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diff --git a/5683-h/5683-h.htm b/5683-h/5683-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a3dd14 --- /dev/null +++ b/5683-h/5683-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,7292 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <meta content="pg2html (binary v0.17)" name="linkgenerator" /> + <title> + The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .75em; margin-bottom: .75em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 5%; text-align: justify; font-size: 80%; font-style: italic;} + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + .xx-small {font-size: 60%;} + .x-small {font-size: 75%;} + .small {font-size: 85%;} + .large {font-size: 115%;} + .x-large {font-size: 130%;} + .indent5 { margin-left: 5%;} + .indent10 { margin-left: 10%;} + .indent15 { margin-left: 15%;} + .indent20 { margin-left: 20%;} + .indent25 { margin-left: 25%;} + .indent30 { margin-left: 30%;} + .indent35 { margin-left: 35%;} + .indent40 { margin-left: 40%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {position: absolute; right: 1%; font-size: 0.6em; + font-variant: normal; font-style: normal; + text-align: right; background-color: #FFFACD; + border: 1px solid; padding: 0.3em;text-indent: 0em;} + .side { float: left; font-size: 75%; width: 15%; padding-left: 0.8em; + border-left: dashed thin; text-align: left; + text-indent: 0; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; + font-weight: bold; color: black; background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} + .head { float: left; font-size: 90%; width: 98%; padding-left: 0.8em; + border-left: dashed thin; text-align: center; + text-indent: 0; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; + font-weight: bold; color: black; background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} + p.pfirst, p.noindent {text-indent: 0} + span.dropcap { float: left; margin: 0 0.1em 0 0; line-height: 0.8 } + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 100%; margin-left: 10%;} +</style> + </head> + <body> + <pre> +Project Gutenberg's The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: The Critique of Practical Reason + +Author: Immanuel Kant + +Release Date: May, 2004 [EBook #5683] +[This file was first posted on August 7, 2002] +Last Updated: December 10, 2018 + + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON *** + + +Etext produced by Matthew Stapleton + +HTML file produced by David Widger + + + + +</pre> + + <div style="height: 8em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON + </h1> + <h2> + By Immanuel Kant + </h2> + <h3> + 1788 + </h3> + <h4> + Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott + </h4> + <hr /> + <p> + <b>CONTENTS</b> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_PREF"> PREFACE. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason. + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0004"> <b>FIRST PART — ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL + REASON.</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0005"> <b>BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical + Reason.</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0001"> CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical + Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0007"> I. DEFINITION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0008"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0009"> II. THEOREM I. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0010"> III. THEOREM II. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0011"> REMARK I. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0012"> REMARK II. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0013"> IV. THEOREM II. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0014"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0015"> V. PROBLEM I. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0016"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0017"> VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL + REASON. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0018"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0019"> COROLLARY. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0020"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0021"> VIII. THEOREM IV. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0022"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0023"> REMARK II. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0024"> Practical Material Principles of Determination + taken as the Foundation of Morality, are: </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0025"> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0026"> I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental + Principles of Pure </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0027"> II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its + Practical use has to an Extension which is not possible to it in its + Speculative Use. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0002"> CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure + Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0029"> Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to + the Notions of Good </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0030"> Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement. + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0003"> CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical + Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0032"> Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure + Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0033"> <b>BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0004"> CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical + Reason Generally. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0005"> CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in + defining the Conception of the "Summum Bonum". </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0036"> I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0037"> II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of + Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0038"> III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in + its Union with the Speculative Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0039"> IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate + of Pure Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0040"> V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure + Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0041"> VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason + Generally. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0042"> VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension + of Pure Reason in a Practical point of view, without its Knowledge as + Speculative being enlarged at the same time? </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0043"> VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure + Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0044"> IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive + Faculties to his Practical Destination. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0045"> <b>SECOND PART. -- METHODOLOGY OF PURE PRACTICAL + REASON.</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0046"> Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_CONC"> CONCLUSION. </a> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_PREF" id="link2H_PREF"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PREFACE. + </h2> + <p> + This work is called the Critique of Practical Reason, not of the pure + practical reason, although its parallelism with the speculative critique + would seem to require the latter term. The reason of this appears + sufficiently from the treatise itself. Its business is to show that there + is pure practical reason, and for this purpose it criticizes the entire + practical faculty of reason. If it succeeds in this, it has no need to + criticize the pure faculty itself in order to see whether reason in making + such a claim does not presumptuously overstep itself (as is the case with + the speculative reason). For if, as pure reason, it is actually practical, + it proves its own reality and that of its concepts by fact, and all + disputation against the possibility of its being real is futile. + </p> + <p> + With this faculty, transcendental freedom is also established; freedom, + namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason required it in + its use of the concept of causality in order to escape the antinomy into + which it inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries + to think the unconditioned. Speculative reason could only exhibit this + concept (of freedom) problematically as not impossible to thought, without + assuring it any objective reality, and merely lest the supposed + impossibility of what it must at least allow to be thinkable should + endanger its very being and plunge it into an abyss of scepticism. + </p> + <p> + Inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an + apodeictic law of practical reason, it is the keystone of the whole system + of pure reason, even the speculative, and all other concepts (those of God + and immortality) which, as being mere ideas, remain in it unsupported, now + attach themselves to this concept, and by it obtain consistence and + objective reality; that is to say, their possibility is proved by the fact + that freedom actually exists, for this idea is revealed by the moral law. + </p> + <p> + Freedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the speculative + reason of which we know the possibility a priori (without, however, + understanding it), because it is the condition of the moral law which we + know. * The ideas of God and immortality, however, are not conditions of + the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary object of a will + determined by this law; that is to say, conditions of the practical use of + our pure reason. Hence, with respect to these ideas, we cannot affirm that + we know and understand, I will not say the actuality, but even the + possibility of them. However they are the conditions of the application of + the morally determined will to its object, which is given to it a priori, + viz., the summum bonum. Consequently in this practical point of view their + possibility must be assumed, although we cannot theoretically know and + understand it. To justify this assumption it is sufficient, in a practical + point of view, that they contain no intrinsic impossibility + (contradiction). Here we have what, as far as speculative reason is + concerned, is a merely subjective principle of assent, which, however, is + objectively valid for a reason equally pure but practical, and this + principle, by means of the concept of freedom, assures objective reality + and authority to the ideas of God and immortality. Nay, there is a + subjective necessity (a need of pure reason) to assume them. Nevertheless + the theoretical knowledge of reason is not hereby enlarged, but only the + possibility is given, which heretofore was merely a problem and now + becomes assertion, and thus the practical use of reason is connected with + the elements of theoretical reason. And this need is not a merely + hypothetical one for the arbitrary purposes of speculation, that we must + assume something if we wish in speculation to carry reason to its utmost + limits, but it is a need which has the force of law to assume something + without which that cannot be which we must inevitably set before us as the + aim of our action. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Lest any one should imagine that he finds an inconsistency + here when I call freedom the condition of the moral law, and + hereafter maintain in the treatise itself that the moral law + is the condition under which we can first become conscious + of freedom, I will merely remark that freedom is the ratio + essendi of the moral law, while the moral law is the ratio + cognoscendi of freedom. For had not the moral law been + previously distinctly thought in our reason, we should never + consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as + freedom, although it be not contradictory. But were there no + freedom it would be impossible to trace the moral law in + ourselves at all. +</pre> + <p> + It would certainly be more satisfactory to our speculative reason if it + could solve these problems for itself without this circuit and preserve + the solution for practical use as a thing to be referred to, but in fact + our faculty of speculation is not so well provided. Those who boast of + such high knowledge ought not to keep it back, but to exhibit it publicly + that it may be tested and appreciated. They want to prove: very good, let + them prove; and the critical philosophy lays its arms at their feet as the + victors. Quid statis? Nolint. Atqui licet esse beatis. As they then do not + in fact choose to do so, probably because they cannot, we must take up + these arms again in order to seek in the mortal use of reason, and to base + on this, the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility of + which speculation cannot adequately prove. + </p> + <p> + Here first is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, viz.: how + we deny objective reality to the supersensible use of the categories in + speculation and yet admit this reality with respect to the objects of pure + practical reason. This must at first seem inconsistent as long as this + practical use is only nominally known. But when, by a thorough analysis of + it, one becomes aware that the reality spoken of does not imply any + theoretical determination of the categories and extension of our knowledge + to the supersensible; but that what is meant is that in this respect an + object belongs to them, because either they are contained in the necessary + determination of the will a priori, or are inseparably connected with its + object; then this inconsistency disappears, because the use we make of + these concepts is different from what speculative reason requires. On the + other hand, there now appears an unexpected and very satisfactory proof of + the consistency of the speculative critical philosophy. For whereas it + insisted that the objects of experience as such, including our own + subject, have only the value of phenomena, while at the same time things + in themselves must be supposed as their basis, so that not everything + supersensible was to be regarded as a fiction and its concept as empty; so + now practical reason itself, without any concert with the speculative, + assures reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, + viz., freedom, although (as becomes a practical concept) only for + practical use; and this establishes on the evidence of a fact that which + in the former case could only be conceived. By this the strange but + certain doctrine of the speculative critical philosophy, that the thinking + subject is to itself in internal intuition only a phenomenon, obtains in + the critical examination of the practical reason its full confirmation, + and that so thoroughly that we should be compelled to adopt this doctrine, + even if the former had never proved it at all. * + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * The union of causality as freedom with causality as + rational mechanism, the former established by the moral law, + the latter by the law of nature in the same subject, namely, + man, is impossible, unless we conceive him with reference to + the former as a being in himself, and with reference to the + latter as a phenomenon- the former in pure consciousness, + the latter in empirical consciousness. Otherwise reason + inevitably contradicts itself. +</pre> + <p> + By this also I can understand why the most considerable objections which I + have as yet met with against the Critique turn about these two points, + namely, on the one side, the objective reality of the categories as + applied to noumena, which is in the theoretical department of knowledge + denied, in the practical affirmed; and on the other side, the paradoxical + demand to regard oneself qua subject of freedom as a noumenon, and at the + same time from the point of view of physical nature as a phenomenon in + one's own empirical consciousness; for as long as one has formed no + definite notions of morality and freedom, one could not conjecture on the + one side what was intended to be the noumenon, the basis of the alleged + phenomenon, and on the other side it seemed doubtful whether it was at all + possible to form any notion of it, seeing that we had previously assigned + all the notions of the pure understanding in its theoretical use + exclusively to phenomena. Nothing but a detailed criticism of the + practical reason can remove all this misapprehension and set in a clear + light the consistency which constitutes its greatest merit. + </p> + <p> + So much by way of justification of the proceeding by which, in this work, + the notions and principles of pure speculative reason which have already + undergone their special critical examination are, now and then, again + subjected to examination. This would not in other cases be in accordance + with the systematic process by which a science is established, since + matters which have been decided ought only to be cited and not again + discussed. In this case, however, it was not only allowable but necessary, + because reason is here considered in transition to a different use of + these concepts from what it had made of them before. Such a transition + necessitates a comparison of the old and the new usage, in order to + distinguish well the new path from the old one and, at the same time, to + allow their connection to be observed. Accordingly considerations of this + kind, including those which are once more directed to the concept of + freedom in the practical use of the pure reason, must not be regarded as + an interpolation serving only to fill up the gaps in the critical system + of speculative reason (for this is for its own purpose complete), or like + the props and buttresses which in a hastily constructed building are often + added afterwards; but as true members which make the connexion of the + system plain, and show us concepts, here presented as real, which there + could only be presented problematically. This remark applies especially to + the concept of freedom, respecting which one cannot but observe with + surprise that so many boast of being able to understand it quite well and + to explain its possibility, while they regard it only psychologically, + whereas if they had studied it in a transcendental point of view, they + must have recognized that it is not only indispensable as a problematical + concept, in the complete use of speculative reason, but also quite + incomprehensible; and if they afterwards came to consider its practical + use, they must needs have come to the very mode of determining the + principles of this, to which they are now so loth to assent. The concept + of freedom is the stone of stumbling for all empiricists, but at the same + time the key to the loftiest practical principles for critical moralists, + who perceive by its means that they must necessarily proceed by a rational + method. For this reason I beg the reader not to pass lightly over what is + said of this concept at the end of the Analytic. + </p> + <p> + I must leave it to those who are acquainted with works of this kind to + judge whether such a system as that of the practical reason, which is here + developed from the critical examination of it, has cost much or little + trouble, especially in seeking not to miss the true point of view from + which the whole can be rightly sketched. It presupposes, indeed, the + Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, but only in so far as + this gives a preliminary acquaintance with the principle of duty, and + assigns and justifies a definite formula thereof; in other respects it is + independent. * It results from the nature of this practical faculty itself + that the complete classification of all practical sciences cannot be + added, as in the critique of the speculative reason. For it is not + possible to define duties specially, as human duties, with a view to their + classification, until the subject of this definition (viz., man) is known + according to his actual nature, at least so far as is necessary with + respect to duty; this, however, does not belong to a critical examination + of the practical reason, the business of which is only to assign in a + complete manner the principles of its possibility, extent, and limits, + without special reference to human nature. The classification then belongs + to the system of science, not to the system of criticism. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 15</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work + has hit the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he + says that no new principle of morality is set forth in it, + but only a new formula. But who would think of introducing a + new principle of all morality and making himself as it were + the first discoverer of it, just as if all the world before + him were ignorant what duty was or had been in thorough- + going error? But whoever knows of what importance to a + mathematician a formula is, which defines accurately what is + to be done to work a problem, will not think that a formula + is insignificant and useless which does the same for all + duty in general. +</pre> + <p> + In the second part of the Analytic I have given, as I trust, a sufficient + answer to the objection of a truth-loving and acute critic * of the + Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals- a critic always worthy + of respect- the objection, namely, that the notion of good was not + established before the moral principle, as he thinks it ought to have + been. ** I have also had regard to many of the objections which have + reached me from men who show that they have at heart the discovery of the + truth, and I shall continue to do so (for those who have only their old + system before their eyes, and who have already settled what is to be + approved or disapproved, do not desire any explanation which might stand + in the way of their own private opinion.) + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * [See Kant's "Das mag in der Theoric ricktig seyn," etc. + Werke, vol. vii, p. 182.] + + ** It might also have been objected to me that I have not + first defined the notion of the faculty of desire, or of the + feeling of Pleasure, although this reproach would be unfair, + because this definition might reasonably be presupposed as + given in psychology. However, the definition there given + might be such as to found the determination of the faculty + of desire on the feeling of pleasure (as is commonly done), + and thus the supreme principle of practical philosophy would + be necessarily made empirical, which, however, remains to be + proved and in this critique is altogether refuted. It will, + therefore, give this definition here in such a manner as it + ought to be given, in order to leave this contested point + open at the beginning, as it should be. LIFE is the faculty + a being has of acting according to laws of the faculty of + desire. The faculty of DESIRE is the being's faculty of + becoming by means of its ideas the cause of the actual + existence of the objects of these ideas. PLEASURE is the + idea of the agreement of the object, or the action with the + subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of + causality of an idea in respect of the actuality of its + object (or with the determination of the forces of the + subject to action which produces it). I have no further need + for the purposes of this critique of notions borrowed from + psychology; the critique itself supplies the rest. It is + easily seen that the question whether the faculty of desire + is always based on pleasure, or whether under certain + conditions pleasure only follows the determination of + desire, is by this definition left undecided, for it is + composed only of terms belonging to the pure understanding, + i.e., of categories which contain nothing empirical. Such + precaution is very desirable in all philosophy and yet is + often neglected; namely, not to prejudge questions by + adventuring definitions before the notion has been + completely analysed, which is often very late. It may be + observed through the whole course of the critical philosophy + (of the theoretical as well as the practical reason) that + frequent opportunity offers of supplying defects in the old + dogmatic method of philosophy, and of correcting errors + which are not observed until we make such rational use of + these notions viewing them as a whole. +</pre> + <p> + When we have to study a particular faculty of the human mind in its + sources, its content, and its limits; then from the nature of human + knowledge we must begin with its parts, with an accurate and complete + exposition of them; complete, namely, so far as is possible in the present + state of our knowledge of its elements. But there is another thing to be + attended to which is of a more philosophical and architectonic character, + namely, to grasp correctly the idea of the whole, and from thence to get a + view of all those parts as mutually related by the aid of pure reason, and + by means of their derivation from the concept of the whole. This is only + possible through the most intimate acquaintance with the system; and those + who find the first inquiry too troublesome, and do not think it worth + their while to attain such an acquaintance, cannot reach the second stage, + namely, the general view, which is a synthetical return to that which had + previously been given analytically. It is no wonder then if they find + inconsistencies everywhere, although the gaps which these indicate are not + in the system itself, but in their own incoherent train of thought. + </p> + <p> + I have no fear, as regards this treatise, of the reproach that I wish to + introduce a new language, since the sort of knowledge here in question has + itself somewhat of an everyday character. Nor even in the case of the + former critique could this reproach occur to anyone who had thought it + through and not merely turned over the leaves. To invent new words where + the language has no lack of expressions for given notions is a childish + effort to distinguish oneself from the crowd, if not by new and true + thoughts, yet by new patches on the old garment. If, therefore, the + readers of that work know any more familiar expressions which are as + suitable to the thought as those seem to me to be, or if they think they + can show the futility of these thoughts themselves and hence that of the + expression, they would, in the first case, very much oblige me, for I only + desire to be understood: and, in the second case, they would deserve well + of philosophy. But, as long as these thoughts stand, I very much doubt + that suitable and yet more common expressions for them can be found. * + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * I am more afraid in the present treatise of occasional + misconception in respect of some expressions which I have + chosen with the greatest care in order that the notion to + which they point may not be missed. Thus, in the table of + categories of the Practical reason under the title of + Modality, the Permitted, and forbidden (in a practical + objective point of view, possible and impossible) have + almost the same meaning in common language as the next + category, duty and contrary to duty. Here, however, the + former means what coincides with, or contradicts, a merely + possible practical precept (for example, the solution of all + problems of geometry and mechanics); the latter, what is + similarly related to a law actually present in the reason; + and this distinction is not quite foreign even to common + language, although somewhat unusual. For example, it is + forbidden to an orator, as such, to forge new words or + constructions; in a certain degree this is permitted to a + poet; in neither case is there any question of duty. For if + anyone chooses to forfeit his reputation as an orator, no + one can prevent him. We have here only to do with the + distinction of imperatives into problematical, assertorial, + and apodeictic. Similarly in the note in which I have pared + the moral ideas of practical perfection in different + philosophical schools, I have distinguished the idea of + wisdom from that of holiness, although I have stated that + essentially and objectively they are the same. But in that + place I understand by the former only that wisdom to which + man (the Stoic) lays claim; therefore I take it subjectively + as an attribute alleged to belong to man. (Perhaps the + expression virtue, with which also the Stoic made great + show, would better mark the characteristic of his school.) + The expression of a postulate of pure practical reason might + give most occasion to misapprehension in case the reader + confounded it with the signification of the postulates in + pure mathematics, which carry apodeictic certainty with + them. These, however, postulate the possibility of an + action, the object of which has been previously recognized a + priori in theory as possible, and that with perfect + certainty. But the former postulates the possibility of an + object itself (God and the immortality of the soul) from + apodeictic practical laws, and therefore only for the + purposes of a practical reason. This certainty of the + postulated possibility then is not at all theoretic, and + consequently not apodeictic; that is to say, it is not a + known necessity as regards the object, but a necessary + supposition as regards the subject, necessary for the + obedience to its objective but practical laws. It is, + therefore, merely a necessary hypothesis. I could find no + better expression for this rational necessity, which is + subjective, but yet true and unconditional. +</pre> + <p> + In this manner, then, the a priori principles of two faculties of the + mind, the faculty of cognition and that of desire, would be found and + determined as to the conditions, extent, and limits of their use, and thus + a sure foundation be paid for a scientific system of philosophy, both + theoretic and practical. + </p> + <p> + Nothing worse could happen to these labours than that anyone should make + the unexpected discovery that there neither is, nor can be, any a priori + knowledge at all. But there is no danger of this. This would be the same + thing as if one sought to prove by reason that there is no reason. For we + only say that we know something by reason, when we are conscious that we + could have known it, even if it had not been given to us in experience; + hence rational knowledge and knowledge a priori are one and the same. It + is a clear contradiction to try to extract necessity from a principle of + experience (ex pumice aquam), and to try by this to give a judgement true + universality (without which there is no rational inference, not even + inference from analogy, which is at least a presumed universality and + objective necessity). To substitute subjective necessity, that is, custom, + for objective, which exists only in a priori judgements, is to deny to + reason the power of judging about the object, i.e., of knowing it, and + what belongs to it. It implies, for example, that we must not say of + something which often or always follows a certain antecedent state that we + can conclude from this to that (for this would imply objective necessity + and the notion of an a priori connexion), but only that we may expect + similar cases (just as animals do), that is that we reject the notion of + cause altogether as false and a mere delusion. As to attempting to remedy + this want of objective and consequently universal validity by saying that + we can see no ground for attributing any other sort of knowledge to other + rational beings, if this reasoning were valid, our ignorance would do more + for the enlargement of our knowledge than all our meditation. For, then, + on this very ground that we have no knowledge of any other rational beings + besides man, we should have a right to suppose them to be of the same + nature as we know ourselves to be: that is, we should really know them. I + omit to mention that universal assent does not prove the objective + validity of a judgement (i.e., its validity as a cognition), and although + this universal assent should accidentally happen, it could furnish no + proof of agreement with the object; on the contrary, it is the objective + validity which alone constitutes the basis of a necessary universal + consent. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 30</span> + </p> + <p> + Hume would be quite satisfied with this system of universal empiricism, + for, as is well known, he desired nothing more than that, instead of + ascribing any objective meaning to the necessity in the concept of cause, + a merely subjective one should be assumed, viz., custom, in order to deny + that reason could judge about God, freedom, and immortality; and if once + his principles were granted, he was certainly well able to deduce his + conclusions therefrom, with all logical coherence. But even Hume did not + make his empiricism so universal as to include mathematics. He holds the + principles of mathematics to be analytical; and if his were correct, they + would certainly be apodeictic also: but we could not infer from this that + reason has the faculty of forming apodeictic judgements in philosophy + also- that is to say, those which are synthetical judgements, like the + judgement of causality. But if we adopt a universal empiricism, then + mathematics will be included. + </p> + <p> + Now if this science is in contradiction with a reason that admits only + empirical principles, as it inevitably is in the antinomy in which + mathematics prove the infinite divisibility of space, which empiricism + cannot admit; then the greatest possible evidence of demonstration is in + manifest contradiction with the alleged conclusions from experience, and + we are driven to ask, like Cheselden's blind patient, "Which deceives me, + sight or touch?" (for empiricism is based on a necessity felt, rationalism + on a necessity seen). And thus universal empiricism reveals itself as + absolute scepticism. It is erroneous to attribute this in such an + unqualified sense to Hume, * since he left at least one certain touchstone + (which can only be found in a priori principles), although experience + consists not only of feelings, but also of judgements. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Names that designate the followers of a sect have always + been accompanied with much injustice; just as if one said, + "N is an Idealist." For although he not only admits, but + even insists, that our ideas of external things have actual + objects of external things corresponding to them, yet he + holds that the form of the intuition does not depend on them + but on the human mind. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 35</span> + </p> + <p> + However, as in this philosophical and critical age such empiricism can + scarcely be serious, and it is probably put forward only as an + intellectual exercise and for the purpose of putting in a clearer light, + by contrast, the necessity of rational a priori principles, we can only be + grateful to those who employ themselves in this otherwise uninstructive + labour. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + The theoretical use of reason was concerned with objects of the cognitive + faculty only, and a critical examination of it with reference to this use + applied properly only to the pure faculty of cognition; because this + raised the suspicion, which was afterwards confirmed, that it might easily + pass beyond its limits, and be lost among unattainable objects, or even + contradictory notions. It is quite different with the practical use of + reason. In this, reason is concerned with the grounds of determination of + the will, which is a faculty either to produce objects corresponding to + ideas, or to determine ourselves to the effecting of such objects (whether + the physical power is sufficient or not); that is, to determine our + causality. For here, reason can at least attain so far as to determine the + will, and has always objective reality in so far as it is the volition + only that is in question. The first question here then is whether pure + reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will, or whether it can + be a ground of determination only as dependent on empirical conditions. + Now, here there comes in a notion of causality justified by the critique + of the pure reason, although not capable of being presented empirically, + viz., that of freedom; and if we can now discover means of proving that + this property does in fact belong to the human will (and so to the will of + all rational beings), then it will not only be shown that pure reason can + be practical, but that it alone, and not reason empirically limited, is + indubitably practical; consequently, we shall have to make a critical + examination, not of pure practical reason, but only of practical reason + generally. For when once pure reason is shown to exist, it needs no + critical examination. For reason itself contains the standard for the + critical examination of every use of it. The critique, then, of practical + reason generally is bound to prevent the empirically conditioned reason + from claiming exclusively to furnish the ground of determination of the + will. If it is proved that there is a [practical] reason, its employment + is alone immanent; the empirically conditioned use, which claims + supremacy, is on the contrary transcendent and expresses itself in demands + and precepts which go quite beyond its sphere. This is just the opposite + of what might be said of pure reason in its speculative employment. + </p> + <p> + However, as it is still pure reason, the knowledge of which is here the + foundation of its practical employment, the general outline of the + classification of a critique of practical reason must be arranged in + accordance with that of the speculative. We must, then, have the Elements + and the Methodology of it; and in the former an Analytic as the rule of + truth, and a Dialectic as the exposition and dissolution of the illusion + in the judgements of practical reason. But the order in the subdivision of + the Analytic will be the reverse of that in the critique of the pure + speculative reason. For, in the present case, we shall commence with the + principles and proceed to the concepts, and only then, if possible, to the + senses; whereas in the case of the speculative reason we began with the + senses and had to end with the principles. The reason of this lies again + in this: that now we have to do with a will, and have to consider reason, + not in its relation to objects, but to this will and its causality. We + must, then, begin with the principles of a causality not empirically + conditioned, after which the attempt can be made to establish our notions + of the determining grounds of such a will, of their application to + objects, and finally to the subject and its sense faculty. We necessarily + begin with the law of causality from freedom, that is, with a pure + practical principle, and this determines the objects to which alone it can + be applied. + </p> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1</span> + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + FIRST PART — ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON. + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0001" id="link2HCH0001"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + I. DEFINITION. + </h2> + <p> + Practical principles are propositions which contain a general + determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They + are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject + as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or practical laws, when + the condition is recognized as objective, that is, valid for the will of + every rational being. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0008" id="link2H_4_0008"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <p> + Supposing that pure reason contains in itself a practical motive, that is, + one adequate to determine the will, then there are practical laws; + otherwise all practical principles will be mere maxims. In case the will + of a rational being is pathologically affected, there may occur a conflict + of the maxims with the practical laws recognized by itself. For example, + one may make it his maxim to let no injury pass unrevenged, and yet he may + see that this is not a practical law, but only his own maxim; that, on the + contrary, regarded as being in one and the same maxim a rule for the will + of every rational being, it must contradict itself. In natural philosophy + the principles of what happens, (e.g., the principle of equality of action + and reaction in the communication of motion) are at the same time laws of + nature; for the use of reason there is theoretical and determined by the + nature of the object. In practical philosophy, i.e., that which has to do + only with the grounds of determination of the will, the principles which a + man makes for himself are not laws by which one is inevitably bound; + because reason in practical matters has to do with the subject, namely, + with the faculty of desire, the special character of which may occasion + variety in the rule. The practical rule is always a product of reason, + because it prescribes action as a means to the effect. But in the case of + a being with whom reason does not of itself determine the will, this rule + is an imperative, i.e., a rule characterized by "shall," which expresses + the objective necessitation of the action and signifies that, if reason + completely determined the will, the action would inevitably take place + according to this rule. Imperatives, therefore, are objectively valid, and + are quite distinct from maxims, which are subjective principles. The + former either determine the conditions of the causality of the rational + being as an efficient cause, i.e., merely in reference to the effect and + the means of attaining it; or they determine the will only, whether it is + adequate to the effect or not. The former would be hypothetical + imperatives, and contain mere precepts of skill; the latter, on the + contrary, would be categorical, and would alone be practical laws. Thus + maxims are principles, but not imperatives. Imperatives themselves, + however, when they are conditional (i.e., do not determine the will simply + as will, but only in respect to a desired effect, that is, when they are + hypothetical imperatives), are practical precepts but not laws. Laws must + be sufficient to determine the will as will, even before I ask whether I + have power sufficient for a desired effect, or the means necessary to + produce it; hence they are categorical: otherwise they are not laws at + all, because the necessity is wanting, which, if it is to be practical, + must be independent of conditions which are pathological and are therefore + only contingently connected with the will. Tell a man, for example, that + he must be industrious and thrifty in youth, in order that he may not want + in old age; this is a correct and important practical precept of the will. + But it is easy to see that in this case the will is directed to something + else which it is presupposed that it desires; and as to this desire, we + must leave it to the actor himself whether he looks forward to other + resources than those of his own acquisition, or does not expect to be old, + or thinks that in case of future necessity he will be able to make shift + with little. Reason, from which alone can spring a rule involving + necessity, does, indeed, give necessity to this precept (else it would not + be an imperative), but this is a necessity dependent on subjective + conditions, and cannot be supposed in the same degree in all subjects. But + that reason may give laws it is necessary that it should only need to + presuppose itself, because rules are objectively and universally valid + only when they hold without any contingent subjective conditions, which + distinguish one rational being from another. Now tell a man that he should + never make a deceitful promise, this is a rule which only concerns his + will, whether the purposes he may have can be attained thereby or not; it + is the volition only which is to be determined a priori by that rule. If + now it is found that this rule is practically right, then it is a law, + because it is a categorical imperative. Thus, practical laws refer to the + will only, without considering what is attained by its causality, and we + may disregard this latter (as belonging to the world of sense) in order to + have them quite pure. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0009" id="link2H_4_0009"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II. THEOREM I. + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 15</span> + </h3> + <p> + All practical principles which presuppose an object (matter) of the + faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are empirical + and can furnish no practical laws. + </p> + <p> + By the matter of the faculty of desire I mean an object the realization of + which is desired. Now, if the desire for this object precedes the + practical rule and is the condition of our making it a principle, then I + say (in the first place) this principle is in that case wholly empirical, + for then what determines the choice is the idea of an object and that + relation of this idea to the subject by which its faculty of desire is + determined to its realization. Such a relation to the subject is called + the pleasure in the realization of an object. This, then, must be + presupposed as a condition of the possibility of determination of the + will. But it is impossible to know a priori of any idea of an object + whether it will be connected with pleasure or pain, or be indifferent. In + such cases, therefore, the determining principle of the choice must be + empirical and, therefore, also the practical material principle which + presupposes it as a condition. + </p> + <p> + In the second place, since susceptibility to a pleasure or pain can be + known only empirically and cannot hold in the same degree for all rational + beings, a principle which is based on this subjective condition may serve + indeed as a maxim for the subject which possesses this susceptibility, but + not as a law even to him (because it is wanting in objective necessity, + which must be recognized a priori); it follows, therefore, that such a + principle can never furnish a practical law. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0010" id="link2H_4_0010"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + III. THEOREM II. + </h2> + <p> + All material practical principles as such are of one and the same kind and + come under the general principle of self-love or private happiness. + </p> + <p> + Pleasure arising from the idea of the idea of the existence of a thing, in + so far as it is to determine the desire of this thing, is founded on the + susceptibility of the subject, since it depends on the presence of an + object; hence it belongs to sense (feeling), and not to understanding, + which expresses a relation of the idea to an object according to concepts, + not to the subject according to feelings. It is, then, practical only in + so far as the faculty of desire is determined by the sensation of + agreeableness which the subject expects from the actual existence of the + object. Now, a rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life + uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is happiness; and the + principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of the will + is the principle of self-love. All material principles, then, which place + the determining ground of the will in the pleasure or pain to be received + from the existence of any object are all of the same kind, inasmuch as + they all belong to the principle of self-love or private happiness. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> + <h3> + COROLLARY. + </h3> + <p> + All material practical rules place the determining principle of the will + in the lower desires; and if there were no purely formal laws of the will + adequate to determine it, then we could not admit any higher desire at + all. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0011" id="link2H_4_0011"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK I. + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 30</span> + </h3> + <p> + It is surprising that men, otherwise acute, can think it possible to + distinguish between higher and lower desires, according as the ideas which + are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin in the senses + or in the understanding; for when we inquire what are the determining + grounds of desire, and place them in some expected pleasantness, it is of + no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing object is derived, but + only how much it pleases. Whether an idea has its seat and source in the + understanding or not, if it can only determine the choice by presupposing + a feeling of pleasure in the subject, it follows that its capability of + determining the choice depends altogether on the nature of the inner + sense, namely, that this can be agreeably affected by it. However + dissimilar ideas of objects may be, though they be ideas of the + understanding, or even of the reason in contrast to ideas of sense, yet + the feeling of pleasure, by means of which they constitute the determining + principle of the will (the expected satisfaction which impels the activity + to the production of the object), is of one and the same kind, not only + inasmuch as it can only be known empirically, but also inasmuch as it + affects one and the same vital force which manifests itself in the faculty + of desire, and in this respect can only differ in degree from every other + ground of determination. Otherwise, how could we compare in respect of + magnitude two principles of determination, the ideas of which depend upon + different faculties, so as to prefer that which affects the faculty of + desire in the highest degree. The same man may return unread an + instructive book which he cannot again obtain, in order not to miss a + hunt; he may depart in the midst of a fine speech, in order not to be late + for dinner; he may leave a rational conversation, such as he otherwise + values highly, to take his place at the gaming-table; he may even repulse + a poor man whom he at other times takes pleasure in benefiting, because he + has only just enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the + theatre. If the determination of his will rests on the feeling of the + agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause, it is + all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected. The only + thing that concerns him, in order to decide his choice, is, how great, how + long continued, how easily obtained, and how often repeated, this + agreeableness is. Just as to the man who wants money to spend, it is all + the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain or washed out of the + sand, provided it is everywhere accepted at the same value; so the man who + cares only for the enjoyment of life does not ask whether the ideas are of + the understanding or the senses, but only how much and how great pleasure + they will give for the longest time. It is only those that would gladly + deny to pure reason the power of determining the will, without the + presupposition of any feeling, who could deviate so far from their own + exposition as to describe as quite heterogeneous what they have themselves + previously brought under one and the same principle. Thus, for example, it + is observed that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power, in + the consciousness of our strength of mind in overcoming obstacles which + are opposed to our designs, in the culture of our mental talents, etc.; + and we justly call these more refined pleasures and enjoyments, because + they are more in our power than others; they do not wear out, but rather + increase the capacity for further enjoyment of them, and while they + delight they at the same time cultivate. But to say on this account that + they determine the will in a different way and not through sense, whereas + the possibility of the pleasure presupposes a feeling for it implanted in + us, which is the first condition of this satisfaction; this is just as + when ignorant persons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so + subtle, so supersubtle that they almost make themselves giddy with it, and + then think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual and yet + extended being. If with Epicurus we make virtue determine the will only by + means of the pleasure it promises, we cannot afterwards blame him for + holding that this pleasure is of the same kind as those of the coarsest + senses. For we have no reason whatever to charge him with holding that the + ideas by which this feeling is excited in us belong merely to the bodily + senses. As far as can be conjectured, he sought the source of many of them + in the use of the higher cognitive faculty, but this did not prevent him, + and could not prevent him, from holding on the principle above stated, + that the pleasure itself which those intellectual ideas give us, and by + which alone they can determine the will, is just of the same kind. + Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher, and yet the most + rarely found. The ancient Greek schools give us more examples of it than + we find in our syncretistic age, in which a certain shallow and dishonest + system of compromise of contradictory principles is devised, because it + commends itself better to a public which is content to know something of + everything and nothing thoroughly, so as to please every party. + </p> + <p> + The principle of private happiness, however much understanding and reason + may be used in it, cannot contain any other determining principles for the + will than those which belong to the lower desires; and either there are no + [higher] desires at all, or pure reason must of itself alone be practical; + that is, it must be able to determine the will by the mere form of the + practical rule without supposing any feeling, and consequently without any + idea of the pleasant or unpleasant, which is the matter of the desire, and + which is always an empirical condition of the principles. Then only, when + reason of itself determines the will (not as the servant of the + inclination), it is really a higher desire to which that which is + pathologically determined is subordinate, and is really, and even + specifically, distinct from the latter, so that even the slightest + admixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and + superiority; just as in a mathematical demonstration the least empirical + condition would degrade and destroy its force and value. Reason, with its + practical law, determines the will immediately, not by means of an + intervening feeling of pleasure or pain, not even of pleasure in the law + itself, and it is only because it can, as pure reason, be practical, that + it is possible for it to be legislative. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0012" id="link2H_4_0012"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK II. + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 35</span> + </h3> + <p> + To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being, and + this, therefore, is inevitably a determining principle of its faculty of + desire. For we are not in possession originally of satisfaction with our + whole existence- a bliss which would imply a consciousness of our own + independent self-sufficiency this is a problem imposed upon us by our own + finite nature, because we have wants and these wants regard the matter of + our desires, that is, something that is relative to a subjective feeling + of pleasure or pain, which determines what we need in order to be + satisfied with our condition. But just because this material principle of + determination can only be empirically known by the subject, it is + impossible to regard this problem as a law; for a law being objective must + contain the very same principle of determination of the will in all cases + and for all rational beings. For, although the notion of happiness is in + every case the foundation of practical relation of the objects to the + desires, yet it is only a general name for the subjective determining + principles, and determines nothing specifically; whereas this is what + alone we are concerned with in this practical problem, which cannot be + solved at all without such specific determination. For it is every man's + own special feeling of pleasure and pain that decides in what he is to + place his happiness, and even in the same subject this will vary with the + difference of his wants according as this feeling changes, and thus a law + which is subjectively necessary (as a law of nature) is objectively a very + contingent practical principle, which can and must be very different in + different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law; since, in the + desire for happiness it is not the form (of conformity to law) that is + decisive, but simply the matter, namely, whether I am to expect pleasure + in following the law, and how much. Principles of self-love may, indeed, + contain universal precepts of skill (how to find means to accomplish one's + purpose), but in that case they are merely theoretical principles; * as, + for example, how he who would like to eat bread should contrive a mill; + but practical precepts founded on them can never be universal, for the + determining principle of the desire is based on the feeling pleasure and + pain, which can never be supposed to be universally directed to the same + objects. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Propositions which in mathematics or physics are called + practical ought properly to be called technical. For they + have nothing to do with the determination of the will; they + only point out how a certain effect is to be produced and + are, therefore, just as theoretical as any propositions + which express the connection of a cause with an effect. Now + whoever chooses the effect must also choose the cause. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 40</span> + </p> + <p> + Even supposing, however, that all finite rational beings were thoroughly + agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings of pleasure and pain, + and also as to the means which they must employ to attain the one and + avoid the other; still, they could by no means set up the principle of + self-love as a practical law, for this unanimity itself would be only + contingent. The principle of determination would still be only + subjectively valid and merely empirical, and would not possess the + necessity which is conceived in every law, namely, an objective necessity + arising from a priori grounds; unless, indeed, we hold this necessity to + be not at all practical, but merely physical, viz., that our action is as + inevitably determined by our inclination, as yawning when we see others + yawn. It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at + all, but only counsels for the service of our desires, than to raise + merely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws, which have + objective necessity, and not merely subjective, and which must be known by + reason a priori, not by experience (however empirically universal this may + be). Even the rules of corresponding phenomena are only called laws of + nature (e.g., the mechanical laws), when we either know them really a + priori, or (as in the case of chemical laws) suppose that they would be + known a priori from objective grounds if our insight reached further. But + in the case of merely subjective practical principles, it is expressly + made a condition that they rest, not on objective, but on subjective + conditions of choice, and hence that they must always be represented as + mere maxims, never as practical laws. This second remark seems at first + sight to be mere verbal refinement, but it defines the terms of the most + important distinction which can come into consideration in practical + investigations. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0013" id="link2H_4_0013"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IV. THEOREM II. + </h2> + <p> + A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal laws, + unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will, not by + their matter, but by their form only. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 45</span> + </p> + <p> + By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the will. This + object is either the determining ground of the will or it is not. In the + former case the rule of the will is subjected to an empirical condition + (viz., the relation of the determining idea to the feeling of pleasure and + pain), consequently it can not be a practical law. Now, when we abstract + from a law all matter, i.e., every object of the will (as a determining + principle), nothing is left but the mere form of a universal legislation. + Therefore, either a rational being cannot conceive his subjective + practical principles, that is, his maxims, as being at the same time + universal laws, or he must suppose that their mere form, by which they are + fitted for universal legislation, is alone what makes them practical laws. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0014" id="link2H_4_0014"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <p> + The commonest understanding can distinguish without instruction what form + of maxim is adapted for universal legislation, and what is not. Suppose, + for example, that I have made it my maxim to increase my fortune by every + safe means. Now, I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which is dead + and has left no writing about it. This is just the case for my maxim. I + desire then to know whether that maxim can also bold good as a universal + practical law. I apply it, therefore, to the present case, and ask whether + it could take the form of a law, and consequently whether I can by my + maxim at the same time give such a law as this, that everyone may deny a + deposit of which no one can produce a proof. I at once become aware that + such a principle, viewed as a law, would annihilate itself, because the + result would be that there would be no deposits. A practical law which I + recognise as such must be qualified for universal legislation; this is an + identical proposition and, therefore, self-evident. Now, if I say that my + will is subject to a practical law, I cannot adduce my inclination (e.g., + in the present case my avarice) as a principle of determination fitted to + be a universal practical law; for this is so far from being fitted for a + universal legislation that, if put in the form of a universal law, it + would destroy itself. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 50</span> + </p> + <p> + It is, therefore, surprising that intelligent men could have thought of + calling the desire of happiness a universal practical law on the ground + that the desire is universal, and, therefore, also the maxim by which + everyone makes this desire determine his will. For whereas in other cases + a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious; here, on the + contrary, if we attribute to the maxim the universality of a law, the + extreme opposite of harmony will follow, the greatest opposition and the + complete destruction of the maxim itself and its purpose. For, in that + case, the will of all has not one and the same object, but everyone has + his own (his private welfare), which may accidentally accord with the + purposes of others which are equally selfish, but it is far from sufficing + for a law; because the occasional exceptions which one is permitted to + make are endless, and cannot be definitely embraced in one universal rule. + In this manner, then, results a harmony like that which a certain + satirical poem depicts as existing between a married couple bent on going + to ruin, "O, marvellous harmony, what he wishes, she wishes also"; or like + what is said of the pledge of Francis I to the Emperor Charles V, "What my + brother Charles wishes that I wish also" (viz., Milan). Empirical + principles of determination are not fit for any universal external + legislation, but just as little for internal; for each man makes his own + subject the foundation of his inclination, and in the same subject + sometimes one inclination, sometimes another, has the preponderance. To + discover a law which would govern them all under this condition, namely, + bringing them all into harmony, is quite impossible. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0015" id="link2H_4_0015"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + V. PROBLEM I. + </h2> + <p> + Supposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the sufficient + determining principle of a will, to find the nature of the will which can + be determined by it alone. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 55</span> + </p> + <p> + Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason, and is, + therefore, not an object of the senses, and consequently does not belong + to the class of phenomena, it follows that the idea of it, which + determines the will, is distinct from all the principles that determine + events in nature according to the law of causality, because in their case + the determining principles must themselves be phenomena. Now, if no other + determining principle can serve as a law for the will except that + universal legislative form, such a will must be conceived as quite + independent of the natural law of phenomena in their mutual relation, + namely, the law of causality; such independence is called freedom in the + strictest, that is, in the transcendental, sense; consequently, a will + which can have its law in nothing but the mere legislative form of the + maxim is a free will. + </p> + <h3> + VI. PROBLEM II. + </h3> + <p> + Supposing that a will is free, to find the law which alone is competent to + determine it necessarily. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 60</span> + </p> + <p> + Since the matter of the practical law, i.e., an object of the maxim, can + never be given otherwise than empirically, and the free will is + independent on empirical conditions (that is, conditions belonging to the + world of sense) and yet is determinable, consequently a free will must + find its principle of determination in the law, and yet independently of + the matter of the law. But, besides the matter of the law, nothing is + contained in it except the legislative form. It is the legislative form, + then, contained in the maxim, which can alone constitute a principle of + determination of the [free] will. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0016" id="link2H_4_0016"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <p> + Thus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each + other. Now I do not ask here whether they are in fact distinct, or whether + an unconditioned law is not rather merely the consciousness of a pure + practical reason and the latter identical with the positive concept of + freedom; I only ask, whence begins our knowledge of the unconditionally + practical, whether it is from freedom or from the practical law? Now it + cannot begin from freedom, for of this we cannot be immediately conscious, + since the first concept of it is negative; nor can we infer it from + experience, for experience gives us the knowledge only of the law of + phenomena, and hence of the mechanism of nature, the direct opposite of + freedom. It is therefore the moral law, of which we become directly + conscious (as soon as we trace for ourselves maxims of the will), that + first presents itself to us, and leads directly to the concept of freedom, + inasmuch as reason presents it as a principle of determination not to be + outweighed by any sensible conditions, nay, wholly independent of them. + But how is the consciousness, of that moral law possible? We can become + conscious of pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure + theoretical principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason + prescribes them and to the elimination of all empirical conditions, which + it directs. The concept of a pure will arises out of the former, as that + of a pure understanding arises out of the latter. That this is the true + subordination of our concepts, and that it is morality that first + discovers to us the notion of freedom, hence that it is practical reason + which, with this concept, first proposes to speculative reason the most + insoluble problem, thereby placing it in the greatest perplexity, is + evident from the following consideration: Since nothing in phenomena can + be explained by the concept of freedom, but the mechanism of nature must + constitute the only clue; moreover, when pure reason tries to ascend in + the series of causes to the unconditioned, it falls into an antinomy which + is entangled in incomprehensibilities on the one side as much as the + other; whilst the latter (namely, mechanism) is at least useful in the + explanation of phenomena, therefore no one would ever have been so rash as + to introduce freedom into science, had not the moral law, and with it + practical reason, come in and forced this notion upon us. Experience, + however, confirms this order of notions. Suppose some one asserts of his + lustful appetite that, when the desired object and the opportunity are + present, it is quite irresistible. [Ask him]- if a gallows were erected + before the house where he finds this opportunity, in order that he should + be hanged thereon immediately after the gratification of his lust, whether + he could not then control his passion; we need not be long in doubt what + he would reply. Ask him, however- if his sovereign ordered him, on pain of + the same immediate execution, to bear false witness against an honourable + man, whom the prince might wish to destroy under a plausible pretext, + would he consider it possible in that case to overcome his love of life, + however great it may be. He would perhaps not venture to affirm whether he + would do so or not, but he must unhesitatingly admit that it is possible + to do so. He judges, therefore, that he can do a certain thing because he + is conscious that he ought, and he recognizes that he is free- a fact + which but for the moral law he would never have known. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 65</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0017" id="link2H_4_0017"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL REASON. + </h2> + <p> + Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as + a principle of universal legislation. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 70</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0018" id="link2H_4_0018"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <p> + Pure geometry has postulates which are practical propositions, but contain + nothing further than the assumption that we can do something if it is + required that we should do it, and these are the only geometrical + propositions that concern actual existence. They are, then, practical + rules under a problematical condition of the will; but here the rule says: + We absolutely must proceed in a certain manner. The practical rule is, + therefore, unconditional, and hence it is conceived a priori as a + categorically practical proposition by which the will is objectively + determined absolutely and immediately (by the practical rule itself, which + thus is in this case a law); for pure reason practical of itself is here + directly legislative. The will is thought as independent on empirical + conditions, and, therefore, as pure will determined by the mere form of + the law, and this principle of determination is regarded as the supreme + condition of all maxims. The thing is strange enough, and has no parallel + in all the rest of our practical knowledge. For the a priori thought of a + possible universal legislation which is therefore merely problematical, is + unconditionally commanded as a law without borrowing anything from + experience or from any external will. This, however, is not a precept to + do something by which some desired effect can be attained (for then the + will would depend on physical conditions), but a rule that determines the + will a priori only so far as regards the forms of its maxims; and thus it + is at least not impossible to conceive that a law, which only applies to + the subjective form of principles, yet serves as a principle of + determination by means of the objective form of law in general. We may + call the consciousness of this fundamental law a fact of reason, because + we cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason, e.g., the + consciousness of freedom (for this is not antecedently given), but it + forces itself on us as a synthetic a priori proposition, which is not + based on any intuition, either pure or empirical. It would, indeed, be + analytical if the freedom of the will were presupposed, but to presuppose + freedom as a positive concept would require an intellectual intuition, + which cannot here be assumed; however, when we regard this law as given, + it must be observed, in order not to fall into any misconception, that it + is not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of the pure reason, which + thereby announces itself as originally legislative (sic volo, sic jubeo). + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0019" id="link2H_4_0019"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + COROLLARY. + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 75</span> + </h3> + <p> + Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to man) a universal + law which we call the moral law. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0020" id="link2H_4_0020"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 80</span> + </h3> + <p> + The fact just mentioned is undeniable. It is only necessary to analyse the + judgement that men pass on the lawfulness of their actions, in order to + find that, whatever inclination may say to the contrary, reason, + incorruptible and self-constrained, always confronts the maxim of the will + in any action with the pure will, that is, with itself, considering itself + as a priori practical. Now this principle of morality, just on account of + the universality of the legislation which makes it the formal supreme + determining principle of the will, without regard to any subjective + differences, is declared by the reason to be a law for all rational + beings, in so far as they have a will, that is, a power to determine their + causality by the conception of rules; and, therefore, so far as they are + capable of acting according to principles, and consequently also according + to practical a priori principles (for these alone have the necessity that + reason requires in a principle). It is, therefore, not limited to men + only, but applies to all finite beings that possess reason and will; nay, + it even includes the Infinite Being as the supreme intelligence. In the + former case, however, the law has the form of an imperative, because in + them, as rational beings, we can suppose a pure will, but being creatures + affected with wants and physical motives, not a holy will, that is, one + which would be incapable of any maxim conflicting with the moral law. In + their case, therefore, the moral law is an imperative, which commands + categorically, because the law is unconditioned; the relation of such a + will to this law is dependence under the name of obligation, which implies + a constraint to an action, though only by reason and its objective law; + and this action is called duty, because an elective will, subject to + pathological affections (though not determined by them, and, therefore, + still free), implies a wish that arises from subjective causes and, + therefore, may often be opposed to the pure objective determining + principle; whence it requires the moral constraint of a resistance of the + practical reason, which may be called an internal, but intellectual, + compulsion. In the supreme intelligence the elective will is rightly + conceived as incapable of any maxim which could not at the same time be + objectively a law; and the notion of holiness, which on that account + belongs to it, places it, not indeed above all practical laws, but above + all practically restrictive laws, and consequently above obligation and + duty. This holiness of will is, however, a practical idea, which must + necessarily serve as a type to which finite rational beings can only + approximate indefinitely, and which the pure moral law, which is itself on + this account called holy, constantly and rightly holds before their eyes. + The utmost that finite practical reason can effect is to be certain of + this indefinite progress of one's maxims and of their steady disposition + to advance. This is virtue, and virtue, at least as a naturally acquired + faculty, can never be perfect, because assurance in such a case never + becomes apodeictic certainty and, when it only amounts to persuasion, is + very dangerous. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0021" id="link2H_4_0021"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VIII. THEOREM IV. + </h2> + <p> + The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of + all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy of the + elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on + the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof and to the morality of the + will. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 85</span> + </p> + <p> + In fact the sole principle of morality consists in the independence on all + matter of the law (namely, a desired object), and in the determination of + the elective will by the mere universal legislative form of which its + maxim must be capable. Now this independence is freedom in the negative + sense, and this self-legislation of the pure, and therefore practical, + reason is freedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral law expresses + nothing else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason; that is, + freedom; and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, and on + this condition only can they agree with the supreme practical law. If + therefore the matter of the volition, which can be nothing else than the + object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the + practical law, as the condition of its possibility, there results + heteronomy of the elective will, namely, dependence on the physical law + that we should follow some impulse or inclination. In that case the will + does not give itself the law, but only the precept how rationally to + follow pathological law; and the maxim which, in such a case, never + contains the universally legislative form, not only produces no + obligation, but is itself opposed to the principle of a pure practical + reason and, therefore, also to the moral disposition, even though the + resulting action may be conformable to the law. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0022" id="link2H_4_0022"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <p> + Hence a practical precept, which contains a material (and therefore + empirical) condition, must never be reckoned a practical law. For the law + of the pure will, which is free, brings the will into a sphere quite + different from the empirical; and as the necessity involved in the law is + not a physical necessity, it can only consist in the formal conditions of + the possibility of a law in general. All the matter of practical rules + rests on subjective conditions, which give them only a conditional + universality (in case I desire this or that, what I must do in order to + obtain it), and they all turn on the principle of private happiness. Now, + it is indeed undeniable that every volition must have an object, and + therefore a matter; but it does not follow that this is the determining + principle and the condition of the maxim; for, if it is so, then this + cannot be exhibited in a universally legislative form, since in that case + the expectation of the existence of the object would be the determining + cause of the choice, and the volition must presuppose the dependence of + the faculty of desire on the existence of something; but this dependence + can only be sought in empirical conditions and, therefore, can never + furnish a foundation for a necessary and universal rule. Thus, the + happiness of others may be the object of the will of a rational being. But + if it were the determining principle of the maxim, we must assume that we + find not only a rational satisfaction in the welfare of others, but also a + want such as the sympathetic disposition in some men occasions. But I + cannot assume the existence of this want in every rational being (not at + all in God). The matter, then, of the maxim may remain, but it must not be + the condition of it, else the maxim could not be fit for a law. Hence, the + mere form of law, which limits the matter, must also be a reason for + adding this matter to the will, not for presupposing it. For example, let + the matter be my own happiness. This (rule), if I attribute it to everyone + (as, in fact, I may, in the case of every finite being), can become an + objective practical law only if I include the happiness of others. + Therefore, the law that we should promote the happiness of others does not + arise from the assumption that this is an object of everyone's choice, but + merely from this, that the form of universality which reason requires as + the condition of giving to a maxim of self-love the objective validity of + a law is the principle that determines the will. Therefore it was not the + object (the happiness of others) that determined the pure will, but it was + the form of law only, by which I restricted my maxim, founded on + inclination, so as to give it the universality of a law, and thus to adapt + it to the practical reason; and it is this restriction alone, and not the + addition of an external spring, that can give rise to the notion of the + obligation to extend the maxim of my self-love to the happiness of others. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 90</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0023" id="link2H_4_0023"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK II. + </h2> + <p> + The direct opposite of the principle of morality is, when the principle of + private happiness is made the determining principle of the will, and with + this is to be reckoned, as I have shown above, everything that places the + determining principle which is to serve as a law, anywhere but in the + legislative form of the maxim. This contradiction, however, is not merely + logical, like that which would arise between rules empirically + conditioned, if they were raised to the rank of necessary principles of + cognition, but is practical, and would ruin morality altogether were not + the voice of reason in reference to the will so clear, so irrepressible, + so distinctly audible, even to the commonest men. It can only, indeed, be + maintained in the perplexing speculations of the schools, which are bold + enough to shut their ears against that heavenly voice, in order to support + a theory that costs no trouble. + </p> + <p> + Suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to attempt to + justify himself to you for having borne false witness, first by alleging + the, in his view, sacred duty of consulting his own happiness; then by + enumerating the advantages which he had gained thereby, pointing out the + prudence he had shown in securing himself against detection, even by + yourself, to whom he now reveals the secret, only in order that he may be + able to deny it at any time; and suppose he were then to affirm, in all + seriousness, that he has fulfilled a true human duty; you would either + laugh in his face, or shrink back from him with disgust; and yet, if a man + has regulated his principles of action solely with a view to his own + advantage, you would have nothing whatever to object against this mode of + proceeding. Or suppose some one recommends you a man as steward, as a man + to whom you can blindly trust all your affairs; and, in order to inspire + you with confidence, extols him as a prudent man who thoroughly + understands his own interest, and is so indefatigably active that he lets + slip no opportunity of advancing it; lastly, lest you should be afraid of + finding a vulgar selfishness in him, praises the good taste with which he + lives; not seeking his pleasure in money-making, or in coarse wantonness, + but in the enlargement of his knowledge, in instructive intercourse with a + select circle, and even in relieving the needy; while as to the means + (which, of course, derive all their value from the end), he is not + particular, and is ready to use other people's money for the purpose as if + it were his own, provided only he knows that he can do so safely, and + without discovery; you would either believe that the recommender was + mocking you, or that he had lost his senses. So sharply and clearly marked + are the boundaries of morality and self-love that even the commonest eye + cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to the one or the + other. The few remarks that follow may appear superfluous where the truth + is so plain, but at least they may serve to give a little more + distinctness to the judgement of common sense. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 95</span> + </p> + <p> + The principle of happiness may, indeed, furnish maxims, but never such as + would be competent to be laws of the will, even if universal happiness + were made the object. For since the knowledge of this rests on mere + empirical data, since every man's judgement on it depends very much on his + particular point of view, which is itself moreover very variable, it can + supply only general rules, not universal; that is, it can give rules which + on the average will most frequently fit, but not rules which must hold + good always and necessarily; hence, no practical laws can be founded on + it. Just because in this case an object of choice is the foundation of the + rule and must therefore precede it, the rule can refer to nothing but what + is [felt], and therefore it refers to experience and is founded on it, and + then the variety of judgement must be endless. This principle, therefore, + does not prescribe the same practical rules to all rational beings, + although the rules are all included under a common title, namely, that of + happiness. The moral law, however, is conceived as objectively necessary, + only because it holds for everyone that has reason and will. + </p> + <p> + The maxim of self-love (prudence) only advises; the law of morality + commands. Now there is a great difference between that which we are + advised to do and that to which we are obliged. + </p> + <p> + The commonest intelligence can easily and without hesitation see what, on + the principle of autonomy of the will, requires to be done; but on + supposition of heteronomy of the will, it is hard and requires knowledge + of the world to see what is to be done. That is to say, what duty is, is + plain of itself to everyone; but what is to bring true durable advantage, + such as will extend to the whole of one's existence, is always veiled in + impenetrable obscurity; and much prudence is required to adapt the + practical rule founded on it to the ends of life, even tolerably, by + making proper exceptions. But the moral law commands the most punctual + obedience from everyone; it must, therefore, not be so difficult to judge + what it requires to be done, that the commonest unpractised understanding, + even without worldly prudence, should fail to apply it rightly. + </p> + <p> + It is always in everyone's power to satisfy the categorical command of + morality; whereas it is seldom possible, and by no means so to everyone, + to satisfy the empirically conditioned precept of happiness, even with + regard to a single purpose. The reason is that in the former case there is + question only of the maxim, which must be genuine and pure; but in the + latter case there is question also of one's capacity and physical power to + realize a desired object. A command that everyone should try to make + himself happy would be foolish, for one never commands anyone to do what + he of himself infallibly wishes to do. We must only command the means, or + rather supply them, since he cannot do everything that he wishes. But to + command morality under the name of duty is quite rational; for, in the + first place, not everyone is willing to obey its precepts if they oppose + his inclinations; and as to the means of obeying this law, these need not + in this case be taught, for in this respect whatever he wishes to do he + can do. + </p> + <p> + He who has lost at play may be vexed at himself and his folly, but if he + is conscious of having cheated at play (although he has gained thereby), + he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law. + This must, therefore, be something different from the principle of private + happiness. For a man must have a different criterion when he is compelled + to say to himself: "I am a worthless fellow, though I have filled my + purse"; and when he approves himself, and says: "I am a prudent man, for I + have enriched my treasure." + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 100</span> + </p> + <p> + Finally, there is something further in the idea of our practical reason, + which accompanies the transgression of a moral law- namely, its ill + desert. Now the notion of punishment, as such, cannot be united with that + of becoming a partaker of happiness; for although he who inflicts the + punishment may at the same time have the benevolent purpose of directing + this punishment to this end, yet it must first be justified in itself as + punishment, i.e., as mere harm, so that if it stopped there, and the + person punished could get no glimpse of kindness hidden behind this + harshness, he must yet admit that justice was done him, and that his + reward was perfectly suitable to his conduct. In every punishment, as + such, there must first be justice, and this constitutes the essence of the + notion. Benevolence may, indeed, be united with it, but the man who has + deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this. + Punishment, then, is a physical evil, which, though it be not connected + with moral evil as a natural consequence, ought to be connected with it as + a consequence by the principles of a moral legislation. Now, if every + crime, even without regarding the physical consequence with respect to the + actor, is in itself punishable, that is, forfeits happiness (at least + partially), it is obviously absurd to say that the crime consisted just in + this, that he has drawn punishment on himself, thereby injuring his + private happiness (which, on the principle of self-love, must be the + proper notion of all crime). According to this view, the punishment would + be the reason for calling anything a crime, and justice would, on the + contrary, consist in omitting all punishment, and even preventing that + which naturally follows; for, if this were done, there would no longer be + any evil in the action, since the harm which otherwise followed it, and on + account of which alone the action was called evil, would now be prevented. + To look, however, on all rewards and punishments as merely the machinery + in the hand of a higher power, which is to serve only to set rational + creatures striving after their final end (happiness), this is to reduce + the will to a mechanism destructive of freedom; this is so evident that it + need not detain us. + </p> + <p> + More refined, though equally false, is the theory of those who suppose a + certain special moral sense, which sense and not reason determines the + moral law, and in consequence of which the consciousness of virtue is + supposed to be directly connected with contentment and pleasure; that of + vice, with mental dissatisfaction and pain; thus reducing the whole to the + desire of private happiness. Without repeating what has been said above, I + will here only remark the fallacy they fall into. In order to imagine the + vicious man as tormented with mental dissatisfaction by the consciousness + of his transgressions, they must first represent him as in the main basis + of his character, at least in some degree, morally good; just as he who is + pleased with the consciousness of right conduct must be conceived as + already virtuous. The notion of morality and duty must, therefore, have + preceded any regard to this satisfaction, and cannot be derived from it. A + man must first appreciate the importance of what we call duty, the + authority of the moral law, and the immediate dignity which the following + of it gives to the person in his own eyes, in order to feel that + satisfaction in the consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter + remorse that accompanies the consciousness of its transgression. It is, + therefore, impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction prior + to the knowledge of obligation, or to make it the basis of the latter. A + man must be at least half honest in order even to be able to form a + conception of these feelings. I do not deny that as the human will is, by + virtue of liberty, capable of being immediately determined by the moral + law, so frequent practice in accordance with this principle of + determination can, at least, produce subjectively a feeling of + satisfaction; on the contrary, it is a duty to establish and to cultivate + this, which alone deserves to be called properly the moral feeling; but + the notion of duty cannot be derived from it, else we should have to + suppose a feeling for the law as such, and thus make that an object of + sensation which can only be thought by the reason; and this, if it is not + to be a flat contradiction, would destroy all notion of duty and put in + its place a mere mechanical play of refined inclinations sometimes + contending with the coarser. + </p> + <p> + If now we compare our formal supreme principle of pure practical reason + (that of autonomy of the will) with all previous material principles of + morality, we can exhibit them all in a table in which all possible cases + are exhausted, except the one formal principle; and thus we can show + visibly that it is vain to look for any other principle than that now + proposed. In fact all possible principles of determination of the will are + either merely subjective, and therefore empirical, or are also objective + and rational; and both are either external or internal. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0024" id="link2H_4_0024"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the Foundation of + Morality, are: + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0025" id="link2H_4_0025"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 105</span> + </h2> + <h3> + SUBJECTIVE. + </h3> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + EXTERNAL INTERNAL + + Education Physical feeling +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 110</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + (Montaigne) (Epicurus) + + The civil Moral feeling + + Constitution (Hutcheson) + + (Mandeville) +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 115</span> + </p> + <h3> + OBJECTIVE. + </h3> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + INTERNAL EXTERNAL + + Perfection Will of God + + (Wolf and the (Crusius and other +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 120</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Stoics) theological Moralists) +</pre> + <p> + Those of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable of + furnishing the universal principle of morality; but those in the lower + table are based on reason (for perfection as a quality of things, and the + highest perfection conceived as substance, that is, God, can only be + thought by means of rational concepts). But the former notion, namely, + that of perfection, may either be taken in a theoretic signification, and + then it means nothing but the completeness of each thing in its own kind + (transcendental), or that of a thing merely as a thing (metaphysical); and + with that we are not concerned here. But the notion of perfection in a + practical sense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of + purposes. This perfection, as a quality of man and consequently internal, + is nothing but talent and, what strengthens or completes this, skill. + Supreme perfection conceived as substance, that is God, and consequently + external (considered practically), is the sufficiency of this being for + all ends. Ends then must first be given, relatively to which only can the + notion of perfection (whether internal in ourselves or external in God) be + the determining principle of the will. But an end- being an object which + must precede the determination of the will by a practical rule and contain + the ground of the possibility of this determination, and therefore contain + also the matter of the will, taken as its determining principle- such an + end is always empirical and, therefore, may serve for the Epicurean + principle of the happiness theory, but not for the pure rational principle + of morality and duty. Thus, talents and the improvement of them, because + they contribute to the advantages of life; or the will of God, if + agreement with it be taken as the object of the will, without any + antecedent independent practical principle, can be motives only by reason + of the happiness expected therefrom. Hence it follows, first, that all the + principles here stated are material; secondly, that they include all + possible material principles; and, finally, the conclusion, that since + material principles are quite incapable of furnishing the supreme moral + law (as has been shown), the formal practical principle of the pure reason + (according to which the mere form of a universal legislation must + constitute the supreme and immediate determining principle of the will) is + the only one possible which is adequate to furnish categorical + imperatives, that is, practical laws (which make actions a duty), and in + general to serve as the principle of morality, both in criticizing conduct + and also in its application to the human will to determine it. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0026" id="link2H_4_0026"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure + </h2> + <p> + Practical Reason. + </p> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 125</span> + </h3> + <p> + This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical, that is, can of + itself determine the will independently of anything empirical; and this it + proves by a fact in which pure reason in us proves itself actually + practical, namely, the autonomy shown in the fundamental principle of + morality, by which reason determines the will to action. + </p> + <p> + It shows at the same time that this fact is inseparably connected with the + consciousness of freedom of the will, nay, is identical with it; and by + this the will of a rational being, although as belonging to the world of + sense it recognizes itself as necessarily subject to the laws of causality + like other efficient causes; yet, at the same time, on another side, + namely, as a being in itself, is conscious of existing in and being + determined by an intelligible order of things; conscious not by virtue of + a special intuition of itself, but by virtue of certain dynamical laws + which determine its causality in the sensible world; for it has been + elsewhere proved that if freedom is predicated of us, it transports us + into an intelligible order of things. + </p> + <p> + Now, if we compare with this the analytical part of the critique of pure + speculative reason, we shall see a remarkable contrast. There it was not + fundamental principles, but pure, sensible intuition (space and time), + that was the first datum that made a priori knowledge possible, though + only of objects of the senses. Synthetical principles could not be derived + from mere concepts without intuition; on the contrary, they could only + exist with reference to this intuition, and therefore to objects of + possible experience, since it is the concepts of the understanding, united + with this intuition, which alone make that knowledge possible which we + call experience. Beyond objects of experience, and therefore with regard + to things as noumena, all positive knowledge was rightly disclaimed for + speculative reason. This reason, however, went so far as to establish with + certainty the concept of noumena; that is, the possibility, nay, the + necessity, of thinking them; for example, it showed against all objections + that the supposition of freedom, negatively considered, was quite + consistent with those principles and limitations of pure theoretic reason. + But it could not give us any definite enlargement of our knowledge with + respect to such objects, but, on the contrary, cut off all view of them + altogether. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, the moral law, although it gives no view, yet gives us + a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world, and + the whole compass of our theoretical use of reason, a fact which points to + a pure world of the understanding, nay, even defines it positively and + enables us to know something of it, namely, a law. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 130</span> + </p> + <p> + This law (as far as rational beings are concerned) gives to the world of + sense, which is a sensible system of nature, the form of a world of the + understanding, that is, of a supersensible system of nature, without + interfering with its mechanism. Now, a system of nature, in the most + general sense, is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature + of rational beings in general is their existence under laws empirically + conditioned, which, from the point of view of reason, is heteronomy. The + supersensible nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their + existence according to laws which are independent of every empirical + condition and, therefore, belong to the autonomy of pure reason. And, + since the laws by which the existence of things depends on cognition are + practical, supersensible nature, so far as we can form any notion of it, + is nothing else than a system of nature under the autonomy of pure + practical reason. Now, the law of this autonomy is the moral law, which, + therefore, is the fundamental law of a supersensible nature, and of a pure + world of understanding, whose counterpart must exist in the world of + sense, but without interfering with its laws. We might call the former the + archetypal world (natura archetypa), which we only know in the reason; and + the latter the ectypal world (natura ectypa), because it contains the + possible effect of the idea of the former which is the determining + principle of the will. For the moral law, in fact, transfers us ideally + into a system in which pure reason, if it were accompanied with adequate + physical power, would produce the summum bonum, and it determines our will + to give the sensible world the form of a system of rational beings. + </p> + <p> + The least attention to oneself proves that this idea really serves as the + model for the determinations of our will. + </p> + <p> + When the maxim which I am disposed to follow in giving testimony is tested + by the practical reason, I always consider what it would be if it were to + hold as a universal law of nature. It is manifest that in this view it + would oblige everyone to speak the truth. For it cannot hold as a + universal law of nature that statements should be allowed to have the + force of proof and yet to be purposely untrue. Similarly, the maxim which + I adopt with respect to disposing freely of my life is at once determined, + when I ask myself what it should be, in order that a system, of which it + is the law, should maintain itself. It is obvious that in such a system no + one could arbitrarily put an end to his own life, for such an arrangement + would not be a permanent order of things. And so in all similar cases. + Now, in nature, as it actually is an object of experience, the free will + is not of itself determined to maxims which could of themselves be the + foundation of a natural system of universal laws, or which could even be + adapted to a system so constituted; on the contrary, its maxims are + private inclinations which constitute, indeed, a natural whole in + conformity with pathological (physical) laws, but could not form part of a + system of nature, which would only be possible through our will acting in + accordance with pure practical laws. Yet we are, through reason, conscious + of a law to which all our maxims are subject, as though a natural order + must be originated from our will. This law, therefore, must be the idea of + a natural system not given in experience, and yet possible through + freedom; a system, therefore, which is supersensible, and to which we give + objective reality, at least in a practical point of view, since we look on + it as an object of our will as pure rational beings. + </p> + <p> + Hence the distinction between the laws of a natural system to which the + will is subject, and of a natural system which is subject to a will (as + far as its relation to its free actions is concerned), rests on this, that + in the former the objects must be causes of the ideas which determine the + will; whereas in the latter the will is the cause of the objects; so that + its causality has its determining principle solely in the pure faculty of + reason, which may therefore be called a pure practical reason. + </p> + <p> + There are therefore two very distinct problems: how, on the one side, pure + reason can cognise objects a priori, and how on the other side it can be + an immediate determining principle of the will, that is, of the causality + of the rational being with respect to the reality of objects (through the + mere thought of the universal validity of its own maxims as laws). + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 135</span> + </p> + <p> + The former, which belongs to the critique of the pure speculative reason, + requires a previous explanation, how intuitions without which no object + can be given, and, therefore, none known synthetically, are possible a + priori; and its solution turns out to be that these are all only sensible + and, therefore, do not render possible any speculative knowledge which + goes further than possible experience reaches; and that therefore all the + principles of that pure speculative reason avail only to make experience + possible; either experience of given objects or of those that may be given + ad infinitum, but never are completely given. + </p> + <p> + The latter, which belongs to the critique of practical reason, requires no + explanation how the objects of the faculty of desire are possible, for + that being a problem of the theoretical knowledge of nature is left to the + critique of the speculative reason, but only how reason can determine the + maxims of the will; whether this takes place only by means of empirical + ideas as principles of determination, or whether pure reason can be + practical and be the law of a possible order of nature, which is not + empirically knowable. The possibility of such a supersensible system of + nature, the conception of which can also be the ground of its reality + through our own free will, does not require any a priori intuition (of an + intelligible world) which, being in this case supersensible, would be + impossible for us. For the question is only as to the determining + principle of volition in its maxims, namely, whether it is empirical, or + is a conception of the pure reason (having the legal character belonging + to it in general), and how it can be the latter. It is left to the + theoretic principles of reason to decide whether the causality of the will + suffices for the realization of the objects or not, this being an inquiry + into the possibility of the objects of the volition. Intuition of these + objects is therefore of no importance to the practical problem. We are + here concerned only with the determination of the will and the determining + principles of its maxims as a free will, not at all with the result. For, + provided only that the will conforms to the law of pure reason, then let + its power in execution be what it may, whether according to these maxims + of legislation of a possible system of nature any such system really + results or not, this is no concern of the critique, which only inquires + whether, and in what way, pure reason can be practical, that is directly + determine the will. + </p> + <p> + In this inquiry criticism may and must begin with pure practical laws and + their reality. But instead of intuition it takes as their foundation the + conception of their existence in the intelligible world, namely, the + concept of freedom. For this concept has no other meaning, and these laws + are only possible in relation to freedom of the will; but freedom being + supposed, they are necessary; or conversely freedom is necessary because + those laws are necessary, being practical postulates. It cannot be further + explained how this consciousness of the moral law, or, what is the same + thing, of freedom, is possible; but that it is admissible is well + established in the theoretical critique. + </p> + <p> + The exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason is now + finished; that is to say, it has been shown first, what it contains, that + it subsists for itself quite a priori and independent of empirical + principles; and next in what it is distinguished from all other practical + principles. With the deduction, that is, the justification of its + objective and universal validity, and the discernment of the possibility + of such a synthetical proposition a priori, we cannot expect to succeed so + well as in the case of the principles of pure theoretical reason. For + these referred to objects of possible experience, namely, to phenomena, + and we could prove that these phenomena could be known as objects of + experience only by being brought under the categories in accordance with + these laws; and consequently that all possible experience must conform to + these laws. But I could not proceed in this way with the deduction of the + moral law. For this does not concern the knowledge of the properties of + objects, which may be given to the reason from some other source; but a + knowledge which can itself be the ground of the existence of the objects, + and by which reason in a rational being has causality, i.e., pure reason, + which can be regarded as a faculty immediately determining the will. + </p> + <p> + Now all our human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at + fundamental powers or faculties, for the possibility of these cannot be + understood by any means, and just as little should it be arbitrarily + invented and assumed. Therefore, in the theoretic use of reason, it is + experience alone that can justify us in assuming them. But this expedient + of adducing empirical proofs, instead of a deduction from a priori sources + of knowledge, is denied us here in respect to the pure practical faculty + of reason. For whatever requires to draw the proof of its reality from + experience must depend for the grounds of its possibility on principles of + experience; and pure, yet practical, reason by its very notion cannot be + regarded as such. Further, the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason + of which we are a priori conscious, and which is apodeictically certain, + though it be granted that in experience no example of its exact fulfilment + can be found. Hence, the objective reality of the moral law cannot be + proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason, whether + speculative or empirically supported, and therefore, even if we renounced + its apodeictic certainty, it could not be proved a posteriori by + experience, and yet it is firmly established of itself. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 140</span> + </p> + <p> + But instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, + something else is found which was quite unexpected, namely, that this + moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the deduction of an + inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove, but of which + speculative reason was compelled at least to assume the possibility (in + order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the unconditioned in the + chain of causality, so as not to contradict itself)- I mean the faculty of + freedom. The moral law, which itself does not require a justification, + proves not merely the possibility of freedom, but that it really belongs + to beings who recognize this law as binding on themselves. The moral law + is in fact a law of the causality of free agents and, therefore, of the + possibility of a supersensible system of nature, just as the metaphysical + law of events in the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible + system of nature; and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy + was compelled to leave undetermined, namely, the law for a causality, the + concept of which in the latter was only negative; and therefore for the + first time gives this concept objective reality. + </p> + <p> + This sort of credential of the moral law, viz., that it is set forth as a + principle of the deduction of freedom, which is a causality of pure + reason, is a sufficient substitute for all a priori justification, since + theoretic reason was compelled to assume at least the possibility of + freedom, in order to satisfy a want of its own. For the moral law proves + its reality, so as even to satisfy the critique of the speculative reason, + by the fact that it adds a positive definition to a causality previously + conceived only negatively, the possibility of which was incomprehensible + to speculative reason, which yet was compelled to suppose it. For it adds + the notion of a reason that directly determines the will (by imposing on + its maxims the condition of a universal legislative form); and thus it is + able for the first time to give objective, though only practical, reality + to reason, which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed + speculatively with its ideas. It thus changes the transcendent use of + reason into an immanent use (so that reason is itself, by means of ideas, + an efficient cause in the field of experience). + </p> + <p> + The determination of the causality of beings in the world of sense, as + such, can never be unconditioned; and yet for every series of conditions + there must be something unconditioned, and therefore there must be a + causality which is determined wholly by itself. Hence, the idea of freedom + as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not found to be a want but, as + far as its possibility is concerned, an analytic principle of pure + speculative reason. But as it is absolutely impossible to find in + experience any example in accordance with this idea, because amongst the + causes of things as phenomena it would be impossible to meet with any + absolutely unconditioned determination of causality, we were only able to + defend our supposition that a freely acting cause might be a being in the + world of sense, in so far as it is considered in the other point of view + as a noumenon, showing that there is no contradiction in regarding all its + actions as subject to physical conditions so far as they are phenomena, + and yet regarding its causality as physically unconditioned, in so far as + the acting being belongs to the world of understanding, and in thus making + the concept of freedom the regulative principle of reason. By this + principle I do not indeed learn what the object is to which that sort of + causality is attributed; but I remove the difficulty, for, on the one + side, in the explanation of events in the world, and consequently also of + the actions of rational beings, I leave to the mechanism of physical + necessity the right of ascending from conditioned to condition ad + infinitum, while on the other side I keep open for speculative reason the + place which for it is vacant, namely, the intelligible, in order to + transfer the unconditioned thither. But I was not able to verify this + supposition; that is, to change it into the knowledge of a being so + acting, not even into the knowledge of the possibility of such a being. + This vacant place is now filled by pure practical reason with a definite + law of causality in an intelligible world (causality with freedom), + namely, the moral law. Speculative reason does not hereby gain anything as + regards its insight, but only as regards the certainty of its + problematical notion of freedom, which here obtains objective reality, + which, though only practical, is nevertheless undoubted. Even the notion + of causality- the application, and consequently the signification, of + which holds properly only in relation to phenomena, so as to connect them + into experiences (as is shown by the Critique of Pure Reason)- is not so + enlarged as to extend its use beyond these limits. For if reason sought to + do this, it would have to show how the logical relation of principle and + consequence can be used synthetically in a different sort of intuition + from the sensible; that is how a causa noumenon is possible. This it can + never do; and, as practical reason, it does not even concern itself with + it, since it only places the determining principle of causality of man as + a sensible creature (which is given) in pure reason (which is therefore + called practical); and therefore it employs the notion of cause, not in + order to know objects, but to determine causality in relation to objects + in general. It can abstract altogether from the application of this notion + to objects with a view to theoretical knowledge (since this concept is + always found a priori in the understanding even independently of any + intuition). Reason, then, employs it only for a practical purpose, and + hence we can transfer the determining principle of the will into the + intelligible order of things, admitting, at the same time, that we cannot + understand how the notion of cause can determine the knowledge of these + things. But reason must cognise causality with respect to the actions of + the will in the sensible world in a definite manner; otherwise, practical + reason could not really produce any action. But as to the notion which it + forms of its own causality as noumenon, it need not determine it + theoretically with a view to the cognition of its supersensible existence, + so as to give it significance in this way. For it acquires significance + apart from this, though only for practical use, namely, through the moral + law. Theoretically viewed, it remains always a pure a priori concept of + the understanding, which can be applied to objects whether they have been + given sensibly or not, although in the latter case it has no definite + theoretical significance or application, but is only a formal, though + essential, conception of the understanding relating to an object in + general. The significance which reason gives it through the moral law is + merely practical, inasmuch as the idea of the law of causality (of the + will) has self causality, or is its determining principle. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0027" id="link2H_4_0027"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its Practical use has to an Extension + which is not possible to it in its Speculative Use. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 145</span> + </p> + <p> + We have in the moral principle set forth a law of causality, the + determining principle of which is set above all the conditions of the + sensible world; we have it conceived how the will, as belonging to the + intelligible world, is determinable, and therefore have its subject (man) + not merely conceived as belonging to a world of pure understanding, and in + this respect unknown (which the critique of speculative reason enabled us + to do), but also defined as regards his causality by means of a law which + cannot be reduced to any physical law of the sensible world; and therefore + our knowledge is extended beyond the limits of that world, a pretension + which the Critique of Pure Reason declared to be futile in all + speculation. Now, how is the practical use of pure reason here to be + reconciled with the theoretical, as to the determination of the limits of + its faculty? + </p> + <p> + David Hume, of whom we may say that he commenced the assault on the claims + of pure reason, which made a thorough investigation of it necessary, + argued thus: The notion of cause is a notion that involves the necessity + of the connexion of the existence of different things (and that, in so far + as they are different), so that, given A, I know that something quite + distinct there from, namely B, must necessarily also exist. Now necessity + can be attributed to a connection, only in so far as it is known a priori, + for experience would only enable us to know of such a connection that it + exists, not that it necessarily exists. Now, it is impossible, says he, to + know a priori and as necessary the connection between one thing and + another (or between one attribute and another quite distinct) when they + have not been given in experience. Therefore the notion of a cause is + fictitious and delusive and, to speak in the mildest way, is an illusion, + only excusable inasmuch as the custom (a subjective necessity) of + perceiving certain things, or their attributes as often associated in + existence along with or in succession to one another, is insensibly taken + for an objective necessity of supposing such a connection in the objects + themselves; and thus the notion of a cause has been acquired + surreptitiously and not legitimately; nay, it can never be so acquired or + authenticated, since it demands a connection in itself vain, chimerical, + and untenable in presence of reason, and to which no object can ever + correspond. In this way was empiricism first introduced as the sole source + of principles, as far as all knowledge of the existence of things is + concerned (mathematics therefore remaining excepted); and with empiricism + the most thorough scepticism, even with regard to the whole science of + nature( as philosophy). For on such principles we can never conclude from + given attributes of things as existing to a consequence (for this would + require the notion of cause, which involves the necessity of such a + connection); we can only, guided by imagination, expect similar cases- an + expectation which is never certain, however often it has been fulfilled. + Of no event could we say: a certain thing must have preceded it, on which + it necessarily followed; that is, it must have a cause; and therefore, + however frequent the cases we have known in which there was such an + antecedent, so that a rule could be derived from them, yet we never could + suppose it as always and necessarily so happening; we should, therefore, + be obliged to leave its share to blind chance, with which all use of + reason comes to an end; and this firmly establishes scepticism in + reference to arguments ascending from effects to causes and makes it + impregnable. + </p> + <p> + Mathematics escaped well, so far, because Hume thought that its + propositions were analytical; that is, proceeded from one property to + another, by virtue of identity and, consequently, according to the + principle of contradiction. This, however, is not the case, since, on the + contrary, they are synthetical; and although geometry, for example, has + not to do with the existence of things, but only with their a priori + properties in a possible intuition, yet it proceeds just as in the case of + the causal notion, from one property (A) to another wholly distinct (B), + as necessarily connected with the former. Nevertheless, mathematical + science, so highly vaunted for its apodeictic certainty, must at last fall + under this empiricism for the same reason for which Hume put custom in the + place of objective necessity in the notion of cause and, in spite of all + its pride, must consent to lower its bold pretension of claiming assent a + priori and depend for assent to the universality of its propositions on + the kindness of observers, who, when called as witnesses, would surely not + hesitate to admit that what the geometer propounds as a theorem they have + always perceived to be the fact, and, consequently, although it be not + necessarily true, yet they would permit us to expect it to be true in the + future. In this manner Hume's empiricism leads inevitably to scepticism, + even with regard to mathematics, and consequently in every scientific + theoretical use of reason (for this belongs either to philosophy or + mathematics). Whether with such a terrible overthrow of the chief branches + of knowledge, common reason will escape better, and will not rather become + irrecoverably involved in this destruction of all knowledge, so that from + the same principles a universal scepticism should follow (affecting, + indeed, only the learned), this I will leave everyone to judge for + himself. + </p> + <p> + As regards my own labours in the critical examination of pure reason, + which were occasioned by Hume's sceptical teaching, but went much further + and embraced the whole field of pure theoretical reason in its synthetic + use and, consequently, the field of what is called metaphysics in general; + I proceeded in the following manner with respect to the doubts raised by + the Scottish philosopher touching the notion of causality. If Hume took + the objects of experience for things in themselves (as is almost always + done), he was quite right in declaring the notion of cause to be a + deception and false illusion; for as to things in themselves, and their + attributes as such, it is impossible to see why because A is given, B, + which is different, must necessarily be also given, and therefore he could + by no means admit such an a priori knowledge of things in themselves. + Still less could this acute writer allow an empirical origin of this + concept, since this is directly contradictory to the necessity of + connection which constitutes the essence of the notion of causality, hence + the notion was proscribed, and in its place was put custom in the + observation of the course of perceptions. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 150</span> + </p> + <p> + It resulted, however, from my inquiries, that the objects with which we + have to do in experience are by no means things in themselves, but merely + phenomena; and that although in the case of things in themselves it is + impossible to see how, if A is supposed, it should be contradictory that + B, which is quite different from A, should not also be supposed (i.e., to + see the necessity of the connection between A as cause and B as effect); + yet it can very well be conceived that, as phenomena, they may be + necessarily connected in one experience in a certain way (e.g., with + regard to time-relations); so that they could not be separated without + contradicting that connection, by means of which this experience is + possible in which they are objects and in which alone they are cognisable + by us. And so it was found to be in fact; so that I was able not only to + prove the objective reality of the concept of cause in regard to objects + of experience, but also to deduce it as an a priori concept by reason of + the necessity of the connection it implied; that is, to show the + possibility of its origin from pure understanding without any empirical + sources; and thus, after removing the source of empiricism, I was able + also to overthrow the inevitable consequence of this, namely, scepticism, + first with regard to physical science, and then with regard to mathematics + (in which empiricism has just the same grounds), both being sciences which + have reference to objects of possible experience; herewith overthrowing + the thorough doubt of whatever theoretic reason professes to discern. + </p> + <p> + But how is it with the application of this category of causality (and all + the others; for without them there can be no knowledge of anything + existing) to things which are not objects of possible experience, but lie + beyond its bounds? For I was able to deduce the objective reality of these + concepts only with regard to objects of possible experience. But even this + very fact, that I have saved them, only in case I have proved that objects + may by means of them be thought, though not determined a priori; this it + is that gives them a place in the pure understanding, by which they are + referred to objects in general (sensible or not sensible). If anything is + still wanting, it is that which is the condition of the application of + these categories, and especially that of causality, to objects, namely, + intuition; for where this is not given, the application with a view to + theoretic knowledge of the object, as a noumenon, is impossible and, + therefore, if anyone ventures on it, is (as in the Critique of Pure + Reason) absolutely forbidden. Still, the objective reality of the concept + (of causality) remains, and it can be used even of noumena, but without + our being able in the least to define the concept theoretically so as to + produce knowledge. For that this concept, even in reference to an object, + contains nothing impossible, was shown by this, that, even while applied + to objects of sense, its seat was certainly fixed in the pure + understanding; and although, when referred to things in themselves (which + cannot be objects of experience), it is not capable of being determined so + as to represent a definite object for the purpose of theoretic knowledge; + yet for any other purpose (for instance, a practical) it might be capable + of being determined so as to have such application. This could not be the + case if, as Hume maintained, this concept of causality contained something + absolutely impossible to be thought. + </p> + <p> + In order now to discover this condition of the application of the said + concept to noumena, we need only recall why we are not content with its + application to objects of experience, but desire also to apply it to + things in themselves. It will appear, then, that it is not a theoretic but + a practical purpose that makes this a necessity. In speculation, even if + we were successful in it, we should not really gain anything in the + knowledge of nature, or generally with regard to such objects as are + given, but we should make a wide step from the sensibly conditioned (in + which we have already enough to do to maintain ourselves, and to follow + carefully the chain of causes) to the supersensible, in order to complete + our knowledge of principles and to fix its limits; whereas there always + remains an infinite chasm unfilled between those limits and what we know; + and we should have hearkened to a vain curiosity rather than a + solid-desire of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + But, besides the relation in which the understanding stands to objects (in + theoretical knowledge), it has also a relation to the faculty of desire, + which is therefore called the will, and the pure will, inasmuch as pure + understanding (in this case called reason) is practical through the mere + conception of a law. The objective reality of a pure will, or, what is the + same thing, of a pure practical reason, is given in the moral law a + priori, as it were, by a fact, for so we may name a determination of the + will which is inevitable, although it does not rest on empirical + principles. Now, in the notion of a will the notion of causality is + already contained, and hence the notion of a pure will contains that of a + causality accompanied with freedom, that is, one which is not determinable + by physical laws, and consequently is not capable of any empirical + intuition in proof of its reality, but, nevertheless, completely justifies + its objective reality a priori in the pure practical law; not, indeed (as + is easily seen) for the purposes of the theoretical, but of the practical + use of reason. Now the notion of a being that has free will is the notion + of a causa noumenon, and that this notion involves no contradiction, we + are already assured by the fact- that inasmuch as the concept of cause has + arisen wholly from pure understanding, and has its objective reality + assured by the deduction, as it is moreover in its origin independent of + any sensible conditions, it is, therefore, not restricted to phenomena + (unless we wanted to make a definite theoretic use of it), but can be + applied equally to things that are objects of the pure understanding. But, + since this application cannot rest on any intuition (for intuition can + only be sensible), therefore, causa noumenon, as regards the theoretic use + of reason, although a possible and thinkable, is yet an empty notion. Now, + I do not desire by means of this to understand theoretically the nature of + a being, in so far as it has a pure will; it is enough for me to have + thereby designated it as such, and hence to combine the notion of + causality with that of freedom (and what is inseparable from it, the moral + law, as its determining principle). Now, this right I certainly have by + virtue of the pure, not-empirical origin of the notion of cause, since I + do not consider myself entitled to make any use of it except in reference + to the moral law which determines its reality, that is, only a practical + use. + </p> + <p> + If, with Hume, I had denied to the notion of causality all objective + reality in its [theoretic] use, not merely with regard to things in + themselves (the supersensible), but also with regard to the objects of the + senses, it would have lost all significance, and being a theoretically + impossible notion would have been declared to be quite useless; and since + what is nothing cannot be made any use of, the practical use of a concept + theoretically null would have been absurd. But, as it is, the concept of a + causality free from empirical conditions, although empty, i.e., without + any appropriate intuition), is yet theoretically possible, and refers to + an indeterminate object; but in compensation significance is given to it + in the moral law and consequently in a practical sense. I have, indeed, no + intuition which should determine its objective theoretic reality, but not + the less it has a real application, which is exhibited in concreto in + intentions or maxims; that is, it has a practical reality which can be + specified, and this is sufficient to justify it even with a view to + noumena. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 155</span> + </p> + <p> + Now, this objective reality of a pure concept of the understanding in the + sphere of the supersensible, once brought in, gives an objective reality + also to all the other categories, although only so far as they stand in + necessary connexion with the determining principle of the will (the moral + law); a reality only of practical application, which has not the least + effect in enlarging our theoretical knowledge of these objects, or the + discernment of their nature by pure reason. So we shall find also in the + sequel that these categories refer only to beings as intelligences, and in + them only to the relation of reason to the will; consequently, always only + to the practical, and beyond this cannot pretend to any knowledge of these + beings; and whatever other properties belonging to the theoretical + representation of supersensible things may be brought into connexion with + these categories, this is not to be reckoned as knowledge, but only as a + right (in a practical point of view, however, it is a necessity) to admit + and assume such beings, even in the case where we [conceive] supersensible + beings (e.g., God) according to analogy, that is, a purely rational + relation, of which we make a practical use with reference to what is + sensible; and thus the application to the supersensible solely in a + practical point of view does not give pure theoretic reason the least + encouragement to run riot into the transcendent. + </p> + <h3> + BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0002" id="link2HCH0002"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + By a concept of the practical reason I understand the idea of an object as + an effect possible to be produced through freedom. To be an object of + practical knowledge, as such, signifies, therefore, only the relation of + the will to the action by which the object or its opposite would be + realized; and to decide whether something is an object of pure practical + reason or not is only to discern the possibility or impossibility of + willing the action by which, if we had the required power (about which + experience must decide), a certain object would be realized. If the object + be taken as the determining principle of our desire, it must first be + known whether it is physically possible by the free use of our powers, + before we decide whether it is an object of practical reason or not. On + the other hand, if the law can be considered a priori as the determining + principle of the action, and the latter therefore as determined by pure + practical reason, the judgement whether a thing is an object of pure + practical reason or not does not depend at all on the comparison with our + physical power; and the question is only whether we should will an action + that is directed to the existence of an object, if the object were in our + power; hence the previous question is only as the moral possibility of the + action, for in this case it is not the object, but the law of the will, + that is the determining principle of the action. The only objects of + practical reason are therefore those of good and evil. For by the former + is meant an object necessarily desired according to a principle of reason; + by the latter one necessarily shunned, also according to a principle of + reason. + </p> + <p> + If the notion of good is not to be derived from an antecedent practical + law, but, on the contrary, is to serve as its foundation, it can only be + the notion of something whose existence promises pleasure, and thus + determines the causality of the subject to produce it, that is to say, + determines the faculty of desire. Now, since it is impossible to discern a + priori what idea will be accompanied with pleasure and what with pain, it + will depend on experience alone to find out what is primarily good or + evil. The property of the subject, with reference to which alone this + experiment can be made, is the feeling of pleasure and pain, a receptivity + belonging to the internal sense; thus that only would be primarily good + with which the sensation of pleasure is immediately connected, and that + simply evil which immediately excites pain. Since, however, this is + opposed even to the usage of language, which distinguishes the pleasant + from the good, the unpleasant from the evil, and requires that good and + evil shall always be judged by reason, and, therefore, by concepts which + can be communicated to everyone, and not by mere sensation, which is + limited to individual [subjects] and their susceptibility; and, since + nevertheless, pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any idea of an + object a priori, the philosopher who thought himself obliged to make a + feeling of pleasure the foundation of his practical judgements would call + that good which is a means to the pleasant, and evil, what is a cause of + unpleasantness and pain; for the judgement on the relation of means to + ends certainly belongs to reason. But, although reason is alone capable of + discerning the connexion of means with their ends (so that the will might + even be defined as the faculty of ends, since these are always determining + principles of the desires), yet the practical maxims which would follow + from the aforesaid principle of the good being merely a means, would never + contain as the object of the will anything good in itself, but only + something good for something; the good would always be merely the useful, + and that for which it is useful must always lie outside the will, in + sensation. Now if this as a pleasant sensation were to be distinguished + from the notion of good, then there would be nothing primarily good at + all, but the good would have to be sought only in the means to something + else, namely, some pleasantness. + </p> + <p> + It is an old formula of the schools: Nihil appetimus nisi sub ratione + boni; Nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali, and it is used often + correctly, but often also in a manner injurious to philosophy, because the + expressions boni and mali are ambiguous, owing to the poverty of language, + in consequence of which they admit a double sense, and, therefore, + inevitably bring the practical laws into ambiguity; and philosophy, which + in employing them becomes aware of the different meanings in the same + word, but can find no special expressions for them, is driven to subtile + distinctions about which there is subsequently no unanimity, because the + distinction could not be directly marked by any suitable expression. * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Besides this, the expression sub ratione boni is also + ambiguous. For it may mean: "We represent something to + ourselves as good, when and because we desire (will) it"; or + "We desire something because we represent it to ourselves as + good," so that either the desire determines the notion of + the object as a good, or the notion of good determines the + desire (the will); so that in the first case sub ratione + boni would mean, "We will something under the idea of the + good"; in the second, "In consequence of this idea," which, + as determining the volition, must precede it. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions which do + not allow this difference to be overlooked. It possesses two very distinct + concepts and especially distinct expressions for that which the Latins + express by a single word, bonum. For bonum it has das Gute [good], and das + Wohl [well, weal], for malum das Bose [evil], and das Ubel [ill, bad], or + das Well [woe]. So that we express two quite distinct judgements when we + consider in an action the good and evil of it, or our weal and woe (ill). + Hence it already follows that the above quoted psychological proposition + is at least very doubtful if it is translated: "We desire nothing except + with a view to our weal or woe"; on the other hand, if we render it thus: + "Under the direction of reason we desire nothing except so far as we + esteem it good or evil," it is indubitably certain and at the same time + quite clearly expressed. + </p> + <p> + Well or ill always implies only a reference to our condition, as pleasant + or unpleasant, as one of pleasure or pain, and if we desire or avoid an + object on this account, it is only so far as it is referred to our + sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or pain that it produces. But + good or evil always implies a reference to the will, as determined by the + law of reason, to make something its object; for it is never determined + directly by the object and the idea of it, but is a faculty of taking a + rule of reason for or motive of an action (by which an object may be + realized). Good and evil therefore are properly referred to actions, not + to the sensations of the person, and if anything is to be good or evil + absolutely (i.e., in every respect and without any further condition), or + is to be so esteemed, it can only be the manner of acting, the maxim of + the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil man + that can be so called, and not a thing. + </p> + <p> + However, then, men may laugh at the Stoic, who in the severest paroxysms + of gout cried out: "Pain, however thou tormentest me, I will never admit + that thou art an evil (kakov, malum)": he was right. A bad thing it + certainly was, and his cry betrayed that; but that any evil attached to + him thereby, this he had no reason whatever to admit, for pain did not in + the least diminish the worth of his person, but only that of his + condition. If he had been conscious of a single lie, it would have lowered + his pride, but pain served only to raise it, when he was conscious that he + had not deserved it by any unrighteous action by which he had rendered + himself worthy of punishment. + </p> + <p> + What we call good must be an object of desire in the judgement of every + rational man, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of everyone; + therefore, in addition to sense, this judgement requires reason. So it is + with truthfulness, as opposed to lying; so with justice, as opposed to + violence, &c. But we may call a thing a bad [or ill] thing, which yet + everyone must at the same time acknowledge to be good, sometimes directly, + sometimes indirectly. The man who submits to a surgical operation feels it + no doubt as a bad thing, but by their reason he and everyone acknowledge + it to be good. If a man who delights in annoying and vexing peaceable + people at last receives a right good beating, this is no doubt a bad + thing; but everyone approves it and regards it as a good thing, even + though nothing else resulted from it; nay, even the man who receives it + must in his reason acknowledge that he has met justice, because he sees + the proportion between good conduct and good fortune, which reason + inevitably places before him, here put into practice. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> + <p> + No doubt our weal and woe are of very great importance in the estimation + of our practical reason, and as far as our nature as sensible beings is + concerned, our happiness is the only thing of consequence, provided it is + estimated as reason especially requires, not by the transitory sensation, + but by the influence that this has on our whole existence, and on our + satisfaction therewith; but it is not absolutely the only thing of + consequence. Man is a being who, as belonging to the world of sense, has + wants, and so far his reason has an office which it cannot refuse, namely, + to attend to the interest of his sensible nature, and to form practical + maxims, even with a view to the happiness of this life, and if possible + even to that of a future. But he is not so completely an animal as to be + indifferent to what reason says on its own account, and to use it merely + as an instrument for the satisfaction of his wants as a sensible being. + For the possession of reason would not raise his worth above that of the + brutes, if it is to serve him only for the same purpose that instinct + serves in them; it would in that case be only a particular method which + nature had employed to equip man for the same ends for which it has + qualified brutes, without qualifying him for any higher purpose. No doubt + once this arrangement of nature has been made for him he requires reason + in order to take into consideration his weal and woe, but besides this he + possesses it for a higher purpose also, namely, not only to take into + consideration what is good or evil in itself, about which only pure + reason, uninfluenced by any sensible interest, can judge, but also to + distinguish this estimate thoroughly from the former and to make it the + supreme condition thereof. + </p> + <p> + In estimating what is good or evil in itself, as distinguished from what + can be so called only relatively, the following points are to be + considered. Either a rational principle is already conceived, as of itself + the determining principle of the will, without regard to possible objects + of desire (and therefore by the more legislative form of the maxim), and + in that case that principle is a practical a priori law, and pure reason + is supposed to be practical of itself. The law in that case determines the + will directly; the action conformed to it is good in itself; a will whose + maxim always conforms to this law is good absolutely in every respect and + is the supreme condition of all good. Or the maxim of the will is + consequent on a determining principle of desire which presupposes an + object of pleasure or pain, something therefore that pleases or + displeases, and the maxim of reason that we should pursue the former and + avoid the latter determines our actions as good relatively to our + inclination, that is, good indirectly, (i.e., relatively to a different + end to which they are means), and in that case these maxims can never be + called laws, but may be called rational practical precepts. The end + itself, the pleasure that we seek, is in the latter case not a good but a + welfare; not a concept of reason, but an empirical concept of an object of + sensation; but the use of the means thereto, that is, the action, is + nevertheless called good (because rational deliberation is required for + it), not however, good absolutely, but only relatively to our sensuous + nature, with regard to its feelings of pleasure and displeasure; but the + will whose maxim is affected thereby is not a pure will; this is directed + only to that in which pure reason by itself can be practical. + </p> + <p> + This is the proper place to explain the paradox of method in a critique of + practical reason, namely, that the concept of good and evil must not be + determined before the moral law (of which it seems as if it must be the + foundation), but only after it and by means of it. In fact, even if we did + not know that the principle of morality is a pure a priori law determining + the will, yet, that we may not assume principles quite gratuitously, we + must, at least at first, leave it undecided, whether the will has merely + empirical principles of determination, or whether it has not also pure a + priori principles; for it is contrary to all rules of philosophical method + to assume as decided that which is the very point in question. Supposing + that we wished to begin with the concept of good, in order to deduce from + it the laws of the will, then this concept of an object (as a good) would + at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining + principle of the will. Now, since this concept had not any practical a + priori law for its standard, the criterion of good or evil could not be + placed in anything but the agreement of the object with our feeling of + pleasure or pain; and the use of reason could only consist in determining + in the first place this pleasure or pain in connexion with all the + sensations of my existence, and in the second place the means of securing + to myself the object of the pleasure. Now, as experience alone can decide + what conforms to the feeling of pleasure, and by hypothesis the practical + law is to be based on this as a condition, it follows that the possibility + of a priori practical laws would be at once excluded, because it was + imagined to be necessary first of all to find an object the concept of + which, as a good, should constitute the universal though empirical + principle of determination of the will. But what it was necessary to + inquire first of all was whether there is not an a priori determining + principle of the will (and this could never be found anywhere but in a + pure practical law, in so far as this law prescribes to maxims merely + their form without regard to an object). Since, however, we laid the + foundation of all practical law in an object determined by our conceptions + of good and evil, whereas without a previous law that object could not be + conceived by empirical concepts, we have deprived ourselves beforehand of + the possibility of even conceiving a pure practical law. On the other + hand, if we had first investigated the latter analytically, we should have + found that it is not the concept of good as an object that determines the + moral law and makes it possible, but that, on the contrary, it is the + moral law that first determines the concept of good and makes it possible, + so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely. + </p> + <p> + This remark, which only concerns the method of ultimate ethical inquiries, + is of importance. It explains at once the occasion of all the mistakes of + philosophers with respect to the supreme principle of morals. For they + sought for an object of the will which they could make the matter and + principle of a law (which consequently could not determine the will + directly, but by means of that object referred to the feeling of pleasure + or pain; whereas they ought first to have searched for a law that would + determine the will a priori and directly, and afterwards determine the + object in accordance with the will). Now, whether they placed this object + of pleasure, which was to supply the supreme conception of goodness, in + happiness, in perfection, in moral [feeling], or in the will of God, their + principle in every case implied heteronomy, and they must inevitably come + upon empirical conditions of a moral law, since their object, which was to + be the immediate principle of the will, could not be called good or bad + except in its immediate relation to feeling, which is always empirical. It + is only a formal law- that is, one which prescribes to reason nothing more + than the form of its universal legislation as the supreme condition of its + maxims- that can be a priori a determining principle of practical reason. + The ancients avowed this error without concealment by directing all their + moral inquiries to the determination of the notion of the summum bonum, + which they intended afterwards to make the determining principle of the + will in the moral law; whereas it is only far later, when the moral law + has been first established for itself, and shown to be the direct + determining principle of the will, that this object can be presented to + the will, whose form is now determined a priori; and this we shall + undertake in the Dialectic of the pure practical reason. The moderns, with + whom the question of the summum bonum has gone out of fashion, or at least + seems to have become a secondary matter, hide the same error under vague + (expressions as in many other cases). It shows itself, nevertheless, in + their systems, as it always produces heteronomy of practical reason; and + from this can never be derived a moral law giving universal commands. + </p> + <p> + Now, since the notions of good and evil, as consequences of the a priori + determination of the will, imply also a pure practical principle, and + therefore a causality of pure reason; hence they do not originally refer + to objects (so as to be, for instance, special modes of the synthetic + unity of the manifold of given intuitions in one consciousness) like the + pure concepts of the understanding or categories of reason in its + theoretic employment; on the contrary, they presuppose that objects are + given; but they are all modes (modi) of a single category, namely, that of + causality, the determining principle of which consists in the rational + conception of a law, which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself, + thereby a priori proving itself practical. However, as the actions on the + one side come under a law which is not a physical law, but a law of + freedom, and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in the world of + intelligence, yet on the other side as events in the world of sense they + belong to phenomena; hence the determinations of a practical reason are + only possible in reference to the latter and, therefore, in accordance + with the categories of the understanding; not indeed with a view to any + theoretic employment of it, i.e., so as to bring the manifold of + (sensible) intuition under one consciousness a priori; but only to subject + the manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness of a practical + reason, giving it commands in the moral law, i.e., to a pure will a + priori. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 15</span> + </p> + <p> + These categories of freedom- for so we choose to call them in contrast to + those theoretic categories which are categories of physical nature- have + an obvious advantage over the latter, inasmuch as the latter are only + forms of thought which designate objects in an indefinite manner by means + of universal concept of every possible intuition; the former, on the + contrary, refer to the determination of a free elective will (to which + indeed no exactly corresponding intuition can be assigned, but which has + as its foundation a pure practical a priori law, which is not the case + with any concepts belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive + faculties); hence, instead of the form of intuition (space and time), + which does not lie in reason itself, but has to be drawn from another + source, namely, the sensibility, these being elementary practical concepts + have as their foundation the form of a pure will, which is given in reason + and, therefore, in the thinking faculty itself. From this it happens that + as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the + determination of the will, not with the physical conditions (of practical + ability) of the execution of one's purpose, the practical a priori + principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom are at once + cognitions, and have not to wait for intuitions in order to acquire + significance, and that for this remarkable reason, because they themselves + produce the reality of that to which they refer (the intention of the + will), which is not the case with theoretical concepts. Only we must be + careful to observe that these categories only apply to the practical + reason; and thus they proceed in order from those which are as yet subject + to sensible conditions and morally indeterminate to those which are free + from sensible conditions and determined merely by the moral law. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0029" id="link2H_4_0029"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good + </h2> + <p> + and Evil. + </p> + <h3> + I. QUANTITY. + </h3> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> + <p> + Subjective, according to maxims (practical opinions of the + </p> + <p> + individual) + </p> + <p> + Objective, according to principles (Precepts) + </p> + <p> + A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom + </p> + <p> + (laws) + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> + <h3> + II. QUALITY. + </h3> + <p> + Practical rules of action (praeceptivae) + </p> + <p> + Practical rules of omission (prohibitivae) + </p> + <p> + Practical rules of exceptions (exceptivae) + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 30</span> + </p> + <h3> + III. RELATION. + </h3> + <p> + To personality + </p> + <p> + To the condition of the person. + </p> + <p> + Reciprocal, of one person to the others of the others. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 35</span> + </p> + <h3> + IV. MODALITY. + </h3> + <p> + The Permitted and the Forbidden + </p> + <p> + Duty and the contrary to duty. + </p> + <p> + Perfect and imperfect duty. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 40</span> + </p> + <p> + It will at once be observed that in this table freedom is considered as a + sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of determination, in + regard to actions possible by it, which are phenomena in the world of + sense, and that consequently it is referred to the categories which + concern its physical possibility, whilst yet each category is taken so + universally that the determining principle of that causality can be placed + outside the world of sense in freedom as a property of a being in the + world of intelligence; and finally the categories of modality introduce + the transition from practical principles generally to those of morality, + but only problematically. These can be established dogmatically only by + the moral law. + </p> + <p> + I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table, since it + is intelligible enough of itself. A division of this kind based on + principles is very useful in any science, both for the sake of + thoroughness and intelligibility. Thus, for instance, we know from the + preceding table and its first number what we must begin from in practical + inquiries; namely, from the maxims which every one founds on his own + inclinations; the precepts which hold for a species of rational beings so + far as they agree in certain inclinations; and finally the law which holds + for all without regard to their inclinations, etc. In this way we survey + the whole plan of what has to be done, every question of practical + philosophy that has to be answered, and also the order that is to be + followed. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0030" id="link2H_4_0030"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 45</span> + </p> + <p> + It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of the + will. They themselves, however, are subject to a practical rule of reason + which, if it is pure reason, determines the will a priori relatively to + its object. Now, whether an action which is possible to us in the world of + sense, comes under the rule or not, is a question to be decided by the + practical judgement, by which what is said in the rule universally (in + abstracto) is applied to an action in concreto. But since a practical rule + of pure reason in the first place as practical concerns the existence of + an object, and in the second place as a practical rule of pure reason + implies necessity as regards the existence of the action and, therefore, + is a practical law, not a physical law depending on empirical principles + of determination, but a law of freedom by which the will is to be + determined independently on anything empirical (merely by the conception + of a law and its form), whereas all instances that can occur of possible + actions can only be empirical, that is, belong to the experience of + physical nature; hence, it seems absurd to expect to find in the world of + sense a case which, while as such it depends only on the law of nature, + yet admits of the application to it of a law of freedom, and to which we + can apply the supersensible idea of the morally good which is to be + exhibited in it in concreto. Thus, the judgement of the pure practical + reason is subject to the same difficulties as that of the pure theoretical + reason. The latter, however, had means at hand of escaping from these + difficulties, because, in regard to the theoretical employment, intuitions + were required to which pure concepts of the understanding could be + applied, and such intuitions (though only of objects of the senses) can be + given a priori and, therefore, as far as regards the union of the manifold + in them, conforming to the pure a priori concepts of the understanding as + schemata. On the other hand, the morally good is something whose object is + supersensible; for which, therefore, nothing corresponding can be found in + any sensible intuition. Judgement depending on laws of pure practical + reason seems, therefore, to be subject to special difficulties arising + from this, that a law of freedom is to be applied to actions, which are + events taking place in the world of sense, and which, so far, belong to + physical nature. + </p> + <p> + But here again is opened a favourable prospect for the pure practical + judgement. When I subsume under a pure practical law an action possible to + me in the world of sense, I am not concerned with the possibility of the + action as an event in the world of sense. This is a matter that belongs to + the decision of reason in its theoretic use according to the law of + causality, which is a pure concept of the understanding, for which reason + has a schema in the sensible intuition. Physical causality, or the + condition under which it takes place, belongs to the physical concepts, + the schema of which is sketched by transcendental imagination. Here, + however, we have to do, not with the schema of a case that occurs + according to laws, but with the schema of a law itself (if the word is + allowable here), since the fact that the will (not the action relatively + to its effect) is determined by the law alone without any other principle, + connects the notion of causality with quite different conditions from + those which constitute physical connection. + </p> + <p> + The physical law being a law to which the objects of sensible intuition, + as such, are subject, must have a schema corresponding to it- that is, a + general procedure of the imagination (by which it exhibits a priori to the + senses the pure concept of the understanding which the law determines). + But the law of freedom (that is, of a causality not subject to sensible + conditions), and consequently the concept of the unconditionally good, + cannot have any intuition, nor consequently any schema supplied to it for + the purpose of its application in concreto. Consequently the moral law has + no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical + objects (not the imagination); and the understanding for the purposes of + the judgement can provide for an idea of the reason, not a schema of the + sensibility, but a law, though only as to its form as law; such a law, + however, as can be exhibited in concreto in objects of the senses, and + therefore a law of nature. We can therefore call this law the type of the + moral law. + </p> + <p> + The rule of the judgement according to laws of pure practical reason is + this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place + by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself a part, you + could regard it as possible by your own will. Everyone does, in fact, + decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or evil. Thus, people + say: "If everyone permitted himself to deceive, when he thought it to his + advantage; or thought himself justified in shortening his life as soon as + he was thoroughly weary of it; or looked with perfect indifference on the + necessity of others; and if you belonged to such an order of things, would + you do so with the assent of your own will?" Now everyone knows well that + if he secretly allows himself to deceive, it does not follow that everyone + else does so; or if, unobserved, he is destitute of compassion, others + would not necessarily be so to him; hence, this comparison of the maxim of + his actions with a universal law of nature is not the determining + principle of his will. Such a law is, nevertheless, a type of the + estimation of the maxim on moral principles. If the maxim of the action is + not such as to stand the test of the form of a universal law of nature, + then it is morally impossible. This is the judgement even of common sense; + for its ordinary judgements, even those of experience, are always based on + the law of nature. It has it therefore always at hand, only that in cases + where causality from freedom is to be criticised, it makes that law of + nature only the type of a law of freedom, because, without something which + it could use as an example in a case of experience, it could not give the + law of a pure practical reason its proper use in practice. + </p> + <p> + It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as the + type of a supersensible system of things, provided I do not transfer to + the latter the intuitions, and what depends on them, but merely apply to + it the form of law in general (the notion of which occurs even in the + commonest use of reason, but cannot be definitely known a priori for any + other purpose than the pure practical use of reason); for laws, as such, + are so far identical, no matter from what they derive their determining + principles. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 50</span> + </p> + <p> + Further, since of all the supersensible absolutely nothing [is known] + except freedom (through the moral law), and this only so far as it is + inseparably implied in that law, and moreover all supersensible objects to + which reason might lead us, following the guidance of that law, have still + no reality for us, except for the purpose of that law, and for the use of + mere practical reason; and as reason is authorized and even compelled to + use physical nature (in its pure form as an object of the understanding) + as the type of the judgement; hence, the present remark will serve to + guard against reckoning amongst concepts themselves that which belongs + only to the typic of concepts. This, namely, as a typic of the judgement, + guards against the empiricism of practical reason, which founds the + practical notions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences + (so-called happiness). No doubt happiness and the infinite advantages + which would result from a will determined by self-love, if this will at + the same time erected itself into a universal law of nature, may certainly + serve as a perfectly suitable type of the morally good, but it is not + identical with it. The same typic guards also against the mysticism of + practical reason, which turns what served only as a symbol into a schema, + that is, proposes to provide for the moral concepts actual intuitions, + which, however, are not sensible (intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of + God), and thus plunges into the transcendent. What is befitting the use of + the moral concepts is only the rationalism of the judgement, which takes + from the sensible system of nature only what pure reason can also conceive + of itself, that is, conformity to law, and transfers into the + supersensible nothing but what can conversely be actually exhibited by + actions in the world of sense according to the formal rule of a law of + nature. However, the caution against empiricism of practical reason is + much more important; for mysticism is quite reconcilable with the purity + and sublimity of the moral law, and, besides, it is not very natural or + agreeable to common habits of thought to strain one's imagination to + supersensible intuitions; and hence the danger on this side is not so + general. Empiricism, on the contrary, cuts up at the roots the morality of + intentions (in which, and not in actions only, consists the high worth + that men can and ought to give to themselves), and substitutes for duty + something quite different, namely, an empirical interest, with which the + inclinations generally are secretly leagued; and empiricism, moreover, + being on this account allied with all the inclinations which (no matter + what fashion they put on) degrade humanity when they are raised to the + dignity of a supreme practical principle; and as these, nevertheless, are + so favourable to everyone's feelings, it is for that reason much more + dangerous than mysticism, which can never constitute a lasting condition + of any great number of persons. + </p> + <h3> + BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0003" id="link2HCH0003"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law + should directly determine the will. If the determination of the will takes + place in conformity indeed to the moral law, but only by means of a + feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to be presupposed in order that + the law may be sufficient to determine the will, and therefore not for the + sake of the law, then the action will possess legality, but not morality. + Now, if we understand by motive (elater animi) the subjective ground of + determination of the will of a being whose reason does not necessarily + conform to the objective law, by virtue of its own nature, then it will + follow, first, that no motives can be attributed to the Divine will, and + that the motives of the human will (as well as that of every created + rational being) can never be anything else than the moral law, and + consequently that the objective principle of determination must always and + alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of the + action, if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law, without + containing its spirit. * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * We may say of every action that conforms to the law, but + is not done for the sake of the law, that it is morally good + in the letter, not in the spirit (the intention). +</pre> + <p> + Since, then, for the purpose of giving the moral law influence over the + will, we must not seek for any other motives that might enable us to + dispense with the motive of the law itself, because that would produce + mere hypocrisy, without consistency; and it is even dangerous to allow + other motives (for instance, that of interest) even to co-operate along + with the moral law; hence nothing is left us but to determine carefully in + what way the moral law becomes a motive, and what effect this has upon the + faculty of desire. For as to the question how a law can be directly and of + itself a determining principle of the will (which is the essence of + morality), this is, for human reason, an insoluble problem and identical + with the question: how a free will is possible. Therefore what we have to + show a priori is not why the moral law in itself supplies a motive, but + what effect it, as such, produces (or, more correctly speaking, must + produce) on the mind. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + The essential point in every determination of the will by the moral law is + that being a free will it is determined simply by the moral law, not only + without the co-operation of sensible impulses, but even to the rejection + of all such, and to the checking of all inclinations so far as they might + be opposed to that law. So far, then, the effect of the moral law as a + motive is only negative, and this motive can be known a priori to be such. + For all inclination and every sensible impulse is founded on feeling, and + the negative effect produced on feeling (by the check on the inclinations) + is itself feeling; consequently, we can see a priori that the moral law, + as a determining principle of the will, must by thwarting all our + inclinations produce a feeling which may be called pain; and in this we + have the first, perhaps the only, instance in which we are able from a + priori considerations to determine the relation of a cognition (in this + case of pure practical reason) to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. + All the inclinations together (which can be reduced to a tolerable system, + in which case their satisfaction is called happiness) constitute + self-regard (solipsismus). This is either the self-love that consists in + an excessive fondness for oneself (philautia), or satisfaction with + oneself (arrogantia). The former is called particularly selfishness; the + latter self-conceit. Pure practical reason only checks selfishness, + looking on it as natural and active in us even prior to the moral law, so + far as to limit it to the condition of agreement with this law, and then + it is called rational self-love. But self-conceit reason strikes down + altogether, since all claims to self-esteem which precede agreement with + the moral law are vain and unjustifiable, for the certainty of a state of + mind that coincides with this law is the first condition of personal worth + (as we shall presently show more clearly), and prior to this conformity + any pretension to worth is false and unlawful. Now the propensity to + self-esteem is one of the inclinations which the moral law checks, + inasmuch as that esteem rests only on morality. Therefore the moral law + breaks down self-conceit. But as this law is something positive in itself, + namely, the form of an intellectual causality, that is, of freedom, it + must be an object of respect; for, by opposing the subjective antagonism + of the inclinations, it weakens self-conceit; and since it even breaks + down, that is, humiliates, this conceit, it is an object of the highest + respect and, consequently, is the foundation of a positive feeling which + is not of empirical origin, but is known a priori. Therefore respect for + the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual cause, and + this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori and the necessity + of which we can perceive. + </p> + <p> + In the preceding chapter we have seen that everything that presents itself + as an object of the will prior to the moral law is by that law itself, + which is the supreme condition of practical reason, excluded from the + determining principles of the will which we have called the + unconditionally good; and that the mere practical form which consists in + the adaptation of the maxims to universal legislation first determines + what is good in itself and absolutely, and is the basis of the maxims of a + pure will, which alone is good in every respect. However, we find that our + nature as sensible beings is such that the matter of desire (objects of + inclination, whether of hope or fear) first presents itself to us; and our + pathologically affected self, although it is in its maxims quite unfit for + universal legislation; yet, just as if it constituted our entire self, + strives to put its pretensions forward first, and to have them + acknowledged as the first and original. This propensity to make ourselves + in the subjective determining principles of our choice serve as the + objective determining principle of the will generally may be called + self-love; and if this pretends to be legislative as an unconditional + practical principle it may be called self-conceit. Now the moral law, + which alone is truly objective (namely, in every respect), entirely + excludes the influence of self-love on the supreme practical principle, + and indefinitely checks the self-conceit that prescribes the subjective + conditions of the former as laws. Now whatever checks our self-conceit in + our own judgement humiliates; therefore the moral law inevitably humbles + every man when he compares with it the physical propensities of his + nature. That, the idea of which as a determining principle of our will + humbles us in our self-consciousness, awakes respect for itself, so far as + it is itself positive and a determining principle. Therefore the moral law + is even subjectively a cause of respect. Now since everything that enters + into self-love belongs to inclination, and all inclination rests on + feelings, and consequently whatever checks all the feelings together in + self-love has necessarily, by this very circumstance, an influence on + feeling; hence we comprehend how it is possible to perceive a priori that + the moral law can produce an effect on feeling, in that it excludes the + inclinations and the propensity to make them the supreme practical + condition, i.e., self-love, from all participation in the supreme + legislation. This effect is on one side merely negative, but on the other + side, relatively to the restricting principle of pure practical reason, it + is positive. No special kind of feeling need be assumed for this under the + name of a practical or moral feeling as antecedent to the moral law and + serving as its foundation. + </p> + <p> + The negative effect on feeling (unpleasantness) is pathological, like + every influence on feeling and like every feeling generally. But as an + effect of the consciousness of the moral law, and consequently in relation + to a supersensible cause, namely, the subject of pure practical reason + which is the supreme lawgiver, this feeling of a rational being affected + by inclinations is called humiliation (intellectual self-depreciation); + but with reference to the positive source of this humiliation, the law, it + is respect for it. There is indeed no feeling for this law; but inasmuch + as it removes the resistance out of the way, this removal of an obstacle + is, in the judgement of reason, esteemed equivalent to a positive help to + its causality. Therefore this feeling may also be called a feeling of + respect for the moral law, and for both reasons together a moral feeling. + </p> + <p> + While the moral law, therefore, is a formal determining principle of + action by practical pure reason, and is moreover a material though only + objective determining principle of the objects of action as called good + and evil, it is also a subjective determining principle, that is, a motive + to this action, inasmuch as it has influence on the morality of the + subject and produces a feeling conducive to the influence of the law on + the will. There is here in the subject no antecedent feeling tending to + morality. For this is impossible, since every feeling is sensible, and the + motive of moral intention must be free from all sensible conditions. On + the contrary, while the sensible feeling which is at the bottom of all our + inclinations is the condition of that impression which we call respect, + the cause that determines it lies in the pure practical reason; and this + impression therefore, on account of its origin, must be called, not a + pathological but a practical effect. For by the fact that the conception + of the moral law deprives self-love of its influence, and self-conceit of + its illusion, it lessens the obstacle to pure practical reason and + produces the conception of the superiority of its objective law to the + impulses of the sensibility; and thus, by removing the counterpoise, it + gives relatively greater weight to the law in the judgement of reason (in + the case of a will affected by the aforesaid impulses). Thus the respect + for the law is not a motive to morality, but is morality itself + subjectively considered as a motive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by + rejecting all the rival pretensions of self-love, gives authority to the + law, which now alone has influence. Now it is to be observed that as + respect is an effect on feeling, and therefore on the sensibility, of a + rational being, it presupposes this sensibility, and therefore also the + finiteness of such beings on whom the moral law imposes respect; and that + respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being, or to any + being free from all sensibility, in whom, therefore, this sensibility + cannot be an obstacle to practical reason. + </p> + <p> + This feeling (which we call the moral feeling) is therefore produced + simply by reason. It does not serve for the estimation of actions nor for + the foundation of the objective moral law itself, but merely as a motive + to make this of itself a maxim. But what name could we more suitably apply + to this singular feeling which cannot be compared to any pathological + feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind that it seems to be at the disposal + of reason only, and that pure practical reason. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> + <p> + Respect applies always to persons only- not to things. The latter may + arouse inclination, and if they are animals (e.g., horses, dogs, etc.), + even love or fear, like the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey; but never + respect. Something that comes nearer to this feeling is admiration, and + this, as an affection, astonishment, can apply to things also, e.g., lofty + mountains, the magnitude, number, and distance of the heavenly bodies, the + strength and swiftness of many animals, etc. But all this is not respect. + A man also may be an object to me of love, fear, or admiration, even to + astonishment, and yet not be an object of respect. His jocose humour, his + courage and strength, his power from the rank he has amongst others, may + inspire me with sentiments of this kind, but still inner respect for him + is wanting. Fontenelle says, "I bow before a great man, but my mind does + not bow." I would add, before an humble plain man, in whom I perceive + uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am conscious of in + myself,- my mind bows whether I choose it or not, and though I bear my + head never so high that he may not forget my superior rank. Why is this? + Because his example exhibits to me a law that humbles my self-conceit when + I compare it with my conduct: a law, the practicability of obedience to + which I see proved by fact before my eyes. Now, I may even be conscious of + a like degree of uprightness, and yet the respect remains. For since in + man all good is defective, the law made visible by an example still + humbles my pride, my standard being furnished by a man whose + imperfections, whatever they may be, are not known to me as my own are, + and who therefore appears to me in a more favourable light. Respect is a + tribute which we cannot refuse to merit, whether we will or not; we may + indeed outwardly withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly. + </p> + <p> + Respect is so far from being a feeling of pleasure that we only + reluctantly give way to it as regards a man. We try to find out something + that may lighten the burden of it, some fault to compensate us for the + humiliation which such an example causes. Even the dead are not always + secure from this criticism, especially if their example appears + inimitable. Even the moral law itself in its solemn majesty is exposed to + this endeavour to save oneself from yielding it respect. Can it be thought + that it is for any other reason that we are so ready to reduce it to the + level of our familiar inclination, or that it is for any other reason that + we all take such trouble to make it out to be the chosen precept of our + own interest well understood, but that we want to be free from the + deterrent respect which shows us our own unworthiness with such severity? + Nevertheless, on the other hand, so little is there pain in it that if + once one has laid aside self-conceit and allowed practical influence to + that respect, he can never be satisfied with contemplating the majesty of + this law, and the soul believes itself elevated in proportion as it sees + the holy law elevated above it and its frail nature. No doubt great + talents and activity proportioned to them may also occasion respect or an + analogous feeling. It is very proper to yield it to them, and then it + appears as if this sentiment were the same thing as admiration. But if we + look closer we shall observe that it is always uncertain how much of the + ability is due to native talent, and how much to diligence in cultivating + it. Reason represents it to us as probably the fruit of cultivation, and + therefore as meritorious, and this notably reduces our self-conceit, and + either casts a reproach on us or urges us to follow such an example in the + way that is suitable to us. This respect, then, which we show to such a + person (properly speaking, to the law that his example exhibits) is not + mere admiration; and this is confirmed also by the fact that when the + common run of admirers think they have learned from any source the badness + of such a man's character (for instance Voltaire's) they give up all + respect for him; whereas the true scholar still feels it at least with + regard to his talents, because he is himself engaged in a business and a + vocation which make imitation of such a man in some degree a law. + </p> + <p> + Respect for the moral law is, therefore, the only and the undoubted moral + motive, and this feeling is directed to no object, except on the ground of + this law. The moral law first determines the will objectively and directly + in the judgement of reason; and freedom, whose causality can be determined + only by the law, consists just in this, that it restricts all + inclinations, and consequently self-esteem, by the condition of obedience + to its pure law. This restriction now has an effect on feeling, and + produces the impression of displeasure which can be known a priori from + the moral law. Since it is so far only a negative effect which, arising + from the influence of pure practical reason, checks the activity of the + subject, so far as it is determined by inclinations, and hence checks the + opinion of his personal worth (which, in the absence of agreement with the + moral law, is reduced to nothing); hence, the effect of this law on + feeling is merely humiliation. We can, therefore, perceive this a priori, + but cannot know by it the force of the pure practical law as a motive, but + only the resistance to motives of the sensibility. But since the same law + is objectively, that is, in the conception of pure reason, an immediate + principle of determination of the will, and consequently this humiliation + takes place only relatively to the purity of the law; hence, the lowering + of the pretensions of moral self-esteem, that is, humiliation on the + sensible side, is an elevation of the moral, i.e., practical, esteem for + the law itself on the intellectual side; in a word, it is respect for the + law, and therefore, as its cause is intellectual, a positive feeling which + can be known a priori. For whatever diminishes the obstacles to an + activity furthers this activity itself. Now the recognition of the moral + law is the consciousness of an activity of practical reason from objective + principles, which only fails to reveal its effect in actions because + subjective (pathological) causes hinder it. Respect for the moral law then + must be regarded as a positive, though indirect, effect of it on feeling, + inasmuch as this respect weakens the impeding influence of inclinations by + humiliating self-esteem; and hence also as a subjective principle of + activity, that is, as a motive to obedience to the law, and as a principle + of the maxims of a life conformable to it. From the notion of a motive + arises that of an interest, which can never be attributed to any being + unless it possesses reason, and which signifies a motive of the will in so + far as it is conceived by the reason. Since in a morally good will the law + itself must be the motive, the moral interest is a pure interest of + practical reason alone, independent of sense. On the notion of an interest + is based that of a maxim. This, therefore, is morally good only in case it + rests simply on the interest taken in obedience to the law. All three + notions, however, that of a motive, of an interest, and of a maxim, can be + applied only to finite beings. For they all suppose a limitation of the + nature of the being, in that the subjective character of his choice does + not of itself agree with the objective law of a practical reason; they + suppose that the being requires to be impelled to action by something, + because an internal obstacle opposes itself. Therefore they cannot be + applied to the Divine will. + </p> + <p> + There is something so singular in the unbounded esteem for the pure moral + law, apart from all advantage, as it is presented for our obedience by + practical reason, the voice of which makes even the boldest sinner tremble + and compels him to hide himself from it, that we cannot wonder if we find + this influence of a mere intellectual idea on the feelings quite + incomprehensible to speculative reason and have to be satisfied with + seeing so much of this a priori that such a feeling is inseparably + connected with the conception of the moral law in every finite rational + being. If this feeling of respect were pathological, and therefore were a + feeling of pleasure based on the inner sense, it would be in vain to try + to discover a connection of it with any idea a priori. But [it] is a + feeling that applies merely to what is practical, and depends on the + conception of a law, simply as to its form, not on account of any object, + and therefore cannot be reckoned either as pleasure or pain, and yet + produces an interest in obedience to the law, which we call the moral + interest, just as the capacity of taking such an interest in the law (or + respect for the moral law itself) is properly the moral feeling. + </p> + <p> + The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law, yet + combined with an inevitable constraint put upon all inclinations, though + only by our own reason, is respect for the law. The law that demands this + respect and inspires it is clearly no other than the moral (for no other + precludes all inclinations from exercising any direct influence on the + will). An action which is objectively practical according to this law, to + the exclusion of every determining principle of inclination, is duty, and + this by reason of that exclusion includes in its concept practical + obligation, that is, a determination to actions, however reluctantly they + may be done. The feeling that arises from the consciousness of this + obligation is not pathological, as would be a feeling produced by an + object of the senses, but practical only, that is, it is made possible by + a preceding (objective) determination of the will and a causality of the + reason. As submission to the law, therefore, that is, as a command + (announcing constraint for the sensibly affected subject), it contains in + it no pleasure, but on the contrary, so far, pain in the action. On the + other hand, however, as this constraint is exercised merely by the + legislation of our own reason, it also contains something elevating, and + this subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical reason is + the sole cause of it, may be called in this respect self-approbation, + since we recognize ourselves as determined thereto solely by the law + without any interest, and are now conscious of a quite different interest + subjectively produced thereby, and which is purely practical and free; and + our taking this interest in an action of duty is not suggested by any + inclination, but is commanded and actually brought about by reason through + the practical law; whence this feeling obtains a special name, that of + respect. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 15</span> + </p> + <p> + The notion of duty, therefore, requires in the action, objectively, + agreement with the law, and, subjectively in its maxim, that respect for + the law shall be the sole mode in which the will is determined thereby. + And on this rests the distinction between the consciousness of having + acted according to duty and from duty, that is, from respect for the law. + The former (legality) is possible even if inclinations have been the + determining principles of the will; but the latter (morality), moral + worth, can be placed only in this, that the action is done from duty, that + is, simply for the sake of the law. * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * If we examine accurately the notion of respect for persons + as it has been already laid down, we shall perceive that it + always rests on the consciousness of a duty which an example + shows us, and that respect, therefore, can never have any + but a moral ground, and that it is very good and even, in a + psychological point of view, very useful for the knowledge + of mankind, that whenever we use this expression we should + attend to this secret and marvellous, yet often recurring, + regard which men in their judgement pay to the moral law. +</pre> + <p> + It is of the greatest importance to attend with the utmost exactness in + all moral judgements to the subjective principle of all maxims, that all + the morality of actions may be placed in the necessity of acting from duty + and from respect for the law, not from love and inclination for that which + the actions are to produce. For men and all created rational beings moral + necessity is constraint, that is obligation, and every action based on it + is to be conceived as a duty, not as a proceeding previously pleasing, or + likely to be pleasing to us of our own accord. As if indeed we could ever + bring it about that without respect for the law, which implies fear, or at + least apprehension of transgression, we of ourselves, like the independent + Deity, could ever come into possession of holiness of will by the + coincidence of our will with the pure moral law becoming as it were part + of our nature, never to be shaken (in which case the law would cease to be + a command for us, as we could never be tempted to be untrue to it). + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> + <p> + The moral law is in fact for the will of a perfect being a law of + holiness, but for the will of every finite rational being a law of duty, + of moral constraint, and of the determination of its actions by respect + for this law and reverence for its duty. No other subjective principle + must be assumed as a motive, else while the action might chance to be such + as the law prescribes, yet, as does not proceed from duty, the intention, + which is the thing properly in question in this legislation, is not moral. + </p> + <p> + It is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and from + sympathetic good will, or to be just from love of order; but this is not + yet the true moral maxim of our conduct which is suitable to our position + amongst rational beings as men, when we pretend with fanciful pride to set + ourselves above the thought of duty, like volunteers, and, as if we were + independent on the command, to want to do of our own good pleasure what we + think we need no command to do. We stand under a discipline of reason and + in all our maxims must not forget our subjection to it, nor withdraw + anything therefrom, or by an egotistic presumption diminish aught of the + authority of the law (although our own reason gives it) so as to set the + determining principle of our will, even though the law be conformed to, + anywhere else but in the law itself and in respect for this law. Duty and + obligation are the only names that we must give to our relation to the + moral law. We are indeed legislative members of a moral kingdom rendered + possible by freedom, and presented to us by reason as an object of + respect; but yet we are subjects in it, not the sovereign, and to mistake + our inferior position as creatures, and presumptuously to reject the + authority of the moral law, is already to revolt from it in spirit, even + though the letter of it is fulfilled. + </p> + <p> + With this agrees very well the possibility of such a command as: Love God + above everything, and thy neighbour as thyself. * For as a command it + requires respect for a law which commands love and does not leave it to + our own arbitrary choice to make this our principle. Love to God, however, + considered as an inclination (pathological love), is impossible, for He is + not an object of the senses. The same affection towards men is possible no + doubt, but cannot be commanded, for it is not in the power of any man to + love anyone at command; therefore it is only practical love that is meant + in that pith of all laws. To love God means, in this sense, to like to do + His commandments; to love one's neighbour means to like to practise all + duties towards him. But the command that makes this a rule cannot command + us to have this disposition in actions conformed to duty, but only to + endeavour after it. For a command to like to do a thing is in itself + contradictory, because if we already know of ourselves what we are bound + to do, and if further we are conscious of liking to do it, a command would + be quite needless; and if we do it not willingly, but only out of respect + for the law, a command that makes this respect the motive of our maxim + would directly counteract the disposition commanded. That law of all laws, + therefore, like all the moral precepts of the Gospel, exhibits the moral + disposition in all its perfection, in which, viewed as an ideal of + holiness, it is not attainable by any creature, but yet is the pattern + which we should strive to approach, and in an uninterrupted but infinite + progress become like to. In fact, if a rational creature could ever reach + this point, that he thoroughly likes to do all moral laws, this would mean + that there does not exist in him even the possibility of a desire that + would tempt him to deviate from them; for to overcome such a desire always + costs the subject some sacrifice and therefore requires self-compulsion, + that is, inward constraint to something that one does not quite like to + do; and no creature can ever reach this stage of moral disposition. For, + being a creature, and therefore always dependent with respect to what he + requires for complete satisfaction, he can never be quite free from + desires and inclinations, and as these rest on physical causes, they can + never of themselves coincide with the moral law, the sources of which are + quite different; and therefore they make it necessary to found the mental + disposition of one's maxims on moral obligation, not on ready inclination, + but on respect, which demands obedience to the law, even though one may + not like it; not on love, which apprehends no inward reluctance of the + will towards the law. Nevertheless, this latter, namely, love to the law + (which would then cease to be a command, and then morality, which would + have passed subjectively into holiness, would cease to be virtue) must be + the constant though unattainable goal of his endeavours. For in the case + of what we highly esteem, but yet (on account of the consciousness of our + weakness) dread, the increased facility of satisfying it changes the most + reverential awe into inclination, and respect into love; at least this + would be the perfection of a disposition devoted to the law, if it were + possible for a creature to attain it. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * This law is in striking contrast with the principle of + private happiness which some make the supreme principle of + morality. This would be expressed thus: Love thyself above + everything, and God and thy neighbour for thine own sake. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> + <p> + This reflection is intended not so much to clear up the evangelical + command just cited, in order to prevent religious fanaticism in regard to + love of God, but to define accurately the moral disposition with regard + directly to our duties towards men, and to check, or if possible prevent, + a merely moral fanaticism which infects many persons. The stage of + morality on which man (and, as far as we can see, every rational creature) + stands is respect for the moral law. The disposition that he ought to have + in obeying this is to obey it from duty, not from spontaneous inclination, + or from an endeavour taken up from liking and unbidden; and this proper + moral condition in which he can always be is virtue, that is, moral + disposition militant, and not holiness in the fancied possession of a + perfect purity of the disposition of the will. It is nothing but moral + fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit that is infused into the mind by + exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, by which men + are led into the delusion that it is not duty, that is, respect for the + law, whose yoke (an easy yoke indeed, because reason itself imposes it on + us) they must bear, whether they like it or not, that constitutes the + determining principle of their actions, and which always humbles them + while they obey it; fancying that those actions are expected from them, + not from duty, but as pure merit. For not only would they, in imitating + such deeds from such a principle, not have fulfilled the spirit of the law + in the least, which consists not in the legality of the action (without + regard to principle), but in the subjection of the mind to the law; not + only do they make the motives pathological (seated in sympathy or + self-love), not moral (in the law), but they produce in this way a vain, + high-flying, fantastic way of thinking, flattering themselves with a + spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor bridle, for + which no command is needed, and thereby forgetting their obligation, which + they ought to think of rather than merit. Indeed actions of others which + are done with great sacrifice, and merely for the sake of duty, may be + praised as noble and sublime, but only so far as there are traces which + suggest that they were done wholly out of respect for duty and not from + excited feelings. If these, however, are set before anyone as examples to + be imitated, respect for duty (which is the only true moral feeling) must + be employed as the motive- this severe holy precept which never allows our + vain self-love to dally with pathological impulses (however analogous they + may be to morality), and to take a pride in meritorious worth. Now if we + search we shall find for all actions that are worthy of praise a law of + duty which commands, and does not leave us to choose what may be agreeable + to our inclinations. This is the only way of representing things that can + give a moral training to the soul, because it alone is capable of solid + and accurately defined principles. + </p> + <p> + If fanaticism in its most general sense is a deliberate over stepping of + the limits of human reason, then moral fanaticism is such an over stepping + of the bounds that practical pure reason sets to mankind, in that it + forbids us to place the subjective determining principle of correct + actions, that is, their moral motive, in anything but the law itself, or + to place the disposition which is thereby brought into the maxims in + anything but respect for this law, and hence commands us to take as the + supreme vital principle of all morality in men the thought of duty, which + strikes down all arrogance as well as vain self-love. + </p> + <p> + If this is so, it is not only writers of romance or sentimental educators + (although they may be zealous opponents of sentimentalism), but sometimes + even philosophers, nay, even the severest of all, the Stoics, that have + brought in moral fanaticism instead of a sober but wise moral discipline, + although the fanaticism of the latter was more heroic, that of the former + of an insipid, effeminate character; and we may, without hypocrisy, say of + the moral teaching of the Gospel, that it first, by the purity of its + moral principle, and at the same time by its suitability to the + limitations of finite beings, brought all the good conduct of men under + the discipline of a duty plainly set before their eyes, which does not + permit them to indulge in dreams of imaginary moral perfections; and that + it also set the bounds of humility (that is, self-knowledge) to + self-conceit as well as to self-love, both which are ready to mistake + their limits. + </p> + <p> + Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or + insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not to move the + will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror, + but merely holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the + mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a + law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly + counter-work it; what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be + found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kindred with + the inclinations; a root to be derived from which is the indispensable + condition of the only worth which men can give themselves? + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 30</span> + </p> + <p> + It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself (as a + part of the world of sense), a power which connects him with an order of + things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the + same time commands the whole sensible world, and with it the empirically + determinable existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all + ends (which totality alone suits such unconditional practical laws as the + moral). This power is nothing but personality, that is, freedom and + independence on the mechanism of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty + of a being which is subject to special laws, namely, pure practical laws + given by its own reason; so that the person as belonging to the sensible + world is subject to his own personality as belonging to the intelligible + [supersensible] world. It is then not to be wondered at that man, as + belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to its + second and highest characteristic only with reverence, and its laws with + the highest respect. + </p> + <p> + On this origin are founded many expressions which designate the worth of + objects according to moral ideas. The moral law is holy (inviolable). Man + is indeed unholy enough, but he must regard humanity in his own person as + holy. In all creation every thing one chooses and over which one has any + power, may be used merely as means; man alone, and with him every rational + creature, is an end in himself. By virtue of the autonomy of his freedom + he is the subject of the moral law, which is holy. Just for this reason + every will, even every person's own individual will, in relation to + itself, is restricted to the condition of agreement with the autonomy of + the rational being, that is to say, that it is not to be subject to any + purpose which cannot accord with a law which might arise from the will of + the passive subject himself; the latter is, therefore, never to be + employed merely as means, but as itself also, concurrently, an end. We + justly attribute this condition even to the Divine will, with regard to + the rational beings in the world, which are His creatures, since it rests + on their personality, by which alone they are ends in themselves. + </p> + <p> + This respect-inspiring idea of personality which sets before our eyes the + sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at the same time it + shows us the want of accord of our conduct with it and thereby strikes + down self-conceit, is even natural to the commonest reason and easily + observed. Has not every even moderately honourable man sometimes found + that, where by an otherwise inoffensive lie he might either have withdrawn + himself from an unpleasant business, or even have procured some advantages + for a loved and well-deserving friend, he has avoided it solely lest he + should despise himself secretly in his own eyes? When an upright man is in + the greatest distress, which he might have avoided if he could only have + disregarded duty, is he not sustained by the consciousness that he has + maintained humanity in its proper dignity in his own person and honoured + it, that he has no reason to be ashamed of himself in his own sight, or to + dread the inward glance of self-examination? This consolation is not + happiness, it is not even the smallest part of it, for no one would wish + to have occasion for it, or would, perhaps, even desire a life in such + circumstances. But he lives, and he cannot endure that he should be in his + own eyes unworthy of life. This inward peace is therefore merely negative + as regards what can make life pleasant; it is, in fact, only the escaping + the danger of sinking in personal worth, after everything else that is + valuable has been lost. It is the effect of a respect for something quite + different from life, something in comparison and contrast with which life + with all its enjoyment has no value. He still lives only because it is his + duty, not because he finds anything pleasant in life. + </p> + <p> + Such is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason; it is no + other than the pure moral law itself, inasmuch as it makes us conscious of + the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and subjectively produces + respect for their higher nature in men who are also conscious of their + sensible existence and of the consequent dependence of their + pathologically very susceptible nature. Now with this motive may be + combined so many charms and satisfactions of life that even on this + account alone the most prudent choice of a rational Epicurean reflecting + on the greatest advantage of life would declare itself on the side of + moral conduct, and it may even be advisable to join this prospect of a + cheerful enjoyment of life with that supreme motive which is already + sufficient of itself; but only as a counterpoise to the attractions which + vice does not fail to exhibit on the opposite side, and not so as, even in + the smallest degree, to place in this the proper moving power when duty is + in question. For that would be just the same as to wish to taint the + purity of the moral disposition in its source. The majesty of duty has + nothing to do with enjoyment of life; it has its special law and its + special tribunal, and though the two should be never so well shaken + together to be given well mixed, like medicine, to the sick soul, yet they + will soon separate of themselves; and if they do not, the former will not + act; and although physical life might gain somewhat in force, the moral + life would fade away irrecoverably. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 35</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0032" id="link2H_4_0032"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + By the critical examination of a science, or of a portion of it, which + constitutes a system by itself, I understand the inquiry and proof why it + must have this and no other systematic form, when we compare it with + another system which is based on a similar faculty of knowledge. Now + practical and speculative reason are based on the same faculty, so far as + both are pure reason. Therefore the difference in their systematic form + must be determined by the comparison of both, and the ground of this must + be assigned. + </p> + <p> + The Analytic of pure theoretic reason had to do with the knowledge of such + objects as may have been given to the understanding, and was obliged + therefore to begin from intuition and consequently (as this is always + sensible) from sensibility; and only after that could advance to concepts + (of the objects of this intuition), and could only end with principles + after both these had preceded. On the contrary, since practical reason has + not to do with objects so as to know them, but with its own faculty of + realizing them (in accordance with the knowledge of them), that is, with a + will which is a causality, inasmuch as reason contains its determining + principle; since, consequently, it has not to furnish an object of + intuition, but as practical reason has to furnish only a law (because the + notion of causality always implies the reference to a law which determines + the existence of the many in relation to one another); hence a critical + examination of the Analytic of reason, if this is to be practical reason + (and this is properly the problem), must begin with the possibility of + practical principles a priori. Only after that can it proceed to concepts + of the objects of a practical reason, namely, those of absolute good and + evil, in order to assign them in accordance with those principles (for + prior to those principles they cannot possibly be given as good and evil + by any faculty of knowledge), and only then could the section be concluded + with the last chapter, that, namely, which treats of the relation of the + pure practical reason to the sensibility and of its necessary influence + thereon, which is a priori cognisable, that is, of the moral sentiment. + Thus the Analytic of the practical pure reason has the whole extent of the + conditions of its use in common with the theoretical, but in reverse + order. The Analytic of pure theoretic reason was divided into + transcendental Aesthetic and transcendental Logic, that of the practical + reversely into Logic and Aesthetic of pure practical reason (if I may, for + the sake of analogy merely, use these designations, which are not quite + suitable). This logic again was there divided into the Analytic of + concepts and that of principles: here into that of principles and + concepts. The Aesthetic also had in the former case two parts, on account + of the two kinds of sensible intuition; here the sensibility is not + considered as a capacity of intuition at all, but merely as feeling (which + can be a subjective ground of desire), and in regard to it pure practical + reason admits no further division. + </p> + <p> + It is also easy to see the reason why this division into two parts with + its subdivision was not actually adopted here (as one might have been + induced to attempt by the example of the former critique). For since it is + pure reason that is here considered in its practical use, and consequently + as proceeding from a priori principles, and not from empirical principles + of determination, hence the division of the analytic of pure practical + reason must resemble that of a syllogism; namely, proceeding from the + universal in the major premiss (the moral principle), through a minor + premiss containing a subsumption of possible actions (as good or evil) + under the former, to the conclusion, namely, the subjective determination + of the will (an interest in the possible practical good, and in the maxim + founded on it). He who has been able to convince himself of the truth of + the positions occurring in the Analytic will take pleasure in such + comparisons; for they justly suggest the expectation that we may perhaps + some day be able to discern the unity of the whole faculty of reason + (theoretical as well as practical) and be able to derive all from one + principle, which, is what human reason inevitably demands, as it finds + complete satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of its + knowledge. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 40</span> + </p> + <p> + If now we consider also the contents of the knowledge that we can have of + a pure practical reason, and by means of it, as shown by the Analytic, we + find, along with a remarkable analogy between it and the theoretical, no + less remarkable differences. As regards the theoretical, the faculty of a + pure rational cognition a priori could be easily and evidently proved by + examples from sciences (in which, as they put their principles to the test + in so many ways by methodical use, there is not so much reason as in + common knowledge to fear a secret mixture of empirical principles of + cognition). But, that pure reason without the admixture of any empirical + principle is practical of itself, this could only be shown from the + commonest practical use of reason, by verifying the fact, that every man's + natural reason acknowledges the supreme practical principle as the supreme + law of his will- a law completely a priori and not depending on any + sensible data. It was necessary first to establish and verify the purity + of its origin, even in the judgement of this common reason, before science + could take it in hand to make use of it, as a fact, that is, prior to all + disputation about its possibility, and all the consequences that may be + drawn from it. But this circumstance may be readily explained from what + has just been said; because practical pure reason must necessarily begin + with principles, which therefore must be the first data, the foundation of + all science, and cannot be derived from it. It was possible to effect this + verification of moral principles as principles of a pure reason quite + well, and with sufficient certainty, by a single appeal to the judgement + of common sense, for this reason, that anything empirical which might slip + into our maxims as a determining principle of the will can be detected at + once by the feeling of pleasure or pain which necessarily attaches to it + as exciting desire; whereas pure practical reason positively refuses to + admit this feeling into its principle as a condition. The heterogeneity of + the determining principles (the empirical and rational) is clearly + detected by this resistance of a practically legislating reason against + every admixture of inclination, and by a peculiar kind of sentiment, + which, however, does not precede the legislation of the practical reason, + but, on the contrary, is produced by this as a constraint, namely, by the + feeling of a respect such as no man has for inclinations of whatever kind + but for the law only; and it is detected in so marked and prominent a + manner that even the most uninstructed cannot fail to see at once in an + example presented to him, that empirical principles of volition may indeed + urge him to follow their attractions, but that he can never be expected to + obey anything but the pure practical law of reason alone. + </p> + <p> + The distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine of + morality, in the former of which empirical principles constitute the + entire foundation, while in the second they do not form the smallest part + of it, is the first and most important office of the Analytic of pure + practical reason; and it must proceed in it with as much exactness and, so + to speak, scrupulousness, as any geometer in his work. The philosopher, + however, has greater difficulties to contend with here (as always in + rational cognition by means of concepts merely without construction), + because he cannot take any intuition as a foundation (for a pure + noumenon). He has, however, this advantage that, like the chemist, he can + at any time make an experiment with every man's practical reason for the + purpose of distinguishing the moral (pure) principle of determination from + the empirical; namely, by adding the moral law (as a determining + principle) to the empirically affected will (e.g., that of the man who + would be ready to lie because he can gain something thereby). It is as if + the analyst added alkali to a solution of lime in hydrochloric acid, the + acid at once forsakes the lime, combines with the alkali, and the lime is + precipitated. Just in the same way, if to a man who is otherwise honest + (or who for this occasion places himself only in thought in the position + of an honest man), we present the moral law by which he recognises the + worthlessness of the liar, his practical reason (in forming a judgement of + what ought to be done) at once forsakes the advantage, combines with that + which maintains in him respect for his own person (truthfulness), and the + advantage after it has been separated and washed from every particle of + reason (which is altogether on the side of duty) is easily weighed by + everyone, so that it can enter into combination with reason in other + cases, only not where it could be opposed to the moral law, which reason + never forsakes, but most closely unites itself with. + </p> + <p> + But it does not follow that this distinction between the principle of + happiness and that of morality is an opposition between them, and pure + practical reason does not require that we should renounce all claim to + happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we should take no + account of happiness. It may even in certain respects be a duty to provide + for happiness; partly, because (including skill, wealth, riches) it + contains means for the fulfilment of our duty; partly, because the absence + of it (e.g., poverty) implies temptations to transgress our duty. But it + can never be an immediate duty to promote our happiness, still less can it + be the principle of all duty. Now, as all determining principles of the + will, except the law of pure practical reason alone (the moral law), are + all empirical and, therefore, as such, belong to the principle of + happiness, they must all be kept apart from the supreme principle of + morality and never be incorporated with it as a condition; since this + would be to destroy all moral worth just as much as any empirical + admixture with geometrical principles would destroy the certainty of + mathematical evidence, which in Plato's opinion is the most excellent + thing in mathematics, even surpassing their utility. + </p> + <p> + Instead, however, of the deduction of the supreme principle of pure + practical reason, that is, the explanation of the possibility of such a + knowledge a priori, the utmost we were able to do was to show that if we + saw the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, we should also + see not merely the possibility, but even the necessity, of the moral law + as the supreme practical law of rational beings, to whom we attribute + freedom of causality of their will; because both concepts are so + inseparably united that we might define practical freedom as independence + of the will on anything but the moral law. But we cannot perceive the + possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, especially in the world + of sense; we are fortunate if only we can be sufficiently assured that + there is no proof of its impossibility, and are now, by the moral law + which postulates it, compelled and therefore authorized to assume it. + However, there are still many who think that they can explain this freedom + on empirical principles, like any other physical faculty, and treat it as + a psychological property, the explanation of which only requires a more + exact study of the nature of the soul and of the motives of the will, and + not as a transcendental predicate of the causality of a being that belongs + to the world of sense (which is really the point). They thus deprive us of + the grand revelation which we obtain through practical reason by means of + the moral law, the revelation, namely, of a supersensible world by the + realization of the otherwise transcendent concept of freedom, and by this + deprive us also of the moral law itself, which admits no empirical + principle of determination. Therefore it will be necessary to add + something here as a protection against this delusion and to exhibit + empiricism in its naked superficiality. + </p> + <p> + The notion of causality as physical necessity, in opposition to the same + notion as freedom, concerns only the existence of things so far as it is + determinable in time, and, consequently, as phenomena, in opposition to + their causality as things in themselves. Now if we take the attributes of + existence of things in time for attributes of things in themselves (which + is the common view), then it is impossible to reconcile the necessity of + the causal relation with freedom; they are contradictory. For from the + former it follows that every event, and consequently every action that + takes place at a certain point of time, is a necessary result of what + existed in time preceding. Now as time past is no longer in my power, + hence every action that I perform must be the necessary result of certain + determining grounds which are not in my power, that is, at the moment in + which I am acting I am never free. Nay, even if I assume that my whole + existence is independent on any foreign cause (for instance, God), so that + the determining principles of my causality, and even of my whole + existence, were not outside myself, yet this would not in the least + transform that physical necessity into freedom. For at every moment of + time I am still under the necessity of being determined to action by that + which is not in my power, and the series of events infinite a parte + priori, which I only continue according to a pre-determined order and + could never begin of myself, would be a continuous physical chain, and + therefore my causality would never be freedom. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 45</span> + </p> + <p> + If, then, we would attribute freedom to a being whose existence is + determined in time, we cannot except him from the law of necessity as to + all events in his existence and, consequently, as to his actions also; for + that would be to hand him over to blind chance. Now as this law inevitably + applies to all the causality of things, so far as their existence is + determinable in time, it follows that if this were the mode in which we + had also to conceive the existence of these things in themselves, freedom + must be rejected as a vain and impossible conception. Consequently, if we + would still save it, no other way remains but to consider that the + existence of a thing, so far as it is determinable in time, and therefore + its causality, according to the law of physical necessity, belong to + appearance, and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in + itself. This is certainly inevitable, if we would retain both these + contradictory concepts together; but in application, when we try to + explain their combination in one and the same action, great difficulties + present themselves which seem to render such a combination impracticable. + </p> + <p> + When I say of a man who commits a theft that, by the law of causality, + this deed is a necessary result of the determining causes in preceding + time, then it was impossible that it could not have happened; how then can + the judgement, according to the moral law, make any change, and suppose + that it could have been omitted, because the law says that it ought to + have been omitted; that is, how can a man be called quite free at the same + moment, and with respect to the same action in which he is subject to an + inevitable physical necessity? Some try to evade this by saying that the + causes that determine his causality are of such a kind as to agree with a + comparative notion of freedom. According to this, that is sometimes called + a free effect, the determining physical cause of which lies within the + acting thing itself, e.g., that which a projectile performs when it is in + free motion, in which case we use the word freedom, because while it is in + flight it is not urged by anything external; or as we call the motion of a + clock a free motion, because it moves its hands itself, which therefore do + not require to be pushed by external force; so although the actions of man + are necessarily determined by causes which precede in time, we yet call + them free, because these causes are ideas produced by our own faculties, + whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances, and hence actions + are wrought according to our own pleasure. This is a wretched subterfuge + with which some persons still let themselves be put off, and so think they + have solved, with a petty word- jugglery, that difficult problem, at the + solution of which centuries have laboured in vain, and which can therefore + scarcely be found so completely on the surface. In fact, in the question + about the freedom which must be the foundation of all moral laws and the + consequent responsibility, it does not matter whether the principles which + necessarily determine causality by a physical law reside within the + subject or without him, or in the former case whether these principles are + instinctive or are conceived by reason, if, as is admitted by these men + themselves, these determining ideas have the ground of their existence in + time and in the antecedent state, and this again in an antecedent, etc. + Then it matters not that these are internal; it matters not that they have + a psychological and not a mechanical causality, that is, produce actions + by means of ideas and not by bodily movements; they are still determining + principles of the causality of a being whose existence is determinable in + time, and therefore under the necessitation of conditions of past time, + which therefore, when the subject has to act, are no longer in his power. + This may imply psychological freedom (if we choose to apply this term to a + merely internal chain of ideas in the mind), but it involves physical + necessity and, therefore, leaves no room for transcendental freedom, which + must be conceived as independence on everything empirical, and, + consequently, on nature generally, whether it is an object of the internal + sense considered in time only, or of the external in time and space. + Without this freedom (in the latter and true sense), which alone is + practical a priori, no moral law and no moral imputation are possible. + Just for this reason the necessity of events in time, according to the + physical law of causality, may be called the mechanism of nature, although + we do not mean by this that things which are subject to it must be really + material machines. We look here only to the necessity of the connection of + events in a time-series as it is developed according to the physical law, + whether the subject in which this development takes place is called + automaton materiale when the mechanical being is moved by matter, or with + Leibnitz spirituale when it is impelled by ideas; and if the freedom of + our will were no other than the latter (say the psychological and + comparative, not also transcendental, that is, absolute), then it would at + bottom be nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once + it is wound up, accomplishes its motions of itself. + </p> + <p> + Now, in order to remove in the supposed case the apparent contradiction + between freedom and the mechanism of nature in one and the same action, we + must remember what was said in the Critique of Pure Reason, or what + follows therefrom; viz., that the necessity of nature, which cannot + co-exist with the freedom of the subject, appertains only to the + attributes of the thing that is subject to time-conditions, consequently + only to those of the acting subject as a phenomenon; that therefore in + this respect the determining principles of every action of the same reside + in what belongs to past time and is no longer in his power (in which must + be included his own past actions and the character that these may + determine for him in his own eyes as a phenomenon). But the very same + subject, being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in + himself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not subject to + time-conditions, and regards himself as only determinable by laws which he + gives himself through reason; and in this his existence nothing is + antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action, and in + general every modification of his existence, varying according to his + internal sense, even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being + is in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but the + result, and never to be regarded as the determining principle, of his + causality as a noumenon. In this view now the rational being can justly + say of every unlawful action that he performs, that he could very well + have left it undone; although as appearance it is sufficiently determined + in the past, and in this respect is absolutely necessary; for it, with all + the past which determines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of his + character which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he imputes + the causality of those appearances to himself as a cause independent on + sensibility. + </p> + <p> + With this agree perfectly the judicial sentences of that wonderful faculty + in us which we call conscience. A man may use as much art as he likes in + order to paint to himself an unlawful act, that he remembers, as an + unintentional error, a mere oversight, such as one can never altogether + avoid, and therefore as something in which he was carried away by the + stream of physical necessity, and thus to make himself out innocent, yet + he finds that the advocate who speaks in his favour can by no means + silence the accuser within, if only he is conscious that at the time when + he did this wrong he was in his senses, that is, in possession of his + freedom; and, nevertheless, he accounts for his error from some bad + habits, which by gradual neglect of attention he has allowed to grow upon + him to such a degree that he can regard his error as its natural + consequence, although this cannot protect him from the blame and reproach + which he casts upon himself. This is also the ground of repentance for a + long past action at every recollection of it; a painful feeling produced + by the moral sentiment, and which is practically void in so far as it + cannot serve to undo what has been done. (Hence Priestley, as a true and + consistent fatalist, declares it absurd, and he deserves to be commended + for this candour more than those who, while they maintain the mechanism of + the will in fact, and its freedom in words only, yet wish it to be thought + that they include it in their system of compromise, although they do not + explain the possibility of such moral imputation.) But the pain is quite + legitimate, because when the law of our intelligible [supersensible] + existence (the moral law) is in question, reason recognizes no distinction + of time, and only asks whether the event belongs to me, as my act, and + then always morally connects the same feeling with it, whether it has + happened just now or long ago. For in reference to the supersensible + consciousness of its existence (i.e., freedom) the life of sense is but a + single phenomenon, which, inasmuch as it contains merely manifestations of + the mental disposition with regard to the moral law (i.e., of the + character), must be judged not according to the physical necessity that + belongs to it as phenomenon, but according to the absolute spontaneity of + freedom. It may therefore be admitted that, if it were possible to have so + profound an insight into a man's mental character as shown by internal as + well as external actions as to know all its motives, even the smallest, + and likewise all the external occasions that can influence them, we could + calculate a man's conduct for the future with as great certainty as a + lunar or solar eclipse; and nevertheless we may maintain that the man is + free. In fact, if we were capable of a further glance, namely, an + intellectual intuition of the same subject (which indeed is not granted to + us, and instead of it we have only the rational concept), then we should + perceive that this whole chain of appearances in regard to all that + concerns the moral laws depends on the spontaneity of the subject as a + thing in itself, of the determination of which no physical explanation can + be given. In default of this intuition, the moral law assures us of this + distinction between the relation of our actions as appearance to our + sensible nature, and the relation of this sensible nature to the + supersensible substratum in us. In this view, which is natural to our + reason, though inexplicable, we can also justify some judgements which we + passed with all conscientiousness, and which yet at first sight seem quite + opposed to all equity. There are cases in which men, even with the same + education which has been profitable to others, yet show such early + depravity, and so continue to progress in it to years of manhood, that + they are thought to be born villains, and their character altogether + incapable of improvement; and nevertheless they are judged for what they + do or leave undone, they are reproached for their faults as guilty; nay, + they themselves (the children) regard these reproaches as well founded, + exactly as if in spite of the hopeless natural quality of mind ascribed to + them, they remained just as responsible as any other man. This could not + happen if we did not suppose that whatever springs from a man's choice (as + every action intentionally performed undoubtedly does) has as its + foundation a free causality, which from early youth expresses its + character in its manifestations (i.e., actions). These, on account of the + uniformity of conduct, exhibit a natural connection, which however does + not make the vicious quality of the will necessary, but on the contrary, + is the consequence of the evil principles voluntarily adopted and + unchangeable, which only make it so much the more culpable and deserving + of punishment. There still remains a difficulty in the combination of + freedom with the mechanism of nature in a being belonging to the world of + sense; a difficulty which, even after all the foregoing is admitted, + threatens freedom with complete destruction. But with this danger there is + also a circumstance that offers hope of an issue still favourable to + freedom; namely, that the same difficulty presses much more strongly (in + fact as we shall presently see, presses only) on the system that holds the + existence determinable in time and space to be the existence of things in + themselves; it does not therefore oblige us to give up our capital + supposition of the ideality of time as a mere form of sensible intuition, + and consequently as a mere manner of representation which is proper to the + subject as belonging to the world of sense; and therefore it only requires + that this view be reconciled with this idea. + </p> + <p> + The difficulty is as follows: Even if it is admitted that the + supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action, + although, as a subject also belonging to the world of sense, he is under + mechanical conditions with respect to the same action, still, as soon as + we allow that God as universal first cause is also the cause of the + existence of substance (a proposition which can never be given up without + at the same time giving up the notion of God as the Being of all beings, + and therewith giving up his all sufficiency, on which everything in + theology depends), it seems as if we must admit that a man's actions have + their determining principle in something which is wholly out of his power- + namely, in the causality of a Supreme Being distinct from himself and on + whom his own existence and the whole determination of his causality are + absolutely dependent. In point of fact, if a man's actions as belonging to + his modifications in time were not merely modifications of him as + appearance, but as a thing in itself, freedom could not be saved. Man + would be a marionette or an automaton, like Vaucanson's, prepared and + wound up by the Supreme Artist. Self-consciousness would indeed make him a + thinking automaton; but the consciousness of his own spontaneity would be + mere delusion if this were mistaken for freedom, and it would deserve this + name only in a comparative sense, since, although the proximate + determining causes of its motion and a long series of their determining + causes are internal, yet the last and highest is found in a foreign hand. + Therefore I do not see how those who still insist on regarding time and + space as attributes belonging to the existence of things in themselves, + can avoid admitting the fatality of actions; or if (like the otherwise + acute Mendelssohn) they allow them to be conditions necessarily belonging + to the existence of finite and derived beings, but not to that of the + infinite Supreme Being, I do not see on what ground they can justify such + a distinction, or, indeed, how they can avoid the contradiction that meets + them, when they hold that existence in time is an attribute necessarily + belonging to finite things in themselves, whereas God is the cause of this + existence, but cannot be the cause of time (or space) itself (since this + must be presupposed as a necessary a priori condition of the existence of + things); and consequently as regards the existence of these things. His + causality must be subject to conditions and even to the condition of time; + and this would inevitably bring in everything contradictory to the notions + of His infinity and independence. On the other hand, it is quite easy for + us to draw the distinction between the attribute of the divine existence + of being independent on all time-conditions, and that of a being of the + world of sense, the distinction being that between the existence of a + being in itself and that of a thing in appearance. Hence, if this ideality + of time and space is not adopted, nothing remains but Spinozism, in which + space and time are essential attributes of the Supreme Being Himself, and + the things dependent on Him (ourselves, therefore, included) are not + substances, but merely accidents inhering in Him; since, if these things + as His effects exist in time only, this being the condition of their + existence in themselves, then the actions of these beings must be simply + His actions which He performs in some place and time. Thus, Spinozism, in + spite of the absurdity of its fundamental idea, argues more consistently + than the creation theory can, when beings assumed to be substances, and + beings in themselves existing in time, are regarded as effects of a + Supreme Cause, and yet as not [belonging] to Him and His action, but as + separate substances. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 50</span> + </p> + <p> + The above-mentioned difficulty is resolved briefly and clearly as follows: + If existence in time is a mere sensible mode of representation belonging + to thinking beings in the world and consequently does not apply to them as + things in themselves, then the creation of these beings is a creation of + things in themselves, since the notion of creation does not belong to the + sensible form of representation of existence or to causality, but can only + be referred to noumena. Consequently, when I say of beings in the world of + sense that they are created, I so far regard them as noumena. As it would + be a contradiction, therefore, to say that God is a creator of + appearances, so also it is a contradiction to say that as creator He is + the cause of actions in the world of sense, and therefore as appearances, + although He is the cause of the existence of the acting beings (which are + noumena). If now it is possible to affirm freedom in spite of the natural + mechanism of actions as appearances (by regarding existence in time as + something that belongs only to appearances, not to things in themselves), + then the circumstance that the acting beings are creatures cannot make the + slightest difference, since creation concerns their supersensible and not + their sensible existence, and, therefore, cannot be regarded as the + determining principle of the appearances. It would be quite different if + the beings in the world as things in themselves existed in time, since in + that case the creator of substance would be at the same time the author of + the whole mechanism of this substance. + </p> + <p> + Of so great importance is the separation of time (as well as space) from + the existence of things in themselves which was effected in the Critique + of the Pure Speculative Reason. + </p> + <p> + It may be said that the solution here proposed involves great difficulty + in itself and is scarcely susceptible of a lucid exposition. But is any + other solution that has been attempted, or that may be attempted, easier + and more intelligible? Rather might we say that the dogmatic teachers of + metaphysics have shown more shrewdness than candour in keeping this + difficult point out of sight as much as possible, in the hope that if they + said nothing about it, probably no one would think of it. If science is to + be advanced, all difficulties must be laid open, and we must even search + for those that are hidden, for every difficulty calls forth a remedy, + which cannot be discovered without science gaining either in extent or in + exactness; and thus even obstacles become means of increasing the + thoroughness of science. On the other hand, if the difficulties are + intentionally concealed, or merely removed by palliatives, then sooner or + later they burst out into incurable mischiefs, which bring science to ruin + in an absolute scepticism. + </p> + <p> + Since it is, properly speaking, the notion of freedom alone amongst all + the ideas of pure speculative reason that so greatly enlarges our + knowledge in the sphere of the supersensible, though only of our practical + knowledge, I ask myself why it exclusively possesses so great fertility, + whereas the others only designate the vacant space for possible beings of + the pure understanding, but are unable by any means to define the concept + of them. I presently find that as I cannot think anything without a + category, I must first look for a category for the rational idea of + freedom with which I am now concerned; and this is the category of + causality; and although freedom, a concept of the reason, being a + transcendent concept, cannot have any intuition corresponding to it, yet + the concept of the understanding- for the synthesis of which the former + demands the unconditioned- (namely, the concept of causality) must have a + sensible intuition given, by which first its objective reality is assured. + Now, the categories are all divided into two classes- the mathematical, + which concern the unity of synthesis in the conception of objects, and the + dynamical, which refer to the unity of synthesis in the conception of the + existence of objects. The former (those of magnitude and quality) always + contain a synthesis of the homogeneous, and it is not possible to find in + this the unconditioned antecedent to what is given in sensible intuition + as conditioned in space and time, as this would itself have to belong to + space and time, and therefore be again still conditioned. Whence it + resulted in the Dialectic of Pure Theoretic Reason that the opposite + methods of attaining the unconditioned and the totality of the conditions + were both wrong. The categories of the second class (those of causality + and of the necessity of a thing) did not require this homogeneity (of the + conditioned and the condition in synthesis), since here what we have to + explain is not how the intuition is compounded from a manifold in it, but + only how the existence of the conditioned object corresponding to it is + added to the existence of the condition (added, namely, in the + understanding as connected therewith); and in that case it was allowable + to suppose in the supersensible world the unconditioned antecedent to the + altogether conditioned in the world of sense (both as regards the causal + connection and the contingent existence of things themselves), although + this unconditioned remained indeterminate, and to make the synthesis + transcendent. Hence, it was found in the Dialectic of the Pure Speculative + Reason that the two apparently opposite methods of obtaining for the + conditioned the unconditioned were not really contradictory, e.g., in the + synthesis of causality to conceive for the conditioned in the series of + causes and effects of the sensible world, a causality which has no + sensible condition, and that the same action which, as belonging to the + world of sense, is always sensibly conditioned, that is, mechanically + necessary, yet at the same time may be derived from a causality not + sensibly conditioned- being the causality of the acting being as belonging + to the supersensible world- and may consequently be conceived as free. + Now, the only point in question was to change this may be into is; that + is, that we should be able to show in an actual case, as it were by a + fact, that certain actions imply such a causality (namely, the + intellectual, sensibly unconditioned), whether they are actual or only + commanded, that is, objectively necessary in a practical sense. We could + not hope to find this connexion in actions actually given in experience as + events of the sensible world, since causality with freedom must always be + sought outside the world of sense in the world of intelligence. But things + of sense are the only things offered to our perception and observation. + Hence, nothing remained but to find an incontestable objective principle + of causality which excludes all sensible conditions: that is, a principle + in which reason does not appeal further to something else as a determining + ground of its causality, but contains this determining ground itself by + means of that principle, and in which therefore it is itself as pure + reason practical. Now, this principle had not to be searched for or + discovered; it had long been in the reason of all men, and incorporated in + their nature, and is the principle of morality. Therefore, that + unconditioned causality, with the faculty of it, namely, freedom, is no + longer merely indefinitely and problematically thought (this speculative + reason could prove to be feasible), but is even as regards the law of its + causality definitely and assertorially known; and with it the fact that a + being (I myself), belonging to the world of sense, belongs also to the + supersensible world, this is also positively known, and thus the reality + of the supersensible world is established and in practical respects + definitely given, and this definiteness, which for theoretical purposes + would be transcendent, is for practical purposes immanent. We could not, + however, make a similar step as regards the second dynamical idea, namely, + that of a necessary being. We could not rise to it from the sensible world + without the aid of the first dynamical idea. For if we attempted to do so, + we should have ventured to leave at a bound all that is given to us, and + to leap to that of which nothing is given us that can help us to effect + the connection of such a supersensible being with the world of sense + (since the necessary being would have to be known as given outside + ourselves). On the other hand, it is now obvious that this connection is + quite possible in relation to our own subject, inasmuch as I know myself + to be on the one side as an intelligible [supersensible] being determined + by the moral law (by means of freedom), and on the other side as acting in + the world of sense. It is the concept of freedom alone that enables us to + find the unconditioned and intelligible for the conditioned and sensible + without going out of ourselves. For it is our own reason that by means of + the supreme and unconditional practical law knows that itself and the + being that is conscious of this law (our own person) belong to the pure + world of understanding, and moreover defines the manner in which, as such, + it can be active. In this way it can be understood why in the whole + faculty of reason it is the practical reason only that can help us to pass + beyond the world of sense and give us knowledge of a supersensible order + and connection, which, however, for this very reason cannot be extended + further than is necessary for pure practical purposes. + </p> + <p> + Let me be permitted on this occasion to make one more remark, namely, that + every step that we make with pure reason, even in the practical sphere + where no attention is paid to subtle speculation, nevertheless accords + with all the material points of the Critique of the Theoretical Reason as + closely and directly as if each step had been thought out with deliberate + purpose to establish this confirmation. Such a thorough agreement, wholly + unsought for and quite obvious (as anyone can convince himself, if he will + only carry moral inquiries up to their principles), between the most + important proposition of practical reason and the often seemingly too + subtle and needless remarks of the Critique of the Speculative Reason, + occasions surprise and astonishment, and confirms the maxim already + recognized and praised by others, namely, that in every scientific inquiry + we should pursue our way steadily with all possible exactness and + frankness, without caring for any objections that may be raised from + outside its sphere, but, as far as we can, to carry out our inquiry + truthfully and completely by itself. Frequent observation has convinced me + that, when such researches are concluded, that which in one part of them + appeared to me very questionable, considered in relation to other + extraneous doctrines, when I left this doubtfulness out of sight for a + time and only attended to the business in hand until it was completed, at + last was unexpectedly found to agree perfectly with what had been + discovered separately without the least regard to those doctrines, and + without any partiality or prejudice for them. Authors would save + themselves many errors and much labour lost (because spent on a delusion) + if they could only resolve to go to work with more frankness. + </p> + <h3> + BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>1 + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0033" id="link2H_4_0033"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0004" id="link2HCH0004"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally. + </h2> + <p> + Pure reason always has its dialetic, whether it is considered in its + speculative or its practical employment; for it requires the absolute + totality of the 'conditions of what is given conditioned, and this can + only be found in things in themselves. But as all conceptions of things in + themselves must be referred to intuitions, and with us men these can never + be other than sensible and hence can never enable us to know objects as + things in themselves but only as appearances, and since the unconditioned + can never be found in this chain of appearances which consists only of + conditioned and conditions; thus from applying this rational idea of the + totality of the conditions (in other words of the unconditioned) to + appearances, there arises an inevitable illusion, as if these latter were + things in themselves (for in the absence of a warning critique they are + always regarded as such). This illusion would never be noticed as delusive + if it did not betray itself by a conflict of reason with itself, when it + applies to appearances its fundamental principle of presupposing the + unconditioned to everything conditioned. By this, however, reason is + compelled to trace this illusion to its source, and search how it can be + removed, and this can only be done by a complete critical examination of + the whole pure faculty of reason; so that the antinomy of the pure reason + which is manifest in its dialectic is in fact the most beneficial error + into which human reason could ever have fallen, since it at last drives us + to search for the key to escape from this labyrinth; and when this key is + found, it further discovers that which we did not seek but yet had need + of, namely, a view into a higher and an immutable order of things, in + which we even now are, and in which we are thereby enabled by definite + precepts to continue to live according to the highest dictates of reason. + </p> + <p> + It may be seen in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason how in its + speculative employment this natural dialectic is to be solved, and how the + error which arises from a very natural illusion may be guarded against. + But reason in its practical use is not a whit better off. As pure + practical reason, it likewise seeks to find the unconditioned for the + practically conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural wants), + and this is not as the determining principle of the will, but even when + this is given (in the moral law) it seeks the unconditioned totality of + the object of pure practical reason under the name of the summum bonum. + </p> + <p> + To define this idea practically, i.e., sufficiently for the maxims of our + rational conduct, is the business of practical wisdom, and this again as a + science is philosophy, in the sense in which the word was understood by + the ancients, with whom it meant instruction in the conception in which + the summum bonum was to be placed, and the conduct by which it was to be + obtained. It would be well to leave this word in its ancient signification + as a doctrine of the summum bonum, so far as reason endeavours to make + this into a science. For on the one hand the restriction annexed would + suit the Greek expression (which signifies the love of wisdom), and yet at + the same time would be sufficient to embrace under the name of philosophy + the love of science: that is to say, of all speculative rational + knowledge, so far as it is serviceable to reason, both for that conception + and also for the practical principle determining our conduct, without + letting out of sight the main end, on account of which alone it can be + called a doctrine of practical wisdom. On the other hand, it would be no + harm to deter the self-conceit of one who ventures to claim the title of + philosopher by holding before him in the very definition a standard of + self-estimation which would very much lower his pretensions. For a teacher + of wisdom would mean something more than a scholar who has not come so far + as to guide himself, much less to guide others, with certain expectation + of attaining so high an end: it would mean a master in the knowledge of + wisdom, which implies more than a modest man would claim for himself. Thus + philosophy as well as wisdom would always remain an ideal, which + objectively is presented complete in reason alone, while subjectively for + the person it is only the goal of his unceasing endeavours; and no one + would be justified in professing to be in possession of it so as to assume + the name of philosopher who could not also show its infallible effects in + his own person as an example (in his self-mastery and the unquestioned + interest that he takes pre-eminently in the general good), and this the + ancients also required as a condition of deserving that honourable title. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + We have another preliminary remark to make respecting the dialectic of the + pure practical reason, on the point of the definition of the summum bonum + (a successful solution of which dialectic would lead us to expect, as in + case of that of the theoretical reason, the most beneficial effects, + inasmuch as the self-contradictions of pure practical reason honestly + stated, and not concealed, force us to undertake a complete critique of + this faculty). + </p> + <p> + The moral law is the sole determining principle of a pure will. But since + this is merely formal (viz., as prescribing only the form of the maxim as + universally legislative), it abstracts as a determining principle from all + matter that is to say, from every object of volition. Hence, though the + summum bonum may be the whole object of a pure practical reason, i.e., a + pure will, yet it is not on that account to be regarded as its determining + principle; and the moral law alone must be regarded as the principle on + which that and its realization or promotion are aimed at. This remark is + important in so delicate a case as the determination of moral principles, + where the slightest misinterpretation perverts men's minds. For it will + have been seen from the Analytic that, if we assume any object under the + name of a good as a determining principle of the will prior to the moral + law and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle, this would + always introduce heteronomy and crush out the moral principle. + </p> + <p> + It is, however, evident that if the notion of the summum bonum includes + that of the moral law as its supreme condition, then the summum bonum + would not merely be an object, but the notion of it and the conception of + its existence as possible by our own practical reason would likewise be + the determining principle of the will, since in that case the will is in + fact determined by the moral law which is already included in this + conception, and by no other object, as the principle of autonomy requires. + This order of the conceptions of determination of the will must not be + lost sight of, as otherwise we should misunderstand ourselves and think we + had fallen into a contradiction, while everything remains in perfect + harmony. + </p> + <h3> + BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0005" id="link2HCH0005"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the Conception of + the "Summum Bonum". + </h2> + <p> + The conception of the summum itself contains an ambiguity which might + occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it. The summum may mean + either the supreme (supremum) or the perfect (consummatum). The former is + that condition which is itself unconditioned, i.e., is not subordinate to + any other (originarium); the second is that whole which is not a part of a + greater whole of the same kind (perfectissimum). It has been shown in the + Analytic that virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition + of all that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our + pursuit of happiness, and is therefore the supreme good. But it does not + follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the desires + of rational finite beings; for this requires happiness also, and that not + merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes himself an end, but + even in the judgement of an impartial reason, which regards persons in + general as ends in themselves. For to need happiness, to deserve it, and + yet at the same time not to participate in it, cannot be consistent with + the perfect volition of a rational being possessed at the same time of all + power, if, for the sake of experiment, we conceive such a being. Now + inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the + summum bonum in a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact + proportion to morality (which is the worth of the person, and his + worthiness to be happy) constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world; + hence this summum bonum expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which, + however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has + no condition above it; whereas happiness, while it is pleasant to the + possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good, but + always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition. + </p> + <p> + When two elements are necessarily united in one concept, they must be + connected as reason and consequence, and this either so that their unity + is considered as analytical (logical connection), or as synthetical (real + connection) the former following the law of identity, the latter that of + causality. The connection of virtue and happiness may therefore be + understood in two ways: either the endeavour to be virtuous and the + rational pursuit of happiness are not two distinct actions, but absolutely + identical, in which case no maxim need be made the principle of the + former, other than what serves for the latter; or the connection consists + in this, that virtue produces happiness as something distinct from the + consciousness of virtue, as a cause produces an effect. + </p> + <p> + The ancient Greek schools were, properly speaking, only two, and in + determining the conception of the summum bonum these followed in fact one + and the same method, inasmuch as they did not allow virtue and happiness + to be regarded as two distinct elements of the summum bonum, and + consequently sought the unity of the principle by the rule of identity; + but they differed as to which of the two was to be taken as the + fundamental notion. The Epicurean said: "To be conscious that one's maxims + lead to happiness is virtue"; the Stoic said: "To be conscious of one's + virtue is happiness." With the former, Prudence was equivalent to + morality; with the latter, who chose a higher designation for virtue, + morality alone was true wisdom. + </p> + <p> + While we must admire the men who in such early times tried all imaginable + ways of extending the domain of philosophy, we must at the same time + lament that their acuteness was unfortunately misapplied in trying to + trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous notions, those of + happiness and virtue. But it agrees with the dialectical spirit of their + times (and subtle minds are even now sometimes misled in the same way) to + get rid of irreconcilable differences in principle by seeking to change + them into a mere contest about words, and thus apparently working out the + identity of the notion under different names, and this usually occurs in + cases where the combination of heterogeneous principles lies so deep or so + high, or would require so complete a transformation of the doctrines + assumed in the rest of the philosophical system, that men are afraid to + penetrate deeply into the real difference and prefer treating it as a + difference in questions of form. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + While both schools sought to trace out the identity of the practical + principles of virtue and happiness, they were not agreed as to the way in + which they tried to force this identity, but were separated infinitely + from one another, the one placing its principle on the side of sense, the + other on that of reason; the one in the consciousness of sensible wants, + the other in the independence of practical reason on all sensible grounds + of determination. According to the Epicurean, the notion of virtue was + already involved in the maxim: "To promote one's own happiness"; according + to the Stoics, on the other hand, the feeling of happiness was already + contained in the consciousness of virtue. Now whatever is contained in + another notion is identical with part of the containing notion, but not + with the whole, and moreover two wholes may be specifically distinct, + although they consist of the same parts; namely if the parts are united + into a whole in totally different ways. The Stoic maintained that the + virtue was the whole summum bonum, and happiness only the consciousness of + possessing it, as making part of the state of the subject. The Epicurean + maintained that happiness was the whole summum bonum, and virtue only the + form of the maxim for its pursuit; viz., the rational use of the means for + attaining it. + </p> + <p> + Now it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and those of + private happiness are quite heterogeneous as to their supreme practical + principle, and, although they belong to one summum bonum which together + they make possible, yet they are so far from coinciding that they restrict + and check one another very much in the same subject. Thus the question: + "How is the summum bonum practically possible?" still remains an unsolved + problem, notwithstanding all the attempts at coalition that have hitherto + been made. The Analytic has, however, shown what it is that makes the + problem difficult to solve; namely, that happiness and morality are two + specifically distinct elements of the summum bonum and, therefore, their + combination cannot be analytically cognised (as if the man that seeks his + own happiness should find by mere analysis of his conception that in so + acting he is virtuous, or as if the man that follows virtue should in the + consciousness of such conduct find that he is already happy ipso facto), + but must be a synthesis of concepts. Now since this combination is + recognised as a priori, and therefore as practically necessary, and + consequently not as derived from experience, so that the possibility of + the summum bonum does not rest on any empirical principle, it follows that + the deduction [legitimation] of this concept must be transcendental. It is + a priori (morally) necessary to produce the summum bonum by freedom of + will: therefore the condition of its possibility must rest solely on a + priori principles of cognition. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0036" id="link2H_4_0036"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> + <p> + In the summum bonum which is practical for us, i.e., to be realized by our + will, virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily combined, so that + the one cannot be assumed by pure practical reason without the other also + being attached to it. Now this combination (like every other) is either + analytical or synthetical. It has been shown that it cannot be analytical; + it must then be synthetical and, more particularly, must be conceived as + the connection of cause and effect, since it concerns a practical good, + i.e., one that is possible by means of action; consequently either the + desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim + of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is + absolutely impossible, because (as was proved in the Analytic) maxims + which place the determining principle of the will in the desire of + personal happiness are not moral at all, and no virtue can be founded on + them. But the second is also impossible, because the practical connection + of causes and effects in the world, as the result of the determination of + the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the will, but on + the knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical power to use them for + one's purposes; consequently we cannot expect in the world by the most + punctilious observance of the moral laws any necessary connection of + happiness with virtue adequate to the summum bonum. Now, as the promotion + of this summum bonum, the conception of which contains this connection, is + a priori a necessary object of our will and inseparably attached to the + moral law, the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the + latter. If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules, then + the moral law also which commands us to promote it is directed to vain + imaginary ends and must consequently be false. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0037" id="link2H_4_0037"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + The antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar conflict + between freedom and physical necessity in the causality of events in the + world. It was solved by showing that there is no real contradiction when + the events and even the world in which they occur are regarded (as they + ought to be) merely as appearances; since one and the same acting being, + as an appearance (even to his own inner sense), has a causality in the + world of sense that always conforms to the mechanism of nature, but with + respect to the same events, so far as the acting person regards himself at + the same time as a noumenon (as pure intelligence in an existence not + dependent on the condition of time), he can contain a principle by which + that causality acting according to laws of nature is determined, but which + is itself free from all laws of nature. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 15</span> + </p> + <p> + It is just the same with the foregoing antinomy of pure practical reason. + The first of the two propositions, "That the endeavour after happiness + produces a virtuous mind," is absolutely false; but the second, "That a + virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness," is not absolutely false, + but only in so far as virtue is considered as a form of causality in the + sensible world, and consequently only if I suppose existence in it to be + the only sort of existence of a rational being; it is then only + conditionally false. But as I am not only justified in thinking that I + exist also as a noumenon in a world of the understanding, but even have in + the moral law a purely intellectual determining principle of my causality + (in the sensible world), it is not impossible that morality of mind should + have a connection as cause with happiness (as an effect in the sensible + world) if not immediate yet mediate (viz., through an intelligent author + of nature), and moreover necessary; while in a system of nature which is + merely an object of the senses, this combination could never occur except + contingently and, therefore, could not suffice for the summum bonum. + </p> + <p> + Thus, notwithstanding this seeming conflict of practical reason with + itself, the summum bonum, which is the necessary supreme end of a will + morally determined, is a true object thereof; for it is practically + possible, and the maxims of the will which as regards their matter refer + to it have objective reality, which at first was threatened by the + antinomy that appeared in the connection of morality with happiness by a + general law; but this was merely from a misconception, because the + relation between appearances was taken for a relation of the things in + themselves to these appearances. + </p> + <p> + When we find ourselves obliged to go so far, namely, to the connection + with an intelligible world, to find the possibility of the summum bonum, + which reason points out to all rational beings as the goal of all their + moral wishes, it must seem strange that, nevertheless, the philosophers + both of ancient and modern times have been able to find happiness in + accurate proportion to virtue even in this life (in the sensible world), + or have persuaded themselves that they were conscious thereof. For + Epicurus as well as the Stoics extolled above everything the happiness + that springs from the consciousness of living virtuously; and the former + was not so base in his practical precepts as one might infer from the + principles of his theory, which he used for explanation and not for + action, or as they were interpreted by many who were misled by his using + the term pleasure for contentment; on the contrary, he reckoned the most + disinterested practice of good amongst the ways of enjoying the most + intimate delight, and his scheme of pleasure (by which he meant constant + cheerfulness of mind) included the moderation and control of the + inclinations, such as the strictest moral philosopher might require. He + differed from the Stoics chiefly in making this pleasure the motive, which + they very rightly refused to do. For, on the one hand, the virtuous + Epicurus, like many well-intentioned men of this day who do not reflect + deeply enough on their principles, fell into the error of presupposing the + virtuous disposition in the persons for whom he wished to provide the + springs to virtue (and indeed the upright man cannot be happy if he is not + first conscious of his uprightness; since with such a character the + reproach that his habit of thought would oblige him to make against + himself in case of transgression and his moral self-condemnation would rob + him of all enjoyment of the pleasantness which his condition might + otherwise contain). But the question is: How is such a disposition + possible in the first instance, and such a habit of thought in estimating + the worth of one's existence, since prior to it there can be in the + subject no feeling at all for moral worth? If a man is virtuous without + being conscious of his integrity in every action, he will certainly not + enjoy life, however favourable fortune may be to him in its physical + circumstances; but can we make him virtuous in the first instance, in + other words, before he esteems the moral worth of his existence so highly, + by praising to him the peace of mind that would result from the + consciousness of an integrity for which he has no sense? + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, however, there is here an occasion of a vitium + subreptionis, and as it were of an optical illusion, in the + self-consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one feels- + an illusion which even the most experienced cannot altogether avoid. The + moral disposition of mind is necessarily combined with a consciousness + that the will is determined directly by the law. Now the consciousness of + a determination of the faculty of desire is always the source of a + satisfaction in the resulting action; but this pleasure, this satisfaction + in oneself, is not the determining principle of the action; on the + contrary, the determination of the will directly by reason is the source + of the feeling of pleasure, and this remains a pure practical not sensible + determination of the faculty of desire. Now as this determination has + exactly the same effect within in impelling to activity, that a feeling of + the pleasure to be expected from the desired action would have had, we + easily look on what we ourselves do as something which we merely passively + feel, and take the moral spring for a sensible impulse, just as it happens + in the so-called illusion of the senses (in this case the inner sense). It + is a sublime thing in human nature to be determined to actions immediately + by a purely rational law; sublime even is the illusion that regards the + subjective side of this capacity of intellectual determination as + something sensible and the effect of a special sensible feeling (for an + intellectual feeling would be a contradiction). It is also of great + importance to attend to this property of our personality and as much as + possible to cultivate the effect of reason on this feeling. But we must + beware lest by falsely extolling this moral determining principle as a + spring, making its source lie in particular feelings of pleasure (which + are in fact only results), we degrade and disfigure the true genuine + spring, the law itself, by putting as it were a false foil upon it. + Respect, not pleasure or enjoyment of happiness, is something for which it + is not possible that reason should have any antecedent feeling as its + foundation (for this would always be sensible and pathological); and + consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the law is by no + means analogous to the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to the + faculty of desire it produces the same effect, but from different sources: + it is only by this mode of conception, however, that we can attain what we + are seeking, namely, that actions be done not merely in accordance with + duty (as a result of pleasant feelings), but from duty, which must be the + true end of all moral cultivation. + </p> + <p> + Have we not, however, a word which does not express enjoyment, as + happiness does, but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence, an + analogue of the happiness which must necessarily accompany the + consciousness of virtue? Yes this word is self-contentment which in its + proper signification always designates only a negative satisfaction in + one's existence, in which one is conscious of needing nothing. Freedom and + the consciousness of it as a faculty of following the moral law with + unyielding resolution is independence of inclinations, at least as motives + determining (though not as affecting) our desire, and so far as I am + conscious of this freedom in following my moral maxims, it is the only + source of an unaltered contentment which is necessarily connected with it + and rests on no special feeling. This may be called intellectual + contentment. The sensible contentment (improperly so-called) which rests + on the satisfaction of the inclinations, however delicate they may be + imagined to be, can never be adequate to the conception of it. For the + inclinations change, they grow with the indulgence shown them, and always + leave behind a still greater void than we had thought to fill. Hence they + are always burdensome to a rational being, and, although he cannot lay + them aside, they wrest from him the wish to be rid of them. Even an + inclination to what is right (e.g., to beneficence), though it may much + facilitate the efficacy of the moral maxims, cannot produce any. For in + these all must be directed to the conception of the law as a determining + principle, if the action is to contain morality and not merely legality. + Inclination is blind and slavish, whether it be of a good sort or not, + and, when morality is in question, reason must not play the part merely of + guardian to inclination, but disregarding it altogether must attend simply + to its own interest as pure practical reason. This very feeling of + compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes the deliberation on the + question of duty and becomes a determining principle, is even annoying to + right thinking persons, brings their deliberate maxims into confusion, and + makes them wish to be delivered from it and to be subject to lawgiving + reason alone. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> + <p> + From this we can understand how the consciousness of this faculty of a + pure practical reason produces by action (virtue) a consciousness of + mastery over one's inclinations, and therefore of independence of them, + and consequently also of the discontent that always accompanies them, and + thus a negative satisfaction with one's state, i.e., contentment, which is + primarily contentment with one's own person. Freedom itself becomes in + this way (namely, indirectly) capable of an enjoyment which cannot be + called happiness, because it does not depend on the positive concurrence + of a feeling, nor is it, strictly speaking, bliss, since it does not + include complete independence of inclinations and wants, but it resembles + bliss in so far as the determination of one's will at least can hold + itself free from their influence; and thus, at least in its origin, this + enjoyment is analogous to the self-sufficiency which we can ascribe only + to the Supreme Being. + </p> + <p> + From this solution of the antinomy of practical pure reason, it follows + that in practical principles we may at least conceive as possible a + natural and necessary connection between the consciousness of morality and + the expectation of a proportionate happiness as its result, though it does + not follow that we can know or perceive this connection; that, on the + other hand, principles of the pursuit of happiness cannot possibly produce + morality; that, therefore, morality is the supreme good (as the first + condition of the summum bonum), while happiness constitutes its second + element, but only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned, but + necessary consequence of the former. Only with this subordination is the + summum bonum the whole object of pure practical reason, which must + necessarily conceive it as possible, since it commands us to contribute to + the utmost of our power to its realization. But since the possibility of + such connection of the conditioned with its condition belongs wholly to + the supersensual relation of things and cannot be given according to the + laws of the world of sense, although the practical consequences of the + idea belong to the world of sense, namely, the actions that aim at + realizing the summum bonum; we will therefore endeavour to set forth the + grounds of that possibility, first, in respect of what is immediately in + our power, and then, secondly, in that which is not in our power, but + which reason presents to us as the supplement of our impotence, for the + realization of the summum bonum (which by practical principles is + necessary). + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0038" id="link2H_4_0038"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its Union with the + Speculative Reason. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> + <p> + By primacy between two or more things connected by reason, I understand + the prerogative, belonging to one, of being the first determining + principle in the connection with all the rest. In a narrower practical + sense it means the prerogative of the interest of one in so far as the + interest of the other is subordinated to it, while it is not postponed to + any other. To every faculty of the mind we can attribute an interest, that + is, a principle, that contains the condition on which alone the former is + called into exercise. Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the + interest of all the powers of the mind and is determined by its own. The + interest of its speculative employment consists in the cognition of the + object pushed to the highest a priori principles: that of its practical + employment, in the determination of the will in respect of the final and + complete end. As to what is necessary for the possibility of any + employment of reason at all, namely, that its principles and affirmations + should not contradict one another, this constitutes no part of its + interest, but is the condition of having reason at all; it is only its + development, not mere consistency with itself, that is reckoned as its + interest. + </p> + <p> + If practical reason could not assume or think as given anything further + than what speculative reason of itself could offer it from its own + insight, the latter would have the primacy. But supposing that it had of + itself original a priori principles with which certain theoretical + positions were inseparably connected, while these were withdrawn from any + possible insight of speculative reason (which, however, they must not + contradict); then the question is: Which interest is the superior (not + which must give way, for they are not necessarily conflicting), whether + speculative reason, which knows nothing of all that the practical offers + for its acceptance, should take up these propositions and (although they + transcend it) try to unite them with its own concepts as a foreign + possession handed over to it, or whether it is justified in obstinately + following its own separate interest and, according to the canonic of + Epicurus, rejecting as vain subtlety everything that cannot accredit its + objective reality by manifest examples to be shown in experience, even + though it should be never so much interwoven with the interest of the + practical (pure) use of reason, and in itself not contradictory to the + theoretical, merely because it infringes on the interest of the + speculative reason to this extent, that it removes the bounds which this + latter had set to itself, and gives it up to every nonsense or delusion of + imagination? + </p> + <p> + In fact, so far as practical reason is taken as dependent on pathological + conditions, that is, as merely regulating the inclinations under the + sensible principle of happiness, we could not require speculative reason + to take its principles from such a source. Mohammed's paradise, or the + absorption into the Deity of the theosophists and mystics would press + their monstrosities on the reason according to the taste of each, and one + might as well have no reason as surrender it in such fashion to all sorts + of dreams. But if pure reason of itself can be practical and is actually + so, as the consciousness of the moral law proves, then it is still only + one and the same reason which, whether in a theoretical or a practical + point of view, judges according to a priori principles; and then it is + clear that although it is in the first point of view incompetent to + establish certain propositions positively, which, however, do not + contradict it, then, as soon as these propositions are inseparably + attached to the practical interest of pure reason, it must accept them, + though it be as something offered to it from a foreign source, something + that has not grown on its own ground, but yet is sufficiently + authenticated; and it must try to compare and connect them with everything + that it has in its power as speculative reason. It must remember, however, + that these are not additions to its insight, but yet are extensions of its + employment in another, namely, a practical aspect; and this is not in the + least opposed to its interest, which consists in the restriction of wild + speculation. + </p> + <p> + Thus, when pure speculative and pure practical reason are combined in one + cognition, the latter has the primacy, provided, namely, that this + combination is not contingent and arbitrary, but founded a priori on + reason itself and therefore necessary. For without this subordination + there would arise a conflict of reason with itself; since, if they were + merely co-ordinate, the former would close its boundaries strictly and + admit nothing from the latter into its domain, while the latter would + extend its bounds over everything and when its needs required would seek + to embrace the former within them. Nor could we reverse the order and + require pure practical reason to be subordinate to the speculative, since + all interest is ultimately practical, and even that of speculative reason + is conditional, and it is only in the practical employment of reason that + it is complete. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 30</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0039" id="link2H_4_0039"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + The realization of the summum bonum in the world is the necessary object + of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this will the perfect + accordance of the mind with the moral law is the supreme condition of the + summum bonum. This then must be possible, as well as its object, since it + is contained in the command to promote the latter. Now, the perfect + accordance of the will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of + which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of + his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically + necessary, it can only be found in a progress in infinitum towards that + perfect accordance, and on the principles of pure practical reason it is + necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our + will. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 35</span> + </p> + <p> + Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an + endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational + being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum, + then, practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality + of the soul; consequently this immortality, being inseparably connected + with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (by which I + mean a theoretical proposition, not demonstrable as such, but which is an + inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical law. + </p> + <p> + This principle of the moral destination of our nature, namely, that it is + only in an endless progress that we can attain perfect accordance with the + moral law, is of the greatest use, not merely for the present purpose of + supplementing the impotence of speculative reason, but also with respect + to religion. In default of it, either the moral law is quite degraded from + its holiness, being made out to be indulgent and conformable to our + convenience, or else men strain their notions of their vocation and their + expectation to an unattainable goal, hoping to acquire complete holiness + of will, and so they lose themselves in fanatical theosophic dreams, which + wholly contradict self-knowledge. In both cases the unceasing effort to + obey punctually and thoroughly a strict and inflexible command of reason, + which yet is not ideal but real, is only hindered. For a rational but + finite being, the only thing possible is an endless progress from the + lower to higher degrees of moral perfection. The Infinite Being, to whom + the condition of time is nothing, sees in this to us endless succession a + whole of accordance with the moral law; and the holiness which his command + inexorably requires, in order to be true to his justice in the share which + He assigns to each in the summum bonum, is to be found in a single + intellectual intuition of the whole existence of rational beings. All that + can be expected of the creature in respect of the hope of this + participation would be the consciousness of his tried character, by which + from the progress he has hitherto made from the worse to the morally + better, and the immutability of purpose which has thus become known to + him, he may hope for a further unbroken continuance of the same, however + long his existence may last, even beyond this life, * and thus he may + hope, not indeed here, nor in any imaginable point of his future + existence, but only in the endlessness of his duration (which God alone + can survey) to be perfectly adequate to his will (without indulgence or + excuse, which do not harmonize with justice). + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * It seems, nevertheless, impossible for a creature to have + the conviction of his unwavering firmness of mind in the + progress towards goodness. On this account the Christian + religion makes it come only from the same Spirit that works + sanctification, that is, this firm purpose, and with it the + consciousness of steadfastness in the moral progress. But + naturally one who is conscious that he has persevered + through a long portion of his life up to the end in the + progress to the better, and this genuine moral motives, may + well have the comforting hope, though not the certainty, + that even in an existence prolonged beyond this life he will + continue in these principles; and although he is never + justified here in his own eyes, nor can ever hope to be so + in the increased perfection of his nature, to which he looks + forward, together with an increase of duties, nevertheless + in this progress which, though it is directed to a goal + infinitely remote, yet is in God's sight regarded as + equivalent to possession, he may have a prospect of a + blessed future; for this is the word that reason employs to + designate perfect well-being independent of all contingent + causes of the world, and which, like holiness, is an idea + that can be contained only in an endless progress and its + totality, and consequently is never fully attained by a + creature. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 40</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0040" id="link2H_4_0040"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + In the foregoing analysis the moral law led to a practical problem which + is prescribed by pure reason alone, without the aid of any sensible + motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the first and + principle element of the summum bonum, viz., morality; and, as this can be + perfectly solved only in eternity, to the postulate of immortality. The + same law must also lead us to affirm the possibility of the second element + of the summum bonum, viz., happiness proportioned to that morality, and + this on grounds as disinterested as before, and solely from impartial + reason; that is, it must lead to the supposition of the existence of a + cause adequate to this effect; in other words, it must postulate the + existence of God, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the + summum bonum (an object of the will which is necessarily connected with + the moral legislation of pure reason). We proceed to exhibit this + connection in a convincing manner. + </p> + <p> + Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world with whom + everything goes according to his wish and will; it rests, therefore, on + the harmony of physical nature with his whole end and likewise with the + essential determining principle of his will. Now the moral law as a law of + freedom commands by determining principles, which ought to be quite + independent of nature and of its harmony with our faculty of desire (as + springs). But the acting rational being in the world is not the cause of + the world and of nature itself. There is not the least ground, therefore, + in the moral law for a necessary connection between morality and + proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of + it, and therefore dependent on it, and which for that reason cannot by his + will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly + harmonize, as far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical + principles. Nevertheless, in the practical problem of pure reason, i.e., + the necessary pursuit of the summum bonum, such a connection is postulated + as necessary: we ought to endeavour to promote the summum bonum, which, + therefore, must be possible. Accordingly, the existence of a cause of all + nature, distinct from nature itself and containing the principle of this + connection, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is + also postulated. Now this supreme cause must contain the principle of the + harmony of nature, not merely with a law of the will of rational beings, + but with the conception of this law, in so far as they make it the supreme + determining principle of the will, and consequently not merely with the + form of morals, but with their morality as their motive, that is, with + their moral character. Therefore, the summum bonum is possible in the + world only on the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality + corresponding to moral character. Now a being that is capable of acting on + the conception of laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the + causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is his + will; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed as + a condition of the summum bonum is a being which is the cause of nature by + intelligence and will, consequently its author, that is God. It follows + that the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the + best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original + good, that is to say, of the existence of God. Now it was seen to be a + duty for us to promote the summum bonum; consequently it is not merely + allowable, but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that + we should presuppose the possibility of this summum bonum; and as this is + possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably + connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally + necessary to assume the existence of God. + </p> + <p> + It must be remarked here that this moral necessity is subjective, that is, + it is a want, and not objective, that is, itself a duty, for there cannot + be a duty to suppose the existence of anything (since this concerns only + the theoretical employment of reason). Moreover, it is not meant by this + that it is necessary to suppose the existence of God as a basis of all + obligation in general (for this rests, as has been sufficiently proved, + simply on the autonomy of reason itself). What belongs to duty here is + only the endeavour to realize and promote the summum bonum in the world, + the possibility of which can therefore be postulated; and as our reason + finds it not conceivable except on the supposition of a supreme + intelligence, the admission of this existence is therefore connected with + the consciousness of our duty, although the admission itself belongs to + the domain of speculative reason. Considered in respect of this alone, as + a principle of explanation, it may be called a hypothesis, but in + reference to the intelligibility of an object given us by the moral law + (the summum bonum), and consequently of a requirement for practical + purposes, it may be called faith, that is to say a pure rational faith, + since pure reason (both in its theoretical and practical use) is the sole + source from which it springs. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 45</span> + </p> + <p> + From this deduction it is now intelligible why the Greek schools could + never attain the solution of their problem of the practical possibility of + the summum bonum, because they made the rule of the use which the will of + man makes of his freedom the sole and sufficient ground of this + possibility, thinking that they had no need for that purpose of the + existence of God. No doubt they were so far right that they established + the principle of morals of itself independently of this postulate, from + the relation of reason only to the will, and consequently made it the + supreme practical condition of the summum bonum; but it was not therefore + the whole condition of its possibility. The Epicureans had indeed assumed + as the supreme principle of morality a wholly false one, namely that of + happiness, and had substituted for a law a maxim of arbitrary choice + according to every man's inclination; they proceeded, however, + consistently enough in this, that they degraded their summum bonum + likewise, just in proportion to the meanness of their fundamental + principle, and looked for no greater happiness than can be attained by + human prudence (including temperance and moderation of the inclinations), + and this as we know would be scanty enough and would be very different + according to circumstances; not to mention the exceptions that their + maxims must perpetually admit and which make them incapable of being laws. + The Stoics, on the contrary, had chosen their supreme practical principle + quite rightly, making virtue the condition of the summum bonum; but when + they represented the degree of virtue required by its pure law as fully + attainable in this life, they not only strained the moral powers of the + man whom they called the wise beyond all the limits of his nature, and + assumed a thing that contradicts all our knowledge of men, but also and + principally they would not allow the second element of the summum bonum, + namely, happiness, to be properly a special object of human desire, but + made their wise man, like a divinity in his consciousness of the + excellence of his person, wholly independent of nature (as regards his own + contentment); they exposed him indeed to the evils of life, but made him + not subject to them (at the same time representing him also as free from + moral evil). They thus, in fact, left out the second element of the summum + bonum namely, personal happiness, placing it solely in action and + satisfaction with one's own personal worth, thus including it in the + consciousness of being morally minded, in which they Might have been + sufficiently refuted by the voice of their own nature. + </p> + <p> + The doctrine of Christianity, * even if we do not yet consider it as a + religious doctrine, gives, touching this point, a conception of the summum + bonum (the kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the strictest demand of + practical reason. The moral law is holy (unyielding) and demands holiness + of morals, although all the moral perfection to which man can attain is + still only virtue, that is, a rightful disposition arising from respect + for the law, implying consciousness of a constant propensity to + transgression, or at least a want of purity, that is, a mixture of many + spurious (not moral) motives of obedience to the law, consequently a + self-esteem combined with humility. In respect, then, of the holiness + which the Christian law requires, this leaves the creature nothing but a + progress in infinitum, but for that very reason it justifies him in hoping + for an endless duration of his existence. The worth of a character + perfectly accordant with the moral law is infinite, since the only + restriction on all possible happiness in the judgement of a wise and all + powerful distributor of it is the absence of conformity of rational beings + to their duty. But the moral law of itself does not promise any happiness, + for according to our conceptions of an order of nature in general, this is + not necessarily connected with obedience to the law. Now Christian + morality supplies this defect (of the second indispensable element of the + summum bonum) by representing the world in which rational beings devote + themselves with all their soul to the moral law, as a kingdom of God, in + which nature and morality are brought into a harmony foreign to each of + itself, by a holy Author who makes the derived summum bonum possible. + Holiness of life is prescribed to them as a rule even in this life, while + the welfare proportioned to it, namely, bliss, is represented as + attainable only in an eternity; because the former must always be the + pattern of their conduct in every state, and progress towards it is + already possible and necessary in this life; while the latter, under the + name of happiness, cannot be attained at all in this world (so far as our + own power is concerned), and therefore is made simply an object of hope. + Nevertheless, the Christian principle of morality itself is not + theological (so as to be heteronomy), but is autonomy of pure practical + reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and His will the + foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of the summum bonum, + on condition of following these laws, and it does not even place the + proper spring of this obedience in the desired results, but solely in the + conception of duty, as that of which the faithful observance alone + constitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy consequences. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * It is commonly held that the Christian precept of morality + has no advantage in respect of purity over the moral + conceptions of the Stoics; the distinction between them is, + however, very obvious. The Stoic system made the + consciousness of strength of mind the pivot on which all + moral dispositions should turn; and although its disciples + spoke of duties and even defined them very well, yet they + placed the spring and proper determining principle of the + will in an elevation of the mind above the lower springs of + the senses, which owe their power only to weakness of mind. + With them therefore, virtue was a sort of heroism in the + wise man raising himself above the animal nature of man, is + sufficient for Himself, and, while he prescribes duties to + others, is himself raised above them, and is not subject to + any temptation to transgress the moral law. All this, + however, they could not have done if they had conceived this + law in all its purity and strictness, as the precept of the + Gospel does. When I give the name idea to a perfection to + which nothing adequate can be given in experience, it does + not follow that the moral ideas are thing transcendent, that + is something of which we could not even determine the + concept adequately, or of which it is uncertain whether + there is any object corresponding to it at all, as is the + case with the ideas of speculative reason; on the contrary, + being types of practical perfection, they serve as the + indispensable rule of conduct and likewise as the standard + of comparison. Now if I consider Christian morals on their + philosophical side, then compared with the ideas of the + Greek schools, they would appear as follows: the ideas of + the Cynics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Christians + are: simplicity of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness. + In respect of the way of attaining them, the Greek schools + were distinguished from one another thus that the Cynics + only required common sense, the others the path of science, + but both found the mere use of natural powers sufficient for + the purpose. Christian morality, because its precept is + framed (as a moral precept must be) so pure and unyielding, + takes from man all confidence that he can be fully adequate + to it, at least in this life, but again sets it up by + enabling us to hope that if we act as well as it is in our + power to do, then what is not in our power will come in to + our aid from another source, whether we know how this may be + or not. Aristotle and Plato differed only as to the origin + of our moral conceptions. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 50</span> + </p> + <p> + In this manner, the moral laws lead through the conception of the summum + bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to religion, + that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as + sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of a foreign and + contingent in themselves, but as essential laws of every free will in + itself, which, nevertheless, must be regarded as commands of the Supreme + Being, because it is only from a morally perfect (holy and good) and at + the same time all-powerful will, and consequently only through harmony + with this will, that we can hope to attain the summum bonum which the + moral law makes it our duty to take as the object of our endeavours. Here + again, then, all remains disinterested and founded merely on duty; neither + fear nor hope being made the fundamental springs, which if taken as + principles would destroy the whole moral worth of actions. The moral law + commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate + object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than + by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the + world; and although the conception of the summum bonum as a whole, in + which the greatest happiness is conceived as combined in the most exact + proportion with the highest degree of moral perfection (possible in + creatures), includes my own happiness, yet it is not this that is the + determining principle of the will which is enjoined to promote the summum + bonum, but the moral law, which, on the contrary, limits by strict + conditions my unbounded desire of happiness. + </p> + <p> + Hence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should make + ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. It is only + when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of participating + some day in happiness in proportion as we have endeavoured to be not + unworthy of it. + </p> + <p> + A man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of it is + in harmony with the summum bonum. We can now easily see that all + worthiness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the summum + bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest (which belongs to one's + state), namely, the participation of happiness. Now it follows from this + that morality should never be treated as a doctrine of happiness, that is, + an instruction how to become happy; for it has to do simply with the + rational condition (conditio sine qua non) of happiness, not with the + means of attaining it. But when morality has been completely expounded + (which merely imposes duties instead of providing rules for selfish + desires), then first, after the moral desire to promote the summum bonum + (to bring the kingdom of God to us) has been awakened, a desire founded on + a law, and which could not previously arise in any selfish mind, and when + for the behoof of this desire the step to religion has been taken, then + this ethical doctrine may be also called a doctrine of happiness because + the hope of happiness first begins with religion only. + </p> + <p> + We can also see from this that, when we ask what is God's ultimate end in + creating the world, we must not name the happiness of the rational beings + in it, but the summum bonum, which adds a further condition to that wish + of such beings, namely, the condition of being worthy of happiness, that + is, the morality of these same rational beings, a condition which alone + contains the rule by which only they can hope to share in the former at + the hand of a wise Author. For as wisdom, theoretically considered, + signifies the knowledge of the summum bonum and, practically, the + accordance of the will with the summum bonum, we cannot attribute to a + supreme independent wisdom an end based merely on goodness. For we cannot + conceive the action of this goodness (in respect of the happiness of + rational beings) as suitable to the highest original good, except under + the restrictive conditions of harmony with the holiness * of his will. + Therefore, those who placed the end of creation in the glory of God + (provided that this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a desire to be + praised) have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For nothing glorifies + God more than that which is the most estimable thing in the world, respect + for his command, the observance of the holy duty that his law imposes on + us, when there is added thereto his glorious plan of crowning such a + beautiful order of things with corresponding happiness. If the latter (to + speak humanly) makes Him worthy of love, by the former He is an object of + adoration. Even men can never acquire respect by benevolence alone, though + they may gain love, so that the greatest beneficence only procures them + honour when it is regulated by worthiness. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 55</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * In order to make these characteristics of these + conceptions clear, I add the remark that whilst we ascribe + to God various attributes, the quality of which we also find + applicable to creatures, only that in Him they are raised to + the highest degree, e.g., power, knowledge, presence, + goodness, etc., under the designations of omnipotence, + omniscience, omnipresence, etc., there are three that are + ascribed to God exclusively, and yet without the addition of + greatness, and which are all moral He is the only holy, the + only blessed, the only wise, because these conceptions + already imply the absence of limitation. In the order of + these attributes He is also the holy lawgiver (and creator), + the good governor (and preserver) and the just judge, three + attributes which include everything by which God is the + object of religion, and in conformity with which the + metaphysical perfections are added of themselves in the + reason. +</pre> + <p> + That in the order of ends, man (and with him every rational being) is an + end in himself, that is, that he can never be used merely as a means by + any (not even by God) without being at the same time an end also himself, + that therefore humanity in our person must be holy to ourselves, this + follows now of itself because he is the subject of the moral law, in other + words, of that which is holy in itself, and on account of which and in + agreement with which alone can anything be termed holy. For this moral law + is founded on the autonomy of his will, as a free will which by its + universal laws must necessarily be able to agree with that to which it is + to submit itself. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0041" id="link2H_4_0041"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason Generally. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 60</span> + </p> + <p> + They all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a postulate + but a law, by which reason determines the will directly, which will, + because it is so determined as a pure will, requires these necessary + conditions of obedience to its precept. These postulates are not + theoretical dogmas but, suppositions practically necessary; while then + they do [not] extend our speculative knowledge, they give objective + reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their + reference to what is practical), and give it a right to concepts, the + possibility even of which it could not otherwise venture to affirm. + </p> + <p> + These postulates are those of immortality, freedom positively considered + (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the intelligible + world), and the existence of God. The first results from the practically + necessary condition of a duration adequate to the complete fulfilment of + the moral law; the second from the necessary supposition of independence + of the sensible world, and of the faculty of determining one's will + according to the law of an intelligible world, that is, of freedom; the + third from the necessary condition of the existence of the summum bonum in + such an intelligible world, by the supposition of the supreme independent + good, that is, the existence of God. + </p> + <p> + Thus the fact that respect for the moral law necessarily makes the summum + bonum an object of our endeavours, and the supposition thence resulting of + its objective reality, lead through the postulates of practical reason to + conceptions which speculative reason might indeed present as problems, but + could never solve. Thus it leads: 1. To that one in the solution of which + the latter could do nothing but commit paralogisms (namely, that of + immortality), because it could not lay hold of the character of + permanence, by which to complete the psychological conception of an + ultimate subject necessarily ascribed to the soul in self-consciousness, + so as to make it the real conception of a substance, a character which + practical reason furnishes by the postulate of a duration required for + accordance with the moral law in the summum bonum, which is the whole end + of practical reason. 2. It leads to that of which speculative reason + contained nothing but antinomy, the solution of which it could only found + on a notion problematically conceivable indeed, but whose objective + reality it could not prove or determine, namely, the cosmological idea of + an intelligible world and the consciousness of our existence in it, by + means of the postulate of freedom (the reality of which it lays down by + virtue of the moral law), and with it likewise the law of an intelligible + world, to which speculative reason could only point, but could not define + its conception. 3. What speculative reason was able to think, but was + obliged to leave undetermined as a mere transcendental ideal, viz., the + theological conception of the first Being, to this it gives significance + (in a practical view, that is, as a condition of the possibility of the + object of a will determined by that law), namely, as the supreme principle + of the summum bonum in an intelligible world, by means of moral + legislation in it invested with sovereign power. + </p> + <p> + Is our knowledge, however, actually extended in this way by pure practical + reason, and is that immanent in practical reason which for the speculative + was only transcendent? Certainly, but only in a practical point of view. + For we do not thereby take knowledge of the nature of our souls, nor of + the intelligible world, nor of the Supreme Being, with respect to what + they are in themselves, but we have merely combined the conceptions of + them in the practical concept of the summum bonum as the object of our + will, and this altogether a priori, but only by means of the moral law, + and merely in reference to it, in respect of the object which it commands. + But how freedom is possible, and how we are to conceive this kind of + causality theoretically and positively, is not thereby discovered; but + only that there is such a causality is postulated by the moral law and in + its behoof. It is the same with the remaining ideas, the possibility of + which no human intelligence will ever fathom, but the truth of which, on + the other hand, no sophistry will ever wrest from the conviction even of + the commonest man. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 65</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0042" id="link2H_4_0042"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure Reason in a + Practical point of view, without its Knowledge as Speculative being + enlarged at the same time? + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 70</span> + </h3> + <p> + In order not to be too abstract, we will answer this question at once in + its application to the present case. In order to extend a pure cognition + practically, there must be an a priori purpose given, that is, an end as + object (of the will), which independently of all theological principle is + presented as practically necessary by an imperative which determines the + will directly (a categorical imperative), and in this case that is the + summum bonum. This, however, is not possible without presupposing three + theoretical conceptions (for which, because they are mere conceptions of + pure reason, no corresponding intuition can be found, nor consequently by + the path of theory any objective reality); namely, freedom, immortality, + and God. Thus by the practical law which commands the existence of the + highest good possible in a world, the possibility of those objects of pure + speculative reason is postulated, and the objective reality which the + latter could not assure them. By this the theoretical knowledge of pure + reason does indeed obtain an accession; but it consists only in this, that + those concepts which otherwise it had to look upon as problematical + (merely thinkable) concepts, are now shown assertorially to be such as + actually have objects; because practical reason indispensably requires + their existence for the possibility of its object, the summum bonum, which + practically is absolutely necessary, and this justifies theoretical reason + in assuming them. But this extension of theoretical reason is no extension + of speculative, that is, we cannot make any positive use of it in a + theoretical point of view. For as nothing is accomplished in this by + practical reason, further than that these concepts are real and actually + have their (possible) objects, and nothing in the way of intuition of them + is given thereby (which indeed could not be demanded), hence the admission + of this reality does not render any synthetical proposition possible. + Consequently, this discovery does not in the least help us to extend this + knowledge of ours in a speculative point of view, although it does in + respect of the practical employment of pure reason. The above three ideas + of speculative reason are still in themselves not cognitions; they are + however (transcendent) thoughts, in which there is nothing impossible. + Now, by help of an apodeictic practical law, being necessary conditions of + that which it commands to be made an object, they acquire objective + reality; that is, we learn from it that they have objects, without being + able to point out how the conception of them is related to an object, and + this, too, is still not a cognition of these objects; for we cannot + thereby form any synthetical judgement about them, nor determine their + application theoretically; consequently, we can make no theoretical + rational use of them at all, in which use all speculative knowledge of + reason consists. Nevertheless, the theoretical knowledge, not indeed of + these objects, but of reason generally, is so far enlarged by this, that + by the practical postulates objects were given to those ideas, a merely + problematical thought having by this means first acquired objective + reality. There is therefore no extension of the knowledge of given + supersensible objects, but an extension of theoretical reason and of its + knowledge in respect of the supersensible generally; inasmuch as it is + compelled to admit that there are such objects, although it is not able to + define them more closely, so as itself to extend this knowledge of the + objects (which have now been given it on practical grounds, and only for + practical use). For this accession, then, pure theoretical reason, for + which all those ideas are transcendent and without object, has simply to + thank its practical faculty. In this they become immanent and + constitutive, being the source of the possibility of realizing the + necessary object of pure practical reason (the summum bonum); whereas + apart from this they are transcendent, and merely regulative principles of + speculative reason, which do not require it to assume a new object beyond + experience, but only to bring its use in experience nearer to + completeness. But when once reason is in possession of this accession, it + will go to work with these ideas as speculative reason (properly only to + assure the certainty of its practical use) in a negative manner: that is, + not extending but clearing up its knowledge so as on one side to keep off + anthropomorphism, as the source of superstition, or seeming extension of + these conceptions by supposed experience; and on the other side + fanaticism, which promises the same by means of supersensible intuition or + feelings of the like kind. All these are hindrances to the practical use + of pure reason, so that the removal of them may certainly be considered an + extension of our knowledge in a practical point of view, without + contradicting the admission that for speculative purposes reason has not + in the least gained by this. + </p> + <p> + Every employment of reason in respect of an object requires pure concepts + of the understanding (categories), without which no object can be + conceived. These can be applied to the theoretical employment of reason, + i.e., to that kind of knowledge, only in case an intuition (which is + always sensible) is taken as a basis, and therefore merely in order to + conceive by means of- them an object of possible experience. Now here what + have to be thought by means of the categories in order to be known are + ideas of reason, which cannot be given in any experience. Only we are not + here concerned with the theoretical knowledge of the objects of these + ideas, but only with this, whether they have objects at all. This reality + is supplied by pure practical reason, and theoretical reason has nothing + further to do in this but to think those objects by means of categories. + This, as we have elsewhere clearly shown, can be done well enough without + needing any intuition (either sensible or supersensible) because the + categories have their seat and origin in the pure understanding, simply as + the faculty of thought, before and independently of any intuition, and + they always only signify an object in general, no matter in what way it + may be given to us. Now when the categories are to be applied to these + ideas, it is not possible to give them any object in intuition; but that + such an object actually exists, and consequently that the category as a + mere form of thought is here not empty but has significance, this is + sufficiently assured them by an object which practical reason presents + beyond doubt in the concept of the summum bonum, the reality of the + conceptions which are required for the possibility of the summum bonum; + without, however, effecting by this accession the least extension of our + knowledge on theoretical principles. + </p> + <p> + When these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the kingdom of God), + and of immortality are further determined by predicates taken from our own + nature, we must not regard this determination as a sensualizing of those + pure rational ideas (anthropomorphism), nor as a transcendent knowledge of + supersensible objects; for these predicates are no others than + understanding and will, considered too in the relation to each other in + which they must be conceived in the moral law, and therefore, only so far + as a pure practical use is made of them. As to all the rest that belongs + to these conceptions psychologically, that is, so far as we observe these + faculties of ours empirically in their exercise (e.g., that the + understanding of man is discursive, and its notions therefore not + intuitions but thoughts, that these follow one another in time, that his + will has its satisfaction always dependent on the existence of its object, + etc., which cannot be the case in the Supreme Being), from all this we + abstract in that case, and then there remains of the notions by which we + conceive a pure intelligence nothing more than just what is required for + the possibility of conceiving a moral law. There is then a knowledge of + God indeed, but only for practical purposes, and, if we attempt to extend + it to a theoretical knowledge, we find an understanding that has + intuitions, not thoughts, a will that is directed to objects on the + existence of which its satisfaction does not in the least depend (not to + mention the transcendental predicates, as, for example, a magnitude of + existence, that is duration, which, however, is not in time, the only + possible means we have of conceiving existence as magnitude). Now these + are all attributes of which we can form no conception that would help to + the knowledge of the object, and we learn from this that they can never be + used for a theory of supersensible beings, so that on this side they are + quite incapable of being the foundation of a speculative knowledge, and + their use is limited simply to the practice of the moral law. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 75</span> + </p> + <p> + This last is so obvious, and can be proved so clearly by fact, that we may + confidently challenge all pretended natural theologians (a singular name) + * to specify (over and above the merely ontological predicates) one single + attribute, whether of the understanding or of the will, determining this + object of theirs, of which we could not show incontrovertibly that, if we + abstract from it everything anthropomorphic, nothing would remain to us + but the mere word, without our being able to connect with it the smallest + notion by which we could hope for an extension of theoretical knowledge. + But as to the practical, there still remains to us of the attributes of + understanding and will the conception of a relation to which objective + reality is given by the practical law (which determines a priori precisely + this relation of the understanding to the will). When once this is done, + then reality is given to the conception of the object of a will morally + determined (the conception of the summum bonum), and with it to the + conditions of its possibility, the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, + but always only relatively to the practice of the moral law (and not for + any speculative purpose). + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Learning is properly only the whole content of the + historical sciences. Consequently it is only the teacher of + revealed theology that can be called a learned theologian. + If, however, we choose to call a man learned who is in + possession of the rational sciences (mathematics and + philosophy), although even this would be contrary to the + signification of the word (which always counts as learning + only that which one must be "learned" and which, therefore, + he cannot discover of himself by reason), even in that case + the philosopher would make too poor a figure with his + knowledge of God as a positive science to let himself be + called on that account a learned man. +</pre> + <p> + According to these remarks it is now easy to find the answer to the + weighty question whether the notion of God is one belonging to physics + (and therefore also to metaphysics, which contains the pure a priori + principles of the former in their universal import) or to morals. If we + have recourse to God as the Author of all things, in order to explain the + arrangements of nature or its changes, this is at least not a physical + explanation, and is a complete confession that our philosophy has come to + an end, since we are obliged to assume something of which in itself we + have otherwise no conception, in order to be able to frame a conception of + the possibility of what we see before our eyes. Metaphysics, however, + cannot enable us to attain by certain inference from the knowledge of this + world to the conception of God and to the proof of His existence, for this + reason, that in order to say that this world could be produced only by a + God (according to the conception implied by this word) we should know this + world as the most perfect whole possible; and for this purpose should also + know all possible worlds (in order to be able to compare them with this); + in other words, we should be omniscient. It is absolutely impossible, + however, to know the existence of this Being from mere concepts, because + every existential proposition, that is, every proposition that affirms the + existence of a being of which I frame a concept, is a synthetic + proposition, that is, one by which I go beyond that conception and affirm + of it more than was thought in the conception itself; namely, that this + concept in the understanding has an object corresponding to it outside the + understanding, and this it is obviously impossible to elicit by any + reasoning. There remains, therefore, only one single process possible for + reason to attain this knowledge, namely, to start from the supreme + principle of its pure practical use (which in every case is directed + simply to the existence of something as a consequence of reason) and thus + determine its object. Then its inevitable problem, namely, the necessary + direction of the will to the summum bonum, discovers to us not only the + necessity of assuming such a First Being in reference to the possibility + of this good in the world, but, what is most remarkable, something which + reason in its progress on the path of physical nature altogether failed to + find, namely, an accurately defined conception of this First Being. As we + can know only a small part of this world, and can still less compare it + with all possible worlds, we may indeed from its order, design, and + greatness, infer a wise, good, powerful, etc., Author of it, but not that + He is all-wise, all-good, all-powerful, etc. It may indeed very well be + granted that we should be justified in supplying this inevitable defect by + a legitimate and reasonable hypothesis; namely, that when wisdom, + goodness, etc, are displayed in all the parts that offer themselves to our + nearer knowledge, it is just the same in all the rest, and that it would + therefore be reasonable to ascribe all possible perfections to the Author + of the world, but these are not strict logical inferences in which we can + pride ourselves on our insight, but only permitted conclusions in which we + may be indulged and which require further recommendation before we can + make use of them. On the path of empirical inquiry then (physics), the + conception of God remains always a conception of the perfection of the + First Being not accurately enough determined to be held adequate to the + conception of Deity. (With metaphysic in its transcendental part nothing + whatever can be accomplished.) + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 80</span> + </p> + <p> + When I now try to test this conception by reference to the object of + practical reason, I find that the moral principle admits as possible only + the conception of an Author of the world possessed of the highest + perfection. He must be omniscient, in order to know my conduct up to the + inmost root of my mental state in all possible cases and into all future + time; omnipotent, in order to allot to it its fitting consequences; + similarly He must be omnipresent, eternal, etc. Thus the moral law, by + means of the conception of the summum bonum as the object of a pure + practical reason, determines the concept of the First Being as the Supreme + Being; a thing which the physical (and in its higher development the + metaphysical), in other words, the whole speculative course of reason, was + unable to effect. The conception of God, then, is one that belongs + originally not to physics, i.e., to speculative reason, but to morals. The + same may be said of the other conceptions of reason of which we have + treated above as postulates of it in its practical use. + </p> + <p> + In the history of Grecian philosophy we find no distinct traces of a pure + rational theology earlier than Anaxagoras; but this is not because the + older philosophers had not intelligence or penetration enough to raise + themselves to it by the path of speculation, at least with the aid of a + thoroughly reasonable hypothesis. What could have been easier, what more + natural, than the thought which of itself occurs to everyone, to assume + instead of several causes of the world, instead of an indeterminate degree + of perfection, a single rational cause having all perfection? But the + evils in the world seemed to them to be much too serious objections to + allow them to feel themselves justified in such a hypothesis. They showed + intelligence and penetration then in this very point, that they did not + allow themselves to adopt it, but on the contrary looked about amongst + natural causes to see if they could not find in them the qualities and + power required for a First Being. But when this acute people had advanced + so far in their investigations of nature as to treat even moral questions + philosophically, on which other nations had never done anything but talk, + then first they found a new and practical want, which did not fail to give + definiteness to their conception of the First Being: and in this the + speculative reason played the part of spectator, or at best had the merit + of embellishing a conception that had not grown on its own ground, and of + applying a series of confirmations from the study of nature now brought + forward for the first time, not indeed to strengthen the authority of this + conception (which was already established), but rather to make a show with + a supposed discovery of theoretical reason. + </p> + <p> + From these remarks, the reader of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason + will be thoroughly convinced how highly necessary that laborious deduction + of the categories was, and how fruitful for theology and morals. For if, + on the one hand, we place them in pure understanding, it is by this + deduction alone that we can be prevented from regarding them, with Plato, + as innate, and founding on them extravagant pretensions to theories of the + supersensible, to which we can see no end, and by which we should make + theology a magic lantern of chimeras; on the other hand, if we regard them + as acquired, this deduction saves us from restricting, with Epicurus, all + and every use of them, even for practical purposes, to the objects and + motives of the senses. But now that the Critique has shown by that + deduction, first, that they are not of empirical origin, but have their + seat and source a priori in the pure understanding; secondly, that as they + refer to objects in general independently of the intuition of them, hence, + although they cannot effect theoretical knowledge, except in application + to empirical objects, yet when applied to an object given by pure + practical reason they enable us to conceive the supersensible definitely, + only so far, however, as it is defined by such predicates as are + necessarily connected with the pure practical purpose given a priori and + with its possibility. The speculative restriction of pure reason and its + practical extension bring it into that relation of equality in which + reason in general can be employed suitably to its end, and this example + proves better than any other that the path to wisdom, if it is to be made + sure and not to be impassable or misleading, must with us men inevitably + pass through science; but it is not till this is complete that we can be + convinced that it leads to this goal. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 85</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0043" id="link2H_4_0043"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason. + </h2> + <p> + A want or requirement of pure reason in its speculative use leads only to + a hypothesis; that of pure practical reason to a postulate; for in the + former case I ascend from the result as high as I please in the series of + causes, not in order to give objective reality to the result (e.g., the + causal connection of things and changes in the world), but in order + thoroughly to satisfy my inquiring reason in respect of it. Thus I see + before me order and design in nature, and need not resort to speculation + to assure myself of their reality, but to explain them I have to + presuppose a Deity as their cause; and then since the inference from an + effect to a definite cause is always uncertain and doubtful, especially to + a cause so precise and so perfectly defined as we have to conceive in God, + hence the highest degree of certainty to which this pre-supposition can be + brought is that it is the most rational opinion for us men. * On the other + hand, a requirement of pure practical reason is based on a duty, that of + making something (the summum bonum) the object of my will so as to promote + it with all my powers; in which case I must suppose its possibility and, + consequently, also the conditions necessary thereto, namely, God, freedom, + and immortality; since I cannot prove these by my speculative reason, + although neither can I refute them. This duty is founded on something that + is indeed quite independent of these suppositions and is of itself + apodeictically certain, namely, the moral law; and so far it needs no + further support by theoretical views as to the inner constitution of + things, the secret final aim of the order of the world, or a presiding + ruler thereof, in order to bind me in the most perfect manner to act in + unconditional conformity to the law. But the subjective effect of this + law, namely, the mental disposition conformed to it and made necessary by + it, to promote the practically possible summum bonum, this pre-supposes at + least that the latter is possible, for it would be practically impossible + to strive after the object of a conception which at bottom was empty and + had no object. Now the above-mentioned postulates concern only the + physical or metaphysical conditions of the possibility of the summum + bonum; in a word, those which lie in the nature of things; not, however, + for the sake of an arbitrary speculative purpose, but of a practically + necessary end of a pure rational will, which in this case does not choose, + but obeys an inexorable command of reason, the foundation of which is + objective, in the constitution of things as they must be universally + judged by pure reason, and is not based on inclination; for we are in + nowise justified in assuming, on account of what we wish on merely + subjective grounds, that the means thereto are possible or that its object + is real. This, then, is an absolutely necessary requirement, and what it + pre-supposes is not merely justified as an allowable hypothesis, but as a + postulate in a practical point of view; and admitting that the pure moral + law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a rule of prudence), + the righteous man may say: "I will that there be a God, that my existence + in this world be also an existence outside the chain of physical causes + and in a pure world of the understanding, and lastly, that my duration be + endless; I firmly abide by this, and will not let this faith be taken from + me; for in this instance alone my interest, because I must not relax + anything of it, inevitably determines my judgement, without regarding + sophistries, however unable I may be to answer them or to oppose them with + others more plausible. ** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * But even here we should not be able to allege a + requirement of reason, if we had not before our eyes a + problematical, but yet inevitable, conception of reason, + namely, that of an absolutely necessary being. This + conception now seeks to be defined, and this, in addition to + the tendency to extend itself, is the objective ground of a + requirement of speculative reason, namely, to have a more + precise definition of the conception of a necessary being + which is to serve as the first cause of other beings, so as + to make these latter knowable by some means. Without such + antecedent necessary problems there are no requirements- at + least not of pure reason- the rest are requirements of + inclination. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 90</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + ** In the Deutsches Museum, February, 1787, there is a + dissertation by a very subtle and clear-headed man, the late + Wizenmann, whose early death is to be lamented, in which he + disputes the right to argue from a want to the objective + reality of its object, and illustrates the point by the + example of a man in love, who having fooled himself into an + idea of beauty, which is merely a chimera of his own brain, + would fain conclude that such an object really exists + somewhere. I quite agree with him in this, in all cases + where the want is founded on inclination, which cannot + necessarily postulate the existence of its object even for + the man that is affected by it, much less can it contain a + demand valid for everyone, and therefore it is merely a + subjective ground of the wish. But in the present case we + have a want of reason springing from an objective + determining principle of the will, namely, the moral law, + which necessarily binds every rational being, and therefore + justifies him in assuming a priori in nature the conditions + proper for it, and makes the latter inseparable from the + complete practical use of reason. It is a duty to realize + the summum bonum to the utmost of our power, therefore it + must be possible, consequently it is unavoidable for every + rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for + its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as + the moral law, in connection with which alone it is valid. +</pre> + <p> + In order to prevent misconception in the use of a notion as yet so unusual + as that of a faith of pure practical reason, let me be permitted to add + one more remark. It might almost seem as if this rational faith were here + announced as itself a command, namely, that we should assume the summum + bonum as possible. But a faith that is commanded is nonsense. Let the + preceding analysis, however, be remembered of what is required to be + supposed in the conception of the summum bonum, and it will be seen that + it cannot be commanded to assume this possibility, and no practical + disposition of mind is required to admit it; but that speculative reason + must concede it without being asked, for no one can affirm that it is + impossible in itself that rational beings in the world should at the same + time be worthy of happiness in conformity with the moral law and also + possess this happiness proportionately. Now in respect of the first + element of the summum bonum, namely, that which concerns morality, the + moral law gives merely a command, and to doubt the possibility of that + element would be the same as to call in question the moral law itself. But + as regards the second element of that object, namely, happiness perfectly + proportioned to that worthiness, it is true that there is no need of a + command to admit its possibility in general, for theoretical reason has + nothing to say against it; but the manner in which we have to conceive + this harmony of the laws of nature with those of freedom has in it + something in respect of which we have a choice, because theoretical reason + decides nothing with apodeictic certainty about it, and in respect of this + there may be a moral interest which turns the scale. + </p> + <p> + I had said above that in a mere course of nature in the world an accurate + correspondence between happiness and moral worth is not to be expected and + must be regarded as impossible, and that therefore the possibility of the + summum bonum cannot be admitted from this side except on the supposition + of a moral Author of the world. I purposely reserved the restriction of + this judgement to the subjective conditions of our reason, in order not to + make use of it until the manner of this belief should be defined more + precisely. The fact is that the impossibility referred to is merely + subjective, that is, our reason finds it impossible for it to render + conceivable in the way of a mere course of nature a connection so exactly + proportioned and so thoroughly adapted to an end, between two sets of + events happening according to such distinct laws; although, as with + everything else in nature that is adapted to an end, it cannot prove, that + is, show by sufficient objective reason, that it is not possible by + universal laws of nature. + </p> + <p> + Now, however, a deciding principle of a different kind comes into play to + turn the scale in this uncertainty of speculative reason. The command to + promote the summum bonum is established on an objective basis (in + practical reason); the possibility of the same in general is likewise + established on an objective basis (in theoretical reason, which has + nothing to say against it). But reason cannot decide objectively in what + way we are to conceive this possibility; whether by universal laws of + nature without a wise Author presiding over nature, or only on supposition + of such an Author. Now here there comes in a subjective condition of + reason, the only way theoretically possible for it, of conceiving the + exact harmony of the kingdom of nature with the kingdom of morals, which + is the condition of the possibility of the summum bonum; and at the same + time the only one conducive to morality (which depends on an objective law + of reason). Now since the promotion of this summum bonum, and therefore + the supposition of its possibility, are objectively necessary (though only + as a result of practical reason), while at the same time the manner in + which we would conceive it rests with our own choice, and in this choice a + free interest of pure practical reason decides for the assumption of a + wise Author of the world; it is clear that the principle that herein + determines our judgement, though as a want it is subjective, yet at the + same time being the means of promoting what is objectively (practically) + necessary, is the foundation of a maxim of belief in a moral point of + view, that is, a faith of pure practical reason. This, then, is not + commanded, but being a voluntary determination of our judgement, conducive + to the moral (commanded) purpose, and moreover harmonizing with the + theoretical requirement of reason, to assume that existence and to make it + the foundation of our further employment of reason, it has itself sprung + from the moral disposition of mind; it may therefore at times waver even + in the well-disposed, but can never be reduced to unbelief. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 95</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0044" id="link2H_4_0044"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties to his Practical + Destination. + </h2> + <p> + If human nature is destined to endeavour after the summum bonum, we must + suppose also that the measure of its cognitive faculties, and particularly + their relation to one another, is suitable to this end. Now the Critique + of Pure Speculative Reason proves that this is incapable of solving + satisfactorily the most weighty problems that are proposed to it, although + it does not ignore the natural and important hints received from the same + reason, nor the great steps that it can make to approach to this great + goal that is set before it, which, however, it can never reach of itself, + even with the help of the greatest knowledge of nature. Nature then seems + here to have provided us only in a step-motherly fashion with the faculty + required for our end. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 100</span> + </p> + <p> + Suppose, now, that in this matter nature had conformed to our wish and had + given us that capacity of discernment or that enlightenment which we would + gladly possess, or which some imagine they actually possess, what would in + all probability be the consequence? Unless our whole nature were at the + same time changed, our inclinations, which always have the first word, + would first of all demand their own satisfaction, and, joined with + rational reflection, the greatest possible and most lasting satisfaction, + under the name of happiness; the moral law would afterwards speak, in + order to keep them within their proper bounds, and even to subject them + all to a higher end, which has no regard to inclination. But instead of + the conflict that the moral disposition has now to carry on with the + inclinations, in which, though after some defeats, moral strength of mind + may be gradually acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would + stand unceasingly before our eyes (for what we can prove perfectly is to + us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of our eyes). + Transgression of the law, would, no doubt, be avoided; what is commanded + would be done; but the mental disposition, from which actions ought to + proceed, cannot be infused by any command, and in this case the spur of + action is ever active and external, so that reason has no need to exert + itself in order to gather strength to resist the inclinations by a lively + representation of the dignity of the law: hence most of the actions that + conformed to the law would be done from fear, a few only from hope, and + none at all from duty, and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in + the eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the + world depends, would cease to exist. As long as the nature of man remains + what it is, his conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism, in + which, as in a puppet-show, everything would gesticulate well, but there + would be no life in the figures. Now, when it is quite otherwise with us, + when with all the effort of our reason we have only a very obscure and + doubtful view into the future, when the Governor of the world allows us + only to conjecture his existence and his majesty, not to behold them or + prove them clearly; and on the other hand, the moral law within us, + without promising or threatening anything with certainty, demands of us + disinterested respect; and only when this respect has become active and + dominant, does it allow us by means of it a prospect into the world of the + supersensible, and then only with weak glances: all this being so, there + is room for true moral disposition, immediately devoted to the law, and a + rational creature can become worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that + corresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his actions. Thus + what the study of nature and of man teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may + well be true here also; that the unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is + not less worthy of admiration in what it has denied than in what it has + granted. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0045" id="link2H_4_0045"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + SECOND PART. + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0046" id="link2H_4_0046"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + By the methodology of pure practical reason we are not to understand the + mode of proceeding with pure practical principles (whether in study or in + exposition), with a view to a scientific knowledge of them, which alone is + what is properly called method elsewhere in theoretical philosophy (for + popular knowledge requires a manner, science a method, i.e., a process + according to principles of reason by which alone the manifold of any + branch of knowledge can become a system). On the contrary, by this + methodology is understood the mode in which we can give the laws of pure + practical reason access to the human mind and influence on its maxims, + that is, by which we can make the objectively practical reason + subjectively practical also. + </p> + <p> + Now it is clear enough that those determining principles of the will which + alone make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth, namely, the + direct conception of the law and the objective necessity of obeying it as + our duty, must be regarded as the proper springs of actions, since + otherwise legality of actions might be produced, but not morality of + character. But it is not so clear; on the contrary, it must at first sight + seem to every one very improbable that even subjectively that exhibition + of pure virtue can have more power over the human mind, and supply a far + stronger spring even for effecting that legality of actions, and can + produce more powerful resolutions to prefer the law, from pure respect for + it, to every other consideration, than all the deceptive allurements of + pleasure or of all that may be reckoned as happiness, or even than all + threatenings of pain and misfortune. Nevertheless, this is actually the + case, and if human nature were not so constituted, no mode of presenting + the law by roundabout ways and indirect recommendations would ever produce + morality of character. All would be simple hypocrisy; the law would be + hated, or at least despised, while it was followed for the sake of one's + own advantage. The letter of the law (legality) would be found in our + actions, but not the spirit of it in our minds (morality); and as with all + our efforts we could not quite free ourselves from reason in our + judgement, we must inevitably appear in our own eyes worthless, depraved + men, even though we should seek to compensate ourselves for this + mortification before the inner tribunal, by enjoying the pleasure that a + supposed natural or divine law might be imagined to have connected with it + a sort of police machinery, regulating its operations by what was done + without troubling itself about the motives for doing it. + </p> + <p> + It cannot indeed be denied that in order to bring an uncultivated or + degraded mind into the track of moral goodness some preparatory guidance + is necessary, to attract it by a view of its own advantage, or to alarm it + by fear of loss; but as soon as this mechanical work, these + leading-strings have produced some effect, then we must bring before the + mind the pure moral motive, which, not only because it is the only one + that can be the foundation of a character (a practically consistent habit + of mind with unchangeable maxims), but also because it teaches a man to + feel his own dignity, gives the mind a power unexpected even by himself, + to tear himself from all sensible attachments so far as they would fain + have the rule, and to find a rich compensation for the sacrifice he + offers, in the independence of his rational nature and the greatness of + soul to which he sees that he is destined. We will therefore show, by such + observations as every one can make, that this property of our minds, this + receptivity for a pure moral interest, and consequently the moving force + of the pure conception of virtue, when it is properly applied to the human + heart, is the most powerful spring and, when a continued and punctual + observance of moral maxims is in question, the only spring of good + conduct. It must, however, be remembered that if these observations only + prove the reality of such a feeling, but do not show any moral improvement + brought about by it, this is no argument against the only method that + exists of making the objectively practical laws of pure reason + subjectively practical, through the mere force of the conception of duty; + nor does it prove that this method is a vain delusion. For as it has never + yet come into vogue, experience can say nothing of its results; one can + only ask for proofs of the receptivity for such springs, and these I will + now briefly present, and then sketch the method of founding and + cultivating genuine moral dispositions. + </p> + <p> + When we attend to the course of conversation in mixed companies, + consisting not merely of learned persons and subtle reasoners, but also of + men of business or of women, we observe that, besides story-telling and + jesting, another kind of entertainment finds a place in them, namely, + argument; for stories, if they are to have novelty and interest, are soon + exhausted, and jesting is likely to become insipid. Now of all argument + there is none in which persons are more ready to join who find any other + subtle discussion tedious, none that brings more liveliness into the + company, than that which concerns the moral worth of this or that action + by which the character of some person is to be made out. Persons, to whom + in other cases anything subtle and speculative in theoretical questions is + dry and irksome, presently join in when the question is to make out the + moral import of a good or bad action that has been related, and they + display an exactness, a refinement, a subtlety, in excogitating everything + that can lessen the purity of purpose, and consequently the degree of + virtue in it, which we do not expect from them in any other kind of + speculation. In these criticisms, persons who are passing judgement on + others often reveal their own character: some, in exercising their + judicial office, especially upon the dead, seem inclined chiefly to defend + the goodness that is related of this or that deed against all injurious + charges of insincerity, and ultimately to defend the whole moral worth of + the person against the reproach of dissimulation and secret wickedness; + others, on the contrary, turn their thoughts more upon attacking this + worth by accusation and fault finding. We cannot always, however, + attribute to these latter the intention of arguing away virtue altogether + out of all human examples in order to make it an empty name; often, on the + contrary, it is only well-meant strictness in determining the true moral + import of actions according to an uncompromising law. Comparison with such + a law, instead of with examples, lowers self-conceit in moral matters very + much, and not merely teaches humility, but makes every one feel it when he + examines himself closely. Nevertheless, we can for the most part observe, + in those who defend the purity of purpose in giving examples that where + there is the presumption of uprightness they are anxious to remove even + the least spot, lest, if all examples had their truthfulness disputed, and + if the purity of all human virtue were denied, it might in the end be + regarded as a mere phantom, and so all effort to attain it be made light + of as vain affectation and delusive conceit. + </p> + <p> + I do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made use of + this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the most subtle + examination of the practical questions that are thrown up; and why they + have not, after first laying the foundation of a purely moral catechism, + searched through the biographies of ancient and modern times with the view + of having at hand instances of the duties laid down, in which, especially + by comparison of similar actions under different circumstances, they might + exercise the critical judgement of their scholars in remarking their + greater or less moral significance. This is a thing in which they would + find that even early youth, which is still unripe for speculation of other + kinds, would soon Become very acute and not a little interested, because + it feels the progress of its faculty of judgement; and, what is most + important, they could hope with confidence that the frequent practice of + knowing and approving good conduct in all its purity, and on the other + hand of remarking with regret or contempt the least deviation from it, + although it may be pursued only as a sport in which children may compete + with one another, yet will leave a lasting impression of esteem on the one + hand and disgust on the other; and so, by the mere habit of looking on + such actions as deserving approval or blame, a good foundation would be + laid for uprightness in the future course of life. Only I wish they would + spare them the example of so-called noble (super-meritorious) actions, in + which our sentimental books so much abound, and would refer all to duty + merely, and to the worth that a man can and must give himself in his own + eyes by the consciousness of not having transgressed it, since whatever + runs up into empty wishes and longings after inaccessible perfection + produces mere heroes of romance, who, while they pique themselves on their + feeling for transcendent greatness, release themselves in return from the + observance of common and every-day obligations, which then seem to them + petty and insignificant. * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * It is quite proper to extol actions that display a great, + unselfish, sympathizing mind or humanity. But, in this case, + we must fix attention not so much on the elevation of soul, + which is very fleeting and transitory, as on the subjection + of the heart to duty, from which a more enduring impression + may be expected, because this implies principle (whereas the + former only implies ebullitions). One need only reflect a + little and he will always find a debt that he has by some + means incurred towards the human race (even if it were only + this, by the inequality of men in the civil constitution, + enjoys advantages on account of which others must be the + more in want), which will prevent the thought of duty from + being repressed by the self-complacent imagination of merit. +</pre> + <p> + But if it is asked: "What, then, is really pure morality, by which as a + touchstone we must test the moral significance of every action," then I + must admit that it is only philosophers that can make the decision of this + question doubtful, for to common sense it has been decided long ago, not + indeed by abstract general formulae, but by habitual use, like the + distinction between the right and left hand. We will then point out the + criterion of pure virtue in an example first, and, imagining that it is + set before a boy, of say ten years old, for his judgement, we will see + whether he would necessarily judge so of himself without being guided by + his teacher. Tell him the history of an honest man whom men want to + persuade to join the calumniators of an innocent and powerless person (say + Anne Boleyn, accused by Henry VIII of England). He is offered advantages, + great gifts, or high rank; he rejects them. This will excite mere + approbation and applause in the mind of the hearer. Now begins the + threatening of loss. Amongst these traducers are his best friends, who now + renounce his friendship; near kinsfolk, who threaten to disinherit him (he + being without fortune); powerful persons, who can persecute and harass him + in all places and circumstances; a prince, who threatens him with loss of + freedom, yea, loss of life. Then to fill the measure of suffering, and + that he may feel the pain that only the morally good heart can feel very + deeply, let us conceive his family threatened with extreme distress and + want, entreating him to yield; conceive himself, though upright, yet with + feelings not hard or insensible either to compassion or to his own + distress; conceive him, I say, at the moment when he wishes that he had + never lived to see the day that exposed him to such unutterable anguish, + yet remaining true to his uprightness of purpose, without wavering or even + doubting; then will my youthful hearer be raised gradually from mere + approval to admiration, from that to amazement, and finally to the + greatest veneration, and a lively wish that he himself could be such a man + (though certainly not in such circumstances). Yet virtue is here worth so + much only because it costs so much, not because it brings any profit. All + the admiration, and even the endeavour to resemble this character, rest + wholly on the purity of the moral principle, which can only be strikingly + shown by removing from the springs of action everything that men may + regard as part of happiness. Morality, then, must have the more power over + the human heart the more purely it is exhibited. Whence it follows that, + if the law of morality and the image of holiness and virtue are to + exercise any influence at all on our souls, they can do so only so far as + they are laid to heart in their purity as motives, unmixed with any view + to prosperity, for it is in suffering that they display themselves most + nobly. Now that whose removal strengthens the effect of a moving force + must have been a hindrance, consequently every admixture of motives taken + from our own happiness is a hindrance to the influence of the moral law on + the heart. I affirm further that even in that admired action, if the + motive from which it was done was a high regard for duty, then it is just + this respect for the law that has the greatest influence on the mind of + the spectator, not any pretension to a supposed inward greatness of mind + or noble meritorious sentiments; consequently duty, not merit, must have + not only the most definite, but, when it is represented in the true light + of its inviolability, the most penetrating, influence on the mind. + </p> + <p> + It is more necessary than ever to direct attention to this method in our + times, when men hope to produce more effect on the mind with soft, tender + feelings, or high-flown, puffing-up pretensions, which rather wither the + heart than strengthen it, than by a plain and earnest representation of + duty, which is more suited to human imperfection and to progress in + goodness. To set before children, as a pattern, actions that are called + noble, magnanimous, meritorious, with the notion of captivating them by + infusing enthusiasm for such actions, is to defeat our end. For as they + are still so backward in the observance of the commonest duty, and even in + the correct estimation of it, this means simply to make them fantastical + romancers betimes. But, even with the instructed and experienced part of + mankind, this supposed spring has, if not an injurious, at least no + genuine, moral effect on the heart, which, however, is what it was desired + to produce. + </p> + <p> + All feelings, especially those that are to produce unwonted exertions, + must accomplish their effect at the moment they are at their height and + before the calm down; otherwise they effect nothing; for as there was + nothing to strengthen the heart, but only to excite it, it naturally + returns to its normal moderate tone and, thus, falls back into its + previous languor. Principles must be built on conceptions; on any other + basis there can only be paroxysms, which can give the person no moral + worth, nay, not even confidence in himself, without which the highest good + in man, consciousness of the morality of his mind and character, cannot + exist. Now if these conceptions are to become subjectively practical, we + must not rest satisfied with admiring the objective law of morality, and + esteeming it highly in reference to humanity, but we must consider the + conception of it in relation to man as an individual, and then this law + appears in a form indeed that is highly deserving of respect, but not so + pleasant as if it belonged to the element to which he is naturally + accustomed; but on the contrary as often compelling him to quit this + element, not without self-denial, and to betake himself to a higher, in + which he can only maintain himself with trouble and with unceasing + apprehension of a relapse. In a word, the moral law demands obedience, + from duty not from predilection, which cannot and ought not to be + presupposed at all. + </p> + <p> + Let us now see, in an example, whether the conception of an action, as a + noble and magnanimous one, has more subjective moving power than if the + action is conceived merely as duty in relation to the solemn law of + morality. The action by which a man endeavours at the greatest peril of + life to rescue people from shipwreck, at last losing his life in the + attempt, is reckoned on one side as duty, but on the other and for the + most part as a meritorious action, but our esteem for it is much weakened + by the notion of duty to himself which seems in this case to be somewhat + infringed. More decisive is the magnanimous sacrifice of life for the + safety of one's country; and yet there still remains some scruple whether + it is a perfect duty to devote one's self to this purpose spontaneously + and unbidden, and the action has not in itself the full force of a pattern + and impulse to imitation. But if an indispensable duty be in question, the + transgression of which violates the moral law itself, and without regard + to the welfare of mankind, and as it were tramples on its holiness (such + as are usually called duties to God, because in Him we conceive the ideal + of holiness in substance), then we give our most perfect esteem to the + pursuit of it at the sacrifice of all that can have any value for the + dearest inclinations, and we find our soul strengthened and elevated by + such an example, when we convince ourselves by contemplation of it that + human nature is capable of so great an elevation above every motive that + nature can oppose to it. Juvenal describes such an example in a climax + which makes the reader feel vividly the force of the spring that is + contained in the pure law of duty, as duty: + </p> + <p> + Esto bonus miles, tutor bonus, arbiter idem + </p> + <p> + Integer; ambiguae si quando citabere testis + </p> + <p> + Incertaeque rei, Phalaris licet imperet ut sis + </p> + <p> + Falsus, et admoto dictet periuria tauro, + </p> + <p> + Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori, + </p> + <p> + Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas. * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * [Juvenal, Satirae, "Be you a good soldier, a faithful + tutor, an uncorrupted umpire also; if you are summoned as a + witness in a doubtful and uncertain thing, though Phalaris + should command that you should be false, and should dictate + perjuries with the bull brought to you, believe it the + highest impiety to prefer life to reputation, and for the + sake of life, to lose the causes of living."] +</pre> + <p> + When we can bring any flattering thought of merit into our action, then + the motive is already somewhat alloyed with self-love and has therefore + some assistance from the side of the sensibility. But to postpone + everything to the holiness of duty alone, and to be conscious that we can + because our own reason recognises this as its command and says that we + ought to do it, this is, as it were, to raise ourselves altogether above + the world of sense, and there is inseparably involved in the same a + consciousness of the law, as a spring of a faculty that controls the + sensibility; and although this is not always attended with effect, yet + frequent engagement with this spring, and the at first minor attempts at + using it, give hope that this effect may be wrought, and that by degrees + the greatest, and that a purely moral interest in it may be produced in + us. + </p> + <p> + The method then takes the following course. At first we are only concerned + to make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural employment + accompanying all our own free actions, as well as the observation of those + of others, and to make it as it were a habit, and to sharpen this + judgement, asking first whether the action conforms objectively to the + moral law, and to what law; and we distinguish the law that merely + furnishes a principle of obligation from that which is really obligatory + (leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus); as, for instance, the law of + what men's wants require from me, as contrasted with that which their + rights demand, the latter of which prescribes essential, the former only + non-essential duties; and thus we teach how to distinguish different kinds + of duties which meet in the same action. The other point to which + attention must be directed is the question whether the action was also + (subjectively) done for the sake of the moral law, so that it not only is + morally correct as a deed, but also, by the maxim from which it is done, + has moral worth as a disposition. Now there is no doubt that this + practice, and the resulting culture of our reason in judging merely of the + practical, must gradually produce a certain interest even in the law of + reason, and consequently in morally good actions. For we ultimately take a + liking for a thing, the contemplation of which makes us feel that the use + of our cognitive faculties is extended; and this extension is especially + furthered by that in which we find moral correctness, since it is only in + such an order of things that reason, with its faculty of determining a + priori on principle what ought to be done, can find satisfaction. An + observer of nature takes liking at last to objects that at first offended + his senses, when he discovers in them the great adaptation of their + organization to design, so that his reason finds food in its + contemplation. So Leibnitz spared an insect that he had carefully examined + with the microscope, and replaced it on its leaf, because he had found + himself instructed by the view of it and had, as it were, received a + benefit from it. + </p> + <p> + But this employment of the faculty of judgement, which makes us feel our + own cognitive powers, is not yet the interest in actions and in their + morality itself. It merely causes us to take pleasure in engaging in such + criticism, and it gives to virtue or the disposition that conforms to + moral laws a form of beauty, which is admired, but not on that account + sought after (laudatur et alget); as everything the contemplation of which + produces a consciousness of the harmony of our powers of conception, and + in which we feel the whole of our faculty of knowledge (understanding and + imagination) strengthened, produces a satisfaction, which may also be + communicated to others, while nevertheless the existence of the object + remains indifferent to us, being only regarded as the occasion of our + becoming aware of the capacities in us which are elevated above mere + animal nature. Now, however, the second exercise comes in, the living + exhibition of morality of character by examples, in which attention is + directed to purity of will, first only as a negative perfection, in so far + as in an action done from duty no motives of inclination have any + influence in determining it. By this the pupil's attention is fixed upon + the consciousness of his freedom, and although this renunciation at first + excites a feeling of pain, nevertheless, by its withdrawing the pupil from + the constraint of even real wants, there is proclaimed to him at the same + time a deliverance from the manifold dissatisfaction in which all these + wants entangle him, and the mind is made capable of receiving the + sensation of satisfaction from other sources. The heart is freed and + lightened of a burden that always secretly presses on it, when instances + of pure moral resolutions reveal to the man an inner faculty of which + otherwise he has no right knowledge, the inward freedom to release himself + from the boisterous importunity of inclinations, to such a degree that + none of them, not even the dearest, shall have any influence on a + resolution, for which we are now to employ our reason. Suppose a case + where I alone know that the wrong is on my side, and although a free + confession of it and the offer of satisfaction are so strongly opposed by + vanity, selfishness, and even an otherwise not illegitimate antipathy to + the man whose rights are impaired by me, I am nevertheless able to discard + all these considerations; in this there is implied a consciousness of + independence on inclinations and circumstances, and of the possibility of + being sufficient for myself, which is salutary to me in general for other + purposes also. And now the law of duty, in consequence of the positive + worth which obedience to it makes us feel, finds easier access through the + respect for ourselves in the consciousness of our freedom. When this is + well established, when a man dreads nothing more than to find himself, on + self-examination, worthless and contemptible in his own eyes, then every + good moral disposition can be grafted on it, because this is the best, + nay, the only guard that can keep off from the mind the pressure of + ignoble and corrupting motives. + </p> + <p> + I have only intended to point out the most general maxims of the + methodology of moral cultivation and exercise. As the manifold variety of + duties requires special rules for each kind, and this would be a prolix + affair, I shall be readily excused if in a work like this, which is only + preliminary, I content myself with these outlines. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_CONC" id="link2H_CONC"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CONCLUSION. + </h2> + <p> + Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, + the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens + above and the moral law within. I have not to search for them and + conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or were in the + transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect + them directly with the consciousness of my existence. The former begins + from the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and enlarges my + connection therein to an unbounded extent with worlds upon worlds and + systems of systems, and moreover into limitless times of their periodic + motion, its beginning and continuance. The second begins from my invisible + self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, + but which is traceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern + that I am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary + connection, as I am also thereby with all those visible worlds. The former + view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates as it were my + importance as an animal creature, which after it has been for a short time + provided with vital power, one knows not how, must again give back the + matter of which it was formed to the planet it inhabits (a mere speck in + the universe). The second, on the contrary, infinitely elevates my worth + as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me + a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world, at + least so far as may be inferred from the destination assigned to my + existence by this law, a destination not restricted to conditions and + limits of this life, but reaching into the infinite. + </p> + <p> + But though admiration and respect may excite to inquiry, they cannot + supply the want of it. What, then, is to be done in order to enter on this + in a useful manner and one adapted to the loftiness of the subject? + Examples may serve in this as a warning and also for imitation. The + contemplation of the world began from the noblest spectacle that the human + senses present to us, and that our understanding can bear to follow in + their vast reach; and it ended- in astrology. Morality began with the + noblest attribute of human nature, the development and cultivation of + which give a prospect of infinite utility; and ended- in fanaticism or + superstition. So it is with all crude attempts where the principal part of + the business depends on the use of reason, a use which does not come of + itself, like the use of the feet, by frequent exercise, especially when + attributes are in question which cannot be directly exhibited in common + experience. But after the maxim had come into vogue, though late, to + examine carefully beforehand all the steps that reason purposes to take, + and not to let it proceed otherwise than in the track of a previously well + considered method, then the study of the structure of the universe took + quite a different direction, and thereby attained an incomparably happier + result. The fall of a stone, the motion of a sling, resolved into their + elements and the forces that are manifested in them, and treated + mathematically, produced at last that clear and henceforward unchangeable + insight into the system of the world which, as observation is continued, + may hope always to extend itself, but need never fear to be compelled to + retreat. + </p> + <p> + This example may suggest to us to enter on the same path in treating of + the moral capacities of our nature, and may give us hope of a like good + result. We have at hand the instances of the moral judgement of reason. By + analysing these into their elementary conceptions, and in default of + mathematics adopting a process similar to that of chemistry, the + separation of the empirical from the rational elements that may be found + in them, by repeated experiments on common sense, we may exhibit both + pure, and learn with certainty what each part can accomplish of itself, so + as to prevent on the one hand the errors of a still crude untrained + judgement, and on the other hand (what is far more necessary) the + extravagances of genius, by which, as by the adepts of the philosopher's + stone, without any methodical study or knowledge of nature, visionary + treasures are promised and the true are thrown away. In one word, science + (critically undertaken and methodically directed) is the narrow gate that + leads to the true doctrine of practical wisdom, if we understand by this + not merely what one ought to do, but what ought to serve teachers as a + guide to construct well and clearly the road to wisdom which everyone + should travel, and to secure others from going astray. Philosophy must + always continue to be the guardian of this science; and although the + public does not take any interest in its subtle investigations, it must + take an interest in the resulting doctrines, which such an examination + first puts in a clear light. + </p> + <h3> + THE END + </h3> + <div style="height: 6em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <pre> + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON *** + +***** This file should be named 5683-h.htm or 5683-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/5/6/8/5683/ + +Etext produced by Matthew Stapleton + +HTML file produced by David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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