible exception can be taken. + + + + +XVII. + +THE CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS. + + +There can be no attempt to gainsay that the Eleventh Corps, on this +luckless Saturday, did not do its whole duty. That it was panic- +stricken, and that it decamped from a field where as a corps it had not +fought, is undeniable. But portions of the corps did fight, and the +entire corps would doubtless have fought well under favorable +circumstances. It is but fair, after casting upon the corps the +aspersion of flight from before the enemy, to do it what justice is +possible, and to palliate the bad conduct of the whole by bearing +testimony to the good conduct of some of its parts. + +It has been called a German corps. This is not quite exact. Of nearly +thirteen thousand men in the corps, only forty-five hundred were +Germans. But it must be admitted that so many officers high in rank +were of that nationality, that the general tendency and feeling were +decidedly unlike the rest of the army. Moreover, there is not wanting +testimony to show that there were some who wore shoulder-straps in the +corps who gave evidence of having taken up the profession of arms to +make money, and not to fight. + +The artillery of the corps did well. Those general officers who most +severely rebuke the conduct of the corps, all say a word in favor of the +service of the guns. Dilger, on the road, just at Buschbeck's line, +fired with his own hands from his last gun a round of canister when the +Confederates were within a dozen yards. Most of the guns had been well +served, but had been sent to the rear in time to save them from capture. + +The reserve artillery did its duty, nor limbered up until the +Confederate line had outflanked its position, rendered it useless, +and jeopardized its safety. + +All the guns that were saved were put into action an hour later, and did +effective service on the Fairview crest, in company with the artillery +of the Third and Twelfth Corps. + +At the time of the attack, which was made by Jackson without an advance +of skirmishers, Devens's reserve regiments were ordered up to support +von Gilsa. There appears to have been something like a stand attempted; +but the left wing of the Confederate line speedily enveloped von Gilsa's +front, and showed in rear of his right flank, when his regiments melted +away. + +Devens states in his report that a new line might have been formed on +Gen. Schurz's division, if the latter had maintained his ground, but +acknowledges that the falling-back of his own troops "must undoubtedly +have added to the difficulties encountered by the command of that +officer." + +Schurz's report is very clear and good. This is partly attributable to +the avalanche of abuse precipitated upon his division by the press, +which called forth his detailed explanation, and an official request for +permission to publish his report. There existed a general understanding +that Schurz held the extreme right; and the newspapermen, to all +appearance, took pleasure in holding a German responsible, in their +early letters, for the origin of the panic. This error, together with +the fact of his having discussed the situation during the day with Gen. +Howard, and of his having remained of the opinion that an attack on our +right was probable, accounts for the care exhibited in his statements. +That he did harbor such fears is proved by his having, of his own motion, +after the attack of three o'clock, placed the Fifty-Eighth New York, +Eighty-Second Ohio, and Twenty-Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, near +Hawkins's farm, in the north part of the Dowdall clearing, and facing +west. Still Schurz's report is only a careful summary of facts +otherwise substantiated. He deals no more in his own opinions than a +division commander has a right to do. + +Schurz states that he strongly advised that the entire corps should take +up the Buschbeck line, not considering the woods a reliable point +d'appui. For they were thick enough to screen the manoeuvring of the +enemy, but not, as the event showed, to prevent his marching through +them to the attack. + +When the onset came, it was impossible quickly to change front. +Schurz's regiments were all hemmed in between the rifle-pits before them +and the woods in their rear. Still, more than half of the regiments of +this division appear to have maintained their credit, and the testimony +would tend to show that the men burned from five to thirty rounds each. +But without avail. They were telescoped. Their defences were rendered +useless. The enemy was on both sides of and perpendicular to them. +It is an open question whether, at that time, any two divisions of the +army could have changed front and made a good defence under these +circumstances. Later in the war our soldiers were more habituated, +particularly in the West, to fighting on either side of their +breastworks. But these were raw troops. And this was not the first, +nor was it the last, panic in the Army of the Potomac. But the corps +had, as ill-luck willed it, nothing in its rear to repair or conceal its +discomfiture. + +Buschbeck's brigade had better opportunities, and acted correspondingly +better. It had time to occupy the rifle-pits facing west before the +enemy had completed the destruction of the first and third divisions. +Buschbeck's stand covered a full half-hour. He was re-enforced by many +fragments of broken regiments, holding together under such officers as +had escaped utter demoralization. The troops remained behind these +works until outflanked on right and left, for Jackson's front of over +two miles easily enveloped any line our little force could form. + +During the early part of the attack, Colquitt's brigade ran across the +pickets of Devens's and Schurz's south front, which there had been no +time to call in. Instead of joining in the advance, Colquitt remained +to engage these latter, deeming it essential to protect Jackson's right. +This was the nucleus of one of the many detached engagements of this +day. Several bodies of Union troops thus isolated were captured en +masse. + +The reports of the officers concerned, as a rule, possess the merit of +frankness. As an instance, Col. Hartung, of the Seventy-Fourth New York, +relates that he had no opportunity to fire a shot until after he arrived +behind the Buschbeck intrenchments. The facts would appear to be given +in an even-handed way, in all the reports rendered. + +Little remains to be said. The Eleventh Corps was panic-stricken, +and did run, instead of retreating. It was a mere disorganized mass in +a half-hour from the beginning of the attack, with but a few isolated +regiments, and one brigade, retaining a semblance of orderliness. + +But was it so much the misbehavior of the troops as the faultiness of +the position they occupied? + +The corps was got together again before Sunday morning, in a condition +to do good service. Had it been tested, it would, in all probability, +have fought well. + +The loss of the corps was one-quarter of its effective. + +Some time after the battle of Chancellorsville, a motion was made to +break up the Eleventh Corps, and distribute its regiments among the +others; but it was not done. Hooker then remarked that he would yet +make that corps fight, and be proud of its name. And it subsequently +did sterling service. Gen. Thomas remarked, in congratulating Hooker on +his victory at Lookout Mountain, that "the bayonet-charge of Howard's +troops, made up the side of a steep and difficult hill, over two hundred +feet high, completely routing and driving the enemy from his barricades +on its top, . . . will rank with the most distinguished feats of arms of +this war." And it is asserted that this encomium was well earned, +and that no portion of it need be set down to encouragement. + +In their evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, +Hooker and Sickles both testify that the panic of the Eleventh Corps +produced a gap in the line, and that this was the main cause of disaster +on this field. But the fatal gap was made long before the Eleventh +Corps was attacked. It was Hooker's giddy blunder in ordering away, +two miles in their front, the entire line from Dowdall's to +Chancellorsville, that made it. + +This was the gap which enabled Jackson to push his advance to within a +few hundred yards of Chancellorsville before he could be arrested. +This was what made it possible for him to join his right to Lee's left +wing next day. Had Hooker but kept his troops in hand, so as to have +moved up Birney sharply in support, to have thrown forward Berry and +Whipple if required, the Confederate advance would, in all human +probability, have been checked at Dowdall's; Lee and Jackson would still +have been separated by a distance of two miles; and of this perilous +division excellent advantage could have yet been taken at daylight +Sunday by the Army of the Potomac. + +Hooker's testimony includes the following attempt to disembarrass +himself of the onus of the faulty position of the Eleventh Corps and its +consequences: "No pickets appear to have been thrown out; and I have +reason to suppose that no effort was made by the commander of the corps +on the right to follow up and keep himself advised of Jackson's +movements, although made in broad daylight, and with his full knowledge. +In this way the Eleventh Corps was lost to me, and more than that, +because its bad conduct impaired the confidence that the corps of the +army had in one another. I observed this fact during the night, from +the firing on the picket-lines, as well as from the general manner of +the troops, if a gun was fired by the enemy: after that, the whole line +would let off their pieces. The men seemed to be nervous; and during +the coming-in of the Eleventh Corps I was fearful, at one time, that the +whole army would be thrown into confusion by it. Some of my staff- +officers killed half a dozen of the men in trying to arrest their +flight." + +It is not intended, by what has been said, to exonerate Howard at the +expense of Hooker. To Howard will always be imputed, and justly, +a certain part of the blame; for there were, during the afternoon, +enough indications of a probable attack down the pike to make a prudent +corps-commander either assume the responsibility of a change of +front,--as it could advantageously be made on the Buschbeck line +prolonged,--or else, at least, so strongly urge the facts on his +superior that no blame could cling to his own skirts. But neither can +Hooker's larger share of blame he shifted off his own to Howard's +shoulders. While it may be said that the latter did not exhibit the +activity which the questionable aspect of affairs demanded,--for he did +not personally inspect his lines after the early morning hours,--it is +equally true that the commander of the army utterly neglected his right +wing, though he had every circumstance relating to its danger reported +to him. + + + + +XVIII. + +HOOKER'S PARRY. + + +The position of the Army of the Potomac is critical in the extreme. +But several circumstances come to the rescue. It is almost dark. +The rebel lines have become inextricably mixed. Colston, who has +gradually moved up to Rodes's support, is so completely huddled together +with this latter's command, that there is no organization left. Still +Jackson's veterans press on, determined to crush our army beyond +recovery, and drive it from United-States Ford. Stuart has in fact, +at his own suggestion, got orders to move his cavalry division in that +direction, and occupy the road to Ely's. A. P. Hill's division is still +intact in rear of the two leading lines, now shuffled into one quite +unmanageable mass, but still instinctively pushing forward. + +So faulty have Hooker's dispositions been, in advancing his entire right +centre without filling the gap, that the only available troops to throw +into the breach, after the rapid destruction of the Eleventh Corps, +are Berry's division of the old Third. These hardened soldiers are +still in reserve on the clearing, north of headquarters. It is +fortunate, indeed, that they are still there; for Sickles has just asked +for their detail to join his own column out in the woods, and an hour +ago Berry would certainly have been sent. + +This division is at once thrown across the pike on the first crest below +Fairview, west of Chancellorsville. The artillery of the Eleventh Corps +is in part re-assembled. Capt. Best, chief of artillery of the Twelfth +Corps, has already trained his guns upon the advancing Confederate +columns, to protect the new line. But Berry is almost alone. Hays's +brigade of the Second Corps, on his right, is his only support. The +Excelsior brigade is rapidly pushed into the woods, north of the plank +road; the Fourth Excelsior and the First Massachusetts south. Carr's +brigade is kept in second line, one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. +The men, with the instinctive pride of self-reliance, move up with the +steadiness of veterans on drill, regardless of the stream of fugitives +breaking through their intervals. + +The flight of the Eleventh Corps has stampeded part of the Third Corps +artillery. But it is re-assembled in short order, and at once thrown +into service. Capt. Best manages by seven P.M. to get thirty-four guns +into line on the crest, well served. Himself is omnipresent. Dimick's +and Winslow's batteries under Osborn, Berry's chief of artillery, +join this line on the hill, leaving a section of Dimick on the road. +And such part of the disjecta membra of the Eleventh Corps as retains +semblance of organization is gathered in support of the guns. Capt. Best +has begun to fire solid shot over the heads of Berry's men into the +woods beyond; and, as Gen. Lee says, the Confederate advance is checked +in front of this crest by the vigorous opposition encountered. + +Hurried orders are despatched to Geary to withdraw his attack, and +re-occupy his breastworks. This he straightway accomplishes. Similar +orders are carried to Williams. But, before the latter can retrace his +steps, Jackson's columns have reached the right of his late position. +Anderson also advances against him; so that Williams is obliged to move +cautiously by his left, and change front when he arrives where his line +had lately joined Geary's and, being unable to take up his old post, +he goes into position, and prolongs Berry, south of the pike. It is +long after dark before he ascertains his bearings, and succeeds in +massing his division where it is needed. + +Anxious as Jackson is to press on,--"Give me one hour more of daylight, +and I will have United-States Ford!" cries he,--he finds that he must +re-establish order in his scattered forces before he can launch this +night attack upon our newly formed but stubbornly maintained lines. + +Nor is the darkness the most potent influence toward this end. Illy as +Sickles's advance has resulted thus far, it is now a sovereign element +in the salvation of the Army of the Potomac. His force at the Furnace, +Birney, Whipple, Barlow, and Pleasonton, amounts to fifteen thousand men, +and over forty guns. None of these officers are the men to stand about +idle. No sooner has Sickles been persuaded by a second courier,--the +first he would not credit,--that the Eleventh Corps has been destroyed, +and that Jackson is in his rear, than he comprehends that now, indeed, +the time has come to batter Jackson's flank. He orders his column to +the right about, and moves up with all speed to the clearing, where +Pleasonton has held his cavalry, near Birney's old front. + +Howard, upon being attacked, had sent hurriedly for a cavalry regiment. +Pleasonton, having received orders to send him one, instructed Major +Huey, commanding the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, to march to Dowdall's +and report to Howard. Huey set out by the wood road which leads through +Hazel Grove into the plank road. From the testimony of the persons +chiefly concerned it would appear that, at the time this order was given +by Pleasonton to Huey, there was at Hazel Grove, where the cavalry +regiments were drawn up, no sign whatever of the disaster to Howard. +There were no fugitives nor any confusion. Nor does the evidence show +that Pleasonton ordered any charge on the enemy: it rather shows that +Huey was not directed to go at urgent speed. And he must have been very +deliberate in his movement, for by the time the cavalry had reached the +vicinity of the plank road, Jackson had demolished the Eleventh Corps, +and had advanced so far that the head of this cavalry column, marching +by twos, suddenly came upon the Confederate lines. The officers in the +lead at once gave the order to charge, and right gallantly did these +intrepid horsemen ride down into the seething mass of exultant +Confederate infantry. The shock was nobly given and home, but was, +of course, in the woods and against such odds, of no great effect. +Thirty men and three officers, including Major Keenan, were killed. +Only one Confederate report--Iverson's--mentions this charge. Its +effect was local only. + +Three batteries of Whipple's division had remained in the Hazel Grove +clearing while the infantry had advanced towards the Furnace. When the +rout of the Eleventh Corps became clear, these eighteen guns were +ordered in battery, facing about north-west, by their commander, +Capt. Huntington, and kept up a heavy fire upon the woods through which +Jackson was pushing his way. Pleasonton, for his part, trained Martin's +horse-battery in the same direction. Other guns were later added to +these, and all expended a good deal of ammunition on the enemy's lines. +But there was no fighting at Hazel Grove rising to the distinction of a +battle. The importance given to it by Sickles and Pleasonton is not +borne out by the facts. There was no Federal loss, to speak of; nor do +the Confederate reports make any comment upon this phase of the battle. +They probably supposed these guns to be an extension of the line of +batteries at Fairview. As such they were, without question, of no +inconsiderable use. + +Meanwhile Birney, sending word to Barlow that they run danger of being +cut off, and detailing the Twentieth Indiana and Sixty-third +Pennsylvania Volunteers as rearguard, rejoins Sickles and Pleasonton in +the clearing, and both move up to sustain his flank. + +So soon as Jackson's guns gave Lee the intimation of his assault, +the latter advanced upon the Union line with sufficient vigor to prevent +Hooker from sending re-enforcements to his right. The attack was sharp; +and a general inclination to the left was ordered, to connect with +Jackson's right as the latter brought his columns nearer. "These orders +were well executed, our troops advancing up to the enemy's intrenchments, +while several batteries played with good effect upon his lines until +prevented by increasing darkness." (Lee.) + +McLaws reports: "My orders were to hold my position, not to engage +seriously, but to press strongly so soon as it was discovered that +Gen. Jackson had attacked . . . when I ordered an advance along the whole +line to engage with the skirmishers, which were largely re-enforced, +and to threaten, but not attack seriously; in doing which Gen. Wofford +became so seriously engaged, that I directed him to withdraw, which was +done in good order, his men in good spirits, after driving the enemy to +their intrenchments." + +The movement of Anderson towards the left made a gap of considerable +distance in the Confederate line "but the skirmishers of Gen. Semmes, +the entire Tenth Georgia, were perfectly reliable, and kept the enemy to +his intrenchments." + +These accounts vary in no wise from those of the Union generals, who +held their positions in front of both Anderson and McLaws, and kept +inside their field-works. + +Meade, whose line on the left of the army was not disturbed, sent +Sykes's division, so soon as the Eleventh Corps rout became known to him, +to the junction of the roads to Ely's and United-States Fords, to hold +that point at all hazards, and form a new right flank. This was done +with Sykes's accustomed energy. Nor was he reached by Jackson's line, +and before morning Reynolds fell in upon his right. + + + + +XIX. + +THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK. + + +When his troops had been summarily brought to a standstill by Berry's +firm ranks and the heavy artillery fire, Jackson determined to withdraw +his first and second lines to Dowdall's clearing to reform, and ordered +A. P. Hill forward to relieve them. + +While this manoeuvre, rendered extremely difficult by the nature of the +woods in which the fighting had been done, but which Hooker was in no +condition to interfere with, was in progress, Sickles and Pleasonton, +whose position was considerably compromised, sought measures to +re-establish communication with the headquarters of the army. + +Sickles despatched Col. Hart, with a cavalry escort, to Hooker, bearing +a detailed statement of his situation. This officer experienced no +little difficulty in reaching Chancellorsville. The roads being in +possession of the enemy, he was forced to make his way through the woods +and ravines. But after the lapse of a number of hours he succeeded in +his mission, and brought back word to hold on to the position gained. +Sickles had so advised, and had, moreover, requested permission to make +a night attack, to recover some guns, caissons, and Whipple's ammunition- +train, which had been left in the woods in Sickles's front, and to +enable him to join his right to Slocum's new line, thrown out in +prolongation of Berry. + +It will be observed that Sickles was now facing northerly, and that his +rear had no obstacle on which to rest, so as to save him from the attack +of Lee, had the latter been aware of the weakness of his position. + +In view of this fact, a move was made somewhat to his right, where a +crest was occupied near Hazel Grove. Here, says Pleasonton, "with the +support of Gen. Sickles's corps we could have defeated the whole rebel +army." It was clearly a strong position; for it is thus referred to by +Stuart, after our troops had been next day withdrawn: "As the sun lifted +the mist that shrouded the field, it was discovered that the ridge on +the extreme right was a fine position for concentrating artillery. +I immediately ordered thirty pieces to that point. The effect of this +fire upon the enemy's batteries was superb." Its possession by the +Confederates did, in fact, notably contribute to the loss of the new +lines at Chancellorsville in Sunday morning's action. + +From this position, at precisely midnight, Sickles made a determined +onslaught upon the Confederate right. It was clear, full moonlight, +and operations could be almost as well conducted as during the daytime, +in these woods. + +Birney stationed Ward in the first line, and Hays in the second, one +hundred yards in the rear. The regiments moved by the right of +companies, with pieces uncapped, and strict orders to rely solely upon +the bayonet. On the road from the Furnace north, parallel to which the +columns moved, the Fortieth New York, Seventeenth Maine, and Sixty-Third +Pennsylvania Volunteers pushed in, in columns of companies at full +distance. + +Berry had been notified to sustain this attack by a movement forward +from his lines, if it should strike him as advisable. + +The attack was made with consummate gallantry. Sickles states that he +drove the enemy back to our original lines, enabling us for the moment +to re-occupy the Eleventh Corps rifle-pits, and to re-capture several +pieces of artillery, despite the fire of some twenty Confederate guns +which had been massed at Dowdall's. + +Thus attacked in flank, though the Confederate right had been refused at +the time of Pleasonton's fight, and still remained so, Hill's line +replied by a front movement of his left on Berry, without being able, +however, to break the latter's line. + +Slocum states that he was not aware that this advance was to be made by +Sickles across his front. Imagining it to be a movement by the enemy on +Williams, he ordered fire to be opened on all troops that appeared, +and fears "that our losses must have been severe from our own fire." +Williams, however, does not think so much damage was done, and alleges +that he himself understood what the movement was, without, however, +quoting the source of his information. + +The Confederate reports state that this attack was met and repulsed by +the Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-third North-Carolina regiments, +with small difficulty or loss. + +It is, however, probable that these as much underrate the vigor and +effect of the attack, as Sickles may overstate it. It is not impossible +that some portion of the Eleventh Corps position was actually reached by +these columns. The road down which the movement was made strikes the +plank road but a short distance east of the position of Buschbeck's +line. This ground was not held in force by Jackson's corps at the +moment, and it was not difficult for Sickles to possess himself +temporarily of some portion of that position. But it must have been a +momentary occupation. + +Birney retired to Hazel Grove after this sally, having recovered part of +Whipple's train, and one or two guns. + +There can be found in the Confederate and Union reports alike, numerous +statements which are not sustained by other testimony. As a sample, +Gen. Lane of A. P. Hill's division states that a Lieut. Emack and four +men captured an entire Pennsylvania regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Smith. +The nearest approach to this is found in the capture of Col. Mathews and +two hundred men of the One Hundred and Twenty-Eighth Pennsylvania, +while Williams was moving by his left to regain his old ground. But it +is highly probable that it required more than five men to effect the +capture. + +A wise rebuke of careless statements in official reports is found in the +following indorsements on a report made of the operations of the One +Hundred and Fourteenth Pennsylvania:-- + +In forwarding this report, which I do merely as a matter of duty, +it is incumbent upon me to say that it is a complete romance from +beginning to end. Col. Collis has had his attention called to these +errors, but has refused to correct them. + CHAS. K. GRAHAM, + Brigadier General. + + HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION THIRD CORPS, + May 17, 1863. + +This paper is forwarded with attention called to Brig.-Gen. Graham's +indorsement. The officer is under arrest on charges of misbehavior +before the enemy. + + D. B. BIRNEY, + Brigadier General commanding Division. + + + + +XX. + +STONEWALL JACKSON. + + +It is probable that the wounding of Jackson at this juncture was the +most effectual cause of the Confederate check on Saturday night. +It occurred just after Jackson had concluded to withdraw his first and +second lines to Dowdall's, there to re-form, and was making dispositions +to move up A. P. Hill to relieve them. Orders had been issued to the +troops not to fire unless at Union cavalry appearing in their front. +Jackson, with some staff-officers and orderlies, had ridden out beyond +his lines, as was his wont, to reconnoitre. On his return he was fired +at by his own men, being mistaken in the gloom for a Federal scout. +Endeavoring to enter at another place, a similar error was made, this +time killing some of the party, and wounding Jackson in several places. +He was carried to the rear. A few days after, he died of pneumonia +brought on by his injury, which aggravated a cold he was suffering from +at the time. + +A. P. Hill was wounded somewhat later that night. + +After the disabling of these two officers, Stuart was sent for, and +promptly assumed command. With Col. Alexander, chief artillery officer +present for duty, (Gen. Crutchfield being wounded,) he spent the night +rectifying the Confederate lines, and selecting positions for his +batteries. It had been Jackson's plan to push forward at night, to +secure the speediest results of his victory. But Stuart, after the +attacks upon his right by Sickles and Pleasonton, and having in view the +disorganized condition of his troops, thought wise to defer a general +assault until daylight. Having submitted the facts to Jackson, and +received word from this officer to use his own discretion in the matter, +he decided to afford his troops a few hours of rest. They were +accordingly halted in line, and lay upon their arms, an ample force of +skirmishers thrown out in front. + +No better place than this will be found in which to say a few words +about the remarkable man who planned and led this movement about +Hooker's flank,--a manoeuvre which must have been condemned as foolhardy +if unsuccessful, but whose triumph wove a final wreath to crown his +dying brows. + +Thomas J. Jackson entered West Point a poor boy, essentially a son of +the people. He was a classmate of McClellan, Foster, Reno, Stoneman, +Couch, Gibbon, and many other noted soldiers, as well those arrayed +against as those serving beside him. His standing in his class was far +from high; and such as he had was obtained by hard, persistent work, +and not by apparent ability. He was known as a simple, honest, +unaffected fellow, rough, and the reverse of social; but he commanded +his companions sincere respect by his rugged honesty, the while his +uncouth bearing earned him many a jeer. + +He was graduated in 1846, and went to Mexico as second lieutenant of the +First United-States Artillery. He was promoted to be first lieutenant +"for gallant and meritorious services at Vera Cruz." Twice mentioned in +Scott's reports, and repeatedly referred to by Worth and Pillow for +gallantry while with Magruder's battery, he emerged from that eventful +campaign with fair fame and abundant training. + +We find him shortly afterwards professor at the Virginia Military +Institute of Lexington. Here he was known as a rigid Presbyterian, +and a "fatalist," if it be fatalism to believe that "what will be will +be,"--Jackson's constant motto. + +Tall, gaunt, awkward, grave, brief, and business-like in all he did, +Jackson passed for odd, "queer,"--insane almost, he was thought by +some,--rather than a man of uncommon reserve power. + +It was only when on parade, or when teaching artillery practice, that he +brightened up; and then scarcely to lose his uncouth habit, but only to +show by the light in his eye, and his wrapt attention in his work, +where lay his happiest tendencies. + +His history during the war is too well known to need to be more than +briefly referred to. He was made colonel of volunteers, and sent to +Harper's Ferry in May, 1861, and shortly after promoted to a brigade. +He accompanied Joe Johnston in his retreat down the valley. At Bull Run, +where his brigade was one of the earliest in the war to use the bayonet, +he earned his soubriquet of "Stonewall" at the lips of Gen. Bee. +But in the mouths of his soldiers his pet name was "Old Jack," and the +term was a talisman which never failed to inflame the heart of every man +who bore arms under his banner. + +Jackson possessed that peculiar magnetism which stirs the blood of +soldiers to boiling-point. Few leaders have ever equalled him in his +control of troops. His men had no questions to ask when "Old Jack" +led the way. They believed in him as did he in his star; and the +impossible only arrested the vigor of their onset, or put a term to +their arduous marches. + +His campaign in the valley against Fremont and Shields requires no +praise. And his movement about McClellan's flank at Mechanicsville, +and his still more sterling manoeuvre in Pope's campaign, need only to +be called to mind. + +In the field he was patient, hard-working, careless of self, and full of +forethought for his men; though no one could call for and get from +troops such excessive work, on the march or in action. No one could ask +them to forego rations, rest, often the barest necessaries of life, +and yet cheerfully yield him their utmost efforts, as could "Old Jack." + +He habitually rode an old sorrel horse, leaning forward in a most +unmilitary seat, and wore a sun-browned cap, dingy gray uniform, and a +stock, into which he would settle his chin in a queer way, as he moved +along with abstracted look. He paid little heed to camp comforts, +and slept on the march, or by snatches under trees, as he might find +occasion; often begging a cup of bean-coffee and a bit of hard bread +from his men, as he passed them in their bivouacs, He was too uncertain +in his movements, and careless of self, for any of his military family +to be able to look after his physical welfare. In fact, a cold +occasioned by lending his cloak to one of his staff, a night or two +before Chancellorsville, was the primary cause of the pneumonia, which, +setting in upon his exhausting wounds, terminated his life. + +Jackson was himself a bad disciplinarian. Nor had he even average +powers of organization. He was in the field quite careless of the +minutiae of drill. But he had a singularly happy faculty for choosing +men to do his work for him. He was a very close calculator of all his +movements. He worked out his manoeuvres to the barest mathematical +chances, and insisted upon the unerring execution of what he prescribed; +and above all be believed in mystery. Of his entire command, he alone +knew what work he had cut out for his corps to do. And this was carried +so far that it is said the men were often forbidden to ask the names of +the places through which they marched. "Mystery," said Jackson, +"mystery is the secret of success in war, as in all transactions of +human life." + +Jackson was a professing member of the Presbyterian Church, and what is +known as a praying man. By this is meant, that, while he never +intentionally paraded or obtruded upon his associates his belief in the +practical and immediate effect of prayer, he made no effort to hide his +faith or practice from the eyes of the world. In action, while the +whole man was wrought up to the culminating pitch of enthusiasm, and +while every fibre of his mind and heart was strained towards the +achievement of his purpose, his hand would often be instinctively raised +upwards; and those who knew him best, believed this to be a sign that +his trust in the help of a Higher Power was ever present. + +Jackson was remarkable as a fighter. In this he stands with but one or +two peers. Few men in the world's history have ever got so great +results from armed men as he was able to do. But to judge rightly of +his actual military strength is not so easy as to award this praise. +Unless a general has commanded large armies, it is difficult to judge of +how far he may be found wanting if tried in that balance. In the +detached commands which he enjoyed, in the Valley and elsewhere, his +strategic ability was marked: but these commands were always more or +less limited; and, unlike Lee or Johnston, Jackson did not live long +enough to rise to the command of a large army upon an extended and +independent field of operations. + +In Gen. Lee, Jackson reposed an implicit faith. "He is the only man I +would follow blindfold," said Jackson. And Lee's confidence in his +lieutenant's ability to carry out any scheme he set his hand to, was +equally pronounced. Honestly, though with too much modesty, did Lee +say: "Could I have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good +of the country, to have been disabled in your stead." + +But, illy as Lee could spare Jackson, less still could the Army of +Northern Virginia spare Robert E. Lee, the greatest in adversity of the +soldiers of our civil war. Still, after Jackson's death, it is certain +that Lee found no one who could attempt the bold manoeuvres on the field +of battle, or the hazardous strategic marches, which have illumined the +name of Jackson to all posterity. + +It is not improbable that had Jackson lived, and risen to larger +commands, he would have been found equal to the full exigencies of the +situation. Whatever he was called upon to do, under limited but +independent scope, seems to testify to the fact that he was far from +having reached his limit. Whatever he did was thoroughly done; and he +never appears to have been taxed to the term of his powers, in any +operation which he undertook. + +Honesty, singleness of purpose, true courage, rare ability, suffice to +account for Jackson's military success. But those alone who have served +under his eye know to what depths that rarer, stranger power of his has +sounded them: they only can testify to the full measure of the strength +of Stonewall Jackson. + + + + +XXI. + +THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW. + + +Gen. Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War +comprises almost every thing which has been officially put forth by him +with reference to this campaign. It therefore stands in lieu of a +report of operations, and it may be profitable to continue to quote from +it to some extent. His alleged intention of withdrawing from +Chancellorsville is thus explained. After setting forth that on the +demolition of the Eleventh Corps, the previous evening, he threw Berry +into the gap to arrest Jackson, "and if possible to seize, and at all +hazards hold, the high ground abandoned by that corps," he says:-- + +"Gen. Berry, after going perhaps three-quarters of a mile, reported that +the enemy was already in possession of the ground commanding my position, +and that he had been compelled to establish his line in the valley on +the Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as this was +communicated to me, I directed Gens. Warren and Comstock to trace out a +new line which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night, +as I would not be able to hold the one I then occupied after the enemy +should renew the attack the next morning." + +"The position" at Dowdall's "was the most commanding one in the +vicinity. In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with his +artillery to enfilade the lines held by the Twelfth and Second Corps." +"To wrest this position from the enemy after his batteries were +established upon it, would have required slender columns of infantry, +which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it." Slender +columns of infantry were at this time among Hooker's pet ideas. + +"Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as +practicable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate with +the movement which had been ordered to be made on our left." + +"The attack was renewed by the enemy about seven o'clock in the morning, +and was bravely resisted by the limited number of troops I could bring +into action until eleven o'clock, when orders were given for the army to +establish itself on the new line. This it did in good order. The +position I abandoned was one that I had held at a disadvantage; and I +kept the troops on it as long as I did, only for the purpose of enabling +me to hear of the approach of the force under Gen. Sedgwick." Thus much +Hooker. + +The position of both armies shortly after daybreak was substantially +that to which the operation of Saturday had led. + +The crest at Fairview was crowned by eight batteries of the Third and +Twelfth Corps, supported by Whipple's Second brigade (Bowman's), in +front to the left, forming, as it were, a third line of infantry. + +In advance of the artillery some five hundred yards, (a good half-mile +from the Chancellor House,) lay the Federal line of battle, on a crest +less high than Fairview, but still commanding the tangled woods in its +front to a limited distance, and with lower ground in its rear, +deepening to a ravine on the south of the plank road. Berry's division +held this line north of the plank road, occupying the ground it had +fought over since dusk of the evening before. Supporting it somewhat +later was Whipple's First brigade (Franklin's). Berdan's sharpshooters +formed a movable skirmish-line; while another, and heavier, was thrown +out by Berry from his own troops. + +A section of Dimick's battery was trained down the road. + +Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps was to the south of the plank +road, both he and Berry substantially in one line, and perpendicular to +it; while Mott's brigade was massed in rear of Williams's right. + +Near Williams's left flank, but almost at right angles to it, came +Geary's division, in the same intrenched line he had defended the day +before; and on his left again, the Second Corps, which had not +materially changed its position since Friday. + +The angle thus formed by Geary and Williams, looked out towards cleared +fields, and rising ground, surmounted by some farm-buildings on a high +crest, about six hundred yards from Fairview. + +At this farm, called Hazel Grove, during the night, and until just +before daybreak, holding a position which could have been utilized as an +almost impregnable point d'appui, and which, so long as it was held, +practically prevented, in the approaching battle, a junction of Lee's +severed wings, had lain Birney's and Whipple's divisions. This point +they had occupied, (as already described,) late the evening before, +after Sickles and Pleasonton had finished their brush with Jackson's +right brigades. But Hooker was blind to the fact that the possession of +this height would enable either himself or his enemy to enfilade the +other's lines; and before daybreak the entire force was ordered to move +back to Chancellorsville. In order to do this, the intervening swamp +had to be bridged, and the troops handled with extreme care. When all +but Graham had been withdrawn, a smart attack was made upon his brigade +by Archer of Hill's command, who charged up and captured the Hazel Grove +height; but it was with no serious Federal loss, except a gun and +caisson stalled in the swamp. Sickles drew in his line by the right, +and was directed to place his two divisions so as to strengthen the new +line at Fairview. + +Reynolds's corps had arrived the evening before, and, after somewhat +blind instructions, had been placed along the east of Hunting Run, +from the Rapidan to the junction of Ely's and United-States Ford roads, +in a location where the least advantage could be gained from his fresh +and eager troops, and where, in fact, the corps was not called into +action at all, restless however Reynolds may have been under his +enforced inactivity. + +The Eleventh Corps had gone to the extreme left, where it had relieved +Meade; Sykes was already formed on Reynolds's left, (having rapidly +moved to the cross roads at dusk on Saturday;) while Meade with the rest +of his corps, so soon as Howard had relieved him, went into position to +support this entire line on the extreme right of the Army of the +Potomac. Thus three strong army corps henceforth disappear from +effective usefulness in the campaign. + +The Confederate position opposite Fairview had been entirely rectified +during the night to prepare for the expected contest. The division of +A. P. Hill was now in the front line, perpendicular to the road, Archer +on the extreme right, and McGowan, Lane, Pender, and Thomas, extending +towards the left; the two latter on the north of the road. Heth was in +reserve, behind Lane and Pender. Archer and McGowan were half refused +from the general line at daylight, so as to face, and if possible drive +Sickles from Hazel Grove. Archer was taking measures with a view to +forcing a connection with Anderson; while the latter sent Perry by the +Catharpen road, and Posey direct, towards the Furnace, with like purpose. + +Colston was drawn up in second line with Trimble's division; while Rodes, +who had led the van in the attack on Howard of last evening, now made +the third. The artillery of the corps was disposed mainly on the right +of the line, occupying, shortly after daylight, the Hazel-Grove crest, +and at Melzi Chancellor's, in the clearing, where the Eleventh Corps had +met its disaster. + +There was thus opposed to the Federal right centre, (Berry's, Whipple's, +and Birney's divisions of the Third Corps, and Williams's of the +Twelfth,) consisting of about twenty-two thousand men, the whole of +Jackson's corps, now reduced to about the same effective; while Anderson, +on the left of the plank road, feeling out towards the Furnace, and +McLaws on the right, with seventeen thousand men between them, +confronted our left centre, consisting of Geary of the Twelfth, and +Hancock of the Second Corps, numbering not much above twelve thousand +for duty. + +Owing to Hooker's ill-fitting dispositions, and lack of ability to +concentrate, the fight of Sunday morning was thus narrowed to a contest +in which the Federals were outnumbered, with the prestige of Confederate +success to offset our intrenchments. + +The right and left wings proper of the Union army comprised the bulk and +freshest part of the forces, having opposite to them no enemy whatever, +unless a couple of cavalry regiments scouting on the Mine and River +roads. + +Gen. Warren, who was much in Hooker's confidence, thus explains his +understanding of the situation Saturday night: "The position of the +Third Corps and our cavalry on the right flank of Jackson's cavalry" +(? corps), "cut off, it seemed, all direct communication with Gen. Lee's +right. No thought of retreating during the night was entertained on our +side; and, unless the enemy did, the next day promised a decisive +battle. By our leaving sufficient force in front of the right wing of +the enemy to hold our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our force +was to be thrown upon his left at dawn of day, with every prospect of +annihilating it. To render this success more complete, Gen. Sedgwick, +with the Sixth Corps, (about twenty thousand strong,) was to leave his +position in front of the enemy's lines at Fredericksburg, and fall upon +Gen. Lee's rear at daylight." + +This summarizes an excellent plan, weak only in the fact that it was +impracticable to expect Sedgwick to gain Lee's rear by daylight. +The balance was well enough, and, vigorously carried out, could, even if +unassisted by Sedgwick, scarcely fail of success. + +To examine into its manner of execution. + + + + +XXII. + +THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW. + + +At the earliest dawn, while Rodes was issuing rations to his men, +who had been many hours without food, the indefatigable Stuart gave +orders for a slight advance of his right, to reduce the angle of refusal +or Archer and McGowan; for at this moment it was ascertained that +Sickles was being withdrawn from Hazel Grove. By some error, Stuart's +order was interpreted as a command for the anticipated general attack, +and the advancing columns soon provoked the fire of the expectant +Federals. + +Seeing that the men were ready for their work, rations or no rations, +Stuart wisely refrained from recalling them; and Berry and Williams +betimes felt the shock of the strong line of A. P. Hill, which Alexander +seconded by opening with his artillery in full action. The Confederates +forged ahead with the watchword, "Charge, and remember Jackson!" +And this appeal was one to nerve all hearts to the desperate task before +them. + +Hotchkiss thus describes the field of operations of this morning: "The +first line of works occupied by the Federal troops had been thrown up in +the night, and was very formidable. The engineer division of the Union +Army consisted of near four thousand men, and these had been +unremittingly engaged in its construction. A vast number of trees had +been felled, and formed into a heavy rampart, all approach to which was +rendered extremely difficult by an abattis of limbs and brushwood. +On the south side of the road this line is situated upon a ridge, +on the Chancellorsville side of Lewis Creek, one of the numerous +head-waters of the Mattapony. It is intersected by the smaller branches +of this creek, and the ravines in which they run. These ravines +extended behind the Federal lines, almost to the plank road, and +afforded excellent positions for successive stands. In the morning, +Sickles extended to the west of the creek, and held the elevated plateau +at Hazel Grove. This is the most commanding point, except Fairview, +in the vicinity. On the north of the plank road, the ground is more +level. The line thus crossed several small branches, the origin of some +small tributaries of the Rappahannock, but the ravines on that side are +not considerable. From the ridge occupied by the first line, the ground +falls away to the east, until the valley of another branch of Lewis +Creek is reached. The depression here is considerable, and gives an +abrupt slope to the Fairview hill, which rises directly from it on the +eastern side. From the first line of the creek, extends on both sides +of the road a dense forest. From the latter point to Fairview heights, +and to Chancellorsville, on the south side of the road, the country is +cleared. This clearing is bounded on the south by a drain, which runs +from near Chancellorsville, between Fairview and the works occupied by +Slocum. It extends some distance on the north of the road. + +"Behind the front line of works, there were some defences in the valley +near the creek, not constituting a connecting line, however; and these +in turn were succeeded by the second main line of works, which covered +the Fairview heights, and were more strongly constructed even than the +first." + +It was at just the time of Rodes's assault, that Birney had received +orders to withdraw from his cardinal position at the angle made by Geary +and Williams, and to form as a second and third line near the plank road, +a duty there was an abundance of troops to fill. He retired, and ployed +into brigade columns by regiments, immediately beyond the crest of +Fairview hill. Here, placing batteries in position, he shelled the +field from which he had just withdrawn. This crest, however, Archer +speedily occupied; and on its summit Stuart, with better foresight than +Hooker, posted some thirty guns under Walker, which enfiladed our lines +with murderous effect during the remainder of the combat of Sunday, +and contributed largely to our defeat. + +The attack of the Confederates was made, "as Jackson usually did, +in heavy columns" (Sickles), and was vigorous and effective. According +to their own accounts, the onset was met with equal cheerful gallantry. +While Archer occupied Hazel Grove, McGowan and Lane assaulted the works +held by Williams, carried them with an impetuous rush, and pushed our +troops well back. This rapid success was largely owing to a serious +breach made in the Union line by the decampment of the Third Maryland +Volunteers, a full regiment of Knipe's brigade, which held the right of +Williams's division on the plank road. The regiment was composed of new +men, no match for Jackson's veterans. They stood as well as raw troops +can, in the face of such an onslaught; but after a loss of about a +hundred men, they yielded ground, and were too green to rally. Into the +gap thus made, quickly poured a stream of Lane's men, thus taking both +Berry's and Williams's lines in reverse. The Second Brigade was +compelled to change front to meet this new attack: Mott was instantly +thrown forward to fill the interval; and after a desperate hand-to-hand +struggle he regained the lost ground, and captured eight stands of +colors and about a thousand prisoners. This separated Archer from the +main line, and took in their turn McGowan and Lane in reverse, +precipitately driving them back, and enabling our columns to regain the +ground lost by the fierceness of the Confederate inroad. This sally in +reverse likewise carried back Lane and Heth, the entire corps having +suffered severely from the excellent service of the Federal guns. +But the effect on Williams's division of this alternating gain and loss, +had been to cause it to waver; while having for an instant captured our +works, was encouragement to our foes. + +On the north of the road, Pender and Thomas had at first won equal +fortune against Berry's works, but their success had been equally +short-lived. For the falling-back of Jackson's right, and the cheering +of the Union line as its fire advanced in hot pursuit, gave at the same +moment notice to the Confederate left that it was compromised, and to +our own brave boys the news of their comrades' fortune. Pender and +Thomas were slowly but surely forced back, under a withering fire, +beyond the breastworks they had won. A second time did these veterans +rally for the charge, and a second time did they penetrate a part of our +defences; only, however, to be taken in flank again by Berry's right +brigade, and tumbled back to their starting-point. But their onset had +shown so great determination, that Ward was despatched to sustain +Berry's right, lest he should be eventually over-matched. + +The Federal line on the north of the plank road had thus doggedly +resisted the most determined attacks of Jackson's men, and had lost no +ground. And so hard pressed indeed was Pender by gallant Berry's +legions, that Colquitt's brigade was sent to his relief. Pender's men +had early expended all their ammunition, word whereof was sent to Stuart, +but merely to evoke renewal of that stubborn officer's orders to hold +their ground with the bayonet, and at all hazards. And such orders as +these were wont to be obeyed by these hardened warriors. + +The three Confederate lines of attack had soon, as on yesternight, +become one, as each pushed forward to sustain the other. The enemy +"pressed forward in crowds rather than in any regular formation" +(Sickles); but the momentum of these splendid troops was well-nigh +irresistible. Nichols's brigade of Trimble's division, and Iverson's +and Rodes's of Rodes's division, pressed forward to sustain the first +line on the north of the road, and repel the flank attack, constantly +renewed by Berry. Another advance of the entire line was ordered. +Rodes led his old brigade in person. The Confederates seemed determined, +for Jackson's sake, to carry and hold the works which they had twice +gained, and out of which they had been twice driven; for, with "Old Jack" +at their head, they had never shown a sterner front. + +Now came the most grievous loss of this morning's conflict. Gallant +Berry, the life of his division, always in the hottest of the fire, +reckless of safety, had fallen mortally wounded, before Ward's brigade +could reach his line. Gen. Revere assumed command, and, almost before +the renewal of the Confederate attack, "heedless of their murmurs," +says Sickles's report, "shamefully led to the rear the whole of the +Second Brigade, and portions of two others, thus subjecting these proud +soldiers, for the first time, to the humiliation of being marched to the +rear while their comrades were under fire. Gen. Revere was promptly +recalled with his troops, and at once relieved of command." Revere +certainly gives no satisfactory explanation of his conduct; but he +appears to have marched over to the vicinity of French of the Second +Corps, upon the White House clearing, and reported to him with a large +portion of his troops. Revere was subsequently courtmartialled for this +misbehavior, and was sentenced to dismissal; but the sentence was +revoked by the President, and he was allowed to resign. + +Col. Stevens was speedily put in command in Revere's stead; but he, too, +soon fell, leaving the gallant division without a leader, nearly half of +its number off the field, and the remainder decimated by the bloody +contest of the past four hours. Moreover, Gen. Hays, whose brigade of +French's division had been detached in support of Berry, where it had +done most gallant work, was at the same time wounded and captured by the +enemy. + +It was near eight o'clock. The artillery was quite out of ammunition, +except canister, which could not be used with safety over the heads of +our troops. Our outer lines of breastworks had been captured, and were +held by the enemy. So much as was left of Berry's division was in +absolute need of re-forming. Its supports were in equally bad plight. +The death of Berry, and the present location of our lines in the low +ground back of the crest just lost, where the undergrowth was so tangled +and the bottom so marshy, that Ward, when he marched to Berry's relief, +had failed to find him, obliged the Federals to fall back to the +Fairview heights, and form a new line at the western edge of the +Chancellor clearing, where the artillery had been so ably sustaining the +struggle now steadily in progress since daylight. Sickles himself +supervised the withdrawal of the line, and its being deployed on its new +position. + +The receding of the right of the line also necessitated the falling-back +of Williams. The latter officer had, moreover, been for some time quite +short of ammunition; and though Graham had filled the place of a part of +his line, and had held it for nearly two hours, repeatedly using the +bayonet, Williams was obliged to give way before Stuart's last assault. +But Graham was not the man readily to accept defeat; and, as Williams's +line melted away, he found himself isolated, and in great danger of +being surrounded. Gen. Birney fortunately became aware of the danger +before it was too late; and, hastily gathering a portion of Hayman's +brigade, he gallantly led them to the charge in person; and, under cover +of this opportune diversion, Graham contrived to withdraw in good order, +holding McGowan severely in check. + +The Union troops now establish their second line near Fairview. The +Confederates' progress is arrested for the nonce. It is somewhat after +eight A.M. A lull, premonitory only of a still fiercer tempest, +supervenes. + +But the lull is of short duration. Re-forming their ranks as well as +may be on the south of the road, the Confederates again assault the +Union second line, on the crest at Fairview. But the height is not +readily carried. The slope is wooded, and affords good cover for an +assault. But the artillery on the summit can now use its canister; and +the Union troops have been rallied and re-formed in good order. The +onset is met and driven back, amid the cheers of the victorious Federals. + +Nor are Stuart's men easily discouraged. Failure only seems to +invigorate these intrepid legions to fresh endeavors. Colston's and +Jones's brigades, with Paxton's, Ramseur's, and Doles' of the third line, +have re-enforced the first, and passed it, and now attack Williams with +redoubled fury in his Fairview breastworks, while Birney sustains him +with his last man and cartridge. The Confederate troops take all +advantage possible of the numerous ravines in our front; but the +batteries at Fairview pour a heavy and destructive fire of shell and +case into their columns as they press on. Every inch of ground is +contested by our divisions, which hold their footing at Fairview with +unflinching tenacity. + +Meanwhile Doles, moving under cover of a hill which protects him from +the Federal batteries, and up a little branch coming from the rear of +Fairview, takes in reverse the left of Williams's line, which has become +somewhat separated from Geary, (whose position is thus fast becoming +untenable,) moves up, and deploys upon the open ground at Chancellorsville. +But he finds great difficulty in maintaining his footing, and would have +at once been driven back, when Paxton's (old Stonewall) brigade comes up +to his support on the double-quick. Jackson's spirit for a while seems +to carry all before it; the charge of these two brigades against our +batteries fairly bristles with audacity; but our guns are too well served, +and the gallant lines are once again decimated and hustled back to +the foot of the crest. + +The seizure of Hazel Grove, from which Sickles had retired, had now +begun to tell against us. It had enabled the Confederates not only to +form the necessary junction of their hitherto separated wings, but to +enfilade our lines in both directions. The artillery under Walker, +Carter, Pegram, and Jones, was admirably served, and much better posted +than our own guns at Fairview. For this height absolutely commanded the +angle made by the lines of Geary and Williams, and every shot went +crashing through heavy masses of troops. Our severest losses during +this day from artillery-fire emanated from this source, not to speak of +the grievous effect upon the morale of our men from the enfilading +missiles. + +About eight A.M., French, one of whose brigades, (Hays's,) had been +detached in support of Berry, and who was in the rifle-pits on the Ely's +Ford road near White House, facing east, perceiving how hotly the +conflict was raging in his rear, on the right of the Third Corps line, +and having no enemy in his own front, assumed the responsibility of +placing four regiments of Carroll's brigade in line on the clearing, +facing substantially west, and formed his Third Brigade on their right, +supporting the left batteries of the Fifth Corps. This was a complete +about-face. + +Soon after taking up this position, Hooker ordered him forward into the +woods, to hold Colquitt and Thomas in check, who were advancing beyond +the right of Sickles's position at Fairview, and compromising the +withdrawal to the new lines which was already determined upon. Says +French: "In a moment the order was given. The men divested themselves +of all but their fighting equipment, and the battalions marched in line +across the plain with a steady pace, receiving at the verge of the woods +the enemy's fire. It was returned with great effect, followed up by an +impetuous charge. . . . The enemy, at first panic-stricken by the +sudden attack on his flank, broke to the right in masses, leaving in our +hands several hundred prisoners, and abandoning a regiment of one of our +corps in the same situation." + +But French had not driven back his antagonist to any considerable +distance before himself was outflanked on his right by a diversion of +Pender's. To meet this new phase of the combat, he despatched an aide +to Couch for re-enforcements; and soon Tyler's brigade appeared, and +went in on his right. This fight of French and Tyler effectually +repelled the danger menacing the White House clearing. It was, however, +a small affair compared to the heavy fighting in front of Fairview. +And, the yielding of Chancellorsville to the enemy about eleven A.M. +having rendered untenable the position of these brigades, they were +gradually withdrawn somewhat before noon. + +Still Jackson's lines, the three now one confused mass, but with +unwavering purpose, returned again and again to the assault. Our +regiments had become entirely depleted of ammunition; and, though Birney +was ordered to throw in his last man to Williams's support, it was too +late to prevent the latter from once more yielding ground. + +For, having resisted the pressure of Stuart's right for nearly four +hours, his troops having been for some time with empty cartridge-boxes, +twenty-four hours without food, and having passed several nights without +sleep, while intrenching, Williams now felt that he could no longer hold +his ground. The enemy was still pressing on, and the mule-train of +small ammunition could not be got up under the heavy fire. His +artillery had also exhausted its supplies; Sickles was in similar +plight; Jackson's men, better used to the bayonet, and possessing the +momentum of success, still kept up their vigorous blows. Williams's +line therefore slowly fell to the rear, still endeavoring to lean on +Sickles's left. + +Sickles, who had kept Hooker informed of the condition of affairs as +they transpired, and had repeatedly requested support, now sent a more +urgent communication to him, asking for additional troops. Major +Tremaine reached headquarters just after the accident to Hooker, and +received no satisfaction. Nor had a second appeal better results. +What should and could easily have been done at an earlier moment by +Hooker,--to wit, re-enforce the right centre (where the enemy was all +too plainly using his full strength and making the key of the field), +from the large force of disposable troops on the right and left,--it was +now too late to order. + +Before nine A.M., Sickles, having looked in vain for re-enforcements, +deemed it necessary to withdraw his lines back of Fairview crest. +Himself re-formed the divisions, except that portion withdrawn by Revere, +and led them to the rear, where the front line occupied the late +artillery breastworks. Ammunition was at once re-distributed. + +We had doubtless inflicted heavy losses upon the Confederates. "Their +formation for attack was entirely broken up, and from my headquarters +they presented to the eye the appearance of a crowd, without definite +formation; and if another corps had been available at the moment to have +relieved me, or even to have supported me, my judgment was that not only +would that attack of the enemy have been triumphantly repulsed, but that +we could have advanced on them, and carried the day." (Sickles.) + +On the Chancellorsville open occurred another sanguinary struggle. +Stuart still pressed on with his elated troops, although his men were +beginning to show signs of severe exhaustion. Franklin's and Mott's +brigades, says Sickles, "made stern resistance to the impulsive assaults +of the enemy, and brilliant charges in return worthy of the Old Guard." + +But, though jaded and bleeding from this prolonged and stubbornly- +contested battle, Jackson's columns had by no means relaxed their +efforts. The blows they could give were feebler, but they were +continued with the wonderful pertinacity their chief had taught them; +and nothing but the Chancellor clearing, and with it the road to +Fredericksburg, would satisfy their purpose. + +And a half-hour later, Sickles, finding himself unsupported on right and +left, though not heavily pressed by the enemy, retired to Chancellorsville, +and re-formed on the right of Hancock, while portions of three batteries +held their ground, half way between Chancellorsville and Fairview, and +fired their last rounds, finally retiring after nearly all their horses +and half their men had been shot, but still without the loss of a gun. + +With characteristic gallantry, Sickles now proposed to regain the +Fairview crest with his corps, attacking the enemy with the bayonet; and +he thinks it could have been done. But, Hooker having been temporarily +disabled, his successor or executive, Couch, did not think fit to +license the attempt. And shortly after, Hooker recovered strength +sufficient to order the withdrawal to the new lines at White House; and +Chancellorsville was reluctantly given up to the enemy, who had won it +so fairly and at such fearful sacrifice. + +In retiring from the Chancellor clearing, Sickles states that he took, +instead of losing, prisoners and material. This appears to be true, +and shows how Stuart had fought his columns to the utmost of their +strength, in driving us from our morning's position. He says: "At the +conclusion of the battle of Sunday, Capt. Seeley's battery, which was +the last battery that fired a shot in the battle of Chancellorsville, +had forty-five horses killed, and in the neighborhood of forty men +killed and wounded;" but "he withdrew so entirely at his leisure, +that he carried off all the harness from his dead horses, loading his +cannoneers with it." "As I said before, if another corps, or even ten +thousand men, had been available at the close of the battle of +Chancellorsville, on that part of the field where I was engaged, I +believe the battle would have resulted in our favor." Such is the +testimony of Hooker's warmest supporter. And there is abundant evidence +on the Confederate side to confirm this assumption. + +The losses of the Third Corps in the battle of Sunday seem to have been +the bulk of that day's casualties. + +There can be no limit to the praise earned by the mettlesome veterans of +Jackson's corps, in the deadly fight at Fairview. They had continuously +marched and fought, with little sleep and less rations, since Thursday +morning. Their ammunition had been sparse, and they had been obliged to +rely frequently upon the bayonet alone. They had fought under +circumstances which rendered all attempts to preserve organization +impossible. They had charged through tangled woods against well- +constructed field-works, and in the teeth of destructive artillery-fire, +and had captured the works again and again. Never had infantry better +earned the right to rank with the best which ever bore arms, than this +gallant twenty thousand,--one man in every four of whom lay bleeding on +the field. + +Nor can the same meed of praise be withheld from our own brave legions. +Our losses had been heavier than those of the enemy. Generals and +regimental commanders had fallen in equal proportions. Our forces had, +owing to the extraordinary combinations of the general in command, +been outnumbered by the enemy wherever engaged. While we had received +the early assaults behind breastworks, we had constantly been obliged to +recapture them, as they were successively wrenched from our grasp,--and +we had done it. Added to the prestige of success, and the flush of the +charge, the massing of columns upon a line of only uniform strength had +enabled the Confederates to repeatedly capture portions of our +intrenchments, and, thus taking the left and right in reverse, to drive +back our entire line. But our divisions had as often done the same. +And well may the soldiers who were engaged in this bloody encounter of +Sunday, May 3, 1863, call to mind with equal pride that each met a +foeman worthy of his steel. + +Say Hotchkiss and Allan: "The resistance of the Federal army had been +stubborn. Numbers, weight of artillery, and strength of position, +had been in its favor. Against it told heavily the loss of morale due +to the disaster of the previous day." + + + + +XXIII. + +THE LEFT CENTRE. + + +While the bulk of the fighting had thus been done by the right centre, +Anderson was steadily forcing his way towards Chancellorsville. He had +Wright's, Posey's, and Perry's brigades on the left of the plank road, +and Mahone's on the right, and was under orders to press on to the +Chancellor clearing as soon as he could join his left to Jackson's +right. He speaks in his report as if he had little fighting to do to +reach his destination. Nor does Geary, who was in his front, mention +any heavy work until about nine A.M.; for Geary's position was +jeopardized by the enfilading fire of Stuart's batteries on the +Hazel-Grove hill, and by the advance of Stuart's line of battle, which +found his right flank in the air. He could scarcely be expected to make +a stubborn contest under these conditions. + +While thus hemmed in, Geary "obeyed an order to retire, and form my +command at right angles with the former line of battle, the right +resting at or near the Brick House," (Chancellorsville). While in the +execution of this order, Hooker seems to have changed his purpose, +and in person ordered him back to his original stand, "to hold it at all +hazards." + +In some manner, accounted for by the prevalent confusion, Greene's and +Kane's brigades had, during this change of front, become separated from +the command, and had retired to a line of defence north of the +Chancellor House. But on regaining the old breastworks, Geary found two +regiments of Greene's brigade still holding them. + +Now ensued a thorough-going struggle for the possession of these +breastworks, and they were tenaciously hung to by Geary with his small +force, until Wright had advanced far beyond his flank, and had reached +the Chancellor clearing; when, on instructions from Slocum, he withdrew +from the unequal strife, and subsequently took up a position on the left +of the Eleventh Corps. + +Anderson now moved his division forward, and occupied the edge of the +clearing, where the Union forces were still making a last stand about +headquarters. + +McLaws, meanwhile, in Couch's front, fought mainly his skirmishers and +artillery. Hancock strengthened Miles's outpost line, who "held it +nobly against repeated assaults." + +While this is transacting, Couch orders Hancock to move up to the +United-States Ford road, which he imagines to be threatened by the +enemy; but the order is countermanded when scarcely begun. There is +assuredly a sufficiency of troops there. + +But Hancock is soon obliged to face about to ward off the advance of +the enemy, now irregularly showing his line of battle upon the +Chancellorsville clearing, while Sickles and Williams slowly and +sullenly retire from before him. + +The enemy is gradually forcing his way towards headquarters. Hancock's +artillery helps keep him in check for a limited period; but the +batteries of Stuart, Anderson, and McLaws, all directing a converging +fire on the Chancellor House, make it, under the discouraging +circumstances, difficult for him to maintain any footing. + +When Couch had temporarily assumed command, Hancock, before Geary was +forced from his intrenchments by Anderson, disposed the Second Corps, +with its eighteen pieces of artillery, in two lines, facing respectively +east and west, about one mile apart. But Geary's relinquishment of the +rifle-pits allowed the flanks of both the lines to be exposed, and +prevented these dispositions from answering their purpose. Hancock +clung to his ground, however, until the enemy had reached within a few +hundred yards. Then the order for all troops to be withdrawn within the +new lines was promulgated, and the removal of the wounded from the +Chancellor House was speedily completed,--the shelling by the enemy +having set it on fire some time before. + +Hancock's artillery at the Chancellor House certainly suffered severely; +for, during this brief engagement, Leppien's battery lost all its horses, +officers, and cannoneers, and the guns had to be removed by an infantry +detail, by hand. + +The Confederate army now occupied itself in refitting its shattered +ranks upon the plain. Its organization had been torn to shreds, during +the stubborn conflict of the morning, in the tangled woods and marshy +ravines of the Wilderness; but this had its full compensation in the +possession of the prize for which it had contended. A new line of +battle was formed on the plank road west of Chancellorsville, and on the +turnpike east. Rodes leaned his right on the Chancellor House, and +Pender swung round to conform to the Federal position. Anderson and +McLaws lay east of Colston, who held the old pike, but were soon after +replaced by Heth, with part of A. P. Hill's corps. + +In the woods, where Berry had made his gallant stand opposite the fierce +assaults of Jackson, and where lay by thousands the mingled dead and +wounded foes, there broke out about noon a fire in the dry and +inflammable underbrush. The Confederates detailed a large force, +and labored bravely to extinguish the flames, equally exhibiting their +humanity to suffering friend and foe; but the fire was hard to control, +and many wounded perished in the flames. + + + + +XXIV. + +THE NEW LINES. + + +The new lines, prepared by Gens. Warren and Comstock, in which the Army +of the Potomac might seek refuge from its weaker but more active foe, +lay as follows:-- + +Birney describes the position as a flattened cone. The apex touched +Bullock's, (White House or Chandler's,) where the Mineral-Spring road, +along which the left wing of the army had lain, crosses the road from +Chancellorsville to Ely's Ford. + +Bullock's lies on a commanding plateau, with open ground in its front, +well covered by our artillery. This clearing is north of and larger +than the Chancellor open, and communicates with it. The position of the +troops on the left was not materially changed, but embraced the corps of +Howard and Slocum. The right lay in advance of and along the road to +Ely's, with Big Hunting Run in its front, and was still held by +Reynolds. At the apex were Sickles and Couch. + +The position was almost impregnable, and covered in full safety the line +of retreat to United-States Ford, the road to which comes into the Ely's +Ford road a half-mile west of Bullock's. + +To these lines the Second, Third, and Twelfth Corps retired, unmolested +by the enemy, and filed into the positions assigned to each division. + +Only slight changes had been made in the situation of Meade since he +took up his lines on the left of the army. He had, with wise +forethought, sent Sykes at the double-quick, after the rout of the +Eleventh Corps, to seize the cross-roads to Ely's and United-States +Fords. Here Sykes now occupied the woods along the road from Bullock's +to connect with Reynolds's left. + +Before daylight Sunday morning, Humphreys, relieved by a division of the +Eleventh Corps, had moved to the right, and massed his division in rear +of Griffin, who had preceded him on the line, and had later moved to +Geary's left, on the Ely's Ford road. At nine A.M., he had sent Tyler's +brigade to support Gen. French, and with the other had held the edge of +Chancellorsville clearing, while the Third and Twelfth Corps retired to +the new lines. + +And, when French returned to these lines, he fell in on Griffin's left. + +About noon of Sunday, then, the patient and in no wise discouraged Union +Army lay as described, while in its front stood the weary Army of +Northern Virginia, with ranks thinned and leaders gone, but with the +pride of success, hardly fought for and nobly earned, to reward it for +all the dangers and hardships of the past few days. + +Gen. Lee, having got his forces into a passable state of re-organization, +began to reconnoitre the Federal position, with a view to another +assault upon it. It was his belief that one more hearty effort would +drive Hooker across the river; and he was ready to make it, at whatever +cost. But, while engaged in the preparation for such an attempt, +he received news from Fredericksburg which caused him to look anxiously +in that direction. + + + + +XXV. + +SUNDAY'S MISCARRIAGE. + + +The operations of Sunday morning, in common with many of our battles, +furnish scarcely more than a narrative of isolated combats, having more +or less remote or immediate effect upon each other. + +The difficulty of the ground over which our armies were constantly +called upon to manoeuvre explains "why the numerous bloody battles +fought between the armies of the Union and of the secessionists should +have been so indecisive. A proper understanding of the country, too, +will help to relieve the Americans from the charge, so frequently made +at home and abroad, of want of generalship in handling troops in +battle,--battles that had to be fought out hand to hand in forests, +where artillery and cavalry could play no part; where the troops could +not be seen by those controlling their movements; where the echoes and +reverberations of sound from tree to tree were enough to appall the +strongest hearts engaged, and yet the noise would often be scarcely +heard beyond the immediate scene of strife. Thus the generals on either +side, shut out from sight and from hearing, had to trust to the +unyielding bravery of their men till couriers from the different parts +of the field, often extending for miles, brought word which way the +conflict was resulting, before sending the needed support. We should +not wonder that such battles often terminated from the mutual exhaustion +of both contending forces, but rather, that, in all these struggles of +Americans against Americans, no panic on either side gave victory to the +other, like that which the French under Moreau gained over the Austrians +in the Black Forest." (Warren.) + +The Confederates had their general plan of action, viz., to drive their +opponents from the Chancellor House, in order to re-unite their right +and left wings, and to obtain possession of the direct road to +Fredericksburg, where lay Early and Barksdale. To accomplish this end, +they attacked the centre of Hooker's army,--the right centre +particularly,--which blocked their way towards both objects. + +It had been no difficult task to divine their purpose. Indeed, it is +abundantly shown that Hooker understood it, in his testimony already +quoted. But, if he needed evidence of the enemy's plans, he had +acquired full knowledge, shortly after dawn, that the bulk of Stuart's +corps was still confronting Sickles and Williams, where they had fought +the evening before; and that Anderson and McLaws had not materially +changed their position in front of Geary and Hancock. He could have +ascertained, by an early morning reconnoissance, (indeed, his corps- +commanders did so on their own responsibility,) that there was no enemy +whatsoever confronting his right and left flanks, where three corps, +the First, Fifth, and Eleventh, lay chafing with eagerness to engage the +foe. And the obvious thing to do was to leave a curtain of troops to +hold these flanks, which were protected by almost insuperable natural +obstacles, as well as formidable intrenchments, and hold the superfluous +troops well in hand, as a central reserve, in the vicinity of +headquarters, to be launched against the attacking columns of the enemy, +wherever occasion demanded. + +Hooker still had in line at Chancellorsville, counting out his losses of +Saturday, over eighty-five thousand men. Lee had not exceeding half the +number. But every musket borne by the Army of Northern Virginia was put +to good use; every round of ammunition was made to tell its story. +On the other hand, of the effective of the Army of the Potomac, barely a +quarter was fought au fond, while at least one-half the force for duty +was given no opportunity to burn a cartridge, to aid in checking the +onset of the elated champions of the South. + +Almost any course would have been preferable to Hooker's inertness. +There was a variety of opportune diversions to make. Reynolds, with his +fresh and eager corps, held the new right, protected in his front by +Hunting Run. It would have been easy at any time to project a strong +column from his front, and take Stuart's line of battle in reverse. +Indeed, a short march of three miles by the Ely's Ford, Haden's Ford, +and Greenwood Gold Mines roads, none of which were held by the enemy, +would have enabled Reynolds to strike Stuart in rear of his left flank, +or seize Dowdall's clearing by a coup de main, and absolutely negative +all Stuart's efforts in front of Fairview. Or an advance through the +forest would have accomplished the same end. To be sure, the ground was +difficult, and cut up by many brooks and ravines; but such ground had +been, in this campaign, no obstacle to the Confederates. Nor would it +have been to Reynolds, had he been given orders to execute such a +manoeuvre. Gen. Doubleday states in his testimony: "The action raged +with the greatest fury near us on our left." "I thought that the simple +advance of our corps would take the enemy in flank, and would be very +beneficial in its results. Gen. Reynolds once or twice contemplated +making this advance on his own responsibility. Col. Stone made a +reconnoissance, showing it to be practicable." + +The same thing applies to the Eleventh and portions of the Fifth Corps +on the left. A heavy column could have been despatched by the Mine and +River roads to attack McLaws's right flank. Barely three miles would +have sufficed, over good roads, to bring such a column into operating +distance of McLaws. It may be said that the Eleventh Corps was not fit +for such work, after its defeat of Saturday night. But testimony is +abundant to show that the corps was fully able to do good service early +on Sunday morning, and eager to wipe off the stain with which its flight +from Dowdall's had blotted its new and cherished colors. But, if Hooker +was apprehensive of trusting these men so soon again, he could scarcely +deem them incapable of holding the intrenchments; and this left Meade +available for the work proposed. + +Instead, then, of relying upon the material ready to his hand, Hooker +conceived that his salvation lay in the efforts of his flying wing under +Sedgwick, some fifteen miles away. He fain would call on Hercules +instead of putting his own shoulder to the wheel. His calculations were +that Sedgwick, whom he supposed to be at Franklin's and Pollock's +crossings, three or four miles below Fredericksburg, could mobilize his +corps, pass the river, capture the heights, where in December a few +Southern brigades had held the entire Army of the Potomac at bay, +march a dozen miles, and fall upon Lee's rear, all in the brief space of +four or five hours. And it was this plan he chose to put into execution, +deeming others equal to the performance of impossibilities, while +himself could not compass the easiest problems under his own eye. + +To measure the work thus cut out for Sedgwick, by the rule of the +performances of the wing immediately commanded by Gen. Hooker, would be +but fair. But Sedgwick's execution of his orders must stand on its own +merits. And his movements are fully detailed elsewhere. + +An excuse often urged in palliation of Hooker's sluggishness, is that he +was on Sunday morning severely disabled. Hooker was standing, between +nine and ten A.M., on the porch of the Chancellor House, listening to +the heavy firing at the Fairview crest, when a shell struck and +dislodged one of the pillars beside him, which toppled over, struck and +stunned him; and he was doubtless for a couple of hours incapacitated +for work. + +But the accident was of no great moment. Hooker does not appear to have +entirely turned over the command to Couch, his superior corps-commander, +but to have merely used him as his mouthpiece, retaining the general +direction of affairs himself. + +And this furnishes no real apology. Hooker's thorough inability to +grasp the situation, and handle the conditions arising from the +responsibility of so large a command, dates from Thursday noon, or at +latest Friday morning. And from this time his enervation was steadily +on the increase. For the defeat of the Army of the Potomac in Sunday +morning's conflict was already a settled fact, when Hooker failed at +early dawn so to dispose his forces as to sustain Sickles and Williams +if over-matched, or to broach some counter-manoeuvre to draw the enemy's +attention to his own safety. + +It is an ungracious task to heap so much blame upon any one man. +But the odium of this defeat has for years been borne by those who are +guiltless of the outcome of the campaign of Chancellorsville; and the +prime source of this fallacy has been Hooker's ever-ready self- +exculpation by misinterpreted facts and unwarranted conclusions, while +his subordinates have held their peace. And this is not alone for the +purpose of vindicating the fair fame of the Army of the Potomac and its +corps-commanders, but truth calls for no less. And it is desired to +reiterate what has already been said,--that it is in all appreciation of +Hooker's splendid qualities as a lieutenant, that his inactivity in this +campaign is dwelt upon. No testimony need be given to sustain Hooker's +courage: no man ever showed more. No better general ever commanded an +army corps in our service: this is abundantly vouched for. But Hooker +could not lead an hundred thousand men; and, unlike his predecessor, +he was unable to confess it. Perhaps he did not own it to himself. +Certainly his every explanation of this campaign involved the shifting +of the onus of his defeat to the shoulders of his subordinates,-- +principally Howard and Sedgwick. And the fullest estimation of Hooker's +brilliant conduct on other fields, is in no wise incompatible with the +freest censure for the disasters of this unhappy week. For truth awards +praise and blame with equal hand; and truth in this case does ample +justice to the brave old army, ample justice to Hooker's noble aides. + +The plan summarized by Warren probably reflected accurately the +intentions of his chief, as conceived in his tent on Saturday night. +It was self-evident that Anderson and McLaws could be readily held in +check, so long as Jackson's corps was kept sundered from them. Indeed, +they would have necessarily remained on the defensive so long as +isolated. Instead, then, of leaving the Third Corps, and one division +of the Twelfth, to confront Jackson's magnificent infantry, had Hooker +withdrawn an entire additional corps, (he could have taken two,) and +thrown these troops in heavy masses at dawn on Stuart, while Birney +retained Hazel Grove, and employed his artillery upon the enemy's flank; +even the dauntless men, whose victories had so often caused them to deem +themselves invincible, must have been crushed by the blows inflicted. + +But there is nothing at all, on this day, in the remotest degree +resembling tactical combination. And, long before the resistance of our +brave troops had ceased, all chances of successful parrying of Lee's +skilful thrusts had passed away. + +Hooker's testimony is to the effect that he was merely lighting on +Sunday morning to retain possession of the road by which Sedgwick was to +join him, and that his retiring to the lines at Bullock's was +predetermined. + +The following extract from the records of the Committee on the Conduct +of the War, illustrates both this statement, and Hooker's method of +exculpating himself by crimination of subordinates. "Question to +Gen. Hooker.--Then I understand you to say, that, not hearing from +Gen. Sedgwick by eleven o'clock, you withdrew your troops from the +position they held at the time you ordered Gen. Sedgwick to join you. + +"Answer.--Yes, sir; not wishing to hold it longer at the disadvantage I +was under. I may add here, that there is a vast difference in +corps-commanders, and that it is the commander that gives tone and +character to his corps. Some of our corps-commanders, and also officers +of other rank, appear to be unwilling to go into a fight." + +But, apart from the innuendo, all this bears the stamp of an after- +thought. If an army was ever driven from its position by fair fighting, +our troops were driven from Chancellorsville. And it would seem, that, +if there was any reasonable doubt on Saturday night that the Army of the +Potomac could hold its own next day, it would have been wiser to have at +once withdrawn to the new lines, while waiting for the arrival of +Sedgwick. For here the position was almost unassailable, and the troops +better massed; and, if Lee had made an unsuccessful assault, Hooker +would have been in better condition to make a sortie upon the arrival of +the Sixth Corps in his vicinity, than after the bloody and disheartening +work at Fairview. + +Still the inactivity of Hooker, when Sedgwick did eventually arrive +within serviceable distance, is so entire a puzzle to the student of +this campaign, that speculation upon what he did then actually assume as +facts, or how he might have acted under any other given conditions, +becomes almost fruitless. + + + + +XXVI. + +SEDGWICK'S CHANGE OF ORDERS. + + +Let us return to the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, where +operations now demanded Lee's undivided skill. This was properly the +left wing of the army, which, under Sedgwick, had made the demonstration +below Fredericksburg, to enable the right wing, under Hooker, to cross +the river above, and establish itself at Chancellorsville. It had +consisted of three corps; but, so soon as the demonstration had effected +its purpose, it will be remembered that Hooker withdrew from Sedgwick's +command both the First and Third Corps, leaving him with his own, +the Sixth, to guard the crossings of the river; while Gibbon's division +of the Second Corps did provost duty at the camp at Falmouth, and held +itself in readiness to move in any direction at a moment's notice. + +From this time on, the Sixth Corps may be more properly considered as a +detached command, than as the left wing of the Army of the Potomac. + +And, beyond some demonstrations in aid of Hooker's manoeuvring, Sedgwick +had been called on to perform no actual service up to the evening of May 2. + +On May 1, a demonstration in support of Hooker's advance from +Chancellorsville had been ordered, and speedily countermanded, on +account of the despatch having reached Sedgwick later than the hour set +for his advance. + +On the forenoon of May 2, Hooker had given Sedgwick discretionary +instructions to attack the enemy in his front, "if an opportunity +presents itself with a reasonable expectation of success." + +Then came the despatch of 4.10 P.M., May 2, already quoted, and received +by Sedgwick just before dark:-- + +"The general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick cross the river as +soon as indications will permit; capture Fredericksburg with every thing +in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know the enemy is flying, +trying to save his trains: two of Sickles's divisions are among them." + +This despatch was immediately followed by another: "The major-general +commanding directs you to pursue the enemy by the Bowling-Green road." + +In pursuance of these and previous orders, Sedgwick transferred the +balance of the Sixth Corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, +one division being already there to guard the bridge-head. Sedgwick's +orders of May 1 contemplated the removal of the pontoons before his +advance on the Bowling-Green road, as he would be able to leave no +sufficient force to guard them. But these orders were received so late +as daylight on the 2d; and the withdrawal of the bridges could not well +be accomplished in the full view of the enemy, without prematurely +developing our plans. + +The order to pursue by the Bowling-Green road having been again repeated, +Sedgwick put his command under arms, advanced his lines, and forced the +enemy--Early's right--from that road and back into the woods. This was +late in the evening of Saturday. + +On the same night, after the crushing of the Eleventh Corps, we have +seen how Hooker came to the conclusion that he could utilize Sedgwick in +his operations at Chancellorsville. He accordingly sent him the +following order, first by telegraph through Gen. Butterfield, at the +same time by an aide-de-camp, and later by Gen. Warren:-- + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + May 2, 1863, 9 P.M. +GEN. BUTTERFIELD, + +The major-general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick crosses the +Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this order, and at once +take up his line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect +with us, and he will attack and destroy any force he may fall in with on +the road. He will leave all his trains behind, except the pack-train of +small ammunition, and march to be in our vicinity at daylight. He will +probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by Gen. Lee, and +between us we will use him up. Send word to Gen. Gibbon to take +possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail. Deliver this by +your swiftest messenger. Send word that it is delivered to Gen. Sedgwick. + + J. H. VAN ALEN, + Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. +(Copy sent Gen. Sedgwick ten P.M.) + + +At eleven P.M., when this order of ten o'clock was received, Sedgwick +had his troops placed, and his dispositions taken, to carry out the +orders to pursue, on the Bowling-Green road, an enemy indicated to him +as in rapid retreat from Hooker's front; and was actually in bivouac +along that road, while a strong picket-line was still engaged +skirmishing with the force in his front. By this time the vanguard of +his columns had proceeded a distance variously given as from one to +three miles below the bridges in this direction; probably near the +Bernard House, not much beyond Deep Creek. + +It is to be presumed that the aide who bore the despatch, and reached +Sedgwick later than the telegram, gave some verbal explanation of this +sudden change of Hooker's purpose; but the order itself was of a nature +to excite considerable surprise, if not to create a feeling of +uncertainty. + +Sedgwick changed his dispositions as speedily as possible, and sent out +his orders to his subordinates within fifteen minutes after receipt of +Hooker's despatch; but it was considerably after midnight before he +could actually get his command faced about, and start the new head of +column toward Fredericksburg. + +Knowing the town to be occupied by the Confederates, Sedgwick was +obliged to proceed with reasonable caution the five or six miles which +separated his command from Fredericksburg. And the enemy appears to +have been sufficiently on the alert to take immediate measures to check +his progress as effectually as it could with the troops at hand. + +Fredericksburg and the heights beyond were held by Early's division and +Barksdale's brigade, with an adequate supply of artillery,--in all some +eighty-five hundred men. Sedgwick speaks, in his testimony before the +Committee on the Conduct of the War, as if he understood at this time +that Early controlled a force as large as his own; but he had been +advised by Butterfield that the force was judged to be much smaller than +it actually was. + +In his report, Early does not mention Sedgwick's advance on the +Bowling-Green road, nor is it probable that Sedgwick had done more than +to advance a strong skirmish-line beyond his column in that direction. +Early's line lay, in fact, upon the heights back of the road, his right +at Hamilton's Crossing, and with no considerable force on the road +itself. So that Sedgwick's advance was skirmishing with scouting- +parties, sent out to impede his march. + +Early had received general instructions from Lee, in case Sedgwick +should remove from his front, to leave a small force to hold the +position, and proceed up the river to join the forces at Chancellorsville. +About eleven A.M. on the 2d, this order was repeated, but by error in +delivery (says Lee) made unconditional. Early, therefore, left Hays +and one regiment of Barksdale at Fredericksburg, and, sending part of +Pendleton's artillery to the rear, at once began to move his command +along the plank road to join his chief. + +As this manoeuvre was in progress, his attention was called to the early +movements of Sedgwick, and, sending to Lee information on this point, +he received in reply a correction of the misdelivered order. He +therefore about-faced, and returned to his position at a rapid gait. + +It is doubtful whether by daylight, and without any considerable +opposition, Sedgwick could have marched the fifteen miles to +Chancellorsville in the few hours allotted him. Nor is it claimed by +Hooker that it was possible for Sedgwick to obey the order of ten P.M. +literally; for it was issued under the supposition that Sedgwick was +still on the north bank of the river. But Hooker does allege that +Sedgwick took no pains to keep him informed of what he was doing; whence +his incorrect assumption. To recross the river for the purpose of again +crossing at Fredericksburg would have been a lame interpretation of the +speedy execution of the order urged upon Sedgwick. He accordingly +shifted his command, and, in a very short time after receiving the +despatch, began to move by the flank on the Bowling-Green road towards +Fredericksburg, Newton's division in the advance, Howe following, +while Brooks still held the bridge-head. + +It was a very foggy night; which circumstance, added to the fact that +Sedgwick was, in common with all our generals, only imperfectly familiar +with the lay of the land, and that the enemy, active and well-informed, +enveloped him with a curtain of light troops, to harass his movement in +whatever direction, materially contributed to the delay which ensued. + +And Sedgwick appears to have encountered Early's pickets, and to have +done some skirmishing with the head of his column, immediately after +passing west of Franklin's Crossing, which, moreover, gave rise to some +picket-firing all along the line, as far as Deep Run, where Bartlett +confronted the enemy. As the outskirts of the town were entered, +four regiments of Wheaton's and Shaler's brigades were sent forward +against the rifle-pits of the enemy, and a gallant assault was made by +them. But it was repulsed, with some loss, by the Confederates, who, +as on Dec. 13, patiently lay behind the stone wall and rifle-pits, +and reserved their fire until our column was within twenty yards. +Then the regiments behind the stone wall, followed by the guns and +infantry on the heights, opened a fire equally sudden and heavy, and +drove our columns back upon the main body. The assault had been +resolute, as the casualties testify, "one regiment alone losing +sixty-four men in as many seconds" (Wheaton); but the darkness, and +uncertainty of our officers with regard to the position, made its +failure almost a foregone conclusion. This was about daylight. "The +force displayed by the enemy was sufficient to show that the +intrenchments could not be carried except at great cost." (Sedgwick.) + +The officer by whom the order to Sedgwick had been sent, Capt. Raderitzchin, +had not been regularly appointed in orders, but was merely a volunteer +aide-de-camp on Gen. Hooker's staff. + +Shortly after he had been despatched, Gen. Warren requested leave +himself to carry a duplicate of the order to Sedgwick, (Capt. Raderitzchin +being "a rather inexperienced, headlong young man,") for Warren feared +the "bad effect such an impossible order would have on Gen. Sedgwick +and his commanders, when delivered by him." And, knowing Warren to be +more familiar with the country than any other available officer, +Hooker detached him on this duty, with instructions again to impress +upon Sedgwick the urgent nature of the orders. Warren, with an aide, +left headquarters about midnight, and reached Sedgwick before dawn. + +As daylight approached, Warren thought he could see that only two +field-pieces were on Marye's heights, and that no infantry was holding +the rifle-pits to our right of it. But the stone-wall breastworks were +held in sufficient force, as was demonstrated by the repulse of the +early assault of Shaler and Wheaton. + +And Warren was somewhat in error. Barksdale, who occupied Fredericksburg, +had been closely scanning these movements of Sedgwick's. He had some +fourteen hundred men under his command. Six field-pieces were placed +near the Marye house. Several full batteries were on Lee's hill, +and near Howison's. And, so soon as Fredericksburg was occupied by our +forces, Early sent Hays to re-enforce Barksdale; one regiment of his +brigade remaining on Barksdale's right, and the balance proceeding +to Stansbury's. + +For, at daylight on Sunday, Early had received word from Barksdale, +whose lines at Fredericksburg were nearly two miles in length, that the +Union forces had thrown a bridge across the river opposite the Lacy +house; and immediately despatched his most available brigade to sustain +him. + +Early's line, however, was thin. Our own was quite two and a half miles +in length, with some twenty-two thousand men; and Early's eighty-five +hundred overlapped both our flanks. But his position sufficiently +counterbalanced this inequality. Moreover his artillery was well +protected, while the Union batteries were quite without cover, and in +Gibbon's attempted advance, his guns suffered considerable damage. + +Brooks's division was still on the left of the Federal line, near the +bridge-heads. Howe occupied the centre, opposite the forces on the +heights, to our left of Hazel Run. Newton held the right as far as the +Telegraph road in Fredericksburg. + +Gibbon's division had been ordered by Butterfield to cross to +Fredericksburg, and second Sedgwick's movement on the right. Gibbon +states that he was delayed by the opposition of the enemy to his laying +the bridge opposite the Lacy house, but this was not considerable. +He appears to have used reasonable diligence, though he did not get his +bridge thrown until daylight. Then he may have been somewhat tardy in +getting his twenty-five hundred men across. And, by the time he got his +bridge thrown, Sedgwick had possession of the town. + +It was seven A.M. when Gibbon had crossed the river with his division, +and filed into position on Sedgwick's right. Gibbon had meanwhile +reported in person to Sedgwick, who ordered him to attempt to turn the +enemy's left at Marye's, while Howe should open a similar movement on +his right at Hazel Run. Gens. Warren and Gibbon at once rode forward to +make a reconnoissance, but could discover no particular force of the +enemy in our front. Just here are two canals skirting the slope of the +hill, and parallel to the river, which supply power to the factories in +the town. The generals passed the first canal, and found the bridge +across it intact. The planks of the second canal-bridge had been +removed, but the structure itself was still sound. + +Gibbon at once ordered these planks to be replaced from the nearest +houses. But, before this order could be carried out, Warren states that +he saw the enemy marching his infantry into the breastworks on the hill, +followed by a battery. This was Hays, coming to Barksdale's relief. +But the breastworks contained a fair complement before. + +Gibbon's attempt was rendered nugatory by the bridge over the second +canal being commanded from the heights, the guns on which opened upon +our columns with shrapnel, while the gunners were completely protected +by their epaulements. And a further attempt by Gibbon to cross the +canal by the bridge near Falmouth, was anticipated by the enemy +extending his line to our right. + +Gen. Warren states that Gen. Gibbon "made a very considerable +demonstration, and acted very handsomely with the small force he +had,--not more than two thousand men. But so much time was taken, +that the enemy got more troops in front of him than he could master." + +Gen. Howe had been simultaneously directed to move on the left of Hazel +Run, and turn the enemy's right; but he found the works in his front +beset, and the character of the stream between him and Newton precluded +any movement of his division to the right. + +By the time, then, that Sedgwick had full possession of the town, +and Gibbon and Howe had returned from their abortive attempt to turn the +enemy's flanks, the sun was some two hours high. As the works could not +be captured by surprise, Sedgwick was reduced to the alternative of +assaulting them in regular form. + +It is not improbable that an earlier attack by Gibbon on Marye's heights, +might have carried them with little loss, and with so much less expense +of time that Sedgwick could have pushed beyond Salem Church, without +being seriously impeded by troops sent against him by Gen. Lee. + +And, as the allegation of all-but criminal delay on the part of +Gen. Sedgwick is one of the cardinal points of Hooker's self-defence +on the score of this campaign, we must examine this charge carefully. + +Sedgwick asserts with truth, that all despatches to him assumed that he +had but a handful of men in his front, and that the conclusions as to +what he could accomplish, were founded upon utterly mistaken premises. +Himself was well aware that the enemy extended beyond both his right and +left, and the corps knew by experience the nature of the intrenchments +on the heights. + +Moreover, what had misled Butterfield into supposing, and informing +Sedgwick, as he did, that the Fredericksburg heights had been abandoned, +was a balloon observation of Early's march to join Lee under the +mistaken orders above alluded to. The enemy was found to be alert +wherever Sedgwick tapped him, and his familiarity with every inch of the +ground enabled him to magnify his own forces, and make every man tell; +while Sedgwick was groping his way through the darkness, knowing his +enemy's ability to lure him into an ambuscade, and taking his +precautions accordingly. + + + + +XXVII. + +SEDGWICK'S ASSAULT. + + +Now, when Sedgwick had concluded upon a general assault, he can scarcely +be blamed for over-caution in his preparations for it. Four months +before, a mere handful of the enemy had successfully held these defences +against half the Army of the Potomac; and an attack without careful +dispositions seemed to be mere waste of life. It would appear to be +almost supererogatory to defend Sedgwick against reasonable time +consumed in these precautions. + +There had been a more or less continuous artillery-fire, during the +entire morning, from our batteries stationed on either side of the +river. This was now redoubled to prepare for the assault. Newton's +batteries concentrated their fire on the stone wall, until our troops +had neared it, when they directed it upon the crest beyond; while like +action was effected to sustain Howe. + +Instructions were issued to the latter, who at once proceeded to form +three storming columns under Gen. Neill, Col. Grant, and Col. Seaver, +and supported them by the fire of his division artillery. + +Sedgwick at the same time ordered out from Newton's division two other +columns, one under Col. Spear, consisting of two regiments, supported by +two more under Gen. Shaler, and one under Col. Johns of equal size, +to move on the plank road, and to the right of it, flanked by a line +under Col. Burnham, with four regiments, on the left of the plank road. +This line advanced manfully at a double-quick against the rifle-pits, +neither halting nor firing a shot, despite the heavy fire they +encountered, until they had driven the enemy from their lower line of +works, while the columns pressed boldly forward to the crest, and +carried the works in their rear. All the guns and many prisoners were +captured. This was a mettlesome assault, and as successful as it was +brief and determined. + +Howe's columns, in whose front the Confederate skirmishers occupied the +railroad-cutting and embankment, while Hays and two regiments of +Barksdale were on Lee's and adjacent hills, as soon as the firing on his +right was heard, moved to the assault with the bayonet; Neill and Grant +pressing straight for Cemetery hill, which, though warmly received, +they carried without any check. They then faced to the right, and, +with Seaver sustaining their left, carried the works on Marye's heights, +capturing guns and prisoners wholesale. + +A stand was subsequently attempted by the Confederates on several +successive crests, but without avail. + +The loss of the Sixth Corps in the assault on the Fredericksburg heights +was not far from a thousand men, including Cols. Spear and Johns, +commanding two of the storming columns. + +The assault of Howe falls in no wise behind the one made by Newton. +The speedy success of both stands out in curious contrast to the deadly +work of Dec. 13. "So rapid had been the final movement on Marye's hill, +that Hays and Wilcox, to whom application had been made for succor, +had not time to march troops from Taylor's and Stansbury's to +Barksdale's aid." (Hotchkiss and Allan.) + +The Confederates were now cut in two: Wilcox and Hays were left north of +the plank road, but Hays retreated round the head of Sedgwick's column, +and rejoined Early. Wilcox, who, on hearing of Sedgwick's manoeuvres +Sunday morning, had hurried with a portion of his force to Barksdale's +assistance at Taylor's, but had arrived too late to participate in the +action, on ascertaining Sedgwick's purpose, retired slowly down the +plank road, and skirmished with the latter's head of column. And he +made so determined a stand near Guest's, that considerable time was +consumed in brushing it away before Sedgwick could hold on his course. + +Early appears to deem the carrying of the Fredericksburg heights to +require an excuse on his part. He says in his report about our +preliminary assaults: "All his efforts to attack the left of my line +were thwarted, and one attack on Marye's hill was repulsed. The enemy, +however, sent a flag of truce to Col. Griffin, of the Eighteenth +Mississippi Regiment, who occupied the works at the foot of Marye's hill +with his own and the Twenty-first Mississippi Regiment, which was +received by him imperfectly; and it had barely returned before heavy +columns were advanced against the position, and the trenches were +carried, and the hill taken." "After this the artillery on Lee's hill, +and the rest of Barksdale's infantry, with one of Hays's regiments, +fell back on the Telegraph road; Hays with the remainder being compelled +to fall back upon the plank road as he was on the left." Later, "a line +was formed across the Telegraph road, at Cox's house, about two miles +back of Lee's hill." + +Barksdale says, "With several batteries under the command of Gen. Pendleton, +and a single brigade of infantry, I had a front of not less than three +miles to defend, extending from Taylor's hill on the left, to the foot +of the hills in the rear of the Howison house." + +Gen. Wilcox, he goes on to state, from Banks's Ford, had come up with +three regiments as far as Taylor's, and Gen. Hays was also in that +vicinity; but "the distance from town to the points assailed was so +short, the attack so suddenly made, and the difficulty of removing +troops from one part of the line to another was so great, that it was +utterly impossible for either Gen. Wilcox or Gen. Hays to reach the +scene of action in time to afford any assistance whatever. It will then +be seen that Marye's hill was defended by but one small regiment, +three companies, and four pieces of artillery." + +Barksdale further states that, "upon the pretext of taking care of their +wounded, the enemy asked a flag of truce, after the second assault at +Marye's hill, which was granted by Col. Griffin; and thus the weakness +of our force at that point was discovered." + +The bulk of Early's division was holding the heights from Hazel Run to +Hamilton's Crossing; and the sudden assault on the Confederate positions +at Marye's, and the hills to the west, gave him no opportunity of +sustaining his forces there. But it is not established that any unfair +use was made of the flag of truce mentioned by Barksdale. + +The loss in this assault seems heavy, when the small force of +Confederates is considered. The artillery could not do much damage, +inasmuch as the guns could not be sufficiently depressed, but the +infantry fire was very telling; and, as already stated, both colonels +commanding the assaulting columns on the right were among the casualties. + +The enemy's line being thus cut in twain, sundering those at Banks's +Ford and on the left of the Confederate line from Early at Hamilton's +Crossing, it would now have been easy for Sedgwick to have dispersed +Early's forces, and to have destroyed the depots at the latter place. +But orders precluded anything but an immediate advance. + +The question whether Sedgwick could have complied with his instructions, +so as to reach Hooker in season to relieve him from a part of Lee's +pressure on Sunday morning, is answered by determining whether it was +feasible to carry the Fredericksburg heights before or at daylight. +If this could have been done, it is not unreasonable to assume that he +could have left a rear-guard, to occupy Early's attention and forestall +attacks on his marching column, and have reached, with the bulk of his +corps, the vicinity of Chancellorsville by the time the Federals were +hardest pressed, say ten A.M., and most needed a diversion in their +favor. + +Not that Hooker's salvation in any measure depended on Sedgwick's so +doing. Hooker had the power in his own hand, if he would only use it. +But it should be determined whether Hooker had any legitimate ground for +fault-finding. + +Putting aside the question of time, Sedgwick's whole manoeuvre is good +enough. It was as well executed as any work done in this campaign, +and would have given abundant satisfaction had not so much more been +required of him. But, remembering that time was of the essence of his +orders, it may be as well to quote the criticism of Warren-- + +"It takes some men just as long to clear away a little force as it does +a large one. It depends entirely upon the man, how long a certain force +will stop him." + +"The enemy had left about one division, perhaps ten thousand or twelve +thousand men, at Fredericksburg, to watch him. They established a kind +of picket-line around his division, so that he could not move any thing +without their knowing it. Just as soon as Gen. Sedgwick began to move, +a little random fire began, and that was kept up till daylight. At +daylight, the head of Gen. Sedgwick's troops had got into Fredericksburg. +I think some little attempt had been made to move forward a skirmish-line, +but that had been repulsed. The enemy had considerable artillery in +position." + +"My opinion was, that, under the circumstances, the most vigorous effort +possible ought to have been made, without regard to circumstances, +because the order was peremptory." But this statement is qualified, +when, in his examination before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, +to a question as to whether, in his opinion, Gen. Sedgwick's vigorous +and energetic attempt to comply with Hooker's order would have led to a +different result of the battle, Warren answered: "Yes, sir! and I will +go further, and say that I think there might have been more fighting +done at the other end of the line. I do not believe that if Gen. Sedgwick +had done all he could, and there had not been harder fighting on the +other end of the line, we would have succeeded." + +If, at eleven P.M., when Sedgwick received the order, he had immediately +marched, regardless of what was in his front, straight through the town, +and up the heights beyond, paying no heed whatever to the darkness of +the night, but pushing on his men as best he might, it is not improbable +that he could have gained the farther side of this obstacle by daylight. +But is it not also probable that his corps would have been in +questionable condition for either a march or a fight? It would be +extravagant to expect that the organization of the corps could be +preserved in any kind of form, however slight the opposition. And, +as daylight came on, the troops would have scarcely been in condition to +offer brilliant resistance to the attack, which Early, fully apprised of +all their movements, would have been in position to make upon their +flank and rear. + +Keeping in view all the facts,--that Sedgwick was on unknown ground, +with an enemy in his front, familiar with every inch of it and with +Sedgwick's every movement; that he had intrenchments to carry where a +few months before one man had been more than a match for ten; that the +night was dark and foggy; and that he was taken unawares by this +order,--it seems that to expect him to carry the heights before daylight, +savors of exorbitance. + +But it may fairly be acknowledged, that more delay can be discovered in +some of the operations of this night and morning, than the most rigorous +construction of the orders would warrant. After the repulse of Wheaton +and Shaler, a heavier column should at once have been thrown against the +works. Nor ought it to have taken so long, under the stringency of the +instructions, to ascertain that Gibbon would be stopped by the canal, +and Howe by Hazel Run; or perhaps to organize the assaulting columns, +after ascertaining that these flank attacks were fruitless. + +All this, however, in no wise whatsoever shifts any part of the +responsibility for the loss of this campaign, from Hooker's to +Sedgwick's shoulders. The order of ten P.M. was ill-calculated and +impracticable. Hooker had no business to count on Sedgwick's corps as +an element in his problem of Sunday at Chancellorsville. + +Sedgwick's movements towards his chief were certainly more rapid than +those of Sickles on Saturday, and no one has undertaken to criticise the +latter. Nor would Lee be lightly accused of tardiness for not attacking +Sedgwick in force until Monday at six P.M., as will shortly be detailed, +when he had despatched his advance towards him shortly after noon on +Sunday, and had but a half-dozen miles to march. And yet Lee, precious +as every moment was to him, consumed all these hours in preparing to +assault Sedgwick's position in front of Banks's Ford. + +In order to do justice to all sources of information, and show how +unreliable our knowledge often was, it may be well to quote from +Gen. Butterfield's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. +"From the best information I had at the time the order came, there was +not over a brigade of the enemy in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. +This information was confirmed afterwards by prisoners taken on Sunday +by Gen. Sedgwick. They told me they were left there with orders, that, +if they did not receive re-enforcements by a certain time, to withdraw; +that they did withdraw about eleven o'clock on Saturday night, but met +re-enforcements coming up, and turned back and re-occupied the works. +The statement may have been false, or may have been true." It was +clearly Early's march under his mistaken instructions, which the +prisoners referred to. "If true, it would show that a bold movement of +Gen. Sedgwick's command on Saturday night, would have taken Marye's +heights, and put him well on the road towards Gen. Hooker before +daylight." To the question whether the order could have been actually +carried out: "There was a force of the enemy there, but in my judgment +not sufficient to have prevented the movement, if made with a determined +attack. Night attacks are dangerous, and should be made only with very +disciplined troops. But it seemed to me at the time that the order +could have been executed." + +Gibbon, on the contrary, is of opinion that the strict execution of the +order was impracticable, but that probably an assault could have been +made at daylight instead of at eleven A.M. He recollects being very +impatient that morning about the delay,--not, however, being more +specific in his testimony. + + + + +XXVIII. + +SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER. + + +So soon as Sedgwick had reduced the only formidable works in his front, +he made dispositions to push out on the plank road. Gibbon was left in +Fredericksburg to prevent the enemy from crossing to the north side of +the river, and to shield the bridges. + +"Gen. Brooks's division was now given the advance, and he was farthest +in the rear, not having got moved from the crossing-place." Brooks had +so extensive a force in his front, that he was constrained to withdraw +with extreme caution. "This necessarily consumed a considerable time, +and before it was completed the sound of the cannonading at +Chancellorsville had ceased." (Warren.) + +This postponement of an immediate advance might well, under the +stringency of the orders, have been avoided, by pushing on with the then +leading division. Not that it would have been of any ultimate +assistance to Hooker at Chancellorsville. At the time the storming +columns assaulted Marye's heights, Hooker had already been driven into +his lines at White House. And though none of his strictures upon +Sedgwick's tardiness, as affecting his own situation, will bear the test +of examination, time will not be considered wholly ill-spent in +determining where Sedgwick might have been more expeditious. It no +doubt accords with military precedents, to alternate in honoring the +successive divisions of a corps with the post of danger; but it may +often be highly improper to arrest an urgent progress in order to +accommodate this principle. And it was certainly inexpedient in this +case, despite the fact that Newton and Howe had fought their divisions, +while Brooks had not yet been under fire. + +"The country being open, Gen. Brooks's division was formed in a column +of brigade-fronts, with an extended line of skirmishers in the front and +flank in advance, and the artillery on the road." (Warren.) The New +Jersey brigade marched on the right, and Bartlett's brigade on the left, +of the road. This disposition was adopted that the enemy might be +attacked as soon as met, without waiting for deployment, and to avoid +the usual manoeuvres necessary to open an action from close column, +or from an extended order of march. + +Gen. Newton followed, marching by the flank along the road. This +"greatly extended the column, made it liable to an enfilading fire, +and put it out of support, in a measure, of the division in advance." +(Warren.) Howe brought up the rear. + +Meanwhile Wilcox, having arrested Sedgwick at Guest's, as long as his +slender force enabled him to do, moved across country to the River road +near Taylor's. But Sedgwick's cautious advance gave him the opportunity +of sending back what cavalry he had, some fifty men, to skirmish along +the plank road, while he himself moved his infantry and artillery by +cross-roads to the toll-house, one-half mile east of Salem Church. +Here he took up an admirable position, and made a handsome resistance to +Sedgwick, until, ascertaining that McLaws had reached the crest at that +place, he withdrew to the position assigned him in the line of battle +now formed by that officer. + +When Early perceived that Sedgwick was marching his corps up the plank +road, instead, as he expected, of attacking him, and endeavoring to +reach the depots at Hamilton's, he concentrated at Cox's all his forces, +now including Hays, who had rejoined him by a circuit, and sent word to +McLaws, whom he ascertained to be advancing to meet Sedgwick, that he +would on the morrow attack Marye's heights with his right, and extend +his left over to join the main line. + + + + +XXIX. + +SALEM CHURCH. + + +It was about noon before Lee became aware that Sedgwick had captured his +stronghold at Fredericksburg, and was where he could sever his +communications, or fall upon his rear at Chancellorsville. Both Lee and +Early (the former taking his cue from his lieutenant) state that at +first Sedgwick advanced down the Telegraph road, with an assumed purpose +to destroy the line in Lee's rear, but that he was checked by Early. +The nature, however, of Sedgwick's orders precluded his doing this, +and there is no mention of such a purpose among any of the reports. +And it was not long before Lee heard that Sedgwick was marching out +towards the battle-ground in the Wilderness, with only Wilcox in his +front. + +McLaws, with his own three brigades, and one of Anderson's, was +accordingly pushed forward at a rapid gait to sustain Wilcox; while +Anderson, with the balance of his division, and fourteen rifled guns, +was sent to the junction of the River road and Mine road to hold that +important position. McLaws arrived about two P.M., and found Wilcox +skirmishing, a trifle beyond Salem Church. He was drawn back a few +hundred yards, while Kershaw and Wofford were thrown out upon Wilcox's +right, and Semmes and Mahone on his left. Wofford arrived somewhat late, +as he had been temporarily left at the junction of the Mine and plank +roads to guard them. McLaws's guns were concentrated on the road, +but were soon withdrawn for lack of ammunition. + +Some troops were thrown into Salem Church, and into a schoolhouse near +by, in front of the woods, forming a salient; but the main Confederate +line was withdrawn some three hundred yards within the wood, where a +clearing lay at their back. + +When Sedgwick's column reached the summit along the road, about a mile +from Salem Church, Wilcox's cavalry skirmishers were met, and a section +of artillery opened with solid shot from a point near the church, +where Wilcox was hurrying his forces into line. The intervening ground +was quite open on both sides the road. The heights at Salem Church are +not considerable; but a ravine running north and south across its front, +and as far as the Rappahannock, furnishes an excellent line of defence, +and the woods come up to its edge at this point, and enclose the road. + +Brooks was pushed in to attack the enemy, the main part of his division +being on the left of the road, while Newton filed in upon his right, +so soon as his regiments could be got up. Disposing his batteries +(Rigby, Parsons, and Williston) along a crest at right angles to the +road, not far from the toll-gate, where good shelter existed for the +caissons and limbers, Brooks sharply advanced his lines under a telling +fire, and, passing the undergrowth, penetrated the edge of the woods +where lay Wilcox and Semmes and Mahone. Wilcox's skirmishers and part +of his line gave way before Brooks's sturdy onset, which created no +little confusion; but Wilcox and Semmes in person headed some reserve +regiments, and led them to the charge. An obstinate combat ensues. +Bartlett has captured the schoolhouse east of the church, advances, +and again breaks for a moment the Confederate line. Wilcox throws in an +Alabama regiment, which delivers a fire at close quarters, and makes a +counter-charge, while the rest of his brigade rallies on its colors, +and again presses forward. The church and the schoolhouse are fought +for with desperation, but only after a heroic defence can the +Confederates recapture them. Bartlett withdraws with a loss of +two-fifths of his brigade, after the most stubborn contest. The line on +the north of the road is likewise forced back. A series of wavering +combats, over this entire ground, continues for the better part of an +hour; but the enemy has the upper hand, and forces our line back towards +the toll-house. + +Though obstinately fighting for a foothold near the church, Brooks had +thus been unable to maintain it, and he has fallen back with a loss of +nearly fifteen hundred men. Reaching his guns, where Newton has +meanwhile formed in support of his right, and where part of Howe's +division later falls in upon his left, the enemy, which has vigorously +followed up his retreat, is met with a storm of grape and canister at +short range, the distance of our batteries from the woods being not much +over five hundred yards. So admirably served are the guns, as McLaws +states, that it is impossible to make head against this new line; and +the Confederates sullenly retire to their position near the church, +which they had so successfully held against our gallant assaults, +followed, but not seriously engaged, by a new line of Brooks's and +Newton's regiments. + +Wheaton's brigade manages to hold on in a somewhat advanced position on +the right, where Mahone had been re-enforced from Wofford's line; but +our left, after the second unsuccessful attempt to wrest more advanced +ground from the enemy, definitely retires to a line a short mile from +Salem Church. + +The Confederate artillery had been out of ammunition, and unable to +engage seriously in this conflict. Their fighting had been confined to +the infantry regiments. But our own guns had borne a considerable share +in the day's work, and had earned their laurels well. + +It was now dark, and both lines bivouacked in line of battle. + +Gen. Russell was placed in command of our front line. + +The Union wounded were sent to Fredericksburg. + +Gen. Warren, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, passes the +following comment upon this action:-- + +"Gen. Sedgwick carried the heights at Fredericksburg, and then moved on +about three miles farther, and had a fight at Salem heights, but could +not carry them. I think that by fighting the battle at Salem heights +differently, we might have won that place also." + +"Gen. Brooks carried Salem heights, but not being closely enough +supported by other troops, he could not hold the heights. It was just +one of those wavering things that a moment settles. If we had been +stronger at that moment, we would have won; not being so, they won." + +It is probable, that, had Brooks's attack been delayed until Newton and +Howe could reach the scene, their support might have enabled him to keep +possession of the ground he came so near to holding single-handed. +But it was a dashing fight, deserving only praise; and it is doubtful +whether the capture of Salem heights would have materially altered the +event. It was the eccentric handling of the Chancellorsville wing which +determined the result of this campaign. Sedgwick's corps could effect +nothing by its own unaided efforts. + + + + +XXX. + +SEDGWICK IN DIFFICULTY. + + +So soon as Wilcox had retired from Banks's Ford to oppose Sedgwick's +advance towards Chancellorsville, Gen. Benham threw a pontoon bridge, +and established communications with the Sixth Corps. Warren, who up to +this time had remained with Sedgwick, now returned to headquarters, +reaching Hooker at eleven and, as a result of conference with him, +telegraphed Sedgwick as follows:-- + +"I find every thing snug here. We contracted the line a little, and +repulsed the last assault with ease. Gen. Hooker wishes them to attack +him to-morrow, if they will. He does not desire you to attack again in +force unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far +away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep +up communication with Gen. Benham at Banks's Ford and Fredericksburg. +You can go to either place if you think best. To cross at Banks's Ford +would bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be +better than falling back to Fredericksburg." + +And later:-- + +"I have reported your situation to Gen. Hooker. I find that we +contracted our lines here somewhat during the morning, and repulsed the +enemy's last assault with ease. The troops are in good position. +Gen. Hooker says you are separated from him so far that he cannot advise +you how to act. You need not try to force the position you attacked at +five P.M. Look to the safety of your corps. You can retire, if +necessary, by way of Fredericksburg or Banks's Ford: the latter would +enable you to join us more readily." + +The former communication reached Sedgwick about four P.M. next day, +and was the only one which up till then he had received. Warren, +in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, rather +apologizes for the want of clear directions in this despatch, on the +score of being greatly exhausted; but its tenor doubtless reflects the +ideas of Gen. Hooker at the time, and is, indeed, in his evidence, +fathered by Hooker as his own creation. It shows conclusively that +there was then no idea of retiring across the river. + +And it is peculiarly noteworthy, that, at this time, Hooker does not, +in tone or by implication, reflect in the remotest degree upon Sedgwick, +either for tardiness or anything else. Hooker was wont to speak his +mind plainly. Indeed, his bluntness in criticism was one of his pet +failings. And had he then felt that Sedgwick had been lacking in +good-will, ability, or conduct, it is strange that there should not be +some apparent expression of it. It was only when he was driven to +extremity in explaining the causes of his defeat, that his after-wit +suggested Sedgwick as an available scapegoat. + +During the night, Lee came to the conclusion that he must absolutely rid +himself of Sedgwick, before he could again assault Hooker's defences. +And, trusting to what he had already seen, in this campaign, of his +opponent's lack of enterprise, he detailed Anderson's remaining three +brigades to the forces opposing Sedgwick's wing, leaving only Jackson's +corps, now numbering some nineteen thousand men, to keep Hooker, with +his eighty thousand, penned up behind his breastworks, while himself +repaired to the battle-ground of Monday at Salem Church, with the +intention of driving Sedgwick across the river, so that he might again +concentrate all his powers upon our forces near Chancellorsville. + +By daylight Monday morning, Early advanced from his position at Cox's, +and with very little difficulty recaptured the heights, held by only a +few of Gibbon's men. Barksdale was again posted in the trenches, +and instructed to keep Gibbon in check. Early meanwhile moved out to +join McLaws, feeling our position with Smith's brigade, and ascertaining +the left of our line to lie near Taylor's, and to extend from there down +to the plank road. + +At an early hour on Monday morning, it came to Sedgwick's knowledge, +that the Confederates had re-occupied the heights in his rear, and cut +him off from Fredericksburg, thus leaving him only Banks's Ford as a +possible outlet in case of disaster. An attempt was made by Early to +throw a force about Howe's left, and seize the approaches to the ford; +but it was timely met, and repulsed by our men, who captured in this +affair two hundred prisoners and a battle-flag. And, to forestall any +serious movement to cut him off from Banks's Ford, Sedgwick had already +formed Howe's division in line to the rear, extending, as we have seen, +from the river to the plank road. + +In his report, and particularly in his testimony before the Committee on +the Conduct of the War, Howe speaks as if he had received from Sedgwick +only general--in fact, vague--and rare instructions, as to the +dispositions to be made of his division; and that all his particular +manoeuvres were originated and completed on his own responsibility, +upon information, or mere hints, from headquarters of the corps. +His line, over two miles long, was covered by less than six thousand men. + +The despatch from Warren reached Sedgwick while matters were in this +condition. To retire to Fredericksburg was impossible; to retire across +Banks's Ford, except by night, equally so, unless he chose to hazard a +disastrous attack from the superior force in his front. For Sedgwick +had scarce twenty thousand men left to confront Lee's twenty-five +thousand, and imagined the odds to be far greater. Our line was formed +with the left on the river, midway between Fredericksburg and Banks's +Ford, running southerly to beyond the plank road, following this on the +south side for nearly two miles, and then turning north to the crest +which Wheaton had held the night before. This was a long, weak position, +depending upon no natural obstacles; but it was, under the circumstances, +well defended by a skilful disposition of the artillery, under charge of +Col. Tompkins. Gen. Newton's division held the right of this line, +facing west; Gen. Brooks had Russell's brigade, also posted so as to +face west, on the left of Newton, while Bartlett and Torbert faced south, +the former resting his left somewhere near Howe's right brigade. +This portion of the line was, on Monday afternoon, re-enforced by +Wheaton's brigade of Newton's division, withdrawn from the extreme +right; and here it rendered effective service at the time the attack was +made on Howe, and captured a number of prisoners. The bulk of Howe's +division lay facing east, from near Guest's house to the river. The +whole line of battle may be characterized, therefore, as a rough convex +order,--or, to describe it more accurately, lay on three sides of a +square, of which the Rappahannock formed the fourth. This line +protected our pontoon-bridges at Scott's Dam, a mile below Banks's Ford. + +No doubt Sedgwick determined wisely in preferring to accept battle where +he lay, if it should be forced upon him, to retiring to Banks's Ford, +and attempting a crossing in retreat by daylight. + +Under these harassing conditions, Sedgwick determined to hold on till +night, and then cross the river; having specially in view Hooker's +caution to look well to the safety of his corps, coupled with the +information that he could not expect to relieve him, and was too far +away to direct him with intelligence. + +Subsequent despatches instructed Sedgwick to hold on where he was, +till Tuesday morning. These despatches are quoted at length on a later +page. + +Having re-occupied Fredericksburg heights, in front of which Hall's +brigade of Gibbon's division was deployed as a skirmish-line, and +occasionally exchanged a few shots with the enemy, Early communicated +with McLaws, and proposed an immediate joint assault upon Sedgwick; but +McLaws, not deeming himself strong enough to attack Sedgwick with the +troops Early and he could muster, preferred to await the arrival of +Anderson, whom he knew to be rapidly pushing to join the forces at Salem +Church. + +Anderson, who, prior to the receipt of his new orders, had been making +preparations for a demonstration against Hooker's left at Chancellorsville, +and had there amused himself by shelling a park of supply-wagons across +the river, broke up from his position at the crossing of the Mine and +River roads, headed east, and arrived about eleven A.M. at the +battle-ground of Sunday afternoon. In an hour he was got into line +on Early's left, while McLaws retained the crest he had so stubbornly +defended against Brooks. + +Lee now had in front of Sedgwick a force outnumbering the Sixth Corps by +one-quarter, with open communications to Fredericksburg. + +The general instructions issued by Lee, after a preliminary +reconnoissance, were to push in Sedgwick's centre by a vigorous assault; +and, while preparations were making for this evolution, a slight touch +of the line was kept up, by the activity of the Confederate pickets in +our front. + +"Some delay occurred in getting the troops into position, owing to the +broken and irregular nature of the ground, and the difficulty of +ascertaining the disposition of the enemy's forces." (Lee.) But more or +less steady skirmishing had been kept up all day,--to cover the +disposition of the Confederate line, and if possible accurately to +ascertain the position and relative strength of the ground held by +Sedgwick's divisions. + +Not until six were Lee's preparations completed to his satisfaction; but +about that hour, at a given signal, the firing of three guns, a general +advance was made by the Confederate forces. Early, on the right of the +line, pushed in, with Hoke on the left of his division, from the hill on +which Downman's house stands, and below it, Gordon on the right, up the +hills near the intrenchments, and Hays in the centre. + +On Early's left came Anderson, whose brigades extended--in order, Wright, +Posey, Perry--to a point nearly as far as, but not joining, McLaws's +right at about Shed's farm; Mahone of Anderson's division remained on +McLaws's extreme left, where he had been placed on account of his +familiarity with the country in that vicinity; and Wilcox occupied his +ground of Sunday. + +Alexander established his batteries on a prominent hill, to command the +Union artillery, which was posted in a manner to enfilade McLaws's line. +It was Alexander's opening fire which was the signal for the general +assault. + +The attack on the corner held by Brooks, was not very heavy, and was +held in check chiefly by his skirmish-line and artillery. "The speedy +approach of darkness prevented Gen. McLaws from perceiving the success +of the attack until the enemy began to re-cross the river." "His right +brigades, under Kershaw and Wofford, advanced through the woods in the +direction of the firing, but the retreat was so rapid, that they could +only join in the pursuit. A dense fog settled over the field, +increasing the obscurity, and rendering great caution necessary to avoid +collision between our own troops. Their movements were consequently +slow." (Lee.) + +Early's assault on Howe was made in echelon of battalions, and columns, +and was hardy in the extreme. It was growing dark as the attack began, +and Hays's and Hoke's brigades (says Early) were thrown into some +confusion by coming in contact, after they crossed the plank road, +below Guest's house. Barksdale remained at Marye's hill, with Smith on +his left in reserve. + +The weakness of Howe's long line, obliged that officer carefully to +study his ground, and make arrangements for ready withdrawal to an +interior line, if overmatched by the enemy; and he stationed his +reserves accordingly. To the rear of the centre of his first line, +held by Gen. Neill's brigade, and two regiments of Grant's, was a small +covering of woods; here a portion of his reserves, and sufficient +artillery, were concentrated. The main assault was made upon his left +by Hoke and Hays. Their first onset was resolutely broken by Howe's +firm front, though made with easy contempt of danger. The simultaneous +attack upon his right was by no means so severe. It was speedily dashed +back, and, by suddenly advancing this wing, Howe succeeded in capturing +nearly all the Eighth Louisiana Regiment; but the gap produced by the +over-advance of our eager troops, was shortly perceived by Gordon's +brigade, which was enabled to move down a ravine in rear of Howe's right, +and compelled its hasty withdrawal. + +Meanwhile Neill's brigade, on Howe's left, was overpowered by Early's +fierce and repeated onslaughts; but no wise disordered, though we had +lost nearly a thousand men, it fell slowly and steadily back to the +previously selected rallying-point, where, on being followed up by Hoke +and Hays, the Vermont brigade, two regiments of Newton's division and +Butler's regular battery, sent to Howe's support by Sedgwick, opened +upon them so sharp a fire, that they retired in headlong confusion, +largely increased by the approaching darkness. This terminated the +fight on the left, and Howe's line was no further molested during the +night. + +Howe is clearly mistaken in alleging that his division was attacked by +McLaws, Anderson, and Early. The position of these divisions has been +laid down. It is one of those frequent assertions, made in the best of +faith, but emanating solely from the recollection of the fierceness of a +recent combat and from unreliable evidence. + + + + +XXXI. + +SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS. + + +Foreseeing from the vigor of Lee's attack the necessity of contracting +his lines, as soon as it was dark, Newton's and Brooks's divisions and +the Light Brigade (Col. Burnham's), were ordered to fall rapidly back +upon Banks's Ford, where they took position on the heights in the +vicinity, and in Wilcox's rifle-pits. Howe was then quietly withdrawn, +and disposed on Newton's right. + +In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, +Gen. Howe appears to think that he was unfairly dealt with by Sedgwick; +in fact, that his division was intentionally left behind to be sacrificed. +But this opinion is scarcely justified by the condition of affairs and +subsequent events. + +Following are the important despatches which passed, during the latter +part of these operations, between Hooker and Sedgwick:-- + + + HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, + May 4, 1863, 9 A.M. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. + +I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my +communication with Banks's Ford. The enemy are in possession of the +heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, +and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday morning +was twenty-two thousand men. I do not know my losses, but they were +large, probably five thousand men. I cannot use the cavalry. It +depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can +sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing upon +Fredericksburg. + + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. + + + + SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BANKS'S FORD, VA., + May 4, 1863, 9.45 A.M. +GEN. HOOKER. + +The enemy are pressing me. I am taking position to cross the river +wherever (? whenever) necessary. + + J. SEDGWICK, Major-General. + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + May 4, 1863, 10.30 A.M. +GEN. SEDGWICK, + Commanding Sixth Corps. + +The commanding general directs that in the event you fall back, you +reserve, if practicable, a position on the Fredericksburg side of the +Rappahannock, which you can hold securely until to-morrow P.M. Please +let the commanding general have your opinion in regard to this by +telegraph from Banks's Ford as soon as possible. + + S. WILLIAMS, + Assistant Adjutant-General. + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 4, 1863, 11 A.M. +MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK. + +The major-general commanding directs me to say that he does not wish you +to cross the river at Banks's Ford unless you are compelled to do so. +The batteries at Banks's Ford command the position. If it is +practicable for you to maintain a position south side of Rappahannock, +near Banks's Ford, you will do so. It is very important that we retain +position at Banks's Ford. Gen. Tyler commands the reserve artillery +there. + + J. H. VAN ALEN, + Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. + + + + SIXTH CORPS, May 4, 1863, 11 A.M. +MAJOR-GEN. BUTTERFIELD AND GEN. HOOKER. + +I hold the same position. The enemy are pressing me hard. If I can +hold until night, I shall cross at Banks's Ford, under instructions from +Gen. Hooker, given by Brig.-Gen. Warren. + + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. + + + + SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS, May 4, 1863, 11.15 A.M. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. + +The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad for +such attack. It was assumed for attack, and not for defence. It is not +improbable that bridges at Banks's Ford may be sacrificed. Can you help +me strongly if I am attacked? + + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. + +P. S.--My bridges are two miles from me. I am compelled to cover them +above and below from attack, with the additional assistance of Gen. Benham's +brigade alone. + J. S. + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 4, 1863, 11.50 A.M. +MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK. + +If the necessary information shall be obtained to-day, and if it shall +be of the character he anticipates, it is the intention of the general +to advance to-morrow. In this event the position of your corps on the +south side of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the general could +desire. It is for this reason he desires that your troops may not cross +the Rappahannock. + + J. H. VAN ALEN, + Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + May 4, 1863, 1.20 P.M. +GEN. SEDGWICK, + Commanding Sixth Corps. + +I expect to advance to-morrow morning, which will be likely to relieve +you. You must not count on much assistance without I hear heavy firing. +Tell Gen. Benham to put down the other bridge if you desire it. + + J. HOOKER, Major-General. + + + + HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, + May 4, 1863, 1.40 P.M. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. + +I occupy the same position as yesterday when Gen. Warren left me. +I have no means of judging enemy's force about me--deserters say forty +thousand. I shall take a position near Banks's Ford, and near the +Taylor house, at the suggestion of Gen. Warren; officers have already +gone to select a position. It is believed that the heights of +Fredericksburg are occupied by two divisions of the enemy. + + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. + + + + May 4, 1863. (Hour not stated.) +MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK, + Banks's Ford, Va. + +It is of vital importance that you should take a commanding position +near Fredericksburg, which you can hold to a certainty till to-morrow. +Please advise me what you can do in this respect. I enclose substance +of a communication sent last night. Its suggestions are highly +important, and meet my full approval. There are positions on your side +commanded by our batteries on the other side I think you could take and +hold. The general would recommend as one such position the ground on +which Dr. Taylor's is situated. + GEN. HOOKER (?) + + + + May 4, 1863, 2.15 P.M. +GEN. HOOKER. + +I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank of the +Rappahannock until to-morrow. + + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. + + + + BANKS'S FORD, VA., + May 4, 1863, 11.50 P.M. (Received 1 A.M., May 5.) +GEN. HOOKER, + United-States Ford. + +My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns from the north +side of Banks's Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I would +withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopard +it by retaining it here? An immediate reply is indispensable, or I may +feel obliged to withdraw. + + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. + + + + BANKS'S FORD, VA., + May 5, 1863. (Received 1 A.M.) +GEN. HOOKER. + +I shall hold my position as ordered on south of Rappahannock. + + SEDGWICK. + + + + HEADQUARTERS, + May 5, 1863, 1 A.M. (Received 2 A.M.) +GEN. SEDGWICK. + +Despatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river, and prevent +any force crossing. Acknowledge this. + + By command of Major-Gen. Hooker. + DANL. BUTTERFIELD + + + + HEADQUARTERS, + May 5, 1863, 1.20 A.M. +GEN. SEDGWICK. + +Yours received saying you should hold position. Order to withdraw +countermanded. Acknowledge both. + GEN. HOOKER + + + + BANKS'S FORD, VA., + May 5, 1863, 2 P.M. (should be 2 A.M.). +MAJOR-GEN. BUTTERFIELD. + +Gen. Hooker's order received. Will withdraw my forces immediately. + + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. + + + + HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, + May 5, 1863, 7 A.M. +GEN. BUTTERFIELD. + +I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night, and am in +camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges have been taken up. + + JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General. + + + +These despatches explain themselves, if read, as is indispensable, +with the hours of sending and receipt kept well in mind. No fault can +be imputed to either Hooker or Sedgwick, in that the intention of the +one could not be executed by the other. The apparent cross-purpose of +the despatches is explained by the difficulty of communication between +headquarters and the Sixth Corps. + +The order to withdraw, though sent by Hooker before the receipt of +Sedgwick's despatch saying he would hold the corps south of the river, +was received by Sedgwick long before the countermand, which was +exceptionally delayed, and was at once, under the urgent circumstances, +put into course of execution. + +As soon as the enemy ascertained that Sedgwick was crossing, Alexander's +artillery began dropping shells in the neighborhood of the bridges and +river banks; and Gen. Wilcox, with his own and Kershaw's brigades, +followed up Sedgwick's movements to the crossing, and used his artillery +freely. + +When the last column had almost filed upon the bridge, Sedgwick was +taken aback by the receipt of Hooker's despatch of 1.20 A.M., +countermanding the order to withdraw as above quoted. + +The main portion, however, being already upon the left bank, the corps +could not now re-cross, except by forcing the passage, as the +Confederates absolutely commanded the bridge and approaches, and with a +heavy body of troops. And, as Lee was fully satisfied to have got rid +of Sedgwick, upon conditions which left him free to turn with the bulk +of his army upon Hooker, it was not likely that Sedgwick could in any +event have successfully attempted it. The situation left him no choice +but to go into camp near by. An adequate force was sent to watch the +ford, and guard the river. + +The losses of the Sixth Corps during these two days' engagements were +4,925 men. Sedgwick captured, according to his report, five flags, +fifteen guns (nine of which were brought off), and fourteen hundred +prisoners, and lost no material. These captures are not conceded by the +Confederate authorities, some of whom claim that Sedgwick decamped in +such confusion as to leave the ground strewed with arms, accoutrements, +and material of all kinds. But it is probable, on comparison of all +facts, and the due weighing of all testimony, that substantially nothing +was lost by the Sixth Corps, except a part of the weapons of the dead +and wounded. + +Gibbon's division, about the same time, crossed to the north bank of the +river, and the pontoon bridge at Lacy's was taken up. Warren says, +"Gen. Sedgwick was attacked very heavily on Monday, fought all day, +and retreated across the river that night. We lay quiet at +Chancellorsville pretty nearly all day." This Warren plainly esteems a +poor sample of generalship, and he does not understand why Hooker did +not order an assault. "I think it very probable we could have succeeded +if it had been made." "Gen. Hooker appeared very much exhausted,"-- +"'tired' would express it." + +Lee's one object having been to drive Sedgwick across the river, so as +to be relieved of the troublesome insecurity of his rear, he could now +again turn his undivided attention to his chief enemy, who lay +listlessly expectant at Chancellorsville, and apparently oblivious of +his maxim enjoined upon Stoneman, "that celerity, audacity, and +resolution are every thing in war." + +Early and Barksdale were left, as before, to hold the Confederate lines +at and near Fredericksburg, while McLaws and Anderson were at once +ordered back to the old battle-field. "They reached their destination +during the afternoon (Tuesday, 5th) in the midst of a violent storm, +which continued throughout the night, and most of the following day." +(Lee.) + +Wilcox and Wright lay that night in bivouac on the Catherine road; +Mahone, Posey, and Perry, along the plank road. + +Kershaw was sent to relieve Heth at the crossing of the River and Mine +roads, and the latter rejoined his division. + +The night of Tuesday Lee spent in preparations to assault Hooker's +position at daylight on Wednesday. The Confederate scouts had been by +no means idle; and the position occupied by Hooker, in most of its +details, was familiar to the Southern commander. He was thus able to +develop his plans with greater ease than a less familiarity with the +terrain would have yielded. He was satisfied that one more vigorous +blow would disable his antagonist for this campaign, and he was +unwilling to delay in striking it. + + + + +XXXII. + +HOOKER'S CRITICISMS. + + +Let us now examine into Hooker's various criticisms upon Sedgwick's +conduct. + +Hooker, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, +baldly accuses Sedgwick of neglecting to keep him advised of his +movements, the inference being that he was debarred thereby from +intelligently using him; and states that when he sent Sedgwick the +despatch to join him at Chancellorsville, "it was written under the +impression that his corps was on the north side of the Rappahannock." +But could Hooker rationally assume this to be the case when he had, +five hours before, ordered Sedgwick to cross and pursue a flying enemy, +and well knew that he had a portion of his forces already guarding the +bridge-heads on the Fredericksburg side? + +"The night was so bright that . . . no special difficulty was +apprehended in executing the order." In the vicinity of Fredericksburg, +shortly after midnight, a fog appears to have arisen from the river, +which considerably impeded the movements of the Sixth Corps. This +Hooker knew from Sedgwick's report, which he was bound to believe, +unless evidence existed to show the contrary. "As will be seen, the +order was peremptory, and would have justified him in losing every man +of his command in its execution." + +Hooker also states that Warren was sent to Sedgwick on account of his +familiarity with the ground, and to impress upon the latter the +necessity of strict compliance with the order. + +"I supposed, and am still of the opinion, that, if Gen. Sedgwick's men +had shouldered arms and advanced at the time named, he would have +encountered less resistance and suffered less loss; but, as it was, +it was late when he went into Fredericksburg, and before he was in +readiness to attack the heights in rear of the town, which was about +eleven o'clock A.M. on the 3d, the enemy had observed his movement, +and concentrated almost their entire force at that point to oppose him." +"He had the whole force of the enemy there to run against in carrying +the heights beyond Fredericksburg, but he carried them with ease; and, +by his movements after that, I think no one would infer that he was +confident in himself, and the enemy took advantage of it. I knew +Gen. Sedgwick very well: he was a classmate of mine, and I had been +through a great deal of service with him. He was a perfectly brave man, +and a good one; but when it came to manoeuvring troops, or judging of +positions for them, in my judgment he was not able or expert. +Had Gen. Reynolds been left with that independent command, I have no +doubt the result would have been very different." "When the attack +was made, it had to be upon the greater part of the enemy's force left +on the right: nevertheless the troops advanced, carried the heights +without heavy loss, and leisurely took up their line of march on the +plank road, advancing two or three miles that day." + +Now, this is scarcely a fair statement of facts. And yet they were all +spread before Hooker, in the reports of the Sixth Corps and of Gibbon. +No doubt Sedgwick was bound, as far as was humanly possible, to obey +that order; but, as in "losing every man in his command" in its +execution, he would scarcely have been of great eventual utility to his +chief, he did the only wise thing, in exercising ordinary discretion as +to the method of attacking the enemy in his path. Hooker's assumption +that Sedgwick was on the north side of the Rappahannock was his own, +and not Sedgwick's fault. Hooker might certainly have supposed that +Sedgwick had obeyed his previous orders, in part at least. + +Sedgwick testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "I +have understood that evidence has appeared before the Committee +censuring me very much for not being at Chancellorsville at daylight, +in accordance with the order of Gen. Hooker. I now affirm that it was +impossible to have made the movement, if there had not been a rebel +soldier in front of me." + +"I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes time in taking the +heights of Fredericksburg." + +Sedgwick did "shoulder arms and advance" as soon as he received the +order; but the reports show plainly enough that he encountered annoying +opposition so soon as he struck the outskirts of the town; that he threw +forward assaulting columns at once; and that these fought as well as the +conditions warranted, but were repulsed. + +It is not intended to convey the impression that there was no loss of +time on Sedgwick's part. On the contrary, he might certainly have been +more active in some of his movements. No doubt there were other general +officers who would have been. But it is no exaggeration to insist that +his dispositions were fully as speedy as those of any other portion of +the army in this campaign. + +Hooker not only alleges that "in his judgment, Gen. Sedgwick did not +obey the spirit of his order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it," +but quotes Warren as saying that Sedgwick "would not have moved at all +if he [Warren] had not been there; and that, when he did move, it was +not with sufficient confidence or ability on his part to manoeuvre his +troops." It is very doubtful whether Warren ever put his opinion in so +strong a way as thus quoted by Hooker from memory. His report does +speak of Gibbon's slowness in coming up, and of his thus losing the +chance of crossing the canals and taking the breastworks before the +Confederates filed into them. But beyond a word to the effect that +giving the advance to Brooks's division, after the capture of the +heights, "necessarily consumed a considerable time," Warren does not in +his report particularly criticise Sedgwick's movements. And in another +place he does speak of the order of ten P.M. as an "impossible" one. + +Gen. Warren's testimony on this subject is of the highest importance, +as representing Gen. Hooker in person. As before stated, he carried a +duplicate of Hooker's order of ten P.M., to Sedgwick, with instructions +from the general to urge upon Sedgwick the importance of the utmost +celerity. Moreover, Warren knew the country better than any one else, +and was more generally conversant with Hooker's plans, ideas, and +methods, being constantly at his side. "Gen. Sedgwick was ordered to be +in his position by daylight: of course that implied, if he could be +there." + +"If Sedgwick had got to Chancellorsville by daylight, I think we ought +to have destroyed Lee's army. But it would depend a great deal upon how +hard the other part of the army fought; for Gen. Sedgwick, with his +twenty thousand men, was in great danger of being destroyed if he became +isolated." + +Moreover, Hooker in this testimony says: "Early in the campaign I had +come to the conclusion that with the arms now in use it would be +impossible to carry works by an assault in front, provided they were +properly constructed and properly manned;" and refers to the +Fredericksburg assault of Dec. 13, to illustrate this position, saying +that they (the enemy) "could destroy men faster than I could throw them +on the works;" and, "I do not know of an instance when rifle-pits, +properly constructed and properly manned, have been taken by front +assaults alone." + +And yet his order to Sedgwick was (as he construes it), blindly to throw +himself into this impossible situation, and lose every man in his +command rather than not make the attempt at once, and without waiting +properly to dispose his men, or feel the enemy. + +As to the leisurely marching of two or three miles on Sunday, we have +seen how Brooks's march was summarily arrested at Salem Church, and how +his attempt to force a passage, cost him alone some fifteen hundred men. + +There is a good deal of evidence difficult to deal with in this movement +of the Sixth Corps. The report of Gen. Howe, written immediately after +the campaign, states facts dispassionately, and is to the point and +nothing more. This is as it should be in the report of a general to his +superior. It has but one error of consequence, viz., the assumption +that the three divisions of Anderson, McLaws, and Early, all under +command of Gen. Lee, attacked his line, leaving no force in front of +Brooks and Newton. It was Early alone, or Early assisted by a brigade +of Anderson, who attacked Howe. + +But his testimony a year later, before the Committee on the Conduct of +the War, cannot be commended as dispassionate, and contains serious +errors. Gen. Howe states that the order to advance towards +Chancellorsville was received "just after dark, say eight o'clock," +whereas it was not sent until nine P.M. from Chancellorsville, and ten +P.M. from Falmouth; nor did Sedgwick receive it until eleven P.M. +Howe evidently remembered the order to pursue by the Bowling-Green road, +as the one to march to Chancellorsville,--when speaking of time of +delivery. The deductions Gen. Howe makes from errors like this are +necessarily somewhat warped. But let us give all due weight to the +testimony of an able soldier. He states that his attack on Marye's +heights was made on a mere notice from Sedgwick, that he was about to +attack, and desired Howe to assist; that he received on Sunday evening a +bare intimation only from Sedgwick, that the left of the corps must be +protected, and that he consequently moved his own left round to the +river; and later, that Sedgwick sent him word to strengthen his position +for defence; but complains that Sedgwick did not properly look after his +division. "Not receiving any instruction or assistance from Gen. Sedgwick, +I felt that we were left to take care of ourselves. It seemed to me, +from the movements or arrangements made during the day, that there was +a want of appreciation or a misunderstanding of the position which we +held." Sedgwick's entire confidence in Howe's ability to handle his +division, upon general instructions of the object to be attained, +might account fully for a large part of this apparent vagueness. +But Howe does not look at it in this light. His opinion was, that no +necessity existed for the Sixth Corps to fall back across the river. + +Gen. Howe's testimony is very positive as to the possibility of the +Sixth Corps complying with Hooker's order as given. He thinks a night +attack could have been made on the Fredericksburg heights, and that they +could have been speedily carried, and the corps have been well on the +road to Chancellorsville long before daylight. He also is of opinion +that Brooks's division could have forced its way beyond Salem Church, +with proper support. But we also know how gallant an attempt Brooks +made to do this very thing, and how hard he struggled before yielding to +failure. + +It is in no wise intended to begrudge Gen. Howe his opinion; but he has +certainly arrived at some of his conclusions, from premises founded on +errors of fact. + +The testimony of Col. Johns, which follows Gen. Howe's before the +Committee on the Conduct of the War, bears only the weight to which the +report of the commander of a brigade is entitled, whose duties allowed +him to have but a partial view of the general features of the march. +Though his opinion agrees with Gen. Howe's, he, too, mistakes the hour +of the urgent order; and it is difficult to see why he was summoned +before the Committee, unless as a partisan. + +"My object" (continues Hooker) "in ordering Gen. Sedgwick forward at the +time named, was to relieve me from the position in which I found myself +at Chancellorsville on the night of the 2d of May." This statement is +not only characteristic of Hooker's illogical method, but disingenuous +to the degree of mockery. For this position, it will be remembered, +was a strongly intrenched line, held by eighty thousand men, well armed +and equipped, having in their front less than half their number of +Confederates. In view of Hooker's above-quoted opinion about rifle- +pits; of the fact that in his testimony he says: "Throughout the +Rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had as large a force +as the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter;" +of the fact that the enemy in his front had been cut in two, and would +so remain if he only kept the salient, just seized by Sickles and +Pleasonton, at the angle south-west of Fairview, well manned; and of the +fact that he had unused reserves greater in number than the entire force +of the enemy,--is it not remarkable that, in Hooker's opinion, nothing +short of a countermarch of three miles by the Sixth Corps, the capture +of formidable and sufficiently manned intrenchments, (the work of the +Army of Northern Virginia during an entire half year,) and an advance of +nearly twelve miles,--all of which was to be accomplished between eleven +and daylight of a day in May,--could operate to "relieve him from the +position in which he found himself on the night of the 2d of May"? + +"I was of the opinion, that if a portion of the army advanced on Lee's +rear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, +Lee would take the road Jackson had marched over on the morning of the +2d, and thus open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, +severed from his depot, would have to retire by way of Gordonsville." +Well enough, but was Sedgwick's corps the only one to accomplish this? +Where were Reynolds, and Meade, and Howard, forsooth? + +There is no particular criticism by Hooker upon Sedgwick's authority to +withdraw to the north side of the river, or upon the necessity for his +so doing. And we have seen how hard-pressed and overmatched Sedgwick +had really been, and that he only withdrew when good military reasons +existed, and the latest-received despatch of his superior advised him to +do so. But Hooker states that "my desire was to have Gen. Sedgwick +retain a position on the south side of the river, in order that I might +leave a sufficient force to hold the position I was in, and with the +balance of my force re-cross the river, march down to Banks's Ford, +and turn the enemy's position in my front by so doing. In this, too, +I was thwarted, because the messenger who bore the despatch to Sedgwick +to withdraw and cover Banks's Ford, reached Sedgwick before the one who +bore the order countermanding the withdrawal." + +Hooker had indicated to Sedgwick that he wished him to take and hold a +position at Taylor's, the point where the Fredericksburg heights +approach the river, above the town, and terminate. But as these heights +were by that time held by Early, and there were no pontoon-bridges there, +the proposal was one Sedgwick knew could not be seriously entertained, +with two-thirds of Lee's whole army surrounding his one corps, though he +did reconnoitre the ground in a vain effort to carry out his chief's +suggestions. + +But was it not simpler for Hooker, who had now only Jackson's corps in +his front,--some eighteen thousand men to eighty thousand,--to move upon +his enemy, "attack and destroy him," and himself fall upon Lee's rear, +while Sedgwick kept him occupied at Banks's Ford? And Hooker had all +Sunday afternoon and night, and all day Monday, to ponder and arrange +for attempting this simplest of manoeuvres. + +It is hard to understand how the man, who could cut out such a gigantic +piece of work for his lieutenant, as Hooker did for Sedgwick, could lack +the enterprise to execute so trivial a tactical movement as the one +indicated. From the stirring words, "Let your watchword be Fight, +and let all your orders be Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" of April 12, to the +inertia and daze of the 4th of May, is indeed a bewildering step. +And yet Hooker, to judge from his testimony, seems to have fully +satisfied himself that he did all that was to be expected of an active +and intelligent commander. + +The impression that an attack should have been made, prevailed among +many of his subordinates. Gen. Wadsworth thus testified before the +Committee on the Conduct of the War: "Question.--Can you tell why it was +not ordered to attack the enemy at the time Gen. Sickles with his Third +Corps was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day, +when you heard the sound of Gen. Sedgwick's engagement with the enemy? +Answer.--I have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered to +re-cross the river, so far as I could judge of the temper and spirit of +the officers and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive. +I do not know why we were withdrawn then; I think we should not have +withdrawn. I think the enemy were whipped; although they had gained +certain advantages, they were so severely handled that they were weaker +than we were." + +"Question.--Is it your opinion as a military man, that, if our army had +been ordered to take the offensive vigorously, we would have gained a +victory there? Answer.--I think we should have taken the offensive when +the enemy attacked Gen. Sedgwick." + +Again Hooker: "During the 3d and 4th, reconnoissances were made on the +right," (i. e., at Chancellorsville,) "from one end of the line to the +other, to feel the enemy's strength, and find a way and place to attack +him successfully; but it was ascertained that it could only be made on +him behind his defences, and with slender columns, which I believed he +could destroy as fast as they could be thrown on to his works. +Subsequent campaigns have only confirmed the opinion I then ascertained." + +Now, Hooker, at the time of giving this testimony, (March 11, 1865), +had had nearly two years in which to become familiar with the true state +of facts. He must have known these facts from the reports of his +subordinates, if not from the accounts of the action in the Southern +press. He must have known that all day Monday, he had only Jackson's +corps opposed to him. He must have known that these troops had time +enough to erect none but very ordinary intrenchments. And yet he +excuses himself from not attacking his opponents, when he outnumbered +them four to one. Would not his testimony tell better for him, if he +had said that at the time he supposed he had more than eighteen thousand +men before him? It is a thankless task to pursue criticism upon such +capricious and revocatory evidence. + +Sickles also, in his testimony, states that from our new lines we felt +the enemy everywhere in his front, and that Gen. Griffin with his entire +division made a reconnoissance, and developed the enemy in great force +on our right flank. This work of reconnoitring can scarcely have been +done with great thoroughness, for we know to a certainty what force Lee +left behind. It would be well to say little about it. But it is not +strange that the purposelessness of the commander should result in +half-hearted work by the subordinates. + +The following extract from the evidence of Gen. Sedgwick before the +Committee on the Conduct of the War, compared with Hooker's and the +actual facts, shows palpably who is in the right. + +"At nine A.M., May 4, I sent this despatch to Gen. Hooker: 'I am +occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my +communication with Banks's Ford. The enemy are in possession of the +heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, +and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday, A.M., +was twenty-two thousand men: I do not know my losses, but they were +large, probably five thousand men. I can't use the cavalry. It depends +upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain +myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing from Fredericksburg.' + +"Question.--When you were in the position on the 4th, to which you have +referred, were you where you could have co-operated with the army at +Chancellorsville in an attack upon the enemy? + +"Answer.--I could not proceed in that direction. I think Gen. Hooker +might have probably relieved me if he had made an attack at that time. +I think I had a much larger force of the enemy around me than Gen. Hooker +had in front of him. There were two divisions of the enemy on the +heights of Fredericksburg, which was in my rear; and they would have +attacked me the moment I undertook to proceed towards Chancellorsville. +About one A.M. of May 5, Gen. Hooker telegraphed me to cross the river, +and take up the bridges. This is the despatch: 'Despatch this moment +received. Withdraw; cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. +Acknowledge receipt.' + +"This was immediately done: as the last of the column was crossing, +between three and four o'clock, the orders to cross were countermanded, +and I was directed to hold a position on the south bank. The despatch +was dated 1.20 A.M., and was received at 3.20, as follows:-- + +"'Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdraw +countermanded. Acknowledge both.' + +"In explanation of this I should say that I had telegraphed to Gen. Hooker +that I could hold the position. He received it after he had ordered me +to cross over. But, receiving his despatch to cross, I had commenced +the movement; and, as I have said, I had very nearly taken my force over, +when the order to cross was countermanded. To return at that time was +wholly impracticable, and I telegraphed that fact to Gen. Hooker." + +To place in juxtaposition Hooker's testimony and Sedgwick's, in no wise +militates against the latter. + +There is one broad criticism which may fairly he passed upon Sedgwick's +withdrawal across the Rappahannock. It is that, with the knowledge that +his remaining in position might be of some assistance to his chief, +instead of exhibiting a perhaps undue anxiety to place himself beyond +danger, he could with his nineteen thousand men, by dint of stubborn +flghting, have held the intrenchments at Banks's Ford, against even Lee +with his twenty-four thousand. + +But if he attempted this course, and was beaten, Lee could have +destroyed his corps. And this risk he was bound to weigh, as he did, +with the advantages Hooker could probably derive from his holding on. +Moreover, to demand thus much of Sedgwick, is to hold him to a defence, +which, in this campaign, no other officer of the Army of the Potomac was +able to make. + +Not but what, under equally pressing conditions, other generals have, +or himself, if he had not received instructions to withdraw, might have, +accomplished so much. But if we assume, that having an eye to the +numbers and losses of his corps, and to his instructions, as well as to +the character and strength of the enemy opposed to him, Sedgwick was +bound to dispute further the possession of Banks's Ford, in order to +lend a questionable aid to Hooker, how lamentable will appear by +comparison the conduct of the other corps of the Army of the Potomac, +under the general commanding, bottled up behind their defences at +Chancellorsville! + + + + +XXXIII. + +HOOKER'S FURTHER PLANS. + + +Hooker states: "Gen. Warren represented to me that Gen. Sedgwick had +said he could do no more; then it was I wanted him to take some position, +and hold it, that I might turn the enemy in my immediate front. I +proposed to leave troops enough where I was, to occupy the enemy there, +and throw the rest of my force down the river, and re-enforce Sedgwick; +then the whole of Lee's army, except that which had been left in front +of Sedgwick, would be thrown off the road to Richmond, and my army would +be on it. + +"As soon as I heard that Gen. Sedgwick had re-crossed the river, seeing +no object in maintaining my position where I was, and believing it would +be more to my advantage to hazard an engagement with the enemy at +Franklin's Crossing, where I had elbow-room, than where I was, the army +on the right was directed to re-cross the river, and did so on the night +between the 5th and 6th of May." + +Now, the Franklin's Crossing plan, or its equivalent, had been tried by +Burnside, in December, with a loss of twelve thousand men; and it had +been fully canvassed and condemned as impracticable, before beginning +the Chancellorsville manoeuvre. To resuscitate it can therefore serve +no purpose but as an idle excuse. And the argument of elbow-room, +if made, is the one Hooker should have used against withdrawing from the +open country he had reached, to the Wilderness, on Friday, May 1. + +"Being resolved on re-crossing the river on the night between the 4th +and 5th, I called the corps commanders together, not as a council of war, +but to ascertain how they felt in regard to making what I considered a +desperate move against the enemy in our front." Be it remembered that +the "desperate move" was one of eighty thousand men, with twenty +thousand more (Sedgwick) close at hand as a reserve, against at the +outside forty-five thousand men, if Early should be ordered up to +re-enforce Lee. And Hooker knew the force of Lee, or had as good +authority for knowing it as he had for most of the facts he assumed, +in condemning Sedgwick. Moreover, from the statements of prisoners we +had taken, very nearly an exact estimate could be made of the then +numbers of the Army of Northern Virginia. + +All the corps commanders were present at this conference, except Slocum, +who afterwards came in. All were in favor of an advance, except +Sickles; while Couch wavered, fearing that no advance could be made to +advantage under Hooker. Hancock, (testimony before the Committee on the +Conduct of the War,) says: "I understood from him" (Couch) "always that +he was in favor of fighting then." Hooker claims Couch to have been for +retreat; but the testimony of the generals present, as far as available, +goes to show the council to have been substantially as will now be +narrated. + +Hooker retired for a while, to allow free expression of opinion; and, +with one exception, all present manifested a desire for another attack, +in full force,--Howard, Meade, and Reynolds being especially urgent to +this purpose. The one dissentient voice was Sickles; and he expressed +himself, confessedly, more from a political than a strategic standpoint. +He allowed the military reasons to be sound for an advance, and modestly +refrained from putting his opinion against that of men trained to the +profession of arms; though all allowed his right to a valid judgment. +But he claimed, with some reason, that the political horizon was dark; +that success by the Army of the Potomac was secondary to the avoidance +of disaster. If, he alleged, this army should be destroyed, it would be +the last one the country would raise. Washington might be captured; and +the effect of this loss upon the country, and upon Europe, was to be +greatly dreaded. The enemies of the administration were strong, and +daily gaining ground. It was necessary that the Army of the Potomac +should not run the risk of destruction. It was the last hold of the +Republican party in Virginia. Better re-cross and recuperate, and then +attempt another campaign, than run any serious risk now. These grounds +largely influenced him in agreeing with the general-in-chief's +determination to retire across the river. But there were other reasons, +which Sickles states in his testimony. The rations with which the men +had started had given out, and there had been no considerable issue +since. Singularly enough, too, (for Hooker was, as a rule, unusually +careful in such matters,) there had been no provision made for supplying +the troops against a possible advance; and yet, from Sunday noon till +Tuesday night, we had lain still behind our intrenchments, with +communications open, and with all facilities at hand to prepare for a +ten-days' absence from our base. This circumstance wears the look of +almost a predetermination to accept defeat. + +Now, at the last moment, difficulties began to arise in bringing over +supplies. The river had rapidly risen from the effects of the storm. +Parts of the bridges had been carried away by the torrent. The ends of +the others were under water, and their entire structure was liable at +any moment to give way. It was not certain that Lee, fully aware of +these circumstances, would, for the moment, accept battle, as he might +judge it better to lure the Army of the Potomac away from the +possibility of victualling. Perhaps Sedgwick would be unable to cross +again so as to join the right wing. The Eleventh Corps might not be in +condition to count on for heavy service. The Richmond papers, received +almost daily through channels more or less irregular, showed that +communications were still open, and that the operations of the Cavalry +Corps had not succeeded in interrupting them in any serious manner. +On the coming Sunday, the time of service of thirty-eight regiments was +up. Many of these conditions could have been eliminated from the +problem, if measures had been seasonably taken; but they now became +critical elements in the decision to be made. And Hooker, despite his +well-earned reputation as a fighting man, was unable to arrive at any +other than the conclusion which Falstaff so cautiously enunciated, +from beneath his shield, at the battle of Shrewsbury, that "the better +part of valor is discretion." + + + + +XXXIV. + +THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES. + + +Orders were accordingly issued with a view to re-crossing the river; and +during the 5th, Gen. Warren and Capt. Comstock of the engineers prepared +a new and shorter line, in the rear of the one then held by the army, +to secure it against any attempt by the enemy to interrupt the retreat. +Capt. Comstock supervised the labor on the west side, and Gen. Warren on +the east, of the United-States Ford road. "A continuous cover and +abattis was constructed from the Rappahannock at Scott's Dam, around to +the mouth of Hunting Run on the Rapidan. The roads were put in good +order, and a third bridge laid. A heavy rain set in about 4.30 P.M., +and lasted till late at night. The movement to re-cross was begun by +the artillery, as per order, at 7.30 and was suddenly interrupted by a +rise in the river so great as to submerge the banks at the ends of the +bridges on the north bank, and the velocity of the current threatened to +sweep them away." "The upper bridge was speedily taken up, and used to +piece out the ends of the other two, and the passage was again made +practicable. Considerable delays, however, resulted from this cause." +"No troops took up position in the new line except the rearguard, +composed of the Fifth Corps, under Gen. Meade, which was done about +daylight on the 6th." "The proper dispositions were made for holding +this line till all but the rearguard was past the river; and then it +quietly withdrew, no enemy pursuing." (Warren.) The last of the army +re-crossed about eight A.M., May 6. + +Testimony of Gen. Henry J. Hunt:-- + +"A storm arose soon after. Just before sunset, the general and his +staff re-crossed the river to the north side. I separated from him in +order to see to the destruction of some works of the enemy on the south +side of the river, which perfectly commanded our bridges. Whilst I was +looking after them, in the darkness, to see that they had been destroyed +as directed, an engineer officer reported to me that our bridges had +been carried away, or were being carried away, by the flood. I found +the chief engineer, Capt. Comstock; and we proceeded together to examine +the bridges, and we found that they were all utterly impassable. +I then proceeded to Gen. Meade's camp, and reported the condition of +affairs to him. All communication with Gen. Hooker being cut off, +Gen. Meade called the corps commanders together; and, as the result of +that conference, I believe, by order of Gen. Couch at any rate, I was +directed to stop the movement of the artillery, which was withdrawn from +the lines, and let them resume their positions, thus suspending the +crossing. On my return to the bridges, I found that one had been +re-established, and the batteries that were down there had commenced +re-crossing the river. I then sought Gen. Hooker up, on the north side +of the river, and proposed to him to postpone the movement for one day, +as it was certain we could not all cross over in a night. I stated to +him that I doubted whether we could more than get the artillery, which +was ordered to cross first, over before daylight: he refused to postpone +the movement, and it proceeded. No opposition was made by the enemy, +nor was the movement disturbed, except by the attempt to place batteries +on the points from which our bridges could be reached, and to command +which I had already posted the necessary batteries on my own +responsibility. A cannonade ensued, and they were driven off with loss, +and one of their caissons exploded: we lost three or four men killed, +and a few horses, in this affair. That is about all that I remember." + +Gen. Barnes's brigade assisted in taking up the bridges; and all were +safely withdrawn by four P.M. on Wednesday, under superintendence of +Major Spaulding of the engineer brigade. + +All who participated in this retreat will remember the precarious +position of the masses of troops, huddled together at the bridge-heads +as in a cul-de-sac, during this eventful night, and the long-drawn +breath of relief as the hours after dawn passed, and no further +disposition to attack was manifested by Lee. This general was doubtless +profoundly grateful that the Army of the Potomac should retire across +the Rappahannock, and leave his troops to the hard-earned rest they +needed so much more than ourselves; but little thanks are due to Hooker, +who was, it seems, on the north side of the river during these critical +moments, that the casualties of the campaign were not doubled by a final +assault on the part of Lee, while we lay in this perilous situation, +and the unmolested retreat turned into another passage of the Beresina. +Providentially, the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia had +expended almost its last round of ammunition previous to this time. + +But several hospitals of wounded, in care of a number of medical +officers and stewards, were left behind, to be removed a few days later +under a flag of truce. + +The respective losses of the two armies are thus officially given:-- + + FEDERAL LOSS. + + General Headquarters and Engineers . . . 9 + First Corps . . . . . . . . 299 + Second Corps . . . . . . . . 1,923 + Third Corps . . . . . . . . 4,119 + Fifth Corps . . . . . . . . 700 + Sixth Corps . . . . . . . . 4,610 + Eleventh Corps . . . . . . . . 2,412 + Twelfth Corps . . . . . . . . 2,822 + Pleasonton's Brigade . . . . . . 202 + Cavalry Corps under Stoneman . . . . 189 + ------ + 17,285 + + CONFEDERATE LOSS. + + Jackson's Corps,-- + Early's division . . . . . . . 851 + A. P. Hill's division . . . . . . 2,583 + Trimble's (Colston) division . . . . 1,868 + D. H. Hill's (Rodes) division . . . . 2,178 + + Longstreet's Corps,-- + Anderson's division . . . . . . 1,180 + McLaws's division . . . . . . 1,379 + Artillery . . . . . . . . . 227 + Cavalry . . . . . . . . . 11 + ------ + 10,277 + Prisoners . . . . . . . . . 2,000 + ------ + 12,277 + + +Both armies now returned to their ancient encampments, elation as +general on one side as disappointment was profound upon the other. + +Hooker says in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the +War: "I lost under those operations" (viz., the Chancellorsville +campaign) "one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one +ambulance. Of course, many of the Eleventh Corps lost their arms and +knapsacks." + +The Confederates, however, claim to have captured nineteen thousand five +hundred stand of small arms, seventeen colors, and much ammunition. +And, while acknowledging a loss of eight guns, it is asserted by them +that they captured thirteen. + +The orders issued to the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern +Virginia by their respective commanders, on the return of the forces to +the shelter of their old camps, need no comment. They are characteristic +to a degree. + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + May 6, 1863. +GENERAL ORDERS NO. 49. + +The major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on +the achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all +that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is +sufficient to say that they were of a character not to be foreseen or +prevented by human sagacity or resources. + +In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering +a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence +of its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to the principles it +represents. + +By fighting at a disadvantage we would have been recreant to our trust, +to ourselves, to our cause, and to our country. Profoundly loyal, +and conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or +decline battle whenever its interests or honor may command it. + +By the celerity and secrecy of our movements, our advance and passage of +the river were undisputed; and, on our withdrawal, not a rebel dared to +follow us. The events of the last week may well cause the heart of +every officer and soldier of the army to swell with pride. + +We have added new laurels to our former renown. We have made long +marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments; and +whenever we have fought, we have inflicted heavier blows than those we +have received. + +We have taken from the enemy five thousand prisoners, and fifteen colors, +captured seven pieces of artillery, and placed hors du combat eighteen +thousand of our foe's chosen troops. + +We have destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores, damaged +his communications, captured prisoners within the fortifications of his +capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation. + +We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave +companions; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have +fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitration of battle. + +By command of Major-Gen. Hooker. + S. WILLIAMS, + Assistant Adjutant-General. + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, + May 7, 1863. + +With heartfelt gratification, the general commanding expresses to the +army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men +during the arduous operations in which they have just been engaged. + +Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, +strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on +the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and, by the valor +that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek +safety beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles +you to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called +upon to return our grateful thanks to the only Giver of victory, for the +signal deliverance He has wrought. + +It is therefore earnestly recommended that the troops unite, on Sunday +next, in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due unto His name. + +Let us not forget in our rejoicing the brave soldiers who have fallen in +defence of their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolve +to emulate their noble example. + +The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one to +whose bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success. + +The following letter from the President of the Confederate States is +communicated to the army as an expression of his appreciation of their +success:-- + +"I have received your despatch, and reverently unite with you in giving +praise to God for the success with which he has crowned our arms. +In the name of the people, I offer my cordial thanks to yourself and the +troops under your command, for this addition to the unprecedented series +of great victories which our army has achieved. The universal rejoicing +produced by this happy result will be mingled with a general regret for +the good and the brave who are numbered among the killed and the +wounded." + + R. E. LEE, General. + + +The following is equally characteristic:-- + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 13, 1863. +To his Excellency, President of the United States. + +Is it asking too much to inquire your opinion of my Order No. 49? +If so, do not answer me. + +Jackson is dead, and Lee beats McClellan in his untruthful bulletins. + + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + JOSEPH HOOKER, + Major-General Commanding. + + + + +XXXV. + +OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS. + + +As was briefly related in the early part of this work, Hooker issued +orders to Gen. Stoneman, the commanding-officer of the Cavalry Corps of +the Army of the Potomac, on the 12th of April, to move the succeeding +day for the purpose of cutting the communications of the enemy. The +order read as follows:-- + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., April 12, 1863. +Commanding Officer, Cavalry Corps. + +I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that you +will march at seven o'clock A.M., on the 13th inst., with all your +available force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the +enemy's position on his left, and of throwing your command between him +and Richmond, isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat, +and inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to his +discomfiture and defeat. + +To accomplish this, the general suggests that you ascend the +Rappahannock by the different routes, keeping well out of the view of +the enemy, and throwing out well to the front and flank small parties to +mask your movement, and to cut off all communication with the enemy, +by the people in their interest living on this side of the river. +To divert suspicion it may not be amiss to have word given out that you +are in pursuit of Jones's guerillas, as they are operating extensively +in the Shenandoah Valley, in the direction of Winchester. He further +suggests that you select for your place of crossing the Rappahannock, +some point to the west of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, which can +only be determined by the circumstances as they are found on the arrival +of your advance. + +In the vicinity of Culpeper, you will be likely to run against Fitz Hugh +Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, which it +is expected you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to +your advance, or detriment to any considerable number of your command. + +At Gordonsville, the enemy have a small provost-guard of infantry, +which it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without +delaying your forward movement. From there it is expected that you will +push forward to the Aquia and Richmond Railroad, somewhere in the +vicinity of Saxton's Junction, destroying along your whole route the +railroad-bridges, trains of cars, depots of provisions, lines of +telegraphic communication, etc. The general directs that you go +prepared with all the means necessary to accomplish this work +effectually. + +As the line of the railroad from Aquia to Richmond presents the shortest +one for the enemy to retire on, it is most probable that he will avail +himself of it, and the usually travelled highways on each side of it, +for this purpose; in which event you will select the strongest positions, +such as the banks of streams, commanding heights, etc., in order to +check or prevent it; and, if unsuccessful, you will fall upon his flanks, +attack his artillery and trains, and harass him until he is exhausted +and out of supplies. + +Moments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit. + +If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will +endeavor to hold your force in his front, and harass him day and night, +on the march, and in camp, unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from his +column large slices, the general desires that you will not fail to take +small ones. Let your watchword be Fight, and let all your orders be +Fight, Fight, FIGHT; bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the +general as the rebel carcasses. It is not in the power of the rebels to +oppose you with more than five thousand sabres, and those badly mounted, +and, after they leave Culpeper, without forage and rations. Keep them +from Richmond, and sooner or later they must fall into our hands. + +The general desires you to understand that he considers the primary +object of your movement the cutting of the enemy's communication with +Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those +lines; and he wishes to make every thing subservient to that object. +He desires that you will keep yourself informed of the enemy's +whereabouts, and attack him wherever you find him. + +If, in your operations, an opportunity should present itself for you to +detach a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, and +destroy depots of supplies said to be there, or along the line of the +Aquia Railroad, in the direction of Richmond, to destroy bridges, etc., +or the crossings of the Pamunkey, in the direction of West Point, +destroying the ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the crossing, +they will all greatly contribute to our complete success. + +You may rely upon the general's being in communication with you before +your supplies are exhausted. + +Let him hear from you as often as necessary and practicable. + +A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at eight o'clock for +Kelly's Ford, with one battery, and a regiment to the United-States Ford +and Banks's Ford, to threaten and hold those places. + +It devolves upon you, general, to take the initiative in the forward +movement of this grand army; and on you and your noble command must +depend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. +Bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every thing in +war, and especially is it the case with the command you have, and the +enterprise on which you are about to embark. + + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + S. WILLIAMS, + Assistant Adjutant-General. + + +In pursuance of which order, the corps broke camp near Belle-Plain, +and encamped on the evening of April 13, beyond Morrisville. On April +14, it moved down to the vicinity of the bridge at Rappahannock station, +which, after a slight skirmish by Gregg, was taken possession of. +Beverly Ford, some miles above, was also examined, and the north bank +occupied. Preparations for an early move on the morning of the 14th +were made. Gen. Buford, commanding the cavalry reserve, remained at +Kelly's Ford during the 14th, in order to draw the attention of the +Confederates to that point, and indulged in a little artillery skirmish. + +During the night a heavy rain set in, and before morning the river was +no longer fordable by the artillery and pack-trains. + +As is well known, it takes no great rainfall to swell the Rappahannock +and Rapidan rivers, and their tributaries, to the proportion of +torrents. Nor are more than a few hours necessary to raise these rivers +and runs, and even the dry ravines, to an impassable depth. Gregg +mentions in his report that a small stream, which, on the 13th, could be +crossed at one step, had swelled to such a flood, that when, on the 15th, +a regiment was obliged to cross it, there were lost one man and two +horses by drowning. + +So that, after crossing one division, Stoneman found that it would +probably be isolated on account of the impracticability of crossing the +rest of the corps, and consequently ordered its immediate return. +And this was accomplished none too soon, by swimming the horses. + +On reporting all these facts to Hooker, Stoneman was ordered to go into +camp, where he remained, along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, +until the 27th. + +The following letter is of interest, in this connection, as showing how +keen Mr. Lincoln's intuitions occasionally were. + + + EXECUTIVE MANSION, + WASHINGTON, D.C., April 15, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. + +It is now 10.15 P.M. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning, +and a few moments later your despatch of this evening. The latter gives +me considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to be +calculated upon. Gen. S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the +expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of +which were unusually fair weather, and all three without hinderance from +the enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. +To reach his point he still has sixty to go, another river (the Rapidan) +to cross; and will he be hindered by the enemy? By arithmetic, how many +days will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be +done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often. +I am very anxious. + + Yours truly, + A. LINCOLN. + + +On the 28th, Stoneman received the following additional orders:-- + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + MORRISVILLE, VA., April 28, 1863. +Commanding Officer Cavalry Corps. + +I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that the +instructions communicated for your government on the 12th instant, +are so far modified as to require you to cross the Rappahannock at such +points as you may determine between Kelly's and Rappahannock Fords, +and for a portion of your force to move in the direction of Raccoon Ford +and Louisa Court House, while the remainder is engaged carrying into +execution that part of your original instructions, which relates to the +enemy's forces and positions on the line of the Alexandria and Orange +Railroad, and the line itself; the operations of this column to be +considered as masking the column which is directed to move, by forced +marches, to strike and destroy the line of the Aquia and Richmond +Railroad. + +You are further directed to determine on some point for the columns to +unite; and it is recommended that it be on the Pamunkey, or near that +line, as you will then be in position with your full force to cut off +the retreat of the enemy by his shortest line. In all other respects +your instructions, as before referred to, will remain the same. + +You will direct all your force to cross to-night, or, if that shall not +be practicable, to be brought to the river, and have it all thrown over +before eight o'clock to-morrow morning. If the fords should be too deep +for your pack-animals and artillery, they will be crossed over the +bridge at Kelly's Ford. + +You will please furnish the officers in command of these two columns +with a copy of this, and of your original instructions. + + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + WM. L. CANDLER, + Captain and Aide-de-Camp. + + +These two orders would appear to be specific enough. The first is not +modified by the second to any great extent; and the primary object of +both is unmistakably to interrupt, by a bold stroke, Lee's main +communications with Richmond by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. + +The point on which the two columns, spoken of in the order of April 28, +were to unite, was suggested as somewhere on the Pamunkey; and the one +column was to go at once about its work, while the other masked its +march, and after joined it. + +Under these orders, Stoneman proceeded to get the corps together,--the +distance of many outlying pickets delaying him almost a day,--and +finally crossed the Rappahannock by five P.M. of the 29th, a portion of +his troops using Kelly's Ford, in connection with Slocum's column. + +He then assembled his division and brigade commanders, spread his maps +before them, and made them acquainted with his orders and plans. + +Averell, with his own division, Davis's brigade of Pleasonton's division, +and Tidball's battery, was instructed to push for Culpeper Court House; +while Stoneman, with Gregg's division, Buford's reserve brigade, and +Robertson's battery, moved on Stevensburg. + +It was expected that Averell would reach Brandy Station the same night +(29th), driving before him the enemy, who was in very small force in his +front. And when Stoneman got well on his way, he despatched Capt. Drummond, +with a squadron, from beyond Rocky Run, by crossroads, to Brandy Station, +to bring intelligence of Averell's movements. The latter had, however, +not reached that place. And, learning later in the evening that he had +leisurely gone into camp, close by the place where the forces had crossed, +Stoneman sent him word that he must turn the enemy in his front over +to him, while himself pushed on towards Richmond. + +This order read as follows:-- + + HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, + April 30, 1863. +BRIG.-GEN. AVERELL, Commanding, etc. + +The major-general commanding directs me to say that we have been delayed +by high water, etc., and that he desires you to push the enemy as +vigorously as possible, keeping him fully occupied, and, if possible, +drive him in the direction of Rapidan Station. He turns the enemy over +to you. + + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + A. J. ALEXANDER, + Assistant Adjutant-General. + + +And Hooker justly claims that it was an entire misinterpretation of his +instructions, which were to have Averell join Stoneman's column, so soon +as he had masked the latter's movement towards the Aquia and Richmond +Railroad. + +On May 3, Averell, who had done nothing but skirmish for a couple of +days with a force of about one-fifth his own, and had then retired to +Ely's Ford, and gone into camp, was relieved, and Pleasonton placed in +command of his division. + +The pack-mules and lead-horses of Stoneman's column were left with the +main army, till the expected junction should be made by its advance +south of the Rappahannock. Stoneman had with him but five or six days' +rations; but he relied upon Hooker's assurance that he would be up with +him before these rations were exhausted. Every officer and man, the +generals and their staffs setting the example, took with them only what +they could carry on their horses. Nor, despite the cold drenching rain, +which fell plentifully, were any camp-fires lighted the first few +nights. Stoneman seems to have been abundantly ambitious of doing his +work thoroughly, and issued stirring orders to his subordinates, calling +upon them for every exertion which they were capable of making. + +On reaching Raccoon Ford, over the Rapidan, Stoneman found it guarded by +the Confederate cavalry. He therefore sent Buford to a point six miles +below, where he was able to cross, and, marching up the south bank, +to uncover Raccoon Ford. The main body was then put over. + +Stoneman's column was in the saddle by two A.M. of the 31st. But it +proved to be too foggy to push on: he had as yet no guides, and he was +obliged to wait for daylight. + +He then hurried Gregg on to Louisa Court House, which place was reached +during the night of May 1, and details were speedily set to work tearing +up the railroads. Buford was sent by way of the North Anna to the same +point; and at ten A.M., May 2, the entire force was at Louisa. + +From here a squadron was despatched towards Gordonsville, to ascertain +the meaning of the movement of several trains of troops, which had +passed up from Richmond in that direction the evening previous. Parties +were also sent out to Tolersville and Frederickshall Stations, to +destroy whatever material could be found there. Still another destroyed +Carr's Bridge on the North Anna. + +The balance of the force was set to work to break up the Virginia +Central; and for a distance of eighteen miles the telegraph, stations, +tanks, and cars were burned, and the rails torn up, and bent and twisted +over bonfires. + +The command then marched for Yanceyville, on the South Anna, and, +arriving at Thompson's Cross-roads at ten P.M. of May 2, headquarters +were established at this point. + +Here Stoneman seems to have become entirely oblivious of his +instructions, and to have substituted for them ideas originating in his +own brain. He assembled his officers, and informed them that "we had +dropped like a shell in that region of country, and he intended to burst +it in every direction." + +Instead, therefore, of pressing with his main force for some point on +the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, and destroying it thoroughly, +as he was particularly instructed to do, that being the one great object +to be achieved, be contented himself with sending Kilpatrick with the +Second New-York Cavalry, and Davis with the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, +to operate, the former against the railroad-bridges over the +Chickahominy, and the latter at Ashland and Atlee; and also despatched +Wyndham, of the First New-Jersey Cavalry, to strike Columbia, and +destroy the canal-aqueduct over the Rivanna river, and if possible make +a dash at the railroad-bridge over the Appomattox; while two regiments +under Gregg were to follow down the South Anna to destroy its bridges, +followed by the Fifth United-States Cavalry to see that the destruction +was complete. + +These parties were directed to rally on Stoneman, who was thus left with +five hundred men of Buford's reserve, or else to push through to +Gloucester Point, or Yorktown, as circumstances should dictate. + +In pursuance of these orders, Gregg's column, which, on May 2, had +burned the depots at Orange Court House, on May 3, moved down the South +Anna, as far as the bridge where the Fredericksburg Railroad crosses the +stream, and attempted to destroy it; but finding it protected by some +infantry, and a couple of guns, he seems to have decided not to attack +this force, and fell back upon the reserve. On the 5th, he destroyed +the bridge at Yanceyville. + +Kilpatrick marched some distance by daylight on the 3d, kept himself +hidden through the day, marched again at nightfall, and reached Hungary +Station at daylight the 4th. Here he destroyed the depot, and several +miles of road, passed the Virginia Central at Meadow's Bridge, which he +likewise burned, with all cars and material he could find in the +vicinity, and camped at night in the rear of Hanover. + +On the 5th, he pushed into Gloucester Point, destroying on the way a +train of fifty-six wagons, and some twenty thousand bushels of corn in +depots. He captured thirty prisoners, but paroled them. + +Capt. Merritt with the Second United-States Cavalry, demolished a number +of bridges and fords on the South Anna, and reached Ashland Station; but +was unable to destroy the bridge at this place, which was guarded by an +infantry force with part of a battery. + +Col. Davis, on May 3, also reached Ashland, burned the trestle south of +the town, and tore up the telegraph-line. He captured and destroyed +some wagon-trains, containing about a hundred wagons, fired the depot +and some material at Hanover, and bivouacked seven miles from Richmond. +He was, however, precluded by his orders from trying to enter the +capital, though he seems to have had a good opportunity for so doing. + +On May 4, at Tunstall, on the York and Richmond Railroad, he met some +resistance from a force of Confederate infantry with a battery; but, +retracing his steps, he turned up in due season at Gloucester Point. + +Col. Wyndham moved on to Columbia, where he rendered useless a large +amount of stores, a number of canal-boats, and several bridges over the +James-River canal. For lack of blasting-materials he was unable to +destroy the aqueduct over the Rivanna river. It was solid enough to +have delayed him at least forty-eight hours. The bridge over the James +river to Elk Island he burned, and damaged the locks and gates of the +canal as far as possible. He returned to Thompson's Cross-roads the +same day with W. H. Fitz Lee at his heels. + +Capt. Harrison, with a part of Buford's reserves, had, on May 4, +somewhat of a skirmish with the enemy at Fleming's Cross-roads; but +without effect upon the movements of the command. And another squadron +crossed sabres with the enemy at Shannon's. + +Such prisoners as were captured by any of the parties, were paroled at +the time. A considerable number captured by Stoneman were sent to +Richmond in one party, with word that the Union cavalry was following +close upon them. + +To quote Stoneman's own reasons, the six days' rations with which he +left camp, having now been consumed, (though it would seem that there +had been ample opportunity to collect as much more as was necessary from +the stores destroyed); Hooker not having come up as expected; vague +rumors having reached him of the defeat of the Army of the Potomac; +having accomplished, as he deemed, all that he was sent to do; Averell +having been withdrawn, thus leaving Lee ready to attack him,--Stoneman +sent Buford with six hundred and fifty picked men to the vicinity of +Gordonsville, and a small party out the Bowling-Green road, and marched +his main body to Orange Court House. + +At noon of the 6th, he assembled his entire command at Orange Springs; +thence marched to Raccoon Ford, and crossed on the 7th. + +On the 8th, the command crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's, having to +swim about twenty yards. + +Leaving Buford to guard the river from the railroad to Falmouth, he then +returned to camp. + +During the latter part of the time occupied by these movements, the +roads had been in very bad order from the heavy rains of the 5th. + +Hotchkiss and Allen say, with reference to this raid: "This failure is +the more surprising from the fact that Gen. Lee had but two regiments of +cavalry, those under W. H. Fitz Lee, to oppose to the large force under +Stoneman, consisting of ten or eleven thousand men. The whole country +in rear of the Confederate Army, up to the very fortifications of +Richmond, was open to the invader. Nearly all the transportation of +that army was collected at Guineas depot, eighteen miles from +Chancellorsville, with little or no guard, and might have been destroyed +by one-fourth of Stoneman's force." + +And further:-- + +"Such was the condition of the railroads and the scarcity of supplies in +the country, that the Confederate commander could never accumulate more +than a few days' rations ahead at Fredericksburg. To have interrupted +his communications for any length of time, would have imperilled his +army, or forced him to retreat." + +They also claim that this column seized all the property that could be +of use, found in their line of march. "The citizens were in many cases +entirely stripped of the necessaries of life." + +Stoneman certainly misconceived his orders. These were plainly enough +to throw his main body in Lee's rear, so as substantially to cut his +communications by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. To +accomplish this, he was to mask his movement by a body of troops, +which should keep whatever Confederate cavalry there might be in the +vicinity of Orange Court House and Gordonsvile, busy, until his main +column was beyond their reach, and then should rejoin him; and to select +a rallying point on the Pamunkey, so as to be near the important scene +of operations. Every thing was to be subordinate to cutting the +Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. + +If Stoneman had properly digested his orders, and had pushed night and +day for any available point on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, +he might have reached it by Sunday. A thorough destruction of Lee's +line of supply and retreat, would no doubt have so decidedly affected +his strength, actual and moral, as to have seriously changed the vigor +of his operations against both Hooker and Sedgwick. + +Stoneman barely had time, from the lateness of his date of starting, +to accomplish great results before Hooker was substantially beaten; but +it would appear that he could have materially contributed to lessen the +disastrous nature of the defeat, if no more. + +His movements were characterized by great weakness. He did not seem to +understand, that safety as well as success depended upon moving with a +body large enough to accomplish results. Instead of this, he sent, +to perform the most important work, bodies so small as to be unable to +destroy bridges, when guarded by a few companies of infantry and a +couple of guns. + +And the damage done appears to have all been repaired by the time the +raiders got back to camp. + +Hooker's criticism in this instance is quite just: "On the 4th, the +cavalry column, under Gen. Stoneman, commenced its return. One party of +it, under Gen. Kilpatrick, crossed the Aquia and Richmond Railroad; and +the fact that on the 5th, the cars carried the rebel wounded and our +prisoners over the road to Richmond, will show to what extent the +enemy's communications had been interrupted. An examination of the +instructions Gen. Stoneman received, in connection with the official +report of his operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer +ever made a greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever +accomplished less in so doing. The effect of throwing his body of +cavalry in the rear of the enemy, and on his communications, at the time +it was in his power to have done it, can readily be estimated. But +instead, that important arm of the army became crippled to an extent +which seriously embarrassed me in my subsequent operations. Soon after, +Gen. Stoneman applied for and obtained a sick-leave; and I requested +that it might be indefinitely extended to him. It is charitable to +suppose that Gens. Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, +and determined to carry on operations in conformity with their own views +and inclinations." + + + + +XXXVI. + +HOOKER'S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN. + + +Nearly two years after this campaign, in his testimony before the +Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker thus speaks about the +general result of the movement:-- + +"I may say here, the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated with +the battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole +loss in the battle of Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen +thousand." + +"I said that Chancellorsville had been called a disaster. I lost under +those operations, one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, +and one ambulance." "In my opinion, there is nothing to regret in +regard to Chancellorsville, except to accomplish all I moved to +accomplish. The troops lost no honor, except one corps, and we lost no +more men than the enemy; but expectation was high, the army in splendid +condition, and great results were expected from it. It was at a time, +too, when the nation required a victory." "I would like to speak +somewhat further of this matter of Chancellorsville. It has been the +desire and aim of some of Gen. McClellan's admirers, and I do not know +but of others, to circulate erroneous impressions in regard to it. +When I returned from Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no +battle; in fact, I had more men than I could use; and I fought no +general battle, for the reason that I could not get my men in position +to do so; probably not more than three or three and a half corps, +on the right, were engaged in that fight." + +And he repeats his understanding of his manoeuvring as follows: "My +impression was, that Lee would have been compelled to move out on the +same road that Jackson had moved on, and pass over to my right. I +should add in my testimony that before leaving Falmouth, to make this +move, I had a million and a half of rations on board lighters, and had +gunboats in readiness to tow them up to points on the Pamunkey River, +in order to replenish my provisions, to enable me to reach Richmond +before the enemy could, in case I succeeded in throwing him off that +line of retreat. When I gave the order to Gen. Sedgwick, I expected +that Lee would be whipped by manoeuvre. I supposed that he would be +compelled to march off on the same line that Jackson had. He would have +been thrown on the Culpeper and Gordonsville road, placing me fifty or +sixty miles nearer Richmond than himself." + +Criticism upon such an eccentric summing-up of the results of the +campaign of Chancellorsville, is too unprofitable a task to reward the +attempt. But assuredly the commander of the gallant Army of the Potomac +stands alone in his measure of the importance of the movement, or of the +disastrous nature of the defeat. + + + + +XXXVII. + +SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE. + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 5, 1863. +To the Commanding Officer, + Confederate Forces, Chancellorsville, Va. + +I would most respectfully request the privilege of sending a burial- +party on the field of Chancellorsville, to bury the dead, and care for +the wounded officers and soldiers of my command. + + Very respectfully, etc., + JOSEPH HOOKER, + Major-General Commanding. + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, + May 6, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. J. HOOKER, + Commanding Army of the Potomac. + +General,--I have had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday, +requesting permission to send a burial-party to attend to your dead and +wounded on the battle-field of Chancellorsville. I regret that their +position is such, being immediately within our lines, that the +necessities of war forbid my compliance with your request, which, +under other circumstances, it would give me pleasure to grant. I will +accord to your dead and wounded the same attention which I bestow upon +my own; but, if there is any thing which your medical director here +requires which we cannot provide, he shall have my permission to receive +from you such medical supplies as you may think proper to furnish. +Consideration for your wounded prompts me to add, that, from what I +learn, their comfort would be greatly promoted by additional medical +attendance and medical supplies. + + I have the honor to be, + Respectfully, your obedient servant, + R. E. LEE, General. + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + May 6, 1863, 4.30 P.M. +HIS EXCELLENCY A. LINCOLN, + President of the United States. + +Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegrams of +eleven A.M. and 12.30. The army had previously re-crossed the river, +and was on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies +with it, I deemed this advisable. Above, I saw no way of giving the +enemy a general battle with the prospect of success which I desire. +Not to exceed three corps, all told, of my troops have been engaged. +For the whole to go in, there is a better place nearer at hand. Will +write you at length to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of the +cavalry have at length turned up. One portion did nothing. + + JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General. + + + + EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., + May 7, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. + +My dear Sir,--The recent movement of your army is ended without +effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important breakings of the +enemy's communications. What next? If possible I would be very glad of +another movement early enough to give us some benefit from the fact of +the enemy's communication being broken; but neither for this reason or +any other do I wish any thing done in desperation or rashness. An early +movement would also help to supersede the bad moral effect of the recent +one, which is said to be considerably injurious. Have you already in +your mind a plan wholly or partially formed? If you have, prosecute it +without interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, +so that I, incompetent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation +of some plan for the army. + + Yours, as ever, + A. LINCOLN. + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 7, 1863. + +His Excellency, President of the United States. + +I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of this date, and in +answer have to state that I do not deem it expedient to suspend +operations on this line, from the reverse we have experienced in +endeavoring to extricate the army from its present position. If in the +first effort we failed, it was not for want of strength or conduct of +the small number of troops actually engaged, but from a cause which +could not be foreseen, and could not be provided against. After its +occurrence the chances of success were so much lessened, that I felt +another plan might be adopted in place of that we were engaged in, +which would be more certain in its results. At all events, a failure +would not involve a disaster, while in the other case it was certain to +follow the absence of success. I may add that this consideration almost +wholly determined me in ordering the army to return to its old camp. +As to the best time for renewing our advance upon the enemy, I can only +decide after an opportunity has been afforded to learn the feeling of +the troops. They should not be discouraged or depressed, for it is no +fault of theirs (if I may except one corps) that our last efforts were +not crowned with glorious victory. I suppose details are not wanted of +me at this time. I have decided in my own mind the plan to be adopted +in our next effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It has +this to recommend it: it will be one in which the operations of all the +corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within my personal +supervision. + + Very respectfully, etc., + JOSEPH HOOKER, + Major-General Commanding. + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, + May 7, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER, + Commanding Army of the Potomac. + +General,--The reasons that prevented me from complying with your request +with reference to your wounded no longer existing, I have the honor to +inform you that you can extend to them such attentions as they may +require. All persons whom it may he necessary to send within my lines +for this purpose will remain until the wounded are finally disposed of. +The burial of your dead has already been provided for. + +I have directed that those of your wounded who desire it, shall be +paroled and transferred within your lines, should you be willing to +receive them; those in the vicinity of Chancellorsville at the +United-States Mine Ford, and those on the battlefield of Salem Church at +Banks's Ford or Fredericksburg. As your wounded generally occupy the +few houses in the vicinity of the late battle-field, the transportation +of this army cannot be employed in conveying them to the river until my +own wounded have been removed to a place of shelter. As soon as this +can be accomplished, I will cause such of your wounded as may desire to +be paroled, to be delivered at the points above indicated, upon being +advised of your willingness to receive them. In the mean time they +shall have such care as is given to my own. + +I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter of yesterday in case the +original may not have reached you. + + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + R. E. LEE, General. + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 7, 1863, 8 P.M. +GEN. R. E. LEE, + Commanding Confederate Forces at Fredericksburg, Va. + +I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two communications +of May 6 and 7 this moment. If agreeable to you, I would like to send +medical supplies and attendance to my wounded, and, at such times as the +state of the stream will permit, send ambulances for them via the fords +designated in your communications, viz., United-States and Banks's +Fords. I will, with your consent, send parties to those fords with +supplies at an early hour to-morrow. The swollen state of the +Rappahannock probably preventing the crossing of any vehicles with +supplies, I shall have to depend upon you for transportation for them. +I will receive the wounded at the points named as soon as it can be +done. I will send an officer to Chancellorsville, with your consent, +to arrange the details, which, judging from your letter, with the state +of the river, cannot now be determined by correspondence. Upon an +intimation from you as to any deficiency in your immediate necessities +of medical supplies of your own, by reason of their use for my wounded +or other causes, I shall with pleasure replace them. I would be obliged +for approximate information concerning the number of wounded, that a +sufficient amount of supplies may be forwarded. I would be under +obligations for an early reply. + + Very respectfully, etc., + JOSEPH HOOKER, + Major-General Commanding. +(Copy furnished medical director.) + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, + CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 9, 1863. +GEN. R. E. LEE, + Commanding Army of Northern Virginia. + +The relatives and friends of several of the officers of this army who +fell in the recent battles, have visited my headquarters with the view, +if possible, of proceeding to the battle-fields to recover the bodies of +those near to them. I therefore have the honor to ask whether any +person will be permitted to visit the battle-fields for the purpose +indicated, or whether any arrangement can be made for sending to the +lines of this army the bodies of such of our fallen officers as may have +friends here seeking for them. + + Very respectfully, etc., + JOSEPH HOOKER, + Major-General Commanding. + + + + HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, + May 10, 1863. +MAJOR-GEN. JOSEPH HOOKER, + Commanding United-States Forces on the Rappahannock. + +General,--In reply to your communication of the 9th inst., I have the +honor to state that it will give me pleasure to afford every facility to +relatives and friends of officers killed in the late battles, to recover +their bodies; but I have no means of identifying them, or of +ascertaining the fields on which they fell. If you will have me +informed, I will cause search to be made. + + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + R. E. LEE, General. + + + + +APPENDIX. + + +In February and March, 1886, there was delivered at the Lowell Institute, +in Boston, a series of lectures upon the late civil war, by the +following gentlemen:-- + + Feb. 16. Introduction. Gen. Charles Devens of Boston. + Feb. 19. Pope's Campaign. Col. Jed. Hotchkiss of Staunton, Va. + Feb. 23. Antietam. Gen. George H. Gordon of Boston. + Feb. 26. Chancellorsville. Col. Theodore A. Dodge, U. S. Army. + March 2. Stonewall Jackson. Col. W. Allan of McDonough, Md. + March 5. Gettysburg. Gen. Francis A. Walker of Boston. + March 9. The Northern Volunteer. Col. T. L. Livermore of Boston. + March 12. The Southern Volunteer. Major H. Kyd Douglas of Hagerstown, Md. + March 16. Chattanooga. Gen. William F. Smith of Wilmington, Del. + March 19. The Wilderness. John C. Ropes, Esq., of Boston. + March 23. Franklin and Nashville. Col. Henry Stone of Boston. + March 26. The Last Campaign. Col. Fred. C. Newhall of Philadelphia. + +These lecturers were well equipped for their task. Earnest study of +their respective subjects had been attested by numerous volumes +published by them relating to the war. The desire to have the truth +told was apparent in the presence of three Confederate officers among +the number; and the special feature of the course seemed to be, that not +only was the truth spoken in the most unvarnished manner, but that it +was listened to with marked approval by overflowing audiences. + +Perhaps the most invidious subject fell to my lot. What I said was +merely a summary of the foregoing pages. But one point in my lecture +aroused the ire of some of Gen. Hooker's partisans, and was made the +subject of attacks so bitter that virulence degenerated into puerility. +The occasion of this rodomontade was a meeting of Third-Corps veterans, +and its outcome was a series of resolutions aimed at the person who had +dared to reflect on Gen. Hooker's capacity, and to refer to the question +of Gen. Hooker's habitual use of stimulants. The public mention of my +name was as sedulously avoided as a reference to his satanic majesty is +wont to be in the society of the superstitious; but the exuberance of +the attack must have afforded unbounded satisfaction to its authors, +as it very apparently did to the audience. + +Following are the resolutions, which are of mild flavor compared to +their accompanying seasoning of speeches:-- + + + RESOLUTIONS. + +The veterans of the Third Army Corps assembled here to-day, soldiers who +served under Gen. Joseph Hooker in his division, corps, and army, +re-affirm their lifelong affection for their old commander, their +admiration for his brilliant achievements as one of the prominent +generals of our armies, and protest against the recent revival of unjust +assaults made on his conduct at Chancellorsville. Whether, after _one +of the most noted tactical victories of modern times_, having placed the +Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock River on the flank of Lee, +he might have gained a still farther advanced position; whether the +failure of the cavalry to fully accomplish what was expected of it; +whether the disaster to the Eleventh Corps and the delay in the advance +of the Sixth Corps,--are to be attributed to errors of judgment of +Gen. Hooker or of the subordinate commanders, are points which will be +discussed again and again with profit to the military student. But we, +who witnessed his successful generalship at Williamsburg, Glendale, +Malvern Hill, Second Bull Run, and Antietam, have no language at our +command strong enough to express our contempt for any one who, twenty +years after the war, affirms that on any occasion in battle, with the +lives of his men and the cause of his country in his keeping, Gen. Hooker +was incapacitated for performing his whole duty as an officer by either +the use of liquor or by the want of it. + +We protest against oft-repeated statements that "Fighting Joe Hooker," +while one of the bravest and ablest division commanders in the army, +was possibly equal to handling a corps, but proved a failure as an +independent commander. Assigned to the Army of the Potomac in January, +1863, after the disaster at Fredericksburg and the failure of oft- +repeated campaigns, our army demoralized by defeat, desertions, and +dissensions, Gen. Hooker re-organized his forces, stopped desertions, +brought back to their colors thousands of absentees, and in three months +revived confidence, re-established discipline, and enabled his army to +take the field unsurpassed in loyalty, courage, and efficiency, as was +shown at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. We say Chancellorsville +because, although not a victory for us, the campaign _inflicted on the +enemy losses at least equal to our own_; and we say also Gettysburg +because that victory was won by the army Hooker had re-organized, +and led with such matchless skill from Falmouth to the eve of the battle. + +Whatever ambition he may have had to command armies, it did not prevent +his cheerfully serving his country under junior officers, giving them +faithful support, and his record shows no instance of his removal from +command by his superiors. + +Here in his native State, amid the homes of so many of his old brigade, +the survivors of the Third Army Corps, all witnesses of his genius, +valor, and devotion to duty, indorse his record as a soldier, as a +gentleman, and as a patriot, and sincerely believe that history will +assign to Major-Gen. Joseph Hooker a place among the greatest commanders +of the late civil war. + + +The italics are mine. "One of the most noted tactical victories of +modern times," applied to Chancellorsville, is refreshing. Equally so +is the exultant claim that "we inflicted on the enemy losses at least +equal to our own." The infliction of loss on the enemy has always been +understood by military men to be an incident rather than the object of +war. + +The following reply in "The Boston Herald" of April 11, 1886, explains +itself:-- + + +TO THE EDITOR OF THE HERALD. + +In the call for the meeting of the Third Corps Gettysburg Re-union +Association, held at Music Hall on Fast Day, was the following clause:-- + +"Loyalty to the memory of our beloved commander, Major-Gen. Joseph +Hooker, makes it a duty, on this occasion, to protest against unjust and +uncalled-for criticisms on his military record as commander of the Army +of the Potomac." + +It having been intimated to me by some old brother officers of the Third +Corps, that my late Lowell lecture on Chancellorsville was the occasion +of this proposed protest, I wrote to the chairman of the committee which +called the meeting, asking for an opportunity to reply to this protest, +within such bounds as even-handedness and the purposes of the meeting +would allow. The committee answered that it could not see the propriety +of turning the occasion into a public debate, and referred me to the +press. I do not object to their decision, made, no doubt, upon what +appeared to them sufficient grounds; but as the occasion was turned into +a public debate--one-sided, to be sure--I ask you for space, to reply in +your valued columns. + +As an old Third-Corps man, I attended the meeting at Music Hall. +The treasurer did not object to selling me a ticket to the dinner. +I expected to hear some new facts about Hooker and Chancellorsville. +I expected to hear some new deductions from old facts. I do not +consider myself beyond making an occasional lapse even in a carefully +prepared piece of work, and am always open to correction. But, to my +surprise (with the exception of a conjecture that Lee's object in his +march into Pennsylvania was to wreck the anthracite-coal industry), +there was not one single fact or statement laid before the meeting, +or the company at dinner, which has not already been, in its minutest +details, canvassed and argued at a length covering hundreds of pages in +the volumes on Chancellorsville, by Hotchkiss and Allen, Swinton, Bates, +the Comte de Paris, Doubleday, and myself, not to speak of numberless +and valuable brochures by others. The bulk of the time devoted to +talking on this occasion was used in denunciation of the wretch--in +other words, myself--who alleged that Joseph Hooker was drunk at +Chancellorsville, or at any other time. This denunciation began with a +devout curse in the chaplain's prayer, culminated in a set of fierce +resolutions, and ended with the last after-dinner speech. + +One thing particularly struck me. There was no one, of all who spoke, +who began to say as many things in favor of Joseph Hooker as I for years +have done; and not in fleeting words, but printed chapters. There was +plenty of eulogy, in nine-tenths of which I joined with all my heart. +But it was of the soldiers'-talk order,--cheering and honest and loyal, +appealing to the sentiments rather than the intelligence. What I have +said of Hooker has been solid praise of his soldierly worth, shown to be +borne out by the facts. Barring, in all I say, the five fighting days +at Chancellorsville, I have yet to find the man who has publicly, +and in print, eulogized Hooker as I have done; and no one among the +veterans gathered together Fast Day applauded with more sincerity than I, +all the tributes to his memory. For though, as some one remarked, +it is true that I "fought mit Sigel," and decamped from Chancellorsville +with the Eleventh Corps; it is also true that I passed through the fiery +ordeal of the Seven Days, and fought my way across the railroad-cutting +at Manassas, side by side with Joseph Hooker, under the gallant +leadership of that other hero Philip Kearney. It was very evident that +but few of the speakers, as well as auditors, had themselves heard or +read what I actually said. The result of "coaching" for the occasion by +some wire-puller was painfully apparent. Let us see what was said. +I give the entire paragraph from my Lowell lecture:-- + +"It has been surmised that Hooker, during this campaign, was +incapacitated by a habit of which, at times, he had been the victim. +There is, rather, evidence that he was prostrated by too much +abstemiousness, when a reasonable use of stimulants might have kept his +nervous system at its normal tension. It was certainly not the use of +alcohol, during this time, which lay at the root of his indecision." + +If that is an accusation that Hooker was then drunk, if it does not +rather lean toward an exculpation from the charge of drunkenness, +then I can neither write nor read the English language. As is well +known, the question of Hooker's sudden and unaccountable loss of power, +during the fighting half of this campaign, coupled with the question of +drunkenness, has been bandied to and fro for years. The mention alone +of Chancellorsville has been enough, ever since that day, to provoke a +query on this very subject, among civilians and soldiers alike. In a +lecture on the subject, I deemed it judicious to lay this ghost as well +as might be. Had I believed that Hooker was intoxicated at +Chancellorsville, I should not have been deterred by the fear of +opposition from saying so. Hooker's over-anxious friends have now +turned into a public scandal what was generally understood as an +exoneration, by intentionally distorting what was said into an +implication that Hooker was so besotted as to be incapable of command. +What I have written of his marching the army to this field and to the +field of Gettysburg is a full answer to such unnecessary perversion. +Let these would-be friends of Hooker remember that this calumny is of +their own making, not mine. I am as sorry for it, as they ought to be. +If the contempt expressed in the resolutions they passed had been silent, +instead of boisterous, Hooker's memory would have suffered far less +damage. + +Gens. Sickles and Butterfield are doubtless good witnesses, though they +sedulously refrained from any testimony on the subject, contenting +themselves with declamation. But they are not the only good witnesses. +After the loss of a leg at Gettysburg, I was ordered to duty in the War +Department, where I served in charge of one or other bureau for seven +years. I have heard this Hooker question discussed in all its bearings, +in the office of the Secretary of War or Adjutant-General, by nearly +every leading officer of the army, hundreds of whom had known Hooker +from West Point up. I have had abundant opportunity of forming an +opinion, and I have expressed it. Let him who garbles its meaning, +bear the blame. + +This action by many veterans of the Third Corps--even though procured by +design from their thoughtless and open soldier's nature--is, however, +much more sweeping and important. To the world at large it is a general +condemnation of every thing which can be said in criticism of Hooker. +It will reach far and wide, and in this light I desire to say what I do. +The resolutions passed at the meeting explicitly protest against the +statement that Hooker proved a failure as an independent commander. +This needs notice at greater length than the question of sobriety or +drunkenness. Few have studied the details of the campaign of +Chancellorsville as carefully as I; but one other author has spread the +facts so fully before the reading public. No part of my recent +criticism before the Lowell Institute was new. It was embodied at much +greater length four years ago, in my "History of Chancellorsville;" +the reception of which volume by press, public, and soldiers, has been +its own best excuse. Gen. Hooker, though making no report, has put on +record his explanation of this campaign. Before the Committee on the +Conduct of the War, he stated his views as follows: "I may say here, +the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated with the battle of +Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole loss in the +battle of Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen thousand. . . . +In my opinion, there is nothing to regret in regard to Chancellorsville, +except to accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The troops lost no +honor, except one corps, and we lost no more men than the enemy; but +expectation was high, the army in splendid condition, and greater +results were expected from it. When I returned from Chancellorsville, +I felt that I had fought no battle; in fact, I had more men than I could +use, and I fought no general battle, for the reason that I could not get +my men in position to do so." + +To speak thus of a passage of arms lasting a week and costing seventeen +thousand men is, to say the least, abnormal. + +In trying to shift the onus of failure from his own shoulders he said: +"Some of our corps commanders, and also officers of other rank, appear +to be unwilling to go into a fight. . . . So far as my experience +extends, there are in all armies officers more valiant after the fight +than while it is pending, and when a truthful history of the Rebellion +shall be written, it will be found that the Army of the Potomac is not +an exception." + +This slur is cast upon men like Reynolds, Meade, Couch, Sedgwick, Slocum, +Howard, Hancock, Humphreys, Sykes, Warren, Birney, Whipple, Wright, +Griffin, and many others equally gallant. To call it ungenerous, +is a mild phrase. It certainly does open the door to unsparing +criticism. Hooker also concisely stated his military rule of action: +"Throughout the Rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had as +large a force as the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of an +encounter." And in his initial orders to Stoneman, in opening the +campaign, came the true ring of the always gallant corps commander, +"Let your watchword be 'Fight!' and let all your orders be, 'Fight, +fight, fight!'" + +I might here say that the only attempt, on Fast Day, to exculpate Hooker +for the disaster of Chancellorsville was not of an order which can be +answered. When one speaker asks, "If Gen. Hooker tells us that it was +wise to withdraw across the river, is not that enough for you and me, +my comrades?" I can only say that history is not so easily satisfied. +To another speaker, who states that when Hooker had planted himself in +Lee's flank by crossing the river, Lee ought, by all the rules of war, +to have retreated, but when he didn't he upset all Hooker's +calculations; that when Jackson made his "extra hazardous" march around +Hooker's flank, he ought, by all rules of war, to have been destroyed, +but when he was not he upset all Hooker's calculations, and that +therefore Hooker was forced to retreat,--it is quite beyond my ability +to reply. When Gen. Sickles throws the blame upon Howard for the defeat +of the Eleventh Corps, by reading the 9.30 A.M. order, without saying +one word about Hooker's actions, change of plans, and despatches from +that hour till the attack at 6 P.M., he makes any thinking man question +seriously the sincerity of what he calls history. When Gen. Butterfield +indulges in innuendoes against Gen. Meade, whose chief of staff he was, +and insults his memory in the effort to exculpate the Third Corps from a +charge no one has ever made, or thought of making, against it, the +fair-minded can only wonder why he goes out of his way to call any one +to task for criticising Hooker. Not one word was spoken on Fast Day +which does not find its full and entire answer in the already published +works on Chancellorsville. It was all a mere re-hash, and poorly cooked +at that. To rely on the four reasons given by the Committee on the +Conduct of the War as a purgation of Hooker from responsibility for our +defeat at Chancellorsville, simply deserves no notice. It is all of a +piece with the discussion of the Third-Corps fight at Gettysburg on July +2. No one ever doubted that the Third Corps fought, as they always did, +like heroes that day. What has been alleged is merely that Sickles did +not occupy and protect Little Round Top, as he would have done if he had +had the military coup d'oeil. + +Now, I desire to compare with Hooker's recorded words, and the +utterances of Fast Day, the actual performance, and see what "loyalty to +Hooker," as voted in Music Hall, means. Chancellorsville bristles with +points of criticism, and there are some few points of possible +disagreement. Of the latter the principal ones upon which Hooker's +formal apologists rely, are the destruction of the Eleventh Corps +through Howard's alleged carelessness, and the failure of Sedgwick to +perform the herculean task assigned to him in coming to Hooker's +support. Allowing, for the moment, that Howard and Sedgwick were +entirely at fault, and eliminating these two questions entirely from the +issue, let us see what Hooker himself did, bearing in mind that he has +officially acknowledged that he knew, substantially, the number of Lee's +army, and bearing also in mind that the following are facts which can be +disputed only by denying the truth and accuracy of all the reports, +Federal and Confederate, taken as a body; and these happen to dovetail +into each other in one so consistent whole, that they leave to the +careful student none but entirely insignificant items open to doubt. + +From Saturday at 8 A.M. till Sunday noon, some twenty-eight hours, +Hooker with seventy-five thousand, and, after the arrival of the First +Corps, nearly ninety thousand men, lay between the separated wings of +Lee's army of twenty-four thousand and seventeen thousand men +respectively, being all the while cognizant of the facts. Had ever a +general a better chance to whip his enemy in detail? And yet we were +badly beaten in this fight. Now, if loyalty to Hooker requires us to +believe that his conduct of this campaign was even respectable, it +follows that the Army of the Potomac, respectably led, could be defeated +by the Army of Northern Virginia, two to one. Will the soldiers of the +ever-faithful army accept this as an explanation of our defeat? + +Again: from Sunday noon till Monday at 9 A.M., twenty-one hours, Hooker, +with over eighty thousand men, was held in the White House lines by a +force of twenty-seven thousand. If loyalty to Hooker requires us to +believe that this was even respectable generalship, it follows that the +Army of the Potomac, well led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern +Virginia, three to one. Shall we accept this as an explanation of our +defeat? + +Again: from Monday at 9 A.M. till Tuesday at 4 P.M., thirty-one hours, +against the advice of all his corps commanders except Sickles and Couch +(the latter agreeing to retreat only because he felt that the army would +be defeated under Hooker whatever they might do), Hooker, with eighty +thousand men, was held in the White House lines by a force of nineteen +thousand, while the rest turned upon and demolished Sedgwick. If +loyalty to Hooker requires us to believe that this was even respectable +generalship, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, well led, could be +defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, four to one. Shall we accept +this as an explanation of our defeat? + +If there is in the world's military history a parallel to this +extraordinary generalship, for which any one who has even pretended to +study the art of war is able to find an excuse, I have failed to find +such an instance in the course of many years' reading, and shall be +happy to have it pointed out to me. Hooker's wound cannot be alleged in +extenuation. If he was disabled, his duty was to turn the command over +to Couch, the next in rank. If he did not do this, he was responsible +for what followed. And he retained the command himself, only using +Couch as his mouthpiece. + +I have always maintained, that, man for man, the Army of the Potomac was +at any time the equal of the Army of Northern Virginia, and that, +man for man, the old Third Corps has proved itself good for Jackson's in +its palmiest days. When, therefore, the Army of the Potomac was, +as here, defeated or bottled up by one-half, one-third, or one-quarter +its force of the enemy, my loyalty to that army demands that I seek a +reason other than Hooker's alleged lack of heart of his subordinate +officers. And this reason is only to be found in Hooker's inability to +handle so many men. All the resolutions in the world, passed under a +furore of misstatement and misconception, even by such a noble body of +men as Third-Corps veterans, will not re-habilitate Joseph Hooker's +military character during these five days, nor make him other than a +morally and intellectually impotent man from May 1 to May 5, 1863. +Loyalty to Hooker, so-called, is disloyalty to the grand old army, +disloyalty to the seventeen thousand men who fell, disloyalty to every +comrade who fought at Chancellorsville. I begrudge no man the desire to +blanket facts and smother truth in order to turn a galling defeat into a +respectable campaign; I begrudge no man his acceptance of Hooker's +theory that Chancellorsville was not a disaster; I begrudge no one his +faith in Hooker as a successful battle-field commander of the Army of +the Potomac. But let it be well understood that this faith of necessity +implies the fact that the Army of the Potomac was unable or unwilling to +fight one-quarter its number of Lee's troops. I prefer my faith in the +stanch, patient army, in its noble rank and file, in its gallant +officers, from company to corps; and I refuse to accept Hooker's insult +to his subordinates as any explanation for allowing the Army of the +Potomac to "be here defeated without ever being fought." + +The Army of the Potomac was better than its commanders from first to +last. It was, beyond speaking, superior to its commander during the +fighting days at Chancellorsville. As a corps commander, Joseph Hooker +will always be a type and household word. In logistics, even as +commander of the Army of the Potomac, he deserves high praise. But when +it comes to fighting the army at Chancellorsville, let whoso will keep +his loyalty to Hooker, without protest from me. I claim for myself and +the bulk of my comrades the right, equally without protest, sneers, +or resolutions, to express my loyalty to the rank and file, my loyalty +to the officers, and my loyalty to the army as a whole. And I claim, +moreover, the right, without protest, sneers, or resolutions, to show +that on this field it was the general commanding, and not the army, +whose lapses caused defeat. Not that I object to these Fast-Day +resolutions. I believe that I can still struggle onward in life, +even under the contempt of their authors. But partisanship in matters +of history is a boomerang which always flies back to whack its thrower. +And Fast Day's performance was baldly partisan. + +I am satisfied to abide the verdict of all soldiers, of all citizens, +who ever studied the facts of this campaign. What ever the action of +any meeting of old soldiers may be under partial knowledge of facts, +under the influence of heated or sectional discussion, or under the +whipping-in of a member of Hooker's staff, I do not believe that with +the issue squarely put before them, and the facts plainly stated, +any but a very inconsiderable fraction, and that not the most +intelligent one, of the men of the Army of the Potomac, will give their +suffrage to what has been suddenly discovered to be loyalty due to +Gen. Joseph Hooker, as against loyalty to the Army of the Potomac. + +The recent course of lectures at the Lowell Institute was intended to be +a purely military one. There was no intention of bringing politics or +sectional pride into the discussion, and it was thought that the +lectures could to-day be delivered without rousing a breath of ancient +animosity. If there was any campaign during our civil war which was +especially, in a military sense, a glorious one for the rebels, and an +ignominious one for us, it was Chancellorsville. It is indeed a pity +that the skill of the one side and the errors of the other cannot be +once again pointed out, that the true and only possible explanation of +Hooker's one hundred and thirty thousand men being defeated by Lee's +sixty thousand cannot be once again stated, without eliciting from a +body of veterans of the old Third Corps a set of condemnatory +resolutions. There has been some very heated criticism of the recent +lectures, and not a little fault-finding with the lecturers. I presume +that none of the gentlemen who participated in the course would feel +like denying the inference, so often suggested, that the censors might +have done much better than they were able to do. Such censors generally +can. These dozen lecturers have all been earnest students of our civil +war, as is abundantly testified by the twenty odd volumes on the subject +published by them since the reports of operations became available; and +they keenly feel that modesty which is always bred of study. Such as +they had, they were glad to give the public; nor do they in any wise +shrink from generous disagreement or courteous criticism. I submit, +however, that some of the carping which has been indulged in is scarcely +apt to lead to the correction of errors, or the elucidation of truth. +It is passing strange, that, at this late day, one may not criticise the +military operations without arousing the evil spirit of the war. +Can we not aim at truth, rather than self-gratulation, which will live +no longer than we do? Criticism has always been indulged in, always +will be. If a Frederick may be dissected by a Lloyd, if a Napoleon may +be sat on in judgment by a Lanfrey, may not the merest tyro in the art +of war he pardoned for reviewing Hooker? The gallant soldier who helped +make history rarely writes history. The same spirit which sent him to +the front in 1861 generally keeps him busy to-day with the material +interests of the country. Despite the certainly novel fling of Fast Day +at one who went into service as a mere boy, it remains a fact that rank, +without the devoted study of years and a single eye to truth, will not +enable any one to write history. It was proven beyond a peradventure on +Fast Day, that the command of a corps, let alone a division, will not of +itself breed a historian. Partisanship never will. + +Truth will get written some day. I myself prefer to write as an +American, forgetting North and South, and to pass down to those who will +write better than any of us, as one who tried to speak the truth, +whomsoever it struck. It is not I who criticise, who condemn Joseph +Hooker: it is the maxims of every master, of every authority on the art +of war. Not one of Hooker's apologists can turn to the history of a +master's achievements, or to a volume of any accepted authority, without +finding his pet commander condemned, in every action, and on every page, +for the faults of the fighting days at Chancellorsville. + +It was assumed on Fast Day that one should criticise only what he saw. +I have never understood that Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman +Empire" is any the less good because he did not live in the first few +centuries of the Christian era, or that Jomini could write any less well +of Frederick than of Napoleon. Service certainly helps a man in his +researches or work, but it only helps. The best critic may be one who +never served. I think I was the first officer to whom the Secretary of +War permitted free use of the rebel archives for study. I have had good +opportunities. How I have used them, I leave to others to say. It is +easy to capture a meeting of honest-hearted veterans by such lamentable +prestidigitation as was exhibited on Fast Day, and to pass any +resolutions desired, by appealing to their enthusiasm. I prefer to be +judged by the sober after-thought of men who are neither partisans, +nor ready to warp facts or make partial statements to sustain their +theories. + + THEODORE A. DODGE. +BOSTON, April 10, 1886. + + + + + + +Transcriber's Appendix: Transcription notes: + + +The first edition of this book was published in 1881. The author's +appendix was added in the second edition, in 1886, which is the source +for this etext. + + +The following modifications were applied while transcribing the +printed book to e-text: + + chapter 4 + - table on p 19, fixed typo ("McGown", should be "McGowan") + + chapter 12 + - p 71, para 1, fixed typo ("inititate") + + chapter 18 + - p 111, para 1, fixed typo ("Pleasanton") + + chapter 27 + - p 180, para 1, fixed "the the" + + Limitations imposed by converting to plain ASCII: + - The words "manoeuvre", "manoeuvres" and "manoeuvring" are printed in + the book using the "oe" ligature. The term "coup d'oeil" was also + printed with the "oe" ligature, "minutiae" was printed using the "ae" + ligature, and several other French terms (such as "elan" and "echelon") + were printed with accented vowels. However, this does not seem enough + to merit an 8-bit text. + - Italics were printed for various non-English words and phrases, and + occasionally for emphasis. For the most part, these were simply + converted to plain text. However, I did use underscores to denote + two italicized phrases in the author's appendix, where the use of + italics was more significant. + + +I did not modify: + - The phrases "on each side the road", "on both sides the road" + - The first paragraph of chapter 22 contains the phrase + "angle of refusal or Archer and McGowan" + I believe "or" is incorrect and should be probably "for" or "of", but + I don't know which. "or" is printed in both the 1881 and 1886 editions, + so I left it as is. + + + + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE *** + +This file should be named cchan10.txt or cchan10.zip +Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks get a new NUMBER, cchan11.txt +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, cchan10a.txt + +Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US +unless a copyright notice is included. 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