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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 56721 ***
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+|Transcriber's note:                              |
+|                                                 |
+|Errors listed in the Errata have been corrected. |
+|                                                 |
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+
+
+ON MR. SPENCER'S DATA OF ETHICS.
+
+BY MALCOLM GUTHRIE,
+
+AUTHOR OF
+"ON MR. SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION," & "ON MR. SPENCER'S
+UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE."
+
+
+LONDON:
+THE MODERN PRESS,
+13 AND 14, PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.
+1884.
+
+(_All rights reserved._)
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+                                                   PAGE
+CHAPTER I.--ETHICS AND THE UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
+            THE PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW                    1
+
+CHAPTER II.--THE SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF THE EVOLUTION
+             OF ETHICS                               27
+
+CHAPTER III.--THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW OF ETHICS          36
+
+CHAPTER IV.--THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW                   56
+
+CHAPTER V.--THE ETHICAL IMPERATIVE                   63
+
+CHAPTER VI.--SYSTEMS OF ETHICS                       75
+
+CHAPTER VII.--THE EVOLUTION OF FREE WILL             83
+
+CHAPTER VIII.--EVOLUTION AND RELIGION               107
+
+CHAPTER IX.--SUMMARY                                120
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+This volume completes the critical examination of Mr. Spencer's system
+of Philosophy already pursued through two previous volumes entitled
+respectively "On Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution," and "On Mr.
+Spencer's Unification of Knowledge." The entire task has been undertaken
+by a student for the use of students. It cannot be of much use to the
+general reader, as it presumes and indeed requires a very intimate
+knowledge of Mr. Spencer's works. For those who do not wish to enter
+into detailed examination perhaps Chapter I. of the "Unification of
+Knowledge" will afford a good epitome of the line of criticism; and this
+may be followed, if desired, by a perusal of the "Formula of Evolution."
+It is believed that the most serious piece of criticism against Mr.
+Spencer's system will be found in the examination of his re-constructive
+Biology in Chapter V. of the "Unification," and in the examination of
+the origin of organic molecules commencing at page 30 of the "Formula
+of Evolution." Evidently of the highest importance in a system of
+philosophy conceived in the manner in which Mr. Spencer presents it,
+this point of transition between the inorganic and the organic with its
+dependent histories is of the very deepest fundamental interest, and
+upon the question whether it is well or badly treated depends the
+practical value of his philosophy as applied to human concerns.
+
+In our opinion, whatever of worth there is in Mr. Spencer's works (and
+there is very much), derives its value from _a posteriori_ grounds and
+not from its _a priori_ reliance upon first principles, nor from its
+place in a deductive system of cosmic philosophy. It has not fallen to
+our lot, nor has it been our object, to appraise the separate or
+incidental value of Mr. Spencer's works. Our view has been limited to
+the single object of examining them in the mode in which he presents
+them, as forming a connected system of philosophy. We have done so
+because he sets forth his works to us in this light, and evidently if
+they can be so accepted, it would be a gift to humanity of the highest
+value, for it would lend cogency to every past and confer a guidance to
+all future ages, forming a crowning glory to the intellectual
+achievements of the human race.
+
+It is therefore to this point that we address our examination, and in
+no unfriendly spirit; for the object Mr. Spencer had in view was one
+which appealed to every sentiment and every intellectual aspiration
+within us. But we feel bound to say how sadly we have been disappointed.
+We have found the object of our admiration to be like Nebuchadnezzar's
+dream god, a thing apparently perfect and complete in configuration but
+like the image compounded of iron and clay and precious stones
+inevitably falling to pieces under the strain of sustained criticisms.
+
+Mr. Spencer's philosophic conception was indeed imposing, and before its
+magnificent proportions many have bowed down in sincere respect. But his
+cosmical scheme when carefully examined proved to be constructed of
+terms which had no fixed and definite meaning, which were in fact merely
+symbols of symbolic conceptions, conceptions themselves symbolic because
+they were not understood--and the moment we began to put them to use as
+having definite values they landed us forthwith in alternative
+contradictions! Then to effect cosmical evolution, which is a process of
+imperceptible objective change, what was necessary, but to adopt a
+system of imperceptible word changes, so that the imperceptible word
+changes accompanying the imperceptible objective changes should lead us
+in the end to the completed results, and the process of evolution should
+thus be made comprehensible! In this manner over the spaces of an
+enormous work have we been skilfully led by a master of language till we
+find ourselves in imagination following out mentally the actual
+processes of the universe. But after all it has only been a process, in
+our own minds, of the skilful substitution of words!
+
+Errors to be successful must be big and bold. Fallacies of reasoning are
+detected on a medium scale, but when they are "writ large" it is
+difficult to detect them. Trains of syllogisms are sometimes more
+effective because they are vast than because they are true. Let them be
+imposing in their language and grand in their proportions, we naturally
+bow down to power, even if it is only power of largeness. When dealing
+with Mr. Spencer's reasonings we feel a certain awe as if we were
+contradicting the forces of the universe--seemingly allied to him. We
+feel conscious of an impertinence in treating of such great matters,
+dealt with in such a mighty sweep--disdainful of precision and
+consistency. The transformations and evolutions of reasoning in Mr.
+Spencer's works are no less wonderful than his treatment of words. The
+mind is swept along by an indiscernable but mighty flow, and sometimes
+after mysterious disappearances of consecutiveness between volumes or
+chapters, we find ourselves landed in a satisfied but bewildered manner
+at a conclusion about which we cannot but wonder however we arrived
+there.
+
+By such terms as equilibration, including the theory of the moving
+equilibrium; by such terms as polarity plastic and coercive; and by
+plausible similarities between modes of process, we are deluded into
+supposing we understand the constructive progress of nature and are made
+to feel happy and proud of our knowledge. A great self satisfaction
+attends the student who believes himself rightly to understand the
+universe. We are pleased with our teacher, and are still more pleased
+with ourselves.
+
+But the real difficulty appears when the necessity for exposition
+arises. If one undertakes to explain, if one has to condense and
+solidify for the purpose of teaching, if one wishes to make others
+understand, and share the knowledge one has attained, then indeed our
+difficulties commence. What seemed so grand and alluring to look at will
+not stand the ordinary handling of scientific language and logical
+statement as between man and man. The illusion vanishes, the system has
+gone. In these remarks we speak only of Mr. Spencer's cosmical system.
+Of the general value of this work as a philosopher we express no
+opinion. In the estimation of competent thinkers it is very great.
+Fiske, Youmans, Carveth Read, Ribot, Maudsley, Clifford, Sully, Grant
+Allen, Gopinay, and others are all working on Spencerian lines, but we
+do not understand that they accept the cosmical explanation of Mr.
+Spencer. He marks not the age of complete accomplishment but the age of
+transition. He has not grasped the solution of problems, but he has
+shewn the direction of future studies. He has failed in his grand
+endeavour, but he has shown what to aim at and has pointed the way. Much
+of his detailed work has been good and effective, and therefore one
+feels some compunction in writing of him so severely. Nevertheless a man
+of such eminence must not be held sacred from criticism, but on the
+contrary, just by reason of his eminence and consequent influence, must
+his work be well examined before it is accepted and approved. This is
+the task we have set ourselves and which may now be considered as
+complete. We have approached the study without any prepossessions, and
+we have endeavoured, while being very strict, to be perfectly fair and
+honest in our presentations of Mr. Spencer's theories. Naturally the
+work has been long and tedious, and where so many contradictory and
+indistinct expressions of opinion are given it has been necessary to
+deal largely in quotations. This has been done in justice both to
+ourselves and to our author. If we have succeeded in bringing out the
+main lines of thought for the future use of students we shall have
+accomplished our end. It is only by very strict thinking and discussion
+that truth is finally evolved.
+
+A few words must be added as to the teleological implications which a
+_Westminster_ reviewer has discovered in our previous works, and has
+regarded as vitiating the whole of their reasoning. The subject of
+teleology is a very interesting and puzzling one, and is bound to
+receive careful attention from the student of nature. It requires much
+consideration as to what is meant by the term. There may be a natural
+teleology apart from a supernatural teleology. We have no very clear
+conceptions upon this point ourselves as yet, but are at present engaged
+upon the study of the question. Intention and design are exemplified in
+human actions, means to an end are adopted by many animals; the "Moving
+Equilibrium" theory, and the "Happy Accident" theory alike seem
+inadequate to account for the origin of natural teleology or even for
+all variations of species; and the study of biological developments
+suggests to us the presence and activity of a subjective factor related
+to physical factors by some law to which may be due the origin of some
+of the biological variations. Mr. Spencer's theory of biological
+variations as internal forces generated by external forces, and thus
+acting as a counterbalance in opposition to an inimical force, or in
+harmony with a favourable force, having for its object the protection or
+sustentation of the organism, is an altogether different theory from the
+agnostic "Happy Accident" hypothesis of the naturalist school. It
+implies the origin of biological variations as means adapted to ends in
+the preservation of the organism or species, and if this is not found
+workable on the physical equilibration hypothesis, some extension of
+theory is required to account for the origin of biological variations in
+which teleological implications are involved, although this theory may
+be truly naturalistic and in perfect harmony with an orderly development
+in the manner of evolution. If we cannot predicate an anthropomorphic
+teleological mind at the beginning of things, nevertheless a teleology
+appears to be involved in biological developments and requires a
+naturalistic explanation.
+
+M. Lionel Dauriac[1] enquires how it comes about that, while accepting
+the theory of Evolution, we write a book of 476 pages against its most
+illustrious exponent, and asks us to explain our acceptance of the
+doctrine as a whole. It is quite true, as he states, that we repudiate a
+materialistic explanation, and it is on this ground that we join issue
+with Mr. Spencer, inasmuch as, notwithstanding Mr. Spencer's own formal
+repudiation, all the formulas of explanation upon which he attempts the
+reconstruction of the universe are materialistic. The factors of
+chemistry, and the laws of physics, together with the laws of
+equilibration and polarity, are all purely materialistic in character.
+By the aid of these factors and these laws alone we do not think it
+possible to understand and explain the history of cosmical evolution. Do
+we then accept a spiritual evolution to which the materialistic has been
+altogether subordinate? No. We do not understand the operations of the
+subjective apart from the material organism. It seems to us that there
+are material factors, and factors which are subjective, and what is
+wanted is the law of their correlation. When we say that we accept
+Evolution, we mean that we accept the theory of an orderly progress from
+a state of indefinite, incoherent simplicity to a state of definite
+coherent complexity. We discern two sets or kinds of factors, the
+materialistic and the subjective, but we are unable sufficiently to
+understand them and their laws of correlation to lay down a formula of
+interaction of such a nature as to explain the orderly development which
+we recognise.
+
+This is a difficulty which has not been overlooked by Mr. Spencer. He
+would escape it in two ways. Firstly by a mysticism, through which after
+the definite meaning he has given to his terms has been found to fail in
+actual work he changes all his fundamental terms into "symbolic
+conceptions." Why? Because they have no meaning; and if you give them a
+meaning the conclusions from them land the student in irreconcilable
+contradictions. Out of this mysticism no progress is possible. Secondly
+by means of the "double aspect" theory. According to this theory
+everything is both material and subjective, as you choose to regard it,
+and may be explained and accounted for in laws of the relations of
+either set of factors. It is true that phenomena may be so described,
+but it is not true that they can be so explained. There is an undoubted
+concomitance between the bodily act and the conscious feeling, but the
+real question is this,--Does the conscious feeling wholly depend upon
+the physical series of events and has itself no effects on the physical
+series? Is it produced without producing? Is it something occurring in
+connexion with certain motions in the nerves of the organism and
+therefore dependent upon and wholly produced by the physical factors in
+their interrelation, according to the known chemical and physical laws
+of the factors? If it is so determined, and does not determine as part
+in a chain of causation it cannot be said to interfere with the
+materialistic explanation. That is complete in itself. The only question
+left is this:--How comes it about that some portions of the physical
+series of phenomena have this strange accompaniment of consciousness? A
+very interesting but comparatively unimportant question. The theory that
+phenomena have two sides is of no use whatever in the endeavour towards
+the statement of a cosmical formula of explanation. The result of our
+studies is to the effect that there are physical factors and subjective
+factors alike produced and producing. We aim at the statement of their
+law of correlation, and in this we would seek the cosmical formula. We
+however seek it in vain, and we do not think it possible to attain it.
+In the meantime we look to the development of the subjective factor in
+life, and more especially in human life, as a fact of the greatest
+interest, the more so that we discern in that development an orderly
+progress in a well marked manner; and it is our task to understand the
+laws of that orderly development. This study has to be undertaken along
+with the study of material Evolution; and although we may not fully
+understand our problem, there is much that we can understand and much to
+make our views large and sympathetic and our minds expansive in working
+out the great questions that are set before us.
+
+
+The study of Ethics from the Evolutionist's point of view assumes an
+altogether different phase from the old methods of inquiry and rests
+upon an altogether different basis. Its ground of authority is seen to
+rest in the very nature of humanity and does not come to him as an
+imposed law. Confidence is first shaken and then fully restored. From
+the new point of view the merit of all preceding systems is seen, and
+how they all fall into harmony in a wonderful manner in the consensus of
+mutual support and enforce ethical law by an united authority.
+
+The chief merit of Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics" is that it puts the
+study upon an entirely new basis in grafting it upon the study of the
+larger science of Biology. Heretofore the study has been isolated, and
+supposed to be complete within its own borders. Henceforth no professor
+or student will be considered competent to express opinions without
+being well grounded in the study of Biological and Psychological
+evolution. Ethics, along with Sociology, must be studied as part of the
+greater movement.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[1] "Revue Philosophique," Dec. 1883.
+
+
+
+
+ON MR. SPENCER'S DATA OF ETHICS.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+ETHICS AND THE UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
+
+THE PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW.
+
+
+Always a very complex problem, the study of ethics, in Mr. Spencer's
+works, becomes in some respects still more complex from the necessity he
+is under of affiliating it in some way upon the cosmical process.
+Conceiving all knowledge to be capable of unification as a system of
+causation, so that when the relations of the original factors are
+understood, all histories are merely corollaries from these ultimate
+truths, Mr. Spencer feels bound, in the first place, to show that each
+particular science falls into its due place in the logical scheme.
+Consequently, one of the main ideas permeating the "Data of Ethics" is
+this view of ethics as interpretable only by an adequate knowledge of
+the cosmical process in which it forms a feature.
+
+Indeed, the proposition is laid down at the outset that parts can only
+be properly understood through a knowledge of the wholes of which they
+form part.[2] Upon this Mr. Spencer reasons that since ethics deals
+with purposed conduct, that kind of conduct can only be understood
+through a scientific knowledge of conduct in general, which again forms
+part of the study of action in general, bringing us at once to the
+cosmical process upon the understanding of which, therefore, depends the
+understanding of our special subject.
+
+This philosophic relation of Ethics to the cosmical process is referred
+to in the preface as being, in fact, the main object Mr. Spencer had in
+view in his elaborate series of volumes, and is more explicitly stated
+in Chapter IV. of the work under review, in which Mr. Spencer
+considering "The Ways of Judging Conduct," justifies the course he thus
+pursues. Here it is pointed out that in the systems of all preceding
+authors the idea of causation has been insufficiently recognised or has
+even been altogether ignored--an assertion which is thereupon justified
+by a review of the Theological, Political, Intuitional, and Utilitarian
+schools of moral philosophers. Mr. Spencer thereupon proceeds (¶ 22)
+"Thus, then, is justified the allegation made at the outset, that,
+irrespective of their distinctive characters and their special
+tendencies, all the current methods of ethics have one general
+defect--they neglect ultimate causal connexions. Of course, I do not
+mean that they wholly ignore the natural consequences of actions; but I
+mean that they recognise them only incidentally. They do not erect into
+a method the ascertaining of necessary relations between causes and
+effects, and deducing rules of conduct from formulated statements of
+them.
+
+"Every science begins by accumulating observations, and presently
+generalises these empirically; but only when it reaches the stage at
+which its empirical generalisations are included in a rational
+generalisation does it become developed science. Astronomy has already
+passed through its successive stages; first, collections of facts, then
+inductions from them, and lastly deductive interpretations of these, as
+corollaries from a universal principle of action among masses in space.
+Accounts of structures and tabulations of strata, grouped and compared,
+have led gradually to the assigning of various classes of geological
+changes to igneous and aqueous actions; and it is now tacitly admitted
+that geology becomes a science proper, only as fast as such changes are
+explained in terms of those natural processes which have arisen in the
+cooling and solidifying Earth, exposed to the Sun's heat and the action
+of the Moon upon its ocean. The science of life has been, and is still,
+exhibiting a like series of steps; the evolution of organic forms at
+large is being affiliated on physical actions in operation from the
+beginning; and the vital phenomena each organism presents, are coming to
+be understood as connected sets of changes, in parts formed of matters
+that are affected by certain forces, and disengage other forces. So is
+it with mind. Early ideas concerning thought and feeling ignored
+everything like cause, save in recognising those effects of habit which
+were forced on men's attention and expressed in proverbs; but there are
+growing up interpretations of thought and feeling as correlates of the
+actions and reactions of a nervous structure, that is influenced by
+outer changes and works in the body adapted changes, the implication
+being that psychology becomes a science, as fast as these relations of
+phenomena are explained as consequences of ultimate principles.
+Sociology, too, represented down to recent times only by stray ideas
+about social organisation, scattered through the masses of worthless
+gossip furnished us by historians, is coming to be recognised by some as
+also a science; and such adumbrations of it as have from time to time
+appeared in the shape of empirical generalisations, are now beginning to
+assume the character of generalisations made coherent by derivation from
+causes lying in human nature placed under given conditions. Clearly
+then, _ethics, which is a science dealing with the conduct of associated
+human beings_, regarded under one of its aspects, has to undergo a like
+transformation, and, at present undeveloped, can be considered a
+developed science only when it has undergone this transformation.
+
+"A preparation in the simpler sciences is pre-supposed. Ethics has a
+physical aspect, since it treats of human activities, which, in common
+with all expenditures of energy, conform to the law of the persistence
+of energy; moral principles must conform to physical necessities. It has
+a biological aspect, since it concerns certain effects, inner and outer,
+individual and social, of the vital changes going on in the highest type
+of animal. It has a psychological aspect, for its subject matter is an
+aggregate of actions that are prompted by feelings and guided by
+intelligence. And it has a sociological aspect, for these actions, some
+of them directly, and all of them indirectly, affect associated beings.
+
+"What is the implication? Belonging under one aspect to each of these
+sciences--physical, biological, psychological, sociological--it can find
+its ultimate interpretations only in those fundamental truths which are
+common to all of them. Already we have concluded in a general way that
+conduct at large, including the conduct Ethics deals with, is to be
+fully understood only as an aspect of evolving life; and now we are
+brought to this conclusion in a more special way.
+
+"Here, then, we have to enter on the consideration of moral phenomena as
+phenomena of evolution; being forced to do this by finding that they
+form a part of the aggregate of phenomena which evolution has wrought
+out. If the entire visible universe has been evolved--if the solar
+system as a whole, the earth as part of it, the life in general which
+the earth bears, as well as that of each individual organism--if the
+mental phenomena displayed by all creatures, up to the highest, in
+common with the phenomena presented by aggregates of these highest--if
+one and all conform to the laws of evolution; then the necessary
+implication is that those phenomena of conduct in these highest
+creatures with which morality is concerned, also conform."[3]
+
+In this passage Mr. Spencer propounds morality or ethics as a matter for
+scientific study, only to be understood or explained as part of general
+conduct when it is capable of explanation deductively from antecedent
+causes. The distinction recognised between conduct called moral and
+conduct regarded as immoral is only to be understood when, after a
+historical survey of human actions and of the actions of organisms in
+general, we not only perceive its immediately antecedent causes, but,
+going behind them, recognise the ultimate necessity of their occurrence
+in the very nature of the universe. This reveals the special features of
+Mr. Spencer's method in the treatment of his subject as distinguished
+from that followed by Mr. Leslie Stephen in his "Science of Ethics," a
+distinction which we may conveniently mark by terming them respectively
+the Philosophic and the Scientific methods. The former term we use in
+the sense assigned to it in the definition given by Mr. Spencer in
+"First Principles."[4]
+
+A philosophy is complete when the mind has been able to form for itself
+such an appraisement of the relations and conditions of factors at a
+period sufficiently remote to ante-date any great amount of complexity
+as will enable us deductively to frame a history of developments which
+may correspond with the actual history of sequences in the concrete
+universe. If this appraisement of a remote cosmos characterised by
+comparative simplicity nevertheless admits the existence of many factors
+whose differences are not accounted for, philosophy is so far formally
+incomplete: but as the determination of these points lies beyond the
+powers of human reason, philosophy may justly be regarded as practically
+complete if it unifies from this point of view all the knowledge with
+which the human mind is conversant. If we are able to include all the
+sciences in one coherent whole nothing more can be expected of
+philosophy--beyond that lies the realm of speculation and the
+Unknowable.
+
+The scope of the sciences is not so ambitious. Their aim is limited
+within a much narrower purview. They seek merely to ascertain the laws
+which subsume special classes of phenomena. They recognise causation and
+their inductions are valid to the extent of the classes of facts
+expressed in any particular law. But each science or class of facts is
+severally and separately worked upon even though the progress of study
+is ever disclosing the mutual dependence of the various sciences.
+
+It is very evident that there must be great imperfections in our scheme
+of knowledge so long as there remain great blanks between the sciences.
+But this is a natural condition of the progress of thought. On the other
+hand a complete philosophic system such as that referred to above, and
+at which Mr. Spencer aims, would throw a flood of light upon each
+particular department if the mutual relation of all problems could be
+deduced from ascertained relations of the original factors. But it is
+also clear that if we think we have framed such a philosophy without
+having really succeeded in so doing, or at any rate without having
+succeeded in making others understand or accept it, then the supposed
+philosophy becomes a confusing element in the exposition of a scientific
+problem. In the work under review the philosophical attempt is very
+regrettable for it spoils the exposition of a scientific treatment,
+surpassing all former expositions, since it dims the clearness of the
+argument, and hinders the force of its practical application.
+
+Such is our judgment of Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics." It contains at
+once an excellent scientific treatment of the subject and a weak attempt
+to affiliate it upon an impotent philosophy. To the philosophical or
+cosmical aspect of the work we will confine ourselves in the present
+chapter, so that we shall hereafter be free to devote our attention to
+the more solid scientific treatment of the questions at issue which it
+presents.
+
+The students of Mr. Spencer's previous volumes will have observed that
+although he states the problem of evolution as a deductive one, he has
+yet regarded evolution in a different aspect in the working out of each
+specific problem. Thus it is very noteworthy that throughout the
+Biological, Psychological, and Sociological expositions, Mr. Spencer has
+regarded the establishment of the fact of evolution by the accretion of
+insensible changes as equivalent to an actual affiliation of the
+sciences upon the theory of evolution, utterly regardless of his own
+rigid requirement that these changes should be explained and accounted
+for by the general deductions of cosmical evolution. The histories of
+organisms, for instance, exhibit gradual development, and therefore are
+supposed to conform to the definition of evolution at large. But if
+these changes are not intellectually discerned as the result of
+antecedent conditions and traceable to the relations of the ultimate
+factors recognised by the philosophy, then the affiliation of the
+science upon evolution in general is not made good. While the form and
+outside show are present, the organic connexion is not exhibited. But it
+is a characteristic of Mr. Spencer's mode of exposition, that when the
+latter fails, the former takes its place. Hence the gradual development
+of conduct is evolution of conduct, but it is an evolution of which we
+want an explanation. We seek it in Biology, but find that Biology also
+is a gradual increment of insensible changes of which again we seek in
+vain for an explanation.
+
+The effect of this mode of presenting evolution or the unification of
+knowledge is heightened by the seemingly systematic manner of its
+exposition. Development is shown to be universally characterised by
+progress in three forms--namely, from a simple, indefinite, incoherent
+state to a complex, definite, and coherent state: and the wonderful
+scope which the universe affords, both in time and space, for
+historically exhibiting these traits, overwhelms the mind with a sense
+of the universality of evolution, in spite of the fact that all the time
+the very point of the question is missed in the absence of any
+explanation. We recognise the gradual development, but where is the
+deductive connexion? Where is the promised system of corollaries from
+original factors which shall account for the historical development?
+
+Thus, when in the "Data of Ethics" we find a reference to the Biology,
+the Psychology, and the Sociology as parts of an established
+philosophical system we are apt to suppose that the views as to ethics
+which Mr. Spencer expresses derive their authority from an antecedent
+apprehension of the cosmical process; whereas this is not really the
+case: and although it is essential to the study that ethics should be
+viewed as dependent upon the sciences named, yet such a connexion is not
+shown as one of logical order; we are only told that Ethics exhibits
+similar traits in its order of development.
+
+But in addition to this foisting of the sciences upon philosophy by
+means of general similarities of history, the student will find that
+whatever inner deductive warrant is set forth is badly conceived in the
+appraisement of the original factors--Matter, Motion, and Force--terms
+to which no definite conceptions can be attached. And should any one be
+so rash as to attach to them such definite meanings as would render
+their logical use possible, then the deductive process which would have
+to be undertaken to render them into corollaries corresponding to
+concrete histories would very shortly bring him to confusion. Should
+he, again, confine himself to the definite chemical factors existent in
+the primordial nebulæ, then his deductive attempt would bring him to the
+impassable gulf at the commencement of life. And, moreover, should he
+import the factor of sentiency into some simple chemical aggregates, and
+should he be able to set forth some gradual development of mind in
+correlation with gradual changes of physical organism, then again in the
+absence of any knowledge as to the relations of the two he would find
+himself unable to work out the deductive process and fail in the system
+of _à priori_ explanations which philosophy requires. For philosophy,
+according to Mr. Spencer, demands a deductive process commencing with
+the apprehension of the relations subsisting between the factors of the
+universe at some particular stage, which deductive process shall be a
+counterpart of the actual histories of the universe.
+
+Such deductive explanations Mr. Spencer does attempt--mainly in the
+Biology--the most important as to results, and the most badly reasoned
+of all his works. It is attempted firstly in a very concrete manner, by
+a consideration of the properties of the chemical substances which form
+the bases of organisms, and of the properties of the surrounding
+agencies--light, heat, air, water, etc. To the inter-relation of these
+are applied the laws of mechanics, such as movement in the direction of
+least resistance, etc., and by their instrumentality at last are
+organisms supposed to be evolved which have, somehow, a concomitant of
+consciousness which is nevertheless not a factor in any action of an
+organism. In such a history however, it is found necessary to admit
+genesis, reproduction, and heredity, and these, since they cannot be
+explained, are accepted without explanation.
+
+It is true that Polarity is called in to assist the endeavour, but it is
+a polarity which is the obedient servant of the author, and does as it
+is bid, firstly in being so amenable to changed conditions as to alter
+conformably with them, and again in being so rigid in its acquired form
+as to coerce molecules into definite construction. It is alternately so
+pliable and so fixed as, hand over hand, to enable the author to scale
+the highest summits of Biology. It is also true that Equilibration is
+called in: but then every change in the organic and the inorganic world
+turns out to be an equilibration, so that the word becomes devoid of
+meaning.
+
+A more special study has to be given to Mr. Spencer's theory of the
+moving equilibrium with which he identifies the existence of an
+organism, and by means of which he is supposed to bridge over the chasm
+between it and the inorganic. The idea is derived from a consideration
+of the spinning top, the solar system, and the steam engine, more
+particularly if the latter is self-feeding! These are moving equilibria,
+and if their motions are disturbed by some external object they will
+generate forces in opposition to the environment. This purely mechanical
+conception is then rendered into an abstract form by the substitution of
+the idea of related _forces_, as constituting a moving equilibrium, and
+is found to fit the abstract conception of an organism, so that the
+solar system and the organism can both be identified as moving
+equilibria. Next, by loosely characterising the behaviour of the solar
+system in its relation to its environment, real or hypothetical, as
+consisting of changes due to the laws of a moving equilibrium, Mr.
+Spencer seeks to show that the adaptations of an organism in response to
+changed external conditions are likewise due to the same laws, so that
+organisms and their histories are supposed to be explainable or
+accounted for both in their origin and in their development in the same
+manner as the moving equilibria of the physical world. Thereupon we are
+supposed to understand both why organisms generate forces to
+counterbalance inimical external forces, and why they generate forces
+(adaptations) for securing and absorbing forces of the environment
+(food) favourable to their continued existence. It is only what all
+moving equilibria do. This biological theory we have discussed at great
+length elsewhere,[5] and we then came to the conclusion that it was only
+a mockery of a rational explanation. We also found that the facts of
+Genesis and the Law of Heredity were wholly inexplicable by means of a
+study of physics or by means of a study of the nature and laws of the
+moving equilibrium. So that altogether we found the main requirements of
+a philosophical explanation of biological facts very far from being
+complied with.
+
+As part of the deductive system which our philosophy requires, we have
+now to consider the origin and development of purposed actions--the
+subject-matter, namely, of our present study which is to lead us up to
+the ultimate study of Ethics proper.
+
+Resuming the consideration of the problem at the point where we left off
+in our reference to the explanations of biology, we have first to review
+the arguments which would explain the origin of purposed actions in the
+nature and laws of the moving equilibrium. For if the actions of
+organisms are thus explainable, so must be the purposed actions or
+purposed conduct of organisms, and Mr. Spencer himself expressly
+includes them in the biological definition. And indeed it is doubtful
+whether "purpose" is not covertly introduced in the very definition of
+life as "the continuous adaptation of inner relations to outer
+relations."
+
+The question is a very nice one, and brings us at once to the obscure
+confines of the organic and the inorganic worlds. How, for instance,
+from the laws of the moving equilibrium, as derived from the study of
+the solar system, are we to regard the movements of an infusorium? "An
+infusorium swims randomly about, determined in its course not by a
+perceived object to be pursued or escaped, but, apparently, by varying
+stimuli in its medium; and its acts unadjusted in any appreciable way to
+ends, lead it now into contact with some nutritive substance which it
+absorbs, and now into the neighbourhood of some creature by which it is
+swallowed and digested.... The conduct is constituted of actions so
+little adjusted to ends, that life continues only as long as the
+accidents of the environment are favourable."[6]
+
+This is one of Mr. Spencer's transitional passages. The infusorium is a
+moving equilibrium. Consequently it rearranges its forces for
+self-preservation in opposition to inimical forces of the environment,
+and in harmony with favoring forces of the environment. The special
+adjustment it displays is motion. But this is not communicated motion of
+a mechanical description, such as the kick given to a foot-ball. Nor,
+apparently, are we to regard its motions as due to a series of
+mechanical motions of the molecules of the environment. The action of
+the environment is expressed as being a stimulus. Does this mean a
+chemical action? Or does it refer to the action of heat and light? If so
+it means that the attractions and repulsions of atoms and the motions of
+ether and of molecules, account for the movements of the infusorium.
+There is certainly no "purpose" in such a theory. But then the question
+arises, how do we apply the theory of the moving equilibrium to such an
+assemblage of atoms thus acted upon to account for the fact that the
+assemblage of atoms endeavours to prolong its existence by defence and
+absorption or by absorption only? If it be said that it does not do so,
+and that its movements have no food object, but are simply the effect of
+chemical and mechanical action, then it is not an animal displaying
+life, inasmuch as it does not adapt means to an end--motions to the end
+of sustenance. If it be regarded as a moving equilibrium in this sense,
+it is one of the same sort as the solar system, and not one of the sort
+known as animals. Nevertheless, Mr. Spencer regards it as displaying
+life, yet very little adjusted to ends; but again he regards its actions
+as determined by external stimuli, without, however, explaining his
+meaning.
+
+If we are to regard the motions of the infusorium as displaying life, it
+must be by regarding them as adaptations of inner relations to outer
+relations--the outer relations being food; but if its actions are merely
+chemically and mechanically determined, then its conduct is not adapted
+to or balanced against the action of any external relations, but is the
+submissive consequent thereof. But if its conduct is altogether
+determined by external relations we seem to be landed in a paradox. The
+only escape is by the obvious inference that the definition of life
+advanced by Mr. Spencer always implies an adaptation or adjustment or
+action having the definite twofold object in view of sustenance and
+self-protection employed _against_ the inimical forces of the
+environment. Life adaptations are always for the accomplishment of the
+end of self-preservation, either by the procuring of food, or by defence
+against enemies--self-preservation primarily and afterwards the
+continuation of the race. Therefore, if we regard the movements of the
+infusoria as included in the definition of life we must regard them as
+having in view the sustenance of the creatures. They are acts adapted to
+ends. Are they then to be regarded as purposed actions? Life adaptations
+seem to be distinguished from the changes wrought by external forces
+upon a physical moving equilibrium in the fact, namely, that they act
+towards a definite end, and therefore come into the class of purposed
+actions. We cannot do more than indicate the difficulty. If we say these
+actions are not purposed we allow that there may be purposed adaptation
+of means to ends by chemistry and mechanics. If we say that chemistry
+and mechanics do this, then we have to revise our meaning of chemistry
+and mechanics, and that in a much more thorough manner than Mr. Spencer
+has done in his treatment of the moving equilibrium.
+
+That there are biological adjustments which do not manifest purpose we
+experience every day in the thickening of the skin and the changes
+wrought by climate or daily avocation, although it is true these
+adjustments may receive a scientific explanation independently of their
+being adaptations of means to ends. We also find that there are reflex
+actions of organisms which take place in response to external stimuli
+without any conscious purpose, such as breathing, digesting, &c. We are
+also acquainted with the fact that purposed actions become by long habit
+automatic. Indeed we have more experience of purposed actions becoming
+automatic than of automatic or reflex actions becoming purposed.
+
+Can there then be purpose without consciousness? There are adaptations
+in the vegetable world as well as in the animal, and of these we do not
+predicate conscious design. Nor can we, on the theory of life as the
+adaptation of a moving equilibrium to its environment, admit that these
+changes are due to mere happy accidents of origin and survival, for we
+are required to account for them as necessary results of their existence
+as moving equilibria. Yet if so the adjustments are so complex, so
+marvellous in their relations to the insect world and the animal world
+generally in view of their preservation and the propagation of their
+species, that purpose or means adapted to ends is the apparent
+characteristic. Means adapted to ends is denied in the "Happy Accident"
+theory, and is sought to be explained by the "Moving Equilibrium"
+theory. Yet when we come to consider the abstract conception of a moving
+equilibrium derived from our solar system we can discern no endeavour
+towards self-sustenance and self defence. No adaptations are there made
+to secure either of these objects. There is no purpose manifested, and
+no adjustment made in view of ends to be secured. On the other hand,
+there are many adaptations in the animal and vegetable worlds which are
+not consciously purposed. Since, however, ours is a critical task and
+not a reconstructive work we need do no more than point out that
+purposed actions in particular, and biological adaptations as a whole,
+are not explainable by regarding organisms as aggregates of the chemical
+elements acted upon by physical forces and constituting merely physical
+moving equilibria, of which the laws are similar to those derived from a
+consideration of moving equilibria like the solar system. Such a theory
+does not admit of purposed action.
+
+Stated in the abstract, the problem is how to explain the origin of
+purpose in a moving equilibrium--commencing from the solar system and
+proceeding to a self-feeding engine and pursuing our investigation to
+the abstract moving equilibrium of forces in which external inimical or
+favourable forces generate internal forces as a counterbalance, either
+of opposition or harmony of adjustment. Thus stated, the problem is
+purely of a dynamic nature, and would give an understanding of purpose
+as a dynamic relation of aggregates of forces. This is the true
+Spencerian view to take of the problem and its mode of settlement, but
+it is one to which Mr. Spencer does not apply himself. In the absence of
+such a study Mr. Spencer forsakes the true line of explanation required
+by his philosophy.
+
+But we think if we proceed more deeply into this study we shall find
+purpose connected with consciousness. The question arises, must all
+purpose be conscious purpose? Purpose implies the direction of action,
+it implies an interval of time, it implies the accomplishment of a
+result. In these respects it differs from chemical and mechanical
+action. We have to ask what place consciousness finds in the
+constitution and action of a moving equilibrium. Evidently it has no
+place in the solar system, for physicists can make their calculations
+without taking it into consideration as a factor. Yet the ideal or
+abstract moving equilibrium, by whose aid we are endeavouring to
+understand the actions of organisms, is derived from the consideration
+of the solar system as a moving equilibrium. But reducing the problem
+from the abstract to the concrete study of an organism, we have to ask
+what place consciousness holds in a moving equilibrium of oxygen,
+nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen, etc., in relation with an environment of
+heat, light, etc. We find that it is in the main a factor in all those
+classes of actions which we term purposed--that in so far as actions
+depart from the chemical and mechanical, that in so far as aggregates
+manifest the characteristics of life--namely, the adaptation of inner
+relations to outer relations--the nearer do they approach the most
+complete adaptation of means to the ends of complete living, and the
+more do they manifest conscious purpose.
+
+The theory has been propounded that consciousness is the result of
+complexity in the combination of the chemical elements, a complexity
+which can be explained on purely physical grounds. Mr. Spencer's biology
+is partly worked so as to prove this theory. But it is evident that no
+more can be got out of a deductive theory than is contained in the
+original factors. It is useless to say that we do not sufficiently know
+all the properties of the original factors, because that is to abandon
+this particular theory, and to acknowledge its inadequacy. The admission
+necessitates an attempt to re-state the original forces of the factors.
+If this can be done it is equivalent to propounding a new theory, which
+again must be judged by its deductive efficacy.
+
+The theory that complexity of nervous structure--a structure produced by
+chemical and mechanical combination--suffices to explain memory,
+reflection, judgment, choice, and purpose, has been treated by Dr. Bain
+and Professor Clifford at considerable length, and has been criticised
+in our former works in great detail.[7]
+
+The theory that organisms are the result of chemical and mechanical
+combinations, and that consciousness is a concomitant of some processes
+in the continuous existence of such physical combinations, throws all
+the burthen of explanation just as fully upon the line of physical
+causation as if there were no such concomitant of consciousness
+whatsoever. The determining causes are wholly physical, and the chain of
+sequence is complete within the lines of chemical and mechanical
+relations. The fact that independent and concomitant consciousness
+accompanies some of the actions in question is an interesting
+circumstance, but although consciousness is produced as an effect, it
+never on this theory produces any effects itself.
+
+The attempt to amend the conceptions of the original chemical factors
+(the sixty or seventy so-called elements,) and of the physical factors
+(heat, light, etc.,) by the association with them of mind, feeling,
+etc., has at various times produced vague theories. More particularly of
+later years Professor Clifford's theory of mind-stuff has attracted a
+great deal of attention. But, singular to say, Professor Clifford only
+endeavoured to work out his theory in some vague semi-mechanical,
+semi-subjective kind of way. It was not of such a sort that, given a
+nebula such as we supposed to be the predecessor of the solar system, we
+should be able to deduce from it the existing universe. The proper
+statement of such a problem would be a statement of the relations not
+merely of mind-stuff, but of mind-oxygen, mind-nitrogen, etc. The
+conception would have to be of such a nature as to express the
+mind-factor, mental side, or subjective aspect of oxygen, as related to
+the mind-factor of nitrogen, etc., and how they variously affected the
+conduct of the doubly-constituted atoms or of the more complex molecules
+into which they formed themselves. But this is a mere indication of the
+larger task of estimating the whole of the elementary substances, and
+estimating the value and the action of their relative mind-factors. From
+this would have to be determined the law of growth by which increasing
+complexity evolved the continually increasing power of the mind-factor
+in determining actions. Upon this might rest a rational basis for a
+definition of life of such sort that the organic could be recognised as
+arising out of the inorganic. And since the organic, in its latest and
+highest development, is mainly distinguished by purposed actions,
+purposed actions might be deemed to have evolved in a natural way out of
+actions which were not purposed. But such a theory is not capable of
+definite statement, and our philosophic object in endeavouring to
+account for the origin of purposed action out of non-purposed action is
+as far off as ever.
+
+It might be as well here for the full satisfaction of the student, to
+consider how far the origin of purposed action is taken account of by
+Mr. Darwin, or is to be accounted for by his methods. There is a wide
+distinction between Mr. Spencer's treatment of Biology and that of Mr.
+Darwin. Mr. Spencer aims at a complete logical deductive system, and
+endeavours to show how in the very nature of things, everything that is,
+must have been what it is. Mr. Darwin's endeavour is not so ambitious.
+He confines his studies to the field of biology, and to past histories
+of living creatures, as preserved for us in the geological record. His
+is a purely scientific work, not trespassing beyond the generalisation
+of the facts with which he deals. These are large and immensely
+important; so much so, that they cover the whole history of living
+things: but his explanations only go a certain way. They are not
+fundamental, and we are only led backwards in time to the original
+twilight and ultimate darkness. His theory is strictly causational. The
+explanation of existing organisms is to be found in the relations of
+antecedent factors. Part of these we understand, and part of them we do
+not understand. We do not understand the wherefore of genesis and
+heredity, but we know them to be facts, and they form the basis for
+large explanations. For if organisms are modifiable, ever-increasing
+changes of structure and function can be produced and reproduced. The
+increment of induced changes in various directions may in succeeding
+generations be such as to obliterate all semblance of relationship to
+the original ancestor. What are the laws of these changes it is Mr.
+Darwin's great achievement to have explained. The struggle for
+existence, the survival of the fittest, the adaptation to new
+environments by the use and disuse of parts, the changes induced by
+change of climate and food, or by the action of new organisms in the
+environment, all these considerations open out to the astonished and
+admiring gaze of man vast and interesting histories of changes such as
+a discerning mind like Mr. Grant Allen revels in in his rambles through
+the English fields.
+
+The question arises how far Mr. Darwin's theories can be extended
+philosophically, so as to explain what he accepts unexplained, viz.:
+genesis, heredity, the origin of organisms out of the inorganic, the
+gradual development of consciousness, the increase of feeling and
+intelligence, and the advent of purposed conduct directed to the
+achievement of definite and deferred ends? For all these points he
+leaves undealt with as not coming within his scientific province.
+Evidently his theories are not fitted to explain what they take for
+granted. They cannot explain what they are founded upon. The origin of
+organisms is unexplained: propagation of the species is accepted as an
+unexplained fact, so are heredity and the presence of consciousness.
+Purposed actions are not accounted for in Mr. Darwin's works.
+
+But there is one point to which we wish to call attention as regards the
+different method in which the changes of species are treated by Mr.
+Spencer and Mr. Darwin. The former regards all changes as necessitated
+by the laws of the moving equilibrium, so that a change of climate of
+such a nature as to deprive an organism of the requisite moisture for
+continued existence through a long period of time, would absolutely
+necessitate some device on its part to counterbalance the external force
+of drought. It would be a consequent in the very nature of things that
+the plant should become thick and succulent like the cactus, or that the
+animal should form for itself a reservoir for the storage of water.
+
+Mr. Darwin's theory is very different. He advances the fact that
+organisms, and more particularly those of the lower and simpler forms
+constantly produce "sports." These are not chance accidents in the false
+metaphysical sense of being uncaused, but are termed accidents as being
+produced by some external or internal incident in the growth of the
+embryo, which causes it to deviate in some point from the structure of
+the parent. This "sport" may be to the advantage or to the detriment of
+the new organism. If it should be the latter, it soon perishes: but if
+it should assist the organism to a fuller life, then it will live longer
+and better, and its progeny will in like manner survive to the detriment
+of its fellows of the unimproved type. The accretion of changes produced
+in this way, now in one direction, and now in another, together with the
+influences elsewhere indicated, might do and no doubt has done much in
+the development of species.
+
+To this cause of change we give in no disrespectful spirit, the name of
+the "Happy Accident Theory" as opposed to Mr. Spencer's "Moving
+Equilibrium Theory," and would ask what it may and may not account for.
+It may account for much within the limits of Mr. Darwin's enquiry, but
+does it at all account for those fundamental facts which he takes for
+granted--genesis, heredity and consciousness, or the origin of the
+organic out of the inorganic. Could some inorganic aggregate, produced
+by the relations of certain chemical compounds under the action of
+light, heat, &c, accidentally take to generation by fission or
+otherwise, and then by a succession of sports eventuate in sexual
+generation? Could such a chemical combination accidentally become
+conscious, and by a succession of sports organise its consciousness
+into purpose? Into these regions we think we cannot carry the Happy
+Accident Theory--the theory of sports. This is a valid and justifiable
+theory within the limits of biology, though even here the estimate of
+its results may be exaggerated; but beyond it and behind those limits it
+is of no use. The very admission of it is a confession of ignorance and
+incapacity to apprehend the exact line of causation; but so long as we
+are satisfied that the accident or the sport which gives rise to a
+variety, occurs within the scope of factors which we are able to
+recognise, the incapacity to account for the special cause of a special
+sport does not affect the general theory. But if any one should rashly
+extend the application of the theory so as to explain the otherwise
+unaccountable presence of a new factor, or advance it as an explanation
+of a line of sequences not logically deducible from all that is included
+in the mental appraisement of the original factors by which the system
+of sequences is to be unified, then he makes a very great mistake
+indeed.
+
+It is to guard against such a mistake that we take notice of the proper
+limits to the applicability of Mr. Darwin's theory. Indeed we think it
+is too commonly supposed that Mr. Darwin's theory is of the
+universalistic scope of Mr. Spencer's theories; his work however is
+purely of a scientific character relating to the province of Biology.
+
+It will have been noticed that in the preceding argument we have not
+dealt with the philosophical problem of the theory of knowledge. We have
+simply taken the study of the cosmos in the historical order, finding
+the inorganic as antecedent to the organic, the unconscious to the
+conscious, a historical order which cannot be disputed whatever theory
+of knowledge may be held.
+
+We conclude therefore that in so far as the Data of Ethics is an attempt
+to explain purposed actions and their ethical quality upon a
+philosophical method of the kind propounded by Mr. Spencer, namely, as
+included in a proper understanding of the cosmical process, and of the
+histories of the universe consequent upon a knowledge of the relations
+of its original factors--so far Mr. Spencer's work must be considered a
+failure. That there is much of real scientific value in the work under
+review, and much original insight and true apprehension of process, we
+hold to be true; but this scientific value is much obscured by the vague
+cosmical references which pervade an otherwise admirable study. As
+stated at the outset of the chapter, we consider the attempt to
+affiliate purposed actions upon the general lines of the cosmical
+process to mar the effect of the work in its scientific aspect. The
+fault is all the greater since Mr. Spencer rests the full stress of his
+theories, not so much upon their limited scientific value, as upon the
+soundness of the philosophic basis. For twenty years or more he has been
+working from this basis, and in the course of his marvellous work has
+had ever in view as his crowning achievement the establishment of Ethics
+upon a cosmical basis through a cosmical process of which it should be
+the glorious outcome. Ethics should be shown to be dominant and
+imperative through the voice of the expanding universe. Yet, except as
+showing Ethics to be a part of the study of Biology, the general laws of
+the development of which are known, but which in its factors and their
+relations and origin is utterly unknown, he has not succeeded. He
+might, with the exception indicated, just as well have written his "Data
+of Ethics" first as last.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[2] Data of Ethics, pp. 5 and 6.
+
+[3] Data of Ethics, p. 61.
+
+[4] See "On Mr. Spencer's Unification of Knowledge," Chap. I., ¶ 1, and
+Chap. III, ¶ 4.
+
+[5] On Mr. Spencer's "Unification of Knowledge," Chap. V.
+
+[6] Data of Ethics, p. 10.
+
+[7] On Mr. Spencer's "Unification of Knowledge," p. 231, _et seq._; and
+see Dr. Bain's reply in "Mind," No. xxxi.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+THE SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF ETHICS.
+
+
+Modern thought since the publication of the "Origin of Species," has
+been more and more forced into the recognition of ethics, (together with
+all other forms of human conduct) as the result of a process of natural
+growth. The factors out of which this growth arose are lost in the
+obscurities of our ignorance, and many of the processes upon which it
+has depended also surpass existing human powers of explanation. Science
+has to take for granted the unexplained existence of organisms. For her
+purposes she is obliged to begin by assuming certain primitive organisms
+of some simple structure and functions. She is also obliged to admit,
+although she does not understand, the facts of reproduction and of
+heredity. Nor can she refuse to acknowledge a place in the history of
+development, along with the factors of chemistry and of physics, to a
+subjective factor called feeling, consciousness, mind, or however else
+it may be best expressed. All these unexplainable but fundamental
+verities of existence she has to assume. It is because these are
+unexplained that science falls short of becoming a philosophy. But
+within the range of their operation science can tell us much, and the
+Darwinian doctrines have displayed before our eyes the wonderful
+histories of change and growth through the preceding cycles of the
+world's existence. Little doubt now remains in the minds of thoughtful
+men as to the truth of biological development. The theory rests upon
+such a wide induction of facts extending over so many branches of
+science and over such remote periods of time, and withal as by a stroke
+of magic it has so arranged all sorts of odd incomprehensible facts into
+definite places in a well ordered organic history, that the mind can no
+longer withhold its subjection to so imperial and cogent a scientific
+conception.
+
+Although the philosophical laws of biological development are as we have
+seen beyond our reach, and although our theory of the accidental origin
+of variations is rather lame, still there is much that can be expressed
+in the formal statements called the Laws of Biological Development,
+which throws light upon those processes of change and growth that have
+led up from simple organic forms to the highest manifestation of life in
+the human race. Mr. Spencer defines life as "the continuous adjustment
+of inner relations to outer relations." This Mr. Spencer regards not
+merely as a definition but as a law. Its philosophical justification is
+sought in vain, but it may be accepted as a correct scientific
+statement--not only of the non-conscious adaptations of organisms to
+changes of the environment, (such as the thickening of the fur to resist
+arctic cold, or protective change of colour to imitate physical
+surroundings,) but also of the conscious adaptations by which higher
+animals perform particular actions or undergo changes of habit.
+
+As Mr. Spencer points out, the acceptance of this law implies not merely
+an entire harmony between the existence of an organism and its
+environment, but it also implies various degrees of life. The greater
+the number and variety of correspondences established between an
+organism and the immensities of the external world--immensities
+displayed not only in the multiplicities of individual objects, but also
+in the grandeur of their collective interrelations--the greater the
+degree of life. Much stress is laid by Mr. Spencer upon this
+Quantitative character of Life. Much more, indeed, than upon mere
+continuity, although the latter is to a certain extent essential to the
+former. Subordinate to this notion, advance in degree of life is found
+to proceed from a simple, incoherent, and indefinite life to a more and
+more definite, coherent and complex set of relations with the
+environment.
+
+But side by side with this development, and indeed in a manner to be
+likened to that of a geometrical progression, the subjective factor has
+advanced in relative importance. In its more rudimentary development,
+Mr. Spencer finds pain to be the concomitant of those states of the
+physical organism which tend to its destruction, and pleasure to be the
+concomitant of those states which tend to its promotion. Thus hunger is
+a pain indicative of the absence of those supplies of energy to be
+obtained from the environment, which are requisite for the continuance
+of the organism's activity, while the pleasure of feeding is concomitant
+with the due supply of the energy necessary for the continuance of
+organic function. Pleasure and pain, therefore, become motives, and the
+attainment of the one and the avoidance of the other work together for
+the continuance of life. Pleasures and pains are relative to the
+organism--according to the physiological constitution and structure of
+the organism so are its pleasures and its pains.
+
+The concomitant of some of the structures and functions of the organism
+has been not merely sentiency but perception. Mind has developed from
+the distinguishment, identification, and recognition of modes of
+sentiency. These functions and structures have been accompanied by
+pleasure and pain, and have formed the basis of the pleasures of
+intellectual activity in their multiform variety. From their very nature
+in relation to the environment they have increased wonderfully the
+quantitative development of life.
+
+With the increase of mind has proceeded the recognition of the part
+played in the organic universe by feeling. This recognition of the
+existence of feeling--of the susceptibilities of external organisms to
+pleasure and pain--has formed the basis of a large part of the
+adaptations of organisms in relation to their organic environment.
+Adaptations revealing this recognition are to be seen not only more
+manifestly in the actions of man and the animals, but also in the
+functions of plants, strange as this may seem.
+
+With this increase of general intelligence has proceeded an increase of
+rational knowledge of the causal relationships of phenomena: and with
+the increase of the knowledge of human motives has proceeded an
+increased knowledge of the sequences of actions. Thus larger rational
+judgments of the consequences of actions have been attained.
+
+Following upon the increased recognition of pleasure and pain as
+motives, and upon the increased amount of rational judgment as to the
+sequences of actions, has come the adaptation of conduct to the pains
+and pleasures of others. Those adaptations have, however, been relative
+to the particular constitution of the Ego, and relative also to the
+constitution of the environing Egos.
+
+The knowledge of the existence of sentiency in external organisms may be
+turned to the account of the Ego by inflicting pain, so as to coerce
+other sentient organisms to its own selfish objects; or, again, by
+conferring pleasure, so as to subserve the same end. Thus cruelty may be
+a natural pleasure in certain early stages of development, as a
+concomitant of necessities of existence, and may remain by inheritance
+long after the necessities have passed away. But with the increase of
+life has occurred the increase of sympathy. It is a law of nature that
+after the pleasures of the ego are satisfied they are augmented by the
+contemplation of similar enjoyments of others. But this again is
+relative. The gourmand likes the society of gourmands, and cares not for
+the company of the æsthetic or the ascetic. The man of taste revels in
+the society of kindred natures and despises the pleasures of the base.
+But the family relation has been the main source of all sweet and manly
+sympathies: and it has been the gradually widening scope of social
+organisations which has spread more and more the feeling of human
+sympathy. The course of history exhibits to us a constant growth, not
+merely in passively refraining from the infliction of pain, but also in
+the active endeavour to promote the happiness of our fellow creatures.
+
+This is a general statement of the scientific view of purposed conduct.
+Its laws are derived from a study of its growth. The growth is one
+exhibiting several distinguishable features. There has been the ordinary
+biological "struggle for existence," and "survival of the fittest."
+There have been adaptations necessitated by the action of the
+environment, and there have been chance variations within the lines of
+causation which, benefitting the individual or some particular race,
+have given them such an advantage in the battle of life as to secure for
+their descendants a preponderating possession of the good things of the
+world. There has been the increase of intelligence, the increase in the
+organisation of society, the increase of rational judgments of phenomena
+and human actions. There has been increased knowledge of the
+determination of actions by motives. There has been increase of
+sympathy.
+
+But what is the ethical virtue of this historical study is not very
+clear. The history of human developments is a matter of natural history
+and no more. And even if we proceed as we might do, to study more in
+detail the history of the development of notions of right and wrong and
+of the various changeful applications of those terms, we are still
+within the limits of a natural history--we are still holding the merely
+scientific or observant attitude. It is true such study may be essential
+to our future history: but the mere study of what has been, and the
+consequent pre-vision of what will be, establishes no rule of right. To
+prophecy the determining courses of future human conduct does not
+furnish an ethical imperative to the individual. "If so it will be," he
+may say, "so let it be, it is no affair of mine. The obligation rests
+with nature and not with me." Whence then the new "regulative system,"
+the want of which fills Mr. Spencer with alarm? Where shall we look for
+the new gospel which shall restrain and vivify the moral conduct of
+future generations in place of the supernatural systems which are
+supposed to be tottering to their fall?
+
+And if we go beyond this and find that this natural history of man is
+governed by general laws of adaptation and development we shall still
+have to question the ethical discernment and ethical authority in
+special junctures, when what is--is judged not to be what it ought to
+be; when, in fact, adaptations or biological facts, or equilibrations
+produced by evolution, are judged not to be ethically good
+equilibrations.
+
+However, Mr. Spencer holds that rules of right conduct can be
+established on a scientific basis, and it is our task to examine his
+treatment of the problem.
+
+"Though this first division of the work terminating the Synthetic
+Philosophy, cannot, of course, contain the specific conclusions to be
+set forth in the entire work; yet it implies them in such wise that,
+definitely to formulate them requires nothing beyond logical deduction.
+
+"I am the more anxious to indicate in outline if I cannot complete this
+final work, because the establishment of rules of right conduct on a
+scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that moral injunctions are
+losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the
+secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen
+more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system, no
+longer fit, before another and fitter regulative system has grown up to
+replace it. Most of those who reject the current creeds, appear to
+assume that the controlling agency furnished by it may be safely thrown
+aside, and the vacancy left unfilled by any other controlling agency.
+Meanwhile, those who defend the current creeds allege that in the
+absence of the guidance it yields, no guidance can exist; divine
+commandments they think the only possible guides. Thus between these
+extreme opponents there is a certain community. The one holds that the
+gap left by disappearance of the code of supernatural ethics, need not
+be filled by a code of natural ethics; and the other holds that it
+cannot be so filled. Both contemplate a vacuum which the one wishes and
+the other fears. As the change which promises or threatens to bring
+about this state, desired or dreaded, is rapidly progressing, those who
+believe that the vacuum can be filled, are called on to do something in
+pursuance of their belief."[8]
+
+It is clear, from the above passage, that Mr. Spencer seeks not merely a
+knowledge of the laws of past developments, which have landed us in our
+present position with regard to moral obligation in general and the
+varied social regulations extant in different societies, but he seeks in
+addition to strengthen and establish on a new basis the authority of all
+such obligations. What Mr. Spencer hopes for is a practical end. He
+seeks the art of good living. As there are sciences of chemistry,
+metallurgy, electricity, etc., and arts consequent upon them, so he
+looks for Rules of Life which shall benefit humanity, consequent upon
+the Science of Humanity. But it is a question whether the Moral
+Imperative can be regarded as the result of science. However, if not the
+result, yet science may be able to discern that the Moral Imperative is
+so firmly established in human nature, that it may be able to proclaim
+loudly its empire in the heart and over the actions of man; while at the
+same time Science may be able to guide it to wiser and better judgments.
+
+The task we have before us is to pursue Mr. Spencer's course of
+thought, undertaken in this spirit, through the succeeding chapters of
+his work. Neglecting minor criticisms and passing over much valuable
+teaching, our business is to follow the main course of his reasoning and
+examine the chief grounds for such authority and guidance which he
+finally presents to us as the outcome of his study.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[8] Introduction to "Data of Ethics," p. 3.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW OF ETHICS.
+
+
+We shall best arrive at an adequate estimate of Mr. Spencer's ethical
+system by studying first what he terms the biological view of ethics.
+But to do this properly requires a survey not only of Chapter VI., which
+bears this title, but also of the following chapter, which deals with
+the psychological view. We hold that Mr. Spencer, in this division of
+his subject into separate stages, makes a false arrangement of his
+studies. For as on the one hand he endeavours to include the study of
+biology as a branch of physics, on the other hand he treats it as
+incapable of comprehensive developmental study apart from the factors of
+feeling and mind. These divisions are marked features of the form into
+which Mr. Spencer has thrown his study of human conduct, but they do not
+correspond with his actual treatment of the subject. The course of
+thought cannot be fitted into the formal outline. It is found that the
+understanding of biology is as dependent upon a knowledge of psychology
+as it is upon a knowledge of physics. The sequence of dependent stages
+as set forth does not hold good. The conduct of animal and perhaps
+vegetable organisms is not explicable as the action of mere physical
+aggregates, and is little understood without the admission of a
+subjective factor of feeling or mind. It is all very well for Mr.
+Spencer to argue, as he does in Chapter V., on the "Physical View," that
+since all conduct is objectively physical action it may be separately
+studied from the physical point of view; but since the actions of
+organisms are not to be explained within the limits of physical laws
+this is a very useless reminder, and Mr. Spencer himself makes nothing
+of the study since he cannot work out the line of causation in terms of
+the physical factors only. On the other hand we find that our author has
+not proceeded three pages into the biological view before he introduces
+the subjective factors of Pleasure and Pain, which he eventually
+establishes not merely as the accompaniments of life-sustaining and
+life-diminishing acts, but even as the causes of further actions which
+shall at the same time tend to secure Pleasure and avoid Pain, and thus
+sustain the organism in a continuance of existence. Only for three pages
+can the purely biological view of animal organisms as physical moving
+equilibria be maintained; and then with section 32 comes the
+introduction of subjective factors--factors which are treated not merely
+as the concomitants of physical processes conducted wholly within and
+according to the laws of physical sequence, but as actual factors
+interfering with and affecting the line of causation. It is true Mr.
+Spencer recognises and deals with the difficulty which obviously arises
+as to the separability of the psychological view from a biological view
+which admits the factors of Pleasure and Pain. But the distinction he
+makes, while justifiable, does not deal with the fundamental difficulty.
+Psychology treats, roughly speaking, of mentality; it comprises a study
+of the establishment of sets of inner relations, (_i.e._, associations
+of thought, relations of ideas, relations of sequences, the powers of
+remembrance, of discrimination and identification,) with sets of
+external relations, namely, the actual existences of which the inner
+relations are the representatives. The establishment of such inner
+relations corresponding to outer relations and their widening growth,
+must have a marked influence upon human conduct so that it may very well
+be separated for convenience of study from the earlier forms of organic
+conduct, in which such action is little recognisable. But how to form
+the connective law is the difficulty. Moreover, it is one thing to
+establish the fact of evolution, and another thing to explain it. We
+ourselves admit the fact, indeed, but search in vain for the
+explanation.
+
+Are we to look for the origin of Pleasure and Pain in those laws of the
+moving equilibrium which necessitate the generation of internal forces
+equal and in opposition to external inimical forces? If so, Pleasure and
+Pain must be regarded as forces--as factors--in the organism, and we
+must regard the subjective as generated by external physical factors
+operating upon internal physical factors, and we must regard these
+subjective factors not merely as concomitant, but as producing physical
+effects by way of reaction.
+
+So far as it goes there may be a physical view of purposed conduct, and
+so far as it goes there may be a psychological view, but between the two
+the biological view is a mere disorderly mixture, borrowing its terms
+first on one hand and then on the other, and assigning its determining
+causes first to the physical moving equilibrium theory, and then again
+to the anticipation of Pleasure and Pain. But the biological law which
+should co-ordinate these two sets of laws is not formulated, and hence
+we find more or less gliding, or more or less sudden transition from one
+set of terms or laws to the other, a defect which is concealed in some
+measure by the formal divisions of the chapters. But if the course of
+thought is carefully followed it is found that the actual treatment does
+not properly fit in. There is an unmistakeable transition from the
+purely physical set of factors to the purely subjective, and there is no
+co-ordinated biological law at all. The chapter is a transitional one,
+it is true, but only in the sense of gradually leaving off the
+employment of one set of terms, and the gradual employment of another
+set of terms in the treatment of the same phenomena.
+
+Mr. Spencer argues well in Chapter V. as to the concomitance of
+pleasure-giving acts with life-sustaining acts, and of pain-giving acts
+with decrease of life; but which is prior in the chain of causation? Or,
+to repeat the old difficulty, is the subjective factor present in the
+line of causation at all? Is it merely a concomitant of the physical
+line of events?
+
+Mr. Spencer proposes to deal with feelings and functions in their mutual
+dependence,[9] and so admits the subjective as a factor. Thus there are
+feelings which are sensations and serve partly as guides and partly as
+stimuli towards actions for the sustenance and preservation of life.
+And there are feelings which are classed as emotions which also act in a
+very potent way as guides and stimuli, such as fear and joy. Hence, in
+treating of conduct under its biological aspect we are compelled to
+consider that inter-action of feelings and functions which is essential
+to animal life in all its more developed forms.[10]
+
+Following upon this we are taught that Pleasure is a feeling which we
+seek to bring into consciousness, and Pain a feeling which we seek to
+keep out of consciousness. This certainly accords to the subjective
+factor a commanding position in the physical action of organisms; it
+also implies a foresight of the results of actions, and a certain degree
+of advance in psychology but throws no light upon the lower stages of
+biological action. Mr. Spencer says, however, that "fit connections
+between acts and results must establish themselves in living things even
+before consciousness arises." This is followed by an interesting study
+of the proposition that "after the rise of consciousness these
+connections can change in no other way than to become better
+established," and that "whenever sentiency makes its appearance as an
+accompaniment, its forms must be such that in the one case the produced
+feeling is of a kind that will be sought--Pleasure, and in the other
+case is of a kind that will be shunned--Pain." "It is an inevitable
+deduction from the hypothesis of evolution that races of sentient
+creatures could have come into existence under no other conditions" than
+that "pains are the correlatives of actions injurious to the organism,
+while pleasures are the correlatives of actions conducive to its
+welfare."
+
+All this may be admitted, granted the existence of the subjective
+factor; but at what stage does it commence to have such a potent
+influence upon the development of organisms, and whence came it at all?
+Mr. Spencer says, "fit connections between acts and results must
+establish themselves in living things even before consciousness arises."
+"At the very outset life is maintained by persistence in acts which
+conduce to it, and desistance from acts which impede it." It would seem
+that if life can be maintained by means of unconscious persistence in
+beneficial acts and unconscious desistance from injurious acts, such a
+process might continue in more complex organisms without the assistance
+of consciousness, and that the continuance and development of life could
+be explained in terms of the same factors and processes which originated
+life, and regulated and propagated the existence of races in the lowest
+forms of organisms. Mr. Spencer clearly holds that such races of
+organisms were originated and maintained by the action of physical laws
+before sentiency became a factor in their sustaining or generative
+actions. What need then for sentiency in the subsequent development? Mr.
+Spencer's argument is good, that, granted the concomitance of Pleasure
+and Pain with life-sustaining and life-diminishing acts respectively,
+the attainment of the one and the avoidance of the other acts on the
+increase of life; but he says that, previous to the advent of sentiency,
+life was sustained in much the same way. There is this difference in it,
+however, that only where the requisite acts were performed or avoided in
+pre-sentient organisms did such organisms continue to exist, and that
+these acts were not consciously performed, but only happened in the
+course of physical sequence; whereas in the case of sentient creatures
+Pleasure is consciously sought, and Pain is intentionally avoided. But
+it seems to us that when acts are determined by the anticipation of
+Pleasure or Pain, we enter upon the domain of psychology, and when they
+are determined by physical factors without consciousness we remain in
+the province of physics, so that there is no intermediate science of
+Biology at all. And by this we mean, not that for convenience we may not
+so arrange our classes of study, but that there are no laws of physics
+which will account for the development of organisms, and there are no
+biological processes which do not imply the action of a subjective
+factor; and that there is no true biological law which properly
+expresses the correllation of the two. Mr. Spencer starts with a Biology
+from which the subjective is completely absent, and ends with a
+Psychology of the highest description: but he fails to express the
+biological law which accounts for the growth of the one out of the
+other, or expresses the law of their correlation in a concomitant
+growth.
+
+How then can we arrive at any ethical rule by the study of Biology? In
+this way. An organism is a moving equilibrium: it is a law of moving
+equilibria that they counterbalance by means of new adjustments
+antagonistic forces in the environment, and absorb forces from the
+environment favourable to their continuance. Their continued existence
+depends upon such continuous absorption and adjustment. But as
+environment varies, so do adjustments; and thus there is a wonderful
+variety of different moving equilibria, which form important parts of
+one another's environment. The suitable structures and functions which
+have thus been evolved are therefore relative to the environment, and
+the inherited structure and functions forming a moving equilibrium are
+fitted for particular environments and no other. There is no absolute
+moving equilibrium; all are relative. "That which was defined as a
+moving equilibrium, we define biologically as a balance of functions.
+The implication of such a balance is that the several functions in their
+kinds, amounts, and combinations, are adjusted to the several activities
+which maintain and constitute complete life; and to be so adjusted is to
+have reached the goal towards which the evolution of conduct continually
+tends." But completeness of life means primarily the completeness of
+life in each individual organism as regards its continued existence, and
+the full satisfaction of all its functions during the period of its
+existence. The biologically good is all that conduces to this end, and
+the biologically bad is all that detracts from it. The biologically good
+and bad are therefore relative to the consensus of functions which
+constitute an animal or other organism. The biologically good and bad
+are therefore individual. That which is good for the individual is the
+right conduct, and that which is bad for it is wrong conduct. It is
+therefore right for the big fishes to eat the little ones, for the bird
+to prey upon the insect; it is a fit satisfaction for the functions of
+the lion to devour the antelope, for one tribe to slay or drive out
+another tribe in order to possess itself of more fertile plains and more
+delightful countries. And so, as long as the functions delight in
+egoism, and there is no counterforce of sympathy included among them, it
+is right to tyrannise, to subject others to the service or passions of
+the dominant organisms. They subserve the biological law--they are
+conducive to complete relative life. The biological law does not
+recognise the lives of others until sympathy has become part of the
+functions of the organism.
+
+The question here arises, how far the ethical law is to be determined by
+the biological law, for if the biological law is dominant, and the
+ethical dependant, the latter can only be explained and justified by the
+former. But we at once see that the two things are not identical and
+co-extensive. We recognise the difference between the biologically
+efficient and the ethically good and bad. The law of Biology refers to
+the actions of each individual in regard to itself alone, whatever the
+functions, etc., which constitute that self. It relates to its good
+alone, irrespective of the good of others, unless, and until, sympathy
+with others has become part of the functions of the individual.
+
+But Mr. Spencer seeks to make the biological view of conduct identical
+with the ethical by introducing the conception of quantitative life. In
+this case an organism has more life the greater the number of
+correspondences it has with the environment. And since the environment
+is constituted of two classes of objects, the objective and the
+subjective--the purely physical and the organisms possessing feeling--so
+the correspondences established in the individual are of two kinds, the
+psychological and the emotional. In the former class are comprised all
+the objects and relations of the inorganic world, the great laws and
+intricacies of nature and her past history, including the history of
+organisms and of man. In the latter are included all the feeling, living
+creatures around us, with their pleasures, hopes, and pains, and all the
+characters, noble and beautiful, delicate or brutal, passionate or
+aspiring, who have ever trod the stage of history, or wrought or thought
+for us in antecedent ages. In fact all the patient work and mighty
+achievements of science, and all the emotional relations of men have
+afforded scope for the quantitative increase of life; and in proportion
+to the increase so it is suggested that life became ethical. The
+biological law is the continuous adjustment of organisms to environment,
+and the increase of adjustment is the increase of life.
+
+This may be so; but it is a denial of Ethics as being coeval with
+Biology; it makes the one simply a late outcome of the other. According
+to this view, Ethics is something which has supervened upon the process,
+and which requires a separate analysis. But we have seen that increase
+of correspondence is of two kinds--it takes place in the direction of
+intellect, and it takes place in the direction of emotion, whether of
+sympathy or antipathy. But it is with the latter class of phenomena
+alone that Ethics is concerned. The increased quantitative life which is
+identical with the increase of knowledge has no ethical aspect. It is
+increased relations of an emotional nature only which admit that term.
+In fact it is to societarian relations alone that it is applicable.
+Increase of life may proceed in the direction of intellect or
+recognition of the facts and relations of the external world, and yet
+the life may never be termed ethical; while on the other hand there may
+be but little increase of intellect, yet a great increase of ethical
+relations. Therefore, increased quantitative life, considered as a mode
+of identifying the biological law with the ethical law, except by way of
+comprehension in a larger classification, fails in the end because it
+is not true that the increase of correspondences need be in the special
+direction of increase of emotional correspondences: and thus we find
+that ethics is not to be affiliated upon the main line of biological
+progress, but with one distinguishable result of it--namely the relation
+of the individual with its subjective environment--that is to say,
+Society.
+
+And here it is fit that we should take notice of Mr. Spencer's account
+of Good and Bad Conduct, given in chapter 3 of the "Data of Ethics." A
+good knife, gun, or house are such in virtue of their capacity for
+fulfilling the purposes for which they were designed. A good day or a
+good season are such as satisfy certain of our desires. A good pointer
+or a good ox are so in reference to certain of our requirements. A good
+jump, or good stroke at billiards, are those which accomplish the
+desired ends. And bad things are those which do not subserve desired
+ends.
+
+Mr. Spencer then proceeds to study the ethically good and bad, and to
+discuss the application of these terms to actions as regards the welfare
+of self, of offspring, and of fellow citizens. Acts are said to be good
+and bad according as they affect the welfare of self. Here it is
+indicated that acts are judged according to their degree of biological
+efficiency. In the next class--namely, acts relating to offspring--a
+father and mother are again judged according to their efficiency in
+those capacities, although the egoistic element is present in a
+subordinate degree. "Most emphatic, however, are the applications of the
+words good and bad to conduct throughout that third division of it
+comprising the deeds by which men affect one another. In maintaining
+their own lives" (biological laws) "and fostering their offspring,
+men's adjustments of acts to ends are so apt to hinder the kindred
+adjustments of other men, that insistence on the needful limitations has
+to be perpetual; and the mischiefs caused by men's interferences with
+one another's life-subserving actions are so great, that the interdicts
+have to be peremptory."
+
+The general meaning of "good" and "bad" as applied to actions, then, has
+reference to their efficiency. The differences of their meaning are due
+to the end regarded. The meanings are harmonised, however, when we
+consider that they are applicable to different degrees in the evolution
+of conduct; the conduct to which we apply the name good is the
+relatively more evolved conduct, and "bad is the name we apply to
+conduct which is relatively less evolved. This involves a reference to
+the three stages of biological evolution, the individual, the offspring,
+and society."
+
+"Lastly, we inferred that establishment of an associated state, both
+makes possible and requires a form of conduct such that life may be
+completed in each and in his offspring, not only without preventing
+completion of it in others, but with furtherance of it in others; and we
+have found that this is the form of conduct most emphatically termed
+good."[11] From this Mr. Spencer infers the contemporaneous achievement
+of the greatest totality of life in self, and this is supposed to
+vindicate the affiliation of Ethics upon Biology.
+
+We have, however, already shown that the enlargement of the relations
+between the individual and the subjective environment is the special
+ethical relation, and that the enlargement of the relations between the
+individual and the objective environment is non-ethical, thus
+specialising the ethical interpretation of the enlargement of biological
+relations. We must also notice that Mr. Spencer's affiliation of biology
+with ethics relates to a remote ideal future and not to an actual
+present or a historic past. The biological law is the adaptation of the
+individual to its own special surroundings, and not the adaptation of
+its remote and changed descendant to its remote and changed environment.
+According to the fitness of the individual for supplying itself with
+food, whether of a vegetable or animal nature, and according to its
+capacities for, self preservation or defence, so will it be deemed
+biologically perfect. This is a relative, an individual standard,
+without reference to the subjective environment except in so far as this
+subjective environment subserves some internal function of sympathy. But
+even in this case the ethical relation is subordinate to the biological
+and is relative to the actual individual and not to a future ideal
+descendant. Moreover, the biological standard is always individual and
+singular and is not societarian.
+
+We therefore come to the conclusion that the biological point of view
+does not furnish us with any ethical theory. The biological law is not
+individual completeness; it is individual suitability to environment. It
+is true, individual greatness may be the most complete life; but when
+that is not possible from the nature of the inherited organism, or from
+the nature of the surroundings, then the actually best thing, because
+relatively best, is conformity to the surroundings. The man who cannot
+adapt the environment to himself will prudently adapt himself to the
+environment. That is the biological law; whether it be the ethical law
+is another question. Abstract quantitative life may not be attainable
+either intellectually or in relation to the emotional surroundings.
+Therefore the more skilful adaptation having in view the particular
+functions of the organisms, (whether they include sympathies with the
+subjective surroundings, or not), is the biological law--although it may
+not be regarded as the ethical law.
+
+Quantitative life, viewed biologically, _i.e._, individually, does not
+mean an ideal quantitative life, but the most that an individual
+organism can get. This depends upon the organism's own nature and
+capacities, and upon the nature of the environment. That some
+descendents some day may have other natures and other surroundings, is
+not to the point. The presence of subjective surroundings in the
+environment affects the individual according to the nature of his own
+feelings: it affects him in the first place according to his possession
+or non-possession of sympathy, and in the second place according to his
+position of command or subserviency.
+
+If Biology takes cognisance of Ethics, it is from a prudential point of
+view alone. It means a recognition of the penalties of legal enactments
+or social laws. As a matter of calculation it takes account of the
+consequences of actions, and the conduct varies accordingly.
+
+And if we are unable to accept the biological view as identical with the
+fundamentals of Ethics, so we are unable to accept the correlative that
+the preponderance of pleasurable feelings is indicative of the ethically
+correct life. For this criterion again is relative to the individual,
+and prescribes that course of conduct which to him is most largely
+pleasurable. It is only ethical when the surrounding conditions are
+such as to make the personally pleasurable harmonise with what is also
+pleasurable to the subjective environment--again showing the external or
+social origin and authority of the ethical imperative.
+
+Before quitting this subject, it would-be as well to notice the narrow
+limitation assigned to the relation of feeling and function in the
+chapter on the biological view. Pleasure is there described as the
+correlative of life-sustaining acts, and Pain as the correlative of
+life-destructive acts; and we are told that under these conditions alone
+sentient creatures could evolve. This would apparently limit the range
+of the evolution of feeling to those classes of actions which are
+essential to the mere continuance of existence. If the growth of feeling
+is co-extensive with the growth of actions essential to existence, then
+Pleasure and Pain should be limited to the feelings involved in the
+supply of food, the escape from enemies, the pursuit of prey, &c. If to
+these should be added the larger, but as yet unexplained, view of
+Biology, which makes the individual a part only of a greater moving
+equilibrium--namely the species to which he belongs--then there will be
+an extension of feeling (that is, of Pleasure and Pain) to the acts
+requisite for the propagation of the race and the care of off-spring.
+But to these two classes of functions, human pleasures and pains are not
+limited. Beyond what may be termed the essential growth of feeling,
+there has been a super-growth of feeling concomitant with every
+extension of the correspondences between the inner relations and the
+outer relations. In the converse of the organism with its environment
+there has grown up a vast extension of knowledge as to external facts;
+and in the classification and reasoning upon these there has supervened
+a vast interest, which has been pleasurable quite apart from any
+life-sustaining necessity. So in the arts of life there has arisen a
+pleasure in the exercise of ingenuity and skill of manufacture, far
+above the requisites for bodily preservation. In the spread of
+æstheticism and the appreciation of the beautiful in Painting, Statuary,
+Architecture and Decoration generally, there has been manifested an
+amount of taste or feeling, utterly beyond any value it may have as
+"life-sustaining." Poetry, Music, Literature, along with all the other
+highest manifestations of civilization, are not the outcome of the
+necessities of existence, but a work super-imposed upon the poor and
+bare adaptations which are sufficient for simple existence. The same may
+be said of all those fine sympathies of man for man, of man for noble
+ideals of humanity, and even of the more homely love and good feeling of
+simple natures. Our friendships, our admirations, all that makes man
+something over and above the mere brute animals, is due to this larger
+growth of feeling beyond what is essential to the mere continuance of
+life--and if we should identify Pleasure and Pain merely with the
+conditions of life-sustaining and life-destructive acts, we should form
+a very inadequate conception of their place in human life. This of
+course is on the understanding that the biological law implies only self
+continuance or race continuance. That this is Mr. Spencer's original
+view is manifest from the fact that he theoretically derives life from
+the consideration of the laws of the moving equilibrium. But if we take
+the larger view, (which, however, is not derivable from the former),
+that life is correspondence between inner relations and outer
+relations, and is to be measured quantitatively by the increase of the
+number of correspondences, then of course the whole estimation of
+pleasures and pains is changed.
+
+Under the latter view the organism enters into correspondence with all
+the individual objects of the environment, and not only has a present
+regard, but a past and a future interest. The scope of interest in the
+larger minds embraces long lines of history leading up and down the eras
+of development. In narrow measures of family or local interest, the
+social feeling has first risen, but as the framework of tribes or
+nations becomes knit together, so the social feelings acquire a wider
+interest. The merely biological interests have become enlarged by means
+of an internal growth, so as to have regard for other sentient
+existences. Altruism becomes a part of Egoism. We care for others, not
+by compulsion, but from natural growth of interest. Into the causes and
+incidents of this growth it is not necessary to enter. It is a simple
+fact of human nature that the pains and pleasures of others affect us
+much, and sometimes very keenly indeed.
+
+Thus we find that the purely biological law, regarded as the adjustment
+of a moving equilibrium to its environment, derived from and exemplified
+in the physical moving equilibrium of the solar system, the spinning
+top, the steam engine, &c, does not afford us much insight into ethical
+theory, even if the equilibrations have a concomitant of feeling. In any
+approach from the purely biological towards the ethical, we are thrown
+for our explanations upon efficient subjective factors--upon the
+interaction of feeling organisms and sympathetic organisms.
+
+If we attempt to apply the biological law as an explanation of the
+super-growth of correspondences over and above the actual necessities of
+continued existence, and as an explanation of the growth of sympathy or
+altruism, we have to suppose that the external forces have generated in
+the organism internal forces in opposition or balance therewith. But
+this theory of the moving equilibrium, difficult to understand and
+accept in its simplest applications, transcends all powers of human
+comprehension when it attempts to deal with the subjective relations of
+organisms, and, it appears to us, entirely fails to account for the
+growth of sympathy or altruistic feeling.
+
+
+ALTRUISM IN EGOISM.
+
+The fact of the existence of altruistic feelings in the texture of the
+Ego has led to the theory that all altruistic actions, since they arise
+out of the constitution of the Ego, are really egoistic. This argument
+is irresistible. A kind, sympathetic man or woman is so by virtue of
+innate qualities, just as the selfish or the brutal man is. And if the
+justification of actions were to depend upon the authority of natural
+egoism the one is as much capable of justification as the other. If
+Ethics depends for its explanation and justification upon Biology, then,
+since the view of Biology is limited to the individual and means the
+suitable adjustment of every moving equilibrium to its special
+environment, each is capable of equal justification and similar
+explanation. Egoism may include Altruism or it may not, but in either
+case the action is equally valid from the point of view of Biology.
+
+If, however, an extension of this view be argued for on the theory that
+a rationalistic view of all the requirements of the subjective
+surroundings involves a certain line of conduct in order to secure a
+suitable adaptation between the organism and the environment, which
+shall be the equation of that organism, the best adaptation for the time
+being--this will be a superior, because a more extended, biological
+aspect of conduct, and it is not disputed that such a view of life may
+be more or less acted upon.
+
+But neither the Ego-altruistic view, nor the prudential rationalistic
+view attains to the true ethical point of view of human conduct; for the
+altruistic growth in the Ego is not universal, nor of equal development;
+and the prudential rationalistic motive is purely egoistic and
+biological, and therefore adverse to the altruistic, even if it exists
+in the Ego.
+
+The main object of the present argument is to shew that the purely
+biological explanation of ethical injunctions is insufficient as a means
+of understanding their imperative character. And yet it is difficult to
+say this if Biology is to be considered as the law of actions of
+organisms. It all depends upon the factors which are included in the
+generalisation. If the factors are simply physical, then the
+generalisation is insufficient; if the forces included in the moving
+equilibrium include subjective forces capable of growth into sympathy or
+Altruism, then the biological laws receive, perhaps, an extension which
+renders them capable of determining the whole of the phenomena. But if
+Pleasure and Pain are limited to life-sustaining acts or
+life-destructive acts, then the influence of the subjective factors is
+limited to the physical, and the super-growth of correspondences of
+inner with outer (which is necessary to explain the larger growth of
+feeling) transgresses the narrow limits of the biological law--the law
+of simple equilibration between the organism and its environment.
+
+It is well now to raise the question what is the object of ethical
+enquiry. Is it merely scientific determination of the origin, growth,
+and variations of ethical opinion? Is it a natural history of human
+conduct, more particularly of that part of it called ethical? Is it an
+investigation into the natural authority of ethical injunction? Is the
+object to establish ethical authority, or to show that ethics has no
+authority, or to enable us to conform to it and administer it
+intelligently? Generally speaking, is it a scientific enquiry for the
+information of our minds, or is it investigated for the enforcement of
+ethical injunctions?
+
+It is to be presumed that we have both ends in view. Knowledge must
+precede power. Light must go before footsteps. At least, so it must be
+if intellect is to rule. As a matter of fact, Ethics has not been so
+much a reasoned out system of conduct as a worked out system to be
+afterwards reasoned about. Morality has been the interbalance, growth,
+and counterbalance of subjective and sympathetic individuals. Then it
+became something to reason about, to modify by reason in the the
+application to remoter ends and larger bodies of the principles out of
+which it arose. But the province of reason is not to supersede those
+principles, nor to weaken their authority, which indeed it could not do,
+for the forces which produced morality are ever present to sustain it,
+and, indeed, acquire age after age an increasing force.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[9] Data of Ethics, p. 78.
+
+[10] Ibid, p. 78.
+
+[11] Ibid, p. 25.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW.
+
+
+We now enter upon the study of Ethics proper. Notwithstanding Mr.
+Spencer's attempt at the outset of the chapter to identify "right
+living" with the universal biological principle that "Given its
+environment and its structure, and there is for each kind of creature a
+set of actions adapted in their kinds, amounts, and combinations to
+secure the highest conservation its nature permits," the fact still
+remains that the ethical imperative is drawn from the social
+surroundings, and is not derivable from the adaptation to environment,
+unless the environment be of a subjective character requiring an
+adaptation to it as such. Mr. Spencer considers that "there is a
+supposable formula for the activity of each species, which, could it be
+drawn out, would constitute a system of morality for that species,"
+although "such a system of morality would have little or no reference to
+the welfare of others than self and offspring." We cannot concede that
+the formula of activities for a worm by which it maintains its
+existence, is a formula of morality; nor can we admit that the
+longest-lived oyster is the most moral of oysters. Systems of morality
+which relate to the welfare of self and offspring alone are in the
+latter instance confessedly of a very limited character, and when
+entirely confined to self it would seem that we lose all ethical quality
+whatsoever. We continually find in Mr. Spencer's exposition that,
+notwithstanding his attempt to affiliate Ethics upon the biological law,
+it is only in the increased correlation of subjective individuals that
+Ethics arises, and it is only the modification of the individual by
+society, and the mental or emotional growths in the individual
+consequent on the action of the social environment, that constitute the
+groundwork of Ethics.
+
+It is true that, since society is composed of individuals, the nature
+and constitution of the units has to be considered in their mutual
+interaction, and therefore the study must have a biological basis: but
+when we have to consider the special action of the compound social
+environment upon the individual, the study is not one which can be
+properly considered from the purely biological side, nor is it to be
+comprised within the formula of individual life. With respect to the
+social environment Mr. Spencer says, "This additional factor in the
+problem of complete living, is, indeed, so important that the
+necessitated modifications of conduct have come to form a chief part of
+the code of conduct. Because the inherited desires, which directly refer
+to the maintenance of individual life, are fairly adjusted to the
+requirements, there has been no need to insist on that conformity to
+them which furthers self-conservation. Conversely, because these
+desires prompt activities that often conflict with the activities of
+others, and because the sentiments responding to other's claims are
+relatively weak, moral codes emphasise those restraints on conduct which
+the presence of fellow men entails. From the sociological point of view,
+then, Ethics becomes nothing else than a definite account of the forms
+of conduct that are fitted to the associated state, in such wise that
+the lives of each and all may be the greatest possible, alike in length
+and breadth. But here we are met by a fact which forbids us thus to put
+in the foreground the welfares of citizens, individually considered, and
+requires us to put in the foreground the welfare of the society as a
+whole. The life of the social organism must, as an end, rank above the
+lives of its units. These two ends are not harmonious at the outset, and
+though the tendency is towards harmonisation of them, they are still
+partially conflicting."[12]
+
+The difficulty alluded to arises from the fact that human society is not
+one well-ordered whole, but has been from the first, and still is, split
+up into numerous nations having conflicting interests: from which it
+follows that there is not a complete homogeneity of duty between man and
+man when, for instance, a state of warfare exists.
+
+If now we recognise Ethics as the rule of life imposed by Society upon
+the individual, we shall have to recognise great varieties of rule,
+according to the nature and objects of the particular Society imposing
+the rule, according to the state of development at which that Society
+has arrived, and according to the nature of the environment.
+
+The rule of a club over the individuals composing it, the rule of a
+church over its members, the rule of any body of men over its
+constituent units is founded upon the ethical principle, however
+trifling or however serious the objects of the particular association
+may be. Those slight or those important social penalties or
+commendations which fill up the course of everyday life in business, in
+the workshop, in social intercourse--the familiar judgments of
+companions or contemporaries--are all of them ethical valuations of
+conduct. Slight though some of them may be, they are still enforcements
+of social opinions. Man is hedged in on all sides by forces limiting his
+action to certain lines of conduct, and this social pressure is as much
+the basis of the most forceful ethical commands or prohibitions as of
+the most ephemeral influences. The only difference consists in the
+importance of the mode in which the various actions affect the general
+welfare. But this we shall have occasion to treat of hereafter in
+greater detail. It is, however, all a matter of the greater or lesser
+degree in which it affects the welfare of the temporary organisation,
+the welfare of the family, or the welfare of the permanent community, of
+which the individual forms a part.
+
+But it is evident that as the stage of development differs, and as
+nations differ in their environments, so there will be different
+standards of conduct at different times and places. And therefore,
+again, there will be different standards of morality for different sets
+of purposes. This must be acknowledged at once.
+
+Hence arise the questions, What can be the obligation of a relative
+morality? and--Is there no absolute morality with its imperatives
+universal in space and in time?
+
+The question as to absolute morality we reserve: meanwhile we confine
+our considerations to a study of the influence of Society upon
+individuals. This is disclosed in a study of Sociology.
+
+Living together in a social state necessitates certain negative and,
+eventually, positive duties.
+
+"Whether the members of a social group do or do not co-operate, certain
+limitations to their individual activities are necessitated by their
+association; and after recognising these as arising in the absence of
+co-operation, we shall be the better prepared to understand how
+conformity to them is effected when co-operation begins.[13]
+
+"What shape, then, must the mutual restraints take when co-operation
+begins? or rather, what, in addition to the primary mutual restraints
+already specified, are those secondary mutual restraints required to
+make co-operation possible? * * * * The reply will be made clearer if we
+take the successive forms of co-operation in the order of ascending
+complexity. We may distinguish as homogeneous co-operation (1) that in
+which like efforts are joined for like ends that are simultaneously
+enjoyed. As co-operation that is not completely homogeneous we may
+distinguish (2) that in which like efforts are joined for like ends that
+are not simultaneously enjoyed. A co-operation of which the
+heterogeneity is more distinct is (3) that in which unlike efforts are
+joined for like ends. And lastly comes the decidedly heterogeneous
+co-operation, (4) that in which unlike efforts are joined for unlike
+ends."[14]
+
+The social attainment reaches a full development in the last mentioned
+case.
+
+"Only under voluntary agreement then, no longer tacit and vague, but
+overt and definite, can co-operation be harmoniously carried on when
+division of labour becomes established. And, as in the simplest
+co-operation, where like efforts are joined to secure a common good, the
+dissatisfaction caused in those who, having expended their labours, do
+not get their share of the good, prompts them to cease co-operating; as
+in the more advanced co-operation, achieved by exchanging equal labours
+of like kind expended at different times, aversion to co-operate is
+generated if the expected equivalent of labour is not rendered; so in
+this developed co-operation, the failure of either to surrender to the
+other that which was avowedly recognized as of like value with the
+labour or product given, tends to prevent co-operation by exciting
+discontent with its results. And, evidently while antagonisms thus
+caused impede the lives of the units, the life of the aggregate is
+endangered by diminished cohesion."
+
+"But now we have to recognise the fact that complete fulfilment of these
+conditions, original and derived, is not enough. * * * * If no one did
+for his fellows anything more than was required by strict performance of
+contract, private interests would suffer from the absence of attention
+to public interests. The limit of evolution of conduct is consequently
+not reached, until, beyond avoidance of direct and indirect injuries to
+others, there are spontaneous efforts to further the welfare of others."
+
+The point brought out here is the social pressure of the society upon
+the individual, so as to ensure that the actions of the individual
+primarily are not inimical to its welfare, and secondarily are
+subservient to its welfare. But, of course, since society is composed
+of individuals, this pressure must not be of such a character as to be
+destructive of the welfare of the individuals of which the society is
+composed, for that would militate against its own objects.
+
+It is easy to reason out from this principle what actions would be
+condemned and what actions would be praised in the various stages of
+human development. The strongest injunctions would correspond with the
+fundamental requirements of existence, and would enjoin the sacredness
+of life within the community. The family relationships would come next
+in order of authority. The safeguards of property of every description
+would early receive ethical recognition. Commendation would be accorded
+to men whose actions were properly limited in these respects. In early
+stages of development the coward would be condemned, while the warrior
+who did his share well in the protection of the community would be
+praised. And so in a variety of ways men's actions would receive praise
+or blame, according as they conduced to the welfare or to the suffering
+of the existing community.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[12] Data of Ethics, p. 133.
+
+[13] Data of Ethics, p. 139.
+
+[14] Ibid., p. 140.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+THE ETHICAL IMPERATIVE.
+
+
+We have thus seen that the origin and authority of Ethics are to be
+found in Sociology; but to allow the enquiry to rest here is only half
+to understand the nature and imperativeness of ethical obligations as to
+conduct. We consider that Mr. Spencer's ethical theory suffers from his
+mode of exposition. We should be disposed to approach the question in an
+inverse order, and instead of seeking for an ethical authority on
+individual or biological grounds, culminating in an ethical Sociology,
+to acknowledge at once the sociological origin and authority of the
+ethical obligation, and to endeavour to understand it in detail by a
+subordinate study of biological requirements and psychological growths.
+
+The main fact underlying all Ethics is the existence of a society
+composed of subjective factors, factors possessing feelings and
+reasoning powers. The fundamental notion in Ethics is the regulation of
+the mutual conduct of these factors. It is the voice of the million
+against the voice of the unit which decides the duty of the unit. It is
+the voice of the individual against the voice of society claiming a
+modification of opinion. It is the voice of individuals to other
+individuals specifying general duty. Broadly speaking it is the claim of
+duties towards other individuals upon the Ego. But it follows from the
+universality of the claim, that there is mutuality of claim, and the
+duties which are demanded have at the same time to be acknowledged. The
+principle can be easily accepted as theoretically correct, and many
+general rights and duties can be readily deduced as corollaries, but
+beyond these general rules ethical problems have rather to be worked out
+than thought out--in the more important matters by societies during
+their upward growth, in smaller matters by individuals through
+multitudinous adjustments and re-adjustments. I do this or that in
+contravention of some accepted social law. I am condemned, and am made
+so generally uncomfortable by the social penalties that I am coerced
+into conformity, or, otherwise, society modifies its opinion in
+acknowledgment of my right to do as I have done.
+
+But then the question arises, upon what principle should ethical
+judgments be formed? Since society demands the performance of certain
+actions, while it prohibits the performance of others, and since its aim
+is the biological completeness of each of the individuals, what are the
+principles upon which it determines the restraints and imposes the
+injunctions so as not to interfere too much with individual liberties?
+This principle finds very good expression in Mr. Spencer's formula.
+
+The whole problem comes before us when we have to consider the relative
+claims of egoism and altruism, a problem splendidly worked out by Mr.
+Spencer, in the chapters entitled "Egoism _versus_ Altruism," "Altruism
+_versus_ Egoism," "Trial and Compromise," and "Conciliation." As this is
+a purely critical work, to be read only in conjunction with the work
+criticised, we do not feel called upon to give an account of these
+chapters. We simply state our acceptance of them bodily, the
+reservations we would make being merely in regard to certain details of
+the exposition. We ought to reprint them here in order to make this work
+complete in its argument, but it is simpler to ask the student to
+interrupt his reading of this criticism by a reperusal of the chapters
+referred to.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Having read Mr. Spencer's treatment of the problem, the question
+remains, is the ethical imperative merely an external one, dictated by a
+prudential consideration of the requirements of the social environment?
+The answer must be a negative one; there is an internal moral authority
+which gives to actions their ethical glory, their poetic delicacy, their
+qualitative appreciation, insomuch that there are names in past history
+that stand ever in the forefront of the memories of men, hallowed and
+ennobled in their imaginations for all time, on account of the ethical
+glory of their lives and the manner in which their example appeals to
+the wide sympathies within us. From the same internal fount springs the
+detestation of foul and cruel actions, the hatred of unjust and
+tyrannical deeds, and the abhorrence of the men and women who commit
+them. The same internal sentiment covers the individual himself with
+shame and remorse for unworthy actions committed, from which an
+ever-present memory suffers no release.
+
+The natural history of the growth of this internal authority is the
+history of the action of the subjective environment upon the subjective
+individual. The understanding of this growth is the province of
+Psychology in the two forms of emotional evolution and intellectual
+evolution as presented by Mr. Spencer in chapter vii of the "Data of
+Ethics,"--the enlargement of the number of sympathies with the
+subjective environment--past, present, and future--and the enlargement
+of the number of correspondences with the objective environment in
+space, and time, and generality. We are more particularly concerned with
+that branch of it which deals with the growth of the emotions. The
+purely biological view relates to the individual, and its own personal
+existence. But the care of offspring, arising from some incomprehensible
+necessity for the continuance of the species, and accompanied by a
+recognition of their subjective character, produces actions, having
+regard to their effects upon the subjectivity of the offspring, of a
+regulative, coercive, or deterrent character. Moreover, by some not
+understood law, the sympathies which undoubtedly exist between
+organisms, have led to the recognition of the pains of others as
+egoistic pains, and of the pleasures of others as egoistic pleasures.
+Thus altruism from the very first became _to a certain extent_ a form of
+egoism, and the action of the Ego in its subjective environment was of a
+regulative character amongst its offspring. An extension and
+modification of this action ensued upon a social environment composed of
+more distant, or only tribal relationships. Nevertheless psychological
+evolution made the sympathies gradually include tribal and national, and
+eventually humanitarian recognitions. The growth of Ethics, and the
+growth of ethical feeling, are thus seen to be a natural growth, and not
+merely the solution of an intellectual problem. The justification for
+the ethical feeling is that it exists. The justification for any code of
+morality is that is exists. But the amendment of the code of morality
+derives its justification from changing conditions. The changefulness of
+the latter does not detract from but attests the essential nature of the
+former. It is the court of appeal for the retention of existing codes,
+and for the judgment of imminent changes. We cannot, therefore turn
+round and say--as we may be tempted to do when we find the relativity of
+morals and its origin in external obligation--"Ethics is only an
+intellectual puzzle, only a social contract, into which I may enter or
+not as I please." If a man assumes a hostile attitude to society, he
+wrongs his nature as a man; and if a philosopher or selfish man of the
+world cuts off human sympathy for the purpose of living a merely
+prudential life he becomes something less than a man, he misses the full
+function and joy of life. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that
+there are men who have so maimed their emotional nature as to lead
+tolerably satisfactory lives within the narrow limits of selfish
+desires. To them ethical obligation is external only, and the internal
+obligation is a minimum. Such may be the case. There are men who do
+actions in contradiction of the voice of society, and who do not repent.
+Society has to deal with these men as best it can. The ethical problem
+is only of interest to those who feel the obligation, or to the
+philosopher who studies the human nature of which it is a
+characteristic.
+
+Viewed as a practical question, no philosophical theory will carry the
+force of conviction to a bestial, brutal, sordid, selfish man. These
+require the material punishments of the administrators of the law,
+personal force, and social coercion. And even then there remain large
+criminal classes in every community. The study of the ethical problem
+is for those who recognise ethical obligation and seek guidance or to
+guide. The internal ethical obligation is not to be reasoned into a man.
+It must be grown into the child. This is to be done by love-enkindling
+actions and demeanour, a just and considerate course of conduct, well
+judged according to ethical principles. And herein lies the utility of
+the study. Example and injunctions in daily exigencies form the
+groundwork of such influence as can be exerted by education. A
+discriminating judgment of contemporary actions and of past histories
+tends to develop a proper discrimination of the qualities of actions.
+
+But below and accompanying all this must be recognised--as Mr. Spencer
+so fully recognises--the registration, as he terms it, of emotions and
+mental capacities in the inherited constitutions of organisms. That
+which is the lesson of one age has become the inborn faculty of a
+succeeding one. There are natural tendencies inherited by individuals
+from their ancestors, and the perpetual social improvement tends to the
+gradual production of individuals more and more suitable to the social
+state by the possession of sympathies for others, and the internal
+feeling of moral obligation. Furthermore, these individuals are born and
+reared under the influence of a social state ever more and more
+permeated by the recognition of the good of society as rightly
+overruling the destinies of the individual.
+
+The ethical imperative then must be regarded as an internal growth in a
+subjective individual brought about in psychological evolution in the
+continuous advance both of the increase of the sympathetic
+correspondences and of the intellectual correspondences with the
+subjective environment, and in the hereditary transmission of the same,
+and their perpetuation and modification by means of education and
+training induced by the current social pressure, special and general;
+which social pressure is itself undergoing constant but gradual change
+in its incidence and tendency. The ethical imperative therefore is
+partly internal in so far as each individual is actuated by societarian
+sympathies and emotional regards for humanitarian ideals, or in so far
+as he possesses numerous special and personal kindly relations with his
+environment. But in-so-far as a man is destitute of these sympathetic
+possessions, so far is he free from the obligations of the internal
+ethical imperative, and so much does he approach to the lower
+evolutionary states of the inanimate object, or of the beast of the
+forest, the insensate fish which stares into vacuity in the tanks of an
+aquarium, or a self-feeding engine which is only a little less developed
+form of a moving equilibrium. For such as these there only remains the
+external prudential obligation of conformity to social pressure in its
+several forms of law, custom, or public opinion, or the variously
+expressed displeasure or commendations of neighbours whereto it would be
+wise to conform. This to them is the only ethical imperative.
+
+To neither class does any reasoned-out theory of absolute morality yield
+any force of obligation or insight into the details of duty. And here it
+will be convenient to enquire whether Mr. Spencer himself attaches to
+absolute morality, any power as an ethical imperative. Absolute morality
+in Mr. Spencer's treatment is merely a conception of ideal conduct in an
+ideal state of society. We must conceive a state of society in the
+highest degree complex, composed of individuals following all the
+various occupations necessitated by the sub-division of labour from the
+lowest to the highest, in which each individual may yet perform his or
+her functions in such a manner as to insure the highest degree of
+personal happiness, and at the same time promote the highest happiness
+of the society as a whole.
+
+Such an ideal state would comprise individuals of all ages, from infancy
+to extreme old age, and could not possibly exclude invalids and the
+maimed, for we cannot suppose that moving equilibria will be able to
+develop internal forces so as to preserve them intact from the effects
+of storms, explosions, and other natural occurrences, and as it is part
+of the moving equilibrium theory to suppose that organisms are only
+temporary equilibrations on the way towards a final equilibration in a
+state of rest, it is necessary to suppose that they will always be
+subject to disease and death. It is therefore probable that the society
+would comprise many sufferers from organic diseases, and it is difficult
+to imagine any state of society which would be entirely free from mental
+disorders in various degrees of defect, or excess, or aberration.
+Nevertheless we are asked to conceive a state of perfect balance amongst
+a society composed of heterogeneous individuals in various stages of
+equilibration, and we are told that a proper and complete conception of
+this character would furnish us with a code of absolute morality. But it
+is quite clear that Mr. Spencer's utopian hypothesis is the outcome of
+hope springing from large human sympathies rather than a realisable
+future, affording an ethical imperative.
+
+Thus it is supposed that actual standards of morality are extremely
+imperfect, and form but faint foreshadowings of a future ideal, or in
+any case, that there is an absolute morality which rules throughout all
+ages, and is the authority for the approximations of each age. But if
+we sufficiently realise the fundamental notion of Biology as that of the
+most complete adjustment of the organism to its environment, including
+incidentally the adjustment of the environment to the organism we must
+acknowledge that the most perfect morality is the best adjustment of the
+individual to his environment in the society to which he belongs. Thus
+the most perfect morality is the best relative adjustment, and not the
+nearest conformity to an ideal standard suited to a perfect state of
+society. The biological rule is more fundamental than any other, the
+societarian view following; and its ideal of morality is perfection of
+actual adjustment amongst the individuals of existing societies so as to
+insure the greatest happiness of each and all. Thus as there are higher
+lives and lower lives, there are higher moralities and lower moralities,
+but they are justified by their quantitative relative perfection, and
+not according to their approach to absolute morality, and they do not
+derive their ethical obligation from the latter source.
+
+It is due to the growth of psychological views that man is troubled with
+the burthen of so many ideals. Far be it from us to detract from noble
+aims, but it is necessary to note the origin and nature of moral ideals
+and to assign them their proper place. They arise from the growing
+sympathies of the race, and its ever-widening intelligence; more
+especially do they arise in the minds of thinkers and students of
+humanity in regard to the continuous aggregations of tribes and nations
+of men in entering on the practical problem, how they shall live
+together without unduly trespassing upon one another's rights of life
+and enjoyment. These necessarily had to form for themselves practical
+ideals, but ideals of some sort--ideals of greater or less degree of
+imperativeness in proportion as they affected the essentials of a
+pleasurable existence, or as they affected interactions of lesser
+consequence. The growth of individual sympathies continually afforded
+wider scope in the judgment of personal actions, and the spread of
+intelligence insured the acceptance of more general laws of regulative
+requirements on the part of the society. The authoritativeness of some
+of the laws so recognised seemed eventually to be in the nature of
+things, and to be independent and absolute in its imperativeness. Those
+laws which were seen to be essential to the very existence of society
+were regarded as eternal and true independently of society. But this is
+at once seen to be a false notion, and only a peculiar manner of
+representing the most essential laws of relative morality. No men, no
+morals! Immorality is a sin, not against eternal principles of right,
+but against the practical working principles co-eval with human society.
+
+To set up a perfect morality, an ideal code, which may possibly exist in
+an ideal state of society, but which is scarcely likely ever to be
+realised as a rule of present conduct, is to set up not only an
+impracticable, but a false standard, since the only true standard is the
+relative sociological one founded upon the historical principle of
+adjustment.
+
+Perhaps, however, even from this principle we work round to the same
+point, for in working out the problem how to secure to each his fair
+share of happy life, we are obliged to set down certain fundamental laws
+protecting the individual from injury in the full exercise of his
+faculties, and we are obliged to impose upon society as a whole, and
+upon each individual, certain positive duties of assistance towards
+individuals, being members of the community. Nevertheless, the ideal set
+before each generation is that of which it is actually capable, and not
+a fanciful one which is beyond its powers. And we imagine that some harm
+is done by the sweeping condemnation of religious and moral idealists in
+inculcating the sense of sin, and imperfection, and incapability of
+attainment, which the preaching of such high absolute standards
+necessitates.
+
+No doubt the inculcation of high ideals kindles youthful enthusiasm, and
+sustains manly effort. But sometimes the non-attainment of impossible
+ideals detracts from the effort towards attainable relative perfections,
+and causes us to under-value and to neglect the good qualities actually
+extant in ourselves, and in our fellow-creatures. The "unco guid" may
+repress as much as they may develop, for the idealists have made more
+sin, and therefore sinners, than is justified by the adaptations of
+society.
+
+Nevertheless, the psychological conception of an ideal man in an ideal
+state is a most fascinating one, alike to the philanthropist whose heart
+broadens out to all humanity, and to the philosopher who aims at
+absolute perfection of moral or political theory. There are men and
+women of noble and sweet sympathies who aim at making each his little
+ideal world around him, and so leaven the general mass and aid the
+movement towards the great ideal. Poets have sung, and will sing through
+all ages, of that golden age, and philosophers, consciously or
+unconsciously, have it for their ruling motive in all their writings.
+Statesmen in lesser circles of practical scope only work towards it, and
+the whole heart of humanity teems with hope for a time when troubles
+shall cease, and a bearable, if not a happy lot, shall be the meed of
+all.
+
+The ethical imperative we therefore find to possess a two-fold origin.
+It has external authority in the imposition of coercive rules of
+conduct, carrying with them social penalties or rewards, varying in
+degree according to the essential or trivial manner in which actions
+affect the lives of other individuals, and again an external one in the
+sympathetic action of surrounding subjective organisms upon subjective
+organisms in eliciting and enkindling sympathetic response. It has also
+an internal authority in the sympathies which, by a law of nature, grow
+up in the ego towards surrounding egos in the manifestation of its
+several subjective characteristics.
+
+Thus the ethical imperative is a growth within a man. It is also an
+education imposed upon him, and it is again an external social pressure
+accompanied by rewards and punishments. The internal ethical imperative
+does not exist to all men, and to them must be applied the social
+pressure in more or less manifest forms of scorn, denunciation, and even
+scant diet, and the cold frowning walls of jails, and unrewarding
+labour. Towards this end the legislator works, also in the removal of
+hindrances to life, and the promotion of education. The philanthropist
+gently encourages the feeble efflorescences of humanitarian sympathies.
+Sunday schools and pulpits more or less earnestly impress the moral
+obligations. Parents call forth the love and sympathy of children, and
+amongst brothers and sisters and companions the child first learns the
+lesson of mutual duty and mutual help. Occasionally in the world's
+history arises a prophet in whom has become concentrated in a ten-fold
+degree the humanitarian sentiment, and he speaks in a voice which
+reverberates down the outspreading avenues of time, calling forth an
+answering note from the attuned heart chords of the nations.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+SYSTEMS OF ETHICS.
+
+
+Mr. Spencer very justly claims for his system that it gives a new
+meaning and authority to all previous systems of Ethics and theories of
+human action. In his system they all harmonise. Their contradictions
+disappear on the discovery that they are all parts of one consensus of
+truth. We will proceed to examine in order some of these earlier
+theories in their relation to the one now propounded.
+
+The idea that society is a pact or contract, though essentially untrue,
+since society has been a growth and not a partnership resulting from
+negociations, is nevertheless true in the sense that men have had to
+give up individual biological liberties or egoisms in entering upon the
+social stage. There never was any conscious bargaining, but there have
+been an infinite number of tacit understandings of societarian and
+individual adjustments which eventually brought about the well-ordered
+societies of modern times.
+
+The Intuitional School of Moralists finds the intuitions as to what is
+right and wrong, and more especially the feeling of right and the
+feeling of wrong, justified and established in the fact of the growth of
+feeling in general as the essential of the biological history, and in
+the historical establishment of the internal growth of moral feelings
+transmitted from generation to generation. Validity and authority are
+given, to moral principles by the very fact of their existing strength
+and their recognised fitness to the social circumstances. The
+indignation or the admiration naturally felt by man at certain actions
+is justified _a priori_, and apart from any reasoned opinion of their
+bearings. Praise and blame are not much, as a matter of fact, affected
+by reason. Spontaneously and independently passion and enthusiasm are
+expressed. Without staying to think, comes the unbidden frown and sharp
+reproof, or even the hasty blow. Without thought come the expression of
+sorrow and sympathy, the glow of praise, the approving smile, the
+commendatory word, straight from the heart and sympathies of the
+like-minded spectator. Reason may argue about details--it may rejudge
+the spontaneous expressions of the sympathies, it may guide and direct,
+but it never lends to praise its warmth, or to condemnation its
+severity. These are purely instinctive, and reason justifies them in the
+ascertainment of their origin and growth. There is an intuitive
+conscience which has been developed by evolution. The adjustment of
+organisms, the growth of feeling, the acquisition of altruistic or
+sympathetic feeling in an environment of subjective individuals has
+developed not only social adjustments, but also feelings in individuals,
+relative to those social adjustments, which compose a conscience or
+intuition. Never yet could such a conscience or intuition wholly and of
+itself teach a man moral action. The conscience presupposes for its
+actualization the presence of its environment. It needs education,
+encouragement, and instruction. Society is a continuous existence. The
+child born into a society not only inherits its dispositions, but from
+the very first receives its prepossessions, is subject to its
+injunctions, and is trained in its habits. Intuition is only a part of
+the truth. Yet although it may be developed by education, and guided by
+reason, there is no question as to its existence, and as to its
+affording the zest to praise, the keenness to condemnation, and the
+poignancy to remorse.
+
+The view which regards Ethics as explicable by Egoism is a very
+imperfect and ambiguous one. For what is the Ego spoken of, and of what
+does it consist? The view which makes egoism the rule of life, and which
+some suppose may afford the ultimate rationale of Ethics, is identical
+with the biological view which we have already discussed. No doubt
+egoism is the rule of life taken in its widest sense. No doubt the
+adjustment of the Ego to society, and of society to the Ego, is the rule
+of life. But egoism only becomes ethical when it, in order of growth,
+includes love of offspring, love of family, love of fellow-man, regard
+for the tribe, the nation, or humanity at large. As egoism loses its
+narrowness, as it loses its exclusive regard for personal continuance,
+and finds itself possessed of affections for others and altruistic
+considerations, so does it become continually less and less egoistic. It
+is a matter of chopping logic to say that its action is still
+essentially selfish, if it does good to others, because it is part of
+its own nature to do good to others, and it does so to satisfy its own
+egoistic desires. This only proves that egoism is the rule of life, but
+does not establish it as the rule of Ethics, which is a very different
+thing. The ethical rule has been found in the course of the enquiry to
+be, firstly, the body of injunctions which society lays upon the
+individual; and, secondly, the conscience which a society of subjective
+individuals cultivates in each separate Ego, both arising from the
+growth of altruistic sympathy in the subjective organism of which
+society is composed. To say that when men act ethically they act from
+egoism is only to include ethical action in a statement of a more
+general biological law, and takes the mind off from the special ethical
+study altogether. Ethical egoism pre-supposes ethical feeling in the
+Ego, otherwise egoistic morality is obliged to frame for itself a
+hypothetical society of individuals without feelings, which, of course,
+puts it out of relation with humanity. Egoism, as a basis of morals, is
+bound to include altruism, or else it is merely a form of expressing the
+most general law of Biology.
+
+Egoism however gives, in its highest form, a wide and wise consistency
+to actions. It pre-supposes a well-ordered mind capable of
+self-regulation and control. It takes a look all round, and it judges of
+the eventualities of actions. It sums up its own forces and motives, it
+takes account of its present and future surroundings and forms a
+judgment as to the most prudent course of action for securing the
+fittest life possible for itself and the greatest continuance of such
+life in the future. A wise and well-judged egoism is very valuable to
+the community, as well as profitable to the individual. It is not
+however essentially ethical, and is so only in so far as the individual
+is properly altruistic. If the egoist is not altruistic, he may become a
+curse to the society in which he lives, or if on a larger scale--a
+terrible scourge to humanity at large.
+
+Utilitarianism does not explain ethics, unless the word be accepted as
+co-extensive with the biological and sociological adjustments which have
+gone on during the upward growth. No doubt these were all utilities;
+and, therefore, utilitarianism is so far true. But since the process has
+been one of accompanying modified feeling, it is only half an
+explanation, only one feature of the general explanation. It was no
+common intellectual appreciation of the axiom "the greatest happiness
+for the greatest number," which caused the evolution of morals. The
+axiom was itself an after-thought. It may have great use in these days,
+as the expression of the outcome in feeling and in philosophic thought
+of processes of evolution, but it was not the ruling principle which
+produced the evolution. Accepted thus as the outcome, it may be the
+criterion and guide for future action in detailed adjustments and
+modifications of ethical judgments or political action, and may have an
+authority in modern times which it could not have had primordially. But
+its scope is limited to the formation of deliberate judgments, and it
+does not impel spontaneous praise or give any force to spontaneous
+blame. Its judgments are those of the calm reasoner which may very
+properly modify the opinions of society at large, and thus tend to form
+an improved conscience, but it will never make a moral impulse or form
+the base for an ethical ideal.
+
+In an ethical system founded upon an acceptance of biological and
+sociological evolution, all these systems of previous philosophers find
+a due place. Egoism cannot be denied as the rule of life, but it is
+shown that egoism cannot always remain purely egoistic, but at last
+includes inevitably an altruistic growth. The progress of society
+involves altruistic conditions. The intrinsic growth of sympathy and the
+extrinsic imposition of conditions form in a continuous society, by
+change in the internal constitution of organisms, and by hereditary
+transmission of such changes, not only an intuitional feeling of right
+and wrong, but also an intuitional conscience of greater or less
+development. Thus, we admit and explain the law of right and wrong
+written upon each civilized human heart. Utilitarianism is recognised as
+the ultimate outcome of philosophical thought; and, while it is but an
+inadequate expression in the hands of some writers, it may, perhaps, in
+its wider expansion by later philosophers, become an adequate and
+suitable expression of the ethical principle, and a guide for
+re-adjustments in the recognition of the wider ends and larger views of
+human organisation.
+
+But any one of these views is inadequate by itself to explain and
+express the largeness of ethical movement. Only when we seize upon the
+history of the development of subjectivity, only when we understand the
+gradual progress from gross beginnings, and recognise the grand movement
+which carries us forward to we know not what hopeful future, can we
+properly appreciate the ethical position and the ethical authority. But
+to one who understands the evolution of organisms and of society, all
+these varying views fall at once into their natural places in a
+beautiful harmony. The touch of genius in a Darwin or a Spencer,
+produces out of the apparent chaos a well-ordered and progressive
+system.
+
+This is the proper place to notice Mr. Leslie Stephen's very valuable
+and elaborate work upon "The Science of Ethics." That work is wise in
+conception, sound as to its basis and construction, beautifully
+proportioned in its mode of treatment, carefully, and, perhaps, too
+elaborately worked out in detail.
+
+The original conception is wise in that it excludes metaphysical
+questions and discussions as to first principles, and limits the range
+of its considerations to properly-ascertained scientific facts or laws,
+and to such extensions of scientific surmise as are warranted by the
+acceptance of the modern doctrine of evolution, expounded by Darwin. The
+acceptance of this doctrine not only involves the acceptance of historic
+developments, but justifies, and even necessitates, the acceptance of a
+supposititious prehistoric development. This hypothetical history,
+founded on observations of historical order, and of the habits and
+customs of uncivilised races, is perfectly justifiable. However, the
+problem, conducted within scientific limits is to consider the
+groundwork of actual morality (Ch. i.).
+
+Properly to effect this object, it is necessary to study the influence
+of the emotions as determining conduct. Next, the influence of the
+reason as determining conduct, and finally, the interaction of the race
+and the individual (Ch. ii. and iii.).
+
+These preliminaries are succeeded by a study of the moral law as derived
+from social interests, following upon social necessities, establishing
+the moral law as natural, and as authoritative (Ch. iv.).
+
+The contents of the moral law are next discussed, in which the virtues
+of courage, temperance, truth, and the social virtues are considered
+(Ch. v.).
+
+Altruism, as a growth within the Ego, is necessarily an object of study,
+and is explained as a natural development of sympathy out of intrinsic
+subjectivity. Its place in a system of ethics is also set forth. (Ch.
+vi.).
+
+Upon this follows an exposition of special views upon merit, free-will,
+effort, and knowledge, as modified by the acceptance of the doctrine of
+evolution. Of essential importance to an ethical work is a consideration
+of the nature of conscience and the variations of its judgments (Ch.
+viii.).
+
+A discussion of happiness as a criterion succeeds, including a study of
+utilitarianism, and a consideration of the relations of morality and
+happiness (Ch. ix. and x.). A concluding chapter sums up a work of
+nearly 500 closely printed pages.
+
+It is very evident that we cannot undertake the criticism of so large
+and important a work without having to enter minutely upon points of
+agreement and difference which would greatly augment the size of our
+present volume. We need only say that, although there are naturally many
+minor criticisms to be made, we accept it as an excellent exposition of
+modern ethical views modified and co-ordinated as necessitated by the
+recognition of the Darwinian theories. It should be read, we think, in
+succession to Professor Sidgwick's excellent broad and dispassionate
+work on "The Methods of Ethics." Mr. Leslie Stephen's study is based
+upon the same scientific fundamentals as Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics,"
+without the confusing cosmical views which are necessitated by Mr.
+Spencer's position, but which do not by any means tend to strengthen it.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+THE EVOLUTION OF FREE WILL.
+
+
+Two distinct theories may be held by the Evolutionist with respect to
+volition, both of them being strictly causational, and, therefore, of a
+scientific, as opposed to a mystical character.
+
+He may hold, in the first place, the double aspect theory pure and
+simple, according to which all developments of mind are merely dependent
+concomitants of the development of nerve ramifications, with consequent
+growths of nerve-cells, ganglions, and the more considerable nerve
+plexuses, culminating in the growth of a brain. This evolution of a
+nervous and cerebral system he may hold to be wholly due to the action
+of molecular and other motions upon a mass of colloid substances of such
+a constitution as to be fittest, under the action of these external
+stimuli, to form lines for the transmission of motions and for the
+discharge of these motions into certain otherwise formed contractile
+structures called muscles. He will consider that they eventually acquire
+a power of retaining these motions, so that the effect of all the
+motions thus caused is not immediate but deferred. And since all motions
+received are not immediately concerned with the welfare of the organism,
+he may suppose that separate masses of nervous matter are produced, in
+which these motions are stored in an organised form, related indirectly
+rather than directly to the motor apparatus. According to this theory
+the whole system of determining causes is purely physical. In the simple
+organisms the response of muscular action to incident motions is quick,
+direct, and unhesitating. Such action is called reflex or automatic, and
+is as unconscious as chemical activity. But when the system becomes more
+complex, when nerves cross each other, when cells and junctions are
+formed, and more particularly when the storages of motions are formed,
+as just referred to; then compoundings and recompoundings of nervous
+motions take place, and, according to the strength of the various
+currents, to the facility of discharge, and to various physical local or
+general conditions, the action becomes slower and more hesitating. Under
+these circumstances, it is held that the nervous system becomes
+conscious. A double aspect then arises, and the actions which thereafter
+take place may be described either in terms of the relations of the
+various molecular motions in the nervous and cerebral systems, or in
+terms of feeling; but all the same the latter is merely the secondary
+aspect of series of changes altogether determined by the motions and
+structure of the former. On this theory memory is the revived motion of
+a nerve structure; feeling is a consciousness of interaction between
+different nerve motions; trains of thought are the reverberations of
+great varieties of motions throughout the system and brain;
+consciousness resulting from the mingling of the nerve currents and the
+consequent conflict and retardation of effects.
+
+The element of mystery here lies in the secondary or subjective aspect,
+but it is placed strictly without the line of deduction and is a merely
+unexplained accompaniment of a series of changes otherwise fully
+accounted for.
+
+A second theory--as strictly causational as the former--recognises the
+presence of a subjective factor. In some of the quotations from Mr.
+Spencer's "Psychology," given above, it will have been seen that, at the
+point of development of nerve junctions when different currents meet in
+the developed ganglion and in proportion as the system becomes more
+complex, Mr. Spencer asserts not only the rise of a secondary aspect,
+but of an additional factor. The element of mystery here is the entrance
+of this additional factor, capable of taking part as an active agent in
+the affairs of the organism. But since it is itself the result of
+experience and the organization of experiences of the physical nervous
+system, it is strictly of a causational or deductive order, and after
+its unexplained inception, it has to be studied strictly in the
+scientific order of development and action. Notwithstanding that it
+plays a part in the conduct of life, and notwithstanding that its
+dependence upon physical organization and development is so intimate,
+and that this development again cannot be understood without
+it--notwithstanding all this incomprehensibleness of relation and our
+ignorance of its origin, the Evolutionist maintains the orderly
+development of organism and actions, including the subjective as
+resultants of the relations of original factors, although he may be for
+the time being ignorant of the nature of the processes.
+
+It will therefore be seen that in either case he holds the deterministic
+theory of volition, and believes all purposed actions to be actions
+determined by pre-existing causes, whether he regards these causes as
+the structure and condition of nerve centres, or as feelings and
+thoughts, or whether he regards them as ascribable to some law of
+correlation between the two.
+
+Nevertheless, it seems to be incumbent upon all writers dealing with
+the subject of Ethics to define their position as to the Free Will
+controversy. It is needless to say that we accept unreservedly the
+deterministic theory, though it may be necessary to attempt its
+reconciliation with the consciousness in persons of Free Will.
+
+We here make a distinction between theories of Will and theories of Free
+Will. What we have just been considering have been theories of will or
+volition. They are of the deterministic order because in either case the
+actions are wholly determined by preceding facts. Human and all actions
+of organisms are held to be merely resultants of pre-existing factors
+and their relations. This is the theory held by all scientific
+philosophers, and the one most analogous to what we know of physical
+science as well as most in conformity with actual experience of human
+conduct. Another theory--arising no doubt in the mystery of the
+secondary aspect or in the mystery of the origin of the subjective
+factor, denies the rigidity of the scientific order, and asserts the
+presence and activity of a _self-determining factor_, thus placing
+volitional action beyond the scientific order of the dependent and
+related successions of cause and effect.
+
+Perhaps, however, we would be more correct in attributing the confidence
+with which this theory of a self-determining power is sometimes held to
+another cause. There is in all human beings the consciousness of a power
+more or less developed to regulate their own actions; and this process
+of self-regulation is held to be inconsistent with the deterministic
+theory. There can be no doubt that there is such a consciousness and we
+think there can be no doubt also that there is such a power. The
+superficial evolutionist, indeed, may admit the consciousness, which he
+may explain as a secondary aspect of conflicting nerve-currents, and
+laugh in his sleeve at the egotistic vanity of a trustful man proud of
+his power of Will. But we think a deeper explanation, and one more
+commensurate with the phenomena, is to be found: and this brings us back
+to the distinction, as indicated at the outset of this section, between
+theories of Will or Volition, and theories of Free Will or the power of
+regulating one's own conduct.
+
+Will, in its scientific sense, is merely volition, _i.e._ the mental
+state accompanying or immediately preceding action. The nature of the
+action, good, bad, or indifferent, is immaterial. Technically speaking,
+all volitions are equal, viewed as such. The volition for the time being
+is the Will for the time being. The Will of a man is the totality of his
+volitions during the whole of his lifetime. It is a general or
+collective term relating to conscious actions, or states of
+consciousness immediately preceding actions, and is not the name of an
+entity.
+
+But if Will is the volition for the time being, irrespective of any
+qualitative characteristic, then we have to inquire as to the
+applicability to it of the term "Free." Now this term is antithetical to
+the two terms "restrained" and "constrained." Thus if a man's actions
+are hindered or forcefully prevented by the Will of others, that man's
+actions are not free. But if some of a man's motives are restrained or
+his actions constrained by the predominance of some other of his
+motives--as, for instance, when he performs actions which his conscience
+tells him are wrong--in his Will not free? The actions are his
+volitions. If some motives are restrained, and therefore not to be
+considered free, still the others which have gained the predominance
+have thereby become his Will; their operation proves their non-restraint
+or freedom, and the volition or Will is still free. The action is an
+evidence of freedom. Volition is always free. It is of different kinds,
+but this does not affect the conclusion that volition proves its own
+freedom. The Will is always and under all circumstances free.
+
+But although this disposes of the question theoretically, the ordinary
+man remains unconvinced, and clings to his belief in a Free Will, which
+is not merely this technical and universal Free Will, but must be
+interpreted as a power he feels himself to possess of choosing and
+determining his own actions; and if we say to him, "Undoubtedly you have
+this power; but your choice, and therefore your volition and consequent
+action, is still determined in the same manner as if you had not
+recognized the power," he will demur, and, logically or illogically, he
+will deny your position, and hold to his consciousness of what he calls
+his self-determining power over his own actions, which he places out of
+the line of Determinism, however unmeaning or paradoxical his assertions
+may be proved to be.
+
+It is this state of consciousness, this clinging to the belief held by
+many men in their own _power of self-rule_ over their own general
+conduct, and by most men in their own control over some of their
+activities, that Evolution is bound to account for and explain.
+Evolutionists do not sufficiently mark off this _practical_ part of the
+question from the _theoretical_ part, and thus leave imperfectly
+explained the consciousness of the so-called "Free Will." They deem
+that the explanation of Free Will is included in an explanation of Will,
+and therefore they only deal incidentally and imperfectly with
+self-rule. The confusion arises from the term Free Will having two
+meanings--the theoretic or scientific one, as opposed to Determinism,
+and the practical one, as implying the power of self-rule, choice,
+effort, and determination.
+
+That there exists such a power of self-regulation is a fact recognized
+in every department of social intercourse--in the attribution of praise
+or blame, in the teachings of the moralist, in the eye of the law, and
+in the process of education. Every individual is supposed to have a
+command over his own actions, except such as are purely automatic. It is
+not supposed that men are responsible for their congenital tastes or
+abilities; but all members of the community are held responsible for
+their actions towards other members of the community, and to a certain
+extent they are judged to be wise or foolish with regard to themselves,
+on the supposition that they are able to carry out a purposed conduct.
+And even if in various particulars it is seen that they do not possess
+such a power, they, or the persons responsible for their earlier
+education are blamed for their want of this power since it is held to be
+one of the most characteristic and valuable possessions of humanity.
+Thus we find the judicious parent, from the very first, endeavours to
+inculcate in the child habits of command over his temper and his
+appetites. The youth who has received the lessons of wise counsellers,
+who has been imbued with the lessons of Christianity, who has drunk in
+the teachings of the ancient moralists, and framed his ambitions upon
+the severe examples of early Greece and Rome, or who has found his
+sympathies excited by the dreams of modern philanthropy, knows that the
+foundation of all his personal greatness is in his power of
+self-command. It is no idle verbiage that of the rhetorician, the
+preacher, the philosophical novelist, the poet, when they exhort to the
+cultivation of the powers of the Will in their varied representations of
+the aspirations and struggles of noble humanity. There is something that
+calls forth the moralist's sympathies in the poet's appeals to the power
+of Will, and there is no grander spectacle in all this universe than to
+witness the battle of the will-power of a man against difficulties and
+oppositions of all sorts; none the less if the scene of the conflict be
+in the region of his own heart and mind, rather than in the wider field
+of the battle of life.
+
+The evolutionist is bound to account for this amongst the other
+phenomena of human existence. The principles of such an evolution are
+contained in Mr. Spencer's "Psychology," but the development is not
+elaborated in detail, and is well worthy of a special study. We have
+previously roughly indicated the outlines of such a study; and as the
+special psychological question has been treated in an interesting and
+suggestive manner by the Rev. T. W. Fowle in the number of the
+"Nineteenth Century" for March 1881, we will find it convenient to take
+this article as the text or basis of our own remarks.
+
+The writer's argument appears in brief to be this. In the course of
+Evolution, man became self-conscious (see p. 392). This consciousness of
+self led, first of all, to self-preservation, then to self-assertion,
+and finally to self-pleasing. "When man first uttered the words or
+rather felt the impression to which language subsequently gave definite
+shape and force, '_I will_ live in spite of all the forces encompassing
+my destruction,' then was Free Will created upon the earth."
+
+Note here, that Will is changed to Free Will in the course of a single
+sentence, and that this "Free Will" is simply human action predominant
+over external difficulties, which should therefore rather be called
+Will, and is certainly not the Free Will or self-rule which we have now
+under consideration. Hence arises a certain amount of confusion, as
+witness p. 393:--"We ascribe, then, man's consciousness of _Free Will_
+to the concentration of all his pre-human experiences into one
+imperative determination to preserve, to assert, and to please himself."
+Thus, "Free Will," in the mind of the writer, is simply the human Will
+as opposed to the forces of nature. Nothing is said about the exterior
+opposing wills of others, though surely he must intend them also to be
+included in the environment. At the same time we do not know that it
+makes the particular point under consideration more difficult of study,
+although these external wills form a considerable part of the objects
+determining the activities of the self. Yet, as our particular point of
+study is _self_-rule, this extension of the reference to external forces
+does not directly affect the argument.
+
+But it will be seen that the Will or Free Will mentioned here, and
+defined as self-assertion and determination to please one's self, is
+self-assertion as opposed to environment--a self-assertion which,
+irrespective of the qualities or nature of the motives comprised in that
+self, determines to work out its own pleasure there and then in spite of
+all opposition. Such a state is well illustrated in the first
+self-assertions of childhood--its so-called _wilfulness_; for as
+embryology illustrates the stages of biological evolution, so does
+childhood illustrate the stages of mental and moral evolution. This
+self-assertion is also illustrated in the conduct of the insane and of
+the rude, rough, uneducated minds of the masses. Still it is not what is
+meant by Free Will, but the very reverse; for such persons are said to
+be slaves to their passions or motives. This is undoubtedly Egoistic
+_Will_; and therefore theoretically, as before distinguished, it is
+_free_: but it is not the Free Will, the self-rule we are now in search
+of. This sort of self-assertion is the determination to please oneself,
+_irrespective of consequences_. But when it is known that consequences
+recoil upon self--when the _element of time_ is taken into account, and
+the self is found to be continuous, then there is reflection, and
+by-and-by succeeds caution, restraint, and the co-ordination of actions
+to a given end. This is the germ of self-rule which is mistakenly
+regarded as identical with the self-determination of volition.
+
+The term "self-preservation" has a wide and also a restricted sense. It
+may simply mean the continuance in existence of the body; or if the self
+is equivalent to the preservation of the activities comprised in that
+self, _whatever those activities may be_--lust, hate, benevolence,
+æsthetic feeling, &c.--then it implies the continuous gratification of
+those activities. This understanding of self-preservation is dependent
+on the length of time for which the self is expected to continue. The
+religious man, believing in a God and a future life, preserves what he
+esteems his self--_i.e._, his moral and religious being--even in
+martyrdom. But if there is no future life, then the self that has to be
+preserved is the self as it is, whatever that may happen to be--gross or
+refined.
+
+There are no better recognised traits of Free Will--_i.e._,
+self-rule--than the power of self-denial, self-abnegation,
+self-sacrifice. These cannot be explained by any definition of Free Will
+founded on self-assertion and self-preservation merely. Then, again,
+self-education, the designed alteration of the character, and the
+intentional acquirement of self-control, can hardly be held to be
+consistent with simple self-assertion. Self-assertion is the assertion
+of self as it is. The resolution to alter is the denial of
+self-preservation as regards the existing self. The adaptation to
+environment involved in self-abnegation is the opposite to
+self-assertion.
+
+Are we to suppose that the Free Will predicated of man is an universal
+possession of all? If it is a _theoretical_ question, it must be granted
+that all men's wills are free. But if it is a practical question as to
+the strength of the Will as opposed to external forces, and held to be
+free in proportion to its relative strength of self-assertion, surely
+Free Will is a variable quality. If, again, it is a practical question
+as to the power of self-rule, are we to suppose that all men have it in
+equal degrees? Do the idiot and the maniac possess it, or on the
+contrary is it possessed unequally by men, and by some not at all?
+
+The writer says, p. 391, "Now, from the moment that self became an
+object of consciousness, it became also a motive."
+
+This consciousness of self is a consciousness of the totality of the
+activities, a consciousness of the unity of that totality, a
+consciousness of the continuance of that totality for a more or less
+certain future. The motive consequent upon such recognition must be the
+longest continuance of that self, the greatest amount of gratification
+of the activities of that self, the avoidance of pains to that self, and
+the aggregation of more activities by that self.
+
+The result of that motive would be the co-ordination of actions to
+attain the final end thus set before the total self, and the
+subordination of particular motives to their proper places in the
+co-ordinative scheme. But as the total self is in relation to
+environment, that environment, physical or societarian, has to be taken
+into account; and as consequences of actions recoil upon the individual
+at a later time, the results of actions have to be taken into account.
+Therefore there is brought into activity a large amount of rational
+consideration and judgment as to the eventualities of conduct in regard
+to the 'total self'; and finally it is found that action must take one
+of two forms: either the environment must be adjusted to the
+organism--this is a form of Will--or the organism must be adjusted to
+the environment--this is Free Will or self-rule--_i.e._, the Free Will
+as here understood. This is the solution implied in the writer's
+statement that "from the moment that self became an object of
+consciousness it became also a motive."
+
+This rational view of self as an aggregate of faculties and motives
+likely to last a certain length of time, and surrounded by a social
+environment which has in great measure formed it, and which exercises
+upon it a continual pressure, brings forward the relation of Free Will
+to Ethics in the fact that the acquired power of self-rule has to take
+into account, in-so-far as it exists in the individuals forming the
+social coercions and approvals, and in so far as the Ego approaches the
+normal standard of regulating his own sympathies, which together in an
+instructed community make up personal responsibility to the ethical law,
+and supply the ethical as distinguished from the merely altruistic
+motive.
+
+The evolutionist's definition of life is "the continuous adjustment of
+inner to outer relation," or of organism to environment. The principles
+and results of this continuous adjustment, in the modifications of
+structure and function, and their transmission by heredity in gradually
+more permanently established forms, is well understood from the writings
+of Mr. Darwin, Mr. Spencer, and others.
+
+The progress of development in the human race has consisted in the
+_establishment of correspondences_ of a definite and permanent character
+between organism and environment. Why it should have been possible for
+such a grand development to take place as that which has actually taken
+place lies beyond the limits of our subject; but if Evolution is true,
+the fact remains that the human organism has continually been increasing
+the number of its correspondences, in accordance with the increasing
+complexity of its surroundings. Roughly, this establishment of relations
+with the external world may be classed under two divisions, each
+containing a great variety of details. Firstly, the class of cognitions,
+including the knowledge of the physical world, the field, the forest,
+the stream, the animals, the sky and heavenly bodies, and also the
+knowledge of men, and their ways in society; secondly, the class of
+direct relations with other individuals, such as the relations of wife,
+children, parents, chiefs, involving also property, and inducing the
+feelings of love, friendship, hate, justice, and other social
+affections.
+
+The establishment of a correspondence between the organism and the
+environment, of such a definite character as to be transmitted by
+heredity, involves the establishment of motives. The stomach without
+food experiences hunger, a want, and forms a motive. So of the other
+organs, and so of all other established relations inwoven in the
+organism. However subtle and refined any established relation may be,
+but less in proportion to its later order of development, and directly
+as its necessity to existence, so its force. It experiences a want in
+respect of its correlate, and this want becomes a motive or incentive to
+its own gratification.
+
+The kinds of actions, then, may be distinguished as--
+
+The Functional, such as the action of the heart, the intestines, &c.
+These are wholly involuntary.
+
+The Emotional Involuntary, such as the feelings and desires, and the
+muscular expression of some of them, as in laughing, crying, &c.
+
+The Emotional Volitional, or actions proceeding from the emotions, and
+constraining the muscles to the means of their gratification.
+
+Here must be added the Rational Volitional; and if the rational choice
+of actions and ordering of conduct, in which the emotions and passions
+play a subordinate part as factors in a general estimate or judgment,
+can be interpreted as a recognition of "self as an object," and the
+establishment of a correspondence therewith, then the "motive of self"
+as advanced by the essayist may be considered as the highest motive of
+the Emotional Volitional class. Thus self as an enduring whole becomes
+established as the predominating object in the mind of the Ego, towards
+which object or ideal attainment in continuity, and in expansiveness of
+relation the motives of the individual turn--co-ordinating to it all the
+more special motives; and evolving in a higher degree the powers of
+self-rule.
+
+In this manner Self-Rule or Free Will is explained and vindicated as a
+natural possession of humanity and one of its highest and most
+characteristic attainments. At the same time it is found to be
+consistent with a Deterministic scheme and not to require the assistance
+of an incomprehensible Self-Determining Power on the part of the Ego.
+The Deterministic theory as regards the actions and conduct of an
+individual is not, however, so narrow in its purview as this. It
+recognises a great many kinds of conditions as the more or less direct
+or remote causes of actions. It recognises--
+
+_Heredity_, by which the physical qualities, and emotional and
+intellectual tendencies, of the parents, more or less obscurely known on
+account of intermixture, are transmitted to the offspring. The child is
+born with a certain inherited constitution, containing potentially
+within it a course of development through certain physiological changes
+up to decay and old age. This constitution is one of a definite
+character, having definite proportions of parts, as of head, chest,
+abdomen, &c., and definite relations of systems, such as nervous,
+vascular, muscular, visceral, &c., and partly as a consequence of this
+the child also possesses mental and moral tendencies which, while very
+susceptible of influence, are primarily derived by heredity.
+
+_Action of Environment._--From the moment of birth, (or sooner), the
+organism comes into relation with very complex conditions, which
+variously affect its course of development. The suitable or unsuitable
+conditions of the mother's health, food, warmth, sleep, &c., influence
+the development of the child; and thenceforward all through life the
+conditions of nourishment, diet, climate, exposure, disease, accident,
+&c., have strong and recognisable effects upon the organism, physical
+and mental.
+
+_General Tuition_, or the education by contact with the members of the
+family, playmates, companions, and the great body of the individuals of
+the environment with whom the child or youth comes into contact, into
+the general tone and principles of his age, country, class, or sect,
+gradually fashioning him into a certain pattern, shaping the general
+mode of his life, and forming within him certain standards of action,
+certain codes of obligation, moral or ceremonial, certain customs,
+fashions, &c., as well as implanting in him the convictions, theological
+or otherwise, of his time.
+
+_Special Tuition._--Tuition affects the whole of the activities of the
+individual according to the nature of the training, its suitability or
+unsuitability, its persistence, and the force exerted. The value of a
+long course of direct education is well understood in all civilised
+communities, and in modern times is recognised as one of the great means
+of effecting the general improvement of society, if only it could be
+thoroughly applied.
+
+_The Education of Circumstances_ affects not only the physical
+constitution, but also very much the mental and moral qualities of the
+individual. And as these circumstances are widely varied and the
+hereditary tendencies very different, the results will be widely diverse
+in different individuals; but there is no doubt that a condition of
+poverty or of affluence, good or ill usage, neglect or over-governing, a
+solitary or a social condition, surroundings of town or country, status
+of parents, nature of and facilities for amusements and studies, the
+degree of early responsibilities, the kind of business occupation or
+other avocation, all largely affect the conduct and modify the motives
+of the individual.
+
+And it is wonderful in a highly developed and complex state of society,
+where the possession of great wealth creates a large leisure class, and
+the enormous activity pervading the whole ever tends to put the
+organisms included into every possible relation with the outer world,
+and with every relation that can grow up in its own complex social
+mixture--it is wonderful, we say, in such circumstances, the number of
+motives that will grow up. The relations extend to the past and the
+future. The most paltry, evanescent, and adventitious relations become
+more or less motives of action, and grow more or less established in the
+individual and more or less transmitted to posterity. Besides the great
+number of these relationships, there is the difference of kind. Many are
+of a concrete sort; as for instance, the love of dogs, horses, &c.;
+others are of a very abstract description. These latter are principally
+the outcome of social and intellectual relationships. They are
+generalisations of conduct, or they are abstractions of the intellect.
+Virtue, ideal conduct, justice, beauty, truth, science, philosophy, a
+perfected humanity, all become realised abstractions, as it were, with
+which a relation is established, and which, therefore, assume the guise
+of motives seeking their means of gratification. We recognize the fact
+that abstractions may become objects of motives, as distinct from the
+concrete objects which are definitely in relation with corresponding
+affections of the organism. These abstractions grow into definite parts
+of self, and, if they largely predominate in an individual, he will
+become a martyr rather than abandon his devotion to them. He will esteem
+them the principal part of self, and let his body perish rather than act
+against them. Such organic abstractions may, indeed, become the objects
+of the most powerful passions, before which concrete objects sink into
+utter insignificance. We have found that the recognition of the
+continuous or "total self" can become such an object and induce the
+establishment of a corresponding motive.
+
+At the outset, we distinguish the province of Reason, in which is
+included the calculation of the results of actions, and the devising of
+the best means for accomplishing a desired end without incurring pains
+and inconveniences. If a certain end is desired, the intellect has to
+forecast the outcome of different modes for effecting the desired
+result, and to discern that which secures the end with the fewest
+drawbacks. The end may be good or bad; the motives may be of the most
+elevated and generous character or they may be of the worst; but all the
+same, it must be duly considered what is the best means of securing it.
+What would be the result if I did this? on the other hand, would it not
+be better to do that? It will be seen that here there is no choice
+between motives, no dispute to settle between conflicting principles and
+passions, but only a kind of mental calculus or intellectual
+engineering. This state of the mind is sometimes taken to be the
+exercise of a choice, and it may be so; but it is of a different kind to
+that involved in self-rule, which we now approach.
+
+As a power of very gradual growth must we regard that cognition, (with
+its subsequent establishment as an object and a motive in the human
+organism) which recognises the Self as a whole--as a whole at any given
+time, and as a whole extending over seventy years, and perhaps
+indefinitely longer!
+
+Man's total self can become an object of thought and that object a
+motive, as distinguished from any of the particular motives of which it
+is made up. Man's future self may be an object of thought as well as the
+present; and man's Continuous Self may become a constant and
+all-predominating object of regard and interest--an all-absorbing
+motive. Indeed, so far may this go, that the long continuous self
+prospected after death may and has been so much an object of motive as
+to overshadow and dwarf every interest of the present. And if this
+Continuous Self is recognised by the Reason as the complete object, the
+one and chief motive--and it must be so since it includes every motive
+at every instant of time--then the Reason accords to it and claims for
+it a _ruling_ position, a claim before which every other must give way.
+There is no doubt that this is substantially taught, although in
+different terms of exposition, in all ethical books and in all verbal
+precepts of good counsel.
+
+The psychogeny of this development of the continuous self into an object
+and a motive is to be found in the intellectual recognition of the
+actual order displayed by nature in the processes of life. It is the
+harmonising of the volitional actions with the laws of natural change.
+We have seen that the process of life is the continuous adaptation of
+organism to environment. But this is a natural, non-volitional process.
+Change in the environment produces change of organism to correspond with
+it. When cognitions are developed the sequences of action are foreseen,
+the changes of environment are foreseen, the developments of organism
+are foreseen; a generalisation is made of all the factors, and logical
+conclusions drawn as to the necessary adaptations. Then follows a
+rational or intentional adaptation of organism and environment, due to
+the motive of Self which we have just considered; this rational or
+intentional adaptation may be either incidental or continuous, and the
+adaptation may be either of organism or of environment. And in this
+calculus the relation of the individual to the mass of individuals
+constituting society must be taken into account.
+
+A man having regard to his continuous self finds himself in a certain
+position. The motive relating to the continuous self determines that his
+conduct shall be regulated by the best regard for that continuous self.
+And it must be admitted at once that technically it is not qualitatively
+related to any abstraction, such as virtue, &c., unless, indeed, virtue
+be interpreted as the establishment of such a harmony, but has regard
+purely to the establishment of the most harmonious correspondence
+between himself and his environment for the remainder of his life. It
+might be that such a resolve would result in a system of ethics, but we
+wish to limit the consideration to our special subject.
+
+And, in the first place, we must recognise the _quantitative_ character
+of such an adaptation. The self is surrounded by an enormous and highly
+complex environment; but it may, from heredity, or want of education, or
+perverse education, be a very narrow, poor, meagre, little self, having
+very few, weak, feeble correspondences with the environment. A pig in
+his stye may be well adjusted to his environment; but his
+correspondences with the external world are few in number and of small
+intensity. We would therefore assert with Mr. Spencer as a corollary
+from the continuous adjustment of the organism and the environment, not
+merely the establishment of a convenient _modus vivendi_, but an
+adjustment of the organism by enlargement of the number of its
+correspondences with the environment, so as to render the adjustment
+between organism and environment more perfect by making the former
+co-extensive with the latter. In proportion to the number of points of
+interest or correspondences established between organism and
+environment, so is the perfection of the continuous self. In this manner
+then Free Will or Self-Rule in its very nature is related to the
+conception of a continuous self towards which it acts as the object of a
+motive, and possesses also an ethical bearing with regard to the
+enlargement of the correspondences with the external world. For what is
+there of greater interest in the external world than the subjective
+individuals of our surroundings, the society of which we form a part,
+the mysterious past out of which we came and the dependent nations of
+the future which we are helping to make?
+
+It is evident that in thus setting up the continuous self as an object,
+whose realisation is to be the ruling power in the regulation of
+conduct, (whether this self be the complete self we have just
+contemplated, or the incomplete self which we may happen to be, and to
+be pretty well contented with,) a certain amount of self-regulation will
+always be necessary in order to effect the object in view, and at
+occasional crises a very great amount of struggle and effort will have
+to be exerted in order to put down the influence of some active motive
+which would, by its hasty and blind gratification, mar the result of
+that line of conduct already decided upon as the best. Here will come in
+the conflict of passion with reason, and of impulse with prudence, which
+is really of the greatest practical interest in our study.
+
+And here we find, as one of the chief motives in such a conflict, the
+motive of _regard for the continuous self_. It is not always a ruling
+motive. It is best that it should be so. The object of education and
+self-culture is to make it so. But at any rate it is a motive, and a
+strong one. In proportion to its predominance is the amount of
+self-rule, of self-control, and, as we read it, of Free Will.
+
+Thus the rational regard for self becomes recognised as a motive. The
+Rational Volitional becomes the Emotional Volitional. It has been
+recognised in many philosophies under various names, advanced sometimes
+as a motive, sometimes as the very self of self, and sometimes
+designated by the term "self-determining power," &c.; but its true
+character and genesis is best explained by Evolution.
+
+The great practical question is this: Has man the power of choice
+amongst motives? Has he the vaunted power of self-rule? and can he
+cultivate it?
+
+We can only reply that, as a matter of fact, some men have it and some
+have not; that some have in some respects and not in others. As a matter
+of possibility, most men may attain in a considerable degree to the
+power of self-rule by judicious self-culture: and in the education of
+the young, more particularly in home education, a very high standard in
+this respect may be attained. Some feeble minds and flighty or
+impassioned natures, as well as idiots, may not be able to reach it, and
+some fools may lose it after they have got it; but as a general rule
+and a safe fact for all to accept, we may say that a high degree of
+self-rule may by most people be attained, and that the possession of it
+is for the most part happiness.
+
+Adopting, then, the statement of the essayist, "from the moment that
+self became an object of consciousness it became also a motive," we
+would add the element of time and recognise a continuous self. Then,
+placing the statement in a subordinate position, as part of the general
+evolution of life--which is the continuous adjustment of organism and
+environment--and acknowledging the growth of reason, we would define the
+course of action which results from all these factors as _the rational
+quantitative and continuous adjustment of organism and environment_.
+This is the Evolutionist formula of Free Will or self-rule.
+
+Thus the consciousness of choice and of the power of self-rule receives
+an explanation on the Evolution of Deterministic hypothesis in this
+respect, that the recognition of the continuous self as an object of
+thought and an important object of interest and regard, _becomes thereby
+a motive determining action and conduct_, even against the immediate
+urgencies of passion. Determinism is thus acknowledged to be a correct
+theory: but the dignity of the claim for self-rule and free choice is
+vindicated, and the attainment of it by most people is shown to be both
+desirable and feasible.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+EVOLUTION, ETHICS, AND RELIGION.
+
+
+The recognition of the ultimate tendencies of evolution suggests two
+further enquiries, one as to the personal relation with the far-off
+result, and one as to the origin of such a definite progress.
+
+Perhaps the consideration of the former question is bound up in the
+latter. Nevertheless, within the scope of the former more limited
+enquiry, the Comtists are content to rest. For them the narrow limits of
+history and its immediate outlook are sufficient. What is actually
+recorded of humanity, and what is actually revealed in it, together with
+the indications of its possibilities, suffice for the creed of the
+Comtist. The Positivist produced by Evolution worships his Cause under
+the name of humanity, and works towards Mr. Spencer's evolutionist
+ideal. He seeks no justification in philosophy. The product of
+Evolution--he acts from inward impulse and requires no authority. He has
+none to appeal to in the inculcation of his worship, but the natural
+response to be found in the hearts of those who occupy the same
+intellectual and sympathetic position. But this is after all only a
+partial grasp of the fundamental problem of history. It is an
+abandonment, temporary or otherwise, of the intellectual problem,
+although it is a recognition of the onward sweep of humanitarian
+Evolution. The history and the tendencies are alike sought to be
+explained by the philosophy of the Evolutionist. What, then, is the
+position of the Evolutionist in regard to the problem of religion, and
+what practical bearing has it upon Ethics or moral obligation?
+
+The answer to these questions depends upon what is meant by the theory
+of Evolution. If by Evolution is meant a complete system of explanations
+by which all the events comprised in all departments of human knowledge,
+stretching throughout the whole of history recorded and surmised, are
+intelligibly accounted for as the results of the interrelation of
+primordial factors, of which we have a clear apprehension, insomuch that
+the logical order becomes a picture of the historical order, then our
+estimate of Evolution depends upon our estimate of the original factors.
+If they are held to be some seventy in number, and to be those elements
+of which a full account is given in chemistry, and to be subject to
+general laws, such as those described in works on physics, then our
+regard for Evolution must be one due to the reverence we possess for
+chemistry, electricity, heat, gravitation, and the like, and our conduct
+must be made to conform--if we wish to coincide with the eventual
+tendencies of evolution--with what we judge to be the ultimate
+tendencies of the evolution of these factors, namely, their ultimate
+equilibration in universal quiescence. Life, according to this view, is
+an interruption of the process, and a contradiction of cosmical
+intention.
+
+This view of evolution is not saved by the theory that behind these
+chemical affinities and physical relations there is an unknowable power
+of which they are but the manifestations: for the power is not
+unknowable if its manifestations are limited to these known
+manifestations; and if they are not so limited, but operate in other
+ways with new factors, not comprised in our estimate of them, then our
+explanatory system is at fault, and has to be abandoned or amended. The
+recognition of an unknowable power behind chemistry and physics, yet
+limited by the laws of chemistry and physics, is equal only to our
+estimate of chemistry and physics. We could but address it as Oh my Lord
+Chemistry! Oh my Lord Physics!
+
+But we have shown in our previous criticisms that this view of
+evolution, as dealing with purely physical factors, is inadequate to
+explain the cosmical histories. We have criticised adversely Mr.
+Spencer's attempts so to explain biological development; and we have
+indicated the necessity for supposing that other superior factors are
+present in biological evolution. We do not know that Mr. Spencer
+disputes it--his work is too vague and inconsistent to enable us to say
+precisely what he does and what he does not teach. But the admission of
+additional factors does not destroy the theory of evolution. Darwin and
+Spencer and the modern school have established, beyond dispute, the fact
+of orderly development in the cosmos. We are forced, therefore, to admit
+both evolution and the presence in it, so far as Biology is concerned,
+and probably also as regards all the changes anterior to the beginnings
+of life, of a factor over and above the chemical and physical factors.
+The nature of this factor we do not know, nor do we know how, as having
+an orderly relation to chemical and physical events, its law is to be
+expressed in such a manner as to enable us to understand how organisms
+arose and were developed. Here, indeed, we can recognise a power, and an
+inscrutable one: but inasmuch as it is inscrutable it spoils our
+philosophy--our systems of explanations--and laughs at our formulas.
+
+But after all, if we succeed in establishing purposive actions as
+incidents in a process of equilibration, what have we gained? We have
+gained a scientific explanation of all purposive actions as well as of
+all actions of organisms in general. They all stand upon the same
+footing--that is to say they are all equally explicable as parts of the
+universal process. They are all equally equilibrations, and so justified
+in their order of occurrence. They rank alike as incidents in a line of
+causation explicable by the law of equilibration.
+
+Apparently all that is, is right. Equilibration does not recognise any
+distinction as to the quality of actions. This distinction can be
+explained by equilibration, but cannot be justified by it as a law for
+future conduct, any more than any other incident of the course of
+equilibration. If certain laws of living become established, then moving
+equilibria capable of recognising this fact must act accordingly--they
+must adapt themselves to the environment: but this does not prevent the
+organism from adapting the environment to itself, if it can, by changing
+it or overcoming it--this is merely a matter of equilibration. The law
+of Biology will allow it to cope with an adverse environment in many
+ways, namely, by conformity, by escape so as to preserve its
+individuality, and by altering or overcoming the environment. If the
+forces of the environment be powerful and omnipresent, then conformity
+is the only resource. It is only a matter of superiority of force, and
+the resulting conformity is merely a matter of equilibration. It is not
+that equilibration lends any special sanctity or quality to certain
+actions. Social pressure coerces individual pressure--the mutual
+coercion of society is equilibration--the result of this equilibration,
+whatever it is, is a variable Ethics. The recognition of great duties
+and great faults, the facts of moral approbation and condemnation, the
+phenomena of a private and public conscience are all explicable as
+equilibrations: but since whatever is, is an equilibration, it is not
+from the laws of equilibration that any established moral distinction or
+obligation can be justified for guidance for a single day in advance.
+There is no universality, either in place or time in Ethics thus viewed.
+The justification of Ethics from the evolution point of view must be
+sought on other grounds than in that of a cosmical equilibration.
+
+It is difficult to say what support is rendered to practical Ethics by
+the theory of Evolution. According to it, Ethics is a history and a
+prediction; but failing the existence in any individual (as the result
+of a growth) of the moral sense for which Evolution professes to
+account, the prediction only applies to future generations; and it is
+difficult to see that practical Ethics has for such a person any
+intrinsic authority. And even if the moral sense, and social pressure
+(which are respectively the intrinsic and the extrinsic authority, for
+practical Ethics) are sufficient of themselves to enforce moral conduct,
+then the understanding of how they both came to possess such a power of
+command, lends them no additional authority, but rather tends, at first
+sight, to detract from their sacred prestige. The confidence of the
+philosopher is however soon restored, when he considers that despite the
+failure of his theory to intellectually establish moral enforcements,
+nevertheless, the great forces which have produced both the intrinsic
+and the extrinsic ethical authorities are still at work, and must more
+and more prevail. If these are natural growths the movement in the
+hearts of men, and in societarian organization, will ever prevail over
+and above all reasoning about them. Individual opposition and
+restiveness will be levelled before the might of the advance. The
+individual must obey or perish; indeed he must himself change and become
+part of the coercive power.
+
+Thus it will be found that the apprehension which Mr. Spencer expresses
+in his preface, as to the loss of a controlling agency in the decay and
+death of an older regulative system is not met by the establishment of a
+new controlling agency which takes the place of the discarded authority,
+but may be met by the fact disclosed in evolution, that whatever
+authority men may recognise, nay, even if they do not recognise any, it
+is all the same--they are part and parcel of an onward growth against
+which it is useless to rebel. The moral authority is the conviction of
+the inevitable. Thus evolution dispels the fear of a moral anarchy by
+showing the necessity for the existence of present and future moral
+order, ensured alike by extrinsic social organization, and by a no less
+certain prevalence of intrinsic motives. Thus, though evolution lends
+but little additional theoretical force to moral argument, it shows
+forth the power of natural ethical authority, and declares with
+convincing efficacy, "magna est veritas et prævalebit."
+
+The moral imperative is found to be firstly extrinsic in social
+pressure, and secondly intrinsic in altruistic sympathy. These are the
+only authorities competent to say: "Thus shalt thou do, and thus shalt
+thou not do." Evolution establishes no absolute morality. It is always
+relative to the surroundings, and it differs according to the stage of
+civilization. The more nearly the conduct approaches the relatively
+perfect the more truly ideal is it. The imagined ideal is not so perfect
+as the relatively perfect. According as a necessity is universal, so is
+the degree of moral enforcement which accompanies it, and the degree of
+accord in the recognition of its imperativeness. The sanctity of life,
+the condemnation of these who infringe it, the commendation of those who
+promote it are of first eminence. Liberty, Property, and other
+essentials receive little less recognition; and so on by degrees down to
+the small details of everyday life. The kind of moral imperative is the
+same throughout, the degree of enforcement differing according to the
+varying importance of the actions.
+
+As this point very properly comes in the Evolutionist's view of
+religion. We take, as our text on this subject, the speech by Professor
+Fiske at the Spencer banquet held in New York, November 9th, 1882, and
+since published in the form of a tractette.[15]
+
+Professor Fiske here pursues Mr. Spencer's faulty plan of generalising
+all religions, and assuming the common or fundamental content as a true
+finding, besides holding that the fundamental truths of science are
+identical with this final deliverance of religion. It is not that
+Professor Fiske's argument is bad, but that it is badly put. If we
+confine ourselves to the scientific view, and say that the universe
+manifests an orderly development; that it is probably altogether the
+result of the relations of primordial factors; but that of these we can
+form no adequate conception although, nevertheless, they undoubtedly
+contained something of the elements of a subjective nature--then we do
+not transgress the scientific view. Neither do we so transgress when, by
+inductions from the history of man, we assert that the law of
+development of the subjective is towards altruistic sympathy,
+quantitative increase of life, and social harmony or equilibration. Mr.
+Matthew Arnold's recognition of "an eternal power, not ourselves, that
+makes for righteousness" is as near an approach to the truth as we can
+get. Mr. Spencer's formula should be "an unknowable power, not
+ourselves, that makes towards equilibrium." The question, thereupon
+arises, Is the subjective a factor in a process of equilibration, and is
+righteousness subjective equilibration? The question also arises in the
+latter case, Is the "makes for" or "makes towards" a teleological aiming
+at an end, or a process determined completely by antecedent factors of
+which it is but the outcome?
+
+It is difficult to imagine under a system of evolution, even if an
+universal subjective factor be admitted, the operation of a teleological
+activity as ordinarily understood. Nevertheless, we find a teleological
+faculty evolved in man. And even if we accept Mr. Matthew Arnold's
+description, the question arises, Has the eternal power a conscious
+intention of making towards righteousness from the first or from any
+time? Or is it implicit in the original relations of the subjective to
+the chemical and physical that it makes through Biology towards
+righteousness--is righteousness merely another expression for a
+completed biological law involved in the original relations of atoms
+with an omnipresent subjective and relative factor?
+
+And again, what, scientifically viewed, is our personal relation to
+that inscrutable power which makes for righteousness? Here comes in the
+ethical problem as affected by the religious, and both as affected by
+our views of evolution. Professor Fiske says of the propositions
+recognised by all religions "that men ought to do certain things and
+ought to refrain from doing certain other things; and that the reason
+why some things are wrong to do and other things are right to do, is in
+some mysterious but very real way connected with the existence and
+nature of this divine Power."
+
+The fact that personal responsibility to the inscrutable Power belongs
+to the essence of all religions is one thing, and the establishment of
+it as a scientific truth is another. The fact of its existence and of
+its universality is a presumption in its favour, but is not more than a
+presumption. What has science to say to it? With this point Professor
+Fiske next deals. He says that science, after all its searchings, finds,
+in its ultimate enquiries, not only inexplicable laws whose effects it
+can calculate though the laws themselves remain unexplained, but also
+long processes which are not explicable by the known laws, and which
+will probably remain for ever inexplicable. If he does not say so in
+those words, we presume that must be what he means: for if he only means
+that all cosmical histories are explicable by known laws, these laws
+being themselves inexplicable, the inscrutable or Divine Power is only
+antecedent to cosmical histories, and is not present in them, nor does
+it affect the future. Nevertheless, what Professor Fiske has to say of
+the results of scientific enquiry does not amount to much. "The doctrine
+of evolution asserts, as the widest and deepest truth which the study of
+nature can disclose to us, that there exists a power to which no limit
+in time or space is conceivable, and that all the phenomena of the
+universe, whether they be what we call material or what we call
+spiritual phenomena, are manifestations of this infinite and eternal
+Power."
+
+But this scientific truth does not in its mere enunciation bear upon the
+question as to our ethical relationship to the Unknown Power. It is only
+when we study its spiritual or subjective manifestation as an orderly
+development that we can recognise a power to which we owe a moral
+obligation. The scientific evidence of moral obligation to the
+inscrutable power rests, not upon the recognition of the power of which
+the cosmos is a manifestation, nor upon the fact of its inscrutability,
+but upon the knowledge of the subjective factor, its manifested history,
+and the inductions to be drawn from a study of that history in the laws
+of the working of altruistic sympathy, of quantitative life, and of the
+harmony of life as already set forth. Professor Fiske's conclusion is a
+good statement of this scientific establishment of personal
+responsibility to the divine power, and of religion as the crown and
+sanction of Ethics.
+
+"Now, science began to return a decisively affirmative answer to such
+questions as these when it began, with Mr. Spencer, to explain moral
+beliefs and moral sentiments as products of evolution. For clearly, when
+you say of a moral belief or a moral sentiment that it is a product of
+evolution, you imply that it is something which the universe through
+untold ages has been labouring to bring forth, and you ascribe to it a
+value proportionate to the enormous effort that it has cost to produce
+it. Still more, when with Mr. Spencer we study the principles of right
+living as part and parcel of the whole doctrine of the development of
+life upon the earth; when we see that, in an ultimate analysis, that is
+right which tends to enhance fulness of life, and that is wrong which
+tends to detract from fulness of life--we then see that the distinction
+between right and wrong is rooted in the deepest foundations of the
+universe; we see that the very same forces, subtle, exquisite, and
+profound, which brought upon the scene the primal germs of life and
+caused them to unfold, which through countless ages of struggle and
+death have cherished the life that could live more perfectly, and
+destroyed the life that could only live less perfectly, and humanity,
+with all its hopes, and fears, and aspirations, has come into being as
+the crown of all this stupendous work--we see that these very same
+subtle and exquisite forces have wrought into the very fibres of the
+universe those principles of right living which it is man's highest
+function to put into practice. The theoretical sanction thus given to
+right living is incomparably the most powerful that has ever been
+assigned in any philosophy of Ethics. Human responsibility is made more
+strict and solemn than ever, when the eternal power that lives in every
+event of the universe is thus seen to be in the deepest possible sense
+the author of the moral law that should guide our lives, and in
+obedience to which lies our only guarantee of the happiness which is
+incorruptible--which neither inevitable misfortune nor unmerited obloquy
+can ever take away."
+
+This appears to us the best statement yet made of the logical results of
+the enquiry into Evolution when pursued to its furthest point. Some
+enquirers halt at the materialistic point, but an irresistible logic
+leads the honest and open-minded enquirer beyond this stage of thought,
+and he finds in the recognition of the existence of the subjective, and
+in the history of its development, a law of spiritual life. He finds a
+law of relation in subjective individuals which induces the
+establishment of a quantitative life in the increase of the number of
+correspondences with the external world both in Time and Space, and,
+which induces also the establishment of altruistic feeling--a feeling
+that expands to a greater or less comprehension of the great life of the
+subjective throughout the cosmical history; and in this recognition he
+finds also a sense of personal responsibility towards a Power which
+demands from him a surrender, so that he shall work towards its great
+ideal, and find his happiness therein. What more there may be in natural
+religion is beyond the scope of our present volume, though we hope at
+same future time to treat of this important subject. Our present view is
+limited to the consideration of Ethics, and how that science is affected
+by the recent large generalisations of Biological history. Certain
+definite conclusions of a religious character have come forward as the
+result of our studies, and since these have an ethical import, it is
+necessary to refer to them in this place.
+
+Nevertheless the study of Evolution assists Ethics, although it can
+bring no argument to bear upon those who possess little moral
+aspiration, and can add nothing to the forcefulness of social pressure.
+Its _point d'appui_ is in the existence in most men of the moral
+aspirations. Through them it will work upon individuals of their
+environment, and upon the teachers and legislators who form and guide
+society. To them is disclosed the fact that their aspirations coincide
+with the tendencies of nature. They find that they are going with the
+stream, are in fact part of the historic stream itself. They recognise
+in society three movements. The first is the growth of altruism or
+sympathy. The second is the enlargement of quantititive life. The third
+is the approach towards a harmony or equilibration of life. The
+recognition of these truths imparts a deeper faith in moral progress,
+and gives a greater breadth of view, and a more intelligent and
+charitable interpretation of human action. Philosophers, teachers, and
+statesmen, understanding the movements of society from age to age, and
+discerning the goal to which it inevitably works, can read more
+intelligently its primary phases, and assist more skilfully in its
+onward movement. The more extended recognition of the social aim
+throughout society will guide and increase social pressure in a
+corresponding direction, not only in the proper application of social
+rewards and penalties, but in the ethical inculcations, and eventually
+in the hereditarily established intrinsic motives.
+
+Nor will prophets, the ripest fruit of evolution, be wanting in the
+future. Ages produce not only the working results but the religious
+voices. There are always men who give utterance to the thought and to
+the aspirations of their time. Standing in the fore-front of the
+advancing race, they face the mysterious darkness of the future
+illumined but by the lights drawn from the Power working through the
+subjective history.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[15] "Evolution and Religion," by John Fiske, M.A., LL.B. London: J. C.
+Foulger, The Modern Press, 1882. Price Twopence.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+SUMMARY.
+
+
+Whether we consider Biology as a process of equilibration of physical
+factors in a state of moving equilibrium, (including in this formula the
+process of reproduction and heredity to which biologically speaking the
+life of a species is limited--which equilibration explanation includes
+an equilibration of forces, as well as an equilibration of motives,
+respecting which our conceptions are as yet very indefinite and vague,)
+or on the other hand consider that the facts of Biology require us to
+include in our explanatory moving equilibrium theory an equilibration of
+subjective factors with each other, and with the physical forces
+concerned, it is clear in either case that the dominant law of Biology
+as set forth by Mr. Spencer is that of Equilibration.
+
+The place to be assigned to Purpose in a process of equilibration is not
+very clear. In the first place, if the biological explanations are all
+strictly limited to the chemical and physical factors, it seems evident
+that there can be no purposive actions, since all actions are determined
+by the chemical and mechanical relations of molecules, masses of
+molecules, and organised masses of molecules. To say that what we call
+purposive actions are explicable by physical and mechanical laws is to
+abolish purpose and substitute physical causation. Can purpose by any
+means be made lineable in such a sequence? The problem is a fair one to
+consider and to attempt. We fail to do it, and we think that all who
+have attempted it have failed.
+
+But if a subjective factor is admitted into the problem, then it is
+necessary to understand in what way it becomes part of, and in what way
+it affects, a process of equilibration on the part of a moving
+equilibrium in which it is a factor. The peculiar nature of a biological
+moving equilibrium, and the respect in which it differs from a physical
+or mechanical moving equilibrium, consists in the fact that it works
+towards, if indeed it does not purposely aim at self-continuance by
+assimilation of force and self-continuance by means of self-protection
+from adverse forces in the environment. The coincidence of the
+subjective element with this tendency, in many equilibria, is suggestive
+of an efficient connexion. Yet if we do not understand the law of the
+relation of a subjective factor with the physical and mechanical
+factors, how can we understand the resultant process of equilibration
+and the necessity for the biological law of adaptations for
+self-preservation and self-protection? How can we understand Purpose as
+an equilibration?
+
+Ethics to be affiliated upon the cosmical process requires that we
+should understand how purposive actions can be so affiliated, for Ethics
+relates to purposive actions. In the failure of such a logical
+connexion, we may understand Ethics on partial and limited grounds, but
+we do not understand it as Mr. Spencer proposes we should understand it,
+namely, as part of the cosmical process.
+
+According to Mr. Spencer, we are bound to accept Ethics as part of the
+process of cosmical equilibration for this is after all the main
+conception of Mr. Spencer's great work. The apparent and ostensible
+conception, and that with which he has most succeeded in impressing the
+public mind, is the principle of evolution or gradual development; but
+we must not lose sight of the fact that what he proposed to accomplish
+was an explanation of evolution, and not merely the establishment of its
+historical verity. This explanation is in terms of equilibration. That
+conception lies behind and above the celebrated "Formula of Evolution,"
+and by means of it the fanciful law of the moving equilibrium is posited
+as the ruling principle of biological change and development, as well as
+of physical changes proper. The biological law, or law of the moving
+equilibrium, rules supreme over all actions and developments of
+organisms: and even if an additional factor of subjectivity is present
+as one of the forces which equilibrate in a moving equilibrium, it is,
+nevertheless, subject to the laws of equilibration. It is not yet made
+clear how the law of equilibration, which necessitates that all forces
+should come to a state of rest in as speedy a time as possible, can be
+changed into a biological law working in the antagonistic direction of
+the self-preservation of a set of motions, and their self-protection
+against a possible cessation or extinction, with the addition of means
+of reproduction in view of an eventual cessation or extinction. But it
+is these biological actions, some of them purposive, and some of them
+perhaps not consciously purposive, which have to be properly shown as
+part of the cosmical process of equilibration, before purposive actions,
+and therefore, before Ethics can be explained upon cosmical principles.
+
+
+
+
+ERRATA.
+
+
+Page xiii, lines 1 and 13, for "actors" read "factors."
+
+Page ii, line 18, for "he bridges over" read "he is supposed to bridge
+over."
+
+Page 38, line 27, at the end, delete "in the."
+
+Page 43, heading, for "The Philosophical View" read "The Biological
+View."
+
+Page 47, line 27, for "Ethics" read "of Ethics."
+
+Page 51, line 7, for "ætheticism" read "æstheticism."
+
+Page 74, line 14, for "eges" read "egos."
+
+Page 88, line 28, for "pervented" read "prevented."
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's On Mr. Spencer's Data of Ethics, by Malcolm Guthrie
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 56721 ***