diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/56060-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/56060-0.txt | 6327 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 6327 deletions
diff --git a/old/56060-0.txt b/old/56060-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 48a9395..0000000 --- a/old/56060-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6327 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Presidential Problems, by Grover Cleveland - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Presidential Problems - -Author: Grover Cleveland - -Release Date: November 27, 2017 [EBook #56060] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PRESIDENTIAL PROBLEMS *** - - - - -Produced by Wayne Hammond and The Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - PRESIDENTIAL - PROBLEMS - - BY - - GROVER CLEVELAND - - - [Illustration] - - - NEW YORK - THE CENTURY CO. - 1904 - - - Copyright, 1904, by THE CENTURY CO. - - Copyright, 1900, 1901, by - GROVER CLEVELAND - - Copyright, 1904, by - THE S. S. MCCLURE CO. - - Copyright, 1904, by - THE CURTIS PUBLISHING COMPANY - - _Published October, 1904_ - - THE DE VINNE PRESS - - - - -PUBLISHER’S NOTE - - -Of the four essays comprised in this volume, two were originally -delivered as addresses at Princeton University. The other two appeared -first in the magazines. - -All have now been revised thoroughly by Mr. Cleveland, in preparation -for their appearance in book form. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - CHAPTER PAGE - - I THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE 3 - - II THE GOVERNMENT IN THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF 1894 79 - - III THE BOND ISSUES 121 - - IV THE VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY 173 - - - - -PREFACE - - -In considering the propriety of publishing this book, the fact has not -been overlooked that the push and activity of our people’s life lead -them more often to the anticipation of new happenings than to a review -of events which have already become a part of the nation’s history. -This condition is so naturally the result of an immense development -of American enterprise that it should not occasion astonishment, and -perhaps should not be greatly deprecated, so long as a mad rush for -wealth and individual advantage does not stifle our good citizenship -nor weaken the patriotic sentiment which values the integrity of our -Government and the success of its mission immeasurably above all other -worldly possessions. - -The belief that, notwithstanding the overweening desire among our -people for personal and selfish rewards of effort, there still exists, -underneath it all, a sedate and unimpaired interest in the things -that illustrate the design, the traditions, and the power of our -Government, has induced me to present in this volume the details of -certain incidents of national administration concerning which I have -the knowledge of a prominent participant. - -These incidents brought as separate topics to the foreground of -agitation and discussion the relations between the Chief Executive -and the Senate in making appointments to office, the vindication and -enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, the protection of the soundness -and integrity of our finances and currency, and the right of the -general Government to overcome all obstructions to the exercise of its -functions in every part of our national domain. - -Those of our people whose interest in the general features of the -incidents referred to was actively aroused at the time of their -occurrence will perhaps find the following pages of some value for -reference or as a means of more complete information. - -I shall do no more in advocacy of the merits of this book than to say -that as a narrative of facts it has been prepared with great care, and -that I believe it to be complete and accurate in every essential detail. - - GROVER CLEVELAND. - - - - -THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE - - -I - -In dealing with “The Independence of the Executive,” I shall refer -first of all to the conditions in which the Presidency of the United -States had its origin, and shall afterward relate an incident within -my own experience involving the preservation and vindication of an -independent function of this high office. - -When our original thirteen States, actuated by “a decent respect for -the opinions of mankind,” presented to the world the causes which -impelled them to separate from the mother country and to cast off -all allegiance to the Crown of England, they gave prominence to the -declaration that “the history of the present King of Great Britain is -a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct -object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these States.” -This was followed by an indictment containing not less than eighteen -counts or accusations, all leveled at the King and the King alone. -These were closed or clenched by this asseveration: “A Prince whose -character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant is -unfit to be the ruler of a free people.” In this arraignment the -English Parliament was barely mentioned, and then only as “others,” -with whom the King had conspired by “giving his assent to their act of -pretended legislation,” and thus giving operative force to some of the -outrages which had been put upon the colonies. - -It is thus apparent that in the indictment presented by the thirteen -colonies they charged the King, who in this connection may properly be -considered as the Chief Executive of Great Britain, with the crimes and -offenses which were their justification for the following solemn and -impressive decree: - - We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of - America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the - Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude of our intentions, - do, in the name and by the authority of the good People of - these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare that these United - Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent - States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the - British Crown, and that all political connection between them - and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally - dissolved; and that as free and independent States they have - full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, - establish commerce, and do all other acts and things which - independent States may of right do. And for the support of this - Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine - Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our - fortunes, and our sacred honor. - -To this irrevocable predicament had the thirteen States or colonies -been brought by their resistance to the oppressive exercise of -executive power. - -In these circumstances it should not surprise us to find that when, -on the footing of the Declaration of Independence, the first scheme -of government was adopted for the revolted States, it contained -no provision for an executive officer to whom should be intrusted -administrative power and duty. Those who had suffered and rebelled -on account of the tyranny of an English King were evidently chary of -subjecting themselves to the chance of a repetition of their woes -through an abuse of the power that might necessarily devolve upon an -American President. - -Thus, under the Articles of Confederation, “The United States of -America,” without an executive head as we understand the term, came to -the light; and in its charter of existence it was declared that “the -articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every -State, and the Union shall be perpetual.” - -Let us not harbor too low an opinion of the Confederation. Under its -guidance and direction the war of the Revolution was fought to a -successful result, and the people of the States which were parties -to it became in fact free and independent. But the Articles of -Confederation lacked the power to enforce the decree they contained of -inviolable observance by every State; and the union, which under their -sanction was to be permanent and lasting, early developed symptoms of -inevitable decay. - -It thus happened that within ten years after the date of the Articles -of Confederation their deficiencies had become so manifest that -representatives of the people were again assembled in convention to -consider the situation and to devise a plan of government that would -form “a more perfect union” in place of the crumbling structure which -had so lately been proclaimed as perpetual. - -The pressing necessity for such action cannot be more forcibly -portrayed than was done by Mr. Madison when, in a letter written a -short time before the convention, he declared: - - Our situation is becoming every day more and more critical. No - money comes into the Federal treasury; no respect is paid to - the Federal authority; and people of reflection unanimously - agree that the existing Confederacy is tottering to its - foundation. Many individuals of weight, particularly in the - Eastern district, are suspected of leaning towards monarchy. - Other individuals predict a partition of the States into two or - more confederacies. - -It was at this time universally conceded that if success was to -follow the experiment of popular government among the new States, the -creation of an Executive branch invested with power and responsibility -would be an absolutely essential factor. Madison, in referring to the -prospective work of the convention, said: - - A national executive will also be necessary. I have scarcely - ventured to form my own opinion yet, either of the manner in - which it ought to be constituted, or of the authorities with - which it ought to be clothed. - -We know that every plan of government proposed or presented to -the convention embodied in some form as a prominent feature the -establishment of an effective Executive; and I think it can be safely -said that no subject was submitted which proved more perplexing and -troublesome. We ought not to consider this as unnatural. Many members -of the convention, while obliged to confess that the fears and -prejudices that refused executive power to the Confederacy had led to -the most unfortunate results, were still confronted with a remnant of -those fears and prejudices, and were not yet altogether free from the -suspicion that the specter of monarchy might be concealed behind every -suggestion of executive force. Others less timid were nevertheless -tremendously embarrassed by a lack of definite and clear conviction as -to the manner of creating the new office and fixing its limitations. -Still another difficulty, which seems to have been all-pervading and -chronic in the convention, and which obstinately fastened itself -to the discussion of the subject, was the jealousy and suspicion -existing between the large and small States. I am afraid, also, that -an unwillingness to trust too much to the people had its influence -in preventing an easy solution of the executive problem. The first -proposal made in the convention that the President should be elected by -the people was accompanied by an apologetic statement by the member -making the suggestion that he was almost unwilling to declare the mode -of selection he preferred, “being apprehensive that it might appear -chimerical.” Another favored the idea of popular election, but thought -it “impracticable”; another was not clear that the people ought to act -directly even in the choice of electors, being, as alleged, “too little -informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to -deception”; and again, it was declared that “it would be as unnatural -to refer the choice of a proper character for Chief Magistrate to the -people as it would to refer a trial of colors to a blind man.” - -A plan was first adopted by the convention which provided for the -selection of the President by the Congress, or, as it was then called, -by the National Legislature. Various other plans were proposed, but -only to be summarily rejected in favor of that which the convention -had apparently irrevocably decided upon. There were, however, among -the members, some who, notwithstanding the action taken, lost -no opportunity to advocate, with energy and sound reasons, the -substitution of a mode of electing the President more in keeping with -the character of the office and the genius of a popular government. -This fortunate persistence resulted in the reopening of the subject -and its reference, very late in the sessions of the convention, to a -committee who reported in favor of a procedure for the choice of the -Executive substantially identical with that now in force; and this was -adopted by the convention almost unanimously. - -This imperfect review of the incidents that led up to the establishment -of the office of President, and its rescue from dangers which -surrounded its beginning, if not otherwise useful, ought certainly to -suggest congratulatory and grateful reflections. The proposition that -the selection of a President should rest entirely with the Congress, -which came so near adoption, must, I think, appear to us as something -absolutely startling; and we may well be surprised that it was ever -favorably considered by the convention. - -In the scheme of our national Government the Presidency is -preëminently the people’s office. Of course, all offices created by -the Constitution, and all governmental agencies existing under its -sanction, must be recognized, in a sense, as the offices and agencies -of the people--considered either as an aggregation constituting the -national body politic, or some of its divisions. When, however, I now -speak of the Presidency as being preëminently the people’s office, -I mean that it is especially the office related to the people as -individuals, in no general, local, or other combination, but standing -on the firm footing of manhood and American citizenship. The Congress -may enact laws; but they are inert and vain without executive impulse. -The Federal courts adjudicate upon the rights of the citizen when their -aid is invoked. But under the constitutional mandate that the President -“shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” every citizen, -in the day or in the night, at home or abroad, is constantly within the -protection and restraint of the Executive power--none so lowly as to be -beneath its scrupulous care, and none so great and powerful as to be -beyond its restraining force. - -In view of this constant touch and the relationship thus existing -between the citizen and the Executive, it would seem that these -considerations alone supplied sufficient reason why his selection -should rest upon the direct and independent expression of the people’s -choice. This reason is reinforced by the fact that inasmuch as Senators -are elected by the State legislatures, Representatives in Congress -by the votes of districts or States, and judges are appointed by the -President, it is only in the selection of the President that the body -of the American people can by any possibility act together and directly -in the equipment of their national Government. Without at least this -much of participation in that equipment, we could hardly expect that a -ruinous discontent and revolt could be long suppressed among a people -who had been promised a popular and representative government. - -I do not mean to be understood as conceding that the selection of a -President through electors chosen by the people of the several States, -according to our present plan, perfectly meets the case as I have -stated it. On the contrary, it has always seemed to me that this plan -is weakened by an unfortunate infirmity. Though the people in each -State are permitted to vote directly for electors, who shall give voice -to the popular preference of the State in the choice of President, the -voters throughout the nation may be so distributed, and the majorities -given for electors in the different States may be such, that a minority -of all the voters in the land can determine, and in some cases actually -have determined, who the President should be. I believe a way should be -devised to prevent such a result. - -It seems almost ungracious, however, to find fault with our present -method of electing a President when we recall the alternative from -which we escaped, through the final action of the convention which -framed the Constitution. - -It is nevertheless a curious fact that the plan at first adopted, -vesting in Congress the presidential election, was utterly inconsistent -with the opinion of those most prominent in the convention, as well -as of all thoughtful and patriotic Americans who watched for a happy -result from its deliberations, that the corner-stone of the new -Government should be a distinct division of powers and functions -among the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches, with the -independence of each amply secured. Whatever may have been the real -reasons for giving the choice of the President to Congress, I am sure -those which were announced in the convention do not satisfy us in this -day and generation that such an arrangement would have secured either -the separateness or independence of the Executive department. I am glad -to believe this to be so palpable as to make it unnecessary for me to -suggest other objections, which might subject me to the suspicion of -questioning the wisdom or invariably safe motives of Congress in this -relation. It is much more agreeable to acknowledge gratefully that a -danger was avoided, and a method finally adopted for the selection of -the Executive head of the Government which was undoubtedly the best -within the reach of the convention. - -The Constitution formed by this convention has been justly extolled by -informed and liberty-loving men throughout the world. The statesman -who, above all his contemporaries of the past century, was best able -to pass judgment on its merits formulated an unchallenged verdict when -he declared that “the American Constitution is the most wonderful work -ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man.” - -We dwell with becoming pride upon the intellectual greatness of the -men who composed the convention which created this Constitution. They -were indeed great; but the happy result of their labor would not have -been saved to us and to humanity if to intellectual greatness there had -not been added patriotism, patience, and, last but by no means least, -forbearing tact. To these traits are we especially indebted for the -creation of an Executive department, limited against every possible -danger of usurpation or tyranny, but, at the same time, strong and -independent within its limitations. - -The Constitution declares: “The executive power shall be vested in a -President of the United States of America,” and this is followed by a -recital of the specific and distinctly declared duties with which he is -charged, and the powers with which he is invested. The members of the -convention were not willing, however, that the executive power which -they had vested in the President should be cramped and embarrassed by -any implication that a specific statement of certain granted powers and -duties excluded all other executive functions; nor were they apparently -willing that the claim of such exclusion should have countenance in the -strict meaning which might be given to the words “executive power.” -Therefore we find that the Constitution supplements a recital of the -specific powers and duties of the President with this impressive and -conclusive additional requirement: “He shall take care that the laws be -faithfully executed.” This I conceive to be equivalent to a grant of -all the power necessary to the performance of his duty in the faithful -execution of the laws. - -The form of Constitution first proposed to the convention provided that -the President elect, before entering upon the duties of his office, -should take an oath, simply declaring: “I will faithfully execute the -office of President of the United States.” To this brief and very -general obligation there were added by the convention the following -words: “and will to the best of my judgment and power preserve, -protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Finally, -the “Committee on Style,” appointed by the convention, apparently to -arrange the order of the provisions agreed upon, and to suggest the -language in which they would be best expressed, reported in favor of an -oath in these terms: “I will faithfully execute the office of President -of the United States, and will to the best of my ability preserve, -protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States”; and this -form was adopted by the convention without discussion, and continues to -this day as the form of obligation which binds the conscience of every -incumbent of our Chief Magistracy. - -It is therefore apparent that as the Constitution, in addition to -its specification of especial duties and powers devolving upon -the President, provides that “he shall take care that the laws be -faithfully executed,” and as this was evidently intended as a general -devolution of power and imposition of obligation in respect to any -condition that might arise relating to the execution of the laws, so -it is likewise apparent that the convention was not content to rest -the sworn obligation of the President solely upon his covenant to -“faithfully execute the office of President of the United States,” but -added thereto the mandate that he should preserve, protect, and defend -the Constitution, to the best of his judgment and power, or, as it was -afterward expressed, to the best of his ability. Thus is our President -solemnly required not only to exercise every power attached to his -office, to the end that the laws may be faithfully executed, and not -only to render obedience to the demands of the fundamental law and -executive duty, but to exert all his official strength and authority -for the preservation, protection, and defense of the Constitution. - - * * * * * - -I have thus far presented considerations which while they have to do -with my topic are only preliminary to its more especial and distinct -discussion. In furtherance of this discussion it now becomes necessary -to quote from the Constitution the following clause found among its -specification of presidential duty and authority: - - And he shall nominate, and by and with the advice of the Senate - shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, - judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the - United States whose appointments are not herein otherwise - provided for, and which shall be established by law. - -This clause was the subject of a prolonged and thorough debate in -Congress which occurred in the year 1789 and during the first session -of that body assembled under the new Constitution. - - -II - -The question discussed involved distinctly and solely the independent -power of the President under the Constitution to remove an officer -appointed by him by and with the advice of the Senate. The discussion -arose upon a bill then before the Congress, providing for the -organization of the State Department, which contained a provision that -the head of the department to be created should be removable from -office by the President. This was opposed by a considerable number on -the ground that as the Senate coöperated in the appointment, it should -also be consulted in the matter of removal; it was urged by others that -the power of removal in such cases was already vested in the President -by the Constitution, and that the provision was therefore unnecessary; -and it was also contended that the question whether the Constitution -permitted such removal or not should be left untouched by legislative -action, and be determined by the courts. - -Those insisting upon retaining in the bill the clause permitting -removal by the President alone, claimed that such legislation would -remove all doubt on the subject, though they asserted that the absolute -investiture of all executive power in the President, reinforced by -the constitutional command that he should take care that the laws be -faithfully executed, justified their position that the power already -existed, especially in the absence of any adverse expression in the -Constitution. They also insisted that the removal of subordinate -officers was an act so executive in its character, and so intimately -related to the faithful execution of the laws, that it was clearly -among the President’s constitutional prerogatives, and that if it was -not sufficiently declared in the Constitution, the omission should be -supplied by the legislation proposed. - -In support of these positions it was said that the participation of the -Senate in the removal of executive officers would be a dangerous step -toward breaking down the partitions between the different departments -of the Government which had been carefully erected, and were regarded -by every statesman of that time as absolutely essential to our national -existence; and stress was laid upon the unhappy condition that would -arise in case a removal desired by the President should be refused -by the Senate, and he thus should be left, still charged with the -responsibility of the faithful execution of the laws, while deprived -of the loyalty and constancy of his subordinates and assistants, who, -if resentful of his efforts for their removal, would lack devotion -to his work, and who, having learned to rely upon another branch -of the Government for their retention, would be invited to defiant -insubordination. - -At the time of this discussion the proceedings of the Senate took -place behind closed doors, and its debates were not published, but its -determinations upon such questions as came before it were made public. - -The proceedings of the other branch of the Congress, however, were -open, and we are permitted through their publication to follow the very -interesting discussion of the question referred to in the House of -Representatives. - -The membership of that body included a number of those who had been -members of the Constitutional Convention, and who, fresh from its -deliberations, were necessarily somewhat familiar with its purposes and -intent. Mr. Madison was there, who had as much to do as any other man -with the inauguration of the convention and its successful conclusion. -He was not only especially prominent in its deliberations, but -increased his familiarity with its pervading spirit and disposition by -keeping a careful record of its proceedings. In speaking of his reasons -for keeping this record he says: - - The curiosity I had felt during my researches into the history - of the most distinguished confederacies, particularly those - of antiquity, and the deficiency I found in the means of - satisfying it, more especially in what related to the process, - the principles, the reasons and the anticipations which - prevailed in the formation of them, determined me to preserve - as far as I could an exact account of what might pass in the - convention while executing its trust, with the magnitude of - which I was duly impressed, as I was by the gratification - promised to future curiosity, by an authentic exhibition of - the objects, the opinions and the reasonings from which a new - system of government was to receive its peculiar structure - and organization. Nor was I unaware of the value of such a - contribution to the fund of materials for the history of a - Constitution on which would be staked the happiness of a - people great in its infancy and possibly the cause of liberty - throughout the world. - -This important debate also gains great significance from the fact that -it occurred within two years after the completion of the Constitution, -and before political rancor or the temptations of partizan zeal had -intervened to vex our congressional counsels. - -It must be conceded, I think, that all the accompanying circumstances -gave tremendous weight and authority to this first legislative -construction of the Constitution in the first session of the first -House of Representatives, and that these circumstances fully warranted -Mr. Madison’s declaration during the debate: - - I feel the importance of the question, and know that our - decision will involve the decision of all similar cases. The - decision that is at this time made will become the permanent - exposition of the Constitution, and on a permanent exposition - of the Constitution will depend the genius and character of the - whole Government. - -The discussion developed the fact that from the first a decided -majority were of the opinion that the Executive should have power of -independent removal, whether already derived from the Constitution -or to be conferred by supplementary legislation. It will be recalled -that the debate arose upon the clause in a pending bill providing that -the officer therein named should “be removable by the President,” -and that some of the members of the House, holding that such power -of removal was plainly granted to the Constitution, insisted that it -would be useless and improper to assume to confer it by legislative -enactment. Though a motion to strike from the bill the clause objected -to had been negatived by a large majority, it was afterward proposed, -in deference to the opinions of those who suggested that the House -should go no further than to give a legislative construction to the -Constitution in favor of executive removal, that in lieu of the words -contained in the bill, indicating a grant of the power, there should -be inserted a provision for a new appointment in case of a vacancy -occurring in the following manner: - - Whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from - office by the President of the United States, or in any other - case of vacancy. - -This was universally acknowledged to be a distinct and unequivocal -declaration that, under the Constitution, the right of removal was -conferred upon the President; and those supporting that proposition -voted in favor of the change, which was adopted by a decisive majority. -The bill thus completed was sent to the Senate, where, if there was -opposition to it on the ground that it contained a provision in -derogation of senatorial right, it did not avail; for the bill was -passed by that body, though grudgingly, and, as has been disclosed, -only by the vote of the Vice-President, upon an equal division of the -Senate. It may not be amiss to mention, as adding significance to the -concurrence of the House and the Senate in the meaning and effect of -the clause pertaining to removal as embodied in this bill, that during -that same session two other bills creating the Treasury Department -and the War Department, containing precisely the same provision, were -passed by both Houses. - -I hope I shall be deemed fully justified in detailing at some length -the circumstances that led up to a legislative construction of the -Constitution, as authoritative as any surroundings could possibly make -it, in favor of the constitutional right of the President to remove -Federal officials without the participation or interference of the -Senate. - -This was in 1789. In 1886, ninety-seven years afterward, this question -was again raised in a sharp contention between the Senate and the -President. In the meantime, as was quite natural perhaps, partizanship -had grown more pronounced and bitter, and it was at that particular -time by no means softened by the fact that the party that had become -habituated to power by twenty-four years of substantial control of the -Government, was obliged, on the 4th of March, 1885, to make way in the -executive office for a President elected by the opposite party. He -came into office fully pledged to the letter of Civil Service reform; -and passing beyond the letter of the law on that subject, he had said: - - There is a class of government positions which are not within - the letter of the Civil Service statute, but which are so - disconnected with the policy of an administration, that the - removal therefrom of present incumbents, in my opinion, should - not be made during the terms for which they were appointed, - solely on partizan grounds, and for the purpose of putting - in their places those who are in political accord with the - appointing power. - -The meaning of this statement is, that while, among the officers not -affected by the Civil Service law, there are those whose duties are so -related to the enforcement of the political policy of an administration -that they should be in full accord with it, there are others whose -duties are not so related, and who simply perform executive work; and -these, though beyond the protection of Civil Service legislation, -should not be removed merely for the purpose of rewarding the party -friends of the President, by putting them in the positions thus made -vacant. An adherence to this rule, based upon the spirit instead of -the letter of Civil Service reform, I believe established a precedent, -which has since operated to check wholesale removals solely for -political reasons. - -The declaration which I have quoted was, however, immediately followed -by an important qualification, in these terms: - - But many men holding such positions have forfeited all just - claim to retention, because they have used their places for - party purposes, in disregard of their duty to the people; - and because, instead of being decent public servants, they - have proved themselves offensive partizans and unscrupulous - manipulators of local party management. - -These pledges were not made without a full appreciation of the -difficulties and perplexities that would follow in their train. It -was anticipated that party associates would expect, notwithstanding -Executive pledges made in advance, that there would be a speedy and -liberal distribution among them of the offices from which they had been -inexorably excluded for nearly a quarter of a century. It was plainly -seen that many party friends would be disappointed, that personal -friends would be alienated, and that the charge of ingratitude, the -most distressing and painful of all accusations, would find abundant -voice. Nor were the difficulties overlooked that would sometimes -accompany a consistent and just attempt to determine the cases in -which incumbents in office had forfeited their claim to retention. That -such cases were numerous, no one with the slightest claim to sincerity -could for a moment deny. - -With all these things in full view, and with an alternative of escape -in sight through an evasion of pledges, it was stubbornly determined -by the new Executive that the practical enforcement of the principle -involved was worth all the sacrifices which were anticipated. And while -it was not expected that the Senate, which was the only stronghold left -to the party politically opposed to the President, would contribute an -ugly dispute to a situation already sufficiently troublesome, I am in a -position to say that even such a contingency, if early made manifest, -would have been contemplated with all possible fortitude. - -The Tenure of Office act, it will be remembered, was passed in 1867 for -the express purpose of preventing removals from office by President -Johnson, between whom and the Congress a quarrel at that time raged, so -bitter that it was regarded by sober and thoughtful men as a national -affliction, if not a scandal. - -An amusing story is told of a legislator who, endeavoring to persuade -a friend and colleague to aid him in the passage of a certain measure -in which he was personally interested, met the remark that his bill -was unconstitutional with the exclamation, “What does the Constitution -amount to between friends?” It would be unseemly to suggest that in the -heat of strife the majority in Congress had deliberately determined to -pass an unconstitutional law, but they evidently had reached the point -where they considered that what seemed to them the public interest and -safety justified them, whatever the risk might be, in setting aside -the congressional construction given to the Constitution seventy-eight -years before. - -The law passed in 1867 was exceedingly radical, and in effect -distinctly purported to confer upon the Senate the power of preventing -the removal of officers without the consent of that body. It was -provided that during a recess of the Senate an officer might be -suspended only in case it was shown by evidence satisfactory to the -President, that the incumbent was guilty of misconduct in office or -crime, or when for any reason he should become incapable or legally -disqualified to perform his duties; and that within twenty days after -the beginning of the next session of the Senate, the President should -report to that body such suspension, with the evidence and reasons for -his action in the case, and the name of the person designated by the -President to perform temporarily the duties of the office. Then follows -this provision: - - And if the Senate shall concur in such suspension and advise - and consent to the removal of such officer, they shall so - certify to the President, who may thereupon remove said - officer, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate - appoint another person to such office. But if the Senate shall - refuse to concur in such suspension, such officer so suspended - shall forthwith resume the functions of his office. - -On the 5th of April, 1869, a month and a day after President Johnson -was succeeded in the Presidency by General Grant, that part of the -act of 1867 above referred to, having answered the purpose for which -it was passed, was repealed, and other legislation was enacted in its -place. It was provided in the new statute that the President might “in -his discretion,” during the recess of that body, suspend officials -until the end of the next session of the Senate, and designate suitable -persons to perform the duties of such suspended officer in the -meantime; and that such designated persons should be subject to removal -in the discretion of the President by the designation of others. The -following, in regard to the effect of such suspension, was inserted in -lieu of the provision on that subject in the law of 1867 which I have -quoted: - - And it shall be the duty of the President within thirty days - after the commencement of each session of the Senate, except - for any office which in his opinion ought not to be filled, to - nominate persons to fill all vacancies in office which existed - at the meeting of the Senate, whether temporarily filled or - not, and also in the place of all officers suspended; and - if the Senate, during such session, shall refuse to advise - and consent to an appointment in the place of any suspended - officer, then, and not otherwise, the President shall nominate - another person as soon as practicable to said session of the - Senate for said office. - -This was the condition of the so-called tenure of office legislation -when a Democratic President was inaugurated and placed in expected -coöperation with a Republican majority in the Senate--well drilled, -well organized, with partizanship enough at least to insure against -indifference to party advantage, and perhaps with here and there a -trace of post-election irritation. - -Whatever may be said as to the constitutionality of the Tenure of -Office laws of 1867 and 1869, certainly the latter statute did not -seem, in outside appearance, to be charged with explosive material -that endangered Executive prerogative. It grew out of a bill for -the absolute and unconditional repeal of the law of 1867 relating -to removals and suspensions. This bill originated in the House of -Representatives, and passed that body so nearly unanimously that -only sixteen votes were recorded against it. In the Senate, however, -amendments were proposed, which being rejected by the House, a -committee of conference was appointed to adjust, by compromise if -possible, the controversy between the two bodies. This resulted in an -agreement by the committee upon the provisions of the law of 1869, -as a settlement of the difficulty. In the debate in the House of -Representatives on the report of the committee, great uncertainty and -differences of opinion were developed as to its meaning and effect. -Even the House conferees differed in their explanation of it. Members -were assured that the proposed modifications of the law of 1867, if -adopted, would amount to its complete repeal; and it was also asserted -with equal confidence that some of its objectionable limitations upon -executive authority would still remain in force. In this state of -confusion and doubt the House of Representatives, which a few days -before had passed a measure for unconditional repeal, with only sixteen -votes against it, adopted the report of the conference committee with -sixty-seven votes in the negative. - -So far as removals following suspensions are concerned, the language of -the law of 1869 certainly seems to justify the understanding that in -this particular it virtually repealed the existing statute. - -The provision permitting the President to suspend only on certain -specified grounds was so changed as to allow him to make such -suspensions “in his discretion.” The requirements that the President -should report to the Senate “the evidence and reasons for his action in -the case,” and making the advice and consent of the Senate necessary -to the removal of a suspended officer, were entirely eliminated; and -in lieu of the provision in the law of 1867 that “if the Senate shall -refuse to concur in such suspension, such officer so suspended shall -forthwith resume the functions of his office,” the law of 1869, after -requiring the President to send to the Senate nominations to fill the -place of officers who had been “in his discretion” suspended, declared -“that if the Senate, during such session, shall refuse to advise and -consent to an appointment in the place of any suspended officer,”--that -is, shall refuse to confirm the person appointed by the President in -place of the officer suspended,--not that “such officer so suspended -shall resume the functions of his office,” but that “then, and not -otherwise, the President shall nominate another person as soon as -practicable to said session of the Senate for said office.” - -It seems to me that the gist of the whole matter is contained in a -comparison of these two provisions. Under the law of 1867 the incumbent -is only conditionally suspended, still having the right to resume his -office in case the Senate refuses to concur in the suspension; but -under the law of 1869 the Senate had no concern with the suspension -of the incumbent, nor with the discretion vested in the President in -reference thereto by the express language of the statute; and the -suspended incumbent was beyond official resuscitation. Instead of the -least intimation that in any event he might “resume the functions of -his office,” as provided in the law of 1867, it is especially declared -that in case the Senate shall refuse to advise and consent to the -appointment of the particular person nominated by the President in -place of the suspended official, he shall nominate another person -to the Senate for such office. Thus the party suspended seems to -be eliminated from consideration, the Senate is relegated to its -constitutional rights of confirming or rejecting nominations as it sees -fit, and the President is reinstated in his undoubted constitutional -power of removal through the form of suspension. - -In addition to what is apparent from a comparison of these two -statutes, it may not be improper to glance at certain phases of -executive and senatorial action since the passage of the law of 1869 -as bearing upon the theory that, so far as it dealt with suspensions -and their effect, if it did not amount to a repeal of the law of 1867, -it at least extinguished all its harmful vitality as a limitation of -executive prerogative. It has been stated, apparently by authority, -that President Grant within seven weeks after his inauguration on the -4th of March, 1869, sent to the Senate six hundred and eighty cases of -removals or suspensions, all of which I assume were entirely proper and -justifiable. I cannot tell how many of the cases thus submitted to the -Senate were suspensions, nor how many of them purported to be removals; -nor do I know how many nominations of new officers accompanying them -were confirmed. It appears that ninety-seven of them were withdrawn -before they were acted upon by the Senate; and inasmuch as the law of -1867 was in force during four of the seven weeks within which these -removals and suspensions were submitted, it is barely possible that -these withdrawals were made during the four weeks when the law of 1867 -was operative, to await a more convenient season under the law of -1869. Attention should be here called, however, to the dissatisfaction -of President Grant, early in his incumbency, with the complexion of -the situation, even under the repealing and amendatory law of 1869. -In his first annual message to the Congress in December, 1869, he -complained of that statute as “being inconsistent with a faithful -and efficient administration of the Government,” and recommended its -repeal. Perhaps he was led to apprehend that the Senate would claim -under its provisions the power to prevent the President from putting -out of office an undesirable official by suspension. This is indicated -by the following sentence in his message: “What faith can an Executive -put in officials forced upon him, and those, too, whom he has suspended -for reason?” Or it may be possible that he did not then appreciate -how accommodatingly the law might be construed or enforced when the -President and Senate were in political accord. However these things may -be, it is important to observe, in considering the light in which the -law of 1869 came to be regarded by both the Executive and the Senate, -that President Grant did not deem it necessary afterward to renew his -recommendation for its repeal, and that at no time since its enactment -has its existence been permitted to embarrass executive action prior to -the inauguration of a President politically opposed to the majority in -the Senate. - -The review which I have thus made of the creation of our national -Executive office, and of certain events and incidents which interpreted -its powers and functions, leads me now to a detailed account of the -incident mentioned by me at the beginning as related to the general -subject under discussion and in which I was personally concerned. -But before proceeding further, I desire to say that any allusion I -may have made, or may hereafter make, recognizing the existence of -partizanship in certain quarters does not arise from a spirit of -complaint or condemnation. I intend no more by such allusions than -to explain and illustrate the matters with which I have to deal by -surrounding conditions and circumstances. I fully appreciate the fact -that partizanship follows party organization, that it is apt to be -unduly developed in all parties, and that it often hampers the best -aspirations and purposes of public life; but I hope I have reached -a condition when I can recall such adverse partizanship as may have -entered into past conflicts and perplexities, without misleading -irritation or prejudice. - - -III - -Immediately after the change of administration in 1885, the pressure -began for the ousting of Republican office-holders and the substitution -of Democrats in their places. While I claim to have earned a position -which entitles me to resent the accusation that I either openly or -covertly favor swift official decapitation for partizan purposes, I -have no sympathy with the intolerant people who, without the least -appreciation of the meaning of party work and service, superciliously -affect to despise all those who apply for office as they would those -guilty of a flagrant misdemeanor. It will indeed be a happy day when -the ascendancy of party principles, and the attainment of wholesome -administration, will be universally regarded as sufficient rewards -of individual and legitimate party service. Much has already been -accomplished in the direction of closing the door of partizanship as -an entrance to public employment; and though this branch of effort in -the public interest may well be still further extended, such extension -certainly should be supplemented by earnest and persuasive attempts to -correct among our people long-cherished notions concerning the ends -that should be sought through political activity, and by efforts to -uproot pernicious and office-rewarding political methods. I am not sure -that any satisfactory progress can be made toward these results, until -our good men with unanimity cease regarding politics as necessarily -debasing, and by active participation shall displace the selfish and -unworthy who, when uninterrupted, control party operations. In the -meantime, why should we indiscriminately hate those who seek office? -They may not have entirely emancipated themselves from the belief that -the offices should pass with party victory; but even if this is charged -against them, it can surely be said that in all other respects they are -in many instances as honest, as capable, and as intelligent as any of -us. There may be reasons and considerations which properly defeat their -aspirations, but their applications are not always disgraceful. I have -an idea that sometimes the greatest difference between them and those -who needlessly abuse them and gloat over their discomfiture, consists -in the fact that the office-seekers desire office, and their critics, -being more profitably employed, do not. I feel constrained to say -this much by way of defending, or at least excusing, many belonging -to a numerous contingent of citizens, who, after the 4th of March, -1885, made large drafts upon my time, vitality, and patience; and I -feel bound to say that in view of their frequent disappointments, and -the difficulty they found in appreciating the validity of the reasons -given for refusing their applications, they accepted the situation -with as much good nature and contentment as could possibly have been -anticipated. It must be remembered that they and their party associates -had been banished from Federal office-holding for twenty-four years. - -I have no disposition to evade the fact that suspensions of officials -holding presidential commissions began promptly and were quite -vigorously continued; but I confidently claim that every suspension -made was with honest intent and, I believe, in accordance with the -requirements of good administration and consistent with prior executive -pledges. Some of these officials held by tenures unlimited as to their -duration. Among these were certain internal-revenue officers who, it -seemed to me, in analogy with others doing similar work but having a -limited tenure, ought to consider a like limited period of incumbency -their proper term of office; and there were also consular officials -and others attached to the foreign service who, I believe it was -then generally understood, should be politically in accord with the -administration. - -By far the greater number of suspensions, however, were made on -account of gross and indecent partizan conduct on the part of the -incumbents. The preceding presidential campaign, it will be recalled, -was exceedingly bitter, and governmental officials then in place were -apparently so confident of the continued supremacy of their party that -some of them made no pretense of decent behavior. In numerous instances -the post-offices were made headquarters for local party committees and -organizations and the centers of partizan scheming. Party literature -favorable to the postmasters’ party, that never passed regularly -through the mails, was distributed through the post-offices as an item -of party service, and matter of a political character, passing through -the mails in the usual course and addressed to patrons belonging to -the opposite party, was withheld; disgusting and irritating placards -were prominently displayed in many post-offices, and the attention -of Democratic inquirers for mail matter was tauntingly directed to -them by the postmaster; and in various other ways postmasters and -similar officials annoyed and vexed those holding opposite political -opinions, who, in common with all having business at public offices, -were entitled to considerate and obliging treatment. In some quarters -official incumbents neglected public duty to do political work, -and especially in Southern States they frequently were not only -inordinately active in questionable political work, but sought to do -party service by secret and sinister manipulation of colored voters, -and by other practices inviting avoidable and dangerous collisions -between the white and colored population. - -I mention these things in order that what I shall say later may be -better understood. I by no means attempt to describe all the wrongdoing -which formed the basis of many of the suspensions of officials that -followed the inauguration of the new administration. I merely mention -some of the accusations which I recall as having been frequently made, -by way of illustrating in a general way certain phases of pernicious -partizanship that seemed to me to deserve prompt and decisive -treatment. Some suspensions, however, were made on proof of downright -official malfeasance. Complaints against office-holders based on -personal transgression or partizan misconduct were usually made to -the Executive and to the heads of departments by means of letters, -ordinarily personal and confidential, and also often by means of verbal -communications. Whatever papers, letters, or documents were received -on the subject, either by the President or by any head of department, -were, for convenience of reference, placed together on department -files. These complaints were carefully examined; many were cast aside -as frivolous or lacking support, while others, deemed of sufficient -gravity and adequately established, resulted in the suspension of the -accused officials. - -Suspensions instead of immediate removals were resorted to, because -under the law then existing it appeared to be the only way that -during a recess of the Senate an offending official could be ousted -from his office, and his successor installed pending his nomination -to the Senate at its next session. Though, as we have already seen, -the law permitted suspensions by the President “in his discretion,” I -considered myself restrained by the pledges I had made from availing -myself of the discretion thus granted without reasons, and felt bound -to make suspensions of officials having a definite term to serve, only -for adequate cause. - -It will be observed further on that no resistance was then made to the -laws pertaining to executive removals and suspensions, on the ground -of their unconstitutionality; but I have never believed that either -the law of 1867 or the law of 1869, when construed as permitting -interference with the freedom of the President in making removals, -would survive a judicial test of its constitutionality. - -Within thirty days after the Senate met in December, 1885, the -nominations of the persons who had been designated to succeed officials -suspended during the vacation were sent to that body for confirmation, -pursuant to existing statutes. - -It was charged against me by the leader of the majority in the Senate -that these nominations of every kind and description, representing -the suspensions made within ten months succeeding the 4th of March, -1885, numbered six hundred and forty-three. I have not verified this -statement, but I shall assume that it is correct. Among the officials -suspended there were two hundred and seventy-eight postmasters, -twenty-eight district attorneys, and twenty-four marshals, and among -those who held offices with no specified term there were sixty-one -internal-revenue officers and sixty-five consuls and other persons -attached to the foreign service. - -It was stated on the floor of the Senate, after it had been in session -for three months, that of the nominations submitted to that body to -fill the places of suspended officials fifteen had been confirmed and -two rejected. - -Quite early in the session frequent requests in writing began to issue -from the different committees of the Senate to which these nominations -were referred, directed to the heads of the several departments having -supervision of the offices to which the nominations related, asking the -reasons for the suspension of officers whose places it was proposed to -fill by means of the nominations submitted, and for all papers on file -in their departments which showed the reasons for such suspensions. -These requests foreshadowed what the senatorial construction of the -law of 1869 might be, and indicated that the Senate, notwithstanding -constitutional limitations, and even in the face of the repeal of the -statutory provision giving it the right to pass upon suspensions by the -President, was still inclined to insist, directly or indirectly, upon -that right. These requests, as I have said, emanated from committees of -the Senate, and were addressed to the heads of departments. As long as -such requests were made by committees I had no opportunity to discuss -the questions growing out of such requests with the Senate itself, -or to make known directly to that body the position on this subject -which I felt bound to assert. Therefore the replies made to committees -by the different heads of departments stated that by direction of -the President they declined furnishing the reasons and papers so -requested, on the ground that the public interest would not be thereby -promoted, or on the ground that such reasons and papers related to a -purely executive act. Whatever language was used in these replies, -they conveyed the information that the President had directed a denial -of the requests made, because in his opinion the Senate could have no -proper concern with the information sought to be obtained. - -It may not be amiss to mention here that while this was the position -assumed by the Executive in relation to suspensions, all the -information of any description in the possession of the Executive or in -any of the departments, which would aid in determining the character -and fitness of those nominated in place of suspended officials, was -cheerfully and promptly furnished to the Senate or its committees when -requested. - -In considering the requests made for the transmission of the reasons -for suspensions, and the papers relating thereto, I could not avoid the -conviction that a compliance with such requests would be to that extent -a failure to protect and defend the Constitution, as well as a wrong to -the great office I held in trust for the people, and which I was bound -to transmit unimpaired to my successors; nor could I be unmindful of a -tendency in some quarters to encroach upon executive functions, or of -the eagerness with which executive concession would be seized upon as -establishing precedent. - -The nominations sent to the Senate remained neglected in the committees -to which they had been referred; the requests of the committees for -reasons and papers touching suspensions were still refused, and it -became daily more apparent that a sharp contest was impending. In -this condition of affairs it was plainly intimated by members of the -majority in the Senate that if all charges against suspended officials -were abandoned and their suspensions based entirely upon the ground -that the spoils belonged to the victors, confirmations would follow. -This, of course, from my standpoint, would have been untruthful and -dishonest; but the suggestion indicated that in the minds of some -Senators, at least, there was a determination to gain a partizan -advantage by discrediting the professions of the President, who, for -the time, represented the party they opposed. This manifestly could be -thoroughly done by inducing him to turn his back upon the pledges he -had made, and to admit, for the sake of peace, that his action arose -solely from a desire to put his party friends in place. - -Up to this stage of the controversy, not one of the many requests made -for the reasons of suspensions or for the papers relating to them had -been sent from the Senate itself; nor had any of them been addressed -to the President. It may seem not only strange that, in the existing -circumstances, the Senate should have so long kept in the background, -but more strange that the Executive, constituting a coördinate branch -of the Government, and having such exclusive concern in the pending -differences, should have been so completely ignored. I cannot think -it uncharitable to suggest in explanation that as long as these -requests and refusals were confined to Senate committees and heads -of departments, a public communication stating the position of the -President in the controversy would probably be avoided; and that, as -was subsequently made more apparent, there was an intent, in addressing -requests to the heads of departments, to lay a foundation for the -contention that not only the Senate but its committees had a right to -control these heads of departments as against the President in matters -relating to executive duty. - -On the 17th of July, 1885, during the recess of the Senate, one George -M. Duskin was suspended from the office of District Attorney for the -Southern District of Alabama, and John D. Burnett was designated as -his successor. The latter at once took possession of the office, and -entered upon the discharge of its duties; and on the 14th of December, -1885, the Senate having in the meantime convened in regular session, -the nomination of Burnett was sent to that body for confirmation. -This nomination, pursuant to the rules and customs of the Senate, was -referred to its Committee on the Judiciary. On the 26th of December, -that committee then having the nomination under consideration, one of -its members addressed a communication to the Attorney-General of the -United States, requesting him, “on behalf of the Committee on the -Judiciary of the Senate and by its direction,” to send to such member -of the committee all papers and information in the possession of the -Department of Justice touching the nomination of Burnett, “also all -papers and information touching the suspension and proposed removal -from office of George M. Duskin.” On the 11th of January, 1886, the -Attorney-General responded to this request in these terms: - - The Attorney-General states that he sends herewith all papers, - etc., touching the nomination referred to; and in reference to - the papers touching the suspension of Duskin from office, he - has as yet received no direction from the President in relation - to their transmission. - -At this point it seems to have been decided for the first time that -the Senate itself should enter upon the scene as interrogator. It -was not determined, however, to invite the President to answer this -new interrogator, either for the protection and defense of his high -office or in self-vindication. It appears to have been also decided at -this time to give another form to the effort the Senate itself was to -undertake to secure the “papers and information” which its Committee -had been unable to secure. In pursuance of this plan the following -resolution was adopted by the Senate in executive session on the 25th -of January, 1886: - - Resolved, That the Attorney-General of the United States be, - and he hereby is, directed to transmit to the Senate copies of - all documents and papers that have been filed in the Department - of Justice since the 1st day of January, a.d. 1885, in relation - to the conduct of the office of District Attorney of the United - States for the Southern District of Alabama. - -The language of this resolution is more adroit than ingenuous. While -appearing reasonable and fair upon its face, and presenting no -indication that it in any way related to a case of suspension, it -quickly assumes its real complexion when examined in the light of -its surroundings. The requests previously made on behalf of Senate -committees had ripened into a “demand” by the Senate itself. Herein is -found support for the suggestion I have made, that from the beginning -there might have been an intent on the part of the Senate to claim -that the heads of departments, who are members of the President’s -Cabinet and his trusted associates and advisers, owed greater obedience -to the Senate than to their executive chief in affairs which he -and they regarded as exclusively within executive functions. As to -the real meaning and purpose of the resolution, a glance at its -accompanying conditions and the incidents preceding it makes manifest -the insufficiency of its disguise. This resolution was adopted by the -Senate in executive session, where the entire senatorial business done -is the consideration of treaties and the confirmation of nominations -for office. At the time of its adoption Duskin had been suspended for -more than six months, his successor had for that length of time been -in actual possession of the office, and this successor’s nomination -was then before the Senate in executive session for confirmation. -The demand was for copies of documents and papers in relation to the -conduct of the office filed since January 1, 1885, thus covering a -period of incumbency almost equally divided between the suspended -officer and the person nominated to succeed him. The documents and -papers demanded could not have been of any possible use to the Senate -in executive session, except as they had a bearing either upon the -suspension of the one or the nomination of the other. But as we have -already seen, the Attorney-General had previously sent to a committee -of the Senate all the papers he had in his custody in any way relating -to the nomination and the fitness of the nominee, whether such papers -had reference to the conduct of the office or otherwise. Excluding, -therefore, such documents and papers embraced in the demand as related -to the pending nomination, and which had already been transmitted, it -was plain that there was nothing left with the Attorney-General that -could be included in the demand of the Senate in its executive session -except what had reference to the conduct of the previous incumbent -and his suspension. It is important to recall in this connection the -fact that this subtle demand of the Senate for papers relating “to the -conduct of the office” followed closely upon a failure to obtain “all -papers and information” touching said suspension, in response to a -plain and blunt request specifying precisely what was desired. - - -IV - -I have referred to these matters because it seems to me they indicate -the animus and intent which characterized the first stages of a -discussion that involved the rights and functions of the Executive -branch of the Government. It was perfectly apparent that the issue -was between the President and the Senate, and that the question -constituting that issue was whether or not the Executive was invested -with the right and power to suspend officials without the interference -of the Senate or any accountability to that body for the reasons of -his action. It was also manifest if it was desired to deal with this -issue directly and fairly, disembarrassed by any finesse for position, -it could at any time have been easily done, if only one of the many -requests for reasons for suspensions, which were sent by committees of -the Senate to heads of departments, had been sent by the Senate itself -to the President. - -Within three days after the passage by the Senate, in executive -session, of the resolution directing the Attorney-General to -transmit to that body the documents and papers on file relating -to the management and conduct of the office from which Mr. Duskin -had been removed, and to which Mr. Burnett had been nominated, the -Attorney-General replied thereto as follows: - - In response to the said resolution, the President of the - United States directs me to say that the papers that were in - this department relating to the fitness of John D. Burnett, - recently nominated to said office, having already been sent - to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and the papers and - documents which are mentioned in the said resolution, and still - remaining in the custody of this department, having exclusive - reference to the suspension by the President of George M. - Duskin, the late incumbent of the office of District Attorney - for the Southern District of Alabama, it is not considered that - the public interests will be promoted by a compliance with said - resolution and the transmission of the papers and documents - therein mentioned to the Senate in executive session. - -This response of the Attorney-General was referred to the Senate -Committee on the Judiciary. Early in February, 1886, a majority of -the committee made a report to the Senate, in which it seems to have -been claimed that all papers--whatever may be their personal, private, -or confidential character--if placed on file, or, in other words, if -deposited in the office of the head of a department, became thereupon -official papers, and that the Senate had therefore a right to their -transmittal when they had reference to the conduct of a suspended -official, and when that body had under advisement the confirmation of -his proposed successor. Much stress was laid upon the professions made -by the President of his adherence to Civil Service reform methods, and -it was broadly hinted that, in the face of six hundred and forty-three -suspensions from office, these professions could hardly be sincere. -Instances were cited in which papers and information had been demanded -and furnished in previous administrations, and these were claimed to -be precedents in favor of the position assumed by the majority of the -committee. Almost at the outset of the report it was declared: - - The important question, then, is whether it is within the - constitutional competence of either House of Congress to have - access to the official papers and documents in the various - public offices of the United States, created by laws enacted by - themselves. - -In conclusion, the majority recommended the adoption by the Senate of -the following resolutions: - - Resolved, That the Senate hereby expresses its condemnation of - the refusal of the Attorney-General, under whatever influence, - to send to the Senate copies of papers called for by its - resolution of the 25th of January and set forth in the report - of the Committee on the Judiciary, as in violation of his - official duty and subversive of the fundamental principles of - the Government, and of a good administration thereof. - - Resolved, That it is under these circumstances the duty of the - Senate to refuse its advice and consent to proposed removals of - officers, the documents and papers in reference to the supposed - official or personal misconduct of whom are withheld by the - Executive or any head of a department when deemed necessary by - the Senate and called for in considering the matter. - - Resolved, That the provision of Section 1754 of the Revised - Statutes, declaring that persons honorably discharged from the - military or naval service by reason of disability resulting - from wounds or sickness incurred in the line of duty shall be - preferred for appointment to civil offices provided they are - found to possess the business capacity necessary for the proper - discharge of the duties of such offices, ought to be faithfully - and fully put in execution, and that to remove or to propose - to remove any such soldier whose faithfulness, competency, and - character are above reproach, and to give place to another who - has not rendered such service, is a violation of the spirit - of the law and of the practical gratitude the people and - the Government of the United States owe to the defenders of - constitutional liberty and the integrity of the Government. - -The first of these resolutions contains charges which, if true, -should clearly furnish grounds for the impeachment of the -Attorney-General--if not the President under whose “influence” he -concededly refused to submit the papers demanded by the Senate. A -public officer whose acts are “in violation of his official duty -and subversive of the fundamental principles of the Government, and -of a good administration thereof,” can scarcely add anything to his -predicament of guilt. - -The second resolution has the merit of honesty in confessing that the -intent and object of the demand upon the Attorney-General was to secure -the demanded papers and documents for the purpose of passing upon the -President’s reasons for suspension. Beyond this, the declaration it -contains, that it was the “duty of the Senate to refuse its advice -and consent to proposed removals of officers” when the papers and -documents relating to their “supposed official or personal misconduct” -were withheld, certainly obliged the Senate, if the resolution should -be adopted, and if the good faith of that body in the controversy -should be assumed, to reject or ignore all nominations made to succeed -suspended officers unless the documents and papers upon which the -suspension was based were furnished and the Senate was thus given an -opportunity to review and reverse or confirm the President’s executive -act, resting, by the very terms of existing law, “in his discretion.” - -The third resolution is grandly phrased, and its sentiment is -patriotic, noble, and inspiriting. Inasmuch, however, as the removal of -veteran soldiers from office did not seem to assume any considerable -prominence in the arraignment of the administration, the object of the -resolution is slightly obscure, unless, as was not unusual in those -days, the cause of the old soldier was impressed into the service of -the controversy for purposes of general utility. - -A minority report was subsequently submitted, signed by all the -Democratic members of the committee, in which the allegations of the -majority report were sharply controverted. It was therein positively -asserted that no instance could be found in the practice of the -Government whose similarity in its essential features entitled it -to citation as an authoritative precedent; and that neither the -Constitution nor the existing law afforded any justification for the -action of the Senate in the promises. - -These two reports, of course, furnished abundant points of controversy. -About the time of their submission, moreover, another document was -addressed to the Senate, which, whatever else may be said of it, seems -to have contributed considerably to the spirit and animation of the -discussion that ensued. This was a message from the President, in which -his position concerning the matter in dispute was defined. In this -communication the complete and absolute responsibility of the President -for all suspensions and the fact that the Executive had been afforded -no opportunity to speak for himself was stated in the following terms: - - Though these suspensions are my executive acts based upon - considerations addressed to me alone, and for which I am wholly - responsible, I have had no invitation from the Senate to - state the position which I have felt constrained to assume in - relation to the same, or to interpret for myself my acts and - motives in the premises. In this condition of affairs I have - forborne addressing the Senate upon the subject, lest I might - be accused of thrusting myself unbidden upon the attention of - that body. - -This statement was accompanied by the expression of a hope that the -misapprehension of the Executive position, indicated in the majority -report just presented and published, might excuse his then submitting -a communication. He commented upon the statement in the report -that “the important question, then, is whether it is within the -constitutional competence of either House of Congress to have access -to the official papers and documents in the various public offices -of the United States, created by laws enacted by themselves,” by -suggesting that though public officials of the United States might be -created by laws enacted by the two Houses of Congress, this fact did -not necessarily subject their offices to congressional control, but, -on the contrary, that “these instrumentalities were created for the -benefit of the people, and to answer the general purposes of government -under the Constitution and the laws; and that they are unencumbered by -any lien in favor of either branch of Congress growing out of their -construction, and unembarrassed by any obligation to the Senate as the -price of their creation.” While not conceding that the Senate had in -any case the right to review Executive action in suspending officials, -the President disclaimed any intention to withhold official papers -and documents when requested; and as to such papers and documents, he -expressed his willingness, because they were official, to continue, as -he had theretofore done in all cases, to lay them before the Senate -without inquiry as to the use to be made of them, and relying upon -the Senate for their legitimate utilization. The proposition was -expressly denied, however, that papers and documents inherently private -or confidential, addressed to the President or a head of department, -having reference to an act so entirely executive in its nature as the -suspension of an official, and which was by the Constitution as well -as by existing law placed within the discretion of the President, were -changed in their nature and instantly became official when placed for -convenience or for other reasons in the custody of a public department. -The contention of the President was thus stated: - - There is no mysterious power of transmutation in departmental - custody, nor is there magic in the undefined and sacred - solemnity of departmental files. If the presence of these - papers in the public office is a stumbling-block in the way of - the performance of senatorial duty, it can be easily removed. - -The Senate’s purposes were characterized in the message as follows: - - The requests and demands which by the score have for nearly - three months been presented to the different departments of - the Government, whatever may be their form, have but one - complexion. They assume the right of the Senate to sit in - judgment upon the exercise of my exclusive discretion and - Executive function, for which I am solely responsible to the - people from whom I have so lately received the sacred trust of - office. My oath to support and defend the Constitution, my duty - to the people who have chosen me to execute the powers of their - great office and not relinquish them, and my duty to the chief - magistracy which I must preserve unimpaired in all its dignity - and vigor, compel me to refuse compliance with these demands. - -This was immediately supplemented by the following concession of -the independent and unlimited power of the Senate in the matter of -confirmation: - - To the end that the service may be improved, the Senate is - invited to the fullest scrutiny of the persons submitted to - them for public office, in recognition of the constitutional - power of that body to advise and consent to their appointment. - I shall continue, as I have thus far done, to furnish, at the - request of the confirming body, all the information I possess - touching the fitness of the nominees placed before them for - their action, both when they are proposed to fill vacancies - and to take the place of suspended officials. Upon a refusal - to confirm, I shall not assume the right to ask the reasons - for the action of the Senate nor question its determination. I - cannot think that anything more is required to secure worthy - incumbents in public office than a careful and independent - discharge of our respective duties within their well-defined - limits. - -As it was hardly concealed that by no means the least important -senatorial purpose in the pending controversy was to discredit the -Civil Service reform pledges and professions of the Executive, this -issue was thus distinctly invited at the close of the message: - - Every pledge I have made by which I have placed a limitation - upon my exercise of executive power has been faithfully - redeemed. Of course the pretense is not put forth that no - mistakes have been committed; but not a suspension has been - made except it appeared to my satisfaction that the public - welfare would be promoted thereby. Many applications for - suspension have been denied, and an adherence to the rule laid - down to govern my action as to such suspensions has caused - much irritation and impatience on the part of those who have - insisted upon more changes in the offices. - - The pledges I have made were made to the people, and to them I - am responsible for the manner in which they have been redeemed. - I am not responsible to the Senate, and I am unwilling to - submit my actions and official conduct to them for judgment. - - There are no grounds for an allegation that the fear of being - found false to my professions influences me in declining to - submit to the demands of the Senate. I have not constantly - refused to suspend officials and thus incurred the displeasure - of political friends, and yet wilfully broken faith with the - people, for the sake of being false to them. - - Neither the discontent of party friends nor the allurements, - constantly offered, of confirmation of appointees conditioned - upon the avowal that suspensions have been made on party - grounds alone, nor the threat proposed in the resolutions now - before the Senate that no confirmation will be made unless - the demands of that body be complied with, are sufficient to - discourage or deter me from following in the way which I am - convinced leads to better government for the people. - -The temper and disposition of the Senate may be correctly judged, I -think, from the remarks made upon the presentation of this message by -the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary and the acknowledged -leader of the majority. On a formal motion that the message be printed -and lie upon the table, he moved as an amendment that it be referred to -the committee of which he was chairman, and said: - - I merely wish to remark, in moving to refer this document to - the Committee on the Judiciary, that it very vividly brought to - my mind the communications of King Charles I to the Parliament, - telling them what, in conducting their affairs, they ought to - do and ought not to do; and I think I am safe in saying that - it is the first time in the history of the republican United - States that any President of the United States has undertaken - to interfere with the deliberations of either House of Congress - on questions pending before them, otherwise than by messages - on the state of the Union which the Constitution commands him - to make from time to time. This message is devoted simply to - a question for the Senate itself, in regard to itself, that - it has under consideration. That is its singularity. I think - it will strike reflecting people in this country as somewhat - extraordinary--if in this day of reform anything at all can be - thought extraordinary. - -King Charles I fared badly at the hands of the Parliament; but it was -most reassuring to know that, after all said and done, the Senate of -the United States was not a bloodthirsty body, and that the chairman -of its Committee on the Judiciary was one of the most courteous and -amiable of men--at least when outside of the Senate. - -The debate upon the questions presented by the report and resolutions -recommended by the majority of the committee, and by the minority -report and the presidential message, occupied almost exclusively the -sessions of the Senate for over two weeks. More than twenty-five -Senators participated, and the discussion covered such a wide range of -argument that all considerations relevant to the subject, and some not -clearly related to it, seem to have been presented. At the close of the -debate, the resolution condemning the Attorney-General for withholding -the papers and documents which the Senate had demanded was passed by -thirty-two votes in the affirmative and twenty-five in the negative; -the next resolution, declaring it to be the duty of the Senate to -refuse its advice and consent to proposed removals of officers when -papers and documents in reference to their alleged misconduct were -withheld, was adopted by a majority of only a single vote; and the -proclamation contained in the third resolution, setting forth the -obligations of the Government and its people to the veterans of the -civil war, was unanimously approved, except for one dissenting voice. - -The controversy thus closed arose from the professed anxiety of the -majority in the Senate to guard the interests of an official who was -suspended from office in July, 1885, and who was still claimed to be in -a condition of suspension. In point of fact, however, that official’s -term of office expired by limitation on the 20th of December, -1885--before the demand for papers and documents relating to his -conduct in office was made, before the resolutions and reports of the -Committee on the Judiciary were presented, and before the commencement -of the long discussion in defense of the right of a suspended -incumbent. This situation escaped notice in Executive quarters, because -the appointee to succeed the suspended officer having been actually -installed and in the discharge of the duties of the position for more -than six months, and his nomination having been sent to the Senate -very soon after the beginning of its session, the situation or duration -of the former incumbent’s term was not kept in mind. The expiration of -his term was, however, distinctly alleged in the Senate on the second -day of the discussion, and by the first speaker in opposition to the -majority report. The question of suspension or removal was therefore -eliminated from the case and the discussion as related to the person -suspended continued as a sort of post-mortem proceeding. Shortly -after the resolutions of the committee were passed, the same person -who superseded the suspended and defunct officer was again nominated -to succeed him by reason of the expiration of his term; and this -nomination was confirmed. - -At last, after stormy weather, Duskin, the suspended, and Burnett, his -successor, were at rest. The earnest contention that beat about their -names ceased, and no shout of triumph disturbed the supervening quiet. - - -V - -I have thus attempted, after fourteen years of absolute calm, to -recount the prominent details of the strife; and I hope that interest -in the subject is still sufficient to justify me in a further brief -reference to some features of the dispute and certain incidents that -followed it, which may aid to a better appreciation of its true -character and motive. - -Of the elaborate speeches made in support of the resolutions and the -committee’s majority report, seven dealt more or less prominently -with the President’s Civil Service reform professions and his pledges -against the removal of officials on purely partizan grounds. It seems -to have been assumed that these pledges had been violated. At any rate, -without any evidence worthy of the name, charges of such violation -ranged all the way from genteel insinuation to savage accusation. -Senators who would have stoutly refused to vote for the spoils system -broadly intimated or openly declared that if suspensions had been -made confessedly on partizan grounds they would have interposed no -opposition. The majority seem to have especially admired and applauded -the antics of one of their number, who, in intervals of lurid and -indiscriminate vituperation, gleefully mingled ridicule for Civil -Service reform with praise of the forbidding genius of partizan spoils. -In view of these deliverances and as bearing upon their relevancy, -as well as indicating their purpose, let me again suggest that the -issue involved in the discussion as selected by the majority of the -Committee on the Judiciary, and distinctly declared in their report, -was whether, as a matter of right, or, as the report expresses it, as -within “constitutional competence,” either House of Congress should -“have access to the official papers and documents in the various public -offices of the United States, created by laws enacted by themselves.” -It will be readily seen that if the question was one of senatorial -right, the President’s Civil Service reform pledges had no honest or -legitimate place in the discussion. - -The debate and the adoption of the resolutions reported by the -committee caused no surrender of the Executive position. Nevertheless, -confirmations of those nominated in place of suspended officers soon -began, and I cannot recall any further embarrassment or difficulty -on that score. I ought to add, however, that in many cases, at least, -these confirmations were accompanied by reports from the committee -to which they had been referred, stating that the late incumbent had -been suspended for “political reasons,” or on account of “offensive -partizanship,” or for a like reason, differently expressed, and that -nothing was alleged against them affecting their personal character. -If the terms thus used by the committee in designating causes for -suspension mean that the persons suspended were guilty of offensive -partizanship or political offenses, as distinguished from personal -offenses and moral or official delinquencies, I am satisfied with the -statement. And here it occurs to me to suggest that if offenses and -moral or official delinquencies, not partizan in their nature, had -existed, they would have been subjects for official inspection and -report, and such reports, being official documents, would have been -submitted to the committee or to the Senate, according to custom, and -would have told their own story and excluded committee comment. - -It is worth recalling, when referring to committee reports on -nomination, that they belong to the executive business of the Senate, -and are, therefore, among the secrets of that body. Those I have -mentioned, nevertheless, were by special order made public, and -published in the proceedings of the Senate in open session. This -extraordinary, if not unprecedented, action, following long after -the conclusion of the dispute, easily interprets its own intent, and -removes all covering from a design to accomplish partizan advantage. -The declaration of the resolutions that it was the duty of the Senate -“to refuse its advice and consent to the proposed removal of officers” -when the papers and documents relating to their supposed misconduct -were withheld, was abandoned, and the irrevocable removal of such -officers by confirmation of their successors was entered upon, with or -without the much-desired papers and documents, and was supplemented by -the publication of committee reports, from which the secrecy of the -executive session had been removed, to the end that, pursuant to a -fixed determination, an unfavorable senatorial interpretation might be -publicly given to the President’s action in making suspensions. - -I desire to call attention to one other incident connected with the -occurrences already narrated. On the 14th of December, 1885,--prior to -the first request or demand upon any executive department relating -to suspensions, and of course before any controversy upon the subject -arose,--a bill was introduced in the Senate by one of the most -distinguished and able members of the majority in that body, and also -a member of its Committee on the Judiciary, for the total and complete -repeal of the law of 1869, which, it will be remembered, furnished the -basis for the contention we have considered. This repealing bill was -referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, where it slumbered -until the 21st of June, 1886,--nearly three months after the close of -the contention,--when it was returned to the Senate with a favorable -report, the chairman of the committee alone dissenting. When the bill -was presented for discussion, the Senator who introduced it explained -its object as follows: - - This bill repeals what is left of what is called the Tenure of - Office act, passed under the administration of Andrew Johnson, - and as a part of the contest with that President. It leaves - the law as it was from the beginning of the Government until - that time, and it repeals the provision which authorizes the - suspension of civil officers and requires the submission of - that suspension to the Senate. - -On a later day, in discussing the bill, he said, after referring to the -early date of its introduction: - - It did not seem to me to be quite becoming to ask the Senate to - deal with this general question while the question which arose - between the President and the Senate as to the interpretation - and administration of the existing law was pending. I thought - as a party man that I had hardly the right to interfere with - the matter which was under the special charge of my honorable - friend from Vermont, by challenging a debate upon the general - subject from a different point of view. This question has - subsided and is past, and it seems to me now proper to ask the - Senate to vote upon the question whether it will return to the - ancient policy of the Government, to the rule of public conduct - which existed from 1789 until 1867, and which has practically - existed, notwithstanding the condition of the statute-book, - since the accession to power of General Grant on the 4th of - March, 1869. - -The personnel of the committee which reported favorably upon this -repealing bill had not been changed since all the members of it -politically affiliating with the majority in the Senate joined in -recommending the accusatory report and resolutions, which, when -adopted, after sharp and irritating discussion, caused the question -between the President and the Senate, in the language of the introducer -of the repealing bill, to “subside.” - -This repealing act passed the Senate on the 17th of December, 1886, by -thirty affirmative votes against twenty-two in the negative. A short -time afterward it passed in the House of Representatives by a majority -of one hundred and five. - -Thus was an unpleasant controversy happily followed by an expurgation -of the last pretense of statutory sanction to an encroachment upon -constitutional Executive prerogatives, and thus was a time-honored -interpretation of the Constitution restored to us. The President, freed -from the Senate’s claim of tutelage, became again the independent agent -of the people, representing a coördinate branch of their Government, -charged with responsibilities which, under his oath, he ought not -to avoid or divide with others, and invested with powers, not to be -surrendered, but to be used, under the guidance of patriotic intention -and an unclouded conscience. - - - - -THE GOVERNMENT IN THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF 1894 - - -I - -The President inaugurated on the fourth day of March, 1893, and -those associated with him as Cabinet officials, encountered, during -their term of executive duty, unusual and especially perplexing -difficulties. The members of that administration who still survive, -in recalling the events of this laborious service, cannot fail to fix -upon the years 1894 and 1895 as the most troublous and anxious of -their incumbency. During those years unhappy currency complications -compelled executive resort to heroic treatment for the preservation of -our nation’s financial integrity, and forced upon the administration a -constant, unrelenting struggle for sound money; a long and persistent -executive effort to accomplish beneficent and satisfactory tariff -reform so nearly miscarried as to bring depression and disappointment -to the verge of discouragement; and it was at the close of the year -1895 that executive insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine culminated -in a situation that gave birth to solemn thoughts of war. Without -attempting to complete the list of troubles and embarrassments that -beset the administration during these luckless years, I have reserved -for separate and more detailed treatment one of its incidents not yet -mentioned, which immensely increased executive anxiety and foreboded -the most calamitous and far-reaching consequences. - -In the last days of June, 1894, a very determined and ugly labor -disturbance broke out in the city of Chicago. Almost in a night it grew -to full proportions of malevolence and danger. Rioting and violence -were its early accompaniments; and it spread so swiftly that within -a few days it had reached nearly the entire Western and Southwestern -sections of our country. Railroad transportation was especially -involved in its attacks. The carriage of United States mails was -interrupted, interstate commerce was obstructed, and railroad property -was riotously destroyed. - -This disturbance is often called “The Chicago Strike.” It is true that -its beginning was in that city; and the headquarters of those who -inaugurated it and directed its operations were located there; but the -name thus given to it is an entire misnomer so far as it applies to the -scope and reach of the trouble. Railroad operations were more or less -affected in twenty-seven States and Territories; and in all these the -interposition of the general Government was to a greater or less extent -invoked. - -This wide-spread trouble had its inception in a strike by the employees -of the Pullman Palace Car Company, a corporation located and doing -business at the town of Pullman, which is within the limits of the city -of Chicago. This company was a manufacturing corporation--or at least -it was not a railroad corporation. Its main object was the operation -and running of sleeping- and parlor-cars upon railroads under written -contracts; but its charter contemplated the manufacture of cars as -well; and soon after its incorporation it began the manufacture of its -own cars and, subsequently, the manufacture of cars for the general -market. - -The strike on the part of the employees of this company began on the -eleventh day of May, 1894, and was provoked by a reduction of wages. - -The American Railway Union was organized in the summer of 1893. -It was professedly an association of all the different classes of -railway employees. In its scope and intent it was the most compact -and effective organization of the kind ever attempted. Its purpose -was a thorough unification of defensive and offensive effort among -railway employees under one central direction, and the creation of -a combination embracing all such employees, which should make the -grievances of any section of its membership a common cause. Those -prominent in this project estimated that various other organizations -of railroad employees then existing had a membership of 102,000 in -the United States and neighboring countries; and they claimed that -these brotherhoods, because of divided councils and for other reasons, -were ineffective, and that nearly 1,000,000 railroad employees still -remained unorganized. - -The wonderful growth of this new combination is made apparent by the -fact that between the month of August, 1893, and the time it became -involved in the Pullman strike, in June, 1894, it had enrolled nearly -150,000 members. - -The employees of the Pullman Palace Car Company could not on any -reasonable and consistent theory be regarded as eligible to membership -in an organization devoted to the interests of railway employees; and -yet, during the months of March, April, and May, 1894, it appears that -nearly 4000 of these employees were enrolled in the American Railway -Union. - -This, to say the least of it, was an exceedingly unfortunate -proceeding, since it created a situation which implicated in a -comparatively insignificant quarrel between the managers of an -industrial establishment and their workmen the large army of the -Railway Union. It was the membership of these workmen in the Railway -Union, and the union’s consequent assumption of their quarrel, that -gave it the proportions of a tremendous disturbance, paralyzing the -most important business interests, obstructing the functions of the -Government, and disturbing social peace and order.... - -No injury to the property of the Pullman Palace Car Company was done or -attempted while the strike was confined to its employees; and during -that time very little disorder of any kind occurred. - -It so happened, however, that in June, 1894, after the strike at -Pullman had continued for about one month, a regular stated convention -of the American Railway Union was held in the city of Chicago, which -was attended by delegates from local branches of the organization in -different States, as well as by representatives of its members among -the employees of the Pullman Palace Car Company. At this convention the -trouble at Pullman was considered, and after earnest efforts on the -part of the Railway Union to bring about a settlement, a resolution -was, on the twenty-second day of June, passed by the convention, -declaring that unless the Pullman Palace Car Company should adjust the -grievances of its employees before noon of the twenty-sixth day of -June, the members of the American Railway Union would, after that date, -refuse to handle Pullman cars and equipment. - -The twenty-sixth day of June arrived without any change in the attitude -of the parties to the Pullman controversy; and thereupon the order made -by the American Railway Union forbidding the handling of Pullman cars, -became operative throughout its entire membership. - -At this time the Pullman Palace Car Company was furnishing drawing-room -and sleeping-car accommodations to the traveling public under contracts -with numerous railway companies, and was covering by this service -about one hundred and twenty-five thousand miles of railway, or -approximately three fourths of all the railroad mileage of the country. -The same railroad companies which had contracted to use these Pullman -cars upon their lines had contracts with the United States Government -for the carriage of mails, and were, of course, also largely engaged -in interstate commerce. It need hardly be said that, of necessity, the -trains on which the mails were carried and which served the purpose of -interstate commerce were, very generally, those to which the Pullman -cars were also attached. - -The president of the Railway Union was one Eugene V. Debs. In a sworn -statement afterward made he gave the following description of the -results of the interference of the union in the Pullman dispute: - - The employees, obedient to the order of the convention, at - once, on the 26th, refused to haul Pullman cars. The switchmen, - in the first place, refused to attach a Pullman car to a train, - and that is where the trouble began; and then, when a switchman - would be discharged for that, they would all simultaneously - quit, as they had agreed to do. One department after another - was involved until the Illinois Central was practically - paralyzed, and the Rock Island and other roads in their turn. - Up to the first day of July, or after the strike had been in - progress five days, the railway managers, as we believe, were - completely defeated. Their immediate resources were exhausted, - their properties were paralyzed, and they were unable to - operate their trains. Our men were intact at every point, firm, - quiet, and yet determined, and no sign of violence or disorder - anywhere. That was the condition on the thirtieth day of June - and the first day of July. - -The officers of the Railway Union from their headquarters in the city -of Chicago gave directions for the maintenance and management of the -strike, which were quickly transmitted to distant railroad points and -were there promptly executed. As early as the 28th of June, two days -after the beginning of the strike ordered by the Railway Union at -Chicago, information was received at Washington from the Post-Office -Department that on the Southern Pacific System, between Portland -and San Francisco, Ogden and San Francisco, and Los Angeles and San -Francisco, the mails were completely obstructed, and that the strikers -refused to permit trains to which Pullman cars were attached to run -over the lines mentioned. Thereupon Attorney-General Olney immediately -sent the following telegraphic despatch to the United States district -attorneys in the State of California: - - WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1894. - - See that the passage of regular trains, carrying United States - mails in the usual and ordinary way, as contemplated by the - act of Congress and directed by the Postmaster-General, is not - obstructed. Procure warrants or any other available process - from United States courts against any and all persons engaged - in such obstructions, and direct the marshal to execute the - same by such number of deputies or such posse as may be - necessary. - -On the same day, and during a number of days immediately following, -complaints of a similar character, sometimes accompanied by charges -of forcible seizure of trains and other violent disorders, poured in -upon the Attorney-General from all parts of the West and Southwest. -These complaints came from post-office officials, from United States -marshals and district attorneys, from railroad managers, and from -other officials and private citizens. In all cases of substantial -representation of interference with the carriage of mails, a despatch -identical with that already quoted was sent by the Attorney-General to -the United States district attorneys in the disturbed localities; and -this was supplemented, whenever necessary, by such other prompt action -as the different emergencies required. - -I shall not enter upon an enumeration of all the disorders and -violence, the defiance of law and authority, and the obstructions of -national functions and duties, which occurred in many localities as -a consequence of this labor contention, thus tremendously reinforced -and completely under way. It is my especial purpose to review the -action taken by the Government for the maintenance of its own authority -and the protection of the interests intrusted to its keeping, so far -as they were endangered by this disturbance; and I do not intend to -specifically deal with the incidents of the strike except in so far as -a reference to them may be necessary to show conditions which not only -justified but actually obliged the Government to resort to stern and -unusual measures in the assertion of its prerogatives. - -Inasmuch, therefore, as the city of Chicago was the birthplace of the -disturbance and the home of its activities, and because it was the -field of its most pronounced and malign manifestations, as well as the -place of its final extinction, I shall meet the needs of my subject -if I supplement what has been already said by a recital of events -occurring at this central point. In doing this, I shall liberally -embody documents, orders, instructions, and reports which I hope will -not prove tiresome, since they supply the facts I desire to present, -at first hand and more impressively than they could be presented by any -words of mine. - -Owing to the enforced relationship of Chicago to the strike which -started within its borders, and because of its importance as a center -of railway traffic, Government officials at Washington were not -surprised by the early and persistent complaints of mail and interstate -commerce obstructions which reached them from that city. It was from -the first anticipated that this would be the seat of the most serious -complications, and the place where the strong arm of the law would -be most needed. In these circumstances it would have been a criminal -neglect of duty if those charged with the protection of governmental -agencies and the enforcement of orderly obedience and submission to -Federal authority, had been remiss in preparations for any emergency in -that quarter. - -On the thirtieth day of June the district attorney at Chicago reported -by telegraph that mail trains in the suburbs of Chicago were, on the -previous night, stopped by strikers, that an engine had been cut off -and disabled, and that conditions were growing more and more likely -to culminate in the stoppage of all trains; and he recommended that -the marshal be authorized to employ a force of special deputies who -should be placed on trains to protect mails and detect the parties -guilty of such interference. In reply to this despatch Attorney-General -Olney on the same day authorized the marshal to employ additional -deputies as suggested, and designated Edwin Walker, an able and -prominent attorney in Chicago, as special counsel for the Government, -to assist the district attorney in any legal proceedings that might -be instituted. He also notified the district attorney of the steps -thus taken, and enjoined upon him that “action ought to be prompt and -vigorous,” and also directed him to confer with the special counsel -who had been employed. In a letter of the same date addressed to this -special counsel, the Attorney-General, in making suggestions concerning -legal proceedings, wrote: “It has seemed to me that if the rights of -the United States were vigorously asserted in Chicago, the origin and -center of the demonstration, the result would be to make it a failure -everywhere else, and to prevent its spread over the entire country”; -and in that connection he indicated that it might be advisable, -instead of relying entirely upon warrants issued under criminal -statutes against persons actually guilty of the offense of obstructing -United States mails, to apply to the courts for injunctions which -would restrain and prevent any attempt to commit such offense. This -suggestion contemplated the inauguration of legal proceedings in a -regular and usual way to restrain those prominently concerned in the -interference with the mails and the obstruction of interstate commerce, -basing such proceedings on the proposition that, under the Constitution -and laws, these subjects were in the exclusive care of the Government -of the United States, and that for their protection the Federal -courts were competent under general principles of law to intervene by -injunction; and on the further ground that under an act of Congress, -passed July 2, 1890, conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce -among the several States were declared to be illegal, and the circuit -courts of the United States were therein expressly given jurisdiction -to prevent and restrain such conspiracies. - -On the first day of July the district attorney reported to the -Attorney-General that he was preparing a bill of complaint to be -presented to the court the next day, on an application for an -injunction. He further reported that very little mail and no freight -was moving, that the marshal was using all his force to prevent -riots and the obstruction of tracks, and that this force was clearly -inadequate. On the same day the marshal reported that the situation was -desperate, that he had sworn in over four hundred deputies, that many -more would be required to protect mail trains, and that he expected -great trouble the next day. He further expressed the opinion that one -hundred riot guns were needed. - -Upon the receipt of these reports, and anticipating an attempt to serve -injunctions on the following day, the Attorney-General immediately sent -a despatch to the district attorney directing him to report at once -if the process of the court should be resisted by such force as the -marshal could not overcome, and suggesting that the United States judge -should join in such report. He at the same time sent a despatch to the -special counsel requesting him to report his view of the situation as -early as the forenoon of the next day. - -In explanation of these two despatches it should here be said that -the desperate character of this disturbance was not in the least -underestimated by executive officials at Washington; and it must be -borne in mind that while menacing conditions were moving swiftly and -accumulating at Chicago, like conditions, inspired and supported from -that central point, existed in many other places within the area of the -strike’s contagion. - -Of course it was hoped by those charged with the responsibility of -dealing with the situation, that a direct assertion of authority by the -marshal and a resort to the restraining power of the courts would prove -sufficient for the emergency. Notwithstanding, however, an anxious -desire to avoid measures more radical, the fact had not been overlooked -that a contingency might occur which would compel a resort to military -force. The key to these despatches of the Attorney-General is found in -the determination of the Federal authorities to overcome by any lawful -and constitutional means all resistance to governmental functions as -related to the transportation of mails, the operation of interstate -commerce, and the preservation of the property of the United States. - -The Constitution requires that the United States shall protect each of -the States against invasion, “and on application of the legislature, -or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against -domestic violence.” There was plenty of domestic violence in the city -of Chicago and in the State of Illinois during the early days of -July, 1894; but no application was made to the Federal Government for -assistance. It was probably a very fortunate circumstance that the -presence of United States soldiers in Chicago at that time did not -depend upon the request or desire of Governor Altgeld. - -Section 5298 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides: -“Whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations or -assemblages of persons, or rebellion against the authority of the -United States, it shall become impracticable in the judgment of the -President to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, -the laws of the United States within any State or Territory, it -shall be lawful for the President to call forth the militia of any -or all of the States, and to employ such parts of the land or naval -forces of the United States as he may deem necessary to enforce the -faithful execution of the laws of the United States, or to suppress -such rebellion, in whatever State or Territory thereof the laws of -the United States may be forcibly opposed, or the execution thereof -be forcibly obstructed”; and Section 5299 provides: “Whenever any -insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combinations or conspiracies -in any State ... opposes or obstructs the laws of the United States, -or the due execution thereof, or impedes or obstructs the due course -of justice under the same, it shall be lawful for the President, and -it shall be his duty, to take such measures, by the employment of the -militia, or the land and naval forces of the United States, or of -either, or by other means as he may deem necessary, for the suppression -of such insurrection, domestic violence or combinations.” - - -II - -It was the intention of the Attorney-General to suggest in these -despatches that immediate and authoritative information should be given -to the Washington authorities if a time should arrive when, under the -sanction of general executive authority, or the constitutional and -statutory provisions above quoted, a military force would be necessary -at the scene of disturbance. - -On the 2d of July, the day after these despatches were sent, -information was received from the district attorney and special counsel -that a sweeping injunction had been granted against Eugene V. Debs, -president of the American Railway Union, and other officials of that -organization, together with parties whose names were unknown, and -that the writs would be served that afternoon. The special counsel -also expressed the opinion that it would require Government troops to -enforce the orders of the court and protect the transportation of mails. - -Major-General Schofield was then in command of the army; and, after a -consultation with him, in which the Attorney-General and the Secretary -of War took part, I directed the issuance of the following order by -telegraph to General Nelson A. Miles, in command of the Military -Department of Missouri, with headquarters at Chicago: - - HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY. - WASHINGTON, July 2, 1894. - - _To the Commanding-General, - Department of Missouri, - Chicago, Ill._ - - You will please make all necessary arrangements confidentially - for the transportation of the entire garrison at Fort - Sheridan--infantry, cavalry, and artillery--to the lake front - in the city of Chicago. To avoid possible interruption of the - movement by rail and by marching through a part of the city, it - may be advisable to bring them by steam-boat. Please consider - this matter and have the arrangements perfected without delay. - You may expect orders at any time for the movement. Acknowledge - receipt and report in what manner movement is to be made. - - J. M. SCHOFIELD, - _Major-General Commanding_. - -It should by no means be inferred from this despatch that it had been -definitely determined that the use of a military force was inevitable. -It was still hoped that the effect of the injunction would be such that -this alternative might be avoided. A painful emergency is created -when public duty forces the necessity of placing trained soldiers -face to face with riotous opposition to the general Government, and -an acute and determined defiance to law and order. This course, once -entered upon, admits of no backward step; and an appreciation of the -consequences that may ensue cannot fail to oppress those responsible -for its adoption with sadly disturbing reflections. Nevertheless, it -was perfectly plain that, whatever the outcome might be, the situation -positively demanded such precaution and preparation as would insure -readiness and promptness in case the presence of a military force -should finally be found necessary. - -On the morning of the next day, July 3, the Attorney-General received a -letter from Mr. Walker, the special counsel, in which, after referring -to the issuance of the injunctions and setting forth that the marshal -was engaged in serving them, he wrote: - - I do not believe that the marshal and his deputies can protect - the railroad companies in moving their trains, either freight - or passenger, including, of course, the trains carrying United - States mails. Possibly, however, the service of the writ of - injunction will have a restraining influence upon Debs and - other officers of the association. If it does not, from - present appearances, I think it is the opinion of all that the - orders of the court cannot be enforced except by the aid of the - regular army. - -Thereupon the Attorney-General immediately sent this despatch to the -district attorney: - - I trust use of United States troops will not be necessary. If - it becomes necessary, they will be used promptly and decisively - upon the justifying facts being certified to me. In such case, - if practicable, let Walker and the marshal and United States - judge join in statement as to the exigency. - -A few hours afterward the following urgent and decisive despatch -from the marshal, endorsed by a judge of the United States court -and the district attorney and special counsel, was received by the -Attorney-General. - - CHICAGO, ILL., July 3, 1894. - - Hon. RICHARD OLNEY, _Attorney-General_, - Washington, D. C.: - - When the injunction was granted yesterday, a mob of from two - to three thousand held possession of a point in the city near - the crossing of the Rock Island by other roads, where they had - already ditched a mail-train, and prevented the passing of any - trains, whether mail or otherwise. I read the injunction writ - to this mob and commanded them to disperse. The reading of - the writ met with no response except jeers and hoots. Shortly - after, the mob threw a number of baggage-cars across the track, - since when no mail-train has been able to move. I am unable to - disperse the mob, clear the tracks, or arrest the men who were - engaged in the acts named, and believe that no force less than - the regular troops of the United States can procure the passage - of the mail-trains, or enforce the orders of the courts. I - believe people engaged in trades are quitting employment - to-day, and in my opinion will be joining the mob to-night and - especially to-morrow; and it is my judgment that the troops - should be here at the earliest moment. An emergency has arisen - for their presence in this city. - - J. W. ARNOLD, - _United States Marshal_. - - We have read the foregoing, and from that information, and - other information that has come to us, believe that an - emergency exists for the immediate presence of United States - troops. - - P. S. GROSSCUP, _Judge_. - EDWIN WALKER, } - THOMAS E. MILCHIST,} _Attys_. - -In the afternoon of the same day the following order was telegraphed -from army headquarters in the city of Washington: - - WAR DEPARTMENT, - HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY. - WASHINGTON, D. C., July 3, 1894, - 4 o’clock P.M. - - TO MARTIN, _Adjutant-General_, - Headquarters Department of Missouri, - Chicago, Ill. - - It having become impracticable in the judgment of the President - to enforce by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings the - laws of the United States, you will direct Colonel Crofton to - move his entire command at once to the city of Chicago (leaving - the necessary guard at Fort Sheridan), there to execute the - orders and processes of the United States court, to prevent - the obstruction of the United States mails, and generally - to enforce the faithful execution of the laws of the United - States. He will confer with the United States marshal, the - United States district attorney, and Edwin Walker, special - counsel. Acknowledge receipt and report action promptly. By - order of the President. - - J. M. SCHOFIELD, _Major-General_. - -Immediately after this order was issued, the following despatch was -sent to the district attorney by the Attorney-General: - - Colonel Crofton’s command ordered to Chicago by the President. - As to disposition and movement of troops, yourself, Walker, and - the marshal should confer with Colonel Crofton and with Colonel - Martin, adjutant-general at Chicago. While action should - be prompt and decisive, it should of course be kept within - the limits provided by the Constitution and laws. Rely upon - yourself and Walker to see that this is done. - -Colonel Martin, adjutant-general at Chicago, reported, the same night -at half-past nine o’clock, that the order for the movement of troops -was, immediately on its receipt by him, transmitted to Fort Sheridan, -and that Colonel Crofton’s command started for Chicago at nine o’clock. - -During the forenoon of the next day, July 4, Colonel Martin advised the -War Department that Colonel Crofton reported his command in the city of -Chicago at 10:15 that morning. After referring to the manner in which -the troops had been distributed, this officer added: “People seem to -feel easier since arrival of troops.” - -General Miles, commanding the department, arrived in Chicago the same -morning, and at once assumed direction of military movements. In -the afternoon of that day he sent a report to the War Department at -Washington, giving an account of the disposition of troops, recounting -an unfavorable condition of affairs, and recommending an increase of -the garrison at Fort Sheridan sufficient to meet any emergency. - -In response to this despatch General Miles was immediately authorized -to order six companies of infantry from Fort Leavenworth, in Kansas, -and two companies from Fort Brady, in Michigan, to Fort Sheridan. - -On the fifth day of July he reported that a mob of over two thousand -had gathered that morning at the stock-yards, crowded among the troops, -obstructed the movement of trains, knocked down a railroad official, -and overturned about twenty freight-cars, which obstructed all freight -and passenger traffic in the vicinity of the stock-yards, and that the -mob had also derailed a passenger-train on the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne -and Chicago Railroad, and burned switches. To this recital of violent -demonstrations he added the following statement: - - The injunction of the United States court is openly defied, - and unless the mobs are dispersed by the action of the police - or they are fired upon by United States troops, more serious - trouble may be expected, as the mob is increasing and becoming - more defiant. - -In view of the situation as reported by General Miles, a despatch was -sent to him by General Schofield directing him to concentrate his -troops in order that they might act more effectively in the execution -of orders theretofore given, and in the protection of United States -property. This despatch concluded as follows: - - The mere preservation of peace and good order in the city is, - of course, the province of the city and state authorities. - -The situation on the sixth day of July was thus described in a despatch -sent in the afternoon of that day by General Miles to the Secretary of -War: - - In answer to your telegram, I report the following: Mayor - Hopkins last night issued a proclamation prohibiting - riotous assemblies and directing the police to stop people - from molesting railway communication. Governor Altgeld has - ordered General Wheeler’s brigade on duty in Chicago to - support the Mayor’s authority. So far, there have been no - large mobs like the one of yesterday, which moved from 51st - Street to 18th Street before it dispersed. The lawlessness - has been along the line of the railways, destroying and - burning more than one hundred cars and railway buildings, - and obstructing transportation in various ways, even to the - extent of cutting telegraph lines. United States troops have - dispersed mobs at 51st Street, Kensington, and a company of - infantry is moving along the Rock Island to support a body of - United States marshals in making arrests for violating the - injunction of the United States court. Of the twenty-three - roads centering in Chicago, only six are unobstructed in - freight, passenger, and mail transportation. Thirteen are at - present entirely obstructed, and ten are running only mail- - and passenger-trains. Large numbers of trains moving in and - out of the city have been stoned and fired upon by mobs, and - one engineer killed. There was a secret meeting to-day of - Debs and the representatives of labor unions considering the - advisability of a general strike of all labor unions. About - one hundred men were present at that meeting. The result is - not yet known. United States troops are at the stock-yards, - Kensington, Blue Island, crossing of 51st Street, and have - been moving along some of the lines: the balance, eight - companies of infantry, battery of artillery, and one troop - of cavalry, are camped on Lake Front Park, ready for any - emergency and to protect Government buildings and property. It - is learned from the Fire Department, City Hall, that a party of - strikers has been going through the vicinity from 14th to 41st - streets and Stewart Avenue freight-yards, throwing gasoline on - freight-cars all through that section. Captain Ford, of the - Fire Department, was badly stoned this morning. Troops have - just dispersed a mob of incendiaries on Fort Wayne tracks, near - 51st Street, and fires that were started have been suppressed. - Mob just captured mail-train at 47th Street, and troops sent to - disperse them. - -On the eighth day of July, in view of the apparently near approach of -a crisis which the Government had attempted to avoid, the following -Executive Proclamation was issued and at once extensively published in -the city of Chicago: - - Whereas, by reason of unlawful obstruction, combinations and - assemblages of persons, it has become impracticable, in the - judgment of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course - of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States within - the State of Illinois, and especially in the city of Chicago - within said State; and - - Whereas, for the purpose of enforcing the faithful execution of - the laws of the United States and protecting its property and - removing obstructions to the United States mails in the State - and city aforesaid, the President has employed a part of the - military forces of the United States:-- - - Now, therefore, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United - States, do hereby admonish all good citizens, and all persons - who may be or may come within the City and State aforesaid, - against aiding, countenancing, encouraging, or taking any part - in such unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages; - and I hereby warn all persons engaged in or in any way - connected with such unlawful obstructions, combinations, - and assemblages to disperse and retire peaceably to their - respective abodes on or before twelve o’clock noon of the 9th - day of July instant. - - Those who disregard this warning and persist in taking part - with a riotous mob in forcibly resisting and obstructing the - execution of the laws of the United States, or interfering with - the functions of the Government, or destroying or attempting to - destroy the property belonging to the United States or under - its protection, cannot be regarded otherwise than as public - enemies. - - Troops employed against such a riotous mob will act - with all the moderation and forbearance consistent with - the accomplishment of the desired end; but the stern - necessities that confront them will not with certainty permit - discrimination between guilty participants and those who are - mingling with them from curiosity and without criminal intent. - The only safe course, therefore, for those not actually - participating, is to abide at their homes, or at least not to - be found in the neighborhood of riotous assemblages. - - While there will be no vacillation in the decisive treatment - of the guilty, this warning is especially intended to protect - and save the innocent. - -On the 10th of July, Eugene V. Debs, the president of the American -Railway Union, together with its vice-president, general secretary, and -one other who was an active director, were arrested upon indictments -found against them for complicity in the obstruction of mails and -interstate commerce. Three days afterward our special counsel expressed -the opinion that the strike was practically broken. This must not -be taken to mean, however, that peace and quiet had been completely -restored or that the transportation of mails and the activities of -interstate commerce were entirely free from interruption. It was only -the expression of a well-sustained and deliberate expectation that the -combination of measures already inaugurated, and others contemplated -in the near future, would speedily bring about a termination of the -difficulty. - -On the seventeenth day of July an information was filed in the United -States Circuit Court at Chicago against Debs and the three other -officials of the Railway Union who had been arrested on indictment -a few days before, but were then at large on bail. This information -alleged that these parties had been guilty of open, continued, and -defiant disobedience of the injunction which was served on them July -3, forbidding them to do certain specified acts tending to incite and -aid the obstruction of the carriage of mails and the operation of -interstate commerce. On the footing of this information these parties -were brought before the court to show cause why they should not be -punished for contempt in disobeying the injunction. Instead of giving -bail for their freedom pending the investigation of this charge against -them, as they were invited to do, they preferred to be committed to -custody--perhaps intending by such an act of martyrdom either to revive -a waning cause, or to gain a plausible and justifying excuse for -the collapse of their already foredoomed movement. Debs himself, in -speaking of this event afterward, said: “As soon as the employees found -that we were arrested and taken from the scene of action they became -demoralized, and that ended the strike.” - -That the strike ended about the time of this second arrest is -undoubtedly true; for, during the few days immediately preceding and -following the seventeenth day of July, reports came from nearly all -the localities to which the strike had spread, indicating its defeat -and the accomplishment of all the purposes of the Government’s -interference. The successful assertion of national authority was -conclusively indicated when on the twentieth day of July the last of -the soldiers of the United States who had been ordered for duty at the -very center of opposition and disturbance, were withdrawn from Chicago -and returned to the military posts to which they were attached. - -I hope I have been successful thus far in my effort satisfactorily to -exhibit the extensive reach and perilous tendency of the convulsion -under consideration, the careful promptness which characterized the -interference of the Government, the constant desire of the national -administration to avoid extreme measures, the scrupulous limitation -of its interference to purposes which were clearly within its -constitutional competency and duty, and the gratifying and important -results of its conservative but stern activity. - -I must not fail to mention here as part of the history of this -perplexing affair, a contribution made by the governor of Illinois to -its annoyances. This official not only refused to regard the riotous -disturbances within the borders of his State as a sufficient cause for -an application to the Federal Government for its protection “against -domestic violence” under the mandate of the Constitution, but he -actually protested against the presence of Federal troops sent into the -State upon the general Government’s own initiative and for the purpose -of defending itself in the exercise of its well-defined legitimate -functions. - -On the fifth day of July, twenty-four hours after our soldiers had been -brought to the city of Chicago, pursuant to the order of July 3d, I -received a long despatch from Governor Altgeld, beginning as follows: - - I am advised that you have ordered Federal troops to go into - service in the State of Illinois. Surely the facts have not - been correctly presented to you in this case or you would not - have taken the step; for it is entirely unnecessary and, as it - seems to me, unjustifiable. Waiving all question of courtesy, - I will say that the State of Illinois is not only able to take - care of itself, but it stands ready to-day to furnish the - Federal Government any assistance it may need elsewhere. - -This opening sentence was followed by a lengthy statement which so far -missed actual conditions as to appear irrelevant and, in some parts, -absolutely frivolous. - -This remarkable despatch closed with the following words: - - As Governor of the State of Illinois, I protest against this - and ask the immediate withdrawal of Federal troops from active - duty in this State. Should the situation at any time get so - serious that we cannot control it with the State forces, we - will promptly and freely ask for Federal assistance; but - until such time I protest with all due deference against this - uncalled-for reflection upon our people, and again ask for the - immediate withdrawal of these troops. - -Immediately upon the receipt of this communication, I sent to Governor -Altgeld the following reply: - - Federal troops were sent to Chicago in strict accordance with - the Constitution and the laws of the United States, upon the - demand of the Post-Office Department that obstructions of the - mails should be removed, and upon the representation of the - judicial officers of the United States that process of the - Federal courts could not be executed through the ordinary - means, and upon abundant proof that conspiracies existed - against commerce between the States. To meet these conditions, - which are clearly within the province of Federal authority, the - presence of Federal troops in the city of Chicago was deemed - not only proper but necessary; and there has been no intention - of thereby interfering with the plain duty of the local - authorities to preserve the peace of the city. - - -III - -In response to this the governor, evidently unwilling to allow the -matter at issue between us to rest without a renewal of argument -and protest, at once addressed to me another long telegraphic -communication, evidently intended to be more severely accusatory and -insistent than its predecessor. Its general tenor may be inferred from -the opening words: - - Your answer to my protest involves some startling conclusions, - and ignores and evades the question at issue--that is, that the - principle of local self-government is just as fundamental in - our institutions as is that of Federal supremacy. You calmly - assume that the Executive has the legal right to order Federal - troops into any community of the United States in the first - instance, whenever there is the slightest disturbance, and that - he can do this without any regard to the question as to whether - the community is able to and ready to enforce the law itself. - -After a rather dreary discussion of the importance of preserving -the rights of the States and a presentation of the dangers to -constitutional government that lurked in the course that had been -pursued by the general Government, this communication closed as follows: - - Inasmuch as the Federal troops can do nothing but what the - State troops can do there, and believing that the State is - amply able to take care of the situation and to enforce the - law, and believing that the ordering out of the Federal troops - was unwarranted, I again ask their withdrawal. - -I confess that my patience was somewhat strained when I quickly sent -the following despatch in reply to this communication: - - EXECUTIVE MANSION. - WASHINGTON, D. C., July 6, 1894. - - While I am still persuaded that I have neither transcended - my authority nor duty in the emergency that confronts us, it - seems to me that in this hour of danger and public distress, - discussion may well give way to active efforts on the part of - all in authority to restore obedience to law and to protect - life and property. - - GROVER CLEVELAND. - - Hon. John P. Altgeld, - _Governor of Illinois_. - -This closed a discussion which in its net results demonstrated how far -one’s disposition and inclination will lead him astray in the field of -argument. - -I shall conclude the treatment of my subject by a brief reference to -the legal proceedings which grew out of this disturbance, and finally -led to an adjudication by the highest court in our land, establishing -in an absolutely authoritative manner and for all time the power of the -national Government to protect itself in the exercise of its functions. - -It will be recalled that in the course of our narrative we left Mr. -Debs, the president of the Railway Union, and his three associates -in custody of the law, on the seventeenth day of July, awaiting an -investigation of the charge of contempt of court made against them, -based upon their disobedience of the writs of injunction forbidding -them to do certain things in aid or encouragement of interference with -mail transportation or interstate commerce. - -This investigation was so long delayed that the decision of the Circuit -Court before which the proceedings were pending was not rendered until -the fourteenth day of December, 1894. On that date the court delivered -an able and carefully considered decision finding Debs and his -associates guilty of contempt of court, basing its decision upon the -provisions of the law of Congress, passed in 1890, entitled: “An act to -protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraint and monopolies”; -sometimes called the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Thereupon the parties -were sentenced on said conviction to confinement in the county jail for -terms varying from three to six months. - -Afterward, and on the 14th day of January, 1895, the prisoners applied -to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus -to relieve them from imprisonment, on the ground that the facts found -against them by the Circuit Court did not constitute disobedience of -the writs of injunction and that their commitment in the manner and -for the reasons alleged was without justification and not within the -constitutional power and jurisdiction of that tribunal. - -On this application, the case was elaborately argued before the Supreme -Court in March, 1895; and on the twenty-seventh day of May, 1895, the -court rendered its decision, upholding on the broadest grounds the -proceedings of the Circuit Court and confirming its adjudication and -the commitment to jail of the petitioners thereupon. - -Justice Brewer, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Supreme -Court, stated the case as follows: - - The United States, finding that the interstate transportation - of persons and property, as well as the carriage of mails, - is forcibly obstructed, and that a combination and conspiracy - exists to subject the control of such transportation to the - will of the conspirators, applied to one of their courts - sitting as a court of equity, for an injunction to restrain - such obstructions and prevent carrying into effect such - conspiracy. Two questions of importance are presented: First, - are the relations of the general Government to interstate - commerce and the transportation of the mails such as to - authorize a direct interference to prevent a forcible - obstruction thereof? Second, if authority exists,--as authority - in governmental affairs implies both power and duty,--has a - court of equity jurisdiction to issue an injunction in aid of - the performance of such duty? - -Both of these questions were answered by the court in the affirmative; -and in the opinion read by the learned justice, the inherent power of -the Government to execute the powers and functions belonging to it -by means of physical force through its official agents, and on every -foot of American soil, was amply vindicated by a process of reasoning -simple, logical, unhampered by fanciful distinctions, and absolutely -conclusive; and the Government’s peaceful resort to the court, the -injunction issued in its aid, and all the proceedings thereon, -including the imprisonment of Debs and his associates, were fully -approved. - -Thus the Supreme Court of the United States has written the closing -words of this history, tragical in many of its details, and in every -line provoking sober reflection. As we gratefully turn its concluding -page, those who were most nearly related by executive responsibility to -the troublous days whose story is told may well especially congratulate -themselves on the part which fell to them in marking out the way and -clearing the path, now unchangeably established, which shall hereafter -guide our nation safely and surely in the exercise of the important -functions which represent the people’s trust. - - - - -THE BOND ISSUES - - -I - -The sales of United States bonds in the years 1894, 1895, and 1896 for -the purpose of replenishing the stock of gold in the public Treasury -have been greatly misunderstood by many honest people, and often -deliberately misrepresented. - -My conviction that a love of fairness still abides with the masses of -our people has encouraged me to give a history of these transactions -for the benefit of those who are uninformed or have been misled -concerning them. In undertaking this task I shall attempt to avoid -unprofitable and tiresome explanation; but I shall, nevertheless, -indulge in the recital of details to such an extent as may appear -necessary to an easy understanding of the matter in hand. I desire, -above all things, to treat the subject in such a way that none who -read my narrative will be confused by the use of obscure or technical -language. - -The Government’s gold reserve, as it is usually known, originated under -the provision of an act of Congress passed January 14, 1875, entitled, -“An Act to provide for the resumption of specie payments.” This law -contemplated the redemption in gold and the retirement of the currency -obligations legally known as United States notes, but commonly called -greenbacks; and it provided that such notes in excess of $300,000,000 -should be redeemed and retired prior to January 1, 1879, and that after -that date all the remainder of such notes should be likewise redeemed -and canceled. This law further provided that “to enable the Secretary -of the Treasury to prepare and provide for such redemption” he should -have the authority “to issue, sell and dispose of” bonds of the United -States which were therein particularly specified. Of course this -authority was given to the Secretary of the Treasury in order that, by -the sale of Government bonds, he could accumulate a sufficient gold -fund or reserve to meet the demands of the gold redemption provided -for, and accomplish the ultimate retirement of all the United States -notes in circulation. - -In compliance with this act, the sum of about $92,000,000 in gold was -realized by the sale of bonds, and about $41,000,000, in addition, -was obtained from surplus revenue; and thereupon the contemplated -redemption was entered upon. But after the retirement and cancelation -of only about $30,000,000 of these notes, and on the thirty-first day -of May, 1878, this process was interrupted by the passage of an act -forbidding their further retirement or cancelation, and providing that -any such notes thereafter redeemed should not be canceled or destroyed, -but should be “reissued and paid out again and kept in circulation.” -At the time this act was passed the United States notes uncanceled -and still outstanding amounted to $346,681,016. It will be observed -that though the actual retirement of these notes was prohibited, their -redemption in gold was still continued, coupled with the condition -that, though thus redeemed, they should be still kept on foot and again -put in circulation as a continuing and never-ending obligation of the -Government, calling for payment in gold--not once alone, but as often -as their reissue permitted, and without the least regard to prior -so-called redemptions. It will be also observed that this prohibition -of cancelation intervened seven months prior to January 1, 1879, the -date when the general and unrestricted redemption and retirement of -all these outstanding notes was, under the terms of the act of 1875, -to commence. At the time when their further cancelation was thus -terminated there remained of the gold which had been provided as a -reserve for their redemption about $103,000,000. This is the fund which -has since then been called the “gold reserve.” - -In point of fact, this reserve was thereafter made up of all the net -gold held by the Government; and its amount at any particular date was -ascertained by deducting from the entire stock of gold in the Treasury -the amounts covered by outstanding gold certificates, which instruments -resemble a bank’s certificate of deposit, and are issued by the -Secretary of the Treasury to those making with the Government specific -deposits of gold, to be returned to the holders of the certificates on -demand. Of course the gold thus held for certificate-holders is not -available for the redemption of United States notes. - -In the year 1882 a law was passed by Congress which provided that -the Secretary of the Treasury should suspend the issue of these gold -certificates “whenever the amount of gold coin and gold bullion in the -Treasury, reserved for the redemption of United States notes, falls -below $100,000,000.” Whatever may have been the actual relationship -between gold certificates representing gold deposited for their -redemption, and the gold kept on hand for the redemption of United -States notes, the provision of law just quoted seems to have been -accepted as a statutory recognition of the fact that our gold reserve -for note redemption should have for its lowest limit this sum of -$100,000,000. It is a singular circumstance that until very lately, -when this reserve was increased and fixed at $150,000,000, no Act of -Congress actually provided, or in any way expressly stated, what the -limits of this gold reserve for redemption purposes should be; and it -is no less singular that this provision in the law of 1882 fixed its -lowest safe limit as perfectly and authoritatively in the understanding -of our people as it could have been done by a distinct legislative -requirement. At the time this reserve was created, as well as when -the actual cancelation of United States notes after redemption was -prohibited, it evidently was thought by those directing our nation’s -financial affairs that the sum of $100,000,000 in net gold actually in -hand, especially with such additions as might naturally be expected to -reach the fund by way of surplus revenue receipts, or otherwise, would -constitute a sufficient gold reserve to redeem such of these notes -still left outstanding as might be presented, and that the assurance -of their gold redemption when presented would keep them largely in -circulation. This scheme seemed for a time to be abundantly vindicated -by the people’s contentment with the sufficiency of the redemption -reserve, and by their willingness to keep in circulating use these -United States notes as currency more convenient than gold itself. - -Another most important condition of mind among the people, however, -grew out of, or at least accompanied, their acceptance of the -redemptive sufficiency of the gold reserve as constituted. The popular -belief became deep-seated and apparently immovable that the reduction -of this gold reserve to an amount less than $100,000,000 would, in some -way, cause a disastrous situation, and perhaps justify an apprehension -concerning our nation’s financial soundness. Thus a gold reserve -containing at all times at least $100,000,000 came to be regarded by -the people with a sort of sentimental solicitude, which, whatever else -may be said of it, was certainly something to be reckoned with in -making our national financial calculations. - -That the plans thus set on foot for the so-called redemption of the -United States notes outstanding promised to be adequate and effective -is seen in the fact that the gold reserve, starting at the end of -June, 1878, with about $103,500,000, never afterward fell as low as -$100,000,000 until April, 1893, and that sometimes in its fluctuations -during this interval of twenty-five years it amounted to upward of -$200,000,000. Under conditions then existing popular confidence was -well established, the reserve satisfactorily endured the strain of -all redemption demands, and United States notes were kept well in -circulation as money. - -In an evil hour, however, a legislative concession was made to a -mischievous and persistent demand for the free and unlimited coinage -of silver. This concession was first exhibited in an act of Congress -passed in 1878, directing the expenditure of not less than $2,000,000 -nor more than $4,000,000 each month by the Secretary of the Treasury in -the purchase of silver bullion, and the coinage of such bullion into -silver dollars. Though this act is not in itself so intimately related -to my subject as to require detailed explanation, it was the forerunner -of another law of Congress which had much to do with creating the -financial conditions that necessitated the issuance of Government -bonds for the reinforcement of the gold reserve. - -This law was passed in 1890, and superseded the provision of the law -of 1878 directing the purchase and coinage of silver. In lieu of -these provisions the Secretary of the Treasury was thereby directed -to purchase silver bullion from time to time in each month to the -aggregate amount of 4,500,000 ounces, or as much as might be offered, -at the market price, not to exceed, however, a limit therein fixed. -It was further provided that there should be issued, in payment of -such purchases of silver bullion, Treasury notes of the United States -in denominations not less than one dollar nor more than $1000; that -such notes should be redeemable in coin, and should “be a legal tender -in payment of all debts, public and private, except where otherwise -expressly stipulated in the contract, and should be receivable for -customs, taxes and all public dues”; and that when they were redeemed -or paid into the Treasury they might be reissued. The Secretary of -the Treasury was directed to coin into silver dollars in each month -until the first day of July, 1891, 2,000,000 ounces of the silver so -purchased, and thereafter so much as might be necessary to provide for -the redemption of the notes issued in payment for the silver from time -to time purchased under the act. - -I have recited these provisions by way of leading up to the proposition -that, under the law of 1890, the burden upon the gold reserve was -tremendously enlarged. It will be readily seen that it forced larger -monthly purchases of silver than were required under the prior act, -and that, instead of providing for silver dollars, which as coins, or -certificates of deposit representing such coins, should circulate as -silver currency, unredeemable in gold as was done under the act of -1878, it directed that in payment of such purchases a new obligation of -the Government, redeemable in coin, should be issued and added to our -circulating medium. - -It is, however, only when we examine the specific provision for the -redemption of these notes that we discover in its full extent the -harmful relationship of this new device to the integrity of the gold -reserve. At its outset the redemption clause of the act courageously -and manfully gave to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to -redeem such notes in gold or silver _at his discretion_; but in its -ending it fell down a pitiful victim of the silver craze. The entire -clause is in these words: “That upon demand of the holder of any of -the Treasury notes herein provided for, the Secretary of the Treasury -shall, under such regulations as he may provide, redeem such notes in -gold or silver coin at his discretion, _it being the established policy -of the United States to maintain the two metals at a parity with each -other upon the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by -law_.” - -According to the legal ratio then existing, which has never been -changed, the average intrinsic gold value of a silver dollar as -compared with a gold dollar was, during the year 1891, about -seventy-six cents, during 1892 a trifle more than sixty-seven cents, -and during 1893 about sixty cents. - -It is hardly necessary to say that the assertion in the act of “the -established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals at -a parity” had the effect of transferring the discretion of determining -whether these Treasury notes should be redeemed in gold or silver, from -the Secretary of the Treasury to the holder of the notes. Manifestly, -in the face of this assertion of the Government’s intention, a demand -for gold redemption on the part of the holders of such notes could not -be refused, and the acceptance of silver dollars insisted upon, without -either subjecting to doubt the good faith and honest intention of the -Government’s professions, or creating a suspicion of our country’s -solvency. The parity between the two metals could not be maintained, -but, on the contrary, would be distinctly denied, if the Secretary of -the Treasury persisted in redeeming these notes, against the will of -the holders, in dollars of silver instead of gold. - -Therefore it came to pass that the Treasury notes issued for the -purchase of silver under the law of 1890 took their place by the side -of the United States notes, commonly called greenbacks, as demands -against our very moderate and shifting gold reserve. - -It should have been plainly apparent to all who had eyes to see that -the monetary scheme, thus additionally burdened, was adequate and safe -only in smooth financial weather, and was miserably calculated to -resist any disturbances in public confidence, or the rough waves of -business emergencies. The proof of this was quickly forthcoming. - -The new Treasury notes made their first appearance as part of our money -circulation in August, 1890; and at the close of that month the gold -reserve amounted to $185,837,581. During the next month it fell off -about $38,000,000, reducing the amount on the last day of September -to nearly $148,000,000; and with a few slight spasmodic rallies it -continued to decrease until the sale of bonds for its replenishment. - -In the latter part of 1892 and the first months of 1893, these Treasury -notes having, in the meantime, very greatly multiplied, the withdrawals -of gold from the Treasury through the redemption of these as well -as the United States notes strikingly increased; and the fact that -by far the larger part of the gold so withdrawn was shipped abroad -plainly showed that foreign investors in American securities had grave -apprehensions as to our ability to continue to redeem all these notes -in gold and thus maintain the integrity and soundness of our financial -condition. - -I succeeded Mr. Harrison in the Presidency on the fourth day of -March, 1893; and on the seventh of that month Mr. Carlisle became -Secretary of the Treasury. The gold reserve on that day amounted to -$100,982,410--only $982,410 in excess of the sum that had come to -be generally regarded as indicating the danger line. The retiring -Secretary of the Treasury, appreciating the importance of preventing -the fall of the reserve below this limit, had just before his -retirement directed the preparation of plates for the engraving of -bonds so that he might by their sale obtain gold to reinforce the -fund. I have heard him say within the last few years that he expected -before the close of his term to resort to bond sales for the purpose -of such reinforcement, unless prevented at the last moment by the -President’s disapproval. Of course it is but natural that any one -directing the affairs of the Treasury Department should be anxious to -avoid such an expedient; and Secretary Foster avoided it, and barely -saved the reserve from falling below the $100,000,000 mark during his -term, by effecting arrangements, in January and February, 1893, with -certain bankers in New York, by which he obtained from them in exchange -for United States notes, or on other considerations, something over -$8,000,000 in gold, which enabled him to escape the sale of bonds in -aid of the reserve. - -With the gold reserve lower than it had ever been since its creation -in 1878, and showing an excess of less than $1,000,000 above the -supposed limit of disaster, and with the demand for gold redemption -of Government currency obligations giving no sign of abatement, -the prospect that greeted the new administration was certainly not -reassuring. In our effort to meet the emergency without an issue of -bonds Secretary Carlisle immediately applied to banks in different -localities for an exchange with the Government of a portion of their -holdings of gold coin for other forms of currency. This effort was so -far successful that on the 25th of March the gold reserve amounted -to over $107,000,000, notwithstanding the fact that considerable -withdrawals had been made in the interval. The slight betterment -thus secured proved, however, to be only temporary; for under the -stress of continued and augmented withdrawals, the gold reserve, on -the twenty-second day of April, 1893, for the first time since its -establishment, was reduced below the $100,000,000 limit--amounting on -that day to about $97,000,000. - -Though this fall below the minimum theretofore always maintained was -not followed by any sudden and distinctly new disaster, it had the -effect of accelerating withdrawals of gold. It became apparent that -there had intervened a growing apprehension among the masses of our -own people concerning the Government’s competency to continue gold -redemption, with the result that a greatly increased proportion of the -amount withdrawn from the gold reserve, instead of going abroad to -satisfy the claims of foreigners or as a basis of commercial exchange, -was hoarded by our citizens at home as a precaution against possible -financial distress. In the meantime, nearly the entire gold receipts -in payment of customs and other revenue charges had ceased. To meet -this situation strenuous efforts were made by the Secretary of the -Treasury to improve the condition by resorting again to the plan of -exchanging for gold other forms of currency, with some success, while -in the month of August, 1893, gold revenue receipts were temporarily -considerably stimulated. Thus a fleeting gleam of hope was given to the -dark surroundings. - -In these troublous times those charged with the administration of the -Government’s financial affairs could not fail to recognize in the law -of 1890, directing the monthly purchase of silver and the issuance in -payment therefor of Treasury notes in effect redeemable in gold, a -prolific cause of our financial trouble. Accordingly, a special session -of Congress was called to meet on the seventh day of August, 1893, to -repeal this law, and thus terminate the creation of further demands -upon our already overburdened and feeble gold reserve. The repealing -act was quite promptly passed in the House of Representatives on the -twenty-eighth day of August; but, on account of vexatious opposition -in the Senate, the repeal was not finally effected until the first day -of November, 1893, and then only after there had been added to the act -an inopportune repetition of the statement concerning the Government’s -intention to maintain the parity of both gold and silver coins. - - -II - -The effect of this repeal in its immediate results failed to quiet the -fear of impending evil now thoroughly aroused; nor were all the efforts -thus far made to augment the gold reserve effective as against the -constant process of its depletion. - -On the seventeenth day of January, 1894, the Government was confronted -by a disquieting emergency. The gold reserve had fallen to less than -$70,000,000, notwithstanding the most diligent efforts to maintain it -in sounder condition. Against this slender fund gold demands amounting -to not less than $450,000,000 in United States notes and Treasury notes -were in actual circulation, and others amounting to about $50,000,000, -in addition, were temporarily held in the Treasury subject to -reissue--the entire volume, by peremptory requirement of law, remaining -uncanceled even after repeated redemption; nor was there any promise -of a cessation of the abnormal and exhausting drain of gold then fully -under way. Another factor in the situation, most perplexing and -dangerous, was the distrust, which was growing enormously, regarding -the wisdom and stability of our scheme of finance. As a result of these -conditions there loomed in sight the menace of the destruction of our -gold reserve, the repudiation of our gold obligations, the humiliating -fall of our nation’s finances to a silver basis, and the degradation of -our Government’s high standing in the respect of the civilized world. - -There was absolutely but one way to avert national calamity and our -country’s disgrace; and this way was adopted when, on the seventeenth -day of January, 1894, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a notice -that bids in gold would be received until the first day of February -following for $50,000,000 in bonds of the United States, redeemable in -coin at the pleasure of the Government after ten years from the date -of their issue, and bearing interest at the rate of five per cent. -per annum. It was further stated in the notice that no bid would be -considered that did not offer a premium on said bonds of a fraction -more than seventeen per cent., which would secure to the purchaser an -investment yielding three per cent. per annum. - -It should here be mentioned that the only Government bonds which could -be sold in the manner and for the purpose contemplated were such as -were authorized and described in a law passed in 1870, and which were -designated in the law of 1875 providing for the redemption of United -States notes as the kind of bonds which the Secretary of the Treasury -was permitted to sell to enable him “to prepare and provide for” -such redemption. The issues of bonds thus authorized were of three -descriptions: one payable at the pleasure of the Government after -ten years from their date, and bearing interest at the rate of five -per cent.; one so made payable after fifteen years from their date, -bearing four and a half per cent. interest; and one in like manner -made payable after thirty years from their date, bearing interest at -the rate of four per cent. The five per cent. bonds were specified in -the Secretary’s offer of sale because on account of their high rate of -interest they would command a greater premium, and therefore a larger -return of gold, and for the further reason that the option of the -Government regarding their payment could be earlier exercised. - -The withdrawals of gold did not cease with the offer to sell bonds -for the replenishment of the reserve, and on the day before the date -limited for the opening of bids the fund had decreased to less than -$66,000,000. In the meantime, the perplexity of the situation, already -intense, was made more so by the fact that the bids for bonds under -the offer of the Secretary came in so slowly that a few days before -the 1st of February, when the bids were to be opened, there were plain -indications that the contemplated sale would fail unless prompt and -energetic measures were taken to avoid such a perilous result. - -Thereupon the Secretary of the Treasury invited to a conference, in -the city of New York, a number of bankers and presidents of moneyed -institutions, which resulted in so arousing their patriotism, as -well as their solicitude for the protection of the interests they -represented, that they effectively exerted themselves, barely in time -to prevent a disastrous failure of the sale. The proceeds of this -sale, received from numerous bidders large and small, aggregated -$58,660,917.63 in gold, which so increased the reserve that on the -sixth day of March, 1894, it amounted to $107,440,802. - -It was hoped that this measure of restoration and this exhibition of -the nation’s ability to protect its financial integrity would allay -apprehension and restore confidence to such an extent as to render -further bond sales unnecessary. It was soon discovered, however, that -the complications of our ill condition were so deep-seated and stubborn -that the treatment resorted to was only a palliative instead of a cure. - -On the last day of May, 1894, less than three months after its -reinforcement, as mentioned, the gold reserve had been again so -depleted by withdrawals that it amounted to only $78,693,267. An almost -uninterrupted downward tendency followed, notwithstanding constant -efforts on the part of the Government to check the fall, until, on the -fourteenth day of November, 1894, the fund had fallen to $61,878,374. -In the meantime, the inclination of our timid citizens to take gold -from the reserve for hoarding “had grown by what it fed on,” while -large shipments abroad to meet foreign indebtedness or for profit still -continued and increased in amount. - -In these circumstances the inexorable alternative presented itself of -again selling Government bonds for the replenishment of its redemption -gold, or assuming the tremendous risk of neglecting the safety and -permanence of every interest dependent upon the soundness of our -national finances. An obedient regard for official duty made the right -path exceedingly plain. - -On the day last mentioned a public proposal was issued inviting bids -in gold for the purchase of additional five per cent. bonds to the -amount of $50,000,000. Numerous bids were received under this proposal, -one of which, for “all or none” of the bonds, tendered on behalf of -thirty-three banking institutions and financiers in the city of New -York, being considerably more advantageous to the Government than all -other bids, was accepted, and the entire amount was awarded to these -parties. This resulted in adding to the reserve the sum of $58,538,500. - -The president at that time of the United States Trust Company, one -of the strongest and largest financial institutions in the country, -rendered most useful and patriotic service in making both this and the -previous offer of bonds successful; and his company was a prominent -purchaser on both occasions. He afterward testified under oath that -the accepted bid for “all or none,” in which his company was a large -participant, proved unprofitable to the bidders. - -The payment of gold into the Treasury on account of this sale of -bonds was not entirely completed until after the 1st of December, -1894. Then followed a time of bitter disappointment and miserable -depression, greater than any that had before darkened the struggles of -the Executive branch of the Government to save our nation’s financial -integrity. - -The addition made to the gold reserve by this completed transaction -seemed to be of no substantial benefit, if, on the contrary, it did -not actually stimulate the disquieting factors of the situation. In -December, 1894, during which month $58,538,500 in gold, realized from -this second sale of bonds, was fully paid in and added to the reserve, -the withdrawals from the fund amounted to nearly $32,000,000; and this -was followed in the next month, or during January, 1895, by a further -depletion in the sum of more than $45,000,000. - -In view of the crisis which these suddenly increased withdrawals seemed -to portend, the aid of Congress was earnestly invoked in a special -presidential message to that body, dated on the 28th of January, 1895, -in which the gravity and embarrassment of the situation were set forth -in the following terms: - - The real trouble which confronts us consists in a lack of - confidence, widespread and constantly increasing, in the - continuing ability or disposition of the Government to pay - its obligations in gold. This lack of confidence grows to - some extent out of the palpable and apparent embarrassment - attending the efforts of the Government under existing laws to - procure gold, and to a greater extent out of the impossibility - of either keeping it in the Treasury or canceling obligations - by its expenditure after it is obtained.... - - The most dangerous and irritating feature of the situation, - however, remains to be mentioned. It is found in the means - by which the Treasury is despoiled of the gold thus obtained - (by the sale of bonds) without canceling a single Government - obligation, and solely for the benefit of those who find profit - in shipping it abroad, or whose fears induce them to hoard it - at home. We have outstanding about $500,000,000 of currency - notes of the Government for which gold may be demanded, and, - curiously enough, the law requires that when presented, and, in - fact, redeemed and paid in gold, they shall be reissued. Thus - the same notes may do duty many times in drawing gold from the - Treasury; nor can the process be averted so long as private - parties, for profit or otherwise, see an advantage in repeating - the operation. More than $300,000,000 of these notes have been - redeemed in gold, and, notwithstanding such redemption, they - are still outstanding. - -After giving a history of the bond issues already made to replenish the -reserve, and of their results, it was further stated: - - The financial events of the past year suggest facts and - conditions which should certainly arrest attention. More than - $172,000,000 in gold have been drawn out of the Treasury - during the year for the purpose of shipment abroad or hoarding - at home. - - While nearly $103,000,000 was drawn out during the first ten - months of the year, a sum aggregating more than two-thirds of - that amount, being about $69,000,000, was drawn out during the - following two months, thus indicating a marked acceleration of - the depleting process with the lapse of time. - -Following a reference to existing differences of opinion in regard to -the extent to which silver should be coined or used in our currency, -and the irrelevancy of such differences to the matter in hand, the -message continued: - - While I am not unfriendly to silver, and while I desire to see - it recognized to such an extent as is consistent with financial - safety and the preservation of national honor and credit, I am - not willing to see gold entirely banished from our currency - and finances. To avert such a consequence I believe thorough - and radical remedial legislation should be promptly passed. - I therefore beg the Congress to give the subject immediate - attention. - -After recommending the passage of a law authorizing the issue of -long-term bonds, bearing a low rate of interest, to be used for the -maintenance of an adequate gold reserve and in exchange for outstanding -United States notes and Treasury notes for the purpose of their -cancelation, and after giving details of the proposed scheme, the -message concluded as follows: - - In conclusion, I desire to frankly confess my reluctance to - issue more bonds in present circumstances and with no better - results than have lately followed that course. I cannot, - however, refrain from adding to an assurance of my anxiety to - co-operate with the present Congress in any reasonable measure - of relief, an expression of my determination to leave nothing - undone which furnishes a hope for improving the situation, or - checking a suspicion of our disinclination or disability to - meet, with the strictest honor, every national obligation. - -This appeal to Congress for legislative aid was absolutely fruitless. - -On the eighth day of February, 1895, those who, under the mandate of -Executive duty, were striving, thus unaided, to avert the perils of the -situation, could count in the gold reserve only the frightfully low sum -of $41,340,181; and it must be remembered that this was only two months -after the proceeds of the second sale of bonds had been added to the -fund. In point of fact, the withdrawals of gold during the short period -mentioned had exceeded by more than $18,000,000 the amount of such -proceeds; and several million dollars more had been demanded, some of -which, though actually taken out, was unexpectedly, and on account of -the transaction now to be detailed, returned to the Treasury. - -This sudden fall in the reserve, and the apparent certainty of the -continuance of its rapid depletion, seemed to justify the fear that -before another bond sale by means of public notice and popular -subscription could be perfected the gold reserve might be entirely -exhausted; nor could we keep out of mind the apprehension that in -consequence of repeated dispositions of bonds, with worse instead -of better financial conditions impending, further sales by popular -subscription might fail of success, except upon terms that would give -the appearance of impaired national credit. - -Notwithstanding all this, no other way seemed to be open to us than -another public offer of bonds; and it was determined to move in that -direction immediately. - -In anticipation of this action it was important to obtain certain -information and suggestions touching the feeling and disposition of -those actively prominent in financial and business circles. - -I think it may here be frankly confessed that it never occurred to -any of us to consult, in this emergency, farmers, doctors, lawyers, -shoe-makers, or even statesmen. We could not escape the belief that -the prospect of obtaining what we needed might be somewhat improved by -making application to those whose business and surroundings qualified -them to intelligently respond. - -Therefore, on the evening of the seventh day of February, 1895, an -interview was held at the White House with Mr. J. P. Morgan of New -York; and I propose to give the details of that interview as gathered -from a recollection which I do not believe can be at fault. Secretary -Carlisle was present nearly or quite all the time, Attorney-General -Olney was there a portion of the time, and Mr. Morgan and a young man -from his office and myself all the time. At the outset Mr. Morgan was -inclined to complain of the treatment he had received from Treasury -officials in the repudiation of an arrangement which he thought he had -been encouraged to perfect in connection with the disposal of another -issue of bonds. I said to Mr. Morgan, whatever there might be in all -this, another offer of bonds for popular subscription open to all -bidders had been determined upon, and that there were two questions I -wanted to ask him which he ought to be able to answer: one was whether -the bonds to be so offered would probably be taken at a good price -on short notice; and the other was whether, in case there should be -imminent danger of the disappearance of what remained of the gold -reserve, during the time that must elapse between published notice and -the opening of bids, a sufficient amount of gold could be temporarily -obtained from financial institutions in the city of New York to bridge -over the difficulty and save the reserve until the Government could -realize upon the sale of its bonds. Mr. Morgan replied that he had no -doubt bonds could be again sold on popular subscription at some price, -but he could not say what the price would be; and to the second inquiry -his answer was that, in his opinion, such an advance of gold as might -be required could be accomplished if the gold could be kept in this -country, but that there might be reluctance to making such an advance -if it was to be immediately withdrawn for shipment abroad, leaving -our financial condition substantially unimproved. After a little -further discussion of the situation he suddenly asked me why we did -not buy $100,000,000 in gold at a fixed price and pay for it in bonds, -under Section 3700 of the Revised Statutes. This was a proposition -entirely new to me. I turned to the Statutes and read the section he -had mentioned. Secretary Carlisle confirmed me in the opinion that -this law abundantly authorized such a transaction, and agreed that it -might be expedient if favorable terms could be made. The section of the -Statutes referred to reads as follows: - - _Section 3700._ The Secretary of the Treasury may purchase coin - with any of the bonds or notes of the United States authorized - by law, at such rates and upon such terms as he may deem most - advantageous to the public interest. - -Mr. Morgan strongly urged that, if we proceeded under this law, the -amount of gold purchased should not be less than $100,000,000; but he -was at once informed that in no event would more bonds be then issued -than would be sufficient to provide for adding to the reserve, about -$60,000,000, the amount necessary to raise the fund to $100,000,000. - -Not many months afterward I became convinced that on this point Mr. -Morgan made a wise suggestion; and I have always since regretted that -it was not adopted. - - -III - -It can hardly be necessary to state that any plan which would protect -from immediate withdrawal the gold we might add to our reserve could -not fail to be of extreme value. Such of these withdrawals as were -made for hoarding gold could be prevented only by a restoration of -confidence among those of our people who had grown suspicious of -the Government’s financial ability; but the considerable drain from -the reserve for the purchase of the very bonds to be sold for its -reinforcement, and the much larger drain made by those who profited by -the shipment of gold abroad, could be, measurably at least, directly -arrested. Thus to the extent that foreign gold might be brought here -and used for the purchase of bonds, the use for that purpose of such -as was held by our own people or as was already in the reserve subject -to their withdrawal would not only be decreased, but the current of -the passage of gold would be changed and would flow toward us instead -of away from us, making the prospect of profit in gold exportation -less alluring. An influx of gold from abroad would also have a tendency -to decrease the sentimental estimate of its desirability which its -unrelieved scarcity was apt to create in timid minds. It was especially -plain that so far as withdrawals from our reserve for speculative -shipment abroad were concerned, they could be discouraged by the -efforts of those whose financial connections in other countries enabled -them to sell gold exchange on foreign money centers at a price which -would make the actual transportation of the coin itself unprofitable. - -The position of Mr. Morgan and the other parties in interest whom he -represented was such in the business world that they were abundantly -able, not only to furnish the gold we needed, but to protect us in -the manner indicated against its immediate loss. Their willingness to -undertake both these services was developed during the discussion of -the plan proposed; and after careful consideration of every detail -until a late hour of the night, an agreement was made by which J. P. -Morgan & Co. of New York, for themselves and for J. S. Morgan & Co. -of London; and August Belmont & Co. of New York, for themselves and -for N. M. Rothschild & Son of London, were to sell and deliver to the -Government 3,500,000 ounces of standard gold coin of the United States, -to be paid for in bonds bearing annual interest at the rate of four per -cent. per annum, and payable at the pleasure of the Government after -thirty years from their date, such bonds to be issued and delivered -from time to time as the gold coin to be furnished was deposited by -said parties in the subtreasuries or other legal depositories of the -United States. At least one half of the coin so delivered was to be -obtained in Europe, and shipped from there in amounts not less than -300,000 ounces per month, at the expense and risk of the parties -furnishing the same; and so far as it was in their power they were -to “exert all financial influence and make all legitimate efforts to -protect the Treasury of the United States against the withdrawals of -gold pending the complete performance of the contract.” - -Four per cent. bonds were selected for use in this transaction instead -of ten-year bonds bearing five per cent. interest, because their -maturity was extended to thirty years, thus offering a more permanent -and inviting investment, and for the further reason that $100,000,000 -of shorter five per cent. bonds had already been issued, and it was, -therefore, deemed desirable to postpone these further bond obligations -of the Government to a later date. The price agreed upon for the gold -coin to be delivered was such that the bonds given in payment therefor -would yield to the investor an annual income of three and three fourths -per cent. - -It has already been stated that the only bonds which could be utilized -in our efforts to maintain our gold reserve were those described in a -law passed as early as 1870, and made available for our uses by an act -passed in 1875. The terms of these bonds were ill suited to later ideas -of investment, and they were made payable in coin and not specifically -in gold. Nothing at any time induced the exchange of gold for these -coin bonds, except a reliance upon such a measure of good faith on the -part of the Government, and honesty on the part of the people, as would -assure their payment in gold coin and not in depreciated silver. - -It was exceedingly fortunate that, at the time this agreement was under -consideration, certain political movements calculated to undermine this -reliance upon the Government’s continued financial integrity were not -in sight; but it was, nevertheless, very apparent that the difficulties -of the situation would be greatly lessened if, in safeguarding our -reserve, bonds could be used payable by their terms in gold, and -bearing a rate of interest not exceeding three per cent. Accordingly, -at the instance of Secretary Carlisle, a bill had been introduced in -the House of Representatives, some time before the Morgan-Belmont -agreement was entered upon, which authorized the issue of bonds of that -description. A few hours before the agreement was consummated this -sane and sensible legislation was brought to a vote in the House and -rejected. - -When, in our interview with Mr. Morgan, the price for the gold to be -furnished was considered, he gave reasons which we could not well -answer in support of the terms finally agreed upon; but he said that -the parties offering to furnish the gold would be glad to accept at par -three per cent. bonds, payable by their terms in gold instead of in -coin, in case their issue could be authorized. He expressed not only a -willingness but a strong desire that a substitution might be made of -such bonds in lieu of those already selected, and readily agreed to -allow us time to procure the necessary legislation for that purpose. -He explained, however, that only a short time could be stipulated -for such a substitution, because in order to carry out successfully -the agreement contemplated, the bonds must be offered in advance to -investors both here and abroad, and that after numerous subscriptions -had been received from outside parties the form and condition of the -securities could not be changed; and he added that, but for this, there -would be no objection to the concession of all the time desired. It -was finally agreed that ten days should be allowed us to secure from -Congress the legislation necessary to permit the desired substitution -of bonds. A simple calculation demonstrated that by such a substitution -the Government would save on account of interest more than $16,000,000 -before the maturity of the bonds. It was further stipulated on the part -of the Government that if the Secretary of the Treasury should desire -to sell any further bonds on or before October 1, 1895, they should -first be offered to the parties then represented by Mr. Morgan. This -stipulation did not become operative. - -When our conference terminated it was understood that Secretary -Carlisle and Attorney-General Olney should act for the Government at -a meeting between the parties early the following day, at which the -agreement we had made was to be reduced to writing; and thereupon I -prepared a message which was submitted to the Congress at the opening -of its session on the following day, in which the details of our -agreement were set forth and the amount which would be saved to the -Government by the substitution of three per cent. gold bonds was -plainly stated; but having no memorandum of the agreement before me, -in my haste I carelessly omitted to mention the efforts agreed on by -Mr. Morgan and his associates to prevent gold shipments. The next -morning a contract embodying our agreement was drawn and signed, and a -copy at once given to the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of -the House, so that the delay of a demand for its inspection might be -avoided. A bill was also immediately introduced again giving authority -to issue three per cent. bonds, payable by their terms in gold, to be -substituted in place of the four per cent. bonds as provided in the -contract--to the end that $16,000,000 might be saved to the Government, -and the public welfare in every way subserved. - -The object of this message was twofold. It was deemed important, -considering the critical condition of our gold reserve, that the public -should be speedily informed of the steps taken for its protection; and -in addition, though previous efforts to obtain helpful legislation had -resulted in discouragement, it was hoped that when the saving by the -Government of $16,000,000 was seen to depend on the action of Congress -there might be a response that would accord with patriotic public duty. - -Quite in keeping with the congressional habit prevailing at that time, -the needed legislation was refused, and this money was not saved. - -The contract was thereupon carried out as originally made. In its -execution four per cent. bonds were delivered amounting to $62,315,400, -and the sum of $65,116,244.62 in gold received as their price. The -last deposit in completion of the contract was made in June, 1895, but -additional gold was obtained from the contracting parties in exchange -for United States notes and Treasury notes until in September, 1895, -when the entire amount of gold received from them under the contract -and through such exchanges had amounted to more than $81,000,000. The -terms of the agreement were so well carried out, not only in the matter -of furnishing gold, but in procuring it from abroad and protecting the -reserve from withdrawals, that during its continuance the operation -of the “endless chain” which had theretofore drained our gold was -interrupted. No gold was, during that period, taken from the Treasury -to be used in the purchase of bonds, as had previously been the case, -nor was any withdrawn for shipment abroad. - -It became manifest, however, soon after this contract was fully -performed, that our financial ailments had reached a stage so nearly -chronic that their cure by any treatment within Executive reach might -well be considered a matter of anxious doubt. In the latter months of -the year 1895 a scarcity of foreign exchange and its high rate, the -termination of the safeguards of the Morgan-Belmont contract, and, as -a result, the renewal of opportunity profitably to withdraw gold for -export with a newly stimulated popular apprehension, and perhaps other -disturbing incidents, brought about a recurrence of serious depletions -of gold from the reserve. - -In the annual Executive message sent to Congress on the second day -of December, 1895, the situation of our finances and currency was -set forth in detail, and another earnest plea was made for remedial -legislative action. After mentioning the immediately satisfactory -results of the contract for the purchase of gold, the message continued: - - Though the contract mentioned stayed for a time the tide of - gold withdrawals, its good results could not be permanent. - Recent withdrawals have reduced the reserve from $107,571,230 - on the eighth day of July, 1895, to $79,333,966. How long it - will remain large enough to render its increase unnecessary is - only a matter of conjecture, though quite large withdrawals for - shipment in the immediate future are predicted in well-informed - quarters. About $16,000,000 has been withdrawn during the month - of November. - -The prediction of further withdrawals mentioned in this message was so -fully verified that eighteen days after its transmission, and on the -twentieth day of December, 1895, another Executive communication was -sent to Congress, in contemplation of its holiday recess, in which, -after referring to the details contained in the former message, it was -stated: - - The contingency then feared has reached us, and the withdrawals - of gold since the communication referred to, and others - that appear inevitable, threaten such a depletion in our - Government’s gold reserve as brings us face to face with the - necessity of further action for its protection. This condition - is intensified by the prevalence in certain quarters of sudden - and unusual apprehension and timidity in business circles. - - The real and sensible cure for our recurring troubles can only - be effected by a complete change in our financial scheme. - Pending that, the Executive branch of the Government will not - relax its efforts nor abandon its determination to use every - means within its reach to maintain before the world American - credit, nor will there be any hesitation in exhibiting its - confidence in the resources of our country and the constant - patriotism of our people. - - In view, however, of the peculiar situation now confronting us, - I have ventured to herein express the earnest hope that the - Congress, in default of the inauguration of a better system - of finance, will not take a recess from its labors before it - has, by legislative enactment or declaration, done something, - not only to remind those apprehensive among our own people - that the resources of this Government and a scrupulous regard - for honest dealing afford a sure guarantee of unquestioned - safety and soundness, but to reassure the world that with these - factors, and the patriotism of our citizens, the ability and - determination of our nation to meet in any circumstances every - obligation it incurs do not admit of question. - -Perhaps it should not have been expected that members of Congress would -permit troublesome thoughts of the Government’s financial difficulties -to disturb the pleasant anticipations of their holiday recess; at -any rate, these difficulties and the appeal of the President for at -least some manifestation of a disposition to aid in their remedy were -completely ignored. - -On the sixth day of January, 1896, the gold reserve having fallen -to $61,251,710, its immediate repair became imperative. Though our -resort to the expedient of purchasing gold with bonds under contract -had been productive of very satisfactory results, it by no means -indicated our abandonment of the policy of inviting offerings of gold -by public advertisement. It was rather an exceptional departure from -that policy, made necessary by the dangerously low state of the reserve -on account of extensive and sudden depletions, and the peril attending -any delay in replenishing it. We had not lost faith in the loyalty -and patriotism of the people, nor did we doubt their willingness to -respond to an appeal from their Government in any emergency. We also -confidently believed that if the bonds issued for the purpose of -increasing our stock of gold were widely distributed among our people, -self-interest as well as patriotism would stimulate the solicitude of -the masses of our citizens for the welfare of the nation. No reason -for discouragement had been found in public offerings for bonds, so -far as obtaining a needed supply of gold and a fair price for our -bonds were concerned. The failure of their wide distribution among -the people when so disposed of seemed to be largely owing to the fact -that the bonds themselves were so antiquated in form, and bore so high -a rate of interest, that it was difficult for an ordinary person to -make the rather confusing computation of premium and other factors -necessary to a safe and intelligent bid. In a transaction of this -sort, where the smallest fraction of a cent may determine the success -of an offer, those accustomed to the niceties of financial calculations -are apt to hold the field to the exclusion of many who, unaided, dare -not trust themselves in the haze of such intricacies. If Congress had -provided for the issuance of bonds bearing a low rate of interest, -which could have been offered to the public at par, I am convinced -that the plain people of the land would more generally have become -purchasers. Another difficulty that had to some extent prevented a more -common participation by the people in prior public sales arose, it was -thought, from their lack of notice of the pendency of such sales, and -want of information as to the advantages of the investment offered, and -the procedure necessary to present their bids in proper form. - -In view of the fact that the gold then in the reserve amounted to -$20,000,000 more than it contained eleven months earlier, when the -Morgan-Belmont contract was made, and because, for that reason, more -time could be allowed for its replenishment, there was no hesitation -in deciding upon a return to our original plan of offering bonds in -exchange for gold by public subscription. - -Having determined upon a return to this method, it was deemed wise, -upon consideration of all the circumstances, to make some modification -of prior action in such cases. Instead of short-term five per cent. -bonds, the longer-term bonds bearing four per cent. interest were -substituted, as, on the whole, the best we could offer for popular -subscription. Since two offerings of $50,000,000 each had proved to -be of only very temporary benefit, it was determined to double the -amount and offer $100,000,000 for subscription. Nearly a month was to -be given instead of a shorter time, as theretofore, between the date -of notice of the offer and the opening of the bids; and extraordinary -efforts were to be made to give the most thorough publicity to the -offerings--to the end that we might stimulate in every possible way the -desire of the masses of our people to invest in the bonds. Especial -information and aid were to be furnished for the guidance of those -inclined to subscribe; and successful bidders were to be allowed to pay -for the bonds awarded to them in instalments. The lowest denomination -of the bonds was to be fifty dollars, and the larger ones were to be in -multiples of that sum. In point of fact, it was resolved that nothing -should be left undone which would in any way promote the success of -this additional and increased offer of bond subscription to the public. - -Accordingly, on the sixth day of January, 1896, a circular bearing -that date was issued, giving notice that proposals would be received -until the fifth day of February following for gold coin purchases of -$100,000,000 of the four per cent. bonds of the United States, upon -the terms above mentioned. These circulars were extensively published -in the newspapers throughout the country. Copies, together with a -letter of instruction to bidders, containing, among other things, a -computation showing the income the bonds would yield to the investor -upon their purchase at prices therein specified, and accompanied by -blanks for subscription, were sent to the postmasters in every State -and Territory with directions that they should be conspicuously -displayed in their offices. The Comptroller of the Currency prepared -and sent to all national banks a circular letter, urging them to call -the attention of their patrons to the desirability of obtaining the -bonds as an investment, and to aid in stimulating subscriptions; and -with this was forwarded a complete set of papers similar to those sent -to the postmasters. These papers were also sent to other banks and -financial institutions and to bankers in all parts of the country, -and, in addition, notice was given that they could be obtained upon -application to the Treasury Department or any of the subtreasuries -of the United States. Soon afterward, in view of the large amount of -the bonds offered, and as a precaution against an undue strain upon -the general money market, as well as to permit the greatest possible -opportunity for subscription, the terms of the original offer of the -Secretary of the Treasury were modified by reducing in amount the -instalments of the purchase price and extending the time for their -payment. - -On an examination of the bids at the expiration of the time limited -for their presentation, it was found that 4635 bids had been received, -after rejecting six which were palpably not genuine or not made in good -faith. The bidders were scattered through forty-seven of our States and -Territories, and the aggregate amount represented by their bids was -$526,970,000. The number of accepted bids upon which bonds were awarded -was only 828, and of these ten were forfeited after acceptance, on -account of non-payment of the first instalment of the purchase price. -Several of the bids accepted were for a single fifty-dollar bond, and -they varied in amount from that to one bid made by J. P. Morgan & Co. -and several associates for the entire issue of $100,000,000, for which -they offered 110.6877 on the dollar. To all the other 827 accepted -bidders who offered even the smallest fraction of a farthing more than -this the full number of bonds for which they bid were awarded. - -The aggregate of the bonds awarded to these bidders, excluding the -Morgan bid, amounted to $62,321,150. The remainder of the entire -offering, including more than $4,700,000 of the awards which became -forfeited for non-payment as above mentioned, were awarded to Mr. -Morgan and his associates, their bid being the highest next to those on -which bonds had been awarded in full, as already stated. - -The aggregate of the prices received for these bonds represented, by -reason of the premiums paid, an income to the investor of a trifle less -than three and four tenths per cent. - -As a result of this large sale of bonds, the gold reserve, which, on -the last day of January, 1896, amounted to less than $50,000,000, was -so increased that at the end of February, in spite of withdrawals in -the meantime, it stood at nearly $124,000,000. - -It will be observed that, notwithstanding all the efforts made to -distribute this issue of bonds among the people, but 827 bids out of -4641 were entitled to awards as being above the Morgan bid; and that -more than one third of all the bonds sold were awarded on the single -bid of Mr. Morgan and his associates. - -The price received on this public sale was apparently somewhat better -for the Government than that secured by the Morgan-Belmont contract; -but their agreement required of them such labor, risk, and expense -as perhaps entitled them to a favorable bargain. In any event, the -advantages the Government derived from this contract were certainly -very valuable and should not be overlooked. On every sale of bonds by -public offering, not excluding that just mentioned, large amounts of -gold were withdrawn from the Treasury and used in paying for the bonds -offered. In the execution of the contract of February, 1895, no gold -was withdrawn for the purchase of the bonds, and the reserve received -the full benefit of the transaction. Each sale by public advertisement -made prior to the time of the contract had been so quickly followed -by extensive and wasting withdrawals of gold from the reserve, that -scarcely a breathing-time was allowed before we were again overtaken -by the necessity for its reinforcement. Even after the notice given -for the last sale on the eighth day of January, 1896, and between that -date and the 1st of June following, these withdrawals amounted to more -than $73,000,000, while during the six months or more of the existence -of the Morgan-Belmont contract the withdrawals of gold for export -were entirely prevented and a season of financial quiet and peace was -secured. - -Whatever may be the comparative merits of the two plans for maintaining -our gold reserve, both of them when utilized were abundantly and -clearly justified. - -Whether from fatigue of malign conditions or other causes, ever since -the last large sale of bonds was made the gold reserve has been so free -from depletion that its condition has caused no alarm. - -Two hundred and sixty-two millions of dollars in bonds were issued on -its account during the critical time covered by this narrative; but the -credit and fair fame of our nation were saved. - -I have attempted to give a detailed history of the crime charged -against an administration which “issued bonds of the Government in -time of peace.” Without shame and without repentance, I confess my -share of the guilt; and I refuse to shield my accomplices in this crime -who, with me, held high places in that administration. And though Mr. -Morgan and Mr. Belmont and scores of other bankers and financiers who -were accessories in these transactions may be steeped in destructive -propensities, and may be constantly busy in sinful schemes, I shall -always recall with satisfaction and self-congratulation my association -with them at a time when our country sorely needed their aid. - - - - -THE VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY - - -I - -There is no better illustration of the truth that nations and -individuals are affected in the same manner by like causes than is -often furnished by the beginning, progress, and results of a national -boundary dispute. We all know that among individuals, when neighbors -have entered upon a quarrel concerning their division-line or the -location of a line fence, they will litigate until all account of -cost and all regard for the merits of the contention give place to -a ruthless and all-dominating determination, by fair means or foul, -to win; and if fisticuffs and forcible possession are resorted to, -the big, strong neighbor rejoices in his strength as he mauls and -disfigures his small and weak antagonist. - -It will be found that nations behave in like fashion. One or the other -of two national neighbors claims that their dividing-line should be -defined or rectified in a certain manner. If this is questioned, a -season of diplomatic untruthfulness and finesse sometimes intervenes -for the sake of appearances. Developments soon follow, however, that -expose a grim determination behind fine phrases of diplomacy; and in -the end the weaker nation frequently awakens to the fact that it must -either accede to an ultimatum dictated by its stronger adversary, or -look in the face of war and a spoliation of its territory; and if such -a stage is reached, superior strength and fighting ability, instead of -suggesting magnanimity, are graspingly used to enforce extreme demands -if not to consummate extensive conquest or complete subjugation. - -I propose to call attention to one of these unhappy national boundary -disputes, between the kingdom of Great Britain and the South American -republic of Venezuela, involving the boundary-line separating Venezuela -from the English colony of British Guiana, which adjoins Venezuela on -the east. - -Venezuela, once a Spanish possession, declared her independence in -1810, and a few years afterward united with two other of Spain’s -revolted colonies in forming the old Colombian federal union, which -was recognized by the United States in 1822. In 1836 this union was -dissolved and Venezuela became again a separate and independent -republic, being promptly recognized as such by our Government and by -other powers. Spain, however, halted in her recognition until 1845, -when she quite superfluously ceded to Venezuela by treaty the territory -which as an independent republic she had actually owned and possessed -since 1810. But neither in this treaty nor in any other mention of -the area of the republic were its boundaries described with more -definiteness than as being “the same as those which marked the ancient -viceroyalty and captaincy-general of New Granada and Venezuela in the -year 1810.” - -England derived title to the colony of Guiana from Holland in 1814, -by a treaty in which the territory was described as “the Cape of Good -Hope and the establishments of Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice.” No -boundaries of those settlements or “establishments” were given in the -treaty, nor does it appear that any such boundaries had ever been -particularly defined. - -It is quite apparent that the limits of these adjoining countries thus -lacking any mention of definite metes and bounds, were in need of -extraneous assistance before they could be exactly fixed, and that -their proper location was quite likely to lead to serious disagreement. -In such circumstances threatening complications can frequently be -avoided if the adjoining neighbors agree upon a divisional line -promptly, and before their demands are stimulated and their tenacity -increased by a real or fancied advance in the value of the possessions -to be divided, or other incidents have intervened to render it more -difficult to make concessions. - -I shall not attempt to sketch the facts and arguments that bear upon -the exact merits of this boundary controversy between Great Britain and -Venezuela. They have been thoroughly examined by an arbitral tribunal -to which the entire difficulty was referred, and by whose determination -the boundary between the two countries has been fixed--perhaps in -strict accord with justice, but at all events finally and irrevocably. -Inasmuch, however, as our own country became in a sense involved in the -controversy, or at least deeply concerned in its settlement, I have -thought there might be interest in an explanation of the manner and the -processes by which the interposition of the United States Government -was brought about. I must not be expected to exclude from mention -every circumstance that may relate to the merits of the dispute as -between the parties primarily concerned; but so far as I make use of -such circumstances I intend to do so only in aid and simplification of -the explanation I have undertaken. - -This dispute began in 1841. On October 5 of that year the Venezuelan -minister to Great Britain, in a note to Lord Aberdeen, Principal -Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after reminding the secretary -that a proposal made by Venezuela on the 28th of January, 1841, for -joint action in the matter of fixing a divisional boundary, still -awaited the acceptance of Great Britain, wrote as follows: - - The Honorable Earl of Aberdeen may now judge of the surprise of - the Government of Venezuela upon learning that in the territory - of the Republic a sentry-box has been erected upon which the - British flag has been raised. The Venezuelan Government is in - ignorance of the origin and purport of these proceedings, and - hopes that they may receive some satisfactory explanation of - this action. In the meantime the undersigned, in compliance - with the instructions communicated to him, urges upon the - Honorable Earl of Aberdeen the necessity of entering into a - treaty of boundaries as a previous step to the fixation of - limits, and begs to ask for an answer to the above-mentioned - communication of January 28. - -Lord Aberdeen, in his reply, dated October 21, 1841, makes the -following statement: - - Her Majesty’s Government has received from the Governor of - British Guiana, Mr. Schomburgk’s report of his proceedings in - execution of the commission with which he has been charged. - That report states that Mr. Schomburgk set out from Demerara in - April last and was on his return to the Essequibo River at the - end of June. It appears that Mr. Schomburgk planted boundary - posts at certain points of the country which he has surveyed, - and that he was fully aware that the demarcation so made was - merely a preliminary measure, open to further discussion - between the Governments of Great Britain and Venezuela. But - it does not appear that Mr. Schomburgk left behind him any - guard-house, sentry-box, or other building having the British - flag. - - With respect to the proposal of the Venezuelan Government - that the Governments of Great Britain and Venezuela should - conclude a treaty as a preliminary step to the demarcation - of the boundaries between British Guiana and Venezuela, the - undersigned begs leave to observe that it appears to him that - if it should be necessary to make a treaty upon the subject of - the boundaries in question, such a measure should follow rather - than precede the operation of the survey. - -In a communication dated the 18th of November, 1841, the Venezuelan -minister, after again complaining of the acts of Schomburgk and -alleging that he “has planted at a point on the mouth of the Orinoco -several posts bearing Her Majesty’s initials, and raised at the -same place, with a show of armed forces, the British flag, and also -performed several other acts of dominion and government,” refers to -the great dissatisfaction aroused in Venezuela by what he calls “this -undeserved offense,” and adds: “The undersigned therefore has no doubts -but that he will obtain from Her Majesty’s Government a reparation for -the wrong done to the dignity of the Republic, and that those signs -which have so unpleasantly shaken public confidence will be ordered -removed.” - -No early response having been made to this communication, another -was addressed to Lord Aberdeen, dated December 8, 1841, in which the -representative of Venezuela refers to his previous unanswered note and -to a recent order received from his government, which he says directs -him “to insist not only upon the conclusion of a treaty fixing the -boundaries between Venezuela and British Guiana, but also, and this -very particularly, to insist upon the removal of the signs set up, -contrary to all rights, by the surveyor R. H. Schomburgk in Barima -and in other points of the Venezuelan territory”; and he continues: -“In his afore-mentioned communication of the 18th of last month, the -undersigned has already informed the Honorable Earl of Aberdeen of -the dissatisfaction prevailing among the Venezuelans on this account, -and now adds that this dissatisfaction, far from diminishing, grows -stronger--as is but natural--as time goes on and no reparation of the -wrongs is made.” - -These two notes of the Venezuelan minister were answered on the -eleventh day of December, 1841. In his reply Lord Aberdeen says: - - The undersigned begs leave to refer to his note of the 21st - of October last, in which he explained that the proceeding of - Mr. Schomburgk in planting boundary posts at certain points - of the country which he has surveyed was merely a preliminary - measure open to future discussion between the two Governments, - and that it would be premature to make a boundary treaty before - the survey will be completed. The undersigned has only further - to state that much unnecessary inconvenience would result from - the removal of the posts fixed by Mr. Schomburgk, as they - will afford the only tangible means by which Her Majesty’s - Government can be prepared to discuss the question of the - boundaries with the Government of Venezuela. These posts were - erected for that express purpose, and not, as the Venezuelan - Government appears to apprehend, as indications of dominion and - empire on the part of Great Britain. - -In a reply to this note, after referring to the explanation of the -purpose of these posts or signs which Lord Aberdeen had given, it was -said, in further urging their removal: “The undersigned regrets to be -obliged to again insist upon this point; but the damages sustained by -Venezuela on account of the permanence of said signs are so serious -that he hopes in view of those facts that the trouble resulting from -their removal may not appear useless.” The minister followed this -insistence with such earnest argument that on the thirty-first day of -January, 1842, nearly four months after the matter was first agitated, -Lord Aberdeen informed the Venezuelan minister that instructions would -be sent to the governor of British Guiana directing him to remove the -posts which had been placed by Mr. Schomburgk near the Orinoco. He, -however, accompanied this assurance with the distinct declaration -“that although, in order to put an end to the misapprehension which -appears to prevail in Venezuela with regard to the object of Mr. -Schomburgk’s survey, the undersigned has consented to comply with the -renewed representation of the Minister upon this affair, Her Majesty’s -Government must not be understood to abandon any portion of the rights -of Great Britain over the territory which was formerly held by the -Dutch in Guiana.” - -It should be here stated that the work which Schomburgk performed -at the instance of the British Government consisted not only in -placing monuments of some sort at the mouth of the Orinoco River, -upon territory claimed by Venezuela, but also in locating from such -monuments a complete dividing-line running far inland and annexing to -British Guiana on the west a large region which Venezuela also claimed. -This line, as originally located or as afterward still further extended -to the west, came to be called “the Schomburgk line.” - -The Orinoco River, flowing eastward to the sea, is a very broad -and deep waterway, which, with its affluents, would in any event, -and however the bounds of Venezuela might be limited, traverse a -very extensive portion of that country’s area; and its control and -free navigation are immensely important factors in the progress and -prosperity of the republic. Substantially at the mouth of the Orinoco, -and on its south side, two quite large rivers, the Barima and the -Amacuro, flow into the sea. The region adjacent to the mouth of those -rivers has, sometimes at least, been called Barima; and it was here -that the posts or signs complained of by Venezuela were placed. - -The coast from the mouth of the Orinoco River slopes or drops to the -east and south; and some distance from that river’s mouth, in the -directions mentioned, the Essequibo, a large river flowing for a long -distance from the south, empties into the sea. - -After the correspondence I have mentioned, which resulted in the -removal of the so-called initial monuments of the Schomburgk line -from the Barima region, there seems to have been less activity in -the boundary discussion until January 31, 1844, when the Venezuelan -minister to England again addressed Lord Aberdeen on the subject. -He referred to the erection of the Schomburgk monuments and the -complaints of Venezuela on that account, and stated that since the -removal of those monuments he had not ceased to urge Lord Aberdeen “to -commence without delay negotiations for a treaty fixing definitely -the boundary-line that shall divide the two countries.” He adds the -following very sensible statement: “Although it was undoubtedly -the duty of the one who promoted this question to take the first -step toward the negotiation of the treaty, the undersigned being -well aware that other important matters claim the attention of Her -Majesty’s Government, and as he ought not to wait indefinitely, hastens -to propose an agreement which, if left for a later date, may be -difficult to conclude.” It is disappointing to observe that the good -sense exhibited in this statement did not hold out to the end of the -minister’s communication. After a labored presentation of historical -incidents, beginning with the discovery of the American continent, -he concludes by putting forward the Essequibo River as the proper -boundary-line between the two countries. This was a proposition of -such extreme pretensions that the Venezuelan representative knew, or -ought to have known, it would not be considered for a moment by the -Government of Great Britain; and it seems to me that a diplomatic error -was made when, failing to apprehend the fact that the exigencies of the -situation called for a show of concession, the Venezuelan minister, -instead of intimating a disposition to negotiate, gave Great Britain an -opportunity to be first in making proposals apparently calculated to -meet the needs of conciliation and compromise. - -Thus two months after the receipt of this communication,--on the -thirtieth day of March, 1844,--Lord Aberdeen sent his reply. After -combating the allegations contained in the letter of the Venezuelan -representative, he remarked that if he were inclined to act upon the -spirit of that letter, it was evident that he ought to claim on behalf -of Great Britain, as the rightful successor to Holland, all the coast -from the Orinoco to the Essequibo. Then follows this significant -declaration: - - But the undersigned believes that the negotiations would not - be free from difficulties if claims that cannot be sustained - are presented, and shall not therefore follow Señor Fortique’s - example, but state here the concessions that Great Britain - is disposed to make of her rights, prompted by a friendly - consideration for Venezuela and by her desire to avoid all - cause of serious controversies between the two countries. Being - convinced that the most important object for the interests - of Venezuela is the exclusive possession of the Orinoco, Her - Majesty’s Government is ready to yield to the Republic of - Venezuela a portion of the coast sufficient to insure her the - free control of the mouth of this her principal river, and to - prevent its being under the control of any foreign power. - -Lord Aberdeen further declared that, “with this end in view, and -being persuaded that a concession of the greatest importance has been -made to Venezuela,” he would consent on behalf of Great Britain to a -boundary which he particularly defined, and in general terms may be -described as beginning in the mouth of the Moroco River, which is on -the coast southeast of the mouth of the Orinoco River and about two -thirds of the distance between that point and the Essequibo River, said -boundary running inland from that point until it included in its course -considerably more territory than was embraced within the original -Schomburgk line, though it excluded the region embraced within that -line adjacent to the Barima and Amacuro rivers and the mouth of the -Orinoco. - -This boundary, as proposed by Lord Aberdeen, was not satisfactory to -Venezuela; and soon after its submission her diplomatic representative -died. This interruption was quickly followed by a long period of -distressing internal strifes and revolutions, which so distracted and -disturbed her government that for more than thirty years she was not in -condition to renew negotiations for an adjustment of her territorial -limits. - -During all this time Great Britain seemed not especially unwilling to -allow these negotiations to remain in abeyance. - -This interval was not, however, entirely devoid of boundary incidents. -In 1850 great excitement and indignation were aroused among the -Venezuelans by a rumor that Great Britain intended to take possession -of Venezuelan Guiana, a province adjoining British Guiana on the west, -and a part of the territory claimed by Venezuela; and the feeling thus -engendered became so extreme, both among the people and on the part of -the government of the republic, that all remaining friendliness between -the two countries was seriously menaced. Demonstrations indicating that -Venezuela was determined to repel the rumored movement as an invasion -of her rights, were met by instructions given by Great Britain to the -commander of her Majesty’s naval forces in the West Indies as to the -course he was to pursue if the Venezuelan forces should construct -fortifications within the territory in dispute. At the same time, Mr. -Balford Hinton Wilson, England’s representative at Caracas, in a note -addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Venezuela, indignantly -characterized these disquieting rumors of Great Britain’s intention -to occupy the lands mentioned, as mischievous, and maliciously false; -but he also declared that, on the other hand, her Majesty’s Government -would not see with indifference the aggressions of Venezuela upon the -disputed territory. - -This note contained, in addition, a rather impressive pronouncement in -these words: - - The Venezuelan Government, in justice to Great Britain, cannot - mistrust for a moment the sincerity of the formal declaration, - which is now made in the name and by the express order of Her - Majesty’s Government, that Great Britain has no intention to - occupy or encroach upon the territory in dispute; therefore the - Venezuelan Government, in an equal spirit of good faith and - friendship, cannot refuse to make a similar declaration to Her - Majesty’s Government, namely, that Venezuela herself has no - intention to occupy or encroach upon the territory in dispute. - -The Minister of Foreign Affairs for Venezuela responded to this -communication in the following terms: - - The undersigned has been instructed by His Excellency the - President of the Republic to give the following answer: The - Government never could be persuaded that Great Britain, in - contempt of the negotiation opened on the subject and the - alleged rights in the question of limits pending between the - two countries, would want to use force in order to occupy - the land that each side claims--much less after Mr. Wilson’s - repeated assurance, which the Executive Power believes to have - been most sincere, that those imputations had no foundation - whatever, being, on the contrary, quite the reverse of the - truth. Fully confident of this, and fortified by the protest - embodied in the note referred to, the Government has no - difficulty in declaring, as they do declare, that Venezuela - has no intention of occupying or encroaching upon any portion - of the territory the possession of which is in controversy; - neither will she look with indifference on a contrary - proceeding on the part of Great Britain. - -In furtherance of these declarations the English Government stipulated -that it would not “order or sanction such occupations or encroachments -on the part of the British authorities”; and Venezuela agreed on her -part to “instruct the authorities of Venezuelan Guiana to refrain from -taking any step which might clash with the engagement hereby made by -the Government.” - -I suspect there was some justification on each side for the accusations -afterward interchanged between the parties that this understanding or -agreement, in its strict letter and spirit, had not been scrupulously -observed. - -As we now pass from this incident to a date more than twenty-five years -afterward, when attempts to negotiate for a settlement of the boundary -controversy were resumed, it may be profitable, before going further, -to glance at some of the conditions existing at the time of such -resumption. - - -II - -In 1876--thirty-two years after the discontinuance of efforts on the -part of Great Britain and Venezuela to fix by agreement a line which -should divide their possessions--Venezuela was confronted, upon the -renewal of negotiations for that purpose, by the following conditions: - -The claim by her, of a divisional line, founded upon her conception of -strict right, which her powerful opponent had insisted could not in any -way be plausibly supported, and which therefore she would in no event -accept. - -An indefiniteness in the limits claimed by Great Britain--so great -that, of two boundary-lines indicated or suggested by her, one had -been plainly declared to be “merely a preliminary measure open to -future discussion between the Governments of Great Britain and -Venezuela,” while the other was distinctly claimed to be based not on -any acknowledgment of the republic’s rights, but simply upon generous -concessions and a “desire to avoid all cause of serious controversies -between the two countries.” - -A controversy growing out of this situation impossible of friendly -settlement except by such arrangement and accommodation as would -satisfy Great Britain, or by a submission of the dispute to arbitration. - -A constant danger of such an extension of British settlements in the -disputed territory as would necessarily complicate the situation -and furnish a convenient pretext for the refusal of any concession -respecting the lands containing such settlements. - -A continual profession on the part of Great Britain of her present -readiness to make benevolent concessions and of her willingness to -co-operate in a speedy adjustment, while at the same time neither -reducing her pretensions, nor attempting in a conspicuous manner to -hasten negotiations to a conclusion. - -A tremendous disparity in power and strength between Venezuela and -her adversary, which gave her no hope of defending her territory or -preventing its annexation to the possessions of Great Britain in case -the extremity of force or war was reached. - -The renewed negotiations began with a communication dated November -14, 1876, addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Venezuela -to Lord Derby, then Great Britain’s principal Secretary of State. In -this communication the efforts made between the years 1841 and 1844 to -establish by agreement a divisional line between the two countries, -and their interruption, were referred to, and the earnest desire was -expressed that negotiations for that purpose might at once be resumed. -The minister suggested no other line than the Essequibo River, but in -conclusion declared that the President of Venezuela was led to “hope -that the solution of this question, already for so many years delayed, -will be a work of very speedy and cordial agreement.” - -On the same day that this note was written to Lord Derby, one was -also written by the same Venezuelan official to Mr. Fish, then our -Secretary of State. After speaking of the United States as “the most -powerful and the oldest of the Republics of the new continent, and -called on to lend to others its powerful moral support in disputes -with European nations,” the minister directs attention to the boundary -controversy between Venezuela and Great Britain and the great necessity -of bringing it to a speedy termination. He concludes as follows: “But -whatever may be the result of the new steps of the Government, it has -desired that the American Government might at once take cognizance -of them, convinced, as it is, that it will give the subject its kind -consideration and take an interest in having due justice done to -Venezuela.” A memorandum was inclosed with the note, setting forth the -claims of Venezuela touching the boundary location. - -This appears to be the first communication addressed to our Government -on the subject of a controversy in which we afterward became very -seriously concerned. - -A short time after the date of these communications, a Venezuelan envoy -to Great Britain was appointed; and, on the thirteenth day of February, -1877, he addressed to Lord Derby a note in which, after asserting the -right of Venezuela to insist upon the boundary previously claimed by -her, he declared the willingness of his government “to settle this -long-pending question in the most amicable manner,” and suggested -either the acceptance of a boundary-line such as would result from -a presentation by both parties of Spanish and Dutch titles, maps, -documents, and proofs existing before the advent in South America of -either Venezuela or British Guiana, or the adoption of “a conventional -line fixed by mutual accord between the Governments of Venezuela and -Great Britain after a careful and friendly consideration of the case, -keeping in view the documents presented by both sides, solely with the -object of reconciling their mutual interests, and to fix a boundary as -equitable as possible.” The suggestion is made that the adoption of -a divisional line is important “to prevent the occurrence of serious -differences in the future, particularly as Guiana is attracting the -general attention of the world on account of the immense riches which -are daily being discovered there.” - -Let us here note that this renewal by Venezuela of her efforts to -settle her boundary-line was accompanied by two new features. These, -though in themselves entirely independent, became so related to each -other, and in their subsequent combination and development they so -imperiously affected our Government, that their coincident appearance -at this particular stage of the controversy may well strike us as -significant. One of these features was the abandonment by Venezuela of -her insistence upon a line representing her extreme claims, and which -England would not in any contingency accept, thus clearing the field -for possible arbitration; and the other was her earnest appeal to us -for our friendly aid. Neither should we fail to notice the new and -important reference of the Venezuelan envoy to the immense riches being -discovered in the disputed territory. Gold beneath soil in controversy -does not always hasten the adjustment of uncertain or disputed -boundary-lines. - -On the twenty-fourth day of March, 1877, Lord Derby informed the -Venezuelan envoy that the governor of British Guiana was shortly -expected in London, and that he was anxious to await his arrival before -taking any steps in the boundary discussion. - -After waiting for more than two years for a further answer from the -English Government, the Venezuelan representative in London, on the -19th of May, 1879, addressed a note on the subject to Lord Salisbury, -who, in the meantime, had succeeded Lord Derby. In this note reference -was made to the communication sent to Lord Derby in 1877, to the desire -expressed by him to await the arrival of the governor of British -Guiana before making reply, and to the fact that the communication -mentioned still remained unanswered; and on behalf of Venezuela her -representative repeated the alternative proposition made by him in -February, 1877, in these words: “The boundary treaty may be based -either on the acceptance of the line of strict right as shown by the -records, documents, and other authoritative proofs which each party may -exhibit, or on the acceptance at once by both Governments of a frontier -of accommodation which shall satisfy the respective interests of the -two countries”; and he concluded his note as follows: - - If Her Britannic Majesty’s Government should prefer the - frontier of accommodation or convenience, then it would be - desirable that it should vouchsafe to make a proposition of an - arrangement, on the understanding that, in order to obviate - future difficulties and to give Great Britain the fullest - proof of the consideration and friendship which Venezuela - professes for her, my Government would not hesitate to accept - a demarcation that should satisfy as far as possible the - interests of the Republic. - - At all events, my Lord, something will have to be done to - prevent this question from pending any longer. - - Thirty-eight years ago my Government wrote urging Her Majesty’s - Government to have the Boundary Treaty concluded, and now - this affair is in the same position as in 1841, without any - settlement; meanwhile Guiana has become of more importance than - it was then, by reason of the large deposits of gold which have - been and still are met with in that region. - -Now, at the date of this communication England’s most extreme claims -were indicated either by the Schomburgk line or by the line which -Lord Aberdeen suggested in 1844 as a concession. These were indeed the -only lines which Great Britain had thus far presented. When in such -circumstances, and with these lines distinctly in mind, the envoy of -Venezuela offered to abandon for his country her most extreme claims, -and asked that Great Britain should “vouchsafe to make a proposition -of an arrangement” upon the basis of a “frontier of accommodation or -convenience,” what answer had he a right to expect? Most assuredly he -had a right to expect that if Great Britain should prefer to proceed -upon the theory of “accommodation or convenience,” she would respond by -offering such a reduction of the claims she had already made as would -indicate a degree of concession or “accommodation” on her part that -should entitle her to expect similar concession from Venezuela. - -What was the answer actually made? After a delay of nearly eight -months, on the tenth day of January, 1880, Lord Salisbury replied that -her Majesty’s Government were of the opinion that to argue the matter -on the ground of strict right would involve so many intricate questions -that it would be very unlikely to lead to a satisfactory solution of -the question, and they would therefore prefer the alternative “of -endeavoring to come to an agreement as to the acceptance by the two -Governments of a frontier of accommodation which shall satisfy the -respective interests of the two countries.” - -He then gives a most startling statement of the English Government’s -claim, by specifying boundaries which overlap the Schomburgk line -and every other line that had been thought of or dreamed of before, -declaring that such claim is justified “by virtue of ancient treaties -with the aboriginal tribes and of subsequent cessions from Holland.” He -sets against this claim, or “on the other hand,” as he says, the fact -that the President of Venezuela, in a message dated February 20, 1877, -“put forward a claim on the part of Venezuela to the river Essequibo -as the boundary to which the Republic was entitled”--thereby giving -prejudicial importance to a claim of boundary made by the President -of Venezuela three years before, notwithstanding his Lordship was -answering a communication in which Venezuela’s present diplomatic -representative distinctly proposed “a frontier of accommodation.” His -declaration, therefore, that the boundary which was thus put forward by -the President of Venezuela would involve “the surrender of a province -now inhabited by forty thousand British subjects,” seems quite -irrelevant, because such a boundary was not then under consideration; -and in passing it may occur to us that the great delay in settling the -boundaries between the two countries had given abundant opportunity for -such inhabitation as Lord Salisbury suggests. His Lordship having thus -built up a contention in which he puts on one side a line which for the -sake of pacific accommodation Venezuela no longer proposes to insist -upon, and on the other a line for Great Britain so grotesquely extreme -as to appear fanciful, soberly observes: - - The difference, therefore, between these two claims is - so great that it is clear that, in order to arrive at a - satisfactory arrangement, each party must be prepared to - make considerable concessions to the other; and although the - claim of Venezuela to the Essequibo River boundary could not - under any circumstances be entertained, I beg leave to assure - you that Her Majesty’s Government are anxious to meet the - Venezuelan Government in a spirit of conciliation, and would - be willing, in the event of a renewal of negotiations for a - general settlement of boundaries, to waive a portion of what - they consider to be their strict right, if Venezuela is really - disposed to make corresponding concessions on her part. - -And ignoring entirely the humbly respectful request of the Venezuelan -minister that Great Britain would “vouchsafe to make a proposition -of an arrangement,” his Lordship thus concludes his communication: -“Her Majesty’s Government will therefore be glad to receive, and will -undertake to consider in the most friendly spirit, any proposal that -the Venezuelan Government may think fit to make for the establishment -of a boundary satisfactory to both nations.” - -This is diplomacy--of a certain sort. It is a deep and mysterious -science; and we probably cannot do better than to confess our inability -to understand its intricacies and sinuosities; but at this point we can -hardly keep out of mind the methods of the shrewd, sharp trader who -demands exorbitant terms, and at the same time invites negotiation, -looking for a result abundantly profitable in the large range for -dicker which he has created. - -An answer was made to Lord Salisbury’s note on the twelfth day of -April, 1880, in which the Venezuelan envoy stated in direct terms -that he had received specific instructions from his government for -the arrangement of the difficulty, by abandoning the ground of strict -right and “concurring in the adoption for both countries of a frontier -mutually convenient, and reconciling in the best possible manner their -respective interests--each party having to make concessions to the -other for the purpose of attaining such an important result.” - -It will be remembered that in 1844, when this boundary question was -under discussion, Lord Aberdeen proposed a line beginning in the mouth -of the Moroco River, being a point on the coast south and east of the -mouth of the Orinoco, thus giving to Venezuela the control of that -river, but running inland in such a manner as to include, in the whole, -little if any less area than that included in the Schomburgk line; -and it will also be recalled that this line was not then acceptable -to Venezuela. It appears, however, that the delays and incidents of -thirty-six years had impressed upon the government of the republic -the serious disadvantages of her situation in contention with Great -Britain; for we find in this reply of the Venezuelan envoy the inquiry -“whether Her Britannic Majesty’s Government is disposed now, as it -was in 1844, to accept the mouth of the river Moroco as the frontier -at the coast.” To this Lord Salisbury promptly responded that the -attorney-general for the colony of British Guiana was shortly expected -in England, and that her Majesty’s Government would prefer to postpone -the boundary discussion until his arrival. - -This was followed by a silence of five months, with no word or sign -from England’s Foreign Office; and in the meantime Earl Granville had -succeeded Lord Salisbury as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. -After waiting thus long, the representative of Venezuela, on the 23d -of September, 1880, reminded Lord Granville that in the preceding -April his immediate predecessor had informed him that the arrival of -the attorney-general of British Guiana was awaited before deciding the -question of boundaries between the two Guianas; and as he had not, -after the lapse of five months, been honored with a communication on -the subject, he was bound to suppose that the attorney-general had not -accomplished his voyage, in which case it was useless longer to wait -for him. He further reminded his Lordship that on the 24th of March, -1877, Lord Derby, then in charge of British foreign affairs, also -desired to postpone the consideration of the question until the arrival -in London of the governor of British Guiana, who was then expected, but -who apparently never came. He then proceeds as follows: - - Consequently it is best not to go on waiting either for the - Governor or for the Attorney-General of the Colony, but - to decide these questions ourselves, considering that my - Government is now engaged in preparing the official map of the - Republic and wishes of course to mark out the boundaries on the - East. - - In my despatch of the 12th of April last, I informed your - Excellency [Excellency’s predecessor?] that as a basis of a - friendly demarcation my Government was disposed to accept the - mouth of the River Moroco as the frontier on the coast. If - Her Britannic Majesty’s Government should accept this point - of departure, it would be very easy to determine the general - course of the frontier, either by means of notes or in verbal - conferences, as your Excellency might prefer. - -On the twelfth day of February, 1881, Lord Granville, replying to -Venezuela’s two notes dated April 12 and September 23, 1880, informed -her representative, without explanation, that her Majesty’s Government -would not accept the mouth of the Moroco as the divisional boundary on -the coast. - -A few days afterward, in an answer to this refusal, Venezuela’s -representative mentioned the extreme claims of the two countries and -the fact that it had been agreed between the parties that steps should -be taken to settle upon a frontier of accommodation; that in pursuance -thereof he had proposed as the point of departure for such a frontier -the mouth of the Moroco River, which was in agreement thus far with -the proposition made by Lord Aberdeen on behalf of Great Britain in -1844; and pertinently added: “Thus thirty-seven years ago Her Britannic -Majesty’s Government spontaneously proposed the mouth of the Moroco -River as the limit on the coast, a limit which your Excellency does -not accept now, for you are pleased to tell me so in the note which I -have the honor of answering.” He thereupon suggests another boundary, -beginning on the coast at a point one mile north of the mouth of -the Moroco River and thence extending inland in such manner as to -constitute a large concession on the part of Venezuela, but falling -very far short of meeting the claims of Great Britain. He declares, -however, that this demarcation “is the maximum of all concessions which -in this matter the Government of Venezuela can grant by way of friendly -arrangement.” - -Apparently anticipating, as he well might, that the boundary he -proposed would fail of acceptance, he suggests that in such case -the two governments would have no alternative but to determine the -frontier by strict right, and that on this basis they would find it -impossible to arrive at an agreement. Therefore he declares that he has -received instructions from his government to urge upon Great Britain -the submission of the question to an arbitrator, to be chosen by both -parties, to whose award both governments should submit. - -In this proposal of arbitration by Venezuela we find an approach to a -new phase of the controversy. At first, the two countries had stood -at arm’s-length, each asserting strict right of boundary, only to -be met by obstinate and unyielding resistance. Next, the field of -mutual concession and accommodation had been traversed, with no result -except damaging and dangerous delay. And now, after forty years of -delusive hope, the time seemed at hand when the feebler contestant must -contemplate ignominious submission to dictatorial exaction, or forcible -resistance, futile and distressing, unless honorable rest and justice -could be found in arbitration--the refuge which civilization has -builded among the nations of the earth for the protection of the weak -against the strong, and the citadel from which the ministries of peace -issue their decrees against the havoc and barbarism of war. - -The reply of Lord Granville to the communication of the envoy of -Venezuela proposing an alternative of arbitration was delayed for seven -months; and when, in September, 1881, it was received, it contained a -rejection of the boundary offered by Venezuela and a proposal of a -new line apparently lacking almost every feature of concession; and, -singularly enough, there was not in this reply the slightest allusion -to Venezuela’s request for arbitration. - -I do not find that this communication of Great Britain was ever -specifically answered, though an answer was often requested. No further -steps appear to have been taken until September 7, 1883, when Lord -Granville instructed the British minister to Venezuela to invite the -serious attention of the Venezuelan Government to the questions pending -between the two countries, with a view to their early settlement. -These questions are specified as relating to the boundary, to certain -differential duties imposed on imports from British colonies, and -to the claims of British creditors of the republic. His Lordship -declared in those instructions that as a preliminary to entering upon -negotiations it was indispensable that an answer should be given to the -pending proposal which had been made by her Majesty’s Government in -regard to the boundary. - -The representations made to the Government of Venezuela by the British -minister, in obedience to those instructions, elicited a reply, in -which a provision of the Venezuelan constitution was cited prohibiting -the alienation or cession of any part of the territory of the republic; -and it was suggested that, inasmuch as the Essequibo line seemed -abundantly supported as the true boundary of Venezuela, a concession -beyond that line by treaty would be obnoxious to this constitutional -prohibition, whereas any reduction of territory brought about by a -decree of an arbitral tribunal would obviate the difficulty. Therefore -the urgent necessity was submitted for the selection of an arbitrator, -“who, freely and unanimously chosen by the two Governments, would judge -and pronounce a sentence of a definitive character.” - -The representative of her Majesty’s Government, in a response dated -February 29, 1884, commented upon the new difficulty introduced by the -statement concerning the prohibition contained in the constitution of -the republic, and expressed a fear that if arbitration was agreed to, -the same prohibition might be invoked as an excuse for not abiding by -an award unfavorable to Venezuela; and it was declared that if, on the -other hand, the arbitrator should decide in favor of the Venezuelan -Government to the full extent of their claim, “a large and important -territory which has for a long period been inhabited and occupied by -Her Majesty’s subjects and treated as a part of the Colony of British -Guiana would be severed from the Queen’s dominions.” This declaration -is immediately followed by a conclusion in these words: - - For the above-mentioned reasons, therefore, the circumstances - of the case do not appear to Her Majesty’s Government to be - such as to render arbitration applicable for a solution of the - difficulty; and I have accordingly to request you, in making - this known to the Venezuelan Government, to express to them - the hope of Her Majesty’s Government that some other means may - be devised for bringing this long-standing matter to an issue - satisfactory to both powers. - -Let us pause here for a moment’s examination of the surprising refusal -of Great Britain to submit this difficulty to arbitration, and the -more surprising reasons presented for its justification. The refusal -was surprising because the controversy had reached such a stage that -arbitration was evidently the only means by which it could be settled -consistently with harmonious relations between the two countries. - -It was on this ground that Venezuela proposed arbitration; and -she strongly urged it on the further ground that inasmuch as the -prohibition of her constitution prevented the relinquishment, by -treaty or voluntary act, of any part of the territory which her people -and their government claimed to be indubitably Venezuelan, such a -relinquishment would present no difficulties if it was in obedience -to a decree of a tribunal to which the question of ownership had been -mutually submitted. - -In giving her reasons for rejecting arbitration Great Britain says in -effect: The plan you urge for the utter and complete elimination of -this constitutional prohibition--for its expurgation and destruction so -far as it is related to the pending dispute--is objectionable, because -we fear the prohibition thus eliminated, expunged, and destroyed will -still be used as a pretext for disobedience to an award which, for the -express purpose of avoiding this constitutional restraint, you have -invited. - -The remaining objection interposed by Great Britain to the arbitration -requested by Venezuela is based upon the fear that an award might be -made in favor of the Venezuelan claim, in which case “a large and -important territory which has for a long period been inhabited and -occupied by Her Majesty’s subjects and treated as a part of the Colony -of British Guiana would be severed from the Queen’s dominions.” - -It first occurs to us that a contention may well be suspected of -weakness when its supporters are unwilling to subject it to the test -of impartial arbitration. Certain inquiries are also pertinent in this -connection. Who were the British subjects who had long occupied the -territory that might through arbitration be severed from the Queen’s -dominions? How many of them began this occupancy during the more than -forty years that the territory had been steadily and notoriously -disputed? Did they enter upon this territory with knowledge of the -dispute and against the warning of the government to which they owed -allegiance, or were they encouraged and invited to such entry by -agencies of that government who had full notice of the uncertainty of -the British title? In one case, being themselves in the wrong, they -were entitled to no consideration; in the other, the question of loss -and indemnification should rest between them and their government, -which had impliedly guaranteed them against disturbance. In any event, -neither case presented a reason why Great Britain should take or -possess the lands of Venezuela; nor did either case furnish an excuse -for denying to Venezuela a fair and impartial adjudication of her -disputed rights. By whom had this territory “been treated as a part -of the Colony of British Guiana”? Surely not by Venezuela. On the -contrary, she had persistently claimed it as her own, and had “treated” -it as her own as far as she could and dared. England alone had treated -it as a part of British Guiana; her immense power had enabled her to do -this; and her decrees in her own favor as against her weak adversary -undoubtedly promised greater advantages than arbitration could possibly -assure. - - -III - -The Secretary of State of Venezuela, soon after this refusal of Great -Britain to submit the boundary dispute to arbitration, in a despatch -dated the second day of April, 1884, still urged that method of -settlement, citing precedents and presenting arguments in its favor; -and in conclusion he asked the minister of the English Government at -Caracas “to have the goodness to think out and suggest any acceptable -course for attaining a solution of the difficulty.” This was followed, -a few days afterward, by another communication from the Venezuelan -Secretary of State, repeating his urgent request for arbitration. From -this communication it may not be amiss to make the following quotation: - - Venezuela and Great Britain possess the same rights in the - question under discussion. If the Republic should yield up - any part of her pretensions, she would recognize the superior - right of Great Britain, would violate the above-quoted - article of the Constitution, and draw down the censure of - her fellow-citizens. But when both nations, putting aside - their independence of action in deference to peace and good - friendship, create by mutual consent a Tribunal which may - decide in the controversy, the same is able to pass sentence - that one of the two parties or both of them have been mistaken - in their opinions concerning the extent of their territory. - Thus the case would not be in opposition to the Constitution - of the Republic, there being no alienation of that which shall - have been determined not to be her property. - -On the tenth day of June, 1884, arbitration was again refused in a curt -note from Lord Granville, declaring that “Her Majesty’s Government -adhere to their objection to arbitration as a mode of dealing with this -question.” - -About this time complaints and protests of the most vigorous character, -based upon alleged breaches of the agreement of 1850 concerning the -non-occupation of the disputed territory broke out on both sides of -the controversy, and accusations of aggression and occupation were -constantly made. I shall not attempt to follow them, as in detail they -are not among the incidents which I consider especially relevant to the -presentation of my theme. - -On the thirteenth day of December, 1884, Venezuela, in reply to a -proposition of the British Government that the boundary question and -certain other differences should be settled simultaneously, suggested, -in view of the unwillingness of Great Britain to submit the boundary -dispute to arbitration, that it should be presented for decision to -a court of law, the members of which should be chosen by the parties -respectively. - -The British Government promptly declined this proposition, and stated -that they were not prepared to depart from the arrangement made in 1877 -to decide the question by adopting a conventional boundary fixed by -mutual accord between the two governments. This was in the face of the -efforts which had been made along that line and found utterly fruitless. - -Immediately following the last-mentioned proposition by Venezuela -for the presentation of the difficulty to a court of law mutually -chosen, negotiations were entered upon for the conclusion of a treaty -between Great Britain and Venezuela, which should quiet a difference -pending between the two countries relating to differential duties and -which should also dispose of other unsettled questions. In a draft of -such a treaty submitted by Venezuela there was inserted an article -providing for arbitration in case of all differences which could not -be adjusted by friendly negotiation. To this article Great Britain -suggested an amendment, making such arbitration applicable only to -matters arising out of the interpretation or execution of the treaty -itself, and especially excluding those emanating from any other source; -but on further representation by Venezuela, Lord Granville, in behalf -of the Government of Great Britain, expressly agreed with Venezuela -that the treaty article relating to arbitration should be unrestricted -in its operation. This diplomatic agreement was in explicit terms, -her Majesty’s Government agreeing “that the undertaking to refer -differences to arbitration shall include all differences which may -arise between the High Contracting Parties, and not those only which -arise on the interpretation of the Treaty.” - -This occurred on the fifteenth day of May, 1885. Whatever Lord -Granville may have intended by the language used, the Government of -Venezuela certainly understood his agreement to include the pending -boundary dispute as among the questions that should be submitted to -arbitration; and all other matters which the treaty should embrace -seemed so easy of adjustment that its early completion, embodying a -stipulation for the final arbitration of the boundary controversy, was -confidently and gladly anticipated by the republic. - -The high hopes and joyful anticipations of Venezuela born of this -apparently favorable situation were, however, but short-lived. - -On the twenty-seventh day of July, 1885, Lord Salisbury, who in the -meantime had succeeded the Earl of Granville in Great Britain’s -Foreign Office, in a note to Venezuela’s envoy, declared: “Her -Majesty’s Government are unable to concur in the assent given by their -predecessors in office to the general arbitration article proposed -by Venezuela, and they are unable to agree to the inclusion in it of -matters other than those arising out of the interpretation or alleged -violation of this particular treaty.” - -No assertion of the irrevocability of the agreement which Venezuela -had made with his predecessor, and no plea or argument of any kind, -availed to save the enlarged terms of this arbitration clause from Lord -Salisbury’s destructive insistence. - -On the twentieth day of June, 1886, Lord Rosebery suggested for Great -Britain, and as a solution of the difficulty, that the territory within -two certain lines which had been already proposed as boundaries should -be equally divided between the contestants, either by arbitration or -the determination of a mixed commission. - -This was declined by Venezuela on the twenty-ninth day of July, 1886, -upon the same grounds that led to the declination of prior proposals -that apparently involved an absolute cession of a part of her -territory; and she still insisted upon an arbitration embracing the -entire disputed territory as the only feasible method of adjustment. - -This declination on the part of Venezuela of Lord Rosebery’s -proposition terminated the second attempt in point of time, to settle -this vexed question. In the meantime the aggressive conduct which for -some time the officials of both countries had exhibited in and near -the contested region had grown in distinctness and significance, until -Great Britain had openly and with notorious assertion of ownership -taken possession of a valuable part of the territory in dispute. On -the 26th of October, 1886, an official document was published in the -London “Gazette” giving notice that no grants of land made by the -Government of Venezuela in the territory claimed by Great Britain would -be admitted or recognized by her Majesty; and this more significant -statement was added: “A map showing the boundary between British -Guiana and Venezuela claimed by Her Majesty’s Government can be seen in -the library of the Colonial Office, Downing Street, or at the Office -of the Government Secretary, Georgetown, British Guiana.” The boundary -here spoken of, as shown on the map to which attention is directed, -follows the Schomburgk line. Protests and demands in abundance on the -part of Venezuela followed, which were utterly disregarded, until, -on the thirty-first day of January, 1887, the Venezuelan Secretary -of State distinctly demanded of Great Britain the evacuation of the -disputed territory which she was occupying in violation of prior -agreement and the rights of the republic, and gave formal notice -that unless such evacuation should be completed, and accompanied by -acceptance of arbitration as a means of deciding the pending frontier -dispute, by the twentieth day of February, 1887, diplomatic relations -between the two countries would on that day cease. - -These demands were absolutely unheeded; and thereupon, when the -twentieth day of February arrived, Venezuela exhibited a long list of -specific charges of aggression and wrongdoing against Great Britain, -and made the following statement and final protest: - - In consequence, Venezuela, not deeming it fitting to continue - friendly relations with a state which thus injures her, - suspends them from to-day. - - And she protests before the Government of Her Britannic - Majesty, before all civilized nations, before the whole world, - against the acts of spoliation which the Government of Great - Britain has committed to her detriment, and which she will - never on any consideration recognize as capable of altering in - the slightest degree the rights which she has acquired from - Spain, and respecting which she will be always ready to submit - to a third power, as the only way to a solution compatible with - her constitutional principles. - -Notwithstanding all this, three years afterward, and on the tenth day -of January, 1890, an agent of Venezuela, appointed for that purpose, -addressed a note to Lord Salisbury, still in charge of Great Britain’s -foreign relations, expressing the desire of Venezuela to renew -diplomatic relations with Great Britain, and requesting an interview to -that end. - -A short time thereafter the Government of Great Britain expressed its -satisfaction that a renewal of diplomatic relations was in prospect, -and presented to the representative of Venezuela “a statement of the -conditions which Her Majesty’s Government considered necessary for -a satisfactory settlement of the questions pending between the two -countries.” - -As the first of these conditions it was declared that “Her Majesty’s -Government could not accept as satisfactory any arrangement which did -not admit the British title to the territory comprised within the line -laid down by Sir R. Schomburgk in 1841; but they would be willing to -refer to arbitration the claims of Great Britain to certain territory -to the west of that line.” - -Naturally enough, this statement was received by Venezuela with great -disappointment and surprise. Her representative promptly replied that -his government could not accept any single point of the arbitrary and -capricious line laid down by Sir R. Schomburgk in 1841, which had been -declared null and void even by the Government of her Majesty; and that -it was not possible for Venezuela to accept arbitration in respect to -territory west of that line. He further expressed his regret that the -conditions then demanded by Lord Salisbury were more unfavorable to -Venezuela than the proposals made to the former agent of the republic -prior to the suspension of diplomatic relations. - -On the 19th of March, 1890, the British Government reiterated its -position more in detail. Its refusal to admit any question as to -Great Britain’s title to any of the territory within the Schomburgk -line was emphatically repeated, and the British claim was defined to -extend beyond any pretension which I believe had ever been previously -made except by Lord Salisbury himself in 1880. A map was presented -indicating this extreme claim, the Schomburgk line, and a certain part -of the territory between the boundary of this extreme claim on the -west and the Schomburgk line, which Great Britain proposed to submit -to arbitration, abandoning all claim to the remainder of the territory -between these last-named two lines. This scheme, if adopted, would give -to England absolutely and without question the large territory between -British Guiana’s conceded western boundary and the Schomburgk line, -with an opportunity to lay claim before a board of arbitration for -extensive additional territory beyond the Schomburgk line. - -This is pitiful. The Schomburgk line, which was declared by the British -Government, at the time it was made, to be “merely a preliminary -measure, open to further discussion between the Governments of Great -Britain and Venezuela,” and which had been since largely extended in -some mysterious way, is now declared to be a line so well established, -so infallible, and so sacred that only the territory that England -exorbitantly claims beyond that line is enough in dispute to be -submitted to impartial arbitration. The trader is again in evidence. -On this basis England could abundantly afford to lose entirely in the -arbitration she at length conceded. - -And yet Venezuela was not absolutely discouraged. Soon after the -receipt of Great Britain’s last depressing communication, she -appointed still another agent who was to try his hand with England -in the field of diplomacy. On the twenty-fourth day of June, 1890, -this new representative replied to the above proposal made to his -predecessor by her Majesty’s Government, and expressed the great -regret of Venezuela that its recent proposals for a settlement of the -boundary difficulty by arbitration affecting all the disputed territory -had been peremptorily declined. He also declared that the emphatic -statement contained in Great Britain’s last communication in reference -to this question created for his government “difficulties not formerly -contemplated,” and thereupon formally declined on behalf of Venezuela -the consideration of the proposals contained in said communication. -This statement of discouraging conditions was, however, supplemented by -a somewhat new suggestion to the effect that a preliminary agreement -should be made containing a declaration on the part of the Government -of Venezuela that the river Essequibo, its banks, and the lands -covering it belong exclusively to British Guiana, and a declaration -on the part of her Majesty’s Government that the Orinoco River, its -banks, and the lands covering it belong exclusively to Venezuela, and -providing that a mixed commission of two chief engineers and their -staffs should be appointed to make, within one year, careful maps and -charts of the region to the west and northwest of the Essequibo River, -toward the Orinoco, in order to determine officially the exact course -of its rivers and streams, and the precise position of its mountains -and hills, and all other details that would permit both countries to -have reliable official knowledge of the territory which was actually -in dispute, enabling them to determine with a mutual feeling of -friendship and good will a boundary with perfect knowledge of the case; -but in the event that a determination should not be thus reached, -the final decision of the boundary question should be submitted -to two arbitrators, one selected by each government, and a third -chosen by the other two, to act as umpire in case of disagreement, -who, in view of the original titles and documents presented, should -fix a boundary-line which, being in accordance with the respective -rights and titles, should have the advantage as far as possible of -constituting a natural boundary; and that, pending such determination, -both governments should remove or withdraw all posts and other -indications and signs of possession or dominion on said territory, and -refrain from exercising any jurisdiction within the disputed region. - -On the 24th of July, 1890, Lord Salisbury declined to accept these -suggestions of the Venezuelan representative, and declared: “Her -Majesty’s Government have more than once explained that they cannot -consent to submit to arbitration what they regard as their indisputable -title to districts in the possession of the British Colony.” - -Is it uncharitable to see in this reference to “possession” a hint -of the industrious manner in which Great Britain had attempted to -improve her position by permitting colonization, and by other acts of -possession, during the half-century since the boundary dispute began? - -Efforts to settle this controversy seem to have languished after this -rebuff until March, 1893, when still another agent was appointed by -Venezuela for the purpose of reëstablishing diplomatic relations with -Great Britain, and settling, if possible, the boundary trouble and -such other differences as might be pending between the two countries. -As a means to that end, this agent, on the twenty-sixth day of May, -1893, presented a memorandum to the British Government containing -suggestions for such settlement. The suggestion relating to the -adjustment of the boundary question rested upon the idea of arbitration -and did not materially differ from that made by this agent’s immediate -predecessor in 1890, except as to the _status quo_, pending final -adjustment, which it was proposed should be the same as that existing -after the agreement of non-interference in the disputed territory made -by the two governments in 1850. - -The plan thus suggested was declined by the Government of Great -Britain, because, in the first place, it involved an arbitration, -“which had been repeatedly declined by Her Majesty’s Government,” and, -further, because it was, in the language of the British reply, “quite -impossible that they should consent to revert to the _status quo_ of -1850 and evacuate what has for some years constituted an integral -portion of British Guiana.” - -A further communication from the agent of Venezuela, offering -additional arguments in support of his suggestions, brought forth -a reply informing him that the contents of his note did not “appear -to Her Majesty’s Government to afford any opening for arriving at an -understanding on this question which they could accept.” - -Six months afterward, on the twenty-ninth day of September, 1893, a -final communication was addressed by the representative of Venezuela to -the British Government, reviewing the situation and the course of past -efforts to arrive at a settlement, and concluding with the words: - - I must now declare in the most solemn manner, and in the name - of the Government of Venezuela, that it is with the greatest - regret that that Government sees itself forced to leave the - situation produced in the disputed territory by the acts of - recent years unsettled, and subject to the serious disturbances - which acts of force cannot but produce; and to declare that - Venezuela will never consent to proceedings of that nature - being accepted as title-deeds to justify the arbitrary - occupation of territory which is within its jurisdiction. - -Here closed a period in this dispute, fifty-two years in duration, -vexed with agitation, and perturbed by irritating and repeated failures -to reach a peaceful adjustment. Instead of progress in the direction -of a settlement of their boundaries, the results of their action were -increased obstacles to fair discussion, intensified feelings of injury, -extended assertion of title, ruthless appropriation of the territory in -controversy, and an unhealed breach in diplomatic relations. - - -IV - -I have thus far dealt with this dispute as one in which Great Britain -and Venezuela, the parties primarily concerned, were sole participants. -We have now, however, reached a stage in the affair which requires -a recital of other facts which led up to the active and positive -interference of our own Government in the controversy. In discussing -this branch of our topic it will be necessary not only to deal with -circumstances following those already narrated, but to retrace our -steps sufficiently to exhibit among other things the appeals and -representations made to the Government of the United States by -Venezuela, while she was still attempting to arrive at an adjustment -with Great Britain. - -I have already referred to the first communication made to us by -Venezuela on the subject. This, it will be remembered, was in 1876, -when she sought to resume negotiations with Great Britain, after an -interruption of thirty-two years. I have also called attention to the -fact that coincident with this communication Venezuela presented to -Great Britain a willingness to relax her insistence upon her extreme -boundary claim, based upon alleged right, and suggested that a -conventional line might be fixed by mutual concession. - -Venezuela’s first appeal to us for support and aid amounted to little -more than a vague and indefinite request for countenance and sympathy -in her efforts to settle her differences with her contestant, with -an expression of a desire that we would take cognizance of her new -steps in that direction. I do not find that any reply was made to this -communication. - -Five years afterward, in 1881, the Venezuelan minister in Washington -presented to Mr. Evarts, then our Secretary of State, information he -had received that British vessels had made their appearance in the -mouth of the Orinoco River with materials to build a telegraph-line, -and had begun to erect poles for that purpose at Barima: and he -referred to the immense importance to his country of the Orinoco; -to the efforts of his government to adjust her difficulty with -Great Britain, and to the delays interposed; and finally expressed -his confident belief that the United States would not view with -indifference what was being done in a matter of such capital importance. - -Mr. Evarts promptly replied, and informed the Venezuelan representative -that “in view of the deep interest which the Government of the United -States takes in all transactions tending to attempted encroachments -of foreign powers upon the territory of any of the republics of this -continent, this Government could not look with indifference to the -forcible acquisition of such territory by England, if the mission of -the vessels now at the mouth of the Orinoco should be found to be for -that end.” - -Again, on the thirtieth day of November, 1881, our minister to -Venezuela reported to Mr. Blaine, who had succeeded Mr. Evarts as -Secretary of State, an interview with the President of Venezuela -at his request, in which the subject of the boundary dispute was -discussed. Our minister represented that the question was spoken of -by the President as being of essential importance and a source of -great anxiety to him, involving a large and fertile territory between -the Essequibo and Orinoco, and probably the control of the mouth -and a considerable portion of the latter river; and he alleged that -the policy of Great Britain, in the treatment of this question, had -been delay--the interval being utilized by gradually but steadily -extending her interest and authority into the disputed territory; and -“that, though the rights of Venezuela were clear and indisputable, he -questioned her ability, unaided by some friendly nation, to maintain -them.” - -In July, 1882, Mr. Frelinghuysen, successor to Mr. Blaine, sent to -our representative at Venezuela a despatch to be communicated to the -government of the republic, in which he stated that, if Venezuela -desired it, the United States would propose to the Government of Great -Britain that the boundary question be submitted to the arbitrament of a -third power. - -It will be remembered that a proposition for arbitration had been made -by Venezuela to Great Britain in February, 1881, and that Great Britain -had refused to accede to it. - -In July, 1884, Mr. Frelinghuysen sent a confidential despatch to Mr. -Lowell, our minister to Great Britain, informing him that Guzman -Blanco, ex-President of Venezuela, who had recently been accredited as -a special envoy from his country to Great Britain, had called on him -relative to the objects of his mission, in respect of which he desired -to obtain the good offices of this Government, and that doubtless he -would seek to confer with Mr. Lowell in London. He further informed -Mr. Lowell that he had told the Venezuelan envoy that, “in view of our -interest in all that touches the independent life of the Republics of -the American Continent, the United States could not be indifferent to -anything that might impair their normal self-control”; that “the moral -position of the United States in these matters was well known through -the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine,” though formal action in the -direction of applying that doctrine to a speculative case affecting -Venezuela seemed to him to be inopportune, and therefore he could not -advise Venezuela to arouse a discussion of that point. He instructed -our minister to show proper consideration to the Venezuelan envoy, and -to “take proper occasion to let Lord Granville know that we are not -without concern as to whatever may affect the interest of a sister -Republic of the American Continent and its position in the family of -nations.” - -In July, 1885, the Venezuelan minister to the United States addressed -a communication to Secretary of State Bayard, setting forth the -correspondence which had already taken place between our Government and -that of Venezuela touching the boundary dispute, and referring to the -serious condition existing on account of the renewed aggressions of -Great Britain. - -Mr. Bayard thereupon sent a despatch on the subject to Mr. Phelps, -our diplomatic representative to England, in which, after stating -that the Venezuelan Government had never definitely declared what -course she desired us to pursue, but, on the contrary, had expressed -a desire to be guided by our counsel, he said: “The good offices of -this Government have been tendered to Venezuela to suggest to Great -Britain the submission of the boundary dispute to arbitration; but when -shown that such action on our part would exclude us from acting as -arbitrator, Venezuela ceased to press the matter in that direction”; -and the next day after writing this despatch Mr. Bayard informed the -Venezuelan minister that the President of the United States could not -entertain a request to act as umpire in any dispute unless it should -come concurrently from both contestants. - -In December, 1886, our minister to Venezuela addressed a despatch -to Mr. Bayard, in which he reported that matters looked very angry -and threatening in Venezuela on account of fresh aggressions on the -part of Great Britain in the disputed territory; and he expressed the -fear that an open rupture might occur between the two countries. -He inclosed a statement made by the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign -Affairs, containing a list of grievances, followed by this declaration: -“Venezuela, listening to the advice of the United States, has -endeavored several times to obtain that the difference should be -submitted to the award of a third power.... But such efforts have -proven fruitless, and the possibility of that result, the only one -prescribed by our constitution, being arrived at, becomes more and -more remote from day to day. Great Britain has been constant in her -clandestine advances upon the Venezuelan territory, not taking into -consideration either the rights or the complaints of this Republic.” -And he adds the following declaration: “Under such circumstances the -Government has but two courses left open: either to employ force in -order to recover places from which force has ejected the Republic, -since its amicable representations on the subject have failed to secure -redress, or to present a solemn protest to the Government of the United -States against so great an abuse, which is an evident declaration of -war--a provocative aggression.” - -Thereupon, and on the twentieth day of December, 1886, a despatch was -sent by Mr. Bayard to Mr. Phelps, in which the secretary comments -on the fact that at no time theretofore had the good offices of our -Government been actually tendered to avert a rupture between Great -Britain and Venezuela, and that our inaction in this regard seemed -to be due to the reluctance of Venezuela to have the Government of -the United States take any steps having relation to the action of the -British Government which might, in appearance even, prejudice the -resort to our arbitration or mediation which Venezuela desired; but -that the intelligence now received warranted him in tendering the good -offices of the United States to promote an amicable settlement of the -difficulty between the two countries, and offering our arbitration if -acceptable to both countries--as he supposed the dispute turned upon -simple and readily ascertainable historical facts. - -Additional complaints against Great Britain on account of further -trespasses on Venezuelan territory were contained in a note from the -Venezuelan minister to Mr. Bayard, dated January 4, 1887. I shall quote -only the following passage: - - My Government has tried all possible means to induce that - of London to accept arbitration, as advised by the United - States; this, however, has resulted in nothing but fresh - attempts against the integrity of the territory by the colonial - authorities of Demerara. It remains to be seen how long my - Government will find it possible to exercise forbearance - transcending the limits of its positive official duty. - -Pursuant to his instructions from Mr. Bayard, our minister to Great -Britain formally tendered to the English Government, on the eighth day -of February, 1887, the good offices of the United States to promote -an amicable settlement of the pending controversy, and offered our -arbitration, if acceptable to both parties. - -A few days afterward Lord Salisbury, on behalf of Great Britain, -replied that the attitude which had been taken by the President of the -Venezuelan republic precluded her Majesty’s Government from submitting -the question at that time to the arbitration of any third power. - -The fact that Lord Salisbury had declined our offer of mediation and -arbitration, was promptly conveyed to the government of Venezuela; -and thereupon, on the fourth day of May, 1887, her minister at -Washington addressed another note to our Secretary of State indicating -much depression on account of the failure of all efforts up to that -time made to induce Great Britain to agree to a settlement of the -controversy by arbitration, and expressing the utmost gratitude for the -steps taken by our Government in aid of those efforts. He also referred -to the desire his government once entertained that, in case arbitration -could be attained, the United States might be selected as arbitrator, -and to the fact that this desire had been relinquished because the -maintenance of impartiality essential in an arbitrator would “seriously -impair the efficiency of action which for the furtherance of the common -interests of America, and in obedience to the doctrine of the immortal -Monroe, should possess all the vitality that the alarming circumstances -demand”; and he begged the secretary to instruct our representative in -London “to insist, in the name of the United States Government, upon -the necessity of submitting the boundary question between Venezuela and -British Guiana to arbitration.” - -I have heretofore refrained from stating in detail the quite numerous -instances of quarrel and collision that occurred in and near the -disputed territory, with increasing frequency, during this controversy. -One of these, however, I think should be here mentioned. It seems -that in 1883 two vessels belonging to English subjects were seized -and their crews taken into custody by Venezuelan officials in the -disputed region, for alleged violations of the laws of Venezuela within -her jurisdiction, and that English officials had assumed, without any -judicial determination and without any notice to Venezuela, to assess -damages against her on account of such seizure and arrests, in an -amount which, with interest, amounted in 1887 to about forty thousand -dollars. On the seventh day of October in that year, the governor -of Trinidad, an English island near the mouth of the Orinoco, in a -letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Venezuela, declared that -her Majesty’s Government could not permit such injuries to remain -unredressed, or their representations to be disregarded any longer, -and thereupon it was demanded that the money claimed, with interest, -be paid within seven days from the delivery of said letter. The letter -concluded as follows: - - Failing compliance with the above demands Her Majesty’s - Government will be reluctantly compelled to instruct the - Commander of Her Majesty’s naval forces in the West Indies - to take such measures as he may deem necessary to obtain - that reparation which has been vainly sought for by friendly - means; and in case of so doing they will hold the Venezuelan - Government responsible for any consequences that may arise. - -Venezuela did not fail to appreciate and frankly acknowledge that, in -her defenseless condition, there was no escape from the payment of the -sum which England, as a judge in its own cause, had decreed against -her. The President of the republic, however, in a prompt reply to the -governor’s note, characterized its terms as “offensive to the dignity -of the nation and to the equality which, according to the principles -of the rights of nations, all countries enjoy without any regard to -their strength or weakness.” Thereupon he sought the good offices of -our minister to Venezuela in an effort to procure a withdrawal of the -objectionable communication. This was attempted in a note sent by the -American minister to the governor of Trinidad, in which he said: - - I hope your Excellency will permit me to suggest, as a mutual - friend of both parties, the suspension or withdrawal of your - note of the 7th instant, so that negotiations may at once - be opened for the immediate and final settlement of the - afore-mentioned claims without further resort to unpleasant - measures. From representations made to me, I am satisfied - that if the note of the 7th instant is withdrawn temporarily - even, Venezuela will do in the premises that which will prove - satisfactory to your Government. - -A few days after this note was sent, a reply was received in which the -governor of Trinidad courteously expressed his thanks to our minister -for his good offices, and informed him that, as the Government of -Venezuela regarded his note of October 7 “as offensive, and appeared -desirous of at last settling this long-pending question in a friendly -spirit,” he promptly telegraphed to her Majesty’s Government asking -permission to withdraw that note and substitute a less forcible one for -it; and that he had just been informed by his home government in reply -that this arrangement could not be sanctioned. - -Our minister reported this transaction to his home government at -Washington on the fourth day of November, 1887, and stated that the -money demanded by Great Britain had been paid by Venezuela under -protest. - -Venezuela may have been altogether at fault in the transaction out -of which this demand arose; the amount which England exacted may not -have been unreasonable; and the method of its assessment, though not -the most considerate possible, has support in precedent; and even -the threat of a naval force may sometimes be justified in enforcing -unheeded demands. I have not adverted to this incident for the -purpose of inviting judgment on any of its phases, but only to call -attention to the fact that it was allowed to culminate with seemingly -studied accompaniments of ruthlessness and irritation, at a time when -a boundary question was pending between the two nations, when the -weaker contestant was importuning the stronger for arbitration, and -when a desire for reconciliation and peace in presence of strained -relations should have counseled considerateness and magnanimity--all -this in haughty disregard of the solicitous and expressed desire of -the Government of the United States to induce a peaceful adjustment -of the boundary dispute, and in curt denial of our request that -this especially disturbing incident should be relieved of its most -exasperating features. - -In the trial of causes before our courts, evidence is frequently -introduced to show the animus or intent of litigating parties. - -Perhaps strict decorum hardly permits us to adopt the following -language, used by the Venezuelan minister when reporting to our -Secretary of State the anticipated arrival of a British war-steamer to -enforce the demand of Great Britain: - - Such alarming news shows evidently that the Government of Her - Britannic Majesty, encouraged by the impunity on which it has - counted until now for the realization of its unjust designs - with regard to Venezuela, far from procuring a pacific and - satisfactory agreement on the different questions pending with - the latter, is especially eager to complicate in order to - render less possible every day that equitable solution which - has been so fully the endeavor of my people. - -On the fifteenth day of February, 1888, the Venezuelan minister, in -communicating to our Government information he had received touching a -decree of the governor of Demerara denying the validity of a contract -entered into by the Government of Venezuela for the construction of a -railway between certain points in the territory claimed by Venezuela, -commented on the affair as follows: - - England has at last declared emphatically that her rights are - without limit, and embrace whatever regions may be suggested - to her by her insatiate thirst for conquest. She even goes - so far as to deny the validity of railway grants comprised - within territory where not even the wildest dream of fancy - had ever conceived that the day would come when Venezuela’s - right thereto could be disputed. The fact is that until now - England has relied upon impunity. She beholds in us a weak and - unfriended nation, and seeks to make the Venezuelan coast and - territories the base of a conquest which, if circumstances are - not altered, will have no other bounds than the dictates of her - own will. - - -V - -Mr. Bayard, in a despatch transmitting this to our minister to England, -says that our Government has heretofore acted upon the assumption that -the boundary controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela was one -based on historical facts, which without difficulty could be determined -according to evidence, but that the British pretension now stated gives -rise to grave disquietude, and creates the apprehension that their -territorial claim does not follow historical traditions or evidence, -but is apparently indefinite. He refers to the British Colonial Office -list of previous years, and calls attention to the wide detour to the -westward in the boundaries of British Guiana between the years 1877 and -1887, as shown in that record. He suggests that our minister “express -anew to Lord Salisbury the great gratification it would afford our -Government to see the Venezuelan dispute amicably and honorably settled -by arbitration or otherwise,” and adds: “If indeed it should appear -that there is no fixed limit to the British boundary claim, our good -disposition to aid in a settlement might not only be defeated, but be -obliged to give place to a feeling of grave concern.” - -It was about this time that the Venezuelan minister, in a note -expressing his appreciation of our efforts to bring about a settlement -of the dispute, made the following statement: - - Disastrous and fatal consequences would ensue for the - independence of South America if, under the pretext of a - question of boundaries, Great Britain should succeed in - consummating the usurpation of a third part of our territory, - and therewith a river so important as the Orinoco. Under the - pretext of a mere question of boundaries which began on the - banks of the Essequibo, we now find ourselves on the verge of - losing regions lying more than five degrees away from that - river. - -On May 1, 1890, Mr. Blaine, Mr. Bayard’s successor as Secretary of -State, instructed Mr. Robert T. Lincoln, our minister to England, “to -use his good offices with Lord Salisbury to bring about the resumption -of diplomatic intercourse between Great Britain and Venezuela as a -preliminary step toward the settlement of the boundary dispute by -arbitration.” He also requested him “to propose to Lord Salisbury, -with a view to an accommodation, that an informal conference be had in -Washington or in London of representatives of the three powers.” The -secretary added: “In such conference the position of the United States -is one solely of impartial friendship toward both litigants.” - -In response to this instruction Mr. Lincoln had an interview with -Lord Salisbury. On this occasion his Lordship said that her Majesty’s -Government had not for some time been keen in attempts to settle the -dispute, in view of their feeling of uncertainty as to the stability -of the present Venezuelan Government and the frequency of revolutions -in that quarter; but that he would take pleasure in considering our -suggestion after consulting the Colonial Office, to which it would -first have to be referred. Mr. Lincoln, in giving his impressions -derived from the interview, says that “while Lord Salisbury did -not intimate what would probably be the nature of his reply, there -was certainly nothing unfavorable in his manner of receiving the -suggestion”; and he follows this with these significant words: “If the -matter had been entirely new and dissociated with its previous history, -I should have felt from his tone that the idea of arbitration in some -form, to put an end to the boundary dispute, was quite agreeable to -him.” - -On the 26th of May, 1890, Lord Salisbury addressed a note to Mr. -Lincoln, in which his Lordship stated that her Majesty’s Government was -at that moment in communication with the Venezuelan minister in Paris, -who had been authorized to express the desire of his Government for the -renewal of diplomatic relations, and to discuss the conditions on which -it might be effected; that the terms on which her Majesty’s Government -considered that a settlement of the question in issue between the -two countries might be made, had been communicated to Venezuela’s -representative; that his reply was still awaited, and that the British -Government “would wish to have the opportunity of examining that -reply, and ascertaining what prospect it would afford of an adjustment -of existing differences, before considering the expediency of having -recourse to the good offices of a third party.” - -No mention was made, in this communication, nor at any time thereafter, -so far as I can discover, of Mr. Blaine’s proposal of a conference -among representatives of the three nations interested in an adjustment. - -Lord Salisbury, in a despatch to the English representative at -Washington, dated November 11, 1891, stated that our minister to -England had, in conversation with him, renewed, on the part of our -Government, the expression of a hope that the Government of Great -Britain would refer the boundary dispute to arbitration; that his -Lordship had expressed his willingness to submit to arbitration all the -questions which seemed to his government to be fairly capable of being -treated as questions of controversy; that the principal obstacle was -the rupture of diplomatic relations caused by Venezuela’s act; and that -before the Government of Great Britain could renew negotiations they -must be satisfied that those relations were about to be resumed with a -prospect of their continuance. - -While our Government was endeavoring to influence Great Britain in the -direction of fair and just arbitration, and receiving for our pains -only barren assurances and procrastinating excuses, the appeals of -Venezuela for help, stimulated by allegations of constantly increasing -English pretensions, were incessantly ringing in our ears. - -Without mentioning a number of these appeals, and passing over a period -of more than two years, I shall next refer to a representation made -by the Venezuelan minister at Washington on March 31, 1894, to Mr. -Gresham, who was then our Secretary of State. In this communication -the course of the controversy and the alleged unauthorized acts -of England from the beginning to that date were rehearsed with -circumstantial particularity. The conduct of Great Britain in refusing -arbitration was again reprobated, and pointed reference was made to -a principle which had been asserted by the United States, “that the -nations of the American continent, after having acquired the liberty -and independence which they enjoy and maintain, were not subject to -colonization by any European power.” The minister further declared that -“Venezuela has been ready to adhere to the conciliatory counsel of the -United States that a conference, consisting of its own Representative -and those of the two parties, should meet at Washington or London -for the purpose of preparing an honorable reëstablishment of harmony -between the litigants,” and that “Great Britain has disregarded the -equitable proposition of the United States.” - -On July 13, 1894, Mr. Gresham sent a despatch to Mr. Bayard, formerly -Secretary of State, but then ambassador to England, inclosing the -communication of the Venezuelan minister, calling particular attention -to its contents, and at the same time briefly discussing the boundary -dispute. In this despatch Mr. Gresham said: - - The recourse to arbitration first proposed in 1881, having been - supported by your predecessors, was in turn advocated by you, - in a spirit of friendly regard for the two nations involved. - In the meantime successive advances of British settlers in the - region admittedly in dispute were followed by similar advances - of British Colonial administration, contesting and supplanting - Venezuelan claims to exercise authority therein. - -He adds: “Toward the end of 1887, the British territorial claim, which -had, as it would seem, been silently increased by some twenty-three -thousand square miles between 1885 and 1886, took another comprehensive -sweep westward to embrace” a certain rich mining district. “Since -then,” the secretary further states, “repeated efforts have been made -by Venezuela as a directly interested party, and by the United States -as the impartial friend of both countries, to bring about a resumption -of diplomatic relations, which had been suspended in consequence of the -dispute now under consideration.” - -This despatch concludes as follows: - - The President is inspired by a desire for a peaceable and - honorable adjustment of the existing difficulties between an - American state and a powerful transatlantic nation, and would - be glad to see the reëstablishment of such diplomatic relations - between them as would promote that end. I can discover but - two equitable solutions to the present controversy. One is the - arbitral determination of the rights of the disputants as the - respective successors to the historical rights of Holland and - Spain over the region in question. The other is to create a - new boundary-line in accordance with the dictates of mutual - expediency and consideration. The two Governments having so far - been unable to agree on a conventional line, the consistent - and conspicuous advocacy by the United States and England of - the principle of arbitration, and their recourse thereto in - settlement of important questions arising between them, makes - such a mode of adjustment especially appropriate in the present - instance; and this Government will gladly do what it can to - further a determination in that sense. - -In another despatch to Mr. Bayard, dated December 1, 1894, Mr. Gresham -says: - - I cannot believe Her Majesty’s Government will maintain that - the validity of their claim to territory long in dispute - between the two countries shall be conceded as a condition - precedent to the arbitration of the question whether Venezuela - is entitled to other territory, which until a recent period was - never in doubt. Our interest in the question has repeatedly - been shown by our friendly efforts to further a settlement - alike honorable to both countries, and the President is pleased - to know that Venezuela will soon renew her efforts to bring - about such an adjustment. - -Two days afterward, on December 3, 1894, the President’s annual message -was sent to the Congress, containing the following reference to the -controversy: - - The boundary of British Guiana still remains in dispute - between Great Britain and Venezuela. Believing that its early - settlement on some just basis alike honorable to both parties - is in the line of our established policy to remove from this - hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the - sea, I shall renew the efforts heretofore made to bring about - a restoration of diplomatic relations between the disputants - and to induce a reference to arbitration--a resort which Great - Britain so conspicuously favors in principle and respects in - practice, and which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversary. - -On the twenty-second day of February, 1895, a joint resolution was -passed by the Congress, earnestly recommending to both parties in -interest the President’s suggestion “that Great Britain and Venezuela -refer their dispute as to boundaries to friendly arbitration.” - -A despatch dated February 23, 1895, from Great Britain’s Foreign -Office to the English ambassador at Washington, stated that on the -twenty-fifth day of January, 1895, our ambassador, Mr. Bayard, had, in -an official interview, referred to the boundary controversy, and said -“that his Government would gladly lend their good offices to bring -about a settlement by means of an arbitration.” The despatch further -stated that Mr. Bayard had thereupon been informed that her Majesty’s -Government had expressed their willingness to submit the question, -within certain limits, to arbitration, but could not agree to the -more extensive reference on which the Venezuelan Government insisted; -that Mr. Bayard called again on the twentieth day of February, when a -memorandum was read to him concerning the situation and a map shown him -of the territory in dispute; that at the same time he was informed that -the Venezuelans had recently made an aggression upon the territory of -English occupation, and, according to report, ill-treated some of the -colonial police stationed there, and that it was the boundary defined -by the Schomburgk line which had thus been violated in a marked manner -by the Venezuelans. - -This despatch concludes as follows: - - On Mr. Bayard’s observing that the United States Government - was anxious to do anything in their power to facilitate a - settlement of the difficulty by arbitration, I reminded his - Excellency that although Her Majesty’s Government were ready - to go to arbitration as to a certain portion of the territory - which I had pointed out to him, they could not consent to any - departure from the Schomburgk line. - -It now became plainly apparent that a new stage had been reached in the -progress of our intervention, and that the ominous happenings embraced -within a few months had hastened the day when we were challenged to -take our exact bearings, lest we should miss the course of honor -and national duty. The more direct tone that had been given to our -despatches concerning the dispute, our more insistent and emphatic -suggestion of arbitration, the serious reference to the subject -in the President’s message, the significant resolution passed by -Congress earnestly recommending arbitration, all portended a growth of -conviction on the part of our Government concerning this controversy, -which gave birth to pronounced disappointment and anxiety when Great -Britain, concurrently with these apprising incidents, repeated in -direct and positive terms her refusal to submit to arbitration except -on condition that a portion of the disputed territory which Venezuela -had always claimed to be hers should at the outset be irrevocably -conceded to England. - -During a period of more than fourteen years our Government, assuming -the character of a mutual and disinterested friend of both countries, -had, with varying assiduity, tendered its good offices to bring about -a pacific and amicable settlement of this boundary controversy, only -to be repelled with more or less civility by Great Britain. We had -seen her pretensions in the disputed regions widen and extend in -such manner and upon such pretexts as seemed to constitute an actual -or threatened violation of a doctrine which our nation long ago -established, declaring that the American continents are not to be -considered subjects for future colonization by any European power; and -despite all this we had, nevertheless, hoped, during all these years, -that arrangement and accommodation between the principal parties would -justify us in keeping an invocation of that doctrine in the background -of the discussion. Notwithstanding, however, all our efforts to avoid -it, we could not be unmindful of the conditions which the progress of -events had created, and whose meaning and whose exigencies inexorably -confronted us. England had finally and unmistakably declared that all -the territory embraced within the Schomburgk line was indisputably -hers. Venezuela presented a claim to territory within the same -limits, which could not be said to lack strong support. England -had absolutely refused to permit Venezuela’s claim to be tested by -arbitration; and Venezuela was utterly powerless to resist by force -England’s self-pronounced decree of ownership. If this decree was not -justified by the facts, and it should be enforced against the protest -and insistence of Venezuela and should result in the possession and -colonization of Venezuelan territory by Great Britain, it seemed quite -plain that the American doctrine which denies to European powers the -colonization of any part of the American continent would be violated. - -If the ultimatum of Great Britain as to her claim of territory had -appeared to us so thoroughly supported upon the facts as to admit of -small doubt, we might have escaped the responsibility of insisting -on an observance of the Monroe Doctrine in the premises, on our own -account, and have still remained the disinterested friend of both -countries, merely contenting ourselves with benevolent attempts to -reconcile the disputants. We were, however, far from discovering -such satisfactory support in the evidence within our reach. On the -contrary, we believed that the effects of our acquiescence in Great -Britain’s pretensions would amount to a failure to uphold and maintain -a principle universally accepted by our Government and our people -as vitally essential to our national integrity and welfare. The -arbitration, for which Venezuela pleaded, would have adjudged the exact -condition of the rival claims, would have forever silenced Venezuela’s -complaints, and would have displaced by conclusive sentence our -unwelcome doubts and suspicions; but this Great Britain had refused to -Venezuela, and thus far had also denied to us. - -Recreancy to a principle so fundamentally American as the Monroe -Doctrine, on the part of those charged with the administration of our -Government, was of course out of the question. Inasmuch, therefore, -as all our efforts to avoid its assertion had miscarried, there -was nothing left for us to do consistently with national honor but -to take the place of Venezuela in the controversy, so far as that -was necessary, in vindication of our American doctrine. Our mild -and amiable proffers of good offices, and the hopes we indulged -that at last they might be the means of securing to a weak sister -republic peace and justice, and to ourselves immunity from sterner -interposition, were not suited to the new emergency. In the advanced -condition of the dispute, sympathy with Venezuela and solicitude for -her distressed condition could no longer constitute the motive power of -our conduct, but these were to give way to the duty and obligation of -protecting our own national rights. - -Mr. Gresham, who since the fourth day of March, 1893, had been our -Secretary of State, died in the latter days of May, 1895. His love -of justice, his sympathy with every cause that deserved sympathy, his -fearless and disinterested patriotism, and his rare mental endowments, -combined to make him a noble American and an able advocate of his -country’s honor. To such a man every phase of the Venezuelan boundary -dispute strongly appealed; and he had been conscientiously diligent -in acquainting himself with its history and in considering the -contingencies that might arise in its future development. Though his -death was most lamentable, I have always considered it a providential -circumstance that the Government then had among its Cabinet officers an -exceptionally strong and able man, in every way especially qualified -to fill the vacant place, and thoroughly familiar with the pending -controversy--which seemed every day to bring us closer to momentous -duty and responsibility. - -Mr. Olney was appointed Secretary of State early in June, 1895; and -promptly thereafter, at the suggestion of the President, he began, with -characteristic energy and vigor, to make preparation for the decisive -step which it seemed should no longer be delayed. - -The seriousness of the business we had in hand was fully understood, -and the difficulty or impossibility of retracing the step we -contemplated was thoroughly appreciated. The absolute necessity of -certainty concerning the facts which should underlie our action was, of -course, perfectly apparent. Whatever our beliefs or convictions might -be, as derived from the examination we had thus far given the case, and -however strongly we might be persuaded that Great Britain’s pretensions -could not be conceded consistently with our maintenance of the Monroe -Doctrine, it would, nevertheless, have been manifestly improper and -heedless on our part to find conclusively against Great Britain, before -soliciting her again and in new circumstances to give us an opportunity -to judge of the merits of her claims through the submission of them to -arbitration. - -It was determined, therefore, that a communication should be prepared -for presentation to the British Government through our ambassador -to England, detailing the progress and incidents of the controversy -as we apprehended them, giving a thorough exposition of the origin -of the Monroe Doctrine, and the reasons on which it was based, -demonstrating our interest in the controversy because of its relation -to that doctrine, and from our new standpoint and on our own account -requesting Great Britain to join Venezuela in submitting to arbitration -their contested claims to the entire territory in dispute. - -This was accordingly done; and a despatch to this effect, dated July -20, 1895, was sent by Mr. Olney to her Majesty’s Government through Mr. -Bayard, our ambassador. - -The Monroe Doctrine may be abandoned; we may forfeit it by taking our -lot with nations that expand by following un-American ways; we may -outgrow it, as we seem to be outgrowing other things we once valued; -or it may forever stand as a guaranty of protection and safety in our -enjoyment of free institutions; but in no event will this American -principle ever be better defined, better defended, or more bravely -asserted than was done by Mr. Olney in this despatch. - -After referring to the various incidents of the controversy, and -stating the conditions then existing, it was declared: - - The accuracy of the foregoing analysis of the existing status - cannot, it is believed, be challenged. It shows that status to - be such, that those charged with the interests of the United - States are now forced to determine exactly what those interests - are and what course of action they require. It compels them - to decide to what extent, if any, the United States may and - should intervene in a controversy between, and primarily - concerning, only Great Britain and Venezuela, and to decide - how far it is bound to see that the integrity of Venezuelan - territory is not impaired by the pretensions of its powerful - antagonist. - -After an exhaustive explanation and vindication of the Monroe Doctrine, -and after asserting that aggressions by Great Britain on Venezuelan -soil would fall within its purview, the despatch proceeded as follows: - - While Venezuela charges such usurpation, Great Britain denies - it; and the United States, until the merits are authoritatively - ascertained, can take sides with neither. But while this - is so,--while the United States may not, under existing - circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which of the - two parties is right and which is wrong,--it is certainly - within its right to demand that the truth be ascertained. - Being entitled to resent and resist any sequestration of - Venezuelan soil by Great Britain, it is necessarily entitled to - know whether such sequestration has occurred or is now going - on.... It being clear, therefore, that the United States may - legitimately insist upon the merits of the boundary question - being determined, it is equally clear that there is but one - feasible mode of determining them, viz., peaceful arbitration. - -The demand of Great Britain that her right to a portion of the disputed -territory should be acknowledged as a condition of her consent to -arbitration as to the remainder, was thus characterized: - - It is not perceived how such an attitude can be defended, nor - how it is reconcilable with that love of justice and fair - play so eminently characteristic of the English race. It in - effect deprives Venezuela of her free agency and puts her under - virtual duress. Territory acquired by reason of it will be as - much wrested from her by the strong hand as if occupied by - British troops or covered by British fleets. - -The despatch, after directing the presentation to Lord Salisbury of the -views it contained, concluded as follows: - - They call for a definite decision upon the point whether Great - Britain will consent or decline to submit the Venezuelan - boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration. It - is the earnest hope of the President that the conclusion will - be on the side of arbitration, and that Great Britain will - add one more to the conspicuous precedents she has already - furnished in favor of that wise and just mode of settling - international disputes. If he is to be disappointed in that - hope, however,--a result not to be anticipated, and in his - judgment calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations - between this country and Great Britain,--it is his wish to be - made acquainted with the fact at such early date as will enable - him to lay the whole subject before Congress in his next annual - message. - - -VI - -The reply of Great Britain to this communication consisted of two -despatches addressed by Lord Salisbury to the British ambassador -at Washington for submission to our Government. Though dated the -twenty-sixth day of November, 1895, these despatches were not presented -to our State Department until a number of days after the assemblage of -the Congress in the following month. In one of these communications -Lord Salisbury, in dealing with the Monroe Doctrine and the right or -propriety of our appeal to it in the pending controversy, declared: -“The dangers which were apprehended by President Monroe have no -relation to the state of things in which we live at the present day.” -He further declared: - - But the circumstances with which President Monroe was - dealing and those to which the present American Government - is addressing itself have very few features in common. Great - Britain is imposing no “system” upon Venezuela and is not - concerning herself in any way with the nature of the political - institutions under which the Venezuelans may prefer to live. - But the British Empire and the Republic of Venezuela are - neighbors, and they have differed for some time past, and - continue to differ, as to the line by which their dominions are - separated. It is a controversy with which the United States - have no apparent practical concern.... The disputed frontier - of Venezuela has nothing to do with any of the questions dealt - with by President Monroe. - -His Lordship, in commenting upon our position as developed in Mr. -Olney’s despatch, defined it in these terms: “If any independent -American state advances a demand for territory of which its neighbor -claims to be the owner, and that neighbor is a colony of an European -state, the United States have a right to insist that the European state -shall submit the demand and its own impugned rights to arbitration.” - -I confess I should be greatly disappointed if I believed that the -history I have attempted to give of this controversy did not easily and -promptly suggest that this definition of our contention fails to take -into account some of its most important and controlling features. - -Speaking of arbitration as a method of terminating international -differences, Lord Salisbury said: - - It has proved itself valuable in many cases, but it is not free - from defects which often operate as a serious drawback on - its value. It is not always easy to find an arbitrator who is - competent and who, at the same time, is wholly free from bias; - and the task of insuring compliance with the award when it is - made is not exempt from difficulty. It is a mode of settlement - of which the value varies much according to the nature of the - controversy to which it is applied and the character of the - litigants who appeal to it. Whether in any particular case - it is a suitable method of procedure is generally a delicate - and difficult question. The only parties who are competent - to decide that question are the two parties whose rival - contentions are in issue. The claim of a third nation which - is unaffected by the controversy to impose this particular - procedure on either of the two others cannot be reasonably - justified and has no foundation in the law of nations. - -Immediately following this statement his Lordship again touched upon -the Monroe Doctrine for the purpose of specifically disclaiming its -acceptance by her Majesty’s Government as a sound and valid principle. -He says: - - It must always be mentioned with respect, on account of the - distinguished statesman to whom it is due and the great nation - who have generally adopted it. But international law is founded - on the general consent of nations; and no statesman, however - eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to - insert into the code of international law a novel principle - which was never recognized before, and which has not since been - accepted by the Government of any other country. The United - States have a right, like any other nation, to interpose in any - controversy by which their own interests are affected; and they - are the judge whether those interests are touched and in what - measure they should be sustained. But their rights are in no - way strengthened or extended by the fact that the controversy - affects some territory which is called American. - -In concluding this despatch Lord Salisbury declared that her -Majesty’s Government “fully concur with the view which President -Monroe apparently entertained, that any disturbance of the existing -territorial distribution in that hemisphere by any fresh acquisitions -on the part of any European state would be a highly inexpedient change. -But they are not prepared to admit that the recognition of that -expediency is clothed with the sanction which belongs to a doctrine of -international law. They are not prepared to admit that the interests -of the United States are necessarily concerned in any frontier dispute -which may arise between any two of the states who possess dominions in -the Western Hemisphere; and still less can they accept the doctrine -that the United States are entitled to claim that the process of -arbitration shall be applied to any demand for the surrender of -territory which one of those states may make against another.” - -The other despatch of Lord Salisbury, which accompanied the one upon -which I have commented, was mainly devoted to a statement of facts -and evidence on Great Britain’s side in the boundary controversy; and -in making such statement his Lordship in general terms designated the -territory to which her Majesty’s Government was entitled as being -embraced within the lines of the most extreme claim which she had at -any time presented. He added: - - A portion of that claim, however, they have always been willing - to waive altogether; in regard to another portion they have - been and continue to be perfectly ready to submit the question - of their title to arbitration. As regards the rest, that which - lies within the so-called Schomburgk line, they do not consider - that the rights of Great Britain are open to question. Even - within that line they have on various occasions offered to - Venezuela considerable concessions as a matter of friendship - and conciliation and for the purpose of securing an amicable - settlement of the dispute. If, as time has gone on, the - concessions thus offered have been withdrawn, this has been the - necessary consequence of the gradual spread over the country of - British settlements, which Her Majesty’s Government cannot in - justice to the inhabitants offer to surrender to foreign rule. - -In conclusion his Lordship asserts that his Government has - - repeatedly expressed their readiness to submit to arbitration - the conflicting claims of Great Britain and Venezuela to large - tracts of territory which from their auriferous nature are - known to be of almost untold value. But they cannot consent - to entertain, or to submit to the arbitration of another - power or of foreign jurists however eminent, claims based on - the extravagant pretensions of Spanish officials in the last - century and involving the transfer of large numbers of British - subjects, who have for many years enjoyed the settled rule of - a British colony, to a nation of different race and language, - whose political system is subject to frequent disturbance, and - whose institutions as yet too often afford very inadequate - protection to life and property. - -These despatches exhibit a refusal to admit such an interest in the -controversy on our part as entitled us to insist upon an arbitration -for the purpose of having the line between Great Britain and Venezuela -established; a denial of such force or meaning to the Monroe Doctrine -as made it worthy of the regard of Great Britain in the premises; -and a fixed and continued determination on the part of her Majesty’s -Government to reject arbitration as to any territory included within -the extended Schomburgk line. They further indicate that the existence -of gold within the disputed territory had not been overlooked; and -they distinctly put forward the colonization and settlement by English -subjects in such territory, during more than half a century of dispute, -as creating a claim to dominion and sovereignty, if not strong enough -to override all question of right and title, at least so clear and -indisputable as to be properly considered as above and beyond the -contingencies of arbitration. - -If we had been obliged to accept Lord Salisbury’s estimate of the -Monroe Doctrine, and his ideas of our interest, or rather want of -interest, in the settlement of the boundary between Great Britain and -Venezuela, his despatches would have certainly been very depressing. -It would have been unpleasant for us to know that a doctrine which we -had supposed for seventy years to be of great value and importance to -us and our national safety was, after all, a mere plaything with which -we might amuse ourselves; and that our efforts to enforce it were to -be regarded by Great Britain and other European nations as meddlesome -interferences with affairs in which we could have no legitimate concern. - -The reply of the English Government to Mr. Olney’s despatch, whatever -else it accomplished, seemed absolutely to destroy any hope we might -have entertained that, in our changed position in the controversy and -upon our independent solicitation, arbitration might be conceded to us. -Since, therefore, Great Britain was unwilling, on any consideration, -to coöperate with Venezuela in setting on foot an investigation of -their contested claim, and since prudence and care dictated that any -further steps we might take should be proved to be as fully justified -as was practicable in the circumstances, there seemed to be no better -way open to us than to inaugurate a careful independent investigation -of the merits of the controversy, on our own motion, with a view of -determining as accurately as possible, for our own guidance, where the -divisional line between the two countries should be located. - -Mr. Olney’s despatch and Lord Salisbury’s reply were submitted to the -Congress on the seventeenth day of December, 1895, accompanied by a -message from the President. - -In this message the President, after stating Lord Salisbury’s positions -touching the Monroe Doctrine, declared: - - Without attempting extended argument in reply to these - positions, it may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine - upon which we stand is strong and sound, because its - enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation, - and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and - the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. - It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, - and cannot become obsolete while our Republic endures. If the - balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among - the governments of the Old World and a subject for our absolute - non-interference, none the less is the observance of the Monroe - Doctrine of vital concern to our people and their Government. - -Speaking of the claim made by Lord Salisbury that this doctrine had no -place in international law, it was said in the message: “The Monroe -Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law -which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights -protected and its just claims enforced.” - -Referring to the request contained in Mr. Olney’s despatch that the -entire boundary controversy be submitted to arbitration, the following -language was used: - - It will be seen from the correspondence herewith submitted that - this proposition has been declined by the British Government - upon grounds which in the circumstances seem to me to be far - from satisfactory. It is deeply disappointing that such an - appeal, actuated by the most friendly feelings toward both - nations directly concerned, addressed to the sense of justice - and to the magnanimity of one of the great powers of the world, - and touching its relations to one comparatively weak and small, - should have produced no better results. - - The course to be pursued by this Government in view of the - present condition does not appear to admit of serious doubt. - Having labored faithfully for many years to induce Great - Britain to submit their dispute to impartial arbitration, and - having been finally apprised of her refusal to do so, nothing - remains but to accept the situation, to recognize its plain - requirements, and deal with it accordingly. Great Britain’s - present proposition has never thus far been regarded as - admissible by Venezuela, though any adjustment of the boundary - which that country may deem for her advantage and may enter - into of her own free will cannot, of course, be objected to - by the United States. Assuming, however, that the attitude of - Venezuela will remain unchanged, the dispute has reached such - a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United States to - take measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its - justification what is the true divisional line between the - Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana. The inquiry to that - end should, of course, be conducted carefully and judicially; - and due weight should be given to all available evidence, - records, and facts in support of the claims of both parties. - -After recommending to the Congress an adequate appropriation to -meet the expense of a commission which should make the suggested -investigation and report thereon with the least possible delay, the -President concluded his message as follows: - - When such report is made and accepted, it will, in my opinion, - be the duty of the United States to resist by every means - in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and - interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or - the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory - which after investigation we have determined of right belongs - to Venezuela. - - In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the - responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the - consequences that may follow. - - I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that while it is a - grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking - peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly - competitors in the onward march of civilization, and strenuous - and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no - calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that - which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice, and - the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath - which are shielded and defended a people’s safety and greatness. - -The recommendations contained in this message were acted upon with -such promptness and unanimity that on the twenty-first day of -December, 1895, four days after they were submitted, a law was passed -by the Congress authorizing the President to appoint a commission -“to investigate and report upon the true divisional line between -the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana,” and making an ample -appropriation to meet the expenses of its work. - -On the first day of January, 1896, five of our most able and -distinguished citizens were selected to constitute the commission; and -they immediately entered upon their investigation. At the outset of -their labors, and on the fifteenth day of January, 1896, the president -of the commission suggested to Mr. Olney the expediency of calling -the attention of the Governments of Great Britain and Venezuela to -the appointment of the commission, adding: “It may be that they would -see a way entirely consistent with their own sense of international -propriety to give the Commission the aid that it is no doubt in -their power to furnish in the way of documentary proof, historical -narrative, unpublished archives, or the like.” This suggestion, on its -presentation to the Government of Great Britain, was met by a most -courteous and willing offer to supply to our commission every means -of information touching the subject of their investigation which was -within the reach of the English authorities; and at all times during -the labors of the commission this offer was cheerfully fulfilled. - -In the meantime, and as early as February, 1896, the question of -submitting the Venezuelan boundary dispute to mutual arbitration was -again agitated between the United States and Great Britain. - -Our ambassador to England, in a note to Lord Salisbury, dated February -27, 1896, after speaking of such arbitration as seeming to be “almost -unanimously desired by both the United States and Great Britain,” -proposed, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, “an -entrance forthwith upon negotiations at Washington to effect this -purpose, and that Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Washington should be -empowered to discuss the question at that capital with the Secretary -of State.” He also requested that a definition should be given of -“settlements” in the disputed territory which it was understood her -Majesty’s Government desired should be excluded from the proposed -submission to arbitration. - -Lord Salisbury, in his reply to this note, dated March 3, 1896, said: - - The communications which have already passed between Her - Majesty’s Government and that of the United States have made - you acquainted with the desire of Her Majesty’s Government to - bring the difference between themselves and the Republic of - Venezuela to an equitable settlement. They therefore readily - concur in the suggestion that negotiations for this purpose - should be opened at Washington without unnecessary delay. I - have accordingly empowered Sir Julian Pauncefote to discuss the - question either with the representative of Venezuela or with - the Government of the United States acting as the friend of - Venezuela. - -With this transfer of treaty negotiations to Washington, Mr. Olney -and Sir Julian Pauncefote, the ambassador of Great Britain to this -country, industriously addressed themselves to the subject. The -insistence of Great Britain that her title to the territory within -the Schomburgk line should not be questioned, was no longer placed by -her in the way of submitting the rights of the parties in the entire -disputed territory to arbitration. She still insisted, however, that -English settlers long in the occupancy of any of the territory in -controversy, supposing it to be under British dominion, should have -their rights scrupulously considered. Any difference of view that -arose from this proposition was adjusted without serious difficulty, -by agreeing that adverse holding or prescription during a period of -fifty years should make a good title, and that the arbitrators might -deem exclusive political control of a district, as well as actual -settlement, sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to make title -by prescription. - -On the 10th of November, 1896, Mr. Olney addressed a note to the -president of the commission which had been appointed to investigate -the boundary question on behalf of our Government, in which he said: -“The United States and Great Britain are in entire accord as to the -provisions of a proposed treaty between Great Britain and Venezuela. -The treaty is so eminently just and fair as respects both parties--so -thoroughly protects the rights and claims of Venezuela--that I cannot -conceive of its not being approved by the Venezuelan President and -Congress. It is thoroughly approved by the counsel of Venezuela here -and by the Venezuelan Minister at this Capital.” In view of these -conditions he suggested a suspension of the work of the commission. - -The treaty was signed at Washington by the representatives of Great -Britain and Venezuela on the second day of February, 1897. No part of -the territory in dispute was reserved from the arbitration it created. -It was distinctly made the duty of those appointed to carry out its -provisions, “to determine the boundary-line between the Colony of -British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela.” - -The fact must not be overlooked that, notwithstanding this treaty -was promoted and negotiated by the officers of our Government, the -parties to it were Great Britain and Venezuela. This was a fortunate -circumstance, inasmuch as the work accomplished was thus saved from -the risk of customary disfigurement at the hands of the United States -Senate. - -The arbitrators began their labors in the city of Paris in January, -1899, and made their award on the third day of October in the same year. - -The line they determined upon as the boundary-line between the two -countries begins in the coast at a point considerably south and east of -the mouth of the Orinoco River, thus giving to Venezuela the absolute -control of that important waterway, and awarding to her valuable -territory near it. Running inland, the line is so located as to give -to Venezuela quite a considerable section of territory within the -Schomburgk line. This results not only in the utter denial of Great -Britain’s claim to any territory lying beyond the Schomburgk line, but -also in the award to Venezuela of a part of the territory which for a -long time England had claimed to be so clearly hers that she would not -consent to submit it to arbitration. - -Thus, we have made a laborious and patient journey through the -incidents of a long dispute, to find at last a peaceful rest. As -we look back over the road we have traversed, and view again the -incidents we have passed on our way, some may be surprised that this -controversy was so long chronic, and yet, in the end, yielded so easily -to pronounced treatment. I know that occasionally some Americans -of a certain sort, who were quite un-American when the difficulty -was pending, have been very fond of lauding the extreme forbearance -and kindness of England toward us in our so-called belligerent and -ill-advised assertion of American principle. Those to whom this is a -satisfaction are quite welcome to it. - -My own surprise and disappointment have arisen more from the honest -misunderstanding and the dishonest and insincere misrepresentation, on -the part of many of our people, regarding the motives and purposes of -the interference of the Government of the United States in this affair. -Some conceited and doggedly mistaken critics have said that it was -dreadful for us to invite war for the sake of a people unworthy of our -consideration, and for the purpose of protecting their possession of -land not worth possessing. It is certainly strange that any intelligent -citizen, professing information on public affairs, could fail to see -that when we aggressively interposed in this controversy it was -because it was necessary in order to assert and vindicate a principle -distinctively American, and in the maintenance of which the people -and Government of the United States were profoundly concerned. It was -because this principle was endangered, and because those charged with -administrative responsibility would not abandon or neglect it, that our -Government interposed to prevent any further colonization of American -soil by a European nation. In these circumstances neither the character -of the people claiming the soil as against Great Britain, nor the value -of the lands in dispute, was of the least consequence to us; nor did -it in the least concern us which of the two contestants had the best -title to any part of the disputed territory, so long as England did not -possess and colonize more than belonged to her--however much or however -little that might be. But we needed proof of the limits of her rights -in order to determine our duty in defense of our Monroe Doctrine; -and we sought to obtain such proof, and to secure peace, through -arbitration. - -But those among us who most loudly reprehended and bewailed our -vigorous assertion of the Monroe Doctrine were the timid ones who -feared personal financial loss, or those engaged in speculation -and stock-gambling, in buying much beyond their ability to pay, and -generally in living by their wits. The patriotism of such people -traverses exclusively the pocket nerve. They are willing to tolerate -the Monroe Doctrine, or any other patriotic principle, so long as it -does not interfere with their plans, and are just as willing to cast it -off when it becomes troublesome. - -But these things are as nothing when weighed against the sublime -patriotism and devotion to their nation’s honor exhibited by the great -mass of our countrymen--the plain people of the land. Though, in case -of the last extremity, the chances and suffering of conflict would have -fallen to their lot, nothing blinded them to the manner in which the -integrity of their country was involved. Not for a single moment did -their Government know the lack of their strong and stalwart support. - -I hope there are but few of our fellow-citizens who, in retrospect, -do not now acknowledge the good that has come to our nation through -this episode in our history. It has established the Monroe Doctrine -on lasting foundations before the eyes of the world; it has given us -a better place in the respect and consideration of the people of all -nations, and especially of Great Britain; it has again confirmed -our confidence in the overwhelming prevalence among our citizens of -disinterested devotion to American honor; and last, but by no means -least, it has taught us where to look in the ranks of our countrymen -for the best patriotism. - - -[Transcriber's Note: - -Page 101, ‘yourself, Walker, and marshal should confer’ changed to read -‘yourself, Walker, and the marshal should confer’. - -Obvious printer errors corrected silently. - -Inconsistent spelling and hyphenation are as in the original.] - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Presidential Problems, by Grover Cleveland - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PRESIDENTIAL PROBLEMS *** - -***** This file should be named 56060-0.txt or 56060-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/6/0/6/56060/ - -Produced by Wayne Hammond and The Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - |