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The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant
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Project Gutenberg's The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant
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Title: The Critique of Practical Reason
Author: Immanuel Kant
Release Date: May, 2004 [EBook #5683]
[This file was first posted on August 7, 2002]
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</pre>
<div style="height: 8em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h1>
THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
</h1>
<h2>
By Immanuel Kant
</h2>
<h3>
1788
</h3>
<h4>
Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
</h4>
<hr />
<p>
<b>CONTENTS</b>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_PREF"> PREFACE. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0003"> Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason.
</a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0004"> <b>FIRST PART — ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL
REASON.</b> </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0005"> <b>BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical
Reason.</b> </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2HCH0001"> CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical
Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0007"> I. DEFINITION. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0008"> REMARK. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0009"> II. THEOREM I. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0010"> III. THEOREM II. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0011"> REMARK I. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0012"> REMARK II. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0013"> IV. THEOREM II. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0014"> REMARK. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0015"> V. PROBLEM I. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0016"> REMARK. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0017"> VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL
REASON. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0018"> REMARK. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0019"> COROLLARY. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0020"> REMARK. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0021"> VIII. THEOREM IV. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0022"> REMARK. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0023"> REMARK II. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0024"> Practical Material Principles of Determination
taken as the Foundation of Morality, are: </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0025"> </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0026"> I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental
Principles of Pure </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0027"> II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its
Practical use has to an Extension which is not possible to it in its
Speculative Use. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2HCH0002"> CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure
Practical Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0029"> Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to
the Notions of Good </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0030"> Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement.
</a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2HCH0003"> CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical
Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0032"> Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure
Practical Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0033"> <b>BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.</b>
</a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2HCH0004"> CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical
Reason Generally. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2HCH0005"> CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in
defining the Conception of the "Summum Bonum". </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0036"> I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0037"> II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of
Practical Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0038"> III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in
its Union with the Speculative Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0039"> IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate
of Pure Practical Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0040"> V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure
Practical Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0041"> VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason
Generally. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0042"> VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension
of Pure Reason in a Practical point of view, without its Knowledge as
Speculative being enlarged at the same time? </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0043"> VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure
Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0044"> IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive
Faculties to his Practical Destination. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0045"> <b>SECOND PART. -- METHODOLOGY OF PURE PRACTICAL
REASON.</b> </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_4_0046"> Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. </a>
</p>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#link2H_CONC"> CONCLUSION. </a>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_PREF" id="link2H_PREF"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
PREFACE.
</h2>
<p>
This work is called the Critique of Practical Reason, not of the pure
practical reason, although its parallelism with the speculative critique
would seem to require the latter term. The reason of this appears
sufficiently from the treatise itself. Its business is to show that there
is pure practical reason, and for this purpose it criticizes the entire
practical faculty of reason. If it succeeds in this, it has no need to
criticize the pure faculty itself in order to see whether reason in making
such a claim does not presumptuously overstep itself (as is the case with
the speculative reason). For if, as pure reason, it is actually practical,
it proves its own reality and that of its concepts by fact, and all
disputation against the possibility of its being real is futile.
</p>
<p>
With this faculty, transcendental freedom is also established; freedom,
namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason required it in
its use of the concept of causality in order to escape the antinomy into
which it inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries
to think the unconditioned. Speculative reason could only exhibit this
concept (of freedom) problematically as not impossible to thought, without
assuring it any objective reality, and merely lest the supposed
impossibility of what it must at least allow to be thinkable should
endanger its very being and plunge it into an abyss of scepticism.
</p>
<p>
Inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an
apodeictic law of practical reason, it is the keystone of the whole system
of pure reason, even the speculative, and all other concepts (those of God
and immortality) which, as being mere ideas, remain in it unsupported, now
attach themselves to this concept, and by it obtain consistence and
objective reality; that is to say, their possibility is proved by the fact
that freedom actually exists, for this idea is revealed by the moral law.
</p>
<p>
Freedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the speculative
reason of which we know the possibility a priori (without, however,
understanding it), because it is the condition of the moral law which we
know. * The ideas of God and immortality, however, are not conditions of
the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary object of a will
determined by this law; that is to say, conditions of the practical use of
our pure reason. Hence, with respect to these ideas, we cannot affirm that
we know and understand, I will not say the actuality, but even the
possibility of them. However they are the conditions of the application of
the morally determined will to its object, which is given to it a priori,
viz., the summum bonum. Consequently in this practical point of view their
possibility must be assumed, although we cannot theoretically know and
understand it. To justify this assumption it is sufficient, in a practical
point of view, that they contain no intrinsic impossibility
(contradiction). Here we have what, as far as speculative reason is
concerned, is a merely subjective principle of assent, which, however, is
objectively valid for a reason equally pure but practical, and this
principle, by means of the concept of freedom, assures objective reality
and authority to the ideas of God and immortality. Nay, there is a
subjective necessity (a need of pure reason) to assume them. Nevertheless
the theoretical knowledge of reason is not hereby enlarged, but only the
possibility is given, which heretofore was merely a problem and now
becomes assertion, and thus the practical use of reason is connected with
the elements of theoretical reason. And this need is not a merely
hypothetical one for the arbitrary purposes of speculation, that we must
assume something if we wish in speculation to carry reason to its utmost
limits, but it is a need which has the force of law to assume something
without which that cannot be which we must inevitably set before us as the
aim of our action.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph</span>
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* Lest any one should imagine that he finds an inconsistency
here when I call freedom the condition of the moral law, and
hereafter maintain in the treatise itself that the moral law
is the condition under which we can first become conscious
of freedom, I will merely remark that freedom is the ratio
essendi of the moral law, while the moral law is the ratio
cognoscendi of freedom. For had not the moral law been
previously distinctly thought in our reason, we should never
consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as
freedom, although it be not contradictory. But were there no
freedom it would be impossible to trace the moral law in
ourselves at all.
</pre>
<p>
It would certainly be more satisfactory to our speculative reason if it
could solve these problems for itself without this circuit and preserve
the solution for practical use as a thing to be referred to, but in fact
our faculty of speculation is not so well provided. Those who boast of
such high knowledge ought not to keep it back, but to exhibit it publicly
that it may be tested and appreciated. They want to prove: very good, let
them prove; and the critical philosophy lays its arms at their feet as the
victors. Quid statis? Nolint. Atqui licet esse beatis. As they then do not
in fact choose to do so, probably because they cannot, we must take up
these arms again in order to seek in the mortal use of reason, and to base
on this, the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility of
which speculation cannot adequately prove.
</p>
<p>
Here first is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, viz.: how
we deny objective reality to the supersensible use of the categories in
speculation and yet admit this reality with respect to the objects of pure
practical reason. This must at first seem inconsistent as long as this
practical use is only nominally known. But when, by a thorough analysis of
it, one becomes aware that the reality spoken of does not imply any
theoretical determination of the categories and extension of our knowledge
to the supersensible; but that what is meant is that in this respect an
object belongs to them, because either they are contained in the necessary
determination of the will a priori, or are inseparably connected with its
object; then this inconsistency disappears, because the use we make of
these concepts is different from what speculative reason requires. On the
other hand, there now appears an unexpected and very satisfactory proof of
the consistency of the speculative critical philosophy. For whereas it
insisted that the objects of experience as such, including our own
subject, have only the value of phenomena, while at the same time things
in themselves must be supposed as their basis, so that not everything
supersensible was to be regarded as a fiction and its concept as empty; so
now practical reason itself, without any concert with the speculative,
assures reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality,
viz., freedom, although (as becomes a practical concept) only for
practical use; and this establishes on the evidence of a fact that which
in the former case could only be conceived. By this the strange but
certain doctrine of the speculative critical philosophy, that the thinking
subject is to itself in internal intuition only a phenomenon, obtains in
the critical examination of the practical reason its full confirmation,
and that so thoroughly that we should be compelled to adopt this doctrine,
even if the former had never proved it at all. *
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 10</span>
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* The union of causality as freedom with causality as
rational mechanism, the former established by the moral law,
the latter by the law of nature in the same subject, namely,
man, is impossible, unless we conceive him with reference to
the former as a being in himself, and with reference to the
latter as a phenomenon- the former in pure consciousness,
the latter in empirical consciousness. Otherwise reason
inevitably contradicts itself.
</pre>
<p>
By this also I can understand why the most considerable objections which I
have as yet met with against the Critique turn about these two points,
namely, on the one side, the objective reality of the categories as
applied to noumena, which is in the theoretical department of knowledge
denied, in the practical affirmed; and on the other side, the paradoxical
demand to regard oneself qua subject of freedom as a noumenon, and at the
same time from the point of view of physical nature as a phenomenon in
one's own empirical consciousness; for as long as one has formed no
definite notions of morality and freedom, one could not conjecture on the
one side what was intended to be the noumenon, the basis of the alleged
phenomenon, and on the other side it seemed doubtful whether it was at all
possible to form any notion of it, seeing that we had previously assigned
all the notions of the pure understanding in its theoretical use
exclusively to phenomena. Nothing but a detailed criticism of the
practical reason can remove all this misapprehension and set in a clear
light the consistency which constitutes its greatest merit.
</p>
<p>
So much by way of justification of the proceeding by which, in this work,
the notions and principles of pure speculative reason which have already
undergone their special critical examination are, now and then, again
subjected to examination. This would not in other cases be in accordance
with the systematic process by which a science is established, since
matters which have been decided ought only to be cited and not again
discussed. In this case, however, it was not only allowable but necessary,
because reason is here considered in transition to a different use of
these concepts from what it had made of them before. Such a transition
necessitates a comparison of the old and the new usage, in order to
distinguish well the new path from the old one and, at the same time, to
allow their connection to be observed. Accordingly considerations of this
kind, including those which are once more directed to the concept of
freedom in the practical use of the pure reason, must not be regarded as
an interpolation serving only to fill up the gaps in the critical system
of speculative reason (for this is for its own purpose complete), or like
the props and buttresses which in a hastily constructed building are often
added afterwards; but as true members which make the connexion of the
system plain, and show us concepts, here presented as real, which there
could only be presented problematically. This remark applies especially to
the concept of freedom, respecting which one cannot but observe with
surprise that so many boast of being able to understand it quite well and
to explain its possibility, while they regard it only psychologically,
whereas if they had studied it in a transcendental point of view, they
must have recognized that it is not only indispensable as a problematical
concept, in the complete use of speculative reason, but also quite
incomprehensible; and if they afterwards came to consider its practical
use, they must needs have come to the very mode of determining the
principles of this, to which they are now so loth to assent. The concept
of freedom is the stone of stumbling for all empiricists, but at the same
time the key to the loftiest practical principles for critical moralists,
who perceive by its means that they must necessarily proceed by a rational
method. For this reason I beg the reader not to pass lightly over what is
said of this concept at the end of the Analytic.
</p>
<p>
I must leave it to those who are acquainted with works of this kind to
judge whether such a system as that of the practical reason, which is here
developed from the critical examination of it, has cost much or little
trouble, especially in seeking not to miss the true point of view from
which the whole can be rightly sketched. It presupposes, indeed, the
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, but only in so far as
this gives a preliminary acquaintance with the principle of duty, and
assigns and justifies a definite formula thereof; in other respects it is
independent. * It results from the nature of this practical faculty itself
that the complete classification of all practical sciences cannot be
added, as in the critique of the speculative reason. For it is not
possible to define duties specially, as human duties, with a view to their
classification, until the subject of this definition (viz., man) is known
according to his actual nature, at least so far as is necessary with
respect to duty; this, however, does not belong to a critical examination
of the practical reason, the business of which is only to assign in a
complete manner the principles of its possibility, extent, and limits,
without special reference to human nature. The classification then belongs
to the system of science, not to the system of criticism.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 15</span>
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work
has hit the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he
says that no new principle of morality is set forth in it,
but only a new formula. But who would think of introducing a
new principle of all morality and making himself as it were
the first discoverer of it, just as if all the world before
him were ignorant what duty was or had been in thorough-
going error? But whoever knows of what importance to a
mathematician a formula is, which defines accurately what is
to be done to work a problem, will not think that a formula
is insignificant and useless which does the same for all
duty in general.
</pre>
<p>
In the second part of the Analytic I have given, as I trust, a sufficient
answer to the objection of a truth-loving and acute critic * of the
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals- a critic always worthy
of respect- the objection, namely, that the notion of good was not
established before the moral principle, as he thinks it ought to have
been. ** I have also had regard to many of the objections which have
reached me from men who show that they have at heart the discovery of the
truth, and I shall continue to do so (for those who have only their old
system before their eyes, and who have already settled what is to be
approved or disapproved, do not desire any explanation which might stand
in the way of their own private opinion.)
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 20</span>
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* [See Kant's "Das mag in der Theoric ricktig seyn," etc.
Werke, vol. vii, p. 182.]
** It might also have been objected to me that I have not
first defined the notion of the faculty of desire, or of the
feeling of Pleasure, although this reproach would be unfair,
because this definition might reasonably be presupposed as
given in psychology. However, the definition there given
might be such as to found the determination of the faculty
of desire on the feeling of pleasure (as is commonly done),
and thus the supreme principle of practical philosophy would
be necessarily made empirical, which, however, remains to be
proved and in this critique is altogether refuted. It will,
therefore, give this definition here in such a manner as it
ought to be given, in order to leave this contested point
open at the beginning, as it should be. LIFE is the faculty
a being has of acting according to laws of the faculty of
desire. The faculty of DESIRE is the being's faculty of
becoming by means of its ideas the cause of the actual
existence of the objects of these ideas. PLEASURE is the
idea of the agreement of the object, or the action with the
subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of
causality of an idea in respect of the actuality of its
object (or with the determination of the forces of the
subject to action which produces it). I have no further need
for the purposes of this critique of notions borrowed from
psychology; the critique itself supplies the rest. It is
easily seen that the question whether the faculty of desire
is always based on pleasure, or whether under certain
conditions pleasure only follows the determination of
desire, is by this definition left undecided, for it is
composed only of terms belonging to the pure understanding,
i.e., of categories which contain nothing empirical. Such
precaution is very desirable in all philosophy and yet is
often neglected; namely, not to prejudge questions by
adventuring definitions before the notion has been
completely analysed, which is often very late. It may be
observed through the whole course of the critical philosophy
(of the theoretical as well as the practical reason) that
frequent opportunity offers of supplying defects in the old
dogmatic method of philosophy, and of correcting errors
which are not observed until we make such rational use of
these notions viewing them as a whole.
</pre>
<p>
When we have to study a particular faculty of the human mind in its
sources, its content, and its limits; then from the nature of human
knowledge we must begin with its parts, with an accurate and complete
exposition of them; complete, namely, so far as is possible in the present
state of our knowledge of its elements. But there is another thing to be
attended to which is of a more philosophical and architectonic character,
namely, to grasp correctly the idea of the whole, and from thence to get a
view of all those parts as mutually related by the aid of pure reason, and
by means of their derivation from the concept of the whole. This is only
possible through the most intimate acquaintance with the system; and those
who find the first inquiry too troublesome, and do not think it worth
their while to attain such an acquaintance, cannot reach the second stage,
namely, the general view, which is a synthetical return to that which had
previously been given analytically. It is no wonder then if they find
inconsistencies everywhere, although the gaps which these indicate are not
in the system itself, but in their own incoherent train of thought.
</p>
<p>
I have no fear, as regards this treatise, of the reproach that I wish to
introduce a new language, since the sort of knowledge here in question has
itself somewhat of an everyday character. Nor even in the case of the
former critique could this reproach occur to anyone who had thought it
through and not merely turned over the leaves. To invent new words where
the language has no lack of expressions for given notions is a childish
effort to distinguish oneself from the crowd, if not by new and true
thoughts, yet by new patches on the old garment. If, therefore, the
readers of that work know any more familiar expressions which are as
suitable to the thought as those seem to me to be, or if they think they
can show the futility of these thoughts themselves and hence that of the
expression, they would, in the first case, very much oblige me, for I only
desire to be understood: and, in the second case, they would deserve well
of philosophy. But, as long as these thoughts stand, I very much doubt
that suitable and yet more common expressions for them can be found. *
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 25</span>
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* I am more afraid in the present treatise of occasional
misconception in respect of some expressions which I have
chosen with the greatest care in order that the notion to
which they point may not be missed. Thus, in the table of
categories of the Practical reason under the title of
Modality, the Permitted, and forbidden (in a practical
objective point of view, possible and impossible) have
almost the same meaning in common language as the next
category, duty and contrary to duty. Here, however, the
former means what coincides with, or contradicts, a merely
possible practical precept (for example, the solution of all
problems of geometry and mechanics); the latter, what is
similarly related to a law actually present in the reason;
and this distinction is not quite foreign even to common
language, although somewhat unusual. For example, it is
forbidden to an orator, as such, to forge new words or
constructions; in a certain degree this is permitted to a
poet; in neither case is there any question of duty. For if
anyone chooses to forfeit his reputation as an orator, no
one can prevent him. We have here only to do with the
distinction of imperatives into problematical, assertorial,
and apodeictic. Similarly in the note in which I have pared
the moral ideas of practical perfection in different
philosophical schools, I have distinguished the idea of
wisdom from that of holiness, although I have stated that
essentially and objectively they are the same. But in that
place I understand by the former only that wisdom to which
man (the Stoic) lays claim; therefore I take it subjectively
as an attribute alleged to belong to man. (Perhaps the
expression virtue, with which also the Stoic made great
show, would better mark the characteristic of his school.)
The expression of a postulate of pure practical reason might
give most occasion to misapprehension in case the reader
confounded it with the signification of the postulates in
pure mathematics, which carry apodeictic certainty with
them. These, however, postulate the possibility of an
action, the object of which has been previously recognized a
priori in theory as possible, and that with perfect
certainty. But the former postulates the possibility of an
object itself (God and the immortality of the soul) from
apodeictic practical laws, and therefore only for the
purposes of a practical reason. This certainty of the
postulated possibility then is not at all theoretic, and
consequently not apodeictic; that is to say, it is not a
known necessity as regards the object, but a necessary
supposition as regards the subject, necessary for the
obedience to its objective but practical laws. It is,
therefore, merely a necessary hypothesis. I could find no
better expression for this rational necessity, which is
subjective, but yet true and unconditional.
</pre>
<p>
In this manner, then, the a priori principles of two faculties of the
mind, the faculty of cognition and that of desire, would be found and
determined as to the conditions, extent, and limits of their use, and thus
a sure foundation be paid for a scientific system of philosophy, both
theoretic and practical.
</p>
<p>
Nothing worse could happen to these labours than that anyone should make
the unexpected discovery that there neither is, nor can be, any a priori
knowledge at all. But there is no danger of this. This would be the same
thing as if one sought to prove by reason that there is no reason. For we
only say that we know something by reason, when we are conscious that we
could have known it, even if it had not been given to us in experience;
hence rational knowledge and knowledge a priori are one and the same. It
is a clear contradiction to try to extract necessity from a principle of
experience (ex pumice aquam), and to try by this to give a judgement true
universality (without which there is no rational inference, not even
inference from analogy, which is at least a presumed universality and
objective necessity). To substitute subjective necessity, that is, custom,
for objective, which exists only in a priori judgements, is to deny to
reason the power of judging about the object, i.e., of knowing it, and
what belongs to it. It implies, for example, that we must not say of
something which often or always follows a certain antecedent state that we
can conclude from this to that (for this would imply objective necessity
and the notion of an a priori connexion), but only that we may expect
similar cases (just as animals do), that is that we reject the notion of
cause altogether as false and a mere delusion. As to attempting to remedy
this want of objective and consequently universal validity by saying that
we can see no ground for attributing any other sort of knowledge to other
rational beings, if this reasoning were valid, our ignorance would do more
for the enlargement of our knowledge than all our meditation. For, then,
on this very ground that we have no knowledge of any other rational beings
besides man, we should have a right to suppose them to be of the same
nature as we know ourselves to be: that is, we should really know them. I
omit to mention that universal assent does not prove the objective
validity of a judgement (i.e., its validity as a cognition), and although
this universal assent should accidentally happen, it could furnish no
proof of agreement with the object; on the contrary, it is the objective
validity which alone constitutes the basis of a necessary universal
consent.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 30</span>
</p>
<p>
Hume would be quite satisfied with this system of universal empiricism,
for, as is well known, he desired nothing more than that, instead of
ascribing any objective meaning to the necessity in the concept of cause,
a merely subjective one should be assumed, viz., custom, in order to deny
that reason could judge about God, freedom, and immortality; and if once
his principles were granted, he was certainly well able to deduce his
conclusions therefrom, with all logical coherence. But even Hume did not
make his empiricism so universal as to include mathematics. He holds the
principles of mathematics to be analytical; and if his were correct, they
would certainly be apodeictic also: but we could not infer from this that
reason has the faculty of forming apodeictic judgements in philosophy
also- that is to say, those which are synthetical judgements, like the
judgement of causality. But if we adopt a universal empiricism, then
mathematics will be included.
</p>
<p>
Now if this science is in contradiction with a reason that admits only
empirical principles, as it inevitably is in the antinomy in which
mathematics prove the infinite divisibility of space, which empiricism
cannot admit; then the greatest possible evidence of demonstration is in
manifest contradiction with the alleged conclusions from experience, and
we are driven to ask, like Cheselden's blind patient, "Which deceives me,
sight or touch?" (for empiricism is based on a necessity felt, rationalism
on a necessity seen). And thus universal empiricism reveals itself as
absolute scepticism. It is erroneous to attribute this in such an
unqualified sense to Hume, * since he left at least one certain touchstone
(which can only be found in a priori principles), although experience
consists not only of feelings, but also of judgements.
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* Names that designate the followers of a sect have always
been accompanied with much injustice; just as if one said,
"N is an Idealist." For although he not only admits, but
even insists, that our ideas of external things have actual
objects of external things corresponding to them, yet he
holds that the form of the intuition does not depend on them
but on the human mind.
</pre>
<p>
<span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 35</span>
</p>
<p>
However, as in this philosophical and critical age such empiricism can
scarcely be serious, and it is probably put forward only as an
intellectual exercise and for the purpose of putting in a clearer light,
by contrast, the necessity of rational a priori principles, we can only be
grateful to those who employ themselves in this otherwise uninstructive
labour.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
INTRODUCTION.
</h2>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
The theoretical use of reason was concerned with objects of the cognitive
faculty only, and a critical examination of it with reference to this use
applied properly only to the pure faculty of cognition; because this
raised the suspicion, which was afterwards confirmed, that it might easily
pass beyond its limits, and be lost among unattainable objects, or even
contradictory notions. It is quite different with the practical use of
reason. In this, reason is concerned with the grounds of determination of
the will, which is a faculty either to produce objects corresponding to
ideas, or to determine ourselves to the effecting of such objects (whether
the physical power is sufficient or not); that is, to determine our
causality. For here, reason can at least attain so far as to determine the
will, and has always objective reality in so far as it is the volition
only that is in question. The first question here then is whether pure
reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will, or whether it can
be a ground of determination only as dependent on empirical conditions.
Now, here there comes in a notion of causality justified by the critique
of the pure reason, although not capable of being presented empirically,
viz., that of freedom; and if we can now discover means of proving that
this property does in fact belong to the human will (and so to the will of
all rational beings), then it will not only be shown that pure reason can
be practical, but that it alone, and not reason empirically limited, is
indubitably practical; consequently, we shall have to make a critical
examination, not of pure practical reason, but only of practical reason
generally. For when once pure reason is shown to exist, it needs no
critical examination. For reason itself contains the standard for the
critical examination of every use of it. The critique, then, of practical
reason generally is bound to prevent the empirically conditioned reason
from claiming exclusively to furnish the ground of determination of the
will. If it is proved that there is a [practical] reason, its employment
is alone immanent; the empirically conditioned use, which claims
supremacy, is on the contrary transcendent and expresses itself in demands
and precepts which go quite beyond its sphere. This is just the opposite
of what might be said of pure reason in its speculative employment.
</p>
<p>
However, as it is still pure reason, the knowledge of which is here the
foundation of its practical employment, the general outline of the
classification of a critique of practical reason must be arranged in
accordance with that of the speculative. We must, then, have the Elements
and the Methodology of it; and in the former an Analytic as the rule of
truth, and a Dialectic as the exposition and dissolution of the illusion
in the judgements of practical reason. But the order in the subdivision of
the Analytic will be the reverse of that in the critique of the pure
speculative reason. For, in the present case, we shall commence with the
principles and proceed to the concepts, and only then, if possible, to the
senses; whereas in the case of the speculative reason we began with the
senses and had to end with the principles. The reason of this lies again
in this: that now we have to do with a will, and have to consider reason,
not in its relation to objects, but to this will and its causality. We
must, then, begin with the principles of a causality not empirically
conditioned, after which the attempt can be made to establish our notions
of the determining grounds of such a will, of their application to
objects, and finally to the subject and its sense faculty. We necessarily
begin with the law of causality from freedom, that is, with a pure
practical principle, and this determines the objects to which alone it can
be applied.
</p>
<h3>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1</span>
</h3>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
FIRST PART — ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.
</h2>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2HCH0001" id="link2HCH0001"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 5</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
I. DEFINITION.
</h2>
<p>
Practical principles are propositions which contain a general
determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They
are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject
as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or practical laws, when
the condition is recognized as objective, that is, valid for the will of
every rational being.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 10</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0008" id="link2H_4_0008"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
REMARK.
</h2>
<p>
Supposing that pure reason contains in itself a practical motive, that is,
one adequate to determine the will, then there are practical laws;
otherwise all practical principles will be mere maxims. In case the will
of a rational being is pathologically affected, there may occur a conflict
of the maxims with the practical laws recognized by itself. For example,
one may make it his maxim to let no injury pass unrevenged, and yet he may
see that this is not a practical law, but only his own maxim; that, on the
contrary, regarded as being in one and the same maxim a rule for the will
of every rational being, it must contradict itself. In natural philosophy
the principles of what happens, (e.g., the principle of equality of action
and reaction in the communication of motion) are at the same time laws of
nature; for the use of reason there is theoretical and determined by the
nature of the object. In practical philosophy, i.e., that which has to do
only with the grounds of determination of the will, the principles which a
man makes for himself are not laws by which one is inevitably bound;
because reason in practical matters has to do with the subject, namely,
with the faculty of desire, the special character of which may occasion
variety in the rule. The practical rule is always a product of reason,
because it prescribes action as a means to the effect. But in the case of
a being with whom reason does not of itself determine the will, this rule
is an imperative, i.e., a rule characterized by "shall," which expresses
the objective necessitation of the action and signifies that, if reason
completely determined the will, the action would inevitably take place
according to this rule. Imperatives, therefore, are objectively valid, and
are quite distinct from maxims, which are subjective principles. The
former either determine the conditions of the causality of the rational
being as an efficient cause, i.e., merely in reference to the effect and
the means of attaining it; or they determine the will only, whether it is
adequate to the effect or not. The former would be hypothetical
imperatives, and contain mere precepts of skill; the latter, on the
contrary, would be categorical, and would alone be practical laws. Thus
maxims are principles, but not imperatives. Imperatives themselves,
however, when they are conditional (i.e., do not determine the will simply
as will, but only in respect to a desired effect, that is, when they are
hypothetical imperatives), are practical precepts but not laws. Laws must
be sufficient to determine the will as will, even before I ask whether I
have power sufficient for a desired effect, or the means necessary to
produce it; hence they are categorical: otherwise they are not laws at
all, because the necessity is wanting, which, if it is to be practical,
must be independent of conditions which are pathological and are therefore
only contingently connected with the will. Tell a man, for example, that
he must be industrious and thrifty in youth, in order that he may not want
in old age; this is a correct and important practical precept of the will.
But it is easy to see that in this case the will is directed to something
else which it is presupposed that it desires; and as to this desire, we
must leave it to the actor himself whether he looks forward to other
resources than those of his own acquisition, or does not expect to be old,
or thinks that in case of future necessity he will be able to make shift
with little. Reason, from which alone can spring a rule involving
necessity, does, indeed, give necessity to this precept (else it would not
be an imperative), but this is a necessity dependent on subjective
conditions, and cannot be supposed in the same degree in all subjects. But
that reason may give laws it is necessary that it should only need to
presuppose itself, because rules are objectively and universally valid
only when they hold without any contingent subjective conditions, which
distinguish one rational being from another. Now tell a man that he should
never make a deceitful promise, this is a rule which only concerns his
will, whether the purposes he may have can be attained thereby or not; it
is the volition only which is to be determined a priori by that rule. If
now it is found that this rule is practically right, then it is a law,
because it is a categorical imperative. Thus, practical laws refer to the
will only, without considering what is attained by its causality, and we
may disregard this latter (as belonging to the world of sense) in order to
have them quite pure.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0009" id="link2H_4_0009"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
II. THEOREM I.
</h2>
<h3>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 15</span>
</h3>
<p>
All practical principles which presuppose an object (matter) of the
faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are empirical
and can furnish no practical laws.
</p>
<p>
By the matter of the faculty of desire I mean an object the realization of
which is desired. Now, if the desire for this object precedes the
practical rule and is the condition of our making it a principle, then I
say (in the first place) this principle is in that case wholly empirical,
for then what determines the choice is the idea of an object and that
relation of this idea to the subject by which its faculty of desire is
determined to its realization. Such a relation to the subject is called
the pleasure in the realization of an object. This, then, must be
presupposed as a condition of the possibility of determination of the
will. But it is impossible to know a priori of any idea of an object
whether it will be connected with pleasure or pain, or be indifferent. In
such cases, therefore, the determining principle of the choice must be
empirical and, therefore, also the practical material principle which
presupposes it as a condition.
</p>
<p>
In the second place, since susceptibility to a pleasure or pain can be
known only empirically and cannot hold in the same degree for all rational
beings, a principle which is based on this subjective condition may serve
indeed as a maxim for the subject which possesses this susceptibility, but
not as a law even to him (because it is wanting in objective necessity,
which must be recognized a priori); it follows, therefore, that such a
principle can never furnish a practical law.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 20</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0010" id="link2H_4_0010"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
III. THEOREM II.
</h2>
<p>
All material practical principles as such are of one and the same kind and
come under the general principle of self-love or private happiness.
</p>
<p>
Pleasure arising from the idea of the idea of the existence of a thing, in
so far as it is to determine the desire of this thing, is founded on the
susceptibility of the subject, since it depends on the presence of an
object; hence it belongs to sense (feeling), and not to understanding,
which expresses a relation of the idea to an object according to concepts,
not to the subject according to feelings. It is, then, practical only in
so far as the faculty of desire is determined by the sensation of
agreeableness which the subject expects from the actual existence of the
object. Now, a rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life
uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is happiness; and the
principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of the will
is the principle of self-love. All material principles, then, which place
the determining ground of the will in the pleasure or pain to be received
from the existence of any object are all of the same kind, inasmuch as
they all belong to the principle of self-love or private happiness.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 25</span>
</p>
<h3>
COROLLARY.
</h3>
<p>
All material practical rules place the determining principle of the will
in the lower desires; and if there were no purely formal laws of the will
adequate to determine it, then we could not admit any higher desire at
all.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0011" id="link2H_4_0011"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
REMARK I.
</h2>
<h3>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 30</span>
</h3>
<p>
It is surprising that men, otherwise acute, can think it possible to
distinguish between higher and lower desires, according as the ideas which
are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin in the senses
or in the understanding; for when we inquire what are the determining
grounds of desire, and place them in some expected pleasantness, it is of
no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing object is derived, but
only how much it pleases. Whether an idea has its seat and source in the
understanding or not, if it can only determine the choice by presupposing
a feeling of pleasure in the subject, it follows that its capability of
determining the choice depends altogether on the nature of the inner
sense, namely, that this can be agreeably affected by it. However
dissimilar ideas of objects may be, though they be ideas of the
understanding, or even of the reason in contrast to ideas of sense, yet
the feeling of pleasure, by means of which they constitute the determining
principle of the will (the expected satisfaction which impels the activity
to the production of the object), is of one and the same kind, not only
inasmuch as it can only be known empirically, but also inasmuch as it
affects one and the same vital force which manifests itself in the faculty
of desire, and in this respect can only differ in degree from every other
ground of determination. Otherwise, how could we compare in respect of
magnitude two principles of determination, the ideas of which depend upon
different faculties, so as to prefer that which affects the faculty of
desire in the highest degree. The same man may return unread an
instructive book which he cannot again obtain, in order not to miss a
hunt; he may depart in the midst of a fine speech, in order not to be late
for dinner; he may leave a rational conversation, such as he otherwise
values highly, to take his place at the gaming-table; he may even repulse
a poor man whom he at other times takes pleasure in benefiting, because he
has only just enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the
theatre. If the determination of his will rests on the feeling of the
agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause, it is
all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected. The only
thing that concerns him, in order to decide his choice, is, how great, how
long continued, how easily obtained, and how often repeated, this
agreeableness is. Just as to the man who wants money to spend, it is all
the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain or washed out of the
sand, provided it is everywhere accepted at the same value; so the man who
cares only for the enjoyment of life does not ask whether the ideas are of
the understanding or the senses, but only how much and how great pleasure
they will give for the longest time. It is only those that would gladly
deny to pure reason the power of determining the will, without the
presupposition of any feeling, who could deviate so far from their own
exposition as to describe as quite heterogeneous what they have themselves
previously brought under one and the same principle. Thus, for example, it
is observed that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power, in
the consciousness of our strength of mind in overcoming obstacles which
are opposed to our designs, in the culture of our mental talents, etc.;
and we justly call these more refined pleasures and enjoyments, because
they are more in our power than others; they do not wear out, but rather
increase the capacity for further enjoyment of them, and while they
delight they at the same time cultivate. But to say on this account that
they determine the will in a different way and not through sense, whereas
the possibility of the pleasure presupposes a feeling for it implanted in
us, which is the first condition of this satisfaction; this is just as
when ignorant persons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so
subtle, so supersubtle that they almost make themselves giddy with it, and
then think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual and yet
extended being. If with Epicurus we make virtue determine the will only by
means of the pleasure it promises, we cannot afterwards blame him for
holding that this pleasure is of the same kind as those of the coarsest
senses. For we have no reason whatever to charge him with holding that the
ideas by which this feeling is excited in us belong merely to the bodily
senses. As far as can be conjectured, he sought the source of many of them
in the use of the higher cognitive faculty, but this did not prevent him,
and could not prevent him, from holding on the principle above stated,
that the pleasure itself which those intellectual ideas give us, and by
which alone they can determine the will, is just of the same kind.
Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher, and yet the most
rarely found. The ancient Greek schools give us more examples of it than
we find in our syncretistic age, in which a certain shallow and dishonest
system of compromise of contradictory principles is devised, because it
commends itself better to a public which is content to know something of
everything and nothing thoroughly, so as to please every party.
</p>
<p>
The principle of private happiness, however much understanding and reason
may be used in it, cannot contain any other determining principles for the
will than those which belong to the lower desires; and either there are no
[higher] desires at all, or pure reason must of itself alone be practical;
that is, it must be able to determine the will by the mere form of the
practical rule without supposing any feeling, and consequently without any
idea of the pleasant or unpleasant, which is the matter of the desire, and
which is always an empirical condition of the principles. Then only, when
reason of itself determines the will (not as the servant of the
inclination), it is really a higher desire to which that which is
pathologically determined is subordinate, and is really, and even
specifically, distinct from the latter, so that even the slightest
admixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and
superiority; just as in a mathematical demonstration the least empirical
condition would degrade and destroy its force and value. Reason, with its
practical law, determines the will immediately, not by means of an
intervening feeling of pleasure or pain, not even of pleasure in the law
itself, and it is only because it can, as pure reason, be practical, that
it is possible for it to be legislative.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0012" id="link2H_4_0012"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
REMARK II.
</h2>
<h3>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 35</span>
</h3>
<p>
To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being, and
this, therefore, is inevitably a determining principle of its faculty of
desire. For we are not in possession originally of satisfaction with our
whole existence- a bliss which would imply a consciousness of our own
independent self-sufficiency this is a problem imposed upon us by our own
finite nature, because we have wants and these wants regard the matter of
our desires, that is, something that is relative to a subjective feeling
of pleasure or pain, which determines what we need in order to be
satisfied with our condition. But just because this material principle of
determination can only be empirically known by the subject, it is
impossible to regard this problem as a law; for a law being objective must
contain the very same principle of determination of the will in all cases
and for all rational beings. For, although the notion of happiness is in
every case the foundation of practical relation of the objects to the
desires, yet it is only a general name for the subjective determining
principles, and determines nothing specifically; whereas this is what
alone we are concerned with in this practical problem, which cannot be
solved at all without such specific determination. For it is every man's
own special feeling of pleasure and pain that decides in what he is to
place his happiness, and even in the same subject this will vary with the
difference of his wants according as this feeling changes, and thus a law
which is subjectively necessary (as a law of nature) is objectively a very
contingent practical principle, which can and must be very different in
different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law; since, in the
desire for happiness it is not the form (of conformity to law) that is
decisive, but simply the matter, namely, whether I am to expect pleasure
in following the law, and how much. Principles of self-love may, indeed,
contain universal precepts of skill (how to find means to accomplish one's
purpose), but in that case they are merely theoretical principles; * as,
for example, how he who would like to eat bread should contrive a mill;
but practical precepts founded on them can never be universal, for the
determining principle of the desire is based on the feeling pleasure and
pain, which can never be supposed to be universally directed to the same
objects.
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* Propositions which in mathematics or physics are called
practical ought properly to be called technical. For they
have nothing to do with the determination of the will; they
only point out how a certain effect is to be produced and
are, therefore, just as theoretical as any propositions
which express the connection of a cause with an effect. Now
whoever chooses the effect must also choose the cause.
</pre>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 40</span>
</p>
<p>
Even supposing, however, that all finite rational beings were thoroughly
agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings of pleasure and pain,
and also as to the means which they must employ to attain the one and
avoid the other; still, they could by no means set up the principle of
self-love as a practical law, for this unanimity itself would be only
contingent. The principle of determination would still be only
subjectively valid and merely empirical, and would not possess the
necessity which is conceived in every law, namely, an objective necessity
arising from a priori grounds; unless, indeed, we hold this necessity to
be not at all practical, but merely physical, viz., that our action is as
inevitably determined by our inclination, as yawning when we see others
yawn. It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at
all, but only counsels for the service of our desires, than to raise
merely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws, which have
objective necessity, and not merely subjective, and which must be known by
reason a priori, not by experience (however empirically universal this may
be). Even the rules of corresponding phenomena are only called laws of
nature (e.g., the mechanical laws), when we either know them really a
priori, or (as in the case of chemical laws) suppose that they would be
known a priori from objective grounds if our insight reached further. But
in the case of merely subjective practical principles, it is expressly
made a condition that they rest, not on objective, but on subjective
conditions of choice, and hence that they must always be represented as
mere maxims, never as practical laws. This second remark seems at first
sight to be mere verbal refinement, but it defines the terms of the most
important distinction which can come into consideration in practical
investigations.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0013" id="link2H_4_0013"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
IV. THEOREM II.
</h2>
<p>
A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal laws,
unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will, not by
their matter, but by their form only.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 45</span>
</p>
<p>
By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the will. This
object is either the determining ground of the will or it is not. In the
former case the rule of the will is subjected to an empirical condition
(viz., the relation of the determining idea to the feeling of pleasure and
pain), consequently it can not be a practical law. Now, when we abstract
from a law all matter, i.e., every object of the will (as a determining
principle), nothing is left but the mere form of a universal legislation.
Therefore, either a rational being cannot conceive his subjective
practical principles, that is, his maxims, as being at the same time
universal laws, or he must suppose that their mere form, by which they are
fitted for universal legislation, is alone what makes them practical laws.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0014" id="link2H_4_0014"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
REMARK.
</h2>
<p>
The commonest understanding can distinguish without instruction what form
of maxim is adapted for universal legislation, and what is not. Suppose,
for example, that I have made it my maxim to increase my fortune by every
safe means. Now, I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which is dead
and has left no writing about it. This is just the case for my maxim. I
desire then to know whether that maxim can also bold good as a universal
practical law. I apply it, therefore, to the present case, and ask whether
it could take the form of a law, and consequently whether I can by my
maxim at the same time give such a law as this, that everyone may deny a
deposit of which no one can produce a proof. I at once become aware that
such a principle, viewed as a law, would annihilate itself, because the
result would be that there would be no deposits. A practical law which I
recognise as such must be qualified for universal legislation; this is an
identical proposition and, therefore, self-evident. Now, if I say that my
will is subject to a practical law, I cannot adduce my inclination (e.g.,
in the present case my avarice) as a principle of determination fitted to
be a universal practical law; for this is so far from being fitted for a
universal legislation that, if put in the form of a universal law, it
would destroy itself.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 50</span>
</p>
<p>
It is, therefore, surprising that intelligent men could have thought of
calling the desire of happiness a universal practical law on the ground
that the desire is universal, and, therefore, also the maxim by which
everyone makes this desire determine his will. For whereas in other cases
a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious; here, on the
contrary, if we attribute to the maxim the universality of a law, the
extreme opposite of harmony will follow, the greatest opposition and the
complete destruction of the maxim itself and its purpose. For, in that
case, the will of all has not one and the same object, but everyone has
his own (his private welfare), which may accidentally accord with the
purposes of others which are equally selfish, but it is far from sufficing
for a law; because the occasional exceptions which one is permitted to
make are endless, and cannot be definitely embraced in one universal rule.
In this manner, then, results a harmony like that which a certain
satirical poem depicts as existing between a married couple bent on going
to ruin, "O, marvellous harmony, what he wishes, she wishes also"; or like
what is said of the pledge of Francis I to the Emperor Charles V, "What my
brother Charles wishes that I wish also" (viz., Milan). Empirical
principles of determination are not fit for any universal external
legislation, but just as little for internal; for each man makes his own
subject the foundation of his inclination, and in the same subject
sometimes one inclination, sometimes another, has the preponderance. To
discover a law which would govern them all under this condition, namely,
bringing them all into harmony, is quite impossible.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0015" id="link2H_4_0015"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
V. PROBLEM I.
</h2>
<p>
Supposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the sufficient
determining principle of a will, to find the nature of the will which can
be determined by it alone.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 55</span>
</p>
<p>
Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason, and is,
therefore, not an object of the senses, and consequently does not belong
to the class of phenomena, it follows that the idea of it, which
determines the will, is distinct from all the principles that determine
events in nature according to the law of causality, because in their case
the determining principles must themselves be phenomena. Now, if no other
determining principle can serve as a law for the will except that
universal legislative form, such a will must be conceived as quite
independent of the natural law of phenomena in their mutual relation,
namely, the law of causality; such independence is called freedom in the
strictest, that is, in the transcendental, sense; consequently, a will
which can have its law in nothing but the mere legislative form of the
maxim is a free will.
</p>
<h3>
VI. PROBLEM II.
</h3>
<p>
Supposing that a will is free, to find the law which alone is competent to
determine it necessarily.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 60</span>
</p>
<p>
Since the matter of the practical law, i.e., an object of the maxim, can
never be given otherwise than empirically, and the free will is
independent on empirical conditions (that is, conditions belonging to the
world of sense) and yet is determinable, consequently a free will must
find its principle of determination in the law, and yet independently of
the matter of the law. But, besides the matter of the law, nothing is
contained in it except the legislative form. It is the legislative form,
then, contained in the maxim, which can alone constitute a principle of
determination of the [free] will.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0016" id="link2H_4_0016"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
REMARK.
</h2>
<p>
Thus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each
other. Now I do not ask here whether they are in fact distinct, or whether
an unconditioned law is not rather merely the consciousness of a pure
practical reason and the latter identical with the positive concept of
freedom; I only ask, whence begins our knowledge of the unconditionally
practical, whether it is from freedom or from the practical law? Now it
cannot begin from freedom, for of this we cannot be immediately conscious,
since the first concept of it is negative; nor can we infer it from
experience, for experience gives us the knowledge only of the law of
phenomena, and hence of the mechanism of nature, the direct opposite of
freedom. It is therefore the moral law, of which we become directly
conscious (as soon as we trace for ourselves maxims of the will), that
first presents itself to us, and leads directly to the concept of freedom,
inasmuch as reason presents it as a principle of determination not to be
outweighed by any sensible conditions, nay, wholly independent of them.
But how is the consciousness, of that moral law possible? We can become
conscious of pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure
theoretical principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason
prescribes them and to the elimination of all empirical conditions, which
it directs. The concept of a pure will arises out of the former, as that
of a pure understanding arises out of the latter. That this is the true
subordination of our concepts, and that it is morality that first
discovers to us the notion of freedom, hence that it is practical reason
which, with this concept, first proposes to speculative reason the most
insoluble problem, thereby placing it in the greatest perplexity, is
evident from the following consideration: Since nothing in phenomena can
be explained by the concept of freedom, but the mechanism of nature must
constitute the only clue; moreover, when pure reason tries to ascend in
the series of causes to the unconditioned, it falls into an antinomy which
is entangled in incomprehensibilities on the one side as much as the
other; whilst the latter (namely, mechanism) is at least useful in the
explanation of phenomena, therefore no one would ever have been so rash as
to introduce freedom into science, had not the moral law, and with it
practical reason, come in and forced this notion upon us. Experience,
however, confirms this order of notions. Suppose some one asserts of his
lustful appetite that, when the desired object and the opportunity are
present, it is quite irresistible. [Ask him]- if a gallows were erected
before the house where he finds this opportunity, in order that he should
be hanged thereon immediately after the gratification of his lust, whether
he could not then control his passion; we need not be long in doubt what
he would reply. Ask him, however- if his sovereign ordered him, on pain of
the same immediate execution, to bear false witness against an honourable
man, whom the prince might wish to destroy under a plausible pretext,
would he consider it possible in that case to overcome his love of life,
however great it may be. He would perhaps not venture to affirm whether he
would do so or not, but he must unhesitatingly admit that it is possible
to do so. He judges, therefore, that he can do a certain thing because he
is conscious that he ought, and he recognizes that he is free- a fact
which but for the moral law he would never have known.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 65</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0017" id="link2H_4_0017"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL REASON.
</h2>
<p>
Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as
a principle of universal legislation.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 70</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0018" id="link2H_4_0018"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
REMARK.
</h2>
<p>
Pure geometry has postulates which are practical propositions, but contain
nothing further than the assumption that we can do something if it is
required that we should do it, and these are the only geometrical
propositions that concern actual existence. They are, then, practical
rules under a problematical condition of the will; but here the rule says:
We absolutely must proceed in a certain manner. The practical rule is,
therefore, unconditional, and hence it is conceived a priori as a
categorically practical proposition by which the will is objectively
determined absolutely and immediately (by the practical rule itself, which
thus is in this case a law); for pure reason practical of itself is here
directly legislative. The will is thought as independent on empirical
conditions, and, therefore, as pure will determined by the mere form of
the law, and this principle of determination is regarded as the supreme
condition of all maxims. The thing is strange enough, and has no parallel
in all the rest of our practical knowledge. For the a priori thought of a
possible universal legislation which is therefore merely problematical, is
unconditionally commanded as a law without borrowing anything from
experience or from any external will. This, however, is not a precept to
do something by which some desired effect can be attained (for then the
will would depend on physical conditions), but a rule that determines the
will a priori only so far as regards the forms of its maxims; and thus it
is at least not impossible to conceive that a law, which only applies to
the subjective form of principles, yet serves as a principle of
determination by means of the objective form of law in general. We may
call the consciousness of this fundamental law a fact of reason, because
we cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason, e.g., the
consciousness of freedom (for this is not antecedently given), but it
forces itself on us as a synthetic a priori proposition, which is not
based on any intuition, either pure or empirical. It would, indeed, be
analytical if the freedom of the will were presupposed, but to presuppose
freedom as a positive concept would require an intellectual intuition,
which cannot here be assumed; however, when we regard this law as given,
it must be observed, in order not to fall into any misconception, that it
is not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of the pure reason, which
thereby announces itself as originally legislative (sic volo, sic jubeo).
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0019" id="link2H_4_0019"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
COROLLARY.
</h2>
<h3>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 75</span>
</h3>
<p>
Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to man) a universal
law which we call the moral law.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0020" id="link2H_4_0020"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
REMARK.
</h2>
<h3>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 80</span>
</h3>
<p>
The fact just mentioned is undeniable. It is only necessary to analyse the
judgement that men pass on the lawfulness of their actions, in order to
find that, whatever inclination may say to the contrary, reason,
incorruptible and self-constrained, always confronts the maxim of the will
in any action with the pure will, that is, with itself, considering itself
as a priori practical. Now this principle of morality, just on account of
the universality of the legislation which makes it the formal supreme
determining principle of the will, without regard to any subjective
differences, is declared by the reason to be a law for all rational
beings, in so far as they have a will, that is, a power to determine their
causality by the conception of rules; and, therefore, so far as they are
capable of acting according to principles, and consequently also according
to practical a priori principles (for these alone have the necessity that
reason requires in a principle). It is, therefore, not limited to men
only, but applies to all finite beings that possess reason and will; nay,
it even includes the Infinite Being as the supreme intelligence. In the
former case, however, the law has the form of an imperative, because in
them, as rational beings, we can suppose a pure will, but being creatures
affected with wants and physical motives, not a holy will, that is, one
which would be incapable of any maxim conflicting with the moral law. In
their case, therefore, the moral law is an imperative, which commands
categorically, because the law is unconditioned; the relation of such a
will to this law is dependence under the name of obligation, which implies
a constraint to an action, though only by reason and its objective law;
and this action is called duty, because an elective will, subject to
pathological affections (though not determined by them, and, therefore,
still free), implies a wish that arises from subjective causes and,
therefore, may often be opposed to the pure objective determining
principle; whence it requires the moral constraint of a resistance of the
practical reason, which may be called an internal, but intellectual,
compulsion. In the supreme intelligence the elective will is rightly
conceived as incapable of any maxim which could not at the same time be
objectively a law; and the notion of holiness, which on that account
belongs to it, places it, not indeed above all practical laws, but above
all practically restrictive laws, and consequently above obligation and
duty. This holiness of will is, however, a practical idea, which must
necessarily serve as a type to which finite rational beings can only
approximate indefinitely, and which the pure moral law, which is itself on
this account called holy, constantly and rightly holds before their eyes.
The utmost that finite practical reason can effect is to be certain of
this indefinite progress of one's maxims and of their steady disposition
to advance. This is virtue, and virtue, at least as a naturally acquired
faculty, can never be perfect, because assurance in such a case never
becomes apodeictic certainty and, when it only amounts to persuasion, is
very dangerous.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0021" id="link2H_4_0021"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
VIII. THEOREM IV.
</h2>
<p>
The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of
all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy of the
elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on
the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof and to the morality of the
will.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 85</span>
</p>
<p>
In fact the sole principle of morality consists in the independence on all
matter of the law (namely, a desired object), and in the determination of
the elective will by the mere universal legislative form of which its
maxim must be capable. Now this independence is freedom in the negative
sense, and this self-legislation of the pure, and therefore practical,
reason is freedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral law expresses
nothing else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason; that is,
freedom; and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, and on
this condition only can they agree with the supreme practical law. If
therefore the matter of the volition, which can be nothing else than the
object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the
practical law, as the condition of its possibility, there results
heteronomy of the elective will, namely, dependence on the physical law
that we should follow some impulse or inclination. In that case the will
does not give itself the law, but only the precept how rationally to
follow pathological law; and the maxim which, in such a case, never
contains the universally legislative form, not only produces no
obligation, but is itself opposed to the principle of a pure practical
reason and, therefore, also to the moral disposition, even though the
resulting action may be conformable to the law.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0022" id="link2H_4_0022"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
REMARK.
</h2>
<p>
Hence a practical precept, which contains a material (and therefore
empirical) condition, must never be reckoned a practical law. For the law
of the pure will, which is free, brings the will into a sphere quite
different from the empirical; and as the necessity involved in the law is
not a physical necessity, it can only consist in the formal conditions of
the possibility of a law in general. All the matter of practical rules
rests on subjective conditions, which give them only a conditional
universality (in case I desire this or that, what I must do in order to
obtain it), and they all turn on the principle of private happiness. Now,
it is indeed undeniable that every volition must have an object, and
therefore a matter; but it does not follow that this is the determining
principle and the condition of the maxim; for, if it is so, then this
cannot be exhibited in a universally legislative form, since in that case
the expectation of the existence of the object would be the determining
cause of the choice, and the volition must presuppose the dependence of
the faculty of desire on the existence of something; but this dependence
can only be sought in empirical conditions and, therefore, can never
furnish a foundation for a necessary and universal rule. Thus, the
happiness of others may be the object of the will of a rational being. But
if it were the determining principle of the maxim, we must assume that we
find not only a rational satisfaction in the welfare of others, but also a
want such as the sympathetic disposition in some men occasions. But I
cannot assume the existence of this want in every rational being (not at
all in God). The matter, then, of the maxim may remain, but it must not be
the condition of it, else the maxim could not be fit for a law. Hence, the
mere form of law, which limits the matter, must also be a reason for
adding this matter to the will, not for presupposing it. For example, let
the matter be my own happiness. This (rule), if I attribute it to everyone
(as, in fact, I may, in the case of every finite being), can become an
objective practical law only if I include the happiness of others.
Therefore, the law that we should promote the happiness of others does not
arise from the assumption that this is an object of everyone's choice, but
merely from this, that the form of universality which reason requires as
the condition of giving to a maxim of self-love the objective validity of
a law is the principle that determines the will. Therefore it was not the
object (the happiness of others) that determined the pure will, but it was
the form of law only, by which I restricted my maxim, founded on
inclination, so as to give it the universality of a law, and thus to adapt
it to the practical reason; and it is this restriction alone, and not the
addition of an external spring, that can give rise to the notion of the
obligation to extend the maxim of my self-love to the happiness of others.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 90</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0023" id="link2H_4_0023"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
REMARK II.
</h2>
<p>
The direct opposite of the principle of morality is, when the principle of
private happiness is made the determining principle of the will, and with
this is to be reckoned, as I have shown above, everything that places the
determining principle which is to serve as a law, anywhere but in the
legislative form of the maxim. This contradiction, however, is not merely
logical, like that which would arise between rules empirically
conditioned, if they were raised to the rank of necessary principles of
cognition, but is practical, and would ruin morality altogether were not
the voice of reason in reference to the will so clear, so irrepressible,
so distinctly audible, even to the commonest men. It can only, indeed, be
maintained in the perplexing speculations of the schools, which are bold
enough to shut their ears against that heavenly voice, in order to support
a theory that costs no trouble.
</p>
<p>
Suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to attempt to
justify himself to you for having borne false witness, first by alleging
the, in his view, sacred duty of consulting his own happiness; then by
enumerating the advantages which he had gained thereby, pointing out the
prudence he had shown in securing himself against detection, even by
yourself, to whom he now reveals the secret, only in order that he may be
able to deny it at any time; and suppose he were then to affirm, in all
seriousness, that he has fulfilled a true human duty; you would either
laugh in his face, or shrink back from him with disgust; and yet, if a man
has regulated his principles of action solely with a view to his own
advantage, you would have nothing whatever to object against this mode of
proceeding. Or suppose some one recommends you a man as steward, as a man
to whom you can blindly trust all your affairs; and, in order to inspire
you with confidence, extols him as a prudent man who thoroughly
understands his own interest, and is so indefatigably active that he lets
slip no opportunity of advancing it; lastly, lest you should be afraid of
finding a vulgar selfishness in him, praises the good taste with which he
lives; not seeking his pleasure in money-making, or in coarse wantonness,
but in the enlargement of his knowledge, in instructive intercourse with a
select circle, and even in relieving the needy; while as to the means
(which, of course, derive all their value from the end), he is not
particular, and is ready to use other people's money for the purpose as if
it were his own, provided only he knows that he can do so safely, and
without discovery; you would either believe that the recommender was
mocking you, or that he had lost his senses. So sharply and clearly marked
are the boundaries of morality and self-love that even the commonest eye
cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to the one or the
other. The few remarks that follow may appear superfluous where the truth
is so plain, but at least they may serve to give a little more
distinctness to the judgement of common sense.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 95</span>
</p>
<p>
The principle of happiness may, indeed, furnish maxims, but never such as
would be competent to be laws of the will, even if universal happiness
were made the object. For since the knowledge of this rests on mere
empirical data, since every man's judgement on it depends very much on his
particular point of view, which is itself moreover very variable, it can
supply only general rules, not universal; that is, it can give rules which
on the average will most frequently fit, but not rules which must hold
good always and necessarily; hence, no practical laws can be founded on
it. Just because in this case an object of choice is the foundation of the
rule and must therefore precede it, the rule can refer to nothing but what
is [felt], and therefore it refers to experience and is founded on it, and
then the variety of judgement must be endless. This principle, therefore,
does not prescribe the same practical rules to all rational beings,
although the rules are all included under a common title, namely, that of
happiness. The moral law, however, is conceived as objectively necessary,
only because it holds for everyone that has reason and will.
</p>
<p>
The maxim of self-love (prudence) only advises; the law of morality
commands. Now there is a great difference between that which we are
advised to do and that to which we are obliged.
</p>
<p>
The commonest intelligence can easily and without hesitation see what, on
the principle of autonomy of the will, requires to be done; but on
supposition of heteronomy of the will, it is hard and requires knowledge
of the world to see what is to be done. That is to say, what duty is, is
plain of itself to everyone; but what is to bring true durable advantage,
such as will extend to the whole of one's existence, is always veiled in
impenetrable obscurity; and much prudence is required to adapt the
practical rule founded on it to the ends of life, even tolerably, by
making proper exceptions. But the moral law commands the most punctual
obedience from everyone; it must, therefore, not be so difficult to judge
what it requires to be done, that the commonest unpractised understanding,
even without worldly prudence, should fail to apply it rightly.
</p>
<p>
It is always in everyone's power to satisfy the categorical command of
morality; whereas it is seldom possible, and by no means so to everyone,
to satisfy the empirically conditioned precept of happiness, even with
regard to a single purpose. The reason is that in the former case there is
question only of the maxim, which must be genuine and pure; but in the
latter case there is question also of one's capacity and physical power to
realize a desired object. A command that everyone should try to make
himself happy would be foolish, for one never commands anyone to do what
he of himself infallibly wishes to do. We must only command the means, or
rather supply them, since he cannot do everything that he wishes. But to
command morality under the name of duty is quite rational; for, in the
first place, not everyone is willing to obey its precepts if they oppose
his inclinations; and as to the means of obeying this law, these need not
in this case be taught, for in this respect whatever he wishes to do he
can do.
</p>
<p>
He who has lost at play may be vexed at himself and his folly, but if he
is conscious of having cheated at play (although he has gained thereby),
he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law.
This must, therefore, be something different from the principle of private
happiness. For a man must have a different criterion when he is compelled
to say to himself: "I am a worthless fellow, though I have filled my
purse"; and when he approves himself, and says: "I am a prudent man, for I
have enriched my treasure."
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 100</span>
</p>
<p>
Finally, there is something further in the idea of our practical reason,
which accompanies the transgression of a moral law- namely, its ill
desert. Now the notion of punishment, as such, cannot be united with that
of becoming a partaker of happiness; for although he who inflicts the
punishment may at the same time have the benevolent purpose of directing
this punishment to this end, yet it must first be justified in itself as
punishment, i.e., as mere harm, so that if it stopped there, and the
person punished could get no glimpse of kindness hidden behind this
harshness, he must yet admit that justice was done him, and that his
reward was perfectly suitable to his conduct. In every punishment, as
such, there must first be justice, and this constitutes the essence of the
notion. Benevolence may, indeed, be united with it, but the man who has
deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this.
Punishment, then, is a physical evil, which, though it be not connected
with moral evil as a natural consequence, ought to be connected with it as
a consequence by the principles of a moral legislation. Now, if every
crime, even without regarding the physical consequence with respect to the
actor, is in itself punishable, that is, forfeits happiness (at least
partially), it is obviously absurd to say that the crime consisted just in
this, that he has drawn punishment on himself, thereby injuring his
private happiness (which, on the principle of self-love, must be the
proper notion of all crime). According to this view, the punishment would
be the reason for calling anything a crime, and justice would, on the
contrary, consist in omitting all punishment, and even preventing that
which naturally follows; for, if this were done, there would no longer be
any evil in the action, since the harm which otherwise followed it, and on
account of which alone the action was called evil, would now be prevented.
To look, however, on all rewards and punishments as merely the machinery
in the hand of a higher power, which is to serve only to set rational
creatures striving after their final end (happiness), this is to reduce
the will to a mechanism destructive of freedom; this is so evident that it
need not detain us.
</p>
<p>
More refined, though equally false, is the theory of those who suppose a
certain special moral sense, which sense and not reason determines the
moral law, and in consequence of which the consciousness of virtue is
supposed to be directly connected with contentment and pleasure; that of
vice, with mental dissatisfaction and pain; thus reducing the whole to the
desire of private happiness. Without repeating what has been said above, I
will here only remark the fallacy they fall into. In order to imagine the
vicious man as tormented with mental dissatisfaction by the consciousness
of his transgressions, they must first represent him as in the main basis
of his character, at least in some degree, morally good; just as he who is
pleased with the consciousness of right conduct must be conceived as
already virtuous. The notion of morality and duty must, therefore, have
preceded any regard to this satisfaction, and cannot be derived from it. A
man must first appreciate the importance of what we call duty, the
authority of the moral law, and the immediate dignity which the following
of it gives to the person in his own eyes, in order to feel that
satisfaction in the consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter
remorse that accompanies the consciousness of its transgression. It is,
therefore, impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction prior
to the knowledge of obligation, or to make it the basis of the latter. A
man must be at least half honest in order even to be able to form a
conception of these feelings. I do not deny that as the human will is, by
virtue of liberty, capable of being immediately determined by the moral
law, so frequent practice in accordance with this principle of
determination can, at least, produce subjectively a feeling of
satisfaction; on the contrary, it is a duty to establish and to cultivate
this, which alone deserves to be called properly the moral feeling; but
the notion of duty cannot be derived from it, else we should have to
suppose a feeling for the law as such, and thus make that an object of
sensation which can only be thought by the reason; and this, if it is not
to be a flat contradiction, would destroy all notion of duty and put in
its place a mere mechanical play of refined inclinations sometimes
contending with the coarser.
</p>
<p>
If now we compare our formal supreme principle of pure practical reason
(that of autonomy of the will) with all previous material principles of
morality, we can exhibit them all in a table in which all possible cases
are exhausted, except the one formal principle; and thus we can show
visibly that it is vain to look for any other principle than that now
proposed. In fact all possible principles of determination of the will are
either merely subjective, and therefore empirical, or are also objective
and rational; and both are either external or internal.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0024" id="link2H_4_0024"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the Foundation of
Morality, are:
</h2>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0025" id="link2H_4_0025"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 105</span>
</h2>
<h3>
SUBJECTIVE.
</h3>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
EXTERNAL INTERNAL
Education Physical feeling
</pre>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 110</span>
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
(Montaigne) (Epicurus)
The civil Moral feeling
Constitution (Hutcheson)
(Mandeville)
</pre>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 115</span>
</p>
<h3>
OBJECTIVE.
</h3>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
INTERNAL EXTERNAL
Perfection Will of God
(Wolf and the (Crusius and other
</pre>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 120</span>
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
Stoics) theological Moralists)
</pre>
<p>
Those of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable of
furnishing the universal principle of morality; but those in the lower
table are based on reason (for perfection as a quality of things, and the
highest perfection conceived as substance, that is, God, can only be
thought by means of rational concepts). But the former notion, namely,
that of perfection, may either be taken in a theoretic signification, and
then it means nothing but the completeness of each thing in its own kind
(transcendental), or that of a thing merely as a thing (metaphysical); and
with that we are not concerned here. But the notion of perfection in a
practical sense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of
purposes. This perfection, as a quality of man and consequently internal,
is nothing but talent and, what strengthens or completes this, skill.
Supreme perfection conceived as substance, that is God, and consequently
external (considered practically), is the sufficiency of this being for
all ends. Ends then must first be given, relatively to which only can the
notion of perfection (whether internal in ourselves or external in God) be
the determining principle of the will. But an end- being an object which
must precede the determination of the will by a practical rule and contain
the ground of the possibility of this determination, and therefore contain
also the matter of the will, taken as its determining principle- such an
end is always empirical and, therefore, may serve for the Epicurean
principle of the happiness theory, but not for the pure rational principle
of morality and duty. Thus, talents and the improvement of them, because
they contribute to the advantages of life; or the will of God, if
agreement with it be taken as the object of the will, without any
antecedent independent practical principle, can be motives only by reason
of the happiness expected therefrom. Hence it follows, first, that all the
principles here stated are material; secondly, that they include all
possible material principles; and, finally, the conclusion, that since
material principles are quite incapable of furnishing the supreme moral
law (as has been shown), the formal practical principle of the pure reason
(according to which the mere form of a universal legislation must
constitute the supreme and immediate determining principle of the will) is
the only one possible which is adequate to furnish categorical
imperatives, that is, practical laws (which make actions a duty), and in
general to serve as the principle of morality, both in criticizing conduct
and also in its application to the human will to determine it.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0026" id="link2H_4_0026"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure
</h2>
<p>
Practical Reason.
</p>
<h3>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 125</span>
</h3>
<p>
This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical, that is, can of
itself determine the will independently of anything empirical; and this it
proves by a fact in which pure reason in us proves itself actually
practical, namely, the autonomy shown in the fundamental principle of
morality, by which reason determines the will to action.
</p>
<p>
It shows at the same time that this fact is inseparably connected with the
consciousness of freedom of the will, nay, is identical with it; and by
this the will of a rational being, although as belonging to the world of
sense it recognizes itself as necessarily subject to the laws of causality
like other efficient causes; yet, at the same time, on another side,
namely, as a being in itself, is conscious of existing in and being
determined by an intelligible order of things; conscious not by virtue of
a special intuition of itself, but by virtue of certain dynamical laws
which determine its causality in the sensible world; for it has been
elsewhere proved that if freedom is predicated of us, it transports us
into an intelligible order of things.
</p>
<p>
Now, if we compare with this the analytical part of the critique of pure
speculative reason, we shall see a remarkable contrast. There it was not
fundamental principles, but pure, sensible intuition (space and time),
that was the first datum that made a priori knowledge possible, though
only of objects of the senses. Synthetical principles could not be derived
from mere concepts without intuition; on the contrary, they could only
exist with reference to this intuition, and therefore to objects of
possible experience, since it is the concepts of the understanding, united
with this intuition, which alone make that knowledge possible which we
call experience. Beyond objects of experience, and therefore with regard
to things as noumena, all positive knowledge was rightly disclaimed for
speculative reason. This reason, however, went so far as to establish with
certainty the concept of noumena; that is, the possibility, nay, the
necessity, of thinking them; for example, it showed against all objections
that the supposition of freedom, negatively considered, was quite
consistent with those principles and limitations of pure theoretic reason.
But it could not give us any definite enlargement of our knowledge with
respect to such objects, but, on the contrary, cut off all view of them
altogether.
</p>
<p>
On the other hand, the moral law, although it gives no view, yet gives us
a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world, and
the whole compass of our theoretical use of reason, a fact which points to
a pure world of the understanding, nay, even defines it positively and
enables us to know something of it, namely, a law.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 130</span>
</p>
<p>
This law (as far as rational beings are concerned) gives to the world of
sense, which is a sensible system of nature, the form of a world of the
understanding, that is, of a supersensible system of nature, without
interfering with its mechanism. Now, a system of nature, in the most
general sense, is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature
of rational beings in general is their existence under laws empirically
conditioned, which, from the point of view of reason, is heteronomy. The
supersensible nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their
existence according to laws which are independent of every empirical
condition and, therefore, belong to the autonomy of pure reason. And,
since the laws by which the existence of things depends on cognition are
practical, supersensible nature, so far as we can form any notion of it,
is nothing else than a system of nature under the autonomy of pure
practical reason. Now, the law of this autonomy is the moral law, which,
therefore, is the fundamental law of a supersensible nature, and of a pure
world of understanding, whose counterpart must exist in the world of
sense, but without interfering with its laws. We might call the former the
archetypal world (natura archetypa), which we only know in the reason; and
the latter the ectypal world (natura ectypa), because it contains the
possible effect of the idea of the former which is the determining
principle of the will. For the moral law, in fact, transfers us ideally
into a system in which pure reason, if it were accompanied with adequate
physical power, would produce the summum bonum, and it determines our will
to give the sensible world the form of a system of rational beings.
</p>
<p>
The least attention to oneself proves that this idea really serves as the
model for the determinations of our will.
</p>
<p>
When the maxim which I am disposed to follow in giving testimony is tested
by the practical reason, I always consider what it would be if it were to
hold as a universal law of nature. It is manifest that in this view it
would oblige everyone to speak the truth. For it cannot hold as a
universal law of nature that statements should be allowed to have the
force of proof and yet to be purposely untrue. Similarly, the maxim which
I adopt with respect to disposing freely of my life is at once determined,
when I ask myself what it should be, in order that a system, of which it
is the law, should maintain itself. It is obvious that in such a system no
one could arbitrarily put an end to his own life, for such an arrangement
would not be a permanent order of things. And so in all similar cases.
Now, in nature, as it actually is an object of experience, the free will
is not of itself determined to maxims which could of themselves be the
foundation of a natural system of universal laws, or which could even be
adapted to a system so constituted; on the contrary, its maxims are
private inclinations which constitute, indeed, a natural whole in
conformity with pathological (physical) laws, but could not form part of a
system of nature, which would only be possible through our will acting in
accordance with pure practical laws. Yet we are, through reason, conscious
of a law to which all our maxims are subject, as though a natural order
must be originated from our will. This law, therefore, must be the idea of
a natural system not given in experience, and yet possible through
freedom; a system, therefore, which is supersensible, and to which we give
objective reality, at least in a practical point of view, since we look on
it as an object of our will as pure rational beings.
</p>
<p>
Hence the distinction between the laws of a natural system to which the
will is subject, and of a natural system which is subject to a will (as
far as its relation to its free actions is concerned), rests on this, that
in the former the objects must be causes of the ideas which determine the
will; whereas in the latter the will is the cause of the objects; so that
its causality has its determining principle solely in the pure faculty of
reason, which may therefore be called a pure practical reason.
</p>
<p>
There are therefore two very distinct problems: how, on the one side, pure
reason can cognise objects a priori, and how on the other side it can be
an immediate determining principle of the will, that is, of the causality
of the rational being with respect to the reality of objects (through the
mere thought of the universal validity of its own maxims as laws).
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 135</span>
</p>
<p>
The former, which belongs to the critique of the pure speculative reason,
requires a previous explanation, how intuitions without which no object
can be given, and, therefore, none known synthetically, are possible a
priori; and its solution turns out to be that these are all only sensible
and, therefore, do not render possible any speculative knowledge which
goes further than possible experience reaches; and that therefore all the
principles of that pure speculative reason avail only to make experience
possible; either experience of given objects or of those that may be given
ad infinitum, but never are completely given.
</p>
<p>
The latter, which belongs to the critique of practical reason, requires no
explanation how the objects of the faculty of desire are possible, for
that being a problem of the theoretical knowledge of nature is left to the
critique of the speculative reason, but only how reason can determine the
maxims of the will; whether this takes place only by means of empirical
ideas as principles of determination, or whether pure reason can be
practical and be the law of a possible order of nature, which is not
empirically knowable. The possibility of such a supersensible system of
nature, the conception of which can also be the ground of its reality
through our own free will, does not require any a priori intuition (of an
intelligible world) which, being in this case supersensible, would be
impossible for us. For the question is only as to the determining
principle of volition in its maxims, namely, whether it is empirical, or
is a conception of the pure reason (having the legal character belonging
to it in general), and how it can be the latter. It is left to the
theoretic principles of reason to decide whether the causality of the will
suffices for the realization of the objects or not, this being an inquiry
into the possibility of the objects of the volition. Intuition of these
objects is therefore of no importance to the practical problem. We are
here concerned only with the determination of the will and the determining
principles of its maxims as a free will, not at all with the result. For,
provided only that the will conforms to the law of pure reason, then let
its power in execution be what it may, whether according to these maxims
of legislation of a possible system of nature any such system really
results or not, this is no concern of the critique, which only inquires
whether, and in what way, pure reason can be practical, that is directly
determine the will.
</p>
<p>
In this inquiry criticism may and must begin with pure practical laws and
their reality. But instead of intuition it takes as their foundation the
conception of their existence in the intelligible world, namely, the
concept of freedom. For this concept has no other meaning, and these laws
are only possible in relation to freedom of the will; but freedom being
supposed, they are necessary; or conversely freedom is necessary because
those laws are necessary, being practical postulates. It cannot be further
explained how this consciousness of the moral law, or, what is the same
thing, of freedom, is possible; but that it is admissible is well
established in the theoretical critique.
</p>
<p>
The exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason is now
finished; that is to say, it has been shown first, what it contains, that
it subsists for itself quite a priori and independent of empirical
principles; and next in what it is distinguished from all other practical
principles. With the deduction, that is, the justification of its
objective and universal validity, and the discernment of the possibility
of such a synthetical proposition a priori, we cannot expect to succeed so
well as in the case of the principles of pure theoretical reason. For
these referred to objects of possible experience, namely, to phenomena,
and we could prove that these phenomena could be known as objects of
experience only by being brought under the categories in accordance with
these laws; and consequently that all possible experience must conform to
these laws. But I could not proceed in this way with the deduction of the
moral law. For this does not concern the knowledge of the properties of
objects, which may be given to the reason from some other source; but a
knowledge which can itself be the ground of the existence of the objects,
and by which reason in a rational being has causality, i.e., pure reason,
which can be regarded as a faculty immediately determining the will.
</p>
<p>
Now all our human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at
fundamental powers or faculties, for the possibility of these cannot be
understood by any means, and just as little should it be arbitrarily
invented and assumed. Therefore, in the theoretic use of reason, it is
experience alone that can justify us in assuming them. But this expedient
of adducing empirical proofs, instead of a deduction from a priori sources
of knowledge, is denied us here in respect to the pure practical faculty
of reason. For whatever requires to draw the proof of its reality from
experience must depend for the grounds of its possibility on principles of
experience; and pure, yet practical, reason by its very notion cannot be
regarded as such. Further, the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason
of which we are a priori conscious, and which is apodeictically certain,
though it be granted that in experience no example of its exact fulfilment
can be found. Hence, the objective reality of the moral law cannot be
proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason, whether
speculative or empirically supported, and therefore, even if we renounced
its apodeictic certainty, it could not be proved a posteriori by
experience, and yet it is firmly established of itself.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 140</span>
</p>
<p>
But instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle,
something else is found which was quite unexpected, namely, that this
moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the deduction of an
inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove, but of which
speculative reason was compelled at least to assume the possibility (in
order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the unconditioned in the
chain of causality, so as not to contradict itself)- I mean the faculty of
freedom. The moral law, which itself does not require a justification,
proves not merely the possibility of freedom, but that it really belongs
to beings who recognize this law as binding on themselves. The moral law
is in fact a law of the causality of free agents and, therefore, of the
possibility of a supersensible system of nature, just as the metaphysical
law of events in the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible
system of nature; and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy
was compelled to leave undetermined, namely, the law for a causality, the
concept of which in the latter was only negative; and therefore for the
first time gives this concept objective reality.
</p>
<p>
This sort of credential of the moral law, viz., that it is set forth as a
principle of the deduction of freedom, which is a causality of pure
reason, is a sufficient substitute for all a priori justification, since
theoretic reason was compelled to assume at least the possibility of
freedom, in order to satisfy a want of its own. For the moral law proves
its reality, so as even to satisfy the critique of the speculative reason,
by the fact that it adds a positive definition to a causality previously
conceived only negatively, the possibility of which was incomprehensible
to speculative reason, which yet was compelled to suppose it. For it adds
the notion of a reason that directly determines the will (by imposing on
its maxims the condition of a universal legislative form); and thus it is
able for the first time to give objective, though only practical, reality
to reason, which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed
speculatively with its ideas. It thus changes the transcendent use of
reason into an immanent use (so that reason is itself, by means of ideas,
an efficient cause in the field of experience).
</p>
<p>
The determination of the causality of beings in the world of sense, as
such, can never be unconditioned; and yet for every series of conditions
there must be something unconditioned, and therefore there must be a
causality which is determined wholly by itself. Hence, the idea of freedom
as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not found to be a want but, as
far as its possibility is concerned, an analytic principle of pure
speculative reason. But as it is absolutely impossible to find in
experience any example in accordance with this idea, because amongst the
causes of things as phenomena it would be impossible to meet with any
absolutely unconditioned determination of causality, we were only able to
defend our supposition that a freely acting cause might be a being in the
world of sense, in so far as it is considered in the other point of view
as a noumenon, showing that there is no contradiction in regarding all its
actions as subject to physical conditions so far as they are phenomena,
and yet regarding its causality as physically unconditioned, in so far as
the acting being belongs to the world of understanding, and in thus making
the concept of freedom the regulative principle of reason. By this
principle I do not indeed learn what the object is to which that sort of
causality is attributed; but I remove the difficulty, for, on the one
side, in the explanation of events in the world, and consequently also of
the actions of rational beings, I leave to the mechanism of physical
necessity the right of ascending from conditioned to condition ad
infinitum, while on the other side I keep open for speculative reason the
place which for it is vacant, namely, the intelligible, in order to
transfer the unconditioned thither. But I was not able to verify this
supposition; that is, to change it into the knowledge of a being so
acting, not even into the knowledge of the possibility of such a being.
This vacant place is now filled by pure practical reason with a definite
law of causality in an intelligible world (causality with freedom),
namely, the moral law. Speculative reason does not hereby gain anything as
regards its insight, but only as regards the certainty of its
problematical notion of freedom, which here obtains objective reality,
which, though only practical, is nevertheless undoubted. Even the notion
of causality- the application, and consequently the signification, of
which holds properly only in relation to phenomena, so as to connect them
into experiences (as is shown by the Critique of Pure Reason)- is not so
enlarged as to extend its use beyond these limits. For if reason sought to
do this, it would have to show how the logical relation of principle and
consequence can be used synthetically in a different sort of intuition
from the sensible; that is how a causa noumenon is possible. This it can
never do; and, as practical reason, it does not even concern itself with
it, since it only places the determining principle of causality of man as
a sensible creature (which is given) in pure reason (which is therefore
called practical); and therefore it employs the notion of cause, not in
order to know objects, but to determine causality in relation to objects
in general. It can abstract altogether from the application of this notion
to objects with a view to theoretical knowledge (since this concept is
always found a priori in the understanding even independently of any
intuition). Reason, then, employs it only for a practical purpose, and
hence we can transfer the determining principle of the will into the
intelligible order of things, admitting, at the same time, that we cannot
understand how the notion of cause can determine the knowledge of these
things. But reason must cognise causality with respect to the actions of
the will in the sensible world in a definite manner; otherwise, practical
reason could not really produce any action. But as to the notion which it
forms of its own causality as noumenon, it need not determine it
theoretically with a view to the cognition of its supersensible existence,
so as to give it significance in this way. For it acquires significance
apart from this, though only for practical use, namely, through the moral
law. Theoretically viewed, it remains always a pure a priori concept of
the understanding, which can be applied to objects whether they have been
given sensibly or not, although in the latter case it has no definite
theoretical significance or application, but is only a formal, though
essential, conception of the understanding relating to an object in
general. The significance which reason gives it through the moral law is
merely practical, inasmuch as the idea of the law of causality (of the
will) has self causality, or is its determining principle.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0027" id="link2H_4_0027"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its Practical use has to an Extension
which is not possible to it in its Speculative Use.
</h2>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 145</span>
</p>
<p>
We have in the moral principle set forth a law of causality, the
determining principle of which is set above all the conditions of the
sensible world; we have it conceived how the will, as belonging to the
intelligible world, is determinable, and therefore have its subject (man)
not merely conceived as belonging to a world of pure understanding, and in
this respect unknown (which the critique of speculative reason enabled us
to do), but also defined as regards his causality by means of a law which
cannot be reduced to any physical law of the sensible world; and therefore
our knowledge is extended beyond the limits of that world, a pretension
which the Critique of Pure Reason declared to be futile in all
speculation. Now, how is the practical use of pure reason here to be
reconciled with the theoretical, as to the determination of the limits of
its faculty?
</p>
<p>
David Hume, of whom we may say that he commenced the assault on the claims
of pure reason, which made a thorough investigation of it necessary,
argued thus: The notion of cause is a notion that involves the necessity
of the connexion of the existence of different things (and that, in so far
as they are different), so that, given A, I know that something quite
distinct there from, namely B, must necessarily also exist. Now necessity
can be attributed to a connection, only in so far as it is known a priori,
for experience would only enable us to know of such a connection that it
exists, not that it necessarily exists. Now, it is impossible, says he, to
know a priori and as necessary the connection between one thing and
another (or between one attribute and another quite distinct) when they
have not been given in experience. Therefore the notion of a cause is
fictitious and delusive and, to speak in the mildest way, is an illusion,
only excusable inasmuch as the custom (a subjective necessity) of
perceiving certain things, or their attributes as often associated in
existence along with or in succession to one another, is insensibly taken
for an objective necessity of supposing such a connection in the objects
themselves; and thus the notion of a cause has been acquired
surreptitiously and not legitimately; nay, it can never be so acquired or
authenticated, since it demands a connection in itself vain, chimerical,
and untenable in presence of reason, and to which no object can ever
correspond. In this way was empiricism first introduced as the sole source
of principles, as far as all knowledge of the existence of things is
concerned (mathematics therefore remaining excepted); and with empiricism
the most thorough scepticism, even with regard to the whole science of
nature( as philosophy). For on such principles we can never conclude from
given attributes of things as existing to a consequence (for this would
require the notion of cause, which involves the necessity of such a
connection); we can only, guided by imagination, expect similar cases- an
expectation which is never certain, however often it has been fulfilled.
Of no event could we say: a certain thing must have preceded it, on which
it necessarily followed; that is, it must have a cause; and therefore,
however frequent the cases we have known in which there was such an
antecedent, so that a rule could be derived from them, yet we never could
suppose it as always and necessarily so happening; we should, therefore,
be obliged to leave its share to blind chance, with which all use of
reason comes to an end; and this firmly establishes scepticism in
reference to arguments ascending from effects to causes and makes it
impregnable.
</p>
<p>
Mathematics escaped well, so far, because Hume thought that its
propositions were analytical; that is, proceeded from one property to
another, by virtue of identity and, consequently, according to the
principle of contradiction. This, however, is not the case, since, on the
contrary, they are synthetical; and although geometry, for example, has
not to do with the existence of things, but only with their a priori
properties in a possible intuition, yet it proceeds just as in the case of
the causal notion, from one property (A) to another wholly distinct (B),
as necessarily connected with the former. Nevertheless, mathematical
science, so highly vaunted for its apodeictic certainty, must at last fall
under this empiricism for the same reason for which Hume put custom in the
place of objective necessity in the notion of cause and, in spite of all
its pride, must consent to lower its bold pretension of claiming assent a
priori and depend for assent to the universality of its propositions on
the kindness of observers, who, when called as witnesses, would surely not
hesitate to admit that what the geometer propounds as a theorem they have
always perceived to be the fact, and, consequently, although it be not
necessarily true, yet they would permit us to expect it to be true in the
future. In this manner Hume's empiricism leads inevitably to scepticism,
even with regard to mathematics, and consequently in every scientific
theoretical use of reason (for this belongs either to philosophy or
mathematics). Whether with such a terrible overthrow of the chief branches
of knowledge, common reason will escape better, and will not rather become
irrecoverably involved in this destruction of all knowledge, so that from
the same principles a universal scepticism should follow (affecting,
indeed, only the learned), this I will leave everyone to judge for
himself.
</p>
<p>
As regards my own labours in the critical examination of pure reason,
which were occasioned by Hume's sceptical teaching, but went much further
and embraced the whole field of pure theoretical reason in its synthetic
use and, consequently, the field of what is called metaphysics in general;
I proceeded in the following manner with respect to the doubts raised by
the Scottish philosopher touching the notion of causality. If Hume took
the objects of experience for things in themselves (as is almost always
done), he was quite right in declaring the notion of cause to be a
deception and false illusion; for as to things in themselves, and their
attributes as such, it is impossible to see why because A is given, B,
which is different, must necessarily be also given, and therefore he could
by no means admit such an a priori knowledge of things in themselves.
Still less could this acute writer allow an empirical origin of this
concept, since this is directly contradictory to the necessity of
connection which constitutes the essence of the notion of causality, hence
the notion was proscribed, and in its place was put custom in the
observation of the course of perceptions.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 150</span>
</p>
<p>
It resulted, however, from my inquiries, that the objects with which we
have to do in experience are by no means things in themselves, but merely
phenomena; and that although in the case of things in themselves it is
impossible to see how, if A is supposed, it should be contradictory that
B, which is quite different from A, should not also be supposed (i.e., to
see the necessity of the connection between A as cause and B as effect);
yet it can very well be conceived that, as phenomena, they may be
necessarily connected in one experience in a certain way (e.g., with
regard to time-relations); so that they could not be separated without
contradicting that connection, by means of which this experience is
possible in which they are objects and in which alone they are cognisable
by us. And so it was found to be in fact; so that I was able not only to
prove the objective reality of the concept of cause in regard to objects
of experience, but also to deduce it as an a priori concept by reason of
the necessity of the connection it implied; that is, to show the
possibility of its origin from pure understanding without any empirical
sources; and thus, after removing the source of empiricism, I was able
also to overthrow the inevitable consequence of this, namely, scepticism,
first with regard to physical science, and then with regard to mathematics
(in which empiricism has just the same grounds), both being sciences which
have reference to objects of possible experience; herewith overthrowing
the thorough doubt of whatever theoretic reason professes to discern.
</p>
<p>
But how is it with the application of this category of causality (and all
the others; for without them there can be no knowledge of anything
existing) to things which are not objects of possible experience, but lie
beyond its bounds? For I was able to deduce the objective reality of these
concepts only with regard to objects of possible experience. But even this
very fact, that I have saved them, only in case I have proved that objects
may by means of them be thought, though not determined a priori; this it
is that gives them a place in the pure understanding, by which they are
referred to objects in general (sensible or not sensible). If anything is
still wanting, it is that which is the condition of the application of
these categories, and especially that of causality, to objects, namely,
intuition; for where this is not given, the application with a view to
theoretic knowledge of the object, as a noumenon, is impossible and,
therefore, if anyone ventures on it, is (as in the Critique of Pure
Reason) absolutely forbidden. Still, the objective reality of the concept
(of causality) remains, and it can be used even of noumena, but without
our being able in the least to define the concept theoretically so as to
produce knowledge. For that this concept, even in reference to an object,
contains nothing impossible, was shown by this, that, even while applied
to objects of sense, its seat was certainly fixed in the pure
understanding; and although, when referred to things in themselves (which
cannot be objects of experience), it is not capable of being determined so
as to represent a definite object for the purpose of theoretic knowledge;
yet for any other purpose (for instance, a practical) it might be capable
of being determined so as to have such application. This could not be the
case if, as Hume maintained, this concept of causality contained something
absolutely impossible to be thought.
</p>
<p>
In order now to discover this condition of the application of the said
concept to noumena, we need only recall why we are not content with its
application to objects of experience, but desire also to apply it to
things in themselves. It will appear, then, that it is not a theoretic but
a practical purpose that makes this a necessity. In speculation, even if
we were successful in it, we should not really gain anything in the
knowledge of nature, or generally with regard to such objects as are
given, but we should make a wide step from the sensibly conditioned (in
which we have already enough to do to maintain ourselves, and to follow
carefully the chain of causes) to the supersensible, in order to complete
our knowledge of principles and to fix its limits; whereas there always
remains an infinite chasm unfilled between those limits and what we know;
and we should have hearkened to a vain curiosity rather than a
solid-desire of knowledge.
</p>
<p>
But, besides the relation in which the understanding stands to objects (in
theoretical knowledge), it has also a relation to the faculty of desire,
which is therefore called the will, and the pure will, inasmuch as pure
understanding (in this case called reason) is practical through the mere
conception of a law. The objective reality of a pure will, or, what is the
same thing, of a pure practical reason, is given in the moral law a
priori, as it were, by a fact, for so we may name a determination of the
will which is inevitable, although it does not rest on empirical
principles. Now, in the notion of a will the notion of causality is
already contained, and hence the notion of a pure will contains that of a
causality accompanied with freedom, that is, one which is not determinable
by physical laws, and consequently is not capable of any empirical
intuition in proof of its reality, but, nevertheless, completely justifies
its objective reality a priori in the pure practical law; not, indeed (as
is easily seen) for the purposes of the theoretical, but of the practical
use of reason. Now the notion of a being that has free will is the notion
of a causa noumenon, and that this notion involves no contradiction, we
are already assured by the fact- that inasmuch as the concept of cause has
arisen wholly from pure understanding, and has its objective reality
assured by the deduction, as it is moreover in its origin independent of
any sensible conditions, it is, therefore, not restricted to phenomena
(unless we wanted to make a definite theoretic use of it), but can be
applied equally to things that are objects of the pure understanding. But,
since this application cannot rest on any intuition (for intuition can
only be sensible), therefore, causa noumenon, as regards the theoretic use
of reason, although a possible and thinkable, is yet an empty notion. Now,
I do not desire by means of this to understand theoretically the nature of
a being, in so far as it has a pure will; it is enough for me to have
thereby designated it as such, and hence to combine the notion of
causality with that of freedom (and what is inseparable from it, the moral
law, as its determining principle). Now, this right I certainly have by
virtue of the pure, not-empirical origin of the notion of cause, since I
do not consider myself entitled to make any use of it except in reference
to the moral law which determines its reality, that is, only a practical
use.
</p>
<p>
If, with Hume, I had denied to the notion of causality all objective
reality in its [theoretic] use, not merely with regard to things in
themselves (the supersensible), but also with regard to the objects of the
senses, it would have lost all significance, and being a theoretically
impossible notion would have been declared to be quite useless; and since
what is nothing cannot be made any use of, the practical use of a concept
theoretically null would have been absurd. But, as it is, the concept of a
causality free from empirical conditions, although empty, i.e., without
any appropriate intuition), is yet theoretically possible, and refers to
an indeterminate object; but in compensation significance is given to it
in the moral law and consequently in a practical sense. I have, indeed, no
intuition which should determine its objective theoretic reality, but not
the less it has a real application, which is exhibited in concreto in
intentions or maxims; that is, it has a practical reality which can be
specified, and this is sufficient to justify it even with a view to
noumena.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 155</span>
</p>
<p>
Now, this objective reality of a pure concept of the understanding in the
sphere of the supersensible, once brought in, gives an objective reality
also to all the other categories, although only so far as they stand in
necessary connexion with the determining principle of the will (the moral
law); a reality only of practical application, which has not the least
effect in enlarging our theoretical knowledge of these objects, or the
discernment of their nature by pure reason. So we shall find also in the
sequel that these categories refer only to beings as intelligences, and in
them only to the relation of reason to the will; consequently, always only
to the practical, and beyond this cannot pretend to any knowledge of these
beings; and whatever other properties belonging to the theoretical
representation of supersensible things may be brought into connexion with
these categories, this is not to be reckoned as knowledge, but only as a
right (in a practical point of view, however, it is a necessity) to admit
and assume such beings, even in the case where we [conceive] supersensible
beings (e.g., God) according to analogy, that is, a purely rational
relation, of which we make a practical use with reference to what is
sensible; and thus the application to the supersensible solely in a
practical point of view does not give pure theoretic reason the least
encouragement to run riot into the transcendent.
</p>
<h3>
BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2
</h3>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2HCH0002" id="link2HCH0002"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
By a concept of the practical reason I understand the idea of an object as
an effect possible to be produced through freedom. To be an object of
practical knowledge, as such, signifies, therefore, only the relation of
the will to the action by which the object or its opposite would be
realized; and to decide whether something is an object of pure practical
reason or not is only to discern the possibility or impossibility of
willing the action by which, if we had the required power (about which
experience must decide), a certain object would be realized. If the object
be taken as the determining principle of our desire, it must first be
known whether it is physically possible by the free use of our powers,
before we decide whether it is an object of practical reason or not. On
the other hand, if the law can be considered a priori as the determining
principle of the action, and the latter therefore as determined by pure
practical reason, the judgement whether a thing is an object of pure
practical reason or not does not depend at all on the comparison with our
physical power; and the question is only whether we should will an action
that is directed to the existence of an object, if the object were in our
power; hence the previous question is only as the moral possibility of the
action, for in this case it is not the object, but the law of the will,
that is the determining principle of the action. The only objects of
practical reason are therefore those of good and evil. For by the former
is meant an object necessarily desired according to a principle of reason;
by the latter one necessarily shunned, also according to a principle of
reason.
</p>
<p>
If the notion of good is not to be derived from an antecedent practical
law, but, on the contrary, is to serve as its foundation, it can only be
the notion of something whose existence promises pleasure, and thus
determines the causality of the subject to produce it, that is to say,
determines the faculty of desire. Now, since it is impossible to discern a
priori what idea will be accompanied with pleasure and what with pain, it
will depend on experience alone to find out what is primarily good or
evil. The property of the subject, with reference to which alone this
experiment can be made, is the feeling of pleasure and pain, a receptivity
belonging to the internal sense; thus that only would be primarily good
with which the sensation of pleasure is immediately connected, and that
simply evil which immediately excites pain. Since, however, this is
opposed even to the usage of language, which distinguishes the pleasant
from the good, the unpleasant from the evil, and requires that good and
evil shall always be judged by reason, and, therefore, by concepts which
can be communicated to everyone, and not by mere sensation, which is
limited to individual [subjects] and their susceptibility; and, since
nevertheless, pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any idea of an
object a priori, the philosopher who thought himself obliged to make a
feeling of pleasure the foundation of his practical judgements would call
that good which is a means to the pleasant, and evil, what is a cause of
unpleasantness and pain; for the judgement on the relation of means to
ends certainly belongs to reason. But, although reason is alone capable of
discerning the connexion of means with their ends (so that the will might
even be defined as the faculty of ends, since these are always determining
principles of the desires), yet the practical maxims which would follow
from the aforesaid principle of the good being merely a means, would never
contain as the object of the will anything good in itself, but only
something good for something; the good would always be merely the useful,
and that for which it is useful must always lie outside the will, in
sensation. Now if this as a pleasant sensation were to be distinguished
from the notion of good, then there would be nothing primarily good at
all, but the good would have to be sought only in the means to something
else, namely, some pleasantness.
</p>
<p>
It is an old formula of the schools: Nihil appetimus nisi sub ratione
boni; Nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali, and it is used often
correctly, but often also in a manner injurious to philosophy, because the
expressions boni and mali are ambiguous, owing to the poverty of language,
in consequence of which they admit a double sense, and, therefore,
inevitably bring the practical laws into ambiguity; and philosophy, which
in employing them becomes aware of the different meanings in the same
word, but can find no special expressions for them, is driven to subtile
distinctions about which there is subsequently no unanimity, because the
distinction could not be directly marked by any suitable expression. *
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* Besides this, the expression sub ratione boni is also
ambiguous. For it may mean: "We represent something to
ourselves as good, when and because we desire (will) it"; or
"We desire something because we represent it to ourselves as
good," so that either the desire determines the notion of
the object as a good, or the notion of good determines the
desire (the will); so that in the first case sub ratione
boni would mean, "We will something under the idea of the
good"; in the second, "In consequence of this idea," which,
as determining the volition, must precede it.
</pre>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 5</span>
</p>
<p>
The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions which do
not allow this difference to be overlooked. It possesses two very distinct
concepts and especially distinct expressions for that which the Latins
express by a single word, bonum. For bonum it has das Gute [good], and das
Wohl [well, weal], for malum das Bose [evil], and das Ubel [ill, bad], or
das Well [woe]. So that we express two quite distinct judgements when we
consider in an action the good and evil of it, or our weal and woe (ill).
Hence it already follows that the above quoted psychological proposition
is at least very doubtful if it is translated: "We desire nothing except
with a view to our weal or woe"; on the other hand, if we render it thus:
"Under the direction of reason we desire nothing except so far as we
esteem it good or evil," it is indubitably certain and at the same time
quite clearly expressed.
</p>
<p>
Well or ill always implies only a reference to our condition, as pleasant
or unpleasant, as one of pleasure or pain, and if we desire or avoid an
object on this account, it is only so far as it is referred to our
sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or pain that it produces. But
good or evil always implies a reference to the will, as determined by the
law of reason, to make something its object; for it is never determined
directly by the object and the idea of it, but is a faculty of taking a
rule of reason for or motive of an action (by which an object may be
realized). Good and evil therefore are properly referred to actions, not
to the sensations of the person, and if anything is to be good or evil
absolutely (i.e., in every respect and without any further condition), or
is to be so esteemed, it can only be the manner of acting, the maxim of
the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil man
that can be so called, and not a thing.
</p>
<p>
However, then, men may laugh at the Stoic, who in the severest paroxysms
of gout cried out: "Pain, however thou tormentest me, I will never admit
that thou art an evil (kakov, malum)": he was right. A bad thing it
certainly was, and his cry betrayed that; but that any evil attached to
him thereby, this he had no reason whatever to admit, for pain did not in
the least diminish the worth of his person, but only that of his
condition. If he had been conscious of a single lie, it would have lowered
his pride, but pain served only to raise it, when he was conscious that he
had not deserved it by any unrighteous action by which he had rendered
himself worthy of punishment.
</p>
<p>
What we call good must be an object of desire in the judgement of every
rational man, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of everyone;
therefore, in addition to sense, this judgement requires reason. So it is
with truthfulness, as opposed to lying; so with justice, as opposed to
violence, &c. But we may call a thing a bad [or ill] thing, which yet
everyone must at the same time acknowledge to be good, sometimes directly,
sometimes indirectly. The man who submits to a surgical operation feels it
no doubt as a bad thing, but by their reason he and everyone acknowledge
it to be good. If a man who delights in annoying and vexing peaceable
people at last receives a right good beating, this is no doubt a bad
thing; but everyone approves it and regards it as a good thing, even
though nothing else resulted from it; nay, even the man who receives it
must in his reason acknowledge that he has met justice, because he sees
the proportion between good conduct and good fortune, which reason
inevitably places before him, here put into practice.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 10</span>
</p>
<p>
No doubt our weal and woe are of very great importance in the estimation
of our practical reason, and as far as our nature as sensible beings is
concerned, our happiness is the only thing of consequence, provided it is
estimated as reason especially requires, not by the transitory sensation,
but by the influence that this has on our whole existence, and on our
satisfaction therewith; but it is not absolutely the only thing of
consequence. Man is a being who, as belonging to the world of sense, has
wants, and so far his reason has an office which it cannot refuse, namely,
to attend to the interest of his sensible nature, and to form practical
maxims, even with a view to the happiness of this life, and if possible
even to that of a future. But he is not so completely an animal as to be
indifferent to what reason says on its own account, and to use it merely
as an instrument for the satisfaction of his wants as a sensible being.
For the possession of reason would not raise his worth above that of the
brutes, if it is to serve him only for the same purpose that instinct
serves in them; it would in that case be only a particular method which
nature had employed to equip man for the same ends for which it has
qualified brutes, without qualifying him for any higher purpose. No doubt
once this arrangement of nature has been made for him he requires reason
in order to take into consideration his weal and woe, but besides this he
possesses it for a higher purpose also, namely, not only to take into
consideration what is good or evil in itself, about which only pure
reason, uninfluenced by any sensible interest, can judge, but also to
distinguish this estimate thoroughly from the former and to make it the
supreme condition thereof.
</p>
<p>
In estimating what is good or evil in itself, as distinguished from what
can be so called only relatively, the following points are to be
considered. Either a rational principle is already conceived, as of itself
the determining principle of the will, without regard to possible objects
of desire (and therefore by the more legislative form of the maxim), and
in that case that principle is a practical a priori law, and pure reason
is supposed to be practical of itself. The law in that case determines the
will directly; the action conformed to it is good in itself; a will whose
maxim always conforms to this law is good absolutely in every respect and
is the supreme condition of all good. Or the maxim of the will is
consequent on a determining principle of desire which presupposes an
object of pleasure or pain, something therefore that pleases or
displeases, and the maxim of reason that we should pursue the former and
avoid the latter determines our actions as good relatively to our
inclination, that is, good indirectly, (i.e., relatively to a different
end to which they are means), and in that case these maxims can never be
called laws, but may be called rational practical precepts. The end
itself, the pleasure that we seek, is in the latter case not a good but a
welfare; not a concept of reason, but an empirical concept of an object of
sensation; but the use of the means thereto, that is, the action, is
nevertheless called good (because rational deliberation is required for
it), not however, good absolutely, but only relatively to our sensuous
nature, with regard to its feelings of pleasure and displeasure; but the
will whose maxim is affected thereby is not a pure will; this is directed
only to that in which pure reason by itself can be practical.
</p>
<p>
This is the proper place to explain the paradox of method in a critique of
practical reason, namely, that the concept of good and evil must not be
determined before the moral law (of which it seems as if it must be the
foundation), but only after it and by means of it. In fact, even if we did
not know that the principle of morality is a pure a priori law determining
the will, yet, that we may not assume principles quite gratuitously, we
must, at least at first, leave it undecided, whether the will has merely
empirical principles of determination, or whether it has not also pure a
priori principles; for it is contrary to all rules of philosophical method
to assume as decided that which is the very point in question. Supposing
that we wished to begin with the concept of good, in order to deduce from
it the laws of the will, then this concept of an object (as a good) would
at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining
principle of the will. Now, since this concept had not any practical a
priori law for its standard, the criterion of good or evil could not be
placed in anything but the agreement of the object with our feeling of
pleasure or pain; and the use of reason could only consist in determining
in the first place this pleasure or pain in connexion with all the
sensations of my existence, and in the second place the means of securing
to myself the object of the pleasure. Now, as experience alone can decide
what conforms to the feeling of pleasure, and by hypothesis the practical
law is to be based on this as a condition, it follows that the possibility
of a priori practical laws would be at once excluded, because it was
imagined to be necessary first of all to find an object the concept of
which, as a good, should constitute the universal though empirical
principle of determination of the will. But what it was necessary to
inquire first of all was whether there is not an a priori determining
principle of the will (and this could never be found anywhere but in a
pure practical law, in so far as this law prescribes to maxims merely
their form without regard to an object). Since, however, we laid the
foundation of all practical law in an object determined by our conceptions
of good and evil, whereas without a previous law that object could not be
conceived by empirical concepts, we have deprived ourselves beforehand of
the possibility of even conceiving a pure practical law. On the other
hand, if we had first investigated the latter analytically, we should have
found that it is not the concept of good as an object that determines the
moral law and makes it possible, but that, on the contrary, it is the
moral law that first determines the concept of good and makes it possible,
so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely.
</p>
<p>
This remark, which only concerns the method of ultimate ethical inquiries,
is of importance. It explains at once the occasion of all the mistakes of
philosophers with respect to the supreme principle of morals. For they
sought for an object of the will which they could make the matter and
principle of a law (which consequently could not determine the will
directly, but by means of that object referred to the feeling of pleasure
or pain; whereas they ought first to have searched for a law that would
determine the will a priori and directly, and afterwards determine the
object in accordance with the will). Now, whether they placed this object
of pleasure, which was to supply the supreme conception of goodness, in
happiness, in perfection, in moral [feeling], or in the will of God, their
principle in every case implied heteronomy, and they must inevitably come
upon empirical conditions of a moral law, since their object, which was to
be the immediate principle of the will, could not be called good or bad
except in its immediate relation to feeling, which is always empirical. It
is only a formal law- that is, one which prescribes to reason nothing more
than the form of its universal legislation as the supreme condition of its
maxims- that can be a priori a determining principle of practical reason.
The ancients avowed this error without concealment by directing all their
moral inquiries to the determination of the notion of the summum bonum,
which they intended afterwards to make the determining principle of the
will in the moral law; whereas it is only far later, when the moral law
has been first established for itself, and shown to be the direct
determining principle of the will, that this object can be presented to
the will, whose form is now determined a priori; and this we shall
undertake in the Dialectic of the pure practical reason. The moderns, with
whom the question of the summum bonum has gone out of fashion, or at least
seems to have become a secondary matter, hide the same error under vague
(expressions as in many other cases). It shows itself, nevertheless, in
their systems, as it always produces heteronomy of practical reason; and
from this can never be derived a moral law giving universal commands.
</p>
<p>
Now, since the notions of good and evil, as consequences of the a priori
determination of the will, imply also a pure practical principle, and
therefore a causality of pure reason; hence they do not originally refer
to objects (so as to be, for instance, special modes of the synthetic
unity of the manifold of given intuitions in one consciousness) like the
pure concepts of the understanding or categories of reason in its
theoretic employment; on the contrary, they presuppose that objects are
given; but they are all modes (modi) of a single category, namely, that of
causality, the determining principle of which consists in the rational
conception of a law, which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself,
thereby a priori proving itself practical. However, as the actions on the
one side come under a law which is not a physical law, but a law of
freedom, and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in the world of
intelligence, yet on the other side as events in the world of sense they
belong to phenomena; hence the determinations of a practical reason are
only possible in reference to the latter and, therefore, in accordance
with the categories of the understanding; not indeed with a view to any
theoretic employment of it, i.e., so as to bring the manifold of
(sensible) intuition under one consciousness a priori; but only to subject
the manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness of a practical
reason, giving it commands in the moral law, i.e., to a pure will a
priori.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 15</span>
</p>
<p>
These categories of freedom- for so we choose to call them in contrast to
those theoretic categories which are categories of physical nature- have
an obvious advantage over the latter, inasmuch as the latter are only
forms of thought which designate objects in an indefinite manner by means
of universal concept of every possible intuition; the former, on the
contrary, refer to the determination of a free elective will (to which
indeed no exactly corresponding intuition can be assigned, but which has
as its foundation a pure practical a priori law, which is not the case
with any concepts belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive
faculties); hence, instead of the form of intuition (space and time),
which does not lie in reason itself, but has to be drawn from another
source, namely, the sensibility, these being elementary practical concepts
have as their foundation the form of a pure will, which is given in reason
and, therefore, in the thinking faculty itself. From this it happens that
as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the
determination of the will, not with the physical conditions (of practical
ability) of the execution of one's purpose, the practical a priori
principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom are at once
cognitions, and have not to wait for intuitions in order to acquire
significance, and that for this remarkable reason, because they themselves
produce the reality of that to which they refer (the intention of the
will), which is not the case with theoretical concepts. Only we must be
careful to observe that these categories only apply to the practical
reason; and thus they proceed in order from those which are as yet subject
to sensible conditions and morally indeterminate to those which are free
from sensible conditions and determined merely by the moral law.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0029" id="link2H_4_0029"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good
</h2>
<p>
and Evil.
</p>
<h3>
I. QUANTITY.
</h3>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 20</span>
</p>
<p>
Subjective, according to maxims (practical opinions of the
</p>
<p>
individual)
</p>
<p>
Objective, according to principles (Precepts)
</p>
<p>
A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom
</p>
<p>
(laws)
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 25</span>
</p>
<h3>
II. QUALITY.
</h3>
<p>
Practical rules of action (praeceptivae)
</p>
<p>
Practical rules of omission (prohibitivae)
</p>
<p>
Practical rules of exceptions (exceptivae)
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 30</span>
</p>
<h3>
III. RELATION.
</h3>
<p>
To personality
</p>
<p>
To the condition of the person.
</p>
<p>
Reciprocal, of one person to the others of the others.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 35</span>
</p>
<h3>
IV. MODALITY.
</h3>
<p>
The Permitted and the Forbidden
</p>
<p>
Duty and the contrary to duty.
</p>
<p>
Perfect and imperfect duty.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 40</span>
</p>
<p>
It will at once be observed that in this table freedom is considered as a
sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of determination, in
regard to actions possible by it, which are phenomena in the world of
sense, and that consequently it is referred to the categories which
concern its physical possibility, whilst yet each category is taken so
universally that the determining principle of that causality can be placed
outside the world of sense in freedom as a property of a being in the
world of intelligence; and finally the categories of modality introduce
the transition from practical principles generally to those of morality,
but only problematically. These can be established dogmatically only by
the moral law.
</p>
<p>
I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table, since it
is intelligible enough of itself. A division of this kind based on
principles is very useful in any science, both for the sake of
thoroughness and intelligibility. Thus, for instance, we know from the
preceding table and its first number what we must begin from in practical
inquiries; namely, from the maxims which every one founds on his own
inclinations; the precepts which hold for a species of rational beings so
far as they agree in certain inclinations; and finally the law which holds
for all without regard to their inclinations, etc. In this way we survey
the whole plan of what has to be done, every question of practical
philosophy that has to be answered, and also the order that is to be
followed.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0030" id="link2H_4_0030"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement.
</h2>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 45</span>
</p>
<p>
It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of the
will. They themselves, however, are subject to a practical rule of reason
which, if it is pure reason, determines the will a priori relatively to
its object. Now, whether an action which is possible to us in the world of
sense, comes under the rule or not, is a question to be decided by the
practical judgement, by which what is said in the rule universally (in
abstracto) is applied to an action in concreto. But since a practical rule
of pure reason in the first place as practical concerns the existence of
an object, and in the second place as a practical rule of pure reason
implies necessity as regards the existence of the action and, therefore,
is a practical law, not a physical law depending on empirical principles
of determination, but a law of freedom by which the will is to be
determined independently on anything empirical (merely by the conception
of a law and its form), whereas all instances that can occur of possible
actions can only be empirical, that is, belong to the experience of
physical nature; hence, it seems absurd to expect to find in the world of
sense a case which, while as such it depends only on the law of nature,
yet admits of the application to it of a law of freedom, and to which we
can apply the supersensible idea of the morally good which is to be
exhibited in it in concreto. Thus, the judgement of the pure practical
reason is subject to the same difficulties as that of the pure theoretical
reason. The latter, however, had means at hand of escaping from these
difficulties, because, in regard to the theoretical employment, intuitions
were required to which pure concepts of the understanding could be
applied, and such intuitions (though only of objects of the senses) can be
given a priori and, therefore, as far as regards the union of the manifold
in them, conforming to the pure a priori concepts of the understanding as
schemata. On the other hand, the morally good is something whose object is
supersensible; for which, therefore, nothing corresponding can be found in
any sensible intuition. Judgement depending on laws of pure practical
reason seems, therefore, to be subject to special difficulties arising
from this, that a law of freedom is to be applied to actions, which are
events taking place in the world of sense, and which, so far, belong to
physical nature.
</p>
<p>
But here again is opened a favourable prospect for the pure practical
judgement. When I subsume under a pure practical law an action possible to
me in the world of sense, I am not concerned with the possibility of the
action as an event in the world of sense. This is a matter that belongs to
the decision of reason in its theoretic use according to the law of
causality, which is a pure concept of the understanding, for which reason
has a schema in the sensible intuition. Physical causality, or the
condition under which it takes place, belongs to the physical concepts,
the schema of which is sketched by transcendental imagination. Here,
however, we have to do, not with the schema of a case that occurs
according to laws, but with the schema of a law itself (if the word is
allowable here), since the fact that the will (not the action relatively
to its effect) is determined by the law alone without any other principle,
connects the notion of causality with quite different conditions from
those which constitute physical connection.
</p>
<p>
The physical law being a law to which the objects of sensible intuition,
as such, are subject, must have a schema corresponding to it- that is, a
general procedure of the imagination (by which it exhibits a priori to the
senses the pure concept of the understanding which the law determines).
But the law of freedom (that is, of a causality not subject to sensible
conditions), and consequently the concept of the unconditionally good,
cannot have any intuition, nor consequently any schema supplied to it for
the purpose of its application in concreto. Consequently the moral law has
no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical
objects (not the imagination); and the understanding for the purposes of
the judgement can provide for an idea of the reason, not a schema of the
sensibility, but a law, though only as to its form as law; such a law,
however, as can be exhibited in concreto in objects of the senses, and
therefore a law of nature. We can therefore call this law the type of the
moral law.
</p>
<p>
The rule of the judgement according to laws of pure practical reason is
this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place
by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself a part, you
could regard it as possible by your own will. Everyone does, in fact,
decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or evil. Thus, people
say: "If everyone permitted himself to deceive, when he thought it to his
advantage; or thought himself justified in shortening his life as soon as
he was thoroughly weary of it; or looked with perfect indifference on the
necessity of others; and if you belonged to such an order of things, would
you do so with the assent of your own will?" Now everyone knows well that
if he secretly allows himself to deceive, it does not follow that everyone
else does so; or if, unobserved, he is destitute of compassion, others
would not necessarily be so to him; hence, this comparison of the maxim of
his actions with a universal law of nature is not the determining
principle of his will. Such a law is, nevertheless, a type of the
estimation of the maxim on moral principles. If the maxim of the action is
not such as to stand the test of the form of a universal law of nature,
then it is morally impossible. This is the judgement even of common sense;
for its ordinary judgements, even those of experience, are always based on
the law of nature. It has it therefore always at hand, only that in cases
where causality from freedom is to be criticised, it makes that law of
nature only the type of a law of freedom, because, without something which
it could use as an example in a case of experience, it could not give the
law of a pure practical reason its proper use in practice.
</p>
<p>
It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as the
type of a supersensible system of things, provided I do not transfer to
the latter the intuitions, and what depends on them, but merely apply to
it the form of law in general (the notion of which occurs even in the
commonest use of reason, but cannot be definitely known a priori for any
other purpose than the pure practical use of reason); for laws, as such,
are so far identical, no matter from what they derive their determining
principles.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 50</span>
</p>
<p>
Further, since of all the supersensible absolutely nothing [is known]
except freedom (through the moral law), and this only so far as it is
inseparably implied in that law, and moreover all supersensible objects to
which reason might lead us, following the guidance of that law, have still
no reality for us, except for the purpose of that law, and for the use of
mere practical reason; and as reason is authorized and even compelled to
use physical nature (in its pure form as an object of the understanding)
as the type of the judgement; hence, the present remark will serve to
guard against reckoning amongst concepts themselves that which belongs
only to the typic of concepts. This, namely, as a typic of the judgement,
guards against the empiricism of practical reason, which founds the
practical notions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences
(so-called happiness). No doubt happiness and the infinite advantages
which would result from a will determined by self-love, if this will at
the same time erected itself into a universal law of nature, may certainly
serve as a perfectly suitable type of the morally good, but it is not
identical with it. The same typic guards also against the mysticism of
practical reason, which turns what served only as a symbol into a schema,
that is, proposes to provide for the moral concepts actual intuitions,
which, however, are not sensible (intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of
God), and thus plunges into the transcendent. What is befitting the use of
the moral concepts is only the rationalism of the judgement, which takes
from the sensible system of nature only what pure reason can also conceive
of itself, that is, conformity to law, and transfers into the
supersensible nothing but what can conversely be actually exhibited by
actions in the world of sense according to the formal rule of a law of
nature. However, the caution against empiricism of practical reason is
much more important; for mysticism is quite reconcilable with the purity
and sublimity of the moral law, and, besides, it is not very natural or
agreeable to common habits of thought to strain one's imagination to
supersensible intuitions; and hence the danger on this side is not so
general. Empiricism, on the contrary, cuts up at the roots the morality of
intentions (in which, and not in actions only, consists the high worth
that men can and ought to give to themselves), and substitutes for duty
something quite different, namely, an empirical interest, with which the
inclinations generally are secretly leagued; and empiricism, moreover,
being on this account allied with all the inclinations which (no matter
what fashion they put on) degrade humanity when they are raised to the
dignity of a supreme practical principle; and as these, nevertheless, are
so favourable to everyone's feelings, it is for that reason much more
dangerous than mysticism, which can never constitute a lasting condition
of any great number of persons.
</p>
<h3>
BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3
</h3>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2HCH0003" id="link2HCH0003"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law
should directly determine the will. If the determination of the will takes
place in conformity indeed to the moral law, but only by means of a
feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to be presupposed in order that
the law may be sufficient to determine the will, and therefore not for the
sake of the law, then the action will possess legality, but not morality.
Now, if we understand by motive (elater animi) the subjective ground of
determination of the will of a being whose reason does not necessarily
conform to the objective law, by virtue of its own nature, then it will
follow, first, that no motives can be attributed to the Divine will, and
that the motives of the human will (as well as that of every created
rational being) can never be anything else than the moral law, and
consequently that the objective principle of determination must always and
alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of the
action, if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law, without
containing its spirit. *
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* We may say of every action that conforms to the law, but
is not done for the sake of the law, that it is morally good
in the letter, not in the spirit (the intention).
</pre>
<p>
Since, then, for the purpose of giving the moral law influence over the
will, we must not seek for any other motives that might enable us to
dispense with the motive of the law itself, because that would produce
mere hypocrisy, without consistency; and it is even dangerous to allow
other motives (for instance, that of interest) even to co-operate along
with the moral law; hence nothing is left us but to determine carefully in
what way the moral law becomes a motive, and what effect this has upon the
faculty of desire. For as to the question how a law can be directly and of
itself a determining principle of the will (which is the essence of
morality), this is, for human reason, an insoluble problem and identical
with the question: how a free will is possible. Therefore what we have to
show a priori is not why the moral law in itself supplies a motive, but
what effect it, as such, produces (or, more correctly speaking, must
produce) on the mind.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 5</span>
</p>
<p>
The essential point in every determination of the will by the moral law is
that being a free will it is determined simply by the moral law, not only
without the co-operation of sensible impulses, but even to the rejection
of all such, and to the checking of all inclinations so far as they might
be opposed to that law. So far, then, the effect of the moral law as a
motive is only negative, and this motive can be known a priori to be such.
For all inclination and every sensible impulse is founded on feeling, and
the negative effect produced on feeling (by the check on the inclinations)
is itself feeling; consequently, we can see a priori that the moral law,
as a determining principle of the will, must by thwarting all our
inclinations produce a feeling which may be called pain; and in this we
have the first, perhaps the only, instance in which we are able from a
priori considerations to determine the relation of a cognition (in this
case of pure practical reason) to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure.
All the inclinations together (which can be reduced to a tolerable system,
in which case their satisfaction is called happiness) constitute
self-regard (solipsismus). This is either the self-love that consists in
an excessive fondness for oneself (philautia), or satisfaction with
oneself (arrogantia). The former is called particularly selfishness; the
latter self-conceit. Pure practical reason only checks selfishness,
looking on it as natural and active in us even prior to the moral law, so
far as to limit it to the condition of agreement with this law, and then
it is called rational self-love. But self-conceit reason strikes down
altogether, since all claims to self-esteem which precede agreement with
the moral law are vain and unjustifiable, for the certainty of a state of
mind that coincides with this law is the first condition of personal worth
(as we shall presently show more clearly), and prior to this conformity
any pretension to worth is false and unlawful. Now the propensity to
self-esteem is one of the inclinations which the moral law checks,
inasmuch as that esteem rests only on morality. Therefore the moral law
breaks down self-conceit. But as this law is something positive in itself,
namely, the form of an intellectual causality, that is, of freedom, it
must be an object of respect; for, by opposing the subjective antagonism
of the inclinations, it weakens self-conceit; and since it even breaks
down, that is, humiliates, this conceit, it is an object of the highest
respect and, consequently, is the foundation of a positive feeling which
is not of empirical origin, but is known a priori. Therefore respect for
the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual cause, and
this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori and the necessity
of which we can perceive.
</p>
<p>
In the preceding chapter we have seen that everything that presents itself
as an object of the will prior to the moral law is by that law itself,
which is the supreme condition of practical reason, excluded from the
determining principles of the will which we have called the
unconditionally good; and that the mere practical form which consists in
the adaptation of the maxims to universal legislation first determines
what is good in itself and absolutely, and is the basis of the maxims of a
pure will, which alone is good in every respect. However, we find that our
nature as sensible beings is such that the matter of desire (objects of
inclination, whether of hope or fear) first presents itself to us; and our
pathologically affected self, although it is in its maxims quite unfit for
universal legislation; yet, just as if it constituted our entire self,
strives to put its pretensions forward first, and to have them
acknowledged as the first and original. This propensity to make ourselves
in the subjective determining principles of our choice serve as the
objective determining principle of the will generally may be called
self-love; and if this pretends to be legislative as an unconditional
practical principle it may be called self-conceit. Now the moral law,
which alone is truly objective (namely, in every respect), entirely
excludes the influence of self-love on the supreme practical principle,
and indefinitely checks the self-conceit that prescribes the subjective
conditions of the former as laws. Now whatever checks our self-conceit in
our own judgement humiliates; therefore the moral law inevitably humbles
every man when he compares with it the physical propensities of his
nature. That, the idea of which as a determining principle of our will
humbles us in our self-consciousness, awakes respect for itself, so far as
it is itself positive and a determining principle. Therefore the moral law
is even subjectively a cause of respect. Now since everything that enters
into self-love belongs to inclination, and all inclination rests on
feelings, and consequently whatever checks all the feelings together in
self-love has necessarily, by this very circumstance, an influence on
feeling; hence we comprehend how it is possible to perceive a priori that
the moral law can produce an effect on feeling, in that it excludes the
inclinations and the propensity to make them the supreme practical
condition, i.e., self-love, from all participation in the supreme
legislation. This effect is on one side merely negative, but on the other
side, relatively to the restricting principle of pure practical reason, it
is positive. No special kind of feeling need be assumed for this under the
name of a practical or moral feeling as antecedent to the moral law and
serving as its foundation.
</p>
<p>
The negative effect on feeling (unpleasantness) is pathological, like
every influence on feeling and like every feeling generally. But as an
effect of the consciousness of the moral law, and consequently in relation
to a supersensible cause, namely, the subject of pure practical reason
which is the supreme lawgiver, this feeling of a rational being affected
by inclinations is called humiliation (intellectual self-depreciation);
but with reference to the positive source of this humiliation, the law, it
is respect for it. There is indeed no feeling for this law; but inasmuch
as it removes the resistance out of the way, this removal of an obstacle
is, in the judgement of reason, esteemed equivalent to a positive help to
its causality. Therefore this feeling may also be called a feeling of
respect for the moral law, and for both reasons together a moral feeling.
</p>
<p>
While the moral law, therefore, is a formal determining principle of
action by practical pure reason, and is moreover a material though only
objective determining principle of the objects of action as called good
and evil, it is also a subjective determining principle, that is, a motive
to this action, inasmuch as it has influence on the morality of the
subject and produces a feeling conducive to the influence of the law on
the will. There is here in the subject no antecedent feeling tending to
morality. For this is impossible, since every feeling is sensible, and the
motive of moral intention must be free from all sensible conditions. On
the contrary, while the sensible feeling which is at the bottom of all our
inclinations is the condition of that impression which we call respect,
the cause that determines it lies in the pure practical reason; and this
impression therefore, on account of its origin, must be called, not a
pathological but a practical effect. For by the fact that the conception
of the moral law deprives self-love of its influence, and self-conceit of
its illusion, it lessens the obstacle to pure practical reason and
produces the conception of the superiority of its objective law to the
impulses of the sensibility; and thus, by removing the counterpoise, it
gives relatively greater weight to the law in the judgement of reason (in
the case of a will affected by the aforesaid impulses). Thus the respect
for the law is not a motive to morality, but is morality itself
subjectively considered as a motive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by
rejecting all the rival pretensions of self-love, gives authority to the
law, which now alone has influence. Now it is to be observed that as
respect is an effect on feeling, and therefore on the sensibility, of a
rational being, it presupposes this sensibility, and therefore also the
finiteness of such beings on whom the moral law imposes respect; and that
respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being, or to any
being free from all sensibility, in whom, therefore, this sensibility
cannot be an obstacle to practical reason.
</p>
<p>
This feeling (which we call the moral feeling) is therefore produced
simply by reason. It does not serve for the estimation of actions nor for
the foundation of the objective moral law itself, but merely as a motive
to make this of itself a maxim. But what name could we more suitably apply
to this singular feeling which cannot be compared to any pathological
feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind that it seems to be at the disposal
of reason only, and that pure practical reason.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 10</span>
</p>
<p>
Respect applies always to persons only- not to things. The latter may
arouse inclination, and if they are animals (e.g., horses, dogs, etc.),
even love or fear, like the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey; but never
respect. Something that comes nearer to this feeling is admiration, and
this, as an affection, astonishment, can apply to things also, e.g., lofty
mountains, the magnitude, number, and distance of the heavenly bodies, the
strength and swiftness of many animals, etc. But all this is not respect.
A man also may be an object to me of love, fear, or admiration, even to
astonishment, and yet not be an object of respect. His jocose humour, his
courage and strength, his power from the rank he has amongst others, may
inspire me with sentiments of this kind, but still inner respect for him
is wanting. Fontenelle says, "I bow before a great man, but my mind does
not bow." I would add, before an humble plain man, in whom I perceive
uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am conscious of in
myself,- my mind bows whether I choose it or not, and though I bear my
head never so high that he may not forget my superior rank. Why is this?
Because his example exhibits to me a law that humbles my self-conceit when
I compare it with my conduct: a law, the practicability of obedience to
which I see proved by fact before my eyes. Now, I may even be conscious of
a like degree of uprightness, and yet the respect remains. For since in
man all good is defective, the law made visible by an example still
humbles my pride, my standard being furnished by a man whose
imperfections, whatever they may be, are not known to me as my own are,
and who therefore appears to me in a more favourable light. Respect is a
tribute which we cannot refuse to merit, whether we will or not; we may
indeed outwardly withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly.
</p>
<p>
Respect is so far from being a feeling of pleasure that we only
reluctantly give way to it as regards a man. We try to find out something
that may lighten the burden of it, some fault to compensate us for the
humiliation which such an example causes. Even the dead are not always
secure from this criticism, especially if their example appears
inimitable. Even the moral law itself in its solemn majesty is exposed to
this endeavour to save oneself from yielding it respect. Can it be thought
that it is for any other reason that we are so ready to reduce it to the
level of our familiar inclination, or that it is for any other reason that
we all take such trouble to make it out to be the chosen precept of our
own interest well understood, but that we want to be free from the
deterrent respect which shows us our own unworthiness with such severity?
Nevertheless, on the other hand, so little is there pain in it that if
once one has laid aside self-conceit and allowed practical influence to
that respect, he can never be satisfied with contemplating the majesty of
this law, and the soul believes itself elevated in proportion as it sees
the holy law elevated above it and its frail nature. No doubt great
talents and activity proportioned to them may also occasion respect or an
analogous feeling. It is very proper to yield it to them, and then it
appears as if this sentiment were the same thing as admiration. But if we
look closer we shall observe that it is always uncertain how much of the
ability is due to native talent, and how much to diligence in cultivating
it. Reason represents it to us as probably the fruit of cultivation, and
therefore as meritorious, and this notably reduces our self-conceit, and
either casts a reproach on us or urges us to follow such an example in the
way that is suitable to us. This respect, then, which we show to such a
person (properly speaking, to the law that his example exhibits) is not
mere admiration; and this is confirmed also by the fact that when the
common run of admirers think they have learned from any source the badness
of such a man's character (for instance Voltaire's) they give up all
respect for him; whereas the true scholar still feels it at least with
regard to his talents, because he is himself engaged in a business and a
vocation which make imitation of such a man in some degree a law.
</p>
<p>
Respect for the moral law is, therefore, the only and the undoubted moral
motive, and this feeling is directed to no object, except on the ground of
this law. The moral law first determines the will objectively and directly
in the judgement of reason; and freedom, whose causality can be determined
only by the law, consists just in this, that it restricts all
inclinations, and consequently self-esteem, by the condition of obedience
to its pure law. This restriction now has an effect on feeling, and
produces the impression of displeasure which can be known a priori from
the moral law. Since it is so far only a negative effect which, arising
from the influence of pure practical reason, checks the activity of the
subject, so far as it is determined by inclinations, and hence checks the
opinion of his personal worth (which, in the absence of agreement with the
moral law, is reduced to nothing); hence, the effect of this law on
feeling is merely humiliation. We can, therefore, perceive this a priori,
but cannot know by it the force of the pure practical law as a motive, but
only the resistance to motives of the sensibility. But since the same law
is objectively, that is, in the conception of pure reason, an immediate
principle of determination of the will, and consequently this humiliation
takes place only relatively to the purity of the law; hence, the lowering
of the pretensions of moral self-esteem, that is, humiliation on the
sensible side, is an elevation of the moral, i.e., practical, esteem for
the law itself on the intellectual side; in a word, it is respect for the
law, and therefore, as its cause is intellectual, a positive feeling which
can be known a priori. For whatever diminishes the obstacles to an
activity furthers this activity itself. Now the recognition of the moral
law is the consciousness of an activity of practical reason from objective
principles, which only fails to reveal its effect in actions because
subjective (pathological) causes hinder it. Respect for the moral law then
must be regarded as a positive, though indirect, effect of it on feeling,
inasmuch as this respect weakens the impeding influence of inclinations by
humiliating self-esteem; and hence also as a subjective principle of
activity, that is, as a motive to obedience to the law, and as a principle
of the maxims of a life conformable to it. From the notion of a motive
arises that of an interest, which can never be attributed to any being
unless it possesses reason, and which signifies a motive of the will in so
far as it is conceived by the reason. Since in a morally good will the law
itself must be the motive, the moral interest is a pure interest of
practical reason alone, independent of sense. On the notion of an interest
is based that of a maxim. This, therefore, is morally good only in case it
rests simply on the interest taken in obedience to the law. All three
notions, however, that of a motive, of an interest, and of a maxim, can be
applied only to finite beings. For they all suppose a limitation of the
nature of the being, in that the subjective character of his choice does
not of itself agree with the objective law of a practical reason; they
suppose that the being requires to be impelled to action by something,
because an internal obstacle opposes itself. Therefore they cannot be
applied to the Divine will.
</p>
<p>
There is something so singular in the unbounded esteem for the pure moral
law, apart from all advantage, as it is presented for our obedience by
practical reason, the voice of which makes even the boldest sinner tremble
and compels him to hide himself from it, that we cannot wonder if we find
this influence of a mere intellectual idea on the feelings quite
incomprehensible to speculative reason and have to be satisfied with
seeing so much of this a priori that such a feeling is inseparably
connected with the conception of the moral law in every finite rational
being. If this feeling of respect were pathological, and therefore were a
feeling of pleasure based on the inner sense, it would be in vain to try
to discover a connection of it with any idea a priori. But [it] is a
feeling that applies merely to what is practical, and depends on the
conception of a law, simply as to its form, not on account of any object,
and therefore cannot be reckoned either as pleasure or pain, and yet
produces an interest in obedience to the law, which we call the moral
interest, just as the capacity of taking such an interest in the law (or
respect for the moral law itself) is properly the moral feeling.
</p>
<p>
The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law, yet
combined with an inevitable constraint put upon all inclinations, though
only by our own reason, is respect for the law. The law that demands this
respect and inspires it is clearly no other than the moral (for no other
precludes all inclinations from exercising any direct influence on the
will). An action which is objectively practical according to this law, to
the exclusion of every determining principle of inclination, is duty, and
this by reason of that exclusion includes in its concept practical
obligation, that is, a determination to actions, however reluctantly they
may be done. The feeling that arises from the consciousness of this
obligation is not pathological, as would be a feeling produced by an
object of the senses, but practical only, that is, it is made possible by
a preceding (objective) determination of the will and a causality of the
reason. As submission to the law, therefore, that is, as a command
(announcing constraint for the sensibly affected subject), it contains in
it no pleasure, but on the contrary, so far, pain in the action. On the
other hand, however, as this constraint is exercised merely by the
legislation of our own reason, it also contains something elevating, and
this subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical reason is
the sole cause of it, may be called in this respect self-approbation,
since we recognize ourselves as determined thereto solely by the law
without any interest, and are now conscious of a quite different interest
subjectively produced thereby, and which is purely practical and free; and
our taking this interest in an action of duty is not suggested by any
inclination, but is commanded and actually brought about by reason through
the practical law; whence this feeling obtains a special name, that of
respect.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 15</span>
</p>
<p>
The notion of duty, therefore, requires in the action, objectively,
agreement with the law, and, subjectively in its maxim, that respect for
the law shall be the sole mode in which the will is determined thereby.
And on this rests the distinction between the consciousness of having
acted according to duty and from duty, that is, from respect for the law.
The former (legality) is possible even if inclinations have been the
determining principles of the will; but the latter (morality), moral
worth, can be placed only in this, that the action is done from duty, that
is, simply for the sake of the law. *
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* If we examine accurately the notion of respect for persons
as it has been already laid down, we shall perceive that it
always rests on the consciousness of a duty which an example
shows us, and that respect, therefore, can never have any
but a moral ground, and that it is very good and even, in a
psychological point of view, very useful for the knowledge
of mankind, that whenever we use this expression we should
attend to this secret and marvellous, yet often recurring,
regard which men in their judgement pay to the moral law.
</pre>
<p>
It is of the greatest importance to attend with the utmost exactness in
all moral judgements to the subjective principle of all maxims, that all
the morality of actions may be placed in the necessity of acting from duty
and from respect for the law, not from love and inclination for that which
the actions are to produce. For men and all created rational beings moral
necessity is constraint, that is obligation, and every action based on it
is to be conceived as a duty, not as a proceeding previously pleasing, or
likely to be pleasing to us of our own accord. As if indeed we could ever
bring it about that without respect for the law, which implies fear, or at
least apprehension of transgression, we of ourselves, like the independent
Deity, could ever come into possession of holiness of will by the
coincidence of our will with the pure moral law becoming as it were part
of our nature, never to be shaken (in which case the law would cease to be
a command for us, as we could never be tempted to be untrue to it).
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 20</span>
</p>
<p>
The moral law is in fact for the will of a perfect being a law of
holiness, but for the will of every finite rational being a law of duty,
of moral constraint, and of the determination of its actions by respect
for this law and reverence for its duty. No other subjective principle
must be assumed as a motive, else while the action might chance to be such
as the law prescribes, yet, as does not proceed from duty, the intention,
which is the thing properly in question in this legislation, is not moral.
</p>
<p>
It is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and from
sympathetic good will, or to be just from love of order; but this is not
yet the true moral maxim of our conduct which is suitable to our position
amongst rational beings as men, when we pretend with fanciful pride to set
ourselves above the thought of duty, like volunteers, and, as if we were
independent on the command, to want to do of our own good pleasure what we
think we need no command to do. We stand under a discipline of reason and
in all our maxims must not forget our subjection to it, nor withdraw
anything therefrom, or by an egotistic presumption diminish aught of the
authority of the law (although our own reason gives it) so as to set the
determining principle of our will, even though the law be conformed to,
anywhere else but in the law itself and in respect for this law. Duty and
obligation are the only names that we must give to our relation to the
moral law. We are indeed legislative members of a moral kingdom rendered
possible by freedom, and presented to us by reason as an object of
respect; but yet we are subjects in it, not the sovereign, and to mistake
our inferior position as creatures, and presumptuously to reject the
authority of the moral law, is already to revolt from it in spirit, even
though the letter of it is fulfilled.
</p>
<p>
With this agrees very well the possibility of such a command as: Love God
above everything, and thy neighbour as thyself. * For as a command it
requires respect for a law which commands love and does not leave it to
our own arbitrary choice to make this our principle. Love to God, however,
considered as an inclination (pathological love), is impossible, for He is
not an object of the senses. The same affection towards men is possible no
doubt, but cannot be commanded, for it is not in the power of any man to
love anyone at command; therefore it is only practical love that is meant
in that pith of all laws. To love God means, in this sense, to like to do
His commandments; to love one's neighbour means to like to practise all
duties towards him. But the command that makes this a rule cannot command
us to have this disposition in actions conformed to duty, but only to
endeavour after it. For a command to like to do a thing is in itself
contradictory, because if we already know of ourselves what we are bound
to do, and if further we are conscious of liking to do it, a command would
be quite needless; and if we do it not willingly, but only out of respect
for the law, a command that makes this respect the motive of our maxim
would directly counteract the disposition commanded. That law of all laws,
therefore, like all the moral precepts of the Gospel, exhibits the moral
disposition in all its perfection, in which, viewed as an ideal of
holiness, it is not attainable by any creature, but yet is the pattern
which we should strive to approach, and in an uninterrupted but infinite
progress become like to. In fact, if a rational creature could ever reach
this point, that he thoroughly likes to do all moral laws, this would mean
that there does not exist in him even the possibility of a desire that
would tempt him to deviate from them; for to overcome such a desire always
costs the subject some sacrifice and therefore requires self-compulsion,
that is, inward constraint to something that one does not quite like to
do; and no creature can ever reach this stage of moral disposition. For,
being a creature, and therefore always dependent with respect to what he
requires for complete satisfaction, he can never be quite free from
desires and inclinations, and as these rest on physical causes, they can
never of themselves coincide with the moral law, the sources of which are
quite different; and therefore they make it necessary to found the mental
disposition of one's maxims on moral obligation, not on ready inclination,
but on respect, which demands obedience to the law, even though one may
not like it; not on love, which apprehends no inward reluctance of the
will towards the law. Nevertheless, this latter, namely, love to the law
(which would then cease to be a command, and then morality, which would
have passed subjectively into holiness, would cease to be virtue) must be
the constant though unattainable goal of his endeavours. For in the case
of what we highly esteem, but yet (on account of the consciousness of our
weakness) dread, the increased facility of satisfying it changes the most
reverential awe into inclination, and respect into love; at least this
would be the perfection of a disposition devoted to the law, if it were
possible for a creature to attain it.
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* This law is in striking contrast with the principle of
private happiness which some make the supreme principle of
morality. This would be expressed thus: Love thyself above
everything, and God and thy neighbour for thine own sake.
</pre>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 25</span>
</p>
<p>
This reflection is intended not so much to clear up the evangelical
command just cited, in order to prevent religious fanaticism in regard to
love of God, but to define accurately the moral disposition with regard
directly to our duties towards men, and to check, or if possible prevent,
a merely moral fanaticism which infects many persons. The stage of
morality on which man (and, as far as we can see, every rational creature)
stands is respect for the moral law. The disposition that he ought to have
in obeying this is to obey it from duty, not from spontaneous inclination,
or from an endeavour taken up from liking and unbidden; and this proper
moral condition in which he can always be is virtue, that is, moral
disposition militant, and not holiness in the fancied possession of a
perfect purity of the disposition of the will. It is nothing but moral
fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit that is infused into the mind by
exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, by which men
are led into the delusion that it is not duty, that is, respect for the
law, whose yoke (an easy yoke indeed, because reason itself imposes it on
us) they must bear, whether they like it or not, that constitutes the
determining principle of their actions, and which always humbles them
while they obey it; fancying that those actions are expected from them,
not from duty, but as pure merit. For not only would they, in imitating
such deeds from such a principle, not have fulfilled the spirit of the law
in the least, which consists not in the legality of the action (without
regard to principle), but in the subjection of the mind to the law; not
only do they make the motives pathological (seated in sympathy or
self-love), not moral (in the law), but they produce in this way a vain,
high-flying, fantastic way of thinking, flattering themselves with a
spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor bridle, for
which no command is needed, and thereby forgetting their obligation, which
they ought to think of rather than merit. Indeed actions of others which
are done with great sacrifice, and merely for the sake of duty, may be
praised as noble and sublime, but only so far as there are traces which
suggest that they were done wholly out of respect for duty and not from
excited feelings. If these, however, are set before anyone as examples to
be imitated, respect for duty (which is the only true moral feeling) must
be employed as the motive- this severe holy precept which never allows our
vain self-love to dally with pathological impulses (however analogous they
may be to morality), and to take a pride in meritorious worth. Now if we
search we shall find for all actions that are worthy of praise a law of
duty which commands, and does not leave us to choose what may be agreeable
to our inclinations. This is the only way of representing things that can
give a moral training to the soul, because it alone is capable of solid
and accurately defined principles.
</p>
<p>
If fanaticism in its most general sense is a deliberate over stepping of
the limits of human reason, then moral fanaticism is such an over stepping
of the bounds that practical pure reason sets to mankind, in that it
forbids us to place the subjective determining principle of correct
actions, that is, their moral motive, in anything but the law itself, or
to place the disposition which is thereby brought into the maxims in
anything but respect for this law, and hence commands us to take as the
supreme vital principle of all morality in men the thought of duty, which
strikes down all arrogance as well as vain self-love.
</p>
<p>
If this is so, it is not only writers of romance or sentimental educators
(although they may be zealous opponents of sentimentalism), but sometimes
even philosophers, nay, even the severest of all, the Stoics, that have
brought in moral fanaticism instead of a sober but wise moral discipline,
although the fanaticism of the latter was more heroic, that of the former
of an insipid, effeminate character; and we may, without hypocrisy, say of
the moral teaching of the Gospel, that it first, by the purity of its
moral principle, and at the same time by its suitability to the
limitations of finite beings, brought all the good conduct of men under
the discipline of a duty plainly set before their eyes, which does not
permit them to indulge in dreams of imaginary moral perfections; and that
it also set the bounds of humility (that is, self-knowledge) to
self-conceit as well as to self-love, both which are ready to mistake
their limits.
</p>
<p>
Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or
insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not to move the
will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror,
but merely holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the
mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a
law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly
counter-work it; what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be
found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kindred with
the inclinations; a root to be derived from which is the indispensable
condition of the only worth which men can give themselves?
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 30</span>
</p>
<p>
It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself (as a
part of the world of sense), a power which connects him with an order of
things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the
same time commands the whole sensible world, and with it the empirically
determinable existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all
ends (which totality alone suits such unconditional practical laws as the
moral). This power is nothing but personality, that is, freedom and
independence on the mechanism of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty
of a being which is subject to special laws, namely, pure practical laws
given by its own reason; so that the person as belonging to the sensible
world is subject to his own personality as belonging to the intelligible
[supersensible] world. It is then not to be wondered at that man, as
belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to its
second and highest characteristic only with reverence, and its laws with
the highest respect.
</p>
<p>
On this origin are founded many expressions which designate the worth of
objects according to moral ideas. The moral law is holy (inviolable). Man
is indeed unholy enough, but he must regard humanity in his own person as
holy. In all creation every thing one chooses and over which one has any
power, may be used merely as means; man alone, and with him every rational
creature, is an end in himself. By virtue of the autonomy of his freedom
he is the subject of the moral law, which is holy. Just for this reason
every will, even every person's own individual will, in relation to
itself, is restricted to the condition of agreement with the autonomy of
the rational being, that is to say, that it is not to be subject to any
purpose which cannot accord with a law which might arise from the will of
the passive subject himself; the latter is, therefore, never to be
employed merely as means, but as itself also, concurrently, an end. We
justly attribute this condition even to the Divine will, with regard to
the rational beings in the world, which are His creatures, since it rests
on their personality, by which alone they are ends in themselves.
</p>
<p>
This respect-inspiring idea of personality which sets before our eyes the
sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at the same time it
shows us the want of accord of our conduct with it and thereby strikes
down self-conceit, is even natural to the commonest reason and easily
observed. Has not every even moderately honourable man sometimes found
that, where by an otherwise inoffensive lie he might either have withdrawn
himself from an unpleasant business, or even have procured some advantages
for a loved and well-deserving friend, he has avoided it solely lest he
should despise himself secretly in his own eyes? When an upright man is in
the greatest distress, which he might have avoided if he could only have
disregarded duty, is he not sustained by the consciousness that he has
maintained humanity in its proper dignity in his own person and honoured
it, that he has no reason to be ashamed of himself in his own sight, or to
dread the inward glance of self-examination? This consolation is not
happiness, it is not even the smallest part of it, for no one would wish
to have occasion for it, or would, perhaps, even desire a life in such
circumstances. But he lives, and he cannot endure that he should be in his
own eyes unworthy of life. This inward peace is therefore merely negative
as regards what can make life pleasant; it is, in fact, only the escaping
the danger of sinking in personal worth, after everything else that is
valuable has been lost. It is the effect of a respect for something quite
different from life, something in comparison and contrast with which life
with all its enjoyment has no value. He still lives only because it is his
duty, not because he finds anything pleasant in life.
</p>
<p>
Such is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason; it is no
other than the pure moral law itself, inasmuch as it makes us conscious of
the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and subjectively produces
respect for their higher nature in men who are also conscious of their
sensible existence and of the consequent dependence of their
pathologically very susceptible nature. Now with this motive may be
combined so many charms and satisfactions of life that even on this
account alone the most prudent choice of a rational Epicurean reflecting
on the greatest advantage of life would declare itself on the side of
moral conduct, and it may even be advisable to join this prospect of a
cheerful enjoyment of life with that supreme motive which is already
sufficient of itself; but only as a counterpoise to the attractions which
vice does not fail to exhibit on the opposite side, and not so as, even in
the smallest degree, to place in this the proper moving power when duty is
in question. For that would be just the same as to wish to taint the
purity of the moral disposition in its source. The majesty of duty has
nothing to do with enjoyment of life; it has its special law and its
special tribunal, and though the two should be never so well shaken
together to be given well mixed, like medicine, to the sick soul, yet they
will soon separate of themselves; and if they do not, the former will not
act; and although physical life might gain somewhat in force, the moral
life would fade away irrecoverably.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 35</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0032" id="link2H_4_0032"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
By the critical examination of a science, or of a portion of it, which
constitutes a system by itself, I understand the inquiry and proof why it
must have this and no other systematic form, when we compare it with
another system which is based on a similar faculty of knowledge. Now
practical and speculative reason are based on the same faculty, so far as
both are pure reason. Therefore the difference in their systematic form
must be determined by the comparison of both, and the ground of this must
be assigned.
</p>
<p>
The Analytic of pure theoretic reason had to do with the knowledge of such
objects as may have been given to the understanding, and was obliged
therefore to begin from intuition and consequently (as this is always
sensible) from sensibility; and only after that could advance to concepts
(of the objects of this intuition), and could only end with principles
after both these had preceded. On the contrary, since practical reason has
not to do with objects so as to know them, but with its own faculty of
realizing them (in accordance with the knowledge of them), that is, with a
will which is a causality, inasmuch as reason contains its determining
principle; since, consequently, it has not to furnish an object of
intuition, but as practical reason has to furnish only a law (because the
notion of causality always implies the reference to a law which determines
the existence of the many in relation to one another); hence a critical
examination of the Analytic of reason, if this is to be practical reason
(and this is properly the problem), must begin with the possibility of
practical principles a priori. Only after that can it proceed to concepts
of the objects of a practical reason, namely, those of absolute good and
evil, in order to assign them in accordance with those principles (for
prior to those principles they cannot possibly be given as good and evil
by any faculty of knowledge), and only then could the section be concluded
with the last chapter, that, namely, which treats of the relation of the
pure practical reason to the sensibility and of its necessary influence
thereon, which is a priori cognisable, that is, of the moral sentiment.
Thus the Analytic of the practical pure reason has the whole extent of the
conditions of its use in common with the theoretical, but in reverse
order. The Analytic of pure theoretic reason was divided into
transcendental Aesthetic and transcendental Logic, that of the practical
reversely into Logic and Aesthetic of pure practical reason (if I may, for
the sake of analogy merely, use these designations, which are not quite
suitable). This logic again was there divided into the Analytic of
concepts and that of principles: here into that of principles and
concepts. The Aesthetic also had in the former case two parts, on account
of the two kinds of sensible intuition; here the sensibility is not
considered as a capacity of intuition at all, but merely as feeling (which
can be a subjective ground of desire), and in regard to it pure practical
reason admits no further division.
</p>
<p>
It is also easy to see the reason why this division into two parts with
its subdivision was not actually adopted here (as one might have been
induced to attempt by the example of the former critique). For since it is
pure reason that is here considered in its practical use, and consequently
as proceeding from a priori principles, and not from empirical principles
of determination, hence the division of the analytic of pure practical
reason must resemble that of a syllogism; namely, proceeding from the
universal in the major premiss (the moral principle), through a minor
premiss containing a subsumption of possible actions (as good or evil)
under the former, to the conclusion, namely, the subjective determination
of the will (an interest in the possible practical good, and in the maxim
founded on it). He who has been able to convince himself of the truth of
the positions occurring in the Analytic will take pleasure in such
comparisons; for they justly suggest the expectation that we may perhaps
some day be able to discern the unity of the whole faculty of reason
(theoretical as well as practical) and be able to derive all from one
principle, which, is what human reason inevitably demands, as it finds
complete satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of its
knowledge.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 40</span>
</p>
<p>
If now we consider also the contents of the knowledge that we can have of
a pure practical reason, and by means of it, as shown by the Analytic, we
find, along with a remarkable analogy between it and the theoretical, no
less remarkable differences. As regards the theoretical, the faculty of a
pure rational cognition a priori could be easily and evidently proved by
examples from sciences (in which, as they put their principles to the test
in so many ways by methodical use, there is not so much reason as in
common knowledge to fear a secret mixture of empirical principles of
cognition). But, that pure reason without the admixture of any empirical
principle is practical of itself, this could only be shown from the
commonest practical use of reason, by verifying the fact, that every man's
natural reason acknowledges the supreme practical principle as the supreme
law of his will- a law completely a priori and not depending on any
sensible data. It was necessary first to establish and verify the purity
of its origin, even in the judgement of this common reason, before science
could take it in hand to make use of it, as a fact, that is, prior to all
disputation about its possibility, and all the consequences that may be
drawn from it. But this circumstance may be readily explained from what
has just been said; because practical pure reason must necessarily begin
with principles, which therefore must be the first data, the foundation of
all science, and cannot be derived from it. It was possible to effect this
verification of moral principles as principles of a pure reason quite
well, and with sufficient certainty, by a single appeal to the judgement
of common sense, for this reason, that anything empirical which might slip
into our maxims as a determining principle of the will can be detected at
once by the feeling of pleasure or pain which necessarily attaches to it
as exciting desire; whereas pure practical reason positively refuses to
admit this feeling into its principle as a condition. The heterogeneity of
the determining principles (the empirical and rational) is clearly
detected by this resistance of a practically legislating reason against
every admixture of inclination, and by a peculiar kind of sentiment,
which, however, does not precede the legislation of the practical reason,
but, on the contrary, is produced by this as a constraint, namely, by the
feeling of a respect such as no man has for inclinations of whatever kind
but for the law only; and it is detected in so marked and prominent a
manner that even the most uninstructed cannot fail to see at once in an
example presented to him, that empirical principles of volition may indeed
urge him to follow their attractions, but that he can never be expected to
obey anything but the pure practical law of reason alone.
</p>
<p>
The distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine of
morality, in the former of which empirical principles constitute the
entire foundation, while in the second they do not form the smallest part
of it, is the first and most important office of the Analytic of pure
practical reason; and it must proceed in it with as much exactness and, so
to speak, scrupulousness, as any geometer in his work. The philosopher,
however, has greater difficulties to contend with here (as always in
rational cognition by means of concepts merely without construction),
because he cannot take any intuition as a foundation (for a pure
noumenon). He has, however, this advantage that, like the chemist, he can
at any time make an experiment with every man's practical reason for the
purpose of distinguishing the moral (pure) principle of determination from
the empirical; namely, by adding the moral law (as a determining
principle) to the empirically affected will (e.g., that of the man who
would be ready to lie because he can gain something thereby). It is as if
the analyst added alkali to a solution of lime in hydrochloric acid, the
acid at once forsakes the lime, combines with the alkali, and the lime is
precipitated. Just in the same way, if to a man who is otherwise honest
(or who for this occasion places himself only in thought in the position
of an honest man), we present the moral law by which he recognises the
worthlessness of the liar, his practical reason (in forming a judgement of
what ought to be done) at once forsakes the advantage, combines with that
which maintains in him respect for his own person (truthfulness), and the
advantage after it has been separated and washed from every particle of
reason (which is altogether on the side of duty) is easily weighed by
everyone, so that it can enter into combination with reason in other
cases, only not where it could be opposed to the moral law, which reason
never forsakes, but most closely unites itself with.
</p>
<p>
But it does not follow that this distinction between the principle of
happiness and that of morality is an opposition between them, and pure
practical reason does not require that we should renounce all claim to
happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we should take no
account of happiness. It may even in certain respects be a duty to provide
for happiness; partly, because (including skill, wealth, riches) it
contains means for the fulfilment of our duty; partly, because the absence
of it (e.g., poverty) implies temptations to transgress our duty. But it
can never be an immediate duty to promote our happiness, still less can it
be the principle of all duty. Now, as all determining principles of the
will, except the law of pure practical reason alone (the moral law), are
all empirical and, therefore, as such, belong to the principle of
happiness, they must all be kept apart from the supreme principle of
morality and never be incorporated with it as a condition; since this
would be to destroy all moral worth just as much as any empirical
admixture with geometrical principles would destroy the certainty of
mathematical evidence, which in Plato's opinion is the most excellent
thing in mathematics, even surpassing their utility.
</p>
<p>
Instead, however, of the deduction of the supreme principle of pure
practical reason, that is, the explanation of the possibility of such a
knowledge a priori, the utmost we were able to do was to show that if we
saw the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, we should also
see not merely the possibility, but even the necessity, of the moral law
as the supreme practical law of rational beings, to whom we attribute
freedom of causality of their will; because both concepts are so
inseparably united that we might define practical freedom as independence
of the will on anything but the moral law. But we cannot perceive the
possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, especially in the world
of sense; we are fortunate if only we can be sufficiently assured that
there is no proof of its impossibility, and are now, by the moral law
which postulates it, compelled and therefore authorized to assume it.
However, there are still many who think that they can explain this freedom
on empirical principles, like any other physical faculty, and treat it as
a psychological property, the explanation of which only requires a more
exact study of the nature of the soul and of the motives of the will, and
not as a transcendental predicate of the causality of a being that belongs
to the world of sense (which is really the point). They thus deprive us of
the grand revelation which we obtain through practical reason by means of
the moral law, the revelation, namely, of a supersensible world by the
realization of the otherwise transcendent concept of freedom, and by this
deprive us also of the moral law itself, which admits no empirical
principle of determination. Therefore it will be necessary to add
something here as a protection against this delusion and to exhibit
empiricism in its naked superficiality.
</p>
<p>
The notion of causality as physical necessity, in opposition to the same
notion as freedom, concerns only the existence of things so far as it is
determinable in time, and, consequently, as phenomena, in opposition to
their causality as things in themselves. Now if we take the attributes of
existence of things in time for attributes of things in themselves (which
is the common view), then it is impossible to reconcile the necessity of
the causal relation with freedom; they are contradictory. For from the
former it follows that every event, and consequently every action that
takes place at a certain point of time, is a necessary result of what
existed in time preceding. Now as time past is no longer in my power,
hence every action that I perform must be the necessary result of certain
determining grounds which are not in my power, that is, at the moment in
which I am acting I am never free. Nay, even if I assume that my whole
existence is independent on any foreign cause (for instance, God), so that
the determining principles of my causality, and even of my whole
existence, were not outside myself, yet this would not in the least
transform that physical necessity into freedom. For at every moment of
time I am still under the necessity of being determined to action by that
which is not in my power, and the series of events infinite a parte
priori, which I only continue according to a pre-determined order and
could never begin of myself, would be a continuous physical chain, and
therefore my causality would never be freedom.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 45</span>
</p>
<p>
If, then, we would attribute freedom to a being whose existence is
determined in time, we cannot except him from the law of necessity as to
all events in his existence and, consequently, as to his actions also; for
that would be to hand him over to blind chance. Now as this law inevitably
applies to all the causality of things, so far as their existence is
determinable in time, it follows that if this were the mode in which we
had also to conceive the existence of these things in themselves, freedom
must be rejected as a vain and impossible conception. Consequently, if we
would still save it, no other way remains but to consider that the
existence of a thing, so far as it is determinable in time, and therefore
its causality, according to the law of physical necessity, belong to
appearance, and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in
itself. This is certainly inevitable, if we would retain both these
contradictory concepts together; but in application, when we try to
explain their combination in one and the same action, great difficulties
present themselves which seem to render such a combination impracticable.
</p>
<p>
When I say of a man who commits a theft that, by the law of causality,
this deed is a necessary result of the determining causes in preceding
time, then it was impossible that it could not have happened; how then can
the judgement, according to the moral law, make any change, and suppose
that it could have been omitted, because the law says that it ought to
have been omitted; that is, how can a man be called quite free at the same
moment, and with respect to the same action in which he is subject to an
inevitable physical necessity? Some try to evade this by saying that the
causes that determine his causality are of such a kind as to agree with a
comparative notion of freedom. According to this, that is sometimes called
a free effect, the determining physical cause of which lies within the
acting thing itself, e.g., that which a projectile performs when it is in
free motion, in which case we use the word freedom, because while it is in
flight it is not urged by anything external; or as we call the motion of a
clock a free motion, because it moves its hands itself, which therefore do
not require to be pushed by external force; so although the actions of man
are necessarily determined by causes which precede in time, we yet call
them free, because these causes are ideas produced by our own faculties,
whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances, and hence actions
are wrought according to our own pleasure. This is a wretched subterfuge
with which some persons still let themselves be put off, and so think they
have solved, with a petty word- jugglery, that difficult problem, at the
solution of which centuries have laboured in vain, and which can therefore
scarcely be found so completely on the surface. In fact, in the question
about the freedom which must be the foundation of all moral laws and the
consequent responsibility, it does not matter whether the principles which
necessarily determine causality by a physical law reside within the
subject or without him, or in the former case whether these principles are
instinctive or are conceived by reason, if, as is admitted by these men
themselves, these determining ideas have the ground of their existence in
time and in the antecedent state, and this again in an antecedent, etc.
Then it matters not that these are internal; it matters not that they have
a psychological and not a mechanical causality, that is, produce actions
by means of ideas and not by bodily movements; they are still determining
principles of the causality of a being whose existence is determinable in
time, and therefore under the necessitation of conditions of past time,
which therefore, when the subject has to act, are no longer in his power.
This may imply psychological freedom (if we choose to apply this term to a
merely internal chain of ideas in the mind), but it involves physical
necessity and, therefore, leaves no room for transcendental freedom, which
must be conceived as independence on everything empirical, and,
consequently, on nature generally, whether it is an object of the internal
sense considered in time only, or of the external in time and space.
Without this freedom (in the latter and true sense), which alone is
practical a priori, no moral law and no moral imputation are possible.
Just for this reason the necessity of events in time, according to the
physical law of causality, may be called the mechanism of nature, although
we do not mean by this that things which are subject to it must be really
material machines. We look here only to the necessity of the connection of
events in a time-series as it is developed according to the physical law,
whether the subject in which this development takes place is called
automaton materiale when the mechanical being is moved by matter, or with
Leibnitz spirituale when it is impelled by ideas; and if the freedom of
our will were no other than the latter (say the psychological and
comparative, not also transcendental, that is, absolute), then it would at
bottom be nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once
it is wound up, accomplishes its motions of itself.
</p>
<p>
Now, in order to remove in the supposed case the apparent contradiction
between freedom and the mechanism of nature in one and the same action, we
must remember what was said in the Critique of Pure Reason, or what
follows therefrom; viz., that the necessity of nature, which cannot
co-exist with the freedom of the subject, appertains only to the
attributes of the thing that is subject to time-conditions, consequently
only to those of the acting subject as a phenomenon; that therefore in
this respect the determining principles of every action of the same reside
in what belongs to past time and is no longer in his power (in which must
be included his own past actions and the character that these may
determine for him in his own eyes as a phenomenon). But the very same
subject, being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in
himself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not subject to
time-conditions, and regards himself as only determinable by laws which he
gives himself through reason; and in this his existence nothing is
antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action, and in
general every modification of his existence, varying according to his
internal sense, even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being
is in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but the
result, and never to be regarded as the determining principle, of his
causality as a noumenon. In this view now the rational being can justly
say of every unlawful action that he performs, that he could very well
have left it undone; although as appearance it is sufficiently determined
in the past, and in this respect is absolutely necessary; for it, with all
the past which determines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of his
character which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he imputes
the causality of those appearances to himself as a cause independent on
sensibility.
</p>
<p>
With this agree perfectly the judicial sentences of that wonderful faculty
in us which we call conscience. A man may use as much art as he likes in
order to paint to himself an unlawful act, that he remembers, as an
unintentional error, a mere oversight, such as one can never altogether
avoid, and therefore as something in which he was carried away by the
stream of physical necessity, and thus to make himself out innocent, yet
he finds that the advocate who speaks in his favour can by no means
silence the accuser within, if only he is conscious that at the time when
he did this wrong he was in his senses, that is, in possession of his
freedom; and, nevertheless, he accounts for his error from some bad
habits, which by gradual neglect of attention he has allowed to grow upon
him to such a degree that he can regard his error as its natural
consequence, although this cannot protect him from the blame and reproach
which he casts upon himself. This is also the ground of repentance for a
long past action at every recollection of it; a painful feeling produced
by the moral sentiment, and which is practically void in so far as it
cannot serve to undo what has been done. (Hence Priestley, as a true and
consistent fatalist, declares it absurd, and he deserves to be commended
for this candour more than those who, while they maintain the mechanism of
the will in fact, and its freedom in words only, yet wish it to be thought
that they include it in their system of compromise, although they do not
explain the possibility of such moral imputation.) But the pain is quite
legitimate, because when the law of our intelligible [supersensible]
existence (the moral law) is in question, reason recognizes no distinction
of time, and only asks whether the event belongs to me, as my act, and
then always morally connects the same feeling with it, whether it has
happened just now or long ago. For in reference to the supersensible
consciousness of its existence (i.e., freedom) the life of sense is but a
single phenomenon, which, inasmuch as it contains merely manifestations of
the mental disposition with regard to the moral law (i.e., of the
character), must be judged not according to the physical necessity that
belongs to it as phenomenon, but according to the absolute spontaneity of
freedom. It may therefore be admitted that, if it were possible to have so
profound an insight into a man's mental character as shown by internal as
well as external actions as to know all its motives, even the smallest,
and likewise all the external occasions that can influence them, we could
calculate a man's conduct for the future with as great certainty as a
lunar or solar eclipse; and nevertheless we may maintain that the man is
free. In fact, if we were capable of a further glance, namely, an
intellectual intuition of the same subject (which indeed is not granted to
us, and instead of it we have only the rational concept), then we should
perceive that this whole chain of appearances in regard to all that
concerns the moral laws depends on the spontaneity of the subject as a
thing in itself, of the determination of which no physical explanation can
be given. In default of this intuition, the moral law assures us of this
distinction between the relation of our actions as appearance to our
sensible nature, and the relation of this sensible nature to the
supersensible substratum in us. In this view, which is natural to our
reason, though inexplicable, we can also justify some judgements which we
passed with all conscientiousness, and which yet at first sight seem quite
opposed to all equity. There are cases in which men, even with the same
education which has been profitable to others, yet show such early
depravity, and so continue to progress in it to years of manhood, that
they are thought to be born villains, and their character altogether
incapable of improvement; and nevertheless they are judged for what they
do or leave undone, they are reproached for their faults as guilty; nay,
they themselves (the children) regard these reproaches as well founded,
exactly as if in spite of the hopeless natural quality of mind ascribed to
them, they remained just as responsible as any other man. This could not
happen if we did not suppose that whatever springs from a man's choice (as
every action intentionally performed undoubtedly does) has as its
foundation a free causality, which from early youth expresses its
character in its manifestations (i.e., actions). These, on account of the
uniformity of conduct, exhibit a natural connection, which however does
not make the vicious quality of the will necessary, but on the contrary,
is the consequence of the evil principles voluntarily adopted and
unchangeable, which only make it so much the more culpable and deserving
of punishment. There still remains a difficulty in the combination of
freedom with the mechanism of nature in a being belonging to the world of
sense; a difficulty which, even after all the foregoing is admitted,
threatens freedom with complete destruction. But with this danger there is
also a circumstance that offers hope of an issue still favourable to
freedom; namely, that the same difficulty presses much more strongly (in
fact as we shall presently see, presses only) on the system that holds the
existence determinable in time and space to be the existence of things in
themselves; it does not therefore oblige us to give up our capital
supposition of the ideality of time as a mere form of sensible intuition,
and consequently as a mere manner of representation which is proper to the
subject as belonging to the world of sense; and therefore it only requires
that this view be reconciled with this idea.
</p>
<p>
The difficulty is as follows: Even if it is admitted that the
supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action,
although, as a subject also belonging to the world of sense, he is under
mechanical conditions with respect to the same action, still, as soon as
we allow that God as universal first cause is also the cause of the
existence of substance (a proposition which can never be given up without
at the same time giving up the notion of God as the Being of all beings,
and therewith giving up his all sufficiency, on which everything in
theology depends), it seems as if we must admit that a man's actions have
their determining principle in something which is wholly out of his power-
namely, in the causality of a Supreme Being distinct from himself and on
whom his own existence and the whole determination of his causality are
absolutely dependent. In point of fact, if a man's actions as belonging to
his modifications in time were not merely modifications of him as
appearance, but as a thing in itself, freedom could not be saved. Man
would be a marionette or an automaton, like Vaucanson's, prepared and
wound up by the Supreme Artist. Self-consciousness would indeed make him a
thinking automaton; but the consciousness of his own spontaneity would be
mere delusion if this were mistaken for freedom, and it would deserve this
name only in a comparative sense, since, although the proximate
determining causes of its motion and a long series of their determining
causes are internal, yet the last and highest is found in a foreign hand.
Therefore I do not see how those who still insist on regarding time and
space as attributes belonging to the existence of things in themselves,
can avoid admitting the fatality of actions; or if (like the otherwise
acute Mendelssohn) they allow them to be conditions necessarily belonging
to the existence of finite and derived beings, but not to that of the
infinite Supreme Being, I do not see on what ground they can justify such
a distinction, or, indeed, how they can avoid the contradiction that meets
them, when they hold that existence in time is an attribute necessarily
belonging to finite things in themselves, whereas God is the cause of this
existence, but cannot be the cause of time (or space) itself (since this
must be presupposed as a necessary a priori condition of the existence of
things); and consequently as regards the existence of these things. His
causality must be subject to conditions and even to the condition of time;
and this would inevitably bring in everything contradictory to the notions
of His infinity and independence. On the other hand, it is quite easy for
us to draw the distinction between the attribute of the divine existence
of being independent on all time-conditions, and that of a being of the
world of sense, the distinction being that between the existence of a
being in itself and that of a thing in appearance. Hence, if this ideality
of time and space is not adopted, nothing remains but Spinozism, in which
space and time are essential attributes of the Supreme Being Himself, and
the things dependent on Him (ourselves, therefore, included) are not
substances, but merely accidents inhering in Him; since, if these things
as His effects exist in time only, this being the condition of their
existence in themselves, then the actions of these beings must be simply
His actions which He performs in some place and time. Thus, Spinozism, in
spite of the absurdity of its fundamental idea, argues more consistently
than the creation theory can, when beings assumed to be substances, and
beings in themselves existing in time, are regarded as effects of a
Supreme Cause, and yet as not [belonging] to Him and His action, but as
separate substances.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 50</span>
</p>
<p>
The above-mentioned difficulty is resolved briefly and clearly as follows:
If existence in time is a mere sensible mode of representation belonging
to thinking beings in the world and consequently does not apply to them as
things in themselves, then the creation of these beings is a creation of
things in themselves, since the notion of creation does not belong to the
sensible form of representation of existence or to causality, but can only
be referred to noumena. Consequently, when I say of beings in the world of
sense that they are created, I so far regard them as noumena. As it would
be a contradiction, therefore, to say that God is a creator of
appearances, so also it is a contradiction to say that as creator He is
the cause of actions in the world of sense, and therefore as appearances,
although He is the cause of the existence of the acting beings (which are
noumena). If now it is possible to affirm freedom in spite of the natural
mechanism of actions as appearances (by regarding existence in time as
something that belongs only to appearances, not to things in themselves),
then the circumstance that the acting beings are creatures cannot make the
slightest difference, since creation concerns their supersensible and not
their sensible existence, and, therefore, cannot be regarded as the
determining principle of the appearances. It would be quite different if
the beings in the world as things in themselves existed in time, since in
that case the creator of substance would be at the same time the author of
the whole mechanism of this substance.
</p>
<p>
Of so great importance is the separation of time (as well as space) from
the existence of things in themselves which was effected in the Critique
of the Pure Speculative Reason.
</p>
<p>
It may be said that the solution here proposed involves great difficulty
in itself and is scarcely susceptible of a lucid exposition. But is any
other solution that has been attempted, or that may be attempted, easier
and more intelligible? Rather might we say that the dogmatic teachers of
metaphysics have shown more shrewdness than candour in keeping this
difficult point out of sight as much as possible, in the hope that if they
said nothing about it, probably no one would think of it. If science is to
be advanced, all difficulties must be laid open, and we must even search
for those that are hidden, for every difficulty calls forth a remedy,
which cannot be discovered without science gaining either in extent or in
exactness; and thus even obstacles become means of increasing the
thoroughness of science. On the other hand, if the difficulties are
intentionally concealed, or merely removed by palliatives, then sooner or
later they burst out into incurable mischiefs, which bring science to ruin
in an absolute scepticism.
</p>
<p>
Since it is, properly speaking, the notion of freedom alone amongst all
the ideas of pure speculative reason that so greatly enlarges our
knowledge in the sphere of the supersensible, though only of our practical
knowledge, I ask myself why it exclusively possesses so great fertility,
whereas the others only designate the vacant space for possible beings of
the pure understanding, but are unable by any means to define the concept
of them. I presently find that as I cannot think anything without a
category, I must first look for a category for the rational idea of
freedom with which I am now concerned; and this is the category of
causality; and although freedom, a concept of the reason, being a
transcendent concept, cannot have any intuition corresponding to it, yet
the concept of the understanding- for the synthesis of which the former
demands the unconditioned- (namely, the concept of causality) must have a
sensible intuition given, by which first its objective reality is assured.
Now, the categories are all divided into two classes- the mathematical,
which concern the unity of synthesis in the conception of objects, and the
dynamical, which refer to the unity of synthesis in the conception of the
existence of objects. The former (those of magnitude and quality) always
contain a synthesis of the homogeneous, and it is not possible to find in
this the unconditioned antecedent to what is given in sensible intuition
as conditioned in space and time, as this would itself have to belong to
space and time, and therefore be again still conditioned. Whence it
resulted in the Dialectic of Pure Theoretic Reason that the opposite
methods of attaining the unconditioned and the totality of the conditions
were both wrong. The categories of the second class (those of causality
and of the necessity of a thing) did not require this homogeneity (of the
conditioned and the condition in synthesis), since here what we have to
explain is not how the intuition is compounded from a manifold in it, but
only how the existence of the conditioned object corresponding to it is
added to the existence of the condition (added, namely, in the
understanding as connected therewith); and in that case it was allowable
to suppose in the supersensible world the unconditioned antecedent to the
altogether conditioned in the world of sense (both as regards the causal
connection and the contingent existence of things themselves), although
this unconditioned remained indeterminate, and to make the synthesis
transcendent. Hence, it was found in the Dialectic of the Pure Speculative
Reason that the two apparently opposite methods of obtaining for the
conditioned the unconditioned were not really contradictory, e.g., in the
synthesis of causality to conceive for the conditioned in the series of
causes and effects of the sensible world, a causality which has no
sensible condition, and that the same action which, as belonging to the
world of sense, is always sensibly conditioned, that is, mechanically
necessary, yet at the same time may be derived from a causality not
sensibly conditioned- being the causality of the acting being as belonging
to the supersensible world- and may consequently be conceived as free.
Now, the only point in question was to change this may be into is; that
is, that we should be able to show in an actual case, as it were by a
fact, that certain actions imply such a causality (namely, the
intellectual, sensibly unconditioned), whether they are actual or only
commanded, that is, objectively necessary in a practical sense. We could
not hope to find this connexion in actions actually given in experience as
events of the sensible world, since causality with freedom must always be
sought outside the world of sense in the world of intelligence. But things
of sense are the only things offered to our perception and observation.
Hence, nothing remained but to find an incontestable objective principle
of causality which excludes all sensible conditions: that is, a principle
in which reason does not appeal further to something else as a determining
ground of its causality, but contains this determining ground itself by
means of that principle, and in which therefore it is itself as pure
reason practical. Now, this principle had not to be searched for or
discovered; it had long been in the reason of all men, and incorporated in
their nature, and is the principle of morality. Therefore, that
unconditioned causality, with the faculty of it, namely, freedom, is no
longer merely indefinitely and problematically thought (this speculative
reason could prove to be feasible), but is even as regards the law of its
causality definitely and assertorially known; and with it the fact that a
being (I myself), belonging to the world of sense, belongs also to the
supersensible world, this is also positively known, and thus the reality
of the supersensible world is established and in practical respects
definitely given, and this definiteness, which for theoretical purposes
would be transcendent, is for practical purposes immanent. We could not,
however, make a similar step as regards the second dynamical idea, namely,
that of a necessary being. We could not rise to it from the sensible world
without the aid of the first dynamical idea. For if we attempted to do so,
we should have ventured to leave at a bound all that is given to us, and
to leap to that of which nothing is given us that can help us to effect
the connection of such a supersensible being with the world of sense
(since the necessary being would have to be known as given outside
ourselves). On the other hand, it is now obvious that this connection is
quite possible in relation to our own subject, inasmuch as I know myself
to be on the one side as an intelligible [supersensible] being determined
by the moral law (by means of freedom), and on the other side as acting in
the world of sense. It is the concept of freedom alone that enables us to
find the unconditioned and intelligible for the conditioned and sensible
without going out of ourselves. For it is our own reason that by means of
the supreme and unconditional practical law knows that itself and the
being that is conscious of this law (our own person) belong to the pure
world of understanding, and moreover defines the manner in which, as such,
it can be active. In this way it can be understood why in the whole
faculty of reason it is the practical reason only that can help us to pass
beyond the world of sense and give us knowledge of a supersensible order
and connection, which, however, for this very reason cannot be extended
further than is necessary for pure practical purposes.
</p>
<p>
Let me be permitted on this occasion to make one more remark, namely, that
every step that we make with pure reason, even in the practical sphere
where no attention is paid to subtle speculation, nevertheless accords
with all the material points of the Critique of the Theoretical Reason as
closely and directly as if each step had been thought out with deliberate
purpose to establish this confirmation. Such a thorough agreement, wholly
unsought for and quite obvious (as anyone can convince himself, if he will
only carry moral inquiries up to their principles), between the most
important proposition of practical reason and the often seemingly too
subtle and needless remarks of the Critique of the Speculative Reason,
occasions surprise and astonishment, and confirms the maxim already
recognized and praised by others, namely, that in every scientific inquiry
we should pursue our way steadily with all possible exactness and
frankness, without caring for any objections that may be raised from
outside its sphere, but, as far as we can, to carry out our inquiry
truthfully and completely by itself. Frequent observation has convinced me
that, when such researches are concluded, that which in one part of them
appeared to me very questionable, considered in relation to other
extraneous doctrines, when I left this doubtfulness out of sight for a
time and only attended to the business in hand until it was completed, at
last was unexpectedly found to agree perfectly with what had been
discovered separately without the least regard to those doctrines, and
without any partiality or prejudice for them. Authors would save
themselves many errors and much labour lost (because spent on a delusion)
if they could only resolve to go to work with more frankness.
</p>
<h3>
BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>1
</h3>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0033" id="link2H_4_0033"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2HCH0004" id="link2HCH0004"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally.
</h2>
<p>
Pure reason always has its dialetic, whether it is considered in its
speculative or its practical employment; for it requires the absolute
totality of the 'conditions of what is given conditioned, and this can
only be found in things in themselves. But as all conceptions of things in
themselves must be referred to intuitions, and with us men these can never
be other than sensible and hence can never enable us to know objects as
things in themselves but only as appearances, and since the unconditioned
can never be found in this chain of appearances which consists only of
conditioned and conditions; thus from applying this rational idea of the
totality of the conditions (in other words of the unconditioned) to
appearances, there arises an inevitable illusion, as if these latter were
things in themselves (for in the absence of a warning critique they are
always regarded as such). This illusion would never be noticed as delusive
if it did not betray itself by a conflict of reason with itself, when it
applies to appearances its fundamental principle of presupposing the
unconditioned to everything conditioned. By this, however, reason is
compelled to trace this illusion to its source, and search how it can be
removed, and this can only be done by a complete critical examination of
the whole pure faculty of reason; so that the antinomy of the pure reason
which is manifest in its dialectic is in fact the most beneficial error
into which human reason could ever have fallen, since it at last drives us
to search for the key to escape from this labyrinth; and when this key is
found, it further discovers that which we did not seek but yet had need
of, namely, a view into a higher and an immutable order of things, in
which we even now are, and in which we are thereby enabled by definite
precepts to continue to live according to the highest dictates of reason.
</p>
<p>
It may be seen in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason how in its
speculative employment this natural dialectic is to be solved, and how the
error which arises from a very natural illusion may be guarded against.
But reason in its practical use is not a whit better off. As pure
practical reason, it likewise seeks to find the unconditioned for the
practically conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural wants),
and this is not as the determining principle of the will, but even when
this is given (in the moral law) it seeks the unconditioned totality of
the object of pure practical reason under the name of the summum bonum.
</p>
<p>
To define this idea practically, i.e., sufficiently for the maxims of our
rational conduct, is the business of practical wisdom, and this again as a
science is philosophy, in the sense in which the word was understood by
the ancients, with whom it meant instruction in the conception in which
the summum bonum was to be placed, and the conduct by which it was to be
obtained. It would be well to leave this word in its ancient signification
as a doctrine of the summum bonum, so far as reason endeavours to make
this into a science. For on the one hand the restriction annexed would
suit the Greek expression (which signifies the love of wisdom), and yet at
the same time would be sufficient to embrace under the name of philosophy
the love of science: that is to say, of all speculative rational
knowledge, so far as it is serviceable to reason, both for that conception
and also for the practical principle determining our conduct, without
letting out of sight the main end, on account of which alone it can be
called a doctrine of practical wisdom. On the other hand, it would be no
harm to deter the self-conceit of one who ventures to claim the title of
philosopher by holding before him in the very definition a standard of
self-estimation which would very much lower his pretensions. For a teacher
of wisdom would mean something more than a scholar who has not come so far
as to guide himself, much less to guide others, with certain expectation
of attaining so high an end: it would mean a master in the knowledge of
wisdom, which implies more than a modest man would claim for himself. Thus
philosophy as well as wisdom would always remain an ideal, which
objectively is presented complete in reason alone, while subjectively for
the person it is only the goal of his unceasing endeavours; and no one
would be justified in professing to be in possession of it so as to assume
the name of philosopher who could not also show its infallible effects in
his own person as an example (in his self-mastery and the unquestioned
interest that he takes pre-eminently in the general good), and this the
ancients also required as a condition of deserving that honourable title.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 5</span>
</p>
<p>
We have another preliminary remark to make respecting the dialectic of the
pure practical reason, on the point of the definition of the summum bonum
(a successful solution of which dialectic would lead us to expect, as in
case of that of the theoretical reason, the most beneficial effects,
inasmuch as the self-contradictions of pure practical reason honestly
stated, and not concealed, force us to undertake a complete critique of
this faculty).
</p>
<p>
The moral law is the sole determining principle of a pure will. But since
this is merely formal (viz., as prescribing only the form of the maxim as
universally legislative), it abstracts as a determining principle from all
matter that is to say, from every object of volition. Hence, though the
summum bonum may be the whole object of a pure practical reason, i.e., a
pure will, yet it is not on that account to be regarded as its determining
principle; and the moral law alone must be regarded as the principle on
which that and its realization or promotion are aimed at. This remark is
important in so delicate a case as the determination of moral principles,
where the slightest misinterpretation perverts men's minds. For it will
have been seen from the Analytic that, if we assume any object under the
name of a good as a determining principle of the will prior to the moral
law and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle, this would
always introduce heteronomy and crush out the moral principle.
</p>
<p>
It is, however, evident that if the notion of the summum bonum includes
that of the moral law as its supreme condition, then the summum bonum
would not merely be an object, but the notion of it and the conception of
its existence as possible by our own practical reason would likewise be
the determining principle of the will, since in that case the will is in
fact determined by the moral law which is already included in this
conception, and by no other object, as the principle of autonomy requires.
This order of the conceptions of determination of the will must not be
lost sight of, as otherwise we should misunderstand ourselves and think we
had fallen into a contradiction, while everything remains in perfect
harmony.
</p>
<h3>
BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2
</h3>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2HCH0005" id="link2HCH0005"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the Conception of
the "Summum Bonum".
</h2>
<p>
The conception of the summum itself contains an ambiguity which might
occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it. The summum may mean
either the supreme (supremum) or the perfect (consummatum). The former is
that condition which is itself unconditioned, i.e., is not subordinate to
any other (originarium); the second is that whole which is not a part of a
greater whole of the same kind (perfectissimum). It has been shown in the
Analytic that virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition
of all that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our
pursuit of happiness, and is therefore the supreme good. But it does not
follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the desires
of rational finite beings; for this requires happiness also, and that not
merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes himself an end, but
even in the judgement of an impartial reason, which regards persons in
general as ends in themselves. For to need happiness, to deserve it, and
yet at the same time not to participate in it, cannot be consistent with
the perfect volition of a rational being possessed at the same time of all
power, if, for the sake of experiment, we conceive such a being. Now
inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the
summum bonum in a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact
proportion to morality (which is the worth of the person, and his
worthiness to be happy) constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world;
hence this summum bonum expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which,
however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has
no condition above it; whereas happiness, while it is pleasant to the
possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good, but
always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition.
</p>
<p>
When two elements are necessarily united in one concept, they must be
connected as reason and consequence, and this either so that their unity
is considered as analytical (logical connection), or as synthetical (real
connection) the former following the law of identity, the latter that of
causality. The connection of virtue and happiness may therefore be
understood in two ways: either the endeavour to be virtuous and the
rational pursuit of happiness are not two distinct actions, but absolutely
identical, in which case no maxim need be made the principle of the
former, other than what serves for the latter; or the connection consists
in this, that virtue produces happiness as something distinct from the
consciousness of virtue, as a cause produces an effect.
</p>
<p>
The ancient Greek schools were, properly speaking, only two, and in
determining the conception of the summum bonum these followed in fact one
and the same method, inasmuch as they did not allow virtue and happiness
to be regarded as two distinct elements of the summum bonum, and
consequently sought the unity of the principle by the rule of identity;
but they differed as to which of the two was to be taken as the
fundamental notion. The Epicurean said: "To be conscious that one's maxims
lead to happiness is virtue"; the Stoic said: "To be conscious of one's
virtue is happiness." With the former, Prudence was equivalent to
morality; with the latter, who chose a higher designation for virtue,
morality alone was true wisdom.
</p>
<p>
While we must admire the men who in such early times tried all imaginable
ways of extending the domain of philosophy, we must at the same time
lament that their acuteness was unfortunately misapplied in trying to
trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous notions, those of
happiness and virtue. But it agrees with the dialectical spirit of their
times (and subtle minds are even now sometimes misled in the same way) to
get rid of irreconcilable differences in principle by seeking to change
them into a mere contest about words, and thus apparently working out the
identity of the notion under different names, and this usually occurs in
cases where the combination of heterogeneous principles lies so deep or so
high, or would require so complete a transformation of the doctrines
assumed in the rest of the philosophical system, that men are afraid to
penetrate deeply into the real difference and prefer treating it as a
difference in questions of form.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 5</span>
</p>
<p>
While both schools sought to trace out the identity of the practical
principles of virtue and happiness, they were not agreed as to the way in
which they tried to force this identity, but were separated infinitely
from one another, the one placing its principle on the side of sense, the
other on that of reason; the one in the consciousness of sensible wants,
the other in the independence of practical reason on all sensible grounds
of determination. According to the Epicurean, the notion of virtue was
already involved in the maxim: "To promote one's own happiness"; according
to the Stoics, on the other hand, the feeling of happiness was already
contained in the consciousness of virtue. Now whatever is contained in
another notion is identical with part of the containing notion, but not
with the whole, and moreover two wholes may be specifically distinct,
although they consist of the same parts; namely if the parts are united
into a whole in totally different ways. The Stoic maintained that the
virtue was the whole summum bonum, and happiness only the consciousness of
possessing it, as making part of the state of the subject. The Epicurean
maintained that happiness was the whole summum bonum, and virtue only the
form of the maxim for its pursuit; viz., the rational use of the means for
attaining it.
</p>
<p>
Now it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and those of
private happiness are quite heterogeneous as to their supreme practical
principle, and, although they belong to one summum bonum which together
they make possible, yet they are so far from coinciding that they restrict
and check one another very much in the same subject. Thus the question:
"How is the summum bonum practically possible?" still remains an unsolved
problem, notwithstanding all the attempts at coalition that have hitherto
been made. The Analytic has, however, shown what it is that makes the
problem difficult to solve; namely, that happiness and morality are two
specifically distinct elements of the summum bonum and, therefore, their
combination cannot be analytically cognised (as if the man that seeks his
own happiness should find by mere analysis of his conception that in so
acting he is virtuous, or as if the man that follows virtue should in the
consciousness of such conduct find that he is already happy ipso facto),
but must be a synthesis of concepts. Now since this combination is
recognised as a priori, and therefore as practically necessary, and
consequently not as derived from experience, so that the possibility of
the summum bonum does not rest on any empirical principle, it follows that
the deduction [legitimation] of this concept must be transcendental. It is
a priori (morally) necessary to produce the summum bonum by freedom of
will: therefore the condition of its possibility must rest solely on a
priori principles of cognition.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
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<h2>
I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 10</span>
</p>
<p>
In the summum bonum which is practical for us, i.e., to be realized by our
will, virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily combined, so that
the one cannot be assumed by pure practical reason without the other also
being attached to it. Now this combination (like every other) is either
analytical or synthetical. It has been shown that it cannot be analytical;
it must then be synthetical and, more particularly, must be conceived as
the connection of cause and effect, since it concerns a practical good,
i.e., one that is possible by means of action; consequently either the
desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim
of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is
absolutely impossible, because (as was proved in the Analytic) maxims
which place the determining principle of the will in the desire of
personal happiness are not moral at all, and no virtue can be founded on
them. But the second is also impossible, because the practical connection
of causes and effects in the world, as the result of the determination of
the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the will, but on
the knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical power to use them for
one's purposes; consequently we cannot expect in the world by the most
punctilious observance of the moral laws any necessary connection of
happiness with virtue adequate to the summum bonum. Now, as the promotion
of this summum bonum, the conception of which contains this connection, is
a priori a necessary object of our will and inseparably attached to the
moral law, the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the
latter. If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules, then
the moral law also which commands us to promote it is directed to vain
imaginary ends and must consequently be false.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
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<h2>
II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
The antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar conflict
between freedom and physical necessity in the causality of events in the
world. It was solved by showing that there is no real contradiction when
the events and even the world in which they occur are regarded (as they
ought to be) merely as appearances; since one and the same acting being,
as an appearance (even to his own inner sense), has a causality in the
world of sense that always conforms to the mechanism of nature, but with
respect to the same events, so far as the acting person regards himself at
the same time as a noumenon (as pure intelligence in an existence not
dependent on the condition of time), he can contain a principle by which
that causality acting according to laws of nature is determined, but which
is itself free from all laws of nature.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 15</span>
</p>
<p>
It is just the same with the foregoing antinomy of pure practical reason.
The first of the two propositions, "That the endeavour after happiness
produces a virtuous mind," is absolutely false; but the second, "That a
virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness," is not absolutely false,
but only in so far as virtue is considered as a form of causality in the
sensible world, and consequently only if I suppose existence in it to be
the only sort of existence of a rational being; it is then only
conditionally false. But as I am not only justified in thinking that I
exist also as a noumenon in a world of the understanding, but even have in
the moral law a purely intellectual determining principle of my causality
(in the sensible world), it is not impossible that morality of mind should
have a connection as cause with happiness (as an effect in the sensible
world) if not immediate yet mediate (viz., through an intelligent author
of nature), and moreover necessary; while in a system of nature which is
merely an object of the senses, this combination could never occur except
contingently and, therefore, could not suffice for the summum bonum.
</p>
<p>
Thus, notwithstanding this seeming conflict of practical reason with
itself, the summum bonum, which is the necessary supreme end of a will
morally determined, is a true object thereof; for it is practically
possible, and the maxims of the will which as regards their matter refer
to it have objective reality, which at first was threatened by the
antinomy that appeared in the connection of morality with happiness by a
general law; but this was merely from a misconception, because the
relation between appearances was taken for a relation of the things in
themselves to these appearances.
</p>
<p>
When we find ourselves obliged to go so far, namely, to the connection
with an intelligible world, to find the possibility of the summum bonum,
which reason points out to all rational beings as the goal of all their
moral wishes, it must seem strange that, nevertheless, the philosophers
both of ancient and modern times have been able to find happiness in
accurate proportion to virtue even in this life (in the sensible world),
or have persuaded themselves that they were conscious thereof. For
Epicurus as well as the Stoics extolled above everything the happiness
that springs from the consciousness of living virtuously; and the former
was not so base in his practical precepts as one might infer from the
principles of his theory, which he used for explanation and not for
action, or as they were interpreted by many who were misled by his using
the term pleasure for contentment; on the contrary, he reckoned the most
disinterested practice of good amongst the ways of enjoying the most
intimate delight, and his scheme of pleasure (by which he meant constant
cheerfulness of mind) included the moderation and control of the
inclinations, such as the strictest moral philosopher might require. He
differed from the Stoics chiefly in making this pleasure the motive, which
they very rightly refused to do. For, on the one hand, the virtuous
Epicurus, like many well-intentioned men of this day who do not reflect
deeply enough on their principles, fell into the error of presupposing the
virtuous disposition in the persons for whom he wished to provide the
springs to virtue (and indeed the upright man cannot be happy if he is not
first conscious of his uprightness; since with such a character the
reproach that his habit of thought would oblige him to make against
himself in case of transgression and his moral self-condemnation would rob
him of all enjoyment of the pleasantness which his condition might
otherwise contain). But the question is: How is such a disposition
possible in the first instance, and such a habit of thought in estimating
the worth of one's existence, since prior to it there can be in the
subject no feeling at all for moral worth? If a man is virtuous without
being conscious of his integrity in every action, he will certainly not
enjoy life, however favourable fortune may be to him in its physical
circumstances; but can we make him virtuous in the first instance, in
other words, before he esteems the moral worth of his existence so highly,
by praising to him the peace of mind that would result from the
consciousness of an integrity for which he has no sense?
</p>
<p>
On the other hand, however, there is here an occasion of a vitium
subreptionis, and as it were of an optical illusion, in the
self-consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one feels-
an illusion which even the most experienced cannot altogether avoid. The
moral disposition of mind is necessarily combined with a consciousness
that the will is determined directly by the law. Now the consciousness of
a determination of the faculty of desire is always the source of a
satisfaction in the resulting action; but this pleasure, this satisfaction
in oneself, is not the determining principle of the action; on the
contrary, the determination of the will directly by reason is the source
of the feeling of pleasure, and this remains a pure practical not sensible
determination of the faculty of desire. Now as this determination has
exactly the same effect within in impelling to activity, that a feeling of
the pleasure to be expected from the desired action would have had, we
easily look on what we ourselves do as something which we merely passively
feel, and take the moral spring for a sensible impulse, just as it happens
in the so-called illusion of the senses (in this case the inner sense). It
is a sublime thing in human nature to be determined to actions immediately
by a purely rational law; sublime even is the illusion that regards the
subjective side of this capacity of intellectual determination as
something sensible and the effect of a special sensible feeling (for an
intellectual feeling would be a contradiction). It is also of great
importance to attend to this property of our personality and as much as
possible to cultivate the effect of reason on this feeling. But we must
beware lest by falsely extolling this moral determining principle as a
spring, making its source lie in particular feelings of pleasure (which
are in fact only results), we degrade and disfigure the true genuine
spring, the law itself, by putting as it were a false foil upon it.
Respect, not pleasure or enjoyment of happiness, is something for which it
is not possible that reason should have any antecedent feeling as its
foundation (for this would always be sensible and pathological); and
consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the law is by no
means analogous to the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to the
faculty of desire it produces the same effect, but from different sources:
it is only by this mode of conception, however, that we can attain what we
are seeking, namely, that actions be done not merely in accordance with
duty (as a result of pleasant feelings), but from duty, which must be the
true end of all moral cultivation.
</p>
<p>
Have we not, however, a word which does not express enjoyment, as
happiness does, but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence, an
analogue of the happiness which must necessarily accompany the
consciousness of virtue? Yes this word is self-contentment which in its
proper signification always designates only a negative satisfaction in
one's existence, in which one is conscious of needing nothing. Freedom and
the consciousness of it as a faculty of following the moral law with
unyielding resolution is independence of inclinations, at least as motives
determining (though not as affecting) our desire, and so far as I am
conscious of this freedom in following my moral maxims, it is the only
source of an unaltered contentment which is necessarily connected with it
and rests on no special feeling. This may be called intellectual
contentment. The sensible contentment (improperly so-called) which rests
on the satisfaction of the inclinations, however delicate they may be
imagined to be, can never be adequate to the conception of it. For the
inclinations change, they grow with the indulgence shown them, and always
leave behind a still greater void than we had thought to fill. Hence they
are always burdensome to a rational being, and, although he cannot lay
them aside, they wrest from him the wish to be rid of them. Even an
inclination to what is right (e.g., to beneficence), though it may much
facilitate the efficacy of the moral maxims, cannot produce any. For in
these all must be directed to the conception of the law as a determining
principle, if the action is to contain morality and not merely legality.
Inclination is blind and slavish, whether it be of a good sort or not,
and, when morality is in question, reason must not play the part merely of
guardian to inclination, but disregarding it altogether must attend simply
to its own interest as pure practical reason. This very feeling of
compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes the deliberation on the
question of duty and becomes a determining principle, is even annoying to
right thinking persons, brings their deliberate maxims into confusion, and
makes them wish to be delivered from it and to be subject to lawgiving
reason alone.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 20</span>
</p>
<p>
From this we can understand how the consciousness of this faculty of a
pure practical reason produces by action (virtue) a consciousness of
mastery over one's inclinations, and therefore of independence of them,
and consequently also of the discontent that always accompanies them, and
thus a negative satisfaction with one's state, i.e., contentment, which is
primarily contentment with one's own person. Freedom itself becomes in
this way (namely, indirectly) capable of an enjoyment which cannot be
called happiness, because it does not depend on the positive concurrence
of a feeling, nor is it, strictly speaking, bliss, since it does not
include complete independence of inclinations and wants, but it resembles
bliss in so far as the determination of one's will at least can hold
itself free from their influence; and thus, at least in its origin, this
enjoyment is analogous to the self-sufficiency which we can ascribe only
to the Supreme Being.
</p>
<p>
From this solution of the antinomy of practical pure reason, it follows
that in practical principles we may at least conceive as possible a
natural and necessary connection between the consciousness of morality and
the expectation of a proportionate happiness as its result, though it does
not follow that we can know or perceive this connection; that, on the
other hand, principles of the pursuit of happiness cannot possibly produce
morality; that, therefore, morality is the supreme good (as the first
condition of the summum bonum), while happiness constitutes its second
element, but only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned, but
necessary consequence of the former. Only with this subordination is the
summum bonum the whole object of pure practical reason, which must
necessarily conceive it as possible, since it commands us to contribute to
the utmost of our power to its realization. But since the possibility of
such connection of the conditioned with its condition belongs wholly to
the supersensual relation of things and cannot be given according to the
laws of the world of sense, although the practical consequences of the
idea belong to the world of sense, namely, the actions that aim at
realizing the summum bonum; we will therefore endeavour to set forth the
grounds of that possibility, first, in respect of what is immediately in
our power, and then, secondly, in that which is not in our power, but
which reason presents to us as the supplement of our impotence, for the
realization of the summum bonum (which by practical principles is
necessary).
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
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</div>
<h2>
III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its Union with the
Speculative Reason.
</h2>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 25</span>
</p>
<p>
By primacy between two or more things connected by reason, I understand
the prerogative, belonging to one, of being the first determining
principle in the connection with all the rest. In a narrower practical
sense it means the prerogative of the interest of one in so far as the
interest of the other is subordinated to it, while it is not postponed to
any other. To every faculty of the mind we can attribute an interest, that
is, a principle, that contains the condition on which alone the former is
called into exercise. Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the
interest of all the powers of the mind and is determined by its own. The
interest of its speculative employment consists in the cognition of the
object pushed to the highest a priori principles: that of its practical
employment, in the determination of the will in respect of the final and
complete end. As to what is necessary for the possibility of any
employment of reason at all, namely, that its principles and affirmations
should not contradict one another, this constitutes no part of its
interest, but is the condition of having reason at all; it is only its
development, not mere consistency with itself, that is reckoned as its
interest.
</p>
<p>
If practical reason could not assume or think as given anything further
than what speculative reason of itself could offer it from its own
insight, the latter would have the primacy. But supposing that it had of
itself original a priori principles with which certain theoretical
positions were inseparably connected, while these were withdrawn from any
possible insight of speculative reason (which, however, they must not
contradict); then the question is: Which interest is the superior (not
which must give way, for they are not necessarily conflicting), whether
speculative reason, which knows nothing of all that the practical offers
for its acceptance, should take up these propositions and (although they
transcend it) try to unite them with its own concepts as a foreign
possession handed over to it, or whether it is justified in obstinately
following its own separate interest and, according to the canonic of
Epicurus, rejecting as vain subtlety everything that cannot accredit its
objective reality by manifest examples to be shown in experience, even
though it should be never so much interwoven with the interest of the
practical (pure) use of reason, and in itself not contradictory to the
theoretical, merely because it infringes on the interest of the
speculative reason to this extent, that it removes the bounds which this
latter had set to itself, and gives it up to every nonsense or delusion of
imagination?
</p>
<p>
In fact, so far as practical reason is taken as dependent on pathological
conditions, that is, as merely regulating the inclinations under the
sensible principle of happiness, we could not require speculative reason
to take its principles from such a source. Mohammed's paradise, or the
absorption into the Deity of the theosophists and mystics would press
their monstrosities on the reason according to the taste of each, and one
might as well have no reason as surrender it in such fashion to all sorts
of dreams. But if pure reason of itself can be practical and is actually
so, as the consciousness of the moral law proves, then it is still only
one and the same reason which, whether in a theoretical or a practical
point of view, judges according to a priori principles; and then it is
clear that although it is in the first point of view incompetent to
establish certain propositions positively, which, however, do not
contradict it, then, as soon as these propositions are inseparably
attached to the practical interest of pure reason, it must accept them,
though it be as something offered to it from a foreign source, something
that has not grown on its own ground, but yet is sufficiently
authenticated; and it must try to compare and connect them with everything
that it has in its power as speculative reason. It must remember, however,
that these are not additions to its insight, but yet are extensions of its
employment in another, namely, a practical aspect; and this is not in the
least opposed to its interest, which consists in the restriction of wild
speculation.
</p>
<p>
Thus, when pure speculative and pure practical reason are combined in one
cognition, the latter has the primacy, provided, namely, that this
combination is not contingent and arbitrary, but founded a priori on
reason itself and therefore necessary. For without this subordination
there would arise a conflict of reason with itself; since, if they were
merely co-ordinate, the former would close its boundaries strictly and
admit nothing from the latter into its domain, while the latter would
extend its bounds over everything and when its needs required would seek
to embrace the former within them. Nor could we reverse the order and
require pure practical reason to be subordinate to the speculative, since
all interest is ultimately practical, and even that of speculative reason
is conditional, and it is only in the practical employment of reason that
it is complete.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 30</span>
</p>
<p>
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</p>
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<h2>
IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
The realization of the summum bonum in the world is the necessary object
of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this will the perfect
accordance of the mind with the moral law is the supreme condition of the
summum bonum. This then must be possible, as well as its object, since it
is contained in the command to promote the latter. Now, the perfect
accordance of the will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of
which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of
his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically
necessary, it can only be found in a progress in infinitum towards that
perfect accordance, and on the principles of pure practical reason it is
necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our
will.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 35</span>
</p>
<p>
Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an
endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational
being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum,
then, practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality
of the soul; consequently this immortality, being inseparably connected
with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (by which I
mean a theoretical proposition, not demonstrable as such, but which is an
inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical law.
</p>
<p>
This principle of the moral destination of our nature, namely, that it is
only in an endless progress that we can attain perfect accordance with the
moral law, is of the greatest use, not merely for the present purpose of
supplementing the impotence of speculative reason, but also with respect
to religion. In default of it, either the moral law is quite degraded from
its holiness, being made out to be indulgent and conformable to our
convenience, or else men strain their notions of their vocation and their
expectation to an unattainable goal, hoping to acquire complete holiness
of will, and so they lose themselves in fanatical theosophic dreams, which
wholly contradict self-knowledge. In both cases the unceasing effort to
obey punctually and thoroughly a strict and inflexible command of reason,
which yet is not ideal but real, is only hindered. For a rational but
finite being, the only thing possible is an endless progress from the
lower to higher degrees of moral perfection. The Infinite Being, to whom
the condition of time is nothing, sees in this to us endless succession a
whole of accordance with the moral law; and the holiness which his command
inexorably requires, in order to be true to his justice in the share which
He assigns to each in the summum bonum, is to be found in a single
intellectual intuition of the whole existence of rational beings. All that
can be expected of the creature in respect of the hope of this
participation would be the consciousness of his tried character, by which
from the progress he has hitherto made from the worse to the morally
better, and the immutability of purpose which has thus become known to
him, he may hope for a further unbroken continuance of the same, however
long his existence may last, even beyond this life, * and thus he may
hope, not indeed here, nor in any imaginable point of his future
existence, but only in the endlessness of his duration (which God alone
can survey) to be perfectly adequate to his will (without indulgence or
excuse, which do not harmonize with justice).
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* It seems, nevertheless, impossible for a creature to have
the conviction of his unwavering firmness of mind in the
progress towards goodness. On this account the Christian
religion makes it come only from the same Spirit that works
sanctification, that is, this firm purpose, and with it the
consciousness of steadfastness in the moral progress. But
naturally one who is conscious that he has persevered
through a long portion of his life up to the end in the
progress to the better, and this genuine moral motives, may
well have the comforting hope, though not the certainty,
that even in an existence prolonged beyond this life he will
continue in these principles; and although he is never
justified here in his own eyes, nor can ever hope to be so
in the increased perfection of his nature, to which he looks
forward, together with an increase of duties, nevertheless
in this progress which, though it is directed to a goal
infinitely remote, yet is in God's sight regarded as
equivalent to possession, he may have a prospect of a
blessed future; for this is the word that reason employs to
designate perfect well-being independent of all contingent
causes of the world, and which, like holiness, is an idea
that can be contained only in an endless progress and its
totality, and consequently is never fully attained by a
creature.
</pre>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 40</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
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<h2>
V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
In the foregoing analysis the moral law led to a practical problem which
is prescribed by pure reason alone, without the aid of any sensible
motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the first and
principle element of the summum bonum, viz., morality; and, as this can be
perfectly solved only in eternity, to the postulate of immortality. The
same law must also lead us to affirm the possibility of the second element
of the summum bonum, viz., happiness proportioned to that morality, and
this on grounds as disinterested as before, and solely from impartial
reason; that is, it must lead to the supposition of the existence of a
cause adequate to this effect; in other words, it must postulate the
existence of God, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the
summum bonum (an object of the will which is necessarily connected with
the moral legislation of pure reason). We proceed to exhibit this
connection in a convincing manner.
</p>
<p>
Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world with whom
everything goes according to his wish and will; it rests, therefore, on
the harmony of physical nature with his whole end and likewise with the
essential determining principle of his will. Now the moral law as a law of
freedom commands by determining principles, which ought to be quite
independent of nature and of its harmony with our faculty of desire (as
springs). But the acting rational being in the world is not the cause of
the world and of nature itself. There is not the least ground, therefore,
in the moral law for a necessary connection between morality and
proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of
it, and therefore dependent on it, and which for that reason cannot by his
will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly
harmonize, as far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical
principles. Nevertheless, in the practical problem of pure reason, i.e.,
the necessary pursuit of the summum bonum, such a connection is postulated
as necessary: we ought to endeavour to promote the summum bonum, which,
therefore, must be possible. Accordingly, the existence of a cause of all
nature, distinct from nature itself and containing the principle of this
connection, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is
also postulated. Now this supreme cause must contain the principle of the
harmony of nature, not merely with a law of the will of rational beings,
but with the conception of this law, in so far as they make it the supreme
determining principle of the will, and consequently not merely with the
form of morals, but with their morality as their motive, that is, with
their moral character. Therefore, the summum bonum is possible in the
world only on the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality
corresponding to moral character. Now a being that is capable of acting on
the conception of laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the
causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is his
will; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed as
a condition of the summum bonum is a being which is the cause of nature by
intelligence and will, consequently its author, that is God. It follows
that the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the
best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original
good, that is to say, of the existence of God. Now it was seen to be a
duty for us to promote the summum bonum; consequently it is not merely
allowable, but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that
we should presuppose the possibility of this summum bonum; and as this is
possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably
connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally
necessary to assume the existence of God.
</p>
<p>
It must be remarked here that this moral necessity is subjective, that is,
it is a want, and not objective, that is, itself a duty, for there cannot
be a duty to suppose the existence of anything (since this concerns only
the theoretical employment of reason). Moreover, it is not meant by this
that it is necessary to suppose the existence of God as a basis of all
obligation in general (for this rests, as has been sufficiently proved,
simply on the autonomy of reason itself). What belongs to duty here is
only the endeavour to realize and promote the summum bonum in the world,
the possibility of which can therefore be postulated; and as our reason
finds it not conceivable except on the supposition of a supreme
intelligence, the admission of this existence is therefore connected with
the consciousness of our duty, although the admission itself belongs to
the domain of speculative reason. Considered in respect of this alone, as
a principle of explanation, it may be called a hypothesis, but in
reference to the intelligibility of an object given us by the moral law
(the summum bonum), and consequently of a requirement for practical
purposes, it may be called faith, that is to say a pure rational faith,
since pure reason (both in its theoretical and practical use) is the sole
source from which it springs.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 45</span>
</p>
<p>
From this deduction it is now intelligible why the Greek schools could
never attain the solution of their problem of the practical possibility of
the summum bonum, because they made the rule of the use which the will of
man makes of his freedom the sole and sufficient ground of this
possibility, thinking that they had no need for that purpose of the
existence of God. No doubt they were so far right that they established
the principle of morals of itself independently of this postulate, from
the relation of reason only to the will, and consequently made it the
supreme practical condition of the summum bonum; but it was not therefore
the whole condition of its possibility. The Epicureans had indeed assumed
as the supreme principle of morality a wholly false one, namely that of
happiness, and had substituted for a law a maxim of arbitrary choice
according to every man's inclination; they proceeded, however,
consistently enough in this, that they degraded their summum bonum
likewise, just in proportion to the meanness of their fundamental
principle, and looked for no greater happiness than can be attained by
human prudence (including temperance and moderation of the inclinations),
and this as we know would be scanty enough and would be very different
according to circumstances; not to mention the exceptions that their
maxims must perpetually admit and which make them incapable of being laws.
The Stoics, on the contrary, had chosen their supreme practical principle
quite rightly, making virtue the condition of the summum bonum; but when
they represented the degree of virtue required by its pure law as fully
attainable in this life, they not only strained the moral powers of the
man whom they called the wise beyond all the limits of his nature, and
assumed a thing that contradicts all our knowledge of men, but also and
principally they would not allow the second element of the summum bonum,
namely, happiness, to be properly a special object of human desire, but
made their wise man, like a divinity in his consciousness of the
excellence of his person, wholly independent of nature (as regards his own
contentment); they exposed him indeed to the evils of life, but made him
not subject to them (at the same time representing him also as free from
moral evil). They thus, in fact, left out the second element of the summum
bonum namely, personal happiness, placing it solely in action and
satisfaction with one's own personal worth, thus including it in the
consciousness of being morally minded, in which they Might have been
sufficiently refuted by the voice of their own nature.
</p>
<p>
The doctrine of Christianity, * even if we do not yet consider it as a
religious doctrine, gives, touching this point, a conception of the summum
bonum (the kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the strictest demand of
practical reason. The moral law is holy (unyielding) and demands holiness
of morals, although all the moral perfection to which man can attain is
still only virtue, that is, a rightful disposition arising from respect
for the law, implying consciousness of a constant propensity to
transgression, or at least a want of purity, that is, a mixture of many
spurious (not moral) motives of obedience to the law, consequently a
self-esteem combined with humility. In respect, then, of the holiness
which the Christian law requires, this leaves the creature nothing but a
progress in infinitum, but for that very reason it justifies him in hoping
for an endless duration of his existence. The worth of a character
perfectly accordant with the moral law is infinite, since the only
restriction on all possible happiness in the judgement of a wise and all
powerful distributor of it is the absence of conformity of rational beings
to their duty. But the moral law of itself does not promise any happiness,
for according to our conceptions of an order of nature in general, this is
not necessarily connected with obedience to the law. Now Christian
morality supplies this defect (of the second indispensable element of the
summum bonum) by representing the world in which rational beings devote
themselves with all their soul to the moral law, as a kingdom of God, in
which nature and morality are brought into a harmony foreign to each of
itself, by a holy Author who makes the derived summum bonum possible.
Holiness of life is prescribed to them as a rule even in this life, while
the welfare proportioned to it, namely, bliss, is represented as
attainable only in an eternity; because the former must always be the
pattern of their conduct in every state, and progress towards it is
already possible and necessary in this life; while the latter, under the
name of happiness, cannot be attained at all in this world (so far as our
own power is concerned), and therefore is made simply an object of hope.
Nevertheless, the Christian principle of morality itself is not
theological (so as to be heteronomy), but is autonomy of pure practical
reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and His will the
foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of the summum bonum,
on condition of following these laws, and it does not even place the
proper spring of this obedience in the desired results, but solely in the
conception of duty, as that of which the faithful observance alone
constitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy consequences.
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* It is commonly held that the Christian precept of morality
has no advantage in respect of purity over the moral
conceptions of the Stoics; the distinction between them is,
however, very obvious. The Stoic system made the
consciousness of strength of mind the pivot on which all
moral dispositions should turn; and although its disciples
spoke of duties and even defined them very well, yet they
placed the spring and proper determining principle of the
will in an elevation of the mind above the lower springs of
the senses, which owe their power only to weakness of mind.
With them therefore, virtue was a sort of heroism in the
wise man raising himself above the animal nature of man, is
sufficient for Himself, and, while he prescribes duties to
others, is himself raised above them, and is not subject to
any temptation to transgress the moral law. All this,
however, they could not have done if they had conceived this
law in all its purity and strictness, as the precept of the
Gospel does. When I give the name idea to a perfection to
which nothing adequate can be given in experience, it does
not follow that the moral ideas are thing transcendent, that
is something of which we could not even determine the
concept adequately, or of which it is uncertain whether
there is any object corresponding to it at all, as is the
case with the ideas of speculative reason; on the contrary,
being types of practical perfection, they serve as the
indispensable rule of conduct and likewise as the standard
of comparison. Now if I consider Christian morals on their
philosophical side, then compared with the ideas of the
Greek schools, they would appear as follows: the ideas of
the Cynics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Christians
are: simplicity of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness.
In respect of the way of attaining them, the Greek schools
were distinguished from one another thus that the Cynics
only required common sense, the others the path of science,
but both found the mere use of natural powers sufficient for
the purpose. Christian morality, because its precept is
framed (as a moral precept must be) so pure and unyielding,
takes from man all confidence that he can be fully adequate
to it, at least in this life, but again sets it up by
enabling us to hope that if we act as well as it is in our
power to do, then what is not in our power will come in to
our aid from another source, whether we know how this may be
or not. Aristotle and Plato differed only as to the origin
of our moral conceptions.
</pre>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 50</span>
</p>
<p>
In this manner, the moral laws lead through the conception of the summum
bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to religion,
that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as
sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of a foreign and
contingent in themselves, but as essential laws of every free will in
itself, which, nevertheless, must be regarded as commands of the Supreme
Being, because it is only from a morally perfect (holy and good) and at
the same time all-powerful will, and consequently only through harmony
with this will, that we can hope to attain the summum bonum which the
moral law makes it our duty to take as the object of our endeavours. Here
again, then, all remains disinterested and founded merely on duty; neither
fear nor hope being made the fundamental springs, which if taken as
principles would destroy the whole moral worth of actions. The moral law
commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate
object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than
by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the
world; and although the conception of the summum bonum as a whole, in
which the greatest happiness is conceived as combined in the most exact
proportion with the highest degree of moral perfection (possible in
creatures), includes my own happiness, yet it is not this that is the
determining principle of the will which is enjoined to promote the summum
bonum, but the moral law, which, on the contrary, limits by strict
conditions my unbounded desire of happiness.
</p>
<p>
Hence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should make
ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. It is only
when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of participating
some day in happiness in proportion as we have endeavoured to be not
unworthy of it.
</p>
<p>
A man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of it is
in harmony with the summum bonum. We can now easily see that all
worthiness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the summum
bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest (which belongs to one's
state), namely, the participation of happiness. Now it follows from this
that morality should never be treated as a doctrine of happiness, that is,
an instruction how to become happy; for it has to do simply with the
rational condition (conditio sine qua non) of happiness, not with the
means of attaining it. But when morality has been completely expounded
(which merely imposes duties instead of providing rules for selfish
desires), then first, after the moral desire to promote the summum bonum
(to bring the kingdom of God to us) has been awakened, a desire founded on
a law, and which could not previously arise in any selfish mind, and when
for the behoof of this desire the step to religion has been taken, then
this ethical doctrine may be also called a doctrine of happiness because
the hope of happiness first begins with religion only.
</p>
<p>
We can also see from this that, when we ask what is God's ultimate end in
creating the world, we must not name the happiness of the rational beings
in it, but the summum bonum, which adds a further condition to that wish
of such beings, namely, the condition of being worthy of happiness, that
is, the morality of these same rational beings, a condition which alone
contains the rule by which only they can hope to share in the former at
the hand of a wise Author. For as wisdom, theoretically considered,
signifies the knowledge of the summum bonum and, practically, the
accordance of the will with the summum bonum, we cannot attribute to a
supreme independent wisdom an end based merely on goodness. For we cannot
conceive the action of this goodness (in respect of the happiness of
rational beings) as suitable to the highest original good, except under
the restrictive conditions of harmony with the holiness * of his will.
Therefore, those who placed the end of creation in the glory of God
(provided that this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a desire to be
praised) have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For nothing glorifies
God more than that which is the most estimable thing in the world, respect
for his command, the observance of the holy duty that his law imposes on
us, when there is added thereto his glorious plan of crowning such a
beautiful order of things with corresponding happiness. If the latter (to
speak humanly) makes Him worthy of love, by the former He is an object of
adoration. Even men can never acquire respect by benevolence alone, though
they may gain love, so that the greatest beneficence only procures them
honour when it is regulated by worthiness.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 55</span>
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* In order to make these characteristics of these
conceptions clear, I add the remark that whilst we ascribe
to God various attributes, the quality of which we also find
applicable to creatures, only that in Him they are raised to
the highest degree, e.g., power, knowledge, presence,
goodness, etc., under the designations of omnipotence,
omniscience, omnipresence, etc., there are three that are
ascribed to God exclusively, and yet without the addition of
greatness, and which are all moral He is the only holy, the
only blessed, the only wise, because these conceptions
already imply the absence of limitation. In the order of
these attributes He is also the holy lawgiver (and creator),
the good governor (and preserver) and the just judge, three
attributes which include everything by which God is the
object of religion, and in conformity with which the
metaphysical perfections are added of themselves in the
reason.
</pre>
<p>
That in the order of ends, man (and with him every rational being) is an
end in himself, that is, that he can never be used merely as a means by
any (not even by God) without being at the same time an end also himself,
that therefore humanity in our person must be holy to ourselves, this
follows now of itself because he is the subject of the moral law, in other
words, of that which is holy in itself, and on account of which and in
agreement with which alone can anything be termed holy. For this moral law
is founded on the autonomy of his will, as a free will which by its
universal laws must necessarily be able to agree with that to which it is
to submit itself.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0041" id="link2H_4_0041"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason Generally.
</h2>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 60</span>
</p>
<p>
They all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a postulate
but a law, by which reason determines the will directly, which will,
because it is so determined as a pure will, requires these necessary
conditions of obedience to its precept. These postulates are not
theoretical dogmas but, suppositions practically necessary; while then
they do [not] extend our speculative knowledge, they give objective
reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their
reference to what is practical), and give it a right to concepts, the
possibility even of which it could not otherwise venture to affirm.
</p>
<p>
These postulates are those of immortality, freedom positively considered
(as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the intelligible
world), and the existence of God. The first results from the practically
necessary condition of a duration adequate to the complete fulfilment of
the moral law; the second from the necessary supposition of independence
of the sensible world, and of the faculty of determining one's will
according to the law of an intelligible world, that is, of freedom; the
third from the necessary condition of the existence of the summum bonum in
such an intelligible world, by the supposition of the supreme independent
good, that is, the existence of God.
</p>
<p>
Thus the fact that respect for the moral law necessarily makes the summum
bonum an object of our endeavours, and the supposition thence resulting of
its objective reality, lead through the postulates of practical reason to
conceptions which speculative reason might indeed present as problems, but
could never solve. Thus it leads: 1. To that one in the solution of which
the latter could do nothing but commit paralogisms (namely, that of
immortality), because it could not lay hold of the character of
permanence, by which to complete the psychological conception of an
ultimate subject necessarily ascribed to the soul in self-consciousness,
so as to make it the real conception of a substance, a character which
practical reason furnishes by the postulate of a duration required for
accordance with the moral law in the summum bonum, which is the whole end
of practical reason. 2. It leads to that of which speculative reason
contained nothing but antinomy, the solution of which it could only found
on a notion problematically conceivable indeed, but whose objective
reality it could not prove or determine, namely, the cosmological idea of
an intelligible world and the consciousness of our existence in it, by
means of the postulate of freedom (the reality of which it lays down by
virtue of the moral law), and with it likewise the law of an intelligible
world, to which speculative reason could only point, but could not define
its conception. 3. What speculative reason was able to think, but was
obliged to leave undetermined as a mere transcendental ideal, viz., the
theological conception of the first Being, to this it gives significance
(in a practical view, that is, as a condition of the possibility of the
object of a will determined by that law), namely, as the supreme principle
of the summum bonum in an intelligible world, by means of moral
legislation in it invested with sovereign power.
</p>
<p>
Is our knowledge, however, actually extended in this way by pure practical
reason, and is that immanent in practical reason which for the speculative
was only transcendent? Certainly, but only in a practical point of view.
For we do not thereby take knowledge of the nature of our souls, nor of
the intelligible world, nor of the Supreme Being, with respect to what
they are in themselves, but we have merely combined the conceptions of
them in the practical concept of the summum bonum as the object of our
will, and this altogether a priori, but only by means of the moral law,
and merely in reference to it, in respect of the object which it commands.
But how freedom is possible, and how we are to conceive this kind of
causality theoretically and positively, is not thereby discovered; but
only that there is such a causality is postulated by the moral law and in
its behoof. It is the same with the remaining ideas, the possibility of
which no human intelligence will ever fathom, but the truth of which, on
the other hand, no sophistry will ever wrest from the conviction even of
the commonest man.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 65</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0042" id="link2H_4_0042"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure Reason in a
Practical point of view, without its Knowledge as Speculative being
enlarged at the same time?
</h2>
<h3>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 70</span>
</h3>
<p>
In order not to be too abstract, we will answer this question at once in
its application to the present case. In order to extend a pure cognition
practically, there must be an a priori purpose given, that is, an end as
object (of the will), which independently of all theological principle is
presented as practically necessary by an imperative which determines the
will directly (a categorical imperative), and in this case that is the
summum bonum. This, however, is not possible without presupposing three
theoretical conceptions (for which, because they are mere conceptions of
pure reason, no corresponding intuition can be found, nor consequently by
the path of theory any objective reality); namely, freedom, immortality,
and God. Thus by the practical law which commands the existence of the
highest good possible in a world, the possibility of those objects of pure
speculative reason is postulated, and the objective reality which the
latter could not assure them. By this the theoretical knowledge of pure
reason does indeed obtain an accession; but it consists only in this, that
those concepts which otherwise it had to look upon as problematical
(merely thinkable) concepts, are now shown assertorially to be such as
actually have objects; because practical reason indispensably requires
their existence for the possibility of its object, the summum bonum, which
practically is absolutely necessary, and this justifies theoretical reason
in assuming them. But this extension of theoretical reason is no extension
of speculative, that is, we cannot make any positive use of it in a
theoretical point of view. For as nothing is accomplished in this by
practical reason, further than that these concepts are real and actually
have their (possible) objects, and nothing in the way of intuition of them
is given thereby (which indeed could not be demanded), hence the admission
of this reality does not render any synthetical proposition possible.
Consequently, this discovery does not in the least help us to extend this
knowledge of ours in a speculative point of view, although it does in
respect of the practical employment of pure reason. The above three ideas
of speculative reason are still in themselves not cognitions; they are
however (transcendent) thoughts, in which there is nothing impossible.
Now, by help of an apodeictic practical law, being necessary conditions of
that which it commands to be made an object, they acquire objective
reality; that is, we learn from it that they have objects, without being
able to point out how the conception of them is related to an object, and
this, too, is still not a cognition of these objects; for we cannot
thereby form any synthetical judgement about them, nor determine their
application theoretically; consequently, we can make no theoretical
rational use of them at all, in which use all speculative knowledge of
reason consists. Nevertheless, the theoretical knowledge, not indeed of
these objects, but of reason generally, is so far enlarged by this, that
by the practical postulates objects were given to those ideas, a merely
problematical thought having by this means first acquired objective
reality. There is therefore no extension of the knowledge of given
supersensible objects, but an extension of theoretical reason and of its
knowledge in respect of the supersensible generally; inasmuch as it is
compelled to admit that there are such objects, although it is not able to
define them more closely, so as itself to extend this knowledge of the
objects (which have now been given it on practical grounds, and only for
practical use). For this accession, then, pure theoretical reason, for
which all those ideas are transcendent and without object, has simply to
thank its practical faculty. In this they become immanent and
constitutive, being the source of the possibility of realizing the
necessary object of pure practical reason (the summum bonum); whereas
apart from this they are transcendent, and merely regulative principles of
speculative reason, which do not require it to assume a new object beyond
experience, but only to bring its use in experience nearer to
completeness. But when once reason is in possession of this accession, it
will go to work with these ideas as speculative reason (properly only to
assure the certainty of its practical use) in a negative manner: that is,
not extending but clearing up its knowledge so as on one side to keep off
anthropomorphism, as the source of superstition, or seeming extension of
these conceptions by supposed experience; and on the other side
fanaticism, which promises the same by means of supersensible intuition or
feelings of the like kind. All these are hindrances to the practical use
of pure reason, so that the removal of them may certainly be considered an
extension of our knowledge in a practical point of view, without
contradicting the admission that for speculative purposes reason has not
in the least gained by this.
</p>
<p>
Every employment of reason in respect of an object requires pure concepts
of the understanding (categories), without which no object can be
conceived. These can be applied to the theoretical employment of reason,
i.e., to that kind of knowledge, only in case an intuition (which is
always sensible) is taken as a basis, and therefore merely in order to
conceive by means of- them an object of possible experience. Now here what
have to be thought by means of the categories in order to be known are
ideas of reason, which cannot be given in any experience. Only we are not
here concerned with the theoretical knowledge of the objects of these
ideas, but only with this, whether they have objects at all. This reality
is supplied by pure practical reason, and theoretical reason has nothing
further to do in this but to think those objects by means of categories.
This, as we have elsewhere clearly shown, can be done well enough without
needing any intuition (either sensible or supersensible) because the
categories have their seat and origin in the pure understanding, simply as
the faculty of thought, before and independently of any intuition, and
they always only signify an object in general, no matter in what way it
may be given to us. Now when the categories are to be applied to these
ideas, it is not possible to give them any object in intuition; but that
such an object actually exists, and consequently that the category as a
mere form of thought is here not empty but has significance, this is
sufficiently assured them by an object which practical reason presents
beyond doubt in the concept of the summum bonum, the reality of the
conceptions which are required for the possibility of the summum bonum;
without, however, effecting by this accession the least extension of our
knowledge on theoretical principles.
</p>
<p>
When these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the kingdom of God),
and of immortality are further determined by predicates taken from our own
nature, we must not regard this determination as a sensualizing of those
pure rational ideas (anthropomorphism), nor as a transcendent knowledge of
supersensible objects; for these predicates are no others than
understanding and will, considered too in the relation to each other in
which they must be conceived in the moral law, and therefore, only so far
as a pure practical use is made of them. As to all the rest that belongs
to these conceptions psychologically, that is, so far as we observe these
faculties of ours empirically in their exercise (e.g., that the
understanding of man is discursive, and its notions therefore not
intuitions but thoughts, that these follow one another in time, that his
will has its satisfaction always dependent on the existence of its object,
etc., which cannot be the case in the Supreme Being), from all this we
abstract in that case, and then there remains of the notions by which we
conceive a pure intelligence nothing more than just what is required for
the possibility of conceiving a moral law. There is then a knowledge of
God indeed, but only for practical purposes, and, if we attempt to extend
it to a theoretical knowledge, we find an understanding that has
intuitions, not thoughts, a will that is directed to objects on the
existence of which its satisfaction does not in the least depend (not to
mention the transcendental predicates, as, for example, a magnitude of
existence, that is duration, which, however, is not in time, the only
possible means we have of conceiving existence as magnitude). Now these
are all attributes of which we can form no conception that would help to
the knowledge of the object, and we learn from this that they can never be
used for a theory of supersensible beings, so that on this side they are
quite incapable of being the foundation of a speculative knowledge, and
their use is limited simply to the practice of the moral law.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 75</span>
</p>
<p>
This last is so obvious, and can be proved so clearly by fact, that we may
confidently challenge all pretended natural theologians (a singular name)
* to specify (over and above the merely ontological predicates) one single
attribute, whether of the understanding or of the will, determining this
object of theirs, of which we could not show incontrovertibly that, if we
abstract from it everything anthropomorphic, nothing would remain to us
but the mere word, without our being able to connect with it the smallest
notion by which we could hope for an extension of theoretical knowledge.
But as to the practical, there still remains to us of the attributes of
understanding and will the conception of a relation to which objective
reality is given by the practical law (which determines a priori precisely
this relation of the understanding to the will). When once this is done,
then reality is given to the conception of the object of a will morally
determined (the conception of the summum bonum), and with it to the
conditions of its possibility, the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality,
but always only relatively to the practice of the moral law (and not for
any speculative purpose).
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* Learning is properly only the whole content of the
historical sciences. Consequently it is only the teacher of
revealed theology that can be called a learned theologian.
If, however, we choose to call a man learned who is in
possession of the rational sciences (mathematics and
philosophy), although even this would be contrary to the
signification of the word (which always counts as learning
only that which one must be "learned" and which, therefore,
he cannot discover of himself by reason), even in that case
the philosopher would make too poor a figure with his
knowledge of God as a positive science to let himself be
called on that account a learned man.
</pre>
<p>
According to these remarks it is now easy to find the answer to the
weighty question whether the notion of God is one belonging to physics
(and therefore also to metaphysics, which contains the pure a priori
principles of the former in their universal import) or to morals. If we
have recourse to God as the Author of all things, in order to explain the
arrangements of nature or its changes, this is at least not a physical
explanation, and is a complete confession that our philosophy has come to
an end, since we are obliged to assume something of which in itself we
have otherwise no conception, in order to be able to frame a conception of
the possibility of what we see before our eyes. Metaphysics, however,
cannot enable us to attain by certain inference from the knowledge of this
world to the conception of God and to the proof of His existence, for this
reason, that in order to say that this world could be produced only by a
God (according to the conception implied by this word) we should know this
world as the most perfect whole possible; and for this purpose should also
know all possible worlds (in order to be able to compare them with this);
in other words, we should be omniscient. It is absolutely impossible,
however, to know the existence of this Being from mere concepts, because
every existential proposition, that is, every proposition that affirms the
existence of a being of which I frame a concept, is a synthetic
proposition, that is, one by which I go beyond that conception and affirm
of it more than was thought in the conception itself; namely, that this
concept in the understanding has an object corresponding to it outside the
understanding, and this it is obviously impossible to elicit by any
reasoning. There remains, therefore, only one single process possible for
reason to attain this knowledge, namely, to start from the supreme
principle of its pure practical use (which in every case is directed
simply to the existence of something as a consequence of reason) and thus
determine its object. Then its inevitable problem, namely, the necessary
direction of the will to the summum bonum, discovers to us not only the
necessity of assuming such a First Being in reference to the possibility
of this good in the world, but, what is most remarkable, something which
reason in its progress on the path of physical nature altogether failed to
find, namely, an accurately defined conception of this First Being. As we
can know only a small part of this world, and can still less compare it
with all possible worlds, we may indeed from its order, design, and
greatness, infer a wise, good, powerful, etc., Author of it, but not that
He is all-wise, all-good, all-powerful, etc. It may indeed very well be
granted that we should be justified in supplying this inevitable defect by
a legitimate and reasonable hypothesis; namely, that when wisdom,
goodness, etc, are displayed in all the parts that offer themselves to our
nearer knowledge, it is just the same in all the rest, and that it would
therefore be reasonable to ascribe all possible perfections to the Author
of the world, but these are not strict logical inferences in which we can
pride ourselves on our insight, but only permitted conclusions in which we
may be indulged and which require further recommendation before we can
make use of them. On the path of empirical inquiry then (physics), the
conception of God remains always a conception of the perfection of the
First Being not accurately enough determined to be held adequate to the
conception of Deity. (With metaphysic in its transcendental part nothing
whatever can be accomplished.)
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 80</span>
</p>
<p>
When I now try to test this conception by reference to the object of
practical reason, I find that the moral principle admits as possible only
the conception of an Author of the world possessed of the highest
perfection. He must be omniscient, in order to know my conduct up to the
inmost root of my mental state in all possible cases and into all future
time; omnipotent, in order to allot to it its fitting consequences;
similarly He must be omnipresent, eternal, etc. Thus the moral law, by
means of the conception of the summum bonum as the object of a pure
practical reason, determines the concept of the First Being as the Supreme
Being; a thing which the physical (and in its higher development the
metaphysical), in other words, the whole speculative course of reason, was
unable to effect. The conception of God, then, is one that belongs
originally not to physics, i.e., to speculative reason, but to morals. The
same may be said of the other conceptions of reason of which we have
treated above as postulates of it in its practical use.
</p>
<p>
In the history of Grecian philosophy we find no distinct traces of a pure
rational theology earlier than Anaxagoras; but this is not because the
older philosophers had not intelligence or penetration enough to raise
themselves to it by the path of speculation, at least with the aid of a
thoroughly reasonable hypothesis. What could have been easier, what more
natural, than the thought which of itself occurs to everyone, to assume
instead of several causes of the world, instead of an indeterminate degree
of perfection, a single rational cause having all perfection? But the
evils in the world seemed to them to be much too serious objections to
allow them to feel themselves justified in such a hypothesis. They showed
intelligence and penetration then in this very point, that they did not
allow themselves to adopt it, but on the contrary looked about amongst
natural causes to see if they could not find in them the qualities and
power required for a First Being. But when this acute people had advanced
so far in their investigations of nature as to treat even moral questions
philosophically, on which other nations had never done anything but talk,
then first they found a new and practical want, which did not fail to give
definiteness to their conception of the First Being: and in this the
speculative reason played the part of spectator, or at best had the merit
of embellishing a conception that had not grown on its own ground, and of
applying a series of confirmations from the study of nature now brought
forward for the first time, not indeed to strengthen the authority of this
conception (which was already established), but rather to make a show with
a supposed discovery of theoretical reason.
</p>
<p>
From these remarks, the reader of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason
will be thoroughly convinced how highly necessary that laborious deduction
of the categories was, and how fruitful for theology and morals. For if,
on the one hand, we place them in pure understanding, it is by this
deduction alone that we can be prevented from regarding them, with Plato,
as innate, and founding on them extravagant pretensions to theories of the
supersensible, to which we can see no end, and by which we should make
theology a magic lantern of chimeras; on the other hand, if we regard them
as acquired, this deduction saves us from restricting, with Epicurus, all
and every use of them, even for practical purposes, to the objects and
motives of the senses. But now that the Critique has shown by that
deduction, first, that they are not of empirical origin, but have their
seat and source a priori in the pure understanding; secondly, that as they
refer to objects in general independently of the intuition of them, hence,
although they cannot effect theoretical knowledge, except in application
to empirical objects, yet when applied to an object given by pure
practical reason they enable us to conceive the supersensible definitely,
only so far, however, as it is defined by such predicates as are
necessarily connected with the pure practical purpose given a priori and
with its possibility. The speculative restriction of pure reason and its
practical extension bring it into that relation of equality in which
reason in general can be employed suitably to its end, and this example
proves better than any other that the path to wisdom, if it is to be made
sure and not to be impassable or misleading, must with us men inevitably
pass through science; but it is not till this is complete that we can be
convinced that it leads to this goal.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 85</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0043" id="link2H_4_0043"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason.
</h2>
<p>
A want or requirement of pure reason in its speculative use leads only to
a hypothesis; that of pure practical reason to a postulate; for in the
former case I ascend from the result as high as I please in the series of
causes, not in order to give objective reality to the result (e.g., the
causal connection of things and changes in the world), but in order
thoroughly to satisfy my inquiring reason in respect of it. Thus I see
before me order and design in nature, and need not resort to speculation
to assure myself of their reality, but to explain them I have to
presuppose a Deity as their cause; and then since the inference from an
effect to a definite cause is always uncertain and doubtful, especially to
a cause so precise and so perfectly defined as we have to conceive in God,
hence the highest degree of certainty to which this pre-supposition can be
brought is that it is the most rational opinion for us men. * On the other
hand, a requirement of pure practical reason is based on a duty, that of
making something (the summum bonum) the object of my will so as to promote
it with all my powers; in which case I must suppose its possibility and,
consequently, also the conditions necessary thereto, namely, God, freedom,
and immortality; since I cannot prove these by my speculative reason,
although neither can I refute them. This duty is founded on something that
is indeed quite independent of these suppositions and is of itself
apodeictically certain, namely, the moral law; and so far it needs no
further support by theoretical views as to the inner constitution of
things, the secret final aim of the order of the world, or a presiding
ruler thereof, in order to bind me in the most perfect manner to act in
unconditional conformity to the law. But the subjective effect of this
law, namely, the mental disposition conformed to it and made necessary by
it, to promote the practically possible summum bonum, this pre-supposes at
least that the latter is possible, for it would be practically impossible
to strive after the object of a conception which at bottom was empty and
had no object. Now the above-mentioned postulates concern only the
physical or metaphysical conditions of the possibility of the summum
bonum; in a word, those which lie in the nature of things; not, however,
for the sake of an arbitrary speculative purpose, but of a practically
necessary end of a pure rational will, which in this case does not choose,
but obeys an inexorable command of reason, the foundation of which is
objective, in the constitution of things as they must be universally
judged by pure reason, and is not based on inclination; for we are in
nowise justified in assuming, on account of what we wish on merely
subjective grounds, that the means thereto are possible or that its object
is real. This, then, is an absolutely necessary requirement, and what it
pre-supposes is not merely justified as an allowable hypothesis, but as a
postulate in a practical point of view; and admitting that the pure moral
law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a rule of prudence),
the righteous man may say: "I will that there be a God, that my existence
in this world be also an existence outside the chain of physical causes
and in a pure world of the understanding, and lastly, that my duration be
endless; I firmly abide by this, and will not let this faith be taken from
me; for in this instance alone my interest, because I must not relax
anything of it, inevitably determines my judgement, without regarding
sophistries, however unable I may be to answer them or to oppose them with
others more plausible. **
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* But even here we should not be able to allege a
requirement of reason, if we had not before our eyes a
problematical, but yet inevitable, conception of reason,
namely, that of an absolutely necessary being. This
conception now seeks to be defined, and this, in addition to
the tendency to extend itself, is the objective ground of a
requirement of speculative reason, namely, to have a more
precise definition of the conception of a necessary being
which is to serve as the first cause of other beings, so as
to make these latter knowable by some means. Without such
antecedent necessary problems there are no requirements- at
least not of pure reason- the rest are requirements of
inclination.
</pre>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 90</span>
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
** In the Deutsches Museum, February, 1787, there is a
dissertation by a very subtle and clear-headed man, the late
Wizenmann, whose early death is to be lamented, in which he
disputes the right to argue from a want to the objective
reality of its object, and illustrates the point by the
example of a man in love, who having fooled himself into an
idea of beauty, which is merely a chimera of his own brain,
would fain conclude that such an object really exists
somewhere. I quite agree with him in this, in all cases
where the want is founded on inclination, which cannot
necessarily postulate the existence of its object even for
the man that is affected by it, much less can it contain a
demand valid for everyone, and therefore it is merely a
subjective ground of the wish. But in the present case we
have a want of reason springing from an objective
determining principle of the will, namely, the moral law,
which necessarily binds every rational being, and therefore
justifies him in assuming a priori in nature the conditions
proper for it, and makes the latter inseparable from the
complete practical use of reason. It is a duty to realize
the summum bonum to the utmost of our power, therefore it
must be possible, consequently it is unavoidable for every
rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for
its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as
the moral law, in connection with which alone it is valid.
</pre>
<p>
In order to prevent misconception in the use of a notion as yet so unusual
as that of a faith of pure practical reason, let me be permitted to add
one more remark. It might almost seem as if this rational faith were here
announced as itself a command, namely, that we should assume the summum
bonum as possible. But a faith that is commanded is nonsense. Let the
preceding analysis, however, be remembered of what is required to be
supposed in the conception of the summum bonum, and it will be seen that
it cannot be commanded to assume this possibility, and no practical
disposition of mind is required to admit it; but that speculative reason
must concede it without being asked, for no one can affirm that it is
impossible in itself that rational beings in the world should at the same
time be worthy of happiness in conformity with the moral law and also
possess this happiness proportionately. Now in respect of the first
element of the summum bonum, namely, that which concerns morality, the
moral law gives merely a command, and to doubt the possibility of that
element would be the same as to call in question the moral law itself. But
as regards the second element of that object, namely, happiness perfectly
proportioned to that worthiness, it is true that there is no need of a
command to admit its possibility in general, for theoretical reason has
nothing to say against it; but the manner in which we have to conceive
this harmony of the laws of nature with those of freedom has in it
something in respect of which we have a choice, because theoretical reason
decides nothing with apodeictic certainty about it, and in respect of this
there may be a moral interest which turns the scale.
</p>
<p>
I had said above that in a mere course of nature in the world an accurate
correspondence between happiness and moral worth is not to be expected and
must be regarded as impossible, and that therefore the possibility of the
summum bonum cannot be admitted from this side except on the supposition
of a moral Author of the world. I purposely reserved the restriction of
this judgement to the subjective conditions of our reason, in order not to
make use of it until the manner of this belief should be defined more
precisely. The fact is that the impossibility referred to is merely
subjective, that is, our reason finds it impossible for it to render
conceivable in the way of a mere course of nature a connection so exactly
proportioned and so thoroughly adapted to an end, between two sets of
events happening according to such distinct laws; although, as with
everything else in nature that is adapted to an end, it cannot prove, that
is, show by sufficient objective reason, that it is not possible by
universal laws of nature.
</p>
<p>
Now, however, a deciding principle of a different kind comes into play to
turn the scale in this uncertainty of speculative reason. The command to
promote the summum bonum is established on an objective basis (in
practical reason); the possibility of the same in general is likewise
established on an objective basis (in theoretical reason, which has
nothing to say against it). But reason cannot decide objectively in what
way we are to conceive this possibility; whether by universal laws of
nature without a wise Author presiding over nature, or only on supposition
of such an Author. Now here there comes in a subjective condition of
reason, the only way theoretically possible for it, of conceiving the
exact harmony of the kingdom of nature with the kingdom of morals, which
is the condition of the possibility of the summum bonum; and at the same
time the only one conducive to morality (which depends on an objective law
of reason). Now since the promotion of this summum bonum, and therefore
the supposition of its possibility, are objectively necessary (though only
as a result of practical reason), while at the same time the manner in
which we would conceive it rests with our own choice, and in this choice a
free interest of pure practical reason decides for the assumption of a
wise Author of the world; it is clear that the principle that herein
determines our judgement, though as a want it is subjective, yet at the
same time being the means of promoting what is objectively (practically)
necessary, is the foundation of a maxim of belief in a moral point of
view, that is, a faith of pure practical reason. This, then, is not
commanded, but being a voluntary determination of our judgement, conducive
to the moral (commanded) purpose, and moreover harmonizing with the
theoretical requirement of reason, to assume that existence and to make it
the foundation of our further employment of reason, it has itself sprung
from the moral disposition of mind; it may therefore at times waver even
in the well-disposed, but can never be reduced to unbelief.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 95</span>
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0044" id="link2H_4_0044"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties to his Practical
Destination.
</h2>
<p>
If human nature is destined to endeavour after the summum bonum, we must
suppose also that the measure of its cognitive faculties, and particularly
their relation to one another, is suitable to this end. Now the Critique
of Pure Speculative Reason proves that this is incapable of solving
satisfactorily the most weighty problems that are proposed to it, although
it does not ignore the natural and important hints received from the same
reason, nor the great steps that it can make to approach to this great
goal that is set before it, which, however, it can never reach of itself,
even with the help of the greatest knowledge of nature. Nature then seems
here to have provided us only in a step-motherly fashion with the faculty
required for our end.
</p>
<p>
<span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 100</span>
</p>
<p>
Suppose, now, that in this matter nature had conformed to our wish and had
given us that capacity of discernment or that enlightenment which we would
gladly possess, or which some imagine they actually possess, what would in
all probability be the consequence? Unless our whole nature were at the
same time changed, our inclinations, which always have the first word,
would first of all demand their own satisfaction, and, joined with
rational reflection, the greatest possible and most lasting satisfaction,
under the name of happiness; the moral law would afterwards speak, in
order to keep them within their proper bounds, and even to subject them
all to a higher end, which has no regard to inclination. But instead of
the conflict that the moral disposition has now to carry on with the
inclinations, in which, though after some defeats, moral strength of mind
may be gradually acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would
stand unceasingly before our eyes (for what we can prove perfectly is to
us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of our eyes).
Transgression of the law, would, no doubt, be avoided; what is commanded
would be done; but the mental disposition, from which actions ought to
proceed, cannot be infused by any command, and in this case the spur of
action is ever active and external, so that reason has no need to exert
itself in order to gather strength to resist the inclinations by a lively
representation of the dignity of the law: hence most of the actions that
conformed to the law would be done from fear, a few only from hope, and
none at all from duty, and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in
the eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the
world depends, would cease to exist. As long as the nature of man remains
what it is, his conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism, in
which, as in a puppet-show, everything would gesticulate well, but there
would be no life in the figures. Now, when it is quite otherwise with us,
when with all the effort of our reason we have only a very obscure and
doubtful view into the future, when the Governor of the world allows us
only to conjecture his existence and his majesty, not to behold them or
prove them clearly; and on the other hand, the moral law within us,
without promising or threatening anything with certainty, demands of us
disinterested respect; and only when this respect has become active and
dominant, does it allow us by means of it a prospect into the world of the
supersensible, and then only with weak glances: all this being so, there
is room for true moral disposition, immediately devoted to the law, and a
rational creature can become worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that
corresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his actions. Thus
what the study of nature and of man teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may
well be true here also; that the unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is
not less worthy of admiration in what it has denied than in what it has
granted.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0045" id="link2H_4_0045"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
SECOND PART.
</h2>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_4_0046" id="link2H_4_0046"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
Methodology of Pure Practical Reason.
</h2>
<p>
By the methodology of pure practical reason we are not to understand the
mode of proceeding with pure practical principles (whether in study or in
exposition), with a view to a scientific knowledge of them, which alone is
what is properly called method elsewhere in theoretical philosophy (for
popular knowledge requires a manner, science a method, i.e., a process
according to principles of reason by which alone the manifold of any
branch of knowledge can become a system). On the contrary, by this
methodology is understood the mode in which we can give the laws of pure
practical reason access to the human mind and influence on its maxims,
that is, by which we can make the objectively practical reason
subjectively practical also.
</p>
<p>
Now it is clear enough that those determining principles of the will which
alone make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth, namely, the
direct conception of the law and the objective necessity of obeying it as
our duty, must be regarded as the proper springs of actions, since
otherwise legality of actions might be produced, but not morality of
character. But it is not so clear; on the contrary, it must at first sight
seem to every one very improbable that even subjectively that exhibition
of pure virtue can have more power over the human mind, and supply a far
stronger spring even for effecting that legality of actions, and can
produce more powerful resolutions to prefer the law, from pure respect for
it, to every other consideration, than all the deceptive allurements of
pleasure or of all that may be reckoned as happiness, or even than all
threatenings of pain and misfortune. Nevertheless, this is actually the
case, and if human nature were not so constituted, no mode of presenting
the law by roundabout ways and indirect recommendations would ever produce
morality of character. All would be simple hypocrisy; the law would be
hated, or at least despised, while it was followed for the sake of one's
own advantage. The letter of the law (legality) would be found in our
actions, but not the spirit of it in our minds (morality); and as with all
our efforts we could not quite free ourselves from reason in our
judgement, we must inevitably appear in our own eyes worthless, depraved
men, even though we should seek to compensate ourselves for this
mortification before the inner tribunal, by enjoying the pleasure that a
supposed natural or divine law might be imagined to have connected with it
a sort of police machinery, regulating its operations by what was done
without troubling itself about the motives for doing it.
</p>
<p>
It cannot indeed be denied that in order to bring an uncultivated or
degraded mind into the track of moral goodness some preparatory guidance
is necessary, to attract it by a view of its own advantage, or to alarm it
by fear of loss; but as soon as this mechanical work, these
leading-strings have produced some effect, then we must bring before the
mind the pure moral motive, which, not only because it is the only one
that can be the foundation of a character (a practically consistent habit
of mind with unchangeable maxims), but also because it teaches a man to
feel his own dignity, gives the mind a power unexpected even by himself,
to tear himself from all sensible attachments so far as they would fain
have the rule, and to find a rich compensation for the sacrifice he
offers, in the independence of his rational nature and the greatness of
soul to which he sees that he is destined. We will therefore show, by such
observations as every one can make, that this property of our minds, this
receptivity for a pure moral interest, and consequently the moving force
of the pure conception of virtue, when it is properly applied to the human
heart, is the most powerful spring and, when a continued and punctual
observance of moral maxims is in question, the only spring of good
conduct. It must, however, be remembered that if these observations only
prove the reality of such a feeling, but do not show any moral improvement
brought about by it, this is no argument against the only method that
exists of making the objectively practical laws of pure reason
subjectively practical, through the mere force of the conception of duty;
nor does it prove that this method is a vain delusion. For as it has never
yet come into vogue, experience can say nothing of its results; one can
only ask for proofs of the receptivity for such springs, and these I will
now briefly present, and then sketch the method of founding and
cultivating genuine moral dispositions.
</p>
<p>
When we attend to the course of conversation in mixed companies,
consisting not merely of learned persons and subtle reasoners, but also of
men of business or of women, we observe that, besides story-telling and
jesting, another kind of entertainment finds a place in them, namely,
argument; for stories, if they are to have novelty and interest, are soon
exhausted, and jesting is likely to become insipid. Now of all argument
there is none in which persons are more ready to join who find any other
subtle discussion tedious, none that brings more liveliness into the
company, than that which concerns the moral worth of this or that action
by which the character of some person is to be made out. Persons, to whom
in other cases anything subtle and speculative in theoretical questions is
dry and irksome, presently join in when the question is to make out the
moral import of a good or bad action that has been related, and they
display an exactness, a refinement, a subtlety, in excogitating everything
that can lessen the purity of purpose, and consequently the degree of
virtue in it, which we do not expect from them in any other kind of
speculation. In these criticisms, persons who are passing judgement on
others often reveal their own character: some, in exercising their
judicial office, especially upon the dead, seem inclined chiefly to defend
the goodness that is related of this or that deed against all injurious
charges of insincerity, and ultimately to defend the whole moral worth of
the person against the reproach of dissimulation and secret wickedness;
others, on the contrary, turn their thoughts more upon attacking this
worth by accusation and fault finding. We cannot always, however,
attribute to these latter the intention of arguing away virtue altogether
out of all human examples in order to make it an empty name; often, on the
contrary, it is only well-meant strictness in determining the true moral
import of actions according to an uncompromising law. Comparison with such
a law, instead of with examples, lowers self-conceit in moral matters very
much, and not merely teaches humility, but makes every one feel it when he
examines himself closely. Nevertheless, we can for the most part observe,
in those who defend the purity of purpose in giving examples that where
there is the presumption of uprightness they are anxious to remove even
the least spot, lest, if all examples had their truthfulness disputed, and
if the purity of all human virtue were denied, it might in the end be
regarded as a mere phantom, and so all effort to attain it be made light
of as vain affectation and delusive conceit.
</p>
<p>
I do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made use of
this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the most subtle
examination of the practical questions that are thrown up; and why they
have not, after first laying the foundation of a purely moral catechism,
searched through the biographies of ancient and modern times with the view
of having at hand instances of the duties laid down, in which, especially
by comparison of similar actions under different circumstances, they might
exercise the critical judgement of their scholars in remarking their
greater or less moral significance. This is a thing in which they would
find that even early youth, which is still unripe for speculation of other
kinds, would soon Become very acute and not a little interested, because
it feels the progress of its faculty of judgement; and, what is most
important, they could hope with confidence that the frequent practice of
knowing and approving good conduct in all its purity, and on the other
hand of remarking with regret or contempt the least deviation from it,
although it may be pursued only as a sport in which children may compete
with one another, yet will leave a lasting impression of esteem on the one
hand and disgust on the other; and so, by the mere habit of looking on
such actions as deserving approval or blame, a good foundation would be
laid for uprightness in the future course of life. Only I wish they would
spare them the example of so-called noble (super-meritorious) actions, in
which our sentimental books so much abound, and would refer all to duty
merely, and to the worth that a man can and must give himself in his own
eyes by the consciousness of not having transgressed it, since whatever
runs up into empty wishes and longings after inaccessible perfection
produces mere heroes of romance, who, while they pique themselves on their
feeling for transcendent greatness, release themselves in return from the
observance of common and every-day obligations, which then seem to them
petty and insignificant. *
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* It is quite proper to extol actions that display a great,
unselfish, sympathizing mind or humanity. But, in this case,
we must fix attention not so much on the elevation of soul,
which is very fleeting and transitory, as on the subjection
of the heart to duty, from which a more enduring impression
may be expected, because this implies principle (whereas the
former only implies ebullitions). One need only reflect a
little and he will always find a debt that he has by some
means incurred towards the human race (even if it were only
this, by the inequality of men in the civil constitution,
enjoys advantages on account of which others must be the
more in want), which will prevent the thought of duty from
being repressed by the self-complacent imagination of merit.
</pre>
<p>
But if it is asked: "What, then, is really pure morality, by which as a
touchstone we must test the moral significance of every action," then I
must admit that it is only philosophers that can make the decision of this
question doubtful, for to common sense it has been decided long ago, not
indeed by abstract general formulae, but by habitual use, like the
distinction between the right and left hand. We will then point out the
criterion of pure virtue in an example first, and, imagining that it is
set before a boy, of say ten years old, for his judgement, we will see
whether he would necessarily judge so of himself without being guided by
his teacher. Tell him the history of an honest man whom men want to
persuade to join the calumniators of an innocent and powerless person (say
Anne Boleyn, accused by Henry VIII of England). He is offered advantages,
great gifts, or high rank; he rejects them. This will excite mere
approbation and applause in the mind of the hearer. Now begins the
threatening of loss. Amongst these traducers are his best friends, who now
renounce his friendship; near kinsfolk, who threaten to disinherit him (he
being without fortune); powerful persons, who can persecute and harass him
in all places and circumstances; a prince, who threatens him with loss of
freedom, yea, loss of life. Then to fill the measure of suffering, and
that he may feel the pain that only the morally good heart can feel very
deeply, let us conceive his family threatened with extreme distress and
want, entreating him to yield; conceive himself, though upright, yet with
feelings not hard or insensible either to compassion or to his own
distress; conceive him, I say, at the moment when he wishes that he had
never lived to see the day that exposed him to such unutterable anguish,
yet remaining true to his uprightness of purpose, without wavering or even
doubting; then will my youthful hearer be raised gradually from mere
approval to admiration, from that to amazement, and finally to the
greatest veneration, and a lively wish that he himself could be such a man
(though certainly not in such circumstances). Yet virtue is here worth so
much only because it costs so much, not because it brings any profit. All
the admiration, and even the endeavour to resemble this character, rest
wholly on the purity of the moral principle, which can only be strikingly
shown by removing from the springs of action everything that men may
regard as part of happiness. Morality, then, must have the more power over
the human heart the more purely it is exhibited. Whence it follows that,
if the law of morality and the image of holiness and virtue are to
exercise any influence at all on our souls, they can do so only so far as
they are laid to heart in their purity as motives, unmixed with any view
to prosperity, for it is in suffering that they display themselves most
nobly. Now that whose removal strengthens the effect of a moving force
must have been a hindrance, consequently every admixture of motives taken
from our own happiness is a hindrance to the influence of the moral law on
the heart. I affirm further that even in that admired action, if the
motive from which it was done was a high regard for duty, then it is just
this respect for the law that has the greatest influence on the mind of
the spectator, not any pretension to a supposed inward greatness of mind
or noble meritorious sentiments; consequently duty, not merit, must have
not only the most definite, but, when it is represented in the true light
of its inviolability, the most penetrating, influence on the mind.
</p>
<p>
It is more necessary than ever to direct attention to this method in our
times, when men hope to produce more effect on the mind with soft, tender
feelings, or high-flown, puffing-up pretensions, which rather wither the
heart than strengthen it, than by a plain and earnest representation of
duty, which is more suited to human imperfection and to progress in
goodness. To set before children, as a pattern, actions that are called
noble, magnanimous, meritorious, with the notion of captivating them by
infusing enthusiasm for such actions, is to defeat our end. For as they
are still so backward in the observance of the commonest duty, and even in
the correct estimation of it, this means simply to make them fantastical
romancers betimes. But, even with the instructed and experienced part of
mankind, this supposed spring has, if not an injurious, at least no
genuine, moral effect on the heart, which, however, is what it was desired
to produce.
</p>
<p>
All feelings, especially those that are to produce unwonted exertions,
must accomplish their effect at the moment they are at their height and
before the calm down; otherwise they effect nothing; for as there was
nothing to strengthen the heart, but only to excite it, it naturally
returns to its normal moderate tone and, thus, falls back into its
previous languor. Principles must be built on conceptions; on any other
basis there can only be paroxysms, which can give the person no moral
worth, nay, not even confidence in himself, without which the highest good
in man, consciousness of the morality of his mind and character, cannot
exist. Now if these conceptions are to become subjectively practical, we
must not rest satisfied with admiring the objective law of morality, and
esteeming it highly in reference to humanity, but we must consider the
conception of it in relation to man as an individual, and then this law
appears in a form indeed that is highly deserving of respect, but not so
pleasant as if it belonged to the element to which he is naturally
accustomed; but on the contrary as often compelling him to quit this
element, not without self-denial, and to betake himself to a higher, in
which he can only maintain himself with trouble and with unceasing
apprehension of a relapse. In a word, the moral law demands obedience,
from duty not from predilection, which cannot and ought not to be
presupposed at all.
</p>
<p>
Let us now see, in an example, whether the conception of an action, as a
noble and magnanimous one, has more subjective moving power than if the
action is conceived merely as duty in relation to the solemn law of
morality. The action by which a man endeavours at the greatest peril of
life to rescue people from shipwreck, at last losing his life in the
attempt, is reckoned on one side as duty, but on the other and for the
most part as a meritorious action, but our esteem for it is much weakened
by the notion of duty to himself which seems in this case to be somewhat
infringed. More decisive is the magnanimous sacrifice of life for the
safety of one's country; and yet there still remains some scruple whether
it is a perfect duty to devote one's self to this purpose spontaneously
and unbidden, and the action has not in itself the full force of a pattern
and impulse to imitation. But if an indispensable duty be in question, the
transgression of which violates the moral law itself, and without regard
to the welfare of mankind, and as it were tramples on its holiness (such
as are usually called duties to God, because in Him we conceive the ideal
of holiness in substance), then we give our most perfect esteem to the
pursuit of it at the sacrifice of all that can have any value for the
dearest inclinations, and we find our soul strengthened and elevated by
such an example, when we convince ourselves by contemplation of it that
human nature is capable of so great an elevation above every motive that
nature can oppose to it. Juvenal describes such an example in a climax
which makes the reader feel vividly the force of the spring that is
contained in the pure law of duty, as duty:
</p>
<p>
Esto bonus miles, tutor bonus, arbiter idem
</p>
<p>
Integer; ambiguae si quando citabere testis
</p>
<p>
Incertaeque rei, Phalaris licet imperet ut sis
</p>
<p>
Falsus, et admoto dictet periuria tauro,
</p>
<p>
Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori,
</p>
<p>
Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas. *
</p>
<pre xml:space="preserve">
* [Juvenal, Satirae, "Be you a good soldier, a faithful
tutor, an uncorrupted umpire also; if you are summoned as a
witness in a doubtful and uncertain thing, though Phalaris
should command that you should be false, and should dictate
perjuries with the bull brought to you, believe it the
highest impiety to prefer life to reputation, and for the
sake of life, to lose the causes of living."]
</pre>
<p>
When we can bring any flattering thought of merit into our action, then
the motive is already somewhat alloyed with self-love and has therefore
some assistance from the side of the sensibility. But to postpone
everything to the holiness of duty alone, and to be conscious that we can
because our own reason recognises this as its command and says that we
ought to do it, this is, as it were, to raise ourselves altogether above
the world of sense, and there is inseparably involved in the same a
consciousness of the law, as a spring of a faculty that controls the
sensibility; and although this is not always attended with effect, yet
frequent engagement with this spring, and the at first minor attempts at
using it, give hope that this effect may be wrought, and that by degrees
the greatest, and that a purely moral interest in it may be produced in
us.
</p>
<p>
The method then takes the following course. At first we are only concerned
to make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural employment
accompanying all our own free actions, as well as the observation of those
of others, and to make it as it were a habit, and to sharpen this
judgement, asking first whether the action conforms objectively to the
moral law, and to what law; and we distinguish the law that merely
furnishes a principle of obligation from that which is really obligatory
(leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus); as, for instance, the law of
what men's wants require from me, as contrasted with that which their
rights demand, the latter of which prescribes essential, the former only
non-essential duties; and thus we teach how to distinguish different kinds
of duties which meet in the same action. The other point to which
attention must be directed is the question whether the action was also
(subjectively) done for the sake of the moral law, so that it not only is
morally correct as a deed, but also, by the maxim from which it is done,
has moral worth as a disposition. Now there is no doubt that this
practice, and the resulting culture of our reason in judging merely of the
practical, must gradually produce a certain interest even in the law of
reason, and consequently in morally good actions. For we ultimately take a
liking for a thing, the contemplation of which makes us feel that the use
of our cognitive faculties is extended; and this extension is especially
furthered by that in which we find moral correctness, since it is only in
such an order of things that reason, with its faculty of determining a
priori on principle what ought to be done, can find satisfaction. An
observer of nature takes liking at last to objects that at first offended
his senses, when he discovers in them the great adaptation of their
organization to design, so that his reason finds food in its
contemplation. So Leibnitz spared an insect that he had carefully examined
with the microscope, and replaced it on its leaf, because he had found
himself instructed by the view of it and had, as it were, received a
benefit from it.
</p>
<p>
But this employment of the faculty of judgement, which makes us feel our
own cognitive powers, is not yet the interest in actions and in their
morality itself. It merely causes us to take pleasure in engaging in such
criticism, and it gives to virtue or the disposition that conforms to
moral laws a form of beauty, which is admired, but not on that account
sought after (laudatur et alget); as everything the contemplation of which
produces a consciousness of the harmony of our powers of conception, and
in which we feel the whole of our faculty of knowledge (understanding and
imagination) strengthened, produces a satisfaction, which may also be
communicated to others, while nevertheless the existence of the object
remains indifferent to us, being only regarded as the occasion of our
becoming aware of the capacities in us which are elevated above mere
animal nature. Now, however, the second exercise comes in, the living
exhibition of morality of character by examples, in which attention is
directed to purity of will, first only as a negative perfection, in so far
as in an action done from duty no motives of inclination have any
influence in determining it. By this the pupil's attention is fixed upon
the consciousness of his freedom, and although this renunciation at first
excites a feeling of pain, nevertheless, by its withdrawing the pupil from
the constraint of even real wants, there is proclaimed to him at the same
time a deliverance from the manifold dissatisfaction in which all these
wants entangle him, and the mind is made capable of receiving the
sensation of satisfaction from other sources. The heart is freed and
lightened of a burden that always secretly presses on it, when instances
of pure moral resolutions reveal to the man an inner faculty of which
otherwise he has no right knowledge, the inward freedom to release himself
from the boisterous importunity of inclinations, to such a degree that
none of them, not even the dearest, shall have any influence on a
resolution, for which we are now to employ our reason. Suppose a case
where I alone know that the wrong is on my side, and although a free
confession of it and the offer of satisfaction are so strongly opposed by
vanity, selfishness, and even an otherwise not illegitimate antipathy to
the man whose rights are impaired by me, I am nevertheless able to discard
all these considerations; in this there is implied a consciousness of
independence on inclinations and circumstances, and of the possibility of
being sufficient for myself, which is salutary to me in general for other
purposes also. And now the law of duty, in consequence of the positive
worth which obedience to it makes us feel, finds easier access through the
respect for ourselves in the consciousness of our freedom. When this is
well established, when a man dreads nothing more than to find himself, on
self-examination, worthless and contemptible in his own eyes, then every
good moral disposition can be grafted on it, because this is the best,
nay, the only guard that can keep off from the mind the pressure of
ignoble and corrupting motives.
</p>
<p>
I have only intended to point out the most general maxims of the
methodology of moral cultivation and exercise. As the manifold variety of
duties requires special rules for each kind, and this would be a prolix
affair, I shall be readily excused if in a work like this, which is only
preliminary, I content myself with these outlines.
</p>
<p>
<br /><br />
</p>
<hr />
<p>
<a name="link2H_CONC" id="link2H_CONC"> </a>
</p>
<div style="height: 4em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<h2>
CONCLUSION.
</h2>
<p>
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe,
the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens
above and the moral law within. I have not to search for them and
conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or were in the
transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect
them directly with the consciousness of my existence. The former begins
from the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and enlarges my
connection therein to an unbounded extent with worlds upon worlds and
systems of systems, and moreover into limitless times of their periodic
motion, its beginning and continuance. The second begins from my invisible
self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity,
but which is traceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern
that I am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary
connection, as I am also thereby with all those visible worlds. The former
view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates as it were my
importance as an animal creature, which after it has been for a short time
provided with vital power, one knows not how, must again give back the
matter of which it was formed to the planet it inhabits (a mere speck in
the universe). The second, on the contrary, infinitely elevates my worth
as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me
a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world, at
least so far as may be inferred from the destination assigned to my
existence by this law, a destination not restricted to conditions and
limits of this life, but reaching into the infinite.
</p>
<p>
But though admiration and respect may excite to inquiry, they cannot
supply the want of it. What, then, is to be done in order to enter on this
in a useful manner and one adapted to the loftiness of the subject?
Examples may serve in this as a warning and also for imitation. The
contemplation of the world began from the noblest spectacle that the human
senses present to us, and that our understanding can bear to follow in
their vast reach; and it ended- in astrology. Morality began with the
noblest attribute of human nature, the development and cultivation of
which give a prospect of infinite utility; and ended- in fanaticism or
superstition. So it is with all crude attempts where the principal part of
the business depends on the use of reason, a use which does not come of
itself, like the use of the feet, by frequent exercise, especially when
attributes are in question which cannot be directly exhibited in common
experience. But after the maxim had come into vogue, though late, to
examine carefully beforehand all the steps that reason purposes to take,
and not to let it proceed otherwise than in the track of a previously well
considered method, then the study of the structure of the universe took
quite a different direction, and thereby attained an incomparably happier
result. The fall of a stone, the motion of a sling, resolved into their
elements and the forces that are manifested in them, and treated
mathematically, produced at last that clear and henceforward unchangeable
insight into the system of the world which, as observation is continued,
may hope always to extend itself, but need never fear to be compelled to
retreat.
</p>
<p>
This example may suggest to us to enter on the same path in treating of
the moral capacities of our nature, and may give us hope of a like good
result. We have at hand the instances of the moral judgement of reason. By
analysing these into their elementary conceptions, and in default of
mathematics adopting a process similar to that of chemistry, the
separation of the empirical from the rational elements that may be found
in them, by repeated experiments on common sense, we may exhibit both
pure, and learn with certainty what each part can accomplish of itself, so
as to prevent on the one hand the errors of a still crude untrained
judgement, and on the other hand (what is far more necessary) the
extravagances of genius, by which, as by the adepts of the philosopher's
stone, without any methodical study or knowledge of nature, visionary
treasures are promised and the true are thrown away. In one word, science
(critically undertaken and methodically directed) is the narrow gate that
leads to the true doctrine of practical wisdom, if we understand by this
not merely what one ought to do, but what ought to serve teachers as a
guide to construct well and clearly the road to wisdom which everyone
should travel, and to secure others from going astray. Philosophy must
always continue to be the guardian of this science; and although the
public does not take any interest in its subtle investigations, it must
take an interest in the resulting doctrines, which such an examination
first puts in a clear light.
</p>
<h3>
THE END
</h3>
<div style="height: 6em;">
<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
</div>
<pre>
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