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+Project Gutenberg's The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license
+
+
+Title: The Critique of Practical Reason
+
+Author: Immanuel Kant
+
+Posting Date: July 15, 2013 [EBook #5683]
+Release Date: May, 2004
+[This file was first posted on August 7, 2002]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Matthew Stapleton
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+				 1788
+
+		   THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
+
+			   by Immanuel Kant
+
+		translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+This work is called the Critique of Practical Reason, not of the
+pure practical reason, although its parallelism with the speculative
+critique would seem to require the latter term. The reason of this
+appears sufficiently from the treatise itself. Its business is to show
+that there is pure practical reason, and for this purpose it
+criticizes the entire practical faculty of reason. If it succeeds in
+this, it has no need to criticize the pure faculty itself in order
+to see whether reason in making such a claim does not presumptuously
+overstep itself (as is the case with the speculative reason). For
+if, as pure reason, it is actually practical, it proves its own
+reality and that of its concepts by fact, and all disputation
+against the possibility of its being real is futile.
+
+With this faculty, transcendental freedom is also established;
+freedom, namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason
+required it in its use of the concept of causality in order to
+escape the antinomy into which it inevitably falls, when in the
+chain of cause and effect it tries to think the unconditioned.
+Speculative reason could only exhibit this concept (of freedom)
+problematically as not impossible to thought, without assuring it
+any objective reality, and merely lest the supposed impossibility of
+what it must at least allow to be thinkable should endanger its very
+being and plunge it into an abyss of scepticism.
+
+Inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an
+apodeictic law of practical reason, it is the keystone of the whole
+system of pure reason, even the speculative, and all other concepts
+(those of God and immortality) which, as being mere ideas, remain in
+it unsupported, now attach themselves to this concept, and by it
+obtain consistence and objective reality; that is to say, their
+possibility is proved by the fact that freedom actually exists, for
+this idea is revealed by the moral law.
+
+Freedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the
+speculative reason of which we know the possibility a priori (without,
+however, understanding it), because it is the condition of the moral
+law which we know. * The ideas of God and immortality, however, are
+not conditions of the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary
+object of a will determined by this law; that is to say, conditions of
+the practical use of our pure reason. Hence, with respect to these
+ideas, we cannot affirm that we know and understand, I will not say
+the actuality, but even the possibility of them. However they are
+the conditions of the application of the morally determined will to
+its object, which is given to it a priori, viz., the summum bonum.
+Consequently in this practical point of view their possibility must be
+assumed, although we cannot theoretically know and understand it. To
+justify this assumption it is sufficient, in a practical point of
+view, that they contain no intrinsic impossibility (contradiction).
+Here we have what, as far as speculative reason is concerned, is a
+merely subjective principle of assent, which, however, is
+objectively valid for a reason equally pure but practical, and this
+principle, by means of the concept of freedom, assures objective
+reality and authority to the ideas of God and immortality. Nay,
+there is a subjective necessity (a need of pure reason) to assume
+them. Nevertheless the theoretical knowledge of reason is not hereby
+enlarged, but only the possibility is given, which heretofore was
+merely a problem and now becomes assertion, and thus the practical use
+of reason is connected with the elements of theoretical reason. And
+this need is not a merely hypothetical one for the arbitrary
+purposes of speculation, that we must assume something if we wish in
+speculation to carry reason to its utmost limits, but it is a need
+which has the force of law to assume something without which that
+cannot be which we must inevitably set before us as the aim of our
+action.
+
+
+
+                                                    {PREFACE ^paragraph 5}
+
+* Lest any one should imagine that he finds an inconsistency here
+when I call freedom the condition of the moral law, and hereafter
+maintain in the treatise itself that the moral law is the condition
+under which we can first become conscious of freedom, I will merely
+remark that freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, while the
+moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. For had not the moral
+law been previously distinctly thought in our reason, we should
+never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as
+freedom, although it be not contradictory. But were there no freedom
+it would be impossible to trace the moral law in ourselves at all.
+
+
+
+It would certainly be more satisfactory to our speculative reason if
+it could solve these problems for itself without this circuit and
+preserve the solution for practical use as a thing to be referred
+to, but in fact our faculty of speculation is not so well provided.
+Those who boast of such high knowledge ought not to keep it back,
+but to exhibit it publicly that it may be tested and appreciated. They
+want to prove: very good, let them prove; and the critical
+philosophy lays its arms at their feet as the victors. Quid statis?
+Nolint. Atqui licet esse beatis. As they then do not in fact choose to
+do so, probably because they cannot, we must take up these arms
+again in order to seek in the mortal use of reason, and to base on
+this, the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility of
+which speculation cannot adequately prove.
+
+Here first is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, viz.:
+how we deny objective reality to the supersensible use of the
+categories in speculation and yet admit this reality with respect to
+the objects of pure practical reason. This must at first seem
+inconsistent as long as this practical use is only nominally known.
+But when, by a thorough analysis of it, one becomes aware that the
+reality spoken of does not imply any theoretical determination of
+the categories and extension of our knowledge to the supersensible;
+but that what is meant is that in this respect an object belongs to
+them, because either they are contained in the necessary determination
+of the will a priori, or are inseparably connected with its object;
+then this inconsistency disappears, because the use we make of these
+concepts is different from what speculative reason requires. On the
+other hand, there now appears an unexpected and very satisfactory
+proof of the consistency of the speculative critical philosophy. For
+whereas it insisted that the objects of experience as such,
+including our own subject, have only the value of phenomena, while
+at the same time things in themselves must be supposed as their basis,
+so that not everything supersensible was to be regarded as a fiction
+and its concept as empty; so now practical reason itself, without
+any concert with the speculative, assures reality to a supersensible
+object of the category of causality, viz., freedom, although (as
+becomes a practical concept) only for practical use; and this
+establishes on the evidence of a fact that which in the former case
+could only be conceived. By this the strange but certain doctrine of
+the speculative critical philosophy, that the thinking subject is to
+itself in internal intuition only a phenomenon, obtains in the
+critical examination of the practical reason its full confirmation,
+and that so thoroughly that we should be compelled to adopt this
+doctrine, even if the former had never proved it at all. *
+
+
+
+                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 10}
+
+* The union of causality as freedom with causality as rational
+mechanism, the former established by the moral law, the latter by
+the law of nature in the same subject, namely, man, is impossible,
+unless we conceive him with reference to the former as a being in
+himself, and with reference to the latter as a phenomenon- the
+former in pure consciousness, the latter in empirical consciousness.
+Otherwise reason inevitably contradicts itself.
+
+
+
+By this also I can understand why the most considerable objections
+which I have as yet met with against the Critique turn about these two
+points, namely, on the one side, the objective reality of the
+categories as applied to noumena, which is in the theoretical
+department of knowledge denied, in the practical affirmed; and on
+the other side, the paradoxical demand to regard oneself qua subject
+of freedom as a noumenon, and at the same time from the point of
+view of physical nature as a phenomenon in one's own empirical
+consciousness; for as long as one has formed no definite notions of
+morality and freedom, one could not conjecture on the one side what
+was intended to be the noumenon, the basis of the alleged
+phenomenon, and on the other side it seemed doubtful whether it was at
+all possible to form any notion of it, seeing that we had previously
+assigned all the notions of the pure understanding in its
+theoretical use exclusively to phenomena. Nothing but a detailed
+criticism of the practical reason can remove all this
+misapprehension and set in a clear light the consistency which
+constitutes its greatest merit.
+
+So much by way of justification of the proceeding by which, in
+this work, the notions and principles of pure speculative reason which
+have already undergone their special critical examination are, now and
+then, again subjected to examination. This would not in other cases be
+in accordance with the systematic process by which a science is
+established, since matters which have been decided ought only to be
+cited and not again discussed. In this case, however, it was not
+only allowable but necessary, because reason is here considered in
+transition to a different use of these concepts from what it had
+made of them before. Such a transition necessitates a comparison of
+the old and the new usage, in order to distinguish well the new path
+from the old one and, at the same time, to allow their connection to
+be observed. Accordingly considerations of this kind, including
+those which are once more directed to the concept of freedom in the
+practical use of the pure reason, must not be regarded as an
+interpolation serving only to fill up the gaps in the critical
+system of speculative reason (for this is for its own purpose
+complete), or like the props and buttresses which in a hastily
+constructed building are often added afterwards; but as true members
+which make the connexion of the system plain, and show us concepts,
+here presented as real, which there could only be presented
+problematically. This remark applies especially to the concept of
+freedom, respecting which one cannot but observe with surprise that so
+many boast of being able to understand it quite well and to explain
+its possibility, while they regard it only psychologically, whereas if
+they had studied it in a transcendental point of view, they must
+have recognized that it is not only indispensable as a problematical
+concept, in the complete use of speculative reason, but also quite
+incomprehensible; and if they afterwards came to consider its
+practical use, they must needs have come to the very mode of
+determining the principles of this, to which they are now so loth to
+assent. The concept of freedom is the stone of stumbling for all
+empiricists, but at the same time the key to the loftiest practical
+principles for critical moralists, who perceive by its means that they
+must necessarily proceed by a rational method. For this reason I beg
+the reader not to pass lightly over what is said of this concept at
+the end of the Analytic.
+
+I must leave it to those who are acquainted with works of this
+kind to judge whether such a system as that of the practical reason,
+which is here developed from the critical examination of it, has
+cost much or little trouble, especially in seeking not to miss the
+true point of view from which the whole can be rightly sketched. It
+presupposes, indeed, the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of
+Morals, but only in so far as this gives a preliminary acquaintance
+with the principle of duty, and assigns and justifies a definite
+formula thereof; in other respects it is independent. * It results
+from the nature of this practical faculty itself that the complete
+classification of all practical sciences cannot be added, as in the
+critique of the speculative reason. For it is not possible to define
+duties specially, as human duties, with a view to their
+classification, until the subject of this definition (viz., man) is
+known according to his actual nature, at least so far as is
+necessary with respect to duty; this, however, does not belong to a
+critical examination of the practical reason, the business of which is
+only to assign in a complete manner the principles of its possibility,
+extent, and limits, without special reference to human nature. The
+classification then belongs to the system of science, not to the
+system of criticism.
+
+                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 15}
+
+
+
+* A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work has hit
+the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he says that no new
+principle of morality is set forth in it, but only a new formula.
+But who would think of introducing a new principle of all morality and
+making himself as it were the first discoverer of it, just as if all
+the world before him were ignorant what duty was or had been in
+thorough-going error? But whoever knows of what importance to a
+mathematician a formula is, which defines accurately what is to be
+done to work a problem, will not think that a formula is insignificant
+and useless which does the same for all duty in general.
+
+
+
+In the second part of the Analytic I have given, as I trust, a
+sufficient answer to the objection of a truth-loving and acute
+critic * of the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals- a
+critic always worthy of respect- the objection, namely, that the
+notion of good was not established before the moral principle, as he
+thinks it ought to have been. *(2) I have also had regard to many of
+the objections which have reached me from men who show that they have
+at heart the discovery of the truth, and I shall continue to do so
+(for those who have only their old system before their eyes, and who
+have already settled what is to be approved or disapproved, do not
+desire any explanation which might stand in the way of their own
+private opinion.)
+
+
+
+                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 20}
+
+* [See Kant's "Das mag in der Theoric ricktig seyn," etc. Werke,
+vol. vii, p. 182.]
+
+*(2) It might also have been objected to me that I have not first
+defined the notion of the faculty of desire, or of the feeling of
+Pleasure, although this reproach would be unfair, because this
+definition might reasonably be presupposed as given in psychology.
+However, the definition there given might be such as to found the
+determination of the faculty of desire on the feeling of pleasure
+(as is commonly done), and thus the supreme principle of practical
+philosophy would be necessarily made empirical, which, however,
+remains to be proved and in this critique is altogether refuted. It
+will, therefore, give this definition here in such a manner as it
+ought to be given, in order to leave this contested point open at
+the beginning, as it should be. LIFE is the faculty a being has of
+acting according to laws of the faculty of desire. The faculty of
+DESIRE is the being's faculty of becoming by means of its ideas the
+cause of the actual existence of the objects of these ideas.
+PLEASURE is the idea of the agreement of the object, or the action
+with the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of
+causality of an idea in respect of the actuality of its object (or
+with the determination of the forces of the subject to action which
+produces it). I have no further need for the purposes of this critique
+of notions borrowed from psychology; the critique itself supplies
+the rest. It is easily seen that the question whether the faculty of
+desire is always based on pleasure, or whether under certain
+conditions pleasure only follows the determination of desire, is by
+this definition left undecided, for it is composed only of terms
+belonging to the pure understanding, i.e., of categories which contain
+nothing empirical. Such precaution is very desirable in all philosophy
+and yet is often neglected; namely, not to prejudge questions by
+adventuring definitions before the notion has been completely
+analysed, which is often very late. It may be observed through the
+whole course of the critical philosophy (of the theoretical as well as
+the practical reason) that frequent opportunity offers of supplying
+defects in the old dogmatic method of philosophy, and of correcting
+errors which are not observed until we make such rational use of these
+notions viewing them as a whole.
+
+
+
+When we have to study a particular faculty of the human mind in
+its sources, its content, and its limits; then from the nature of
+human knowledge we must begin with its parts, with an accurate and
+complete exposition of them; complete, namely, so far as is possible
+in the present state of our knowledge of its elements. But there is
+another thing to be attended to which is of a more philosophical and
+architectonic character, namely, to grasp correctly the idea of the
+whole, and from thence to get a view of all those parts as mutually
+related by the aid of pure reason, and by means of their derivation
+from the concept of the whole. This is only possible through the
+most intimate acquaintance with the system; and those who find the
+first inquiry too troublesome, and do not think it worth their while
+to attain such an acquaintance, cannot reach the second stage, namely,
+the general view, which is a synthetical return to that which had
+previously been given analytically. It is no wonder then if they
+find inconsistencies everywhere, although the gaps which these
+indicate are not in the system itself, but in their own incoherent
+train of thought.
+
+I have no fear, as regards this treatise, of the reproach that I
+wish to introduce a new language, since the sort of knowledge here
+in question has itself somewhat of an everyday character. Nor even
+in the case of the former critique could this reproach occur to anyone
+who had thought it through and not merely turned over the leaves. To
+invent new words where the language has no lack of expressions for
+given notions is a childish effort to distinguish oneself from the
+crowd, if not by new and true thoughts, yet by new patches on the
+old garment. If, therefore, the readers of that work know any more
+familiar expressions which are as suitable to the thought as those
+seem to me to be, or if they think they can show the futility of these
+thoughts themselves and hence that of the expression, they would, in
+the first case, very much oblige me, for I only desire to be
+understood: and, in the second case, they would deserve well of
+philosophy. But, as long as these thoughts stand, I very much doubt
+that suitable and yet more common expressions for them can be found. *
+
+                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 25}
+
+
+
+* I am more afraid in the present treatise of occasional
+misconception in respect of some expressions which I have chosen
+with the greatest care in order that the notion to which they point
+may not be missed. Thus, in the table of categories of the Practical
+reason under the title of Modality, the Permitted, and forbidden (in a
+practical objective point of view, possible and impossible) have
+almost the same meaning in common language as the next category,
+duty and contrary to duty. Here, however, the former means what
+coincides with, or contradicts, a merely possible practical precept
+(for example, the solution of all problems of geometry and mechanics);
+the latter, what is similarly related to a law actually present in the
+reason; and this distinction is not quite foreign even to common
+language, although somewhat unusual. For example, it is forbidden to
+an orator, as such, to forge new words or constructions; in a
+certain degree this is permitted to a poet; in neither case is there
+any question of duty. For if anyone chooses to forfeit his
+reputation as an orator, no one can prevent him. We have here only
+to do with the distinction of imperatives into problematical,
+assertorial, and apodeictic. Similarly in the note in which I have
+pared the moral ideas of practical perfection in different
+philosophical schools, I have distinguished the idea of wisdom from
+that of holiness, although I have stated that essentially and
+objectively they are the same. But in that place I understand by the
+former only that wisdom to which man (the Stoic) lays claim; therefore
+I take it subjectively as an attribute alleged to belong to man.
+(Perhaps the expression virtue, with which also the Stoic made great show,
+would better mark the characteristic of his school.) The expression of
+a postulate of pure practical reason might give most occasion to
+misapprehension in case the reader confounded it with the
+signification of the postulates in pure mathematics, which carry
+apodeictic certainty with them. These, however, postulate the
+possibility of an action, the object of which has been previously
+recognized a priori in theory as possible, and that with perfect
+certainty. But the former postulates the possibility of an object
+itself (God and the immortality of the soul) from apodeictic practical
+laws, and therefore only for the purposes of a practical reason.
+This certainty of the postulated possibility then is not at all
+theoretic, and consequently not apodeictic; that is to say, it is
+not a known necessity as regards the object, but a necessary
+supposition as regards the subject, necessary for the obedience to its
+objective but practical laws. It is, therefore, merely a necessary
+hypothesis. I could find no better expression for this rational
+necessity, which is subjective, but yet true and unconditional.
+
+
+
+In this manner, then, the a priori principles of two faculties of
+the mind, the faculty of cognition and that of desire, would be
+found and determined as to the conditions, extent, and limits of their
+use, and thus a sure foundation be paid for a scientific system of
+philosophy, both theoretic and practical.
+
+Nothing worse could happen to these labours than that anyone
+should make the unexpected discovery that there neither is, nor can
+be, any a priori knowledge at all. But there is no danger of this.
+This would be the same thing as if one sought to prove by reason
+that there is no reason. For we only say that we know something by
+reason, when we are conscious that we could have known it, even if
+it had not been given to us in experience; hence rational knowledge
+and knowledge a priori are one and the same. It is a clear
+contradiction to try to extract necessity from a principle of
+experience (ex pumice aquam), and to try by this to give a judgement
+true universality (without which there is no rational inference, not
+even inference from analogy, which is at least a presumed universality
+and objective necessity). To substitute subjective necessity, that is,
+custom, for objective, which exists only in a priori judgements, is to
+deny to reason the power of judging about the object, i.e., of knowing
+it, and what belongs to it. It implies, for example, that we must
+not say of something which often or always follows a certain
+antecedent state that we can conclude from this to that (for this
+would imply objective necessity and the notion of an a priori
+connexion), but only that we may expect similar cases (just as animals
+do), that is that we reject the notion of cause altogether as false
+and a mere delusion. As to attempting to remedy this want of objective
+and consequently universal validity by saying that we can see no
+ground for attributing any other sort of knowledge to other rational
+beings, if this reasoning were valid, our ignorance would do more
+for the enlargement of our knowledge than all our meditation. For,
+then, on this very ground that we have no knowledge of any other
+rational beings besides man, we should have a right to suppose them to
+be of the same nature as we know ourselves to be: that is, we should
+really know them. I omit to mention that universal assent does not
+prove the objective validity of a judgement (i.e., its validity as a
+cognition), and although this universal assent should accidentally
+happen, it could furnish no proof of agreement with the object; on the
+contrary, it is the objective validity which alone constitutes the
+basis of a necessary universal consent.
+
+                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 30}
+
+Hume would be quite satisfied with this system of universal
+empiricism, for, as is well known, he desired nothing more than
+that, instead of ascribing any objective meaning to the necessity in
+the concept of cause, a merely subjective one should be assumed, viz.,
+custom, in order to deny that reason could judge about God, freedom,
+and immortality; and if once his principles were granted, he was
+certainly well able to deduce his conclusions therefrom, with all
+logical coherence. But even Hume did not make his empiricism so
+universal as to include mathematics. He holds the principles of
+mathematics to be analytical; and if his were correct, they would
+certainly be apodeictic also: but we could not infer from this that
+reason has the faculty of forming apodeictic judgements in
+philosophy also- that is to say, those which are synthetical
+judgements, like the judgement of causality. But if we adopt a
+universal empiricism, then mathematics will be included.
+
+Now if this science is in contradiction with a reason that admits
+only empirical principles, as it inevitably is in the antinomy in
+which mathematics prove the infinite divisibility of space, which
+empiricism cannot admit; then the greatest possible evidence of
+demonstration is in manifest contradiction with the alleged
+conclusions from experience, and we are driven to ask, like
+Cheselden's blind patient, "Which deceives me, sight or touch?" (for
+empiricism is based on a necessity felt, rationalism on a necessity
+seen). And thus universal empiricism reveals itself as absolute
+scepticism. It is erroneous to attribute this in such an unqualified
+sense to Hume, * since he left at least one certain touchstone (which
+can only be found in a priori principles), although experience
+consists not only of feelings, but also of judgements.
+
+
+
+* Names that designate the followers of a sect have always been
+accompanied with much injustice; just as if one said, "N is an
+Idealist." For although he not only admits, but even insists, that our
+ideas of external things have actual objects of external things
+corresponding to them, yet he holds that the form of the intuition
+does not depend on them but on the human mind.
+
+
+
+                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 35}
+
+However, as in this philosophical and critical age such empiricism
+can scarcely be serious, and it is probably put forward only as an
+intellectual exercise and for the purpose of putting in a clearer
+light, by contrast, the necessity of rational a priori principles,
+we can only be grateful to those who employ themselves in this
+otherwise uninstructive labour.
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+                     INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+
+     Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+The theoretical use of reason was concerned with objects of the
+cognitive faculty only, and a critical examination of it with
+reference to this use applied properly only to the pure faculty of
+cognition; because this raised the suspicion, which was afterwards
+confirmed, that it might easily pass beyond its limits, and be lost
+among unattainable objects, or even contradictory notions. It is quite
+different with the practical use of reason. In this, reason is
+concerned with the grounds of determination of the will, which is a
+faculty either to produce objects corresponding to ideas, or to
+determine ourselves to the effecting of such objects (whether the
+physical power is sufficient or not); that is, to determine our
+causality. For here, reason can at least attain so far as to determine
+the will, and has always objective reality in so far as it is the
+volition only that is in question. The first question here then is
+whether pure reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will, or
+whether it can be a ground of determination only as dependent on
+empirical conditions. Now, here there comes in a notion of causality
+justified by the critique of the pure reason, although not capable
+of being presented empirically, viz., that of freedom; and if we can
+now discover means of proving that this property does in fact belong
+to the human will (and so to the will of all rational beings), then it
+will not only be shown that pure reason can be practical, but that
+it alone, and not reason empirically limited, is indubitably
+practical; consequently, we shall have to make a critical examination,
+not of pure practical reason, but only of practical reason
+generally. For when once pure reason is shown to exist, it needs no
+critical examination. For reason itself contains the standard for
+the critical examination of every use of it. The critique, then, of
+practical reason generally is bound to prevent the empirically
+conditioned reason from claiming exclusively to furnish the ground
+of determination of the will. If it is proved that there is a
+[practical] reason, its employment is alone immanent; the
+empirically conditioned use, which claims supremacy, is on the
+contrary transcendent and expresses itself in demands and precepts
+which go quite beyond its sphere. This is just the opposite of what
+might be said of pure reason in its speculative employment.
+
+However, as it is still pure reason, the knowledge of which is
+here the foundation of its practical employment, the general outline
+of the classification of a critique of practical reason must be
+arranged in accordance with that of the speculative. We must, then,
+have the Elements and the Methodology of it; and in the former an
+Analytic as the rule of truth, and a Dialectic as the exposition and
+dissolution of the illusion in the judgements of practical reason. But
+the order in the subdivision of the Analytic will be the reverse of
+that in the critique of the pure speculative reason. For, in the
+present case, we shall commence with the principles and proceed to the
+concepts, and only then, if possible, to the senses; whereas in the
+case of the speculative reason we began with the senses and had to end
+with the principles. The reason of this lies again in this: that now
+we have to do with a will, and have to consider reason, not in its
+relation to objects, but to this will and its causality. We must,
+then, begin with the principles of a causality not empirically
+conditioned, after which the attempt can be made to establish our
+notions of the determining grounds of such a will, of their
+application to objects, and finally to the subject and its sense
+faculty. We necessarily begin with the law of causality from
+freedom, that is, with a pure practical principle, and this determines
+the objects to which alone it can be applied.
+
+BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1
+
+                    FIRST PART.
+
+
+
+         ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.
+
+
+
+    BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+ CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason.
+
+                                           {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 5}
+
+
+
+                    I. DEFINITION.
+
+
+
+Practical principles are propositions which contain a general
+determination of the will, having under it several practical rules.
+They are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by
+the subject as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or
+practical laws, when the condition is recognized as objective, that
+is, valid for the will of every rational being.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 10}
+
+                       REMARK.
+
+
+
+Supposing that pure reason contains in itself a practical motive,
+that is, one adequate to determine the will, then there are
+practical laws; otherwise all practical principles will be mere
+maxims. In case the will of a rational being is pathologically
+affected, there may occur a conflict of the maxims with the
+practical laws recognized by itself. For example, one may make it
+his maxim to let no injury pass unrevenged, and yet he may see that
+this is not a practical law, but only his own maxim; that, on the
+contrary, regarded as being in one and the same maxim a rule for the
+will of every rational being, it must contradict itself. In natural
+philosophy the principles of what happens, (e.g., the principle of
+equality of action and reaction in the communication of motion) are at
+the same time laws of nature; for the use of reason there is
+theoretical and determined by the nature of the object. In practical
+philosophy, i.e., that which has to do only with the grounds of
+determination of the will, the principles which a man makes for
+himself are not laws by which one is inevitably bound; because
+reason in practical matters has to do with the subject, namely, with
+the faculty of desire, the special character of which may occasion
+variety in the rule. The practical rule is always a product of reason,
+because it prescribes action as a means to the effect. But in the case
+of a being with whom reason does not of itself determine the will,
+this rule is an imperative, i.e., a rule characterized by "shall,"
+which expresses the objective necessitation of the action and
+signifies that, if reason completely determined the will, the action
+would inevitably take place according to this rule. Imperatives,
+therefore, are objectively valid, and are quite distinct from
+maxims, which are subjective principles. The former either determine
+the conditions of the causality of the rational being as an
+efficient cause, i.e., merely in reference to the effect and the means
+of attaining it; or they determine the will only, whether it is
+adequate to the effect or not. The former would be hypothetical
+imperatives, and contain mere precepts of skill; the latter, on the
+contrary, would be categorical, and would alone be practical laws.
+Thus maxims are principles, but not imperatives. Imperatives
+themselves, however, when they are conditional (i.e., do not determine
+the will simply as will, but only in respect to a desired effect, that
+is, when they are hypothetical imperatives), are practical precepts
+but not laws. Laws must be sufficient to determine the will as will,
+even before I ask whether I have power sufficient for a desired
+effect, or the means necessary to produce it; hence they are
+categorical: otherwise they are not laws at all, because the necessity
+is wanting, which, if it is to be practical, must be independent of
+conditions which are pathological and are therefore only
+contingently connected with the will. Tell a man, for example, that he
+must be industrious and thrifty in youth, in order that he may not
+want in old age; this is a correct and important practical precept
+of the will. But it is easy to see that in this case the will is
+directed to something else which it is presupposed that it desires;
+and as to this desire, we must leave it to the actor himself whether
+he looks forward to other resources than those of his own acquisition,
+or does not expect to be old, or thinks that in case of future
+necessity he will be able to make shift with little. Reason, from
+which alone can spring a rule involving necessity, does, indeed,
+give necessity to this precept (else it would not be an imperative),
+but this is a necessity dependent on subjective conditions, and cannot
+be supposed in the same degree in all subjects. But that reason may
+give laws it is necessary that it should only need to presuppose
+itself, because rules are objectively and universally valid only
+when they hold without any contingent subjective conditions, which
+distinguish one rational being from another. Now tell a man that he
+should never make a deceitful promise, this is a rule which only
+concerns his will, whether the purposes he may have can be attained
+thereby or not; it is the volition only which is to be determined a
+priori by that rule. If now it is found that this rule is
+practically right, then it is a law, because it is a categorical
+imperative. Thus, practical laws refer to the will only, without
+considering what is attained by its causality, and we may disregard
+this latter (as belonging to the world of sense) in order to have them
+quite pure.
+
+
+
+                    II. THEOREM I.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 15}
+
+
+
+All practical principles which presuppose an object (matter) of
+the faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are
+empirical and can furnish no practical laws.
+
+By the matter of the faculty of desire I mean an object the
+realization of which is desired. Now, if the desire for this object
+precedes the practical rule and is the condition of our making it a
+principle, then I say (in the first place) this principle is in that
+case wholly empirical, for then what determines the choice is the idea
+of an object and that relation of this idea to the subject by which
+its faculty of desire is determined to its realization. Such a
+relation to the subject is called the pleasure in the realization of
+an object. This, then, must be presupposed as a condition of the
+possibility of determination of the will. But it is impossible to know
+a priori of any idea of an object whether it will be connected with
+pleasure or pain, or be indifferent. In such cases, therefore, the
+determining principle of the choice must be empirical and,
+therefore, also the practical material principle which presupposes
+it as a condition.
+
+In the second place, since susceptibility to a pleasure or pain
+can be known only empirically and cannot hold in the same degree for
+all rational beings, a principle which is based on this subjective
+condition may serve indeed as a maxim for the subject which
+possesses this susceptibility, but not as a law even to him (because
+it is wanting in objective necessity, which must be recognized a
+priori); it follows, therefore, that such a principle can never
+furnish a practical law.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 20}
+
+                   III. THEOREM II.
+
+
+
+All material practical principles as such are of one and the same
+kind and come under the general principle of self-love or private
+happiness.
+
+Pleasure arising from the idea of the idea of the existence of a
+thing, in so far as it is to determine the desire of this thing, is
+founded on the susceptibility of the subject, since it depends on
+the presence of an object; hence it belongs to sense (feeling), and
+not to understanding, which expresses a relation of the idea to an
+object according to concepts, not to the subject according to
+feelings. It is, then, practical only in so far as the faculty of
+desire is determined by the sensation of agreeableness which the
+subject expects from the actual existence of the object. Now, a
+rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life
+uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is happiness; and the
+principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of
+the will is the principle of self-love. All material principles, then,
+which place the determining ground of the will in the pleasure or pain
+to be received from the existence of any object are all of the same
+kind, inasmuch as they all belong to the principle of self-love or
+private happiness.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 25}
+
+                      COROLLARY.
+
+
+
+All material practical rules place the determining principle of
+the will in the lower desires; and if there were no purely formal laws
+of the will adequate to determine it, then we could not admit any
+higher desire at all.
+
+
+
+                       REMARK I.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 30}
+
+
+
+It is surprising that men, otherwise acute, can think it possible to
+distinguish between higher and lower desires, according as the ideas
+which are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin
+in the senses or in the understanding; for when we inquire what are
+the determining grounds of desire, and place them in some expected
+pleasantness, it is of no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing
+object is derived, but only how much it pleases. Whether an idea has
+its seat and source in the understanding or not, if it can only
+determine the choice by presupposing a feeling of pleasure in the
+subject, it follows that its capability of determining the choice
+depends altogether on the nature of the inner sense, namely, that this
+can be agreeably affected by it. However dissimilar ideas of objects
+may be, though they be ideas of the understanding, or even of the
+reason in contrast to ideas of sense, yet the feeling of pleasure,
+by means of which they constitute the determining principle of the
+will (the expected satisfaction which impels the activity to the
+production of the object), is of one and the same kind, not only
+inasmuch as it can only be known empirically, but also inasmuch as
+it affects one and the same vital force which manifests itself in
+the faculty of desire, and in this respect can only differ in degree
+from every other ground of determination. Otherwise, how could we
+compare in respect of magnitude two principles of determination, the
+ideas of which depend upon different faculties, so as to prefer that
+which affects the faculty of desire in the highest degree. The same
+man may return unread an instructive book which he cannot again
+obtain, in order not to miss a hunt; he may depart in the midst of a
+fine speech, in order not to be late for dinner; he may leave a
+rational conversation, such as he otherwise values highly, to take his
+place at the gaming-table; he may even repulse a poor man whom he at
+other times takes pleasure in benefiting, because he has only just
+enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the theatre. If
+the determination of his will rests on the feeling of the
+agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause, it
+is all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected.
+The only thing that concerns him, in order to decide his choice, is,
+how great, how long continued, how easily obtained, and how often
+repeated, this agreeableness is. Just as to the man who wants money to
+spend, it is all the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain
+or washed out of the sand, provided it is everywhere accepted at the
+same value; so the man who cares only for the enjoyment of life does
+not ask whether the ideas are of the understanding or the senses,
+but only how much and how great pleasure they will give for the
+longest time. It is only those that would gladly deny to pure reason
+the power of determining the will, without the presupposition of any
+feeling, who could deviate so far from their own exposition as to
+describe as quite heterogeneous what they have themselves previously
+brought under one and the same principle. Thus, for example, it is
+observed that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power, in
+the consciousness of our strength of mind in overcoming obstacles
+which are opposed to our designs, in the culture of our mental
+talents, etc.; and we justly call these more refined pleasures and
+enjoyments, because they are more in our power than others; they do
+not wear out, but rather increase the capacity for further enjoyment
+of them, and while they delight they at the same time cultivate. But
+to say on this account that they determine the will in a different way
+and not through sense, whereas the possibility of the pleasure
+presupposes a feeling for it implanted in us, which is the first
+condition of this satisfaction; this is just as when ignorant
+persons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so subtle,
+so supersubtle that they almost make themselves giddy with it, and
+then think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual
+and yet extended being. If with Epicurus we make virtue determine
+the will only by means of the pleasure it promises, we cannot
+afterwards blame him for holding that this pleasure is of the same
+kind as those of the coarsest senses. For we have no reason whatever
+to charge him with holding that the ideas by which this feeling is
+excited in us belong merely to the bodily senses. As far as can be
+conjectured, he sought the source of many of them in the use of the
+higher cognitive faculty, but this did not prevent him, and could
+not prevent him, from holding on the principle above stated, that
+the pleasure itself which those intellectual ideas give us, and by
+which alone they can determine the will, is just of the same kind.
+Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher, and yet the
+most rarely found. The ancient Greek schools give us more examples
+of it than we find in our syncretistic age, in which a certain shallow
+and dishonest system of compromise of contradictory principles is
+devised, because it commends itself better to a public which is
+content to know something of everything and nothing thoroughly, so
+as to please every party.
+
+The principle of private happiness, however much understanding and
+reason may be used in it, cannot contain any other determining
+principles for the will than those which belong to the lower
+desires; and either there are no [higher] desires at all, or pure
+reason must of itself alone be practical; that is, it must be able
+to determine the will by the mere form of the practical rule without
+supposing any feeling, and consequently without any idea of the
+pleasant or unpleasant, which is the matter of the desire, and which
+is always an empirical condition of the principles. Then only, when
+reason of itself determines the will (not as the servant of the
+inclination), it is really a higher desire to which that which is
+pathologically determined is subordinate, and is really, and even
+specifically, distinct from the latter, so that even the slightest
+admixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and
+superiority; just as in a mathematical demonstration the least
+empirical condition would degrade and destroy its force and value.
+Reason, with its practical law, determines the will immediately, not
+by means of an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain, not even of
+pleasure in the law itself, and it is only because it can, as pure
+reason, be practical, that it is possible for it to be legislative.
+
+
+
+                      REMARK II.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 35}
+
+
+
+To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational
+being, and this, therefore, is inevitably a determining principle of
+its faculty of desire. For we are not in possession originally of
+satisfaction with our whole existence- a bliss which would imply a
+consciousness of our own independent self-sufficiency this is a
+problem imposed upon us by our own finite nature, because we have
+wants and these wants regard the matter of our desires, that is,
+something that is relative to a subjective feeling of pleasure or
+pain, which determines what we need in order to be satisfied with
+our condition. But just because this material principle of
+determination can only be empirically known by the subject, it is
+impossible to regard this problem as a law; for a law being
+objective must contain the very same principle of determination of the
+will in all cases and for all rational beings. For, although the
+notion of happiness is in every case the foundation of practical
+relation of the objects to the desires, yet it is only a general
+name for the subjective determining principles, and determines nothing
+specifically; whereas this is what alone we are concerned with in this
+practical problem, which cannot be solved at all without such specific
+determination. For it is every man's own special feeling of pleasure
+and pain that decides in what he is to place his happiness, and even
+in the same subject this will vary with the difference of his wants
+according as this feeling changes, and thus a law which is
+subjectively necessary (as a law of nature) is objectively a very
+contingent practical principle, which can and must be very different
+in different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law; since, in
+the desire for happiness it is not the form (of conformity to law)
+that is decisive, but simply the matter, namely, whether I am to
+expect pleasure in following the law, and how much. Principles of
+self-love may, indeed, contain universal precepts of skill (how to
+find means to accomplish one's purpose), but in that case they are
+merely theoretical principles; * as, for example, how he who would
+like to eat bread should contrive a mill; but practical precepts
+founded on them can never be universal, for the determining principle
+of the desire is based on the feeling pleasure and pain, which can
+never be supposed to be universally directed to the same objects.
+
+
+
+* Propositions which in mathematics or physics are called practical
+ought properly to be called technical. For they have nothing to do
+with the determination of the will; they only point out how a certain
+effect is to be produced and are, therefore, just as theoretical as
+any propositions which express the connection of a cause with an
+effect. Now whoever chooses the effect must also choose the cause.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 40}
+
+Even supposing, however, that all finite rational beings were
+thoroughly agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings of
+pleasure and pain, and also as to the means which they must employ
+to attain the one and avoid the other; still, they could by no means
+set up the principle of self-love as a practical law, for this
+unanimity itself would be only contingent. The principle of
+determination would still be only subjectively valid and merely
+empirical, and would not possess the necessity which is conceived in
+every law, namely, an objective necessity arising from a priori
+grounds; unless, indeed, we hold this necessity to be not at all
+practical, but merely physical, viz., that our action is as inevitably
+determined by our inclination, as yawning when we see others yawn.
+It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at
+all, but only counsels for the service of our desires, than to raise
+merely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws, which have
+objective necessity, and not merely subjective, and which must be
+known by reason a priori, not by experience (however empirically
+universal this may be). Even the rules of corresponding phenomena
+are only called laws of nature (e.g., the mechanical laws), when we
+either know them really a priori, or (as in the case of chemical laws)
+suppose that they would be known a priori from objective grounds if
+our insight reached further. But in the case of merely subjective
+practical principles, it is expressly made a condition that they rest,
+not on objective, but on subjective conditions of choice, and hence
+that they must always be represented as mere maxims, never as
+practical laws. This second remark seems at first sight to be mere
+verbal refinement, but it defines the terms of the most important
+distinction which can come into consideration in practical
+investigations.
+
+
+
+                     IV. THEOREM II.
+
+
+
+A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal
+laws, unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will,
+not by their matter, but by their form only.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 45}
+
+By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the
+will. This object is either the determining ground of the will or it
+is not. In the former case the rule of the will is subjected to an
+empirical condition (viz., the relation of the determining idea to the
+feeling of pleasure and pain), consequently it can not be a
+practical law. Now, when we abstract from a law all matter, i.e.,
+every object of the will (as a determining principle), nothing is left
+but the mere form of a universal legislation. Therefore, either a
+rational being cannot conceive his subjective practical principles,
+that is, his maxims, as being at the same time universal laws, or he
+must suppose that their mere form, by which they are fitted for
+universal legislation, is alone what makes them practical laws.
+
+
+
+                       REMARK.
+
+
+
+The commonest understanding can distinguish without instruction what
+form of maxim is adapted for universal legislation, and what is not.
+Suppose, for example, that I have made it my maxim to increase my
+fortune by every safe means. Now, I have a deposit in my hands, the
+owner of which is dead and has left no writing about it. This is
+just the case for my maxim. I desire then to know whether that maxim
+can also bold good as a universal practical law. I apply it,
+therefore, to the present case, and ask whether it could take the form
+of a law, and consequently whether I can by my maxim at the same
+time give such a law as this, that everyone may deny a deposit of
+which no one can produce a proof. I at once become aware that such a
+principle, viewed as a law, would annihilate itself, because the
+result would be that there would be no deposits. A practical law which
+I recognise as such must be qualified for universal legislation;
+this is an identical proposition and, therefore, self-evident. Now, if
+I say that my will is subject to a practical law, I cannot adduce my
+inclination (e.g., in the present case my avarice) as a principle of
+determination fitted to be a universal practical law; for this is so
+far from being fitted for a universal legislation that, if put in
+the form of a universal law, it would destroy itself.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 50}
+
+It is, therefore, surprising that intelligent men could have thought
+of calling the desire of happiness a universal practical law on the
+ground that the desire is universal, and, therefore, also the maxim by
+which everyone makes this desire determine his will. For whereas in
+other cases a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious;
+here, on the contrary, if we attribute to the maxim the universality
+of a law, the extreme opposite of harmony will follow, the greatest
+opposition and the complete destruction of the maxim itself and its
+purpose. For, in that case, the will of all has not one and the same
+object, but everyone has his own (his private welfare), which may
+accidentally accord with the purposes of others which are equally
+selfish, but it is far from sufficing for a law; because the
+occasional exceptions which one is permitted to make are endless,
+and cannot be definitely embraced in one universal rule. In this
+manner, then, results a harmony like that which a certain satirical
+poem depicts as existing between a married couple bent on going to
+ruin, "O, marvellous harmony, what he wishes, she wishes also"; or
+like what is said of the pledge of Francis I to the Emperor Charles V,
+"What my brother Charles wishes that I wish also" (viz., Milan).
+Empirical principles of determination are not fit for any universal
+external legislation, but just as little for internal; for each man
+makes his own subject the foundation of his inclination, and in the
+same subject sometimes one inclination, sometimes another, has the
+preponderance. To discover a law which would govern them all under
+this condition, namely, bringing them all into harmony, is quite
+impossible.
+
+
+
+                     V. PROBLEM I.
+
+
+
+Supposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the
+sufficient determining principle of a will, to find the nature of
+the will which can be determined by it alone.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 55}
+
+ Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason, and
+is, therefore, not an object of the senses, and consequently does
+not belong to the class of phenomena, it follows that the idea of
+it, which determines the will, is distinct from all the principles
+that determine events in nature according to the law of causality,
+because in their case the determining principles must themselves be
+phenomena. Now, if no other determining principle can serve as a law
+for the will except that universal legislative form, such a will
+must be conceived as quite independent of the natural law of phenomena
+in their mutual relation, namely, the law of causality; such
+independence is called freedom in the strictest, that is, in the
+transcendental, sense; consequently, a will which can have its law
+in nothing but the mere legislative form of the maxim is a free will.
+
+
+
+                     VI. PROBLEM II.
+
+
+
+Supposing that a will is free, to find the law which alone is
+competent to determine it necessarily.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 60}
+
+Since the matter of the practical law, i.e., an object of the maxim,
+can never be given otherwise than empirically, and the free will is
+independent on empirical conditions (that is, conditions belonging
+to the world of sense) and yet is determinable, consequently a free
+will must find its principle of determination in the law, and yet
+independently of the matter of the law. But, besides the matter of the
+law, nothing is contained in it except the legislative form. It is the
+legislative form, then, contained in the maxim, which can alone
+constitute a principle of determination of the [free] will.
+
+
+
+                          REMARK.
+
+
+
+Thus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply
+each other. Now I do not ask here whether they are in fact distinct,
+or whether an unconditioned law is not rather merely the consciousness
+of a pure practical reason and the latter identical with the
+positive concept of freedom; I only ask, whence begins our knowledge
+of the unconditionally practical, whether it is from freedom or from
+the practical law? Now it cannot begin from freedom, for of this we
+cannot be immediately conscious, since the first concept of it is
+negative; nor can we infer it from experience, for experience gives us
+the knowledge only of the law of phenomena, and hence of the mechanism
+of nature, the direct opposite of freedom. It is therefore the moral
+law, of which we become directly conscious (as soon as we trace for
+ourselves maxims of the will), that first presents itself to us, and
+leads directly to the concept of freedom, inasmuch as reason
+presents it as a principle of determination not to be outweighed by
+any sensible conditions, nay, wholly independent of them. But how is
+the consciousness, of that moral law possible? We can become conscious
+of pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure theoretical
+principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes
+them and to the elimination of all empirical conditions, which it
+directs. The concept of a pure will arises out of the former, as
+that of a pure understanding arises out of the latter. That this is
+the true subordination of our concepts, and that it is morality that
+first discovers to us the notion of freedom, hence that it is
+practical reason which, with this concept, first proposes to
+speculative reason the most insoluble problem, thereby placing it in
+the greatest perplexity, is evident from the following
+consideration: Since nothing in phenomena can be explained by the
+concept of freedom, but the mechanism of nature must constitute the
+only clue; moreover, when pure reason tries to ascend in the series of
+causes to the unconditioned, it falls into an antinomy which is
+entangled in incomprehensibilities on the one side as much as the
+other; whilst the latter (namely, mechanism) is at least useful in the
+explanation of phenomena, therefore no one would ever have been so
+rash as to introduce freedom into science, had not the moral law,
+and with it practical reason, come in and forced this notion upon
+us. Experience, however, confirms this order of notions. Suppose
+some one asserts of his lustful appetite that, when the desired object
+and the opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible. [Ask
+him]- if a gallows were erected before the house where he finds this
+opportunity, in order that he should be hanged thereon immediately
+after the gratification of his lust, whether he could not then control
+his passion; we need not be long in doubt what he would reply. Ask
+him, however- if his sovereign ordered him, on pain of the same
+immediate execution, to bear false witness against an honourable
+man, whom the prince might wish to destroy under a plausible
+pretext, would he consider it possible in that case to overcome his
+love of life, however great it may be. He would perhaps not venture to
+affirm whether he would do so or not, but he must unhesitatingly admit
+that it is possible to do so. He judges, therefore, that he can do a
+certain thing because he is conscious that he ought, and he recognizes
+that he is free- a fact which but for the moral law he would never
+have known.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 65}
+
+
+
+       VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL REASON.
+
+
+
+Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold
+good as a principle of universal legislation.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 70}
+
+                       REMARK.
+
+
+
+Pure geometry has postulates which are practical propositions, but
+contain nothing further than the assumption that we can do something
+if it is required that we should do it, and these are the only
+geometrical propositions that concern actual existence. They are,
+then, practical rules under a problematical condition of the will; but
+here the rule says: We absolutely must proceed in a certain manner.
+The practical rule is, therefore, unconditional, and hence it is
+conceived a priori as a categorically practical proposition by which
+the will is objectively determined absolutely and immediately (by
+the practical rule itself, which thus is in this case a law); for pure
+reason practical of itself is here directly legislative. The will is
+thought as independent on empirical conditions, and, therefore, as
+pure will determined by the mere form of the law, and this principle
+of determination is regarded as the supreme condition of all maxims.
+The thing is strange enough, and has no parallel in all the rest of
+our practical knowledge. For the a priori thought of a possible
+universal legislation which is therefore merely problematical, is
+unconditionally commanded as a law without borrowing anything from
+experience or from any external will. This, however, is not a
+precept to do something by which some desired effect can be attained
+(for then the will would depend on physical conditions), but a rule
+that determines the will a priori only so far as regards the forms
+of its maxims; and thus it is at least not impossible to conceive that
+a law, which only applies to the subjective form of principles, yet
+serves as a principle of determination by means of the objective
+form of law in general. We may call the consciousness of this
+fundamental law a fact of reason, because we cannot reason it out from
+antecedent data of reason, e.g., the consciousness of freedom (for
+this is not antecedently given), but it forces itself on us as a
+synthetic a priori proposition, which is not based on any intuition,
+either pure or empirical. It would, indeed, be analytical if the
+freedom of the will were presupposed, but to presuppose freedom as a
+positive concept would require an intellectual intuition, which cannot
+here be assumed; however, when we regard this law as given, it must be
+observed, in order not to fall into any misconception, that it is
+not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of the pure reason, which
+thereby announces itself as originally legislative (sic volo, sic
+jubeo).
+
+
+
+                     COROLLARY.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 75}
+
+
+
+Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to man) a
+universal law which we call the moral law.
+
+
+
+                       REMARK.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 80}
+
+The fact just mentioned is undeniable. It is only necessary to
+analyse the judgement that men pass on the lawfulness of their
+actions, in order to find that, whatever inclination may say to the
+contrary, reason, incorruptible and self-constrained, always
+confronts the maxim of the will in any action with the pure will, that
+is, with itself, considering itself as a priori practical. Now this
+principle of morality, just on account of the universality of the
+legislation which makes it the formal supreme determining principle of
+the will, without regard to any subjective differences, is declared by
+the reason to be a law for all rational beings, in so far as they have
+a will, that is, a power to determine their causality by the
+conception of rules; and, therefore, so far as they are capable of
+acting according to principles, and consequently also according to
+practical a priori principles (for these alone have the necessity that
+reason requires in a principle). It is, therefore, not limited to
+men only, but applies to all finite beings that possess reason and
+will; nay, it even includes the Infinite Being as the supreme
+intelligence. In the former case, however, the law has the form of
+an imperative, because in them, as rational beings, we can suppose a
+pure will, but being creatures affected with wants and physical
+motives, not a holy will, that is, one which would be incapable of any
+maxim conflicting with the moral law. In their case, therefore, the
+moral law is an imperative, which commands categorically, because
+the law is unconditioned; the relation of such a will to this law is
+dependence under the name of obligation, which implies a constraint to
+an action, though only by reason and its objective law; and this
+action is called duty, because an elective will, subject to
+pathological affections (though not determined by them, and,
+therefore, still free), implies a wish that arises from subjective
+causes and, therefore, may often be opposed to the pure objective
+determining principle; whence it requires the moral constraint of a
+resistance of the practical reason, which may be called an internal,
+but intellectual, compulsion. In the supreme intelligence the elective
+will is rightly conceived as incapable of any maxim which could not at
+the same time be objectively a law; and the notion of holiness,
+which on that account belongs to it, places it, not indeed above all
+practical laws, but above all practically restrictive laws, and
+consequently above obligation and duty. This holiness of will is,
+however, a practical idea, which must necessarily serve as a type to
+which finite rational beings can only approximate indefinitely, and
+which the pure moral law, which is itself on this account called holy,
+constantly and rightly holds before their eyes. The utmost that finite
+practical reason can effect is to be certain of this indefinite
+progress of one's maxims and of their steady disposition to advance.
+This is virtue, and virtue, at least as a naturally acquired
+faculty, can never be perfect, because assurance in such a case
+never becomes apodeictic certainty and, when it only amounts to
+persuasion, is very dangerous.
+
+
+
+                     VIII. THEOREM IV.
+
+
+
+The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and
+of all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy
+of the elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation,
+but is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof and to the
+morality of the will.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 85}
+
+In fact the sole principle of morality consists in the
+independence on all matter of the law (namely, a desired object),
+and in the determination of the elective will by the mere universal
+legislative form of which its maxim must be capable. Now this
+independence is freedom in the negative sense, and this
+self-legislation of the pure, and therefore practical, reason is
+freedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral law expresses nothing
+else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason; that is, freedom;
+and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, and on this
+condition only can they agree with the supreme practical law. If
+therefore the matter of the volition, which can be nothing else than
+the object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the
+practical law, as the condition of its possibility, there results
+heteronomy of the elective will, namely, dependence on the physical
+law that we should follow some impulse or inclination. In that case
+the will does not give itself the law, but only the precept how
+rationally to follow pathological law; and the maxim which, in such
+a case, never contains the universally legislative form, not only
+produces no obligation, but is itself opposed to the principle of a
+pure practical reason and, therefore, also to the moral disposition,
+even though the resulting action may be conformable to the law.
+
+
+
+                       REMARK.
+
+
+
+Hence a practical precept, which contains a material (and
+therefore empirical) condition, must never be reckoned a practical
+law. For the law of the pure will, which is free, brings the will into
+a sphere quite different from the empirical; and as the necessity
+involved in the law is not a physical necessity, it can only consist
+in the formal conditions of the possibility of a law in general. All
+the matter of practical rules rests on subjective conditions, which
+give them only a conditional universality (in case I desire this or
+that, what I must do in order to obtain it), and they all turn on
+the principle of private happiness. Now, it is indeed undeniable
+that every volition must have an object, and therefore a matter; but
+it does not follow that this is the determining principle and the
+condition of the maxim; for, if it is so, then this cannot be
+exhibited in a universally legislative form, since in that case the
+expectation of the existence of the object would be the determining
+cause of the choice, and the volition must presuppose the dependence
+of the faculty of desire on the existence of something; but this
+dependence can only be sought in empirical conditions and,
+therefore, can never furnish a foundation for a necessary and
+universal rule. Thus, the happiness of others may be the object of the
+will of a rational being. But if it were the determining principle
+of the maxim, we must assume that we find not only a rational
+satisfaction in the welfare of others, but also a want such as the
+sympathetic disposition in some men occasions. But I cannot assume the
+existence of this want in every rational being (not at all in God).
+The matter, then, of the maxim may remain, but it must not be the
+condition of it, else the maxim could not be fit for a law. Hence, the
+mere form of law, which limits the matter, must also be a reason for
+adding this matter to the will, not for presupposing it. For
+example, let the matter be my own happiness. This (rule), if I
+attribute it to everyone (as, in fact, I may, in the case of every
+finite being), can become an objective practical law only if I include
+the happiness of others. Therefore, the law that we should promote the
+happiness of others does not arise from the assumption that this is an
+object of everyone's choice, but merely from this, that the form of
+universality which reason requires as the condition of giving to a
+maxim of self-love the objective validity of a law is the principle
+that determines the will. Therefore it was not the object (the
+happiness of others) that determined the pure will, but it was the
+form of law only, by which I restricted my maxim, founded on
+inclination, so as to give it the universality of a law, and thus to
+adapt it to the practical reason; and it is this restriction alone,
+and not the addition of an external spring, that can give rise to
+the notion of the obligation to extend the maxim of my self-love to
+the happiness of others.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 90}
+
+
+
+                     REMARK II.
+
+
+
+The direct opposite of the principle of morality is, when the
+principle of private happiness is made the determining principle of
+the will, and with this is to be reckoned, as I have shown above,
+everything that places the determining principle which is to serve
+as a law, anywhere but in the legislative form of the maxim. This
+contradiction, however, is not merely logical, like that which would
+arise between rules empirically conditioned, if they were raised to
+the rank of necessary principles of cognition, but is practical, and
+would ruin morality altogether were not the voice of reason in
+reference to the will so clear, so irrepressible, so distinctly
+audible, even to the commonest men. It can only, indeed, be maintained
+in the perplexing speculations of the schools, which are bold enough
+to shut their ears against that heavenly voice, in order to support
+a theory that costs no trouble.
+
+Suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to
+attempt to justify himself to you for having borne false witness,
+first by alleging the, in his view, sacred duty of consulting his
+own happiness; then by enumerating the advantages which he had
+gained thereby, pointing out the prudence he had shown in securing
+himself against detection, even by yourself, to whom he now reveals
+the secret, only in order that he may be able to deny it at any
+time; and suppose he were then to affirm, in all seriousness, that
+he has fulfilled a true human duty; you would either laugh in his
+face, or shrink back from him with disgust; and yet, if a man has
+regulated his principles of action solely with a view to his own
+advantage, you would have nothing whatever to object against this mode
+of proceeding. Or suppose some one recommends you a man as steward, as
+a man to whom you can blindly trust all your affairs; and, in order to
+inspire you with confidence, extols him as a prudent man who
+thoroughly understands his own interest, and is so indefatigably
+active that he lets slip no opportunity of advancing it; lastly,
+lest you should be afraid of finding a vulgar selfishness in him,
+praises the good taste with which he lives; not seeking his pleasure
+in money-making, or in coarse wantonness, but in the enlargement of
+his knowledge, in instructive intercourse with a select circle, and
+even in relieving the needy; while as to the means (which, of
+course, derive all their value from the end), he is not particular,
+and is ready to use other people's money for the purpose as if it were
+his own, provided only he knows that he can do so safely, and
+without discovery; you would either believe that the recommender was
+mocking you, or that he had lost his senses. So sharply and clearly
+marked are the boundaries of morality and self-love that even the
+commonest eye cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to
+the one or the other. The few remarks that follow may appear
+superfluous where the truth is so plain, but at least they may serve
+to give a little more distinctness to the judgement of common sense.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 95}
+
+The principle of happiness may, indeed, furnish maxims, but never
+such as would be competent to be laws of the will, even if universal
+happiness were made the object. For since the knowledge of this
+rests on mere empirical data, since every man's judgement on it
+depends very much on his particular point of view, which is itself
+moreover very variable, it can supply only general rules, not
+universal; that is, it can give rules which on the average will most
+frequently fit, but not rules which must hold good always and
+necessarily; hence, no practical laws can be founded on it. Just
+because in this case an object of choice is the foundation of the rule
+and must therefore precede it, the rule can refer to nothing but
+what is [felt], and therefore it refers to experience and is founded
+on it, and then the variety of judgement must be endless. This
+principle, therefore, does not prescribe the same practical rules to
+all rational beings, although the rules are all included under a
+common title, namely, that of happiness. The moral law, however, is
+conceived as objectively necessary, only because it holds for everyone
+that has reason and will.
+
+The maxim of self-love (prudence) only advises; the law of
+morality commands. Now there is a great difference between that
+which we are advised to do and that to which we are obliged.
+
+The commonest intelligence can easily and without hesitation see
+what, on the principle of autonomy of the will, requires to be done;
+but on supposition of heteronomy of the will, it is hard and
+requires knowledge of the world to see what is to be done. That is
+to say, what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone; but what is to
+bring true durable advantage, such as will extend to the whole of
+one's existence, is always veiled in impenetrable obscurity; and
+much prudence is required to adapt the practical rule founded on it to
+the ends of life, even tolerably, by making proper exceptions. But the
+moral law commands the most punctual obedience from everyone; it must,
+therefore, not be so difficult to judge what it requires to be done,
+that the commonest unpractised understanding, even without worldly
+prudence, should fail to apply it rightly.
+
+It is always in everyone's power to satisfy the categorical
+command of morality; whereas it is seldom possible, and by no means so
+to everyone, to satisfy the empirically conditioned precept of
+happiness, even with regard to a single purpose. The reason is that in
+the former case there is question only of the maxim, which must be
+genuine and pure; but in the latter case there is question also of
+one's capacity and physical power to realize a desired object. A
+command that everyone should try to make himself happy would be
+foolish, for one never commands anyone to do what he of himself
+infallibly wishes to do. We must only command the means, or rather
+supply them, since he cannot do everything that he wishes. But to
+command morality under the name of duty is quite rational; for, in the
+first place, not everyone is willing to obey its precepts if they
+oppose his inclinations; and as to the means of obeying this law,
+these need not in this case be taught, for in this respect whatever he
+wishes to do he can do.
+
+He who has lost at play may be vexed at himself and his folly, but
+if he is conscious of having cheated at play (although he has gained
+thereby), he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself
+with the moral law. This must, therefore, be something different
+from the principle of private happiness. For a man must have a
+different criterion when he is compelled to say to himself: "I am a
+worthless fellow, though I have filled my purse"; and when he approves
+himself, and says: "I am a prudent man, for I have enriched my
+treasure."
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 100}
+
+Finally, there is something further in the idea of our practical
+reason, which accompanies the transgression of a moral law- namely,
+its ill desert. Now the notion of punishment, as such, cannot be
+united with that of becoming a partaker of happiness; for although
+he who inflicts the punishment may at the same time have the
+benevolent purpose of directing this punishment to this end, yet it
+must first be justified in itself as punishment, i.e., as mere harm,
+so that if it stopped there, and the person punished could get no
+glimpse of kindness hidden behind this harshness, he must yet admit
+that justice was done him, and that his reward was perfectly
+suitable to his conduct. In every punishment, as such, there must
+first be justice, and this constitutes the essence of the notion.
+Benevolence may, indeed, be united with it, but the man who has
+deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this.
+Punishment, then, is a physical evil, which, though it be not
+connected with moral evil as a natural consequence, ought to be
+connected with it as a consequence by the principles of a moral
+legislation. Now, if every crime, even without regarding the
+physical consequence with respect to the actor, is in itself
+punishable, that is, forfeits happiness (at least partially), it is
+obviously absurd to say that the crime consisted just in this, that he
+has drawn punishment on himself, thereby injuring his private
+happiness (which, on the principle of self-love, must be the proper
+notion of all crime). According to this view, the punishment would
+be the reason for calling anything a crime, and justice would, on
+the contrary, consist in omitting all punishment, and even
+preventing that which naturally follows; for, if this were done, there
+would no longer be any evil in the action, since the harm which
+otherwise followed it, and on account of which alone the action was
+called evil, would now be prevented. To look, however, on all
+rewards and punishments as merely the machinery in the hand of a
+higher power, which is to serve only to set rational creatures
+striving after their final end (happiness), this is to reduce the will
+to a mechanism destructive of freedom; this is so evident that it need
+not detain us.
+
+More refined, though equally false, is the theory of those who
+suppose a certain special moral sense, which sense and not reason
+determines the moral law, and in consequence of which the
+consciousness of virtue is supposed to be directly connected with
+contentment and pleasure; that of vice, with mental dissatisfaction
+and pain; thus reducing the whole to the desire of private
+happiness. Without repeating what has been said above, I will here
+only remark the fallacy they fall into. In order to imagine the
+vicious man as tormented with mental dissatisfaction by the
+consciousness of his transgressions, they must first represent him
+as in the main basis of his character, at least in some degree,
+morally good; just as he who is pleased with the consciousness of
+right conduct must be conceived as already virtuous. The notion of
+morality and duty must, therefore, have preceded any regard to this
+satisfaction, and cannot be derived from it. A man must first
+appreciate the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the
+moral law, and the immediate dignity which the following of it gives
+to the person in his own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in
+the consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter remorse
+that accompanies the consciousness of its transgression. It is,
+therefore, impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction
+prior to the knowledge of obligation, or to make it the basis of the
+latter. A man must be at least half honest in order even to be able to
+form a conception of these feelings. I do not deny that as the human
+will is, by virtue of liberty, capable of being immediately determined
+by the moral law, so frequent practice in accordance with this
+principle of determination can, at least, produce subjectively a
+feeling of satisfaction; on the contrary, it is a duty to establish
+and to cultivate this, which alone deserves to be called properly
+the moral feeling; but the notion of duty cannot be derived from it,
+else we should have to suppose a feeling for the law as such, and thus
+make that an object of sensation which can only be thought by the
+reason; and this, if it is not to be a flat contradiction, would
+destroy all notion of duty and put in its place a mere mechanical play
+of refined inclinations sometimes contending with the coarser.
+
+If now we compare our formal supreme principle of pure practical
+reason (that of autonomy of the will) with all previous material
+principles of morality, we can exhibit them all in a table in which
+all possible cases are exhausted, except the one formal principle; and
+thus we can show visibly that it is vain to look for any other
+principle than that now proposed. In fact all possible principles of
+determination of the will are either merely subjective, and
+therefore empirical, or are also objective and rational; and both
+are either external or internal.
+
+
+
+Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the
+Foundation of Morality, are:
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 105}
+
+
+
+                       SUBJECTIVE.
+
+
+
+          EXTERNAL                 INTERNAL
+
+        Education                Physical feeling
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 110}
+
+        (Montaigne)              (Epicurus)
+
+        The civil                Moral feeling
+
+        Constitution             (Hutcheson)
+
+        (Mandeville)
+
+
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 115}
+
+                       OBJECTIVE.
+
+
+
+          INTERNAL                  EXTERNAL
+
+        Perfection                Will of God
+
+        (Wolf and the             (Crusius and other
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 120}
+
+        Stoics)                   theological Moralists)
+
+
+
+Those of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable
+of furnishing the universal principle of morality; but those in the
+lower table are based on reason (for perfection as a quality of
+things, and the highest perfection conceived as substance, that is,
+God, can only be thought by means of rational concepts). But the
+former notion, namely, that of perfection, may either be taken in a
+theoretic signification, and then it means nothing but the
+completeness of each thing in its own kind (transcendental), or that
+of a thing merely as a thing (metaphysical); and with that we are
+not concerned here. But the notion of perfection in a practical
+sense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of
+purposes. This perfection, as a quality of man and consequently
+internal, is nothing but talent and, what strengthens or completes
+this, skill. Supreme perfection conceived as substance, that is God,
+and consequently external (considered practically), is the sufficiency
+of this being for all ends. Ends then must first be given,
+relatively to which only can the notion of perfection (whether
+internal in ourselves or external in God) be the determining principle
+of the will. But an end- being an object which must precede the
+determination of the will by a practical rule and contain the ground
+of the possibility of this determination, and therefore contain also
+the matter of the will, taken as its determining principle- such an
+end is always empirical and, therefore, may serve for the Epicurean
+principle of the happiness theory, but not for the pure rational
+principle of morality and duty. Thus, talents and the improvement of
+them, because they contribute to the advantages of life; or the will
+of God, if agreement with it be taken as the object of the will,
+without any antecedent independent practical principle, can be motives
+only by reason of the happiness expected therefrom. Hence it
+follows, first, that all the principles here stated are material;
+secondly, that they include all possible material principles; and,
+finally, the conclusion, that since material principles are quite
+incapable of furnishing the supreme moral law (as has been shown), the
+formal practical principle of the pure reason (according to which the
+mere form of a universal legislation must constitute the supreme and
+immediate determining principle of the will) is the only one
+possible which is adequate to furnish categorical imperatives, that
+is, practical laws (which make actions a duty), and in general to
+serve as the principle of morality, both in criticizing conduct and
+also in its application to the human will to determine it.
+
+
+
+I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure
+Practical Reason.
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 125}
+
+
+
+This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical, that is,
+can of itself determine the will independently of anything
+empirical; and this it proves by a fact in which pure reason in us
+proves itself actually practical, namely, the autonomy shown in the
+fundamental principle of morality, by which reason determines the will
+to action.
+
+It shows at the same time that this fact is inseparably connected
+with the consciousness of freedom of the will, nay, is identical
+with it; and by this the will of a rational being, although as
+belonging to the world of sense it recognizes itself as necessarily
+subject to the laws of causality like other efficient causes; yet,
+at the same time, on another side, namely, as a being in itself, is
+conscious of existing in and being determined by an intelligible order
+of things; conscious not by virtue of a special intuition of itself,
+but by virtue of certain dynamical laws which determine its
+causality in the sensible world; for it has been elsewhere proved that
+if freedom is predicated of us, it transports us into an
+intelligible order of things.
+
+Now, if we compare with this the analytical part of the critique
+of pure speculative reason, we shall see a remarkable contrast.
+There it was not fundamental principles, but pure, sensible
+intuition (space and time), that was the first datum that made a
+priori knowledge possible, though only of objects of the senses.
+Synthetical principles could not be derived from mere concepts without
+intuition; on the contrary, they could only exist with reference to
+this intuition, and therefore to objects of possible experience, since
+it is the concepts of the understanding, united with this intuition,
+which alone make that knowledge possible which we call experience.
+Beyond objects of experience, and therefore with regard to things as
+noumena, all positive knowledge was rightly disclaimed for speculative
+reason. This reason, however, went so far as to establish with
+certainty the concept of noumena; that is, the possibility, nay, the
+necessity, of thinking them; for example, it showed against all
+objections that the supposition of freedom, negatively considered, was
+quite consistent with those principles and limitations of pure
+theoretic reason. But it could not give us any definite enlargement of
+our knowledge with respect to such objects, but, on the contrary,
+cut off all view of them altogether.
+
+On the other hand, the moral law, although it gives no view, yet
+gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the
+sensible world, and the whole compass of our theoretical use of
+reason, a fact which points to a pure world of the understanding, nay,
+even defines it positively and enables us to know something of it,
+namely, a law.
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 130}
+
+This law (as far as rational beings are concerned) gives to the
+world of sense, which is a sensible system of nature, the form of a
+world of the understanding, that is, of a supersensible system of
+nature, without interfering with its mechanism. Now, a system of
+nature, in the most general sense, is the existence of things under
+laws. The sensible nature of rational beings in general is their
+existence under laws empirically conditioned, which, from the point of
+view of reason, is heteronomy. The supersensible nature of the same
+beings, on the other hand, is their existence according to laws
+which are independent of every empirical condition and, therefore,
+belong to the autonomy of pure reason. And, since the laws by which
+the existence of things depends on cognition are practical,
+supersensible nature, so far as we can form any notion of it, is
+nothing else than a system of nature under the autonomy of pure
+practical reason. Now, the law of this autonomy is the moral law,
+which, therefore, is the fundamental law of a supersensible nature,
+and of a pure world of understanding, whose counterpart must exist
+in the world of sense, but without interfering with its laws. We might
+call the former the archetypal world (natura archetypa), which we only
+know in the reason; and the latter the ectypal world (natura
+ectypa), because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the
+former which is the determining principle of the will. For the moral
+law, in fact, transfers us ideally into a system in which pure reason,
+if it were accompanied with adequate physical power, would produce the
+summum bonum, and it determines our will to give the sensible world
+the form of a system of rational beings.
+
+The least attention to oneself proves that this idea really serves
+as the model for the determinations of our will.
+
+When the maxim which I am disposed to follow in giving testimony
+is tested by the practical reason, I always consider what it would
+be if it were to hold as a universal law of nature. It is manifest
+that in this view it would oblige everyone to speak the truth. For
+it cannot hold as a universal law of nature that statements should
+be allowed to have the force of proof and yet to be purposely
+untrue. Similarly, the maxim which I adopt with respect to disposing
+freely of my life is at once determined, when I ask myself what it
+should be, in order that a system, of which it is the law, should
+maintain itself. It is obvious that in such a system no one could
+arbitrarily put an end to his own life, for such an arrangement
+would not be a permanent order of things. And so in all similar cases.
+Now, in nature, as it actually is an object of experience, the free
+will is not of itself determined to maxims which could of themselves
+be the foundation of a natural system of universal laws, or which
+could even be adapted to a system so constituted; on the contrary, its
+maxims are private inclinations which constitute, indeed, a natural
+whole in conformity with pathological (physical) laws, but could not
+form part of a system of nature, which would only be possible
+through our will acting in accordance with pure practical laws. Yet we
+are, through reason, conscious of a law to which all our maxims are
+subject, as though a natural order must be originated from our will.
+This law, therefore, must be the idea of a natural system not given in
+experience, and yet possible through freedom; a system, therefore,
+which is supersensible, and to which we give objective reality, at
+least in a practical point of view, since we look on it as an object
+of our will as pure rational beings.
+
+Hence the distinction between the laws of a natural system to
+which the will is subject, and of a natural system which is subject to
+a will (as far as its relation to its free actions is concerned),
+rests on this, that in the former the objects must be causes of the
+ideas which determine the will; whereas in the latter the will is
+the cause of the objects; so that its causality has its determining
+principle solely in the pure faculty of reason, which may therefore be
+called a pure practical reason.
+
+There are therefore two very distinct problems: how, on the one
+side, pure reason can cognise objects a priori, and how on the other
+side it can be an immediate determining principle of the will, that
+is, of the causality of the rational being with respect to the reality
+of objects (through the mere thought of the universal validity of
+its own maxims as laws).
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 135}
+
+The former, which belongs to the critique of the pure speculative
+reason, requires a previous explanation, how intuitions without
+which no object can be given, and, therefore, none known
+synthetically, are possible a priori; and its solution turns out to be
+that these are all only sensible and, therefore, do not render
+possible any speculative knowledge which goes further than possible
+experience reaches; and that therefore all the principles of that pure
+speculative reason avail only to make experience possible; either
+experience of given objects or of those that may be given ad
+infinitum, but never are completely given.
+
+The latter, which belongs to the critique of practical reason,
+requires no explanation how the objects of the faculty of desire are
+possible, for that being a problem of the theoretical knowledge of
+nature is left to the critique of the speculative reason, but only how
+reason can determine the maxims of the will; whether this takes
+place only by means of empirical ideas as principles of determination,
+or whether pure reason can be practical and be the law of a possible
+order of nature, which is not empirically knowable. The possibility of
+such a supersensible system of nature, the conception of which can
+also be the ground of its reality through our own free will, does
+not require any a priori intuition (of an intelligible world) which,
+being in this case supersensible, would be impossible for us. For
+the question is only as to the determining principle of volition in
+its maxims, namely, whether it is empirical, or is a conception of the
+pure reason (having the legal character belonging to it in general),
+and how it can be the latter. It is left to the theoretic principles
+of reason to decide whether the causality of the will suffices for the
+realization of the objects or not, this being an inquiry into the
+possibility of the objects of the volition. Intuition of these objects
+is therefore of no importance to the practical problem. We are here
+concerned only with the determination of the will and the
+determining principles of its maxims as a free will, not at all with
+the result. For, provided only that the will conforms to the law of
+pure reason, then let its power in execution be what it may, whether
+according to these maxims of legislation of a possible system of
+nature any such system really results or not, this is no concern of
+the critique, which only inquires whether, and in what way, pure
+reason can be practical, that is directly determine the will.
+
+In this inquiry criticism may and must begin with pure practical
+laws and their reality. But instead of intuition it takes as their
+foundation the conception of their existence in the intelligible
+world, namely, the concept of freedom. For this concept has no other
+meaning, and these laws are only possible in relation to freedom of
+the will; but freedom being supposed, they are necessary; or
+conversely freedom is necessary because those laws are necessary,
+being practical postulates. It cannot be further explained how this
+consciousness of the moral law, or, what is the same thing, of
+freedom, is possible; but that it is admissible is well established in
+the theoretical critique.
+
+The exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason is now
+finished; that is to say, it has been shown first, what it
+contains, that it subsists for itself quite a priori and independent
+of empirical principles; and next in what it is distinguished from all
+other practical principles. With the deduction, that is, the
+justification of its objective and universal validity, and the
+discernment of the possibility of such a synthetical proposition a
+priori, we cannot expect to succeed so well as in the case of the
+principles of pure theoretical reason. For these referred to objects
+of possible experience, namely, to phenomena, and we could prove
+that these phenomena could be known as objects of experience only by
+being brought under the categories in accordance with these laws;
+and consequently that all possible experience must conform to these
+laws. But I could not proceed in this way with the deduction of the
+moral law. For this does not concern the knowledge of the properties
+of objects, which may be given to the reason from some other source;
+but a knowledge which can itself be the ground of the existence of the
+objects, and by which reason in a rational being has causality,
+i.e., pure reason, which can be regarded as a faculty immediately
+determining the will.
+
+Now all our human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at
+fundamental powers or faculties, for the possibility of these cannot
+be understood by any means, and just as little should it be
+arbitrarily invented and assumed. Therefore, in the theoretic use of
+reason, it is experience alone that can justify us in assuming them.
+But this expedient of adducing empirical proofs, instead of a
+deduction from a priori sources of knowledge, is denied us here in
+respect to the pure practical faculty of reason. For whatever requires
+to draw the proof of its reality from experience must depend for the
+grounds of its possibility on principles of experience; and pure,
+yet practical, reason by its very notion cannot be regarded as such.
+Further, the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason of which we
+are a priori conscious, and which is apodeictically certain, though it
+be granted that in experience no example of its exact fulfilment can
+be found. Hence, the objective reality of the moral law cannot be
+proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason,
+whether speculative or empirically supported, and therefore, even if
+we renounced its apodeictic certainty, it could not be proved a
+posteriori by experience, and yet it is firmly established of itself.
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 140}
+
+But instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral
+principle, something else is found which was quite unexpected, namely,
+that this moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the
+deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove,
+but of which speculative reason was compelled at least to assume the
+possibility (in order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the
+unconditioned in the chain of causality, so as not to contradict
+itself)- I mean the faculty of freedom. The moral law, which itself
+does not require a justification, proves not merely the possibility of
+freedom, but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this law
+as binding on themselves. The moral law is in fact a law of the
+causality of free agents and, therefore, of the possibility of a
+supersensible system of nature, just as the metaphysical law of events
+in the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible system of
+nature; and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy was
+compelled to leave undetermined, namely, the law for a causality,
+the concept of which in the latter was only negative; and therefore
+for the first time gives this concept objective reality.
+
+This sort of credential of the moral law, viz., that it is set forth
+as a principle of the deduction of freedom, which is a causality of
+pure reason, is a sufficient substitute for all a priori
+justification, since theoretic reason was compelled to assume at least
+the possibility of freedom, in order to satisfy a want of its own. For
+the moral law proves its reality, so as even to satisfy the critique
+of the speculative reason, by the fact that it adds a positive
+definition to a causality previously conceived only negatively, the
+possibility of which was incomprehensible to speculative reason, which
+yet was compelled to suppose it. For it adds the notion of a reason
+that directly determines the will (by imposing on its maxims the
+condition of a universal legislative form); and thus it is able for
+the first time to give objective, though only practical, reality to
+reason, which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed
+speculatively with its ideas. It thus changes the transcendent use
+of reason into an immanent use (so that reason is itself, by means
+of ideas, an efficient cause in the field of experience).
+
+The determination of the causality of beings in the world of
+sense, as such, can never be unconditioned; and yet for every series
+of conditions there must be something unconditioned, and therefore
+there must be a causality which is determined wholly by itself. Hence,
+the idea of freedom as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not found
+to be a want but, as far as its possibility is concerned, an
+analytic principle of pure speculative reason. But as it is absolutely
+impossible to find in experience any example in accordance with this
+idea, because amongst the causes of things as phenomena it would be
+impossible to meet with any absolutely unconditioned determination
+of causality, we were only able to defend our supposition that a
+freely acting cause might be a being in the world of sense, in so
+far as it is considered in the other point of view as a noumenon,
+showing that there is no contradiction in regarding all its actions as
+subject to physical conditions so far as they are phenomena, and yet
+regarding its causality as physically unconditioned, in so far as
+the acting being belongs to the world of understanding, and in thus
+making the concept of freedom the regulative principle of reason. By
+this principle I do not indeed learn what the object is to which
+that sort of causality is attributed; but I remove the difficulty,
+for, on the one side, in the explanation of events in the world, and
+consequently also of the actions of rational beings, I leave to the
+mechanism of physical necessity the right of ascending from
+conditioned to condition ad infinitum, while on the other side I
+keep open for speculative reason the place which for it is vacant,
+namely, the intelligible, in order to transfer the unconditioned
+thither. But I was not able to verify this supposition; that is, to
+change it into the knowledge of a being so acting, not even into the
+knowledge of the possibility of such a being. This vacant place is now
+filled by pure practical reason with a definite law of causality in an
+intelligible world (causality with freedom), namely, the moral law.
+Speculative reason does not hereby gain anything as regards its
+insight, but only as regards the certainty of its problematical notion
+of freedom, which here obtains objective reality, which, though only
+practical, is nevertheless undoubted. Even the notion of causality-
+the application, and consequently the signification, of which holds
+properly only in relation to phenomena, so as to connect them into
+experiences (as is shown by the Critique of Pure Reason)- is not so
+enlarged as to extend its use beyond these limits. For if reason
+sought to do this, it would have to show how the logical relation of
+principle and consequence can be used synthetically in a different
+sort of intuition from the sensible; that is how a causa noumenon is
+possible. This it can never do; and, as practical reason, it does
+not even concern itself with it, since it only places the
+determining principle of causality of man as a sensible creature
+(which is given) in pure reason (which is therefore called practical);
+and therefore it employs the notion of cause, not in order to know
+objects, but to determine causality in relation to objects in general.
+It can abstract altogether from the application of this notion to
+objects with a view to theoretical knowledge (since this concept is
+always found a priori in the understanding even independently of any
+intuition). Reason, then, employs it only for a practical purpose, and
+hence we can transfer the determining principle of the will into the
+intelligible order of things, admitting, at the same time, that we
+cannot understand how the notion of cause can determine the
+knowledge of these things. But reason must cognise causality with
+respect to the actions of the will in the sensible world in a definite
+manner; otherwise, practical reason could not really produce any
+action. But as to the notion which it forms of its own causality as
+noumenon, it need not determine it theoretically with a view to the
+cognition of its supersensible existence, so as to give it
+significance in this way. For it acquires significance apart from
+this, though only for practical use, namely, through the moral law.
+Theoretically viewed, it remains always a pure a priori concept of the
+understanding, which can be applied to objects whether they have
+been given sensibly or not, although in the latter case it has no
+definite theoretical significance or application, but is only a
+formal, though essential, conception of the understanding relating
+to an object in general. The significance which reason gives it
+through the moral law is merely practical, inasmuch as the idea of
+the law of causality (of the will) has self causality, or is
+its determining principle.
+
+
+
+II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its Practical use has to an
+Extension which is not possible to it in its Speculative Use.
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 145}
+
+
+
+We have in the moral principle set forth a law of causality, the
+determining principle of which is set above all the conditions of
+the sensible world; we have it conceived how the will, as belonging
+to the intelligible world, is determinable, and therefore have
+its subject (man) not merely conceived as belonging to a world of
+pure understanding, and in this respect unknown (which the critique of
+speculative reason enabled us to do), but also defined as regards
+his causality by means of a law which cannot be reduced to any
+physical law of the sensible world; and therefore our knowledge is
+extended beyond the limits of that world, a pretension which the
+Critique of Pure Reason declared to be futile in all speculation. Now,
+how is the practical use of pure reason here to be reconciled with the
+theoretical, as to the determination of the limits of its faculty?
+
+David Hume, of whom we may say that he commenced the assault on
+the claims of pure reason, which made a thorough investigation of it
+necessary, argued thus: The notion of cause is a notion that
+involves the necessity of the connexion of the existence of
+different things (and that, in so far as they are different), so that,
+given A, I know that something quite distinct there from, namely B,
+must necessarily also exist. Now necessity can be attributed to a
+connection, only in so far as it is known a priori, for experience
+would only enable us to know of such a connection that it exists,
+not that it necessarily exists. Now, it is impossible, says he, to
+know a priori and as necessary the connection between one thing and
+another (or between one attribute and another quite distinct) when
+they have not been given in experience. Therefore the notion of a
+cause is fictitious and delusive and, to speak in the mildest way,
+is an illusion, only excusable inasmuch as the custom (a subjective
+necessity) of perceiving certain things, or their attributes as
+often associated in existence along with or in succession to one
+another, is insensibly taken for an objective necessity of supposing
+such a connection in the objects themselves; and thus the notion of
+a cause has been acquired surreptitiously and not legitimately; nay,
+it can never be so acquired or authenticated, since it demands a
+connection in itself vain, chimerical, and untenable in presence of
+reason, and to which no object can ever correspond. In this way was
+empiricism first introduced as the sole source of principles, as far
+as all knowledge of the existence of things is concerned
+(mathematics therefore remaining excepted); and with empiricism the
+most thorough scepticism, even with regard to the whole science of
+nature( as philosophy). For on such principles we can never conclude
+from given attributes of things as existing to a consequence (for this
+would require the notion of cause, which involves the necessity of
+such a connection); we can only, guided by imagination, expect similar
+cases- an expectation which is never certain, however often it has
+been fulfilled. Of no event could we say: a certain thing must have
+preceded it, on which it necessarily followed; that is, it must have a
+cause; and therefore, however frequent the cases we have known in
+which there was such an antecedent, so that a rule could be derived
+from them, yet we never could suppose it as always and necessarily
+so happening; we should, therefore, be obliged to leave its share to
+blind chance, with which all use of reason comes to an end; and this
+firmly establishes scepticism in reference to arguments ascending from
+effects to causes and makes it impregnable.
+
+Mathematics escaped well, so far, because Hume thought that its
+propositions were analytical; that is, proceeded from one property
+to another, by virtue of identity and, consequently, according to
+the principle of contradiction. This, however, is not the case, since,
+on the contrary, they are synthetical; and although geometry, for
+example, has not to do with the existence of things, but only with
+their a priori properties in a possible intuition, yet it proceeds
+just as in the case of the causal notion, from one property (A) to
+another wholly distinct (B), as necessarily connected with the former.
+Nevertheless, mathematical science, so highly vaunted for its
+apodeictic certainty, must at last fall under this empiricism for
+the same reason for which Hume put custom in the place of objective
+necessity in the notion of cause and, in spite of all its pride,
+must consent to lower its bold pretension of claiming assent a
+priori and depend for assent to the universality of its propositions
+on the kindness of observers, who, when called as witnesses, would
+surely not hesitate to admit that what the geometer propounds as a
+theorem they have always perceived to be the fact, and,
+consequently, although it be not necessarily true, yet they would
+permit us to expect it to be true in the future. In this manner Hume's
+empiricism leads inevitably to scepticism, even with regard to
+mathematics, and consequently in every scientific theoretical use of
+reason (for this belongs either to philosophy or mathematics). Whether
+with such a terrible overthrow of the chief branches of knowledge,
+common reason will escape better, and will not rather become
+irrecoverably involved in this destruction of all knowledge, so that
+from the same principles a universal scepticism should follow
+(affecting, indeed, only the learned), this I will leave everyone to
+judge for himself.
+
+As regards my own labours in the critical examination of pure
+reason, which were occasioned by Hume's sceptical teaching, but went
+much further and embraced the whole field of pure theoretical reason
+in its synthetic use and, consequently, the field of what is called
+metaphysics in general; I proceeded in the following manner with
+respect to the doubts raised by the Scottish philosopher touching
+the notion of causality. If Hume took the objects of experience for
+things in themselves (as is almost always done), he was quite right in
+declaring the notion of cause to be a deception and false illusion;
+for as to things in themselves, and their attributes as such, it is
+impossible to see why because A is given, B, which is different,
+must necessarily be also given, and therefore he could by no means
+admit such an a priori knowledge of things in themselves. Still less
+could this acute writer allow an empirical origin of this concept,
+since this is directly contradictory to the necessity of connection
+which constitutes the essence of the notion of causality, hence the
+notion was proscribed, and in its place was put custom in the
+observation of the course of perceptions.
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 150}
+
+It resulted, however, from my inquiries, that the objects with which
+we have to do in experience are by no means things in themselves,
+but merely phenomena; and that although in the case of things in
+themselves it is impossible to see how, if A is supposed, it should be
+contradictory that B, which is quite different from A, should not also
+be supposed (i.e., to see the necessity of the connection between A as
+cause and B as effect); yet it can very well be conceived that, as
+phenomena, they may be necessarily connected in one experience in a
+certain way (e.g., with regard to time-relations); so that they
+could not be separated without contradicting that connection, by means
+of which this experience is possible in which they are objects and
+in which alone they are cognisable by us. And so it was found to be in
+fact; so that I was able not only to prove the objective reality of
+the concept of cause in regard to objects of experience, but also to
+deduce it as an a priori concept by reason of the necessity of the
+connection it implied; that is, to show the possibility of its
+origin from pure understanding without any empirical sources; and
+thus, after removing the source of empiricism, I was able also to
+overthrow the inevitable consequence of this, namely, scepticism,
+first with regard to physical science, and then with regard to
+mathematics (in which empiricism has just the same grounds), both
+being sciences which have reference to objects of possible experience;
+herewith overthrowing the thorough doubt of whatever theoretic
+reason professes to discern.
+
+But how is it with the application of this category of causality
+(and all the others; for without them there can be no knowledge of
+anything existing) to things which are not objects of possible
+experience, but lie beyond its bounds? For I was able to deduce the
+objective reality of these concepts only with regard to objects of
+possible experience. But even this very fact, that I have saved
+them, only in case I have proved that objects may by means of them
+be thought, though not determined a priori; this it is that gives them
+a place in the pure understanding, by which they are referred to
+objects in general (sensible or not sensible). If anything is still
+wanting, it is that which is the condition of the application of these
+categories, and especially that of causality, to objects, namely,
+intuition; for where this is not given, the application with a view to
+theoretic knowledge of the object, as a noumenon, is impossible and,
+therefore, if anyone ventures on it, is (as in the Critique of Pure
+Reason) absolutely forbidden. Still, the objective reality of the
+concept (of causality) remains, and it can be used even of noumena,
+but without our being able in the least to define the concept
+theoretically so as to produce knowledge. For that this concept,
+even in reference to an object, contains nothing impossible, was shown
+by this, that, even while applied to objects of sense, its seat was
+certainly fixed in the pure understanding; and although, when referred
+to things in themselves (which cannot be objects of experience), it is
+not capable of being determined so as to represent a definite object
+for the purpose of theoretic knowledge; yet for any other purpose (for
+instance, a practical) it might be capable of being determined so as
+to have such application. This could not be the case if, as Hume
+maintained, this concept of causality contained something absolutely
+impossible to be thought.
+
+In order now to discover this condition of the application of the
+said concept to noumena, we need only recall why we are not content
+with its application to objects of experience, but desire also to
+apply it to things in themselves. It will appear, then, that it is not
+a theoretic but a practical purpose that makes this a necessity. In
+speculation, even if we were successful in it, we should not really
+gain anything in the knowledge of nature, or generally with regard
+to such objects as are given, but we should make a wide step from
+the sensibly conditioned (in which we have already enough to do to
+maintain ourselves, and to follow carefully the chain of causes) to
+the supersensible, in order to complete our knowledge of principles
+and to fix its limits; whereas there always remains an infinite
+chasm unfilled between those limits and what we know; and we should
+have hearkened to a vain curiosity rather than a solid-desire of
+knowledge.
+
+But, besides the relation in which the understanding stands to
+objects (in theoretical knowledge), it has also a relation to the
+faculty of desire, which is therefore called the will, and the pure
+will, inasmuch as pure understanding (in this case called reason) is
+practical through the mere conception of a law. The objective
+reality of a pure will, or, what is the same thing, of a pure
+practical reason, is given in the moral law a priori, as it were, by a
+fact, for so we may name a determination of the will which is
+inevitable, although it does not rest on empirical principles. Now, in
+the notion of a will the notion of causality is already contained, and
+hence the notion of a pure will contains that of a causality
+accompanied with freedom, that is, one which is not determinable by
+physical laws, and consequently is not capable of any empirical
+intuition in proof of its reality, but, nevertheless, completely
+justifies its objective reality a priori in the pure practical law;
+not, indeed (as is easily seen) for the purposes of the theoretical,
+but of the practical use of reason. Now the notion of a being that has
+free will is the notion of a causa noumenon, and that this notion
+involves no contradiction, we are already assured by the fact- that
+inasmuch as the concept of cause has arisen wholly from pure
+understanding, and has its objective reality assured by the deduction,
+as it is moreover in its origin independent of any sensible
+conditions, it is, therefore, not restricted to phenomena (unless we
+wanted to make a definite theoretic use of it), but can be applied
+equally to things that are objects of the pure understanding. But,
+since this application cannot rest on any intuition (for intuition can
+only be sensible), therefore, causa noumenon, as regards the theoretic
+use of reason, although a possible and thinkable, is yet an empty
+notion. Now, I do not desire by means of this to understand
+theoretically the nature of a being, in so far as it has a pure
+will; it is enough for me to have thereby designated it as such, and
+hence to combine the notion of causality with that of freedom (and
+what is inseparable from it, the moral law, as its determining
+principle). Now, this right I certainly have by virtue of the pure,
+not-empirical origin of the notion of cause, since I do not consider
+myself entitled to make any use of it except in reference to the moral
+law which determines its reality, that is, only a practical use.
+
+If, with Hume, I had denied to the notion of causality all objective
+reality in its [theoretic] use, not merely with regard to things in
+themselves (the supersensible), but also with regard to the objects of
+the senses, it would have lost all significance, and being a
+theoretically impossible notion would have been declared to be quite
+useless; and since what is nothing cannot be made any use of, the
+practical use of a concept theoretically null would have been
+absurd. But, as it is, the concept of a causality free from
+empirical conditions, although empty, i.e., without any appropriate
+intuition), is yet theoretically possible, and refers to an
+indeterminate object; but in compensation significance is given to
+it in the moral law and consequently in a practical sense. I have,
+indeed, no intuition which should determine its objective theoretic
+reality, but not the less it has a real application, which is
+exhibited in concreto in intentions or maxims; that is, it has a
+practical reality which can be specified, and this is sufficient to
+justify it even with a view to noumena.
+
+                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 155}
+
+Now, this objective reality of a pure concept of the understanding
+in the sphere of the supersensible, once brought in, gives an
+objective reality also to all the other categories, although only so
+far as they stand in necessary connexion with the determining
+principle of the will (the moral law); a reality only of practical
+application, which has not the least effect in enlarging our
+theoretical knowledge of these objects, or the discernment of their
+nature by pure reason. So we shall find also in the sequel that
+these categories refer only to beings as intelligences, and in them
+only to the relation of reason to the will; consequently, always
+only to the practical, and beyond this cannot pretend to any knowledge
+of these beings; and whatever other properties belonging to the
+theoretical representation of supersensible things may be brought into
+connexion with these categories, this is not to be reckoned as
+knowledge, but only as a right (in a practical point of view, however,
+it is a necessity) to admit and assume such beings, even in the case
+where we [conceive] supersensible beings (e.g., God) according to
+analogy, that is, a purely rational relation, of which we make a
+practical use with reference to what is sensible; and thus the
+application to the supersensible solely in a practical point of view
+does not give pure theoretic reason the least encouragement to run
+riot into the transcendent.
+
+BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2
+
+CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+By a concept of the practical reason I understand the idea of an
+object as an effect possible to be produced through freedom. To be
+an object of practical knowledge, as such, signifies, therefore,
+only the relation of the will to the action by which the object or its
+opposite would be realized; and to decide whether something is an
+object of pure practical reason or not is only to discern the
+possibility or impossibility of willing the action by which, if we had
+the required power (about which experience must decide), a certain
+object would be realized. If the object be taken as the determining
+principle of our desire, it must first be known whether it is
+physically possible by the free use of our powers, before we decide
+whether it is an object of practical reason or not. On the other hand,
+if the law can be considered a priori as the determining principle
+of the action, and the latter therefore as determined by pure
+practical reason, the judgement whether a thing is an object of pure
+practical reason or not does not depend at all on the comparison
+with our physical power; and the question is only whether we should
+will an action that is directed to the existence of an object, if
+the object were in our power; hence the previous question is only as
+the moral possibility of the action, for in this case it is not the
+object, but the law of the will, that is the determining principle
+of the action. The only objects of practical reason are therefore
+those of good and evil. For by the former is meant an object
+necessarily desired according to a principle of reason; by the
+latter one necessarily shunned, also according to a principle of
+reason.
+
+If the notion of good is not to be derived from an antecedent
+practical law, but, on the contrary, is to serve as its foundation, it
+can only be the notion of something whose existence promises pleasure,
+and thus determines the causality of the subject to produce it, that
+is to say, determines the faculty of desire. Now, since it is
+impossible to discern a priori what idea will be accompanied with
+pleasure and what with pain, it will depend on experience alone to
+find out what is primarily good or evil. The property of the
+subject, with reference to which alone this experiment can be made, is
+the feeling of pleasure and pain, a receptivity belonging to the
+internal sense; thus that only would be primarily good with which
+the sensation of pleasure is immediately connected, and that simply
+evil which immediately excites pain. Since, however, this is opposed
+even to the usage of language, which distinguishes the pleasant from
+the good, the unpleasant from the evil, and requires that good and
+evil shall always be judged by reason, and, therefore, by concepts
+which can be communicated to everyone, and not by mere sensation,
+which is limited to individual [subjects] and their susceptibility;
+and, since nevertheless, pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any
+idea of an object a priori, the philosopher who thought himself
+obliged to make a feeling of pleasure the foundation of his
+practical judgements would call that good which is a means to the
+pleasant, and evil, what is a cause of unpleasantness and pain; for
+the judgement on the relation of means to ends certainly belongs to
+reason. But, although reason is alone capable of discerning the
+connexion of means with their ends (so that the will might even be
+defined as the faculty of ends, since these are always determining
+principles of the desires), yet the practical maxims which would
+follow from the aforesaid principle of the good being merely a
+means, would never contain as the object of the will anything good
+in itself, but only something good for something; the good would
+always be merely the useful, and that for which it is useful must
+always lie outside the will, in sensation. Now if this as a pleasant
+sensation were to be distinguished from the notion of good, then there
+would be nothing primarily good at all, but the good would have to
+be sought only in the means to something else, namely, some
+pleasantness.
+
+It is an old formula of the schools: Nihil appetimus nisi sub
+ratione boni; Nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali, and it is used
+often correctly, but often also in a manner injurious to philosophy,
+because the expressions boni and mali are ambiguous, owing to the
+poverty of language, in consequence of which they admit a double
+sense, and, therefore, inevitably bring the practical laws into
+ambiguity; and philosophy, which in employing them becomes aware of
+the different meanings in the same word, but can find no special
+expressions for them, is driven to subtile distinctions about which
+there is subsequently no unanimity, because the distinction could
+not be directly marked by any suitable expression. *
+
+
+
+* Besides this, the expression sub ratione boni is also ambiguous.
+For it may mean: "We represent something to ourselves as good, when
+and because we desire (will) it"; or "We desire something because we
+represent it to ourselves as good," so that either the desire
+determines the notion of the object as a good, or the notion of good
+determines the desire (the will); so that in the first case sub
+ratione boni would mean, "We will something under the idea of the
+good"; in the second, "In consequence of this idea," which, as
+determining the volition, must precede it.
+
+                                           {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 5}
+
+
+
+The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions
+which do not allow this difference to be overlooked. It possesses
+two very distinct concepts and especially distinct expressions for
+that which the Latins express by a single word, bonum. For bonum it
+has das Gute [good], and das Wohl [well, weal], for malum das Bose
+[evil], and das Ubel [ill, bad], or das Well [woe]. So that we express
+two quite distinct judgements when we consider in an action the good
+and evil of it, or our weal and woe (ill). Hence it already follows
+that the above quoted psychological proposition is at least very
+doubtful if it is translated: "We desire nothing except with a view to
+our weal or woe"; on the other hand, if we render it thus: "Under
+the direction of reason we desire nothing except so far as we esteem
+it good or evil," it is indubitably certain and at the same time quite
+clearly expressed.
+
+Well or ill always implies only a reference to our condition, as
+pleasant or unpleasant, as one of pleasure or pain, and if we desire
+or avoid an object on this account, it is only so far as it is
+referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or pain
+that it produces. But good or evil always implies a reference to the
+will, as determined by the law of reason, to make something its
+object; for it is never determined directly by the object and the idea
+of it, but is a faculty of taking a rule of reason for or motive of an
+action (by which an object may be realized). Good and evil therefore
+are properly referred to actions, not to the sensations of the person,
+and if anything is to be good or evil absolutely (i.e., in every
+respect and without any further condition), or is to be so esteemed,
+it can only be the manner of acting, the maxim of the will, and
+consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil man that
+can be so called, and not a thing.
+
+However, then, men may laugh at the Stoic, who in the severest
+paroxysms of gout cried out: "Pain, however thou tormentest me, I will
+never admit that thou art an evil (kakov, malum)": he was right. A bad
+thing it certainly was, and his cry betrayed that; but that any evil
+attached to him thereby, this he had no reason whatever to admit,
+for pain did not in the least diminish the worth of his person, but
+only that of his condition. If he had been conscious of a single
+lie, it would have lowered his pride, but pain served only to raise
+it, when he was conscious that he had not deserved it by any
+unrighteous action by which he had rendered himself worthy of
+punishment.
+
+What we call good must be an object of desire in the judgement of
+every rational man, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of
+everyone; therefore, in addition to sense, this judgement requires
+reason. So it is with truthfulness, as opposed to lying; so with
+justice, as opposed to violence, &c. But we may call a thing a bad [or
+ill] thing, which yet everyone must at the same time acknowledge to be
+good, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. The man who submits to
+a surgical operation feels it no doubt as a bad thing, but by their
+reason he and everyone acknowledge it to be good. If a man who
+delights in annoying and vexing peaceable people at last receives a
+right good beating, this is no doubt a bad thing; but everyone
+approves it and regards it as a good thing, even though nothing else
+resulted from it; nay, even the man who receives it must in his reason
+acknowledge that he has met justice, because he sees the proportion
+between good conduct and good fortune, which reason inevitably
+places before him, here put into practice.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 10}
+
+No doubt our weal and woe are of very great importance in the
+estimation of our practical reason, and as far as our nature as
+sensible beings is concerned, our happiness is the only thing of
+consequence, provided it is estimated as reason especially requires,
+not by the transitory sensation, but by the influence that this has on
+our whole existence, and on our satisfaction therewith; but it is
+not absolutely the only thing of consequence. Man is a being who, as
+belonging to the world of sense, has wants, and so far his reason
+has an office which it cannot refuse, namely, to attend to the
+interest of his sensible nature, and to form practical maxims, even
+with a view to the happiness of this life, and if possible even to
+that of a future. But he is not so completely an animal as to be
+indifferent to what reason says on its own account, and to use it
+merely as an instrument for the satisfaction of his wants as a
+sensible being. For the possession of reason would not raise his worth
+above that of the brutes, if it is to serve him only for the same
+purpose that instinct serves in them; it would in that case be only
+a particular method which nature had employed to equip man for the
+same ends for which it has qualified brutes, without qualifying him
+for any higher purpose. No doubt once this arrangement of nature has
+been made for him he requires reason in order to take into
+consideration his weal and woe, but besides this he possesses it for a
+higher purpose also, namely, not only to take into consideration
+what is good or evil in itself, about which only pure reason,
+uninfluenced by any sensible interest, can judge, but also to
+distinguish this estimate thoroughly from the former and to make it
+the supreme condition thereof.
+
+In estimating what is good or evil in itself, as distinguished
+from what can be so called only relatively, the following points are
+to be considered. Either a rational principle is already conceived, as
+of itself the determining principle of the will, without regard to
+possible objects of desire (and therefore by the more legislative form
+of the maxim), and in that case that principle is a practical a priori
+law, and pure reason is supposed to be practical of itself. The law in
+that case determines the will directly; the action conformed to it
+is good in itself; a will whose maxim always conforms to this law is
+good absolutely in every respect and is the supreme condition of all
+good. Or the maxim of the will is consequent on a determining
+principle of desire which presupposes an object of pleasure or pain,
+something therefore that pleases or displeases, and the maxim of
+reason that we should pursue the former and avoid the latter
+determines our actions as good relatively to our inclination, that is,
+good indirectly, (i.e., relatively to a different end to which they are
+means), and in that case these maxims can never be called laws, but
+may be called rational practical precepts. The end itself, the
+pleasure that we seek, is in the latter case not a good but a welfare;
+not a concept of reason, but an empirical concept of an object of
+sensation; but the use of the means thereto, that is, the action, is
+nevertheless called good (because rational deliberation is required
+for it), not however, good absolutely, but only relatively to our
+sensuous nature, with regard to its feelings of pleasure and
+displeasure; but the will whose maxim is affected thereby is not a
+pure will; this is directed only to that in which pure reason by
+itself can be practical.
+
+This is the proper place to explain the paradox of method in a
+critique of practical reason, namely, that the concept of good and
+evil must not be determined before the moral law (of which it seems as
+if it must be the foundation), but only after it and by means of it.
+In fact, even if we did not know that the principle of morality is a
+pure a priori law determining the will, yet, that we may not assume
+principles quite gratuitously, we must, at least at first, leave it
+undecided, whether the will has merely empirical principles of
+determination, or whether it has not also pure a priori principles;
+for it is contrary to all rules of philosophical method to assume as
+decided that which is the very point in question. Supposing that we
+wished to begin with the concept of good, in order to deduce from it
+the laws of the will, then this concept of an object (as a good) would
+at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining
+principle of the will. Now, since this concept had not any practical a
+priori law for its standard, the criterion of good or evil could not
+be placed in anything but the agreement of the object with our feeling
+of pleasure or pain; and the use of reason could only consist in
+determining in the first place this pleasure or pain in connexion with
+all the sensations of my existence, and in the second place the
+means of securing to myself the object of the pleasure. Now, as
+experience alone can decide what conforms to the feeling of
+pleasure, and by hypothesis the practical law is to be based on this
+as a condition, it follows that the possibility of a priori
+practical laws would be at once excluded, because it was imagined to
+be necessary first of all to find an object the concept of which, as a
+good, should constitute the universal though empirical principle of
+determination of the will. But what it was necessary to inquire
+first of all was whether there is not an a priori determining
+principle of the will (and this could never be found anywhere but in a
+pure practical law, in so far as this law prescribes to maxims
+merely their form without regard to an object). Since, however, we
+laid the foundation of all practical law in an object determined by
+our conceptions of good and evil, whereas without a previous law
+that object could not be conceived by empirical concepts, we have
+deprived ourselves beforehand of the possibility of even conceiving
+a pure practical law. On the other hand, if we had first
+investigated the latter analytically, we should have found that it
+is not the concept of good as an object that determines the moral
+law and makes it possible, but that, on the contrary, it is the
+moral law that first determines the concept of good and makes it
+possible, so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely.
+
+This remark, which only concerns the method of ultimate ethical
+inquiries, is of importance. It explains at once the occasion of all
+the mistakes of philosophers with respect to the supreme principle
+of morals. For they sought for an object of the will which they
+could make the matter and principle of a law (which consequently could
+not determine the will directly, but by means of that object
+referred to the feeling of pleasure or pain; whereas they ought
+first to have searched for a law that would determine the will a
+priori and directly, and afterwards determine the object in accordance
+with the will). Now, whether they placed this object of pleasure,
+which was to supply the supreme conception of goodness, in
+happiness, in perfection, in moral [feeling], or in the will of God,
+their principle in every case implied heteronomy, and they must
+inevitably come upon empirical conditions of a moral law, since
+their object, which was to be the immediate principle of the will,
+could not be called good or bad except in its immediate relation to
+feeling, which is always empirical. It is only a formal law- that
+is, one which prescribes to reason nothing more than the form of its
+universal legislation as the supreme condition of its maxims- that can
+be a priori a determining principle of practical reason. The
+ancients avowed this error without concealment by directing all
+their moral inquiries to the determination of the notion of the summum
+bonum, which they intended afterwards to make the determining
+principle of the will in the moral law; whereas it is only far
+later, when the moral law has been first established for itself, and
+shown to be the direct determining principle of the will, that this
+object can be presented to the will, whose form is now determined a
+priori; and this we shall undertake in the Dialectic of the pure
+practical reason. The moderns, with whom the question of the summum
+bonum has gone out of fashion, or at least seems to have become a
+secondary matter, hide the same error under vague (expressions as in
+many other cases). It shows itself, nevertheless, in their systems, as
+it always produces heteronomy of practical reason; and from this can
+never be derived a moral law giving universal commands.
+
+Now, since the notions of good and evil, as consequences of the a
+priori determination of the will, imply also a pure practical
+principle, and therefore a causality of pure reason; hence they do not
+originally refer to objects (so as to be, for instance, special
+modes of the synthetic unity of the manifold of given intuitions in
+one consciousness) like the pure concepts of the understanding or
+categories of reason in its theoretic employment; on the contrary,
+they presuppose that objects are given; but they are all modes
+(modi) of a single category, namely, that of causality, the
+determining principle of which consists in the rational conception
+of a law, which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself, thereby
+a priori proving itself practical. However, as the actions on the
+one side come under a law which is not a physical law, but a law of
+freedom, and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in the world
+of intelligence, yet on the other side as events in the world of sense
+they belong to phenomena; hence the determinations of a practical
+reason are only possible in reference to the latter and, therefore, in
+accordance with the categories of the understanding; not indeed with a
+view to any theoretic employment of it, i.e., so as to bring the
+manifold of (sensible) intuition under one consciousness a priori; but
+only to subject the manifold of desires to the unity of
+consciousness of a practical reason, giving it commands in the moral
+law, i.e., to a pure will a priori.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 15}
+
+These categories of freedom- for so we choose to call them in
+contrast to those theoretic categories which are categories of
+physical nature- have an obvious advantage over the latter, inasmuch
+as the latter are only forms of thought which designate objects in
+an indefinite manner by means of universal concept of every possible
+intuition; the former, on the contrary, refer to the determination
+of a free elective will (to which indeed no exactly corresponding
+intuition can be assigned, but which has as its foundation a pure
+practical a priori law, which is not the case with any concepts
+belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive faculties); hence,
+instead of the form of intuition (space and time), which does not
+lie in reason itself, but has to be drawn from another source, namely,
+the sensibility, these being elementary practical concepts have as
+their foundation the form of a pure will, which is given in reason
+and, therefore, in the thinking faculty itself. From this it happens
+that as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the
+determination of the will, not with the physical conditions (of
+practical ability) of the execution of one's purpose, the practical
+a priori principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom
+are at once cognitions, and have not to wait for intuitions in order
+to acquire significance, and that for this remarkable reason,
+because they themselves produce the reality of that to which they
+refer (the intention of the will), which is not the case with
+theoretical concepts. Only we must be careful to observe that these
+categories only apply to the practical reason; and thus they proceed
+in order from those which are as yet subject to sensible conditions
+and morally indeterminate to those which are free from sensible
+conditions and determined merely by the moral law.
+
+
+
+Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good
+and Evil.
+
+
+
+                   I. QUANTITY.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 20}
+
+ Subjective, according to maxims (practical opinions of the
+
+   individual)
+
+ Objective, according to principles (Precepts)
+
+ A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom
+
+   (laws)
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 25}
+
+
+
+                   II. QUALITY.
+
+ Practical rules of action (praeceptivae)
+
+ Practical rules of omission (prohibitivae)
+
+ Practical rules of exceptions (exceptivae)
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 30}
+
+
+
+                   III. RELATION.
+
+ To personality
+
+ To the condition of the person.
+
+ Reciprocal, of one person to the others of the others.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 35}
+
+                    IV. MODALITY.
+
+ The Permitted and the Forbidden
+
+ Duty and the contrary to duty.
+
+ Perfect and imperfect duty.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 40}
+
+It will at once be observed that in this table freedom is considered
+as a sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of
+determination, in regard to actions possible by it, which are
+phenomena in the world of sense, and that consequently it is
+referred to the categories which concern its physical possibility,
+whilst yet each category is taken so universally that the
+determining principle of that causality can be placed outside the
+world of sense in freedom as a property of a being in the world of
+intelligence; and finally the categories of modality introduce the
+transition from practical principles generally to those of morality,
+but only problematically. These can be established dogmatically only
+by the moral law.
+
+I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table,
+since it is intelligible enough of itself. A division of this kind
+based on principles is very useful in any science, both for the sake
+of thoroughness and intelligibility. Thus, for instance, we know
+from the preceding table and its first number what we must begin
+from in practical inquiries; namely, from the maxims which every one
+founds on his own inclinations; the precepts which hold for a
+species of rational beings so far as they agree in certain
+inclinations; and finally the law which holds for all without regard
+to their inclinations, etc. In this way we survey the whole plan of
+what has to be done, every question of practical philosophy that has
+to be answered, and also the order that is to be followed.
+
+
+
+Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 45}
+
+It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of
+the will. They themselves, however, are subject to a practical rule of
+reason which, if it is pure reason, determines the will a priori
+relatively to its object. Now, whether an action which is possible
+to us in the world of sense, comes under the rule or not, is a
+question to be decided by the practical judgement, by which what is
+said in the rule universally (in abstracto) is applied to an action in
+concreto. But since a practical rule of pure reason in the first place
+as practical concerns the existence of an object, and in the second
+place as a practical rule of pure reason implies necessity as
+regards the existence of the action and, therefore, is a practical
+law, not a physical law depending on empirical principles of
+determination, but a law of freedom by which the will is to be
+determined independently on anything empirical (merely by the
+conception of a law and its form), whereas all instances that can
+occur of possible actions can only be empirical, that is, belong to
+the experience of physical nature; hence, it seems absurd to expect to
+find in the world of sense a case which, while as such it depends only
+on the law of nature, yet admits of the application to it of a law
+of freedom, and to which we can apply the supersensible idea of the
+morally good which is to be exhibited in it in concreto. Thus, the
+judgement of the pure practical reason is subject to the same
+difficulties as that of the pure theoretical reason. The latter,
+however, had means at hand of escaping from these difficulties,
+because, in regard to the theoretical employment, intuitions were
+required to which pure concepts of the understanding could be applied,
+and such intuitions (though only of objects of the senses) can be
+given a priori and, therefore, as far as regards the union of the
+manifold in them, conforming to the pure a priori concepts of the
+understanding as schemata. On the other hand, the morally good is
+something whose object is supersensible; for which, therefore, nothing
+corresponding can be found in any sensible intuition. Judgement
+depending on laws of pure practical reason seems, therefore, to be
+subject to special difficulties arising from this, that a law of
+freedom is to be applied to actions, which are events taking place
+in the world of sense, and which, so far, belong to physical nature.
+
+But here again is opened a favourable prospect for the pure
+practical judgement. When I subsume under a pure practical law an
+action possible to me in the world of sense, I am not concerned with
+the possibility of the action as an event in the world of sense.
+This is a matter that belongs to the decision of reason in its
+theoretic use according to the law of causality, which is a pure
+concept of the understanding, for which reason has a schema in the
+sensible intuition. Physical causality, or the condition under which
+it takes place, belongs to the physical concepts, the schema of
+which is sketched by transcendental imagination. Here, however, we
+have to do, not with the schema of a case that occurs according to
+laws, but with the schema of a law itself (if the word is allowable
+here), since the fact that the will (not the action relatively to
+its effect) is determined by the law alone without any other
+principle, connects the notion of causality with quite different
+conditions from those which constitute physical connection.
+
+The physical law being a law to which the objects of sensible
+intuition, as such, are subject, must have a schema corresponding to
+it- that is, a general procedure of the imagination (by which it
+exhibits a priori to the senses the pure concept of the
+understanding which the law determines). But the law of freedom
+(that is, of a causality not subject to sensible conditions), and
+consequently the concept of the unconditionally good, cannot have
+any intuition, nor consequently any schema supplied to it for the
+purpose of its application in concreto. Consequently the moral law has
+no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical
+objects (not the imagination); and the understanding for the
+purposes of the judgement can provide for an idea of the reason, not a
+schema of the sensibility, but a law, though only as to its form as
+law; such a law, however, as can be exhibited in concreto in objects
+of the senses, and therefore a law of nature. We can therefore call
+this law the type of the moral law.
+
+The rule of the judgement according to laws of pure practical reason
+is this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to
+take place by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself
+a part, you could regard it as possible by your own will. Everyone
+does, in fact, decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or
+evil. Thus, people say: "If everyone permitted himself to deceive,
+when he thought it to his advantage; or thought himself justified in
+shortening his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of it; or
+looked with perfect indifference on the necessity of others; and if
+you belonged to such an order of things, would you do so with the
+assent of your own will?" Now everyone knows well that if he
+secretly allows himself to deceive, it does not follow that everyone
+else does so; or if, unobserved, he is destitute of compassion, others
+would not necessarily be so to him; hence, this comparison of the
+maxim of his actions with a universal law of nature is not the
+determining principle of his will. Such a law is, nevertheless, a type
+of the estimation of the maxim on moral principles. If the maxim of
+the action is not such as to stand the test of the form of a universal
+law of nature, then it is morally impossible. This is the judgement
+even of common sense; for its ordinary judgements, even those of
+experience, are always based on the law of nature. It has it therefore
+always at hand, only that in cases where causality from freedom is
+to be criticised, it makes that law of nature only the type of a law
+of freedom, because, without something which it could use as an
+example in a case of experience, it could not give the law of a pure
+practical reason its proper use in practice.
+
+It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as
+the type of a supersensible system of things, provided I do not
+transfer to the latter the intuitions, and what depends on them, but
+merely apply to it the form of law in general (the notion of which
+occurs even in the commonest use of reason, but cannot be definitely
+known a priori for any other purpose than the pure practical use of
+reason); for laws, as such, are so far identical, no matter from
+what they derive their determining principles.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 50}
+
+Further, since of all the supersensible absolutely nothing [is
+known] except freedom (through the moral law), and this only so far as
+it is inseparably implied in that law, and moreover all
+supersensible objects to which reason might lead us, following the
+guidance of that law, have still no reality for us, except for the
+purpose of that law, and for the use of mere practical reason; and
+as reason is authorized and even compelled to use physical nature
+(in its pure form as an object of the understanding) as the type of
+the judgement; hence, the present remark will serve to guard against
+reckoning amongst concepts themselves that which belongs only to the
+typic of concepts. This, namely, as a typic of the judgement, guards
+against the empiricism of practical reason, which founds the practical
+notions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences (so-called
+happiness). No doubt happiness and the infinite advantages which would
+result from a will determined by self-love, if this will at the same
+time erected itself into a universal law of nature, may certainly
+serve as a perfectly suitable type of the morally good, but it is
+not identical with it. The same typic guards also against the
+mysticism of practical reason, which turns what served only as a
+symbol into a schema, that is, proposes to provide for the moral
+concepts actual intuitions, which, however, are not sensible
+(intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of God), and thus plunges into the
+transcendent. What is befitting the use of the moral concepts is
+only the rationalism of the judgement, which takes from the sensible
+system of nature only what pure reason can also conceive of itself,
+that is, conformity to law, and transfers into the supersensible
+nothing but what can conversely be actually exhibited by actions in
+the world of sense according to the formal rule of a law of nature.
+However, the caution against empiricism of practical reason is much
+more important; for mysticism is quite reconcilable with the purity
+and sublimity of the moral law, and, besides, it is not very natural
+or agreeable to common habits of thought to strain one's imagination
+to supersensible intuitions; and hence the danger on this side is
+not so general. Empiricism, on the contrary, cuts up at the roots
+the morality of intentions (in which, and not in actions only,
+consists the high worth that men can and ought to give to themselves),
+and substitutes for duty something quite different, namely, an
+empirical interest, with which the inclinations generally are secretly
+leagued; and empiricism, moreover, being on this account allied with
+all the inclinations which (no matter what fashion they put on)
+degrade humanity when they are raised to the dignity of a supreme
+practical principle; and as these, nevertheless, are so favourable
+to everyone's feelings, it is for that reason much more dangerous than
+mysticism, which can never constitute a lasting condition of any great
+number of persons.
+
+BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3
+
+  CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral
+law should directly determine the will. If the determination of the
+will takes place in conformity indeed to the moral law, but only by
+means of a feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to be
+presupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to determine the
+will, and therefore not for the sake of the law, then the action
+will possess legality, but not morality. Now, if we understand by
+motive (elater animi) the subjective ground of determination of the
+will of a being whose reason does not necessarily conform to the
+objective law, by virtue of its own nature, then it will follow,
+first, that no motives can be attributed to the Divine will, and that
+the motives of the human will (as well as that of every created
+rational being) can never be anything else than the moral law, and
+consequently that the objective principle of determination must always
+and alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of
+the action, if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law,
+without containing its spirit. *
+
+
+
+* We may say of every action that conforms to the law, but is not
+done for the sake of the law, that it is morally good in the letter,
+not in the spirit (the intention).
+
+
+
+Since, then, for the purpose of giving the moral law influence
+over the will, we must not seek for any other motives that might
+enable us to dispense with the motive of the law itself, because
+that would produce mere hypocrisy, without consistency; and it is even
+dangerous to allow other motives (for instance, that of interest) even
+to co-operate along with the moral law; hence nothing is left us but
+to determine carefully in what way the moral law becomes a motive, and
+what effect this has upon the faculty of desire. For as to the
+question how a law can be directly and of itself a determining
+principle of the will (which is the essence of morality), this is, for
+human reason, an insoluble problem and identical with the question:
+how a free will is possible. Therefore what we have to show a priori
+is not why the moral law in itself supplies a motive, but what
+effect it, as such, produces (or, more correctly speaking, must
+produce) on the mind.
+
+                                           {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 5}
+
+The essential point in every determination of the will by the
+moral law is that being a free will it is determined simply by the
+moral law, not only without the co-operation of sensible impulses, but
+even to the rejection of all such, and to the checking of all
+inclinations so far as they might be opposed to that law. So far,
+then, the effect of the moral law as a motive is only negative, and
+this motive can be known a priori to be such. For all inclination
+and every sensible impulse is founded on feeling, and the negative
+effect produced on feeling (by the check on the inclinations) is
+itself feeling; consequently, we can see a priori that the moral
+law, as a determining principle of the will, must by thwarting all our
+inclinations produce a feeling which may be called pain; and in this
+we have the first, perhaps the only, instance in which we are able
+from a priori considerations to determine the relation of a
+cognition (in this case of pure practical reason) to the feeling of
+pleasure or displeasure. All the inclinations together (which can be
+reduced to a tolerable system, in which case their satisfaction is
+called happiness) constitute self-regard (solipsismus). This is either
+the self-love that consists in an excessive fondness for oneself
+(philautia), or satisfaction with oneself (arrogantia). The former
+is called particularly selfishness; the latter self-conceit. Pure
+practical reason only checks selfishness, looking on it as natural and
+active in us even prior to the moral law, so far as to limit it to the
+condition of agreement with this law, and then it is called rational
+self-love. But self-conceit reason strikes down altogether, since
+all claims to self-esteem which precede agreement with the moral law
+are vain and unjustifiable, for the certainty of a state of mind
+that coincides with this law is the first condition of personal
+worth (as we shall presently show more clearly), and prior to this
+conformity any pretension to worth is false and unlawful. Now the
+propensity to self-esteem is one of the inclinations which the moral
+law checks, inasmuch as that esteem rests only on morality.
+Therefore the moral law breaks down self-conceit. But as this law is
+something positive in itself, namely, the form of an intellectual
+causality, that is, of freedom, it must be an object of respect;
+for, by opposing the subjective antagonism of the inclinations, it
+weakens self-conceit; and since it even breaks down, that is,
+humiliates, this conceit, it is an object of the highest respect
+and, consequently, is the foundation of a positive feeling which is
+not of empirical origin, but is known a priori. Therefore respect
+for the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual
+cause, and this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori
+and the necessity of which we can perceive.
+
+In the preceding chapter we have seen that everything that
+presents itself as an object of the will prior to the moral law is
+by that law itself, which is the supreme condition of practical
+reason, excluded from the determining principles of the will which
+we have called the unconditionally good; and that the mere practical
+form which consists in the adaptation of the maxims to universal
+legislation first determines what is good in itself and absolutely,
+and is the basis of the maxims of a pure will, which alone is good
+in every respect. However, we find that our nature as sensible
+beings is such that the matter of desire (objects of inclination,
+whether of hope or fear) first presents itself to us; and our
+pathologically affected self, although it is in its maxims quite unfit
+for universal legislation; yet, just as if it constituted our entire
+self, strives to put its pretensions forward first, and to have them
+acknowledged as the first and original. This propensity to make
+ourselves in the subjective determining principles of our choice serve
+as the objective determining principle of the will generally may be
+called self-love; and if this pretends to be legislative as an
+unconditional practical principle it may be called self-conceit. Now
+the moral law, which alone is truly objective (namely, in every
+respect), entirely excludes the influence of self-love on the
+supreme practical principle, and indefinitely checks the
+self-conceit that prescribes the subjective conditions of the former
+as laws. Now whatever checks our self-conceit in our own judgement
+humiliates; therefore the moral law inevitably humbles every man
+when he compares with it the physical propensities of his nature.
+That, the idea of which as a determining principle of our will humbles
+us in our self-consciousness, awakes respect for itself, so far as
+it is itself positive and a determining principle. Therefore the moral
+law is even subjectively a cause of respect. Now since everything that
+enters into self-love belongs to inclination, and all inclination
+rests on feelings, and consequently whatever checks all the feelings
+together in self-love has necessarily, by this very circumstance, an
+influence on feeling; hence we comprehend how it is possible to
+perceive a priori that the moral law can produce an effect on feeling,
+in that it excludes the inclinations and the propensity to make them
+the supreme practical condition, i.e., self-love, from all
+participation in the supreme legislation. This effect is on one side
+merely negative, but on the other side, relatively to the
+restricting principle of pure practical reason, it is positive. No
+special kind of feeling need be assumed for this under the name of a
+practical or moral feeling as antecedent to the moral law and
+serving as its foundation.
+
+The negative effect on feeling (unpleasantness) is pathological,
+like every influence on feeling and like every feeling generally.
+But as an effect of the consciousness of the moral law, and
+consequently in relation to a supersensible cause, namely, the subject
+of pure practical reason which is the supreme lawgiver, this feeling
+of a rational being affected by inclinations is called humiliation
+(intellectual self-depreciation); but with reference to the positive
+source of this humiliation, the law, it is respect for it. There is
+indeed no feeling for this law; but inasmuch as it removes the
+resistance out of the way, this removal of an obstacle is, in the
+judgement of reason, esteemed equivalent to a positive help to its
+causality. Therefore this feeling may also be called a feeling of
+respect for the moral law, and for both reasons together a moral
+feeling.
+
+While the moral law, therefore, is a formal determining principle of
+action by practical pure reason, and is moreover a material though
+only objective determining principle of the objects of action as
+called good and evil, it is also a subjective determining principle,
+that is, a motive to this action, inasmuch as it has influence on
+the morality of the subject and produces a feeling conducive to the
+influence of the law on the will. There is here in the subject no
+antecedent feeling tending to morality. For this is impossible,
+since every feeling is sensible, and the motive of moral intention
+must be free from all sensible conditions. On the contrary, while
+the sensible feeling which is at the bottom of all our inclinations is
+the condition of that impression which we call respect, the cause that
+determines it lies in the pure practical reason; and this impression
+therefore, on account of its origin, must be called, not a
+pathological but a practical effect. For by the fact that the
+conception of the moral law deprives self-love of its influence, and
+self-conceit of its illusion, it lessens the obstacle to pure
+practical reason and produces the conception of the superiority of its
+objective law to the impulses of the sensibility; and thus, by
+removing the counterpoise, it gives relatively greater weight to the
+law in the judgement of reason (in the case of a will affected by
+the aforesaid impulses). Thus the respect for the law is not a
+motive to morality, but is morality itself subjectively considered
+as a motive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by rejecting all the
+rival pretensions of self-love, gives authority to the law, which now
+alone has influence. Now it is to be observed that as respect is an
+effect on feeling, and therefore on the sensibility, of a rational
+being, it presupposes this sensibility, and therefore also the
+finiteness of such beings on whom the moral law imposes respect; and
+that respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being, or
+to any being free from all sensibility, in whom, therefore, this
+sensibility cannot be an obstacle to practical reason.
+
+This feeling (which we call the moral feeling) is therefore produced
+simply by reason. It does not serve for the estimation of actions
+nor for the foundation of the objective moral law itself, but merely
+as a motive to make this of itself a maxim. But what name could we
+more suitably apply to this singular feeling which cannot be
+compared to any pathological feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind
+that it seems to be at the disposal of reason only, and that pure
+practical reason.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 10}
+
+Respect applies always to persons only- not to things. The latter
+may arouse inclination, and if they are animals (e.g., horses, dogs,
+etc.), even love or fear, like the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey;
+but never respect. Something that comes nearer to this feeling is
+admiration, and this, as an affection, astonishment, can apply to
+things also, e.g., lofty mountains, the magnitude, number, and
+distance of the heavenly bodies, the strength and swiftness of many
+animals, etc. But all this is not respect. A man also may be an object
+to me of love, fear, or admiration, even to astonishment, and yet
+not be an object of respect. His jocose humour, his courage and
+strength, his power from the rank he has amongst others, may inspire
+me with sentiments of this kind, but still inner respect for him is
+wanting. Fontenelle says, "I bow before a great man, but my mind
+does not bow." I would add, before an humble plain man, in whom I
+perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am
+conscious of in myself,- my mind bows whether I choose it or not,
+and though I bear my head never so high that he may not forget my
+superior rank. Why is this? Because his example exhibits to me a law
+that humbles my self-conceit when I compare it with my conduct: a law,
+the practicability of obedience to which I see proved by fact before
+my eyes. Now, I may even be conscious of a like degree of uprightness,
+and yet the respect remains. For since in man all good is defective,
+the law made visible by an example still humbles my pride, my standard
+being furnished by a man whose imperfections, whatever they may be,
+are not known to me as my own are, and who therefore appears to me
+in a more favourable light. Respect is a tribute which we cannot
+refuse to merit, whether we will or not; we may indeed outwardly
+withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly.
+
+Respect is so far from being a feeling of pleasure that we only
+reluctantly give way to it as regards a man. We try to find
+out something that may lighten the burden of it, some fault
+to compensate us for the humiliation which such an example
+causes. Even the dead are not always secure from this criticism,
+especially if their example appears inimitable. Even the moral law
+itself in its solemn majesty is exposed to this endeavour to save
+oneself from yielding it respect. Can it be thought that it is for any
+other reason that we are so ready to reduce it to the level of our
+familiar inclination, or that it is for any other reason that we all
+take such trouble to make it out to be the chosen precept of our own
+interest well understood, but that we want to be free from the
+deterrent respect which shows us our own unworthiness with such
+severity? Nevertheless, on the other hand, so little is there pain
+in it that if once one has laid aside self-conceit and allowed
+practical influence to that respect, he can never be satisfied with
+contemplating the majesty of this law, and the soul believes itself
+elevated in proportion as it sees the holy law elevated above it and
+its frail nature. No doubt great talents and activity proportioned
+to them may also occasion respect or an analogous feeling. It is
+very proper to yield it to them, and then it appears as if this
+sentiment were the same thing as admiration. But if we look closer
+we shall observe that it is always uncertain how much of the ability
+is due to native talent, and how much to diligence in cultivating
+it. Reason represents it to us as probably the fruit of cultivation,
+and therefore as meritorious, and this notably reduces our
+self-conceit, and either casts a reproach on us or urges us to
+follow such an example in the way that is suitable to us. This
+respect, then, which we show to such a person (properly speaking, to
+the law that his example exhibits) is not mere admiration; and this is
+confirmed also by the fact that when the common run of admirers
+think they have learned from any source the badness of such a man's
+character (for instance Voltaire's) they give up all respect for
+him; whereas the true scholar still feels it at least with regard to
+his talents, because he is himself engaged in a business and a
+vocation which make imitation of such a man in some degree a law.
+
+Respect for the moral law is, therefore, the only and the
+undoubted moral motive, and this feeling is directed to no object,
+except on the ground of this law. The moral law first determines the
+will objectively and directly in the judgement of reason; and freedom,
+whose causality can be determined only by the law, consists just in
+this, that it restricts all inclinations, and consequently
+self-esteem, by the condition of obedience to its pure law. This
+restriction now has an effect on feeling, and produces the
+impression of displeasure which can be known a priori from the moral
+law. Since it is so far only a negative effect which, arising from the
+influence of pure practical reason, checks the activity of the
+subject, so far as it is determined by inclinations, and hence
+checks the opinion of his personal worth (which, in the absence of
+agreement with the moral law, is reduced to nothing); hence, the
+effect of this law on feeling is merely humiliation. We can,
+therefore, perceive this a priori, but cannot know by it the force
+of the pure practical law as a motive, but only the resistance to
+motives of the sensibility. But since the same law is objectively,
+that is, in the conception of pure reason, an immediate principle of
+determination of the will, and consequently this humiliation takes
+place only relatively to the purity of the law; hence, the lowering of
+the pretensions of moral self-esteem, that is, humiliation on the
+sensible side, is an elevation of the moral, i.e., practical, esteem
+for the law itself on the intellectual side; in a word, it is
+respect for the law, and therefore, as its cause is intellectual, a
+positive feeling which can be known a priori. For whatever
+diminishes the obstacles to an activity furthers this activity itself.
+Now the recognition of the moral law is the consciousness of an
+activity of practical reason from objective principles, which only
+fails to reveal its effect in actions because subjective
+(pathological) causes hinder it. Respect for the moral law then must
+be regarded as a positive, though indirect, effect of it on feeling,
+inasmuch as this respect weakens the impeding influence of
+inclinations by humiliating self-esteem; and hence also as a subjective
+principle of activity, that is, as a motive to obedience to the law,
+and as a principle of the maxims of a life conformable to it. From the
+notion of a motive arises that of an interest, which can never be
+attributed to any being unless it possesses reason, and which
+signifies a motive of the will in so far as it is conceived by the
+reason. Since in a morally good will the law itself must be the
+motive, the moral interest is a pure interest of practical reason
+alone, independent of sense. On the notion of an interest is based
+that of a maxim. This, therefore, is morally good only in case it
+rests simply on the interest taken in obedience to the law. All
+three notions, however, that of a motive, of an interest, and of a
+maxim, can be applied only to finite beings. For they all suppose a
+limitation of the nature of the being, in that the subjective
+character of his choice does not of itself agree with the objective
+law of a practical reason; they suppose that the being requires to
+be impelled to action by something, because an internal obstacle
+opposes itself. Therefore they cannot be applied to the Divine will.
+
+There is something so singular in the unbounded esteem for the
+pure moral law, apart from all advantage, as it is presented for our
+obedience by practical reason, the voice of which makes even the
+boldest sinner tremble and compels him to hide himself from it, that
+we cannot wonder if we find this influence of a mere intellectual idea
+on the feelings quite incomprehensible to speculative reason and
+have to be satisfied with seeing so much of this a priori that such
+a feeling is inseparably connected with the conception of the moral
+law in every finite rational being. If this feeling of respect were
+pathological, and therefore were a feeling of pleasure based on the
+inner sense, it would be in vain to try to discover a connection of it
+with any idea a priori. But [it] is a feeling that applies merely to
+what is practical, and depends on the conception of a law, simply as
+to its form, not on account of any object, and therefore cannot be
+reckoned either as pleasure or pain, and yet produces an interest in
+obedience to the law, which we call the moral interest, just as the
+capacity of taking such an interest in the law (or respect for the
+moral law itself) is properly the moral feeling.
+
+The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law, yet
+combined with an inevitable constraint put upon all inclinations,
+though only by our own reason, is respect for the law. The law that
+demands this respect and inspires it is clearly no other than the
+moral (for no other precludes all inclinations from exercising any
+direct influence on the will). An action which is objectively
+practical according to this law, to the exclusion of every determining
+principle of inclination, is duty, and this by reason of that
+exclusion includes in its concept practical obligation, that is, a
+determination to actions, however reluctantly they may be done. The
+feeling that arises from the consciousness of this obligation is not
+pathological, as would be a feeling produced by an object of the
+senses, but practical only, that is, it is made possible by a
+preceding (objective) determination of the will and a causality of the
+reason. As submission to the law, therefore, that is, as a command
+(announcing constraint for the sensibly affected subject), it contains
+in it no pleasure, but on the contrary, so far, pain in the action. On
+the other hand, however, as this constraint is exercised merely by the
+legislation of our own reason, it also contains something elevating,
+and this subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical
+reason is the sole cause of it, may be called in this respect
+self-approbation, since we recognize ourselves as determined thereto
+solely by the law without any interest, and are now conscious of a
+quite different interest subjectively produced thereby, and which is
+purely practical and free; and our taking this interest in an action
+of duty is not suggested by any inclination, but is commanded and
+actually brought about by reason through the practical law; whence
+this feeling obtains a special name, that of respect.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 15}
+
+The notion of duty, therefore, requires in the action,
+objectively, agreement with the law, and, subjectively in its maxim,
+that respect for the law shall be the sole mode in which the will is
+determined thereby. And on this rests the distinction between the
+consciousness of having acted according to duty and from duty, that
+is, from respect for the law. The former (legality) is possible even
+if inclinations have been the determining principles of the will;
+but the latter (morality), moral worth, can be placed only in this,
+that the action is done from duty, that is, simply for the sake of the
+law. *
+
+
+
+* If we examine accurately the notion of respect for persons as it
+has been already laid down, we shall perceive that it always rests
+on the consciousness of a duty which an example shows us, and that
+respect, therefore, can never have any but a moral ground, and that it
+is very good and even, in a psychological point of view, very useful
+for the knowledge of mankind, that whenever we use this expression
+we should attend to this secret and marvellous, yet often recurring,
+regard which men in their judgement pay to the moral law.
+
+
+
+It is of the greatest importance to attend with the utmost exactness
+in all moral judgements to the subjective principle of all maxims,
+that all the morality of actions may be placed in the necessity of
+acting from duty and from respect for the law, not from love and
+inclination for that which the actions are to produce. For men and all
+created rational beings moral necessity is constraint, that is
+obligation, and every action based on it is to be conceived as a duty,
+not as a proceeding previously pleasing, or likely to be pleasing to
+us of our own accord. As if indeed we could ever bring it about that
+without respect for the law, which implies fear, or at least
+apprehension of transgression, we of ourselves, like the independent
+Deity, could ever come into possession of holiness of will by the
+coincidence of our will with the pure moral law becoming as it were
+part of our nature, never to be shaken (in which case the law would
+cease to be a command for us, as we could never be tempted to be
+untrue to it).
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 20}
+
+The moral law is in fact for the will of a perfect being a law of
+holiness, but for the will of every finite rational being a law of
+duty, of moral constraint, and of the determination of its actions
+by respect for this law and reverence for its duty. No other
+subjective principle must be assumed as a motive, else while the
+action might chance to be such as the law prescribes, yet, as does not
+proceed from duty, the intention, which is the thing properly in
+question in this legislation, is not moral.
+
+It is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and
+from sympathetic good will, or to be just from love of order; but this
+is not yet the true moral maxim of our conduct which is suitable to
+our position amongst rational beings as men, when we pretend with
+fanciful pride to set ourselves above the thought of duty, like
+volunteers, and, as if we were independent on the command, to want
+to do of our own good pleasure what we think we need no command to do.
+We stand under a discipline of reason and in all our maxims must not
+forget our subjection to it, nor withdraw anything therefrom, or by an
+egotistic presumption diminish aught of the authority of the law
+(although our own reason gives it) so as to set the determining
+principle of our will, even though the law be conformed to, anywhere
+else but in the law itself and in respect for this law. Duty and
+obligation are the only names that we must give to our relation to the
+moral law. We are indeed legislative members of a moral kingdom
+rendered possible by freedom, and presented to us by reason as an
+object of respect; but yet we are subjects in it, not the sovereign,
+and to mistake our inferior position as creatures, and
+presumptuously to reject the authority of the moral law, is already to
+revolt from it in spirit, even though the letter of it is fulfilled.
+
+With this agrees very well the possibility of such a command as:
+Love God above everything, and thy neighbour as thyself. * For as a
+command it requires respect for a law which commands love and does not
+leave it to our own arbitrary choice to make this our principle.
+Love to God, however, considered as an inclination (pathological
+love), is impossible, for He is not an object of the senses. The
+same affection towards men is possible no doubt, but cannot be
+commanded, for it is not in the power of any man to love anyone at
+command; therefore it is only practical love that is meant in that
+pith of all laws. To love God means, in this sense, to like to do
+His commandments; to love one's neighbour means to like to practise
+all duties towards him. But the command that makes this a rule
+cannot command us to have this disposition in actions conformed to
+duty, but only to endeavour after it. For a command to like to do a
+thing is in itself contradictory, because if we already know of
+ourselves what we are bound to do, and if further we are conscious
+of liking to do it, a command would be quite needless; and if we do it
+not willingly, but only out of respect for the law, a command that
+makes this respect the motive of our maxim would directly counteract
+the disposition commanded. That law of all laws, therefore, like all
+the moral precepts of the Gospel, exhibits the moral disposition in
+all its perfection, in which, viewed as an ideal of holiness, it is
+not attainable by any creature, but yet is the pattern which we should
+strive to approach, and in an uninterrupted but infinite progress
+become like to. In fact, if a rational creature could ever reach
+this point, that he thoroughly likes to do all moral laws, this
+would mean that there does not exist in him even the possibility of
+a desire that would tempt him to deviate from them; for to overcome
+such a desire always costs the subject some sacrifice and therefore
+requires self-compulsion, that is, inward constraint to something that
+one does not quite like to do; and no creature can ever reach this
+stage of moral disposition. For, being a creature, and therefore
+always dependent with respect to what he requires for complete
+satisfaction, he can never be quite free from desires and
+inclinations, and as these rest on physical causes, they can never
+of themselves coincide with the moral law, the sources of which are
+quite different; and therefore they make it necessary to found the
+mental disposition of one's maxims on moral obligation, not on ready
+inclination, but on respect, which demands obedience to the law,
+even though one may not like it; not on love, which apprehends no
+inward reluctance of the will towards the law. Nevertheless, this
+latter, namely, love to the law (which would then cease to be a
+command, and then morality, which would have passed subjectively
+into holiness, would cease to be virtue) must be the constant though
+unattainable goal of his endeavours. For in the case of what we highly
+esteem, but yet (on account of the consciousness of our weakness)
+dread, the increased facility of satisfying it changes the most
+reverential awe into inclination, and respect into love; at least this
+would be the perfection of a disposition devoted to the law, if it
+were possible for a creature to attain it.
+
+
+
+* This law is in striking contrast with the principle of private
+happiness which some make the supreme principle of morality. This
+would be expressed thus: Love thyself above everything, and God and
+thy neighbour for thine own sake.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 25}
+
+
+
+This reflection is intended not so much to clear up the
+evangelical command just cited, in order to prevent religious
+fanaticism in regard to love of God, but to define accurately the
+moral disposition with regard directly to our duties towards men,
+and to check, or if possible prevent, a merely moral fanaticism
+which infects many persons. The stage of morality on which man (and,
+as far as we can see, every rational creature) stands is respect for
+the moral law. The disposition that he ought to have in obeying this
+is to obey it from duty, not from spontaneous inclination, or from
+an endeavour taken up from liking and unbidden; and this proper
+moral condition in which he can always be is virtue, that is, moral
+disposition militant, and not holiness in the fancied possession of
+a perfect purity of the disposition of the will. It is nothing but
+moral fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit that is infused into the
+mind by exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous,
+by which men are led into the delusion that it is not duty, that is,
+respect for the law, whose yoke (an easy yoke indeed, because reason
+itself imposes it on us) they must bear, whether they like it or
+not, that constitutes the determining principle of their actions,
+and which always humbles them while they obey it; fancying that
+those actions are expected from them, not from duty, but as pure
+merit. For not only would they, in imitating such deeds from such a
+principle, not have fulfilled the spirit of the law in the least,
+which consists not in the legality of the action (without regard to
+principle), but in the subjection of the mind to the law; not only
+do they make the motives pathological (seated in sympathy or
+self-love), not moral (in the law), but they produce in this way a
+vain, high-flying, fantastic way of thinking, flattering themselves
+with a spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor
+bridle, for which no command is needed, and thereby forgetting their
+obligation, which they ought to think of rather than merit. Indeed
+actions of others which are done with great sacrifice, and merely
+for the sake of duty, may be praised as noble and sublime, but only so
+far as there are traces which suggest that they were done wholly out
+of respect for duty and not from excited feelings. If these,
+however, are set before anyone as examples to be imitated, respect for
+duty (which is the only true moral feeling) must be employed as the
+motive- this severe holy precept which never allows our vain self-love
+to dally with pathological impulses (however analogous they may be
+to morality), and to take a pride in meritorious worth. Now if we
+search we shall find for all actions that are worthy of praise a law
+of duty which commands, and does not leave us to choose what may be
+agreeable to our inclinations. This is the only way of representing
+things that can give a moral training to the soul, because it alone is
+capable of solid and accurately defined principles.
+
+If fanaticism in its most general sense is a deliberate over
+stepping of the limits of human reason, then moral fanaticism is
+such an over stepping of the bounds that practical pure reason sets to
+mankind, in that it forbids us to place the subjective determining
+principle of correct actions, that is, their moral motive, in anything
+but the law itself, or to place the disposition which is thereby
+brought into the maxims in anything but respect for this law, and
+hence commands us to take as the supreme vital principle of all
+morality in men the thought of duty, which strikes down all
+arrogance as well as vain self-love.
+
+If this is so, it is not only writers of romance or sentimental
+educators (although they may be zealous opponents of
+sentimentalism), but sometimes even philosophers, nay, even the
+severest of all, the Stoics, that have brought in moral fanaticism
+instead of a sober but wise moral discipline, although the
+fanaticism of the latter was more heroic, that of the former of an
+insipid, effeminate character; and we may, without hypocrisy, say of
+the moral teaching of the Gospel, that it first, by the purity of
+its moral principle, and at the same time by its suitability to the
+limitations of finite beings, brought all the good conduct of men
+under the discipline of a duty plainly set before their eyes, which
+does not permit them to indulge in dreams of imaginary moral
+perfections; and that it also set the bounds of humility (that is,
+self-knowledge) to self-conceit as well as to self-love, both which
+are ready to mistake their limits.
+
+Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing
+charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not
+to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural
+aversion or terror, but merely holdest forth a law which of itself
+finds entrance into the mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence
+(though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are
+dumb, even though they secretly counter-work it; what origin is
+there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble
+descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations; a
+root to be derived from which is the indispensable condition of the
+only worth which men can give themselves?
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 30}
+
+It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself
+(as a part of the world of sense), a power which connects him with
+an order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a
+world which at the same time commands the whole sensible world, and
+with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time, as well
+as the sum total of all ends (which totality alone suits such
+unconditional practical laws as the moral). This power is nothing
+but personality, that is, freedom and independence on the mechanism of
+nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of a being which is subject to
+special laws, namely, pure practical laws given by its own reason;
+so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to
+his own personality as belonging to the intelligible [supersensible]
+world. It is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to both
+worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to its second and
+highest characteristic only with reverence, and its laws with the
+highest respect.
+
+On this origin are founded many expressions which designate the
+worth of objects according to moral ideas. The moral law is holy
+(inviolable). Man is indeed unholy enough, but he must regard humanity
+in his own person as holy. In all creation every thing one chooses and
+over which one has any power, may be used merely as means; man
+alone, and with him every rational creature, is an end in himself.
+By virtue of the autonomy of his freedom he is the subject of the
+moral law, which is holy. Just for this reason every will, even
+every person's own individual will, in relation to itself, is
+restricted to the condition of agreement with the autonomy of the
+rational being, that is to say, that it is not to be subject to any
+purpose which cannot accord with a law which might arise from the will
+of the passive subject himself; the latter is, therefore, never to
+be employed merely as means, but as itself also, concurrently, an end.
+We justly attribute this condition even to the Divine will, with
+regard to the rational beings in the world, which are His creatures,
+since it rests on their personality, by which alone they are ends in
+themselves.
+
+This respect-inspiring idea of personality which sets before our
+eyes the sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at
+the same time it shows us the want of accord of our conduct with it
+and thereby strikes down self-conceit, is even natural to the
+commonest reason and easily observed. Has not every even moderately
+honourable man sometimes found that, where by an otherwise inoffensive
+lie he might either have withdrawn himself from an unpleasant
+business, or even have procured some advantages for a loved and
+well-deserving friend, he has avoided it solely lest he should despise
+himself secretly in his own eyes? When an upright man is in the
+greatest distress, which he might have avoided if he could only have
+disregarded duty, is he not sustained by the consciousness that he has
+maintained humanity in its proper dignity in his own person and
+honoured it, that he has no reason to be ashamed of himself in his own
+sight, or to dread the inward glance of self-examination? This
+consolation is not happiness, it is not even the smallest part of
+it, for no one would wish to have occasion for it, or would,
+perhaps, even desire a life in such circumstances. But he lives, and
+he cannot endure that he should be in his own eyes unworthy of life.
+This inward peace is therefore merely negative as regards what can
+make life pleasant; it is, in fact, only the escaping the danger of
+sinking in personal worth, after everything else that is valuable
+has been lost. It is the effect of a respect for something quite
+different from life, something in comparison and contrast with which
+life with all its enjoyment has no value. He still lives only
+because it is his duty, not because he finds anything pleasant in
+life.
+
+Such is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason; it
+is no other than the pure moral law itself, inasmuch as it makes us
+conscious of the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and
+subjectively produces respect for their higher nature in men who are
+also conscious of their sensible existence and of the consequent
+dependence of their pathologically very susceptible nature. Now with
+this motive may be combined so many charms and satisfactions of life
+that even on this account alone the most prudent choice of a
+rational Epicurean reflecting on the greatest advantage of life
+would declare itself on the side of moral conduct, and it may even
+be advisable to join this prospect of a cheerful enjoyment of life
+with that supreme motive which is already sufficient of itself; but
+only as a counterpoise to the attractions which vice does not fail
+to exhibit on the opposite side, and not so as, even in the smallest
+degree, to place in this the proper moving power when duty is in
+question. For that would be just the same as to wish to taint the
+purity of the moral disposition in its source. The majesty of duty has
+nothing to do with enjoyment of life; it has its special law and its
+special tribunal, and though the two should be never so well shaken
+together to be given well mixed, like medicine, to the sick soul,
+yet they will soon separate of themselves; and if they do not, the
+former will not act; and although physical life might gain somewhat in
+force, the moral life would fade away irrecoverably.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 35}
+
+Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+By the critical examination of a science, or of a portion of it,
+which constitutes a system by itself, I understand the inquiry and
+proof why it must have this and no other systematic form, when we
+compare it with another system which is based on a similar faculty
+of knowledge. Now practical and speculative reason are based on the
+same faculty, so far as both are pure reason. Therefore the difference
+in their systematic form must be determined by the comparison of both,
+and the ground of this must be assigned.
+
+The Analytic of pure theoretic reason had to do with the knowledge
+of such objects as may have been given to the understanding, and was
+obliged therefore to begin from intuition and consequently (as this is
+always sensible) from sensibility; and only after that could advance
+to concepts (of the objects of this intuition), and could only end
+with principles after both these had preceded. On the contrary,
+since practical reason has not to do with objects so as to know
+them, but with its own faculty of realizing them (in accordance with
+the knowledge of them), that is, with a will which is a causality,
+inasmuch as reason contains its determining principle; since,
+consequently, it has not to furnish an object of intuition, but as
+practical reason has to furnish only a law (because the notion of
+causality always implies the reference to a law which determines the
+existence of the many in relation to one another); hence a critical
+examination of the Analytic of reason, if this is to be practical
+reason (and this is properly the problem), must begin with the
+possibility of practical principles a priori. Only after that can it
+proceed to concepts of the objects of a practical reason, namely,
+those of absolute good and evil, in order to assign them in accordance
+with those principles (for prior to those principles they cannot
+possibly be given as good and evil by any faculty of knowledge), and
+only then could the section be concluded with the last chapter,
+that, namely, which treats of the relation of the pure practical
+reason to the sensibility and of its necessary influence thereon,
+which is a priori cognisable, that is, of the moral sentiment. Thus
+the Analytic of the practical pure reason has the whole extent of
+the conditions of its use in common with the theoretical, but in
+reverse order. The Analytic of pure theoretic reason was divided
+into transcendental Aesthetic and transcendental Logic, that of the
+practical reversely into Logic and Aesthetic of pure practical
+reason (if I may, for the sake of analogy merely, use these
+designations, which are not quite suitable). This logic again was
+there divided into the Analytic of concepts and that of principles:
+here into that of principles and concepts. The Aesthetic also had in
+the former case two parts, on account of the two kinds of sensible
+intuition; here the sensibility is not considered as a capacity of
+intuition at all, but merely as feeling (which can be a subjective
+ground of desire), and in regard to it pure practical reason admits no
+further division.
+
+It is also easy to see the reason why this division into two parts
+with its subdivision was not actually adopted here (as one might
+have been induced to attempt by the example of the former critique).
+For since it is pure reason that is here considered in its practical
+use, and consequently as proceeding from a priori principles, and
+not from empirical principles of determination, hence the division
+of the analytic of pure practical reason must resemble that of a
+syllogism; namely, proceeding from the universal in the major
+premiss (the moral principle), through a minor premiss containing a
+subsumption of possible actions (as good or evil) under the former, to
+the conclusion, namely, the subjective determination of the will (an
+interest in the possible practical good, and in the maxim founded on
+it). He who has been able to convince himself of the truth of the
+positions occurring in the Analytic will take pleasure in such
+comparisons; for they justly suggest the expectation that we may
+perhaps some day be able to discern the unity of the whole faculty
+of reason (theoretical as well as practical) and be able to derive all
+from one principle, which, is what human reason inevitably demands, as
+it finds complete satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of
+its knowledge.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 40}
+
+If now we consider also the contents of the knowledge that we can
+have of a pure practical reason, and by means of it, as shown by the
+Analytic, we find, along with a remarkable analogy between it and
+the theoretical, no less remarkable differences. As regards the
+theoretical, the faculty of a pure rational cognition a priori could
+be easily and evidently proved by examples from sciences (in which, as
+they put their principles to the test in so many ways by methodical
+use, there is not so much reason as in common knowledge to fear a
+secret mixture of empirical principles of cognition). But, that pure
+reason without the admixture of any empirical principle is practical
+of itself, this could only be shown from the commonest practical use
+of reason, by verifying the fact, that every man's natural reason
+acknowledges the supreme practical principle as the supreme law of his
+will- a law completely a priori and not depending on any sensible
+data. It was necessary first to establish and verify the purity of its
+origin, even in the judgement of this common reason, before science
+could take it in hand to make use of it, as a fact, that is, prior
+to all disputation about its possibility, and all the consequences
+that may be drawn from it. But this circumstance may be readily
+explained from what has just been said; because practical pure
+reason must necessarily begin with principles, which therefore must be
+the first data, the foundation of all science, and cannot be derived
+from it. It was possible to effect this verification of moral
+principles as principles of a pure reason quite well, and with
+sufficient certainty, by a single appeal to the judgement of common
+sense, for this reason, that anything empirical which might slip
+into our maxims as a determining principle of the will can be detected
+at once by the feeling of pleasure or pain which necessarily
+attaches to it as exciting desire; whereas pure practical reason
+positively refuses to admit this feeling into its principle as a
+condition. The heterogeneity of the determining principles (the
+empirical and rational) is clearly detected by this resistance of a
+practically legislating reason against every admixture of inclination,
+and by a peculiar kind of sentiment, which, however, does not
+precede the legislation of the practical reason, but, on the contrary,
+is produced by this as a constraint, namely, by the feeling of a
+respect such as no man has for inclinations of whatever kind but for
+the law only; and it is detected in so marked and prominent a manner
+that even the most uninstructed cannot fail to see at once in an
+example presented to him, that empirical principles of volition may
+indeed urge him to follow their attractions, but that he can never
+be expected to obey anything but the pure practical law of reason
+alone.
+
+The distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine
+of morality, in the former of which empirical principles constitute
+the entire foundation, while in the second they do not form the
+smallest part of it, is the first and most important office of the
+Analytic of pure practical reason; and it must proceed in it with as
+much exactness and, so to speak, scrupulousness, as any geometer in
+his work. The philosopher, however, has greater difficulties to
+contend with here (as always in rational cognition by means of
+concepts merely without construction), because he cannot take any
+intuition as a foundation (for a pure noumenon). He has, however, this
+advantage that, like the chemist, he can at any time make an
+experiment with every man's practical reason for the purpose of
+distinguishing the moral (pure) principle of determination from the
+empirical; namely, by adding the moral law (as a determining
+principle) to the empirically affected will (e.g., that of the man who
+would be ready to lie because he can gain something thereby). It is as
+if the analyst added alkali to a solution of lime in hydrochloric
+acid, the acid at once forsakes the lime, combines with the alkali,
+and the lime is precipitated. Just in the same way, if to a man who is
+otherwise honest (or who for this occasion places himself only in
+thought in the position of an honest man), we present the moral law by
+which he recognises the worthlessness of the liar, his practical
+reason (in forming a judgement of what ought to be done) at once
+forsakes the advantage, combines with that which maintains in him
+respect for his own person (truthfulness), and the advantage after
+it has been separated and washed from every particle of reason
+(which is altogether on the side of duty) is easily weighed by
+everyone, so that it can enter into combination with reason in other
+cases, only not where it could be opposed to the moral law, which
+reason never forsakes, but most closely unites itself with.
+
+But it does not follow that this distinction between the principle
+of happiness and that of morality is an opposition between them, and
+pure practical reason does not require that we should renounce all
+claim to happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we
+should take no account of happiness. It may even in certain respects
+be a duty to provide for happiness; partly, because (including
+skill, wealth, riches) it contains means for the fulfilment of our
+duty; partly, because the absence of it (e.g., poverty) implies
+temptations to transgress our duty. But it can never be an immediate
+duty to promote our happiness, still less can it be the principle of
+all duty. Now, as all determining principles of the will, except the
+law of pure practical reason alone (the moral law), are all
+empirical and, therefore, as such, belong to the principle of
+happiness, they must all be kept apart from the supreme principle of
+morality and never be incorporated with it as a condition; since
+this would be to destroy all moral worth just as much as any empirical
+admixture with geometrical principles would destroy the certainty of
+mathematical evidence, which in Plato's opinion is the most
+excellent thing in mathematics, even surpassing their utility.
+
+Instead, however, of the deduction of the supreme principle of
+pure practical reason, that is, the explanation of the possibility
+of such a knowledge a priori, the utmost we were able to do was to
+show that if we saw the possibility of the freedom of an efficient
+cause, we should also see not merely the possibility, but even the
+necessity, of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational
+beings, to whom we attribute freedom of causality of their will;
+because both concepts are so inseparably united that we might define
+practical freedom as independence of the will on anything but the
+moral law. But we cannot perceive the possibility of the freedom of an
+efficient cause, especially in the world of sense; we are fortunate if
+only we can be sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its
+impossibility, and are now, by the moral law which postulates it,
+compelled and therefore authorized to assume it. However, there are
+still many who think that they can explain this freedom on empirical
+principles, like any other physical faculty, and treat it as a
+psychological property, the explanation of which only requires a
+more exact study of the nature of the soul and of the motives of the
+will, and not as a transcendental predicate of the causality of a
+being that belongs to the world of sense (which is really the
+point). They thus deprive us of the grand revelation which we obtain
+through practical reason by means of the moral law, the revelation,
+namely, of a supersensible world by the realization of the otherwise
+transcendent concept of freedom, and by this deprive us also of the
+moral law itself, which admits no empirical principle of
+determination. Therefore it will be necessary to add something here as
+a protection against this delusion and to exhibit empiricism in its
+naked superficiality.
+
+The notion of causality as physical necessity, in opposition to
+the same notion as freedom, concerns only the existence of things so
+far as it is determinable in time, and, consequently, as phenomena, in
+opposition to their causality as things in themselves. Now if we
+take the attributes of existence of things in time for attributes of
+things in themselves (which is the common view), then it is impossible
+to reconcile the necessity of the causal relation with freedom; they
+are contradictory. For from the former it follows that every event,
+and consequently every action that takes place at a certain point of
+time, is a necessary result of what existed in time preceding. Now
+as time past is no longer in my power, hence every action that I
+perform must be the necessary result of certain determining grounds
+which are not in my power, that is, at the moment in which I am acting
+I am never free. Nay, even if I assume that my whole existence is
+independent on any foreign cause (for instance, God), so that the
+determining principles of my causality, and even of my whole
+existence, were not outside myself, yet this would not in the least
+transform that physical necessity into freedom. For at every moment of
+time I am still under the necessity of being determined to action by
+that which is not in my power, and the series of events infinite a
+parte priori, which I only continue according to a pre-determined
+order and could never begin of myself, would be a continuous
+physical chain, and therefore my causality would never be freedom.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 45}
+
+If, then, we would attribute freedom to a being whose existence is
+determined in time, we cannot except him from the law of necessity
+as to all events in his existence and, consequently, as to his actions
+also; for that would be to hand him over to blind chance. Now as
+this law inevitably applies to all the causality of things, so far
+as their existence is determinable in time, it follows that if this
+were the mode in which we had also to conceive the existence of
+these things in themselves, freedom must be rejected as a vain and
+impossible conception. Consequently, if we would still save it, no
+other way remains but to consider that the existence of a thing, so
+far as it is determinable in time, and therefore its causality,
+according to the law of physical necessity, belong to appearance,
+and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in itself.
+This is certainly inevitable, if we would retain both these
+contradictory concepts together; but in application, when we try to
+explain their combination in one and the same action, great
+difficulties present themselves which seem to render such a
+combination impracticable.
+
+When I say of a man who commits a theft that, by the law of
+causality, this deed is a necessary result of the determining causes
+in preceding time, then it was impossible that it could not have
+happened; how then can the judgement, according to the moral law, make
+any change, and suppose that it could have been omitted, because the
+law says that it ought to have been omitted; that is, how can a man be
+called quite free at the same moment, and with respect to the same
+action in which he is subject to an inevitable physical necessity?
+Some try to evade this by saying that the causes that determine his
+causality are of such a kind as to agree with a comparative notion
+of freedom. According to this, that is sometimes called a free effect,
+the determining physical cause of which lies within the acting thing
+itself, e.g., that which a projectile performs when it is in free
+motion, in which case we use the word freedom, because while it is
+in flight it is not urged by anything external; or as we call the
+motion of a clock a free motion, because it moves its hands itself,
+which therefore do not require to be pushed by external force; so
+although the actions of man are necessarily determined by causes which
+precede in time, we yet call them free, because these causes are ideas
+produced by our own faculties, whereby desires are evoked on
+occasion of circumstances, and hence actions are wrought according
+to our own pleasure. This is a wretched subterfuge with which some
+persons still let themselves be put off, and so think they have
+solved, with a petty word- jugglery, that difficult problem, at the
+solution of which centuries have laboured in vain, and which can
+therefore scarcely be found so completely on the surface. In fact,
+in the question about the freedom which must be the foundation of
+all moral laws and the consequent responsibility, it does not matter
+whether the principles which necessarily determine causality by a
+physical law reside within the subject or without him, or in the
+former case whether these principles are instinctive or are
+conceived by reason, if, as is admitted by these men themselves, these
+determining ideas have the ground of their existence in time and in
+the antecedent state, and this again in an antecedent, etc. Then it
+matters not that these are internal; it matters not that they have a
+psychological and not a mechanical causality, that is, produce actions
+by means of ideas and not by bodily movements; they are still
+determining principles of the causality of a being whose existence
+is determinable in time, and therefore under the necessitation of
+conditions of past time, which therefore, when the subject has to act,
+are no longer in his power. This may imply psychological freedom (if
+we choose to apply this term to a merely internal chain of ideas in
+the mind), but it involves physical necessity and, therefore, leaves
+no room for transcendental freedom, which must be conceived as
+independence on everything empirical, and, consequently, on nature
+generally, whether it is an object of the internal sense considered in
+time only, or of the external in time and space. Without this
+freedom (in the latter and true sense), which alone is practical a
+priori, no moral law and no moral imputation are possible. Just for
+this reason the necessity of events in time, according to the physical
+law of causality, may be called the mechanism of nature, although we
+do not mean by this that things which are subject to it must be really
+material machines. We look here only to the necessity of the
+connection of events in a time-series as it is developed according
+to the physical law, whether the subject in which this development
+takes place is called automaton materiale when the mechanical being is
+moved by matter, or with Leibnitz spirituale when it is impelled by
+ideas; and if the freedom of our will were no other than the latter
+(say the psychological and comparative, not also transcendental,
+that is, absolute), then it would at bottom be nothing better than the
+freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, accomplishes
+its motions of itself.
+
+Now, in order to remove in the supposed case the apparent
+contradiction between freedom and the mechanism of nature in one and
+the same action, we must remember what was said in the Critique of
+Pure Reason, or what follows therefrom; viz., that the necessity of
+nature, which cannot co-exist with the freedom of the subject,
+appertains only to the attributes of the thing that is subject to
+time-conditions, consequently only to those of the acting subject as a
+phenomenon; that therefore in this respect the determining
+principles of every action of the same reside in what belongs to
+past time and is no longer in his power (in which must be included his
+own past actions and the character that these may determine for him in
+his own eyes as a phenomenon). But the very same subject, being on the
+other side conscious of himself as a thing in himself, considers his
+existence also in so far as it is not subject to time-conditions,
+and regards himself as only determinable by laws which he gives
+himself through reason; and in this his existence nothing is
+antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action, and
+in general every modification of his existence, varying according to
+his internal sense, even the whole series of his existence as a
+sensible being is in the consciousness of his supersensible
+existence nothing but the result, and never to be regarded as the
+determining principle, of his causality as a noumenon. In this view
+now the rational being can justly say of every unlawful action that he
+performs, that he could very well have left it undone; although as
+appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past, and in this
+respect is absolutely necessary; for it, with all the past which
+determines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of his character
+which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he imputes the
+causality of those appearances to himself as a cause independent on
+sensibility.
+
+With this agree perfectly the judicial sentences of that wonderful
+faculty in us which we call conscience. A man may use as much art as
+he likes in order to paint to himself an unlawful act, that he
+remembers, as an unintentional error, a mere oversight, such as one
+can never altogether avoid, and therefore as something in which he was
+carried away by the stream of physical necessity, and thus to make
+himself out innocent, yet he finds that the advocate who speaks in his
+favour can by no means silence the accuser within, if only he is
+conscious that at the time when he did this wrong he was in his
+senses, that is, in possession of his freedom; and, nevertheless, he
+accounts for his error from some bad habits, which by gradual
+neglect of attention he has allowed to grow upon him to such a
+degree that he can regard his error as its natural consequence,
+although this cannot protect him from the blame and reproach which
+he casts upon himself. This is also the ground of repentance for a
+long past action at every recollection of it; a painful feeling
+produced by the moral sentiment, and which is practically void in so
+far as it cannot serve to undo what has been done. (Hence Priestley,
+as a true and consistent fatalist, declares it absurd, and he deserves
+to be commended for this candour more than those who, while they
+maintain the mechanism of the will in fact, and its freedom in words
+only, yet wish it to be thought that they include it in their system
+of compromise, although they do not explain the possibility of such
+moral imputation.) But the pain is quite legitimate, because when
+the law of our intelligible [supersensible] existence (the moral
+law) is in question, reason recognizes no distinction of time, and
+only asks whether the event belongs to me, as my act, and then
+always morally connects the same feeling with it, whether it has
+happened just now or long ago. For in reference to the supersensible
+consciousness of its existence (i.e., freedom) the life of sense is
+but a single phenomenon, which, inasmuch as it contains merely
+manifestations of the mental disposition with regard to the moral
+law (i.e., of the character), must be judged not according to the
+physical necessity that belongs to it as phenomenon, but according
+to the absolute spontaneity of freedom. It may therefore be admitted
+that, if it were possible to have so profound an insight into a
+man's mental character as shown by internal as well as external
+actions as to know all its motives, even the smallest, and likewise
+all the external occasions that can influence them, we could calculate
+a man's conduct for the future with as great certainty as a lunar or
+solar eclipse; and nevertheless we may maintain that the man is
+free. In fact, if we were capable of a further glance, namely, an
+intellectual intuition of the same subject (which indeed is not
+granted to us, and instead of it we have only the rational concept),
+then we should perceive that this whole chain of appearances in regard
+to all that concerns the moral laws depends on the spontaneity of
+the subject as a thing in itself, of the determination of which no
+physical explanation can be given. In default of this intuition, the
+moral law assures us of this distinction between the relation of our
+actions as appearance to our sensible nature, and the relation of this
+sensible nature to the supersensible substratum in us. In this view,
+which is natural to our reason, though inexplicable, we can also
+justify some judgements which we passed with all conscientiousness,
+and which yet at first sight seem quite opposed to all equity. There
+are cases in which men, even with the same education which has been
+profitable to others, yet show such early depravity, and so continue
+to progress in it to years of manhood, that they are thought to be
+born villains, and their character altogether incapable of
+improvement; and nevertheless they are judged for what they do or
+leave undone, they are reproached for their faults as guilty; nay,
+they themselves (the children) regard these reproaches as well
+founded, exactly as if in spite of the hopeless natural quality of
+mind ascribed to them, they remained just as responsible as any
+other man. This could not happen if we did not suppose that whatever
+springs from a man's choice (as every action intentionally performed
+undoubtedly does) has as its foundation a free causality, which from
+early youth expresses its character in its manifestations (i.e.,
+actions). These, on account of the uniformity of conduct, exhibit a
+natural connection, which however does not make the vicious quality of
+the will necessary, but on the contrary, is the consequence of the
+evil principles voluntarily adopted and unchangeable, which only
+make it so much the more culpable and deserving of punishment. There
+still remains a difficulty in the combination of freedom with the
+mechanism of nature in a being belonging to the world of sense; a
+difficulty which, even after all the foregoing is admitted,
+threatens freedom with complete destruction. But with this danger
+there is also a circumstance that offers hope of an issue still
+favourable to freedom; namely, that the same difficulty presses much
+more strongly (in fact as we shall presently see, presses only) on the
+system that holds the existence determinable in time and space to be
+the existence of things in themselves; it does not therefore oblige us
+to give up our capital supposition of the ideality of time as a mere
+form of sensible intuition, and consequently as a mere manner of
+representation which is proper to the subject as belonging to the
+world of sense; and therefore it only requires that this view be
+reconciled with this idea.
+
+The difficulty is as follows: Even if it is admitted that the
+supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action,
+although, as a subject also belonging to the world of sense, he is
+under mechanical conditions with respect to the same action, still, as
+soon as we allow that God as universal first cause is also the cause
+of the existence of substance (a proposition which can never be
+given up without at the same time giving up the notion of God as the
+Being of all beings, and therewith giving up his all sufficiency, on
+which everything in theology depends), it seems as if we must admit
+that a man's actions have their determining principle in something
+which is wholly out of his power- namely, in the causality of a
+Supreme Being distinct from himself and on whom his own existence
+and the whole determination of his causality are absolutely dependent.
+In point of fact, if a man's actions as belonging to his modifications
+in time were not merely modifications of him as appearance, but as a
+thing in itself, freedom could not be saved. Man would be a marionette
+or an automaton, like Vaucanson's, prepared and wound up by the
+Supreme Artist. Self-consciousness would indeed make him a thinking
+automaton; but the consciousness of his own spontaneity would be
+mere delusion if this were mistaken for freedom, and it would
+deserve this name only in a comparative sense, since, although the
+proximate determining causes of its motion and a long series of
+their determining causes are internal, yet the last and highest is
+found in a foreign hand. Therefore I do not see how those who still
+insist on regarding time and space as attributes belonging to the
+existence of things in themselves, can avoid admitting the fatality of
+actions; or if (like the otherwise acute Mendelssohn) they allow
+them to be conditions necessarily belonging to the existence of finite
+and derived beings, but not to that of the infinite Supreme Being, I
+do not see on what ground they can justify such a distinction, or,
+indeed, how they can avoid the contradiction that meets them, when
+they hold that existence in time is an attribute necessarily belonging
+to finite things in themselves, whereas God is the cause of this
+existence, but cannot be the cause of time (or space) itself (since
+this must be presupposed as a necessary a priori condition of the
+existence of things); and consequently as regards the existence of
+these things. His causality must be subject to conditions and even
+to the condition of time; and this would inevitably bring in
+everything contradictory to the notions of His infinity and
+independence. On the other hand, it is quite easy for us to draw the
+distinction between the attribute of the divine existence of being
+independent on all time-conditions, and that of a being of the world
+of sense, the distinction being that between the existence of a
+being in itself and that of a thing in appearance. Hence, if this
+ideality of time and space is not adopted, nothing remains but
+Spinozism, in which space and time are essential attributes of the
+Supreme Being Himself, and the things dependent on Him (ourselves,
+therefore, included) are not substances, but merely accidents inhering
+in Him; since, if these things as His effects exist in time only, this
+being the condition of their existence in themselves, then the actions
+of these beings must be simply His actions which He performs in some
+place and time. Thus, Spinozism, in spite of the absurdity of its
+fundamental idea, argues more consistently than the creation theory
+can, when beings assumed to be substances, and beings in themselves
+existing in time, are regarded as effects of a Supreme Cause, and
+yet as not [belonging] to Him and His action, but as separate
+substances.
+
+                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 50}
+
+The above-mentioned difficulty is resolved briefly and clearly as
+follows: If existence in time is a mere sensible mode of
+representation belonging to thinking beings in the world and
+consequently does not apply to them as things in themselves, then
+the creation of these beings is a creation of things in themselves,
+since the notion of creation does not belong to the sensible form of
+representation of existence or to causality, but can only be
+referred to noumena. Consequently, when I say of beings in the world
+of sense that they are created, I so far regard them as noumena. As it
+would be a contradiction, therefore, to say that God is a creator of
+appearances, so also it is a contradiction to say that as creator He
+is the cause of actions in the world of sense, and therefore as
+appearances, although He is the cause of the existence of the acting
+beings (which are noumena). If now it is possible to affirm freedom in
+spite of the natural mechanism of actions as appearances (by regarding
+existence in time as something that belongs only to appearances, not
+to things in themselves), then the circumstance that the acting beings
+are creatures cannot make the slightest difference, since creation
+concerns their supersensible and not their sensible existence, and,
+therefore, cannot be regarded as the determining principle of the
+appearances. It would be quite different if the beings in the world as
+things in themselves existed in time, since in that case the creator
+of substance would be at the same time the author of the whole
+mechanism of this substance.
+
+Of so great importance is the separation of time (as well as
+space) from the existence of things in themselves which was effected
+in the Critique of the Pure Speculative Reason.
+
+It may be said that the solution here proposed involves great
+difficulty in itself and is scarcely susceptible of a lucid
+exposition. But is any other solution that has been attempted, or that
+may be attempted, easier and more intelligible? Rather might we say
+that the dogmatic teachers of metaphysics have shown more shrewdness
+than candour in keeping this difficult point out of sight as much as
+possible, in the hope that if they said nothing about it, probably
+no one would think of it. If science is to be advanced, all
+difficulties must be laid open, and we must even search for those that
+are hidden, for every difficulty calls forth a remedy, which cannot be
+discovered without science gaining either in extent or in exactness;
+and thus even obstacles become means of increasing the thoroughness of
+science. On the other hand, if the difficulties are intentionally
+concealed, or merely removed by palliatives, then sooner or later they
+burst out into incurable mischiefs, which bring science to ruin in
+an absolute scepticism.
+
+Since it is, properly speaking, the notion of freedom alone amongst all
+the ideas of pure speculative reason that so greatly enlarges our
+knowledge in the sphere of the supersensible, though only of our
+practical knowledge, I ask myself why it exclusively possesses so great
+fertility, whereas the others only designate the vacant space for
+possible beings of the pure understanding, but are unable by any means
+to define the concept of them. I presently find that as I cannot think
+anything without a category, I must first look for a category for the
+rational idea of freedom with which I am now concerned; and this is the
+category of causality; and although freedom, a concept of the reason,
+being a transcendent concept, cannot have any intuition corresponding to
+it, yet the concept of the understanding- for the synthesis of which the
+former demands the unconditioned- (namely, the concept of causality)
+must have a sensible intuition given, by which first its objective
+reality is assured. Now, the categories are all divided into two
+classes- the mathematical, which concern the unity of synthesis in the
+conception of objects, and the dynamical, which refer to the unity of
+synthesis in the conception of the existence of objects. The former
+(those of magnitude and quality) always contain a synthesis of the
+homogeneous, and it is not possible to find in this the unconditioned
+antecedent to what is given in sensible intuition as conditioned in
+space and time, as this would itself have to belong to space and time,
+and therefore be again still conditioned. Whence it resulted in the
+Dialectic of Pure Theoretic Reason that the opposite methods of
+attaining the unconditioned and the totality of the conditions were both
+wrong. The categories of the second class (those of causality and of the
+necessity of a thing) did not require this homogeneity (of the
+conditioned and the condition in synthesis), since here what we have to
+explain is not how the intuition is compounded from a manifold in it,
+but only how the existence of the conditioned object corresponding to it
+is added to the existence of the condition (added, namely, in the
+understanding as connected therewith); and in that case it was allowable
+to suppose in the supersensible world the unconditioned antecedent to
+the altogether conditioned in the world of sense (both as regards the
+causal connection and the contingent existence of things themselves),
+although this unconditioned remained indeterminate, and to make the
+synthesis transcendent. Hence, it was found in the Dialectic of the Pure
+Speculative Reason that the two apparently opposite methods of obtaining
+for the conditioned the unconditioned were not really contradictory,
+e.g., in the synthesis of causality to conceive for the conditioned in
+the series of causes and effects of the sensible world, a causality
+which has no sensible condition, and that the same action which, as
+belonging to the world of sense, is always sensibly conditioned, that
+is, mechanically necessary, yet at the same time may be derived from a
+causality not sensibly conditioned- being the causality of the acting
+being as belonging to the supersensible world- and may consequently be
+conceived as free. Now, the only point in question was to change this
+may be into is; that is, that we should be able to show in an actual
+case, as it were by a fact, that certain actions imply such a causality
+(namely, the intellectual, sensibly unconditioned), whether they are
+actual or only commanded, that is, objectively necessary in a practical
+sense. We could not hope to find this connexion in actions actually
+given in experience as events of the sensible world, since causality
+with freedom must always be sought outside the world of sense in the
+world of intelligence. But things of sense are the only things offered
+to our perception and observation. Hence, nothing remained but to find
+an incontestable objective principle of causality which excludes all
+sensible conditions: that is, a principle in which reason does not
+appeal further to something else as a determining ground of its
+causality, but contains this determining ground itself by means of that
+principle, and in which therefore it is itself as pure reason practical.
+Now, this principle had not to be searched for or discovered; it had
+long been in the reason of all men, and incorporated in their nature,
+and is the principle of morality. Therefore, that unconditioned
+causality, with the faculty of it, namely, freedom, is no longer merely
+indefinitely and problematically thought (this speculative reason could
+prove to be feasible), but is even as regards the law of its causality
+definitely and assertorially known; and with it the fact that a being (I
+myself), belonging to the world of sense, belongs also to the
+supersensible world, this is also positively known, and thus the reality
+of the supersensible world is established and in practical respects
+definitely given, and this definiteness, which for theoretical purposes
+would be transcendent, is for practical purposes immanent. We could not,
+however, make a similar step as regards the second dynamical idea,
+namely, that of a necessary being. We could not rise to it from the
+sensible world without the aid of the first dynamical idea. For if we
+attempted to do so, we should have ventured to leave at a bound all that
+is given to us, and to leap to that of which nothing is given us that
+can help us to effect the connection of such a supersensible being with
+the world of sense (since the necessary being would have to be known as
+given outside ourselves). On the other hand, it is now obvious that this
+connection is quite possible in relation to our own subject, inasmuch as
+I know myself to be on the one side as an intelligible [supersensible]
+being determined by the moral law (by means of freedom), and on the
+other side as acting in the world of sense. It is the concept of freedom
+alone that enables us to find the unconditioned and intelligible for the
+conditioned and sensible without going out of ourselves. For it is our
+own reason that by means of the supreme and unconditional practical law
+knows that itself and the being that is conscious of this law (our own
+person) belong to the pure world of understanding, and moreover defines
+the manner in which, as such, it can be active. In this way it can be
+understood why in the whole faculty of reason it is the practical reason
+only that can help us to pass beyond the world of sense and give us
+knowledge of a supersensible order and connection, which, however, for
+this very reason cannot be extended further than is necessary for pure
+practical purposes.
+
+Let me be permitted on this occasion to make one more remark,
+namely, that every step that we make with pure reason, even in the
+practical sphere where no attention is paid to subtle speculation,
+nevertheless accords with all the material points of the Critique of
+the Theoretical Reason as closely and directly as if each step had
+been thought out with deliberate purpose to establish this
+confirmation. Such a thorough agreement, wholly unsought for and quite
+obvious (as anyone can convince himself, if he will only carry moral
+inquiries up to their principles), between the most important
+proposition of practical reason and the often seemingly too subtle and
+needless remarks of the Critique of the Speculative Reason,
+occasions surprise and astonishment, and confirms the maxim already
+recognized and praised by others, namely, that in every scientific
+inquiry we should pursue our way steadily with all possible
+exactness and frankness, without caring for any objections that may be
+raised from outside its sphere, but, as far as we can, to carry out
+our inquiry truthfully and completely by itself. Frequent
+observation has convinced me that, when such researches are concluded,
+that which in one part of them appeared to me very questionable,
+considered in relation to other extraneous doctrines, when I left this
+doubtfulness out of sight for a time and only attended to the business
+in hand until it was completed, at last was unexpectedly found to
+agree perfectly with what had been discovered separately without the
+least regard to those doctrines, and without any partiality or
+prejudice for them. Authors would save themselves many errors and much
+labour lost (because spent on a delusion) if they could only resolve
+to go to work with more frankness.
+
+BOOK_2|CHAPTER_1
+
+      BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally.
+
+
+
+Pure reason always has its dialetic, whether it is considered in its
+speculative or its practical employment; for it requires the
+absolute totality of the 'conditions of what is given conditioned, and
+this can only be found in things in themselves. But as all conceptions
+of things in themselves must be referred to intuitions, and with us
+men these can never be other than sensible and hence can never
+enable us to know objects as things in themselves but only as
+appearances, and since the unconditioned can never be found in this
+chain of appearances which consists only of conditioned and
+conditions; thus from applying this rational idea of the totality of
+the conditions (in other words of the unconditioned) to appearances,
+there arises an inevitable illusion, as if these latter were things in
+themselves (for in the absence of a warning critique they are always
+regarded as such). This illusion would never be noticed as delusive if
+it did not betray itself by a conflict of reason with itself, when
+it applies to appearances its fundamental principle of presupposing
+the unconditioned to everything conditioned. By this, however,
+reason is compelled to trace this illusion to its source, and search
+how it can be removed, and this can only be done by a complete
+critical examination of the whole pure faculty of reason; so that
+the antinomy of the pure reason which is manifest in its dialectic
+is in fact the most beneficial error into which human reason could
+ever have fallen, since it at last drives us to search for the key
+to escape from this labyrinth; and when this key is found, it
+further discovers that which we did not seek but yet had need of,
+namely, a view into a higher and an immutable order of things, in
+which we even now are, and in which we are thereby enabled by definite
+precepts to continue to live according to the highest dictates of
+reason.
+
+It may be seen in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason how in its
+speculative employment this natural dialectic is to be solved, and how
+the error which arises from a very natural illusion may be guarded
+against. But reason in its practical use is not a whit better off.
+As pure practical reason, it likewise seeks to find the
+unconditioned for the practically conditioned (which rests on
+inclinations and natural wants), and this is not as the determining
+principle of the will, but even when this is given (in the moral
+law) it seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure
+practical reason under the name of the summum bonum.
+
+To define this idea practically, i.e., sufficiently for the maxims
+of our rational conduct, is the business of practical wisdom, and this
+again as a science is philosophy, in the sense in which the word was
+understood by the ancients, with whom it meant instruction in the
+conception in which the summum bonum was to be placed, and the conduct
+by which it was to be obtained. It would be well to leave this word in
+its ancient signification as a doctrine of the summum bonum, so far as
+reason endeavours to make this into a science. For on the one hand the
+restriction annexed would suit the Greek expression (which signifies
+the love of wisdom), and yet at the same time would be sufficient to
+embrace under the name of philosophy the love of science: that is to
+say, of all speculative rational knowledge, so far as it is
+serviceable to reason, both for that conception and also for the
+practical principle determining our conduct, without letting out of
+sight the main end, on account of which alone it can be called a
+doctrine of practical wisdom. On the other hand, it would be no harm
+to deter the self-conceit of one who ventures to claim the title of
+philosopher by holding before him in the very definition a standard of
+self-estimation which would very much lower his pretensions. For a
+teacher of wisdom would mean something more than a scholar who has not
+come so far as to guide himself, much less to guide others, with
+certain expectation of attaining so high an end: it would mean a
+master in the knowledge of wisdom, which implies more than a modest
+man would claim for himself. Thus philosophy as well as wisdom would
+always remain an ideal, which objectively is presented complete in
+reason alone, while subjectively for the person it is only the goal of
+his unceasing endeavours; and no one would be justified in
+professing to be in possession of it so as to assume the name of
+philosopher who could not also show its infallible effects in his
+own person as an example (in his self-mastery and the unquestioned
+interest that he takes pre-eminently in the general good), and this
+the ancients also required as a condition of deserving that honourable
+title.
+
+                                           {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 5}
+
+We have another preliminary remark to make respecting the
+dialectic of the pure practical reason, on the point of the definition
+of the summum bonum (a successful solution of which dialectic would
+lead us to expect, as in case of that of the theoretical reason, the
+most beneficial effects, inasmuch as the self-contradictions of pure
+practical reason honestly stated, and not concealed, force us to
+undertake a complete critique of this faculty).
+
+The moral law is the sole determining principle of a pure will.
+But since this is merely formal (viz., as prescribing only the form of
+the maxim as universally legislative), it abstracts as a determining
+principle from all matter that is to say, from every object of
+volition. Hence, though the summum bonum may be the whole object of
+a pure practical reason, i.e., a pure will, yet it is not on that
+account to be regarded as its determining principle; and the moral law
+alone must be regarded as the principle on which that and its
+realization or promotion are aimed at. This remark is important in
+so delicate a case as the determination of moral principles, where the
+slightest misinterpretation perverts men's minds. For it will have
+been seen from the Analytic that, if we assume any object under the
+name of a good as a determining principle of the will prior to the
+moral law and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle,
+this would always introduce heteronomy and crush out the moral
+principle.
+
+It is, however, evident that if the notion of the summum bonum
+includes that of the moral law as its supreme condition, then the
+summum bonum would not merely be an object, but the notion of it and
+the conception of its existence as possible by our own practical
+reason would likewise be the determining principle of the will,
+since in that case the will is in fact determined by the moral law
+which is already included in this conception, and by no other
+object, as the principle of autonomy requires. This order of the
+conceptions of determination of the will must not be lost sight of, as
+otherwise we should misunderstand ourselves and think we had fallen
+into a contradiction, while everything remains in perfect harmony.
+
+BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2
+
+  CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the
+
+            Conception of the "Summum Bonum".
+
+
+
+The conception of the summum itself contains an ambiguity which
+might occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it. The
+summum may mean either the supreme (supremum) or the perfect
+(consummatum). The former is that condition which is itself
+unconditioned, i.e., is not subordinate to any other (originarium);
+the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the
+same kind (perfectissimum). It has been shown in the Analytic that
+virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of all
+that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our pursuit
+of happiness, and is therefore the supreme good. But it does not
+follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the
+desires of rational finite beings; for this requires happiness also,
+and that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes
+himself an end, but even in the judgement of an impartial reason,
+which regards persons in general as ends in themselves. For to need
+happiness, to deserve it, and yet at the same time not to
+participate in it, cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a
+rational being possessed at the same time of all power, if, for the
+sake of experiment, we conceive such a being. Now inasmuch as virtue
+and happiness together constitute the possession of the summum bonum
+in a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion
+to morality (which is the worth of the person, and his worthiness to
+be happy) constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world; hence this
+summum bonum expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which, however,
+virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has no
+condition above it; whereas happiness, while it is pleasant to the
+possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good,
+but always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition.
+
+When two elements are necessarily united in one concept, they must
+be connected as reason and consequence, and this either so that
+their unity is considered as analytical (logical connection), or as
+synthetical (real connection) the former following the law of
+identity, the latter that of causality. The connection of virtue and
+happiness may therefore be understood in two ways: either the
+endeavour to be virtuous and the rational pursuit of happiness are not
+two distinct actions, but absolutely identical, in which case no maxim
+need be made the principle of the former, other than what serves for
+the latter; or the connection consists in this, that virtue produces
+happiness as something distinct from the consciousness of virtue, as a
+cause produces an effect.
+
+The ancient Greek schools were, properly speaking, only two, and
+in determining the conception of the summum bonum these followed in
+fact one and the same method, inasmuch as they did not allow virtue
+and happiness to be regarded as two distinct elements of the summum
+bonum, and consequently sought the unity of the principle by the
+rule of identity; but they differed as to which of the two was to be
+taken as the fundamental notion. The Epicurean said: "To be
+conscious that one's maxims lead to happiness is virtue"; the Stoic
+said: "To be conscious of one's virtue is happiness." With the former,
+Prudence was equivalent to morality; with the latter, who chose a
+higher designation for virtue, morality alone was true wisdom.
+
+While we must admire the men who in such early times tried all
+imaginable ways of extending the domain of philosophy, we must at
+the same time lament that their acuteness was unfortunately misapplied
+in trying to trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous
+notions, those of happiness and virtue. But it agrees with the
+dialectical spirit of their times (and subtle minds are even now
+sometimes misled in the same way) to get rid of irreconcilable
+differences in principle by seeking to change them into a mere contest
+about words, and thus apparently working out the identity of the
+notion under different names, and this usually occurs in cases where
+the combination of heterogeneous principles lies so deep or so high,
+or would require so complete a transformation of the doctrines assumed
+in the rest of the philosophical system, that men are afraid to
+penetrate deeply into the real difference and prefer treating it as
+a difference in questions of form.
+
+                                           {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 5}
+
+While both schools sought to trace out the identity of the practical
+principles of virtue and happiness, they were not agreed as to the way
+in which they tried to force this identity, but were separated
+infinitely from one another, the one placing its principle on the side
+of sense, the other on that of reason; the one in the consciousness of
+sensible wants, the other in the independence of practical reason on
+all sensible grounds of determination. According to the Epicurean, the
+notion of virtue was already involved in the maxim: "To promote
+one's own happiness"; according to the Stoics, on the other hand,
+the feeling of happiness was already contained in the consciousness of
+virtue. Now whatever is contained in another notion is identical
+with part of the containing notion, but not with the whole, and
+moreover two wholes may be specifically distinct, although they
+consist of the same parts; namely if the parts are united into a whole
+in totally different ways. The Stoic maintained that the virtue was
+the whole summum bonum, and happiness only the consciousness of
+possessing it, as making part of the state of the subject. The
+Epicurean maintained that happiness was the whole summum bonum, and
+virtue only the form of the maxim for its pursuit; viz., the
+rational use of the means for attaining it.
+
+Now it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and
+those of private happiness are quite heterogeneous as to their supreme
+practical principle, and, although they belong to one summum bonum
+which together they make possible, yet they are so far from coinciding
+that they restrict and check one another very much in the same
+subject. Thus the question: "How is the summum bonum practically
+possible?" still remains an unsolved problem, notwithstanding all
+the attempts at coalition that have hitherto been made. The Analytic
+has, however, shown what it is that makes the problem difficult to
+solve; namely, that happiness and morality are two specifically
+distinct elements of the summum bonum and, therefore, their
+combination cannot be analytically cognised (as if the man that
+seeks his own happiness should find by mere analysis of his conception
+that in so acting he is virtuous, or as if the man that follows virtue
+should in the consciousness of such conduct find that he is already
+happy ipso facto), but must be a synthesis of concepts. Now since this
+combination is recognised as a priori, and therefore as practically
+necessary, and consequently not as derived from experience, so that
+the possibility of the summum bonum does not rest on any empirical
+principle, it follows that the deduction [legitimation] of this
+concept must be transcendental. It is a priori (morally) necessary
+to produce the summum bonum by freedom of will: therefore the
+condition of its possibility must rest solely on a priori principles
+of cognition.
+
+
+
+        I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 10}
+
+In the summum bonum which is practical for us, i.e., to be
+realized by our will, virtue and happiness are thought as
+necessarily combined, so that the one cannot be assumed by pure
+practical reason without the other also being attached to it. Now this
+combination (like every other) is either analytical or synthetical. It
+has been shown that it cannot be analytical; it must then be
+synthetical and, more particularly, must be conceived as the
+connection of cause and effect, since it concerns a practical good,
+i.e., one that is possible by means of action; consequently either the
+desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the
+maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is
+absolutely impossible, because (as was proved in the Analytic)
+maxims which place the determining principle of the will in the desire
+of personal happiness are not moral at all, and no virtue can be
+founded on them. But the second is also impossible, because the
+practical connection of causes and effects in the world, as the result
+of the determination of the will, does not depend upon the moral
+dispositions of the will, but on the knowledge of the laws of nature
+and the physical power to use them for one's purposes; consequently we
+cannot expect in the world by the most punctilious observance of the
+moral laws any necessary connection of happiness with virtue
+adequate to the summum bonum. Now, as the promotion of this summum
+bonum, the conception of which contains this connection, is a priori a
+necessary object of our will and inseparably attached to the moral
+law, the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the
+latter. If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules,
+then the moral law also which commands us to promote it is directed to
+vain imaginary ends and must consequently be false.
+
+
+
+ II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+The antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar
+conflict between freedom and physical necessity in the causality of
+events in the world. It was solved by showing that there is no real
+contradiction when the events and even the world in which they occur
+are regarded (as they ought to be) merely as appearances; since one
+and the same acting being, as an appearance (even to his own inner
+sense), has a causality in the world of sense that always conforms
+to the mechanism of nature, but with respect to the same events, so
+far as the acting person regards himself at the same time as a
+noumenon (as pure intelligence in an existence not dependent on the
+condition of time), he can contain a principle by which that causality
+acting according to laws of nature is determined, but which is
+itself free from all laws of nature.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 15}
+
+It is just the same with the foregoing antinomy of pure practical
+reason. The first of the two propositions, "That the endeavour after
+happiness produces a virtuous mind," is absolutely false; but the
+second, "That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness," is
+not absolutely false, but only in so far as virtue is considered as
+a form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently only if
+I suppose existence in it to be the only sort of existence of a
+rational being; it is then only conditionally false. But as I am not
+only justified in thinking that I exist also as a noumenon in a
+world of the understanding, but even have in the moral law a purely
+intellectual determining principle of my causality (in the sensible
+world), it is not impossible that morality of mind should have a
+connection as cause with happiness (as an effect in the sensible
+world) if not immediate yet mediate (viz., through an intelligent
+author of nature), and moreover necessary; while in a system of nature
+which is merely an object of the senses, this combination could
+never occur except contingently and, therefore, could not suffice
+for the summum bonum.
+
+Thus, notwithstanding this seeming conflict of practical reason with
+itself, the summum bonum, which is the necessary supreme end of a will
+morally determined, is a true object thereof; for it is practically
+possible, and the maxims of the will which as regards their matter
+refer to it have objective reality, which at first was threatened by
+the antinomy that appeared in the connection of morality with
+happiness by a general law; but this was merely from a
+misconception, because the relation between appearances was taken
+for a relation of the things in themselves to these appearances.
+
+When we find ourselves obliged to go so far, namely, to the
+connection with an intelligible world, to find the possibility of
+the summum bonum, which reason points out to all rational beings as
+the goal of all their moral wishes, it must seem strange that,
+nevertheless, the philosophers both of ancient and modern times have
+been able to find happiness in accurate proportion to virtue even in
+this life (in the sensible world), or have persuaded themselves that
+they were conscious thereof. For Epicurus as well as the Stoics
+extolled above everything the happiness that springs from the
+consciousness of living virtuously; and the former was not so base
+in his practical precepts as one might infer from the principles of
+his theory, which he used for explanation and not for action, or as
+they were interpreted by many who were misled by his using the term
+pleasure for contentment; on the contrary, he reckoned the most
+disinterested practice of good amongst the ways of enjoying the most
+intimate delight, and his scheme of pleasure (by which he meant
+constant cheerfulness of mind) included the moderation and control
+of the inclinations, such as the strictest moral philosopher might
+require. He differed from the Stoics chiefly in making this pleasure
+the motive, which they very rightly refused to do. For, on the one
+hand, the virtuous Epicurus, like many well-intentioned men of this
+day who do not reflect deeply enough on their principles, fell into
+the error of presupposing the virtuous disposition in the persons
+for whom he wished to provide the springs to virtue (and indeed the
+upright man cannot be happy if he is not first conscious of his
+uprightness; since with such a character the reproach that his habit
+of thought would oblige him to make against himself in case of
+transgression and his moral self-condemnation would rob him of all
+enjoyment of the pleasantness which his condition might otherwise
+contain). But the question is: How is such a disposition possible in
+the first instance, and such a habit of thought in estimating the
+worth of one's existence, since prior to it there can be in the
+subject no feeling at all for moral worth? If a man is virtuous
+without being conscious of his integrity in every action, he will
+certainly not enjoy life, however favourable fortune may be to him
+in its physical circumstances; but can we make him virtuous in the
+first instance, in other words, before he esteems the moral worth of
+his existence so highly, by praising to him the peace of mind that
+would result from the consciousness of an integrity for which he has
+no sense?
+
+On the other hand, however, there is here an occasion of a vitium
+subreptionis, and as it were of an optical illusion, in the
+self-consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one
+feels- an illusion which even the most experienced cannot altogether
+avoid. The moral disposition of mind is necessarily combined with a
+consciousness that the will is determined directly by the law. Now the
+consciousness of a determination of the faculty of desire is always
+the source of a satisfaction in the resulting action; but this
+pleasure, this satisfaction in oneself, is not the determining
+principle of the action; on the contrary, the determination of the
+will directly by reason is the source of the feeling of pleasure,
+and this remains a pure practical not sensible determination of the
+faculty of desire. Now as this determination has exactly the same
+effect within in impelling to activity, that a feeling of the pleasure
+to be expected from the desired action would have had, we easily
+look on what we ourselves do as something which we merely passively
+feel, and take the moral spring for a sensible impulse, just as it
+happens in the so-called illusion of the senses (in this case the
+inner sense). It is a sublime thing in human nature to be determined
+to actions immediately by a purely rational law; sublime even is the
+illusion that regards the subjective side of this capacity of
+intellectual determination as something sensible and the effect of a
+special sensible feeling (for an intellectual feeling would be a
+contradiction). It is also of great importance to attend to this
+property of our personality and as much as possible to cultivate the
+effect of reason on this feeling. But we must beware lest by falsely
+extolling this moral determining principle as a spring, making its
+source lie in particular feelings of pleasure (which are in fact
+only results), we degrade and disfigure the true genuine spring, the
+law itself, by putting as it were a false foil upon it. Respect, not
+pleasure or enjoyment of happiness, is something for which it is not
+possible that reason should have any antecedent feeling as its
+foundation (for this would always be sensible and pathological); and
+consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the law is by
+no means analogous to the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to
+the faculty of desire it produces the same effect, but from
+different sources: it is only by this mode of conception, however,
+that we can attain what we are seeking, namely, that actions be done
+not merely in accordance with duty (as a result of pleasant feelings),
+but from duty, which must be the true end of all moral cultivation.
+
+Have we not, however, a word which does not express enjoyment, as
+happiness does, but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence, an
+analogue of the happiness which must necessarily accompany the
+consciousness of virtue? Yes this word is self-contentment which in
+its proper signification always designates only a negative
+satisfaction in one's existence, in which one is conscious of
+needing nothing. Freedom and the consciousness of it as a faculty of
+following the moral law with unyielding resolution is independence
+of inclinations, at least as motives determining (though not as
+affecting) our desire, and so far as I am conscious of this freedom in
+following my moral maxims, it is the only source of an unaltered
+contentment which is necessarily connected with it and rests on no
+special feeling. This may be called intellectual contentment. The
+sensible contentment (improperly so-called) which rests on the
+satisfaction of the inclinations, however delicate they may be
+imagined to be, can never be adequate to the conception of it. For the
+inclinations change, they grow with the indulgence shown them, and
+always leave behind a still greater void than we had thought to
+fill. Hence they are always burdensome to a rational being, and,
+although he cannot lay them aside, they wrest from him the wish to
+be rid of them. Even an inclination to what is right (e.g., to
+beneficence), though it may much facilitate the efficacy of the
+moral maxims, cannot produce any. For in these all must be directed to
+the conception of the law as a determining principle, if the action is
+to contain morality and not merely legality. Inclination is blind
+and slavish, whether it be of a good sort or not, and, when morality
+is in question, reason must not play the part merely of guardian to
+inclination, but disregarding it altogether must attend simply to
+its own interest as pure practical reason. This very feeling of
+compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes the deliberation on the
+question of duty and becomes a determining principle, is even annoying
+to right thinking persons, brings their deliberate maxims into
+confusion, and makes them wish to be delivered from it and to be
+subject to lawgiving reason alone.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 20}
+
+From this we can understand how the consciousness of this faculty of
+a pure practical reason produces by action (virtue) a consciousness of
+mastery over one's inclinations, and therefore of independence of
+them, and consequently also of the discontent that always
+accompanies them, and thus a negative satisfaction with one's state,
+i.e., contentment, which is primarily contentment with one's own
+person. Freedom itself becomes in this way (namely, indirectly)
+capable of an enjoyment which cannot be called happiness, because it
+does not depend on the positive concurrence of a feeling, nor is it,
+strictly speaking, bliss, since it does not include complete
+independence of inclinations and wants, but it resembles bliss in so
+far as the determination of one's will at least can hold itself free
+from their influence; and thus, at least in its origin, this enjoyment
+is analogous to the self-sufficiency which we can ascribe only to
+the Supreme Being.
+
+From this solution of the antinomy of practical pure reason, it
+follows that in practical principles we may at least conceive as
+possible a natural and necessary connection between the
+consciousness of morality and the expectation of a proportionate
+happiness as its result, though it does not follow that we can know or
+perceive this connection; that, on the other hand, principles of the
+pursuit of happiness cannot possibly produce morality; that,
+therefore, morality is the supreme good (as the first condition of the
+summum bonum), while happiness constitutes its second element, but
+only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned, but necessary
+consequence of the former. Only with this subordination is the
+summum bonum the whole object of pure practical reason, which must
+necessarily conceive it as possible, since it commands us to
+contribute to the utmost of our power to its realization. But since
+the possibility of such connection of the conditioned with its
+condition belongs wholly to the supersensual relation of things and
+cannot be given according to the laws of the world of sense,
+although the practical consequences of the idea belong to the world of
+sense, namely, the actions that aim at realizing the summum bonum;
+we will therefore endeavour to set forth the grounds of that
+possibility, first, in respect of what is immediately in our power,
+and then, secondly, in that which is not in our power, but which
+reason presents to us as the supplement of our impotence, for the
+realization of the summum bonum (which by practical principles is
+necessary).
+
+
+
+  III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its
+
+         Union with the Speculative Reason.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 25}
+
+
+
+By primacy between two or more things connected by reason, I
+understand the prerogative, belonging to one, of being the first
+determining principle in the connection with all the rest. In a
+narrower practical sense it means the prerogative of the interest of
+one in so far as the interest of the other is subordinated to it,
+while it is not postponed to any other. To every faculty of the mind
+we can attribute an interest, that is, a principle, that contains
+the condition on which alone the former is called into exercise.
+Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the interest of all
+the powers of the mind and is determined by its own. The interest of
+its speculative employment consists in the cognition of the object
+pushed to the highest a priori principles: that of its practical
+employment, in the determination of the will in respect of the final
+and complete end. As to what is necessary for the possibility of any
+employment of reason at all, namely, that its principles and
+affirmations should not contradict one another, this constitutes no
+part of its interest, but is the condition of having reason at all; it
+is only its development, not mere consistency with itself, that is
+reckoned as its interest.
+
+If practical reason could not assume or think as given anything
+further than what speculative reason of itself could offer it from its
+own insight, the latter would have the primacy. But supposing that
+it had of itself original a priori principles with which certain
+theoretical positions were inseparably connected, while these were
+withdrawn from any possible insight of speculative reason (which,
+however, they must not contradict); then the question is: Which
+interest is the superior (not which must give way, for they are not
+necessarily conflicting), whether speculative reason, which knows
+nothing of all that the practical offers for its acceptance, should
+take up these propositions and (although they transcend it) try to
+unite them with its own concepts as a foreign possession handed over
+to it, or whether it is justified in obstinately following its own
+separate interest and, according to the canonic of Epicurus, rejecting
+as vain subtlety everything that cannot accredit its objective reality
+by manifest examples to be shown in experience, even though it
+should be never so much interwoven with the interest of the
+practical (pure) use of reason, and in itself not contradictory to the
+theoretical, merely because it infringes on the interest of the
+speculative reason to this extent, that it removes the bounds which
+this latter had set to itself, and gives it up to every nonsense or
+delusion of imagination?
+
+In fact, so far as practical reason is taken as dependent on
+pathological conditions, that is, as merely regulating the
+inclinations under the sensible principle of happiness, we could not
+require speculative reason to take its principles from such a
+source. Mohammed's paradise, or the absorption into the Deity of the
+theosophists and mystics would press their monstrosities on the reason
+according to the taste of each, and one might as well have no reason
+as surrender it in such fashion to all sorts of dreams. But if pure
+reason of itself can be practical and is actually so, as the
+consciousness of the moral law proves, then it is still only one and
+the same reason which, whether in a theoretical or a practical point
+of view, judges according to a priori principles; and then it is clear
+that although it is in the first point of view incompetent to
+establish certain propositions positively, which, however, do not
+contradict it, then, as soon as these propositions are inseparably
+attached to the practical interest of pure reason, it must accept
+them, though it be as something offered to it from a foreign source,
+something that has not grown on its own ground, but yet is
+sufficiently authenticated; and it must try to compare and connect
+them with everything that it has in its power as speculative reason.
+It must remember, however, that these are not additions to its
+insight, but yet are extensions of its employment in another,
+namely, a practical aspect; and this is not in the least opposed to
+its interest, which consists in the restriction of wild speculation.
+
+Thus, when pure speculative and pure practical reason are combined
+in one cognition, the latter has the primacy, provided, namely, that
+this combination is not contingent and arbitrary, but founded a priori
+on reason itself and therefore necessary. For without this
+subordination there would arise a conflict of reason with itself;
+since, if they were merely co-ordinate, the former would close its
+boundaries strictly and admit nothing from the latter into its domain,
+while the latter would extend its bounds over everything and when
+its needs required would seek to embrace the former within them. Nor
+could we reverse the order and require pure practical reason to be
+subordinate to the speculative, since all interest is ultimately
+practical, and even that of speculative reason is conditional, and
+it is only in the practical employment of reason that it is complete.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 30}
+
+
+
+   IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of
+
+                Pure Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+The realization of the summum bonum in the world is the necessary
+object of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this will the
+perfect accordance of the mind with the moral law is the supreme
+condition of the summum bonum. This then must be possible, as well
+as its object, since it is contained in the command to promote the
+latter. Now, the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law
+is holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible
+world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since,
+nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only
+be found in a progress in infinitum towards that perfect accordance,
+and on the principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to
+assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 35}
+
+Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an
+endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational
+being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum,
+then, practically is only possible on the supposition of the
+immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality, being
+inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure
+practical reason (by which I mean a theoretical proposition, not
+demonstrable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an
+unconditional a priori practical law.
+
+This principle of the moral destination of our nature, namely,
+that it is only in an endless progress that we can attain perfect
+accordance with the moral law, is of the greatest use, not merely
+for the present purpose of supplementing the impotence of
+speculative reason, but also with respect to religion. In default of
+it, either the moral law is quite degraded from its holiness, being
+made out to be indulgent and conformable to our convenience, or else
+men strain their notions of their vocation and their expectation to an
+unattainable goal, hoping to acquire complete holiness of will, and so
+they lose themselves in fanatical theosophic dreams, which wholly
+contradict self-knowledge. In both cases the unceasing effort to
+obey punctually and thoroughly a strict and inflexible command of
+reason, which yet is not ideal but real, is only hindered. For a
+rational but finite being, the only thing possible is an endless
+progress from the lower to higher degrees of moral perfection. The
+Infinite Being, to whom the condition of time is nothing, sees in this
+to us endless succession a whole of accordance with the moral law; and
+the holiness which his command inexorably requires, in order to be
+true to his justice in the share which He assigns to each in the
+summum bonum, is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of the
+whole existence of rational beings. All that can be expected of the
+creature in respect of the hope of this participation would be the
+consciousness of his tried character, by which from the progress he
+has hitherto made from the worse to the morally better, and the
+immutability of purpose which has thus become known to him, he may
+hope for a further unbroken continuance of the same, however long
+his existence may last, even beyond this life, * and thus he may
+hope, not indeed here, nor in any imaginable point of his future
+existence, but only in the endlessness of his duration (which God
+alone can survey) to be perfectly adequate to his will (without
+indulgence or excuse, which do not harmonize with justice).
+
+
+
+* It seems, nevertheless, impossible for a creature to have the
+conviction of his unwavering firmness of mind in the progress
+towards goodness. On this account the Christian religion makes it come
+only from the same Spirit that works sanctification, that is, this
+firm purpose, and with it the consciousness of steadfastness in the
+moral progress. But naturally one who is conscious that he has
+persevered through a long portion of his life up to the end in the
+progress to the better, and this genuine moral motives, may well
+have the comforting hope, though not the certainty, that even in an
+existence prolonged beyond this life he will continue in these
+principles; and although he is never justified here in his own eyes,
+nor can ever hope to be so in the increased perfection of his
+nature, to which he looks forward, together with an increase of
+duties, nevertheless in this progress which, though it is directed
+to a goal infinitely remote, yet is in God's sight regarded as
+equivalent to possession, he may have a prospect of a blessed
+future; for this is the word that reason employs to designate
+perfect well-being independent of all contingent causes of the
+world, and which, like holiness, is an idea that can be contained only
+in an endless progress and its totality, and consequently is never
+fully attained by a creature.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 40}
+
+V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+In the foregoing analysis the moral law led to a practical problem
+which is prescribed by pure reason alone, without the aid of any
+sensible motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the
+first and principle element of the summum bonum, viz., morality;
+and, as this can be perfectly solved only in eternity, to the
+postulate of immortality. The same law must also lead us to affirm the
+possibility of the second element of the summum bonum, viz., happiness
+proportioned to that morality, and this on grounds as disinterested as
+before, and solely from impartial reason; that is, it must lead to the
+supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect; in
+other words, it must postulate the existence of God, as the
+necessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum (an
+object of the will which is necessarily connected with the moral
+legislation of pure reason). We proceed to exhibit this connection
+in a convincing manner.
+
+Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world with
+whom everything goes according to his wish and will; it rests,
+therefore, on the harmony of physical nature with his whole end and
+likewise with the essential determining principle of his will. Now the
+moral law as a law of freedom commands by determining principles,
+which ought to be quite independent of nature and of its harmony
+with our faculty of desire (as springs). But the acting rational being
+in the world is not the cause of the world and of nature itself. There
+is not the least ground, therefore, in the moral law for a necessary
+connection between morality and proportionate happiness in a being
+that belongs to the world as part of it, and therefore dependent on
+it, and which for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this
+nature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly harmonize, as far as
+his happiness is concerned, with his practical principles.
+Nevertheless, in the practical problem of pure reason, i.e., the
+necessary pursuit of the summum bonum, such a connection is postulated
+as necessary: we ought to endeavour to promote the summum bonum,
+which, therefore, must be possible. Accordingly, the existence of a
+cause of all nature, distinct from nature itself and containing the
+principle of this connection, namely, of the exact harmony of
+happiness with morality, is also postulated. Now this supreme cause
+must contain the principle of the harmony of nature, not merely with a
+law of the will of rational beings, but with the conception of this
+law, in so far as they make it the supreme determining principle of
+the will, and consequently not merely with the form of morals, but
+with their morality as their motive, that is, with their moral
+character. Therefore, the summum bonum is possible in the world only
+on the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality corresponding
+to moral character. Now a being that is capable of acting on the
+conception of laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the
+causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is
+his will; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be
+presupposed as a condition of the summum bonum is a being which is the
+cause of nature by intelligence and will, consequently its author,
+that is God. It follows that the postulate of the possibility of the
+highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the
+reality of a highest original good, that is to say, of the existence
+of God. Now it was seen to be a duty for us to promote the summum
+bonum; consequently it is not merely allowable, but it is a
+necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should
+presuppose the possibility of this summum bonum; and as this is
+possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably
+connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally
+necessary to assume the existence of God.
+
+It must be remarked here that this moral necessity is subjective,
+that is, it is a want, and not objective, that is, itself a duty,
+for there cannot be a duty to suppose the existence of anything (since
+this concerns only the theoretical employment of reason). Moreover, it
+is not meant by this that it is necessary to suppose the existence
+of God as a basis of all obligation in general (for this rests, as has
+been sufficiently proved, simply on the autonomy of reason itself).
+What belongs to duty here is only the endeavour to realize and promote
+the summum bonum in the world, the possibility of which can
+therefore be postulated; and as our reason finds it not conceivable
+except on the supposition of a supreme intelligence, the admission
+of this existence is therefore connected with the consciousness of our
+duty, although the admission itself belongs to the domain of
+speculative reason. Considered in respect of this alone, as a
+principle of explanation, it may be called a hypothesis, but in
+reference to the intelligibility of an object given us by the moral
+law (the summum bonum), and consequently of a requirement for
+practical purposes, it may be called faith, that is to say a pure
+rational faith, since pure reason (both in its theoretical and
+practical use) is the sole source from which it springs.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 45}
+
+From this deduction it is now intelligible why the Greek schools
+could never attain the solution of their problem of the practical
+possibility of the summum bonum, because they made the rule of the use
+which the will of man makes of his freedom the sole and sufficient
+ground of this possibility, thinking that they had no need for that
+purpose of the existence of God. No doubt they were so far right
+that they established the principle of morals of itself
+independently of this postulate, from the relation of reason only to
+the will, and consequently made it the supreme practical condition
+of the summum bonum; but it was not therefore the whole condition of
+its possibility. The Epicureans had indeed assumed as the supreme
+principle of morality a wholly false one, namely that of happiness,
+and had substituted for a law a maxim of arbitrary choice according to
+every man's inclination; they proceeded, however, consistently
+enough in this, that they degraded their summum bonum likewise, just
+in proportion to the meanness of their fundamental principle, and
+looked for no greater happiness than can be attained by human prudence
+(including temperance and moderation of the inclinations), and this as
+we know would be scanty enough and would be very different according
+to circumstances; not to mention the exceptions that their maxims must
+perpetually admit and which make them incapable of being laws. The
+Stoics, on the contrary, had chosen their supreme practical
+principle quite rightly, making virtue the condition of the summum
+bonum; but when they represented the degree of virtue required by
+its pure law as fully attainable in this life, they not only
+strained the moral powers of the man whom they called the wise
+beyond all the limits of his nature, and assumed a thing that
+contradicts all our knowledge of men, but also and principally they
+would not allow the second element of the summum bonum, namely,
+happiness, to be properly a special object of human desire, but made
+their wise man, like a divinity in his consciousness of the excellence
+of his person, wholly independent of nature (as regards his own
+contentment); they exposed him indeed to the evils of life, but made
+him not subject to them (at the same time representing him also as
+free from moral evil). They thus, in fact, left out the second element
+of the summum bonum namely, personal happiness, placing it solely in
+action and satisfaction with one's own personal worth, thus
+including it in the consciousness of being morally minded, in which
+they Might have been sufficiently refuted by the voice of their own
+nature.
+
+The doctrine of Christianity, * even if we do not yet consider it
+as a religious doctrine, gives, touching this point, a conception of
+the summum bonum (the kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the
+strictest demand of practical reason. The moral law is holy
+(unyielding) and demands holiness of morals, although all the moral
+perfection to which man can attain is still only virtue, that is, a
+rightful disposition arising from respect for the law, implying
+consciousness of a constant propensity to transgression, or at least a
+want of purity, that is, a mixture of many spurious (not moral)
+motives of obedience to the law, consequently a self-esteem combined
+with humility. In respect, then, of the holiness which the Christian
+law requires, this leaves the creature nothing but a progress in
+infinitum, but for that very reason it justifies him in hoping for
+an endless duration of his existence. The worth of a character
+perfectly accordant with the moral law is infinite, since the only
+restriction on all possible happiness in the judgement of a wise and
+all powerful distributor of it is the absence of conformity of
+rational beings to their duty. But the moral law of itself does not
+promise any happiness, for according to our conceptions of an order of
+nature in general, this is not necessarily connected with obedience to
+the law. Now Christian morality supplies this defect (of the second
+indispensable element of the summum bonum) by representing the world
+in which rational beings devote themselves with all their soul to
+the moral law, as a kingdom of God, in which nature and morality are
+brought into a harmony foreign to each of itself, by a holy Author who
+makes the derived summum bonum possible. Holiness of life is
+prescribed to them as a rule even in this life, while the welfare
+proportioned to it, namely, bliss, is represented as attainable only
+in an eternity; because the former must always be the pattern of their
+conduct in every state, and progress towards it is already possible
+and necessary in this life; while the latter, under the name of
+happiness, cannot be attained at all in this world (so far as our
+own power is concerned), and therefore is made simply an object of
+hope. Nevertheless, the Christian principle of morality itself is
+not theological (so as to be heteronomy), but is autonomy of pure
+practical reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and
+His will the foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of
+the summum bonum, on condition of following these laws, and it does
+not even place the proper spring of this obedience in the desired
+results, but solely in the conception of duty, as that of which the
+faithful observance alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain those
+happy consequences.
+
+
+
+* It is commonly held that the Christian precept of morality has no
+advantage in respect of purity over the moral conceptions of the
+Stoics; the distinction between them is, however, very obvious. The
+Stoic system made the consciousness of strength of mind the pivot on
+which all moral dispositions should turn; and although its disciples
+spoke of duties and even defined them very well, yet they placed the
+spring and proper determining principle of the will in an elevation of
+the mind above the lower springs of the senses, which owe their
+power only to weakness of mind. With them therefore, virtue was a sort
+of heroism in the wise man raising himself above the animal nature
+of man, is sufficient for Himself, and, while he prescribes duties
+to others, is himself raised above them, and is not subject to any
+temptation to transgress the moral law. All this, however, they
+could not have done if they had conceived this law in all its purity
+and strictness, as the precept of the Gospel does. When I give the
+name idea to a perfection to which nothing adequate can be given in
+experience, it does not follow that the moral ideas are thing
+transcendent, that is something of which we could not even determine
+the concept adequately, or of which it is uncertain whether there is
+any object corresponding to it at all, as is the case with the ideas
+of speculative reason; on the contrary, being types of practical
+perfection, they serve as the indispensable rule of conduct and
+likewise as the standard of comparison. Now if I consider Christian
+morals on their philosophical side, then compared with the ideas of
+the Greek schools, they would appear as follows: the ideas of the
+Cynics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Christians are: simplicity
+of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness. In respect of the way of
+attaining them, the Greek schools were distinguished from one
+another thus that the Cynics only required common sense, the others
+the path of science, but both found the mere use of natural powers
+sufficient for the purpose. Christian morality, because its precept is
+framed (as a moral precept must be) so pure and unyielding, takes from
+man all confidence that he can be fully adequate to it, at least in
+this life, but again sets it up by enabling us to hope that if we
+act as well as it is in our power to do, then what is not in our power
+will come in to our aid from another source, whether we know how
+this may be or not. Aristotle and Plato differed only as to the origin
+of our moral conceptions.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 50}
+
+In this manner, the moral laws lead through the conception of the
+summum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to
+religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine
+commands, not as sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of
+a foreign and contingent in themselves, but as essential laws of every
+free will in itself, which, nevertheless, must be regarded as commands
+of the Supreme Being, because it is only from a morally perfect
+(holy and good) and at the same time all-powerful will, and
+consequently only through harmony with this will, that we can hope
+to attain the summum bonum which the moral law makes it our duty to
+take as the object of our endeavours. Here again, then, all remains
+disinterested and founded merely on duty; neither fear nor hope
+being made the fundamental springs, which if taken as principles would
+destroy the whole moral worth of actions. The moral law commands me to
+make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all
+my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the
+harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the world;
+and although the conception of the summum bonum as a whole, in which
+the greatest happiness is conceived as combined in the most exact
+proportion with the highest degree of moral perfection (possible in
+creatures), includes my own happiness, yet it is not this that is
+the determining principle of the will which is enjoined to promote the
+summum bonum, but the moral law, which, on the contrary, limits by
+strict conditions my unbounded desire of happiness.
+
+Hence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should
+make ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. It
+is only when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of
+participating some day in happiness in proportion as we have
+endeavoured to be not unworthy of it.
+
+A man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of
+it is in harmony with the summum bonum. We can now easily see that all
+worthiness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the
+summum bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest (which belongs
+to one's state), namely, the participation of happiness. Now it
+follows from this that morality should never be treated as a
+doctrine of happiness, that is, an instruction how to become happy;
+for it has to do simply with the rational condition (conditio sine qua
+non) of happiness, not with the means of attaining it. But when
+morality has been completely expounded (which merely imposes duties
+instead of providing rules for selfish desires), then first, after the
+moral desire to promote the summum bonum (to bring the kingdom of
+God to us) has been awakened, a desire founded on a law, and which
+could not previously arise in any selfish mind, and when for the
+behoof of this desire the step to religion has been taken, then this
+ethical doctrine may be also called a doctrine of happiness because
+the hope of happiness first begins with religion only.
+
+We can also see from this that, when we ask what is God's ultimate
+end in creating the world, we must not name the happiness of the
+rational beings in it, but the summum bonum, which adds a further
+condition to that wish of such beings, namely, the condition of
+being worthy of happiness, that is, the morality of these same
+rational beings, a condition which alone contains the rule by which
+only they can hope to share in the former at the hand of a wise
+Author. For as wisdom, theoretically considered, signifies the
+knowledge of the summum bonum and, practically, the accordance of
+the will with the summum bonum, we cannot attribute to a supreme
+independent wisdom an end based merely on goodness. For we cannot
+conceive the action of this goodness (in respect of the happiness of
+rational beings) as suitable to the highest original good, except
+under the restrictive conditions of harmony with the holiness * of
+his will. Therefore, those who placed the end of creation in the glory
+of God (provided that this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a
+desire to be praised) have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For
+nothing glorifies God more than that which is the most estimable thing
+in the world, respect for his command, the observance of the holy duty
+that his law imposes on us, when there is added thereto his glorious
+plan of crowning such a beautiful order of things with corresponding
+happiness. If the latter (to speak humanly) makes Him worthy of
+love, by the former He is an object of adoration. Even men can never
+acquire respect by benevolence alone, though they may gain love, so
+that the greatest beneficence only procures them honour when it is
+regulated by worthiness.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 55}
+
+* In order to make these characteristics of these conceptions
+clear, I add the remark that whilst we ascribe to God various
+attributes, the quality of which we also find applicable to creatures,
+only that in Him they are raised to the highest degree, e.g., power,
+knowledge, presence, goodness, etc., under the designations of
+omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, etc., there are three that are
+ascribed to God exclusively, and yet without the addition of
+greatness, and which are all moral He is the only holy, the only
+blessed, the only wise, because these conceptions already imply the
+absence of limitation. In the order of these attributes He is also the
+holy lawgiver (and creator), the good governor (and preserver) and the
+just judge, three attributes which include everything by which God
+is the object of religion, and in conformity with which the
+metaphysical perfections are added of themselves in the reason.
+
+
+
+That in the order of ends, man (and with him every rational being)
+is an end in himself, that is, that he can never be used merely as a
+means by any (not even by God) without being at the same time an end
+also himself, that therefore humanity in our person must be holy to
+ourselves, this follows now of itself because he is the subject of the
+moral law, in other words, of that which is holy in itself, and on
+account of which and in agreement with which alone can anything be
+termed holy. For this moral law is founded on the autonomy of his
+will, as a free will which by its universal laws must necessarily be
+able to agree with that to which it is to submit itself.
+
+
+
+  VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason Generally.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 60}
+
+
+
+They all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a
+postulate but a law, by which reason determines the will directly,
+which will, because it is so determined as a pure will, requires these
+necessary conditions of obedience to its precept. These postulates are
+not theoretical dogmas but, suppositions practically necessary;
+while then they do [not] extend our speculative knowledge, they give
+objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by
+means of their reference to what is practical), and give it a right to
+concepts, the possibility even of which it could not otherwise venture
+to affirm.
+
+These postulates are those of immortality, freedom positively
+considered (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the
+intelligible world), and the existence of God. The first results
+from the practically necessary condition of a duration adequate to the
+complete fulfilment of the moral law; the second from the necessary
+supposition of independence of the sensible world, and of the
+faculty of determining one's will according to the law of an
+intelligible world, that is, of freedom; the third from the
+necessary condition of the existence of the summum bonum in such an
+intelligible world, by the supposition of the supreme independent
+good, that is, the existence of God.
+
+Thus the fact that respect for the moral law necessarily makes the
+summum bonum an object of our endeavours, and the supposition thence
+resulting of its objective reality, lead through the postulates of
+practical reason to conceptions which speculative reason might
+indeed present as problems, but could never solve. Thus it leads: 1.
+To that one in the solution of which the latter could do nothing but
+commit paralogisms (namely, that of immortality), because it could not
+lay hold of the character of permanence, by which to complete the
+psychological conception of an ultimate subject necessarily ascribed
+to the soul in self-consciousness, so as to make it the real
+conception of a substance, a character which practical reason
+furnishes by the postulate of a duration required for accordance
+with the moral law in the summum bonum, which is the whole end of
+practical reason. 2. It leads to that of which speculative reason
+contained nothing but antinomy, the solution of which it could only
+found on a notion problematically conceivable indeed, but whose
+objective reality it could not prove or determine, namely, the
+cosmological idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of
+our existence in it, by means of the postulate of freedom (the reality
+of which it lays down by virtue of the moral law), and with it
+likewise the law of an intelligible world, to which speculative reason
+could only point, but could not define its conception. 3. What
+speculative reason was able to think, but was obliged to leave
+undetermined as a mere transcendental ideal, viz., the theological
+conception of the first Being, to this it gives significance (in a
+practical view, that is, as a condition of the possibility of the
+object of a will determined by that law), namely, as the supreme
+principle of the summum bonum in an intelligible world, by means of
+moral legislation in it invested with sovereign power.
+
+Is our knowledge, however, actually extended in this way by pure
+practical reason, and is that immanent in practical reason which for
+the speculative was only transcendent? Certainly, but only in a
+practical point of view. For we do not thereby take knowledge of the
+nature of our souls, nor of the intelligible world, nor of the Supreme
+Being, with respect to what they are in themselves, but we have merely
+combined the conceptions of them in the practical concept of the
+summum bonum as the object of our will, and this altogether a
+priori, but only by means of the moral law, and merely in reference to
+it, in respect of the object which it commands. But how freedom is
+possible, and how we are to conceive this kind of causality
+theoretically and positively, is not thereby discovered; but only that
+there is such a causality is postulated by the moral law and in its
+behoof. It is the same with the remaining ideas, the possibility of
+which no human intelligence will ever fathom, but the truth of
+which, on the other hand, no sophistry will ever wrest from the
+conviction even of the commonest man.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 65}
+
+
+
+VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure
+
+     Reason in a Practical point of view, without its
+
+        Knowledge as Speculative being enlarged at
+
+                    the same time?
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 70}
+
+
+
+In order not to be too abstract, we will answer this question at
+once in its application to the present case. In order to extend a pure
+cognition practically, there must be an a priori purpose given, that
+is, an end as object (of the will), which independently of all
+theological principle is presented as practically necessary by an
+imperative which determines the will directly (a categorical
+imperative), and in this case that is the summum bonum. This, however,
+is not possible without presupposing three theoretical conceptions
+(for which, because they are mere conceptions of pure reason, no
+corresponding intuition can be found, nor consequently by the path
+of theory any objective reality); namely, freedom, immortality, and
+God. Thus by the practical law which commands the existence of the
+highest good possible in a world, the possibility of those objects
+of pure speculative reason is postulated, and the objective reality
+which the latter could not assure them. By this the theoretical
+knowledge of pure reason does indeed obtain an accession; but it
+consists only in this, that those concepts which otherwise it had to
+look upon as problematical (merely thinkable) concepts, are now
+shown assertorially to be such as actually have objects; because
+practical reason indispensably requires their existence for the
+possibility of its object, the summum bonum, which practically is
+absolutely necessary, and this justifies theoretical reason in
+assuming them. But this extension of theoretical reason is no
+extension of speculative, that is, we cannot make any positive use
+of it in a theoretical point of view. For as nothing is accomplished
+in this by practical reason, further than that these concepts are real
+and actually have their (possible) objects, and nothing in the way
+of intuition of them is given thereby (which indeed could not be
+demanded), hence the admission of this reality does not render any
+synthetical proposition possible. Consequently, this discovery does
+not in the least help us to extend this knowledge of ours in a
+speculative point of view, although it does in respect of the
+practical employment of pure reason. The above three ideas of
+speculative reason are still in themselves not cognitions; they are
+however (transcendent) thoughts, in which there is nothing impossible.
+Now, by help of an apodeictic practical law, being necessary
+conditions of that which it commands to be made an object, they
+acquire objective reality; that is, we learn from it that they have
+objects, without being able to point out how the conception of them is
+related to an object, and this, too, is still not a cognition of these
+objects; for we cannot thereby form any synthetical judgement about
+them, nor determine their application theoretically; consequently,
+we can make no theoretical rational use of them at all, in which use
+all speculative knowledge of reason consists. Nevertheless, the
+theoretical knowledge, not indeed of these objects, but of reason
+generally, is so far enlarged by this, that by the practical
+postulates objects were given to those ideas, a merely problematical
+thought having by this means first acquired objective reality. There
+is therefore no extension of the knowledge of given supersensible
+objects, but an extension of theoretical reason and of its knowledge
+in respect of the supersensible generally; inasmuch as it is compelled
+to admit that there are such objects, although it is not able to
+define them more closely, so as itself to extend this knowledge of the
+objects (which have now been given it on practical grounds, and only
+for practical use). For this accession, then, pure theoretical reason,
+for which all those ideas are transcendent and without object, has
+simply to thank its practical faculty. In this they become immanent
+and constitutive, being the source of the possibility of realizing the
+necessary object of pure practical reason (the summum bonum);
+whereas apart from this they are transcendent, and merely regulative
+principles of speculative reason, which do not require it to assume
+a new object beyond experience, but only to bring its use in
+experience nearer to completeness. But when once reason is in
+possession of this accession, it will go to work with these ideas as
+speculative reason (properly only to assure the certainty of its
+practical use) in a negative manner: that is, not extending but
+clearing up its knowledge so as on one side to keep off
+anthropomorphism, as the source of superstition, or seeming
+extension of these conceptions by supposed experience; and on the
+other side fanaticism, which promises the same by means of
+supersensible intuition or feelings of the like kind. All these are
+hindrances to the practical use of pure reason, so that the removal of
+them may certainly be considered an extension of our knowledge in a
+practical point of view, without contradicting the admission that
+for speculative purposes reason has not in the least gained by this.
+
+Every employment of reason in respect of an object requires pure
+concepts of the understanding (categories), without which no object
+can be conceived. These can be applied to the theoretical employment
+of reason, i.e., to that kind of knowledge, only in case an
+intuition (which is always sensible) is taken as a basis, and
+therefore merely in order to conceive by means of- them an object of
+possible experience. Now here what have to be thought by means of
+the categories in order to be known are ideas of reason, which
+cannot be given in any experience. Only we are not here concerned with
+the theoretical knowledge of the objects of these ideas, but only with
+this, whether they have objects at all. This reality is supplied by
+pure practical reason, and theoretical reason has nothing further to
+do in this but to think those objects by means of categories. This, as
+we have elsewhere clearly shown, can be done well enough without
+needing any intuition (either sensible or supersensible) because the
+categories have their seat and origin in the pure understanding,
+simply as the faculty of thought, before and independently of any
+intuition, and they always only signify an object in general, no
+matter in what way it may be given to us. Now when the categories
+are to be applied to these ideas, it is not possible to give them
+any object in intuition; but that such an object actually exists,
+and consequently that the category as a mere form of thought is here
+not empty but has significance, this is sufficiently assured them by
+an object which practical reason presents beyond doubt in the
+concept of the summum bonum, the reality of the conceptions which
+are required for the possibility of the summum bonum; without,
+however, effecting by this accession the least extension of our
+knowledge on theoretical principles.
+
+
+
+When these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the kingdom of
+God), and of immortality are further determined by predicates taken
+from our own nature, we must not regard this determination as a
+sensualizing of those pure rational ideas (anthropomorphism), nor as a
+transcendent knowledge of supersensible objects; for these
+predicates are no others than understanding and will, considered too
+in the relation to each other in which they must be conceived in the
+moral law, and therefore, only so far as a pure practical use is
+made of them. As to all the rest that belongs to these conceptions
+psychologically, that is, so far as we observe these faculties of ours
+empirically in their exercise (e.g., that the understanding of man
+is discursive, and its notions therefore not intuitions but
+thoughts, that these follow one another in time, that his will has its
+satisfaction always dependent on the existence of its object, etc.,
+which cannot be the case in the Supreme Being), from all this we
+abstract in that case, and then there remains of the notions by
+which we conceive a pure intelligence nothing more than just what is
+required for the possibility of conceiving a moral law. There is
+then a knowledge of God indeed, but only for practical purposes,
+and, if we attempt to extend it to a theoretical knowledge, we find an
+understanding that has intuitions, not thoughts, a will that is
+directed to objects on the existence of which its satisfaction does
+not in the least depend (not to mention the transcendental predicates,
+as, for example, a magnitude of existence, that is duration, which,
+however, is not in time, the only possible means we have of conceiving
+existence as magnitude). Now these are all attributes of which we
+can form no conception that would help to the knowledge of the object,
+and we learn from this that they can never be used for a theory of
+supersensible beings, so that on this side they are quite incapable of
+being the foundation of a speculative knowledge, and their use is
+limited simply to the practice of the moral law.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 75}
+
+This last is so obvious, and can be proved so clearly by fact,
+that we may confidently challenge all pretended natural theologians (a
+singular name) * to specify (over and above the merely ontological
+predicates) one single attribute, whether of the understanding or of
+the will, determining this object of theirs, of which we could not
+show incontrovertibly that, if we abstract from it everything
+anthropomorphic, nothing would remain to us but the mere word, without
+our being able to connect with it the smallest notion by which we
+could hope for an extension of theoretical knowledge. But as to the
+practical, there still remains to us of the attributes of
+understanding and will the conception of a relation to which objective
+reality is given by the practical law (which determines a priori
+precisely this relation of the understanding to the will). When once
+this is done, then reality is given to the conception of the object of
+a will morally determined (the conception of the summum bonum), and
+with it to the conditions of its possibility, the ideas of God,
+freedom, and immortality, but always only relatively to the practice
+of the moral law (and not for any speculative purpose).
+
+
+
+* Learning is properly only the whole content of the historical
+sciences. Consequently it is only the teacher of revealed theology
+that can be called a learned theologian. If, however, we choose to
+call a man learned who is in possession of the rational sciences
+(mathematics and philosophy), although even this would be contrary
+to the signification of the word (which always counts as learning only
+that which one must be "learned" and which, therefore, he cannot
+discover of himself by reason), even in that case the philosopher
+would make too poor a figure with his knowledge of God as a positive
+science to let himself be called on that account a learned man.
+
+
+
+According to these remarks it is now easy to find the answer to
+the weighty question whether the notion of God is one belonging to
+physics (and therefore also to metaphysics, which contains the pure
+a priori principles of the former in their universal import) or to
+morals. If we have recourse to God as the Author of all things, in
+order to explain the arrangements of nature or its changes, this is at
+least not a physical explanation, and is a complete confession that
+our philosophy has come to an end, since we are obliged to assume
+something of which in itself we have otherwise no conception, in order
+to be able to frame a conception of the possibility of what we see
+before our eyes. Metaphysics, however, cannot enable us to attain by
+certain inference from the knowledge of this world to the conception
+of God and to the proof of His existence, for this reason, that in
+order to say that this world could be produced only by a God
+(according to the conception implied by this word) we should know this
+world as the most perfect whole possible; and for this purpose
+should also know all possible worlds (in order to be able to compare
+them with this); in other words, we should be omniscient. It is
+absolutely impossible, however, to know the existence of this Being
+from mere concepts, because every existential proposition, that is,
+every proposition that affirms the existence of a being of which I
+frame a concept, is a synthetic proposition, that is, one by which I
+go beyond that conception and affirm of it more than was thought in
+the conception itself; namely, that this concept in the
+understanding has an object corresponding to it outside the
+understanding, and this it is obviously impossible to elicit by any
+reasoning. There remains, therefore, only one single process
+possible for reason to attain this knowledge, namely, to start from
+the supreme principle of its pure practical use (which in every case
+is directed simply to the existence of something as a consequence of
+reason) and thus determine its object. Then its inevitable problem,
+namely, the necessary direction of the will to the summum bonum,
+discovers to us not only the necessity of assuming such a First
+Being in reference to the possibility of this good in the world,
+but, what is most remarkable, something which reason in its progress
+on the path of physical nature altogether failed to find, namely, an
+accurately defined conception of this First Being. As we can know only
+a small part of this world, and can still less compare it with all
+possible worlds, we may indeed from its order, design, and
+greatness, infer a wise, good, powerful, etc., Author of it, but not
+that He is all-wise, all-good, all-powerful, etc. It may indeed very
+well be granted that we should be justified in supplying this
+inevitable defect by a legitimate and reasonable hypothesis; namely,
+that when wisdom, goodness, etc, are displayed in all the parts that
+offer themselves to our nearer knowledge, it is just the same in all
+the rest, and that it would therefore be reasonable to ascribe all
+possible perfections to the Author of the world, but these are not
+strict logical inferences in which we can pride ourselves on our
+insight, but only permitted conclusions in which we may be indulged
+and which require further recommendation before we can make use of
+them. On the path of empirical inquiry then (physics), the
+conception of God remains always a conception of the perfection of the
+First Being not accurately enough determined to be held adequate to
+the conception of Deity. (With metaphysic in its transcendental part
+nothing whatever can be accomplished.)
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 80}
+
+When I now try to test this conception by reference to the object of
+practical reason, I find that the moral principle admits as possible
+only the conception of an Author of the world possessed of the highest
+perfection. He must be omniscient, in order to know my conduct up to
+the inmost root of my mental state in all possible cases and into
+all future time; omnipotent, in order to allot to it its fitting
+consequences; similarly He must be omnipresent, eternal, etc. Thus the
+moral law, by means of the conception of the summum bonum as the
+object of a pure practical reason, determines the concept of the First
+Being as the Supreme Being; a thing which the physical (and in its
+higher development the metaphysical), in other words, the whole
+speculative course of reason, was unable to effect. The conception
+of God, then, is one that belongs originally not to physics, i.e.,
+to speculative reason, but to morals. The same may be said of the
+other conceptions of reason of which we have treated above as
+postulates of it in its practical use.
+
+In the history of Grecian philosophy we find no distinct traces of a
+pure rational theology earlier than Anaxagoras; but this is not
+because the older philosophers had not intelligence or penetration
+enough to raise themselves to it by the path of speculation, at
+least with the aid of a thoroughly reasonable hypothesis. What could
+have been easier, what more natural, than the thought which of
+itself occurs to everyone, to assume instead of several causes of
+the world, instead of an indeterminate degree of perfection, a
+single rational cause having all perfection? But the evils in the
+world seemed to them to be much too serious objections to allow them
+to feel themselves justified in such a hypothesis. They showed
+intelligence and penetration then in this very point, that they did
+not allow themselves to adopt it, but on the contrary looked about
+amongst natural causes to see if they could not find in them the
+qualities and power required for a First Being. But when this acute
+people had advanced so far in their investigations of nature as to
+treat even moral questions philosophically, on which other nations had
+never done anything but talk, then first they found a new and
+practical want, which did not fail to give definiteness to their
+conception of the First Being: and in this the speculative reason
+played the part of spectator, or at best had the merit of embellishing
+a conception that had not grown on its own ground, and of applying a
+series of confirmations from the study of nature now brought forward
+for the first time, not indeed to strengthen the authority of this
+conception (which was already established), but rather to make a
+show with a supposed discovery of theoretical reason.
+
+
+
+From these remarks, the reader of the Critique of Pure Speculative
+Reason will be thoroughly convinced how highly necessary that
+laborious deduction of the categories was, and how fruitful for
+theology and morals. For if, on the one hand, we place them in pure
+understanding, it is by this deduction alone that we can be
+prevented from regarding them, with Plato, as innate, and founding
+on them extravagant pretensions to theories of the supersensible, to
+which we can see no end, and by which we should make theology a
+magic lantern of chimeras; on the other hand, if we regard them as
+acquired, this deduction saves us from restricting, with Epicurus, all
+and every use of them, even for practical purposes, to the objects and
+motives of the senses. But now that the Critique has shown by that
+deduction, first, that they are not of empirical origin, but have
+their seat and source a priori in the pure understanding; secondly,
+that as they refer to objects in general independently of the
+intuition of them, hence, although they cannot effect theoretical
+knowledge, except in application to empirical objects, yet when
+applied to an object given by pure practical reason they enable us
+to conceive the supersensible definitely, only so far, however, as
+it is defined by such predicates as are necessarily connected with the
+pure practical purpose given a priori and with its possibility. The
+speculative restriction of pure reason and its practical extension
+bring it into that relation of equality in which reason in general can
+be employed suitably to its end, and this example proves better than
+any other that the path to wisdom, if it is to be made sure and not to
+be impassable or misleading, must with us men inevitably pass
+through science; but it is not till this is complete that we can be
+convinced that it leads to this goal.
+
+
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 85}
+
+    VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason.
+
+
+
+A want or requirement of pure reason in its speculative use leads
+only to a hypothesis; that of pure practical reason to a postulate;
+for in the former case I ascend from the result as high as I please in
+the series of causes, not in order to give objective reality to the
+result (e.g., the causal connection of things and changes in the
+world), but in order thoroughly to satisfy my inquiring reason in
+respect of it. Thus I see before me order and design in nature, and
+need not resort to speculation to assure myself of their reality,
+but to explain them I have to presuppose a Deity as their cause; and
+then since the inference from an effect to a definite cause is
+always uncertain and doubtful, especially to a cause so precise and so
+perfectly defined as we have to conceive in God, hence the highest
+degree of certainty to which this pre-supposition can be brought is
+that it is the most rational opinion for us men. * On the other hand,
+a requirement of pure practical reason is based on a duty, that of
+making something (the summum bonum) the object of my will so as to
+promote it with all my powers; in which case I must suppose its
+possibility and, consequently, also the conditions necessary
+thereto, namely, God, freedom, and immortality; since I cannot prove
+these by my speculative reason, although neither can I refute them.
+This duty is founded on something that is indeed quite independent
+of these suppositions and is of itself apodeictically certain, namely,
+the moral law; and so far it needs no further support by theoretical
+views as to the inner constitution of things, the secret final aim
+of the order of the world, or a presiding ruler thereof, in order to
+bind me in the most perfect manner to act in unconditional
+conformity to the law. But the subjective effect of this law,
+namely, the mental disposition conformed to it and made necessary by
+it, to promote the practically possible summum bonum, this
+pre-supposes at least that the latter is possible, for it would be
+practically impossible to strive after the object of a conception
+which at bottom was empty and had no object. Now the above-mentioned
+postulates concern only the physical or metaphysical conditions of the
+possibility of the summum bonum; in a word, those which lie in the
+nature of things; not, however, for the sake of an arbitrary
+speculative purpose, but of a practically necessary end of a pure
+rational will, which in this case does not choose, but obeys an
+inexorable command of reason, the foundation of which is objective, in
+the constitution of things as they must be universally judged by
+pure reason, and is not based on inclination; for we are in nowise
+justified in assuming, on account of what we wish on merely subjective
+grounds, that the means thereto are possible or that its object is
+real. This, then, is an absolutely necessary requirement, and what
+it pre-supposes is not merely justified as an allowable hypothesis,
+but as a postulate in a practical point of view; and admitting that
+the pure moral law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a
+rule of prudence), the righteous man may say: "I will that there be
+a God, that my existence in this world be also an existence outside
+the chain of physical causes and in a pure world of the understanding,
+and lastly, that my duration be endless; I firmly abide by this, and
+will not let this faith be taken from me; for in this instance alone
+my interest, because I must not relax anything of it, inevitably
+determines my judgement, without regarding sophistries, however unable
+I may be to answer them or to oppose them with others more
+plausible. *(2)
+
+
+
+* But even here we should not be able to allege a requirement of
+reason, if we had not before our eyes a problematical, but yet
+inevitable, conception of reason, namely, that of an absolutely
+necessary being. This conception now seeks to be defined, and this, in
+addition to the tendency to extend itself, is the objective ground
+of a requirement of speculative reason, namely, to have a more precise
+definition of the conception of a necessary being which is to serve as
+the first cause of other beings, so as to make these latter knowable
+by some means. Without such antecedent necessary problems there are no
+requirements- at least not of pure reason- the rest are requirements
+of inclination.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 90}
+
+*(2) In the Deutsches Museum, February, 1787, there is a
+dissertation by a very subtle and clear-headed man, the late
+Wizenmann, whose early death is to be lamented, in which he disputes
+the right to argue from a want to the objective reality of its object,
+and illustrates the point by the example of a man in love, who
+having fooled himself into an idea of beauty, which is merely a
+chimera of his own brain, would fain conclude that such an object
+really exists somewhere. I quite agree with him in this, in all
+cases where the want is founded on inclination, which cannot
+necessarily postulate the existence of its object even for the man
+that is affected by it, much less can it contain a demand valid for
+everyone, and therefore it is merely a subjective ground of the
+wish. But in the present case we have a want of reason springing
+from an objective determining principle of the will, namely, the moral
+law, which necessarily binds every rational being, and therefore
+justifies him in assuming a priori in nature the conditions proper for
+it, and makes the latter inseparable from the complete practical use
+of reason. It is a duty to realize the summum bonum to the utmost of
+our power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it is
+unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is
+necessary for its objective possibility. The assumption is as
+necessary as the moral law, in connection with which alone it is
+valid.
+
+
+
+In order to prevent misconception in the use of a notion as yet so
+unusual as that of a faith of pure practical reason, let me be
+permitted to add one more remark. It might almost seem as if this
+rational faith were here announced as itself a command, namely, that
+we should assume the summum bonum as possible. But a faith that is
+commanded is nonsense. Let the preceding analysis, however, be
+remembered of what is required to be supposed in the conception of the
+summum bonum, and it will be seen that it cannot be commanded to
+assume this possibility, and no practical disposition of mind is
+required to admit it; but that speculative reason must concede it
+without being asked, for no one can affirm that it is impossible in
+itself that rational beings in the world should at the same time be
+worthy of happiness in conformity with the moral law and also
+possess this happiness proportionately. Now in respect of the first
+element of the summum bonum, namely, that which concerns morality, the
+moral law gives merely a command, and to doubt the possibility of that
+element would be the same as to call in question the moral law itself.
+But as regards the second element of that object, namely, happiness
+perfectly proportioned to that worthiness, it is true that there is no
+need of a command to admit its possibility in general, for theoretical
+reason has nothing to say against it; but the manner in which we
+have to conceive this harmony of the laws of nature with those of
+freedom has in it something in respect of which we have a choice,
+because theoretical reason decides nothing with apodeictic certainty
+about it, and in respect of this there may be a moral interest which
+turns the scale.
+
+I had said above that in a mere course of nature in the world an
+accurate correspondence between happiness and moral worth is not to be
+expected and must be regarded as impossible, and that therefore the
+possibility of the summum bonum cannot be admitted from this side
+except on the supposition of a moral Author of the world. I
+purposely reserved the restriction of this judgement to the subjective
+conditions of our reason, in order not to make use of it until the
+manner of this belief should be defined more precisely. The fact is
+that the impossibility referred to is merely subjective, that is,
+our reason finds it impossible for it to render conceivable in the way
+of a mere course of nature a connection so exactly proportioned and so
+thoroughly adapted to an end, between two sets of events happening
+according to such distinct laws; although, as with everything else
+in nature that is adapted to an end, it cannot prove, that is, show by
+sufficient objective reason, that it is not possible by universal laws
+of nature.
+
+Now, however, a deciding principle of a different kind comes into
+play to turn the scale in this uncertainty of speculative reason.
+The command to promote the summum bonum is established on an objective
+basis (in practical reason); the possibility of the same in general is
+likewise established on an objective basis (in theoretical reason,
+which has nothing to say against it). But reason cannot decide
+objectively in what way we are to conceive this possibility; whether
+by universal laws of nature without a wise Author presiding over
+nature, or only on supposition of such an Author. Now here there comes
+in a subjective condition of reason, the only way theoretically
+possible for it, of conceiving the exact harmony of the kingdom of
+nature with the kingdom of morals, which is the condition of the
+possibility of the summum bonum; and at the same time the only one
+conducive to morality (which depends on an objective law of reason).
+Now since the promotion of this summum bonum, and therefore the
+supposition of its possibility, are objectively necessary (though only
+as a result of practical reason), while at the same time the manner in
+which we would conceive it rests with our own choice, and in this
+choice a free interest of pure practical reason decides for the
+assumption of a wise Author of the world; it is clear that the
+principle that herein determines our judgement, though as a want it is
+subjective, yet at the same time being the means of promoting what
+is objectively (practically) necessary, is the foundation of a maxim
+of belief in a moral point of view, that is, a faith of pure practical
+reason. This, then, is not commanded, but being a voluntary
+determination of our judgement, conducive to the moral (commanded)
+purpose, and moreover harmonizing with the theoretical requirement
+of reason, to assume that existence and to make it the foundation of
+our further employment of reason, it has itself sprung from the
+moral disposition of mind; it may therefore at times waver even in the
+well-disposed, but can never be reduced to unbelief.
+
+                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 95}
+
+
+
+  IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties
+
+             to his Practical Destination.
+
+
+
+If human nature is destined to endeavour after the summum bonum,
+we must suppose also that the measure of its cognitive faculties,
+and particularly their relation to one another, is suitable to this
+end. Now the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason proves that this is
+incapable of solving satisfactorily the most weighty problems that are
+proposed to it, although it does not ignore the natural and
+important hints received from the same reason, nor the great steps
+that it can make to approach to this great goal that is set before it,
+which, however, it can never reach of itself, even with the help of
+the greatest knowledge of nature. Nature then seems here to have
+provided us only in a step-motherly fashion with the faculty required
+for our end.
+
+                                         {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 100}
+
+Suppose, now, that in this matter nature had conformed to our wish
+and had given us that capacity of discernment or that enlightenment
+which we would gladly possess, or which some imagine they actually
+possess, what would in all probability be the consequence? Unless
+our whole nature were at the same time changed, our inclinations,
+which always have the first word, would first of all demand their
+own satisfaction, and, joined with rational reflection, the greatest
+possible and most lasting satisfaction, under the name of happiness;
+the moral law would afterwards speak, in order to keep them within
+their proper bounds, and even to subject them all to a higher end,
+which has no regard to inclination. But instead of the conflict that
+the moral disposition has now to carry on with the inclinations, in
+which, though after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be
+gradually acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would
+stand unceasingly before our eyes (for what we can prove perfectly
+is to us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of
+our eyes). Transgression of the law, would, no doubt, be avoided; what
+is commanded would be done; but the mental disposition, from which
+actions ought to proceed, cannot be infused by any command, and in
+this case the spur of action is ever active and external, so that
+reason has no need to exert itself in order to gather strength to
+resist the inclinations by a lively representation of the dignity of
+the law: hence most of the actions that conformed to the law would
+be done from fear, a few only from hope, and none at all from duty,
+and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the eyes of
+supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world
+depends, would cease to exist. As long as the nature of man remains
+what it is, his conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism,
+in which, as in a puppet-show, everything would gesticulate well,
+but there would be no life in the figures. Now, when it is quite
+otherwise with us, when with all the effort of our reason we have only
+a very obscure and doubtful view into the future, when the Governor of
+the world allows us only to conjecture his existence and his
+majesty, not to behold them or prove them clearly; and on the other
+hand, the moral law within us, without promising or threatening
+anything with certainty, demands of us disinterested respect; and only
+when this respect has become active and dominant, does it allow us
+by means of it a prospect into the world of the supersensible, and
+then only with weak glances: all this being so, there is room for true
+moral disposition, immediately devoted to the law, and a rational
+creature can become worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that
+corresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his
+actions. Thus what the study of nature and of man teaches us
+sufficiently elsewhere may well be true here also; that the
+unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration
+in what it has denied than in what it has granted.
+
+PART_2|METHODOLOGY
+
+                    SECOND PART.
+
+
+
+        Methodology of Pure Practical Reason.
+
+
+
+By the methodology of pure practical reason we are not to understand
+the mode of proceeding with pure practical principles (whether in
+study or in exposition), with a view to a scientific knowledge of
+them, which alone is what is properly called method elsewhere in
+theoretical philosophy (for popular knowledge requires a manner,
+science a method, i.e., a process according to principles of reason by
+which alone the manifold of any branch of knowledge can become a
+system). On the contrary, by this methodology is understood the mode
+in which we can give the laws of pure practical reason access to the
+human mind and influence on its maxims, that is, by which we can
+make the objectively practical reason subjectively practical also.
+
+Now it is clear enough that those determining principles of the will
+which alone make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth,
+namely, the direct conception of the law and the objective necessity
+of obeying it as our duty, must be regarded as the proper springs of
+actions, since otherwise legality of actions might be produced, but
+not morality of character. But it is not so clear; on the contrary, it
+must at first sight seem to every one very improbable that even
+subjectively that exhibition of pure virtue can have more power over
+the human mind, and supply a far stronger spring even for effecting
+that legality of actions, and can produce more powerful resolutions to
+prefer the law, from pure respect for it, to every other
+consideration, than all the deceptive allurements of pleasure or of
+all that may be reckoned as happiness, or even than all threatenings
+of pain and misfortune. Nevertheless, this is actually the case, and
+if human nature were not so constituted, no mode of presenting the law
+by roundabout ways and indirect recommendations would ever produce
+morality of character. All would be simple hypocrisy; the law would be
+hated, or at least despised, while it was followed for the sake of
+one's own advantage. The letter of the law (legality) would be found
+in our actions, but not the spirit of it in our minds (morality);
+and as with all our efforts we could not quite free ourselves from
+reason in our judgement, we must inevitably appear in our own eyes
+worthless, depraved men, even though we should seek to compensate
+ourselves for this mortification before the inner tribunal, by
+enjoying the pleasure that a supposed natural or divine law might be
+imagined to have connected with it a sort of police machinery,
+regulating its operations by what was done without troubling itself
+about the motives for doing it.
+
+It cannot indeed be denied that in order to bring an uncultivated or
+degraded mind into the track of moral goodness some preparatory
+guidance is necessary, to attract it by a view of its own advantage,
+or to alarm it by fear of loss; but as soon as this mechanical work,
+these leading-strings have produced some effect, then we must bring
+before the mind the pure moral motive, which, not only because it is
+the only one that can be the foundation of a character (a
+practically consistent habit of mind with unchangeable maxims), but
+also because it teaches a man to feel his own dignity, gives the
+mind a power unexpected even by himself, to tear himself from all
+sensible attachments so far as they would fain have the rule, and to
+find a rich compensation for the sacrifice he offers, in the
+independence of his rational nature and the greatness of soul to which
+he sees that he is destined. We will therefore show, by such
+observations as every one can make, that this property of our minds,
+this receptivity for a pure moral interest, and consequently the
+moving force of the pure conception of virtue, when it is properly
+applied to the human heart, is the most powerful spring and, when a
+continued and punctual observance of moral maxims is in question,
+the only spring of good conduct. It must, however, be remembered
+that if these observations only prove the reality of such a feeling,
+but do not show any moral improvement brought about by it, this is
+no argument against the only method that exists of making the
+objectively practical laws of pure reason subjectively practical,
+through the mere force of the conception of duty; nor does it prove
+that this method is a vain delusion. For as it has never yet come into
+vogue, experience can say nothing of its results; one can only ask for
+proofs of the receptivity for such springs, and these I will now
+briefly present, and then sketch the method of founding and
+cultivating genuine moral dispositions.
+
+                                         {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 5}
+
+When we attend to the course of conversation in mixed companies,
+consisting not merely of learned persons and subtle reasoners, but
+also of men of business or of women, we observe that, besides
+story-telling and jesting, another kind of entertainment finds a place
+in them, namely, argument; for stories, if they are to have novelty
+and interest, are soon exhausted, and jesting is likely to become
+insipid. Now of all argument there is none in which persons are more
+ready to join who find any other subtle discussion tedious, none
+that brings more liveliness into the company, than that which concerns
+the moral worth of this or that action by which the character of
+some person is to be made out. Persons, to whom in other cases
+anything subtle and speculative in theoretical questions is dry and
+irksome, presently join in when the question is to make out the
+moral import of a good or bad action that has been related, and they
+display an exactness, a refinement, a subtlety, in excogitating
+everything that can lessen the purity of purpose, and consequently the
+degree of virtue in it, which we do not expect from them in any
+other kind of speculation. In these criticisms, persons who are
+passing judgement on others often reveal their own character: some, in
+exercising their judicial office, especially upon the dead, seem
+inclined chiefly to defend the goodness that is related of this or
+that deed against all injurious charges of insincerity, and ultimately
+to defend the whole moral worth of the person against the reproach
+of dissimulation and secret wickedness; others, on the contrary,
+turn their thoughts more upon attacking this worth by accusation and
+fault finding. We cannot always, however, attribute to these latter
+the intention of arguing away virtue altogether out of all human
+examples in order to make it an empty name; often, on the contrary, it
+is only well-meant strictness in determining the true moral import
+of actions according to an uncompromising law. Comparison with such
+a law, instead of with examples, lowers self-conceit in moral
+matters very much, and not merely teaches humility, but makes every
+one feel it when he examines himself closely. Nevertheless, we can for
+the most part observe, in those who defend the purity of purpose in
+giving examples that where there is the presumption of uprightness
+they are anxious to remove even the least spot, lest, if all
+examples had their truthfulness disputed, and if the purity of all
+human virtue were denied, it might in the end be regarded as a mere
+phantom, and so all effort to attain it be made light of as vain
+affectation and delusive conceit.
+
+I do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made
+use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the
+most subtle examination of the practical questions that are thrown up;
+and why they have not, after first laying the foundation of a purely
+moral catechism, searched through the biographies of ancient and
+modern times with the view of having at hand instances of the duties
+laid down, in which, especially by comparison of similar actions under
+different circumstances, they might exercise the critical judgement of
+their scholars in remarking their greater or less moral
+significance. This is a thing in which they would find that even early
+youth, which is still unripe for speculation of other kinds, would
+soon Become very acute and not a little interested, because it feels
+the progress of its faculty of judgement; and, what is most important,
+they could hope with confidence that the frequent practice of
+knowing and approving good conduct in all its purity, and on the other
+hand of remarking with regret or contempt the least deviation from it,
+although it may be pursued only as a sport in which children may
+compete with one another, yet will leave a lasting impression of
+esteem on the one hand and disgust on the other; and so, by the mere
+habit of looking on such actions as deserving approval or blame, a
+good foundation would be laid for uprightness in the future course
+of life. Only I wish they would spare them the example of so-called
+noble (super-meritorious) actions, in which our sentimental books so
+much abound, and would refer all to duty merely, and to the worth that
+a man can and must give himself in his own eyes by the consciousness
+of not having transgressed it, since whatever runs up into empty
+wishes and longings after inaccessible perfection produces mere heroes
+of romance, who, while they pique themselves on their feeling for
+transcendent greatness, release themselves in return from the
+observance of common and every-day obligations, which then seem to
+them petty and insignificant. *
+
+
+
+* It is quite proper to extol actions that display a great,
+unselfish, sympathizing mind or humanity. But, in this case, we must
+fix attention not so much on the elevation of soul, which is very
+fleeting and transitory, as on the subjection of the heart to duty,
+from which a more enduring impression may be expected, because this
+implies principle (whereas the former only implies ebullitions). One
+need only reflect a little and he will always find a debt that he
+has by some means incurred towards the human race (even if it were
+only this, by the inequality of men in the civil constitution,
+enjoys advantages on account of which others must be the more in
+want), which will prevent the thought of duty from being repressed
+by the self-complacent imagination of merit.
+
+
+
+                                        {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 10}
+
+But if it is asked: "What, then, is really pure morality, by which
+as a touchstone we must test the moral significance of every
+action," then I must admit that it is only philosophers that can
+make the decision of this question doubtful, for to common sense it
+has been decided long ago, not indeed by abstract general formulae,
+but by habitual use, like the distinction between the right and left
+hand. We will then point out the criterion of pure virtue in an
+example first, and, imagining that it is set before a boy, of say
+ten years old, for his judgement, we will see whether he would
+necessarily judge so of himself without being guided by his teacher.
+Tell him the history of an honest man whom men want to persuade to
+join the calumniators of an innocent and powerless person (say Anne
+Boleyn, accused by Henry VIII of England). He is offered advantages,
+great gifts, or high rank; he rejects them. This will excite mere
+approbation and applause in the mind of the hearer. Now begins the
+threatening of loss. Amongst these traducers are his best friends, who
+now renounce his friendship; near kinsfolk, who threaten to disinherit
+him (he being without fortune); powerful persons, who can persecute
+and harass him in all places and circumstances; a prince, who
+threatens him with loss of freedom, yea, loss of life. Then to fill
+the measure of suffering, and that he may feel the pain that only
+the morally good heart can feel very deeply, let us conceive his
+family threatened with extreme distress and want, entreating him to
+yield; conceive himself, though upright, yet with feelings not hard or
+insensible either to compassion or to his own distress; conceive
+him, I say, at the moment when he wishes that he had never lived to
+see the day that exposed him to such unutterable anguish, yet
+remaining true to his uprightness of purpose, without wavering or even
+doubting; then will my youthful hearer be raised gradually from mere
+approval to admiration, from that to amazement, and finally to the
+greatest veneration, and a lively wish that he himself could be such a
+man (though certainly not in such circumstances). Yet virtue is here
+worth so much only because it costs so much, not because it brings any
+profit. All the admiration, and even the endeavour to resemble this
+character, rest wholly on the purity of the moral principle, which can
+only be strikingly shown by removing from the springs of action
+everything that men may regard as part of happiness. Morality, then,
+must have the more power over the human heart the more purely it is
+exhibited. Whence it follows that, if the law of morality and the
+image of holiness and virtue are to exercise any influence at all on
+our souls, they can do so only so far as they are laid to heart in
+their purity as motives, unmixed with any view to prosperity, for it
+is in suffering that they display themselves most nobly. Now that
+whose removal strengthens the effect of a moving force must have
+been a hindrance, consequently every admixture of motives taken from
+our own happiness is a hindrance to the influence of the moral law
+on the heart. I affirm further that even in that admired action, if
+the motive from which it was done was a high regard for duty, then
+it is just this respect for the law that has the greatest influence on
+the mind of the spectator, not any pretension to a supposed inward
+greatness of mind or noble meritorious sentiments; consequently
+duty, not merit, must have not only the most definite, but, when it is
+represented in the true light of its inviolability, the most
+penetrating, influence on the mind.
+
+It is more necessary than ever to direct attention to this method in
+our times, when men hope to produce more effect on the mind with soft,
+tender feelings, or high-flown, puffing-up pretensions, which rather
+wither the heart than strengthen it, than by a plain and earnest
+representation of duty, which is more suited to human imperfection and
+to progress in goodness. To set before children, as a pattern, actions
+that are called noble, magnanimous, meritorious, with the notion of
+captivating them by infusing enthusiasm for such actions, is to defeat
+our end. For as they are still so backward in the observance of the
+commonest duty, and even in the correct estimation of it, this means
+simply to make them fantastical romancers betimes. But, even with
+the instructed and experienced part of mankind, this supposed spring
+has, if not an injurious, at least no genuine, moral effect on the
+heart, which, however, is what it was desired to produce.
+
+All feelings, especially those that are to produce unwonted
+exertions, must accomplish their effect at the moment they are at
+their height and before the calm down; otherwise they effect
+nothing; for as there was nothing to strengthen the heart, but only to
+excite it, it naturally returns to its normal moderate tone and, thus,
+falls back into its previous languor. Principles must be built on
+conceptions; on any other basis there can only be paroxysms, which can
+give the person no moral worth, nay, not even confidence in himself,
+without which the highest good in man, consciousness of the morality
+of his mind and character, cannot exist. Now if these conceptions
+are to become subjectively practical, we must not rest satisfied
+with admiring the objective law of morality, and esteeming it highly
+in reference to humanity, but we must consider the conception of it in
+relation to man as an individual, and then this law appears in a
+form indeed that is highly deserving of respect, but not so pleasant
+as if it belonged to the element to which he is naturally
+accustomed; but on the contrary as often compelling him to quit this
+element, not without self-denial, and to betake himself to a higher,
+in which he can only maintain himself with trouble and with
+unceasing apprehension of a relapse. In a word, the moral law
+demands obedience, from duty not from predilection, which cannot and
+ought not to be presupposed at all.
+
+Let us now see, in an example, whether the conception of an
+action, as a noble and magnanimous one, has more subjective moving
+power than if the action is conceived merely as duty in relation to
+the solemn law of morality. The action by which a man endeavours at
+the greatest peril of life to rescue people from shipwreck, at last
+losing his life in the attempt, is reckoned on one side as duty, but
+on the other and for the most part as a meritorious action, but our
+esteem for it is much weakened by the notion of duty to himself
+which seems in this case to be somewhat infringed. More decisive is
+the magnanimous sacrifice of life for the safety of one's country; and
+yet there still remains some scruple whether it is a perfect duty to
+devote one's self to this purpose spontaneously and unbidden, and
+the action has not in itself the full force of a pattern and impulse
+to imitation. But if an indispensable duty be in question, the
+transgression of which violates the moral law itself, and without
+regard to the welfare of mankind, and as it were tramples on its
+holiness (such as are usually called duties to God, because in Him
+we conceive the ideal of holiness in substance), then we give our most
+perfect esteem to the pursuit of it at the sacrifice of all that can
+have any value for the dearest inclinations, and we find our soul
+strengthened and elevated by such an example, when we convince
+ourselves by contemplation of it that human nature is capable of so
+great an elevation above every motive that nature can oppose to it.
+Juvenal describes such an example in a climax which makes the reader
+feel vividly the force of the spring that is contained in the pure law
+of duty, as duty:
+
+
+
+                                        {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 15}
+
+  Esto bonus miles, tutor bonus, arbiter idem
+
+  Integer; ambiguae si quando citabere testis
+
+  Incertaeque rei, Phalaris licet imperet ut sis
+
+  Falsus, et admoto dictet periuria tauro,
+
+  Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori,
+
+                                        {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 20}
+
+  Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas. *
+
+
+
+* [Juvenal, Satirae, "Be you a good soldier, a faithful tutor, an
+uncorrupted umpire also; if you are summoned as a witness in a
+doubtful and uncertain thing, though Phalaris should command that
+you should be false, and should dictate perjuries with the bull
+brought to you, believe it the highest impiety to prefer life to
+reputation, and for the sake of life, to lose the causes of living."]
+
+
+
+When we can bring any flattering thought of merit into our action,
+then the motive is already somewhat alloyed with self-love and has
+therefore some assistance from the side of the sensibility. But to
+postpone everything to the holiness of duty alone, and to be conscious
+that we can because our own reason recognises this as its command
+and says that we ought to do it, this is, as it were, to raise
+ourselves altogether above the world of sense, and there is
+inseparably involved in the same a consciousness of the law, as a
+spring of a faculty that controls the sensibility; and although this
+is not always attended with effect, yet frequent engagement with
+this spring, and the at first minor attempts at using it, give hope
+that this effect may be wrought, and that by degrees the greatest, and
+that a purely moral interest in it may be produced in us.
+
+                                        {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 25}
+
+The method then takes the following course. At first we are only
+concerned to make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural
+employment accompanying all our own free actions, as well as the
+observation of those of others, and to make it as it were a habit, and
+to sharpen this judgement, asking first whether the action conforms
+objectively to the moral law, and to what law; and we distinguish
+the law that merely furnishes a principle of obligation from that
+which is really obligatory (leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus);
+as, for instance, the law of what men's wants require from me, as
+contrasted with that which their rights demand, the latter of which
+prescribes essential, the former only non-essential duties; and thus
+we teach how to distinguish different kinds of duties which meet in
+the same action. The other point to which attention must be directed
+is the question whether the action was also (subjectively) done for
+the sake of the moral law, so that it not only is morally correct as a
+deed, but also, by the maxim from which it is done, has moral worth as
+a disposition. Now there is no doubt that this practice, and the
+resulting culture of our reason in judging merely of the practical,
+must gradually produce a certain interest even in the law of reason,
+and consequently in morally good actions. For we ultimately take a
+liking for a thing, the contemplation of which makes us feel that
+the use of our cognitive faculties is extended; and this extension
+is especially furthered by that in which we find moral correctness,
+since it is only in such an order of things that reason, with its
+faculty of determining a priori on principle what ought to be done,
+can find satisfaction. An observer of nature takes liking at last to
+objects that at first offended his senses, when he discovers in them
+the great adaptation of their organization to design, so that his
+reason finds food in its contemplation. So Leibnitz spared an insect
+that he had carefully examined with the microscope, and replaced it on
+its leaf, because he had found himself instructed by the view of it
+and had, as it were, received a benefit from it.
+
+But this employment of the faculty of judgement, which makes us feel
+our own cognitive powers, is not yet the interest in actions and in
+their morality itself. It merely causes us to take pleasure in
+engaging in such criticism, and it gives to virtue or the
+disposition that conforms to moral laws a form of beauty, which is
+admired, but not on that account sought after (laudatur et alget);
+as everything the contemplation of which produces a consciousness of
+the harmony of our powers of conception, and in which we feel the
+whole of our faculty of knowledge (understanding and imagination)
+strengthened, produces a satisfaction, which may also be
+communicated to others, while nevertheless the existence of the object
+remains indifferent to us, being only regarded as the occasion of
+our becoming aware of the capacities in us which are elevated above
+mere animal nature. Now, however, the second exercise comes in, the
+living exhibition of morality of character by examples, in which
+attention is directed to purity of will, first only as a negative
+perfection, in so far as in an action done from duty no motives of
+inclination have any influence in determining it. By this the
+pupil's attention is fixed upon the consciousness of his freedom,
+and although this renunciation at first excites a feeling of pain,
+nevertheless, by its withdrawing the pupil from the constraint of even
+real wants, there is proclaimed to him at the same time a
+deliverance from the manifold dissatisfaction in which all these wants
+entangle him, and the mind is made capable of receiving the
+sensation of satisfaction from other sources. The heart is freed and
+lightened of a burden that always secretly presses on it, when
+instances of pure moral resolutions reveal to the man an inner faculty
+of which otherwise he has no right knowledge, the inward freedom to
+release himself from the boisterous importunity of inclinations, to
+such a degree that none of them, not even the dearest, shall have
+any influence on a resolution, for which we are now to employ our
+reason. Suppose a case where I alone know that the wrong is on my
+side, and although a free confession of it and the offer of
+satisfaction are so strongly opposed by vanity, selfishness, and
+even an otherwise not illegitimate antipathy to the man whose rights
+are impaired by me, I am nevertheless able to discard all these
+considerations; in this there is implied a consciousness of
+independence on inclinations and circumstances, and of the possibility
+of being sufficient for myself, which is salutary to me in general for
+other purposes also. And now the law of duty, in consequence of the
+positive worth which obedience to it makes us feel, finds easier
+access through the respect for ourselves in the consciousness of our
+freedom. When this is well established, when a man dreads nothing more
+than to find himself, on self-examination, worthless and
+contemptible in his own eyes, then every good moral disposition can be
+grafted on it, because this is the best, nay, the only guard that
+can keep off from the mind the pressure of ignoble and corrupting
+motives.
+
+I have only intended to point out the most general maxims of the
+methodology of moral cultivation and exercise. As the manifold variety
+of duties requires special rules for each kind, and this would be a
+prolix affair, I shall be readily excused if in a work like this,
+which is only preliminary, I content myself with these outlines.
+
+PART_2|CONCLUSION
+
+                     CONCLUSION.
+
+
+
+Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and
+awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the
+starry heavens above and the moral law within. I have not to search
+for them and conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or
+were in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before
+me and connect them directly with the consciousness of my existence.
+The former begins from the place I occupy in the external world of
+sense, and enlarges my connection therein to an unbounded extent
+with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and moreover into
+limitless times of their periodic motion, its beginning and
+continuance. The second begins from my invisible self, my personality,
+and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but which is
+traceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern that I
+am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary
+connection, as I am also thereby with all those visible worlds. The
+former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates as it
+were my importance as an animal creature, which after it has been
+for a short time provided with vital power, one knows not how, must
+again give back the matter of which it was formed to the planet it
+inhabits (a mere speck in the universe). The second, on the
+contrary, infinitely elevates my worth as an intelligence by my
+personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent
+of animality and even of the whole sensible world, at least so far
+as may be inferred from the destination assigned to my existence by
+this law, a destination not restricted to conditions and limits of
+this life, but reaching into the infinite.
+
+But though admiration and respect may excite to inquiry, they cannot
+supply the want of it. What, then, is to be done in order to enter
+on this in a useful manner and one adapted to the loftiness of the
+subject? Examples may serve in this as a warning and also for
+imitation. The contemplation of the world began from the noblest
+spectacle that the human senses present to us, and that our
+understanding can bear to follow in their vast reach; and it ended- in
+astrology. Morality began with the noblest attribute of human
+nature, the development and cultivation of which give a prospect of
+infinite utility; and ended- in fanaticism or superstition. So it is
+with all crude attempts where the principal part of the business
+depends on the use of reason, a use which does not come of itself,
+like the use of the feet, by frequent exercise, especially when
+attributes are in question which cannot be directly exhibited in
+common experience. But after the maxim had come into vogue, though
+late, to examine carefully beforehand all the steps that reason
+purposes to take, and not to let it proceed otherwise than in the
+track of a previously well considered method, then the study of the
+structure of the universe took quite a different direction, and
+thereby attained an incomparably happier result. The fall of a
+stone, the motion of a sling, resolved into their elements and the
+forces that are manifested in them, and treated mathematically,
+produced at last that clear and henceforward unchangeable insight into
+the system of the world which, as observation is continued, may hope
+always to extend itself, but need never fear to be compelled to
+retreat.
+
+This example may suggest to us to enter on the same path in treating
+of the moral capacities of our nature, and may give us hope of a
+like good result. We have at hand the instances of the moral judgement
+of reason. By analysing these into their elementary conceptions, and
+in default of mathematics adopting a process similar to that of
+chemistry, the separation of the empirical from the rational
+elements that may be found in them, by repeated experiments on
+common sense, we may exhibit both pure, and learn with certainty
+what each part can accomplish of itself, so as to prevent on the one
+hand the errors of a still crude untrained judgement, and on the other
+hand (what is far more necessary) the extravagances of genius, by
+which, as by the adepts of the philosopher's stone, without any
+methodical study or knowledge of nature, visionary treasures are
+promised and the true are thrown away. In one word, science
+(critically undertaken and methodically directed) is the narrow gate
+that leads to the true doctrine of practical wisdom, if we
+understand by this not merely what one ought to do, but what ought
+to serve teachers as a guide to construct well and clearly the road to
+wisdom which everyone should travel, and to secure others from going
+astray. Philosophy must always continue to be the guardian of this
+science; and although the public does not take any interest in its
+subtle investigations, it must take an interest in the resulting
+doctrines, which such an examination first puts in a clear light.
+
+
+                             THE END
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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